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Theory: Conversion in United States and Some Implications for USSR
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[Article by Valeriy Yevgenyevich Khrutskiy, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] The problems we are encountering in the conversion of military production, the insufficient planning of priorities and mechanisms for the respecialization of enterprises, and the flaws in the theory elaborated by the union government and central administrative bodies all compel us to take a closer look at foreign, primarily American, experience. It turns out that the USSR and the United States have many more problems in common in this process than differences stemming from their different economic systems.

Scales of Conversion

In the next 3-5 years, there will be substantial cuts in the U.S. military budget. American experts have cited different figures, and the level of military expenditures will depend on the general political climate in the world. There is the assumption, however, that the scales of the projected conversion will be quite broad.

According to the military spending plans of defense secretaries C. Weinberger and F. Carlucci, the total Defense Department budget for fiscal years 1990-1994 was to amount to 1.943 trillion dollars and 1.713 trillion respectively; according to R. Cheney's budget plans, it will be 1.666 trillion. The actual cuts, however, could be even more sizable. On 19 June 1990 Cheney submitted official proposals to the congressional leadership on the possible reduction of U.S. armed forces by 25 percent in the next 5 years.

The closure of 72 military installations, including production facilities (for example, the large shipyard in Philadelphia), and the cancellation of funding for some military programs have already been set as immediate goals.

The first reports of cuts in military spending affected the state of the economy. Above all, the reduction of appropriations for military programs will mean the loss of large future contracts for defense-oriented companies, the dramatic decline of their financial status, and the growth of their short-term indebtedness. Stock exchanges in the United States reacted accordingly. The stocks of some military-industrial firms fell 30-40 percent between February 1989 and February 1990. This kind of dramatic decline could have a negative effect on the state of the entire U.S. economy.

Another negative consequence of the cuts in military spending is the growth of unemployment in regions where military installations are located. Bank of America experts have estimated that cuts in national military spending will mean the loss of 200,000 jobs in the state of California alone by 1994.

Peace Dividend of Conversion

All of the difficulties connected with conversion do not, however, mean that it should not be carried out or that it will not benefit the economy in certain ways. As economist Larry Butler from Southern California Edison, a research organization, said, even if all of the discharged servicemen should have to go to work at McDonald's, this will ultimately be of greater benefit to the U.S. economy than keeping them in the service, because the productivity of their labor will finally rise above zero. In fact, however efficient the production of military equipment might be, it chips away at national well-being instead of enhancing it. For this reason, any cuts in military appropriations will promote quicker economic growth. What kind of benefits will be derived from the cuts in military appropriations? What will the so-called "peace dividend" of conversion be? The reduction of military spending in the USSR and the United States could free the following types of resources:

- additional state budget income; in the case of the United States it would also reduce the cost of financing the public debt as the budget deficit decreases;
- buildings, installations, and enterprises not used for production (military bases, hospitals, radar stations, etc.);
- the production capacities where military requisitions were previously filled;
- the manpower of enterprises previously working on military contracts.

The USSR and United States will have to find the most effective ways of using these resources during the conversion process. Experience has shown that the respecialization of enterprises and military installations not used for production and the retraining of personnel will require sizable expenditures, and sources of these funds should therefore be found first.

The work on military programs includes important research and development projects, the results of which (especially those connected with basic research and with the development of fundamentally new technologies) could contribute to economic growth and the enhancement of competitiveness. For this reason, accumulated potential in the R & D sphere must not be allowed to diminish during the conversion process but must be put to commercial use as quickly as possible. Otherwise, it might seem that the short-term benefits of conversion will be replaced by big losses in the future. Finally, we must also remember that if the defensive potential of one side is weakened too quickly, this could have a negative effect on the mutual security of both countries. When the superpowers set conversion priorities, they should be guided by the following criteria:
the development (by means of retooling and large capital investments) of the most backward sectors of the country's economy;

the stimulation of business activity and the creation of a favorable climate for higher investments in production modernization;

the prevention of the substantial growth of unemployment;

the preservation and augmentation of the technological potential accumulated in the military sphere;

the consolidation of the competitiveness of industry in world markets (for the United States) and the dramatic augmentation of export potential with the use of the now only comparative advantages in competition (for the USSR);

the consolidation of defensive capabilities and mobilization potential through the more effective use of non-military factors.

Let us take a look at the priorities of conversion in the United States and the USSR. In the United States these criteria apply to branches of the infrastructure. According to many American experts, the stepped-up development of these should be the highest priority of military conversion in the United States. The infrastructure is the group of branches whose development presupposes the renovation of highways, bridges, and waste recycling systems, the retooling of utilities, and the development of modern communication systems, monitoring and testing equipment in the sphere of environmental protection and energy conservation, etc. The development of the infrastructure also presupposes higher expenditures on education and public health and on environmental protection, which will ultimately contribute to the expanded reproduction of high-quality manpower. Why is the development of the infrastructure a priority field of conversion in the United States?

1) Branches of the infrastructure in many parts of the United States are the most neglected sphere of the economy. The situation became particularly critical in the last 10 years. Proportional expenditures on highway construction and repair, public transport, water management, and waste management decreased from 2.3 percent of the country's GNP in 1978 to 1 percent in 1988. Whereas the capital-labor ratio in the private sector of the American economy is constantly rising (including the service sphere), it is decreasing in branches of the infrastructure, concentrated mainly in the public sector, because capital investments in this sphere amount to no more than half of total investments in the private sector.\(^5\) The growth of the U.S. population, however, puts increasing pressure on the service branches of the infrastructure, and the relatively low capital-labor ratio will allow for the creation of enough jobs to compensate for losses due to cuts in military spending.

2) Higher capital investments in the infrastructure will stimulate business activity and enhance the competitiveness of American companies. Experts from the Federal Reserve Bank in Chicago have found a close connection (a statistically significant correlation) between the rise in capital investments in the infrastructure and the rise in labor productivity in the entire economy.

3) American experts expect the development of branches of the infrastructure to augment the country's export potential. According to the data of the Small Business Administration, the following branches of the American economy have the greatest export potential: the production of computers and related equipment, telecommunications equipment, computer software, medical equipment and instruments, electronic components. These branches are connected with the development and technical equipping of a modern infrastructure. Furthermore, many companies in these branches are now among the leading Defense Department contractors. The respecialization of their production facilities for civilian production could broaden export capabilities considerably.

4) Many American defense-oriented companies have, first of all, considerable technological potential for the production of equipment needed in the retooling of branches of the infrastructure (telecommunications and navigation equipment and electronic components and instruments); second, their enterprises cannot be respecialized for the production of anything outside their specialty; third, the operating conditions of these companies during work on federal contracts for the development of weapons systems are devoid of the pressure of market price competition and will complicate their adaptation to conditions in the commercial market during the conversion process. For this reason, the redirection of a portion of military expenditures into the development of the infrastructure will allow defense-oriented firms to make the transition to civilian production without changing their structure of economic management.

These factors are what make the infrastructure one of the highest priority fields of conversion. Furthermore, American experts who have analyzed the priorities in the respecialization of the production capacities made available by conversion have commented on the ineffectiveness of their use for consumer goods production. Calculations indicate that if the production volume of defense enterprises is reduced by 5 percent, the increase in consumer goods production here is not likely to exceed 3 percent (in cost terms).\(^6\)

This lack of balance could cause serious long-term disparities in the economy (the underloading of production capacities and a simultaneous rise in inflation and unemployment). Why will there be difficulty in respecializing defense-oriented enterprises for consumer goods production?
The methods of production organization and technology in the military sphere were geared to small-series production from the beginning. Special attachments and accessories are an important part of this process. Respecializing these enterprises for the mass production of consumer goods would be extremely ineffective and inadvisable.

The quality control systems are designed to secure the kind of final characteristics that will be necessary only in extreme conditions and are not necessary in the consumer market. In the experience of the federal contract system of the United States, there were cases in the 1980s when coffee pots and airplane seats were made for the Defense Department at a cost of several thousand dollars. At that time the American press had much to say about the abuses of military contractors, but when companies working for the commercial market offered to produce the same items, with the same technical characteristics, these firms set a price exceeding the price of the military contractor by 30-40 percent. The requirements for the reliable operation of these products in extreme conditions were that high. Consumers in the commercial market, however, do not expect to use products in extreme conditions, and items meeting the specifications of military production are therefore unlikely to be in mass demand in the consumer market.

The economic mechanism of the federal contract system, the distribution of contracts primarily on the basis of direct negotiations between the client and the contractor, the extremely weak mechanisms of market price competition, and the authority of the monopoly producer (this producer owns the R & D results on which the weapons system is based, and for this reason no other company can compete with it in the production or delivery of the item) all make defense-oriented enterprises unsuitable for operations in the consumer market, most of which has already been divided up among the companies traditionally operating in this sphere. Adapting to the new conditions of economic operations will take time and substantial financial resources. During the period of respecialization, the enterprises could be on the verge of bankruptcy and their products will not be competitive.

The federal contract system does little to stimulate the constant reduction of production expenditures. Almost all contracts in the military sphere reimburse the contractor for the actual cost of production, which often includes part of the cost of R & D projects of earlier years and the overhead costs of the contracted work.

It appears that the people who planned the conversion process in the USSR and set the priorities for enterprise respecialization were unaware of these facts. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain why they expected conversion to correct shortages in our consumer market through the development or augmentation of consumer goods production at our defense plants. The conditions for this do not exist here. Even the enterprises that did produce sports equipment or pots and pans were using the waste products of their main production processes.

The manufacture of these items was work for a specific niche of the market where defense plants had certain advantages. An analysis of the experience of U.S. enterprises geared to specific niches of the market indicates that these operations are justified only when the capacity of the "niche" does not exceed 1-2 million dollars. For this reason, large plants usually cannot operate effectively under these conditions.

During the conversion of military production in the USSR, defense enterprises will be expected to turn their auxiliary operations into their main field of economic activity, even though the conditions for this do not exist. Making cookware and bicycles out of waste products is not the same as making them out of high-quality raw materials and semimanufactured goods. Furthermore, the increase in the gross output of relatively cheap consumer goods (even by several dozen times in comparison with the earlier level—i.e., by tens of millions of rubles) cannot compensate for the reduction of total production volume as a result of cuts in military requirements (by hundreds of millions of rubles). This will also reduce the wage fund. The only way of avoiding the abrupt decline of profits and the income of personnel is an artificial rise in the prices of the products. In view of the projected state aid for our defense industry, the output of consumer goods will not fill the consumer market (this will take years), but will lead to higher inflation.

This is why American experts are warning the U.S. Administration not to repeat the mistakes of the USSR officials who reoriented defense enterprises toward the production of consumer goods. This approach, in their opinion, will reduce American industrial strength and diminish the competitiveness of the products of American industrial firms.

Another area of conversion in the USSR—the respecialization of defense enterprises for the production of equipment for light industry and the food industry—is also unproductive. According to the most optimistic estimates, it will take 5-7 years to develop this field and to produce this kind of equipment, which is unfamiliar to most of our defense plants, in sufficient quantities. Of course, within 5 years this equipment will already be highly inferior to its foreign counterparts. Efforts to patch up holes in our economy now prevail in our conversion plans instead of a search for ways of restructuring industry.

A different approach would be more effective: the respecialization of defense industry enterprises for the production of items with no counterparts in world markets and the creation of fundamentally new sales markets, where items and technologies based on the results of large-scale R & D projects, basic research and pioneer development projects intended for the military sphere, would be sold. This type of conversion would not only allow defense industry enterprises to retain their scientific, technical, and personnel potential, but would also compensate them much more for the economic losses
connected with cuts in military spending. The consumer market can be filled more quickly and efficiently with imports. After all, the sale of one plane in the foreign market and the use of the foreign currency receipts to pay for imports of clothing, footwear, and other consumer items from Hong Kong or South Korea would produce 30-50 times as many consumer goods (even in the 1990 prices of our domestic market) per ruble of wages paid to the personnel of our aviation industry than the mastery of the mass production of pots and pans or kitchen appliances at the same plants.

It is not only finished goods, but also the components of high-technology products made by Soviet defense plants that could produce a much greater economic impact than their respecialization for consumer goods production. The Ferrit Scientific Production Association in Leningrad was prepared to ship 10 million ferrite cores to China each year at 10 cents each (their price in the domestic market of the USSR is 10 kopecks). For the 1 million dollars in receipts, consumer goods worth 40-50 million rubles (in the prices of the domestic Soviet market in 1990) could have been bought in China. As a result, each ruble of wages could have meant an increase of more than 100 rubles in consumer goods. This is how high the price of unique, high-quality, high-technology products is in the international market.

In this way the domestic consumer market in the Soviet Union could be filled more quickly and, what is most important, without a higher rate of inflation. Conversion in our country should be aimed not at patching up holes in the economy, but at effective participation in international division of labor on the basis of the unique scientific, technical, and personnel potential the Soviet defense industry still has. In essence, conversion is the USSR's only chance of enhancing the competitiveness and effectiveness of industrial production. The clear emphasis on immediate benefits in earlier and current conversion plans, on the other hand, is a sure way of losing this chance. In particular, the Ferrit transaction could not take place because of the opposition of union ministries.

**Possibilities for Production Diversification**

Changing the orientation of defense enterprises, in the sectorial or production sense, and the dismissal of their accumulated technological experience might be the most undesirable element of conversion and should be avoided as much as possible.

The experience of the United States after World War II, just as the experience of France after the end of the colonial war in Algeria, proved that much of the technological equipment of military enterprises could not be respecialized for civilian needs. Many of the machine tools used in the production of military equipment are simply useless in the production of goods for civilian use. The layout of technological equipment in these enterprises is also the exact opposite of the one needed for the commercial market. The composition of manpower differs significantly from that of enterprises producing civilian goods. For this reason, the most valid proposal would seem to be that of the American experts who believe that enterprises which cannot respecialize their specialty in the commercial market should be liquidated.

There could be different varieties of liquidation:
- the demolition of all buildings and installations and the clearing of the lots (keeping part of the infrastructure) for new industrial construction;
- the sale of various pieces of technological equipment and inventory;
- the leasing or sale of the buildings and installations of former military enterprises and non-production facilities to private individuals and local government agencies.

When World War II was coming to an end, the U.S. Government already had to form groups of highly skilled engineers to solve purely technological problems of conversion by analyzing the situation at each specific enterprise and suggesting what might be done with its production capacities. Of course, directive assignments and stipulations of conversion priorities and the product assortment handed down from above, as in the USSR, were out of the question. This, according to American experts, dooms conversion to failure from the very beginning and deprives the society of the chance to earn the "peace dividend."

The establishment of the so-called military-industrial complex in the U.S. economy in the postwar period, in which the enterprises were designed, built, and equipped for the production of military hardware, essentially faced the defense-oriented companies with the problem of dealing with cuts in military spending not by respecializing production capacities, but by diversifying production, which entails substantial changes in the economic structure of companies (the composition of enterprises and organizations) and their market orientation.

There are three separate groups of defense-oriented enterprises and firms in the United States today with considerably diverging conditions and methods of conversion:

Enterprises and firms where production capacities and the economic structure cannot be respecialized for civilian production for technical and economic reasons: When military expenditures are cut, these enterprises will be liquidated or will acquire completely different sectorial and market specialties. Above all, this is true of enterprises of the shipbuilding industry. In 1986 military contracts accounted for more 94 percent of their work, and in terms of overhead costs, these enterprises had no chance of competing with firms in South Korea and Japan.

Companies where part of the production capacities could be respecialized for civilian production: These
companies could retain their sectorial and market orientation after the partial diversification of production through the acquisition of existing enterprises, the development of new production capacities, and the modification of the product assortment. These include, for example, the companies of the aircraft industry. Whereas the technical reasons for the liquidation (sale or demolition) of part of the production capacities in the aircraft industry are the same as at enterprises of the first group—for example, the abundance of special attachments and accessories—the economic factors are different. After military expenditures have been cut and contracts for the development of new aircraft are no longer awarded, there will be no commercial market comparable in size to the market for Defense Department requisitions. According to available data, the projected cuts in military spending could reduce production volume at these enterprises by 70 percent. This means that 7 out of every 10 current producers of aviation equipment in the United States will have to be liquidated or find new specialties in other industries.

In spite of all this, technological factors are the main impediments to the respecialization of enterprises in the aircraft industry. According to a study by the well-known McKenzie consulting firm, enterprises of the General Dynamics corporation cannot be respecialized for the commercial market. The more highly involved a corporation is in the military business, the more difficult its respecialization will be.

Enterprises producing or capable of producing dual-purpose items—for military or civilian use—but working only on military contracts for a number of reasons: Their respecialization could be accomplished by the diversification of production, the development of new markets, and the modification of the product assortment. These companies are mainly in the electronics industry and instrument building.

The two last groups of enterprises and firms have something in common—the technological, production, organizational, and economic prerequisites for diversification and the development of branches of the infrastructure. The only possibility for the respecialization of aircraft enterprises working on military contracts without a change in their sectorial and market orientation, which would also mean the fewest changes in the technology and organization of production, is a move to the production of planes for civil aviation and participation in the re-equipping of airports. Today many of the leading Defense Department contractors (Lockheed, Northrop, Boeing, Grumman, and McDonnell Douglas) are working on new types of civilian aircraft. Boeing is developing a new Airbus model. The company has considerable experience in this area. Many aircraft companies also have other technological capabilities for the production of items for infrastructural development. Northrop, according to experts, could begin producing items for infrastructural development on federal contracts (particularly fuel-efficient buses, express freight delivery, etc.). What is particularly important is not merely the development of the infrastructure, but the use of the scientific and technical potential of the military sphere in this area. For this reason, the most effective plan would entail the development of high-technology production (state-of-the-art communication systems and high-speed public and passenger transport). Lockheed intends to diversify its production of space systems. Another company in this industry, Martin Marietta, already has sizable production capacities working for the commercial market and plans to invest additional resources in these. Military electronics enterprises could also become involved in the establishment of a modern infrastructure, particularly communication systems. Telecommunications equipment for commercial use represents 50 percent of the production volume of one Defense Department contractor, California Microwave. This company could respecialize its production capacities for a non-military output effectively because it already has experience working for the commercial market in its own specialty. It is true that the company's equipment intended for the commercial market was used in its work on military contracts, and the diversification of production will therefore not be as difficult for it as for other military companies.

For many electronics firms there was no commercial market at all just 10 years ago. Telecommunications equipment, for example, was only produced on contracts from the Defense Department at the end of the 1970s because there were few clients in the commercial market.

Raytheon hopes to diversify its production by replacing the defense-related electronics in its output with energy-saving equipment and fuel-monitoring devices. Raytheon is already operating successfully in many civilian markets (components and parts for civil aviation, the construction industry, and the machine tool industry).

Watkins-Johnson and Westinghouse Electric, leading producers of electronics for military use, are now engaged in the diversification of their production and a transfer to the manufacture of civilian items. These companies have considerable technological potential and their own development projects and are now trying to find a use for them in the civilian sector. For the electronics industry, a move from the production of military products to civilian production by simply changing the product assortment and finding new sales markets is completely possible because many of its products are dual-purpose items. The electronics industry has more opportunities to create new markets by incorporating fundamentally new technologies in production (through the development of new types of instruments and equipment), and the transfer of technology from the military to the civilian sphere is also much simpler in this industry than in other, more capital-intensive industries. Investments in production based on its own patents are recouped in 5-7 years on the average, and today fundamentally new types of electronic components and technologies are put into series production every 9 months or so on the average.
An analysis of processes occurring in the conversion of U.S. military production confirms the priorities of re-specialization—the stepped-up development of high-technology branches of industry whose products will be competitive in world markets. Exports of these products must be used to solve problems in the USSR's consumer market. We must strive for the maximum retention of the basic production specialty in converted enterprises of the defense industry.

We must also realize that in many cases it will be more convenient to close (or liquidate) enterprises and sell their equipment instead of re-specializing them for the production of new civilian items, because the purely technological incompatibility of military and civilian production is more pronounced than most people believe.

Footnotes

1. Valeriy Yevgenyevich Khrutskiy is a candidate of economic sciences and a senior scientific associate at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies.
2. PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, 23 April 1990.
4. SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1 April 1990.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.


Practice: Conversion of Ural Transport Machine-Building Plant

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[Interview with Yuri Filippovich Butrinny, chief engineer of Uraltransmash Production Association, by Y.Ye. Khrutskiy, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies in Sverdlovsk]

[Text] Khrutskiy] Today conversion is being discussed by specialists and laymen in our country and abroad, and people are arguing about what conversion means. Columbia University Professor S. Melman believes that this is the complete re-specialization of enterprises in the military industry for the production of civilian goods. Partial re-specialization, according to him, is not conversion, but merely the diversification of production. Yuri Filippovich, what will conversion entail at your enterprise?

[Butrinny] Our plant in Sverdlovsk is one of the largest defense industry enterprises. It specializes mainly in the production of self-propelled artillery mounts, including the most powerful mortar in the world. In the last 10-12 years, however, the plant has been quickly augmenting the output of civilian goods and turning into a diversified enterprise. This process has been particularly intense in the last 2 years, following the decision to carry out conversion in the USSR.

Today military equipment still accounts for most of the gross product in cost terms. Consumer goods (athletic equipment, furniture accessories, and prefabricated garages) represent no more than 14 percent of the total. Conversion will not only change this ratio in the future by reducing the proportional amount of military items, but will also create new opportunities for the resolution of socioeconomic problems at the enterprise.

In our plant conversion will entail, first of all, the reduction of military output (the output of military equipment decreased by 40 percent in natural terms between 1988 and 1990), second, the re-specialization of part of the production capacities, including new buildings originally intended for military production, and third, the development of fundamentally new types of production with our own development fund, centralized capital investments, and funds from other outside sources. The existing industrial infrastructure, lots cleared for new construction, and existing skilled personnel will be used in this process.

[Khrutskiy] Our press is constantly reporting the thoughtless squandering of the technological, production, and personnel potential of defense enterprises: They are producing baby carriages instead of missiles and aluminum cookware instead of airplanes. An analysis of the foreign experience in conversion, especially in large diversified enterprises, indicates that even their potential for the effective and economically justified production of civilian goods is extremely limited.

After capacities are freed, it is not that simple to reload them. If we wish to develop world-class competitive production at an enterprise, we must take the following factors into consideration during the choice of conversion priorities: accumulated production experience and the possibility of using existing technological and organizational patterns and structures; the technological compatibility of new items with basic (military) production and previously mastered areas of civilian production; the export potential of new items and the possibilities for the enterprise's effective participation in international division of labor; the retention of skilled personnel and the validity of chosen priorities from the standpoint of the resolution of social problems; the enhancement of the overall profitability of production; the impermissibility of lowering the overall scientific and technical level of the enterprise.

In essence, the need to consider these factors is dictated more by general trends in the development and diversification of production (as the experience of Japanese firms has shown) than by mere examples of effective conversion.
Besides this, in view of all the discussion of the transition to the market in our country, the conversion experience and the mastery of the production of new items will primarily require marketing skills from managers and specialists and the ability to work under different conditions of economic management. This will allow for the better preparation of an enterprise for market-based operations. How are things going at the Ural Transport Machine-Building Plant in this respect?

[Butryn] We have been trying to convert basic production and respecialize new production capacities with a view to these factors. The technological specialties of the enterprise are precision casting (steel, pig iron, and aluminum), metal working (all-purpose machine tools and machines with numerical programming), laser machining and cutting, and deposition. Let us consider the development of consumer goods production. Like any other diversified enterprise, the Ural plant is trying to increase the output of goods distinguished by stable demand and a large market.

This applies, for example, to the Zdorovye athletic work-out machines of our own unique design. They cost 200 rubles and can be used for various athletic exercises at home or at work. The machine is collapsible and can be hung on the wall, where it only takes up 0.2 square meters of space. In terms of functional possibilities, it has no close analogues in our country. The demand for it is far in excess of the supply. Today the plant produces around 20,000 exercise machines a year, but the projected demand in the domestic market alone has been estimated at 40,000-50,000. In the future we plan to add a set of children’s attachments to the machine (rope, rings, punching bag, etc.), as well as new equipment for adults (stairs-climbing simulators), to make the machine something for the whole family.

In strict accordance with world trends in effective diversification, the plant is making preparations for the production of upholstered furniture with metal frames and will strive to use accumulated experience and technological expertise in a promising new market. Many technological designs tested in the manufacture of the exercise machines could be used in the production of this furniture. Furthermore, the enterprise has some experience in producing sewing goods (backpacks for campers), furniture accessories (the plant produces 6 million coils a year for a sum of 6 million rubles), and special retractable brackets for clothes closets (400,000 a year).

A new plant building originally intended for military production will be used for the production of upholstered furniture. In the future we also plan to make modular furniture here and begin producing sets of furniture of the “room group” type.

Conversion will allow the enterprise to step up the rate of diversification dramatically: Furniture worth 20 million rubles is to be produced in the new building. The plant intends to invest 4.5 million rubles of its own money from the development fund in furniture production. These expenditures, however, will be recouped quickly. The furniture market in our country is quite large, and the demand for furniture has not been satisfied. The enterprise expects to produce the first pieces of furniture in 1991 and 1992. Projected capacity—5,000 sets of furniture a year—should be reached by 1993-1994.

In addition to producing furniture and athletic equipment, the plant intends to increase the output of other consumer goods compatible in the technological sense to basic production or the consumer goods production we have already mastered. These will be prefabricated garages for motor vehicles (costing 800 rubles and produced at a rate of 4,000 a year), reinforced frames and panels for hothouses and greenhouses (primarily glass) measuring 3 x 6 meters, with the possibility of modular expansion, exercycles costing 200 rubles (among the cheapest in the country), and trailers for automobiles.

[Khrutskiy] The augmentation of this output could not fully compensate the enterprise for the losses resulting from reduced orders for military equipment.

[Butryn] Of course not, and this is why we are still placing most of our hope in the conversion sphere on the production of civilian goods to be used in production. The main thing here will be the civilian use of the technologies and designs previously used in the production of military equipment. The best option here, as analysis has indicated, is an emphasis on high-technology items (on a level no lower than military equipment, and in all probability even higher) which are highly specialized and have no counterparts in the market. One of these designs calls for the use of the chassis of the 2c3m self-propelled artillery mount, which is no longer being produced, in a specialized vehicle for rescue operations in earthquake zones and the sites of major accidents and natural disasters. The vehicle would be a caterpillar-tracked crane with a lifting capacity of 16 tons with possible augmentation up to 25 tons, equipped with a bulldozer blade, compressors with pneumatic drills and equipment to supply air to people trapped in landslides or under ruins, oxyacetylene and arc welding equipment, water pumps, and a winch capable of pulling up to 100 tons. The total weight of the vehicle will be 52 tons, which means that it can be taken to disaster zones by plane. This kind of vehicle could also be used in logging operations. It has aroused the interest of railroad men looking for new equipment for their repair trains. The price has been set at 250,000 rubles (not counting the cost of making the cab more comfortable). The plant plans to produce 100 of these vehicles a year. There is nothing like this on the market. Besides this, two of these chassis could be used to build a heavy-duty model.

[Khrutskiy] In a recent conversation with American businessman A. Fine, a retired admiral, I learned that his firm sells much less complex vehicles for more than 200,000 dollars each.
Another direction conversion could take in this sphere is the development of specialized technological equipment (using three artillery mount chassis) for the mining industry. This would be a unique and unparalleled complex for working small seams in salt mines with high precision and efficiency. The price of this complex would be somewhere between 300,000 and 1 million rubles.

What are the advantages of this approach to conversion, to the use of the basic military technology for civilian purposes? One is the technological compatibility of the civilian items with the earlier military products, but there is also the matter of the market for which the enterprise will have to work, and the economic environment here has features in common with military production—small-series production, a lengthy manufacturing cycle, and large quantities of special attachments and accessories. These circumstances will do much to simplify conversion and make it economically effective. The priorities the Ural plant has set could also expand the enterprise's foreign economic operations. Which forms of cooperation with foreign partners would be best?

Our contacts with foreign partners are being broadened. We have an export license. It is not simply that the enterprise has become open and more accessible to foreign businessmen, although this is certainly important. The main thing is that now we can use our advantages to heighten the competitiveness of products and augment exports. What can the plant offer foreign partners and investors during the conversion process? Items which could be exported for hard currency or on a compensatory basis; barter transactions (resources and non-liquid assets); items with no counterparts and with an original manufacturing technology; areas for new industrial construction, equipped with the rudiments of the infrastructure and ready for the establishment of new production capacities and new enterprises.

The main ways of organizing foreign economic operations by the enterprise are the following: the development of cooperative ties and the formation of joint ventures for the use of the production capacities made available or the improvement of existing technology to meet world standards; the organization of large joint investment projects; the invitation of foreign partners to serve as middlemen in the augmentation of export potential. Let us consider the problem of renewing our cooperative ties. The successful development of the production of some items, especially furniture, requires the organization of a system of cooperative deliveries with foreign partners. Because of the shortage of upholstery material in our economy, we decided to attract partners from China. Protocols of intention have already been signed and samples of Chinese furniture fabric have been received. The Chinese side is willing to ship us its products in exchange for finished items, and this will be particularly convenient for the enterprise in the economic sense. The Chinese furniture market is far from saturated, and the plant has good prospects for the sale of its products there so that the necessary material can be obtained to increase deliveries to the domestic market. The Chinese side is also interested in barter transactions.

Cooperation with foreign firms is also necessary to the plant in the export of exercise machines (they can be exported to France and Hungary because the necessary bids have been submitted). Bringing them up to the level of the best Western models, however, will require modern electronic instruments. Electronics of the necessary quality can be obtained mainly from abroad. Joint ventures will be particularly important in developing the complex for the mining industry with the use of our unique technology. We already have the blueprints for the vehicle.

Conversion has created the possibility of a new form of cooperation with foreign partners—construction on the lot where the plant's new shops were to be built. The earlier plan called for capital investments of 500 million rubles in large shops for the production of heavy armaments. A construction site was prepared. This 54-hectare lot, located next to the plant, could be the site of an enterprise for the production of 50,000 four-wheel drive hatchbacks of a higher class than the "Niva." The best option would be the formation of a joint venture with an American or Japanese firm so that automobile production with modern technology could be organized here. This could also be the site of assembly lines and shops for the production of automobile bodies, transmissions, and other components. The foreign firm could invest funds in the construction and provide the engines (just until an engine plant of our own is built in the USSR). People in our ministry are already investigating the possibilities for the production of diesel engines for all-terrain vehicles.

How has conversion affected the financial status of your enterprise?

On the whole, the financial status of the Ural plant during the conversion process could be called stable. The enterprise is profitable as a whole and is not wary of the market, even though centralized capital investments virtually ceased to exist after the transition to self-funding and military requisitions have been reduced considerably. We have not had the difficulties other defense plants in the USSR have encountered. The prospects of the Ural plant, however, depend not only on the competence or ability of the plant managers to use production resources efficiently for respecialization, but also on the economic policy of the union government and the specific methods employed to institute market relations in the national economy.

From the standpoint of profitability, conversion is advantageous for our enterprise, although it will create additional difficulties. Whereas the profit margin for civilian products is 18 percent on the average, the profitability of our basic production is lower. The level
of profitability will be even higher if the production of furniture or the complex for the mining industry can be mastered successfully.

[Khutreskiy] In other words, in our defense industry the situation with regard to the profitability of military and civilian production is the direct opposite of the one in the United States. Whereas the military business is more profitable than work for the commercial market there, the reverse is true in the USSR. Why is there so much discussion in our press and on high-level rostrums about the difficulties of conversion? Why is it described as an extremely painful process, and why are they saying that the cuts in military spending will put defense enterprises at a disadvantage?

[Butrinyy] Once again, everything will depend on the method of transition to the market. Within the framework of the union government program for the transition to the market with administrative price increases (even in the guise of contract prices), the financial status of defense enterprises of union jurisdiction which continue to work on military contracts could decline dramatically. Why? Because the prices of military equipment produced on state contracts will not change or will be raised only slightly. In any case, the rise in the prices of new military equipment certainly cannot compensate for the losses resulting from the total reduction of production volume when fewer weapons are requisitioned. We have already calculated these costs at our plant. Our weapons systems are not goods for the domestic market. This will have a negative effect on total profits and, consequently, on the size of the wage fund. In turn, this means that the increase in wages in the military production sphere will not compensate for the higher contract prices of consumer goods.

[Khutreskiy] In other words, enterprise managers will have to make a choice between initiating market relations in the military production sphere—i.e., organizing something like a “bidding system” between the state and the contractor enterprises along the lines of the American federal contract system—or dramatically augmenting exports during the conversion process. This would probably be more effective. If an enterprise has sufficient opportunities to cover the demand of its personnel for consumer goods with imports purchased with the hard currency it earns, there may be no need to pick the state’s pocket either directly (in the form of contract prices on weapons) or indirectly (in the form of consumer goods rationing).

[Butrinyy] As far as the augmentation of exports is concerned, there are too many problems today in connection with currency regulation in our country. In the simplest terms, we have no real incentive to augment exports of our products quickly, even in the case of products no one in our country needs.

[Khutreskiy] The maximum stimulation of exports is, after all, an axiom for the fiscal and currency legislation of any country. It appears that we are also making some claim to historical exclusivity here, judging by the president’s ukase on currency regulation in 1991. Furthermore, we have to remember that the conversion process has just begun in our country.

[Butrinyy] I must say that the plant administration is certainly trying to compensate its workers for the reduction in total wages. We are establishing direct ties between the shops of the enterprise and outside clients on a contract basis. The shops have been granted complete operational autonomy in the use of resources made available by conversion. A shop can negotiate contracts autonomously with other state enterprises (usually scientific research institutes and plants) for various types of work on the equipment made available by conversion. Approximately 40 percent of the contract price in this case is deposited directly in the shop wage fund. Quite often, they not only do not ask for permission to negotiate a contract, but do not even inform the enterprise administration of this and report the transaction only to the plant bookkeepers.

[Khutreskiy] The tendency for relations between plant managers and production subdivisions to be based more and more on a financial and economic foundation during the conversion process is an indisputably positive development, but what about cooperatives?

[Butrinyy] The distinctive features of a defense plant do not allow us to establish cooperatives here or to initiate joint projects with them. Of course, our experience in this area has all been negative. And the problem is not high prices or the cooperative’s insistence on a higher profit margin, which is the usual complaint, although we have had this experience as well. The woefully inferior quality of the items we get from cooperatives, along with their constant disruptions of delivery schedules and deviations from technical specifications, constitute much more serious problems. It was not just their reluctance to deal with us honestly, but their absolute inability to do this, that forced us to stop working with them.

[Khutreskiy] How do you feel about the proposals of the Soviet economists who feel that defense industry enterprises should be privatized, that their centrally allocated material and technical supplies should be limited, and that they should be removed from the jurisdiction of sectorial ministries?

[Butrinyy] On the whole, I have the most negative feelings about this. Today this could not do anything but hurt us. It would sever our collaborative ties (not only in the production sphere, but also in the sphere of R & D, which is much more important in military production), and these would be extremely difficult to restore. It would undermine the technical level of production and affect product quality. Measures to turn enterprise personnel into co-owners must be carefully considered and thoroughly planned.
[Khrutskiy] I want to add my own opinion to this. I do not know whether the proposals regarding the privatization of defense industry enterprises stem more from ignorance about the distinctive features of military production or ignorance about administrative affairs in general. After all, even in the United States there is still something like the central allocation of resources within the framework of the federal contract system, strong sectorial ties in the sphere of R & D, and resource and material quality control. These are distinctive features of military production, and they cannot be ignored. In principle, military production cannot function in an atmosphere of economic austerity. This, in my opinion, is the main difficulty in the actual accomplishment of conversion in the USSR—and, furthermore, in the United States. Any conversion program must first be substantiated as thoroughly as possible from the standpoint of its own economic effectiveness and from the standpoint of its impact on the effectiveness of nationwide industrial production.


Origins of the Cold War
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[Article by Konstantin Viktorovich Pleshakov, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies]

[Text] The events of fall 1989 forced many people to reassess the postwar phase of history. The revolution in Eastern Europe and the new status of Soviet-American relations offered vivid proof that the world order had undergone serious qualitative changes. Of course, there could be arguments about whether this was the end of the “cold war” or something else, but in any case the academic community was stunned by the changes.

After realizing that political science had failed to keep up with real events once again, academics began the debates that finally (wonder of wonders!) attracted the attention of politicians.

One example of this was the conference organized by the Peace Institute of the United States and the Scientific Coordinating Center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Meshcherino (a Moscow suburb) and in Washington in June-July 1990. The changes that were scheduled for discussion were so significant that the people attending the conference included the patriarchs of postwar history (R. Conquest, W. Laqueur, R. Pipes, W. Rostow, E. Rostow, G. Smith, H. Sonnenfeld, A. Ulam, and A. Schlesinger) and leading scholars of the middle generation (A. Weinstein, J. Gaddis, M. Leffler, and F. Fukuyama). The Soviet side in the debates was represented by specialists from many academy institutes, including the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies. No consensus was reached at the conference (with the possible exception of the acknowledgement of Stalin’s destructive role, which would be ridiculous to deny at this point). The discussion did raise certain questions that could be answered by each participant in accordance with his own beliefs. One of these, the question of the origins of the “cold war,” prompted the author of this article to attempt his own analysis, and he is now submitting it for the reader’s approval.

The Essence of the Phenomenon

Obviously, as a phenomenon, “cold war” represents a certain system, and an understanding of its origins first requires a definition of the terms in which it should be discussed. What do we mean when we say “cold war”? After all, in addition to being given different interpretations by different researchers, the concept also experienced the vulgarizing influence of political jargon. It is commonly viewed as the period of East-West confrontation in the military-political sphere, but this definition is too simple. There was confrontation between the East and the West in the 1920s and 1930s as well, and this confrontation also included brinkmanship and even war. The socialist Soviet Union attacked capitalist Finland, and capitalist Germany attacked the socialist Soviet Union. The identification of “cold war” with the arms race is also unproductive: The arms race not only existed in the pre-war years, but had also been going on forever in the general sense, even during the most primitive stages of the development of warfare. From the methodological standpoint, there is no difference between competition in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles or battleships, the first cannons, and so forth. Is “cold war” the state between war and peace? History is full of such periods, beginning in antiquity. All unidimensional definitions of “cold war” can be subjected to strict analysis and proved to be extremely conditional.

Therefore, we will take the “naive” approach and proceed not from the definition to the process, but from the process to the definition. What were the distinctive features of international relations as a system in the postwar years?

There is no question that the main feature of the “cold war” was confrontation without global war (brinkmanship), and in this sense the usual use of the term is accurate. What was it, however, that distinguished this system of international relations from, for example, the history of French-English confrontation in the 19th century? First of all, this was global and bipolar confrontation. The enemies were not two coalitions, but the two halves of the world, and there were virtually no neutral zones in the world. Bipolarity was not absolute in the political sense: De Gaulle, Mao Zedong, and Kim Il-sung frequently acted completely autonomously even in the 1950s. From the ideological and psychological standpoints, however, it was absolute. The entire world was divided into “ours” and “theirs.” “Ours” might have been “revisionists” or “nationalists,” but they were on the same side of the barricades (even during the years of the dramatic deterioration of relations, Soviet researchers still included China in the “socialist camp,”
although they did not include it in the “socialist community,” where a fine line was drawn). The confrontation was truly global: “Ours” and “theirs” were rivals in all parts of the world—not necessarily to an equal extent, but everywhere.

This confrontation, however, never grew into global warfare. In this sense, J. Gaddis is correct in calling the “cold war” the period of the “long peace.” Obviously, it would be impossible to continue denying the definite positive role of weapons of mass destruction, which deterred leaders by making a potential conflict comparable to the end of the world. All of this still has to be analyzed more thoroughly. The atomic bomb, with its potentially horrifying consequences, turned any crisis into a potential armageddon and thereby deterred the escalation of conflicts and kept them from growing into global war.

Could the postwar years, however, be described as unvarying? In other words, can we say that the “cold war” lasted until 1989? This seems doubtful.

A simple review of history reveals three stages in postwar development. During the first and shortest, from 1945 to 1948, when the slide toward confrontation occurred, the United States and USSR tried to consolidate the spheres of influence they had acquired in the war years, accusing the other side of aggressive intentions but never crossing the threshold of irreversible confrontation. Stalin’s tactic in those years, for example, could be described as creeping expansion: He left troops in Iran past the scheduled withdrawal date, exacerbated relations with Turkey, and interfered in the affairs of East European and East Asian countries. The West pursued the “Truman doctrine,” supported Chiang Kai-shek, and so forth.

A separate period, representing the “cold war” proper, began in 1948 and lasted until 1962. It began with the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and reached its most intense point at the time of the Berlin crisis (from April 1948 to September 1949). This was followed by the Korean War (1950-1953) and other such events. The last of these was the Caribbean crisis in 1962. The opposing sides balanced on the brink of war, standing at its very threshold. To be fair, we have to say that many serious crises were provoked by the USSR or its allies, and it is no coincidence that the Caribbean crisis, which broke out over nuclear weapons (and was the most dangerous), marked the end of this period: It became obvious that the game could no longer be played by these rules. The settlement of this crisis was the end of the “cold war.” The great powers never allowed events to reach this level of escalation again. The result was an effectively uninterrupted Soviet-American dialogue: The Moscow Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests in the Three Spheres was signed in 1963. Soviet-American relations later had their ups and downs, but they never reached the dangerous point again. In addition to the Caribbean crisis, the Sino-Soviet rift, signifying the erosion of the bipolar structure, played a positive role in ending the state of “cold war.”

The world order of the “cold war,” however, was still alive from 1962 to 1989, with its accompanying diplomacy, thinking, and military planning. There were even some extremely serious conflicts, but neither the Vietnam War nor the Afghan War raised any doubts about the need to maintain peace as a condition of human existence.

Nevertheless, as long as seats of “cold war,” however few in number, continue to exist—for example, in East Asia (the situation in Korea and the Taiwan problem)—it will be difficult to overcome stereotypical patterns of thinking. The result of “cold war” was a corresponding type of international relations. Even after the causes disappeared, the mechanisms of inertia continued to work and is still working today (although it is much weaker).

Therefore, if a precise definition of “cold war” is even possible, we might say that this was the planetary bilateral (or bipolar) confrontation between the USSR and the United States and between their allies on a precise ideological basis, distinguished by a struggle for spheres of influence and taking the form of crises putting the world on the brink of global war involving the use of nuclear weapons. We cannot agree with the common assertion that the “cold war” began in Eastern Europe and because of it. It appears that the causes and essence of the “cold war” were much more complex.

Genesis

An understanding of the origins of the “cold war” necessitates the acknowledgement that there were many and that far from all of them came into being during the years directly preceding this phenomenon. The process of “historical elimination”—i.e., the removal of a particular process (or event) from history to assess its actual importance—could be extremely helpful.

R. Pipes, for example, believes that the “cold war” began in 1917. Although his statement contradicts the definition on which this article is based, we must admit that there would certainly have been no “cold war” without the events of 1917 in Russia. By the same token, the world would not have undergone the bipolar ideological split because the evolution of world development would not have been interrupted. The entire picture of the world would have been completely different (the “cold war” was a specific phenomenon with specific participants). October 1917 may have been an essential condition, but it was not enough to start the “cold war.”

Even if we could assume that the events of 1917 had never happened, considering the evolution of the Mediterranean seat of civilization (the central seat in world history, in contrast to the American, East Asian, and several others), it would be impossible to say that there would not have been an atomic bomb. “Cold war” without an atomic bomb would not have been the same:
The fundamental feature distinguishing it from other confrontations would have disappeared. Even if we assume that communism did not triumph in any one of the countries drained of their blood after World War I, nothing could have prevented the invention of atomic weapons. Even in a world not split into antagonistic systems, the atomic bomb would have brought about the most severe confrontation fraught with war. Under comparatively peaceful circumstances, various coalitions of states would have begun to acquire the atomic bomb at approximately the same time. In a more complex multipolar system of international relations, the mechanism of nuclear deterrence might not have worked (just as it might break down in the 1990s when new powers join the nuclear club).  

Therefore, the appearance of the atomic bomb could not have been prevented, because it is more difficult to change the course of scientific development than the course of history. Certain coincidences, however, might have delayed the appearance of this weapon for 10 or 15 years. What would have happened then? In principle, the Western world could have been divided again into rival coalitions (as Stalin predicted), and this would have reproduced the picture of the world as it existed before World War II. What kind of postwar relations would Stalin have had with the United States in this case? Would this have led to real war? Paradoxically, Stalin was at his most aggressive precisely at the time when the United States still had a nuclear monopoly. In fact, the expansion in Eastern Europe and even the Berlin crisis and Korean War all occurred when the USSR still did not have an atomic bomb (it was tested in September 1949, but it naturally entered our arsenal later). Consequently, the United States' nuclear monopoly did not work under Stalin. The reason is still a mystery, and we lack the sources and information needed to decipher it. Did the generalissimo agree with Mao Zedong that the atomic bomb was a "paper tiger"? Did he feel that the United States would not use it until there was a real threat to its security? Did he expect (as in the case with the appeasement of Hitler) that the Western powers would put too high a value on peace and not resort to war on principle?

This would be a good time to judge the effectiveness of the notorious "containment of communism." Yes, nuclear weapons did begin to play a deterring role in political conflicts after Stalin's death, but by that time there were new leaders in power, and the role of nuclear weapons themselves had changed radically: The growth of arsenals and the improvement of delivery vehicles had made this factor stronger than it had been in 1945-1950. The "containment of communism," however, never served its direct purpose and was a futile undertaking in this sense (although it did play an important role in the integration of the West). The United States did not prevent the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia or the spread of the Soviet sphere of influence in the Third World.

In any case, when we consider the possibility of a nuclear-free world in the 1940s and 1950s, it is highly improbable that the Western powers would have allowed their camp to disintegrate at the time of Stalin's expansion in Europe and Asia. Therefore, the Soviet Union would still have had to face a more or less monolithic West led by the United States, the only real victor in World War II. Even if there had been no atomic weapon, it seems doubtful that the Western world would have been divided into rival coalitions again after World War II.

This brings us to an exceptionally important moment in the genesis of the "cold war"—World War II. It was this bloody worldwide carnage that allowed the USSR and United States to fight an intense struggle for spheres of influence, first in Europe and Asia and then in the rest of the world. Whereas the United States was doing this on a wave of prosperity, however, Stalin did it after the most devastating war, ignoring the expense and dooming the country's economy to even more serious retardation.

If we return to the method of "historical elimination," it would be difficult to assume that World War II could have been avoided after 1917. Left-wing extremism was necessarily accompanied by right-wing extremism: They were as inseparable as an object and its reflection in a mirror. This is why the corporal's arrival in the German chancellery was brought about to some extent by the events of October 1917. Let us assume, however, that extremely farsighted politicians had been able to restrain Hitler—for example, by declaring war on Germany after the occupation of the Ruhr or the anshchluss in Austria. Let us assume that Great Britain, France, and the United States undertook a joint expedition under the auspices of the League of Nations and were able to avert World War II. In this case, regimes in Europe would have remained stable and viable, and the European balance of power would have remained quite strong. But what about the Far East? Who could have curbed the aggression there? Let us, however, make the highly improbable assumption that Japanese militarism could have been stopped at an early stage. This would have created a zone of stability along Stalin's borders. The democratic powers would not have been united in an iron-clad alliance but would nevertheless have been the guarantors of a stable world order. Under these conditions, Stalin would have had nowhere to go and would have remained isolated. Consequently, there would have been no division of spheres of influence, and there would have been no "cold war" either.

In this way, we have isolated the three main reasons for the start of the "cold war"—1917 (the division of the world), nuclear weapons (a new political factor), and World War II (the possibility of a fight for the repartition of spheres of influence). They had a collective impact. The "cold war" did not begin in Stalin's office in the Kremlin or in Truman's office in the White House. The course of events was predetermined by the October coup of 1917, which established the ideological prerequisites.
for confrontation, by the work in the Curie and Rutherford laboratories and even Newton’s work and, finally, by the first sparks of World War II in 1935-1939.

We still have to determine the role of individuals in the genesis of the “cold war.” R. Tucker has said more than once that the “cold war” ended on 5 March 1953. In explanations of this statement, he has suggested that if Stalin had died in April 1945 instead of Roosevelt, there would have been no “cold war.”

There is no question that Stalin was one of the men who shaped the 20th century. It is even more indisputable that he could be called one of the chief architects of the “cold war,” but it would be wrong to blame its inception only on the personality features of the “father of the people.” I would like to express a fairly seditionist opinion: Confrontation and expansion (and these were the essence of the “cold war”) were characteristic of Bolshevism in general. Any Bolshevik leader who had been a victor in World War II and had had to contend with the United States’ efforts to build the world in its own image would have behaved in approximately the same way as Stalin. It is a different matter that Stalin’s revolutionary fervor was combined with imperial ambitions and that the imperial complex of another leader (Trotsky, as the most probable alternative to Stalin, or Bukharin, Zinoviev, or Kirov) might not have grown to the same proportions. In itself, the theory of world revolution presupposes an uncompromising struggle with the West for influence in all countries of the world and leads, therefore, to global confrontation. It is possible that another leader with a stronger romantic streak than Stalin’s might have been even more dangerous in this position. The pragmatic generalissimo might have been the lesser evil in comparison with an unpredictable romantic.

Did Stalin need the “cold war” to consolidate his power? This is an extremely difficult question. There is no doubt that the “cold war” and the world order it created strengthened Stalinism in the Soviet society. An external threat always consolidates authoritarian regimes, and it was therefore useful to Stalin’s successors. But did Stalin himself need it? It appears that his control over the society was already unlimited. Furthermore, the alternative to “cold war” was not the fraternization of peoples, but a “cold peace”—i.e., moderate confrontation, in which the country would still have been closed off from the outside world, and the outside world would have been closed off from the country. Therefore, it would be wrong to assume that Stalin exacerbated relations with the West for the sake of internal political advantages.

It would not be objective, however, to confine this discussion only to the Soviet leadership. Using Zen Buddhist terminology, J. Gaddis commented several times that historical studies of the “cold war” until recently were like “the sound of one hand clapping” (referring to the fact that Soviet historians had no access to archives and were ideologically obstructed anyway); it is equally true that the “cold war” itself was not in any sense “one hand clapping.” Now that we have acknowledged Stalin’s clearly aggressive behavior, it would be wrong to overlook the actions of the other side, the Western side. I must say that the question of America’s role in the “cold war” is just as important as the question of the Soviet leadership’s role in it.

Therefore, if Roosevelt’s life had not come to an end in April 1945, this would certainly have changed the situation and would have affected the course of the “cold war,” but it would not have automatically prevented it. Roosevelt and Stalin had a personal bond and a common past stemming from the incredible tension of the war years. The severance of ties with the West was partly due to Stalin’s loss of the capital he had earned—cooperation and a certain degree of mutual understanding. Roosevelt died, and Churchill lost his power, but it was Churchill who made the speech in Fulton, and there is no reason to believe that Roosevelt would not have reacted just as vehemently to Stalin’s expansion. In this sense, it is probably wrong to speak of changes in the political climate in Washington “in connection with the death of FDR.” In the final analysis, it is the death of a dictator that changes the political climate in a country, and even this does not always change it radically, as the post-Stalin years in the USSR demonstrated. There were several objective reasons for the change in Washington policy.

**Alternatives**

Western historians have reached the consensus that it would have been impossible to prevent the “cold war.” More and more Soviet historians are also agreeing with this point of view. The main argument of the proponents of this theory is that it was impossible to reach agreements with Stalin in principle; the Stalinist regime was programmed only for confrontation. The author will risk criticism by disagreeing with this belief.

After the earlier discussion of the origins of the “cold war,” in which we agreed that the main factors giving rise to it were so global that it would have been extremely difficult to eliminate any of them, it might seem odd to begin discussing missed opportunities. Nevertheless, we will try to substantiate the hypothesis that certain opportunities were missed.

Historical determinism is flawed in general. Furthermore, whereas we were once under the power of the determinism of objective circumstances, we are now being drawn into a deterministic dependence on historical personalities. Sometimes an individual who gains unimaginable control over the society completely ignores logic, does not act in the national interest, and is not even guided by the knowledge that minimal outlays will preserve his own influence. We have seen examples of this in the recent past: The Ayatollah Khomeini could be called a hyperindependent leader. Individuals of this type are few in number, however, and Stalin was not one of them.

“Are you really saying,” the reader will ask, “that Stalin, the dictator of dictators, the man who gained unlimited...”
authority in the country, could have been controlled from outside?" Yes, Stalin did gain absolute power, but he was nevertheless a realistic politician and understood that this was power over the Soviet Union, the satellites, and the world communist movement, and nothing else. Stalin did not see himself as the ruler of the macrocosm, as hyperindependent leaders do. He was clearly aware of the limits of his authority and could be influenced by outside forces and even manipulated at times, in the way that the hyperindependent Hitler was able to manipulate him in 1939-1941.

Today we are inclined to demonize Stalin and endow him with characteristics that were not typical of him at all—for example, absolute freedom of will, because this, as most people would agree, is a salient feature of the dictator. We use exactly the same methods to demonize other leaders of Stalin's generation, such as Mao Zedong, one of the main protagonists of the 'cold war,' and one who still has an undeserved reputation as a hyperindependent leader.

Let us return to 1944 and 1945, when Mao Zedong, the leader of a growing communist movement, which had spread to many countries, and the effective sovereign of one of the states into which China had been divided by civil strife, began building bridges with the Americans. In negotiations with them, Mao Zedong agreed to make concessions; his idea of the period of transition to socialism, which was fairly close to Lenin's New Economic Policy, was influenced by the prospect of cooperation with the West. Mao was trying to avoid exactly what happened to the world in 1946-1948, when it split into two camps headed by two hegemonic powers. American political groups, however, were not willing to cooperate with the communists in China, where the Americans already had an ally—Chiang Kai-shek. The result was deplorable for the global system of international relations and for the Chinese people, who were stuck in the position where the ideology of Chinese Bolshevism and the "cold war" had driven them. Washington's unwillingness to meet Mao halfway was certainly a missed opportunity, one of those which pushed the world into "cold war."

Even Stalin, under whose power Mao Zedong was afraid of falling (which is what motivated him to negotiate with the Americans), also displayed a wish to come to some kind of agreement with the West, but whereas we have fairly reliable sources of information about Mao Zedong, everything pertaining to Stalin has been taken from documents that the generalissimo intended for public consumption from the very beginning—in other words, they were carefully "edited" from beginning to end.

By the end of World War II Stalin had decided that it would be possible to expand his empire considerably and was fully determined to do this. It is unlikely that he planned to attain this goal by means of fierce confrontation with the West, especially the United States. His cooperation with Roosevelt and Churchill in the war years convinced him that the peaceful division of spheres of influence was possible and quite productive. When we read the records of the meetings of these three leaders, it seems clear that they felt they had the right to decide the future of the world (this may have been more true of Stalin and Churchill, but it was also characteristic of Roosevelt). Most people know how Stalin, Churchill, Molotov, and Eden calculated the amount of influence the USSR and Great Britain would have in postwar Eastern Europe in terms of percentages. Therefore, Stalin may have acquired the belief that he would not have any trouble reaching an agreement with his Western partners after the war either. In his speech of 9 February 1946, which many people falsely describe as a declaration of "cold war," he specifically said: "It is probable that a military disaster could be averted if raw materials and sales markets could be redistributed periodically among countries in proportion to their economic influence, by means of coordinated and peaceful decisions," and then went on to say, "but this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development." It is significant that this was Stalin's campaign speech: Striving to adapt to Western political traditions, he tried to make his suggestion sound as legitimate as possible, but no one listened to him anyway.

The author has already expressed the opinion that the generalissimo's thinking revolved, so to speak, around two suns—revolutionary fervor and the idea of empire. Stalin the revolutionary was unpredictable, although he was programmed for unconditional confrontation. Stalin the emperor was willing to play by the rules of the balance of power. Like any other person, he was inclined to think in archetypes. It is possible that he identified himself at times not with Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great, but with Alexander I, the conqueror of Napoleon and the head of the Vienna Congress. Did the meetings of the "Big Three" not resemble the Vienna Congress? Why not continue them in peacetime?

In general, the war must have changed Stalin substantially. We can assume that he considered a partial departure from Bolshevism (although not from terror, of course) and was inclined to prefer the idea of an empire. These nuances are more likely to be sensed by writers than by historians. The author would like to take this opportunity to quote an excerpt from a novel by Yuz Aleshkovskiy. The events take place in Livadiya at the time of the Yalta Conference in 1945. The novel belongs to the genre of grotesque satire, and in this context the conversation between Stalin and his right foot, the "revisionist" one, is not surprising. "Return the land to the peasants, relax the stranglehold on the economy, and live out the rest of your days as a man.... You can see the world, have a good time....and all of the churches in the world will absolve you of your bloody sins.... Do it, Soso, I beg you, do an about-face! Do it! Turn everything around! You can do it!" Stalin replies: "And what if the unimaginable could actually happen, that Stalin could be the man who reformed the Marxist doctrine, restored the New Economic Policy and, last but not least, admitted
the existence of the Immortal Soul and the so-called Demiurge? ...What if all the heads of the great powers in turn would follow the orders of the Pastors General of the Nations of the World...PGNW...PGNW for short?”

To some extent, Stalin’s intention to reach an agreement with the West is revealed by his policy in China. Although there was a real chance to give Mao Zedong maximum support, Stalin was in no hurry to do this, and not only because of personal animosity. His reluctance to irritate the United States, which had taken Chiang Kai-shek’s side, was a more important motive.

It is understandable that there were not enough signs of this for the West, and in this sense Stalin’s policy, if he genuinely wanted to avoid what later came to be called the “cold war,” was a policy of constant missed opportunities. And what about the West?

What did the West fail to do? I think the West did not understand that Stalin could deviate slightly from his revolutionary principles in exchange for an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of his sphere of influence, that an agreement could be reached with Stalin, and that he was not a fanatic like Hitler. This point of view is not indisputable, because there were good feelings for Stalin in the West after the war, but the author believes that there were mutual misperceptions on all levels, including a misunderstanding of the kind of “good relationship” the partner wanted.

What could the West have done or not done? Instead of consistent contacts (preferably on the highest level—Stalin appreciated this), there were sporadic meetings and hysterical reactions to Stalin’s policies. Furthermore, the dialogue the West could have conducted should have been firm, with precise definitions of the limits on what Stalin would be allowed to do, possibly even with deliberate and carefully calculated pressure on Stalin. Paradoxically, the American response to Moscow’s policies in the 1940s was not firm. It was, I repeat, hysterical, and like any other form of hysterics it was not associated with consistent and carefully planned countermeasures. The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan represented only part of a possible firm response. Furthermore, each of them was belated to some extent, and the proof of this is that Stalin went so far as to start the Korean War. The United States was unable to find the necessary tone in its dialogue with the dictator. On the one hand, it avoided appeasement, setting something like the Munich syndrome in motion, and on the other, despite the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, there was an obvious lack of consistency and firmness. Washington was nervous because it felt that it was dealing with an irrational fanatic, but Stalin was not one of these.

At the conference in Washington, A.O. Chubaryan cited a convincing example of the way the West got results by stating its position in explicit terms: In 1944 Stalin never did give the order to cross the Finnish border because he was afraid of a vehement reaction overseas.

Global factors pushed the world toward “cold war,” but on the level of actual policy it still could have been avoided. The metal of the “cold war” had been forged by 1945, but a starting mechanism was needed and was found: It was the lack of mutual understanding between Stalin and the Western politicians and the lack of explicit limits on the escalation of tension. For this reason, the “cold war” is a topic connected to a considerable extent with the sphere of mutual perception.

Could peaceful cooperation have developed instead of the “cold war”? No, not at all. The only possible alternative was a “cold peace,” accompanied by tense and difficult negotiations, advances and retreats, crises, and the repartition of spheres of influence—i.e., something like what was happening in 1962-1985.

Stalin, Truman, and Churchill were already psychologically prepared for confrontation in Potsdam in 1945. Even before Potsdam, none of the allies ever considered sharing not only the secret of the atomic bomb, but even the very fact that it was being developed, with the others. In Potsdam itself, Truman did not feel the need to inform Stalin, his ally, of the plans to use the atomic bomb in the war in the Far East, which Stalin was supposed to enter within a few weeks. Stalin himself, who had already heard about the new weapon, could have, instead of putting on a “poker face,” asked Truman the “naive” question: “Are you planning to use the atomic bomb?” But Truman did not feel the need to discuss military plans, and Stalin did not feel the need to ask the “naive” question. They were ready for confrontation, but did they want it?

Footnotes

1. F. Fukuyama is the author of the article “End of History?” The complete text of the article and a discussion of it were published in SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1990, Nos 5 and 6—Ed.


4. “Would it not be more correct to say,” Stalin wrote in his political testament, “that capitalist England, and then capitalist France will eventually have to escape the embraces of the United States and resort to a conflict with it in order to secure their own political autonomy and, of course, high profits? ...Believing that these countries (West Germany and Japan—K.P.) will not try to get back on their feet, rebel against the U.S. ‘regime,’ and make a bid for autonomous development is the same as believing in miracles” (L.V. Stalin, “Ekonomicheskiye problemy sootsializma v SSSR” [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR], Moscow, 1953, pp 33-34).

5. Ray Bradbury once wrote a story in which a man goes back in time and accidentally kills a butterfly. When he
Obstacles on the Road to Postwar Cooperation

We can confidently say that the leaders of the "Big Two," who were first preoccupied with the mobilization of forces and then stunned by their victory, did not exactly how to handle it in 1945. They were still inclined to look at many things through the prism of their pre-war ideas and wartime experiences. The headquarters of both countries initially associated the main threat with the possibility of joint revenge by Germany and Japan in the future. The American administration was fully determined not to repeat the fatal errors of the 1930s, which led to the domination of the entire European continent by a single aggressive power. The Americans also remembered the disastrous beginning of the war with Japan. Whereas the Americans felt the oppressive influence of the experiences of Munich and Pearl Harbor, the 1941 syndrome was naturally much harder for the Soviet side to bear than Munich and Pearl Harbor were for the United States.

The natural desire to prevent the repetition of aggression dictated the need to assess their own possibilities and alignment of forces. Stalin and his associates were fully determined to maintain the "balance of power" in which the Soviet Union would play the role of a second world power on a level with the United States. They are known to have measured their strength in terms of "permanent factors," among which they included the advantages of the Soviet order, the strength of the home front, the high morale, and the ability, even in the event of a surprise attack, to regroup and win a war. Of course, Stalin must have seen that the country's economy had been ravaged and looked quite pale in comparison with the economic giant—the United States. As a classic Marxist, however, Stalin expected the slump in military production to evoke a severe crisis in the United States. Furthermore, Roosevelt's behavior confirmed his expectation that serious conflicts between the United States and Great Britain could be used to the advantage of the Soviet Union. In the second place, we can assume that Stalin was always prepared for war as an inevitability; Germany, he remarked in a conversation with Yugoslav communist M. Djilas, would eventually, even if it took 10 or 20 years, get back on its feet and start a war. Although Stalin had only vague ideas about the Americans, he did not expect them to start a war. It is possible that he even underestimated the United States' ability to expand its influence in the world by military-political as well as financial-economic means.

Stalin and his associates, disgraced diplomat Maksim Litvinov bitterly told an English journalist in June 1946, had returned to the "old-fashioned idea of geographic security." The buffer zone was to consist of Central Europe and, if possible, Manchuria. Did Stalin also have his eye on northern Iran and the bases in the Turkish straits, as Western Sovietologists have asserted? In any case, there was reason for suspicion. In a conversation with American Ambassador A. Harriman before he left Moscow, Stalin explained that the delay in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from northern Iran was an effort...
to guarantee the security of the Baku oilfields. There are records of conversations in the archives in which V.M. Molotov asks about the possibility of giving the Soviet Union the bases in Turkey and returning the northern territories.

What was happening in the United States? People there were certain of their total superiority to the Soviet Union. The embassy (especially G. Kennan) and the military mission in Moscow painted a gloomy picture of a ravaged and almost lifeless country. The military was not afraid of Soviet divisions and did not pay any attention to the suspiciously slow demobilization of the Soviet Armed Forces until December 1945. The best military administrators under the command of D. MacArthur and L. Clay were racking their brains over ways to prevent the rebirth of the threat posed by occupied Germany and Japan, especially in view of the fact that, as Roosevelt told Stalin, America wanted to send its troops back home within 2 years after the end of the war.

Roosevelt did not leave his successor any hints about postwar strategy—only the Yalta agreements, the idea of the United Nations, and an almost ready atomic bomb. After his death, there was virtually no American theory of security; instead, there were the vague principles of the “Atlantic Charter,” dating back to W. Wilson’s time: the freedom of trade and economic activity, respect for the right of small nations to self-determination, and the support of democratic movements and regimes. Truman, who had to assume the burden of power, settled into his routine with some concern about the method of coordinating cooperation with Russia with, for example, the open-door policy in Europe and the atomic bomb.

Eventually, the administration began to realize that its ideas about postwar regulation conflicted with new circumstances—the presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe and the Far East and the political influence of the communists in Western Europe. What was the solution? The sharing of spheres of influence? Churchill was all in favor of this and came up with the notorious “percentage agreement” on the central European countries in an attempt to get the British boot inside the door of the Soviet sphere. The Americans did not want to do this, because it was suspiciously reminiscent of the old partitions of the world and contradicted the principles of the “Atlantic Charter.” The seditious idea of dividing up spheres of influence with the USSR was found only in letters by G. Kennan, then an insignificant embassy staffer. No, the Americans hoped to win the compliance of Moscow without this, believing that it would have to ask the United States for financial, economic, and technological assistance anyway. Some people, including A. Harriman, suggested that a strategy of economic relations with the USSR be planned in advance and that this aid, in contrast to lend-lease, be made conditional upon strict terms. In all of the turmoil of the change of administrations and the subsequent period, this was never done. Furthermore, the chances of using economic leverage were diminished after the rightward shift in the U.S. Congress in 1945, which strengthened the position of isolationist Republicans and those who saw the Yalta agreements as a damnable division of spheres of influence with the godless Soviets.

Therefore, the ground for peaceful cooperation between the great powers was slippery and uneven from the start. The absence of any clear converging interests (especially in the economy) was not enough, however, to make conflict inevitable. This required conflicting interests, and these had already made their appearance at the end of the war.²

The Conflict Becomes Imminent

A “trick” picture appeared in the press recently in connection with the unification of Germany: It portrayed a peaceful farmer, but the face was that of a ferocious Prussian soldier when the picture was turned upside-down. The phenomenon of the quick transformation of the “partner image” into the “enemy image” has recently been a matter of increasing interest to specialists in social and political psychology.

The disappearance of postwar expectations and of the atmosphere of cooperation and the virtually simultaneous move by both countries toward confrontational behavior were similar to this reversible picture. Although the reversal was so quick it was imperceptible, the reasons for it accumulated gradually, throughout 1945 and part of 1946. The completion of the common mission of defeating the aggressive Axis powers could be seen as the starting point. The wormholes of discord began to appear on the sweet fruits of victory almost immediately. This discord began with national ideas that were too dissimilar and radically contradictory with regard to the ways of utilizing this victory and the means and methods of preventing future threats to security.

The economic aspect of the postwar order was one of the areas where the interests of the superpowers diverged sharply. The United States wanted to organize a common world economic system and to become its leader. The USSR officially supported the Bretton Woods agreements but could not become part of this system without radical changes in its economic and political nature. The Stalinist leadership also hoped to gain preferential aid from the United States after the war and was horribly disillusioned and offended when it was offered on specific terms. As a result, Stalin decided to rely exclusively on his own resources in the economic restoration of the USSR, but without neglecting intensive reparations and the dismantling of the economies of the countries where territory had been occupied by Soviet troops.

This naturally aggravated the already sore issue of the postwar order in Germany and the question of the USSR’s right to part of the reparations from the Western occupation zones. It became clear that the Americans and the English did not want to dismantle industry in the Ruhr and were trying to keep the Soviet Union from
taking reparations in the form of equipment and finished products out of Germany. Even worse suspicions were aroused once again: The West would not only try to deprive the USSR of its legal compensation, but also wanted to preserve the military-industrial core of Germany for the future.

What was the reason for the United States' behavior? It does not seem to have been dictated by anticommunist feelings or a reluctance to help the Soviets (although these certainly did exist). Even leftwing liberals and other followers of Roosevelt, among whom Truman also included himself at first, were disturbed by the Soviet requisitions in Germany, Korea, and other countries. They believed that plundering and devastating the countries of recent enemies could only engender future conflicts, while the establishment of the necessary conditions for their economic recovery, on the other hand, would heal the wounds of war more quickly and create favorable opportunities for the establishment of a world market. Congress and the administration were also disturbed by another elementary fact: The poorer Germany, and especially its eastern zone, became, and the more homeless refugees there were, including refugees from Soviet zones of occupation, the heavier the American taxpayer’s burden would be. The military administration of the occupied territories was seriously worried that this would strengthen isolationist feelings in the United States and undermine the basis of the American presence in Europe and the Far East.

The new regimes in Eastern Europe and the instability in Western Europe were also prominent contributing factors to the conflicting interests of the “Big Two.” No, the “cold war” was not started by the Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe. No, the Stalinist leadership was not originally trying to impose its own model on the political regimes in its zone. It did, however, do something else: Instead of “exporting revolution,” it re-exported local communists, who had lived through the terror of the 1930s and had spent the war in Moscow, to the liberated countries. Their reprisals against their old enemies, with the sympathetic understanding (and sometimes the direct assistance) of Soviet occupation authorities, shocked the “quiet Americans” like Truman’s emissary M. Etheridge. The increasingly harassed East European non-communist intelligentsia and bourgeoisie contributed a great deal to the “Soviet enemy image” by convincing the Americans and the numerous U.S. immigrants from Eastern Europe that there was little difference between the methods of the Soviet communists and the Nazis. Prominent political scientist J. Gaddis once asked the pertinent question, “Did the course of postwar history depend on the efforts of the intelligence community? In particular, did the reports of Stalin’s agents feed his suspicions?” Through its agents (K. Fuchs, K. Philby, G. Burgess, W. Maclean, and others), the Soviet side received unique information attesting to the West’s doubts about postwar cooperation with the USSR. If we recall the incidents that aroused Stalin’s suspicions, we will remember that intelligence data were the least important factor and that they sometimes acquired a completely different value. One of the first of these episodes was the interception of Churchill’s telegram ordering the collection of German weapons so that they could be redistributed to German prisoners-of-war if necessary. From the memoirs of Soviet intelligence agents, we learn that this telegram was categorized as disinformation.

Stalin received the reports of the success of the Manhattan Project from K. Fuchs. In A.A. Gromyko’s memoirs, he says that Stalin did not blame Roosevelt for keeping the atomic bomb a secret from him, and it was only in Potsdam, when the “device” had worked and Truman sprang this surprise on him in what seemed to be a carefully staged manner, that Stalin began to suspect the Americans of intentions to abuse the atomic monopoly.

Other incidents which turned the Soviet leadership against the Truman administration needed no corroboration from intelligence agencies: the rebuffs V.M. Molotov and A.A. Gromyko suffered during their meetings with the president of the United States on 24 and 25 April 1945, after which officials in the Kremlin decided that Truman was incapable of withstanding the pressure of “reactionary circles” the discussion of the “Henry Stimson memorandum” at a meeting of Truman’s cabinet on 21 September 1945, a paper which proposed the initiation of a bilateral exchange of views with the Soviet Union on future control of the atomic bomb. The information leaks with regard to this meeting and the subsequent commotion over the “sale of the bomb to the Russians” convinced Stalin that the Americans did not want serious negotiations and might resort to “atomic blackmail.”

Of course, intelligence cannot be completely disregarded as a factor contributing to the start of the “cold war.” The information that the Americans still did not have enough atomic bombs might have entered into Stalin’s calculations. It is completely possible that this allowed Stalin to feel quite confident in the second half of 1945 and later. The instructions to the Soviet delegation at the first (London) session of the SMID included this note from Stalin: Byrnes (the secretary of state the Kremlin associated with anti-Soviet forces and “atomic blackmail”) is not to be given an inch, even if this should cause the failure of the session.

This was at the same time that the “Gudzenko affair” (the defection of a cipher clerk from the Soviet embassy in Canada) shocked the American public: It turned out that “the Russians had been spying” on their allies throughout the war. There is no question that this did much to undermine trust in the Soviet Union and the intentions of its leadership.

Although the hyperactivity of Soviet intelligence hurt our prestige in this case, the insufficient results of American activity in this sphere contributed even more to the “enemy image,” especially because of the veil of
secrecy surrounding everything in the Soviet Union. During the war years this did not evoke any special concern, but in peacetime the "impenetrability" of the USSR became a source of irritation and then of anxiety. One of the goals of Stalin's secrecy was the concealment of Soviet weaknesses and the creation of "Potemkin villages." As a result, the Americans had to be satisfied with isolated data.

The diplomatic disagreements of 1945 were not enough to cause a clash between strategic aims. They did not impede broad-scale conversion and demobilization in both countries. They did, however, create the atmosphere of mutual suspicion without which the "cold war" could never have flared up.

The Decisive Move

By the beginning of 1946 essentially unilateral intentions to consolidate postwar security prevailed in both the United States and the USSR. The American aim was set forth in Kennan's "long telegram" of 22 February 1946. On the Soviet side this was done in Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946, envisaging the stepped-up restoration of the USSR economy in case of another major war. Both the Americans and the Russians had already begun drawing up operational plans for a response to the other side's aggression: an atomic strike for the United States (the "Dropshot" plan and others), and defensive operations by conventional forces in East Germany for the USSR. Neither the American nor the Soviet aims had reached the universal level yet, however. In other words, there were no plans for the globalization of the conflict and there was no talk of threats to vital national interests.

In our opinion, Stalin's speech was not yet a signal of the triumph of ideology over the policy of compromise and did not signify a move to a confrontational strategy in relations with the West. The "doctrine of containment," which was formulated by G. Kennan, A. Harriman, C. Clifford, and others, on the other hand, did absolutize the expansionist, ideological motives of Soviet behavior, but the conclusions drawn from this were still limited.

The abrupt loss of strength of the third power, Great Britain, immediately introduced an element of fatality into the growing discord. The Stalinist leadership had proceeded from the inevitability of the collapse of the British Empire in its plans for the postwar world and assumed that this would be convenient for the USSR and the United States. Truman, in contrast to Roosevelt, would not and could not play the role of an arbiter between Russia and Great Britain.

After Churchill's speech in Fulton, there were references in Moscow to the "Anglo-Saxon anti-Soviet alliance"; in the press, where only Great Britain had been attacked up to that time, anti-American feeling became apparent. The collapse of the hopes for Anglo-American antagonism after the end of the war was an unpleasant surprise. Just a few months before the Truman Doctrine made its appearance, Stalin began suspecting that the United States wanted to rule the world.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently declassified a telegram from Soviet Ambassador Novikov in Washington of 27 September 1946, where U.S. foreign policy was already being interpreted from a hostile vantage point. The interval between Kennan's "long telegram" and this dispatch does not prove that the "enemy image" took longer to mature in the Kremlin. In this telegram Novikov was obviously repeating and substantiating ideas which had taken shape at the top. The document mentioned the rapid loss of influence by U.S. supporters of Roosevelt's line of cooperation by peaceful powers and the increasing influence of "the most reactionary groups in the Democratic Party" and the "bloc of reactionary southern Democrats and Republican Old Guard, headed by Vandenberg and Taft," in the Congress. It said that "Wallace's resignation is a victory for reactionary groups in the Democratic Party and for the foreign policy line Byrnes is pursuing in collaboration with Vandenberg and Taft.

"The augmentation of peacetime military potential and the organization of a high number of air and naval bases in the United States and beyond its borders," the ambassador went on to say, "are clear indications of the United States' hope of dominating the world." The telegram stressed that the United States had already reached an agreement with England "on the partial division of the world on the basis of mutual concessions," although the question of the Mediterranean had not been settled yet. He concluded with the statement that "the United States' attitude toward England is influenced by two basic facts. On the one hand, the United States views England as its biggest potential rival, but on the other, England looks like a possible ally to the United States."

The Truman Doctrine convinced Moscow that the conflicts between the two "imperialist plunderers" had been resolved and that the United States would be the undisputed leader of the non-communist world. Did this lessen the threat of a new world war? Stalin preferred a different conclusion: The imperialist agreement had become possible because it was directed against the Soviet Union. Ambassador Novikov guessed the mood of his superiors and wired them from Washington that "the official goal of the doctrine (Truman—V.Z.) is the limitation of 'communist expansion.'"

Many of the postulates cited above were born in Stalin's head and acquired the force of indisputable facts on his lips. Stalin and Stalinism, therefore, were responsible for the misinterpretation of postwar tendencies and the exaggeration of the danger of war.

In a conversation with the author, one of the veterans of the Soviet diplomatic service argued that Stalin did not want "cold war" at first, but later, he added, "his brain got addled." Regrettably, Stalin started a war against his own people, even before the relations between the allies deteriorated, in the fear that troops returning from the
West would bring the “Decembrist spirit” back home. From the first day of peace, the “father of the people” tried to eliminate any possibility of “admiration of the West” in the Soviet Union by sending millions of the Soviet people who had been taken prisoner in Europe to his own prison camps. Later this war nach Innen [in German], inside the country, acquired excellent reinforcement and substantiation in the “cold war” nach Aussend [in German]—against the Western world. Apparently, Stalin did not even realize the degree to which his domestic policy and the “line of restraint” in Europe were devaluing all of the assurances of peace and driving wedge after wedge into the prospects for postwar cooperation. And if he did suspect this, it did not change his behavior in any way.

Many people in the United States still wanted “peace with Russia,” but they no longer regarded it as a friendly power. Newspapers reported the harassment of liberals and social democrats in the East European countries, the exposure of “Soviet spy networks,” and the persecution of Zoschenko and Akhmatova. Whereas the transformation of the “partner image” into the “enemy image” affected only a few politicians, members of the administration and Congress, at the beginning of 1946, by the end of that year the general public, including Russia’s former admirers, turned away from Moscow after some internal turmoil and struggle.

Stalin also failed to notice the danger of his diplomatic tactic based on a principle he himself quite frankly explained to U.S. Secretary of State G. Marshall in March 1947 at the time of the fourth (Moscow) session of the SMID. When Marshall expressed his concern that the relations between the allies were going downhill so quickly, Stalin admitted that he regarded the session as a form of battle reconnaissance. When partnership had been exhausted (sic! [in English]), compromises might be possible. Stalin and his diplomats—Molotov, Vyshinsky, and Gromyko—were absolutely unyielding at the talks at first and then only gradually—and too late—agreed to certain compromises that had been obvious from the very beginning. Stalin’s compromises included the agreement on Bulgaria and Romania in December 1946, the consent to withdraw troops from northern Iran (Iranian Azerbaijan) in March 1946, and the concessions in the discussion of German issues.

In the first postwar years this tactic worked fairly well, raising the level of international tension a little higher each time. Many members of the U.S. Administration wanted to prevent “another Munich” and decided that the only way of dealing with Stalin was to respond to his tough line with an even tougher one.

The World Is Split

The end of the “cold war” dispelled the myth of its inevitability. The position of the determinists here is noticeably weaker, and the date of the decisive, “irreversible” move toward split and confrontation is being moved up from 1946 to 1947, and even to 1948 (the beginning of the Berlin blockade).

Yes, it is evident that there were missed opportunities, but could they include the demonization of Stalin in the West and the underestimation of his ability to “exchange his revolutionary principles for an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of his sphere of influence”? Is there any reason to believe that “firm pressure” on Stalin by the Western countries, instead of “hysteria,” would have prevented the Berlin crisis and the Korean War? Finally, should the appearance of nuclear weapons be regarded as one of the main causes of the “cold war” because they limited (if I understand Pleshakov correctly) the possibility of compromise?

An examination of Western documents reveals that in 1946, and even later, American and British architects of “cold war” strategy continued, with rare exceptions, to rely on Stalin’s pragmatism and underestimated the extremist and frankly paranoid aspects of his behavior. Long after his meeting with Stalin in Potsdam, Truman continued to compare the “mountain man in the Kremlin” to Tom Pendergast, the Missouri political boss, and regretted that Stalin was bound by his Politburo in the same way that he, the president, was bound by the 80th Congress. Even after Stalin’s death, Eisenhower thought of him as a pragmatist who had submitted to circumstances. Stalin also lived on in A. Harriman’s memory as a frank and pragmatic man. It appears that Western politicians, starting with Roosevelt, saw Stalin’s dictatorship as one of the positive factors which, along with the dislocation of the Soviet economy and the traditional “laziness, lack of discipline, and inefficiency of the Russian people,” would restrain the aggressive impulses of the Soviet Union and make any potential confrontation brief.

If this is true, they were severely mistaken. The discussion and adoption of the Marshall Plan proved that Stalin could be a slave to his own “class” dogmas and could make irreparable mistakes under their influence.

Somewhere deep down inside, Truman, Marshall, and other Western leaders knew that they would have to agree to the economic restoration of only the western part of Europe. They were afraid, however, of Soviet obstruction. They were even more afraid that Stalin would demand his share of assistance and that the conservative Congress would then chop the entire plan to bits. Openly preventing the USSR’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan would automatically cut Poland off from it as well, but many congressmen, including Vandenberg, had to consider the opinions of voters of Polish origin. Offering the aid on terms discriminating against the USSR would also have been difficult from the moral and propaganda standpoints.

Stalin sent an extraordinarily large delegation to Paris to discuss the plan, but he was already determined to boycott it. It is unlikely that historians will ever know what the dictator was saying and thinking at that time,
but it does not take the wisdom of Solomon to understand that the Marshall Plan would have reigned Stal- lin's smoldering fears of the possibility of the rapid revival of the "German threat" with the aid of the Western countries.

The diabolical mind of our leader played another trick on him: He decided that the Marshall Plan was a U.S. plot to prevent a worldwide capitalist economic crisis (and Academician Ye. Varga's analysis confirmed this), to stop the growth of revolutionary feelings in Western Europe, and to help in establishing American dominion in Western Europe and in the penetration of the Soviet sphere of influence by the Yankees for the eventual isolation of the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about the anti-Soviet purpose of the plan, and the embassy in Washington corroborated this. If these suspicions were valid, then Marshall's proposal would necessarily conceal a detailed aid plan, surrounded by terms calculated to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and intended to reveal the facts of the military-political potential of the USSR and its allies and so forth. The Soviet delegates, who had been instructed to learn more about the plot, reported from Paris that the Americans were "keeping it a mystery" and that the English and French also refused to divulge the details.

Stalin's reaction was neurotic. Instead of doing what the West actually feared, he made things much simpler for Truman, Acheson, and Marshall by instructing the delegation to break off the talks. After the Soviet demarche and refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan, the East European countries also had to follow Moscow's example. At a conference of representatives of some communist parties in September 1947 in Warsaw, A. Zhdanov attacked "American imperialism" and the "overly expansionist policies of the United States" and threatened that "the USSR will do everything within its power to keep this plan (Marshall—V.Z.) from being implemented." 14

The establishment of the Cominform [Communist Information Bureau], forcing the people of Eastern Europe to accept regimes following the mobilizing orders of the Kremlin and even the local Soviet military-administrative command, was a reaction to the Marshall Plan and the consolidation of West Germany. The home front was simultaneously purged of class enemies, possible opposition, and all liberal thinking. Because preparations for the repulsion of aggression were the only possible justification for these measures, Stalin's propaganda machine began to accuse the United States of planning a war against the USSR. In the atmosphere of Stalinism, this propaganda was taken on faith and became a separate and self-sufficient internal factor contributing to the fueling of the "cold war" and the cultivation of the "enemy image" in the Soviet Union (incidentally, the USSR was viewed as the enemy in U.S. military plans).

If the author had to say when the "cold war" crystallized, he would name the last months of 1947. All of the talks on Germany, Japan, and reparations were broken off, and even the exchange of views through confidential diplomatic channels fell prey to propaganda.

I would like to conclude with a few words about the "hysteria" in the West and the factor of the U.S. atomic monopoly. There could hardly be any doubt that the Truman-Acheson line, with the support of allies C. Attlee, E. Bevin, and G. Bidault, did not presuppose consistent pressure on Stalin. The "hysteria," as I already demonstrated, was displayed by Stalin, and not by the Western leaders, who quite calmly made use of Moscow's most flagrant errors to consolidate the FRG and NATO, prepare the American public emotionally for the "cold war," and turn the "doctrine of containment" into a military-political reality. The violent overthrow of Benes' liberal cabinet in Czechoslovakia and Stalin's use of military means to cut the Soviet occupation zone off from West Germany and West Berlin helped the U.S. Administration mobilize public opinion and receive another invitation from the West Europeans, this time to serve as the organizer and main military force of NATO.

Before the Berlin blockade, the Stalinist regime was more successful in consolidating "cold war" forces. Later, however, the American side began to "catch up" with the Soviet Union: Rightwing conservative and demagogic-populist forces were used to accomplish the abrupt and dramatic ideologization of the conflict in the American public mind. America, which had emerged from the war in an immeasurably stronger position than the USSR, suddenly felt "vulnerable" and subject to "infiltration from within." The rapid reinforcement of defense, intelligence, and counterintelligence structures began.

The test of the first Soviet atomic bomb and the victory of the people's democratic revolution in China in 1949 shook the Americans' conviction that they could win the "cold war" by economic, political, and diplomatic means in the foreseeable future. The main goal became stronger military guarantees for Western Europe and Japan as the pillars of the future "Pax Americana."

Most historians of the "cold war" still do not feel completely comfortable with the atomic factor. Many Soviet researchers and "revisionist" historians in the West have traditionally regarded the atomic test in Nevada and Hiroshima as something just short of the first volleys of the "cold war." Others, like J. Mueller, believe that the atomic bomb had nothing to do with it: It was not the bomb that started the "cold war," and it was not the bomb that kept it from turning into a "hot war."

It would be difficult to go beyond hypotheses in this case, because Stalin's opinion of the atomic bomb, in contrast to the evolution of Western views, is virtually undocumented. Did the American atomic monopoly deter Stalin? I agree with Pleshakov that it did not—not in Berlin in 1948 and not in Korea in 1950. When Stalin had to
face the fact of the American monopoly, he decided to eliminate it as quickly as possible and simultaneously tried to ignore it and underrate it. Although Stalin did not regard the atomic weapon as the decisive means of winning a war and assigned priority to "permanent factors" instead, he must have been aware of the political-psychological impact of the bomb on the perception of the postwar alignment of forces. "Restoring the balance of power the bomb destroyed"—this was essentially the slogan that inspired the politicians, military leaders, scientists, and engineers who were working on the Soviet atomic project.

It has been a long time since perceptive researchers have seriously believed that the test of the Soviet atomic bomb motivated Stalin to embark on a broad-scale plan, part of which was the invasion in Korea. Could he have even wanted this? The Berlin blockade ended in a clear retreat by the Soviet Union, while the other side emerged from it more cohesive than before and fully determined to defend its positions. The Soviet atomic test and the triumph of the revolution in China aroused new fears: What if the Americans should deliver a preventive atomic strike before the USSR could build up its atomic arsenal? How would Mao act toward the Americans and the USSR? Might he not take advantage of Soviet-American conflicts? According to Stalin's contemporaries, particularly Khrushchev, Stalin twice refused to sanction Kim II-song's "liberation of South Korea." It was only when the Maoist leadership supported this idea, and when Stalin received guarantees (the war proved what they were worth) from Kim that the victory would be almost instantaneous and that "American imperialism" would not have time to intervene, that decisive preparations began north of the 38th parallel.

The history of the embryonic development, birth, and stiffening of the "cold war" suggests two not very original ideas. The first concerns the danger of the age-old desire to be the first great power or the first among equals. It was this, and not a thirst for expansion or the military threat, that motivated Stalin and his associates to risk adventurous behavior and diplomatic deadlock; furthermore, they were not even aware of this. The second is that attempts to abandon traditional geostrategic practices, renounce the separation of "spheres of influence," and establish the primacy of law can split a world marked by ideological contrasts, the contrasts of wealth and poverty, and the contrasts of economic prosperity and crisis.

Footnotes


3. The existence of this document was mentioned by Churchill in his memoirs. See V.G. Trukhanovskiy, "Vneshnyaya politika Anglii v period vtoroy mirovoy voyny (1939-1945)" [England's Foreign Policy During World War II (1939-1945)], Moscow, 1963, p 550.


6. The SMID—Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs—was a body established in 1945 by a decision of the Potsdam Conference and consisting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States, Great Britain, France, and China—Ed.

7. Speech by Professor M.M. Narinskiy at the conference in Meshcherino.


9. USSR Foreign Policy Archives (AVP), div 6, inv 8, f 45, c 759.

10. USSR AVP, div 59, inv 18, f 39, c 249, sh 109.


12. Ibid., p 112.

13. The author heard these interesting comments from American political scientist W. Rostow at the conference.


Soviet Researchers' View of U.S. Congress

914k0020E Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 91 (signed to press 20 Apr 91) pp 102-105


[Text] This new book by Sovietologist R. Huber has won high praise from several prominent American politicians and experts on international relations, including
Chairman D. Fascell of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Speaker of the House T. Foley, influential Republican W. Broomfield, and many others. The opinion of former Speaker of the House T. O'Neill is particularly noteworthy: "This is an excellent work by one of the most experienced congressional experts on the Soviet Union... It is highly recommended reading for American politicians in the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the Capitol."

The author of the book worked for more than 10 years as a consultant and staff member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. He was in charge of reviewing, hearings, and legislative recommendations for members of Congress on arms control issues and American-Soviet relations and contributed to the parliamentary studies of "The USSR and the Third World," "Soviet Diplomacy: Negotiating Style," and "Approaches to the U.S. Congress in the USSR." Huber visited the Soviet Union several times with congressional delegations and alone. It is no coincidence that he makes extensive use not only of hundreds of books and articles by Soviet scholars of American affairs in his book, but also of dozens of interviews with researchers, statesmen, and diplomats in the USSR and the United States.

In short, the author's academic credentials are irrefutable, but is his topic too limited? Are the matters which are discussed in the U.S. Congress of so much interest to all experts on foreign policy and to others? In his work Huber conclusively refutes the arguments of skeptics who find it hard to believe that the parliamentary kaleidoscope essentially reflects all of the major issues of the present day and thereby affirms its status as an efficiently operating institution. The author conducts an objective and astute appraisal of the main milestones in the development of Soviet studies of American affairs: He neither praises nor condemns the opinions of Soviet scholars. In general, we must say that the rich diversity of his investigatory palate is probably one of the main achievements of a scholar who was writing his book in the years of the past decade that were far from the best in Soviet-American relations.

In what way, then, is Huber's book of instructive value to American and Soviet readers?

After analyzing Western studies of the Soviet Union, the author says in the beginning of the book that after Stalin's death, as researchers all over the world have already acknowledged, Soviet foreign policy was distinguished by a change from the totalitarian, ideologized, and confrontational model to a more pluralistic and pragmatic model conducive to negotiations (p 1). This was, so to speak, the general tendency, but development within it was far from consistent (for example, Khrushchev's brief thaw or the years of stagnation). Sufficient to say that the terms "political pluralism" and "multi-party system" aroused negative feelings in many of our politicians and ideologists just a few years ago.

The author lists three main American schools of Soviet foreign policy research: totalitarian, pluralistic, and corporativist, although we could add others to the list if we wished. The proponents of the first school viewed the Soviet Union as a totalitarian dictatorship distinguished by a rigid official ideology, a single mass party headed by a leader-dictator, and party control of the news media, the armed forces, and the economy.

At the end of the 1960s the pluralistic school began to grow stronger as a counterbalance to the totalitarian school. Its advocates believed that Soviet foreign policy could no longer be viewed merely as a product of the opinions and decisions of the top political—in other words, party—leadership. They saw clashes between various groups and factions behind the facade of the monolithic party and underscored the role of the specialists who mapped out the different foreign policy options. Because of this, they paid special attention to institutional and group interests and the differences in the views of members of the political elite.

The corporativist school emerged in the middle of the 1970s as something like a synthesis of the first two. Using studies of the political systems of Western Europe and Latin America as a basis, the corporativists arrived at the conclusion that Soviet foreign policy was the result of the state's actions to plan and secure the "common good." Although the corporativists were similar to the totalitarian school in acknowledging the presence of aggressive impulses within the USSR, they explained this not as a desire to export revolution, but as a result of efforts to maintain the stability of the existing political system in the Soviet Union. Various groups, institutions, and factions were not seen as autonomous entities, but as integral parts of the state which secured their own survival by means of constant interaction (pp 3-9).

Huber feels that the accuracy, validity, and credibility of all of the theoretical explanations of these three schools are questionable (p 11). Not one of these schools was capable of forecasting Soviet foreign policy in a particular region. It is interesting, however, that these schools and their theories were reflected to some extent in the works of Soviet scholars of American affairs. The author examines these correlations in 10 spheres of American area studies—from analyses of the separation of powers and the two-party system to studies of U.S. policy in Western and Eastern Europe.

In Huber's opinion, at least seven spheres of American area studies attest to the spread of pluralistic views among Soviet researchers: the congressional foreign policy mechanism, lobbying, the separation of powers, the party system, military policy and arms control, Congress' role in U.S. policy in Western Europe, and the arms trade in the Middle East.

Huber also believes that Soviet researchers of U.S. policy in the East European countries usually displayed not "political awareness, ideological pragmatism, and intellectual strength," but "a dogmatic and biased view of
world events.” Furthermore, studies of congressional actions in matters of American-Soviet trade displayed politically assigned judgments, focusing on the negative consequences for the USSR. “In some areas connected with Congress’ role in foreign policy (which was particularly important to policymakers), such as American-Soviet trade or Congress’ current attitude toward military prerogatives (the barometer of the legislators’ approach to the use of force in American foreign policy), American area studies seemed to be confined to analyses of the way in which congressional actions served or contradicted Soviet foreign policy goals.... Analysis was subordinated to unadulterated examinations of isolated Soviet interests” (pp 82, 157).

This is even more true of the researchers of American affairs who do their work outside the academy institutes and do not even have the “quasi-academic atmosphere of investigations of alternatives to the existing policy line or strategy in Soviet-American relations.” Party and Foreign Ministry diplomats, in the author’s words, were much more influenced by the short-range goals of current policy, utilitarian considerations, and their accountability to their superiors (p 156).

The author also points out the fact that researchers of American affairs in the Academy of Sciences resolutely rejected foreign policy analyses based on strict economic determinism. Instead, they insisted on investigations of the foreign policy mechanism, separating the foreign policy sphere from economic structures. They acknowledged the pluralism of different segments of the ruling class which allowed some elite political groups and factions to even impose their will on leaders of the “business community” and recognized the contradictory, inconsistent, and multidimensional nature of U.S. foreign policymaking, including Congress’ role in this process (pp 153-155).

During the current stage of American area studies, researchers are acknowledging the significance of electoral factors in the determination of Congress’ foreign policy line, the complexity of organizational and political-ideological structures, and the role of intra- and inter-party factions. In line with this, they refute analyses based on the definition of Congress as a wholly progressive institution in opposition to an executive branch dominated by monopolistic capital.

In some cases, Huber stresses, the level of the research of Soviet experts is amazingly high. This applies, for example, to their recognition of Congress’ ability to plan measures in conjunction with NATO allies to temper differences of opinion with the American administration. This is also attested to by their statements about the inconsistency of the legislators who simultaneously approve MX appropriations and a freeze on nuclear arsenals. Finally, the statements by researchers conducting analyses in line with Marxist-Leninist theories that Congress is a “mirror of American politics” and a “political barometer” of changing public opinion even acknowledge its status as a representative institution (p 155).

The works by Soviet researchers on the U.S. Congress confirmed the theoretical inquiries of members of the main schools. Some Soviet researchers, for example, underscored the weakening of foreign policy authority, the author writes. They saw this as part of “the centralization of economic power in the hands of monopolies and their merger with the machinery of state”; the main levers of government influence, however, were concentrated in the executive agencies headed by the president, which accompanied “the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of monopolistic capital.” This oversimplified approach confirmed the accuracy of the proponents of the totalitarian school in the United States. “As a demonstration of their ideological reliability, researchers of American affairs sometimes had to supplement their professional knowledge of the two-party system and the role of the party factor and bipartisan groups and factions with references to ritual dogmas about the predominance of ruling class interests in policy toward the Soviet Union” (p 160).

The pluralists found arguments in favor of their theories in Soviet researchers’ recognition of the importance of legal and constitutional factors in the American political system and their assertions that the excessive concentration of power in the president’s hands at the expense of congressional committees and their allies in administrative departments would undermine the flexibility and adaptability of the system. They found substantial differences in Soviet researchers’ descriptions of the scales, nature, and role of Congress in foreign policy (p 13).

The corporativist school also has its disciples among Soviet scholars of American affairs, the author says. At the end of the 1970s, when the conservatives in Congress had buried detente and its main symbol—the SALT II treaty—researchers of American affairs were concerned about the fragmentation of foreign policy decision-making and the provincialism and regional biases of parliamentary diplomacy. Their disillusionment with Congress’ role in Soviet-American economic and military-treaty relations increased their appreciation of the executive branch as a supposedly “more responsible, more rational, and more farsighted component of the system.”

The corporativist influence in Soviet studies in American affairs is also apparent in the “elements of clientism”—i.e., the propaganda and substantiation of the legality of the current foreign policy line, participation in parliamentary exchanges, and the training of foreign policy personnel for the party and government establishments; in short, the “patron-client” relationship between the Soviet leaders and leading experts which was supposed to uphold the existing power structure in the USSR, Huber remarks (p 158).
Huber writes that a genuine upsurge of interest in congressional research in the USSR began in the middle of the 1970s and grew strongest after the passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. In his opinion, the tendency of the Soviet state leadership of that time to rely too heavily on diplomacy through the executive branch (through President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger) "led to mistaken Soviet assessments based on ignorance of the state of affairs in Congress."

The author’s evaluation of the USSR political leadership’s awareness of problems in American politics is particularly interesting. In Huber’s opinion, the political “learning process” has been most intensive in recent years.

In the past the researchers of American affairs were clearly more aware of the specifics of U.S. politics than the party and state leaders. “At any rate, on the level of the secretary general of the CPSU Central Committee this increased awareness was distinguished by an evolution from Brezhnev, who knew little about the activities or prerogatives of Congress, to Andropov, who had some rather superficial knowledge, to Gorbachev, who seems to understand everything.” “Of all the past and present Politburo members who have met members of Congress since 1974, Gorbachev easily demonstrates the most impressive understanding of the foreign policy powers of Congress. The amount of time allotted to meetings with legislators, the number of groups with whom Gorbachev agreed to meet, and his understanding of Congress’ role in foreign policy are confirmed by congressmen of differing political views. One congressmen said in an interview that Gorbachev, in contrast to Brezhnev and Kosygin, is clearly aware of Congress’ importance. Whereas Brezhnev and Kosygin, in the legislator’s words, regarded meetings with Congress as purely ceremonial events and felt that Congress’ authority in the American political system was comparable to that of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet system, Gorbachev perceives congressmen as powerful makers of foreign policy” (pp 145, 149).

At the end of the book, the author expresses the belief that although the gap between the knowledge and level of understanding of Congress’ role (and that of American foreign policy in general) of the political leadership and experts on American affairs has been reduced perceptibly, American area studies still represent a combination of the totalitarian, pluralistic, and corporativist ideas. Nevertheless, the broad network of contacts the current USSR leadership is developing with the U.S. Congress, including direct interaction and even diplomacy through “spacebridges” as well as the more frequent interparliamentary exchanges, the speeches in congressional committees, and the discussions with members of Congress at international conferences and negotiations, are all drawing the Soviet Union into the group of civilized democratic countries.


Long Postwar Peace
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[Report by V.I. Batyuk on Soviet-American conference at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies in Fall 1990]

[Text] A Soviet-American conference on the lessons of the past historical era—the era of “cold war”—and the political realities of the future system of international relations was held at the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies last fall.

The American side was represented by L. Gardner, a professor of history from Rutgers University; M. Milarsky, a professor in the Political Science Department of the University of Florida; R. Johansen, a professor at Notre Dame University and fellow of the International Peace Research Institute; G. Johnson, a professor and the director of international programs at Rutgers University; C. Kegeley, Jr., a professor and fellow of the International Research Institute of the University of South Carolina; J. Krutzel, a professor from Ohio State University and fellow of the Mershon Center; J. Levy, a professor in the Political Science Department of the University of Minnesota; D. Puchala, a professor and the director of the International Research Institute of the University of South Carolina; J. Ray, a professor in the Political Science Department of Florida State University; G. Raymond, a professor in the Political Science Department of Idaho State University; and J. Vasquez, a professor in the Political Science Department of Rutgers University. The American “team” was quite strong: Its members are the elite of U.S. political science and their scientific works are well known to specialists throughout the world.

The Soviet side was also quite impressive. Reports were presented by Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies deputy directors Corresponding Member A.A. Kokoshin and Doctor of Historical Sciences V.A. Kremenyuk, institute department heads Doctor of Historical Sciences S.M. Rogov and Candidate of Historical Sciences A.V. Kortunov, sector head Candidate of Historical Sciences P.V. Gladkov, and senior scientific associate Candidate of Historical Sciences V.M. Zubok. The conference was also attended by Candidate of Historical Sciences I.Ye. Malashenko, a former institute associate who is now a CPSU Central Committee consultant.

The main topic was Soviet-American relations during the period of “cold war.” C. Kegeley, Jr., pointed out four distinctive features of the period: 1) the irregular nature of superpower cooperation and competition, 2) the existence of cyclical phases in the development of these relations, 3) the presence of a long-range tendency toward their improvement, and 4) a distinct correlation in USSR-U.S. interrelations: Hostile policy was provoked by the other side's hostility, while a more constructive approach evoked a constructive response.
Using the method of extrapolation, the scholar constructed five developmental models of international relations in which Soviet-American mutual understanding could continue to grow: 1) a move from bipolarity to multipolarity, 2) the prospect of a superpower "condominium" through the mechanism of the new "European concert," which Gorbachev called the "common European home," 3) the maintenance of peace with the aid of international institutions such as the United Nations, 4) the acknowledgement by the Soviet Union and (somewhat less likely) by the United States of the inevitability of the reduction of their international influence in the face of the growing strength of Japan and Germany, and 5) the end of superpower confrontation and the development of cooperation as a result of increased mutual understanding.

In V.A. Kremenyuk's opinion, Soviet-American relations during the "cold war" could be described as competitive cooperation, based on an understanding of the impermissibility of a new world war. This understanding, expressed in the form of the so-called "elementary rules of caution," grew stronger, according to the speaker, with each crisis, and it is the job of Soviet and American researchers to trace the dynamics of this process. These "elementary rules," Kremenyuk stressed, played an ambiguous role in the history of the "cold war" in general and of Soviet-American relations in particular. Although they helped to avert a "big" war, they contributed to the involvement of the USSR and United States in regional conflicts. In this context, the speaker commended M.S. Gorbachev's new approach to the Soviet Union's relations with the United States, because he was the first Soviet leader to recognize the mutual dependence in this relationship.

Soviet-American relations during the "cold war" years were also the subject of a structural analysis in S.M. Rogov's speech. In his opinion, the national interests of the superpowers can be divided into the following groups: 1) conflicting interests (manifested in the form of "hot" war), 2) diverging interests ("cold war"), 3) parallel interests (detente), and, finally, 4) coinciding interests (alliance). Different categories of interests were predominant during different periods of history. The confrontation of the "cold war" years, in Rogov's opinion, was due to the irreconcilable ideological differences of the two powers, and not to economic rivalry. Now that ideological priorities are being reordered radically in the USSR, the two countries have a chance to strive for a relationship more constructive than detente. They have a common interest in a peaceful move from the bipolar world to a multipolar one in an atmosphere of continuing military-political stability.

The speaker stressed that the Soviet Union's interaction with the United States in the military sphere is of special importance in this context. He delineated six areas of future arms control: 1) nuclear potential, 2) economic and technological limits on military preparations, which would be particularly instrumental in keeping Japan and Germany from transforming their economic, scientific, and technical potential into military strength, 3) a change in the paradigms of military preparations from offensive to defensive, 4) the augmentation of the transparency of military potential, 5) the institutionalization of the arms control process—the treaty on strategic offensive arms and conventional arms should be followed by SALT-2 and Vienna-2; in addition, arms control should extend to new regions, such as the Middle and Far East, and 6) the further development of contacts between the Soviet and American military establishments, particularly in the form of joint military planning (the military staff committee of the UN Security Council could serve this purpose).

The concept of "deideologization" was criticized in I.Ye. Malashenko's speech. Geopolitical goals, in his words, are interpreted in ideological terms, and for this reason we cannot escape ideology in international relations. Obviously, trends in world politics cannot be discussed in the language of communism or anticommunism today. It is possible that nationalism will take the place of both. In any case, the basis of the world order following the "cold war" will be a balance of power on the international scene. In the speaker's opinion, however, this balance will not be confined to the new "European concert," but will be enriched by new qualitative features: It will consist of more than the balance of power among European nations; the ambition for hegemony in Eurasia will disappear; military strength will lose its importance as a determinant of political influence; economic strength will take its place.

In conclusion, I.Ye. Malashenko suggested that the USSR and United States could reach an agreement on the future world order, but that this is unlikely to occur soon.

The report by A.A. Kokoshin on the evolution of Soviet military doctrine during the "cold war" years and on the role of nuclear potential in USSR foreign policy aroused the interest of conference participants. In his opinion, the Soviet leadership never seriously believed that nuclear weapons could be used to attain foreign policy goals. It is more likely that people in Moscow viewed the possession of the "bomb" as a specific way of dealing with foreign policy opponents and of "scaring them to death." In the speaker's words, the defensive transformation of Soviet military doctrine has not been completed yet, and the outcome will depend largely on the success of the reforms in the USSR and on whether our country will be a federation, confederation, or union of states in the future.

The report by D. Puchala on methodological aspects of Soviet-American relations during the "cold war" aroused lively discussion. He examined the topic from a somewhat unexpected vantage point by comparing the rivalry between the superpowers in the second half of the 20th century to historical examples of confrontation between great powers in the past. Puchala asserted that various empires in all eras (the Roman, Byzantine, and Parthian empires, etc.) were striving mainly to maintain
their own inner integrity. Their rivalry with other powers rarely took the form of a fight to the death and was generally confined to confrontations on peripheral interests. Therefore, it would be wrong to view the “cold war” (in other words, the “long peace”) as a phenomenon peculiar only to this century.

The subject of V.M. Zubok’s report was Soviet nuclear strategy during the initial stage of the “cold war” (the first half of the 1950s). The speaker called 1953 and 1954 the “years of the greatest danger” of nuclear war, because it was then (when the rapid quantitative growth and qualitative improvement of Soviet nuclear potential were under way) that the Kremlin leaders did not realize that nuclear weapons would change the nature of warfare radically and believed that a new world war was inevitable, although Moscow thought in defensive terms in general after 1945.

In the speaker’s opinion, the military preparations of the USSR then and later were influenced not by doctrines and theories, but by “current developments”—the exact current military-political situation—as well as by current ideas about the nature of the military threat. Furthermore, Zubok said, the individual authority in the Kremlin was the best alternative from the standpoint of military-strategic stability, because the “collective leadership” usually took too long in making the appropriate response to the changing situation. All of the positive decisions in the nuclear sphere, the speaker said, were made when there was a single leader in Moscow.

The evolution of alliances was discussed by G. Raymond. Both superpowers—the USSR and the United States—formed two types of alliances after World War II: stationary (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) and mobile (SEATO, CENTO, and the ally relationship between the USSR and Cuba). Whereas Moscow and Washington needed the former, in his opinion, to draw something like a “line of demarcation,” marking the spheres of the superpowers’ vital interests in Europe and the Far East, the latter were needed for maneuvering along the flanks and the rear of the other superpower. Whereas the alliances of the first type, which were based on the common strategic goals of their members, helped to maintain stability, the mobile alliances tended to escalate global tension and to eventually turn “cold war” into a “hot war.”

The report by A.V. Kortunov included a comparative analysis of arms control during the “cold war” and afterward. After pointing out the long-term nature of arms control, he expressed the opinion that the process is not viable in its present form and explained why. First of all, during the “cold war” arms control was based on the principle of approximate parity and equal reductions. Now this approach has proved to be groundless. Furthermore, the United States could be the only nuclear superpower in the near future. In the second place, arms control revealed its inability to solve problems that arose in the military-political sphere on the basis of mutually binding agreements requiring ratification. The process itself gradually became a “public performance.” In the third place, the radical changes in Soviet-American relations led to a situation in which their improvement is no longer a function of arms control.

In Kortunov’s opinion, arms control as a historical phenomenon will survive only if the great powers find non-traditional approaches to the problem, namely the following:

Arms control must not remain confined to the superpowers. Moscow and Washington must consider the involvement of other nuclear states in this process;

The era of all-encompassing arms control agreements is over; future agreements can only be concluded “step by step”;

The great military powers will have to establish a permanent body for the exchange of information on strategic matters;

Arms limitation and reduction will be conducted primarily on a unilateral basis.

The topic of P.V. Gladkov’s speech was USSR-U.S. interaction in international affairs, especially in Europe. The speaker stated unequivocally that whereas Washington’s main source of concern during the “cold war” years was the Soviet Union as a great power, U.S. foreign policy interests are now suffering because the USSR has ceased to be this kind of power. In general, he said, Moscow and Washington do not want a power vacuum to appear on the continent. The problem, in his opinion, is that certain groups might be tempted to take advantage of the USSR’s present weakness to usurp its political position, and this could evoke an outpouring of Russian nationalism and even turn the Soviet Union into the leader of the “Third World” in a struggle against the West.

A matter of exceptional importance—the experience our countries are accumulating in cooperation—was the topic of M. Midlarsky’s report at the conference. In his opinion, two factors contributed to the mutual “education” of the great powers during the “cold war” years: the bipolar structure of international relations, which allowed the Soviet Union and United States to undergo the loss of allies without suffering any damage to their own status, and the presence of strong leaders in both countries throughout the period in question. The “learning process” was complicated, however, by the fact that the USSR and its allies virtually excluded themselves from the world economy. In conclusion, the speaker stressed that the experience of Soviet-American relations in 1945-1990 demonstrated that successful USSR-U.S. cooperation demands a solid economic and political foundation.

Midlarsky’s report aroused lively discussion at the conference. Professor Kegley reminded his Soviet and American colleagues that the “learning process” in relations between the United States and Russia and between
the United States and the USSR was going on not only during the "cold war" years, but also during the two world wars, and that the experience accumulated at the time of the world wars may have had the strongest impact on the foreign policy lines of Moscow and Washington in subsequent years. P.V. Gladkov stressed that negative "lessons" (in confrontation) may have had a stronger impact than positive ones (in cooperation). V.M. Zubok, on the other hand, insisted that both of these processes were equally influential as determinants of the foreign policy behavior of the superpowers. G. Raymond also expressed his own point of view, saying that interrelations within the alliance framework that was built in the "cold war" years were based not on a "learning process," but on "customary behavior." J. Levy had his own definition of "negative mutual education": In his opinion, this is the process by which incorrect lessons are derived from interrelations. Accumulated experience, he went on to say, is not always interpreted objectively; on the contrary, past events are sometimes reinterpreted to serve current political and propaganda purposes. Therefore, the "learning process" is not the sole determinant of the international behavior of states, but only one of many factors.

I would like to conclude this account with the words of J. Vasquez, whose speech won high praise from everyone at the conference: "The new era requires non-standard ideas. The new thinking in the Soviet Union must evoke new thinking in the West.... Coercion must give way to other methods of solving problems, based on the principle of mutual security, and not on an unrealistic power struggle."


Chronicle of Soviet-American Relations (February 1991)
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[Text] February

6—President G. Bush of the United States addressed the members of the New York Economic Club. In his discussion of Soviet-American relations, he said that the events in the Baltic republics were "severely complicating" the dialogue between the two great powers.

7—White House Press Secretary M. Fitzwater made this announcement at a briefing: "The President of the United States has decided to assist in shipping medicine to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which are suffering from a severe shortage of medicines, in response to their request for a show of U.S. concern about the situation in the Baltic zone.... Medicine will also be shipped to the Ukraine to assist the victims of the Chernobyl disaster."

8—U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker addressed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saying that the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms is in the national interest and that the President "would like to conclude the treaty on acceptable to the United States as quickly as possible." Baker reported that the assistant secretary of state and an interdepartmental group had been sent to Geneva to confer with the USSR deputy foreign minister on possible solutions to the last remaining problems at the talks.

9—IZVESTIYA reported that when the WASHINGTON POST alleged that the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces had informed U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union J. Matlock in December 1990 that "the military does not acknowledge the treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe because it was concluded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it was headed by E. Shevardnadze," Matlock sent Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of general staff, an official letter, saying: "I was shocked by the false report in the American press.... You and I know that no such conversation ever took place."

14—Vice-President G.I. Yanayev of the USSR received J. Matlock. They reviewed the status and prospects of Soviet-American relations.

22—As soon as he had met with Iraqi Foreign Minister T. Aziz, President M.S. Gorbachev of the USSR got in touch with President G. Bush of the United States on the telephone and informed him of Iraq's response to the Soviet proposals of 18 February.

President Bush issued an ultimatum to Iraq, stating that Baghdad must begin "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of troops from Kuwait" by noon on 23 February. He also said that the United States appreciated the USSR's efforts to avert a conflict.

25—General Resources International—Imperial Group, an American company, opened its first "Supershop" store in the USSR jointly with Rosinvalyuttorg.

28—At a press conference in Moscow, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Besmertnykh reported that a few hours before the U.S. President announced the cessation of hostilities in the Persian Gulf, he and Secretary of State J. Baker had discussed further action by the USSR and the United States in this region.


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