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AN OPERATIONAL PRIMER FOR MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS

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**Abstract:** The increasing number of peace operations since the end of the cold war provides challenges to the operational commander charged with implementing them. Knowledge of the characteristics, organization, difficulties, and limitations of these operations is essential. This paper provides a short primer on multilateral peace operations, particularly with regard to the levels of war and the operational factors of time, space, and force.
ABSTRACT

AN OPERATIONAL PRIMER FOR MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS

The end of the cold war has seen an increase in the number of peace operations undertaken by the United Nations, by regional organizations, and by multilateral coalitions. Post-cold war peace operations have differed from the “traditional” UN Chapter VI military observation and peacekeeping force models. Humanitarian interventions and the rise in “failed states” have seen peacekeeping forces introduced into missions without the consent of one or more of the belligerents involved.

The United Nations in particular has found these operations difficult, as the United Nations is hampered by structural command and control deficiencies as well as a reliance on member states to fund the missions and provide the contingents needed to carry them out.

Despite some mission failures, peace operations are here to stay, as they fill a void between the public’s demand for action and those situations which, while difficult, do not directly affect a major power’s vital interests. Operational commanders must be prepared to carry out peace operations, and must be knowledgeable of how operational factors are affected by peace operations, as well as the difficulties and limitations inherent in them.
INTRODUCTION. Perhaps the ultimate level of statecraft is that practiced by nation-states in the arena of international, regional, and multilateral coalitions. One subset of this structure of the international political system has been the evolution of the practice known as “peacekeeping” or “peace operations”. The birth of the cold war coincided with the birth of the United Nations system, and of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The birth of the so-called “new world order” at the end of the cold war coincided with an increase in “failed states”, and a rise in demands for “humanitarian intervention” in states suffering ethnic cleansing and genocide, thereby leading to new kinds of peace operations. While this paper is not designed to be an exhaustive tutorial on peace operations, there is a need to understand their basic characteristics and problems in order to give context to the environment in which an operational commander may find himself when conducting or supporting these types of operations.

PEACE OPERATIONS. The academic ferment accompanying the last decades increase in peace operations has led to confusion over definitions.¹ The U.S. military has settled on a series of definitions that encompass peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building, all under the rubric of “peace operations”.² “Peace operations” is defined herein as “A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace”.³

Peace operations can be conducted by the United Nations, or by regional organizations (e.g. NATO) or multilateral coalitions (e.g. Desert Shield/Desert Storm) acting under the authorization of the United Nations. The United Nations and a regional
organization or coalition can conduct these operations by themselves, sequentially with another organization, or in tandem. The last fifty years have seen examples of successes and failures in each.

**THE EVOLUTION OF PEACE OPERATIONS.** International responses to breaches of the peace are outlined in the United Nations Charter.\(^4\) Chapter VI of the charter concerns pacific settlement of disputes, without reference to military force. Although “peacekeeping” as we have come to know it is not specifically mentioned in the charter, UN Secretary-Generals over the years have presided over the creation of what are sometimes known as “Chapter VI-and-a-half”\(^5\) operations—that is, peacekeeping operations involving the deployment of unarmed military observation missions, or armed military units deployed as a preventative measure. These “traditional” peacekeeping operations are generally characterized by three primary considerations: consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense.\(^6\) Chapter VII of the charter addresses the use of force to compel compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions crafted to restore peace and order. Actions under this chapter range from severance of diplomatic relations and embargoes to blockades and military combat action. Chapter VIII of the charter concerns regional arrangements, and Article 53 of that chapter addresses the use of force by regional organizations operating with the authorization of the Security Council.

There have been 49 UN peacekeeping operations since 1948. Of these, 36 were created by the Security Council after 1988.\(^7\) This increase in operations coincided with a lessening of superpower tensions in the wake of the cold war, and an increased willingness by the Security Council to undertake more difficult missions. This
willingness was encapsulated by then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, in his report to the Security Council entitled “An Agenda For Peace”. In it, he presented an activist agenda to take advantage of the new era enabled by the end of the cold war. Significantly, he opened the door to peacekeeping operations undertaken for humanitarian reasons without the consent of all parties concerned. While the Council did not fully endorse all of his recommendations, there was little objection voiced to this new proposal. So evolved a series of peace operations with expanded mandates.

Traditional Chapter VI mandates had been confined to Military Observer Missions and the deployment of UN Field Forces, with observation missions being the most common. These unarmed military observer missions generally were of three types: border or DMZ monitoring, cease-fire, truce, or general armistice agreement monitoring, and the supervision of the withdrawal of forces. Field forces were generally deployed as interpositional forces between two warring states or parties, with the consent of the parties involved. They operated on the basis of strict impartiality, and used force only in self-defense. As one author put it, these forces were “alert, but inert”. Only once, in the Congo in 1960-1964, did a UN Field Force stray from its policy of using force only in self-defense, but that was a unique situation in that there was no interpositional linear boundary to occupy. Even in that case, relatively minimal force was used.

Peace operations created after 1988 often had wider mandates. These missions spanned a range of diverse challenges, including intervention in civil wars, disarming of militias, organizing and/or supervising elections, protecting minorities, evacuating threatened groups, etc. This widening of operations beyond traditional peacekeeping missions has sometimes been referred to as “second generation peacekeeping”.
Within less than two years of the publication of “An Agenda For Peace”, it became apparent that the UN’s reach had exceeded its grasp in the conduct of these second-generation peace operations. The shortcomings of the missions in Somalia and Bosnia soured many, particularly the United States. Peace operations that required the use of force proved beyond the UN’s capability to organize, command, and control. They are difficult missions to execute for a variety of reasons, important among them the unique combination of political, military, and humanitarian circumstances; structural deficiencies within the UN itself; and budgetary constraints imposed by a rapid increase in the number of missions, combined with the failure of some nations (particularly the United States) to pay their assessed peacekeeping dues.\(^1\) In this mix of imperatives, the military consideration may sometimes be the least important in the context of the overall mission.\(^2\) Perhaps the greatest difficulty with second generation peace operations is the fact that they are rarely interstate conflicts, but rather intrastate (failed state) conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping operations are designed for the former.\(^3\) Intervention in a failed state means that at least one, if not more, of the belligerents are not members of the United Nations. These non-state actors are not impressed with the moral authority of the world body.\(^4\) They can’t afford to be—intrastate conflicts are usually zero-sum games.\(^5\)

**THE U.S. EXPERIENCE IN PEACE OPERATIONS.** While U.S. military members have occasionally served in UN military observation missions (including the first one in 1948, the UN Truce Supervisory Organization {UNTSO}), none served in a UN Field Force prior to 1993. With the exception of the British in Cyprus, no great power military unit served in UN operations, a situation driven by cold war tensions and mistrust. The presence of superpower representatives in a military observation mission had some
benefits (they helped to keep folks honest), but drawbacks as well (they might become a target of non-state actors). 20

From 1993 to 1995, US units served in three UN field operations: UNOSOM II in Somalia, UNPROFOR in Croatia, and UNMIH in Haiti. The United States was the lead nation in the three largest operations authorized to date by the UN Security Council under the provisions of Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter: Korea (1950-1954), Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-1991), and UNITAF in Somalia (1992-1993).

United States units have also served in UN-authorized operations of regional organizations (IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia), and as of the date of this paper the United States is leading the NATO’s Operation Allied Force in Kosovo. United States forces also served in the Dominican Republic (1965-1966) and in Grenada (1993). The latter two interventions had a “thin veneer” of OAS and Caribbean participants, but were primarily US operations.

The US experience in multilateral coalitions (other than Korea and Kuwait) has been mixed. The Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon (1992-1994) was a failure; the Multinational Force and Observers (MNF&O) in the Sinai (1982-present) has been a success, primarily because Lebanon was a failed state situation, and the Sinai followed the pattern of a “traditional” peacekeeping operation.

The unhappy experience of US forces serving alongside UN forces in UNOSOM II in Somalia has led to a retrenchment in the original US enthusiasm for increased participation in UN peace operations. As a result of a reassessment of these operations by the Clinton administration, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) on 3 March 1994. Although the PDD itself is classified, an executive
summary was made public. In addition to recommendations on how the UN could better conduct peace operations, PDD-25 also presented three primary reasons why the United States should continue to participate in UN peace operations: (1) to persuade others to participate in actions of US interest, (2) to exercise influence on UN operations without unilaterally bearing the burden, and (3) to provide unique capabilities which other nations cannot.21 The PDD also underscored that while US units may serve under the operational control of a foreign commander under certain situations, US forces would always remain under US command.22

ORGANIZATION FOR PEACE OPERATIONS. The drafters of the UN charter envisioned a world system in which threats to international peace would be met by the collective action of the world body. Chapter VII of the charter included in Article 47 provisions for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee (MSC). Comprised of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives, the MSC was to be "... responsible, under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council."23 In other words, the job of the MSC was to translate political directives into military terms.24 The advent of the cold war prevented the MSC from operating as intended. To this day the MSC meets twice a month, only to adjourn without action until the next meeting. Some commentators hoped that the end of cold war tensions would bring a revitalization of the MSC, and continue to recommend such action.25 Such action is unlikely at present, however. Many smaller countries in the UN are not interested in revitalization of the MSC, fearing that it would consolidate more power in the hands of the permanent five members of the Security Council, at their expense.26
With the neutralization of the MSC, other methods had to be devised to address problems involving the use or potential use of military force by the UN. The aforementioned "Chapter VI-and-a-half" peacekeeping operations were developed by UN Secretaries-General towards this end, and over the intervening years a body of practice and custom concerning such peacekeeping operations was built up. In 1977 draft articles for peacekeeping operations guidelines were published by the UN that rendered some of this customary practice into written form.\textsuperscript{27}

Organization of a UN-directed peace operation begins with the issuance of a mandate by the UN Security Council. All five permanent members and at least four of the nine temporary members must vote for the creation of a mandate. Once authorized by the Security Council, the General Assembly establishes a budget for the operation and appropriates funds for it. The Secretary General is responsible to the Security Council for implementation of the mandate. The Secretary General chooses a Chief Military Observer of Force Commander, depending on the type of operation. The Secretary General may also designate a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSRG) who will exercise overall direction of the operation. Countries are solicited to provide troops for the operation, which are then deployed into the mission area. The member countries are assessed dues for the financial cost of the operation, and the operation is reauthorized as required by the Security Council on a periodic basis.\textsuperscript{28}

While the process sounds simple in theory, it is difficult in practice. The UN is not a sovereign state, and possesses none of the attributes of sovereignty—territory, population, ability to tax, a standing army, etc., and the UN doesn’t have the cohesive decision-making power of a sovereign state.\textsuperscript{29} There is no established UN joint doctrine
for military operations,\textsuperscript{30} nor is the UN secretariat structured for the effective command and control of military operations. As a result, UN peace operations are organized on an ad hoc basis on every occasion.

Some significant improvements have been effected in recent years, however.\textsuperscript{31} Until the early 1990's, the military component of the UN Secretariat consisted only of the Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, and a handful of officers. There was not even a 24-hour watch desk established to handle communications with deployed UN forces.\textsuperscript{32} At the time, and given the relatively non-controversial functioning of traditional peacekeeping missions, this was considered adequate by the UN bureaucracy. The logistics and budget administrative elements that supported UN peacekeepers in the field were an autonomous element, both in the Secretariat and within the deployed forces. The memoirs of former UN Force commanders and peacekeeping officers are replete with bitter complaints of the administrative inertia, lack of urgency, and lack of military knowledge on the part of UN bureaucrats.\textsuperscript{33}

Incremental improvements came as UN-directed operations mushroomed at the end of the cold war. Reorganization of the Secretariat resulted in the establishment of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Included within the DPKO are a 24-hour Situation Center and a Mission Planning Service. Administrative and logistics functions are now located in the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) as part of DPKO.\textsuperscript{34}

Structural problems still remain, however. Given the UN's lack of sovereignty, reorganizations can only accomplish so much. The keys to effective operations are in the
hands of the sovereign member nations of the UN, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council. Even when improvements are suggested or attempted, political and bureaucratic considerations may override them. One example of note is the issue of "gratis" personnel assigned to DPKO. Realizing the need for better military planning and support for the UN, over 30 nations loaned a total of over 100 military officers (including 12 US officers) to UN headquarters to assist in these functions, at no cost to the UN.\textsuperscript{35}

This situation fell victim to internal UN politics, however. Developing nations of the "G-77" have objected to this practice. Many feel they cannot afford to provide gratis personnel, and fear that the ability of the more powerful and wealthy nations to do so will result in undue influence, to the detriment of smaller nations. This issue is tied into the overall issue of representation as a whole. With the exception of a few autonomous UN agencies (UNDP, UNHCR, and UNICEF), the distribution of UN positions is based on "equitable geographic distribution", meaning that every region and member of the UN gets its "fair share" of billets. Smaller nations see this as a means of protecting their interests, which they believe might otherwise be submerged by the interests of larger and more well developed nations.\textsuperscript{36} As a result of complaints by the General Assembly, the "gratis" military personnel program was cancelled, and about 30 of the 100-plus gratis billets are being converted to funded positions based on geographic distribution.\textsuperscript{37} As of the date of this paper, the transition was less than satisfactory.\textsuperscript{38}

If the organization for UN-directed peace operations remains essentially ad hoc, the same holds even truer with regional and multilateral coalition peace operations. With the exception of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), no regional organization has an effective military planning and integration capability. Even NATO
suffers from many of the same issues that surround the lack of sovereign attributes inherent with non-state organizations. Other regional organizations have conducted peace operations with relative degrees of success (the Economic Council of West African States {ECOWAS} in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the Commonwealth of Independent States {CIS} in Tajikistan). These operations were organized on an ad hoc basis, however, and have had the same steep learning curves and financial problems suffered by the comparable UN-directed operations. Multilateral peace operations are most effective when there is one powerful lead nation (e.g. the United States in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and in UNITAF). Even then, the difficulties of integrating other nations with differing doctrines, organizations, capabilities, and political mandates are exceedingly difficult and time-consuming.

THE LEVELS OF WAR IN THE CONTEXT OF PEACE OPERATIONS. In the U.S. system, strategy is decided by the National Command Authority (NCA) (i.e. the President and his advisors). This strategy is further refined by the Secretary of Defense, acting with the assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is transmitted through the CJCS to the operational commander. Operations is the province of the appropriate Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the regional or functional area involved—he or she is the combatant commander who translates the strategic guidance into operational plans to support strategic objectives. Tactics is the responsibility of subordinate commanders, who translate operational objectives into tactical ones that support the larger goals.

A similar process is recognized by the UN, encompassing four levels. The Grand Strategic level is the preserve of the UN Security Council, which creates a mandate and
prescribes the political objectives. The Strategic level is the responsibility of the Secretary-General and his DPKO advisors, in consultation with the troop-contributing states. This level is where the political, military, and other resources are to be integrated and applied in support of the UNSC’s grand strategic objectives. The Operational level concerns the direction of military, political, and other supporting resources to achieve the strategic objective, and is the province of the in-theater SRSG or the Force Commander. Tactical commanders subordinate to the operational commander are responsible for the disposition of units and the accomplishment of tactical missions that support operational objectives.\footnote{39}

Lack of the attributes of sovereignty by the UN and other regional and organizations and multilateral coalitions that conduct peace operations hampers the effectiveness of those operations. In the case of the UN, strategic direction is split between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. Security Council mandates which create peace operations suffer from the often-diverse national goals and interests of the nations which comprise the Council. As a result, mandates are the result of an intentionally vague, “lowest-common-denominator”, decision-by-committee process. The lack of a clearly defined mission statement at the beginning of the operation has an adverse effect on everything that follows.\footnote{40} The inevitable result of this process is an increased burden on the operational commander, who, armed with broad and ill-defined strategic objectives, is left to try to translate them into attainable military objectives. His mission is complicated even further by the compression of strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war not found to the same degree in any other type of operation.\footnote{41}
Political considerations permeate the entire process, from the Secretary-General down to the lowest squad leader.

Although NATO is better organized, it suffers from some of the same strictures. The NATO Council of Ministers serves as the equivalent of the UNSC. NATO’s Director-General fills a position analogous to that of the UN Secretary-General. The main difference lies in the presence of a NATO Military Committee and a Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR), organized and sufficiently staffed to translate strategic objectives into operational ones, and with a subordinate framework of standing commands who are capable of executing those objectives. NATO still suffers, however, from the “consensus-by-committee” process, which can hamper strategic decision-making. Despite years of training and standardization agreements, the operational commander must still contend with national contingents of varying capabilities with regard to equipment, training, and interoperability. No other regional organization has achieved the same degree of progress as has NATO. Their peace operations, should they wish to conduct them, will of necessity be ad hoc ones.

Multilateral coalitions face a similar set of problems, but these are offset to a degree by the fact that there is usually one lead nation involved, who contributes the majority of the forces as well as the C3 backbone. Strategic direction is usually better, the operational commander is able to function with defined goals, and with patience is generally able to integrate national contingents who often present the by now familiar set of potential interoperability problems. The major disadvantage of multilateral coalition peace operations is their ad hoc nature.
Again, the unique combination of political, diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian factors must be borne in mind when considering objectives at all levels of peace operations, and the difficulty of establishing these objectives and integrating these factors should not be underestimated. The military component in UN-directed peace operations is always subordinate to political considerations, and "politics can prevent a force commander from doing militarily necessary things." Perhaps one of the most difficult issues for an operational commander in peace operations is that the idea is to use force to neutralize, not defeat, belligerents.

**OPERATIONAL FACTORS IN PEACE OPERATIONS.** The time factor is the immediate issue in peace operations. Given their ad hoc nature, simultaneous planning is required at all levels, with the certain knowledge that considerations from the political to the financial may result in drastic changes in objectives and the forces with which to implement them. In UN-directed operations, little can be accomplished until the Security Council authorizes the mandate, and the General Assembly funds it. This often results in a lag time of months between the time of a mandate authorization and the time a force is in place to carry it out. The lack of a standing UN army means that time is necessary to recruit and deploy forces, an additional consideration that must be factored into any time line. The same time considerations hold true for most regional organizations. Multilateral peace operations with a strong lead nation can deploy faster from a "standing start", but time will still be required to integrate other national contingents.

A common thread in the force factor of all peace operations, regardless of whether they are initiated by the UN, regional organizations, or multilateral coalitions is the requirement to recruit, assemble, deploy, and integrate dissimilar national contingents. In
the case of UN-directed operations, the familiar issue of equitable geographic representation arises. Multinational geographic representation is a political strength in peace operations, but an operational weakness, and the force structure may be determined by political and not military considerations.\textsuperscript{46} In traditional UN-directed observer missions and peacekeeping forces, this requirement is an irritant to the commander which can usually be overcome; a relatively benign environment will afford him the time to do so. In post-cold war “second generation” peace operations, however, the issue of the appropriate types, quantity, and quality of troop contingents has a direct bearing on the potential for successful mission accomplishment.

As Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali pointed out in “Agenda For Peace”, in the past traditional peacekeeping operations had no shortage of nations willing to send military observers or infantry units to an operation, but critical logistics units were hard to come by.\textsuperscript{47} With the dramatic increase in the number of peace operations since 1988, not only has the requirement for technical units such as logistics, C3, engineer, aviation, logistics, and intelligence risen, but “donor fatigue”, the greater requirements for more infantry units, and financial constraints have all combined to render recruiting of contingents even more difficult. This force quantity problem has exacerbated force quality problems. Many poor countries participate in UN peace operations because such participation subsidizes their military budget. These units are often provided with equipment and logistics at no cost to them, and contributing nations are reimbursed at a rate of approximately $1,000.00 per soldier—a significant sum given the low cost to the providing country.\textsuperscript{48} National contingents may arrive in the area of operations without even the most elemental support—climate-appropriate uniforms and equipment,
rations—even weapons. This capabilities mismatch will consume both an operational commander’s time and resources as he attempts to support these units; an increased burden on an already limited logistics structure. The quality of these contingents can also vary widely. Some may suffer from endemic medical problems, may be illiterate with the exception of their officers, may be poorly trained in basic military skills, may be corrupt, and in all likelihood may have few members who can speak English (the predominant language in most peace operational headquarters).

Force turbulence may also be a problem for the operational commander. Most peace operations are lengthy, and nations may rotate their contingents on a regular basis, creating continuity problems. Political or financial considerations may mean the complete withdrawal of a contingent from the operation on little or no notice.\textsuperscript{49}

The most critical force factor issue, however, is that of unity of command. There is no unity of command in multilateral peace operations. Many if not most nations are reluctant to put their forces under the command of a force commander from another nation. There are valid reasons for this. A foreign force commander has no legal responsibility to the force-providing nation, nor can he be removed or disciplined by that nation as is the case with their own nationals. Nations may be willing to put their forces under the operational control of a force commander on a situational basis, but in cases of doubt or disagreement with the force commander the national contingent will refer back to its own national command authorities for guidance. The United States is no different in this regard.\textsuperscript{50} These parallel lines of communication between the contingent and the force commander on one hand and the contingent and its national government on the other is an inescapable fact of life in peace operations. Also, with often vague mandates
come differing interpretations of them by different governments. The overall objectives
of the operation itself may be in dispute, much less supporting elements such as rules of
engagement. In several operations, national contingents have not only refused to obey a
force commander's orders, but in some cases have actively supported on or the other of
the belligerents in the conflict. 51 With unity of command rendered impossible, unity of
effort is the best that can be accomplished. 52

The space factor's importance is evident from the beginning, and is often directly
related to the urgency with which a mandate for an operation has been created. The force
commander will rarely be able to conduct a survey of the area prior to deployment
(particularly since in UN-directed operations the force commander may not even be
assigned until after the mandate is created). In most situations a survey team dispatched
by the Secretary-General prior to a Security Council vote on mandate creation will visit
the area, but may not have the time or assets to conduct an adequate military assessment.
The operational commander may then end up with insufficient forces to execute his
mission in the area assigned. In these cases, the commander will have to hope that the
moral authority drawn from representing the UN in a "neutral" status may serve to
ameliorate the risks otherwise presented by purely military considerations of the space
factor. 53 Additionally, lack of adequate mobility assets may hinder a force commander's
operations in operations that require large area coverage.

CONCLUSIONS. Peace operations combine political, diplomatic, economic, military,
and humanitarian factors to a greater extent than any other, and in these operations the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war will be compressed—often resident in the
same operational headquarters. Peace operations are formed on an ad hoc basis, often hampered from the beginning by lack of time, lack of planning, and by vague strategic guidance. Parallel chains of command and control are a fact of life in multilateral peace operations. Unity of command is rarely possible; unity of effort is the best that can be hoped for. Peace operations rarely solve the underlying political problem that gave rise to the mission. Remember, "you can have successful peacekeeping at the same time as unsuccessful peacemaking." There is a corollary to this, and that is the issue that getting into the operation, as difficult as it might have been may be easier than getting out again. "Having a precise exit strategy and date when establishing peace support missions is an unrealistic requirement given their dynamic and intractable nature."  

Finally, peace operations are here to stay. Whether they fulfill their "traditional" roles, as was most often the case during the cold war, or whether organized to respond to new issues such as humanitarian crises or "failed states", the necessity for these operations remains. Some crises will have only a peripheral affect on major powers, but public and world opinion will still require a response. In those crises where vital interests of a nation are not affected, multilateral peace operations are a means of sharing the burden while facilitating peacemaking. Enthusiasm for activist humanitarianism and peace operations can swing like a pendulum, as the world saw after Somalia. New crises arise though, and in some situations peace operations are the most acceptable and workable solution. Operational commanders must be able to respond, and to bring to peace operations a ready appreciation of the difficulties and limitations inherent in them.

2 Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations* (Fort Monroe, VA, 1997), p. GL-8. Quoting the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02, the Handbook defines ‘peacekeeping’ as “Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement”. ‘Peace enforcement’ is defined as “Application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.” ‘Peace building’ is defined as “Post-conflict actions, predominantly diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”


9 Ibid, II 20., pg 11.

10 Hillen, p. 50.

11 John Mackinlay, quoted in Hillen, p. 86.


14 Hillen, pp. 141,144; Coulon. pp 26-27

15 UN, *United Nations Peacekeeping*, p 2

16 Hillen, p. 25.


18 Ibid, p. 144.


20 Allan, p. 47.


22 Ibid, p. 1. For the difference in terminology between ‘command’ and ‘control’ see Hillen, p. 44.

28 Ibid., pp. 71-74.
30 Hillen, p. 165.; Allan, p. 80.
32 Coulon, pp. 136-137.
34 JTF Commander’s Handbook, pp. IV-4, IV-5, C-2.
42 Hillen, p. 25.
43 LtGen Emmanuel Erskine, quoted in Hillen, p. 244.
44 Schnese, p. 39.
45 Coulon, p. 172.
47 UN, *Agenda*, para. 51.
49 Hillen, p. 95.
53 Hillen, p. 244.
54 Allan, p. 13.
55 Schnese, p. 114.
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