NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

Joint Military Operations Paper

China’s Military Modernization effects on Operational Art

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College, in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the
Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

17 May 1999

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Abstract: China is developing capabilities with its ongoing military modernization that, when combined with regional diplomatic and economic initiatives, will affect the Operational Art of the Geographic Commander (CINC) and his ability to respond to regional crises and wartime situations. To meet this challenge, China has adopted a military modernization program, along with diplomatic and economic objectives, that will challenge the U.S. military asymmetrically across the entire spectrum of conflict. To meet this challenge, the CINC must conduct 'Operational Movement' and 'Maneuver' that will ensure the correct U.S. forces, properly trained, equipped, and adequately positioned are positioned to exploit China’s critical weaknesses.
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Introduction

China is developing capabilities with its ongoing military modernization that, when combined with regional diplomatic and economic initiatives, will affect the Operational Art of the Geographic Commander (CINC) and his ability to respond to regional crises and wartime situations. Specifically, China is seeking to establish itself as a regional power and has chosen national objectives to enhance its national power. Chinese “describe national power as a combination of economic strength and the level of defense modernization”.¹ In the post Cold-War world, China sees the U.S. as the only power capable of challenging its vital interests.² To meet this challenge, China has adopted a military modernization program, along with diplomatic and economic objectives, that will challenge the U.S. military asymmetrically across the entire spectrum of conflict. The pursuit of Chinese military, diplomatic, and economic objectives have direct impact on 'Operational Art' affecting the CINC.

Chinese National Objectives Development

Chinese security goals are ensuring regime security, maintaining territorial integrity, sustaining economic growth, maintaining a favorable regional balance of power, and expanding its international influence.³ Of these, they value regime security as the number one internal security issue, and territorial integrity as the number one external security issue.⁴ Economic security, though less important than regime or territorial security, is a means by which to realize both objectives.⁵ Through economic development, China can alleviate some internal domestic pressures threatening regime security as well as resolving a major territorial issue by easing the way for reunification with Taiwan. By balancing economic development
with military modernization, China believes it can avoid the pitfalls that caused the disintegration of the USSR.⁶

Chinese past military strategy of defense in depth, which depended on the vast size of China is no longer sufficient to support current strategic goals. China has been forced to reevaluate its military strategy for the following reasons: (1) Security challenges of defending China’s economically developed coastal region; (2) Vital sea-lanes on which China depends for trade and energy; and (3) An increasingly independently minded Taiwanese government. Though economic development is of lesser importance to regime security and territorial integrity, its absence or degradation would have a negative impact on the achievement of either strategic goal. This, in turn, drives Chinese military strategy to develop methods to protect its economic infrastructure through extension of its strategic depth.⁷

An additional element in assessing the military strategy of China is its view that the current international atmosphere is somewhat benign and lacks any direct military threats that could lead to total war. In the Chinese assessment, the most likely conflict, in the near future, would be a limited war fought along its perimeter. Using recent examples such as the war with Iraq, China views a limited war as one: “...of low intensity and short duration, emphasizing the joint operation of air and naval power, and the use of high-tech weapons systems and the most advanced military technology”.⁸ This assessment places additional emphasis on departing from a military strategy that calls for prolonged conflict.

To address these concerns, China has adopted a military strategy of active defense out to the first island chain. (See Map 1)⁹ Later, this would expand to the second island chain as Chinese capabilities become more advanced. This strategy serves to protect the most
economically developed regions of China, and encompasses all Chinese territorial claims such as Taiwan and those in the South China Sea. If carried out successfully, 'Active defense' will deny an opponent the ability to concentrate forces to strike at China. Chinese military capabilities in the 80's were insufficient to accomplish this type of strategy, and the Soviet example demonstrated the pitfalls of uncontrolled military expansion at the cost of economic development. To avoid stifling economic development, China chose a policy of incremental increases in capabilities that would challenge potential adversaries asymmetrically.

Additionally, the Asian economic crisis curtailed the number of potential adversaries. Whereas ASEAN was able to form a consensus to block expansionist aspirations of China in the South China Sea before the economic crisis, it can not do so today. Only the U.S. has forces in the region with sufficient capabilities to challenge China militarily. To meet this challenge, China has shaped its military modernization program, as well as its diplomatic and economic national strategies, to stress systems, tactics and policies that get at U.S. critical vulnerabilities.

Under the limited war scenario, China can employ an area denial strategy that does not create significant internal burdens. Chinese military strategy seeks to: (1) undermine U.S. presence in the region during peacetime, (2) deter U.S. from taking action in time of crisis, (3) and in the event of military operations, raise the cost of intervention higher than the U.S. is willing to pay to achieve its objectives. Diplomatic strategies that tie the region economically to China, coupled with latent military force could preclude access and influence to U.S. forces in time of crisis.

Potential areas of conflict with the U.S. include Korea, Taiwan and the South China
Sea. Though China may not openly confront U.S. forces in Korea, its military power could influence how any conflict is fought. This was true during the Korean crisis in ’94 in which China used its influence to maintain regional stability, and thereby removed a threat to its economic development. Taiwan is linked to the U.S. by a defense treaty, and any military attempt to unite Taiwan with China would be opposed by U.S. forces. However, a unilateral act by Taiwan to declare its independence, followed by the use of force by China may not trigger U.S. intervention. Lastly, disparate territorial claims in the South China Sea, have U.S. traditional regional allies, pitted against one another and China. In this situation, the U.S. has taken a stand off approach to the dispute, but may become involved if China decided to exercise its military muscle to settle the dispute.

Chinese military modernization seeks to address U.S. power projection capabilities that directly threaten China’s center of gravity – regime security. Programs stressing naval and air power modernization over that of the army are in keeping with this approach. As discussed, with a relatively low risk of another power invading China, the Chinese army can delay development thereby reducing the impact of military modernization on the economy. In this light, China has chosen to stress development in such areas as submarine forces, accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, smaller and highly trained mobile forces, command and control, targeting and surveillance technology, as well as space denial capability. Chinese modernization programs all get at U.S. power projection capability by threatening its forward-deployed forces, overseas bases, command and control functions, and surveillance capability.
U.S. Operational Art

The U.S. National Military Strategy (NMS) objectives require the geographic CINC be prepared to promote stability and defeat adversaries. Specifically, the CINC’s approach to accomplishing his tasks are through shaping the international environment, responding to the full spectrum of conflict, and preparing now for an uncertain future. In carrying out his mission, the CINC is forced to exercise ‘Operational Art’ in peace so as to properly organize U.S. military forces assigned in the ‘Operational Factors’ of space, time and force. Accordingly, China’s military modernization directly influences the methods the CINC uses to execute his ‘Operational Art’ in support of the NMS, through the entire spectrum of conflict.

Chinese policy seeks to maintain a stable region and is satisfied with a long-range approach to achieving its ambitions. However, this would not preclude some type of Chinese military opportunism, if risks were low, to achieve some long-term goal. Weak regional players coupled with a general U.S. withdrawal from the region make this scenario plausible. Countries, such as the Philippines, who have territorial disputes with China, are extremely vulnerable to military opportunism: “This vacuum is caused by Manila’s lack of effective military forces and an essentially inoperative military alliance with the U.S.” The NMS gives the CINC the mission of peacetime engagement. Military to military contacts, bilateral and multi-lateral exercises are just a few examples of how the CINC can bolster U.S. credibility at the operational level, while preventing Chinese military opportunism at the strategic level. Additionally, stronger military ties to regional actors would prevent China from conducting an ‘Operational Maneuver’ that undermine U.S. presence in peacetime, and severely restricts the CINC’s ability to respond to a crisis or war.
Greater regional understandings, such as the revised U.S. and Japan security alliance, give greater flexibility to the CINC and act as a deterrent for military opportunism by raising the cost to China.\textsuperscript{16} The revised guidelines provide, during a regional crisis affecting Japan's peace and security, the basis for greater bilateral cooperation. The CINC can further enhance this agreement with exercises that stress its military aspects. This would deny China the ability to omit Japan from any regional crisis, or diminish Japan's influence through the application of a shrewd long-term perspective.

It is clear that China understands the importance of 'Operational Movement' and 'Maneuver'. In a limited war scenario, China realizes both must commence before actual hostilities. Military modernization enhances the diplomatic power of China to achieve this goal. Through diplomacy and economic policy, reinforced by the threat of a credible military force, China hopes to facilitate the movement of its own forces while disrupting the movement of an adversary by isolating the area of operations. By making it unattractive and costly for regional players to support the U.S., China can influence these countries into denying the U.S. critical basing and landing rights. This could limit the courses of action available to the CINC in time of international crisis.

In any Chinese limited war scenario with the U.S., Chinese military thinking envisions controlling the pace and degree of escalation. "Limited deterrence rests on a limited war-fighting capability aimed at communicating China's ability to inflict costly damage on the adversary at every rung on the escalation ladder and thus to deny the adversary victory."\textsuperscript{17} By keeping goals limited, China intends to exclude the U.S. ability to deploy and concentrate its forces before war termination. Weapon systems such as highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles can be utilized in paralysis warfare to rapidly bring the
conflict to conclusion without inflicting unnecessary collateral damage and risking escalation. The success of this scenario is dependent on the relative strength of regional powers with respect to China, and the CINC's ability to have forces on the scene that are capable of deterring Chinese attacks.

The CINC has had the luxury of placing forces close to the scene of conflict and operating from regional bases located well out of the engagement envelope of any adversary. Up until the 1996 Taiwan missile crisis, U.S. forces chose their area of operations more with an eye on potential political impact then on an absolute need of force protection. With Chinese developments in long range surveillance, power projection and intelligence gathering capabilities, the Chinese have greatly improved their ability to locate, target, and attack U.S. forces. By maneuvering his forces into the littoral regions surrounding China, the CINC is only simplifying the locating and targeting problem for the Chinese. The CINC's deliberate plans must take into account that littoral access can not be assured during the early stages of any conflict, and may never be obtained. By operating away from the littorals, U.S. forces can still project power ashore, increase the difficulty of being located and targeted, and provide for better defensive depth. The negative would be a reduced sortie rate caused by increased distances from the targets.

Overseas bases allow U.S. forces to rapidly build up strength, and sustain that build up during a crisis or war. Increased vulnerability of these bases would put in jeopardy any plans that are dependent upon the unrestricted use of a particular port or airfield. Chinese missiles, such as the DF-21, with an 1125nm range have the ability to accurately hit hangers on an airfield.18 The missiles have the potential destroy U.S. forces such as logistical stores, aircraft, and ships at a forward base without endangering the host nation's people or property.
This greatly reduces the chances of escalation while increasing the risk to U.S. operational tempo. The CINC is faced with a finite number of choices to counter this potential threat. Employing a ballistic missile defense system would be ideal but is not yet feasible. Moving staging areas further east, out of China’s growing missile envelope, would better protect his force but cause a greater diffusion of his military power. Destruction of China’s missile capability early on in any conflict would be difficult to achieve due to China’s great size. Lastly, the CINC could respond in kind, making any attack on U.S. bases more painful to the attacker. Currently, the latter choice is the only viable option available, and can be augmented by placing more of the logistical tail in safer rear areas. Still, this would necessitate placing a greater burden on U.S. logistical transportation system, requiring increased numbers of fast cargo ships and aircraft to support.

Chinese learned, from the Gulf war, that logistical support and rapid deployment capabilities were just as important as actual fighting strength.\(^{19}\) By threatening U.S. regional sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs), China can indirectly reduce U.S. combat strength by diverting assets to force protection at the expense of offensive power. Advancements in Chinese submarine forces, surface naval combatants, air to air refueling capabilities, and long range surveillance are just a few areas in which Chinese military modernization has greatly enhanced their ability to accomplish this mission. Geographically, China sits astride important sea and air routes that are vital to some important U.S. regional allies, most notably Japan and South Korea. This geographic position and military capability, combined with other elements of power, could deter, compel, support or coerce Japan and Korea to follow paths more conducive to China’s desires then the U.S. A credible U.S. ability to protect SLOCs would be vital in ensuring freedom of choice for both Japan and Korea. The CINC
could build valuable confidence, as well as seeing to the adequate training of his forces, by demonstrating the ability to locate and track Chinese submarines in international waters in peacetime.

The ability to interdict or influence U.S. SLOCs to its forward bases would also greatly influence the CINC on how he sequenced his forces into a theater of operations. A real or perceived threat would require naval commanders to divert assets to ensure the protection of vital sea transport. Without firing a shot, a Chinese capability of interdicting SLOCs would hinder the CINC from concentrating all his forces against desired objectives. When this is viewed in a Chinese limited war scenario, one of short duration, the limited forces that are forward deployed would be forced to cover greater responsibilities. This, in turn, would either cause the CINC to scale back the scope of some contingency plans, devise new ways to meet his objectives with forces on hand, or call for more forward-deployed forces. The latter alternative is probably resource limited and not probable. To scale back the scope of contingency plans may not be diplomatically or militarily feasible. This leaves the CINC to devise new methods to get more mileage out of the same force structure. One area of U.S. advance is the ‘net-centric’ force with which the navy intends to leverage technology to achieve new levels of effectiveness.

Again, Chinese military modernization has directly targeted U.S. critical vulnerabilities, such as minimizing the affects of a U.S. high-technology force. Continuing development of an anti-satellite capability is an acknowledgement of the value China places on denying the exploitation of space to an adversary like the U.S.20 Chinese military leaders have noted how critical the role of information and electronic systems is in determining the initiative and achieving battlefield victories early on, and at low cost.21 By obtaining a
capability to properly exploit information warfare, while denying it to an adversary, China can control the duration and intensity of a conflict. This is achieved by causing an adversary like the U.S. to delay its concentration of forces or by rapidly causing a paralysis of an opponent like Taiwan. The ability to accomplish this could carry greater benefits than its actual use. Its mere threat may bring about the desired action. In this way, China can avoid the negative impact of an open conflict on its economy. In developing counters to the Chinese moves, the U.S. must remember that China is equally as vulnerable and gauge its responses accordingly.

The critical requirement for China to protect vulnerable coastal regions has forced it to seek weapon systems and methods that create deeper battle space. Therefore, China has sought increased capabilities in information warfare, modern aircraft, ballistic missile, and cruise missile technologies to target enemy forces in deeper battle space on a real time basis. 22 Radar and imaging satellites, both commercial and military, combined with a very robust SIGINT capability are all designed to give China the ability to seek out and engage a potential opponent in its operational depth. 23 To the CINC, this equates to loosing the ability of striking an enemy with forces that originate outside an opponent’s weapons range, thus creating an operational protection problem where none existed before. To solve this problem, the CINC can either remove the threat or divert more assets to the mission of force protection. China’s vast size and ability to disperse its forces make the first alternative difficult to achieve while the latter may not be completely within the capabilities of today’s forces.

Military modernization of China also stresses its geographic strengths while at the same time exploiting a U.S. critical weaknesses created by the geographic position of its base
of operations. Specifically, China has broadened its base of operations by building naval ports, airfields, power plants, and water supply facilities. By adopting a strategy of active defense, with all areas of vital interest to China lying relatively close, China has maintained its lines of operation relatively short to those of the U.S. The U.S. must overcome the tyranny of distance in any Chinese confrontation scenario, including peacetime forward presence. The tyranny of distance carries both a cost of time as well as one of resources. By developing capabilities that could challenge U.S. abilities to overcome this hurdle, China gets right at the principles of war; specifically the ability of the U.S. to persevere in its current policy. Since the Chinese view 'limited war' as one of short duration, forces must be on hand at the outcome of hostilities to have any value in determining its conclusion. The U.S. achieves this through forward presence, but at a cost in both manpower and materials. The CINC can review innovative methods of maintaining forward presence, place requirements for greater intelligence and warning (I&W) capabilities into the procurement system, and enhance regional alliances to maintain a broader base of operations. Good I&W would allow the CINC the greatest opportunity of ensuring the right forces were present before hostilities could break out.

The Chinese long view of its foreign policy and objectives allows it to suffer losses in the short run, while gaining strategic advantage over time. This policy goes right to the core of Chinese military strategy, which requires China, not an adversary, to determine how, when, and for what duration combat will occur. Chinese strategy depends on (1) its ability to forecast crises, (2) combining fighting with negotiation, (3) controlling the rhythm of the action, (4) and preventing an opponent from escalating through prevention. Military modernization lies at the center of all these objectives and is crucial in Chinese strategic
thinking. Failure of achieving one of these objectives would gain the CINC valuable advantage in the negotiation phase of any Chinese conflict. Uncertainty is created by removing the ability to control the rhythm of action, and can cause China to seek a negotiated settlement before the realization of their initial objectives.

**Counter Argument**

A logical counter argument to the above would be that China’s military modernization does not effectively influence the ‘Operational Art’ available to the CINC in time of a crisis or war. First, national goals of China do not pose a threat to U.S. interests and therefore its military modernization would never directly affect U.S. capabilities. Next, Chinese military strategy is essentially defensive, stressing regional stability, and does not pose a challenge to U.S. military forces. Lastly, though China has obtained some military capabilities that directly challenge U.S. critical vulnerabilities, it does not have the capabilities or the professional military to exploit those advantages in times of war.

The first point that China’s national goals do not pose a significant threat to U.S. national interests can be discounted when questions such as Taiwan are raised. Taiwan is viewed as a territorial issue by China, and is consider, by the CINC, as the number one issue that could cause the U.S. and China to go to war. Chinese strategist, under the strategy of active defense, view preemptive attacks to seize the initiative as crucial in their ability to overcome a stronger military power. To achieve an ability to launch quick and paralyzing attacks, China must develop advance weapons and cadres to employ those weapons. To counter this threat, the CINC must conduct operations in peace to enhance his geographic position in the region. This will allow U.S. forces to better apply their capabilities, and reduce critical weaknesses that distance plays on ‘Factor Time’.
The second point that policies of China are defensive in nature and any military modernization would not inherently challenge regional stability or U.S. interests is false when national security issues of China are considered. The point of contention between the U.S. and China is what either side views as internal security issues. Chinese defense modernization’s extends its strategic depth, emphasize limited wars, develops an offensive capability under the rubric of active defense, and emphasizes expertise and modern technology. Failure of the CINC to fully appreciate the impact and direction of China’s modernization would create opportunities in which China could employ its power to some achieve some limited goals.

Finally, the view that although China may have advanced weapons, it still lacks the professional military required to exploit those weapons is also flawed. The fact that China is acutely aware of this problem diminishes its import. A precept of Chinese military modernization is to emphasize “expertise and technology over the ‘red’ dimension and political indoctrination”. The Taiwan missile crisis in ’96 was a clear indication of Chinese capability to use modern weapons to achieve national objectives. The Chinese limited war scenario is designed to avoid the calamity that befell the Soviet Union by controlling the number of professional troops required are not beyond its means. The CINC must view Chinese capabilities in this setting to properly gauge China’s ability to affect his ability to project power in times of crisis and war.

**Conclusion**

As described in the NMS, the CINC, must ‘shape’, ‘respond’, and ‘prepare’ his geographic region to achieve the goals of regional stability and ability to defeat any adversary. Chinese military modernization has adopted a strategy of area denial, which has
long been the method for a weak power to attack a stronger power. German submarine warfare in the world wars, and the USSR naval strategy are just two examples. The CINC has a peacetime mission that directly influences his ability to function in crisis and war. By properly addressing the issues that China raises, he will achieve both NMS objectives.

To achieve this, the CINC must produce military conditions in his theater of operations that enhance his ability to achieve the strategic goal. Chief among these conditions is regional access and influence. Access and influence will permit use of vital overseas bases from which to project U.S. military power during times of crisis and war. Of almost equal importance are military capabilities that could nullify Chinese area-denial capabilities. Theater ballistic missile defense (TBMD), information warfare, and a robust anti-submarine capability would go a long way of combating Chinese capabilities.

The NMS describes four strategic concepts that will most likely produce U.S. desired conditions: strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, and decisive force.\(^{32}\) Forward presence gives the CINC the ability to be on the scene with sufficient force to influence a crisis. Use of forward bases allows those forces to be supplied and reinforced. Protecting those bases guarantees U.S. ability to concentrate all its forces at the strategic depth of an adversary. By properly identifying his requirements to the procurement process, the CINC can cause the right forces to be procured to counter his specific threat.

The CINC should concentrate his resources in areas that enhances his regional access, influence, and force protection capabilities. Regional exercise programs demonstrate commitment, improve interoperability, reassure allies and help relieve sources of instability.\(^{33}\) Specifically, regional exercises help to ensure U.S. access and influence with regional players. Denying the electronic spectrum to an enemy, while ensuring its friendly
use, would prevent China from concentrating its small forces in the U.S. strategic depth. Emphasizing traditional naval capabilities, such as surface and submarine warfare, that take into account the large geographic areas of the Pacific Theater of Operations would greatly improve force and SLOC protection. Military capabilities that make the Pacific region more transparent to U.S. forces would act as an operational and tactical force multiplier. Lastly, rather than closing with China, the CINC could explore options that allow his forces to project power at a greater distance against China’s center of gravity.

There are long-term risks to the CINC if he does not properly account for Chinese military modernization. Among these is a military force incapable of achieving the desired objectives of regional stability and a military power insufficient to defeat any adversary. Specifically, Chinese military modernization seeks to displace U.S. forces geographically. This in turn will exaggerate the negative impact of time and distance on U.S. forces while enhancing the geographic time and distance advantage of China. This would prevent the CINC from concentrating his force at China’s center of gravity while allowing China to deploy a numerically inferior force at a tactical and operational advantage. Any application of power, which threatens, or could threaten, regime security will cause China to reassess its objectives and negotiate. The CINC's Operational 'Movement' and 'Maneuver' should emphasize this point, ensuring that the correct U.S. forces, properly trained, equipped, and adequately positioned are available to exploit this vulnerability.
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