WEINBERGER DOCTRINE: COLD WAR DINOSAUR OR A USEFUL GUIDE FOR INTERVENTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA?

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

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This paper demonstrates that concepts behind five of the six imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine are still relevant to the post-Cold War era. Weinberger's six tests, in addition, are not as restrictive as they appear. Weinberger provides caveats and exceptions in his first five imperatives that allow policy-makers more flexibility in applying his imperatives. All the tests require mature, subjective evaluation by the nation's leaders. The sixth "last resort" imperative, however, implies too much restriction for policy-makers to deal with the complex post-Cold War threat environment. Further, the sixth imperative implies using the instruments of power sequentially rather than simultaneously. This does not optimize the use of all the instruments in concert and can, in fact, cause a policy to fail, as it did in Somalia.

As demonstrated by the Clinton Administration's failed policy in Somalia, following the concepts found in the first five imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine could have averted the failure of the TFR mission and subsequently the UNOSOM II mission. In contrast, following the sixth imperative of "last resort," implying sequential rather than simultaneous use of all the instruments of power, could have led to failure.

The Clinton Administration formulated PDD-25 to avoid many of the policy mistakes it had made in Somalia. Toward that goal, the Administration incorporated the concepts of five of the six imperatives contained in the Weinberger Doctrine, all be it in much less restrictive language and without the requirement that all of the imperatives be met to commit forces to combat. In PDD-25 the Administration rejected Weinberger's sixth imperative requiring combat forces be used as the "last resort."

The six imperatives, overall, are not as restrictive and dogmatic as many consider. Policy-makers must still make subjective judgments when evaluating a specific case against that test. The sixth imperative of "last resort" is the most troublesome for policy-makers because it is the most restrictive of all the tests and it implies that the military instrument of power should only be applied sequentially--not simultaneously. This imperative is the least developed and, probably, the most misleading to policy-makers. Even with the weakness of the sixth imperative, however, the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine still provide decision-makers with some concrete, practical guidelines in making inherently subjective decisions. The concepts behind each of the six imperatives serve as a useful complement to the more general FAS test.
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Chapter I. Introduction

On 28 November 1984, almost four years into the Reagan Administration’s campaign to strengthen the U.S. Armed Forces in order to provide a credible response to the Soviet Union, then Secretary of Defense Casper W. Weinberger delivered a speech to the National Press Club which caused a great deal of controversy and debate among policy-makers. In this speech he proposed six imperatives or tests which needed to be fulfilled before U.S. troops could be committed to combat. This original speech presented the tests as restrictive, with few caveats and explanations. Its purpose was not to establish criteria to determine when to commit forces to peacekeeping operations where the potential for conflict is relatively low. The criteria could be used, however, when deciding when and how the commit forces to a peace-enforcement operation, like that which occurred in Somalia 1992-1994, where it became likely that force or the threat of force would be necessary to enforce the peace.

These six tests are collectively referred to the Weinberger “Doctrin” or the Powell “Doctrin” after the two leaders who espoused the value of these tests when considering whether or not to recommend that U.S. forces be used in combat. Weinberger’s ideas on these six imperatives, initially presented in his National Press Club speech, were later refined and spelled out in detail as part of the overall defense strategy he articulated in the Spring 1986 Foreign Affairs article entitled “U.S. Defense Strategy.” At the time of the original speech many policy-makers, including the then Secretary of State George Shultz, believed the tests to be too restrictive because they did not allow for the use of the military unless vital national security interests were at stake and then only as a last resort.¹ When Weinberger rearticulated these same principles in 1986, he added
some caveats and explanations to the imperatives that made the tests a little more subjective and somewhat less dogmatic. It is likely that he modified his presentation based upon the criticism of senior policy-makers like then Secretary of State George Shultz.

It is important to emphasize that Weinberger did not intend his tests to be applied in a strict dogmatic fashion. He intended all the tests to be applied in light of the specific circumstances. The tests are subject to the subjective evaluation and consideration of the senior policy-makers using them. The simplistic application of each of the slogan-tests does not allow policy-makers enough flexibility to deal with such a complex decision as to commit U.S. forces to combat. The concepts behind each of these imperatives, nevertheless, may provide a useful framework to decide if and how to apply the military instrument of power. The Weinberger Doctrine should not be a replacement to the feasible, acceptable, suitable (FAS) tests; it should be a complement to it.

Little has been written about the Weinberger Doctrine since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War because many believe that the six imperatives are outdated and irrelevant in today's security environment where the U.S. is the sole super power and is required to assume a leadership role in peace-enforcement operations such as Bosnia and Kosovo. This may not be so. First, the Weinberger Doctrine may not be as restrictive in reality as it may appear on the surface. Most critics of the six imperatives do not look beyond the simple slogans of Weinberger’s original speech. Careful examination of the caveats to each imperative as presented in both of Weinberger’s presentations is required to apply the principles in the way that Weinberger intended them. Second, while the six imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine may be
considered too restrictive on the surface, the less rigid concepts behind each of the imperatives can serve as a complement to the feasible, suitable, acceptable tests by which military courses of action are currently evaluated. By looking at the concepts behind each of the imperatives and then applying them to the Clinton Administration's decision to employ force to remove Mohammed Fahah Aideed from the Somali political landscape in 1993, this paper seeks to determine if the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine are relevant to deciding if, when, and how to employ military forces in future peace-enforcement operations.

Many articles, Congressional reports, and other papers have been written about the policy decisions that led first to the deployment of Task Force Ranger (TFR) to Somalia and then to its withdrawal after the costly fire fight with the Somalis on 3-4 October 1993. None of these papers has analyzed the Clinton Administration's decision-making process against the conceptual criteria of the six imperatives of the "Weinberger Doctrine" in order determine if this conceptual framework could have helped the Administration avoid such a significant policy failure. This policy failure is significant because it caused the Administration to re-look its pending Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Presidential Decision Directive-25). The policy failure also caused the Administration to be more cautious in when and how it sent soldiers to Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia.

The paper will be organized in the following manner. Chapter II discusses each of the six imperatives, together with the caveats and underlying concepts behind these imperatives. Chapter III demonstrates the practicality of the Weinberger Doctrine by discussing how its concepts could have assisted the Clinton Administration in making its
decision if, when, and how to deploy TFR in support of United Nations Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II). The utility of the concepts is demonstrated by how they could have been used by the Administration to avoid the failure of Task Force Ranger in Somalia 3-4 October 1993. In Chapter IV the relevancy of many of the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine is further demonstrated by the fact that certain of these concepts were incorporated into the Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Presidential Decision Directive-25). Chapter V concludes that the six imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine are not as restrictive and dogmatic as many consider. Policy-makers must still make subjective judgments when evaluating the specific case against that test. The sixth imperative of “last resort” is the most troublesome for policy-makers because it is the most restrictive of all the tests and it implies that the military instrument of power should only be applied sequentially—not simultaneously. This imperative is the least developed and, probably, the most misleading to policy-makers. Even with the weakness of the sixth imperative, the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine still provide decision-makers with some concrete, practical guidelines in making inherently subjective decisions. The concepts behind each of the six imperatives can thus serve as a useful complement to the more general FAS test.
Chapter II.
Weinberger’s Six Imperatives and the Concepts Underlying Them

This chapter will discuss each of the six imperatives in depth. After quoting each imperative verbatim from Weinberger’s “U.S. Defense Strategy” article in the Spring 1986 edition of Foreign Affairs, the paper presents Weinberger’s explanations and caveats to that imperative. Next, the paper discusses the conceptual underpinnings behind that imperative and how those concepts are relevant in today’s security environment where peace-enforcement operations are common.

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless our vital interests are at stake. Our interests include vital interests of our allies.\textsuperscript{1}

This first imperative on the surface seems highly restrictive and even prohibitive. However, although Weinberger intended all the imperatives to be cautionary, his explanation of this imperative was based on a broad interpretation of what policy-makers consider “vital.” Specifically, while he believed that caution in committing U.S. forces to combat was both prudent and morally required,\textsuperscript{2} he left the definition of “vital” vague enough for the policy-maker to have considerable latitude in making decisions on this imperative. He made clear in his explanation of this first imperative that “American interests are nowhere etched in stone....Judgments about our vital interest will sometimes depend on the circumstances of the specific case and trends, as well as the intrinsic values. Our vital interests can only be determined by ourselves and our definition of the threat.”\textsuperscript{3} The former Secretary of Defense did not limit his definition of vital interests to include only “those of a broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation.”\textsuperscript{4} Weinberger broadly defined vital interests to include military actions
necessary for the U.S. to fulfill its responsibilities as a world power. This definition of vital interests would include what the current National Security Strategy of the United States defines as "important national interests." "These interests do not affect our national survival, but affect the our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live." This shows that Weinberger intended his first imperative to sound a note of caution to future policy-makers when committing forces to combat or potential combat while also allowing much flexibility in what the policy-maker can consider "Vital."

Secretary Weinberger probably left the term "vital" vague so as to avoid giving false signals to potential enemies. Vital can be defined differently depending on the security environment facing the U.S. The stable, bi-polar, cold war environment, which provided the context for Weinberger's six imperatives, is very different from today's environment where the U.S. is the sole superpower and leader in a world filled with pressures of irredentism, failed states, genocide, general instability, and the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this new environment, maintaining stability in key areas of the world may be considered as vital. Given the current National Security Strategy that seeks to shape the international environment so as to make it more secure, selective peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations may be considered vital according to Weinberger's interpretation.

The key concepts of this first imperative are caution and restraint in making the decision to commit American forces to combat or potential combat. Caution is necessary when soldiers' lives are placed at risk. The interests being pursued must be important enough to risk the lives of the troops being sent in harm's way. The human dimension of
this cautionary imperative complements the more antiseptic explanation currently in use of when resources should be committed to defend *important national interests*; specifically, the current National Security Strategy states that, "we will use our *resources* to advance these interests insofar as the costs and risks are commensurate with the interests at stake." The second concept in this imperative is the need for restraint in committing a limited and precious resource. Restraint is necessary because committing combat forces to a peace operation prevents that unit from being committed to another potentially more important mission. Restraint is necessary because each time U.S. forces are committed the prestige of the U.S. is on the line. The U.S.'s prestige was hurt when it prematurely quit its policy in Somalia after 18 soldiers were killed and another 78 were wounded in a firefight with Aideed's forces 3-4 October 1993. The U.S. was perceived as having little resolve to see its mission through. The concepts of caution and restraint derived from Weinberger's first imperative thus appear to have some relevancy in today's world in deciding whether to put U.S. forces in harm's way.

2. Should the United States decide that it is necessary to commit its forces to combat, we must commit them in sufficient numbers and with sufficient support to win. If we are unwilling to commit the forces and resources necessary to achieve our objectives, or if the objective is not important enough so that we must achieve it, we should not commit our force.

This imperative logically follows from the first. In the first imperative the policy maker is compelled to ask himself whether the interests at stake are worth the potential loss of life. If the first imperative is not satisfied, then there is no reason to even consider the rest of the imperatives. If the policy-maker determines that the U.S.'s interests warrant the use of military force, the second imperative emphasizes the need to allocate
the necessary forces and effort for success to be achieved. Weinberger does not narrowly define "win" to mean unconditional surrender. Nor does he believe that the use of military forces should be an all or nothing question. He understood that a small military force can sometimes be used early to avoid a larger commitment later on. He pointed out that an earlier, limited but strong military intervention against Adolph Hitler when he started to break treaties and remilitarize the Rhineland could have prevented the need later to fight a world war.¹⁰ For this example to be consistent with the sixth imperative, Weinberger must have assumed that all the other instruments of power (economic, diplomatic, and informational) had been attempted and had failed or were assessed to have no effect on stopping Hitler’s military ambitions.

Weinberger’s concept of the word “win” is directly linked to his third imperative which requires the policy-maker to define specifically what are the objectives that need to be attained to achieve success, victory, or a “win.” In other words, policy-makers must clearly define the objectives to be achieved and must ensure that the military is given the necessary resources to decisively achieve those objectives.

The most important concept of this second imperative is decisiveness. The U.S. must commit the necessary forces and materiel to accomplish the specific objectives defining victory. Decisiveness requires using overwhelming force to avoid the gradualism that was one of the problems with U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Weinberger emphasized that “If combat forces are required, they should be introduced rapidly and in the strength necessary to achieve their objective at the least cost possible.”¹¹ If the object is worth achieving, then make sure enough forces and materiel are provided to win decisively. This concept can be applied to conventional conflicts as well as peacekeeping
and peace-enforcement operations. This concept has, up to now, been followed in Bosnia but, as will be discussed later, was not followed in Somalia.

3. If we decide to commit forces to combat, we must have clearly defined political objectives. Unless we know precisely what we intend to achieve by fighting, and how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives, we cannot formulate or determine the size of forces properly, and therefore we should not commit our forces at all.\textsuperscript{12}

Weinberger’s third imperative is largely self-explanatory and closely linked to some of his other imperatives. These political objectives must be of sufficient importance to warrant the use of military forces. Further, this imperative requires policy-makers to clearly define what political objectives military forces are required to achieve in order for success to be attained. Weinberger cautions future policy-makers not to employ military forces unless they know what they want to achieve. Without clearly articulated objectives there is no way for policy-makers to explain to the American public and Congress why the Administration is committing troops and what it hopes to achieve by this commitment of troops. Further, without knowing specifically what needs to be accomplished, when, and for how long, there is no way for military planners to determine the force structure, resources, and operational concept required to achieve the decisive victory called for in Weinberger’s second imperative.

The concepts derived from Weinberger’s third imperative concern objectives and end state. Military planners need to know the political objectives and end state to determine the forces and resources required to achieve them. Once the military planners have presented the costs in terms of lives, resources, and time, policy-makers can assess whether the objectives desired are worth the cost of committing combat forces. The
military's assessment of these costs may cause policy-makers to make the political objectives less ambitious.

Altering the political objectives so that the ends are in balance with the means is sound both practically and theoretically. The practical aspect is obvious. The cost of an action in terms of lives and treasure must be in balance with the importance of the objectives sought. In the theoretical realm, the government, according to Clausewitz, must provide the rational political purpose for war.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, policy-makers are responsible for ensuring that the forces used are consistent with the objectives desired. Although "end state" is not specifically referenced in the Weinberger's Doctrine, the concept of "end state" is a logical extension of Weinberger's use of the term objective. End state is defined in the Joint Electronic Library as "What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of power."\textsuperscript{14}

The need for clearly defined political objectives and end state is essential for the Combatant Commands and Joint Force Commanders to conduct operational art.\textsuperscript{15} Operational art is the translation of political or strategic objectives into a series of coordinated tactical operations designed to accomplish those objectives. In practical terms, operational art cannot be successfully accomplished unless policy-makers clearly articulate what they want achieved by the military forces. Weinberger gives an example of what happens when policy-makers do not provide focus and direction to the military. "[I]n Vietnam, failure to define a clear, achievable goal, and a belief that we could achieve what some wanted without military victory, led to confusion and eventual withdrawal."\textsuperscript{16} In undertaking any military endeavor it is essential to begin with the end
state in mind. For military planners to develop a sound plan, policy-makers must be able to articulate what they wish the military to achieve. To avoid another potential Vietnam, Weinberger maintained, "When using force the necessity to win requires a clearly defined, achievable objective on which there is clear agreement."^{17}

4. The relationship between our objectives and the size, composition and disposition of our forces must be continually reassessed and adjusted as necessary. In the course of a conflict, conditions and objectives inevitably change. When they do, so must our combat requirements.^{18}

This fourth test is the balance test to the second test. In the fourth test Weinberger advocates continual policy reassessments wherever U.S. forces are in combat to ensure that the conflict remains in the nation’s national interests.^{19} If the policy review determines the conflict is still in the nation’s interests, then the second test is still valid; therefore, the U.S. must commit the resources and will necessary to win.^{20} Weinberger intended this imperative to help policy-makers avoid the potentially negative effects of "mission creep." This test is designed to prevent two different phenomenon of mission creep: where the mission is expanded without a corresponding increase in resources, the Somalia syndrome, and where resources expand exponentially to achieve a fixed goal, the Vietnam syndrome. This imperative seeks to ensure policy-makers keep the military means balanced with the ends sought.

The key concept of the fourth imperative is need for continual policy reassessment when forces are committed to combat. Policy-makers need to reassess the progress of the mission to ensure military costs do not begin to outweigh the potential gains. Policy reviews are necessary to ensure that the military is conducting its operations consistent with the country’s objectives and that the costs of achieving the ends is in balance with
the costs or means being employed. This timely, effective policy reassessment can reduce the potentially negative effects of mission creep and increase the chances of ensuring that the means are kept in balance with the ends sought. Weinberger recognizes that mission creep is not necessarily bad. The nation’s interests may increase and therefore warrant a commensurate increase in resources and effort. In addition, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the increased threat to the forces employed may require additional soldiers and equipment to prevent failure and ensure success.

Another way to think of the fourth imperative is to think of it as a continual reassessment of the acceptability portion of the adequacy, feasibility, and acceptability criteria for joint plans as described in Joint Publication 5-0. The acceptability criteria states, “Acceptable plans are proportional and worth the anticipated cost. They provide for accomplishment of the mission with available resources without incurring excessive losses in personnel, equipment, materiel, time, or position. They are consistent with the law of war and are militarily and politically supportable.”

Although some scholars have described the seeming contradiction of the second and fourth tests as a weakness in the Weinberger Doctrine, the fourth imperative demonstrates Weinberger’s recognition that war by its very nature is unpredictable and, therefore, in need of constant rational supervision. The government’s role is to ensure that the conduct of the war is kept rational. Government must ensure that the desired ends do not get out of balance with the means being employed. This imperative demonstrates Weinberger’s understanding of the fundamental nature of war as described by the master war theorist, Carl Von Clausewitz. The fourth test is in actuality a strength of the Weinberger Doctrine because it recognizes the inherent complexity and
unpredictability of combat. So, while the aim of war is to dominate the enemy so as to achieve a quick, low cost victory or win as the second imperative requires, the enemy may prevent this.

5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad, the U.S. government should have some reasonable assurance of the support of the American people and their elected representatives in the Congress.24

According to Weinberger policy-makers must be able to garner the support of the American public and of the Congress, which serves them, in order to see a military action through to a successful completion. Weinberger is not advocating that policy-makers conduct polls before deciding to use force. He emphasizes the need for policy-makers in the executive branch, specifically the President, to make a conscious decision regarding all the previous imperatives and then determine if they can justify the commitment of forces to achieve a particular objective. As a representative democracy, U.S. policy-makers have an obligation to the citizens they represent to educate them and build consensus to achieve the desired vital aim.25 “Sustainability of public support cannot be achieved unless our vital interests are threatened, and how, by the use, and only by the use of military forces, we can achieve a clear, worthy goal.”26 If the four previous tests have been satisfied, garnering the support of Congress and the American public will be much easier. Even so, this test requires the Administration to successfully justify to the American public its actions to commit combat forces. Weinberger cites Vietnam as an example of where not having a clear, obtainable vital purpose for the conflict led to the loss of public and congressional support. Here the Johnson Administration did not exert the great effort necessary to garner the consensus and support it needed to continue the
war. This led, ultimately, to the abandoning of the war effort at great cost to the prestige and credibility of the United States.

Weinberger, in this imperative, reveals a concept that transcends all levels of war and is of paramount importance in the conduct of any human endeavor: will.27 Weinberger is specifically addressing the strategic will of a nation that can only be garnered by the country’s leadership. If the President cannot clearly articulate why military force is necessary, what specifically are the “vital” national interests at stake, and why American lives need to be placed at risk to achieve these interests, then it is highly unlikely that a public and Congressional consensus can be achieved toward using military force. Without this consensus and with mounting casualties, policy-makers will have an increasingly difficult time maintaining enough support to see the military action to successful conclusion. As long as the military action stays in the benign peacekeeping realm and does not venture into the casualty-prone peace-enforcement or open conflict dimension, relatively little consensus building is necessary. The greater the number of casualties or risk of casualties and the greater the national treasure required to achieve victory, the greater the effort required to gain and maintain public and Congressional support. The more closely Administration can argue that the military action is in the nation’s vital interests and that the clearly-defined objectives can be achieved with the proposed military plan, the more easily it will be able to garner public and Congressional support.
6. The commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort—only after diplomatic, political, economic and other efforts have been made to protect our vital interests.\textsuperscript{29}

Weinberger states clearly that the use of combat forces should not be the first instrument of power to be used to protect the U.S.'s vital interests. Since Weinberger did not address specific caveats to this imperative elsewhere in his 1984 and 1986 writings, one must infer what he meant by this imperative from his use of his historic examples. His example of the need for using military force earlier against Hitler to prevent his rise seems to leave some subjectivity concerning this imperative too. Weinberger's use of the Hitler example may support an interpretation of this imperative that does not exclude the use of combat forces in instances where there is no time for the other instruments of power (economic, diplomatic, informational) to work or where the other instruments will not be effective. So, even though this imperative is restrictive, it may not prohibit the use of military force if the nature of the vital threat does not permit the use of the other more time consuming instruments of power. However, if Weinberger intended a more liberal interpretation of this imperative, he did not explicitly articulate it.

The imperative is clear that, if time is available, military force should only follow the use of the other instruments of power. A more problematic aspect of this imperative is its implication that the military instrument of power should not be used in concert with the other instruments. Weinberger seems to be advocating a less than completely effective method of employing the instruments of power. Most policy-makers would agree that the military instrument of power is most effective when used as part of an overall policy strategy that incorporates all the instruments of power in a complementary fashion to achieve a synergistic effect. However, while Weinberger's six tests dictate that
combat forces should be employed judiciously, he also sounds a note of caution to potential rivals: “Yet no one should interpret what I am saying as an abdication of America’s responsibilities—either to its citizens or to its allies. Nor should these remarks be misread as a signal that this administration is unwilling to commit forces to combat overseas.”

The key concept behind this final imperative is the same as with the first imperative: restraint. Military force should not be the first instrument of power contemplated to achieve a “vital” interest. Although restraint, for the most part, is a good principle for policy-makers to follow when deciding if to employ combat forces, too much restraint can be counterproductive. For instance, smarting from the military embarrassments in Somalia and Haiti, the Clinton Administration hesitated to use military force in Rwanda to stop the genocide, even though the risk to U.S. forces would have been small and the other instruments of power would have been ineffective in stopping the killing.

This imperative restricts policy-makers too much. It does not take into account instances where the other instruments need to be by-passed as in Rwanda, “bolt out of the blue-type” scenarios, or limited air strikes used to punish Libya in 1986. Depending on the specific situation, military force may need to be the first instrument of power used. Another problem with the imperative is that it implies the sequential rather than simultaneous use of the military instrument of power with the other instruments. Sequential use of the instruments are inherently less effective than the simultaneous use of all the instruments. Although the general concept of restraint in the sixth imperative is still relevant, Weinberger’s explanation of how it should be applied needs to be reviewed
and modified. While the concept of “last resort” is attractive because of its roots in the just war theory and its use in gaining public and Congressional support for military action, Weinberger does not analyze many of the valid exceptions to “last resort.” As articulated in the Weinberger Doctrine, imperative six is too restrictive for policy-makers and implies that the instruments of power should be employed in an inefficient, sequential manner.

Although Weinberger’s sixth imperative has many problems, the “last resort” argument can be very powerful in gaining support for military action. This is why, even though the sixth imperative was not included in PDD-25, President Clinton made the “last resort” argument for his support of NATO bombing against the Serbs. The importance of gaining and maintaining public support for military action was validated by the U.S.’s experience in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia and is yet to be verified by the U.S.’s experience in Bosnia and Kosovo.

This chapter has discussed all six of Weinberger’s imperatives. Weinberger intended that all the imperatives be used and met before forces would be committed to combat. Failure to meet any of the criteria would be sufficient to restrict the use of military force. Nevertheless, Weinberger recognized, “These tests cannot be applied mechanically or deductively. Weighing the evidence in specific cases will always require judgment.” By analyzing each imperative carefully, this discussion has shown that each imperative is less restrictive in practice than the slogan itself would imply. Even the sixth imperative has greater flexibility than is evident on the surface. Justifying military action as a last resort is useful in gaining public and congressional support. Even so, this imperative still restricts policy-makers too much and implies that the instruments of
power should be applied in an inefficient, sequential manner. Overall, the concepts in the six imperatives, if prudently applied, could help policy-makers decide if, when, and how the employ military forces to combat.
Chapter III.
Applying Weinberger's Tests to the Somalia Policy Process

Having discussed each of Weinberger's six imperatives in-depth, this chapter uses the concepts embodied in the six imperatives of the Weinberger doctrine to determine if the concepts could have assisted the Clinton Administration in making wiser policy choices in how it supported UNOSOM II. To accomplish this objective the chapter seeks to answer the following question: had the Clinton Administration applied the concepts embodied in the six imperatives of the "Weinberger Doctrine" in deciding whether to employ Task Force Ranger to Somalia in August 1993 to capture Aideed, could the military and policy failure resulting from the 3-4 October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu been avoided? These six imperatives and the concepts underlying them are presented in the order Weinberger discussed them.

Imperative #1: "Vital Interests of the Nation"

By strictly interpreting this first imperative, the Clinton Administration could have avoided the policy failure associated with the deployment of TFR to Somalia. Clearly, the US had no "vital" interests in Somalia warranting the commitment of combat forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States dated January 1993, the highest order interest of the US is defined as, "Foremost, the United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people." While the strategy also includes interests such as "global and
regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress” and “open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide,” these interests are secondary to the US’ vital interest. When Clinton Administration formulated its own National Security Strategy (NSS) in July 1994, it clearly stated that “Peace operations [in general] often have served, and continue to serve, important U.S. national interests.” But not all peace operations are of equal interest to the U.S. According to this NSS, peace operations in Africa are not as important as they are in Europe. While humanitarian interests dominate Africa, “European stability is vital to our own security....” A stricter interpretation of “vital” interest would have prevented the deployment of TFR.

In reality, the Clinton Administration was not using the Weinberger imperatives in deciding whether or not to deploy TFR. Policy-makers were dealing with the circumstances as they were presented to them. The Clinton Administration was easily able to make the decision to deploy TFR because, in effect, US Forces Somalia had become actively engaged in a counter-insurgency campaign against Aideed under the guise of enforcing UNSCR #834 which called for the arrest of Aideed for the 4 June 1993 ambush of the Pakistanis. The 10th Mountain Division Quick Reaction Force (QRF), which conducted the combat operations against Aideed and his Somali National Alliance (SNA), was under direct US command, not UN command. Only after months of failure by the QRF to capture or kill Aideed and mounting casualties produced by remotely detonated mines did the Administration authorize the TFR deployment. As a result, deployment of TFR was a slight escalation in the effort to bring Aideed to justice, reduce the casualties he inflicted, and bring political stability to southern Somalia.
Even if the Clinton Administration considered support of UNOSOM II important enough to commit TFR to potential combat, the first imperative’s concepts of caution and restraint could have caused the Administration to be more circumspect about whether the military was the best instrument available to achieve its objectives. If the military was deemed necessary to secure US interests, then the next imperatives would have helped avoid the failure of TFR once it was committed. But based upon the decision of the Clinton Administration after the 3-4 October TFR raid to build up then pull out by March 1994, Clinton Administration must not have believed its interest in Somalia to have been that important after all. The Administration was unwilling to commit the resources necessary to win.

Imperative #2: "Commit Sufficient Resources to Win"

Failure to apply the concepts of the second imperative resulted in the failed mission of TFR and the overall UNOSOM II mission. The Clinton Administration authorized the deployment of TFR based upon the reluctant recommendation of then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. Although General Powell and other policy-makers knew that the mission to capture Aideed was high risk, they only authorized TFR to take the minimum forces necessary to conduct the snatch operation.

General Joseph Hoar, the then Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, and General Colin Powell cut the AC-130H’s and the extra-platoon from the force package that TFR originally intended to use in the operation. TFR had trained with these units prior to deployment. Given the sustained, accurate fires provided by the AC-130s and their ability to cause fear in the Somalis, it is unlikely that as many helicopters would have been shot down or as many Americans been killed or wounded. Even if the Somalis
were still able shoot down the two helicopters in enemy territory, it is unlikely that the helicopter at the second crash site would have been over run.

U.S. forces in Somalia would have had even greater capability to manage the unanticipated events of 3-4 October had Secretary of Defense Aspin had approved the additional tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) requested by the MG Thomas Montgomery, the Commander of U.S. Forces Somalia and the Deputy Commander, UNOSOM II. Providing the minimum forces to combat is not wise given war’s unpredictable nature. The Clinton Administration did not follow the caution of this imperative that implies the need for overwhelming force to ensure victory over a thinking, adapting enemy.

Providing all these additional forces would not have been sufficient to achieve victory. These additional forces would, however, have helped to avoid failure of the overall mission by preventing the second crash site from being overrun and reducing the number of casualties. Victory required capturing Aideed. But this may not have been possible or possible only with great difficulty by the time TFR was ordered to Somalia. By this time, Aideed was already in hiding. If he could not be found, he could not be captured. TFR was too small to cordon off and search large portions of Mogadishu. If the Administration believed that the interests in Somalia were great enough, it should have provided the necessary resources to find and capture him or destroy his military organization.

Imperative #3: "Clearly Defined, Achievable Political Objectives"

The concepts of this imperative are complementary to the Second Imperative and also would have been useful to the Clinton Administration in deciding how to employ
TFR once the decision was made to commit them. While the second deals with the concept of winning, this imperative requires a definition of what objectives need to be accomplished for victory to be achieved. By identifying specific objectives and their logical extension the desired end state, policy-makers can determine more accurately the specific resources necessary to achieve those objectives.

TFR had clear military objectives: capture Aideed and his supporting leadership in order to cause the Somali National Alliance to accept the U.N. sponsored peace settlement. Implicit in this test is determining whether the objective the military is trying to achieve is possible. TFR had a low probability of capturing Aideed because he knew he was being hunted and consequently was moving every two hours, changing his means of travel, wearing disguises, sleeping at a different locations each night.\textsuperscript{11} TFR had lost the element to surprise at all levels. Aideed knew when TFR arrived in country. He observed TFR's tactics. His forces knew the precise time that the TFR left its compound at the Mogadishu Airport.\textsuperscript{12} The key to achieving success was finding Aideed and capturing him before he determined TFR was coming. Since TFR was able to conduct six missions without any serious injuries before the ill-fated 3 October raid, the problem was finding him before the enemy could learn how to shoot down TFR's vulnerable MH-60 helicopters. Each mission brought with it increased risk. In retrospect, without the intelligence on where to find Aideed, the mission was not feasible. Further, TFR, as it was configured, was not a suitable force to achieve the objective and victory by itself.

So, the combination of these last two imperatives could have assisted the Clinton Administration in determining whether or not to deploy TFR and, if it did, how to resource it. Imperative \#2 would have required the Administration to determine if
winning were even possible. At the time, the Administration knew it was a high-risk operation with about a twenty-five percent chance of success. But it was still possible. The concepts of Imperatives #2 and #3 would have emphasized the need for sufficient resources to achieve the objective defined as victory or, at least, avoid defeat.

**Imperative #4: "Continually Reassess Means to Ensure Balance with Ends"**

It can be argued that TFR had sufficient resources to capture Aideed if his location had been found. After all, TFR conducted six missions prior to the failed 3-4 October mission without any serious injury. That is why the Imperative #4 is so important. This imperative requires constant reassessment of resources applied to achieve objectives, in other words, a constant assessment of means, ways, ends, and risks. Here the Clinton Administration admits that it failed. Had the entire chain of command realized the increased threat TFR was facing after each mission, the Administration should have either provided the additional resources needed to capture Aideed or should have changed the objectives.

The Administration had decided upon a dual track approach that could seek a negotiated settlement with Aideed but continue simultaneously to try to capture Aideed. In effect, the Administration had altered its policy toward Aideed. The Administration never informed TFR of the policy change. As a result, TFR continued to execute its mission with the same vigor it had at the start, but with increased risk after each failed attempt to capture Aideed. The warlord’s SNA forces were observing each TFR mission and learning how to defeat it. The SNA succeeded on 3-4 October. Had TFR been informed that it was the supporting effort rather than the main effort in this new dual-track approach, it could have altered its tactics to make them less risky but still applied
the military pressure necessary to force Aideed to negotiate a settlement favorable to the
U.S. By applying the concept of continual mission reassessment from Imperative #4 the
Clinton Administration could have avoided the failed 3-4 October TFR raid and its
negative policy consequences.

After the failed raid, the Clinton Administration did conduct a policy
reassessment. The Administration determined that costs of nation building in Somalia
were not worth the potential benefits. With more important uses for American troops in
Bosnia, Somalia was simply not worth the effort. 18

Imperative #5: "Ensure Congressional and Public Support for Military Action"

Here too, it would have been useful for the Administration to have applied the
concepts embodied in Imperative #5 and made an effort to gain the support of Congress
and the America public for its policy to use U.S. combat troops to conduct peace-
enforcement operations and to capture Aideed. Had the Clinton Administration done so
prior to the 3-4 October raid, its overall Somalia policy could have survived. Because the
Administration did not explain to the American public why the peacekeeping mission had
changed to a counter-insurgency mission, the public was unprepared to see the bodies of
mutilated American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. 20 As long
as few lives were being lost in the effort establish peace and stability in Somalia, it is
unlikely that a significant policy change would have been required. But, because the
Administration did not resource TFR with AC-130s and the extra platoon, TFR was
unable to prevent the second helicopter from being over run by the SNA and reduce the
number of casualties.
Imperative #6: "Use Military Force Only as a Last Resort"

Use of this imperative could have both prevented the failed TFR mission as well as ensured its failure. On one hand, strict interpretation of this imperative could have prevented the entire debacle of 3-4 October. The Clinton Administration could have refused to support the UNOSOM II effort to punish Aideed and bring him to justice because U.S. vital interests were not at stake. Failure to deploy TFR would have required the UN to seek a diplomatic solution to the Somali problem.

Putting the vital interest issue aside, the requirement for "last resort" may have in fact reduced TFR’s chances for success. Some policy-makers argue that force was the only instrument of power that could have compelled Aideed to cooperate with the UN mandate under UNOSOM II. In this case, the Clinton Administration probably waited too long to use special forces to capture Aideed. Some policy-makers argue that Aideed could have been captured easily by a small group of special forces before he went into hiding. By allowing the UNOSOM II forces to attempt what they were not skilled and trained to do, surprise was lost and so were the chances of capturing Aideed.22

Another limitation of this imperative, as stated earlier, is that it implies a sequential application of the instruments of power. A sequential application of the instruments of power does not maximize the inherent synergy of applying them together. The Clinton Administration can be faulted here too. The Administration attempted to achieve success in Somalia using an almost exclusively military solution to an inherently political problem.23 Had TFR’s military pressure on Aideed been better coordinated with the diplomatic effort to gain his cooperation, U.S. would have likely succeeded in its overall objective, to gain Aideed’s cooperation in order to form a stable Somali society.
There is ample evidence to suggest that the TFR raids were applying enormous pressure on Aideed. He was in fact seeking a negotiated settlement. TFR was not integrated into a campaign using all the instruments of power to achieve the political end state. By emphasizing the military instrument of power to achieve success to the exclusion of the other instruments of power, the overall Clinton policy in Somalia failed.24

While possibly keeping the Clinton Administration from committing offensive combat forces, like TFR, to Somalia, which the first imperative would have done already, the “last resort” requirement, as shown above, can cause more problems than it attempts to solve. First, the FAS test may determine that combat forces need to be the first instrument of power to be used to solve a problem. Second, “last resort” may cause policy-makers to postpone the use of combat forces when where there is no time for the other instruments of power to work. Timing may be just as important as the instruments being used to accomplish the objective. Third, in contradiction to the implied sequential use of the instruments of power, the military instrument of power is normally best used when used in concert with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments. Given the overall limitations and lack of development of this imperative, it is not surprising that the Clinton Administration omitted it as a factor for consideration in PDD-25.

This chapter shows that the first five tests of the Weinberger Doctrine, had they been applied by the Clinton Administration in its policy in Somalia, could have prevented the failed TFR mission and possibly the overall UNOSOM II mission. However, following the sixth “last resort” imperative would have resulted in some of the same policy problems as actually occurred with the employment of TFR and the other
instruments of power. The Clinton Administration learned these lessons and incorporated them into PDD-25.
Chapter IV. PDD-25 and the Concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine

Having discussed how the concepts of the six imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine could have assisted the Clinton Administration in deciding if and, if so, how to employ TFR in support of its Somalia policy, it is time to analyze how five of the six concepts were incorporated into the PDD-25.\(^1\) The “last resort” imperative, while in the September 1993 draft, was deleted from the final PDD signed May 1994. This chapter will evaluate each of the imperatives in order to determine how PDD-25 incorporates the concepts contained in Weinberger’s imperatives.

The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD-25) addresses six major issues of reform and improvement—two of these echo the Weinberger Doctrine:

1. Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support—both when we vote in the Security Council for UN peace operations and when we participate in such operations with U.S. troops.
   - To achieve this goal, the policy directive sets forth three increasingly rigorous standards of review for U.S. support for or participation in peace operations, with the most stringent applying to U.S. participation in missions that may involve combat. The policy directive affirms that peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing U.S. national security interests in some circumstances, but both U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective.\(^2\)

6. Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and the American public on peace operations.
   - The policy directive sets out seven proposals for increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation between the executive branch and Congress; the President believes U.S. support for and participation in UN peace operations can only succeed over the long term with the bipartisan support of Congress and the American people.\(^3\)
PDD-25 provides policy guidance for multilateral peace operations that include a range of operations from peacekeeping, where potential for conflict is low, to peace enforcement operations, where the potential for conflict is high.

In contrast, the Weinberger Doctrine’s purpose is to provide more focused guidance on when and how to commit U.S. forces to combat. By extension, the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine should have some relevance in PDD-25, which provides guidance for employing forces in peace enforcement operations that may lead to conflict. The Clinton Administration has also applied some of these same principles when deciding whether to support and, if so, how to employ forces to support less risky peacekeeping operations.

In deciding whether to participate in UN and other peace operations, PDD-25 presents six factors for the Administration to consider when deciding whether to support peacekeeping operations and three additional factors to consider when operations are likely to involve combat (peace enforcement). Ideas behind the first five of the six Weinberger tests are found in these nine factors. The last test’s requirement for “last resort” is not considered. Further, unlike the Weinberger Doctrine that requires all the tests to be met before forces are committed to combat, PDD-25 is far less dogmatic and far more flexible. The directive advises that “Any recommendation to the President will be based on the cumulative weight of the above factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant.” Since all the factors need only be considered, policymakers have greater latitude in determining whether and how to support a peace operation.
The first imperative's conceptual requirement for caution and restraint is reflected in several places in PDD-25. The first major issue that the policy directive stated that it wished to address is the acceptance that the U.S. cannot support or participate in all UN peace operations and missions that thus must be prioritized based upon the national security interests at stake. It also states that the standards for supporting peace operations would become increasingly rigorous as the potential for conflict grew. The executive summary states, "U.S. and UN involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective." Toward that end, the presidential directive requires that the following factors be considered when deciding whether to support a proposed new U.N. peace operation (Chapter VI or Chapter VII):

- U.N. involvement advances U.S. interests, and there is an international community of interest for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.
- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) operations, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.
- The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and considered unacceptable.

In addition to the above criteria, PDD-25 lists the first factor to consider when deciding whether the U.S. will participate in a U.N. sponsored peace operation:

"Participation advances U.S. interests and general risks to American personnel have been weighed and are considered acceptable." This factor does ask policy-makers to consider whether these interests (vital or otherwise) are worth the risk to American personnel. Since, however, this factor does not require that U.S. "vital interests" to be at stake, caution and restraint are not as great in PDD-25 as it is in the Weinberger Doctrine.

The second imperative's concept of winning and decisiveness is found in two separate factors in PDD-25. The directive requires policy-makers to consider if "There
exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives and there exists a plan to achieve those objectives decisively." This imperative and the PDD-25 match closely. The main difference, however, is that in the Weinberger Doctrine this imperative must be met in order for troops to be committed to combat. The directive only requires these factors considered together with all the others. Again, this gives the Administration the more flexibility in deciding whether or not to support the troop deployment.

The third imperative’s requirement for clearly defined, achievable objective and, by extension, end state is restated in one factor for consideration in the presidential directive. The directive states, "The role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for U.S. participation can be identified." Again, the main difference is that in the Weinberger Doctrine this imperative must be met in order for troops to be committed to combat. The directive only requires this factor be considered with all the others. This gives the Administration more flexibility in deciding whether or not to support the troop deployment.

The fourth imperative’s concept of continual policy reassessment is restated as a factor for consideration in PDD-25. The directive states, "There exists a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces to achieve our objectives." In addition to this factor being just another consideration in PDD-25, not an imperative, it does not specifically state the need, as the Weinberger Doctrine does, to reassess whether the objectives themselves are still valid and worth the expenditure of lives and treasure in combat. The intentional or unintentional assumption in this factor is that the objectives remain valid and only means need to be adjusted to
achieve the presumably valid objectives. So, while the concept of continual policy reassessment is in PDD-25, the recognition that the objectives themselves may have to change is not included.

The fifth imperative's concept of marshalling the will of the American public and Congress is stated a factor for consideration in PDD-25. The directive states, "Domestic and Congressional support exists or can be marshalled." The presidential directive, in addition, devotes an entire section to describe how the Clinton Administration intends to improve communication and consultation with Congress. The directive acknowledges the importance of improving communications in order to gain the necessary public and Congressional support for peace operations. Towards this end, the White House recognizes that "To sustain U.S. support for UN peace operations, Congress and the American people must understand and accept the potential value of such operations as tools of U.S. interests." Since these operations support less than vital U.S. interests and may have only "potential value" in securing U.S. interests, the Clinton Administration will have to work harder to gain popular support for peace enforcement operations that will likely involve combat. Therefore, while the concept of marshalling the national will is present in PDD-25, in practice the White House may have a more difficult time developing and maintaining this will to achieve its objectives than it would if it followed a stricter interpretation of "vital interests" in the first imperative of the Weinberger Doctrine.

The sixth imperative's requirement for "last resort" was included in the September 1993 draft of PDD-25 but was deleted in the final draft. This is consistent
with the overall tone of the PDD and with the inherent problems associated with the sixth imperative.

While the Weinberger Doctrine, in general, seeks to strictly limit the use of military force to protect the most vital U.S. interests, PDD-25 seeks to use military force preemptively, judiciously, and purposefully to prevent a greater threat to international peace and security from emerging. To this end, the White House included, as mentioned earlier, the following factor for determining whether to support a proposed new peace operation:

- The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and considered unacceptable.\textsuperscript{16}

This factor assumes that the crisis has progressed to the point where some military force may be necessary to arrest the situation, but it does state that the other instruments of power were already unsuccessful or were deemed to be ineffective in the time required. This factor requires the U.S., as the most powerful world leader, to determine if the costs of inaction are unacceptable in regard to its own interests. Since the concept of restraint from the “last resort” imperative is purposefully weaker in PDD-25 than it is in the Weinberger Doctrine, the Clinton Administration’s criteria for the use of force is less restrictive than advocated in the Weinberger Doctrine.

Five of the six Weinberger imperatives can now be found as factors for consideration in whether and how to support future multi-lateral peace operations with combat forces. There is, however, no requirement for all five of the factors to be met before combat forces are employed. Since all the factors do not have to be met, policymakers gain increased flexibility in deciding when and how to employ combat forces to
peace operations. Changing the imperatives to factors is probably a more significant indication as to how the concepts of the Weinberger are used in practice than the omission of the sixth imperative. The increased flexibility that policy-makers enjoy with PDD-25 may result in increased risk that the U.S. will find itself in another indecisive, unpopular Vietnam-like war. Weinberger’s warning that his imperatives need to be used together, as a whole, may prove to be prescient considering President Clinton’s justification for and conduct of the air campaign against Serbia.
V. Conclusion

This paper demonstrates that concepts behind five of the six imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine are still relevant to the post-Cold War era. Weinberger’s six tests, in addition, are not as restrictive as they appear. Weinberger provides caveats and exceptions in his first five imperatives that allow policy-makers more flexibility in applying his imperatives. All the tests require mature, subjective evaluation by the nation’s leaders. As Weinberger stated, “These tests cannot be applied mechanically or deductively. Weighing the evidence in specific cases will always require judgment.”

The sixth “last resort” imperative, however, implies too much restriction for policy-makers to deal with the complex post-Cold War threat environment. Further, the sixth imperative implies using the instruments of power sequentially rather than simultaneously. This does not optimize the use of all the instruments in concert and can, in fact, cause a policy to fail, as it did in Somalia.

As demonstrated by the Clinton Administration’s failed policy in Somalia, following the concepts found in the first five imperatives of the Weinberger Doctrine could have averted the failure of the TFR mission and subsequently the UNOSOM II mission. In contrast, following the sixth imperative of “last resort,” implying sequential rather than simultaneous use of all the instruments of power, would have served to increase the chances of failure.

The Clinton Administration formulated PDD-25 to avoid many of the policy mistakes it had made in Somalia. Toward that goal, the Administration incorporated the concepts of five of the six imperatives contained in the Weinberger Doctrine, albeit in much less restrictive language and without the requirement that all of the imperatives be
met to commit forces to combat. In PDD-25 the Administration rejected Weinberger’s six imperative requiring combat forces be used as the “last resort.”

The six imperatives, overall, are not as restrictive and dogmatic as many consider. Policy-makers must still make subjective judgments when evaluating a specific case. The sixth imperative of “last resort” is the most troublesome for policy-makers because it is the most restrictive of all the tests and it implies that the military instrument of power should only be applied sequentially—not simultaneously. This imperative is the least developed and, probably, the most misleading to policy-makers. Even with the weakness of the sixth imperative, however, the concepts in the Weinberger Doctrine still provide decision-makers with some concrete, practical guidelines in making inherently subjective decisions. The concepts behind each of the six imperatives serve as a useful complement to the more general FAS test.
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Chapter I


Endnotes
Chapter II


7 Ibid.


12 Ibid., 686.


15 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Electronic Library, “DOD Terminology,” 386. Operational art-(DOD) The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid. 686.


20 Ibid.


23 Clausewitz, 89.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

Endnotes
Chapter III.


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid., 13.


8 U.S. Congress, Senate, 28-29.

9 Ibid.


11 This account of how Aidood was attempting to avoid capture is taken from Lechner, 10.


14 For a thorough discussion of the relationship between ways, means, ends and risk see Schneider, 16-20.

15 Drew, 323-324.

16 U.S. Congress, Senate, 44.

17 Haad.

18 For a detailed account of the Clinton Administration’s policy-making process in regard to Somalia see Drew, 322-330.

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**Chapter V.**

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