RUSSIAN DECEPTION OPERATIONS: ANOTHER TOOL FOR THE KIT BAG

A MONOGRAPh
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ABSTRACT


This monograph investigates the value of analyzing Russian deception doctrine and operations with a goal of improving US deception doctrine or operations. The question asked is: can an analysis of Russian deception doctrine and their use of deception lead to improvements in US deception doctrine, training, or operations? Brief investigation has revealed that deception is not used often at Combat Training Centers and that the loss of surprise is the single greatest cause of poor performance. Deception is a key tool in surprising the enemy.

This monograph first summarizes popular deception theory and US doctrine. It concludes that US doctrine, although unapproved, is prescriptive and focuses on the concepts of developing a deception plan. It does not highlight the “how” of a deception operation and examples are only available through reading history. Theory supports surprise as a goal during all operations, but theorists support varying levels of commitment to the use of deception to attain surprise. The author concludes that in light of today’s improved strategic and operational mobility each theorist considered would support the use of deception.

After summarizing deception theory and US doctrine the monograph considers deception in Russian military operations. First, the social, historical, and political influences are described. From this it is evident that deception is endemic to Russian culture and is part of their military culture as well. Second, Russian doctrine is summarized. The summary is of open source writings and WWII experiences. The information tends to be directive in nature. The doctrine tells Russians units what actions they must do to deceive the enemy. Finally, five deception operations are summarized to give the reader a sense for the Russian ability to conduct deception.

The result of the investigation is that several lessons are to be learned from the analysis of Russian deception doctrine and operations. Russian and US doctrines are very similar in principle, but each focuses in different areas. The Russians dedicate more resources, they place more emphasis on the role of the commander, they place more emphasis on the story as opposed to the objective, and they commit more to verifying their own deception plan.

Finally, recommendations are made for improvements to US deception education and training, and subtle changes to US doctrine. The education system must prepare planners for conducting deception operations. Planners must be educated about deception planning principles as well as the techniques available to deceive the enemy. Major training events must incorporate deception. And US doctrine should shift the emphasis from the objective to the story at the operational level of war.
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Chapter I

Introduction

*Surprise is the master key.*

United States Army deception doctrine is in a state of flux. FM 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*, is rescinded and no single source document for deception doctrine is available. Joint deception doctrine is available in Joint Publication 3-58, *Joint Doctrine for Military Deception*. Currently, Army deception doctrine is discussed in many manuals as it pertains to each manual’s subject. The most recent Army activity was the release of a draft FM 90-2, *Military Deception in Army Operations*. Since its release, no other additions or changes have been made to US Army deception doctrine.

Deception is a critical tool when attempting to maintain the element of surprise, a principle of war. Since deception is not used often, much less effectively during CTC rotations, a pattern of ignoring deception obviously exists, at least at the tactical level of war. By extension, the same lack of consideration for deception exists at the operational level of war.

The former Soviet Union used deception in support of every level operation: tactical, operational, and strategic. Their political slant encouraged them to deceive potential adversaries in ways that traditional western values do not promote. In this monograph I want to determine if Russian deception doctrine or their use of deception has merit for consideration in US deception doctrine, training, or operations.

Methodology

The question this monograph seeks to answer is: Can an analysis of Russian deception doctrine and their use of deception lead to improvements in US deception doctrine, training, or operations? Chapter I is the introduction and methodology. Chapter II discusses selected deception theory and US deception doctrine. United States Army doctrine will be reviewed
with the understanding that none has been approved as of this writing. However, given that the
draft manual is very similar to the older manual many similarities will exist. Some doctrine
will be summarized from Joint Publication 3-58. The views of Clausewitz, Jomini, and Sun
Tzu are compared in reference to deception.

Chapter III is a review of Russian deception information. Three subordinate questions
are addressed in order to understand the Russian views on deception. They are: 1) what are the
societal, historical, and political foundations for deception in Russian military operations. 2)
What is Russian deception doctrine? What are its principles and what do writings from
Russian sources say about deception? Length constraints dictate that this will be a brief
overview structured similarly to the review of US deception doctrine. Russians do not address
deception in their doctrine. Rather, they consider deception part of their military art. The
doctrine addressed in this monograph is a compilation of available sources, most of which are
published as part of on-going debates within the Russian military art community. And, 3) what
do their operations demonstrate about their use of deception? Have they used deception during
recent operations? Historical examples of Russian operations during WWII against Germany
and Japan and from the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan are
summarized. The chapter is organized into three sections, each addressing one issue.

Chapter IV is the analysis. The comparison of US and Russian doctrine reveals more
similarities than differences. Since the focus of this monograph is on the differences, they will
be addressed in detail. Where the differences warrant, recommendations are made for
improvements to US deception training and doctrine.
Limitations

The most significant limitation of this monograph is the lack of approved US Army or
Russian doctrine. Joint doctrine is available and US Army doctrine is emerging, but even the
released draft manual is two years old. Russian doctrine summarized from open sources was
more descriptive than authoritative. Most Russian sources are actually carried over from
former Soviet Union. According to Dr. Kipp, of the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, “what existed prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union is all there is;
Russian military literature on deception has not changed.”
Chapter II

Theory and US Deception Doctrine

"In war-time truth is so precious that she should be attended to by a bodyguard of lies."³

Winston Churchill
Tehran Conference, 1943

The purpose of this Chapter is to summarize applicable deception theory and US Army deception doctrine. The portion on theory briefly demonstrates that selected theorists do not agree on the value of deception or the amount of resources that should be committed to deception operations. A brief analysis of the applicability of each discussed theorist is included in chapter IV. The portion on doctrine sets the general format for the subsequent summary of Russian doctrine. The US doctrine addressed here is limited to that which is necessary for a complete understanding and for the comparison in chapter IV.

Theory

"The ultimate goal of stratagem is to make the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong."⁴

Theory on deception operations is found in many places. The value or relevance of the overall theory of war is questioned by many. Theory’s relevance to deception is critical because the theorists disagree on its value. They unanimously agree that surprise is nice to have, but not critical. They do agree that preserving surprise through deception is important or feasible. Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Jomini, and Liddell Hart are the theorists discussed. And one observation about modern deception theorists is addressed.

Clausewitz

Clausewitz did not place much value on surprise or deception. He realized they were factors, but not important ones. He felt “it would be a mistake...to regard surprise as a key element of success in war"⁵. He placed more value on surprise as a tactical device.
Clausewitz was a product of his time relative to attaining surprise. Wars were not “come as you are” affairs; they involved months of preparation and mobilization.

Clausewitz valued surprise for its effects on an enemy’s spirit. He recognized the psychological effects and the ability of surprise to make the enemy incapable of making coherent decisions.⁶ Surprise is time-sensitive and more easily carried out in operations requiring little time. Clausewitz equates surprise with tempo, and the greater the tempo of an operation the greater the potential for surprising the enemy.

As with surprise, Clausewitz placed little value on deception. He used the term “cunning”. Deception required a considerable expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increased with the scale of the deception and were rarely worth the effort.⁷ Clausewitz asserted that history failed to show any successful deception that was worth the price. Perhaps he left deception to the realm of the genius; therefore, he did not consider it a functional part of the theory of war.

Clausewitz understood the value of using the media. He said, “words, such as statements, declarations, and so forth... are the most common means of creating false impressions.”⁸ Modern words, statements, and declarations are those made by political and military leaders and disseminated by the media. Such actions occur primarily at the strategic level of war. But, remember that strategic deception sets the success for actions at the operational level of war. To Clausewitz the strategic level was the equivalent to today’s operational level of war.⁹

Interestingly, he used the term “sly mobility” and asserted that the forces available to supreme commanders simply did not have the mobility necessary to take advantage of deception.¹⁰ Perhaps the strategic and operational air and ground mobility of today’s forces would alter Clausewitz’s view of the value of deception.
Clausewitz’s views of surprise and deception were molded by his experiences. His views were linear in nature, two dimensional, and focused on land warfare. The value he placed on deception was limited by the speed at which information was disseminated. The improvement of air and ground mobility, especially for combat forces, would have modified his views on the use of surprise and deception. He would also place greater value on the use of political statements and the value of the media in influencing the enemy decisions.

Jomini

Generally, Clausewitz and Jomini agree on deception and surprise. They were both a product of their environment in which the size of armies had far outpaced the developments in mobility or communications. Jomini believed that surprise was rarely achieved because of the size of armies and the amount of time that it took to mobilize. The surprise that Jomini refers to is tactical surprise. However, Jomini does value efforts to deceive the enemy as to where your main line of operations will be (a goal of US deception operations at the operational level of war). In his chapter on diversions and great detachments, he mentions that one reason to separate a force from the main body is “to make a demonstration to draw the enemy in a direction where you wish him to go, in order to facilitate the execution of an enterprise in another direction”. He stresses that such an adventure is always secondary in nature and must not reduce the chance of success at the decisive points. Jomini, in this respect, supports US doctrine in that the resources required for the deception must be considered, and that a deception plan must be part of the overall plan to avoid a disjointed operation and misuse of limited resources.

Clausewitz and Jomini placed the greatest weight on destruction of the body of soldiers that made up the enemy’s main force. Attention was paid to lines of communication or other decisive points, but the battle was won and lost by a fight between the main forces of each side.
Whoever had the most on the battlefield at that time was most likely to win, thus Jomini’s reluctance to separate in forces into unnecessary detachments. As with Clausewitz, Jomini would probably place greater weight on deception with modern technology and weapon systems.

Sun Tzu - “All warfare is based on deception”

Sun Tzu differed significantly from Clausewitz’s perception of the value of surprise and deception. Throughout The Art of War, Sun Tzu alludes to surprise and deception. Deception is the most frequently discussed theme. Unlike Clausewitz, Sun Tzu believed that surprising the enemy was always possible and should always be on the mind of the commander. Sun Tzu valued the use of deception at all levels of war. Surprise is gained by a voracious appetite for information on the enemy, yourself, and the situation. The more known about the enemy the easier it is to surprise him. Conversely, information about yourself must be carefully guarded. Sun Tzu used secrecy, including keeping information from his subordinates, to preserve the element of surprise or to enhance the effects of deception.

Sun Tzu believed that the fundamental principle for attacks was to “go forth where they do not expect it, attack where the are not prepared.” Manipulation of the enemy was the best way to achieve a victory according to Sun Tzu. The simple act of deceiving the enemy was not enough: “the enemy’s leaders must be confused; if possible driven insane.” The principle method of concentrating ones own forces while forcing the enemy to disperse is through deception. Deception is based on a thorough knowledge of the innermost thoughts of the enemy. Never show the enemy the truth. Show him strength where you are weak. Portray weakness where you are strong. Reinforce the preconceived notions the enemy has about you. Use his intelligence collection effort against him. Much of US doctrine is supported by Sun Tzu; unfortunately, we do not have the same voracious appetite for using deception.
Liddell Hart

Liddell Hart is more current than Clausewitz, Jomini, or Sun Tzu. He wrote most of his material in response to the stalemate of World War I. In his opinion, time and surprise were the two most valuable elements in war. Sun Tzu would have agreed. The most valuable idea to emerge from Liddell Hart was the concept of showing the enemy the truth along with deceptive information. Hart conducted analysis that showed that surprise was beneficial to an attacker. His analysis showed that attacking forces did not need the traditional 3 to 1 ratio to gain success. His analysis concluded that successful attackers who did not have the element of surprise had average force ratios from 1.4 to 2.5 to the defender’s 1. Successful attackers, on the other hand, who did have the element of surprise had average force ratios of 1.1 to 1.4 to the defender’s 1. Surprise clearly is a force multiplier. Implications for future US operations are ominous. The author believes that the US will never again fight an opponent with 3 to 1 numerical odds. The US will have to take advantage of the value of deception in preserving the element of surprise.

Modern Theorists

Several modern authors clearly support the use of deception. They appear more likely in their writings to develop principles or rules that make deception more likely to succeed. They support the use of deception and seek to codify what improves the probability of success of a deception plan. Several similarities with current or practiced US doctrine will be obvious. For a deception plan to be successful it:

1) Must reinforce what the enemy believes and must be congruous with possible patterns of operations that the enemy expects.
2) Must be centrally controlled.
3) Requires thorough preparation and must be integrated with all operations.
4) Requires timely feedback of its effect on the target.
5) Requires strict OPSEC, both with respect to the enemy and within your own forces.
6) Present false indicators to as many of the target's sensors and collectors as possible.  
7) Allow the target's intelligence system time to analyze the situation, disseminate the data, and to take the desired actions.  
8) Be imaginative and cannot be "legislated" or "institutionalized" or it will "become predictable." 

Most theorists on war address deception, even if only to render an opinion on its value. Several popular theorists of war support surprising the enemy through the use of deception, but to different degrees. Theorists disagree about the price a commander should be willing to pay in terms of resources in order to surprise the enemy. Sun Tzu would argue that surprise is decisive, expensive, and worth it. He would expend significant assets to resource a deception plan. Clausewitz and Jomini would argue that surprise is important, but difficult to attain and rarely decisive. They would not commit significant assets to a deception effort. They were products of their time and accustomed to massive slow moving armies that took weeks to mobilize. Considering today's mobility and communications, the author believes they would support deception as a valuable way of attaining surprise over the enemy. Modern theorists say that deception is a valuable tool and have given several useful principles that improve the likelihood that a deception plan will be successful.

**US Doctrine**

Deception is defined by Joint Chief of Staff Publication 1-02 as "those measures designed to mislead enemy forces by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests." The US Army definition is the same but adds that the goal is to make an enemy more vulnerable to the effects of weapons, maneuver, and operations of friendly forces.

This section is a brief synopsis of US deception doctrine. The key elements discussed will form the basis for the comparison in chapter IV. Items discussed include: the general purpose of deception at each level of war, who is responsible for planning the deception, the
role of the commander, the fundamental deception techniques, the elements required in a deception plan, the cornerstones of deception operations, and the deception principles.

A common understanding of the levels of deception operations is necessary. Strategic deceptions influence the enemy's capability to wage war in a theater. The highest leaders at the National Command level execute them. Operational deception occurs before the battle and sets the conditions of battle so that the tactical outcome of battles and engagements are favorable. The objectives for operational level deception are to:

1) influence the enemy perception of friendly operational intent (objectives),
2) induce incorrect enemy conclusions and decisions about friendly forces being allocated to fight the battle,
3) induce incorrect enemy conclusions about force dispositions, and
4) induce incorrect enemy conclusion about the nature and extent of air and naval support to the ground maneuver.

Theater Army Component, Army Group, Field Army, and occasionally Corps commanders will consider operational level deception operations.

Tactical deception plans exploit the situation immediately confronted by the tactical commander. Typically, tactical deception plans are developed in the context of an operational deception plan. Tactical deceptions manipulate the decision cycle of the enemy commander in contact. The goals for tactical level deception are:

1) the enemy masses or disperses as appropriate,
2) the enemy holds in place or commits...or commits too early or too late,
3) the enemy adopts force configurations that are inappropriate for his operations, or
4) the enemy adopts a style of maneuver that is inappropriate to his opponents operations.

Although distinct from the operational level objectives these goals, at times, are applicable at the operational level of war.

FM 100-5, Operations, states that deception aids in the probability of achieving surprise. Surprise is a principle of war and should be considered in every operation. As with
surprise, deception must always be considered, but there is no doctrinal requirement to use deception during every operation. In fact, using deception with every operation is probably unwise.\textsuperscript{38} The goal of deception, at any level of war, is to mislead the opposing commander, prompting him to plan his activities in a manner that unwittingly serves the deceiver's objectives.\textsuperscript{39} Occasionally, an operation itself is the deception.

Deception planning must support accomplishment of the commander's mission. The higher level of command must approve deception plans. The plans must be integrated in order to prevent a conflict and their possibility of compromise. Deception must facilitate surprise; it is not an end in itself.

The staff agency responsible for deception is the operations staff, the G3/S3. Up to division level there is no special staff for planning or executing deception operations. Therefore, as operations are planned it is critical that deception is considered with each course of action. At corps level a special staff is resourced in the G3 section. The G3/S3 is responsible for good reason. Deception plans are as much a part of the scheme of maneuver as the real plan, and all courses of action are developed by the G3. Operation plans and orders and fragmentary orders are driven by the G3/S3 and may require adjustment to the deception plan.\textsuperscript{40} All staff agencies assist with the deception operation; for example, the G2/S2 is best suited to identifying where the enemy is vulnerable to deception.

Total staff involvement is portrayed as part of a deception plan. Actually, there in no requirement for anybody to know it is a deception plan. The commander may elect to keep the information to himself, to keep the information close hold, or to form a special ad hoc staff to control the deception.

The commander is involved with a deception plan through the military decision making process. Examples of what he might consider and discuss in his initial guidance are:
1) Should deception be considered in support of the main objective?
2) Is the enemy susceptible to deception?
3) What percentage of friendly forces can be used to support deception?
4) Should deception be used in support of supplementary missions?
5) Are units used to support the deception effort needed for the success of the main objective?
6) If yes, what is the maximum time allowed for the units to stop their deception efforts and redeploy to the main objective area?
7) Does the success of the operation depend on the success of the deception? 

These examples are not all-inclusive, but are highlighted in FM 90-2 as starting thoughts.

The focus of all deception operations is on the enemy. Deception is based on what you want the enemy to do, not what you want him to think. In addition to physical effects, electronic and obscurant based deception can degrade the enemy’s command, communications, and control capabilities (C³), make him question his intelligence collection and analysis system, and induce incorrect maneuver decisions. Caution must be taken to insure that the desired goal or endstate of a deception plan is consistent with the enemy’s military experience and that the desired picture conforms to the enemy’s expectations of our operations.

US doctrine describes four deception techniques that are used to present the story to the enemy: feints, demonstrations, ruses, and displays. Feints are limited objective attacks that give the appearance of the main effort. They are offensive in nature and require contact with the enemy. The timing of a feint is critical. A feint designed to force the commitment of the enemy reserve may attack before the main effort. A feint designed to draw fires or forces from the main effort may need to attack at the same time as the main effort. Often times, a feint is labeled as a supporting effort during an attack.

A demonstration is similar to a feint with one notable difference; no contact with the enemy is intended. Demonstrations lack the realism of a feint, but have some advantages. Demonstrations conserve combat power and the lack of physical contact preserves the force for follow-on operations. A much smaller force can accomplish a demonstration since no contact
is necessary. In fact, simulation devices may even be used when the enemy's reconnaissance capabilities are easily deceived.46

Ruses are tricks designed to deceive the enemy to obtain an advantage. A ruse is characterized by the deliberate exposure of false information to the enemy's collection means.47 An example of a ruse occurred during World War II when Rommel disguised Volkswagens to look like tanks. The effect caused the allies to think that his force was stronger than it actually was.48

Displays mislead the enemy's visual senses, including his observation by radar, camera, infrared device, or the human eye.49 Examples of a display would be the portrayal of a forward operation base or tactical assembly area designed to attract the enemy's attention while not exposing the actual locations.

The three cornerstones of US deception doctrine are intelligence support, integration and synchronization, and operations security.50 Intelligence support for deception is similar to that for other operations but specifies the need to know:

1) How the enemy decision and intelligence cycles operate,
2) What type of deceptive information the enemy is likely to accept,
3) What source(s) the enemy relies on to get his intelligence,
4) What does the enemy need to confirm this information, and
5) What latitude does the enemy commander have in modifying or changing an on-going or planned operation?51

In order to answer these questions, deception planners must have extensive intelligence support during all phases of the operation. This facilitates constant feedback on the enemy's reaction to a deception plan.52

Deception operations must be integrated into and synchronized with the maneuver plan. This highlights the importance of the deception plan being developed along with the
maneuver plan. Synchronization includes the centralized control of the timing, scheduling and execution of deception operations with true operations.53

Operations security (OPSEC) is critical to the success of a deception plan. Deception and OPSEC are mutually supporting. Effective OPSEC supports deception by minimizing the indicators that can give away our true intentions or our deceptive intent.54 OPSEC is not simply an administrative security program; rather it is used to influence enemy decisions by concealing specific operational information from the enemy’s intelligence collection assets.55

Joint Publication 3-58 lists six principles of military deception.56 They are similar to FM 90-2’s cornerstones of deception: focus, objective, centralized control, security, timeliness, and integration.57

The focus of the deception must be the enemy decision maker. Normally, the enemy’s collection system is not the target, merely the conduit to the decision maker.

The objective of the deception must be to make the adversary take certain actions or not take certain actions. The objective cannot be to simply make the adversary believe certain indicators.

The deception must be centrally controlled by a single element. Centralized control is required in order to avoid conflict among subordinate deception plans and to ensure they are portraying the same story. Although control may be centralized, execution may be decentralized.

“Successful deception requires strict security.”58 The simple knowledge of the intent to deceive the adversary must be kept secret. Even the knowledge of deception plans and orders must be protected by need-to-know criteria.

Timeliness is critical to a deception plan. Sufficient time must be allowed for the deception to be detected, but not recognized as a deception. The adversary’s collection system
must be allowed to collect, analyze, and report. Also, the decision maker (target) must be
given the time to make the objective decisions.

All deception plans must be integrated from subordinate to higher. The development of
the deception plan must occur simultaneously with the development of the operational course
of action. Typically, deception plans developed after the fact are not resourced or convincing.

A deception plan has five components: objective, target, story, plan, and events. The
deception objective is the ultimate purpose of the deception operation. The objective specifies
what action or inaction the enemy must be made to take at a specific time or place as the result
of the deception operation. These actions or inactions can then be exploited by friendly
operations.59

The target of a deception operation is the enemy decision maker that can make the
decision relative to the desired action or inaction. The purpose of clearly identifying the
decision maker is to focus the effort on those collectors that influence the targets decision
cycle.60 The deception story is simply what we want the target to believe we are doing.61

The deception plan specifies the operations that will be used to convey the deception to
the target. It is in the format of a standard operations plan. It can be included in a deception
annex or, if appropriate, included in paragraph three of the operation order.62 Planners must
always consider OPSEC. It is possible for planners to never use the phrase “deception” when
preparing or directing operations.

The deception events are those specific indicators and actions that present parts of the
total deception story to the enemy’s collection assets. These may take the form of actions,
inactions, or delayed actions as appropriate.

The author believes that US deception doctrines strongly addresses the fundamentals
behind a deception plan. It prescribes the parts of a deception plan and identifies the objective
as the most important. It has clearly defined principles and addresses the synergistic effects of three cornerstones of deception operations. The role of the commander and staff is differentiated with the staff’s being more prominent, unfortunately the staff usually has the least experience with deception. What is missing is the techniques or “how” of deception. These comments form the basis for the comparison to Russian deception doctrine in chapter IV.

This summary of US deception doctrine reveals that the fundamentals of a deception plan and the fundamentals of developing a good deception plan are available. Although incomplete and unapproved, the doctrine addresses the fundamental considerations of deception operations and the development of deception plans. It does not address the “how” of deceiving the enemy. The author believes that the missing “how” is why US operational forces do not practice deception well. The missing “how” is the tactics, techniques, and procedures for a US force using deception. Perhaps this is a reflection of the reluctance of the US Army or even western armies to develop a standard doctrine for deceiving the enemy. Some authors question the development of standard deception techniques, at least at the unclassified level. Many believe that written deception doctrine defeats the intent of deception because if you write it down and issue it as doctrine then you have essentially “tipped your hand” or limited someone’s imagination. Perhaps Michael I. Handel said it best:

Unfortunately, deception is a creative art and not an exact science or even a craft. For that reason, it is difficult to teach someone how to deceive unless he has an instinct for it. This explains why, despite the numerous wartime memoirs and detailed military histories which discuss deception, little has been written on the theory of deception or how to practice it. It is normally assumed that some military or political leaders are ‘deception minded’ while others are not. There is probably no systemic, structural way to teach the art of deception, just as it is impossible to teach someone to become an original painter. Perhaps the only way to learn this art is through one’s own experience.
Chapter III - The Russian View

This chapter summarizes the Russian views on deception. The purpose is to acquaint the reader with Russian deception doctrine and operations. The comparison in chapter IV will use information summarized in this chapter. The first section will explain the ease with which Russians use deception in everyday interaction with outsiders based on social, historical, and political influences. The second section will address what Russian writings say about deception. The term “Russian doctrine” will be used through the remainder of the monograph. The last section will summarize five Russian operational level deception operations.

Social, Historical, and Political Influences

The Russians have a strong cultural propensity to use deceit. There are social, historical, and political reasons for this. Socially their penchant for deception can be traced back several hundred years when small peasant villages were the lowest unit of society. Each Mir, as the villages were called, was a self-contained separate entity. This situation led to a distrust and paranoia about the outside world.64 Strangers were never welcome and during rare trading with visitors. Deception was used in order to protect themselves and their Mir from any perceived threat.65 Gradually within each Mir a crude system of government developed. The village elders, one of whom became the spokesman and mediator with the outside world, assumed the personality of the Mir: “secretive, deceptive, and autocratic.”66 Over time the Mirs developed alliances and a nation developed. A “Princely Court” was developed and based in Moscow. A “Grand Prince,” eventually called the “Czar”, became the nation’s spokesman with the outside world. As with the Mir, the Princely Court was secretive, deceptive, and autocratic. Contact with the outside world was avoided and visiting foreign ambassadors were kept in plush captivity and not allowed to see how Russian royalty lived.67
The 1917 revolution and the resultant Soviet Union did little to change the nature of relationships with outside entities. The inner workings of their government were rarely shown to outsiders. Deception was used habitually to protect them from the outside world, as they considered themselves the only bastion of true communism.  

The fall of the "Iron Curtain" has opened up much of the secretive society. However, the Russian government is still shrouded in a veil. Military to military contact has expanded, yet the Russians are reluctant to completely expose themselves to the West. Their resistance to the expansion of NATO is a continuation of their perception of constant threat from the outside. Historically, the Russian mindset for deception can be traced to the Mongols. "They [Mongols] specialize[d] in fast, mobile operations, employ[ed] deception on an immense scale, and enforce[d] an unusually rigid tactical doctrine in order to guarantee strategic flexibility."  

The immense deception was necessary due to the nomadic ways of the Mongols and the fact that they usually fought outnumbered. During their exploits the Mongols would send several columns on a wide front in order to force their next target to defend along several avenues of approach. Once convinced that their opponent was sufficiently dispersed and their spies had identified the enemy strong points, they would send one large column, bypassing and fixing strong points, to seize the enemy's capital. The Mongol leader Chingis Khan went as far as to plant false rumors in the enemy camp that garrisons were going to mutiny. As a result, Khan's opponent commanded his own garrisons to stand fast in order to prevent any desertions. The Mongol adeptness at forcing their enemy to commit the bulk of his force to the wrong area, exposing his flanks or to misapply his force led to many successful attacks. As centuries passed the nomadic Mongols settled and were assimilated into Russian society. However, their battlefield techniques continued to flourish.
After the 1917 revolution the Soviet regime kept much of the Czarist military expertise. During WWII they practiced deception in the same Mongol style. Aside from nuclear weapons, NATO mostly feared a massive armored thrust at an unexpected point that would penetrate into their rear.

Politically, Russian deceitfulness can be traced to the Czarist period based on their treatment of ambassadors discussed earlier. Lenin formed the doctrinal basis for Soviet socialism. He had read Clausewitz’s *On War* and firmly believed that war was the continuation of politics by other means. The eventual proletarian uprising against the Bourgeois that must eventually occur during a Lenin-style socialist revolution demonstrates this. Lenin once wrote, “no government says everything that it thinks.” The political system built by the Soviet communists was closed to outsiders. Such a closed society can build “webs of deceit” unlike western or democratic societies. Such deception may be aimed at the enemy or “at one’s own people.” One purpose of deceiving one’s own people would be to create higher morale or to increase the popularity of a potentially unpopular political action.

As stated before, the Soviet government considered themselves the last bastion of socialism. They viewed the West as having predatory aspirations towards all non-West or non-democratic nations. The Soviets believed that deception could not be separated into wartime and peacetime functions. Therefore, they practiced it in peace and war often. They do not, however, practice it openly; thus, the challenge of determining their doctrine.

Clearly the use of deception is embedded socially, historically, and politically in Russian culture. The military is a product of this culture and is comfortable with the use of deception. The use of deception for security has been prolific since the *Mir* was the societal unit. The use against an opponent has its roots in the Mongols. And finally, the political slant of the former Soviet Union led to the use of deceit for self-preservation during all interactions.
with outside nations. All of these factors still effect Russian deception operations today.

Westerners must be aware that when dealing with the Russians or when planning an operation against the Russians, they will use deception.

**Russian Doctrine**

"...Soviet doctrinal thought has made a convincing case that one must expect the unexpected."\(^7^9\)

"Surprise may not be preventable, but, given the Soviet doctrine for war, it has been thoroughly expectable."\(^8^0\)

The purpose of this section is to summarize available Russian deception doctrine. This section parallels closely the structure of the US doctrine section. The summary will be used in the comparison in chapter IV.

Deception is not addressed in Russian military doctrine.\(^8^1\) Russian doctrine is official policy, set in concrete, with no room for discussion. Russian military science, on the other hand, is "a system of knowledge on the nature and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war and the methods of its conduct."\(^8^2\) Russian military science is discussed in the open press and open to debate. A subset of Russian military science is military art. Deception is treated as an element of military art.

The Russians have twelve principles of military art versus the US Army’s nine principles of war. As with the US Army, surprise is one of them. The value of the Russian principle of surprise is stressed by the following definition:

surprise is one of the most important principles of the military art, entailing the selection of (proper) timing, the mode and manner of military action, allowing strikes when the enemy is least prepared to repel them and, moreover, paralyzing the enemy’s will to mount organized resistance. It is achieved by confusing the enemy of your intentions for battle, and by keeping secret your intentions for battle, and by concealing preparations for action; by applying new means of destruction and those types of military actions unfamiliar to the enemy; by correctly choosing the direction of the primary strike and time for its
initiation; by applying unanticipated strikes by means of aviation, artillery,
tanks, and the surprise use of all types of fire; by rapid maneuvering, decisive
action, forestalling the enemy’s launching of strikes...; by conducting deceptive
actions and camouflage; and by adeptly using the area’s relief characteristics
(i.e. geography)."^83

The Russians value surprise, for it makes it possible to inflict heavy losses upon the enemy in
short periods of time, to paralyze his will, and to deprive him of the possibility of offering
organized resistance."^84 Deception is the primary means of gaining surprise.

The Russian term most closely related to the English term “deception” is maskirovka.

The Soviet Military Encyclopedia defines maskirovka as:

a form of security for the combat actions and daily activity of the forces; a
complex of measures, directed at deceiving the enemy relative to the presence
and location of forces (the fleet), various combat objectives, their status, battle
readiness and action, and also the plans of the command. ^85

The term maskirovka is also associated with several other terms when considered in
English. They are all related to the military use of: “cunning, slyness, cleverness, guile,
craftiness, artfulness, stratagem, and wiles.”^86 Deception is clearly part of the Russian
military vernacular. Russian writings describe four categories of maskirovka:
camouflage, concealment, simulation, and imitation. ^87

An understanding of the Russian levels of maskirovka is necessary. Strategic
level deception is implemented by the supreme high command in order to preserve the
secrecy of preparations for strategic operations and campaigns and for disorienting the
enemy as to the real intentions of the Russian armed forces. ^88 Strategically, the
Russians want to deny the enemy information as to their intentions to attack or defend.
The initial period of war is critical to the Russians. Through strategic deception the
Soviets hope to surprise the enemy and catch the enemy unmobilized. Also, they see
an advantage of conducting preemptive attacks, including nuclear, against an unprepared opponent.

Operational level *maskirovka* is implemented by a Front (US Army Group equivalent) or Fleet (flotilla) commander and is directed at ensuring the secrecy of preparations of operations. The goal of Russian operational deception is to disorient the enemy as to direction of the main attack, troop strength, operational organization, and possible courses of action. According to Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov: “The mission of operational level deception is to disguise operations preparations and mislead the enemy about the intentions and character of impending actions.”

Divisions, lesser units and installations conduct tactical maskirovka with the goal of concealing preparations for combat or an installation’s presence. Tactical level *maskirovka* also conceals the presence of military objectives, intermediate and final.

The Russians have not specified a special staff member as the deception officer. During peacetime operations and training the responsibility probably falls upon the operations officer if on anybody at all. However, there are several reasons to believe that wartime organization would be quite different. During the first part of WWII Soviet Fronts created special staffs headed by a Lieutenant Colonel. Later in the war, special *maskirovka* control groups were created. They were composed of all branches and selected for their expertise. Normally this group was headed by an officer from the operations directorate and reported directly to the chief of staff.

Early during World War II there was a tendency to push the responsibility for deception to a subordinate commander, usually the engineer. Quickly, the Soviets learned that the engineer simply did not understand the entire picture. Later in the war,
in the 1943 field regulations, the Soviet high command specified that deception was the responsibility of the commander. Most exercised that responsibility through their maskirovka control group.

Their are four categories of maskirovka. These categories aid the Russian planner when developing deception plans. They are camouflage measures, imitation, demonstration, and disinformation.

Camouflage measures encompass all possible equipment and techniques. These are all the steps taken to hide equipment, units, and installations. This category also includes the use of terrain masking.

Imitation includes the very simple decoy and dummy and the very complicated electronic imitation of enemy signal traffic. Imitation also includes the false representation of one’s own units. For example, imitation includes making an abandoned airfield look like an active airfield for the purpose of attracting enemy attention.

Demonstration maneuvers are any kind of deceptive maneuvering of forces. This includes feints, demonstrations, and any type of movement that is in support of the deception plan.

Disinformation is used most often in the political realm. Misinformation is the popular term in the West. Disinformation involves the release of deceptive information through newspapers, television, and radio.

All of the above can easily be seen in the 1944 Soviet field Regulations pertaining to how the enemy was to be misled:

1) by concealing real objects from enemy reconnaissance and observation.
2) by changing the external appearance of objects.
3) by setting up dummy objects and by feints.
4) by spreading false rumors.
5) by sound discipline and by artificial noises.
6) by masking operations of radios, by setting up dummy radio nets and by radio deception. 99

In addition to the above “how” of Soviet deception during WWII, the following were specified as the desired results of the above actions:

1) mask an increase or redeployment of forces that the enemy has spotted,
2) block the enemy’s perception or identification of new weapons,
3) distract his attention,
4) overload the enemy’s analytical skill,
5) give the illusion of strength where none exists,
6) look weak where there is strength,
7) Use patterns of behavior so the enemy will not recognize offensive preparation,
8) Confuse enemy expectations, leading him to misunderstand...actions so that he fails to find the correct response to them. 100

Through all of these tasks and desired outcomes it is evident that the Soviets seek to deny the enemy indications of their upcoming operations.

Soviet researchers have identified several important requirements for an effective deception plan. The enemy’s intelligence collection system must be evaluated and a counteraction devised. The expected effect upon the enemy must be within the enemy’s operational capability. Deception operations must be centrally planned and done in detail. Deception activities must be integrated into the operational planning system from the very start in order to maintain their credibility, continuity, and diversity. And finally, initiative and creativity must be used in organizing and executing deception measures. 101

The Russians cite three “prerequisites” for successful maskirovka. The first is that planning must be secret. Only a select few must know the deception plan as well as the operational plan. The second is that forces must be assembled and concentrated secretly. In World War II, the Soviets took extraordinary measures to reposition forces secretly. And the
third is that forces must be assured of reasonable survivability, through all measures including
the use of maskirovka, prior to and during combat. 102

The Russians use guidelines for successful maskirovka: activeness, plausibility,
continuity and timelines, and diversity. Activeness refers to measures taken to degrade the
enemy's capability to locate friendly forces. The degradation of the enemy sensors can be done
electronically or by physical attack. The deception must be plausible. The enemy must believe
that the Soviet forces are capable of doing what we want them to believe. Plausibility also
refers to the quality of decoys and dummies. The deception must be continuous and timely.
The continuity refers to the constant portrayal through the operation and throughout the
organization, both horizontally and vertically. Timeliness involves the plan being detailed and
dictating measures in time and space. The plan must be diverse. The enemy must be shown
several reinforcing pictures of the deception input. Several different sensors or collection
assets must be targeted for deceptive input.

Russian deception doctrine has been summarized in this section. The author's goal
was to address the same aspects that were addressed in the US section. Areas not addressed
are the components of the deception plan and what potential physical outcomes the Russians
expected from their deception measures. This is because the topics are not discussed in any
available resources. They do not address potential actions that the enemy may make in
response to a deception plan. Instead, they address enemy perception.

Operational Examples

The purpose of this section is to familiarize the reader with five Russian deception
operations. They are operation BAGRATION against the Germans, the destruction of the
Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria, and the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and
Afghanistan. All are at the operational level of war or higher. These historical examples will be used during the analysis to support conclusions and recommendations.

**World War II against the Germans**

A brief introduction is necessary about Soviet deception operations during WWII prior to the specific examples. The Russians began using deception within months of the German attack. However, it was not measurably successful. They began experiencing success with deception roughly when the German attack had culminated and the Russians began conducting limited offensive operations. At this time Stalin became aware of successful deception operations and mandated its use from that time forward. Towards the end of the war every operation incorporated deception measures. Both of the following examples from WWII occurred during the final period of war.

By the summer of 1944 the Soviet Union had seized the initiative against the Germans and had become extremely sophisticated in their deception operations. The Red Army had begun conducting coordinated deception operations that encompassed the entire front with German forces. These operations were planned and controlled by Front and Army staffs.  

After four years of practicing deception, the Soviets had developed several rules of thumb for portraying units. Generally it took ten percent of the actual equipment in a unit to portray a unit to the enemy. In order to portray “a rifle or tank division, the Soviets required one rifle or tank company, one hundred mock-up tanks and self-propelled assault guns, one battery and twenty to thirty mock-up guns, ten vehicles, sixty to eighty mock-up vehicles, and ten to twelve mock-up field kitchens.” At the operational level, in order to display Corps and Army level units and their associated equipment, radio signals and communication centers were used.
Operation BAGRATION occurred during the summer of 1944 and involved a theater-wide deception plan. The Russian goal was to portray offensive preparations against the northern and or southern portion of the German lines, rather than in the center. The Russian high command dictated that Fronts to the south would simulate concentrations of divisions on the scale of eight to nine divisions per Front.\textsuperscript{107} They directed the Fronts use real antiaircraft guns and combat air patrols to defend dummy tanks and artillery. Also, the Fronts were to verify their deception by using observation aircraft and aerial photographs.\textsuperscript{108}

While simulating concentrations in the north and south the Soviets sought to hide the redeployment of forces to the center. As forces departed assembly areas they created false concentration areas to portray continued presence.\textsuperscript{109} For example, one front, the equivalent of a US Army group, created five concentration areas for tanks, twelve for artillery, seventeen phony fuel dumps, and twelve false ammunition storage points.\textsuperscript{110} In addition to the false sites the Soviets broadcast engine noise and imitated the units’ radio nets.\textsuperscript{111}

Real forces concentrating against the center moved mostly at night in order to avoid detection. Movement during the day was limited to small units during non-flying weather only.\textsuperscript{112} Forces were camouflaged during the day and contact with the civilian population was prohibited.\textsuperscript{113} Arriving units were prohibited from aerial reconnaissance missions over German forces and their radios were sealed to prevent their use. In order to protect the value of ground targets, units were prohibited from mass firing against German reconnaissance aircraft. In sectors where units were to attack they built field fortifications with false minefields to portray preparations for a defense.\textsuperscript{114}

The Soviets committed entire real Armies to the deception plan to improve its credibility. Three tank armies were moved to the south to draw German attention from the center.\textsuperscript{115} The Russian tank armies used the German collection network to their advantage.
Prior to occupying areas they sent teams of officers ahead to arrange for messing and billeting. The German agent network reported their movements and German forces reacted to their detriment.

The effects of the Soviet deception were decisive. They achieved their goal of convincing the Germans that the offensive would be against either the northern or southern part of the front. The Germans reacted better than anticipated; prior to the start of the Soviet offensive Hitler had repositioned all of his available mobile reserves to either the northern or southern part of the front. The Soviets understood the value of extensive deception plans conducted over time and spent months executing deception measures for BAGRATION. The Russian high command suspected that decision makers in Berlin controlled German positioning and that local commanders did not have the flexibility to react to intelligence in the short term. As the date for the offensive neared the Russians moved aircraft and other supporting equipment to the center. Forward German commanders detected the build-up of forces, but Hitler was already convinced that the main attack would occur against the north or south, not against the center.

During WWII, Soviets forces used ruses against the Germans that are worthy of mention. Soviet soldiers wore German uniforms in order to gain access to key locations or to falsely draw German soldiers to discuss truces. Soviet forces used white flags to draw Germans into engagement areas under the guise of discussing terms of surrender. Prisoners of war would be released or allowed to escape with false information. And finally, they would arrange for the capture of Soviet soldiers that had false information.118

World War II against Japan

The Russians had virtually perfected the use of deception by the time they attacked the Japanese. The force ratio of Soviet to Japanese along the border was 1 to 1 (roughly 700,000
to 700,000). The Japanese had anticipated that they would eventually fight the Soviets, but not as early as they actually did. The Japanese templated that it would take three months after the German surrender for the Russians to reposition enough forces to conduct offensive operations. The Japanese anticipated virtual human wave attacks along easily traveled avenues of approach. They also expected uncoordinated and ineffective use of armored forces. The Japanese based these preconceptions on German reports sent early in the war.\textsuperscript{119}

In order to deceive the Japanese as to their intent and timeline the Soviets began moving experienced commanders and staffs to the Manchurian area even before Germany surrendered and they had declared war on Japan. They moved into the area under false names and ranks.\textsuperscript{120} They were usually flown into the area to avoid observation by Japanese spies. When units were moved into the area they moved only at night and stayed away from the front. The rail lines leading to the Manchurian theater were covered by hundreds of miles of screens to avoid Japanese observation. Although the Japanese detected increased traffic they did not anticipate the amount that was delivered. In eight days 1.5 million men arrived and organized into eleven armies on three separate fronts. As forces arrived in theater they were scattered into small towns and kept away from the front. Only in the two days immediately prior to the attack did forces approach the front and occupy attack positions. During preparation for the attack, no reconnaissance beyond that performed by the previously occupying forces was allowed.\textsuperscript{121} Ground reconnaissance was permitted only from ground observation posts in order to prevent alerting the Japanese.\textsuperscript{122}

The Soviets took several additional deceptive measures prior to the attack to insure surprise. They did not declare war until the last minute. They left the local indigenous population in position along the border. Presenting an air of normalcy, the regular garrisons continued to farm the local fields. Officers from one of the regular garrisons were put on leave
until the last minute. Only units previously in the area operated their radio nets; newly arrived
units had their radios sealed until just prior to the attack. Only a select few high ranking
officers and staff members knew of the planned attack. Officers wore troops uniforms when
conducting reconnaissance along the border. And, in order to insure the effectiveness of
camouflage measures special teams of officers were detailed to monitor camouflage discipline
and officers were detailed to control and supervise all movements.\textsuperscript{123}

Once the attack began the Soviets deceived the Japanese by attacking with armor along
corridors that were not conducive to the advancement of such forces. They also attacked all
along the front and overwhelmed the Japanese. They intentionally avoided Japanese strong
points all along the front. They sought to bypass and encircle. Operating differently than
against the Germans, they attacked in a combined arms formation that was not the operational
pattern expected by the Japanese.

The results of the Soviet deception plan were decisive. The Japanese Kwantung Army
was crushed in eight days and eventually surrendered in twelve. They did not anticipate an
attack so soon after Germany’s surrender. They did not anticipate the early use of armor or its
attack through the difficult terrain. The Japanese were in no way alerted to the massive build
up of Soviet forces, and therefore took no additional defensive measures to counter the Soviet
preparations.

\textbf{Hungary}

On October 24th 1956, Soviet forces in Hungary took active measures to protect their
military and diplomatic interests against unrest. This sudden operation, the first of two
conducted, lacked a deception plan.\textsuperscript{124} They were merely protecting their interests as opposed
to crushing a rebellion.\textsuperscript{125} The second operation, the actual invasion of Hungary, on November
4th 1956, was prefaced by deceptive measures. The second operation was designed to crush
the unrest and emplace a government more receptive to the Soviet Union. The targets for the
deception were political and military. They included the Western powers (NATO), the
Hungarian government, the Hungarian military, and the Hungarian people.

At the time of the invasion the world was facing a crisis in the Middle East. Israel,
Britain and France were considering military operations to secure the Suez Canal from Egypt, a
Soviet client state. Meanwhile in Europe, Poland was in open revolution against its Soviet
occupiers. During any operation the Soviet Union had to concern itself with the potential of a
US military intervention in support of the US “rollback” of communism doctrine of the time.126
The Soviets elected to use deception to prevent any active intervention or resistance to their
operation until after it began in earnest.

Targeting all the parties at once the Soviets took active deception measures. During the
October 24th operation they used Hungarian radio to transmit false messages of revolutionaries
seizing military and political facilities in order to justify their own securing of the sites.
Between the initial seizures and the invasion they portrayed a Soviet Union wanting to help
Hungary and not interested in forcing its will upon the country. High level Soviet diplomats
visited Hungary and promised Hungarian leaders that they would withdraw Soviet forces once
the violence stopped. Via the Soviet press, the Soviet government deeply regretted the
bloodshed and asserted they had only sent in forces at the request of the Hungarian government
to reestablish order.127 They continued by assuring the people that the forces would be
withdrawn from Budapest when the Hungarian government felt that they could be dispensed
with. Also, the Soviet government feigned preparedness to engage in negotiations on the
withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungarian territory.128 The new Hungarian government
was optimistic about these promises. As a demonstration of their good will, the Soviets had
even begun withdrawing forces from Budapest. The Hungarian optimism was sadly wasted.
The Soviets began moving forces to airports under the guise of securing the withdrawal of Soviet equipment and their soldiers’ families. On November 4th 1956, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary in force. The effects of the deceptive measures placed the Hungarian government in an unprepared position, both politically and militarily. Also, Western powers had accepted Soviet promises at face value and were not prepared to intervene beyond protests to the United Nations.

**Czechoslovakia**

Tensions in Czechoslovakia in 1968 were similar to those in Hungary in 1956. The Soviet satellite was undergoing an internal struggle against Soviet Communism. The Soviets, not wanting to lose a valuable buffer state, began setting the conditions for an invasion earlier than they did in Hungary. At the time of the unrest no large Soviet units were stationed in Czechoslovakia. Rather, the Armed Forces of Czechoslovakia were firmly under control of their own government.

The Soviet Union began deceptive measures in preparation of the invasion months prior to the actual invasion. The first indicators were training exercises on the Czechoslovakian border with neighboring Warsaw Pact countries. Soviet military leaders also wanted to conduct joint Czechoslovakia-Soviet maneuvers. The Czechoslovakian government did not participate due to expectations of Soviet deceit. Only minimal communications forces were allowed into Czechoslovakia in support of the operations.\(^{129}\)

The Soviet press constantly threatened the counterrevolutionary factions in Czechoslovakia. NATO and Czechoslovakia became desensitized to the threats. In order to build up political support among the Warsaw Pact, the KGB created false caches of weapons supposedly placed just across the West German border in Czechoslovakia by the CIA.\(^{130}\)
The Soviets fooled the Czechoslovakians into positioning critical military assets away from the Soviet avenues of approach. Finally agreeing to participate in maneuvers with Soviet forces, two Czechoslovakian divisions were on the West German border when the Soviets invaded. Large amounts of Czechoslovakian fuel had been transferred to Poland to support the exercises.\textsuperscript{121} The Soviets were conducting their largest logistical exercise to date, involving army and naval forces.\textsuperscript{132} The exercise included forces from the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria.\textsuperscript{133}

Still fearing NATO intervention, the Soviets desensitized the alliance by conducting multiple exercises over a period of several months. Initially these exercises caused NATO to take certain prudent measures, but eventually were considered routine. During these exercises NATO communications were routinely jammed.\textsuperscript{134}

Once the decision had been made to invade, Soviet leadership quickly turned the exercise into an invasion. Only the most senior Soviet military leadership had prepared for the invasion. Preparations had been kept secret from all but a few individuals. The operation went off smoothly with almost no resistance and according to plan due to the Soviet communications forces already in Czechoslovakia supporting maneuvers.\textsuperscript{135}

Due to the deception, and the resulting false sense of security, Czechoslovakian military forces were not prepared to defend. NATO had not anticipated the invasion. The military operation looked too much like recent training events. In fact, NATO had reams of intelligence available on the Warsaw Pact maneuvers, but no one thought that the Soviets would actually stage an invasion.\textsuperscript{136}

**Afghanistan**

Soviet deception operations in Afghanistan can be viewed as military and political. Politically, the deception was aimed at Afghanistan’s government, world opinion, and potential
US intervention. Militarily, the deception was aimed at regular Afghanistan military units (not Afghanistan’s rebel population).

In the political arena, the Soviets sent high-ranking military personnel to assist the Afghan leadership in security affairs, counter-insurgency, and personal protection if necessary. Their actual mission was to organize a coup against the government in order to install a more pro-Soviet government. In support of the assistance mission the Soviets were even permitted to deploy an airborne regiment in order to secure the Afghan capitol’s airport. This brigade sized force turned out to be the lead unit of two airborne divisions.

Military or operational level deception that set the conditions for the tactical operations deception occurred in several instances. Soviet advisors to tank forces around the Afghanistan capitol had the batteries removed from all vehicles, allegedly to replace them with winterized batteries. Many of the same units that turned in batteries had also been convinced to turn in ammunition and anti-tank weapons for inventory. A friendly visit by the Soviet minister of communications was actually a commando team that eventually took over the central communications complex. On the evening of the invasion Afghan military officers were invited to a cocktail party with a “copious” supply of alcohol; the Soviet officers left early and the Afghan officers were locked in the building.

The preceding examples of Russian deception operations demonstrate their proficiency at deception. More importantly, they prove that the Russians have continued to use deception since WWII whenever military forces are involved. The examples from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan are particularly valuable as Russia begins offering to participate in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and peacemaking operations around the world.
Chapter IV - Analysis

The purpose of this chapter show that “yes” is the answer the question: can an analysis of Russian deception doctrine and their use of deception lead to improvements in US deception doctrine, training, or operations? Russian doctrine will be considered relative to the popular theorists discussed. US and Russian doctrine will be compared while considering the historical examples cited. Recommendations will be made throughout the analysis for improvements or changes to US deception training, doctrine, or operations. A summary of this chapter is in chapter V.

The theory behind Russian deception operations is difficult to ascertain. Clausewitz served in the Russian Army. Arguably, his book On War incorporates lessons he learned while serving with the Russians. One link to Clausewitz is evident. The Russians clearly understand the value of using deception in the form of media releases or verbal preludes to action during the time immediately preceding military operations. Since WWII they have successfully camouflaged their military operations as assistance or security operations. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan are examples.

Sun Tzu’s “all war is deception” is exemplified by the Russians. During peacetime maneuver training the Russian military does not stress deception, but during war they mandate its use. During the Cold War, the Russians took extraordinary measures to camouflage various military sites and to conceal their force development from the West. Sun Tzu, as well, felt that deception was always applicable. Sun Tzu stressed knowing your enemy. One of the Russian intelligence collection priorities in support of deception is the enemy’s collection assets and decision making apparatus. Perhaps the Mongols, who have already been identified as critical to Russian military development, were motivated by the same societal and cultural influences that prompted Sun Tzu’s writings 2300 years ago.
The earlier discussion of the societal, historical, and political foundations for Russian use of deception is particularly critical today. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union did not change the societal and historical foundations that support deception. The political foundations may have been altered slightly, but are still a factor. Dealings with Russia must still be undertaken with expectations of deceit.

NATO and the US must cautiously engage Russia through military to military contact. Invitations to Russia to participate in peacekeeping or peacemaking operations must consider any ulterior motives. Expecting such deceit on the part of the Russians is appropriate, when considering their invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan.

The preceding sections dealing with US and Russian deception doctrine and operations reveal many similarities between US Army deception doctrine and Russian maskirovka. Both consider deception important to the security and survivability of the force and to the achievement of surprise. They stress the theme of hiding the real and amplifying the false and use similar tools and concepts. They similarly emphasize that deception plans must be centrally planned at the highest level and coordinated horizontally and vertically. Each gives more credit to deception at the operational level of war. They acknowledge its value at the tactical level, but rely on operational deception to set the conditions for success at the tactical level of war. In both, tactical deception appears to be a by-product of a well-executed operational deception plan. The Russians consider high combat readiness of their tactical units a prerequisite for successful operational level deception. Both doctrines acknowledge that deception can be used during peacetime when preparing for war and that deception is fleeting and vulnerable to compromise. Therefore, they emphasize the value of operations security to deception.
The value of comparing Russian and US deception is in their differences. Comparison reveals subtle, yet significant differences. What the author will do now is identify those differences, examine them in detail, and assess their relevance to improving US doctrine.

The most apparent difference between US and Russian deception operations is their scale. Russians practiced deception on a massive scale during WWII. During Operation BAGRATION, thousands of mock-up tanks were used to simulate forces and entire armies were committed to demonstrations and displays. Soviet deception operations involved measures executed along the entire front against Germany.

Against Japan the Soviets concealed the movement of over a million troops and their equipment. They constructed hundreds of miles of screens to conceal rail movements. Clearly, the resources allocated to the deception effort are not a constraint.

US deception during WWII is best demonstrated by operation FORTITUDE, undertaken to convince the Germans that the main allied invasion was going to be at Pas de Calais (not Normandy). The objective was to fix German reserves, thus preventing their commitment against the Normandy landings. The scope of that deception in terms of dedicated assets was minor compared to the Soviet operations. The Allies simulated two Armies; one was an airborne army and one was commanded by Patton. The Allies did not commit any large real troop formations to the deception. Most of the deception supporting the landing at Calais was accomplished through double agents, leaked information, false landing craft, and air forces.

The lessons learned from the Soviet ability to conduct deception on a massive scale is that real forces must be committed to the effort and it costs; those committed are out of the fight for a period of time. In the Soviet example, units were selected to conduct simulations of larger units. Special deception units were also formed. The US should consider developing
the same units, as done during WWII on a minor scale. At the very least the US should train selected individuals to conduct simulations in support of a deception operation.

The focus of US doctrine is different from the focus of Russian material. US doctrine prescribes the process for developing a deception plan. Soviet material describes the required actions necessary to deceive the enemy. Russian writings and WWII regulations direct that maskirovka will be used and directs how it will be accomplished. Russians material leaves the process of developing the plan to the officers that will eventually be assigned to the maskirovka control group managing the deception. They will know what needs to be done, but will have to develop their own best way to integrate their plan into the maneuver plan.

The directive nature of Russian regulations during WWII was beneficial. Staffs were forced to use deception and gradually became very proficient at it. Russian leadership had acknowledged its value and ordered their forces to use deception. Deception is difficult and staffs use it reluctantly. Several attempts are often necessary before success is achieved. Russian experiences in WWII attest to this. Evidence suggests that Russian forces were not necessarily bound by regulation to use deception after WWII. However, operations in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan clearly demonstrated their aptitude for using deception.

US doctrine pays little attention to the mechanics of deception. The mechanics of deception are discussed in manuals that address tactics, techniques, and procedures and is typically a functional area responsibility. Soviet material focuses on the actions required to accomplish the deception. It is clearly threat based while US material is capability based. US doctrine addresses how to develop a good plan while Russian material addresses how maskirovka will be done. The author believes that Russian material is threat based against the
European armies faced in WWII and has been adapted slightly to account for modern technology and the Cold War.

The implication of a more focused doctrine is that the Russian material takes into account the reluctance of commanders and staffs to use deception. During WWII Russian leaders realized the value of deception and that units would not use it unless directed to, due to the difficulty. US doctrine is adequate for describing the considerations for developing a plan, but does not address the reluctance of staffs to use deception. US doctrine does not mandate the use of deception, only that it be considered. Russian material from WWII, on the other hand, mandated its use during all operations.

The implication for US deception doctrine is that the use of deception must be directed. Commanders and staffs must be presented with opportunities to practice deception. The Battle Command Training Program exercises would be an excellent opportunity for division and corps staffs to practice deception. Training professional soldiers in deception techniques would increase the understanding of deception and increase the opportunity for its use. The education would have to address technical aspects and the more "mundane" or "simple" aspects of troop movements and camouflage. The focus of the education would be on division and higher level planners. The technical nature of much of the material may necessitate classified instruction.

Russian writings place greater responsibility on the commander than US doctrine. During WWII, Russian commanders were held directly accountable for the initial formulation of the deception plan, obviously with counsel of his staff. The maskirovka control group, under the chief of staff, was responsible for the execution. The US commander is given the option of guiding his staff towards a deception plan after completion of the initial mission analysis. He eventually approves or disapproves what the staff develops.
The result is that US deception operations have a tendency to rely on more easily executed high technology techniques that require less lead time than an integrated deception plan that potentially involves major portions of the force. The reason for this is that deception is an afterthought, implemented by functional area experts instead of a resourced and integrated operational plan that incorporates deception at the direction of the commander. Russian examples from the first part of WWII demonstrate that stovepiped deception operations are less effective than operations that integrate deception from the very beginning.

Russians have demonstrated the willingness to use illegal ruses. The author believes that the US must remain on the moral high ground. However, there are lessons to be gained from this demonstrated capability. US staffs must be aware of the potential for “cheating”. The period leading up to conflict is a valuable opportunity for surreptitious operations on the part of the Russians or any belligerent. The Russians will seek opportunities to introduce forces under the guise of peaceful intentions or prudent measures when they are actually a prelude of future hegemonic desires. Operations preceding the invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan demonstrate their capability. As alluded to earlier, the author believes this propensity must be considered when the Russians offer to take part in any operation outside of Russian boundaries.

Both the US and Russians stress hiding the real and displaying the false. However, the results they seek from these actions are different. In terms of US deception doctrine, the US stresses the importance of the “objective” while the Russians stress the importance of the “story”.

US doctrine seeks to gain a specific planned response from the target. Typically, the response results in numerical superiority at a given time or place. Russians, on the other hand, value the shock that a successful deception has on the enemy’s system. Russians endeavor to
prevent the enemy from anticipating what is in their plan; they do not particularly care what they anticipate as long as the target anticipates wrongly. US doctrine, on the other hand, stresses the importance of the target anticipating a particular action and reacting to it in a particular way.

The different uses of intelligence collection assets by each doctrine support this conclusion. Both doctrines stress the importance of understanding the target's collection system and assets. However, they differ during the confirmation of effects of their deception plan. US doctrine focuses collection assets on confirming that the objective is attained. For example, has the target's reserve repositioned away from the main effort avenue of advance in response to a feint or has the target committed his reserve to a false amphibious area, thus leaving the real one exposed?

Russians, instead, focus collection assets to confirm that enemy forces are not reacting to what they are hiding. For example, has the enemy moved any forces to react to the planned main effort? Also, Russians will expend considerable assets looking at themselves to confirm that their own maskirovka measures are successful.

The difference in valuing the story or the objective manifests itself as a difference in operational design and the value placed on shock. US doctrine seeks to attain a resultant advantage in force ratios at a given time and location by surprising the target; the focus is on winning the immediate fight, not necessarily on trying to shock the enemy system. The Russians seek to shock the enemy system through surprise and thus reap the benefits of a degraded enemy system.

Implications for US doctrine are significant. Perhaps at the tactical level the US concept of objective is most important, but at the operational level the story is most important and has potential longer term affects on the target. US doctrine does not account for this.
Operational level deception must focus on the target’s system, not on one aspect of his system. Operational design must focus on the destruction of the enemy system. Therefore, operational level deception must target the enemy’s system.

The prioritization of objective over story is critical in another aspect. As collection assets become more capable, it will become harder to hide. History tells us it is simpler to confuse your enemy and take advantage of him than to convince him to act in a specific way that is prejudicial to his success. At the operational level, US doctrine must be willing to accept a confused enemy, rather than one that is as malleable as current doctrine prescribes.
Chapter V

Summary

Deception is more or less endemic to Russian culture and their way of waging war. They have strong societal, historical, and political drives to use deception. Likewise, they have proven that deception can have decisive effects.

Popular modern theory on war supports the Russian use of deception. Clausewitz acknowledged the value of deceptive measures prior to the initiation of hostilities, just as the Russians. The Russian belief that deception should be used during every operation is supported by Sun Tzu’s writings.

Russians have strong societal, historical, and political drives towards the use of deception. Since the establishment of the MIR the Russians have considered deception critical to their survival. The breakup of the Soviet Union has not changed that dynamic. Therefore, all offers of assistance from the Russians must be considered for possible ulterior motives.

US and Russian doctrine are similar in many ways. Both doctrines have worked well for each country and have demonstrated their value. However, in today’s environment of come-as-you-are wars, lessons can be learned from their differences.

The scale of Russian deception operations is unequaled in US operations. Russians dedicated entire armies to deception operations. The US, on the other hand, does not dedicate the same amount of resources as the Russians. The deception in support of the Normandy landings only simulated two armies. The allies took advantage of Patton’s notoriety and established radio nets for the simulated forces. They used false landing craft and false equipment sites. But very few real units were involved. The Russians designated units to simulate larger units. They established maskirovka control groups that planned the deception and then verified its performance.
Russian deception information focuses what to do to deceive the target while US
decception doctrine focuses on planning procedures. The result is a usable tool for staffs to use
when directed to perform deception. US doctrine, on the other hand, assumes that planners
know what actions deceive the enemy. Thus Russian deception writings are of more value to
an untrained staff directed to use deception.

Russians placed a greater emphasis on the role of the commander in deception
operations. As a result, staffs were forced to use a difficult tool and became more proficient as
WWII lengthened. US doctrine does not mandate the use of deception, it is optional.
Unfortunately, staffs usually place an integrated deception plan in the “too hard box” and
deception becomes an after thought. It is used, but not with decisive results.

Unfortunately, Russians have used illegal ruses. US forces must be on the alert for
their continued use. The best defense against these is force protection and local security.

Russians value the deception story versus the US value of the deception objective. At
the tactical level of war this is appropriate. At the operational level of war it is not. The
operational level of war concerns itself with the incapacitation of the enemy system, thus setting
the conditions for success at the tactical level.

**Recommendations**

The purpose of this section is to summarize the five recommendations made
throughout the analysis portion of this monograph. They address education and training,
awareness issues, and doctrinal shortfalls.

The officer educational system must improve education on deception. Everyone knows
what it is, but is unfamiliar with its practical application. Many planners are unaware of the
assets available to conduct deception. More importantly they are unaware of the critical
components of a deception plan. Russian examples show that deception is decisive. Their
WWII examples are the result of four years of hard war. US forces will not have the luxury of such on-the-job training.

The use of deception must increase during training events. Perhaps special exercises against the world class opposing forces by high level commands would be appropriate. An improved education system will promote this as officers become more knowledgeable on deception.

Awareness of the use of illegal ruses must be kept high. Although the US will never use them, potential adversaries will.

US doctrine must place greater responsibility on the commander when developing a deception plan. His experience and overall knowledge of the situation best facilitate deception plan development. More importantly, commanders must direct the use of deception.

And finally, US doctrine should place greater emphasis on the story than the objective at the operational level of war. The story is the component of the deception plan that is most likely to shock the targets system.

Conclusion

The Russians have a distinguished military tradition that includes the use of deception. This monograph has summarized popular theoretical, societal, historical, and political foundations for Russian use of deception. It has also summarized and compared US and Russian deception doctrine.

Clearly, Russian operational level deception doctrine and their use if it can lead to improvements in US deception doctrine. This monograph has determined that US doctrine better describes the process of developing a deception plan, but does not assist the staff in the mechanics of deception. Russian deception writings are the complete opposite. Ways to overcome that involve training and education. The two key doctrinal issues are the involvement
of the commander and the importance of the objective over the story. Both can be easily remedied perhaps through education and training.

In conclusion, deception is a tool that is kept clean and in the box. It is charged up and ready to go. The US must be prepared to use this valuable combat multiplier especially in today's environment of minimum forces and maximum effects.
ENDNOTES

1 Infantry In Battle, The Infantry Journal Incorporated, Washington DC, (Richmond VA: Garrett and Massie, second reprinting, 1986, original 1939), 64.


4 Michael I. Handel, Military Deception in Peace and War (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1985), 7. “Stratagem” refers to deception at the strategic level of war. Several sources use the term to describe deception in general. Michael I. Handel is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and is one of the more modern writers on deception.


6 Ibid., 201.

7 Ibid., 203.

8 Ibid., 202.

9 In On War, Clausewitz discusses the “strategic” and “tactical” level of war. Modern interpretation of his levels is the operational and tactical levels. Clausewitz asserts that war is the extension of policy by other means, policy being the political aspect and the strategic level of war.

10 Clausewitz, 302.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


20 Whaley, 199.


22 Dewar, 14.

23 Dewar, 14 and Fowler, 42.

24 Fowler, 42.

25 Fowler, 42 and Dewar, 15.

26 Dewar, 15.

27 Fowler, 42.

28 Ibid., 42.


34 Ibid., 2-1.

35 Dewar, 15.

36 Center for Army Lessons Learned, idem, “Deception,” Newsletter 3-88, 15.

37 FM 90-2, 1-29.

38 Ibid., 6-0.


40 FM 90-2, 4-1.

41 Ibid., 4-3. Arguably, some of the wording used in FM 90-2 is inappropriate for maneuver terminology. That is a reflection of its date and authorship. The author is of the opinion that primary authorship should be at Ft Leavenworth, not the US Army Intelligence Center.

42 Ibid., 1-15.

43 Ibid., 1-29.

44 Ibid., 4-13. Several other considerations are necessary. Are we forcing the enemy to act in accordance with his ideology, political training, or his cultural values? Are we presenting an opportunity for the enemy or something he can do nothing about. Are we reducing or increasing the threat to the enemy? Can we maintain the perception for the required amount of time? Will other operations compromise the deception or support it?

45 Ibid., 5-12.

46 Ibid., 5-14.

47 FM 101-5-1, 1-136.

48 FM 90-2, 5-16.

49 FM 101-5-1, 1-54.

50 FM 90-2, 1-30.

51 Ibid., 1-31.

52 Ibid., 1-31.

53 Ibid., 1-31.
54 Ibid., 1-32.

55 Ibid., 1-32.

56 FM 90-2(DRAFT) lists ten principles. They are: orient on the center of gravity, know the target, minimize falsehood, leverage truth, employ variety, avoid windfalls, centralize control, conform to time available, maintain security, and account for risk. The author believes these are of value and merit inclusion into approved doctrine. See 90-2(DRAFT), page 2-8 for a complete description of each.


58 Ibid.

59 90-2, 1-37.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.


65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., 41.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Steven D. Steinmetz, “Clausewitz or Kahn?: The Mongol Method of Military Success” (Parameters, Spring 1984), 71. Brackets added by the author.

70 Ibid., 78.

71 Ibid., 77.

72 Hamilton, 46.

74 Ibid., 265.


76 Garthoff, 265.


80 Ibid.

81 Hamilton, 62.

82 Ibid.


85 Krueger, 15.

86 Reitz, 4.

87 Dewar, 92.

88 Reitz, 5.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid., 6.


92 Reitz, 5.
93 Kreuger, 16.


95 Hamilton, 72.


97 Hamilton, 68.

98 Ibid., 69.

99 Glantz, 70.

100 Justin L. C. Eldridge, "The Myth of Army Tactical Deception" (Ft Leavenworth KS: Military Review, August 1990), 70.

101 Armstrong, 44.

102 Glantz, idem, "Surprise and Maskirovka in Contemporary War", 53.

103 Armstrong, 16.

104 Ibid.

105 Ibid.

106 Ibid., 17.


108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid., 10.
113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid., 11.

116 Ibid., 12.

117 Ibid., 11.


119 Glantz, idem, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, 549.

120 Pirnie, 13.

121 Twining, 103.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Hamilton, 78.

125 Ibid.

126 Ibid.

127 Tibor Meray, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin, translated by Howard L. Katzander (New York, NY; Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1959), 147.

128 Ibid.

129 Tad Szulc, Czechoslovakia Since World War II (New York, NY; The Viking Press, 1971), 313.

130 Hamilton, 86.

131 Ibid., 88.

132 Ibid.

133 Szulc, 377.

134 Ibid., 378.
135 Ibid., 379.

136 Ibid., 378.

137 Hamilton, 94.

138 Ibid.


140 Arnold, 95.

141 Hamilton, 93.

142 Arnold, 95.

143 Ibid.

144 Krueger, 29.

145 Sobik, 4.

146 The 23rd Special troops unit was a dedicated deception unit. During operations in the European theater after D-day they were involved in operations to simulate divisional sized units. As far as the author knows they were the only unit organized and equipped for the sole purpose of simulating units in support of deception plans.

147 The Russians divide their Great Patriotic War into three parts. They did not experience great successes at deception regularly until the third part. Initially, they failed miserably. They had to develop patterns and improve their awareness of their German opponents.
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