BOSNIA--SEARCHING FOR AN EXIT STRATEGY: IS THERE ONE?

A MONOGRAPH

BY

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Second Term AY 98-99

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17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT: UNCLASSIFIED

18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE: UNCLASSIFIED

19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT: UNCLASSIFIED

20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT: UNLIMITED
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

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Accepted this 27th Day of May 1999
ABSTRACT

BOSNIA - SEARCHING FOR AN EXIT STRATEGY: IS THERE ONE? By Major Robert B. McFarland Jr., USA, 58 pages.

This monograph addresses the issue of Intervention Exit Strategies for U.S. Army forces. U.S. Army forces are as of April 1999, involved in Peace Enforcement Operations in Bosnia. It is an open ended operation with no declared termination strategy. Current Joint Military Doctrine does not address the issue of Exit Strategy, although it is debated constantly among the civilian and military leadership of the United States. As the U.S. contemplates interventions in other conflicts, the issue of exiting from Bosnia is a recurrent theme on which the discussion is based.

This monograph is organized into three sections. It examines whether the key concepts of campaign design can be used by Theater Level Commanders to develop and implement a viable exit strategy. Those elements are: Center of Gravity, Decisive Points, Lines of Operations, and Culmination. The monograph posits that proper use of these elements in planning an intervention campaign should result in the ability of U.S. Army forces to intervene, accomplish their mission, and exit as planned.

Section I reviews current Joint and Army military doctrine. The review focuses on campaign design at the operational level of war, using the key concepts of campaign design to determine how an exit strategy is developed. Section II examines two U.S. interventions and analyzes their exit strategies. This examination is used to develop exit strategy criteria that Theater Level Commanders may use in developing an intervention exit strategy. Section III provides lessons learned from planning exit strategies of the two U.S. interventions. It offers military planners recommendations on how to avoid becoming entangled in open ended interventions.

This study concludes that proper use of the elements of campaign design can help avoid future open ended interventions. However, for this to occur, the CINC planning the intervention must receive, or demand clear political objectives from the civilian leadership that can be translated into attainable operational military goals. If he does not receive this guidance, he must offer his own recommendations as to what constitutes end state conditions, and offer his own exit strategy conceived and developed with the elements of campaign design.
Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. Introduction</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Section I: DOCTRINE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Section II: HISTORICAL REVIEW of PAST INTERVENTIONS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dominican Republic Intervention, 1965-1966</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Haiti Intervention, 1994-1996</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bosnia Intervention, 1995</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Section III: LESSONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Conclusion</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. End Notes</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Bibliography</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
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</table>
INTRODUCTION

Bosnia Peace Enforcement Operations by the United States Army began in 1995. Since that time, several prominent Americans, to include the President, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others, have stated that U.S. forces will be withdrawn. As of February 1999, four years later, established withdrawal dates for U.S. forces have yet to be implemented. Instead, U.S. forces are routinely trained and deployed to Bosnia in what appears to be an open ended commitment. U.S. national interests in Bosnia, while tied to NATO, are somewhat obscure, yet the operation is holding down key U.S. Army forces. These forces may be required in other hot spots around the globe such as Korea or Iraq, where U.S. national interests are clearly at stake. This monograph will determine how viable exit strategies based on the key concepts of campaign design, center of gravity, lines of operation, decisive points, and culmination, can offer Theater Level Commanders possible solutions for ending the commitment of U.S. Army forces to open ended operations such as Bosnia.

To avoid open ended operations, it is incumbent upon the commander initiating planning for the operations to provide planners with his intent. This intent includes an end state that provides a focus for all else that planners will do as they develop a campaign plan. "It describes the set of required conditions that achieve operational objectives." Operations without an end state become open ended commitments that inevitably sap the U.S. military of soldiers, equipment, and dollar resources. Military end states are clearly tied to exit strategies and the link between the two is key in campaign design.
Campaign planners are obligated to provide commanders at all levels a coherent strategy based on sound doctrine. This doctrine must use fundamental principles based on key concepts of campaign design, and must be nested throughout the operation with the intent of the commander initiating the operation. Section I reviews current U.S. military doctrine. This review will focus on campaign design at the operational level of war, using the key concepts of campaign design to determine how an exit strategy is developed.

In the course of planning an intervention operation without exit strategy guidance, Theater Level Commanders must insist upon guidance or propose their own. Failure to do otherwise puts U.S. forces at continual risk on missions with no apparent objective. To avoid this conundrum, Theater Level Commanders must turn to doctrine for answers. Commanders may also review historical operations that parallel their own situation to assist in developing possible exit strategy criteria. Section II addresses and analyzes the effectiveness of exit strategies from two U.S. interventions, Operation Power Pack, the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965 - 1966, and Operation Uphold Democracy, the intervention in Haiti in 1994. This historical assessment and analysis will identify the strengths and weaknesses of exit strategies, and help determine Theater Level Commanders abilities and responsibilities to design and implement exit strategies using current doctrine.

As the United States pursues an engagement strategy throughout the Post Cold War world, open ended commitments such as Bosnia have become commonplace. Section III of this paper provides U.S. military planners several lessons from planning the U.S. interventions in the Dominican Republic and Haiti. It also offers U.S. military
planners recommendations on how to possibly exit Bosnia, and prevent other open ended interventions. Commitment to interventions that may not be of vital national interest is a drain on resources that could be used elsewhere to address threats that truly are of vital interest to the U.S. To prevent this from occurring, Theater Level Commanders must develop viable exit strategies for all intervention operations in the course of their planning. Joint doctrine and U.S. Army doctrine are the basis for the development of exit strategies.
SECTION I: DOCTRINE

U.S. Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1995, and U.S. Army Doctrine, FM 100-5 Operations, 1993, fail to define the term exit strategy. Although Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0) identifies the term when discussing campaign planning, it does not discuss the significance of what an exit strategy is or what it does. 3 FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations, 24 November 1997, while not defining exit strategy discusses "exit conditions". It states that "exit conditions are critical to the transfer of responsibility from a Multi National Force to another authority." 4 In 1995, RAND corporation discussed exit strategy in a publication titled, Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post Cold War Era. RAND said, the purpose of the term exit strategy is to develop an understanding of how the U.S. can terminate interventions once they have begun, and for articulating "end conditions" for limited wars. Another aim is to prevent civilian and military leaders from losing sight of political objectives and military operational goals that define the military intervention. 5 While not a firm definition, RAND's discussion sheds light on how to view an exit strategy and will be used in this monograph to facilitate its discussion.

As the RAND discussion made clear, an exit strategy is closely tied to termination of a military intervention. A decision to intervene militarily is determined by the civilian leadership of the United States. Military leaders play a critical role in advising the civilian leadership on the best use of the military instrument of power in achieving strategic objectives. Military leadership therefore must clearly identify an implementation strategy, as well as define military end state conditions, and tie these end state conditions to an exit strategy for military forces.
Reasons for U.S. interventions manifest themselves in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States. The most recent NSS was published in October 1998, and states that "American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our security and make the world safer and more prosperous."6 This guidance assists in developing and implementing the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States. U.S. NMS is one of the principle guides for U.S. military commanders around the world as they estimate and plan possible intervention strategies in their geographic areas of responsibility. Another guide is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) which provides planning guidance to military commanders for accomplishing their mission. Both the NMS and the JSCP are key documents derived from the NSS that assist military commanders planning intervention strategy.7

Military commanders responsible for planning military interventions in support of the NSS are called Combatant Commanders or CINC's. The CINC is responsible for translating national level strategy into a strategy for his area of responsibility or theater. This strategy becomes the basis for developing an intervention or campaign plan within his theater to accomplish his mission. The CINC's strategy expresses his vision and intent (military objectives), the theater "ends" to which the operations are conducted, as well as guidance or theater "ways" to secure national objectives.8

In developing his theater strategy, the CINC must look beyond the tactical level of war. Theater strategy relates to both U.S. national strategy and operational activities within the theater.9 To accomplish his theater strategy, CINC's, also known as Unified Combatant Commanders, have military forces from at least two services.10 When military forces from two or more services conduct missions together, it is called a Joint
Operation. Joint operational planning at the operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives.\footnote{11}

An Army Service Component Commander (ASCC), subordinate to the CINC, must understand the strategic and operational levels of war. The CINC practices operational art. When he assigns the ASCC a warfighting mission, the ASCC also practices operational art.\footnote{12} Operational art as defined in JP 3-0, "is the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles."\footnote{13} The ASCC plans and executes campaigns as part of the CINC's theater strategy.

JP 3-0 defines a campaign as "a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives." The campaign plan describes how the factors of time, space, and purpose are interconnected in these operations.\footnote{14} "Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of combat operations, but can also be used in situations other than war."\footnote{15} The concept of planning a campaign is tied to operational art. William W. Mendel, the former Director, Strategy and Theater Planning at the U.S. Army War College, states that "the campaign planning process is not a scientific methodology. Rather the campaign planning process is a conceptual, intellectual, and indeed, an intuitive exercise from which emerges the CINC's vision for campaigning."\footnote{16}

To assist the CINC or ASCC in visualizing his campaign, several key concepts are available for him to use. These concepts are called the key concepts of campaign design. Mendel identifies three of these as center of gravity, lines of operation, and culminating point.\footnote{17} FM 100-5, Operations, adds the concept of decisive points to
Mendel's three concepts. These concepts provide the theater commander with analytical tools by which he may assess a problem and develop a course of action (COA) into a campaign plan to solve it.

To develop that COA, the theater or operational level commander and his staff use an Operational Planning Process. A key element of a planning process is determining the end state, or the set of conditions that achieve strategic objectives. Defining the end state is one of the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. The commanders' intent describes the desired end state. It is a "concise expression of the purpose of the operation." To achieve that intent, the key concepts of campaign design are used in planning. Using these key concepts, the operational commander not only has analytical tools for developing an intervention campaign, but also the tools for terminating the operation and tying that termination to an exit strategy. Therefore the operational planning process offers the operational commander a method for beginning an operation and for ending it. Both the beginning and the end are designed with the key concepts of campaign design.

The first of these concepts is the center of gravity. Carl von Clausewitz, the noted 19th century theorist, stated that the center of gravity (COG) is "the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends." JP 3-0 states that centers of gravity are "those characteristics, capabilities or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." Mendel sums up the importance of the center of gravity to campaign design by asserting that,

"the essence of operational art is concentrating (in some way) our military resources against the enemy's main source of strength (his center of gravity) in a manner that will give us the strategic
or operational advantage, destroy or neutralize this center of gravity, so we can produce the condition to achieve our strategic objective. 

Strategic and operational objectives are identified early on in the operational planning process. As one of the first steps in operational mission analysis, the COG analysis helps to identify friendly and enemy strengths and weaknesses. It is key in the development and analysis of friendly COAs. As an analytical tool it provides the operational commander and his staff a start point on which to plan an intervention. Likewise, if the commander and staff have correctly deduced the enemy COG and focused their resources on destroying or neutralizing this COG, it is possible that end state conditions are achieved. Achievement of the end state should lead to termination of the intervention. Termination of the intervention should be tied to an exit strategy that allows the operational commander to redeploy his forces outside of the area of operation. Identification of a COG on which to build an intervention and an exit strategy is the difficult part of planning.

At the strategic level, the National Command Authority (NCA), consists of the President and the Secretary of Defense. The NCA, together with the theater CINC, deal with COG(s) that are complex and amorphous. However, "at the operational level of war, the center of gravity is likely to be concrete." As such, operational commanders and their staffs must attempt to correctly identify GOG(s) and develop COAs that address what resources must be used to destroy or neutralize enemy COG(s). Operational commanders focus their intervention strategy on attaining these GOG(s) within the parameters established at the strategic level. This focus on attaining GOG(s) leads to the next key concept of campaign design, decisive points.
JP 3-0 states that "decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to attacking protected centers of gravity." Therefore, it is imperative that decisive points are accurately identified. Failure to do so will waste time and resources, as there are normally more decisive points than a commander can address. The commander and his staff develop COAs by identifying and analyzing decisive points. This analysis is linked to attacking the enemy COG. Those decisive points that enable an attack of the enemy COG become the focus of COA development. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy or neutralize them.26

During a military intervention, controlling or capturing decisive points can quickly give a commander an operational advantage and greatly influence the outcome of the action.27 Whether the intervention is a combat operation, or an intervention under the auspices of a multinational organization for the conduct of Peace Operations, accurate identification of decisive points can quickly bring about military end state conditions. "The military end state normally represents the conditions the CINC wants the campaign to achieve and is reflected in his mission statement, concept and intent."28 Synchronizing the use of resources for the capture or control of decisive points and properly linking them to COGs and exit strategy can help to reduce the possibility of U.S. military forces becoming involved in open ended commitments. Another key concept of campaign design that has a critical bearing on the ability to support and sustain intervention operations and exit from them is the concept of lines of operation.

JP 3-0 defines lines of operation as "the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of
operations and its objectives." Normally this concept of lines of operation is discussed in the context of interior and exterior lines; where interior lines diverge from a central point and exterior lines converge from different positions to a central point. At the operational level, lines of operation "attain a three dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver." 

An operational commander looks at lines of operation in a much broader context. His base of operations may be the United States and his objective a city in central Europe. Therefore, his operational reach, defined by JP 3-0 as "the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively" may be limited. Without free and unlimited lines of operation, a commander is vulnerable. JP 3-0 clearly points out that "there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations." The operational commander's lines of operation must be tied to attainable objectives.

Bruce C. Bade's paper, War Termination: Why Don't We Plan For It?, was published by the National Defense University Press in 1994. In it, Bade said that

"defining attainable objectives demand understanding of military capabilities and limitations and agreements on how the capabilities will be used. Political leaders often fail to understand these factors or military leaders fail to communicate them effectively." 

Operational level commander's must identify up front the requirements for establishing and maintaining lines of operation. Commander's must use lines of operation to focus and synchronize the effects of combat power to achieve the desired end state. Through the synchronization of combat power along well established and effective lines of operation, joint forces are able to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.
Defeat of the enemy COG is tied to the operational end state. Achievement of the end state allows for the possibility of termination and thus an exit. Military leaders tasked to plan an intervention must insure that U.S. civilian leadership is attuned to the difficulties and cost of establishing and maintaining effective lines of operation, and in doing so, insure lines of operation are integrated with the other key concepts of decisive points and center of gravity. Integrating these three concepts along with the fourth, culmination, should allow the Theater Level Commander to achieve his objective and plan his exit strategy accordingly.

*Culmination* as a concept, is applicable to war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). In offensive combat operations, it is the point when an attacker's combat power no longer exceeds the defenders. In defensive combat operations, it is when the defender can no longer counterattack or successfully defend. Joint doctrine for MOOTW does not specifically discuss culmination. However, FM 100-5 *Operations*, states that an operational offensive can culminate if soldiers become "less morally committed." Moral commitment to war and MOOTW by troops must be a constant concern for commander's. Commander's must plan and resource their forces for achieving their strategic and operational objectives before culminating. To prevent culmination from occurring in any operation, commander's must know when to terminate operations. The concept of culmination must include the idea of termination. "Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is a component of strategy and operational art", that helps prevent culmination. Operational commander's must have clear guidance from their superiors on when to terminate operations, to ensure that the political objectives or outcomes endure.
Ideally, civilian leadership will seek the advice of military leaders on when to end military involvement in an intervention operation. The attainment of the political objectives or strategic ends for which military forces were committed should end their involvement and avoid any chance of culmination. However, most intervention operations require a period of postconflict activities that involve all the elements of national power. Commanders must anticipate these activities and tie their exit strategy to them. Proper anticipation of these requirements should allow for the transfer of these activities to other agencies. Once this transition is underway, military forces no longer needed can begin redeployment.\(^37\)

Redeployment operations signal a close for the military intervention campaign. An intervention campaign that successfully uses the four key concepts of campaign design; center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations, and culmination, affords the Theater Level Commander the opportunity to develop and implement his exit strategy. Doctrine can assist the commander and his staff develop an exit strategy. Although doctrine doesn't specifically discuss "exit strategy", proper use of the key concepts of campaign design should lead the commander and his staff to develop an exit strategy when planning an intervention campaign.

Another asset that can assist the Theater Level Commander in development of an exit strategy is the study of previous interventions. Past military interventions may assist in the development of possible exit strategy criteria. Two previous operations that may assist planners in developing exit strategies so as to avoid open ended commitments such as Bosnia, are Operation Power Pack, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965-1966, and Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1994.
SECTION II: HISTORICAL REVIEW of PAST INTERVENTIONS

The Dominican Republic Intervention, 1965-1966

Operation Power Pack, the U.S. intervention into the Dominican Republic in 1965-1966, was initiated by President Johnson for two reasons. The first objective was to protect U.S. citizens from a deteriorating civil situation. The second objective, although not stated for some time, was to prevent a communist takeover. The U.S. could not, and would not allow a second Cuba to emerge in its hemisphere. However, any overt attempt by the U.S. to influence a sovereign government in Latin America would lead to recriminations on the world stage. President Johnson and his advisers, were well aware of how the world would view a U.S. attempt at influencing the installation of a government in a Latin nation. Accordingly, little discussion outside of the president's inner circle was done. Unfortunately for U.S. military planners, this lack of discussion as to what the U.S. political objectives were, prevented them from developing operational goals on which to focus their efforts. Operational goals would evolve as the intervention continued. However, to insure that the second, unspoken political objective of preventing a communist takeover would succeed, a credible military intervention force was assembled.

Operation Power Pack lasted eighteen months. Although it was intended, at least initially to support the anti-communists, it evolved into an effort focused on separating the belligerents and getting them to agree to a negotiated settlement. An exit strategy for U.S. forces was not planned or integrated into the intervention decision by U.S. civilian or military leaders. It was especially difficult for the military leadership to develop an exit strategy, as they were only vaguely aware of the political objectives.
issue facing the military was how to secure operational goals that dovetailed with stated and unstated political objectives. Operational goals were defined by trial and error on the ground, as the situation in the Dominican Republic progressed.

As the U.S. intervention continued, U.S. military forces firmly established themselves in the Dominican Republic. Efforts through diplomatic and military channels eventually set the conditions for the negotiated settlement. Dominican belligerents on both sides were held in check by U.S. military forces. U.S. forces, in effect, became an interposition force. "Peace stabilization as an operational goal simply evolved as the intervention developed." The U.S. ambassador to the Organization of American States (OAS), Ellsworth Bunker, provided some clarity of political objectives missing at the beginning of the operation, and assisted the U.S. military in identifying operational goals. Largely through his efforts, the negotiated settlement became the political objective, and therefore the political end state. With the political objective now clearly defined, U.S. military forces under the leadership of LTG Bruce Palmer, the designated ground force commander, now had something tangible on which to base their operational goals.

Defining those operational goals would be difficult. The operation was just beginning to show the difficulty of exiting from an intervention that had begun with a vague political objective. Although President Johnson made it clear to General Wheeler, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that he was authorized to use whatever force necessary to stop the fighting, he also made it clear that military operations would become secondary to diplomatic efforts once the fighting ceased. What those diplomatic efforts would require from the military were unknown.
In a 1987 article for *Parameters* magazine on Operation Power Pack, Major Lawrence M. Greenberg, a Foreign Area Officer assigned to the U.S. Army Center of Military History, identified one of the main difficulties military planners can expect to encounter when trying to define criteria for ending an intervention. That difficulty is reacting to political developments that occur without input from the military planners executing the operation. Power Pack was a prime example.

"From the operation's onset, Johnson envisioned that once the Army brought the civil war under control, its combat mission would be subordinate to State Department initiatives involving the Organization of American States (OAS). In this capacity, the military would be used purely to apply the right amount of pressure on the right place at the right time."

The military was not privileged as to what the right place or the right time might be. While the president certainly had the right to employ the military to accomplish political objectives of national interest to the U.S., had the military known what they were, planning and execution of the operation could have possibly accomplished the mission sooner.

A 1995 RAND study on intervention in intrastate conflict points out that "an exit strategy is an integral part of the proclamation of limited objectives followed by a definition of precisely what is to be achieved at the operational level." Exit calculations must be factored into the intervention decision. As was pointed out, this was not done by the civilian or military leadership who planned and executed Operation Power Pack. Had the negotiated settlement not been obtained and political objectives and operational goals not achieved, exit calculations could have played a key role in
contingency planning if the original intervention objectives were not met.\textsuperscript{51} This could have been key to the departure of U.S. forces.

The decision to intervene in the Dominican Republic fell short of the ideal on several other grounds.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to the failure to identify the exit strategy up front during the planning, operational goals were poorly defined. This resulted in LTG Palmer constantly reacting to changing diplomatic initiatives. The inability of LTG Palmer to pursue planned end state criteria required extraordinary flexibility on his part to accomplish missions he had little input in planning.\textsuperscript{53} The combination of these factors contributed to a less than ideal intervention and exit.\textsuperscript{54}

Operation Power Pack contained much confusion, and is an example of why policymakers, military planners and decision makers must construct a viable exit strategy before undertaking any intervention.\textsuperscript{55} RAND proposes that an exit strategy include three elements. These elements include,

"a clear and considered statement of the limited, stable, and worthwhile political objectives to be pursued, a derivative set of the discrete and attainable operational goals that must be secured if the political objectives are to be successfully obtained and a set of fallback options that must be anticipated if the original political objectives and operational goals could not be secured for any conceivable reason."\textsuperscript{56}

Operation Power Pack had none of these elements.

To determine why interventions such as Power Pack were lacking in viable exit strategies, the RAND study reviewed six interventions and based on the level of combat intensity characterized them as low-level, mid-level, or high-level. The Dominican Republic intervention was determined to be a mid-level intervention as compared to interventions in Greece, 1946-1949, a low-level intervention, and Panama, 1989, a
high-level intervention. The study found that high-level operations usually have clearly defined political objectives that allow the military to link them with their own operational goals. As such, an exit strategy is usually integrated into the operation. The reason for this integrated operation is associated with the high risk of failure and its exposure to the public eye. Conversely, in mid-level interventions, exit strategies are usually neglected until it is too late. They appear deceptively unambitious until forces are decisively committed to them. It is then that vague political objectives begin to shift and demand more attention, resulting in possible quagmires, such as the intervention into the Dominican Republic in 1965.

Possible interventions that fall into the mid-level category require planners and their commander's to pay particular attention to establishing firm operational goals tied to exit strategies. Not setting these goals prior to intervention might be compensated for by using superior forces as was done during Operation Power Pack. However, this is a risky approach and can often culminate quickly. In the words of LTG Palmer, the Dominican Republic intervention was a "special case" because the U.S. intervened early before either side had the time to develop conventional or unconventional means to challenge the U.S. This intervention strategy may not be applicable to other countries with long established insurgencies or rivalries. In situations such as these, LTG Palmer warned that "we had better think twice before committing our forces, as it may be a bottomless pit."

Each intervention will be different, but all still require thorough planning with a clear linkage between political objectives and operational goals, that when accomplished, should terminate the military involvement and lead to an exit. The Dominican Republic intervention therefore, can only be judged a partial success, because success in large part
was accidental. The RAND study concluded that "the U.S. was simply lucky to have a seasoned diplomat in Bunker and a politically sensitive soldier in the person of Palmer." These two together developed the linkage between the political objectives and the operational goals. This linkage provided an exit strategy for U.S. forces eighteen months after the fact.

"Power Pack, in the final analysis, should be approached cautiously, when used as a model for contingency and peacekeeping operations." Each operation must be evaluated separately on its own merits. Ultimately, the decision to intervene is not the military's, but its civilian leadership. Nonetheless, the Dominican Republic intervention provides planners with "useful insights and reveals recurrent patterns that arise in such contingency operations." Paramount among these is that military commanders and their planners, when tasked to plan and execute interventions, must receive clear, unambiguous guidance from their civilian leadership. This guidance was not forthcoming in Operation Power Pack. When this guidance is not provided, military operational goals are hard to define, interventions tend to become open ended, and exiting becomes a difficult endeavor. Another contingency operation that occurred thirty years later, but in close proximity to the Dominican Republic, was Operation "Uphold Democracy", the U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1994.

**The Haiti Intervention, 1994-1996**

Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. intervention into Haiti under UN auspices in September 1994, is an example of how exit strategies may be developed prior to executing an intervention. The formulation of an exit strategy has its basis in a political
decision to intervene. Ashley J. Tellis, in researching intervention termination for RAND, said this about exit strategy formulation.

"It is, in fact, a comprehensive account of how the national command authority envisages the evolution of an intended intervention, including the criteria for its successful completion together with an examination of several alternate sequences of action, which must be advanced even before the intervention is actually embarked upon." 65

In the case of Haiti, there was a congruence of American policy and UN security council resolutions that formulated the policy to intervene. 66 Events leading up to the intervention demonstrate how proper planning between the political and military leadership can set the stage for successful termination of an intervention operation. As with many UN interventions, success would depend upon U.S. participation.

Alarmed by the declining conditions required for basic human existence in Haiti, the UN security council passed several resolutions to condemn the political and criminal violations taking place in Haiti. 67 Although the U.S. did not agree with Haitian domestic politics, there appeared no reason for the U.S. to intervene in Haiti, as neither U.S. citizens nor U.S. Security was threatened. However, U.S. domestic politics pulled the Clinton administration in the direction of intervention. Special interest groups such as the Congressional Black Caucus, U.S. citizens with strong Haitian connections, and the perceived threat of the continued influx of Haitian boat people all played on the administration to do something. 68

U.S. administration officials listed several international as well as domestic issues that supported U.S. interests to intervene in Haiti. Significant among these was U.S. foreign policy that fostered new democracies with an intent to develop new markets for economic growth as well as a concern for human rights. 69 "The advancement of U.S.
values entailed the removal by justified means of an illegal regime which had overthrown a democratically elected government.\textsuperscript{70} To achieve that aim, the U.S. administration supported United Nations Security Resolution 940 (UNSCR 940). UNSCR 940 extended and modified by UNSCR's 975 and 1007,

"provided the basis for military operations in Haiti under the authority of the UN. The intent of these resolutions was to establish and maintain a stable, secure environment on the island so the elected government could regain control, create an electoral process to reestablish its legislature, and ultimately elect a new president."\textsuperscript{71}

This guidance helped the U.S. formulate its intervention strategy for Haiti. However, the decision by the U.S. to use military means as an extension of policy to intervene in Haiti was driven largely by guidance from Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25). PDD25 directed that U.S. involvement in Peace Keeping Operations be "limited, selective and effective." PDD25 along with the NSS laid the strategic foundations for the campaign plan that guided all operations in Haiti.\textsuperscript{72}

Military leaders and planners immediately set to work translating the political objectives given into attainable operational goals, in effect an end state or what was to be achieved by the intervention. This was a critical step and the successes achieved in Operation Uphold Democracy were due to this action. The Haiti intervention required the CINC and his staff, in concert with the NCA, to translate the broad political guidance given into operational goals. Operational goals are secured by a series of tactical actions carried out during an operation. Tellis states that "proper planning and execution of these tactical tasks should result in the securing of the operational goals which in turn attain the political objectives."\textsuperscript{73} Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Kretchik, Chief, Special Research Projects, Combat Studies Institute at the U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College, said that a problem in planning peace operations and their termination is that they "often lack a traditional enemy, tend to be highly ambiguous and are subject to frequently changing political guidance." Operation Uphold Democracy did not escape this phenomena. Planners however, made a concentrated effort from the beginning to tie operational goals to political objectives. When these political objectives were attained, it would allow U.S. forces to exit Haiti.

Planners had a deadline for extracting U.S. troops, and this extraction was a central part of the plan from its inception. According to John F. Christiansen, the director of Haiti Task Force of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "exit planning started in advance and from the beginning we asked how we were going to leave." As important as terminating the operation was however, getting in to Haiti had to be the priority for the planners.

Planning at the strategic level can follow two paths. Both options are part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Option one is a deliberate planning process accomplished during peacetime. The second option is time sensitive or Crisis Action Planning (CAP). Although planners spent over one year planning Operation Uphold Democracy, it was planned using CAP procedures. "CAP calls on Combatant Commanders in Chief (CINCs) to formulate and transmit executable COAs up the chain of command for consideration by the NCA." The CINC responsible for planning the Haiti intervention was Admiral Paul D. Miller, CINC of US Atlantic Command (USACOM).

USACOM planners used the original UN plan as a start for their own planning. It called for restoring president Aristide to power through peaceful means. It was
developed and agreed to by both Aristide and the man who ousted him, LTG Raoul Cedras. The agreement for a peaceful transition was agreed to at Governor's Island, New York, and thus became known as the Governor's Island accord. Under this agreement, Cedras would retire, international sanctions imposed on Haiti would be lifted, and Aristide would return to power on October 30, 1993. Upon Cedras' return to Haiti however, he unleashed a reign of terror to consolidate his power. Based upon these and other events, U.S. planners began to prepare for a forcible entry operation.

In November 1993, USACOM formed a planning cell on orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin considering political objectives in Haiti, and was tasked with determining how military power could be employed to achieve those ends. The first step in this process was a review of existing contingency plans for Haiti to see if one fit the ongoing situation. A 1988 plan written by Forces Command (FORSCOM) addressed some issues, but did not address how available forces could be used operationally. Operational planning provides the linkage between strategic political objectives and execution of tactical tasks during the operation. To provide that linkage, operational goals had to be developed by USACOM planners and forwarded to decision makers at the strategic level. USACOM planners attempted to provide that linkage for the CINC. Lieutenant Colonel Ed Donnelly, an Army planner working with the USACOM J5 plans section at the time of Operation Uphold Democracy, described how that linkage was achieved.

"Essentially, USACOM put together a document that told the Interagency Working Group within the National Security Council what they would be expected to contribute to an operation in Haiti. USACOM laid out the purpose of the operation, the endstate, and defined criteria for military success. That document went to the JCS and then the NSC where it was
This document would eventually become the political-military plan that would help shape the OPLAN for the Haiti intervention.

Admiral Miller's planners at USACOM began briefing the XVIII Airborne Corps planners on the upcoming operation. XVIII Airborne Corps, as the U.S. Contingency Corps, was the likely candidate for a forced entry operation based on their unique entry capabilities. XVIII Airborne Corps planners based on this guidance began planning a forcible entry or combat operation into Haiti. To assist the planners, both Admiral Miller and LTG Shelton, Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps, provided the planners with their intent and guidance. The planners now had the difficult job of developing an Operation Plan (OPLAN) that linked the tactical execution of a forced entry operation with the political objectives identified by the U.S. NCA. "The U.S. mission as sanctioned by the UN called for the establishment of a safe and secure environment suitable to the restoration of the Aristide presidency and the near term conduct of national elections."

Underlying the difficulty of planning a mission with a vague task such as 'establishing a safe and secure environment', was the fact that the U.S. was not willing to commit itself to a long term operation in Haiti. The ever present 'mission creep' of UN operations and the possibility of another Somalia and its aftermath were seared in the minds of U.S. politicians, military leaders, and the American public. USACOM planners and their subordinate headquarters were under no illusion of a long term commitment in Haiti. Consequently, they designed a carefully defined operation that allowed for a quick withdrawal of U.S. forces and left the vague mission of the 'restoration of democracy' in Haiti to the UN. All parties involved in planning understood that U.S. participation
would be limited, and that quick termination of the operation and exiting were of the highest priority. This was to be a limited engagement, and limited engagements call for an exit strategy early on in the planning.

All military interventions possess a high degree of ambiguity and risk. Limited engagements, of which Haiti was clearly intended to be by U.S. authorities, was no exception. For Operation Uphold Democracy to succeed, its political objectives had to be clear, well understood and limited. According to Tellis, expansion of limited objectives, in the case of Haiti, that of securing the environment so Aristide could return to power, could not occur regardless of failure or success. Any decision to expand objectives requires a deliberate decision by the NCA based on a clear understanding of what is to be gained and how it will effect the termination of the operation and subsequent exit. Crucial for the military planners from USACOM down to the tactical units executing the intervention was tying these political objectives to attainable goals at the operational and tactical level. The vagueness of the political objectives, and the fact that Operation Uphold Democracy was intended to be a limited engagement, made an exit strategy that much more relevant. Tellis said that an exit strategy "serves to define, clearly and discriminatingly, the end state toward which all political and military action is oriented when no "obvious" yardsticks of judging success are otherwise available." It also helps to clear the ambiguity and lessen the risk by providing planners with a focus.

Gabriel Marcella, who at the time of the Haiti intervention was Director of Third World Studies with the Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, believed that any Haiti intervention strategy must avoid vague, open ended goals, such as restoring democracy to a society that has never really known or understood
institutions of accountable government. In his opinion, the ideal exit strategy would have the U.S. leave with its dignity in place and its mission successfully accomplished. To do this he argues would require the U.S. to prepare itself psychologically for the achievement of limited objectives such as establishing security, police training and some forms of humanitarian assistance. In essence, this is what eventually happened, and although the limited political objectives were established at the strategic level, the operational goals and the exit strategy were defined and developed at the tactical level after the intervention occurred.

On 19 September 1994, USACOM directed Joint Task Force (JTF) 180, led by the XVIII Airborne Corps, with elements from XVIII Airborne Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Atlantic Fleet, and Air Combat Command to intervene in Haiti and begin operations to restore president Aristide to power. JTF 180 conducted a permissive entry operation and on 15 October president Aristide returned to power.

A permissive entry operation negated the need for OPLAN 2370, the invasion of Haiti by the 82nd Airborne Division, and a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). OPLAN 2370 planners had envisioned a twenty four day mission of five phases. Phase two, the deployment-combat operations phase, called for the neutralization of the Haitian Army (Fad'H) and Haitian police force, securing key facilities such as the airport, restoration of civil order, and the rebuilding of Haitian security forces. Accomplishing these primary objectives was key, as success would allow for securing or neutralizing the Haitian Centers of Gravity (COGs). The Haitian strategic COG was viewed as the politico-military leadership, and the operational COG was the Fad'H. While pursuing these enemy COGs, U.S. forces would protect their own COGs,
identified at the strategic level as, U.S. public support for the invasion, and the will of the U.S. political leadership to see the intervention through to completion. At the operational level, the COG was determined to be control of Port-au-Prince. Phase five, the redeployment phase, would be a final transfer of responsibility to a follow on force and the redeployment of JTF 180 back to the U.S.\textsuperscript{95}

OPLAN 2380, the permissive entry plan, was the responsibility of the 10th Mountain Division, designated as JTF 190. This OPLAN also had five phases, but extended for 180 days. OPLAN 2380 identified control of Port-au-Prince as the primary COG, with control of Cap Haitien as the secondary COG. Successful control of the Haitian COGs would allow the 10th Mountain Division to "establish and maintain a stable and secure environment."\textsuperscript{96} Phase five of OPLAN 2380 envisioned a successful transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and the redeployment of Combined Joint Task Force Haiti 190, between D+121 and D+180. During this transition period, UNMIH forces would assume responsibility for the mission and U.S. forces would return home.\textsuperscript{97}

All of the potential OPLANs 2370, 2380, as well as 2375 and 2380 Plus, two plans that combined portions of 2370 and 2380, envisioned a quick entry and exit, once the COGs were secured, controlled, or neutralized.\textsuperscript{98} Although they varied in mission length, all OPLANs were designed to accomplish attainable operational goals.\textsuperscript{99} The attainment of these goals was built around plans that attacked or secured decisive points/objectives that led to the neutralization or securing of COGs.\textsuperscript{100} Additionally, all plans relied on secure lines of operation that allowed for successful intervention and continuous support of forces for the duration of the operation.\textsuperscript{101} Planners were intent on
redeployment of their forces before the inevitable mission creep of UN interventions surfaced, and their forces culminated from constantly changing political objectives mandated by U.S. or UN directives, or the hopeless chaos that constitutes Haitian politics. As operations transitioned throughout the intervention, planners never lost sight of the desired military end state, "a stable and secure environment." When this state was achieved, U.S. forces could begin to exit Haiti.

In March 1995, the Multi National Force (MNF) relinquished responsibility for maintaining a stable and secure environment to UNMIH, whose U.S. contingent was known as U.S. Forces Haiti (USFORHAITI). USFORHAITI consisted of a brigade level headquarters staff and attached units, as well as augmentees from USACOM. Prior to UNMIH assuming responsibility, its staff along with the staff of the MNF had to define "stable and secure environment". Until this was defined, the intervention retained the possibility of becoming and staying an open ended commitment. The planners were greatly assisted by adopting the definition of a stable and secure environment developed by Colonel Dubik, a brigade commander of the 10th Mountain Division operating in Cap Haitien. His definition, in effect, became the exit strategy for U.S. forces. He defined stable and secure environment as "acts of violence and criminal acts below the threshold that interrupts normal civic and economic life... sea and airports open to normal traffic and functions."

This measurement of success was adopted and then transferred throughout the rest of the country. It allowed for the successful transition of responsibility from MNF to UNMIH on 31 March 1995, and allowed for U.S. forces of the MNF to redeploy and exit Haiti. The USFORHAITI component of UNMIH also developed its own exit
strategy to leave Haiti. USFORHAITI planners defined their exit strategy as "the planned transition to the host nation of all functions performed on its behalf by peace operations forces." 108 This transition eventually occurred and USFORHAITI departed Haiti on 29 February 1996.109

"On the surface, Operation Uphold Democracy went as planned."110 The strategic objective of restoring democracy depended completely on successful attainment of the operational goal of establishing a stable and secure environment in Haiti for the return of the democratically elected president.111 Although Aristide was returned to power, maintaining a stable and secure environment was a temporary event. This was due in large part to a disconnect between the vague strategic political objective of restoring democracy to Haiti, and the vague operational goal of maintaining a stable and secure environment in Haiti.112

"What was needed to ensure strategic success was a set of operational objectives leading clearly to the upholding of democracy which would describe an operational end state that made the desired outcome as nearly certain as possible. This was not done."113

According to Kretchik, Uphold Democracy from a military standpoint, can be viewed as both a success and a failure. A success, as Cedras left, Aristide returned to power, the Fad'H was disarmed, and the police force retrained. A failure, in that from the beginning, it was doubtful that lasting change could be implemented in Haiti and this was a correct assessment.114 Even though planners from the beginning had intended for all U.S. troops to exit, this was never achieved. At least 2,400 soldiers stayed behind as part of the UN contingent.115 However, it was perceived from the inception of the planned intervention into Haiti that U.S. forces would leave when the end state was achieved. To
accomplish this, U.S. political leadership involved military commanders and planners in determining the end state.\textsuperscript{116} Although it took leaders and planners at the tactical level to eventually determine the precise end state conditions to allow for an exit strategy, the fact that an exit strategy was contemplated and planned for throughout the entire planning process, allowed for the majority of U.S. forces to accomplish their mission, and exit within close proximity to their planned departure date.

Operation Power Pack and Operation Uphold Democracy required planners to adapt to events as they unfolded on the ground. While planners for Power Pack never undertook exit strategy planning, the end state conditions which allowed U.S. forces to depart and return home were very similar to those which allowed U.S. forces involved in Uphold Democracy to exit Haiti, the implementation of a negotiated settlement. Conversely, planners for Uphold Democracy identified endstate conditions for exiting Haiti in accordance with the Governors Island Accord agreement prior to intervening, and from the very beginning of planning, spent a great deal of time attempting to tie that exit strategy to actions at the operational and tactical level.\textsuperscript{117} Although this attempt worked, it had shortcomings and required extensive input from commanders and planners at the tactical level, to identify attainable goals that could be tied to the strategic political objectives.\textsuperscript{118}

Both operations required senior commanders to provide input and guidance to their planners and to assist them in exiting. Whereas LTG Palmer had the unenviable role of developing an exit strategy after the fact, and in the midst of constantly changing political objectives, his role was key to any successes during Power Pack and the eventual exit of U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{119} Admiral Miller and LTG Shelton on the other hand,
provided their planners with their intent and guidance prior to the intervention.\textsuperscript{120} They provided the legitimacy for the exit strategy developed for Uphold Democracy. Their planners used the elements of campaign design and were able to maintain a constant dialogue with the CINC and Task Force commanders. This insured their plans complied with the commanders intent and were tied to the political objectives. As the different plans for Haiti were developed and modified, Miller and Shelton filled the void between the military planners and the civilian leadership, and provided the critical linkage required to insure the intervention went as planned.\textsuperscript{121}

Even a well planned intervention can be subjected to changing political objectives however, and Uphold Democracy was no exception. The fact that original intervention forces from the U.S. were delayed from exiting Haiti is a direct result of political machinations of U.S. and UN political leadership.\textsuperscript{122} This clearly demonstrates the subordination of U.S. military forces to the political leadership and is a fact that military planners must take into consideration when planning intervention operations.

Both interventions terminated with the execution of a negotiated settlement formulated through U.S. and multi national diplomatic channels. Power Pack by Ambassador Bunker and the OAS after the intervention, and Uphold Democracy by U.S. State Department officials and the UN prior to the intervention. Implications for the future seem to show that when pursuing solutions to less than absolute wars or limited engagements, negotiated settlements appear to be the choice of political leaders. Therefore, military leaders and planners must be directly involved to insure a thorough understanding of what they are being asked to do and how their actions can lead to the settlements implementation. Assisting in the implementation of the negotiated
settlement seems to be the ticket out of open ended interventions as shown by Power Pack and Uphold Democracy. Theater level commanders must prepare to assist in this implementation from the start of intervention planning. Doing so may help hasten U.S. military forces exit from other interventions that appear open ended, such as the intervention in Bosnia.

The Bosnia Intervention, 1995

On December 14, 1995, the warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which ended the four year war. As part of this agreement, the UN mandated that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) oversee and enforce the cease-fire between the fighting factions. On December 20, 1995, a NATO established multi national implementation force (IFOR), began Operation Joint Endeavor, with a mission to oversee the cease-fire agreement. One year later on December 20, 1996, a smaller NATO force called the stabilization force (SFOR), replaced the IFOR. SFOR began Operation Joint Guard with a mission to oversee and enforce the cease-fire for 18 months. On June 15, 1998, the UN Security Council through UNSCR 1174, authorized a follow on force for SFOR. This force also known as SFOR was given a 12 month mission with the possibility of extension should the situation in Bosnia warrant it.

Operation's Joint Endeavor, Joint Guard and the follow on SFOR mission, were tied to implementation of the military annexes of the DPA. Annex 1A, established the conditions for separating the belligerent forces and the deployment of IFOR. Annex 1B, addressed the downsizing of military forces and regional stabilization. Further defined
as political objectives, annex 1A called for "ensuring a durable cessation of hostilities", and annex 1B, called for NATO forces to "achieve regional stability". 

According to Lieutenant Colonel Peter J. Schifferle, who at the time was Chief, Bosnia planning for Vth Corps, the military annexes of the DPA, in essence, would separate the warring factions, establish an inner entity boundary line (IEBL), establish cantonment areas for faction forces and equipment, thereby demobilizing belligerent forces to the point that it would take them 45 days to mobilize their forces. This allowed IFOR and SFOR contingents to reduce their presence to merely watching belligerent forces with military police patrols. More importantly, it would allow freedom of movement throughout the area, although this did not happen. U.S. forces involved in this effort originally numbered about 8,500, but now number approximately 6,900.

NATO forces have provided an environment to allow the peace process to continue, but the difficulty of implementing the civil aspects of the DPA have manifested themselves. The major ethnic groups continue to fail to fulfill their obligations called for in the DPA due to political and social mistrust, as well as deeply entrenched ethnic hatreds. It is conceivable and probable that NATO forces, to include its U.S. contingents, will be required for many years to deter hostilities and see the DPA through to fruition. Originally designed to be a limited engagement, the Bosnia intervention has now been extended indefinitely. Continued intransigence of the parties involved has led some observers to believe that "Dayton implementation is but continuation of the war by other means." While this may be true, it is apparent from the provisions of the DPA that its U.S. authors designed the document along the same lines as previous U.S. interventions.
DPA annexes bear close similarities to the vague political objectives stated for Operation Uphold Democracy. Annex 3 called for free and fair democratic elections within nine months after IFOR intervened. U.S. forces in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti interventions provided stability to allow for democratic elections in the Dominican Republic, and the restoration of a democratically elected president in Haiti. Annex 11 calls for a UN led international police task force to monitor local police actions, and to train them in a liberal democratic fashion.\footnote{133} In Haiti, a primary goal was retraining police forces. While these annexes are the responsibility of civil organizations, they represent the type of political objectives that military forces are inevitably required to support.\footnote{134} Unfortunately, as in other interventions, political objectives of this nature are difficult to link to military operational goals that can be understood and executed at the tactical level.\footnote{135} Terminating an operation under these circumstances can appear futile. Arguably, this difficulty can be a result of military leadership not requesting clear guidance from their civilian leadership.\footnote{136} However, this guidance may be difficult to give when the intervention is not based on concrete national interests.

As in Haiti, U.S. political leadership could find no national interest for intervening in Bosnia. However, the plight of refugees and ethnic cleansing tipped the balance in favor of action by the UN, who defaulted to NATO. The concern for human rights and the feeling to "do something" ultimately provided the impetus for U.S. involvement.\footnote{137} When concerns such as these launch multi national interventions in America's backyard, as was the case with the Dominican Republic and Haiti, they are only supportable for a limited time, before the inevitable call to bring the boys home eventually brings about an exit. When the intervention is far from America's shores
however, terminating the operation and implementing an exit strategy can prove to be a difficult endeavor. Keeping civilian and military leadership focused on the cost of interventions not in America's backyard is hard to do. An exit strategy formulated up front and in conjunction with the elements of campaign design can help to provide this focus, as was done by the planners of Operation Uphold Democracy.

Although NATO has developed a transition strategy for disengagement from Bosnia, as of late 1998, it had not developed criteria that would allow SFOR combat units to withdraw. According to an October 1998, U.S. General Accounting Office report, "the NATO transition strategy consists largely of turning over various activities to local authorities or the peace operation's civilian organizations as conditions permit."\textsuperscript{138}

The original intervention did not intend for forces to remain in Bosnia. The transfer of authority from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to IFOR occurred in December 1995. The IFOR force was 60,000 strong and was to complete its mission and withdraw from Bosnia by December 1996. Conditions in December 1996 still required the presence of an international force and thus NATO authorized a new force, SFOR with an authorized force level of 31,000.\textsuperscript{139}

NATO's original intervention plan established an end date versus an end state objective upon which to base its transition strategy. IFOR military forces introduced into Bosnia in December 1995, were given one year, until December 1996, to complete the military tasks outlined in the DPA. When the second NATO element, SFOR, replaced IFOR, it had an end state objective that was broad and politically vague. The desired NATO end state called for a secure environment that allowed for "continued consolidation of the peace" without further need for NATO forces. The conditions for
military withdrawal were closely linked to attaining the civilian goals of the DPA. SFOR was given 18 months to accomplish its mission and NATO pinned its time limit on the hopes that politicians within the international community would develop a framework for withdrawing military forces within this time frame.\textsuperscript{140}

U.S. administration officials developed their own transition strategy based on key objectives and conditions or "benchmarks" that must be achieved for the peace process in Bosnia to become irreversible. Although the linkage between the U.S. "benchmarks" and the withdrawal of NATO military forces is not clear, the benchmarks are also tied to implementation of the civilian aspects of the DPA. "In a letter to Congress dated July 28, 1998, the President said that the 10 conditions represent the point at which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. The letter did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led military force."\textsuperscript{141} All indications are that as long as the former belligerents of the war in Bosnia are not in compliance with the civilian aspects of the DPA, NATO military forces and their U.S. contingents will remain in Bosnia.
SECTION III: LESSONS FOR FUTURE INTERVENTIONS

Three criteria and one emerging trend surfaced during the historical review, and provide important lessons for future intervention planning. The first criteria is the identification of an exit strategy up front during planning and prior to intervention. Second, is the linkage of political objectives to attainable operational goals that can be understood and executed at the tactical level. Third, is the involvement of the Theater level commander with his planners in designing an intervention campaign plan that uses the elements of campaign design. An emerging trend is the use of negotiated settlements to bring conflicts to an end. Applying these criteria to the ongoing Bosnia intervention offer military planners recommendations on how to possibly exit Bosnia, as well as how to possibly prevent other open ended interventions.

Identification of an exit strategy up front and prior to intervention is key to avoiding open ended commitments. The historical review of Operation's Power Pack and Uphold Democracy clearly demonstrate the importance of this fundamental step. It was not done in the Dominican Republic, and U.S. military commanders and their forces found themselves reacting constantly to actions on the ground as they developed. These actions for the most part were triggered by politicians engaged in diplomacy with little regard for its effects upon the military forces, with the exception of Ellsworth Bunker, the U.S. ambassador to the OAS, who was key in assisting LTG Palmer in developing the exit strategy for U.S. forces. While U.S. military forces and the token international force quickly accomplished the military aspects of the intervention, the political aspects of the negotiated settlement kept U.S. forces from exiting. The intervention in Bosnia closely parallels the Dominican Republic intervention. NATO forces and their U.S. military
contingents accomplished the mission outlined for them in the form of annexes 1A and 1B of the DPA. The requirement of these forces to help in accomplishing the civil aspects of the DPA keep them from leaving Bosnia, and have resulted in an open ended rotation policy of U.S. forces in and out of Bosnia.

The opposite can be said for Operation Uphold Democracy. An exit strategy was at the forefront of planning, and planners at all levels insured their exit was closely tied to accomplishing their military mission. While political machinations delayed the exit of U.S. military forces, eventually all intervention forces departed Haiti as planned. The Haiti intervention reinforces the fundamental concept that planners should plan an exit strategy for intervention forces up front during initial planning, and insure it is understood and agreed to by the civilian leadership implementing the intervention. An exit strategy for U.S. forces must be tied to accomplishment of their military mission. When this is done, there appears to be a much greater possibility for forces to exit, whereas waiting until after the intervention has begun tends to lead to open ended commitments. Establishing an exit strategy up front and tying it to an end state should be a fundamental practice when planning an intervention campaign. Insuring that the campaign plan establishes a clear linkage between the political objectives, the operational goals, and the tactical tasks will also assist in avoiding an open ended commitment.

Schifferle said that "American military leaders cannot count on precise statements of strategic goals from their political leaders." The danger for military commanders and their planners is that without clear political objectives, interventions run the chance of becoming hopelessly bogged down in shuttle diplomacy. Military forces will
constantly be required to react to the latest initiative put forth by diplomats and international tribunals. This does not excuse commanders and planners from attempting to force the hand of their civilian leadership. They owe it to the soldiers on the ground executing the mission. Vague political objectives, while giving politicians wiggle room, lead to open ended commitments, and therefore must be clarified if possible by the CINC and his planners. Operation Power Pack and the Bosnia intervention are clear examples of what may occur with vague political objectives.

Any COA developed and accepted must present its planners and the forces executing the intervention with attainable goals. The CINC must insure that the political objectives received from the NCA are sufficiently defined by the NCA, so that his planners can develop COAs with attainable operational goals. Campaign plans are developed around attainable operational goals. The attainment of these goals is the mission of the tactical forces executing the intervention. Operation Uphold Democracy, even with its problems, demonstrated the importance of having a clear linkage from the strategic to the tactical level. It allowed campaign planners to successfully use the elements of campaign design to plan, execute, and ultimately achieve the end state of the intervention.

Designing a campaign requires many things. Chief among these is the involvement of the CINC or his appointed commander. The CINC has a direct line of communication with the NCA. His role is to translate NCA guidance for his planners, so that they may tie key decision points up front in their planning to NCA action. These decisions to act by the NCA, when properly linked to accomplishing military operational goals, should provide the guidance planners need for establishing end state conditions.
This guidance helps to establish the focus for planners designing the intervention. The campaign must be designed using the elements of campaign design. To begin this process, the commander must provide his intent for the campaign to his planners. Inclusive within his intent is his perceived end state for the operation, which when achieved, allows for an exit. Planners must understand how to use the elements of campaign design to pursue the end state of the operation.

Operation Uphold Democracy vividly portrayed the importance of using the elements of campaign design. It proved that by proper application of these elements, and with the involvement of the CINC and his subordinate commanders, an exit strategy can be designed and executed. Doctrine supports the use of the elements of campaign design, and offers commanders and their planners the proper tools to design and execute campaigns focused on destroying, neutralizing or attaining the enemy COG. The plethora of information available for discussing the concept of the COG is directly attributable to its importance in campaign design. When the COG is used in conjunction with the other elements of campaign design; decisive points, lines of operation, and culmination, and to be effective it must be, the result is a coherent campaign plan that offers a viable exit strategy as witnessed by Operation Uphold Democracy.

Operation Uphold Democracy however, is not the panacea for campaign planning; it had problems. These problems were overcome because planners and commanders understood how to use the elements of campaign design, and developed a campaign accordingly. Collectively, they were able to accomplish their mission even with vague political guidance and exit Haiti. They were assisted greatly in their efforts
by Admiral Miller and LTG Shelton. Both men provided their intent and guidance, and stayed involved with the operation until its completion.

Completion of most campaigns seems to revolve around the notion of a negotiated settlement. Although this is not a new idea, it appears that as the U.S. becomes more involved with international organizations in intervention planning and execution, the goal pursued is not total victory, but something achievable through limited engagements. This concept can be traced back to the Korean War, the UN's first war, and up to the Bosnia intervention, NATO's first intervention. This trend shows no sign of changing for future interventions, and is an issue planners must grapple with, and attempt to understand. Military expediency will always take a back seat to civil and diplomatic issues; however, if military commanders and their planners are involved from the beginning in designing the settlement, it may be possible to assist in establishing criteria for achieving the military end state and the exit of U.S. forces.

CONCLUSION

Bosnia Peace Enforcement Operations by the United States Army appear endless. This is the result of several factors, the most telling being the difficulty of exiting an operation whose end state has never been clearly articulated, either by the U.S. administration or the UN. It is difficult for military commanders to design and implement a campaign under the guidance of its U.S. political leadership, when that same political leadership fails to follow its own policy of avoiding open ended peace operations that are not linked to concrete political solutions. Compounding this difficulty is the issue of participating in interventions under the auspices of international organizations. Handing off an operation to the UN in Haiti where it was clear from the
beginning that U.S. forces would not commit to a long term intervention, is somewhat easier than backing out of an alliance intervention in the heart of Europe. Although end dates and end states were articulated by NATO, the failure of the fighting factions to comply with the civil aspects of the DPA makes the exit of U.S. military forces an illusory prospect. Neither the U.S. nor its NATO partners can afford to walk away from Bosnia without being able to declare victory. To do otherwise places the alliance at risk. As long as the U.S. and its NATO partners are not willing to withdraw from a no win situation, they will remain in the quagmire of Bosnia. The difficulty of implementing a negotiated settlement in a region where ethnic and religious conflict has been the norm for eight centuries is obvious. This does not mean that some sort of exit is not possible from Bosnia in the future, nor that a future Bosnia is unavoidable.

Proper use of the elements of campaign design can help to avoid future open ended interventions. Operation Uphold Democracy is clear evidence that it can be done. It requires continuous interaction between the CINC and his planners with the civilian leadership bent on participating in an intervention. The CINC must demand a seat at the table to insure he is aware of the political objectives and offer his strategy as to how they can be met. The CINC must demand clear guidance from the NCA so he can pass this on to his planners. If this guidance is not forthcoming, he must make his own recommendations as to what constitutes end state conditions, and offer his own exit strategy conceived and developed with the elements of campaign design. As part of that campaign development, his planners must develop branches and sequels to address failures and setbacks. They will occur as witnessed by all three interventions this monograph discussed. He must demand that when the military mission is complete, that
other government agencies or organizations take on the follow-on missions that inevitably follow interventions. He must keep the intervention in the public eye, so that the media, and therefore congress and the American public, are fully aware of the costs of intervention, and do not lose sight of the original political objectives and military operational goals. As these change, as they inevitably will, he must be flexible enough to address the new political objectives, while still maintaining his superiors focus on the original objectives, helping them to avoid the pitfalls of open ended commitments.
ENDNOTES


4 U.S. Army, FM 100-8 The Army in Multinational Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 24 November 1997), p. 5-0.

5 James A. Winnefeld et. al., "Interventions in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post Cold War Era," (RAND, 1995). p. 47. This research was sponsored by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DAMO-SSP) and performed within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. This report focuses on helping the Army identify the issues and some of the answers associated with changes taking place in the nature of intrastate conflict. The report focuses principally on intervention (and its termination) in intrastate disputes of interest to the United States.


8 Ibid.


14 Ibid., 32.

15 Ibid., 11.


17 Ibid., 8.


20 Ibid., III-24


30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., III-16.


38 Thomas S. Szayna et. al. "Interventions in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post Cold War Era, Supplemental Materials," (RAND, 1995). p.16. This is a companion volume to "Interventions in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post Cold War Era," by Winnefeld, and provides the supporting material to the main report. That document focuses on helping the Army identify the issues and some of the answers associated with changes taking place in the nature of intrastate conflict. The note refers to the discussion of the objectives both stated and unstated that left the military in a difficult position in attempting to tie operational goals to political objectives. This supporting volume presents the case studies in full, since the findings
from the case studies underpin the implications and conclusions.


42 Ibid., 15.

43 Ibid., 16.

44 Ibid., 17.

45 Ibid.


48 Ibid.


50 Ibid., 53.

51 Ibid., 100-101.


46


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 54.

58 Ibid., 57-58.

59 Ibid., 59.

60 Ibid., 60


63 Ibid., 17.


68 Ibid., 33-34.

69 Ibid., 33.

Ibid.

Ibid., 69-70.


Ibid., 185.


Ibid.

Ibid., 34.

Ibid., 34-43

Ibid., 43.

Ibid., 43-44.

Ibid., 44. This quote is from an interview LTC Kretchik had with LTC Ed Donnelly who was working within the USACOM J5 plans section while planning the Haiti intervention.

Ibid., 45-48.

Ibid., 108.

87 Ibid., 36.


89 Ibid., 121.


95 Ibid., 47-50.

96 Ibid., 58.

97 Ibid., 60.


100 Ibid., 48. Also see map 4, p. 50.

101 Ibid., 51-56. In addition to using Air LOCs and Sea LOCs to support the operation, the 82nd Airborne Division planned to self deploy its Aviation Brigade and over fifty of its organic helicopters over 1000 miles to Great Inagua and position them to support the invasion.


104 Ibid.


106 Ibid., 172.


108 Ibid., 71-72.

109 Ibid., 70.


112 Ibid., 175.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 196.


116 Ibid.

117 Ibid., 36.


121 Ibid., 45-65.


127 Peter J. Schifferle, LTC, U.S. Army. From an interview with Lieutenant Colonel Schifferle, 13 April 1999, who at the time of the intervention was Chief, Bosnia Planning, U.S. Army Vth Corps.


133 Ibid., 11.


138 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. "Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force." (United States General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., October 1998), p. 4. Note 6 on page 4 of this document explains the U.S. executive branch's transition strategy for Bosnia. The U.S. executive branch prepared what it referred to as "benchmarks" in early 1998; however, these "benchmarks" are not intended to provide criteria for determining when NATO forces can draw down or withdraw; instead, the executive branch believes that they represent the point at which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. The executive branch did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led military force.

139 Ibid., 10.

140 Ibid., 42-43.

141 Ibid., 44.


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U.S. Department of the Army. FM 100-8 The Army in Multinational Operations.