Soviet Union
Political Affairs

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Dzasokhov Interviewed on Changes in Role of Ideology

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[Interview with A.S. Dzasokhov by unidentified SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent; place and date not given: "Humanization of Our Ideal"]

[Text] Addressing the historical destiny of the USSR of our day, political scientists and sociologists of the future will most likely say that this was a most important social phenomenon of the final quarter of the 20th century, which largely determined the arterial direction of global civilization in the next, 21st century. The basis of this profound revolutionary turnabout, which we are seeing for ourselves daily, is composed of the philosophy of civil concord and the idea of human unity in the name of the removal of social disorders, injustice, and inequality and the creation of qualitatively renewed humane and democratic socialism. It was the spirit of constructive concord and creation, we believe, that enabled the USSR Supreme Soviet to formulate a program of extrication of our society from the state of profound crisis.

What mission is being performed in the complex process of radical transformations by the ideology of the CPSU, which is being updated? What are the new principles of the interaction of party ideology and culture? What is meant by humanization of the socialist choice? These and other far from ordinary problems, which were recently the focus of attention at a meeting of figures of Soviet culture with M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, are further analyzed in a SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent interview with Aleksandr Sergeyevich Dzasokhov, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee.

[Correspondent] Under the conditions of the profound changes that have come to light in Soviet society there has been an appreciable transformation of the political goals and ideological reference points of the CPSU. What, in your opinion, are the particular features of the party’s ideological activity at the current stage? And how is the particular attention of the new party leadership to the sphere of ideology against the background of the intensifying de-ideologization of a number of areas of our domestic and international life to be understood?

[Dzasokhov] Let us start with the fact that under the conditions of the deformation of socialism in our society, a distorted notion of socialist ideology and its functions took shape. From a system of scientific views and ideas contributing to forward movement along the path of historical progress, it largely became an impediment to the revolutionary renewal of society. Social life on earth with all its contradictions, zigzags, impasses, and surges forged impetuously ahead while we continued, as if by inertia, to duplicate dogmatic precepts divorced from reality. Whence the perfectly understandable rejection and repulsion even of a whole number of ideological precepts by a substantial part of our society, that which remains loyal to the socialist ideal included. A paramount task, therefore, of all ideological components of the CPSU from top to bottom, from the primaries through the CPSU Central Committee Ideology Commission, is the formation of the generic meaning of socialist ideology as a dynamic synthesis of the spiritual wealth accumulated by all of the preceding history of mankind.

No ideology can be preserved forever. Reality sooner or later forces a renewal and reformation of its essence. And woe betide the devotees of the ideology that tries to hide from the new problems posed by reality. In this case the ideology is left merely in the annals of history, carrying away with it both their creators and authors. Unless they wish to remain aloof from the political struggle, ideologists must study and analyze in depth latent social processes and constantly latch onto the shoots of new life.

If we attempt to run our mind’s eye over the most intricate ideological palette characteristic of our society and party, it is obvious that we have embarked upon a period of radical revision of many ideological and theoretical ideas that formerly seemed permanent.

After all, the modern world is no longer that which it was 70, 30 and five years ago. The dynamism of social change is boggling the imagination, and the present state of planetary civilization has proven wholly independent of a single forecast of previous years. Yet the ultimate purpose of any prognosticatory methodology is having a clear sight of the future. We Communists must aspire to this particularly, taking account of the finest nuances of the modern state of society and its contradictory development trends. And a decisive stimulation of thinking representatives of the social sciences, special sociological research, public opinion polls and much else that was previously frequently underestimated here is essential. It is a question here of moving toward qualitatively new forms, methods, and means of struggle for the minds and sentiments of the broadest masses and sensitively catching not only the present but also future problems and contradictions of society.

Let us take, for example, the movement for sovereignty of republics and regions of the country, which has been emerging in tumultuous fashion with us of late. Reading carefully the draft new Union treaty, we see distinctly that problems of a fundamental modernization of interethnic relations in our country are long-urgent and, I would say, overripe problems. Could these deep-seated centrifugal urges have been seen in advance and could attempts have been made from the very outset to direct them into a constructive channel? I am convinced that they could. The perfectly understandable concern to preserve the integrity and permanency of our Union was sometimes manifested in inappropriate forms, namely, in the washing up of existing problems and then in purely negative evaluations of the actions of so-called “separatists,” “nationalists,” and so forth.
NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Or let us turn to another example. The concept of humane, democratic socialism was the result of an in-depth comprehension not only of our own history, but of all world experience also. This ideology was born of a genuinely historical approach to the country's development. Nonetheless, owing to the incompleteness of many of its propositions, it continues to be of an unduly general nature, although I realize that major sociopolitical problems simply cannot be solved overnight.

What does all this indicate? Restructuring one's thinking and altering one's consciousness is at times even more difficult than reality. And many of our present difficulties have been brought about primarily by the unusual persistence of the evolved stereotypes of consciousness, obtuse thinking, and conservative habits inherited from the past.

Another aspect of the manifest drama of our political consciousness is closely connected with the undue exaggeration of the role of ideology, which, as you know, is by no means all-powerful. After all, it is in itself only a part of the political superstructure. Its role is to open people's eyes to social depths that are hidden from our outward observation.

It is this purpose that constitutes the core of our party's ideological work, which is now being intensively updated. Dealing with actual problems of social consciousness, not illusory, mythical ideas, and responding flexibly and opportunately to the changes in public opinion and taking them comprehensively into consideration upon determination of the party's strategy and tactics—this is the main task of our entire party propaganda. It is having to be tackled under complex, largely dramatic conditions where the value of constructive ideas is growing in proportion to the lack of time necessary for their realization. It is clear that society's entire intellectual potential will have to be mobilized here. Social scientists, the artistic intelligentsia and the media are called upon, as the creators of the new ideas of revival and progress, to have their ponderable upbeat say here.

[Correspondent] We would like to begin the next question, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, with what you have just mentioned: the role of science and scientists' mission in the revolutionary transformation of society. What do you see as renewed party policy in this sphere?

[Dzasokhov] I would like to begin my opinions on this range of questions with a brief digression into history, more precisely, with the affirmation that national science has made a contribution to the development of world scientific knowledge without which imagining the level of modern civilization is inconceivable. And this fact is today generally acknowledged overseas also, what is more. Nonetheless, I have to say sadly that outstanding representatives of true scientific inspiration were for many years of authoritarian arbitrariness in our society unthinkingly humiliated and frequently persecuted. We recall A. Chayanov, who wrote the astonishingly powerful work of political economy "The Peasant Economy." Or we reread the original works of N. Kondratyev, who revealed the deeplying regularities of evolution of the world economy. We recall, finally, the names of such scientists as Vernadskiy, Vavilov, Sakharov....

Why did these and any other outstanding scientific minds find themselves in the past in acute conflict with the administrative command system? Why was their career so dramatic and, at times, tragic even? I believe that this was a direct consequence of the fact that a fundamental principle of our political culture, from which it follows that natural scientists arrive at the socialist world outlook by qualitatively different paths—more complex and longer than those of professional revolutionaries, for example—had been consigned to oblivion. The intellectual losses that we sustained as a result of this tragedy are incaucasable. And it is no exaggeration to say that many of our present troubles in the economy, in the agricultural sphere, medicine and biology, and enlightenment and education particularly, come from a chronic underestimation of the scientific intellect. And let us be frank, a mood wherein a professional scientific approach and spiritual wealth evoke misunderstanding has not yet disappeared in our country, even in the parliamentary sphere.

It follows logically from this that our party will be unable to realize its strategy of radical social transformations in full unless it achieves a fundamental breakthrough in the sphere of political culture. We need to convey to the consciousness of each person the simple, incontestable truth that the modern intellect is the greatest engine of social progress and the most important achievement of age-old civilization.

The party, which has moved decisively away from command administrative arbitrariness, and modern science embody the voluntary interaction of two subjects of revolutionary perestroika. Respect for people of genuine science (regardless of their social and political predilections), the creation of the conditions most conducive to their scientific creativity, the removal of bureaucratic barriers to overseas scientific contacts—this is the basic content of our party strategy in the sphere of intellectual labor. And we are sure that these new principles will win the sincere approval of the multimillion army of scientific personnel in the USSR.

[Correspondent] The next question concerns the formation of qualitatively new economic relations in the scientific field in the process of the country's transition to the market. Particular difficulties will arise primarily for basic science. How to avoid the consequences of this transition without major social costs?

[Dzasokhov] The party and its central authorities are now more interested than ever in support for the rapid transmission of scientific knowledge not only to material
production but also other spheres of social life. We need to find stimulating paths of an appreciable increase in scientists' contribution to the elaboration of important political, social and national economic decisions. Of course, scientists should by no means become pure politicians, but a link with the country's politics, culture, and spiritual life will not, I am certain, be contraindicated for them.

The problem of scientists' social protection needs to be solved. We believe it necessary not only to raise the social prestige of the research worker, which has declined noticeably in the last decade, but also to improve his social and material position and thoroughly upgrade the system of their [as published] pay and pensions.

A qualitatively new level in the development of the social and humanitarian sciences is essential today. It should be noted that positive changes have shown through in this sphere in recent years. The very style of thinking of many scientists and their approaches to a study of society and its history are changing. The work of the large group of scholars on "Studies in the History of the CPSU," whose completion, we hope, will contribute to the formation of an objective, realistic view of our history free not only of the dogmatic tenets of the "Short Course" but also the truth-distorting biased material that has inundated our current affairs writing of late, merits attention, for example.

Study of real, stirring social and political processes, not idle comment and a dogmatic explanation of axiomatic truths and propositions, and bold scientific quest—this is what should today determine the ideological aspect of the work of social scientists.

Under the conditions of pluralism we need to think seriously about further democratization in the shaping of the top echelon of national science—the academies of sciences of the USSR and the Union republics and the sectoral academies: pedagogical, agricultural, and medical. We need to ensure that young talents aspire to join the academy ranks not for the sake of career privileges but for the sake of fidelity to the high ideals of scientific creativity.

[Correspondent] Aleksandr Sergeyevich, how do you evaluate today's state of spiritual culture and its role and place in our society? What, in your opinion, are the paths of the revival and enrichment of our society's multinational cultural potential?

[Dzakovkhov] Culture is by nature and in essence broader than any ideology. But there has never anywhere been nor is there now culture outside of ideologies: This is conditioned by their generic connection. It is a different matter if the political system puts ideology above culture, if ideology subordinates to itself literature, art and science and does not imbibe the values, ideas and learning that engender culture. The diktat of ideology over culture is inevitably realized via a system of administrative control, bans and coercion. But ultimately such diktat is disastrous not only for culture: It desiccates and destroys ideology itself. Such is the historical lesson.

Does this mean that our party is quitting or should quit the culture sphere? It is common knowledge that there are no political parties without their own ideologies. The CPSU is a party of radical renovating socialist ideology, and it cannot fail to endeavor to spread its ideology as a means of it achieving its goal—the creation of humane, democratic socialism. Consequently, the question of whether the CPSU may “quit culture”—there is no such question for it nor can there be.

A process of the delineation of the cultural policy of the CPSU and the cultural policy of the state is essentially already under way. It is manifesting itself in publishing activity, in motion pictures, in the theater and so forth. This is a complex and lengthy process. What some people are calling an ideological and organizational "vacuum" is forming in some cases. But this is not so. There are no voids. Given our general sluggishness, the space that is freed is rapidly being filled with various phenomena like the orgy of "mass culture" or the aggressive pressure of the mechanism of the commercialization of spiritual life. There are many instances of the party experiencing the pressure not only of those who wish to squeeze it out of culture but also of people who are demanding that the CPSU "display authority" and "defend culture" and ban cultural currents and organizations that are alternative to the socialist choice. The idea of "bans" for the worthwhile purpose of "defense of culture" is still alive in the party itself also. And this means that ahead of us lie quest, arguments, accumulation of experience and, most likely, mistakes also. But, in any event, not a return to the past.

In the acute debate and polemic on this topic, in which all representatives of the cultural sphere—from the ordinary archives keeper and librarian through the minister and Central Committee secretaries—are participating, an attempt is frequently being made to find an answer to the question: Why is the standard of our mass culture, which borders on lack of culture, so primitive? And this following a far-reaching “cultural revolution” and the formation of the most substantial (in terms of relative significance in society) army of professionally qualified specialists? Why are many of our national museums, parks, and houses of culture so depressing?

Is our society capable of rescuing and reviving the true spirituality of the people and contributing to their becoming an active subject of revolutionary restructuring? I believe that a convincing answer to this question was afforded by the recent meeting of figures of our multinational culture with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

I agree that society needs to be given primarily food and clothing. But how true is the old folk maxim that man does not live by bread alone. Critically surveying our past, we come to the sole possible conclusion that we will
not without a comprehensive statewide national program pull ourselves out of the mire of hostile-aggressive lack of culture, which, as is now apparent, corresponded most to the proposition concerning the so-called “exacerbation of the class struggle” under socialism.

But there is one nuance here. We experience at times an inferiority complex when confronted with a display of our lack of culture (more precisely, crudity and lack of breeding) in industrial shops or the agricultural business, in a research center or in parliament and, finally, in urban mass transit or at a dance party. Can this ailment, which has afflicted man’s soul, be overcome merely by the efforts of routine appeals, slogans, and exhortation?

Hardly, I believe. Cultural synthesis never arises as a consequence of the movement of one social stream. Purposive cultural revival efforts not only of the CPSU but other democratic parties, organizations and movements also are needed. And it is urgently necessary by our common efforts to profoundly and perseveringly introduce to the mass consciousness the principles of kindness, tolerance, charity, mutual understanding, and cooperation. It seems to me that a revival of humanitarian values, of which there are so many in the traditions of all Soviet peoples—large and small—could contribute to a large extent to the establishment of these noble moral and ethical values.

[Correspondent] Certain commentators, raining down their belated attacks on the CPSU, are attempting to maintain that party ideology and mass culture are incompatible. What could you say to our readers in this connection?

[Dzasokhov] The groundlessness of such opinions is shown convincingly by the Leninist stage in the development of our society, when the flower of Russia’s cultural intelligentsia switched to the side of October at the appeal of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

In the past, at the time of the deformation of socialism, unfortunately, culture was for a number of years seen as something subsidiary and instrumental and lacking in independent significance. Superideologization so impoverished its content that freedom of creativity, this ferment of culture, without which it can neither exist nor develop, was defined essentially in official departments. The emphasis was put on it being possible, allegedly, to create models of culture and art prescribed in advance “from above.” Such a term as the “social commission” of culture, essentially merely concealing the primitive manipulation of its values, was preserved even. Culture, art, and the folk traditions nurturing it [as published] were seriously undermined and impoverished. Barely repairable damage was done to them. Yet culture is the living character of the nation and the spiritual reflection of the true riches of life.

Society is today rightly opposed to any kind of illegal privilege. And we have to agree with this. But there is one privilege that I would still leave. This is the priority development of spiritual culture and the mounting of a nationwide campaign for political culture, for civilized standards of human intercourse. I attribute the underestimation of the role of culture and a dismissive attitude toward it primarily to the type of authoritarian thinking to which natural diversity, in whatever it be manifested, is alien.

[Correspondent] What, in your view, are the basic principles of the CPSU’s new cultural policy? To what extent does the policy of development of the market economy accord with the principles of the priority subsidized financing of culture?

[Dzasokhov] It is impossible encompassing all the principles in a short interview. I will say what is most important. What is needed first and foremost is a real enhancement of the status of culture itself, enshrined legislatively. A great deal in our life depends on this currently. After all, the spiritual revival of the people is the arterial path toward national harmony. It is such tasks that could under the conditions of pluralism unite all constructive democratic and patriotic social forces in the country.

Culture, of course, requires a material foundation. But it should be remembered that it is possible to be penny wise, pound foolish. It is essential to create as quickly as possible a system of the allocation of resources from Union, republic, and local sources of financing and more boldly overcome the ossified nature of property relations—to impart a truly social and state nature to the formulation of the long-term strategy of our society’s cultural revival. It is particularly important sparing culture the forbidding laws of commercialization. Yesterday the artist was bound by bureaucratic sets of rules and dogmatic ideological tenets, today he is threatened by material pressure and the visé of monetary constraints. “An audience at all costs”—such today is the motto of a number of theaters, motion picture associations and studios, and concert organizations not only locally but in the center also. And danger, a spiritual vacuum, and an absence of true art are emerging once again. This cannot be allowed.

Of course, there are today also splendid artists and brilliant ensembles, which are in this complex and contradictory atmosphere creating serious gifted works—to a world standard, what is more. But there are not enough such works as yet, unfortunately. And if society does not create for figures of culture normal conditions for their creativity and does not know how to protect them against the diktat of commercialization, there will be fewer and fewer genuine works of art also, and the losses of gifted people leaving in search of their vocation overseas will be immeasurably greater.

I would like in this connection to broach the following subject. The reserves of intellectual culture in our society are considerable. Note how the public consciousness has been politicized. I shall not be sinning against the truth if I say that the vast majority of figures of culture have
become active ideologists of revival and renewal. Assimilating new ideas and social reference points would hardly be possible, you will agree, without the sufficiently developed general cultural potential of society.

At the same time it has to be honestly admitted that a certain part of our society, the younger generation included, is manifestly failing to assimilate the philosophy of the new political thinking and at times entering into opposition to the constructive current of political life. The ranks of extremists at the country's flash points have been composed largely of lumpenized youth. The reasons? Unemployment, social rootlessness, and the impossibility of applying its capabilities. These outbursts of violence induce the thought that culture is conditioned mainly by the ability to live in the company of one's compatriots. A big role here is performed by traditions, habits, and simply satisfaction with one's living conditions and one's social position. Culture may develop and be elite or mass. But its roots lie in the manner of public life.

[Correspondent] Many aspects of political culture have come to the fore now primarily thanks to the CPSU's conscious and purposeful policy of the utmost development of glasnost. A big part here has been played by the mass media. Has there not, in your opinion, been a change in their significance at the current stage of our development?

[Dzasokhov] It is hard to exaggerate the role of the mass media in the renewal of our society. The press, television, and radio have essentially not only been a catalyst of the restructuring processes initiated by the CPSU, but have also become a channel of the development of glasnost, democratization, and the break with the authoritarian-bureaucratic system. The press itself is changing together with society: From an institution which served the state-political superstructure it is becoming a dynamic factor of social progress.

In finding its voice the press has not, it is true, escaped serious failures and populist exaggerations. The race for sensation and the ringing phrase to the detriment of objectivity are at times engendering preconceived ideas and a stoking of passions. Understandably, the dynamic and unusual nature of the processes has not allowed certain journalists and commentators sufficient time for objective interpretation and in-depth analysis. Both superficialities and lacunae in professional training have been reflected. But surviving solely on emotion is impossible: The reader and the viewer are becoming increasingly exacting, and life's realities are demanding a qualitatively new level of the work of the press. As throughout the civilized world, the yardstick here is the talent, honesty, and decency of the author. The party press faces a difficult struggle against a variety of competitors for the readers' trust. Its purpose is to uphold the truth and the people's interests, affirm humanitarian, democratic values, and honestly reveal the actual processes of society's renewal.

[Correspondent] Tension in our society is not abating. Organized crime is on the rise. Manifestations of group and regional egotism are growing in various forms. Frequently contradictory localist, separatist interests are leading to bitter conflicts with the use of power methods of struggle and law breaking. How do you in this connection conceive of the possibility of a rise in the level of the legal conscience in our society?

[Dzasokhov] For our country, where legal culture and the legal conscience have long been at an extremely low level and where crude violence was cultivated for decades, the establishment of a civilized legal conscience is attended by great difficulties.

The basis of a legal conscience and its central idea is human rights, legal and political guarantees of man's dignity, honor, property, conscience and beliefs, and so forth. There is no other way toward civilized forms of life. Rules of law should regulate our entire life. Only thus is it possible to secure the interests of society as a whole and each member thereof individually. For this reason our party considers it its duty to persuade people that progress and civilization are inextricable from their legal conscience and high political and legal culture. Finally, that only a person in possession of the sum total of sociolegal rights and protected by dependable legal safeguards has the opportunity of really participating in the country's social and political life and being a really free personality. All this indicates that the creation of a democratic, humane society without high legal conscience and without observance of human rights and, generally, law and order is utopian. History has shown a thousand times over that force begets force, violence, violence. Legal conscience means primarily respect for the other person and devotion to the principle: If you want respect, show the other person respect. Legal conscience also means tolerance in respect of any phenomenon that exists within the framework of the law.

[Correspondent] As is evident from your opinions, the CPSU is seriously revising the approaches of former years to the problem of violence and nonviolence. Does this mean that the party intends altogether ignoring the confrontational phenomena in society, in the sphere of cultural development included?

[Dzasokhov] In providing a general description of the process that has unfolded in the CPSU of radical renewal of its entire ideological activity, I would like to note with all certainty that our party is a convinced opponent of any "dictatorship of ideas," particularly "from above." We advocate an aware belief in the noble ideals of the socialist liberation of labor. The CPSU is opposed to political tutelage over free-thinking, particularly in the form of petty control over the mass media. We are for the high party and, if you wish, civic responsibility of each commentator, journalist and scholar. May a feeling of belonging to the Soviet multinational state never die in the heart of everyone who is bold enough to pronounce judgment on the past, present, and future of our party and our people.
We are opposed to the directive-power establishment of official party-state guidelines, even if they are cloaked in the form of resolutions, decrees and decisions inasmuch as the strategy of our renewal and progress is based, in the main, on the democratic potentialities and conscious mobilization of the broadest people’s masses. At the same time we cannot ignore the acute ideological and political confrontations under the conditions of pluralism and transition. In political dialogue with other social and political currents, the CPSU has no intention of adhering to some “nonclass” or “nonparty” positions. Such a position would be tantamount to a departure from the socialist ideal. The CPSU has, particularly in connection with the elaboration of a new program, to determine a fundamentally new, universal vision of socialism that organically combines the fundamental social interests of labor, humanitarian values, power of the people, extensive democracy, and popular spirit.

Thus under the conditions of perestroika, the principles of the CPSU’s cultural policy have undergone fundamental change.

I would like to mention particularly that under the conditions of pluralism responsibility for social harmony will be borne henceforward not only by the CPSU but also other progressive political forces and movements, nonparty associations, and society as a whole. Abrupt, wholly unjustified turns both to the right and to the left are equally dangerous for the party and our society under the extraordinarily complex conditions of the transitional period.

Much has been achieved on the path of democratization, although today also we are short of realism and discipline, mutual understanding, and a responsible comprehension of the need for a joint way out of the crisis state of society. It was about this that many of the participants in the recent meeting of figures of Soviet culture and the president of the USSR spoke with concern and distress. However, the main part of the road is still to come. The contours of the new scientifically verified “model” of the relations of the party and our society’s culture are only just coming into view. The prestige and fate of the CPSU, which possesses tremendous intellectual potential, will largely depend on its creative role in the accomplishment of cultural tasks. The main direction here is difficult struggle for transformation of the conditions—moral, legal and material—in which the exponents of culture live and develop. In other words, it is a question of mobilizing our state’s entire intellectual potential in the name of a revival of the spirit of a concerned attitude toward the pearls of national and world civilization, a sense of national pride and civic responsibility and a strengthening of the belief in the revival and progress of our multinational community.
Baltics

Formation of Baltic Military Groups Noted
91UM0102A Kiev LENINSKOEYE ZNAMYA in Russian
19 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by Lt Col N. Kotseruba: “The Peoples of the Baltic Are Not Mankurtas”]

[Text] Chingiz Aytmatov’s novel “A Day Longer Than a Century” contains a parable describing invasions by fearsome foreigners—the Tuan Ruans.

No one was safe from them, neither the old nor the young. But what the people feared most of all was a torment conceived by these enemies, after which the individual lost all of his memory, transforming into a mankurta [translation unknown] having no memory of mother, of home, of motherland, or of the terrible acts of the conquerors. The feeling was that nothing worse could ever be conceived. One mother, Naryan-apa, whose son fell victim to the enemy, decided to restore her firstborn’s consciousness, and he killed her with a shot from his bow. But the unfortunate woman transformed into a white bird, which rose into the sky and tried to save her son from there. “You are a Donenbay! A Donenbay! Remember your name!”

There was purpose to my bringing up this tale: Certain forces in the Baltic are trying to transform the people into mankurts.

The national movements that were created two years ago—Sajudis in Lithuania and the popular fronts in Latvia and Estonia, which initially took a stand beneath the “banner” of perestroika as a cover for their true intentions and thus reduced the vigilance of not only the popular masses in their republics but also of many prominent politicians and state and party officials, played their ethnic “card.” They managed to strongly politicize the population. But now, under the influence of their leaders—career-minded nationals—the national movements in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are gradually losing everything that was good about them, everything that reflected the aspiration of the nation for independent development. Most such champions of national interests are satisfying their own personal interests first: They are receiving large apartments and dachas, and the possibility for regular trips abroad, not to mention the chances for personal commercial gain. There are more than enough facts in the press to support this.

The Baltic republics are presently experiencing a real political struggle, a class struggle if you like, although it is not currently fashionable to talk about this. And if anyone is appealed by Lithuania’s moratorium or the 1.5-year transitional period announced by Latvia and Estonia, he is engaging in self-deception. New state structures supporting a transition to a bourgeois order, to a capitalist orientation, will be created during this time. According to the republic’s present leaders these will be bourgeois democracies, and nothing is being said about any kind of socialist choice. Though judging from the present monopoly the fronts enjoy in the Baltic republics in radio, television and the press, and if we judge from the “pluralism” that is suppressing all dissent, all we have is totalitarianism, and in no way democracy. Other more concrete details and facts confirm this as well. Formation of paramilitary organizations is continuing in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia despite the USSR president’s ukace.

The old units and subunits of the local militia and border guards, security organs and customs departments have been resurrected in Lithuania. They are staffed by many who raised arms against Soviet rule, especially at the management level. And it wouldn’t be at all astonishing if former criminal elements make their appearance even in the republic’s new Supreme Soviet.

The Ayzsarg military-political organization, the members of which actively fought against the revolutionary movement in the 1920s and 1930s, is being revived in Latvia. They carried out the fascist revolution of 15 May 1934, they collaborated with German occupying powers, and numerous acts of terror, murder and plunder of the postwar era are on their conscience. Registration of volunteers is proceeding at full steam. The Ayzsarg leadership intends to form three regiments, to conduct its own congress, and to open a special school in Daugavpils. There are currently as many as around 40,000 members in the republic’s volunteer detachments of “keepers of the peace.”

The military organization Omakayte (Self-Defense), which stained its standards with the blood of the Second World War, has been resurrected in Estonia. Extremist actions by the Green Regiment against Soviet Army soldiers have become commonplace in the republic. Activists of the newly created Eesti Kodukayset security service have attempted attacks upon officers and soldiers many times.

Conscripts, conscientious objectors and deserters, the number of which is climbing beyond the one-thousand mark, are being drawn increasingly more actively into the orbit of national separatist sentiments.

A campaign to rehabilitate fascist hangers-on—“forest brothers,” volunteers of the Estonian 20th SS Division and the Latvian 15th and 19th SS Divisions—has been raised to the rank of state policy in the Baltic republics. This policy is widely supported by the mass media. Government bigwigs are lobbying for pensions for former SS members, who have now been elevated to the rank of “heroes of the struggle against Stalinism,” “people resurrecting the spirit of the nation,” “instilling the idea of national obedience and exclusiveness in the young.” As we know, a monument to the Ern sabotage and espionage organization has been restored. It was erected by the Nazis and their local hirings in 1943. Now the Estonian society for the protection of ancient monuments has begun restoring only the monuments commemorating those who fought on the side of the Whites, or in fascist legions.

All the world, all civilized mankind condemned fascism, but the Estonian government not only showed no desire
to condemn the gathering mob, but it also financed it under the table, and now it is transferring everything from a sick body into a healthy one. It is being supported by the chorus of national-separatist and so-called independent Baltic mass media.

Articles about what happened in Tor were published in the weekly EESTI EKSPRESS, in Riga’s city newspaper RIGAS BALSS and in many other Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian publications. Even though they visited the place, the authors of these articles naturally saw nothing dangerous about the rebirth of fascism. What they wrote about, you see, was the extensive cultural program prepared for former SS members, and they were sorry that it was never implemented. But on the other hand they don’t hold back at all when it comes to describing the threat posed by Soviet paratroopers.

The ignorant reader is inundated by the storm of threats stated by officers of the Soviet Army and by the description of the terrible picture of tanks patrolling in the vicinity of Tor, life in which “...continued in its accustomed rhythm, despite the fact that helicopters were circling above it, army reconnaissance groups, from the smallest to the largest, were wandering through the streets, and from the forests this picture was complemented by the roar of tank engines...” (RIGAS BALSS, 10 July 1990). All of these actions by the military, the newspaper writes, inflicted damages estimated at 90,000 rubles. Impressive?! Especially when the story is told by an eyewitness.

But as it turns out, the aphorism “lies like a witness” fits well here. Surely, at least, according to the documents of local government organs. The first is signed by the chairman of the rural soviet of the village of Tor, Yu. Puust. Its text proclaims: “The rural soviet of the village of Tor has no complaints in regard to the use of roads by military subunits on the territory of the rural soviet during the exercise conducted from 4 to 8 July.” The report bears an official seal.

The second document is an act drawn up on the instructions of the elders of the executive committee of Pyarnu District, identified as document No 78, 9 July 1990. Here is its text: “A commission consisting of...inspected the surface of the road over which the tracked vehicles passed during the troop exercise of 4-8 July 1990. The commission concluded that significant damage was not inflicted upon the road surface, and the executive committee of Pyarnu District has no complaints against the military unit.” The act was signed by seven persons. It bears an official seal.

So that’s the way things are!

But I don’t think that it had any influence on such Baltic newspapers, which, unable to make any hay out of the false reports from Tor, tried to plant some new false reports on their pages, this time about similar events in Latvia. This time the subjects of the reports were two red-starred fighters “which circled at supersonic speed at great height over Bauska.”

No, what compelled the Supreme Soviet and the government of Latvia to call off the SS Black Sabbath in Bauska was not the fighters but the deep indignation of all honest people on Earth, of the country, of the republic’s inhabitants, of former prisoners of Salaspils and other fascist concentration camps who could not tolerate the mockery of the memory of the 313,798 peaceful inhabitants (including 39,835 children) and the 330,032 Soviet prisoners of war destroyed by fascism in Latvia, and of the 279,615 persons forcibly carried off to Germany for slave labor, and persons who have no desire to be mankurtas of national separatism and neo-fascism.

Former legionnaires, police and Ayzsargs were guaranteed beer and “sport” at the Bezdeligas farmstead. But some are still alive who remember that these “hawks” engaged in sport of a different sort during the fascist occupation. From the first days of the war, before they formed into punitive bands, they began annihilating Red Army soldiers and their families, Soviet activists and peaceful inhabitants. By as early as January 1942, the German police and SS in Latvia had at their disposal around 14,000 persons who volunteered for police work. As of 1 September 1943, approximately 36,000 Latvian nationalists were working in various punitive organs.

There is a document drawn up by the fascists themselves concerning the conduct of special operations to create “a neutral zone 40 km wide on the Latvian border” with the purpose of hindering the partisan movement. Seven Latvian battalions, one Ukrainian and one Lithuanian company, special subunits and 700 wheeled vehicles took part in the operation, which was conducted in February-April 1943. Latvian troop subunits entered villages and gunned down all men from 16 to 50 years old; they were followed by Latvian special forces subunits that finished off all who survived. The elderly and the disabled who were incapable of a long journey were also gunned down. The rest, women primarily, were dispatched on foot to places of so-called secondary processing (the concentration camp in Salaspils, Fort No 9 in Kaunas and elsewhere).

Those who fell behind were shot. Then the women were separated from the children and sent to Germany. The villages themselves were plundered and burned.

“The shining memory of people martyred in fascist prisons should compel the republic’s Supreme Soviet to impose a prohibition on this assemblage of executioners,” reads an appeal of former prisoners of fascist concentration camps to the Latvian Supreme Soviet. This time it heeded the demands of the people. The SS rally in Bauska was cancelled. But still-influential nationalistic circles in Latvia and in the Baltic region as a whole are generally continuing along their separatist course. They foster the hope of revenge of fascist survivors under their wing.

All honest people should be aware of this.
As folk wisdom would have it, when God wishes to deprive one of reason, he deprives him of memory. But luckily the world remembers the misanthropic ideology and practice of fascism. And no one has reversed, or ever will reverse, either the judgment at Nuremburg or the United Nations resolutions. It has now become fashionable in the Baltic region to reject everything Soviet and socialist, to sing the praises of former SS soldiers, legionnaires, “Ayzsargs,” “forest brothers”—the postwar bandits. But neither certain “politicians” nor “free journalists” will ever be able to erase from the people’s memory the evil done by these turncoats. They will be unable to transform the people into mankurtas, into subjects of the Tuan Ruan. The peoples of the Baltic region are resolutely saying no to neofascism.

Estonian Republican Party Positions Detailed
91UN0484B Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
20 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Leo Shtarkov and Mart Nutt: “Positions Taken by the United Republican Party on the More Significant Political and Economic Issues of Estonia”]

[Text] The political and economic deadlock in occupied Estonia continues. The absence of full power and actual statehood, the ambiguity in foreign relations, and internal contradictions have prevented the effective execution of the tasks before us. It is obvious that getting out of the crisis situation is possible only through activity that would substantially change the social point of departure.

Having analyzed the possible courses for development in this context, and possible solutions to major short-range problems, the board of the United Republican Party (W) submits herewith a plan for implementing some of the immediate measures it offers for the more important areas of Estonian life.

1. Establishing control (sovereignty) by the government of Estonia over the land, air space and territorial waters of Estonia.
   a) Coming up with a concept of legal protection that provides for:
      - Creating effective police units for criminal, defense, field and traffic assignments.
      - Creating municipal police units that report to townships and are financed by them.
      - Subordinating correctional facilities located in Estonia to Estonia’s Ministry of Justice.
      - Extending and implementing a new criminal code for judicial and correctional procedures.
   b) Establishing an Estonian customs office, along with customs regulations for Estonia.
   c) Creating a border guard service that reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and introducing a system of passports.
   d) Obtaining the right to control all Soviet military cargo in Estonia.

2. Creating an economic structure typical of an independent state and developing Estonia’s market.
   a) Reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union to stipulate that all state property of the Soviet Union located within the territory of Estonia will belong to Estonia, and all objects built by Estonia on the territory of the Soviet Union will belong to the latter.
   b) Bringing all property now under Soviet authority under the jurisdiction of Estonia, or to the maximal extent possible, and to end the extraterritorial status for property still remaining under the Soviet authority. To legally evaluate such property in terms of foreign capital, and to make it subject to Estonian laws and taxation.
   c) Proceed with the creation of an independent money system, as soon as the customs regulations are in place. First, the ruble is to be devalued roughly four to five times, then a monetary reform carried out, based on the experience of the West German monetary reform of 1948. A transition to be made to the Estonian Kroon.
   d) Estonian trade to be geared more toward monetary transactions. If necessary, short-term clearing or barter type trade agreements could be made with the Soviet Union, any of its republics, or some other countries.

3. Restoration of natural ownership arrangements.
   a) Legal ownership arrangements based on private property to be restored, private land ownership among them.
   b) Declaring all property expropriated by Soviet authority to be illegally seized. Creating ownership registers and issuing mortgages that would verify the value of the property. Property that cannot be returned should be subject to compensation. Any owner can give up the property in favor of compensation. The compensator would have to be the expropriator or the Soviet Union, with the Republic of Estonia as the state authority in power acting as the guarantor.
   c) Restoring expropriated farmland and structures to their legal owners, with the use of subsequently erected structures to be regulated by agreements or court action. In cases of restored land ownership, it would be beneficial to offer economic incentives that would steer the owner toward dedicated use of the land.

In case of farms that have become the private property of someone else, the issue would be settled by compensation agreed on mutually, or by court action, while resumption of prior ownership should not be accomplished by expropriating the property from its new owner.

Returning to their former owners all expropriated houses, apartments, buildings and structures that have been put at the disposal of state, enterprises, kolkhozes or some other pseudo-cooperatives. If these have become the private property of someone else, the matter should be settled in the manner suggested for farms. Changes in the ownership arrangements should not result in the termination of rental arrangements.
d) Denationalization and privatization of state and kolkhoze property should be based on the principle that only citizens of the Republic of Estonia can become land owners.

Privatization will have to be based on shares, such shares to be obtained by individuals according to their work contribution. Problems related to denationalization and shares will have to be resolved by a commission of experts formed for that purpose.

Major enterprises that are successful will have to be converted into joint-stock companies.

Property remaining in state ownership will have to be rated at parity with those belonging to any other legal entity and maximum identification with municipalities established.

e) Recognition should be given to the vital role of foreign capital in the restoration process of the Estonian economy. The Estonian economy, however, should also be guarded against falling under the control of foreign capital. No foreign state or firm should gain a position of monopoly in any of the branches of Estonia’s economy. To prevent this, some restrictions will have to be applied. It would be inappropriate to impose high taxes on foreign capital, yet it should be required that a significant share of the profit made on this foreign capital be channeled back into Estonia’s economy.

4. Organization of statehood.

Restoration of the Republic of Estonia, based on legal continuity, must take place according to the constitution now legally in effect.

Inasmuch as none of the constitutions of the Republic of Estonia are suitable for today’s needs, work should start on coming up with a new constitution. To arrive at democracy, it is necessary to proceed from the following principles:

- Legislative power must belong to a unicameral state assembly consisting of some 80 to 120 members. Electoral districts will have to be rather large and have several mandates, with the election system being proportional and based on listings.

Executive power will have to be subordinated to the state assembly, but governmental activity should be free of all internal discord at the state assembly.

Parliamentary form of government to be considered the most suitable one for Estonia, where the head of the state (state elder, president) will have to be the mediator between the state assembly and the government and not have an executive mandate or power of decree.

Locally, full powers should be given to the township government, with county governments to be formed according to the interests of townships.

5. Seeking international recognition to the statehood of Estonia.

The government is duty bound to seek recognition of Estonia’s independence from all the states and organizations of the world, provided that this activity does not jeopardize the recognition derived from legal continuity of the Republic of Estonia. Activities that would lead to the recognition of Estonia’s independence as part of some federation or the status quo cannot be permitted.

Estonian Parties Appeal to Government

91UN0449A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian
11 Oct 90 p 3

[Statement signed by Tiit Made and Mario Kivistik: “Resolution Number 2 of the Estonian Entrepreneurs’ Party and the Estonian Green Party”]

[Text] Estonia’s current political and economic situation was analyzed at the joint session of the EEE [Estonian Entrepreneurs’ Party] and the ERP [Estonian Green Party]. Over the past few months, the changes taking place in our lives have been for worse rather than better.

We have reached a conclusion that:

1. The government of the Republic of Estonia must relinquish attempts to establish Esto-totalitarianism or individual dictatorship rule, recognize the need for opposition as such, and center its attention on fighting against economic chaos and the prospect of starvation;

2. There is no need to enter a treaty with Russia, hurriedly, half-secretly, and at all costs. As a result of such activity, we can one day find ourselves in the political and economic alliance of “independent” union republics. The rulers we have today do not have the right to deprive our future generations of the only politically valid argument—the Estonian people have not voluntarily joined the Soviet Union. This way, a few decades from now, there would be no need for some future politician of ours to travel to Moscow for the purpose of bringing back something that was taken there by one of his ancestors.

3. The government of the Republic of Estonia has not managed to come up with taxation laws that would reflect the level of our economic development and the material resources of our people. We propose to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia that a task force made up of delegates and experts be formed as an adjunct to the economic commission, that would prepare a draft for the entire taxation reform by November 7, so that it could be made effective beginning January 1, 1991.

4. To carry out the property and privatization reform, the following steps are recommended to be taken by the Supreme Soviet and the government before the end of 1990:

a) To take an inventory of state resources, including an estimate of all property held in 1940;

b) To determine the number of persons with property rights now located within the territory of the Republic of Estonia;

c) To pass a law determining property rights of foreigners within the territory of the Republic of Estonia.
We propose that the Supreme Soviet Presidium schedule for the next session of the Supreme Soviet a general political discussion of economic policies for the government of the Republic of Estonia. We also deem it necessary that such a discussion be transmitted over Radio Estonia (in both Russian and Estonian).

On behalf of EEE: Tiit Made

On behalf of ERP: Mario Kivistik

Regulations on Use of Estonian Flag
91UN0406A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 9 Nov 90 p 3

[Ukase Approved by the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium and Dated 16 October 1990: "Procedure for Using the State Flag of the Estonian Republic"]

[Text] Article 1. The state flag of Estonia shall be a blue, black, and white national flag, executed in Estonia's state colors.

Article 2. The state flag of Estonia shall be a rectangular piece of cloth consisting of three, equal-sized stripes placed horizontally as follows: the flag's top stripe shall be blue in color, the middle stripe—black, and the bottom stripe—white.

The ratio of the flag's width to its length shall be 7:11, and its normal, standard size shall be 105 by 165 centimeters.

Article 3. The state flag of the Estonian Republic shall be raised as follows:

1) on buildings of the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet, the Estonian Republic's Government, and organs of local self-rule—permanently; and on buildings where sessions (sittings) of the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet are being held, as well as those of the soviets (representative meetings or assemblies) of local self-rule—for the entire lengths of time that such sessions (sittings) are held.

2) in Tallinn on the Tower of Long German, in other cities and localities as provided for by the decisions of their organs of self-rule—permanently;

3) on the buildings of ministries, government departments, other central institutions, structural units of the executive organs of local self-rule, other government and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as on apartment houses—on state holidays and noteworthy dates, as established by legislation operative or valid within the Estonian Republic, and on national and other holidays;

4) on buildings the Estonian Republic's diplomatic representatives, trade delegations, and consular institutions—during state holidays and in accordance with the traditions of the country where they are located;

5) on the means of transport employed by the chiefs of the Estonian Republic's diplomatic representaions and consular institutions;

6) in accordance with diplomatic protocol—on maritime ships and other means of transport carrying, in their official capacities, the President of the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet, the President of the Estonian Republic's Government (i.e., the prime minister), or other persons representing the Estonian Republic's Supreme Soviet or the Estonian Republic's Government;

7) on vessels registered in Estonia's Ship's Register or Estonia's Book of Ships and to which an Estonian ship's license, appropriate temporary certificate, or ship's card has been issued. A vessel sailing under a state or national flag of a foreign state must—when passing through an inland sea of the Estonian Republic or when staying in a port of the Estonian Republic—must raise and fly the Estonian Republic's state flag in addition to its own flag; this is in accordance with international maritime customs and Article 5 of the present act;

8) upon the instructions of the Estonian Republic's Government or at the orders or with the permission of an organ of local self-rule.

The state flag of the Estonian Republic may also be raised as a national flag during ceremonies and on other solemn occasions (including religious ones) being conducted by Estonia's state and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as during family-type, ceremonial occasions.

The size of the state flag being raised in the cases indicated in Par. 1 of the present article must correspond at least to the flag's normal size.

In cases other than those enumerated in the present article raising the state flag on buildings, vessels, and other means of transport shall be prohibited.

Article 4. As a sign of mourning, the Estonian Republic's state flag may be raised as a mourning flag.

In such cases a black ribbon 10 centimeters wide shall be attached to the upper portion of the pole or mast of the Estonian Republic's state flag. Both ends of such a ribbon shall fall to the entire length of the flag's cloth. As a sign of mourning, the flag may also be lowered to half-mast.
Article 5. Estonia’s state flag shall be raised on state holidays and noteworthy dates, as well as on national and other holidays at sunrise but not earlier than 0700 hours; and it shall be lowered at sunset but not later than 2200 hours, unless there is a special or particular instruction from the Estonian Republic’s Presidium or organ of self-rule with regard to some other time for raising or lowering the state flag.

The raising, flying, and lowering of Estonia’s state flag, as well as saluting the flag on ships, shall be carried out in accordance with international maritime customs.

As the national flag, the Estonian Republic’s state flag shall not be lowered during the course of St. John’s Eve.

Article 6. The Estonian Republic’s state flag shall be raised at a building’s main entrance or other suitable place for this. And it shall be fastened either to a pole and an appropriate bracket, or raised on a mast.

The height of a flagpole above the ground level must be at least six times the flag’s width; the length of a flagstaff to be fastened to the wall of a building must be at least three times the flag’s width.

The lower edge of the state flag’s cloth must be at a height of at least three meters from the ground level. The flag must correspond strictly to the requirements specified for it.

Article 7. In case of a simultaneously raising of the Estonian Republic’s state flag and any other state flags, these flags shall be arranged in the alphabetical order of the names of the states involved (in accordance with the Estonian alphabet) to the right of the Estonian Republic’s state flag, when looked at from the side of the flags; moreover, the edges of the flags (the flag width) to be attached to the pole or mast must have the same length, and the cloths of the flags must be arranged at the same level so that no one flag turns out to be higher than another. Each state flag shall be raised on a separate flagpole or mast.

When simultaneously raising the Estonian Republic’s state flag and the flag of any other district [.Errata] or city, or any other Estonian flag, such flags shall be raised to the left of Estonia’s state flag when looking from the side of the flags. Moreover, the size of a flag belonging to a district, city, or any other Estonian flag must not exceed the size of Estonia’s state flag.

Article 8. The Estonian Republic’s districts and cities, as well as other populated centers and units of self-rule may have those flags of the district, city, or populated center and unit of self-rule which existed in Estonia prior to 25 August 1940. But the flags of those cities and other populated centers or units of self-rule which did not have flags prior to the above-indicated time period shall be approved by the Estonian Republic’s Supreme Soviet Presidium upon being submitted for such approval by the Soviet (or representative assembly) of the appropriate local unit of self-rule, taking into account the traditions and symbols which historically evolved in the particular region in question.

The Estonian Republic’s state and public organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations may have flags specified in a particular procedure by the legislature of the Estonian Republic. However, such flags must not be identical with the flags of foreign states or international organizations, nor with the Estonian Republic’s state flag, the flags of districts, cities, other populated centers or units of local self-rule.

Article 9. The responsibility for seeing to it that the appropriate requirements are followed in raising the Estonian Republic’s state flag shall be borne by the officials of the state and public organs, enterprises, and organizations, and equally by private individuals who own the respective buildings (or vessels) or to whom they have been entrusted (on their accounts or balance sheets).

Article 10. Monitoring the precise observance of the procedures for using the Estonian Republic’s state flag shall be exercised by the executive organs of local self-rule. And monitoring the observance of these procedures on vessels shall be carried out by port captains.

Regulations on Use of Estonian State Emblem
91UN0406B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 9 Nov 90 p 3

[Ukase Approved by the Estonian Republic’s Supreme Soviet Presidium and Dated 16 October 1990: “Procedure for Using the State Emblem of the Estonian Republic”]

[Text] Article 1. The state emblem of the Estonian Republic shall have two forms—the large emblem and the small emblem.

The large emblem of the Estonian Republic against a golden background executed in the style of a baroque shall depict three lion-leopards which are dark-blue in color with red tongues and silvery eyes; looking at it from the side of the shield, these eyes are turned to the right, thus fixing their gaze on the viewer. The shield is framed on three sides by a wreath made of golden-colored, entwined oak twigs.

The Estonian Republic’s small emblem shall consist of the shield and the figures of the emblem, as described in the second part of the above paragraph, but without the oak twigs.

Article 2. The representation of the state emblem shall be used on the great seal of the Estonian Republic and on the seals of all the organs of state authority and state administration, as well as in other cases, as provided for by the present act and the legislation of the Estonian Republic.

The standard for the representations of the large state emblem and the state seal of the Estonian Republic shall
be the images depicted and published in the RIIGI TETATAJA ("State Records"), No 117/118, 1925 (pp 789-790 with an inserted sheet), in accordance with the Law on the State Emblem, as adopted by the State Duma of the Estonian Republic on 19 June 1990. The representation of the Estonian Republic's emblem shall not be deemed distorted if, during the reproduction process, the dark-blue color of the lions has shadings or tints ranging from a cobalt color to ultramarine. When reproducing the figures of the lions, a three-dimensional depiction is replaced by a flat-surface one; in this connection, it is permitted to abandon the dark outline; in depicting the shield, the three-dimensional quality is shown only in the upper corners of the shield. The golden color may be replaced by a yellow color.

The restored standards of the state emblem and state seal of the Estonian Republic shall be stored and preserved in perpetuity, and their representations shall be published in the VEDOMOSTI ESTONSKOY RESPUBLIKI.

The representations of the large and small emblems of the Estonian Republic must, regardless of their sizes, always correspond precisely to the colored or black-and-white representation of the emblem.

**Article 3.** The state seal of the Estonian Republic shall consist of a circular-shaped, metallic seal with a diameter of seven centimeters. In the center of the circle there shall be a representation of the large state emblem of the Estonian Republic, and in the upper portion of the circle above the depiction of the shield there shall be the words "Eesti Vabariik."

The state seal of the Estonian Republic shall be placed as follows:

1) on credentials and letters of recall of plenipotentiary representatives of the Estonian Republic;

2) on international treaties of the Estonian Republic;

3) on envelopes which contain the credentials and letters of recall indicated in Par. 1 of the present section.

The state seal of the Estonian Republic shall be stored and preserved in the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet. The procedure for storing and using the state seal shall be established by the President of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet.

**Article 4.** A circular-shaped metallic seal having a diameter of five centimeters, with a representation of the large state emblem and with its own name in the upper portion of the circle shall be used by the following entities:

1) The Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and its Presidium;

2) The Government of the Estonian Republic;

3) The Supreme Court of the Estonian Republic;

4) Diplomatic representatives of the Estonian Republic.

A circular-shaped seal having a diameter of five diameters, with a representation of the small state emblem and with its own name in the upper portion of the circle shall be used by the following entities:

1) The Office of the President of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet and the Office of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet;

2) The State Control of the Estonian Republic;

3) The State Office of the Estonian Republic;

4) The ministries and government departments of the Estonian Republic;

5) The courts, the State Arbitration Office of the Estonian Republic, the state organs for recording the acts of civil status, and the state notary offices;

6) The Procuracy of the Estonian Republic and its organs;

7) The organs of local self-rule;

8) The Estonian Academy of Sciences, state universities, and other state scientific and educational institutions at all levels;

9) The Bank of Estonia;

10) Trade delegations and consular institutions of the Estonian Republic.

**Article 5.** All the remaining state organs, state enterprises, institutions, and organizations not indicated in Article 4 of the present act have a circular-shaped seal with a diameter of 3.5 centimeters. Located in the center of the circle is a representation of the small state emblem, while the upper portion contains the name of the appropriate state organ, state enterprise, institution, or organization.

**Article 6.** A colored or black-and-white representation of the large state emblem of the Estonian Republic shall be used on forms for laws of the Estonian Republic and forms for decrees of the Government of the Estonian Republic. It can also be used on forms for the most important documents being published by state organs and state institutions (including the forms for all treaties to be concluded with foreign states and on diploma forms), on the signboards of these institutions, on publications of the VEDOMOSTI ESTONSKOY RESPUBLIKI, and on other, official, printed publications. The forms of other documents and printed publications can use only the colored or black-and-white representation of the small state emblem.

**Article 7.** A three-dimensional representation of the large state emblem of the Estonian Republic can be used in their own buildings and in the auditoriums of only those state organs and state institutions which are indicated in Section 1 of Article 4 of the present act, as well as organs of local self-rule and courts in the rooms where they hold their
sessions and the organs for recording acts of civil status in rooms where the formal registration of births and marriages are conducted.

Article 8. In addition to the cases indicated in the present act, the right to use representations of the state emblems of the Estonia Republic may be granted only by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet. The procedure for making, using, storing, and destroying the seals and forms of documents with a representation of the state emblem of the Estonian Republic shall be established by the Government of the Estonian Republic.

Article 9. Districts [ueyxds] and cities of the Estonian Republic, as well as other populated centers and units of local self-rule, can have those emblems of a district, city, or other populated center or unit of local self-rule which existed in Estonia prior to 25 August 1940. But the emblems of those districts, cities, other populated centers, or units of self-rule which lacked them prior to the above-indicated date shall be approved by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium upon being submitted by the Soviet (representative meeting) of the appropriate unit of local self-rule, taking into account the traditions and symbols which have historically evolved within the particular region concerned.

State and public organs of the Estonian Republic, enterprises, institutions, and organizations may have their own emblems, as established in the procedure specified by the legislation of the Estonian Republic. However, these emblems must not be identical with the emblems of foreign states or international organizations, nor the state emblem of the Estonian Republic, the emblems of districts, cities, other populated centers or units of local self-rule.

Article 10. The responsibility for observing the procedure of using and storing the seal and document forms with the representation of the state seal of the Estonian Republic shall be borne by the leading officials of the state organs, state enterprises, institutions, and organizations, as well as by other officials responsible for this.

Article 11. Monitoring controls on the precise execution of the present act shall be exercised by organs of the state power and state administration of the Estonian Republic and by the leading officials of other organs, enterprises, institutions, and organizations which have been granted the right to use the representation of the state emblem of the Estonian Republic.

Results of Estonian Opinion Poll on Citizenship

91UN0449B Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian 13 Oct 90 p 3

[Article by Mikk Titma: "Public Opinion on Citizenship"]

[Text] For Estonian nationalism, the citizenship issue certainly means maintaining the primacy of Estonian nationals in the country of our birth, just as it does to the Swiss, or any other nationality placed at the crossroads of Europe. To representatives of other nationalities living here, the citizenship issue is tied to their individual political rights and, no use denying it, to quite mundane concerns of livelihood. The process of regaining independence has brought with it the need to resolve, once and for all, the citizenship issue for people who have settled in Estonia over the last 50 years. This is an acute political issue that can only be resolved by heeding the political will of the people living here. Any options for a solution (no matter how pure they may seem politically) that ignore these facts will lead to major conflicts. In a situation, where the state of Estonia does not have any power, our action will have to be based on seeking compromises. We are aided in this by public opinion surveys that show people's support to acting on one option or another.

Public opinion surveys in Estonia have been yielding relatively adequate information about the attitude of the population. First, this could be attributed to the relatively small size of the Estonian population and the diversity of opinion typical of such small samples. Secondly, a network of social ties that would stabilize public opinion has not yet developed. Thirdly, the situation is highly volatile, with immediate news about events reaching the people with full impact, while effects of one's deeper value structures are inhibited. This is also why the numeric data that follow cannot be regarded as something of permanent value.

The surveys of both the Media Information Center and Mainor were conducted in the late spring. The situation was relatively stable at that time; under conditions of the November crisis, public opinion is obviously subject to radical changes. This is affected significantly by the prospect of acquiring Russian citizenship as an alternative to Estonian citizenship.

Public opinion has been showing a steady gain in understanding the need to solve the citizenship issue. The Mainor survey of April, 1989 showed that only one tenth of the respondents regarded citizenship to be a crucial issue in our society. By June of 1990, close to half of them deemed it necessary to solve that problem, more than half of the Estonians and one quarter of other-nationals among them.

Conclusion: This issue is of vital significance to Estonians because of their course set on independent statehood, for other-nationals the issue takes on significance at a slower rate, as personal concerns about future are stirred up by the independence movement of Estonians.

Under competitive conditions, if elections for the State Council should become imminent, more than half of the respondents find it necessary to implement the citizenship law. Three quarters of the Estonians support the in soles principle i.e. all those born in Estonia can obtain citizenship. At the same time, however, half of the Estonians are clearly against the 0-option.
Evaluation of Considerations for Obtaining Citizenship

A/K [Source: Media Information Center]

1. To Citizens of the Republic of Estonia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>Other-Nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Those Born in Estonia

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Those Who Have Lived in Estonia at Least 15 Years

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Those Who Have Lived in Estonia at Least 10 Years

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Those with Permanent Registration

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Those Living in Estonia Now

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, we now need to take a closer look at the possibility of a compromise on the citizenship issue between Estonians and other-nationals. Data from Table 1 show that half of the other-nationals recognize the primacy principle regarding citizens of the Republic of Estonia and their offspring. Three fourths of the Estonians accept the in sols principle. This is a clear basis for a political compromise.

The basic divergence stems from the rest of other-nationals and is linked to the length of time they have lived in Estonia, which remains the basis for obtaining citizenship. The majority of Estonians agree on 15 years. This is also accepted by more than one third of the other-nationals. A shorter time will no longer serve as a basis for compromise. Surveys show that the rest of the requirements no longer cause a conflict.

Conclusion: A compromise is possible based on the in sols principle and the requirement of having lived in Estonia for 15 years. This calls for two distinct routes to be followed. First, we need to separate the immediate problem of citizenship, as it affects the uneasy political climate of today, from future naturalization practices in the Republic of Estonia. There is no point in discussing future criteria for naturalization, or in trying to come up with a law to cover them.

Secondly, solving of the citizenship problem in Estonia should be timed to coincide with solving the same problem in Russia. At the present time, a little more than one third of the other-nationals wish to obtain Estonian citizenship: one fourth of them are interested in permits for residence only.

What emerged as determining factors for the behavior of other-nationals were:
1) Introduction of citizenship in Russia creates a choice—to relinquish the citizenship that's given, or that of Estonia;
2) A clearly defined possibility of living in Estonia as a citizen of Russia would remove anxieties that stem from linking citizenship to livelihood concerns;
3) A commitment on the part of the Republic of Estonia for making state help available to resolve livelihood problems connected to repatriation.
4) Separating the current solution to the citizenship problem from future naturalization. Over three fifth of the other-nationals also find that immigration to Estonia should be curbed in the future. The law for obtaining citizenship will have to be passed by the State Council at some future time.

It is clear that Estonians' prime concern in the citizenship issue is centered on the fear of being projected as a minority in our own home country. Fear has big eyes. Discussions have reached fantastic figures like—if all those living here should bring their relatives, they would total close to two million.

As a sociologist, I shall proceed by making this point:

There is no precedent known to history where representatives of a domineering superstate would aspire to become citizens of a small state. In case of a choice to become a citizen of either Estonia or Russia, a Russian would prefer the latter in most of the cases. To give up the protection of one's country is obviously a decision of dubious value to most Russians. I think, however, that there will be a large portion of Russian citizens, who will seek a permit to reside in Estonia.

Going further, we should give up the magic number of 600,000, and look at things as they are. The largest portion of other-nationals is undoubtedly the army, along with its biggest base at Paldiski. To the more than 100,000 military personnel we should add their family members (around 30,000 in total).

Let's now turn to the war industry, something that is hardly ever dismantled, but more likely relocated somewhere else. It is obvious that most of the personnel of these enterprises will also be transferred to such new locations. Among workers of the Union industries here, there are also many who are leaving.

Actually, the biggest group of applicants for Estonian citizenship is the population of northeastern Estonia. Here is a problem that should be cleared up without touching on any internal political issues. Personally, I think that attempts to exert more Estonian influence on Narva are bound to lead to total conflict, whereas reliance on the in sols principle for forming a citizenry out of the established population will make for a strong ally on our eastern border.
As we can see, the monster is not as bad as first it was portrayed. I realize that my opinion is bound to elicit counter-arguments. I would like to hope, however, that those directed at the substance of the argument and not be of the *argumentum ad hominem* variety, as has become the custom lately, and most unfortunately, thanks to the proddings of some individuals. Sober reasoning and discourse should help us move along faster.

**Ethnic Discrimination in Tallinn Housing Law Denied**

*91UN0484A Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian 17 Oct 90 p 2*

[Unattributed article: "Who Has Really Been Getting All the Apartments in Tallinn?"]

[Text] The August 16, 1990 resolution of the Tallinn City Council regarding "Restrictions in the Distribution of Housing in Tallinn" has elicited a lively response, along with a one-sided protest coming from the "Equal Rights" group of deputies to the Estonian Supreme Soviet and the communist faction.

The complaint is that by passing this resolution the city council has violated the international norms of justice in the area of human rights and also the housing laws currently in effect, and has infringed on the constitutional rights of the citizens.

The actual distribution of apartments, as it has been practiced in Tallinn for years, can be viewed from data sent to the editorial offices of PAEVALEHT over the signature of A. Kork, chairman of the Tallinn City Council, as submitted by U. Meristo, head of the housing office of the Tallinn City Council.

**Information About the Distribution of Apartments in Tallinn.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apartments distributed: included</th>
<th>EKT</th>
<th>EML</th>
<th>Estonians Among Recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1,317</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average:</strong></td>
<td><strong>19%</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are 19,764 families registered for obtaining living quarters in state subsidized housing units through enterprises of the city of Tallinn and housing offices of its rayons.

**Length of Tallinn residence of those registered:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of Residence</th>
<th>Registered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>less than 5 years</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 10 years</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 25 years</td>
<td>8,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>over 25 years</td>
<td>8,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Nationality of those receiving state [subsidized] apartments:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonians</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Non-Estonians</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,103</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>3,725</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>5,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>3,507</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>5,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,849</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>3,361</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>5,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>1,681</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>3,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Amendments to Lithuania's Law on Government**

*91UN0498A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 6 Nov 90 p 2*

[Lithuanian Republic Law: "On Changes in Certain Articles of the Lithuanian Republic Law on Government"]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council hereby resolves that the following changes and amendments shall be made in the Lithuanian Republic Law on Government:

1. revision of sections 4, 5 and 6, Article 4 as follows:

"Members of the government shall be confirmed or relieved of their duties at the recommendation of the Chairman (Prime Minister) of the Lithuanian Republic Government and with consideration given to the findings of Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council permanent commissions."

"In the event of refusal by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council to confirm the candidacy of a member of the government submitted to it the Prime Minister shall submit another candidate."

"The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council shall form the Lithuanian Republic Government within two months after the former government relinquishes its powers. If within one month after the presentation of a
new government the Supreme Council has not approved
at least two-thirds of the members of the government, or
if the Supreme Council has not approved the composi-
tion of the entire government within two months after
the former government relinquishes its powers, and if
the Supreme Council does not resolve to extend the time
period allowed for formation of a new government, the
Prime Minister shall resign.”

2. revision of Section 3, Article 7 as follows:

“Any member of the Lithuanian Republic Government may
by decision of the Supreme Council be called upon to give
an accounting of his or her work before that body.”

3. revision of Section 4, Article 8, as follows:

“When a Lithuanian Republic Government resigns it
shall be instructed by the Supreme Council to continue
performing its duties until such time as a new Lithuanian
Republic Government has been formed.”

4. revision of Section 3, Article 9, as follows:

“In the event that a motion of no-confidence is passed
against the Lithuanian Republic Government or a min-
ister of the Lithuanian Republic the entire government
or the minister in question shall be obligated to resign.
The Lithuanian Republic Government or the Lithuanian
Republic minister shall be instructed by the Supreme
Council to continue performing their duties until such
time as a new government has been formed or a new
minister appointed.”

5. revision of Point 3, Article 20, as follows:

“3. if necessary establishes Lithuanian Republic govern-
mental commissions and with the consent of the Supreme
Council establishes Lithuanian Republic state services and
inspectatorates, and also carries out reorganization and
elimination of these organs.”

6. revision of Section 3, Article 29, as follows:

“Lithuanian Republic Government decrees are to be signed
by the Chairman (Prime Minister) of the Lithuanian
Republic Government.”

B. Kuzmickas, deputy chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
Vilnius, 23 October 1990.

Lithuanian Deputies Election Law Changes
91UN0498B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
6 Nov 90 p 2

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
hereby resolves to revise Article 14 of the Lithuanian
Republic Law on Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
Deputies as follows:

“Elections of Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
deputies shall be called by the Lithuanian Republic
Supreme Council not later than five months prior to the
expiration of the Lithuanian Republic Council’s term of office and not later than three months prior
to the day of the elections.”

This Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council is to be
published in the press.

B. Kuzmickas, deputy chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
Vilnius, 23 October 1990

Lithuanian Referendum Law Amendment
91UN0498C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
6 Nov 90 p 2

[Lithuanian Republic Law: “On Amendments to Article
7 of the Lithuanian Republic Referendum Law”]

[Text] The Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
hereby resolves to revise Article 7 of the Lithuanian
Republic Referendum Law as follows:

“Laws may be passed and other important issues of state
resolved through referendums.”

“If necessary consultative (advisory) referendums may
be held.”

B. Kuzmickas, deputy chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council
Vilnius, 23 October 1990

Lithuanian Passport Regulations Published
91UN0439D Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
22 Nov 90 p 7

[Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian
Republic on Lithuanian Passport Regulations]

[Text] Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian
Republic

On the approval of passport regulations for citizens of
the Lithuanian Republic (affixed).

V. Landsbergs, chairman,
Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet;
Vilnius, 8 November 1990.
Regulation on Passports of Citizens of the Lithuanian Republic

I. General Regulations

Article 1. The passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic is a document which confirms citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic and the identity of its owner.

Article 2. Every citizen of Lithuanian who has reached the age of 16 is obliged to have a passport.

For persons who are traveling abroad, the Lithuanian Republic citizen's passport is registered in the procedure prescribed by the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 3. The passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic is issued in accordance with the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic:

1) to persons who were citizens of the Lithuanian Republic, their children, and grandchildren, and likewise to other persons who were permanent inhabitants on the present territory of the Lithuanian Republic up to 15 June 1940, their children and grandchildren, who lived permanently on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic;

2) to persons who have a permanent place of residence in the Lithuanian Republic, if they themselves were born or have proven that even one parent or grandfather or grandmother was born on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic and if they are not citizens of another state;

3) to other persons who, on the day the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic entered into force, were living permanently on the territory of the Lithuanian Republic and have there a permanent place of work or a permanent legal source of livelihood;

4) to persons who acquired citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic in accordance with the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic.

In reference to point 3 of the present article, a passport is issued to persons after their free self-determination with regard to citizenship in the course of two years from the day the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic goes into effect.

In reference to point 4 of the present article, a passport is issued to persons, with the exception of acquiring citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic by birth, on the basis of the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic on admittance to citizenship in the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 4. The question of issuing the passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic to persons stated in points 1, 2, and 3 of Article 3, permanent status is decided by the Internal Affairs Service. When an argument arises between a person and the Internal Affairs Service relative to establishing the citizenship of the person, the question is decided by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic according to the decisions of the administrations of city and regional governments of the Lithuanian Republic which they have received. Materials for preparation of resolutions are presented to the Commission on Citizenship, formed of city and regional governments of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 5. In accordance with the Law on Citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic, a passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic may be issued to persons who have acquired citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic at the consular establishments of the Lithuanian Republic in foreign countries.

II. Entries in the Passport of a Citizen of the Lithuanian Republic. The Validity of the Passport.

Article 6. The passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic has 32 pages. The names of the types of information are printed in Lithuanian, English, and French.

The information is inserted by the services and officials of the Lithuanian Republic in Lithuanian.

Article 7. The following information on the individual citizen is inserted in the passport:

- name, surname;
- year, month, and day of birth;
- place of birth;
- identification number;
- the signature of the person must be in the passport.

The following information about minor children must also be entered in the passport: name, surname, date of birth. The entry of this information is executed by the institutions for entering acts of citizenship status.

Article 8. Other information as provided by law must also be entered in the passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic.

Must make entries in the citizens passport:

- The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic and the consular institution of the Lithuanian Republic - about the passport's period of validity abroad, about children departing jointly, and other additional information;

- the internal affairs services and officials, and representatives to perform this work by by settlement (volost) governments - on permanent place of residence.

With the consent of citizens, public health institutions enter in their passports blood types and Rh factors.

It is prohibited to make other entries in the passport.

Article 9. A passport is issued to a person of 16 years old, which is valid up to the age of 25.
To persons who have reached 25 and 45, the Internal Affairs Services will attach to the passport new photographs corresponding to this age. Passports which do not have such photographs are invalid.

Article 10. A foreign passport is valid for not more than 5 years. At the expiration of the period of validity, the passport must be extended.

Article 11. Evidence of permanent place of residence abroad is entered in the manner prescribed by the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

III. Procedure for Issuing a Passport of a Citizen of the Lithuanian Republic and Its Use

Article 12. Issuing and exchanging passports and attaching new photographs are executed by the Internal Affairs Service of the citizen’s place of residence or by a consul of the Lithuanian Republic.

A citizen of the Lithuanian Republic, on receiving a passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic, is obligated to return to the Internal Affairs Service the passport which he has.

Article 13. To receive a passport of a citizen of the Lithuanian Republic, the following must be presented:

1) an application on the form prescribed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic;

2) certification of citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic and present passport;

3) evidence of birth (on issuing the passport for the first time);

4) two photographs measuring 35 X 45 mm;

5) other documents confirming citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic as necessary.

Stated in points 1, 2, and 3 of article 3 of the present clause, persons not receiving certification of citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic without fail sign to observe the Constitution and laws of the Lithuanian republic, to respect its statehood, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Article 14. With the expiration of the passport’s period of validity, the citizen must present to the Internal Affairs Service the passport and two photographs corresponding to his age, measuring 35 X 45 mm.

On using up the passport’s pages set aside for visas, the Internal Affairs Service or a consular establishment of the Lithuanian Republic inserts the prescribed form in it.

Article 15. The exchange of a passport is carried out in the following circumstances:

1) change of name or surname;

2) established inaccuracies in the entries;

3) using up pages intended for visas and for the extension of the passport’s period of validity;

4) wearing out, damaged, unsuitable for use.

Article 16. For changing a passport, the following are presented:

1) an application by the prescribed form;

2) the passport which is subject to change;

3) two photographs measuring 35 X 45 mm.

For changing a passport in connection with changing the name or surname or by establishing an inaccuracy in the entries, documents which confirm these circumstances are also presented.

Article 17. For receiving, changing or extending the period of validity of a passport, a citizen must present documents and photographs not later than a month after reaching the corresponding age or changing the name or surname.

Article 18. In changing a passport or in exchange for a lost passport, information must be brought to the Internal Affairs Service or to the consul about children who are not yet 16 years old, and likewise, notes on the registration of marriage and the person’s permanent place of residence.

Article 19. For issuing or changing a passport, duties in an established amount are collected.

The heads of Internal Affairs Services and Consuls may release from duty collection for issuing the passport in procedure established by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Article 20. The citizen is obliged to preserve the passport carefully.

On losing a passport, the citizen must make a declaration to the Internal Affairs Service or the consul, who will issue him a temporary certificate confirming his identity. The form of the temporary certificate and the manner of its issue are established by the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

On losing a citizen’s passport, a new passport is issued by the Internal Affairs Service in the manner established by the present Provision.

Article 21. A person who has lost citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic must surrender his passport to the Internal Affairs Service of the Lithuanian Republic.

The passport of a deceased person is surrendered to the consular establishment, an institution of entries of acts of a citizen’s status of the Lithuanian Republic, which send it after registering the death in the Internal Affairs Service.

A found passport is to be surrendered to the Internal Affairs Service.
Article 22. The passport of a person confined under guard, and likewise sentenced to deprivation of freedom, and a person conditionally sentenced to deprivation of freedom with compulsory labor is confiscated by the organs of inquiry, of preliminary investigation, or by the court. On release from under guard or from serving one's sentence, the passport is returned. To a person conditionally released from a place of deprivation of freedom and obligatory sentence to labor, the passport is returned after removing restrictions from it.

Article 23. Withdrawing a passport from a citizen is prohibited except in circumstances provided for by legislation of the Lithuanian Republic and likewise receiving a passport on security.

Article 24. Examples of the seal stamp, stamps and forms needed for implementation of the Regulations for Citizen Passports of the Lithuanian Republic are regulated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Application forms for receiving a passport and forms for information on permanent place of residence of a citizen are issued to him free. For other forms a fee is collected according to their actual value.

Article 25. A list of officials and other persons who are responsible for executing the present Regulations is determined by the government of the Lithuanian Republic.

Article 26. Control for executing the present Regulations is carried out by the organs of authority and administration of the self-government and Internal Affairs Services.

Citizens who violate the present Regulations are called to account by the procedure established by law.

Kaunas City Council Chairman Details Reform Efforts
91UN0417A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
20 Nov 90 p 3

[Interview with Kaunas City Council Chairman Gintaras Pukas by V. Butkus: "The Affairs and Cares of the City Council"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] [Butkas] A completely new city council of deputies has already been at work for half a year, striving to achieve a fundamental restructuring of the economic, social, and cultural life of the city with its almost half a million residents and to solve the many painful problems inherited from its former "masters." Tell us, please, what questions has the city "parliament" examined during this time and what, in concrete terms, has the council succeeded in doing for the good of the residents of Kaunas?

[Pukas] During the half year that has passed since the elections to the city council we have been working hard and rather intensively. However, we cannot boast that we have already moved mountains. We have been held back by the fact that, besides the law "On the Foundations of Local Self-government," there are no other legal documents regulating our activities. How, for example, can we formulate a budget if there still is a lack of complete clarity concerning privatization, the local economy, taxes, etc.? But we no longer have time to wait and therefore it is sometimes necessary to "invent the bicycle," to do it on our own. Because of this, there is talk about the "super-radicalism" of the Kaunas city council, although this is frequently simply a manifestation of initiative, which, incidentally, turns out to be justified.

One also cannot ignore the circumstance that, speaking figuratively, it was necessary for us to begin from zero. Earlier, rayons had been abolished within the city and only one city executive committee, a temporary one at that, was functioning. The deputies to the city council had to spend a great deal of time and energy in order to create new structures for the organs of authority and administration.

Along with organizational questions, the new council has also resolved ones that directly affect the interests, of one kind or another, of city residents. Thus, for example, we have carefully reviewed procedures for allocating parcels of land for individual, city, and industrial construction. It was no secret to anyone in Kaunas that, up until recent times, social injustice has been permitted in this regard. Some home-builders received land in rayons with all public services and amenities, for example in Azhulionas—out in the sticks, where there still is no transportation of any kind. Also, people who already had good communal apartments frequently landed among the lucky ones, while those who did not have their own roof over their heads were left out. Besides this, a decision was approved according to which, until the time that land has been assessed and its cost will depend upon where it is located, all lots for individual construction are being allocated in one quarter of the city, where conditions are equal for all. In the future, the city council intends to strive for regulations on the introduction within the city of a single waiting list to obtain a plot for individual construction.

Perhaps we sometimes make mistakes, but this certainly does not happen as a result of somebody's evil intentions. For all that, completely new people came to power, ones who had no experience in administration but, to make up for this, are not lacking in initiative, energy and a desire to bring order to all areas of city life. Therefore, one should not be surprised that the city council at times approves nonstandard decisions and that, so long as executive power has not been formalized, the deputies have taken upon themselves its functions. Life itself prompts us to do this.

During the time it has been operating, the city council of deputies has approved more than 130 resolutions on the most varied questions.
[Butkas] You mentioned in passing that conditions do not exist for formal formulation of a city budget, but, indeed, satisfaction of many vital needs of the residents of Kaunas depends to a large degree on how this question is resolved. What can you say about this in more detail?

[Butkas] In the city there are many large and wealthy enterprises that could and should help the city. How are relationships developing between the city council and the directors of the enterprises?

[Bukas] Unfortunately, nothing concrete. Recently, at the invitation of the deputies, we were visited by Minister of Finance R. Sikorskis and, from conversations with him, the conclusion suggests itself that precise criteria, upon which formulation of the city budget should be based, do not exist today and, evidently, also will not exist soon.

A great deal would fall into place if there was a precise, concrete government position in questions of property and privatization. Indeed, for example, it is still not clear to whom—the republic or the city—transportation will belong. And a good many such unclear questions are accumulating. We have proposed that everything that is situated within the territory of the city should be transferred to the local government jurisdiction. This does not mean that we want to be the owners of everything. As long as the process of privatization is going on, we would fulfill the functions of owner, and would settle with the state in the form of taxes. We do not intend to dispute the right of the republic to own certain enterprises situated within the territory of the city, such for example as power engineering and the like.

[Bukas] But indeed, a government resolution was recently passed about transferring enterprises, institutions, and organizations to the local economy of self-governments, by which, as is said in the official commune, a basis has been laid for creating an economic base for self-government units, for delimitation of spheres of influence, etc.

[Bukas] I am a jurist by education, and gave up this profession just a few years ago now; however this document is not very pleasant for me. Moreover, I even find it somewhat alarming, inasmuch as its legal and economic aspects are very imprecise. For example, what does the term "sphere of regulation" mean? Regulation of what: of supply, of incomes, of property? The document does not give a concrete answer to these and other no less important questions.

We consider that if enterprises, institutions, and organizations are transferred to the economy of local self-government, as is stated in this resolution, then the city also becomes their fully-authorized owner. Who, if not the local authorities, knows better what to do with them: to privatize them, to create joint-stock companies, etc.? Take taxes from us, check to see whether we are making mistakes, but give us greater freedom of action. Kaunas is a city of enterprising, energetic people and their hands should not be tied. We will concede that we have expressed a desire to open a store in the city that trades for hard currency and to have our own hard currency account in the bank. We are being refused; this cannot be done. This is a monopoly right of the Ministry of Trade.

And the fact that the residents of Kaunas, have been forced to travel to Vilnius in order to purchase goods that are sold for hard currency, that the city needs hard currency to carry out a number of important and urgent programs, does not seem to be of great concern to the "top levels."

[Bukas] I will not say that they were bad, but they could have been more effective. Recently, in a meeting with representatives of the city associations of industrialists, I asked the question why economic directors are not being more active in the solution of citywide problems. We are not invited to be, came the answer. I do not think that any sort of special invitation is necessary for such a matter. The initiative should come not only from the council and the administrative organs, but also from the economic managers themselves. We have now come to an agreement with them that we will create a working group under one of the commissions of the city council, which will coordinate collaboration between the city authorities and the enterprises.

We are think that the enterprises of the city should be able to sell their above-plan production locally at free-market prices. Let them open their own stores, set their own prices, and trade for the benefit of city residents. A part of the money from profits will go to the enterprise and a part will go to the city treasury. In this way, the city's fund that provides money for the provision of proper amenities, for social needs, etc. would be enriched. In my opinion, this benefits everyone. Industrialists are prepared to support such an idea, but the government has expressed objections against it. However, we do not intend to lose heart and will get what we want. We are also thinking of establishing a center or fund for barter exchange of goods, which will include participation by enterprises from other republics.

Very soon now, as we propose, a majority of the enterprises in our city will embark upon the path of privatization, and then it will be easier to find a common language with them.

[Bukas] One of the most urgent problems inherited from earlier times is the housing problem. It is evident that the time is not going to be soon in coming when every working person will be able freely to buy himself an apartment or home. And, at the same time, the situation with regard to communal housing construction is a cause of serious concern. Not long ago, the chief engineer at the Technical Planning Institute for Urban Construction wrote in the newspaper KAUNO TIESA that, for a number of reasons, about 1700 Kaunas families can be left without apartments which are planned for construction by 1994. What is the situation in the city now with regard to housing construction? What concept does the city council support for developing housing construction?
Unfortunately, I cannot assert that we have a precise, clear concept of how to develop the construction of residential housing. However, the idea prevails that it continues to be necessary to build so-called social apartments, which will be allocated by city self-government. These will hardly occupy a significant part of overall housing construction. All the rest should take the path of privatization. If you want to live in a good apartment with lots of conveniences, save the money and buy it.

A second idea is to get away from the construction of multi-apartment buildings. Life in such a "kolkhoz" has a negative effect on how a person feels; it is simply foreign to our national character. Following the western model, it is necessary to build more so-called family apartments—small buildings with individual entrances for its residents. As in all the rest of the world, we intend to develop the construction of "satellite" cities. For this, we are purchasing land from the rayon.

Time of course will be necessary to realize all these ideas. And now, we are doing a great deal of work on how to change for the better the principles of housing allocation. In my view, we should implement a single city waiting list for the receipt of housing. It is no secret that, now, some enterprises are receiving more housing and others less, but indeed it is not a person’s fault that he works in one or another collective. In general, I am for a single list and equal possibilities for all those in need.

I want to emphasize that, despite new trends, we do not intend to restrict the construction of housing. True, we recently approved a rather unpleasant resolution: We decided not to allocate housing to military personnel from the limit due them this year and to return this money—more than 1.3 million rubles—to the USSR Ministry of Defense. I want us to be correctly understood. The consequences of the economic blockade undertaken by the government of the Soviet Union forced us to resort to this. The work of our construction workers was paralyzed during the blockade and they were in arrears to us with regard to completion of residential housing. Indeed, it is not the fault of the citizens of the Lithuanian Republic that the blockade was declared, so why should they suffer from its consequences?

And a final question: How do you feel being chairman of the city council?

I cannot say that I have already completely mastered this post. I think in any case that I am working here on a temporary basis and that I will, in time, return to my own law practice. At times it is very difficult; my knowledge is insufficient and it is necessary to spend a good deal of time solving questions of secondary importance.

When I agreed to become chairman of the city council I thought that, as a jurist, it would be easier for me to orient myself and take a more objective position in this complicated period, when there still are no new, precise laws and when complex relationships exist. To a certain degree this premise has been justified; however, in the given situation, things can be even more complicated for a jurist. I am accustomed to respect the laws; I see in their observance the only path to successful solution of conflict or complicated situations. I understand that, now, not all existing laws correspond to the situation that has developed and that it is necessary to change them more quickly, but one cannot operate counter to the law. It is necessary to understand that we are moving toward a law-governed state, where the law and democracy are indivisible.

RSFSR

Popov Political-Economic Manifesto Reviewed
91UN0637A Moscow VECHERNAYA MOSKVA in Russian 26 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by N. Marinich: “Begin with Tomorrow”]

[Text] A foreign journalist observed: “You have two parties—the CPSU and the parliamentary-democrats.”

The absence of powerful forces capable of reinforcing the radicals’ policies in the parliament is the misfortune and fault of our young democracy. Dozens of parties and the “Democratic Russia” Movement have been founded, but ask a passerby: What kind of program do the “democrats” have? At best, he will answer: They are for the market. For precisely what? What structural model are they proposing for the Union? How do they see the vertical structure of executive power? The people have vague ideas about this.

Because, I am convinced, G. Popov’s pamphlet “What To Do?”—a distinctive plan for Russia’s economic and political infrastructure—will be read with interest. I did not use the analogy with the title of Solzhenitsyn’s work by chance although, of course, G. Popov’s work does not aspire to be either a literary work or even pure social and political journalism. This is rather research models of our society’s development under different variations developed by a man who has found himself in the very thick of the struggle for the country’s renewal and who has known in full measure both the successes of the first waves of democracy and its recent failures and who has understood the soundness of compromises and the limits of their possibilities. However what is surprising is the fact that what frightened and even alienated us from Solzhenitsyn and which was revealed with such relentlessness—for example, border problems between republics and the entire disaster of our crisis in any social sphere—that same harsh reflection is found in pragmatic Popov although he sometimes proposes other solutions.
In the Russian state structure, Solzhenitsyn, who is reputed among some people to be a "Slavophile," and the "Westernizer" Popov at times arrive at similar views and even use the same terms; governors [gubernatory], zemstvos [local assemblies in 19th-century Russia], and village elders [starosty]....

An unfamiliar Popov presents himself to the reader from certain pages. A number of market economists' previous assertions have been rejected, for example, on the undesirability of conducting monetary reform and on the groundlessness of attempts to divide state property equally or to distribute it without charge; both appeals of democrats gravitating to the center for "consolidation for the sake of consolidation itself" and the categorical nature of certain radicals who will not agree to resort to compromise with the [state] apparatus for any reason have been rejected. Some sort of humane shift or perhaps attempt has been accomplished to the only possible path in this case—to the democratic path, as Sakharov stated it—to resolve those most difficult problems which almost defy solution.

Of course, among the ideas proposed by G. Popov are such controversial ideas as, for example, on monetary reform and on borders and, in any case, today's ideas appear controversial to us but he, foreseeing this, stresses: Even if they seem to be unrealistic, democrats must defend them if they are—democrats. I deliberately do not want to discuss the author's proposals in detail. Something else is more important: To single out the main idea and to clearly highlight his positions which were partially expressed in his speech at the current USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

In the sphere of economics instead of the state apparatus reformation that has emerged under which the people bear the entire brunt of the transition to the market, G. Popov proposes the democratic path of denationalization; formation of all forms of property from private; each citizen receives property in equal shares free of charge; the property of the CPSU and other public organizations transfers into the hands of the organs of power and is redistributed as state property; monetary reform is conducted with the goal of seizing unjustly amassed assets and improving finances; free prices are established, competition is coming into being, and social protection is being provided to the poor and infirm using new money and, if necessary, ration cards.

In the structural model of the Union instead of the centrist approach that is fraught with further worsening of ethnic relations and the slow down of economic reform, and also, in all probability, which also leaves problems with borders and refugees to our children—democratic de-federalization: The republics delegate authority to the center and these can be various powers; the autonomies also participate in this process and they delegate their authority to the republics and to the center; border issues will be resolved by referendum through the largest possible territorial subdivisions: Either in the near future, in the event that a republic secedes from the Union, if an autonomy secedes from a republic, or after conclusion of the transition period to privatization. The union parliament will be the highest organ of power and 300 deputies will be elected to it, half from territorial okrugs and half from the republics. Parliament will elect the President. The Union forms several levels which will develop to the extent that authority is delegated to the center. The author analyzes the structure of the RSFSR in the same detail.

In the sphere of political and power reorganization [vlastnoye pereuroystvo]—de-Sovietization: Replacement of the Congress with a new parliament and President: nationwide elections of republic presidents and parliaments, elections of governors, mayors, elders, and heads of zemstvos. Voting—according to party lists. Establishment of a coherent system of executive power and formation of ordinary municipal authority instead of the current local "parliaments."

We need to pay particular attention to the pamphlet's concluding paragraphs where G. Popov reflects on how democrats should act and all the more so since certain thoughts have something in common with rumors which have been springing up lately from time to time about the democrats' intentions to quit their posts for the opposition. Naturally, the democrats' situation is not easy and it is dangerous to become accomplices in the state apparatus program and you may lose the people's trust; to cooperate with the center while simultaneously struggling with it and compelling it toward reform is no less dangerous: To not move far toward concessions and to not ultimately turn out to be left out in the cold next time as it occurred during the story with the "500 days." To enter the opposition having announced: "Either a coalition or we are leaving?" But will this not be perceived as the bankruptcy of democracy in general and of the democratic version of perestroika? Of course, time will pass and the people will sort it out, however, how much time will have to pass?

What to do? Popov answers: To criticize the state apparatus' path and to comprehensively explain and defend the democratic path, to attempt to do everything within the democrats' power through housing, garden plots, and provision of grants to the poor. To seek the re-election of the Supreme Soviet in order to provide a counterweight to presidential power; to seek formation of a government which would be in charge of only those matters transferred to it by the republics. To enter a coalition under the center's leadership with the condition: The leadership is yours, the program is ours. However, if the democratic program is rejected, the democrats must, in G. Popov's opinion, find the courage within themselves to retreat for the sake of preserving the trust of the masses and for the sake of victory in future elections.

It is certainly more obvious to him. And anyway it is difficult to agree with the latter. For example, for how many years will the democrats have to retreat. In this
case, will the pressure of reactionary forces on Gor-
bachev not increase, the reactionary forces who, no
matter how durable their union with the President turns
out to be, can never forgive perestroika itself or its
initiator? Will the people want to resign themselves to
the democrats withdrawal and will this not result in that
same senseless and merciless rebellion which the author
warns against while modeling one of the situations?

I hear Silayev's calm voice on the radio wishing Russians
a Merry Christmas and I reread the speeches of Yeltsin,
Nazarbayev, and other republic leaders at the All-Union
Congress and the letters to the editor and I think: It is
already impossible to turn back. And there is still the
hope that the President will not accept the state appa-
ratus version of reform since he promised that the people
who enter the renewed union organs will have gained
reputations as solid supporters and active participants
of perestroika. It is true that I cannot ascribe this to the
designation, let us say, of the MVD [Ministry of Internal
Affairs] leadership.

No matter how events turn out, democrats need to rally
and set forth clear, short theses of the program and
engage in painstaking educational and organizational
work. And they need to act not sometime later but from
tomorrow. The situation is too serious and too much is at
stake right now.

Western Republics

Belorussian 'Inertia,' Relations With Center
Examined

91UN0423A Moscow SOBESEDKNI in Russian
No 47, Nov 90 p 4

[Interview with Professor Stanislav Stanislavovich Shush-
kevich, first deputy chairman Belorussian Supreme Soviet,
USSR people's deputy, by Yuriy Pilipenko, correspondent:
"Stanislav Shushkevich: 'Belorussia Is Too Patient'"

[Text] Our attention has somehow stayed from those
regions of the USSR where there are no inter-ethnic
shocks or clashes, where monuments to Lenin are still
standing, where the parkiorn buildings are still not being
picketed, and where the passions of political meetings are
not, in general, hampering the rhythm of work. It is
obvious, therefore, that this is the specific reason why
Belorussi— which for many long years has ranked
"third" (after Russia and the Ukraine) in the Union "table
of ranks"— has nowadays disappeared from the field of
vision of the chroniclers of our stormy times. Nevertheless,
this lack of haste is deceptive. At the recently concluded
extraordinary session of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet
an entire package of legislative acts was adopted with
regard to stabilizing the economy and making the transit
to a market-type system. As to radicalism, these
legislative acts surpass the Union-level ones but are close
to the Russian ones. It seems that here they have learned
how to receive directives from the Center calmly, dispassion-
ately and, having taken them into consideration, to
carry out their own, independent policy.

Yu. Pilipenko, a SOBESEDKNI correspondent, met with
Professor Stanislav Stanislavovich Shushkevich, first deputy
chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet and USSR
people's deputy. He has been called one of the most construc-
tive politicians in this republic's parliamentary body. Shush-
kevich is 55 years old, and prior to his election as a people's
deputy he was not engaged in high-level politics. He is well
known as a learned physicist and has been employed for
many years at the Belorussian State University.

Shushkevich is a member of the inter-regional parlia-
mentary group. He views his principal role in the parliament
as one of uniting common-sense forces for the purpose of
adopting effective measures to extricate our republic from
its crisis.

[Correspondent] Stanislav Stanislavovich, let us try to
analyze what lies behind the calm in Belorussia. How
would you characterize the present-day situation in this
republic: as a continuation of the "stagnant prosperity"
or as the Belorussian variant of the "velvet revolution"?
But, perhaps, it would be more correct to speak about the
phenomenon of a spring which can be released and
expand at any moment?

[Shushkevich] To my way of thinking, all three factors
mentioned by you are in operation, although I would not
be too hasty in endorsing the thesis of the spring. Yes,
indeed, the shelves of Belorussia's stores are virtually
empty, and people do not have much money. And if we
had the same natural characteristics as certain southern
peoples, there could already be rebellious riots... Fortunately,
Belorussians are patient, I would even say—too
patient. They are trying to figure out what is happening
around them. The experience of history has suggested to us
that abrupt gestures have never led to the needed results.
Perhaps the term "patient" revolution best characterizes
the present-day condition of Belorussian society.

Moreover, I would not even deny the existence of the
force of inertia here— in the form of the Belorussian
Communist Party Central Committee. As Ales Adam-
ovich expressed it, Vandeya [?] continues to live by the
all patterns. The stagnant party officials have rallied
strongly and are in no hurry to surrender their positions.
Furthermore, they have learned well how to protect their
own interests. Here they do not even want to analyze the
situation existing in our republic—they simply watch
Moscow's lips and take the requisite steps. But I do not
think that there will any place for them in the new
structure of Belorussian society.

[Correspondent] The fact that this republic's Commu-
nist Party leaders look primarily to Moscow with hope is
understandable and even natural. In my opinion, sub-
misive loyalty has become a typical trait of many
generations of Belorussia's party staffers. But nowadays
where is Belorussia’s Supreme Soviet turning its gaze? To the Union parliament or to the Russian one? To our neighboring Baltic republics? To the countries of Eastern or Western Europe?

[Shushkevich] As to the Center, it has often duped us, if I may be excused for using such a word. And we cannot be pleased by this, naturally. But now the example of the work done by the Russian parliament inspires us quite a bit. Previously, you know, the Center and Russia were, so to speak, one and the same thing. But now it seems to have become clear that even Russia has somehow realized that the Russians too were being fooled just as were the Belorussians. And it is this awareness of themselves, this awakening of a sense of national dignity which is bringing us closer together. I am sure that the Belorussian parliament would not have adopted such a Declaration of Sovereignty if we had not based our effort on the experience of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. And so the emergence of an independent and strong Russian parliament is an extremely important factor in our development as well.

Now let me speak about the paths of movement. Most of the members of Belorussia’s Supreme Soviet are advocates of the socialist option. Nor will I conceal the fact that I am also. But it seems to me that, up to now, we have been distorting the idea of socialism more than we have tried to understand it and implement it. And the trouble with many of my colleagues in the parliament is that they are constrained—like a horse wearing blinders—by the framework of the socialist option, and they are afraid to admit even some elements of capitalism into the economy. For example, they have assimilated from their school textbooks the idea that private property is an evil, and they adhere firmly to this position....

[Correspondent] But will it not happen that Belorussia—with its quality of patience and accomodation, as well as the adherence of its parliament to the socialist option—will remain, in the not-too-distant future, the only republic in the USSR?

[Shushkevich] I fully admit the possibility of such a prospect. Belorussia’s parliament could prove to be the most steadfast in this regard. However, the uniqueness of our situation must also be taken into consideration. Belorussia does not have such sharp inter-ethnic conflicts as other republics do. Everyone speaks Russian here (and far-from-everyone speaks Belorussian). History has firmly bound us together with the Russian people. At the same time, we also have traditional ties with the Lithuanians, Poles, and Ukrainians.... Just why should we be in such a hurry to break off relations with the other republics? But we do indeed want to put an end to the dictates of the central departments.

[Correspondent] Tell me, how do you evaluate the stance taken by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, as set forth by him in the article entitled “How Should Russia Be Structured?” What I have in mind is his proposal that 12 republics be permitted to leave the Union, whereas the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians be united. “Together we suffered through the Soviet period; together we fell into this pit; and together we will pull ourselves out of it.” From what I have heard, this great writer was immediately accused in the Ukraine and in Belorussia of Great Russian chauvinism....

[Shushkevich] It was with great pleasure that I read the feasible ideas of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. There is a great deal of value in his treatment of Russia’s destiny and in his scheme for restructuring the country. It is, of course, the stance of a person who is yearning for Russia. But it seems to me that Solzhenitsyn does not know what is going on here nowadays; he is judging Russia more from the viewpoint of a former GULAG prisoner. I agree with him that these three republics are spiritually the closest in our Union. I do not feel myself to be alien when I go to the Ukraine or to Russia. But neither do I feel myself to be alien in Poland. And it would be absurd to speak about the need to unify these four republics solely on that basis.

In my opinion, we will still find a variant of union in which it will be to everyone’s advantage to participate. At least, it will surely be found for those republics about whose unity Solzhenitsyn speaks. But it will be really difficult to seek out and find further points of association. Nowadays the Center must firmly assimilate and accept the following point: it is impossible to direct everything, absolutely everything from Moscow—Chukotsk reindeer breeding, the problems of oceanology and the Siberian rivers.

[Correspondent] But just what, in your opinion, should unification or association be based upon?

[Shushkevich] Today? Without a doubt, upon economic restructuring, granting economic independence to regions, and decentralizing production. Only in that case could we even talk about a broader cooperation. What unites people is not general, ideological dogmas, but rather mutual, economic interest. Unfortunately, the interference of Union-level departments and presidential ukases in the economies of the various republics is so unfair and unpardonable these days that the only thing left for us to do is to proceed to take measures in response. For example, I am ashamed of the law, passed by Belorussia’s Supreme Soviet, which bans the export of goods from this republic. But, you know, we have to protect our own consumer market somehow!

[Correspondent] Do you consider the steps taken by the Union-level government and the ukases of the USSR President directed at reforming the present-day economic relations to be contradictory and illogical?

[Shushkevich] Unfortunately, that is indeed the case. Of course, Gorbachev is very strong in the field of foreign relations. But he does not know what to do inside our country. Tell me, where, in what other country is there a president who has kept a government which is incapable of operating or functioning?
[Correspondent] Let us also give some thought to such an urgent problem for the USSR nowadays as the “parade of sovereignties.” It seems to me that seeking sovereignty in our country has quickly assumed ugly and abnormal forms. The sovereignty of the country, a republic, even the sovereignty of an individual is something I understand. But I cannot understand those persons who seriously speak about the sovereignty of rayons, residential or apartment blocks.... That is the way that absolutely all ties could be broken.

[Shushkevich] I am confident that we in Belorussia will not attain the “dotage of sovereignties.” The thing that you mentioned has been brought about by clumsy attempts to install new democratic principles in old organizational structures. It seems to me that we have already managed to excessively inflate the organs of power; we have engendered such a number of structures that we ourselves have become confused in finding our way about in them. Some people simply have nothing to keep themselves busy, and so they have come up with the idea of “courtyard sovereignty.” However, the root of the evil does not even lie in this, but rather in the fact that we do not yet have a strong executive authority, one which is capable of operating, mobile, and able to take decisive steps.

[Correspondent] I have gotten the impression that, with many other problems, Belorussia has remained alone in confronting the Chernobyl disaster. Is there a feeling here of genuine help on the part of the Union-level organs, or have the hopes placed on the Center collapsed?

[Shushkevich] Of course, that aid which we are receiving along the Union lines is incommensurate with the losses which we suffered. And nowadays we are relying more on our own forces. It is a shame that our scientists had to spend some much time to convince the venerable, office-type specialists from Moscow of the following points: the scope of the disaster on our republic’s territory was enormous and we needed help as quickly as possible. Just imagine, we have the task of resettling more than 100,000 people from the danger zone. Of course, that requires an incredible amount of work and is incredibly expensive....

[Correspondent] Yes, the loss of confidence or trust in the Center is a serious argument in the dispute over whether to remain in or secede from the Union. Nevertheless, what, to your way of thinking, are the principal causes of the USSR’s disintegration: do they lie in the short-sighted actions of the central authorities or in the unrestrained striving of nations to seek out and find independence?

[Shushkevich] I would not agree with the way the question is posed, as if we were to be asked: who is more to blame? We all must bear responsibility: those who acted thoughtlessly and those who “went along” submissively. The fact of the matter is that our state has always included a very strongly developed herd instinct. And we, even when we understood that we were heading in the wrong direction, still continued to follow the “general course.” Just so long as we were together, just so long as we were “in step.” We got into this mess together—so let us be responsible for it together.

Nowadays many people scold Gorbachev for having, supposedly broken up the unbreakable Union. Of course, that is sheer nonsense. In my opinion, Gorbachev has not broken up the country; instead he has attempted to prevent such a break-up, which was inevitable if everything had remained as before.

[Correspondent] It seems to me that the following problem is extremely important both for the country’s future as well as for this republic’s destiny: does the former opposition intend to seriously take part in the “nitty-gritty” work, or, having demolished the administrative system, does it consider that it has already played its historical role? In connection with this point, I would like to ask you what positions are the opposition deputies taking in the Belorussian parliament. It is a well-known fact that, upon the opposition’s initiative, a series of bills were introduced at the extraordinary session of this republic’s Supreme Soviet; these bills dealt with people’s power, citizenship, the banking system, etc. And there was a package of legislative acts specifying the strategy for Belorussia’s conversion to a market-type economic system. During the course of the discussion there was a significant radicalization, and this also was due, in large part, to the efforts of the opposition. And so just where is the truth: are the opposition deputies by their pressure speeding up the solution of overdue problems, or are they hampering the parliament’s work?

[Shushkevich] I can say with complete sincerity that our opposition deputies have quite a few strong ideas. And, indeed, I support them to a large extent; I help to defend the constructive proposals of the parliamentary minority. I am impressed by the zeal of their work (by the way, most of the deputies representing the party-directory body are neither capable nor desirous of working this way). But I cannot understand nor accept the playing to the public engaged in by the representatives of the opposition; many of their positions are openly destructive. They frequently propose such super-radical items, which they know are doomed to fail, items that can lead to nothing but confrontation in the parliament... Nevertheless, I consider that, without an opposition, our Supreme Soviet would operate in a weaker fashion.

[Correspondent] And what is the status nowadays of the mutual relations between the parliament and the organization which until just recently was the “leading and guiding force of the Belorussian people”—this republic’s Communist Party? I have had occasion to hear the opinion that the Belorussian Communist Party is the most conservative and the most reactionary one in the USSR....
[Shushkevich] I would like to emphasize that in many localities in Belorussia party members continue just as before, to hold the levers of influence in their own hands. In some places there is a "mechanical" kind of handing over of power; this occurs when the first secretary of a party raykom or okhkom is elected as chairman of a Soviet. But as to radical changes in the relations between the new organs of power and the party, I do not sense them. Nor do I sense any renovation in the apparatus of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee. It seems to me that this apparatus is incapable of operating under the new conditions. And with regard to the party leadership of this republic, the epithets "most conservative and most reactionary" are fully justified. But I would not apply these words to every party organization in the republic.

By the way, I am pinning my last hopes for a renovation of Belorussia's Communist Party on the upcoming congress to be held in November. But unless there is an honest analysis at this congress of the path which has been traveled, unless there is repentance, and unless the communists specify what concrete activities they will engage in, I will leave the ranks of such a party.

[Correspondent] On 1 November Belorussia made the official transition to a market-type economy. After lengthy discussions, this republic's parliament approved the program for the conversion and its deadlines. Judging by everything, the path to the market will be an extremely difficult one. Nowadays in the republic there is a shortage of the basic necessities.... Moreover, as Arkadiy Averchenko wrote to V.I. Lenin in a letter which is now known: "power is a fine thing when there is satisfaction all around." But just when will the Belorussian people feel a genuine yield or "return on investment" from the new regime? And when will they taste the fruits of this conversion to a market-type economy?

[Shushkevich] I fear that we have lost a great deal of time. Our move toward a market-type system is still inadmissibly slow. The Belorussian parliament already needs to issue a list of repentances—why are we proceeding so poorly? With an explanation of the reasons for the delays and a specification of concrete deadlines for implementing the program of making the transition to market-type relations. And another thing—the people need to trust the new regime. If such trust is there, the regime will be able to accomplish a great deal.

[Correspondent] In conclusion, let me ask you, Stanislav Stanislavovich, to reply to the questions contained in SOBSEDENIK's "Political Rating." Which of the political leaders in the USSR do you like the most? Which one are you disillusioned with? What event in our country do you consider the most significant this year?

[Shushkevich] It is not difficult to answer the first two questions. I direct my liking and my disillusionment toward one and the same person—Gorbachev. As to this year's events, I have to think hard—there were so many of them. Still—the election of Yeltsin as Chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. That was a crucial episode—a turning-point in our country's destiny during the present year.

Confrontational Approach of Belorussian People's Front Scored

[Article by V. Pechennikov, secretary, Belorussian CP Central Committee: "At Odds with the Realities of Life"]

[Text] During the state holidays all of us became witnesses of yet another challenge which was made to the society. In a different situation we might not react, perhaps, so sharply to the anti-communist show which was staged and played out by the BNF [Belorussian People's Front] on 7 November on Lenin Square in Minsk. But, alas, there are limits. These "spectacles" are now becoming a serious brake on the path of further democratic changes; they are exerting a destabilizing influence on the society; they are introducing an additional nervousness in life; they are lowering the level of our national solidarity; and they are involving the younger generations in hysteria. A political evaluation of this action was provided in the statement by the Bureau of the Belorussian CP Central Committee.

Until just recently the newly revealed "democrats" were calling upon us to engage in political pluralism and a free struggle in the elections. But nowadays they issue commands, backed up by real actions, to "take freedom" by means of fists and violence. The masks have been cast aside and the covers removed from the goals of the BNF leaders—to eliminate the socialist system in this republic and to destroy everything that reminds people of the Soviet regime. In accordance with the will of certain of its leaders, the BNF had already been transformed into an anti-communist organization long before it showed its true face on 7 November. Persons, including those who at one time believed in these leaders' hypocritical slogans, nowadays have the opportunity to analyze matters and figure out what kind of an organization they belong to, where they are being called to, and to what they are being led. It should have become clear to an honest citizen that it is precisely the BNF leaders who—in their words—call for civil peace, but—in real life—bring matters to the point where conflict-type situations are created and to a destabilization of the situation in this republic.

In advocating the socialist path of development, one which ensures the protection of citizens, in being for the signing of a new Union treaty, and in being for a national consensus, the Belorussian Communist Party has become an obstacle which is very inconvenient for political rivals along the path to attaining power. It is precisely for this reason that they splash all their bile and malice on the Belorussian Communist Party, on those persons who speak the truth about the BNF and its leaders.

As is known, the viewpoint of the Belorussian Communist Party regarding the basic problems of this republic's
socioeconomic and sociopolitical development has been set forth in the current statements, declarations, and documents, as well as in the program materials of the Belorussian Communist Party published on the eve of its 31st congress. The situation is now extremely complicated, and we should welcome any attempt to find a real way out of this crisis.

Like any new process, perestroika has revealed its own contradictions. Those persons who want to restructure things for themselves rather than for working people are now gathering financial and propaganda weight. This constitutes one of the characteristics of the situation in which the entire country—including Belorussia—has now found itself. Recognition of the past and what is taking place now under these conditions is refracted variously in people’s mind-sets and outlooks on life.

Materials of sociological polls, discussions conducted within the walls of the parliament, in the pages of newspapers and journals, during the course of accounting and elections at party conferences, as well as in work collectives, all permit us to confidently state the following: Most working people have closely embraced the call issued by the country’s leadership to refrain from political adventurism, to rally around unification and civic consensus in the name of economic and political stabilization.

Against this background, it is depressing to view the statements and actions of those persons who are endeavoring to present themselves in the role of the only “saviors” of the nation, as champions of democracy and national rebirth. Also a cause for increasing alarm is the line which certain BNF figures—particularly its present-day leader, Z. Poznyak—are attempting to impose on the society. He stated some of his evolved ideas in a recent interview published by NARODNAYA GAZETA.

I must confess that I have no great desire to analyze the revelations and avowals of Belorussian SSR People’s Deputy Z. Poznyak. His statements do not contain any alternative solutions by means of which the society might extricate itself from its present-day, crisis-type situation; nor does he offer any constructive proposals. Instead, he presents a set of already well-known, political-meeting-type accusations and threats, along with irresponsible challenges, claims, and complaints. At a time of emptying store shelves, rising prices, and lines growing longer, none of this contributes anything either to people or the society except to add to the social tension. Such political demagogy has already caused irritation.

But we simply cannot ignore the anti-communist thrust of the above-mentioned interview. It specifically considers the following idea: Let us divide the nation up into communists and non-communists; we will dump the blame for all the troubles—past and present—on the communists; and then we will try to catch the “little fish” which we need in this pool of muddy water. It is a well-known scenario, but we must bear in mind that evil and insults are poor advisors in life, and all the more so in politics.

Yes, there are things to be criticized in the party. But these days I can state with a clear conscience that, despite targeted and coordinated pressure from several central publications, samizdat sheets, and certain Baltic newspapers, a shameless pressure which has already lasted for almost three years, we have done everything to preserve a stable situation in this republic. We have attempted to inform our people about the true goals of the BNF leaders—goals which, for some time, were concealed by various kinds of at first seemingly attractive statements, declarations, and programs. And if I could reproach myself for something nowadays, it would only be that this was done, perhaps, in too delicate a manner. We were unable to bring about a situation whereby all our people could see the true face and goals of these pseudo-democrats somewhat earlier.

The times dictate completely different approaches. At present a search for mutual understanding is being conducted on a global scale. For maniacal recidivists to seek out “internal enemies” in this context seems like an anachronism, to put it mildly. All the more so in the case of a politician for whom an attempt is being made to enroll him among the saints even during his own lifetime. Just listen to this: “We regard that which comes from the contemporary Belorussian apostle Zyanon Poznyak with great bother, the same as with Jesus Christ himself. We disdainfully trampled the aspirations of both of them for years and now we are not in a hurry to pull them up from the ground” (LITARATURA I MASTATSA, 12 October 1990).

Both a saint and the “nation’s conscience” (that is the way he seems to some persons in a bright, dazzling light), in his struggle for a democratic Belorussia he has increasingly revealed his freedom from any sort of conscience vis-à-vis the people, who comprise the source of his nourishment. T. Mann called anti-communism the greatest stupidity of the 20th century. But what can be done when such is the style of perceiving the world and such is the way or mode of thinking? The scheme of generalizations is exceedingly simple: Everything true, just, and righteous is linked with the BNF; everything false and criminal—with the communists; the CPSU—with the Belorussian Communist Party.

I am not casting doubt upon the sincerity of Z. Poznyak’s stance either now or in the recent past, when he used to argue his viewpoint with other positions in articles and lectures on the problems of resurrecting Belorussian culture. Opinions change, frequently to the point of contradiction. What is worse is something else: behind the present-day, irreconcilable evaluations stands the old, dangerously well-known stereotype of dividing
people into “our own” and “others or aliens,” a division which, sooner or later, leads to confrontation, to violent means of struggle.

A political struggle that is heated up by street-type, spontaneous emotions has its own peculiar logic, irrespective of the ideological “stuffing” and wishes of those persons who inspire it. There is only one way to keep the vector of society’s development on the path of the necessary social reforms; and that is to find commonly shared interests by proceeding from a responsibility to the people, to restrain and place limits on the adventurists.

A person who calls himself a historian cannot help but know that a social disruption which is provoked destroys not only the obsolete, self-exhausted, state and public forms, but also the completely healthy ones, which are capable of functioning. It takes many long decades to restore an economy ruined during periods of socioeconomic chaos, to rebuild the intellectual and spiritual forces of a nation which have been burned in the fires of internecine strife, to revive a culture, and to overcome the bitterness and hatred which have settled in people’s hearts.

Sometimes I ask myself the following question: What would happen if the society decided to grant power to the BNF? And I arrive at some disquieting conclusions. In the approaches taken by the new politicians—those who thirst to have power for themselves—what I find lacking, most of all, is a sense of responsibility. How easily they condemn the “treachery of lack of talent in a government policy!” It is a good thing that sometimes the competence of an art critic is sufficient for this purpose. Moreover, there is an example of just this kind of thing. In our neighboring republic a music professor is already “playing his own kind of music.”

As a movement, of course, the BNF is heterogeneous. It encompasses clearly delineated trends, points of view which, with regard to many issues, do not coincide. There are sober voices. As an example, let me cite the interview—published in the newspaper LIM—M.A. Tkachev, deputy chairman of the BNF and doctor of historical sciences. He gave an approving evaluation of many actions taken, nor did he deny the possibility of a new, Union treaty.

Alas, Z. Poznyak, judging by his presentation, is expressing a very extreme position. He speaks frankly about his own way of looking at democracy. “It is not necessary to respond with force to the force of the authorities;” let the authorities respond to our force (7 November of this year; such an attempt has already been made). In our democracy the only persons for whom there will be no place will be “communists with party cards and communists without party cards”—such is the unconcealed logic of the interviewee.

But, you know, in this republic there are not really many families which do not have at least one party member among their relatives. To whip up hatred means to push people toward disruption and even civil war. The prospects for the latter are, unfortunately, somewhat real.

Yes, to be sure, spadar [landlord or member of the gentry] Poznyak, only “those desirous of suicide for their own people” could call for such a thing as a civil war. Once again let us recall the wisdom of the ancients: “Do not wish for anyone, all the more so for your own people, anything which you yourself do not want, anything that you would not desire for yourself.”

For Z. Poznyak all those persons who are linked with the Belorussian Communist Party are the “internal enemies of the Belorussian people.” Any honest citizen of this republic is capable of objectively analyzing, from the viewpoint of the strictest judge and from his own social experience, to what extent this accusation is just.

Look into the pages of our arduous, heroic, and tragic history. How many of them have been imprinted with the genuinely bright names and fates of communists! Good memories have been left among our people by the following: D.F. Zhilunovich, N.M. Golodev, A.G. Chervyakov, S.O. Prititskiy, K.T. Mazurov, P.M. Mashkov, and many other true fighters for the people’s happiness.

Look into the faces of the communists around you; try to penetrate into their work and thoughts, and appraise their acts. Especially those who experienced on themselves the heavy yoke of Stalinism, those who were the first to fearlessly attack, who shielded the Fatherland with their hearts from the fascist plague. And how many party members, tempered in the forge of Leninism, invested their own labor and talent, their willpower and energy, to raise Belorussia’s cities and villages from the ruins after they had been burned out by the war! Thus they moved the economy, science, and culture forward! This must not be taken as some sort of emotion; that is the way it was.

Even today tens of thousands of Belorussian communists, together with non-party members, are honorably and conscientiously performing their civic and human duties; they are seeking out the optimal methods for solving the most complex problems of the present-day situation. These people do not need to repent or confess; they have not sufficed themselves with anything. They did not have, nor do they have now, any privileges except the following one: They were the first to put their shoulders to the common wheel, they went where things were more difficult, where the most important and vital matters in the lives of the collective, the republic, and our Fatherland were being decided and solved.

It is specifically the communists who nowadays are most consistently speaking out with calls for unity and consensus, who are opposing the pressure of reckless political passions and actions capable of casting to the winds everything that is dear, everything that has been created by the struggle and labor of many generations of our people. Let us listen to the opinion of the well-known Soviet writer V.G. Raspvin. “I am a realist. I think that
we should "place our bets" on this party and help it in every way... It is precisely in this party that I see the principal bulwark, the support capable of stabilizing the situation in this country. There is no other such force" (GLASNOST, 2 August 1990).

Compare all this with the alternative which the BNF offers as the standard of democracy and which quite often spills over into confrontational acts and political intolerance. The BNF claims the role of the only unit expressing the aspirations of the Belorussian people. These claims are dangerous; they are on the road to dictatorship.

One can have various attitudes toward A. Solzhenitsyn and his criticism of our country's past and present. But even he has manifested concern for the destinies of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples. And for a person who calls himself an historian and an archeologist "how bad it is not to know history and all that he should know."

We confess that we were unable to immediately understand and trust a "person of another culture," a person who discovered a truth hitherto unknown to us. For him Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians are "extremely different peoples, belonging to different races, different cultures, and different value systems." Where we were deluded was in considering that, after the Aryan ideologists, these theories would not come to the surface again.

And just what is being proposed for preserving the purity of the race? In the opinion of the BNF leaders, the only solution is to secede from the USSR. The pivotal idea itself sounds forth in the following manner: "We will become an independent, free, and democratic state—we will live, grow, and develop." This is a political abstraction, populism of the purest water. And Z. Poznyak understands full well that Belorussia would not get by without economic and other ties with the Soviet republics. All the more so when one takes the Chernobyl disaster into account.

It is difficult to follow the logic of the interviewee. First he calls for an independent, free Belorussia; then he needs a Baltic-Black Sea alliance of five republics, and it is not hard to guess who he would like to see playing first violin in the new association. But this is nothing but nostalgia for the "former Grand Principality of Lithuania, Russia, and Zhetomtia."

Here we encounter again the extremely politicized approach to history. Whereas previously there had been an unrestrained over-emphasis and often idealization of Belorussia's ties with Russia and the Ukraine, now they are essentially being denied with regard to Russia and the Russian people. And this is ridiculous, to say the least. But when it is a matter of "Russia must create a civilized limitation...," then it is no longer a laughing matter. For direct historical analogies suggest themselves.

In calling for respect to be shown to Belorussians, Z. Poznyak at the same time casts a de facto shadow on the Russians, refusing them the relationship of kinsmen. In an insulting tone of voice he describes the Russian intelligentsia and Russian writers, accusing them of having a complex of "swaggering, self-conceited, Asiatic chauvinism." In my opinion, all these "meditations" are outside the pale of critical analysis.

Nowadays nobody needs to be convinced that each people has the right to choose its own path. At the same time, it is clear that the secession of a republic from membership in the Union inevitably gives rise to very complicated problems. The economic and spiritual ties between Belorussia and the other regions of the USSR are so strong that their disruption is fraught with catastrophe. Life itself, the entire post-October history of our country has vividly shown that the USSR is not an artificial formation, not a zig-zag of history, but rather a union or alliance of peoples brought about by the objective requirements of a multinational society. Interwoven here were our destinies, our past and our present. What evolved were close, national-economic ties; there was a continuing process of the mutual enrichment of national cultures and languages. Furthermore, there are inter-ethnic relationships in millions of families and purely human manifestations, the permanence and strength of which are determined by an alliance of hearts.

Would it not be more honest and honorable nowadays to state the following for all to hear: Independence and sovereignty of a republic comprise a necessary condition for its existence and development as a sovereign state. But this sovereignty can become politically and economically full-fledged and can be reliably guaranteed only within the framework of a renovated Union.

We must not mislead people who are unsophisticated in politics by asserting that the USSR is the "last and harshest empire in the world," and that Belorussia is "a republic which was incorporated as a colony into the USSR." None of this is true at all, and if we write about this, it is merely to make people give some thought as to just what is going on. And what is really going on is an extremely fierce struggle for power. The specific target of all the attacks is the idea of the socialist choice, against which all the political speculators and "shadowy" figures have risen up.

I want to emphasize that the idea of communism in its original form is just as ancient as mankind itself. Like any belief in justice and truth, it may be subjected to distortion, but nobody will succeed in destroying it.

Communist ideals are not something invented by a small band of revolutionaries but rather common human values which have endured and survived throughout the history of civilization. How they have been implemented is another matter. In my opinion, we are just beginning to open the door onto the real truth here.

Our trouble is that we are still too weakly oriented or keyed to the clever interweavings of political struggle; we do not always know how to distinguish between genuine
concern for social justice and social demagoguery. Unfortunately, quite a few voters, indignant over the distortions from the period of stagnation, have allowed themselves to be fooled. But even they are beginning to think about who they have placed their trust in and who they have elected....

Returning to the actions of 7 November, the following thought sneaks in willy-nilly: Are the BNF leaders not now working out new provocations? Because, of course, the 31st Belorussian CP Congress lies just ahead. To my way of thinking, if something similar happens next time, it will demonstrate not the power, but the powerlessness, the political bankruptcy of the BNF leaders and this entire movement.

Let me end my thoughts here with the ideas of the renowned Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevskiy. Without history now, he said, as in any transitional period, there would be no salvation. And so, in turning to our own past and painfully observing our present, I would like to summon, in accordance with his words, to the people's tribunal these brazen-faced heroes with their unceremonious manners, spitting on the ground rather than pouring out their sweat on it. And I would like to ask them what they have done not for themselves, not for a few others, but for the mass of people who so trustingly and reverentially turned the leadership over to them.

Belorussian Deputies Comment on Activities, Colleagues

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[Interview with parliamentarians M.Ye. Matyushonok, M.A. Slemnev, Ye.M. Glushkevich, and V.M. Stankevich: "How the 'First Pancake' Is Baked"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Already more than half a year has passed since the time of the election of people's deputies to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. In analyzing the readers' mail and their suggestions, the newspaper turned to some parliamentarians with a request to answer three questions:

1. How satisfied are you with the implementation of your election program today?

2. Whom among your deputy colleagues do you find most impressive in terms of their civic position and who—to the contrary?....

3. What, in your view, must be done in order for the republic's parliament to start working more constructively?

M.Ye. Matyushonok

1. My voters can be satisfied only by the concrete deed in regard to the fulfillment of their mandates, and not by paper solutions which for the time being abound in the Soviets of all levels. In my work as chairman of the Klichevskiy Rayon Soviet Ispolkom, being guided by the deputy body, I devote a great deal of attention to the solution of the social problems that were at the center of my election program. A great deal has already been done in regard to the improvement of the rayon center and the villages. Through the efforts of the enterprises and organizations, the construction of a medical-sanitation preventive clinic, a cultural-sports complex is being erected, as well as housing, and the public utilities basis is being strengthened.

At the same time, a number of points of my program requiring implementation during the current year remain unsolved. The reason is the absence of appropriate laws regulating the interrelations of people's deputies, of the executive organs of the Soviets and the directors of enterprises and organizations, collectives, and citizens. The execution of the decisions adopted by the ispolkom and frequently by the session of the Soviet has for the time being a purely voluntary character. I think that the laws "On the Status of the People's Deputy" and "On Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the Belorussian SSR", as well as a number of other normative acts, which have been adopted by the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, will make it possible to raise the authority of the Soviets.

2. In the Commission for Economic Reform and the Achievement of the Economic Independence of the Republic, the people's deputies V.P. Alampiyev, F.N. Tormanov, V.I. Telezhnikov, V.A. Saponov, and V.A. Malashko are working with great responsibility. Their businesslike approach and their competence in many questions call forth respect. In spite of different views regarding a number of political aspects, we find a common language, so necessary for the adoption of decisions. The desire of people's deputy S.S. Shushkevich to introduce a maximum of constructiveness into the work of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet. No one has any doubt about the activity of the people's deputies and representatives of the democratic club O. Trusov, V. Gonchar, V. Gribanov, V. Kuchinskii, Ye. Glushkevich, and others.

3. Constructiveness of work in any heterogeneous collective organ can be attained provided there is patience, respect for all opinions, positions, and views. This is precisely what we are lacking. Having proclaimed pluralism, we are in reality not able to overcome the entrenched stereotypes of likemindedness. It comes close to being absurd when you hear a deputy colleague say that only a member of the CPSU may be called comrade when addressing a people's deputy. All others—citizen people's deputy. This was said by deputies highly placed in the party hierarchy. On the other hand, there is criticism of the people's deputies who are members of the CPSU on the part of the people's deputy.

3. Poznyak is also frequently unfounded. In this difficult time for our republic there is no place for political ambitions in parliament. Only the unification of all forces can strengthen the authority of our Supreme Soviet and make its work constructive.
REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

M.A. Slimnev

1. A great deal of what was projected has not been done.
2. Gonchar, Briabnov are most impressive in terms of their active civic position. . . .
3. There are constructive actions in the parliament. To increase their coefficient of useful action [kp] it is necessary to increase the professionalism of the deputies, and in the long term—to shift completely to a professional basis.

Ye.M. Glushkevich

1. In spite of the fact that it proved to be possible to do something in fulfillment of the election program, there is no real satisfaction. I am especially disturbed by our unsoundness in working out the variants of the transition to the market. It seems, it will be very difficult to consolidate our efforts around the conception which has been approved.
2. I am impressed by the position of many deputy colleagues, especially V.I. Gonchar, A.V. Sosnov, P.V. Sadovsky, Z.S. Poznyak, O.A. Trusov, and G.V. Grushevoy.
3. The question is very difficult, I cannot give an unequivocal answer. The Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet is agonizingly going through its formation. One can only expect efficiency if political ambitions will be moved aside.

V.M. Stankevich

1. Up to now there is no satisfaction. The first session was more reminiscent of the division of portfolios than the formation of working organs—and this is now having a considerable effect. The second, special session doted all the “ifs” in regard to power. The Communist Party, in the person of its deputy representatives clearly showed that it does not intend to give up any power voluntarily, but this is not the most frightening thing. The most frightening thing is that the Supreme Soviet in its present composition does not want to take this power. The first clear indication of this is the first vote on Article 12 of the Law on Power. The Supreme Soviet, the highest organ of state power, refused the subordination of all structural formations on the territory of the republic to it! And the constant references to a referendum, as though the Supreme Soviet is not authorized to decide important questions for the people! If we, the authorized representatives, are not empowered to decide the questions of power, land, and ownership, then what are we doing here, for the sake of what have we assembled?!
2. Inessa Mikhaylovna Drobyshkevskaya, Viktor Losifovich Gonchar, and Yecegeniy Mikhaylovich Glushkevich. I could name another dozen and a half or two dozen names of people’s deputies, who are conducting themselves honestly and openly.

I would like to reproach those deputies and party leaders, for whom the narrow party and selfish interests are higher than the concerns and interests of the republic.

When the position of the communist party was strong, it did not divide property into party and state property. Everything was the people’s property. The buildings and machines, the dachas, and the personal pensions for long party service, as well as the equipment for hard currency for the publishing house of the Belorussian CP Central Committee—all this was allowed to a great extent at the expense of the state budget. But today the party suddenly understood that there is party property and state property. And these are not empty words. Let us remember Boris Yeltsin when he said that, even being a member of the Politburo, he did not know for what the party budget was expended. And the solution was quite simple. Party kopecks were mixed with the state budget, and from there the party drew for itself in full measure.

2. It is impossible to confuse the concepts of “Supreme Soviet” and “parliament”. Parliament is a constantly working organ. And its members, having left all matters behind, “think and work on the laws and on the budget.” The purge of the state is also in the hands of parliament. In the Supreme Soviet, the majority of deputies do not think so much about the laws as about what they have at work, what must be “obtained” and “beaten out”, as long as the possibility exists. And this is absolutely not their fault, but our misfortune.

For this reason, in my view, there are two ways out for constructive work in the Supreme Soviet. The first is the change of its very status, the transfer to a professional basis. The second path is to consider the Supreme Soviet a congress of deputies, to select from them a constantly functioning organ—120 to 150 people—and to give this organ legislative functions.

Draft Law, Commentary on Moldovan Local Government Rights
91UN0388A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 10 Nov 90 p 4


[Text] Chapter I: General Principles


1. Local self-government is the free exercise of the citizens of administrative-territorial units established by law, of resolving questions of local significance, either directly, or through the organs which they elect.

2. Local self-government shall function on the basis of the Constitution of the Moldovan SSR, the present Law and the laws of the Moldovan SSR on communa, uyezd and municipal self-government, other laws of the Moldovan SSR, decrees of the President of the Moldovan
SSR, and resolutions of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and the government of the Moldovan SSR.

Article 2. Structure of Local Self-Government.

Two levels of local self-government shall be established. The first level is the kommuna [commune], which consists of one or more villages, and a city. The second level is the uyezd, which is divided into volosts [smallest unit of pre-revolutionary government]; and the munitsipiya [municipality], which is divided into regions [rayon].


Local self-government shall function on the basis of the following principles: elected organs of local self-government, and responsibility of officials, all of whose actions shall be subject to public control; accountability of organs of local self-government to the government of the Moldovan SSR; supremacy [verkhovensvo] of the representative organs of state power with respect to other administrative organs; guarantee of observance of the laws of the Moldovan SSR; independence in taking decisions and exercising administrative power, proceeding from the interests of the citizens of the corresponding administrative units (within the bounds of the authority of the appropriate organs, as stipulated by the laws of the Moldovan SSR); correlation of local interests with the interests of the republic; economic self-administration, glasnost and consideration of public opinion; protection of the rights and legal interests of the citizens; rendering legal assistance to the populace at the first level of local self-government; establishment of contractual relations among units of local self-government and other corporate and physical bodies, and the support of these relationships.


1. Local self-government shall be implemented in accordance with the will of the people, expressed in the form of direct and representative democracy.

2. The most important forms of direct democracy, through which local self-government shall be implemented, are civic initiative, public participation in the discussion and resolution of important questions, and election of representative organs—people's soviets; participation in implementation adopted decisions and exercising control over the actions of organs of local self-government.

3. People's soviets shall organize executive organs—the primeriya and the prefektura.

4. No other forms of local self-government may function without the permission of state government organs.

Chapter II: The System of Local Self-Government

Article 5. Organs of Local Self-Government and the Leading Officials of these Organs.

1. The organs of local self-government shall be: the people's soviet (village, kommuna, city, municipality [munitsipiya] and uyezd soviet); the primeriya (uprava [board])—the executive organ of a kommuna, city and municipality; the prefektura—the executive organ of an uyezd; and the pretura—the volost organ of surveillance and control.

The leading officials of the executive organs shall be the primars [primar] of a village, kommuna, city, municipality and the prefekt of an uyezd.

2. Organs of local self-government, except for the pretura, shall be corporate bodies [yuridicheskoe litso].

Article 6. The People's Soviet.

1. The people's soviet shall be the representative assembly of the corresponding local self-government. Members of the people's soviet, called sovetniki [advisors], shall be elected by the citizens of an administrative unit for five years, on the basis of the Law on Elections. The people's soviets—communal, city and municipal—shall include the corresponding primars, and the uyezd soviet the primar of the city which is the uyezd center.

2. Chiefs of services at uyezd prefectures, archpriests [protoierey] of the national churches (at the discretion of the people's uyezd soviet), and representatives of the press and trade unions, may be members of the people's uyezd soviet with the right of consultative vote.

Article 7. The Primar and the Prefekt.

1. The primar of a village, kommuna and city shall be elected at the appropriate populated place by means of general election, and may be recalled at any time by the electors if he does not observe the Constitution and laws in effect of the Moldovan SSR, or if he does not carry out his functions.

2. The primar of a municipality and the prefekt of an uyezd shall be confirmed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet upon the motion of the government and shall be members of the government of the Moldovan SSR.

3. The primar of a village with a village people's soviet, and the primar of a kommuna shall be the chairman of these people's soviets.

4. The primar of a municipality, city, kommuna or village, and the prefekt of an uyezd shall be the leaders of the executive organs of the corresponding people's soviets.

5. Combining leadership duties in the organs of local self-government with any other position in state organizations and economic organs, in political parties, or in socio-political organizations and movements, shall not be permitted.

6. Upon the motion of the primar or prefekt, people's city, uyezd and municipal soviets shall confirm the
executive organs—the primehriya or prefektura—by simple majority vote of the elected members of these people’s soviets.

7. Primars of municipalities, communes and cities, and prefekts shall be invested with the rights of sovietnik [advisor] in accordance with the present Law. They may take part in voting with the right of deciding vote only if in the course of approving resolutions the votes “for” and “against” are divided equally.

Article 8. Activities of Local Self-Government.

1. The activity of local organs of self-government shall be regulated by the corresponding people’s soviets on the basis of principles established by the present Law and other laws of the Moldovan SSR.

2. A constituent assembly of a people’s soviet shall be convened by the electoral commission not later than two weeks after the elections, if no less than two-thirds of the advisors have been elected. Decisions shall be approved by simple majority vote of the sovietniks.

An assembly of a people’s soviet shall be convened by the primar or prefekt, or upon the proposal of no less than one-third of the members of the people’s soviet.

3. Sovietniks whose authority has been recognized shall be administered the oath of office, without which they may not participate in discussions.

4. People’s soviets shall convene for sessions as follows: uyezd and municipal—not less than twice a year (in March and November); komuna and city—not less than once every three months.

5. As a rule, members of a people’s soviet shall carry out their functions without remuneration.

Article 9. The Primehriya of a Kommuna, City or Municipality, and the Prefektura of an Uyezd.

1. The Primehriya and the prefektura are the executive organs of the people’s soviet. They shall make decisions in the period between sessions within the limits of the authority invested in them by the soviet.

2. Consultative organs (assemblies) may operate at a primehriya and prefektura.

3. A primehriya and prefektura shall have its own staff [apparat], as established by the corresponding people’s soviet. Special local organs, which are subordinate to central organs (ministry or department), shall operate at the level of territorial-administrative units, and shall coordinate their activities with the prefektura and primehriya.

Article 10. Volosts and Preturas.

1. For the purpose of local self-government and effective inspection, uyezds shall be divided into territorial districts [okrug], called volosts.

2. Territorial boundaries of villages, communes and volost centers shall be established by law.

3. The pretura shall function in a volost as the lowest-ranking organ of the uyezd prefektura.

4. A pretura shall be headed by the representative of the prefektura—the prector, who shall as a rule have a juridical education and shall be confirmed by the government of the Moldovan SSR upon motion of the prefekt.

5. The prector, as representative of the prefektura, shall coordinate the activities of the organs of local self-government, and shall monitor and verify the execution of the laws of the Moldovan SSR in the villages and communes.

6. An inspection bureau and a consultative organ—the assembly of primars—shall function at the pretura.


1. A local organ of self-government shall be invested with the functions of local jurisdiction and authority passed to it by the superior organ.

2. An organ of local self-government invested with its own functions and local jurisdiction shall ensure the organization of socio-economic estimates on a given territory. It shall take decisions and bear responsibility for all expenditures of local significance, associated with the organization of local self-government, ensuring the social and economic rights of the citizens, and providing for the socio-economic development of the territory under its jurisdiction, the city economy, the municipal economy, social services; as well as the development of trade and communication, the preservation of nature and rational use of natural resources, ensuring legality, public order and civil rights, and the development of culture, education and religions [kul’tov].

3. An organ of local self-government shall ensure the effective operation of the entire socio-economic organism on the territory under its jurisdiction, depending upon its available resources, and the effective work of the entire sphere of services for the populace; and for observing the laws of the Moldovan SSR, and the rights and liberties of the citizens.

4. An organ of local self-government shall be forbidden to: take decisions on political questions and questions touching upon state legislation, and to publish protests and proclamations of a political nature.

Chapter III: Fundamentals of Economic Activity of Local Self-Government


1. The economic activity of an organ of local self-government shall be based upon municipal property (the property of every village, komuna, municipality and uyezd).
2. Municipal property shall consist of property, transferred in accordance with the law of the Moldovan SSR to the state units of local self-government (land resources and other natural resources, the municipal economy, enterprises, institutions, the social infrastructure, and so on), from the property of enterprises, institutions and organizations, established by organs of local self-government, and their accumulations, including budgeted and non-budgeted assets.

3. Upon implementation of the right of property a soviet of local self-government shall establish enterprises and organizations, to which it shall transfer property according to procedure established by law, and may sell or lease or, on other bases stipulated by law, to working collectives, social organizations, cooperatives, associations or citizens, and may deal with the property belonging to it by other means established by law.

4. An organ of local self-government shall have preferential right, in accordance with the law, to municipalization of various real estate which may be utilized for the needs of the local economy.

**Article 13. The Municipal Economy.**

1. The municipal economy is in aggregate the enterprises, institutions and organizations with their various forms of property, which operate on the territory of a unit of local self-government. The activity of this economy shall be regulated by the local self-government soviet in accordance with the law.

2. The municipal economy shall ensure the direct satisfaction of the needs of the populace, and the functioning of local self-government.

3. Enterprises, institutions and organizations established by organs of local self-government or transferred to them by the state, which operate on the basis of municipal property, shall themselves comprise the municipal economy.

Municipal economy pertains to industrial, agricultural, communal, housing, construction, repair, transport, road, trade enterprises and domestic services enterprises; environmental protection; planning organizations and institutions; public education and culture; medical and social services, and others. Joint enterprises may operate on the territory of a municipality as well.

4. The establishment and liquidation of municipal enterprises, institutions and organizations shall be accomplished in accordance with the laws of the Moldovan SSR.

5. Organs of local self-government shall support by every means the development of market relationships in all branches of the municipal economy, and privatization of state property.

**Article 14. Financial Resources.**

1. The financial resources of units of local self-government shall consist of the budget, extra-budgetary funds, and other assets.

2. Each year, every unit of local self-government shall independently formulate, approve and execute in the interests of the populace the budget of the corresponding territory. Interference of higher-ranking organs in the process of working out, approval and execution of local budgets is forbidden.

3. Relationships between state and local budgets shall be regulated by the laws of the Moldovan SSR on Budget and Taxation.

4. The local budget shall be formed by means of assignments from taxes and state income in accordance with fairly-established, economically and socially-sound norms; by means of local taxes and other income from associations, economic units and organizations, and from the populace; and in necessary situations—from bank credits and loans or from the budget assets of higher-ranking organs, allocated on condition of their return. Losses to the income of units of local self-government and additional expenditures from the local budget shall not be compensated by means of the budget of a higher-ranking organ. Uncommitted funds from the assets of a local budget remaining at the end of the year shall be utilized in the following year for purposes determined by the local soviet.

5. Assignment of funds from the budget of higher-ranking organs to the budget of a unit of local self-government shall be accomplished in accordance with the economic and social needs of the corresponding territory according to procedure established by law.

6. Units of local self-government may, in accordance with established procedure, accumulate and utilize non-budgeted assets and funds.

7. Units of local self-government may concentrate on the basis of shared participation (with the consent of the working collectives or their organs) budgeted and non-budgeted assets of corporate or physical bodies for the solution of questions of general interest.

8. Units of local self-government may utilize bank credits, take and offer loans, and organize the issue of stocks in accordance with the laws of the Moldovan SSR.

**Article 15. The Socio-Enomic Self-Government of a Territory.**

1. Organs of local self-government shall independently work out and approve programs concerning: socio-economic development of the territory, including the siting of economic units and the formation of a social infrastructure; improving the ecological situation, renewal and protection of natural systems, and restoring the health of the environment; taking stock of the demographic situation, control of migration processes, rationalizing employment services for the population,
and professional training of cadres; measures for regulating the interrelations among local economic units; utilization of local economic levers in the regulation of prices, tariff rates, taxes, the budget balance, and so on; development of the national culture; restoration of the church; and preservation and restoration of historic monuments, etc.

Organs of local self-government shall issue permits for the right to utilize natural resources on their territory to corporate bodies and citizens of the Moldovan SSR and shall have primary responsibility for administration of land resources (in accordance with the Moldovan SSR Land Code); shall issue permits for carrying out economic activity and shall register all enterprises, organizations, associations, institutions and private persons, while establishing local requirements for the use of territory and buildings, for protecting the environment, and so on.

Chapter IV: Legal Guarantees for Local Self-Government


1. Organs of local self-government shall be independent in the realization of their rights.

2. Decisions of organs of local self-government taken within the bounds of their jurisdiction are mandatory for all corporate bodies (enterprises, institutions and organizations) situated on their territory, and for responsible officials and the populace. Their non-fulfillment may entail the use of sanctions in accordance with the laws of the republic.

3. The right of self-government may be limited only in those cases stipulated in the laws of the Moldovan SSR.


1. Organs of local self-government shall take decisions; primars and prefekts shall issue instructions.

2. The people's soviet of units of local self-government and its executive organ shall have the right to:

—put a stop to the actions of corporate bodies on administrative territories, if they are in conflict with the laws of the Moldovan SSR, or with the decisions of lower-ranking organs of local self-government (within the bounds of their jurisdiction); and,

—overturn the technical-economic conclusions pertaining to economic objects which are at the initial stage of implementation, and also decisions on allocation of land, or to forbid construction in case of violation of land-usage legislation of the Moldovan SSR, and corresponding agreements.

3. Decisions of the executive organs of local self-government and their responsible officials may be overturned by the corresponding people's soviet.

4. Corporate and physical bodies shall have the right to appeal the instructions of a primar or prefekt, as well as the decisions of executive organs, to the legal organs or the appropriate people's soviet. Decisions of people's soviets may be appealed to the government of the Moldovan SSR.

5. The government of the Moldovan SSR may appeal against the decisions of people's uyezd and municipal soviets, if they are in conflict with the laws of the Moldovan SSR, and also may halt or overturn the decisions of uyezd or municipal executive organs, or the instructions of an the prefekt of an uyezd and primar of a municipality.


1. Dissolution of the people's soviet of local self-government and putting a stop to the actions of its administrative organs are possible in the following situations: if the organs of self-government undertake actions which conflict with the Constitution of the Moldovan SSR; ignore the demands of the competent organs of the Moldovan SSR to cease their illegal actions; or if they fail to assemble in session according to the law, three times in succession.

2. Organs of local self-government shall be dissolved on the basis of a decision of the President of the Moldovan SSR upon a motion by the republic government or the conclusion of a special commission formed of deputies of the Moldovan SSR.

3. In the event of the dissolution of organs of local self-government, the President of the Moldovan SSR shall establish a provisional administrative government and shall call new elections.

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This draft was drawn up by the government of the Moldovan SSR, and was discussed and approved by the Standing Commission on Questions of Local Self-Government and Local Economy of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

We request that suggestions and remarks on the draft of the given Law be sent to the following address: Kishinev, No 1, Great National Assembly Square, Office 646; telephone 23-43-78, 23-32-14, or 23-33-16.

Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet, Commission on Questions of Local Self-Government and Local Economy.

Why State Territorial-Administrative Reform is Necessary


The general crisis that has seized the socio-economic organism of the republic dictates the necessity for "surgical" intervention, if we aspire to true prosperity. Any
major changes in the establishment of a society have always, in all times, brought about radical territorial-administrative reorganization.

The establishment of new structures in Moldova at the level of party, government, ministries and departments is in this sense a definite beginning. At the very same time, the present territorial structure, and the old administrative division in the localities have remained almost untouched.

Governing the republic by means of 55 administrative-territorial units bears the mark of voluntarism, the purpose of which is—to suppress any initiative from below, and to unburden the mechanism of dictatorship from above.

The first and most important distinction of the draft Law "On the Fundamentals of Local Self-Government" is the democratization of state power, directed toward ensuring genuine self-government within the bounds of new economic relationships and the political sovereignty of the Moldovan SSR. The law is oriented toward the citizen and protects him from lawlessness; it guarantees him the right to show himself as an individual, the right to social justice, and the right to responsibility. The execution of the functions of self-government are "lowered" to the first level—to the communes and cities. The draft law also envisages the economic support for this right. The size of local budgets, beginning in 1991, will increase by about 30-35 percent, while funds for maintaining the administrative apparatus will increase by 20-25 percent. In the future the proportion of all local budgets will become even larger.

The strongpoint of the entire system of local self-government will not be the rayon, but the kommuna (city). The kommuna (city) is an autonomous social organism, with the entire community of interests and rights, and economic potential. It cannot be established upon someone's whim. The kommuna can consist of one or more voluntarily-associating villages within a geographic perimeter accessible to the populace. That is, the problem of living together in villages and cities will now be resolved not at the rayon, but in the locality, by their own organs of self-government. Moreover, local citizens will also possess the right of deciding vote in resolving such important questions as roads, transport, available housing, illumination, trade, domestic services, education, health care, ecology, public order, the sanitary situation and many other things which enter the realm of responsibilities of every local organ.

All public services offered by passport desks and notary offices will be rendered not in the rayon, but at one's place of residence, in the primariya. All villages and cities will be able to have primars and primarayas.

From an administrative point of view, kommunas and cities will be subordinate to larger territorial-administrative formations, which for almost the entire 200 years of our historic development had been called uyezds.

The necessity for unifying rayons is dictated by technical-economic requirements as well. On the scale that rayons exist today it is impossible to establish contemporary special services of the required capacity, which could be equipped and operated with competence. Such objectives of regional social importance as specialized construction organizations, wholesale trade facilities, important transportation hubs, modern specialized hospitals, communications nodes, cultural establishments and higher educational institutions, equipped laboratories, and computer centers even today operate as inter-regional enterprises.

The transition to market relationships, self-financing and cost accounting, under which the economic subdivisions are operating, and the self-government of villages and cities demonstrate the futility of the 40 rayon governmental organs that exist today. This should be clear to everyone.

The uyezd, the area and the size of population which permits them to be governed rather effectively, represents at the same time a great potential for natural, economic and human resources, provides for more effective regrouping of capital investments in the production sphere, and also to the social and economic infrastructure. The populated places in which the uyezd residents will be situated as the administrative, economic and cultural centers, with their existing enterprises, institutions and establishments of uyezd significance, will have significantly greater territorial share than the present rayon centers. And as a result of this, it will be possible to provide for more rational disposition of productive resources in the republic, and under conditions of market relationships and competition—genuine cost accounting as well.

In order to alleviate the administration and control over local self-government, an uyezd is divided into territorial districts called volosts (presently rayons). The volost does not have an elective organ and property. The pretura and pretor are situated at the head of the volost (plasa) as the representatives of the uyezd. That is, the existing ispolkom organ of surveillance and control, and all responsible officials and employees are appointed to and subordinate to an uyezd organ.

In order to increase personal responsibility in the system of self-government, the draft law envisions a different procedure for formation and interaction of elected organs (soviets, primars of kommunas and villages) with those which are appointed by higher authorities (primars of munitsipiys, prefects, pretors and others). The priority of elected organs does not exclude, but on the contrary, presupposes personal responsibility within the bounds of the jurisdiction established by law.

The reorganization of the territorial-administrative order and structure, and the new principles of self-government will promote the affirmation of competence and professionalism in self-government itself, and the...
rebirth of the moral authority of state power and the law. Along with its many important advantages, the reform will also lead to significant economies. After all, it is a more civilized organization, designed above all not to expend every last cent. Here are just a few figures, suggested for reflection:

At the present time, 10,359 employees work at republic executive committees. Maintaining them, as well as the 256 members of rayon presidiums costs 50,700,000 budgeted rubles per year. There are 2.7 employees for every 1,000 citizens, which is two to three times more than in other European countries. On the average, there are 160 administrative officials for every rayon. The spontaneous strengthening of rural Soviets at the present time is leading to an increase in these expenditures. The proposed reform will permit reducing about 1,090-1,500 employees and savings of 7.9-9.4 million rubles.

Any changes entail a certain amount of discomfort. At times one has to get used to wearing new clothes. Inertia resists not only new principles of self-government. Some people object to the very names of the new administrative-territorial units. Why kommunya? Why uyezd? Why volost (plasa)? On the whole the terminology in and of itself does not say as much as does national coloration, or historical tradition. If in the course of discussion of the proposed law, other suggestions are received, they will of course be taken into consideration by both the parliamentary commission and the parliament.

One should note that the term “kommuna” (in Russian, “obshchina” [community, commune]) is utilized in almost all countries of Europe (France, the FRG, Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Great Britain and others, in the corresponding translation), and on other continents as well, and signifies nothing more than a territorial association (village, town). It is far more convenient to say the “kommuna of Vesien,” the “kommuna of Meleesht,” or the “kommuna of Sofiya,” than Vesienkiy Village Soviet, and so on. “Kommuna” is a geographic concept, while the term “village soviet” speaks only of the form of government or at best of the corresponding building.

The concept of “zhudets” (uyezd) is a national concept. In similar fashion, one has “Uyeyd” in Russian, “provincie” (province) in Italy, and department in France. The concept of “plasa” (volost) can be replaced by others as well—sector, canton, or chirkumskriptsi (okrug), and one might even retain the previous title, “rayon.” The essence of the reform is not in changing the titles.

The pivotal point of the proposed draft law, “On the Fundamentals of Local Self-Government,” is its universal democratization of human activity, and a return to the natural order of things, in which each particle of the multitude of social phenomena stands on its “own two feet,” which in official language is called self-government, cost accounting, self-financing, and self-perfection.


Draft By-Laws of Moldovan Communist Party Published
91UN03888 Kishinev SOVETS KAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 13 Nov 90 p 2

["Draft By-Laws of the Communist Party of Moldova"]

[Text] The Moldovan Communist Party is a political organization which brings citizens of the Moldovan SSR together on a voluntary basis in order to realize programed goals and to create a democratic socialist society. It reflects and protects the interests of the working people, is devoted to the socialist choice, and stands for ensuring the social guarantees, rights and liberties of the individual.

In its vital activities the Moldovan Communist Party is grounded on the creative development of Marxism-Leninism, the priority of common human values, the achievements of world civilization, and the national, international and humanistic traditions of the people.

The Moldovan Communist Party is an integral part of the political system of the republic, and builds its work on the basis of the Program and By-laws [Ustav], in accordance with the existing Constitution and laws of the Moldovan SSR.

Being an independent political organization within the CPSU, the Moldovan Communist Party is building mutual relations with the union republic Communist Parties on the basis of ideological community, equal rights, mutual consent, in consideration of the principles of the state structure of the country.

I. Membership in the Communist Party of Moldova.

1. Citizens who have reached age 18 who acknowledge the Program, carry out the requirements of the By-laws and take part in the activity of one of the primary party organization and support the party materially, may be members of the Moldovan Communist Party.

Members of the Moldovan Communist Party may not be members of other parties at the same time.

2. All members of the party are equal. A member of the Moldovan Communist Party has the right to: propose and freely discuss questions of the domestic and foreign policy of the party and internal party life, take part in drawing up resolutions, vote and be elected to party organs, receive information about their work, provide his analysis, criticize any party organ and any communist, appeal with statements and suggestions to any party authority and demand a response from it, take part in the work of the party organ when his proposal is being discussed, or a question on his actions or behavior; count on the defense of his honor and dignity from groundless accusations and persecution; and enjoy the services of the party institutions and enterprises.
The Moldovan Communist Party shall not prevent its members from enjoying the right to freedom of conscience, or from observing traditions and rites that do not conflict with common human values.

3. A member of the Moldovan Communist Party is obligated to actively participate in the activity of the party, propagate its ideals, bring the political line of the party to the masses, strengthen the friendship of nations, carry out party decisions and commissions, pay membership dues, and observe the legality and norms of public morality.

4. Reception as a member of the Moldovan Communist Party shall be conducted on an individual basis upon declaration of the applicant. The decision for reception of a party member shall be taken by an assembly of the primary party organization, and is final.

The decision of a primary party organization on reception of a party member shall be registered at the raykom or gorkom of the Moldovan Communist Party, where on the basis of the declaration and application, the party documents of the applicant shall be filled out.

In case there is no party organization at one's place of work or residence, the decision on reception in the party shall be taken by the higher-ranking party committee.

A party member shall be listed on the party books in the primary party organization at his place of work, study or residence. The procedure for registration of communists is determined by the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee.

If a party member, by virtue of his state of health, old age or other reasons cannot fully take part in party life, an assembly of the primary party organization has the right to release him from carrying out his commissions and payment of membership dues.

5. Measures of party education and influence may be taken towards party members who violate party discipline and the norms of social morality, in the form of comrades' criticism, a statement of reprimand, or a notice.

Membership in the Moldovan Communist Party shall be terminated by a primary party organization or higher-ranking party organ, as a consequence of excluding the party member from the Moldovan Communist Party for actions and behavior incompatible with the requirements of the party By-Laws.

A communist found guilty in court of committing a criminal act shall be expelled from the Moldovan Communist Party after the sentence is put into legal force.

A person expelled from the Moldovan Communist Party shall have the right to submit an appeal to the party's controlling organs. The appeal shall be examined within a period of no more than two months from the day of its submission. The results of the examination shall be reported to the primary party organization and the one who submitted the appeal.

Membership in the Moldovan Communist Party may be terminated upon a party member's appeal for voluntary withdrawal from its ranks; it shall be mandatory for the appeal to be examined by the primary party organization.

Upon acceptance as a member of the Moldovan Communist Party, expulsion and withdrawal from the party shall be considered effective if more than half of the members on the rolls at a given communist organization vote in favor of it.

Persons expelled from the Moldovan Communist Party and those who have withdrawn from it may be reinstated in the party on general principles after a period of no less than two years.

6. Temporary suspension of party membership in the Moldovan Communist Party is authorized. The procedure for suspension of party membership shall be determined by the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee.

7. Citizens who support the activity of the Moldovan Communist Party are considered supporters of the party. They may take part in party activity with the right of consultative vote and support it materially.

II. Intraparty Democracy.

8. Intraparty life in the Moldovan Communist Party shall be accomplished on the basis of democratic unity, acknowledging the decisive role of the party masses, the correlation of interests of the party as a whole and every communist individually, broad pluralism of opinion with conscious party discipline, and self-administration in party life.

For all-round comparison of various views and platforms, open criticism and self-criticism within the bounds of individual party organizations as well as in the Moldovan Communist Party as a whole, discussion and referenda may be held on the most principled questions of social and party life. The procedure for holding them shall be established by the leading organs of the party organizations.

9. In the Moldovan Communist Party the following are guaranteed:

—voluntary entry and withdrawal from it;

—equal rights and obligations for all party members;

—moral and material support. A communist does not enjoy any privileges or material benefits not stipulated by law;

—the right of all party organizations to participate in working out party policy;
—elections, replacement and accountability of party organs and their leaders to the communists;

—glašnost and openness in the work of all party organizations and their leading organs;

—collegiality in taking of decisions on the basis of majority opinion and personal responsibility of every communist for matters entrusted to him.

10. In working out decisions of party organizations, their organs are obliged to examine all positions and points of view. The minority shall have the right to propagate and defend its own views within the bounds of programmed positions and the by-laws, and to demand political analysis of erroneous decisions.

The decisions of congresses, conferences and assemblies are binding on party organizations.

11. The highest-ranking organs of the Moldovan Communist Party are the general assembly, the conference and the congress. They shall be deemed valid if more than half the members of the party organization or elected delegates participate in them, and for reports and elections—no less than two-thirds. Higher-ranking party organs shall elect executive organs (bureau, committee) and control commissions, as well as standing or temporary commissions and working groups for the basic directions of work.

Executive and control organs shall be elected by secret balloting, if no other procedure for their formation is stipulated.

Secretaries of party committees may be elected with the one-time voting of the members of these committees at assemblies and conferences. In the period between conferences, secretaries of party committees shall be elected at plenums.

Releasing them from the posts they occupied shall be decided by a plenum of two-thirds of the members of a given committee.

The procedure for electing delegates to rayon (city) conferences, or congresses of the Moldovan Communist Party shall be determined by the corresponding party committee in consideration of the opinion of the majority of communists.

Party organizations may propose candidatures for membership in all higher-ranking party organs simultaneously with the election of delegates. The right of final decision of the question of their election shall be retained by the conference or congress.

12. A party member cannot simultaneously belong to more than two elected party organs. The membership of elected organs may be renewed or re-elected completely prior to the termination of their term of office upon declaration of voluntary retirement or upon the demand of no less than one-third of the communists in the corresponding party organization.

13. Elected party organs shall create for the period of their office a subordinate working staff, which shall carry out analytical sociological prognoses, as well as consultative services for their actions. The staff shall be formed from communists recommended by the primary party organizations.

In case of necessity party organizations may demand recall of a member of an elected party organ or staff official.

14. Party organizations and committees may on their own resources independently or in conjunction with other organizations establish the necessary mass information media. They shall be the organs of party organizations and communists, and their leaders shall be confirmed at the appropriate party committee assemblies, conferences, congresses and plenums.

III. Organizational Structure of the Party

15. The Moldovan Communist Party shall be structured according to territorial-production considerations. Primary organizations, in accordance with the will of the communists, shall be created at one's place of work or residence, and creative and other activities of party members shall be united for the territory. In accordance with the administrative-territorial division of the republic, rayon and city party organizations shall also be part of the structure of the Moldovan Communist Party. On the initiative of the communists Soviets of party organization secretaries, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, party veterans' soviet, and other forms of association of communists according to their interests and problems, as well as according to their platforms, may be created and operate. The Moldovan Communist Party does not allow the creation of factions with their own internal discipline and structure.

Primary Organizations of the Moldovan Communist Party

16. Primary party organizations are the basis of the Moldovan Communist Party. They shall be established upon the initiative of communists in the presence of no less than five party members by decision of their assembly and shall be registered by the higher-ranking party organ. The periodicity for convening assemblies shall be determined by the party organization itself.

17. In order to conduct current work, a party committee (bureau) and treasurer shall be elected. Party organizations numbering fewer than 15 communists, shall elect a party organization secretary, his deputy, and a treasurer.

18. Primary organizations may at their own discretion establish an organizational structure and the competence of their basic links, but they shall be autonomous in the resolution of questions, and in the choice of their forms and methods of work.

In their activities, primary organizations:
shall carry out the program of the Moldovan Communist Party;

shall independently adopt and carry out resolutions, connected with their actions, and promote political initiatives; take part in the preparation, discussion and implementation of the resolutions of higher-ranking organizations; and express their position on the topical questions of social life;

shall influence, by means of the democratic mechanism of social self-government, the activity of cadres, and take part in their selection and posting;

shall take the final decision on receiving members into the party, encouraging the communists, and halting party membership and expulsion from its ranks;

shall have concern for the political culture of their members, have the right to receive from them information on fulfillment of responsibilities stipulated by the By-Laws, shall defend their dignity and legal interests, and render necessary assistance;

may be a corporate body;

shall inform the working collective, the public and high-ranking party organs of their activities;

may carry out publishing activities and have their own information organ;

cooperate with organizations of other parties and social formations within the framework of the laws of the republic; and

shall terminate the activities of a primary organization upon the demand of two-thirds of the organization or by decision of the higher-ranking party organ. Re-registration of party members shall be conducted within a month of the termination of activities.

Rayon and City Party Organizations

19. Primary organizations according to administrative-territorial division of the republic shall be united in city, rayon (territorial) party organizations. The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee shall determine their status.

20. The rayon and city party conference shall elect the corresponding party committee and control commission for a period of five years. The party committee shall in turn, at its plenum, elect the bureau of the party raykom and gorkom, taking into consideration the opinion of the primary party organizations. Party committee bureaus shall periodically render an account of their work.

An extraordinary party conference may be convened by decision of a party committee, upon the proposal of a control commission, or by demand of party organizations comprising no less than one-third the members of a given organization.

21. Party raykoms and gorkoms shall independently adopt various resolutions on the political and internal activities of organizations; they shall elect and recall members of the Central Committee from the territorial organization and shall coordinate the proposals of primary party organizations on nominating candidates to the organs of party, state and social organizations; they shall maintain the rolls of the communists, coordinate the activity of primary organizations, and together with them organize work on carrying out the policy and decisions of the party among the populace; and they shall put forth for the examination of the public and the organs of power concrete socio-economic, cultural and other problems, and promote their realization.

22. The control commission of a rayon or city party organization shall elect the presidium of a commission; it shall be subordinate to the organ that formed it, and shall operate independently in accordance with the provisions approved by the rayon, or city party conference.

Higher-ranking Organs of the Moldovan Communist Party

23. The congress, which shall convene no less than once in five years, shall be the highest organ of the Moldovan Communist Party. The date for holding the congress and the agenda shall be announced no later than three months prior to the start of the congress. An extraordinary congress shall be convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative, by proposal of the Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party, upon the demand of one-third of the rayon and city party organizations, or upon the demand of primary party organizations comprising no less than one-third the total number of communists. An extraordinary congress shall be convened in a two-month period and shall be considered valid if the delegates to it represent more than half the membership of the Moldovan Communist Party.

In the event the Central Committee fails to convene an extraordinary congress, the organizations demanding that it be held may form an organizational committee enjoying the rights of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee for convening an extraordinary congress.

24. A Congress of the Moldovan Communist Party Shall:

—adopt the Party Program and By-Laws, and shall stipulate and introduce changes to them;

—hear the accounts and reports of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party, and shall adopt a resolution on them;

—determine the party line in the realm of party construction and ideological activity, and shall plan the direction of cooperation with other parties, social organizations and movements;
elect the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party;

elect the Central Committee first secretary, at the same time including him in the membership of the Central Committee and the Bureau of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee;

along with the formation of the membership of the Central Committee, in which part of its members are elected to assemblies and conferences of city and rayon party organizations, the Congress shall elect the remainder of the Central Committee members;

define the functions and competence of the Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party;

elect the chairman of the Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party, at the same time including him in the membership of the Central Control Commissioner and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission.

25. In the period between congresses the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee shall convene when necessary republic party conferences for discussing acute questions on the political and practical activity of the party.

26. The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee Shall:

organize the fulfillment of the decisions of party congresses and conferences;

form Central Committee commissions on basic directions of work;

elect the Bureau and Secretariat of the Central Committee;

create and eliminate institutions, enterprises, newspapers, magazines, and party radio and TV studios, and control their activities;

draw up and introduce to republic higher organs of state power, according to procedure of legislative initiative, proposals on the basic directions of domestic and foreign policy;

direct the activities of communist factions (party groups) in republican representative bodies and other directive organizations;

conduct the political line in the sphere of state construction, socio-economic and cultural development of the republic;

work out and implement the cadre policy of the Moldovan Communist Party and coordinate proposals of party gorkoms and raykoms on nominating candidates to republic organs of party, state, economic and social organizations;

confirm and release the chief editors of party publications;

approve the budget of the Moldovan Communist Party, and determine the functions and size of the staff of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee; and shall

represent the Moldovan Communist Party in mutual relations with other parties and social organizations and movements and with state organs.

27. At its plenum, the Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party shall elect a permanently-operating organ—the presidium, and the deputy chairman of the Control Commission, shall create from among the members permanent working groups on directions of action, and shall define the authority of the presidium and the working groups.

The Moldovan Communist Party Control Commission shall be independent, and shall be guided in its activity by the By-Laws and Provisions approved by the Moldovan Communist Party Congress.

A party member may not at the same time be a member of the Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Moldovan Communist Party.

IV. Communists in Organs of Popular Rule, Social Organizations and Movements.

28. The Moldovan Communist Party shall struggle for political leadership in society by means of democratic elections to organs of popular rule and other forms of expression of the people’s will. Party committees and organizations shall recommend communists for nomination as candidates for people’s deputy, and shall help them in organizing the electoral campaign. Party organizations may enter into pre-election agreements with other socio-political organizations and movements, which operate on the basis of and in conjunction with the Constitution of the Moldovan SSR, and shall support the candidates for deputy which they nominate.

Communist deputies shall, for the term of office of the Soviet, unite in party groups (factions) for coordination of their activity and for putting into effect the will of the voters, and their political policy in the solution of common state tasks. They shall interact with the appropriate party committees, take into consideration their decisions and recommendations, and shall receive support and help from them.

29. Party committees and organizations, while respecting the organizational and political independence of young people’s societies which stand on a platform of socialist choice, shall render them all-round support and cooperation; they shall look upon them as the future reserve for replenishing their own ranks, and shall actively recruit them for formulation and realization of the party’s youth policy.
The Moldovan Communist Party shall construct its relationships with trade unions, veterans', women's and other mass social organizations and societies which stand on positions of democratic transformations, social justice and the achievement of national consent, on the basis of political cooperation and partnership.

Communists may participate in various social organizations and movements which operate within the bounds of the law and whose activities are not directed toward undermining the prestige and integrity of the Moldovan Communist Party.

The Moldovan Communist Party shall oppose anti-communist, extremist and separatist formations.

At congresses and conferences convened by social organizations, party groups may be formed, which are called upon to conduct and defend the political line of the Moldovan Communist Party.

V. Party Property

30. All activities of the Moldovan Communist Party and its organizations shall be provided financial and material assets at the expense of party income. Monetary assets shall be formed from party membership dues, income from publishing and economic production activity, voluntary donations of communists and citizens, and other receipts which do not conflict with existing legislation.

Monthly membership dues for party members shall be established in the following amounts:

- with income of 70 rub.—10 kop.
- 70-100 rub.—20 kop.
- 101-150 rub.—30 kop.
- 151-250 rub.—1 percent
- over 250 rubles—2 percent

Primary party organizations may solicit additional receipts for resolving the social needs of communists of their own primary party organization, and may differentially determine the amounts of membership dues of unemployed and retired communists, disabled workers, and also women on maternity leave and those caring for a baby.

Working communist pensioners shall pay party dues separate from their pension and wages. Membership dues are not paid by people with disability pensions.

35. [as published] The formulation of the budget of the Moldovan Communist Party shall be carried out according to normatives from the bottom up, on the basis of the budgets of primary, rayon and city party organizations. Budgets and accounts on their execution shall be approved at joint plenums of the corresponding party committees and control commissions, and general assemblies (conferences) of primary party organizations, and shall be brought to the information of the communists.

Economic activity of party committees shall be encouraged, as long as they do not conflict with the interests of political work. They may establish economic and commercial organizations for the purposes of self-financing.

31. The property of the Moldovan Communist Party shall be the possession of the party as a whole. Objectives of the right of property of the Moldovan Communist Party are buildings, structures, housing, equipment, means of transport, inventories, property for cultural-educational and health purposes, monetary assets, stocks, valuable papers, enterprises, party publishing houses with their periodical publications and printing plants, income from the mass information media, and also other property required to support the activities of the party.

Party committees and organizations shall implement effective control (possession, use and disposition) of the property entrusted to them. The question of sale or otherwise disposing of party property can be resolved only by the higher-ranking organ delegated the property authority, or by a congress or conference, and also on the basis of a referendum of communists. The Moldovan Communist Party Central Committee, the Central Committee Affairs Administration, party committees in the localities, as well as enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Moldovan Communist Party, shall enjoy the rights of a corporate body and may delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions.

Up to 50 percent of the funds from the incoming membership dues may be directed toward financing the activities of primary party organizations.

In order to resolve questions of financing the activities of party organizations, the distribution and redistribution of monetary assets, financial commissions shall be created at party raykoms and gorkoms, with the participation of primary party organizations.

Moldovan Communist Party By-Laws Draft Discussed

Officials Hold 'Roundtable Discussion'
91UN0420A Kishinev SOVetskaya Moldova in Russian 20 Nov 90 p 2

[Report on roundtable discussion of Moldovan CP officials by E. Shalimov]

[Text] As is well known, the question of the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party has been included in the agenda of the forthcoming conference of the Moldovan Communist Party. Previously, there was a single Statute of the CPSU for all communist parties of the union republics. But times are changing. Of course, even today far from all communists adhere to the view that the
Moldovan Communist Party needs a party statute of its own, in some way different from the Statute of the CPSU. But the matter has already been put on a practical basis, and the Moldovan CP Central Committee has published the draft Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party for broad discussion. Is it necessary for the Moldovan Communist Party to have its own Statute, what should it be... The discussion of these questions is part of the present-day life of the primary party organizations and party committees. This was the subject of the "roundtable" discussion in the Moldovan CP Central Committee, whose participants were party officials, secretaries of primary party organizations, and journalists.

Opening the conference, V. G. Tsyra, a senior official of the Moldovan CP Central Committee, said:

"In the maelstrom of the events with which the political life of Moldova is saturated today, the question of the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party, at first glance, may appear to be of a very everyday character. But it is necessary to be aware that it touches on the interests of one of the powerful political organizations of the republic, on whose efforts and influence the civil peace in society and a break-through toward civilized life and social progress in many respects depend.

"For the first time in the history of the republic's Communist Party, an attempt is being made to create a normative act of its own, regulating the principles and norms of intra-party organization with regard to the specific features, the character and trends of socio-political development, and prospects of society. This is being done within the framework of the all-party program documents and the program of renewal of the Communist Party of Moldova, approved by the 17th Moldovan CP Congress. We will not conceal the fact that there are those who object. If the Communist Party of Moldova, they say, is an integral part of the CPSU, then why should it have its own statute? The Statute of the USSR is quite acceptable, and the creation of its own normative act [on the party of the Moldovan CP] is simply a camouflaged attempt on the road to separation of the CPSU.

"Well, first of all, already in the preamble to the draft Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party it is declared that the Communist Party of Moldova is 'an independent organization within the structure of the CPSU', and not outside of it. What is more, it is perfectly evident a break with the CPSU can only weaken the Moldovan Communist Party. I would like to underscore the aspect that in paragraph 22 of the Statute of the CPSU, adopted at the 28th Party Congress, it is indicated that the communist parties of the union republics are independent in their activity and may have their own normative acts.

"Of course, we cannot have but take into account the specific character and the peculiarities of the republic, as well as the impending changes in the state structure of the country, the foundations of which will be laid in the new union agreement. It is clear that there cannot be a return to the unitary state. Sooner we will be talking about a union of sovereign socialist states with different-level relations between them. And it seems that party relations cannot be established on a lower than state level.

"It is clear that suspiciousness is nourished by the severe reality, the limitation of the rights of people, and by the tightrope-walking of some public figures. But mutual suspiciousness in the republic's Communist Party very much prevents renewal, we must get rid of it.

"We cannot but note that in the Communist Party of Moldova there are also adherents of a point of view at the basis of which there lies the idea that only an independent party with its Program and Statute will reflect the national and social interests of the people. It seems that such a point of view, too, is incorrect. First of all, it is impossible to regard independence and sovereignty as one-moment acts, they are a process. Secondly, the party cannot put the rights of the nation higher than the rights of man. Ideally, there should not be contradictions between them, at least not antagonistic ones. For this reason, we must consistently struggle against manifestations of chauvinism, as well as nationalism, no matter in what bright dress they are disguised. Well, and thirdly, it is impossible to attain party, political, and any other independence outside the context of realities and the relations that have taken shape. Freedom at any price is a suicidal slogan. Here no special evidence is necessary.

"If we discard the extreme points of view, the draft Statute of the Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party is perceived by communists as an important and necessary document. It is an essential step on the road to the deepening of the democratization of intra-party relations and the transformation of the party into a voluntary organization of likeminded people, whose goal it is to build a humane, democratic and socialist society. This document is not the fruit of apparatus fantasy; among those who took an active part in its preparation were members of the Central Committee commissions for the development of drafts of the Program and Statute of the Moldovan Communist Party, representatives of science, secretaries of primary party organizations... But, of course, the program can and should be elaborated and enriched. To this end, it was presented for broad discussion. I would like to hope that our meeting, too, will make a certain contribution to this undertaking."

V. V. Durnov, the chief of the Moldovan CP Central Committee Department of the Journal POLITIKA:

"Really, there are diametrically opposed points of view even in the party apparatus. Someone, for example, says: 'I joined the CPSU and shall remain in it.' But the majority (and I am judging if only on the basis of the letters to the journal) believe that the Communist Party of Moldova needs a Statute of its own."
"Well, and now concretely about the proposals and observations. I want to underscore at once that a great deal of what I will say further was expressed at our journal in the editorial board at the party conference during the discussion of the draft statute. Above all, in the Statute, in the preamble, it is necessary to define precisely what the Communist Party of Moldova is: Either we are a completely independent party, or nevertheless a part of the CPSU. The formulation of the goals of the Moldovan Communist Party in the preamble is not sufficiently clear. Further, [The formulation] of whose interests the Communist Party of Moldova. In the draft it is written: [the interests] of the workers who adhere to the socialist choice. I think, it should nevertheless be written: the interests of the whole people. This corresponds to the real state of affairs. But if we leave 'the interests of the workers,' then we need to write—what workers, for in principle the interests of the workers are also defended by the trade unions. But the party defends, above all, the political interests of the workers. In short, it is necessary to make corrections, without even looking at the Statute of the CPSU. I think it is necessary to revise also the formulation: 'The Communist Party of Moldova is an integral part of the political system of the republic.' It is impossible, you know, not to take into account the perception of the very concept of 'political system.' The Communist Party was a part, even the nucleus, of the former political system. Perhaps, it is worthwhile to write as follows: 'The Communist Party of Moldova builds its work on the basis of the Program and the Statute, in conformity with the existing Constitution of the Moldovan SSR and is based on the same ideological and organizational principles as the CPSU.'

"Many communists at our meeting expressed the view that the statute should set forth that a party bureau be elected in the presence of less than 20-25 communists in the party organization, and not 15, as is now written in the draft. It seems that this suggestion makes sense: If a party bureau, even one consisting of only five persons, is elected in a small party organization, there is almost no one left to direct."

V. S. Pozhidayeva, chief of the Organizational Department of the Kishinev Party Gorkom:

"I have a number of suggestions on the basis of the discussion of the draft statute in the primary party organizations of the city. Above all, communists underscore that parallel with the Statute, the Moldovan Communist Party should also have its own Program. Or all those aspects should be precisely and clearly set forth which were touched on in the Preamble of the Statute. Secondly, many regard as very important the question on the correlation: Member of the Communist Party of Moldova—member of the CPSU. On the basis of a single party card? This should be cleared up in the Statute, for in this lies the root of many differences and arguments. The next aspect is about the principle of the organizational structure of the party. In the draft it is written—the production-territorial one. But is it necessary to add that it is in conformity with the administrative-territorial division of the republic. I do not agree with this. Should we "attach" to it our organization, not knowing as yet what it will be in the future—life itself will show the state of the Communist Party of Moldova. It also appears to me that in the draft Statute offered for discussion there are many aspects which may and should be set forth in instructions."

V. P. Berko, first secretary of the Sovetskii Party Raykom:

"I have been at many meetings these days. Indeed, not all regard it as necessary for the Communist Party of Moldova to have its own Statute, although I personally do not doubt that it is needed. How can we persuade people? We simply invite them to read carefully all the articles of the draft and to submit their suggestions to the raykom, and we guarantee that they will reach the republic party conference.

"I am convinced, and practice shows this as well, that to discuss the draft Statute productively at meetings is impossible. For this reason, in the party organizations in our rayon groups are being created consisting of members of the party committees and the party bureo, who accumulate and analyze all the suggestions made by communists, selecting from them the rational kernels. And then an expanded party committee or party bureau is assembled."

"The question of questions is the correlation of members of the Communist Party of Moldova to members of the CPSU. If we permit here an extreme run ahead or lag, we can lose many party members. On the one hand, the mass of communists says: If we will not be members of the CPSU—that's all! But on the other hand, it is impossible not to take into consideration the national composition of the Communist Party of Moldova. One-fourth of the republic's communists are in the Kishinev Party Gorkom. Its composition and trends in it are well known. However, other organizations have trends of their own, which do not strengthen the Communist Party of Moldova. For this reason, I think, it is very important to find the correct formulation about the relations of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Moldova in the Preamble of the Statute."

S. S. Mikhalat, senior scientific associate of the Institute of Socio-Political Research at the Moldavian CP Central Committee:

"Apropos of the fact that it is written in the draft: 'The Communist Party of Moldova strives to create a democratic socialist society.' What is democratic socialism? You know, we have already had all kinds of socialism, right up to developed socialism. And all this in actual fact proved to be no more than formulas invented the next time—in accordance with the social order. We must get away from such words, because they are simply incomprehensible to people. I think we also should also get away from the formulation 'power of the party masses.' This, at least, for the time being is a very difficult question. I regard as very positive the aspect in the draft Statute that a communist may be registered at the place of work, study, or residence. I personally,
for example, was registered now at the place of work in the party organization at the housing operation sector. I think it would be useful to create at the place of residence of other primary party organizations as well—one, let us say, for three to four houses. This is convincingly demonstrated by the elections, more correctly, by their results, which frequently were unsatisfactory for us. The communists simply did not know who was whose candidate.

“And still another aspect. It is a bad thing that the concept of ‘party comradeship’ is going out of use among communists. It is as if it had been compromised by someone. But we must have some such thing.”

A. V. Shumanskiy, secretary of the party committee of the Kishinev Agricultural Institute:

“I fully subscribe to what has been said by many about the necessity of a direct connection of membership in the Communist Party of Moldova and in the CPSU. If the idea is not clearly expressed that we are a united Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we will lose half, and perhaps more, of the communists. Of course, it is difficult to predict the prospects for the development of the Union. But today our approach should be precisely such—unity. The Communist Party of Moldova without a doubt needs its own Statute. But it should consolidate, not separate communists.

“It should be said that the communists literally perceive with hostility the provision concerning the suspension of membership in the party. Moreover, the question arises: This aspect has not been stipulated in any statute, but our Central Committee is already deciding the question of the suspension of membership. Who gave it the right?

“It is also incomprehensible why it is written in the draft that, if a communist left the party, he may again be admitted after two years. Whence did such a term arise? I think this should be removed. The party organization itself decides after how many years to admit anew. Well, and the last thing—about dues. Communists believe that they should be paid from the sum received in hand, after the deduction of taxes. You know, taxes will now sharply increase.”

V. N. Shova, secretary of the party organization of the Kishinev Tractor Plant Production Association:

“During the discussion of the draft Statute at party meetings, the communists at our plant very suspiciously perceive ‘how it was and how it will be.’ And on this plane, I would like to return to the program goals of the Communist Party of Moldova. There is talk of democratic socialism. And somewhere further about the fact that the Communist Party of Moldova actively resists anti-communist manifestations. But here they never decided to say anything about the communist ideals in the draft. Let us get away from this. And communists at once notice this. There is no need to build illusions, some say, we are sacrificing the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. And they emphasize that it is written in the project that a member of the Communist Party of Moldova cannot be a member of another party. In and of itself a correct provision, but it can also be applied in regard to the CPSU.

“And once again about dues. All communists speak in favor of giving members of the party, who are invalids and pensioners, the right to decide themselves how they can support the party.”

This, of course, is a somewhat “streamlined” exposition of the “roundtable” discussion, for it took place in a very animated manner, frequently there arose such passionate arguments after all which could simply not be followed. At all events, the discussion showed that the draft called forth lively interest among communists, that it constitutes a good basis for further work, and for serious work. This is also clear: Statutes are not written quickly. But, on the other hand, the reserves of time which we had, we have probably exhausted. We must work at a different speed than previously—this is a question of the fate of the Communist Party of Moldova. How, in so doing, can we secure the appearance not of a still-born, but a living and working law of party life? There is only one way—for the greatest possible part of the Communists of Moldova to join the elaboration of the draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova. And if by far not everyone can speak at a meeting, very many can write and send their ideas to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova and to the editorial boards of the party newspapers. In SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA there is a “green light” for such letters.

Second Party Secretary Interviewed

91UN0420B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 14 Nov 90 p 1

[Interview with I. T. Gutsu, second secretary of the Moldovan CP Central Committee by unnamed correspondent of SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA; date and place not specified: “An Important Step on the Road to Independence”; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA introduction]

[Text] The draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova was approved by the republic commission for elaboration of the draft Program and Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova and published in the press. Its broad and comprehensive discussion in the party organizations is under way. Our correspondent met with the director of the study group for elaboration of the draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova, the second secretary of the Moldovan CP Central Committee, I. T. Gutsu.

[Correspondent] Ivan Timofeyevich, as is well known, the 28th CPSU Congress confirmed the new Statute of the party. How is it perceived by the Communists of Moldova?
[Gutsu] The new CPSU Statute, according to my deep conviction, one of the most democratic of the 19 that were adopted and reshaped during the entire history of our party. It "breaks" the rigid centralization, the blind subordination of the "lower strata" to the "higher strata" and guarantees the normative strengthening of the new democratic principles of party operation. It contains enormous energy for the renewal of the CPSU.

The path to this was difficult. It is sufficient to recall if only the polemics in the press on the eve of the congress and the sharpness of the debates at the congress itself. Quite a few serious remarks and additions were expressed by the Communists of Moldova. With satisfaction it can be noted that the congress in main supported our suggestions. So that a Statute was adopted which received the approval not only of the majority of congress delegates, but also of the country's communists.

At the same time, the visit of organizations and meetings with Communists at the local level, unfortunately, shows that by far not all have as yet studied the provisions of the new Statute. And not having studied them, it is impossible to add them to one's armor and to put them into action. Wherever the Statute has been studied literally point by point and has been reflected on by every Communist, there party life is filled with the corresponding content. And it confirms the high durability of the new CPSU Statute.

[Correspondent] In that case, why the necessity of elaborating a Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova?

[Gutsu] The way out to a Statute of our own is not anyone's whim, but one of the law-governed results of those democratic processes, with which our entire society and all its political structures are filled. It was preceded by a broad discussion in the party, including at the congress. As a result, they arrived at the understanding that, in the process of the renewal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the independence of the Communist parties of the union republics, which dialectically combine with the unity of the party on the basis of the fundamental program and statute principles of the CPSU, must be secured in deed. And such independence presupposes the right to the development of program and normative documents. This position entered into the Program Declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress. On its basis, a special part—"The Communist Parties of the Union Republics"—was introduced in the new CPSU Statute, which elevates the right to the elaboration of our own program and normative documents to the rank of a statutory norm.

The draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova that has been prepared by us and is being discussed in the party organizations is the concrete embodiment of the right that has been granted to us. Such work is now being carried out in all Communist parties of the union republics. Moreover, I will note that the documents adopted at the 28th Party Congress for all of us have been and remain base documents. The draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova does not contradict the Statute of the CPSU, but it reflects our specific features, it contains a number of innovations, which supplement and develop what lies at the basis of the Statute of the CPSU. There are also more radical aspects, which were included at the insistence of the elaborators and members of the Central Committee, secretaries, party organizations, and, judging by the character of the discussion of the draft, they basically find broad support in the party.

[Correspondent] It is well known that already in the course of the elaboration of the preamble of the draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova in the commission there developed a rather passionate discussion. How can this be explained?

[Gutsu] Only by the fact that already in the preamble we strove to concentrate the basic provisions that accurately fix the place and role of the Communist Party of Moldova in society, its functions and principles, and the system and conditions of interrelations with the various political forces.

The preamble clearly reflects the program goals of the party—the creation of a democratic, socialist society, and the defense of the interests of the workers.

We regarded it as important to emphasize that the Communist Party of Moldova is an integral part of the political system of the republic. This is a fundamental aspect, for in the republic forces have already appeared that would like to see the Communist Party of Moldova in the backseat of political life, and even to displace it completely from society. At the same time, we again assert that the Communist Party of Moldova builds its activity proceeding from the fundamental interests of Moldova, the necessity of securing civic agreement, the rights and freedoms of citizens independent of their nationality, belief, and convictions, which corresponds to the idea of the creation of a rule of law state.

Our party is open for cooperation with all socio-political forces of the republic acting within the limits of the laws of the Moldovan SSR, which stand for democracy and social progress.

[Correspondent] You talked about the fact that in comparison with the Statute of the CPSU the draft statute of the Communist Party of Moldova developed by the commission has quite a few of its own distinctive aspects and innovations. In what do they consist and what are they?

[Gutsu] If we turn to the part on intra-party democracy, it should be noted that it absorbed such democratic principles and approaches to the Statute of the CPSU as glasnost, collegiality, electiveness, voluntariness of entering and leaving the party, the right to discussion, and referenda. But there are also principal differences. In the draft Statute of the Communist Party of Moldova, democratic unity is introduced in the place of the concept of democratic centralism. This was called forth by
the fact that the very word "centralism" in the consciousness of people calls forth by no means an unequivocal reaction. From this it does not follow at all that we are departing from principal propositions. In the draft Statute it is clearly said we are striving for the recognition of the decisive role of the party masses, the combination of the interests of the party as a whole and every Communist in particular, as well as for a broad pluralism of opinions with conscious party discipline, and for self-government in party life.

Other distinctive aspects are connected with the fact that we recognize the right to demand a political assessment of mistaken decisions, which can come from a minority, the right of the party organizations to recall a member of an elective organ or an official of the apparatus who does not justify their trust. We are for the repudiation of privileges and material goods not provided for by law. At the same time, we recognize the necessity of extending moral and material support to communists.

In the sphere of the organizational structure of the party, the essence of the differences lies in the fact that we advocate the creation of primary party organizations not only at the place of work or residence as provided for by the Statute of the CPSU, but also at the place of creative or other activity of Communists in the presence of no less than five party members. We also propose that the independence of organizations, including in financial respects, requires the elections of the treasurer of primary organization. The draft our Statute requires some broadening of the functions of the primary organization. We are talking about the right to receive information from their members, the conduct of their publishing activity, the carrying out of the re-registration of the members of their party, in case of the cessation of the activity of a party organization. We believe that in the process of their activity the primary party organizations are obliged to inform both the labor collective and the population about their work.

There are some differences also in matters relating to membership in the party. The draft contain the provision that the Communist Party of Moldova does not prevent its members from realizing the right to freedom of conscience and the observance of traditions and customs that do not contradict values common to all mankind. The right is granted to a higher party committee to admit members into the party if there is no party organization at the place of residence or the place of work. In the proposed draft, such a measure of party punishment as a reprimand.

For people who have left or were expelled from the party the right is granted to reenter its ranks, but upon expiration of not less than two years. The temporary suspension of membership in the Communist Party of Moldova can be a statutory norm. I especially would like to note the fact that for the first time we are introducing in the Statute such a concept as party supporters. Any citizen who supports the party morally and materially may be a supporter. He has the right to take part in the activity of the party with the right of a consultative vote.

It is natural that not all distinguishing aspects have been named here, but, I think, what has been said will give an idea, and a rather clear one, that we strove to have the kind of draft Statute which would fully correspond to our conditions and ideas.

[Correspondent] Can you not dwell in greater detail on how the discussion of this draft is going?

[Gutsu] We have recommended to the party committees and the party organizations to regard the discussion of the draft of this important normative document attentively and to involve in the discussion as many Communists as possible. We are counting above all on the fact that the primary party organizations have the deciding word. At the same time, it has been suggested to the raycoms and gorkoms to discuss the draft Statute at regular plenums, with the participation of the councils of the secretaries of the primary organizations.

Not long ago, the draft was discussed in a comprehensive and interesting manner at a session of the Republic Council of Chairmen of City and Rayon Soviets and Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations. At present seminars of secretaries of party organizations are being held in cities and rayons. And here the draft is at the center of attention.

We are counting that our party press will join more actively in this important work.

The first opinions, observations and suggestions are already being received by our study group and are being studied. With regard to all the additions and observations, the draft will be elaborated and submitted to the next Central Committee Plenum, which will make a decision concerning the inclusion of the question about this draft in the agenda of the republic party conference.

We hope that by this time the draft will be discussed in every primary organization and that every Communist will express his opinion about it. You know, we all will have to live and work in accordance with this Statute.

Kravchuk Details Major Issues for Ukrainian Supreme Soviet

91UN0335A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 3 Nov 90 pp 1, 2

[Interview with L.M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, by M. Doroshenko: “What is the Chairman’s Chair Like?”]

[Text] [RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Leonid Makarovych, I think that everyone, both deputies and voters, can see that it is not easy to occupy the chair of the republic's top position. At the same time, one cannot say that you are forced to occupy this chair. What is it that most "keeps" you in it—your acquired political experience, your feeling of responsibility to the deputies who elected you to your
position, or the "honorary role" that is ascribed to the current parliament and its chairman during the period of transition from the command administration system to a democratic Ukrainian state?

[Kravchuk] It would not be right to give a simple answer to your question, for this would not reflect the real situation. What and who supports me and "keeps" me in this chair? Of course, it is the people in the session chamber and outside of it. When I meet with my electors in places of work I find that people want democracy, organization and order. They support the sovereignty of Ukraine, the laws passed by the Supreme Soviet. But, of course, support cannot be unanimous as it was once said to be. Even then it was not so, and it is not so now, if somebody wants to make such a claim. In the past, nobody used to ask the people. Now everything has become open, the divisions among the political forces have become clear. Each of these forces has its own position, its own program, and defends them and the people who propagate them. So to count on everyone supporting us would be simply unfair.

But if we look at what is most important, what at this difficult time compels me to work as chairman, then I would say that it is the state in which the republic presently finds itself.

Perhaps there is an insufficiency of necessary experience for a time like this. And not yet enough knowledge to foresee in time the necessary policy and economic strategy, to envisage every step to be taken forward at a time when events are changing in a kaleidoscope-like manner. This is all very difficult, even for the most experienced politician. Everyone knows that we have already made many mistakes at all levels during the period of restructuring.

Nevertheless, I am supported by my responsibility and my conviction that we are obliged to prevent an ultimate collapse of the economy, conflicts among different nationalities, the development of the sort of situation that has arisen in some republics, including neighboring ones. This compels one to defend one's chosen position. I am eager to have contacts with everyone, to demonstrate that there is not another path for us to take. We must work, attack the most pressing problems and solve them. We must make people feel that we can do something for them, that we are not simply declaring the sovereignty of Ukraine, but that we are masters in our own land.

When people say that these days it is easier to give up a position than to take it, they are telling the truth. Sometimes I find myself sitting and thinking: you are no longer young, of an age to be moved by careerist aspirations. And yet every day, morning to evening, you put up with so much stress... Often I come home late in the evening and the thought comes: tomorrow I won't go. I have a family, children, grandchildren. And they, too, ask: why do you need this?

But the morning comes and with it, new concerns, new trepidation.

If we succeed—and I am convinced that we have the ability to do so—in stopping the destructive processes of ruination, this may go down in history as an important achievement at this difficult transitional stage.

What is most important is that we not allow any clashes to occur at any front—economic, political, religious. We must carry out our policy in such a way as to make people feel that we treat everyone in the same way, regardless of their beliefs. For example, I will never accept the view that the government or any of its representatives should support one church and condemn another. This is very dangerous. People will decide for themselves what church to go to. Our task is to create the conditions for free choice of denomination. At present, we have the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Greek-Catholic Church. If Jews want to have their own, let them have it. The same goes for the Crimean Tatars. Nobody should forbid anyone anything. The worst is when someone plays on religious feelings and uses them for his own political goals. This tactic later turns against the politician. But how many tragedies does it give rise to, how much misery, how many deformed human souls? Is it right to do this?

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Your style as speaker in the Supreme Soviet is becoming ever more popular, even among the representatives of the People's Council. But with some deputies, you are developing a particular type of relationship. How do you feel about this?

[Kravchuk] As a person whose responsibility is to chair meetings, I do not like to see situations arising which stand in the way of getting work done. This is natural. But I know that there are some deputies who at any given moment may come up to the microphone and attempt to turn the session in a different direction, to move it away from the agenda. Still, even in a situation like that one has to find a way to keep on working. That is why I try to find ways to deal humorously with unexpected situations. Sometimes I succeed, other times I don't. But some experience is gained. For example, at first I did not do well in this regard, I felt irritated. My attitude was simple: how could people fail to understand that this could not be allowed? But I was posing this question mainly to myself. If I were to ask it in the chamber, I would get at least four different replies. All people are individuals, they have their own ideas, their own psychology, which were formed in different conditions. Some, for example, consider themselves democrats, but categorically reject any criticism of themselves. They often take criticism so badly that one wonders how it can be: they proclaim pluralism, but cannot take criticism, although they themselves are constantly critically examining the acts of other deputies.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] In recent press conferences and other appearances, you have often stressed the
primary importance of the economic problems that the Supreme Soviet must examine and solve. It appears that your personal and the Presidium’s focus on these issues helped the republic’s parliament to literally tear its way through the undergrowth of bickering and misunderstandings and go about its business, passing laws and more recently, its concept of transition to the market. Such persistence and steadfastness will, I think, be appreciated by the objective voter.

[Kravchuk] I also think that people will notice this. For example, I regard as extremely important the law regarding the priority of the social development of the village, which has set down a real basis for beginning to pay off our debts to the village. In this regard, I would again like to say something to farmers.

This year, the republic had a good harvest, enough to provide for our own needs. But now we are short of two-and-a-half million tonnes of forage grains, in particular for poultry and cattle production, which, as people know, is supplied from state resources.

Many farms have not yet filled state orders for grain. As a result, we will not have the needed amount of enriched feed and will be obliged to reduce the number of heads. And this is a big problem.

So what can we do in a situation when we have a good crop and, at the same time, do not have feed for animals? Must we again purchase grain for hard currency, which as it is we do not have enough of for more urgent needs?

Who will understand us? People on the farms which have not delivered grain will also be asking: where can we get goods for farmers? I realize that we have always turned to the village for help in difficult times and it has always held out a helping hand. In future, we will need to apply some economic levers here. But now the situation is such that there just is no other way. If we want to be masters on our own land, we should do it intelligently and care not only about our own, but also about state interests.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] The Supreme Soviet has just passed the most urgent document—the republic’s program for shifting to a market system. What would you consider the highlights of the program?

[Kravchuk] The program is intended to make possible a more effective and rational use of internal resources, the scientific, raw material and technical potentials of the republic, to bring about the necessary structural changes in the economy of Ukraine. These changes are essential, for our industry is built ineffectively, and even if at present every enterprise worked at its peak, the existing structure as a whole would not allow for the desired results.

Further, we view the development of the economy of Ukraine through the strengthening of lateral ties with other republics. In all of our republics there are enormous riches which we should use first of all and for our mutual benefit.

At the same time, however, it is understood that the republic will also operate on the international economic stage, in order to be open to outside capital investment, modern technology, free enterprise.

And what is most important—we plan to carry out the transition to the market while providing solid social guarantees. The steps which are now being taken, in particular, the introduction of the ration book, although not welcomed by all, are aimed at protecting the market and the consumer in conditions of shortages of everything. And this is the most difficult aspect. If we were bringing in all the reforms in conditions of excess production, the situation would be totally different. But given the background of crisis and insufficiency of production, we must resort to unpopular means. But it is important not to sow fear among the people that tomorrow they will find themselves unemployed, without help. In our program, the essential guarantees are foreseen.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] What you have said about government measures brings to mind the fact that earlier, we constantly heard reproaches that the republican government was immobilized, that it was not protecting the consumer market, and so on. But now that concrete measures have been introduced which affect everyone, the measures and the government are again being obstructed. People are saying that the measures are not correct and are almost anti-people. By this logic, whatever you do is not right. One does not envy our leaders.

[Kravchuk] Everyone has his opinion. But based only on his opinion, even if he is a people’s deputy, he should not attempt at the sessions to block the government’s decisions. Some deputies, not having themselves understood what is being done, are already frightening people, announcing to the whole republic that the government is doing the wrong thing. What government could work if every morning the Supreme Soviet blocked its decisions for taking action? We passed a resolution, we are creating the possibility for the government to work. With time it will become clear whether or not it is capable of fulfilling its functions. And if the Supreme Soviet watches over every step the government takes, then neither it nor the government will be able to do anything. We should all understand that there is legislative and executive power and that each should work in its own sphere.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] At present the conviction is growing in society that without radical changes, especially in the economy, restructuring will not be successful. Is there always such a level of understanding in parliament? I am asking this question in relation to the present election of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. During the summer, the candidate for that position, Fokin, was not elected, it seems to me, because he favored a radical approach to economic reform. Now the program for the transition to the market contains even more radical steps. But the time that has passed
since that election has been lost. Will this serve as a lesson to the Supreme Soviet?

[Kravchuk] I think so. The deputies are actively rethinking their positions. Given the period in which we were brought up, this is not easy. But today everyone understands that with the old notions you will not go far. Many suffer from psychological fear that the market is a return to capitalism, to unemployment. They say that will happen here too. But these views come from a lack of sufficient information and confidence in the government. It is true that earlier decisions, especially those made on the Union level, were not effective. That is why people think that this, too, will bring nothing. These doubts return in boomerang fashion to the government and the Supreme Soviet and press on them. This impedes our work. But we have no choice: radicalization is the road to the new economic life. And we must go along this road in such a way that the people will not suffer; especially those elements of the population which are most vulnerable.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Leonid Makarovsky, journalists have already posed questions to you about the position of President of Ukraine and you have expressed your thoughts. If we look a little into the future, after the passage of the new law about elections and, possibly, the election of a President, do you consider it possible that you will take part in the battle for this position?

[Kravchuk] Only a person who does not realize the full extent and scope of a future position eagerly gives his assent to it. This is true in all fields. It is the dilettante who most easily passes judgement on any process.

A person who truly understands the essence of a problem is constantly in reflection. His knowledge allows him to weigh everything, including the enormous responsibility. After all, history will be judging what he has done.

As far as being President of Ukraine, given the present dislocation of forces and unprecedented social tension, not every person, including myself, would want to agree to that.

However, at present, we must make our way through the situation existing here. We should not rush with the presidency. I believe that the President should be elected not by the Supreme Soviet—in the republics where this was done, little has changed. The whole population should elect the President. And at present it would be ruinous for Ukraine to begin a new political battle, new opposition.

And when it comes time for that, I will have to consider whether I can survive the political battle. If I feel and see that there is a candidate who responds to all the present needs of the society and is stronger in all respects, why would I engage in a pointless competition?

At present, we must work, lead the republic out of the crisis. And what is at issue here is not the presidency, but the right policy, the confidence of the people. And confidence will be built only when the government begins to do something concrete for the people. This is a mutual process and in a democratic state that is how it should be. And the people for their part should understand the present difficulties. I do not think that people who have followed the course of the session would fail to understand the situation of, for example, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. And of the whole parliament. They see and understand. The same is true of the government.

For that reason we must find a way to come together and work, work, work. Nobody will rescue us except ourselves. The path of sovereignty is the only correct one. But to make declarations about sovereignty and do nothing for it is political nonsense which again gives rise in the masses to terrible disillusionment: empty slogans, useless declarations. That is why recently I have been constantly repeating: we must proceed to the realization of sovereignty step by step, pass the essential laws, and the government must execute them. Then we will move from where we are and go forward. After all, Ukraine is a rich country. So why can she not make life better for all the people who populate her?

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] Unfortunately, we do not yet have an exact, permanent sociological service which would regularly poll the population, in particular with regard to the popularity of the leaders of the republic. In this situation, anyone can step forward and make judgments in the name of the people. I remember the closing events of the demands of the hunger-striking students. When Masol resigned, some people immediately forecast a speedy downfall for Kravchuk too. But on the contrary, it appears from what I have heard during my assignments and from letters to the editor that recently you have been gaining points among the population. This is probably owing to the patience, the tolerance in the course of the parliament's work, the persistence and at times decisiveness which the chairman of the sessions is obliged to manifest, in order to yet again prevent the Supreme Soviet from slipping into unplanned, fruitless discussion, to lead it in a business-like direction. Are you aware of these opinions and responses? And what kind of relation do you have with voters?

[Kravchuk] I try conscientiously to carry out my duties as deputy. I do all I can to carry out the orders of the voters of the Yampil electoral district No 39, while at the same time not taking advantage of my official position. I cannot, as chairman, take something away from other districts and give it to mine. I think that my voters would not want me to do this. Things must be fair. But when it comes to putting in gas lines, building schools and hospitals, dealing with problems of television, in these and other important social spheres in which there are many problems in the Yampil, Pishchansk and Tomashpil rayons, I will do all I can within the limits of the plan and the law to prevent them from being "left behind," to guarantee people the essentials.
Among the letters that come to me, there are pleasant ones and unpleasant ones. But of the latter, there are very few from my electoral district. The majority supports my actions as chairman and states that the course we are taking is the correct one. People suggest what needs to be done to make the economic and social spheres work as they should. They express their understanding of how difficult it is for anyone, including the Supreme Soviet, to do all this in today’s conditions. Their judgements are expressed kindly, accurately, wisely, fairly.

As to letters with negative judgements: it is understood that every person evaluates my work in his own way. But one cannot fail to notice that the flames are being fanned. I have already spoken about this. Delegates to the all-Ukraine meeting of Rukh travelling from Ivano-Frankovsk to Kiev stopped in the Yampil electoral district in order agitate against the chairman of the Supreme Soviet. And the main accusation against me comes down to the fact that I am a Communist. Is this normal? I am ready to meet people, to have discussions with them, even on television. But to deal with the essence of the present problems, how we are solving them, and not prejudiced attacks and far-fetched aspects of questions. Recently I saw in the papers that it is considered a great achievement for the chairman that he has switched to a white Volga. But even if tomorrow I were to switch to a donkey, what would it change if I did nothing for the people? What matters is not what the chairman and the parliament cost, but what they give to the people. One decision of the Supreme Soviet may bring the people millions in profits, or may take away billions. The effectiveness of decisions—that is the criterion that should be used.

As to the letters that come to me, I would like to go on television with them soon. To think about these letters. To analyze both the positive and negative ones, to say what they have given me. Even the unpleasant letters often help, make it possible for me to regard myself from a distance: stop, you made a mistake here and people see it. For this I am very grateful. Of course there are some letters that contain nothing but insults and anger and express no thought. But I also understand what can stand behind a sheet of paper like that: a person who is simply embittered by something. But bitterness should not block out everything, especially in politics.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] My friend who works in the prosecutor’s office shared his experiences with me. As one who works within the legal system, he understands that the system should be depoliticized. But as a Communist, he cannot give himself the moral right to leave the party at a time that is so difficult for it. And now in accord with the changes in the constitution of Ukraine, the judicial system is becoming depoliticized. How, in your opinion, will this process continue?

[Kravchuk] In any society, there are bodies and organizations which may be officially exempted from the general rule with regard to free party adherence. This need not be regarded as a tragedy. A person who works in these bodies should be free from any influence, so that there cannot be any grounds for accusing him of lack of objectivity. Otherwise anything could happen. Let us say a person acts according to his conscience, but somewhere makes a mistake, which is possible when dealing with complex matters. But this would be regarded in a different light, everything would be blamed on his party adherence. For that reason, during the period when one is carrying out legal duties, it would be best to suspend membership in any party.

We are gradually approaching this situation. And everyone should understand that this is not a tragedy either for the person or for the Communist party as a whole. The break is only temporary, and later the person can return to the party. And what is most important is that in his soul, in his consciousness, a real person will always keep his convictions.

If we speak of enterprises, work places, some people are striving not for overall depoliticization, but only for decommunization. This is another matter. Even at the Rukh convention there was talk of an urgent need to establish centers at enterprises. But Rukh is a political organization, its members represent various parties. What does this add up to? They oppose politicization, but in fact, are leaders of politicization. It is clear that those who announce even in their program documents that they want war with Communists are longing for the days which we are leaving behind us.

[RADYANSKA UKRAYINA] The first phase of the second session has ended. It, too, was characterized by harsh political opposition, confrontation, especially at the beginning and at the end. But there were also examples of people standing together, in particular, when the final resolution was being passed with regard to the demands of the hunger-striking students. So there is potential for constructive work. Do you believe that this potential will continue to be realized?

[Kravchuk] I think so. The fact that all the people have their eyes on the Supreme Soviet has a great effect. So when we propose something rational and necessary for the people, and some deputy comes out against it or tries to divert the session to examine yet some other conflicting situation, then every voter asks himself the question: how did he get there? This has an effect on the education, re-education, of the deputies and on this we need to build all our work.

We do not want to be optimists like “Diogenes in his barrel,” cut off from real life. But of course the Supreme Soviet has potential for getting things done—on one side and on the other. I look at the plans for our future activity and see that there are matters on which we should be able to work together. By this I mean to say that in spite of all the difficulties and even the dramatic nature of events, we want to continue to be a parliament which is needed by the people and which will demonstrate its ability to solve the most difficult problems.
Official Sees Possibility of Working With Ukrainian Communist Party

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[Interview with Volodymyr Yavorivsky, Ukrainian and USSR People's Deputy and chairman of the Rukh Council of Representatives, by Andriy Derepa: "It Is Time to Begin the Tough Work"]

[Text] October 25 the Second Congress of the All-Ukrainian National Movement for Restructuring will begin in Kiev. It will be held at the UKRAYINA Palace, which until now has only hosted Party and Komsomol gatherings. This circumstance in itself testifies to the achievements of the year which has passed since the Founding Congress of Rukh. Rukh representatives will gather not only, in accordance with the season, to "count their chickens". Their goal - to outline tangible directions, to define strategy and tactics for action in the struggle toward a free, independent, and sovereign Ukraine.

[Derepa] Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, within our republic and outside it as well, you are known not only as a writer and twice People's Deputy, but also as one of the most active founders and "godfather" of the Ukrainian National Rukh Movement. Yet in the last six to seven months the impression is, at least in my eyes, that you have distanced yourself from the tasks within Rukh. Am I wrong?

[Yavorivsky] No, you are mistaken, and yet at the same time you are correct. Because I will not be able to step away from Rukh matters for a long time, because I truly suffered, and the bruises acquired in the process of creating Rukh have not yet healed, and abandoning it now would be simple betrayal. Of myself first of all. Still, your discerning journalistic eye has noticed that I, probably, spend less time at meetings, demonstrations; in other words, I appear less in public. And, given the opportunity, I would like to explain this is not because I see myself as that rocket, in which I did the work of one of the stages, and now it is someone else's turn. Although there is some of that as well. But all this is explained by the fact that together with my commission as a Deputy I have also taken on the yoke of Chernobyl. Therefore I believe it completely valid that trying to stand out everywhere and be present everywhere would be unwise and even unrealistic for me. There is a limit to human endurance. That is why I am working these days for that which, possibly, is outside of Rukh, but still occupies the center of politics - Chernobyl and its problems. If, for example, someone were to ask for a report from the Commission on Youth Problems in four to five years, the Commission on Chernobyl will be approached literally in one year, with the question: what have you done, what have you changed? On the other hand, I participated most actively in the Cossack 500th anniversary celebrations, attended the 900th anniversary of Pryluk, and even held a rally there, although, it is true, the press made no mention of this. The Chernigov party leadership would not even let me enter the city: the head of the militia and his political henchman waylaid my automobile and demanded to see a schedule of my stay in the city. I answered, saying I had come simply to shop at the bazaar, and if they so desired I could give them my shopping list...

But speaking seriously, I believe it is time Rukh had new leaders. You understand very well that, let's say, Pavlychko is responsible for Ukrainian international policies, I answer for Chernobyl, Les' Taniuk heads the commission for culture, Volodymyr Pylypchuk, Rukh member and member of the Peoples Soviet has assumed the most weighty role as head of the commission for economic reform - for development of our Ukrainian version for solving the crisis. Ivan Drach is a People's Deputy, Mychaylo Horyn' is too, and in addition half of the secretariat of Rukh is composed of People's Deputies! Forgive us, as we all strive for a professional parliament. That is why the question of new leadership arose, and I will speak of that at the second congress of Rukh: the younger generation should take over. We can have some degree of advisory input - to suggest or advise. Rukh is entering a new stage - tough work will be required. Today we stand on the horizon of something new, that Rukh should go out into the villages, to enrich the villagers, explain to the people what has happened and what is going on. You understand very well, that the worried party apparatus is doing its best, in its daily meetings, through its mass communications media, using its agitators and lecturers, to fill the people's ears with the message that earlier everything was normal: the sausage was rotten, but you could get as much of it as you wanted; cigarettes were bad, but available; whiskey could be bought in regular stores! See what is happening now? This is all the fault of Rukh, of the democrats. But they remain silent about the fact that the country was heading in this same direction under their "wise" party leadership. That sooner or later this would have happened anyway. It would have happened even if Brezhnev were alive, when things were seemingly stable. All this must be explained to the people today. We must turn our attention more to Eastern Ukraine. I was one of those who insisted on conducting the second Congress of Rukh in Kharkov, but for several reasons this did not happen. The situation is changing very rapidly, and Rukh should also enter a new stage of development. It will probably be more difficult than the previous one. When we were creating Rukh, struggling against the "material resistance" of the party, when we all were actually proceeding "into the trenches", it was easier. It is much more difficult now. We are entering a period of multiple new ideas, of new methods of activity. It is imperative that we change the Program of Rukh, because that which we considered to be revolutionary when we wrote the program is now commonly spoken of even by the group of "239". Something must be changed, radicalized, and Rukh should assume a more professional basis. There
should be professional employees in Rukh, with competent organizational leadership, without which we simply cannot continue.

[Derepa] During the preceding weeks political emotions boiled around the issue of a new Soviet Union Treaty - and the future of the Ukraine. What is your position on this question?

[Yavorivskyy] Today this question no longer exists, it is so obvious. When two months ago we could not have ratified our Declaration of National Sovereignty without the words “Soviet Union Treaty”, today no one wants such an alliance any longer. Shall I give you another example? Somehow I found myself in a workshop, where covers were sewn for machines. One of the workers recognized me, and within moments I was surrounded by people who worked there. They included Jews, Russians, Armenians - none of them spoke Ukrain. But all of them shook me literally by the sleeve, trying to persuade me: look here, remain strong to the end, “The Ukraine must be sovereign!” I asked “Why so?”, “There is no other way”, they answered, “for us to live a good life. The Ukraine must be independent.” So, this is the reality ahead of us. Rukh is no longer radical. The important thing now is to achieve political stability. So the people can be certain this Supreme Soviet, this group of “239” will not closet itself inside some corridor and announce the signing of a Soviet Union Treaty.

[Derepa] All right, let us proceed on the assumption that most of the Ukrainian people do not want any kind of Soviet Union Treaty. Take into consideration also that L. M. Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet has officially stated that in today's situation posing the question of signing a Treaty is premature. But how then do you see the prospects of stability within the republic in light of the newly minted law “regarding the increase in authority of the USSR’s President” adopted recently by the USSR Supreme Soviet?

[Yavorivskyy] The fact is that in our political situation today many things are illogical, not thought through. I think it would be good for the Center to stop and listen. The Soviet Parliament, above all, should stop and be still. At least it should think over and understand what is happening in the republics. Then it should adapt itself to the republics. If M.S. Gorbachev states that this will be a completely different Soyuz, that this will be a Soyuz of free nations, then this Soyuz can be created only after the national sovereignty of the republics is guaranteed and inter-republic contacts are established. Only then can the republics decide what authority can be delegated to the Center. Today at all times we see the exact opposite - the Center sends out decrees which are contrary to the ideas of sovereignty of the republics. What kind of Ukrainian sovereignty can we speak of, when the President could position tanks in front of our windows tomorrow? Then, three days later the Supreme Soviet would discuss the question of whether or not this action was correct. But the tanks will be there already! How are we to understand this? I believe the USSR Supreme Soviet should stop creating so many new laws. Regarding the law increasing the authority of the President, I would not like to be overly categorical. There is the danger of a military takeover. The KGB and the Army are still political entities, all it would take is one word from Polozkov, and that would be it! That is why I think such a level of discretionary authority is necessary for Gorbachev, in case he would need to use decisive action at some point. But all this should have been discussed beforehand. This law is very ambiguous, giving the President authority to act according to his own judgment. It is good that we have Gorbachev in power today. He has crossed more than half the river already, and it would make no sense for him to return, because he would never be able to swim back. But what if someone else were to assume power tomorrow? And the authorizations would remain in force? What kind of sovereignty could even be discussed? A member of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium telephoned the Ministry of Defense to enquire about enforcement of our decision regarding military service by our youth on Ukrainian soil. With military abruptness the Muscovite general answered: “Your stupid laws do not concern us!” That is the position of the Center!

[Derepa] Volodymyr Oleksandrovych, at rallies, demonstrations, in declarations and decrees of some political parties and community movements the demand has been raised that the republic’s parliament which exists today be dissolved and a new election held. Do you agree with such a proposition?

[Yavorivskyy] This may not please some people, but I belong to those who are currently categorically opposed to a special election. Let us imagine such a situation - the Supreme Council is dissolved. But someone must remain to fulfill the functions of government. Who? Kravchuk? Hurenko? Or perhaps the leaders of the Supreme Council Presidium, “reinforced” with cadres from the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party? We would need at least a year to carry out new elections. Who will give us this time, when Chernobyl hangs over us? And when we are in complete economic chaos? And if we should again immerse ourselves in political passions, we would never be forgiven. Another thing - who would guarantee that during the election campaign we would not be subjected to a military takeover or dictatorial presidential rule? The only correct variation, I believe, is for our party leaders at all levels in the Supreme Council to leave the far right for the center, to concentrate on what is most important today - the acceptance of the republic’s program for transition to a market economy, acceptance of realistic laws, and that which I categorically demand, a complete change in leadership.

[Derepa] You believe in the possibility of consolidation with the Communist Party of the Ukraine, in the prospect of “turning left” of its leaders?

[Yavorivskyy] We would like that to happen. And that would be the smartest compromise for today. After all,
Rukh has always phrased the question by saying: we do not oppose the Communist Party, so long as it is a Ukrainian Communist Party, independent of Moscow. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian Communist Party today fulfills the function of the principal and most aggressive agent of the Center. Look - they decided to “steal” Ivashko out of the presidency, and took him to Moscow! This was to show us again that we are a province, that we are small, selling us to elect someone else, and we will bribe him with sweets and do things our own way. The heart of the matter is that the leadership of the Ukrainian Communist Party understands fully that if they were to remain alone with the people, without support from the Center, they would very quickly have to liquidate themselves. I am completely convinced of this.

[Derepa] Since we are already on the topic of the party, let us look at it from another point of view. One year ago, when the Founding Congress was called, there were, essentially, no political parties in the Ukraine, with the exception of the Communist Party, and Rukh was “non-partisan”. Today it unites representatives of the Democratic party, and Republicans, and Social Democrats, and the Green Party, and so on... the litany could continue for some time. Each of these parties has its own platform, its goals, which they hope to attain. Who will carry out the programs of Rukh? Will this “distribution” into party “quarters” not weaken it?

[Yavorivskyy] Truly, such a problem does exist, and we will discuss it at the Congress. I think the chairman of Rukh should be a non-partisan individual. Because otherwise, whether we like it or not, partisan ambitions will arise. This would be the result of our many centuries of subservience. From the lack of national identity, of a political heritage. Truthfully, I am concerned with the creation of such a large number of parties. The impression arises that they were formed to fulfill the ambitions of their leaders to assume the scepter of the Hetman. And thus there are so many of these scepters in people’s hands! But if you look closely - there is no army behind them. In this desire to lead we will soon overcome all the most highly developed countries. I simply see no need for so many parties. Today we need one or two strong parties, which would exist as alternatives to the Communist Party. Which could stand up to the Communists and say: move over, boys. That is why we need to stop this peasant-like rush for supremacy and stop dividing our power. Ultimately, we should strive for a nonpartisan society.

[Derepa] In your speeches during the Founding Congress you often posed the question: “what kind of a nation are we?” How would you answer this question today?

[Yavorivskyy] Do you know, I did pose the question, and I, and my colleagues, as long as we live, will continue to formulate the answer. If before I had placed a “?” at the end of that question, then now I would punctuate it with a “!?”.
A member of the Armenian CP cannot at the same time be a member of another party. A communist has the right to participate in the work of public organizations and movements whose activity does not contradict the Program and Statutes of the Armenian Communist Party.

3. A member of the Armenian CP is obliged consistently to implement the political policy of the Armenian CP in labor collectives and among the population, to propagandize the ideas of the party, to struggle for the achievement of its programmatic goals and the support of vanguard positions in society, to fulfill party decisions, and to pay party membership dues.

A member of the Armenian CP is obliged to observe the standards of social morality, to pursue the raising of his political and cultural level, and to be an example in labor and in daily life.

4. Acceptance as a member of the Armenian Communist Party is carried out individually through the application of the person who is joining at a meeting of the primary party organization, whose decision is considered final. The Armenian CP issues members a party card for the Armenian Communist Party. The Armenian CP Central Committee establishes the procedure for the registration of party members.

By decision of the primary party organization, a member of the Armenian CP who has actively worked in the party no less than 30 years may be awarded the honorary title "Veteran of the Armenian Communist Party."

A communist is listed in the party registry according to his place of work or residence at his desire and with the consent of the primary organization.

If a party member, for reasons of health or age, cannot fully participate in party life, then on the basis of his application the primary party organization has the right to decide to release him from constant social work and the payment of membership dues.

5. If the activity and behavior of a party member are incompatible with the requirements of the Armenian Communist Party Statutes, the primary party organization may revoke his membership on its own initiative or at the suggestion of a higher party body.

Membership in the party may also be revoked on a party member's statement of voluntary withdrawal from the Armenian Communist Party, which is submitted to the primary party organization.

During acceptance of a member of the Armenian CP and during expulsion from the party, the decision of the primary party organization is considered valid if more than one-half of its registered communists voted for it.

For violations of party discipline or the standards of social morality, other measures of party influence may be applied to a party member in the form of a notice of reproof or reprimand.

One who has been expelled from the party or who has received a penalty has the right to submit an appeal to the higher and control bodies of the party. The appeal is to be considered within a period of no more than two months from the day of its receipt.

6. Persons sympathetic to the party, who approve of the Program and Statutes of the Armenian Communist Party, are permitted to participate in its activity with the right to a consultative vote at the discretion of the primary party organization.

Intraparty Democracy

7. The Armenian Communist Party operates on the basis of the combination of an ideological community and party discipline.

In all fundamental questions of party life, the final word belongs to the party masses. The free expression of opinions and views, the existence of various platforms and broad opportunities for criticism are ensured in the party. Discussions and referendums on topical issues of social and party life may be held in the Armenian Communist Party and in its individual organizations. They are conducted on the initiative of the leading bodies or on the proposal of party organizations, uniting no fewer than one-third of the members of the corresponding organizations.

8. The leading bodies of the party are the general meeting, conference and congress. They are competent if more than one-half or, during reports and elections, at least two-thirds of the members of the party organization or elected delegates are present. The leading party bodies elect the executive bodies (bureau, committee) and the control bodies (control commission).

The leading party bodies may form permanent or temporary commissions and work groups on the basic directions of work, as well as use other forms of participation of communists and other citizens in their activity.

9. The leading, executive and control bodies in the party are elective. They are chosen through secret vote with a preliminary broad discussion of the candidacies. Party members during elections have the right to nominate a candidate without restrictions, including themselves, thus ensuring alternative choices. Candidates who have collected more than one-half the votes of the party members participating in the voting at the meeting, conference, congress or plenum of the party committee or control commission are considered elected.

The primary party organizations have the right to submit suggestions on candidates for higher party bodies.

10. Members of elected bodies in the party at the level of the raykom and higher can be elected to the same post for no more than two consecutive terms. Secretaries of party committees at all levels and the chairmen of the control commissions are elected with the simultaneous
election of the members of these bodies at the corresponding meetings, conferences, congresses or, at the discretion of the delegates, at the plena of party committees and control commissions, through secret vote. They are accountable to the corresponding party committee or control commission, and are registered with any party organization, besides the party apparatus organization.

11. The party committees and control commissions are accountable to the party organizations which formed them. An elected body is to report on its work to the party organization which elected or recommended it.

12. In drafting resolutions, the party organizations and their bodies are obliged to consider all points of view. Resolutions passed by the majority are mandatory for everyone. The minority has the right to support its positions in party meetings, conferences, congresses, and meetings of executive and control bodies, to use the mass information media for these purposes, to give co-reports, to record a particular opinion or position in the minutes, and to demand a second examination of debatable issues in their own organizations or in higher bodies.

In the party committees and control commissions and in their bureaus and presidiums, in the event of the appearance of disagreements, the draft of the resolution is presented for repeated discussion and is passed by the majority of votes.

The resolutions of congresses, conferences and meetings are mandatory for the party organizations. The resolutions of committees and bureaus at the preparation stage are discussed within the party organizations which they concern, and after passing become mandatory for execution. If a resolution is unacceptable to a party member even after passing it in the established procedure, he need not fulfill it, but is obliged to present a statement to this account, having set forth and defended his point of view, and he may not prevent others from fulfilling said resolution.

13. The elected party bodies, during the term of their authorities, may create a working apparatus which is subordinate to them. The party apparatus is formed on the recommendation of the primary party organization. Labor legislation applies to the employees of the party apparatus.

14. The party organizations and committees may issue and disseminate books, newspapers and journals, bulletins, and propagandistic, informative, reference and other documents through their own means or jointly with other organizations, may form the corresponding editorial boards, may have their own polygraphic base, and may organize television and radio broadcasts. The party mass information media are bodies of the party organizations and committees; their leaders are elected at the appropriate party meeting, conference, congress or plenum of the party committee.

Organizational Structure of the Party

15. The Armenian Communist Party is structured according to territorial and industrial features. Primary, rayon, and city party organizations are part of the party structure.

Councils, secretaries, party organizations, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, councils of party veterans, and other forms which unite party members according to their interests and problems may be created and operate on the initiative of party members. Not having the rights of the primary party organizations, but being based on the programmatic formulations of the Armenian CP, they discuss various issues and draft their own positions, and submit proposals and drafts for the consideration of party committees at any level.

The Armenian Communist Party does not restrict the rights of communists to unite around platforms.

Primary Party Organizations

16. The primary party organizations, which are created given the presence of no less than three members of the Armenian Communist Party by a decision of a meeting of them and are registered by the corresponding party raykom or gorkom, comprise the basis of the party.

The primary party organization may create party groups and shop organizations within its structure. The latter, at the primary party organization's discretion, may be granted the rights of primary organizations. The primary party organizations independently resolve questions of acceptance into the party and of revoking membership in the Armenian Communist Party, determine their own structure, orientation and methods of work, time periods and procedures for holding meetings, questions of political actions, financing and economic activity, and arrange their own interrelations with state and public organizations. The primary party organization propagandizes and carries out the party resolutions, implements the ideological, political and organizational functions of the party in labor collectives and in its territory, influences the solution of economic and social problems, and supports social justice.

17. For the conduct of current work, the meeting (conference) of a primary party organization elects a party bureau (committee) and its secretary for two-three years. The questions of staff, payment for the labor of the secretary and other employees, as well as other forms of material incentive, are determined by the meeting (conference). In party organizations numbering fewer than 15 communists, the secretary of the party organization and his deputy are elected for the time period and in the procedure which are established by the meeting, and in party groups—by the party group organization.

Rayon and City Party Organizations

18. Rayon and city party organizations are the supporting structural link of the party.
The rayon and city party conferences elect the rayon and city party committees, as well as the control commission, for a term of five years.

The rayon or city party committee, taking into account the opinions of the primary organizations, elect the raykoms or gorkom bureaus at its plenum.

The first secretaries of city or rayon party committees are elected at the city or rayon party conferences through a closed (secret) vote, and in the period between conferences—at the plena.

The party raykoms and gorkoms conduct the registration of communists, coordinate the activity of the primary party organizations, and together with them organize the implementation of the policies and decisions of the party in the labor collectives and according to citizens' places of residence, submit proposals on solving specific socio-economic, cultural and other problems for the examination of society and the bodies of power, and contribute to their implementation.

The party raykoms and gorkoms, in order to strengthen work among the population according to place of residence, may create divisions of the party.

19. The control commission of a rayon or city party organization elects its own presidium. The control commission observes the execution of the decisions of leading party bodies, resolves problems related to the observance by communists of party discipline and the standards of social morality, defend the honor and dignity of party members, examine their appeals, hold accountable those guilty of suppressing criticism and of abuses, and review the fulfillment of the party budget and the economic activity of party institutions. The control commission is accountable to the body that elected it, and operates independently in accordance with a resolution, approved by the rayon or city party conference.

Higher and Central Bodies of the Armenian Communist Party

20. The congress is the higher body of the Armenian Communist Party. Regular congresses are convened by the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee no less than once every five years. Between congresses, conferences or an extraordinary congress may be convened. The decision of the Central Committee to convene a regular congress or conference, the agenda and the norm of representation is announced no later than three months before their convocation. The Central Committee publishes drafts of documents on the basic issues which will be submitted at the congress or conference.

A extraordinary congress or conference is convened on the suggestion of the Central Committee RKK or at the demand of party organizations, uniting no fewer than one-third of the overall number of communists within a two-month period.

In the event of failure by the Central Committee to convene an extraordinary congress or conferences, the organizations which demanded its conduct may form an organizational committee, enjoying the rights of the party Central Committee to convene an extraordinary congress or conference.

21. The Congress of the Armenian Communist Party:

Hears the accounts and reports of the Central Committee and the Control Commission, of other bodies and persons, elected by the congress, assesses their work and drafts a resolution on it;

Develops and adopts the party policy in the area of party building, ideological activity, and the internal and external policy of the Armenian Communist Party;

Elects the Armenian CP Central Committee and the republican Control Commission of the Armenian CP;

Variant I: Elects the first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, at the same time electing him a member of the Armenian CP Central Committee and a member of the Bureau;

Variant II: Elects the chairman of the Armenian CP, at the same time electing him a member of the Armenian CP Central Committee and a member of the Armenian CP Central Committee Politburo;

Elects the chairman of the Armenian CP Control Commission, at the same time including him in the Control Commission and the Presidium of the Armenian CP Control Commission.

22. The republican conference of the Armenian CP is convened for the examination of urgent matters in the policy or practical activity of the party.

The conference is competent to hear the reports of the Central Committee and the Control Commission of the Armenian CP concerning their work, partially (up to one-third during the period between congresses) to re-elect their members, and to make other decisions mandatory for the party within the framework of the programmatic documents of the Armenian CP.

23. In the period between congresses and conferences, the Armenian CP Central Committee:

Organizes the implementation of the decisions of the congresses and conferences of the Armenian CP;

Drafts and submits proposals on internal and external policy for the consideration of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian Republic or its presidium;

Directs the activity of party groups (factions) in republican representative bodies;

Drafts and implements the cadre policy of the Armenian CP;
Creates institutions and party enterprises and controls their activity;

Cooperates with sociopolitical organizations in the country and in the republic, and represents the Armenian Communist Party in contacts with foreign parties.


The first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee (or chairman of the Armenian CP) directs the work of the Bureau or the Central Committee Politburo.

The Bureau of the Central Committee (Central Committee Politburo) annually reports on its activity to the plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee.

25. Permanent commissions are created in the Armenian CP Central Committee on the basic directions of its activity. They are formed at the plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee from among the members of the Central Committee, as well as other communists.

26. The Armenian CP Control Commission is guided in its work by the Statutes of the Armenian CP and by the resolution on the Armenian CP Control Commission. It elects a presidium at its own plenum.

27. The Armenian CP Central Committee and Control Commission of the Armenian CP conduct no fewer than two plenary conferences annually, and when necessary, also hold joint meetings.

Members of the Armenian CP Central Committee may participate in the work of the plena of the Armenian CP Control Commission, and members of the Control Commission of the Armenian CP—in the work of the plena of the Armenian CP Central Committee with the right to a consultative vote.

A member of the party cannot simultaneously be a member of the Armenian CP Central Committee and of the Armenian CP Control Commission.

Party Members in Soviets, State Bodies and Public Associations

28. The Armenian Communist Party is struggling for political leadership in society in free elections to the soviets of people’s deputies and through other forms of expression of the will of the citizens. The party organizations draft and publish their own pre-election platforms, recommend communists and nonparty members, with their consent, for nomination as candidate people’s deputies, and help them with the organization of an election campaign.

The party organizations may enter into pre-election agreements with other sociopolitical organizations and movements, operating on the basis of the Constitution, and may support the candidate deputies nominated by them who are not members of the Armenian Communist Party.

29. At sessions of soviets of people’s deputies, communists and those of like mind may unite during the period of authority of the soviets into party groups (factions) for the coordination of their activities for the purpose of implementing the will and commands of the voters.

The creation by communists in the soviets of groups or factions, independent of the leading party bodies, but speaking in the name of the Armenian Communist Party, is not permitted.

Parties groups (factions of communists) cooperate with the corresponding party committees, receive aid and support from them, and take their decisions and recommendations into account.

For current work, the party groups (factions) may elect a bureau or a chairman.

30. The party cooperates with social forces which support the positions of democracy and social justice. It structures its relations with trade unions and other public organizations and movements on the basis of political interaction and cooperation and of respect for the views of others.

At the congresses and conferences convened by public organizations, party groups (factions) may be created.

31. Party bodies and the primary party organizations cooperate with the Komsomol and other progressive youth organizations in work with young people. The interrelations of party and youth organizations are structured on principles of political partnership, ideological community and recognition of their organizational independence, and mutual respect and trust.

32. The primary party organizations and party committees may recommend communists and nonparty members for specific state, economic or public work. In operating through political methods, they contribute to their election or appointment to the corresponding positions, offer them support, hear the reports of communists, and publicize the conclusions and recommendations made in this regard.

Monetary Resources and Property of the Armenian Communist Party

33. The activity of the Armenian CP and its organizations is provided with financial and material and technical resources at the expense of party incomes.

The monetary resources of the Armenian CP are formed from the party membership dues, incomes from publishing and production-economic activity, voluntary contributions from communists and individual citizens, and other receipts, not contradicting existing legislation.
The monthly membership dues for party members are established proceeding from a member's basic salary in the following amounts:

With Incomes of:
Up to 70 rubles, 10 kopeks
71-100 rubles, 20 kopeks
101-150 rubles, 30 kopeks
151-200 rubles, 1 percent
Over 250 rubles, 2 percent

Working communist pensioners pay party membership dues only out of their salaries.

On joining the party, an entry fee is exacted in the amount of 2 percent of one's basic salary.

34. The budget of the Armenian CP, its structure, the amounts of deductions to it from the incomes of local party organizations and of subsidies for them, and reports on the fulfillment of the party budget are approved by the plenum of the party Central Committee and is reported for the information of communists.

Funds for maintaining the Armenian CP Control Commission are determined at joint plena of the corresponding party committees and control commissions.

All party organizations are independent in the disposal of their budgets, in the resolution of structural, staff and production-economic problems, and in the creation, reorganization and elimination of periodical publications. The budgets and reports on their fulfillment are approved at plena of the party committees. The economic activity of party committees, not acting in contradiction to the interests of political work, are encouraged.

35. The property of the Armenian CP is party-wide property, and the objects of the ownership rights of the Armenian CP are buildings, installations, equipment, inventory and property for cultural-educational and sanitary purposes, monetary funds, enterprises, party publishing houses including their periodical publications and typographic equipment, as well as other property necessary for the party's activities.

The party committees carry out the practical management (possession, use, disposal) of the property of the party organizations. The Armenian CP Central Committee, local party organizations, and enterprises, institutions and organizations of the Armenian CP enjoy the rights of a legal entity and may delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions. The primary party organizations may enjoy the rights of a legal entity in accordance with the existing legislation.

Forty percent of funds from the sum of membership dues received is used for the financing of the activity of the primary party organizations.

For resolving the problems of financing the activity of party organizations and for the distribution and redistribution of monetary resources, financial commissions are created in raykoms, gorkoms and in party committees which have the rights of raykoms, with the participation of the secretaries of the primary party organizations.

The local party committees and control commissions annually inform communists about the status of the party budget and the expenditure of resources.

Appendix

On the basis of the statutes of the Armenian CP, the following normative and methodological documents are being drafted and approved at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Control Commission of the Armenian CP:

Instructions on the procedure for elections to the Armenian Communist Party and for recall from the staff of elected bodies;

Instructions on the registration of members of the Armenian CP and on party statistics;

Instructions on the procedure for the creation and work of the primary party organizations according to place of residence;

Instructions on the procedure for accepting citizens of the foreign diaspora into the Armenian Communist Party;

Instructions on record-keeping in party organizations and committees;

Instructions on the registration of party membership dues and financial and economic activity of party organizations;

A resolution on the conduct of referendums and discussions within the party.

Georgia's Round Table Bloc Issues Political, Economic Programs

91US0116A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 23 Oct 90 pp 2-3

["'Political and Economic Platform of 'Round Table—Free Georgia' Election Bloc'""]

[Text] I. Political Section

General Principles

The development of civilization has entered a phase in which the leading countries are trying to solve common human problems together. World processes have sped up so much that the failure to resolve these conflicts in the near future will increase the possibility of worldwide disaster considerably. Just recently, the main political problem was the confrontation between the Western free world and the Eastern totalitarian regimes. Progressive
world political thinking must be given credit for the elimination of this exceptionally intense global confrontation at a minimum cost. Now the processes of life in the West and the East are controlled to such an extent by economic factors that a new military confrontation would be almost impossible.

From the geopolitical standpoint, Georgia today is a faceless part of one of the already reconciled states, and this would make its struggle for the restoration of its own state structure exceptionally difficult if this struggle were to conflict with the rapprochement of these states. The rapprochement of the Western and Eastern political systems and the restoration of the Georgian state government are processes with positive and democratic features, and for this reason their fundamental incompatibility is impossible.

The Georgian radical and democratic opposition united in the Round Table political bloc in April 1990 for the purpose of restoring and maintaining Georgia's state independence, consolidating all of the Georgian people by means of peaceful political struggle, and arranging for constructive cooperation with all national forces through public dialogue. Today the members of the Round Table bloc are the following political organizations: the Helsinki Union of Georgia, the All-Georgian Society of St. Ilia the Just, the All-Georgian Merab Kostav Society, the Union of Georgian Traditionalists, the Georgian National Front—Radical Union, the National-Liberal Union of Georgia, and the Georgian National Christian Party. It also has individual members.

These political organizations, despite some differences in their views, have a single political strategy of national liberation struggle and a single platform, the basic premises of which are being published at this time.

Because of the 70 years of criminal and anti-national policy conducted by communist authorities appointed by the Kremlin, Georgia, with its centuries-old government traditions, is facing spiritual-moral, political, socioeconomic, demographic, and ecological disaster today, and the main reason is the fact that its independent state was obliterated by the occupation and effective annexation of Georgia by Soviet Russia in 1921.

In spite of the announced "perestroika" and "democratization" in the USSR, the political and civil rights of the Georgian population are still being violated, there is discrimination against the Georgians on their own land, and the integrity of Georgia is in jeopardy, even though Georgia already lost almost a third of the territories recognized by the League of Nations after its forcible Sovietization in 1921. Georgia has no state borders, and it has no regime or military units to protect its national interests; the country's treasury is being squandered without any restrictions, its natural resources are being plundered, nature and cultural monuments in Georgia are being destroyed barbarously, and the Georgian church is in danger.

All of the material losses are incomparable to the huge losses the Georgian people and the entire population of Georgia suffered as a result of genocide and terror in the last 70 years. The deliberate annihilation of the best segment of the nationality occurred in 1921-1924, in 1937, in 1950-1951, in 1956, and finally in 1989. Besides this, mass injustice, harassment, arrests, persecution, and other practices contrary to all legal standards occurred on a yearly or daily basis virtually throughout this period. If we add the almost 400,000 people who died in World War II, we realize how great a crime the predatory forces committed against Georgia. It is clear that the impending disintegration of the Soviet empire forced the officials in the Kremlin to change their tactics. The preservation of the empire with the aid of terror and repression was becoming impossible, and for this reason they worked out a plan to keep the conquered peoples and territories in a new, confederated state structure, the basis of which was to be a new, allegedly just union treaty. This is posing a serious threat to the future of our motherland and the national liberation movement of Georgia.

To achieve this goal, the Kremlin has resorted to various forms of struggle against national liberation movements. In addition to its new constitutional-legal leverage and an economic blockade, it has employed a variety of destructive measures: Whereas it arranged for the organization of legal "international fronts" with the aid of the nonnative population in the Baltic countries, in Georgia it managed to form a legal "international front" with the aid of Georgians who were still in the service of the Kremlin.

The assertion that all of the leaders of the national liberation movements were chauvinists and that they were against democracy and were trying to incite ethnic conflicts was an attempt to disorient world public opinion. All of this is part of a plan the center worked out long ago to suppress and stop national liberation processes. Its aim is the stepped-up demographic assimilation of non-Russian nationalities.

The political organizations of the Round Table bloc see only one way out of the present state of crisis in Georgia: the restoration of the independent Georgian state by means of peaceful political struggle, entailing the formation of a national parliament and the drafting of a national constitution and national laws.

Some people feel that the captive nationalities making up the Soviet empire have two main ways of restoring an independent state today: 1. National and civil disobedience, and 2. The organization of democratic elections, if possible, by means of political and legal struggle against the existing totalitarian regime, the election of a provisional regime to protect national interests, and the creation of a legal mechanism for the restoration of an independent state government.

Recent events and experience demonstrated that these two methods cannot exist separately and that only their
combination and intelligent coordination can make state independence possible. In recent years the opposition has managed to surmount the totalitarian regime's resistance in the resolution of our nationality's urgent problems only with the aid of mass protest demonstrations. The passage of the comparatively democratic law on elections and the scheduling of multiparty elections were made possible only by the concerted efforts of the opposition and the people.

Therefore, civil disobedience and parliamentary struggle are two sides of the one and only strategy we should employ in restoring Georgia's state independence.

The legal instrument of Georgian independence, announced by the constituent assembly of the National Council of the Democratic Republic of Georgia on 26 May 1918 and 12 March 1919, is still in force, has never lost its legal validity, and now also represents the legal basis for the restoration of the independent Georgian state, because the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia did not sign a surrender, and neither the government nor the constitution of the republic was ever abolished legally. Therefore, independent Georgia still exists today, and its constitution was only temporarily suspended by the legal government in 1921.

The Helsinki accord was concluded in 1975 and was signed by the Soviet Union. The final act of the accord recognized the inviolability and indestructibility of state borders and the immutability of the sovereignty of nations and their right to decide their own future. The same document stipulated the possibility of the revision of state borders by means of peaceful negotiation, a vivid example of which is provided by the unification of Germany and the scheduling of the clarification of European borders as the main topic of discussion at the Helsinki-II conference planned for the end of this year.

In contrast to the countries of the communist camp in Eastern Europe, effectively annexed Georgia has neither national nor state sovereignty today. In connection with this, we should draw a distinction between occupation and annexation. A country can be occupied without being annexed. If the Soviet state structures are dismantled in Georgia, it will not be subordinate to the center, all of the attributes of the effective annexation will disappear, and the presence of another country's troops on our territory alone cannot be viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to state independence. The tendency to ignore this elementary fact has given rise to pessimistic and incompetent statements about the impossibility of achieving state independence when occupation troops are present or about the need to consent to the kind of state structure that cannot go beyond a confederation.

In line with this, the Georgian Supreme Soviet representing the national interest during the transition period must be guided by common human values, universally accepted standards of international law, and Georgian national traditions when it makes its decisions. In view of all this, we feel that political and legal acts based on the following fundamental principles should be adopted and implemented during the transition period.

1. Georgian Supreme Soviet

The Georgian Supreme Soviet should be the highest legislative body, elected on the multiparty principle by a general, democratic, direct, and secret ballot, and its jurisdiction should extend throughout the territory of the present-day Georgian SSR. Some people feel that the Georgian Supreme Soviet, in spite of the comparatively democratic manner of its election and its multiparty composition, is nevertheless an organ of Soviet power and cannot be the only representative of the people's interests and secure the restoration of Georgia's complete state sovereignty. We feel that this opinion is absolutely mistaken for the following reasons:

a) The RSFSR's armed aggression against Georgia, the occupation of Georgia, and its effective annexation by means of its forcible inclusion in the USSR were declared illegal by the session of the present Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet in the decrees of 9 March and 20 June 1990. All of the "legal" documents connected with this were also declared invalid. In this way, the Georgian Supreme Soviet—the highest Soviet legislative body—effectively declared the Soviet regime in Georgia illegal;

b) The new Georgian Supreme Soviet will be elected on the basis of the comparatively democratic law regarding the multiparty principle. The registration of the political parties and organizations taking part in the election was not conducted by an existing Soviet government agency, but by the Central Election Commission formed in line with the parity principle;

c) In accordance with the law on elections, the newly elected Supreme Soviet will be the "Georgian Supreme Soviet," and not the "Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet," which signifies, of course, not only a change of name, but also a move toward the dismantling of the socialist system and Soviet structures in general;

d) The terms of the campaign registration of political parties are inconsistent with the constitutions of the Georgian SSR and USSR. The election law stipulates only that political parties must observe universally recognized standards of international law, and this alone releases the Supreme Soviet, elected in accordance with this law, from any commitment whatsoever to Soviet legislation;

e) The highest legislative body in the country, formed by means of general democratic elections, will be authorized to replace any earlier law in the country with a view to state interests, common human values, and universally recognized standards of international law and to temporarily suspend or completely abolish existing constitutions.
All of this constitutes the legal basis allowing us to ignore Soviet structures and the Soviet constitution and legislation in the coming elections and afterward. The new Supreme Soviet should legalize what has already been achieved and then take further steps toward the complete reorganization of the existing political system, which will require the passage of the following legal instruments:

1. A declaration of the Georgian Supreme Soviet's jurisdiction;

2. A declaration stipulating that the Soviet regime in Georgia is illegal and that the constitutions of the USSR and Georgian SSR will no longer be in force throughout Georgian territory.

The Georgian Supreme Soviet will have to surmount colossal obstacles on the road to the restoration of state independence. For this reason, the Georgian Supreme Soviet, as the only body expressing the wishes of the nation during the transition period, should combine its supreme legislative function with at least the status of the legal institution in charge of national and civil disobedience in relation to the outside force.

2. Transition Period

With a view to existing political realities, the achievement of Georgia's complete state independence would be unthinkable today without a preparatory transition period. It is precisely during the transition period that the legal, political, and economic foundations of the Georgian independent state should be laid. The transition period will begin after the Georgian people and the entire population of Georgia are fully aware of the absolute need for the restoration of state independence, and after the legal mechanism incorporating Georgia in another state ceases to exist. For this reason, we can confidently say that the transition period has actually already begun in Georgia, and that its further development, in our opinion, will require the newly elected Supreme Soviet to adopt and implement the following legislative acts without delay:

1. A declaration changing the name of the Georgian SSR and the state symbols and announcing the transition period;

2. A decree on the drafting of a basic law for the transition period, based on the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which was temporarily suspended in 1921;

3. A decree acknowledging the invalidity of the union treaty concluded by illegal officials in Georgia after 16 February 1921.

3. Georgia's Territorial Integrity and Its Defense and Protection

After the annexation in 1921, in addition to its territorial losses, Georgia suffered considerable damage as a result of the ruthless exploitation of its minerals and natural resources. Millions of tons of manganese, nonferrous metals, marble, and others were taken out of Georgia. All of this inflicted irreparable damage on nature, and Georgia suffered huge financial losses, which occurred because Georgia's territory was effectively undefended and because its state borders existed only on paper.

There is no question that the new Supreme Soviet should decide the matter of the nationalization and reliable protection of Georgia's territory and its natural resources. A special commission should be formed to establish Georgia's state borders and protect its territorial integrity.

With a view to this, the Supreme Soviet of the transition period should pass the following laws without delay:

1. A law declaring that Georgia's land, air space, water resources, continental shelf, and minerals are national property;

2. A law on Georgia's land, maritime, and air borders;

3. A law on the customs service;

4. A law on transit traffic;

5. A law on national military units;

6. A law assigning units of the Soviet Army in Georgia the status of armed forces of a foreign country;

7. A law on national security service.

We feel it is essential that the newly elected Supreme Soviet begin talks with the RSFSR Supreme Soviet without delay on the acknowledgement of the flagrant violation of the Russian-Georgian treaty of 7 May 1920 and the occupation and effective annexation Soviet Russia perpetrated in February 1921. Talks should be conducted simultaneously with the USSR and other states on the recognition of Georgia as an annexed state.

Because the state independence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia was annulled illegally, its constitution was only suspended temporarily by the legal government on 16 March 1921, the legal government of Georgia did not sign a surrender, and because there is no legal basis for Georgia's inclusion in the USSR, during the transition period we will regard Georgia as an annexed state which should restore its state independence.

The newly elected Supreme Soviet should look into the possibility of restoring Georgian representations in various countries, because these will promote more active Georgian international relations and will confirm the legal status of its state government. These representations will secure Georgia's foreign diplomatic relations with these countries after state independence has been restored.
4. Defense of Human Rights and Civic Tolerance

The history of Georgia clearly indicates that the Georgian phenomenon was always distinguished by ethnic and religious tolerance. People of different nationalities, political views, and religious beliefs lived side by side in Georgia for centuries without any ethnic or religious conflicts.

The newly elected Supreme Soviet, as the body expressing the will of the Georgian people, will naturally be guided in its actions by these ancient traditions after laying the legal foundations for the rectification of the exceptionally aggravated political, ethnic, and religious interrelations of the period of communist totalitarianism. Concrete and effective measures to establish political, religious, and civic tolerance and defend the legal guarantees of citizens should be taken in the Georgia of the transition period on the basis of the universal declaration of human rights of the United Nations and the final acts of the Helsinki and Vienna accords.

The equality of all citizens should be guaranteed in the Georgia of the transition period. In line with this, we feel that the following laws should be passed and enforced:

1. A law on the state status of the Georgian language;
2. A law on citizenship;
3. A law on the legal and political guarantees of citizens;
4. A law on the political legal guarantees of ethnic minorities;
5. A law on immigration;
6. A law on freedom of conscience;
7. A law on religious organizations;
8. A law on political parties;
9. A law on the mass media.

The Soviet way of life, which was exceptionally deformed for decades, established the kind of relationships in Georgia which made a lifestyle of honesty and integrity almost tantamount to heroism for most of the population. In view of this, we feel it is wrong to question the moral and legal responsibility of the people who were forced to make moral compromises under the totalitarian regime. Even crimes were frequently the result of the inhuman living conditions the totalitarian system created. For this reason, we believe that the newly elected Supreme Soviet should consider announcing a sweeping amnesty, abolishing the death penalty, and declaring universal ethnic conciliation and tolerance.

5. Union Treaty

With a view to the common standards of international law, we feel that a just union treaty can be concluded only between independent states with equal rights. For this reason, until Georgia is recognized as a subject of international law, it would be wrong to even consider a state union treaty with any country, including the USSR, but this does not exclude the possibility of reaching various governmental economic and cultural agreements for specific terms during the transition period. We feel that the conclusion of any kind of state union treaty is the prerogative of the Georgian national parliament, which will be elected immediately following the end of the transition period.

6. Dismantling of Soviet Empire's Government Structures and Creation of New Democratic Structures

The centralization of the Soviet empire's structures and authoritarian system of administration caused the effective collapse of all elements of the state structures in Georgia, and this then gave rise to the shadow economy mechanism: The mafia took over, corruption grew to catastrophic dimensions, and professionalism declined dramatically—labor became ineffective. Georgia was actually facing economic, sociopolitical, and cultural disaster.

Under present conditions, Georgia's cultural heritage is actually not being protected at all, and the system for the preservation of monuments and museum management need radical improvement. For this reason, the laws regulating public relations in the sphere of culture in general and the protection of monuments in particular and state and public practices have to be changed.

To rectify this situation, we feel it will be necessary to gradually dismantle the existing state system and its structures and create new democratic structures in their place.

The Georgian Supreme Soviet should take the following steps in this direction:

1. The de-ideologizing of all spheres of public life;
2. The complete separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches;
3. The reform of the judicial system;
4. A law on the administrative-territorial structure of Georgia;
5. A law on forms of local self-government (by means of municipal elections);
6. A decree on the establishment of the structures of the executive branch;
7. A decree on the establishment of a national police force;
8. The reform of the educational system;
How can the Supreme Soviet lead the struggle for the restoration of Georgia’s independence during the transition period without coming into conflict with global political processes?

The crisis in the Middle East is the main issue in world politics today. The dictatorships supporting militant Islamic fundamentalism have set themselves against the comparatively democratic Arab countries and the states of the free world. The Soviet Union, which fed Iraq (with ideology and with weapons) and raised it to become an exceptionally dangerous aggressor, unhesitatingly took the side of the democratic countries for political reasons. Apparently, the Soviet Union is trying to begin the genuine (?) implementation of the principle it declared—the principle of the supremacy of common human values. The seeming inertia of the USSR (the continued presence of Soviet military instructors in Iraq to this day and the refusal to send Soviet armed forces to the crisis zone) is the result of diplomatic flexibility. The only country capable of playing the decisive role in settling the crisis peacefully is the Soviet Union, and this is certain to enhance its already unprecedented popularity.

Now that communist socialism has finally and completely collapsed and antiracist processes are taking place in the Republic of South Africa, it is clear that the final resolution (rather than a temporary settlement) of qualitatively new but eternal problems in world politics cannot be accomplished only with the classic political methods. It will be impossible to achieve world peace without a philosophical, religious, and legal world consensus. These matters transcend the boundaries of classic politics, and the main role in their resolution should be played by the three great authorities of the human race—religion, art, and science.

With a view to this, Georgia and its newly elected Supreme Soviet, as the only official body expressing the real wishes of the people, should be guided precisely by common human values. These values, in turn, can rest only on the principles of the highest truth—religion; art should establish the general atmosphere needed for the reciprocal exchange of these values, and they should be reinforced in people’s minds by common human scientific achievements.

It is precisely to the category of common human values that the Georgian people’s chief goal belongs—the establishment of Georgia as an independent national state, and the affirmation of freedom, universal prosperity, and justice in our homeland, which, of course, cannot be accomplished locally in a single country. Universal freedom and justice must be established on the earth with God’s help and through the concerted efforts of all mankind.

If Georgia, the Georgian people, and their newly elected national Supreme Soviet do not go against the principles of common human values (?) in their struggle for freedom, even in the event of extreme opposition to the center, their actions will be justified by international law and public opinion during the period of general civil disobedience declared by the Supreme Soviet itself. Only in this way can existing international realities and the constantly growing democratic forces in Russia itself prevent the use of anachronistic methods of terror and repression. The supremacy of the law, which can only be enforced in a country by an authority with a mandate of public trust, should be based precisely on the principles of common human values. The supremacy of the law will be essential for the creation of stable conditions and a rule-of-law state in Georgia. In the rule-of-law state, stability is a guarantee of thorough development and universal prosperity.

In the near future, mankind will enter a qualitatively new era in the form of a harmonious community of free nations. They should include the Georgian people, with a completely independent state of their own. Georgia’s initial steps in this direction, and probably its more difficult steps in the future, should be made during the term of the supreme legislative body elected on 28 October.

May the Lord watch over all of Georgia!

II. Economic Section

General Principles

Control over Georgia’s natural resources and its strategic location constituted the main goal of the rivalry between imperial states. In spite of endless invasions and wars, the Georgian economy remained viable at all times because of the strong individualism of the Georgian people, their ability to adapt to unfavorable conditions, and the country’s rich natural resources, and the history of Georgia’s advancement testifies that it can be a highly developed independent state.

The present structure of the Georgian economy is the result of the strategy of development Soviet Russia imposed on Georgia, as a result of which it effectively lost the right of the sovereign choice of its own economic development strategy.

After Georgia was turned into a source of raw materials and a sales market for the empire, it was isolated from international economic processes. Imperial interests absorbed Georgia’s rich natural, labor, and financial resources. The system and methods of economic management based on the Georgian ethnic mindset were consigned to oblivion. The 200-year yoke, the alien economic system imposed on the Georgians, their alienation from the land and other means of production, the state monopolistic ownership of the Soviet period and, consequently, the production relations that were inconsistent with Georgian traditions put the Georgian economy in an extremely difficult position, and in most cases the Georgian ceased to be a producer and creator and became a consumer and money-grubber when he was forced to forget the labor ethic that was part of his genetic code and when labor was confined in an ideological framework that made it loathsome to him. In view of all this, the key to a viable Georgian economy consists in ridding the Georgian of the alien, imposed economic system.
The tremendous potential of Georgia’s favorable geopolitical location, its natural and climatic conditions, and the capabilities of the Georgian laborer will guarantee the restoration of our economy. The acknowledgement of all this and the search for ways of freeing the Georgian businessman represent the basic guidelines of our economic policy. Only an economy based on free enterprise can break the imperial economic circle and include Georgia directly in international economic processes while laying a solid foundation for a strong government and the fulfillment of Georgia’s spiritual mission and allowing it to enter and become part of the family of civilized nations with dignity.

The Georgian’s talent for business was displayed under capitalist conditions as well, because it was precisely totalitarianism that caused the shadow economy in Georgia to take such distorted forms and inflict damages on broad segments of the population. A healthy economic system, based on private ownership of the means of production by the citizens of Georgia, will direct this energy into pursuits for the good of all population strata, universal prosperity and abundance, and a fortuitous future for Georgia. We feel that this is the only realistic way of breaking the vicious circle of the Soviet economy and of directing our country into the channel of natural economic development.

The government of Georgia should request the USSR for compensation for its many years of robbery and its consistent policy of ruining our economy and raw material base; furthermore, on the basis of international legal documents, particularly those pertaining to restitution and reparations, it should declare all of the enterprises and establishments of union jurisdiction on Georgian territory the state property of Georgia and begin negotiations between the government of the Georgia and the USSR on strategic military installations.

The submission of these economic matters to parliament for discussion to safeguard Georgia’s future is our main objective.

Guidelines of Georgian Economic Policy for the Transition Period

Georgia’s political sovereignty is an essential condition for the restoration of its economy. The set of measures aimed at the economic recovery of Georgia should express the common wishes of free citizens. It should constitute the basis for the physical and spiritual freedom of the individual, guaranteed by the recognition of the inviolability of private property, the freedom of business and commercial activity, and the right to choose business partners autonomously and associate with them for the conduct of economic operations.

The primacy of private property does not exclude the possibility of state property ownership. State ownership will be maintained in the Georgian branches and regions with unfavorable economic conditions, but the owner will not be the state in general, but the government of Georgia specifically, which will be responsible to the people for the effective completion of the measures they prescribe. The economic policy of Georgia should envisage a set of sweeping measures for the protection and capable use of all national wealth. Unlimited incentives for personal initiative and the appropriation of the results of personal labor will be the most important conditions of economic recovery. During the process of the creation and establishment of an economy based on market principles, specific measures should be planned for the regulation of the privatization and denationalization of existing state property as an affirmation of free enterprise and private ownership.

The denationalization of state property should be carried out gradually and sequentially so that the state will eventually own only the enterprises whose functioning as private enterprises will be unwarrantable.

The establishment of private ownership will create excellent conditions for the integration of the national economy into the world economy. We will incorporate the specific types of economic forms and methods that will allow us to rid ourselves of the union national economic complex and make preparations to enter the world market and establish partnerships with the industrially developed countries.

Under the conditions of free enterprise and the priority of private ownership in Georgia, the national economy should be based on a fundamentally new sectorial and regional structure of economic management. Priority should be assigned to high technology branches and to ecologically clean technology and production.

In the market economy, economic decisions are made on the basis of the relationship of supply to demand. Private ownership of the means of production, financial markets, and labor exchanges are characteristic of the free economic system. These are the basic ingredients of the market economy, and Georgia must concentrate on developing them first. After these elements begin working, the people will decide, through their elected representatives and on the basis of the experience of Georgia and other countries and peoples, how philanthropic a state they want to have in the future and whether they are willing to pay higher taxes for this.

1. Foreign economic ties. Georgia’s emergence from its isolated economic position, its gradual inclusion in international integration, and its achievement of favorable relations with allies and international partners (including the USSR) will necessitate the commencement of talks without delay with international intergovernmental and European and other regional organizations (the IMF, the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], the European Fund for Agricultural Development and Security, the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation, and others). Only close consultation
and financial ties with them will make the attraction of the necessary resources from the international credit market for the financing of development programs possible (programs for the stabilization of the economy and the structural adaptation and renovation of the infrastructure).

In addition to negotiating with international organizations, we must begin cooperating with various private organizations for the purpose of establishing joint enterprises, firms, and banks. Their right to operate should be defined by Georgian law accordingly.

Parliament should perform the appropriate legislative work for the attainment of these goals. A standing parliamentary commission should be formed to plan strategy in this sphere and monitor its implementation, as well as a parliamentary commission on reparations and restitution.

Parliament should simultaneously arrange for the transfer of the appropriate portion of foreign currency reserves and precious metals from the USSR State Bank to the Georgian Bank.

Part of Georgia's foreign currency receipts should immediately be deposited in a special account in a foreign bank so that these resources will provide the country and its central bank with the minimum initial foreign currency reserve when it gains its independence. A program should be drawn up for the incorporation of new technology, capital, and managerial marketing techniques in the country. To this end, foreign experts will have to be invited to Georgia, and a large group of national personnel will have to be sent to the leading foreign countries.

To guarantee the country's economic security and protect its interests, priorities will have to be set in relation to certain states with the aid of customs tariffs—protectionist measures should be taken; bilateral or multilateral transactions should be employed (clearing and barter transactions, etc.). A Georgian investment code should be compiled in close contact with international organizations and Georgians living abroad so that the world will be aware of investment opportunities in the country.

Furthermore, Georgia should not only use foreign investments but should also engage in vigorous investment activity.

The only guarantee of the resolution of these and other foreign economic problems in the transition period is political stability, which will require strong political leadership and national unity.

2. Wages and social guarantees. Judging by the strategic goals of sovereign Georgia, the employment of Georgian citizens should be the primary concern of its officials. The consistent pursuit of the economic and social policy of the Georgian government should improve the living conditions of citizens and eliminate the beggary that exists now.

The Georgian government will concern itself with the exercise of republic citizens' right to work, regardless of nationality, race, gender, religion, age, social origins, and political views.

The actual pursuit of the policy of employment within the territory of Georgia and the provision of citizens with the appropriate guarantees during the transition period will necessitate the establishment of a state labor exchange for the employment of the population of Georgia. Its main duties will include conducting manpower demand and supply research, keeping records of job vacancies and of citizens needing jobs, placing citizens in the appropriate jobs, registering the unemployed, keeping records of them, paying them monetary compensation, and others.

Wages in Georgia should be paid with a view to the quantity of goods produced and the final results, without any limits on the maximum wage. With a view to the minimum subsistence level, the Georgian government should set a minimum wage for each region, and the observance of this minimum wage should be compulsory for all enterprises, establishments, and organizations, regardless of forms of ownership.

Republic and regional social programs must be drawn up and carried out to improve the living conditions of the population. On the basis of these, each citizen of the republic will be guaranteed a free minimum education, health care, and other cultural and consumer services.

3. Price policy. In the event of an increase in consumer prices, the state should establish a permanent mechanism for the indexing of public monetary income as a reliable guarantee of the maintenance of public purchasing power. From this standpoint, during the transition period and the first phase of the establishment of the market economy, the state should continue regulating the prices of basic products of decisive significance—vital necessities, public utilities, and public transportation.

In the market economy of the transition period, as consumer market regulation and shortages are eliminated, state prices or price controls should be maintained on the goods and services which display a clear tendency toward price increases or market monopolization under these specific conditions.

The regulating role of the state in this area will take the following forms: first, the centralized establishment of state prices and limits on price changes for a strictly defined assortment, approved by the republic parliament, of goods and services of vital importance to the population; second, state influence on price levels and dynamics by economic methods: state regulation by means of effective tax, credit, and customs policies, deliveries of goods to the market, etc.
The flexible regulation of the prices of the main goods and services of vital importance with a view to the interests of producers and consumers will limit the inflationary rise of prices and secure the reliable social protection of the population, particularly low-income strata.

The pricing process should play an active role in the restoration and growth of agriculture, especially its traditional branches. This will necessitate the extensive use of price controls in modern forms and methods which have proved effective in the highly developed countries for the protection of the interests of agricultural producers.

Under the conditions of the radical expansion of Georgia's economic relations with foreign countries, the protection of the domestic market will be extremely important. In addition to a carefully planned and flexible customs policy, pricing policy will also play an important role. It must secure the heightened effectiveness of foreign trade and create optimal conditions for the development of the domestic market in accordance with national interests.

During the period of the establishment of Georgia's state sovereignty and market economy, pricing policy will be a policy effectively reflecting the transition period, and its main purpose will be to usher the republic economy into a qualitatively new state of being as painlessly as possible and with minimum financial and moral-psychological injury.

After the transition period is over—i.e., under the conditions of complete state sovereignty and a developed market economy, the pricing mechanism will depend primarily on the laws of the market, and this means that the mechanism of free pricing will be operating, the sphere of administrative price regulation will contract, and the prices of most goods and services will change under the influence of supply and demand.

Free pricing will make a maximum contribution to the extensive development of the initiative of producers and the encouragement of free competition, which will become the primary economic basis for the dynamic renewal of the product assortment and improvement of product quality.

The effective functioning of independent Georgia's economic mechanism will necessitate the organization of capital and labor exchanges in the service and securities market. Price reform can only solve temporary problems, such as the correction of disparities, while major price problems can be solved only by a competitive market.

4. Tax system. The system of taxation will occupy a prominent place in Georgian economic policy.

Taxes will be paid by all enterprises and establishments operating on the territory of Georgia and all citizens with an income. Certain parties can claim tax exemptions on the basis of international agreements and Georgian laws.

The objects of taxation should be the profits, monetary and natural income, property, which for some categories of taxpayers will be found in their own homes and on their farms or will consist of the land they own, the natural and labor resources used by the taxpayer, and other objects of taxation established by law. The profit tax will be paid by enterprises, irrespective of forms of ownership, on the profits derived from their economic activity. The taxation of profits should not only generate financial resources for the budget, but also solve the problem of economic regulation. A system of tax credits should provide incentives for specific areas of activity in line with state interests. These credits should be instrumental in curbing inflationary processes and stopping the uncontrollable rise of prices. The system of credits will be established by the Georgian Supreme Soviet, and in some cases the right to extend additional privileges should be granted to the Georgian administration (in relation to the portion earmarked for the Georgian state budget) and local government agencies (in relation to the funds to be deposited in their budgets).

In addition to the profit tax, there should be a tax on added value and an excise tax. The tax on added value will be levied on the difference between the earnings from the sale of products and the cost of goods purchased from suppliers. A developed system of excise taxes, on the other hand, will first necessitate the determination of the group of items offering expedient opportunities to tax the consumer—for example, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, etc. Excise taxes can be set in monetary units corresponding to the physical quantity of the item and in percentages of taxable turnover.

An income tax will be levied on the income of the population. In order to secure the genuine protection of Georgian citizens, we should not tax the income of large low-income families, low-income individuals, university students, the disabled, and others. Citizens should pay an income tax based on the declaration of their income for the year.

Inheritance (or gift) taxes will be paid on property inherited (or gifts received) by legal and private persons. A property tax should be paid by legal and physical persons owning land, and the rates of taxation should be differentiated depending on whether the land is used for agriculture or other purposes. The rates should be differentiated depending on the location and fertility of the land.

A state tax will be paid at set rates by legal and private persons for legal deeds and documents issued to enterprises, organizations, and individual citizens.

Vehicle taxes will be paid by legal and private persons, and the rates for vehicle owners will depend on engine power or tonnage.
A pollution tax will be paid by legal or private persons polluting the environment, and the amount of the tax will depend on the degree, amount, nature, and duration of the pollution and the zone affected.

A transit tax will be paid by legal and physical persons for the transport of freight or passengers through the territory of Georgia. Duties will be paid by legal and physical persons on export-import operations.

An income tax for foreign legal and physical persons will be paid by foreign companies, firms, cooperatives, enterprises, and other organizations and establishments, as well as physical persons conducting business within Georgian territory either directly or through an existing representative agency in Georgia.

A tax on natural resources will be paid by the legal and physical persons using them. The tax will be paid for the extraction and use of natural resources, metallic ores, and non-metallic minerals.

A resort tax will be paid by physical persons taking up temporary residence in the republic's health resorts for medical treatment or vacations.

The income from charitable undertakings will not be taxed.

The church will be exempt from the income tax.

All of the taxes collected within the territory of Georgia should be entered into the Georgian budget. The Georgian Supreme Soviet will be in charge of the distribution of tax revenues among republic and local budgets. The organ of self-government in a city (or rayon) will be in charge of the distribution of tax revenues among the city (or rayon) budget and local budgets.

5. Banking system and finance-credit operations. The normal functioning of the Georgian economy will necessitate a banking system on two levels, subordinate only to its highest officials, and headed by a central national bank. The first level will consist of commercial banks, with a general assembly of founder-shareholders serving as its highest directive or legislative body. Their capital will be generated by the main financial basis of the existence of commercial banks—charter capital.

With a view to the extremely difficult financial position of our economy, priority will be assigned in the first phase of the commercialization of the banking system during the transition period to the establishment of state commercial banks with charter capital commensurate with their functions and consisting primarily of the funds of state or local budgets, because commercial banks established by shareholders will be unable to serve enterprises and organizations that are on the verge of financial bankruptcy or are virtually bankrupt already. The number of these is extremely high today, but the functioning of many of them is essential.

For the pursuit of the economic policy of independent Georgia, the national bank will have the status of a central bank performing the most important functions. In addition to the abovementioned coordination and oversight of the activities of commercial and cooperative banks, these will include the pursuit of a unified republic policy on the circulation of money, crediting, financing, payments, and foreign currency transactions, the centralized management of the monetary system, the reinforcement of monetary circulation and the purchasing power of Georgian money, the determination of the rate of exchange for monetary units of other countries, etc.

The Georgian Supreme Soviet will appoint the chairman of the board of the national bank and ratify the charter of the central bank.

In addition to forming a single banking system, it will be necessary to open branches and representative agencies of our banks, especially the central bank, in all of the countries with which mutually beneficial ties are established. It will also be expedient to establish joint banks, because this will allow us to use the credit lines of our partners in the interest of our national economy, and the guarantees they provide will simply the attraction of foreign capital and the sale of local products.

During the establishment of independent Georgia's own monetary system, it will be particularly important to institute a national monetary unit. National money should become a firm guarantee of Georgia's integration with the industrially developed countries. The Georgian economy, which will function on the basis of the principles of free enterprise, will open its doors to various economic partners, and the convertible currencies of many countries should be legal tender on Georgian territory. Under these conditions, we will need our own monetary unit, which will aid us in keeping records of our national product and establishing our balance of payments and trade. The institution of a national currency cannot be accomplished immediately. This will require a set of measures in independent Georgia to lay a strong foundation for a national currency.

Improvement of Sectoral Structure

The defense of Georgia's economic sovereignty and its continued reinforcement will require the dismantling of the colonial sectoral structure which was imposed on us, and the formation of a new structure in line with the national interest.

1. Industry. The restructuring of industry should be accomplished sequentially. In the first phase priority should be assigned to the development of industries in which raw material supplies depend primarily on Georgia's own excellent natural and climatic conditions, and to the development of branches with some experience in sending their products to the international market.

The planning of the optimal structure of the fuel and energy complex for Georgia will be of vital importance for the national economy. As a result of errors in the development of this complex, the republic's supply of energy resources is now quite unsatisfactory.
All of the fuel and energy resources in Georgia should be used extensively on its territory, and special importance should be assigned to the development of non-traditional branches of power engineering: solar, wind, and thermal energy. The proper use of hydraulic power resources will also be important. In addition, the energy of biogas should be placed at the service of the population. Optimal parameters should be set for each construction project in order to determine the guidelines of hydraulic power construction work with a view to energy, ecological, and socioeconomic requirements. The distinctive features of local conditions, our past history, and our national traditions must be borne in mind.

A final decision should be made on the place and role of small hydroelectric stations in our hydraulic power engineering. They could be extremely valuable, and there are excellent opportunities for their development in Georgia. The proper development of small-scale hydraulic power engineering will guarantee a local energy supply, above all in the case of regions high in the mountains and far from the center, and extensive electrification and will promote the economic and social development of these regions.

The economical and efficient use of fuel and energy resources should play an important role in the regular provision of the republic’s economy with these resources. This factor will have much greater influence under the new conditions of different forms of ownership and production relations in independent Georgia.

The machine-building complex will have a special role to play in the development of industry and agriculture. Proceeding from the distinctive features of Georgia, it should produce the kind of items that will promote the intensification of production and the optimal use of the existing strong agricultural base. Besides this, conditions should be established for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises in various branches of the economy, because they will have a significant role to play in foreign economic relations. This will be made possible by the establishment of the optimal intrasectoral structure in the machine-building complex itself, which should secure the heightened effectiveness of production in industry primarily by reducing resource requirements.

Conditions for the development of the metallurgical complex are comparatively limited in Georgia. For this reason, priority should be assigned to the reduction of metal requirements in the economy. Most of Georgia’s metal requirements will be covered by products brought in from abroad. Besides this, certain branches of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy should be developed quickly if there is a raw material base for them in the republic, and their products should be sold on the international market.

The construction materials industry should make a substantial contribution to the resolution of Georgia’s socioeconomic problems by promoting the industrialization of construction and supplying it with modern structural designs. In this branch of industry, ecological requirements dictate the functioning of mainly medium-sized and small enterprises. They should guarantee the correct use of the unique raw material base, broaden the scales of construction, and increase the country’s foreign currency resources.

One of the main branches of Georgian industry is the food industry, which will continue to play the leading role in the economy because of the country’s natural and climatic conditions and its traditions. Savory Georgian products of high quality, such as table and dessert wines, aperitifs, cognacs, champagnes, tea, canned fruit and vegetables, essential oils, mineral water, nonalcoholic beverages, and tobacco products, should be competitive in the international marketplace. Georgia should secure the maximum satisfaction of the population’s demand for food products. To this end, in addition to the development of branches of international specialization, branches of local significance should be a top priority, especially the meat and dairy industry, which would be completely possible in Georgia with the correct organization and stimulation of production.

The fish industry in Georgia, just as in all other maritime countries, should be one of the branches of specialization and should be developed rapidly.

One of the traditional branches of industry in Georgia is light industry, which should be given more attention in the future. As agriculture develops and quantities of silk cocoons, wool, hides, and other raw materials increase, there should be a substantial increase in the output of silk and woolen fabrics and leather goods, which are in high demand in the domestic and foreign markets. Priority should be assigned to the elevation of the technical standards of production in this branch of industry.

2. Agriculture. Intensification should be chosen as the means of developing agriculture. Its economic basis should consist of private production and direct ties between the associations the rural population chooses to establish in order to attach agriculture firmly to the market.

Traditional national forms of agriculture must be revived, with grain farming centers producing wheat and corn in eastern Georgia and corn and legumes in western Georgia; spring grain crops and potatoes should be raised in the alpine zone.

One of the main sources of the Georgian people’s financial well-being is viticulture, and its development should meet the demands made on a well-established viticultural country, which will necessitate the revival of multistrain cultivation. Besides this, viticulture for the production of table and dessert wines, champagnes, and cognacs should be developed with a view to world standards.

Priority should be assigned to industrial methods of fruit growing. To this end, highly intensive orchards should be
encouraged and the appropriate methods of farming should be introduced with a view to regional conditions.

Citrus growing will be developed in accordance with regional climatic and soil conditions and in line with current conditions in the domestic and foreign markets.

The development of tea growing should be based on its economic and social expediency. To this end, plantations will be maintained, with consideration for their quality and labor-intensive nature, and for demand in the domestic and foreign markets.

Vegetable and melon growing are also important, and recommendations should be issued to specialized peasant farms for their development.

Soviet methods of economic management turned animal husbandry into an unprofitable branch, thereby putting a heavy burden on the people. Its restoration and development will necessitate the improvement of livestock strains (with preference for local strains), the reinforcement of the fodder base, the augmentation of productivity, and the improvement of technology, organization, and zootechnical and veterinary services. Scientific recommendations on these matters should be issued by the corresponding research institutes.

3. Transportation. Motor transport plays the leading role in the republic’s transportation system and it will continue to do so in the near future.

Georgia has the geopolitical advantage of being a maritime country, and this gives it direct access to the world ocean and opportunities for active participation in international division of labor.

Maritime transport should become Georgian state property, and all interrelations without exception (financial relations, payment transactions, and others) should be conducted independently. The continued development of maritime transport will be important in republic economic growth and the augmentation of international economic ties. For this reason, we feel that its priority development will be essential.

Regrettably, the capacity of the railroad has been exhausted, and the state and level of its technical base are mediocre. Tracks, stations, switches, and other parts of the railroad need renovation.

The development of air transport and special types of transport (funicular railways, monorails, pneumatic systems, and others) should be assigned priority in independent Georgia. The creation of an air window for Georgia and the establishment of a Georgian air force will be of decisive importance.

4. Social infrastructure. During the phase of transition to the market economy, special attention should be paid to the development of economic branches serving the population directly—trade, public catering, consumer services, and others. The main objectives in this area are the growth of commodity stocks, the dramatic improvement of their quality in republic production, and the augmentation of imports. Per capita annual consumption of the main types of foods must be brought in line with standard physiological requirements, and commodity stocks must be balanced with the purchasing power of the population.

A proper balance between supply and demand will necessitate more precise studies and forecasts of the population’s needs.

The development of recreational and tourist facilities will be important in Georgia: on the one hand, to provide Georgian citizens with vacation sites and facilities for their physical recovery and, on the other, to attract foreign currency and lay the basis for cultural and commercial cooperation with the civilized world. Priority should be assigned to the establishment of a material and technical base for mass sports, which will restore the physical health of the Georgians and stimulate the development of professional sports.

The renovation and improvement of public health facilities will be extremely important.

The income of medical establishments will come from three sources: the health care funds of enterprises, establishments, and organizations, individual insurance funds, and the state budget. The development of insurance and preventive medical care should be assigned priority on this basis.

The development of the creative abilities of the individual should be raised to a qualitatively new level. We will need a single educational theory, covering all forms of education and all levels and sources, a long-range specialist training program, and new curricula for national schools. A flexible system of work with personnel should be developed, the training of specialists should focus on social needs, sources of information should be augmented systematically, and young people should be sent to study abroad regularly.

During the transition period the priority development of education in Georgia will necessitate a modern material and technical base and highly qualified national personnel.

4.[sic] Culture. The almost 200-year imperial yoke gave rise to countless numbers of exceptionally acute problems in our people’s spiritual culture. The spiritual factor is the primary and decisive factor of all existence and, consequently, the transmitter of the highest values.

The development of the national spiritual culture should be coordinated closely with socioeconomic and political changes. If state and private ownership will be possible in the economy, state subsidies and the commercial approach should be subject to the closest scrutiny. We
must be sensitive to the distinctive features of each sphere—the internal, autonomous features of its existence and development. Special importance will be assigned to faith, religion, and the church in the interrelations between official agencies and various spheres of culture. In particular, the observance of standards recognized by all civilized countries—the separation of national and spiritual authorities, noninterference in church affairs, and complete freedom of religion—must be combined intelligently with our obvious interest in restoring the church and the high ecclesiastical moral and intellectual standards.

Finally, the proper orientation of our culture, so that the Georgian people will be fully aware of themselves and their place in world culture, will be exceptionally important.

Georgian CP Plenum Names Secretariat, Buro
91P50072A

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian of 16 December 1990 carries on page 1 a 100 word report on a plenum held by the independent Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee on 15 December. The plenum was chaired by party first secretary Avtandil Margiani. The plenum elected Konstantin Kapanadze, Grigol Oniani, and German Patsatsiya to the Central Committee Secretariat. Andrey Apakidze, Shalva Aliyev, Van Buburt, Guram Gverditsiteli, Teymurz Giorgadze, Zurab Yerkvaniya, Demur Iseliani, Konstantin Kapanadze, Avtandil Margiani, Grigol Oniani, German Patsatsiya, Guram Kharatishvili, Tengiz Khakhva, Giorgii Chechelashvili, Fotiy Chitlov, and Omar Eloshvili were elected to the Central Committee Buro.
RSFSR Justice Minister Explains Press Law; Notes Shortcomings
91UN0408A Moscow TELEVIDENIYE I RADIOVESCHANIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 90

[Interview with RSFSR Minister of Justice I. V. Fedorov by TELEVIDENIYE I RADIOVESCHANIYE correspondent Yu. Petrovskiy under the rubric “The Ether and Society”: “The Individual, Freedom, and Responsibility Before the Law”]

[Text] A USSR law “On the Press and Other Mass Information Media” has been ratified. An akhase has been issued by the USSR President “On Democratization and Development of Television and Radio Broadcasting in the USSR.” Work has begun on a USSR law which will regulate the activities of TV and radio within the country. In a discussion with a correspondent of this journal, Nikolay Vasilievich Fedorov reflects on the interrelationships and interdependence of these and on their individual provisions. His views are those of a scholar (candidate of sciences), a people’s deputy (member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Legislation), and a statesman (RSFSR Minister of Justice). Additionally, these are the opinions of an undeniably brilliant man, one who has emerged into the political arena at a young age (he is now 32 years old, comes from a peasant family, is a graduate of Kazan University, taught at Chuvashskiy University, and is the father of two children).

[Correspondent] You have actively taken part in creating the law on the press—long and painstaking work. Why have the USSR Supreme Soviet, its committee on legislation, and you personally devoted so much time and attention to this?

[Fedorov] Your question is a difficult one, but in the end there is a simple answer: because this is very important. I am one of those who has supported the appearance of true popular power within the country and the organization of a professional system of administration instead of the former totalitarian, party one. And it is evident to me that, without the creation of an independent press, we will, in general, not be able to realize the policy of constructing a law-governed state and a separation of powers or to ensure that, finally, the rulers will begin to answer to their own people for those programs and experiments that they were all the time proposing and that they continue to propose. That is, viewing the press as in fact being a fourth or fifth independent branch of authority, I see specifically in this branch a powerful lever that makes it possible to enlist the attention of society, of the people, in order to make the most objective assessment possible of the proposals, programs, and political actions of the rulers. I am still a member of the party and I want once again to note that, up until now, including during and after completion of the 28th Party Congress, we have not managed to pose the question of the political responsibility of the CPSU, to assess as a whole the role and catastrophic consequences of its activities. It is necessary to talk about this and, in the future, to make such an assessment.

[Correspondent] To what extent does the law that has been passed respond to the goals which you have set in your work?

[Fedorov] Basically, the law does resolve all those political problems that it should have solved. I have in mind first of all the abolition of censorship, the activities of journalists within the framework of professional independence, the possibility of seeking legal recourse in any conflict situations, no matter against which subjects they arise—the Central committee, the Politburo, a founder, a publisher, a journalist, etc. And one more thing: Finally, individual Soviet citizens have been entrusted with the right to be founders of mass information media. In this way, we have moved closer to the provision of rights and freedoms to the specific individual, rather than to an enterprise, a collective, a communist or other labor brigade. That is, finally, in this law, priorities have been fixed and that which is most important has been singled out: the individual, his freedom, and his responsibility before the law—more than before anything else.

[Correspondent] In what ways are you dissatisfied in connection with this law?

[Fedorov] I repeat, basically, my assessment of it is positive. The only fundamental thing that I am not satisfied with is that, unexpectedly for all the members of the working group (I have in mind the deputies), somehow again unnoticed, because of somebody’s shadowy interference, a provision got through which gives the registering organ the right to halt the activities of a news medium. This, to some extent, violates the so-called registration concept: The registrant is a registrant; he should not have the power to give or not to give permission for any kind of activity, or to stop it. But nothing can be done—politics is politics. It is a shame that the opposing side does not have an aversion to nonparliamentary methods of struggle. However, I think that the Russian Federation will correct this shortcoming.

[Correspondent] Surely, a great deal depends upon who the registrants are? According to the press law, they are determined by the USSR Council of Ministers on the all-union level and by “appropriate executive and management organs” on the republic or local level. If one is talking about foreign practice, for example in the United States, the Federal Communications Commission, formed by Congress, is involved in this, along with other functions. Similar institutions exist in many countries...

[Fedorov] From the view point of pure theory and of a developed democratic system, the practice that exists there causes no objection—everything is normal and as it should be. But, as a preliminary step, we must rise to the level of American culture, at least in the fields of politics and justice. Because, what they have there, functioning very well, is, first, a professional, sufficiently democratic
process of selecting personnel for these regulatory structures, one that takes into consideration a diversity of political currents, and, second, a perfectly fine-tuned system for very professional processing by lawyers of the entire complex of problems from the start and, then, really independent legal protection, unlimited by any of the rights of the interested parties. Our law here provides a basis for judicial examination of all questions. Unfortunately, in the presidential ukase entitled "On Democratization and Development of Television and Radio Broadcasting," I see an attempt to restrict possibilities for judicial regulation of a large number of problems; levers are being preserved—to give or not give permission for the establishment of a broadcasting organ, even when this does not depend upon technical realities and, let us say, technical scope. That is, in essence, an attempt has been made to legalize and again give primacy to the discretion of a chief.

[Correspondent] Which of the basic provisions of the law on the press, in your view, should be reflected or further developed within the law on television and radio broadcasting?

[Fedorov] Those same principals established in the law on the press which are accepted in international practice and recognized as democratic achievements. I would very much hope that there are no deviations from them. Moreover, the law on the press directly demands this, although the presidential ukase ignores this norm. I would single out the right of individual citizens to be founders of their own publications, television, and radio. (It is another matter that they may not make use of this right, but I believe we are obligated to legalize it with regard to TV and radio, being guided specifically by the philosophy of freedom of the individual.) Further, I am convinced that the press law does not correspond to the provision of the presidential ukase stating that "transformation of state television and radio broadcasts into a tool for propagandizing the personal political views of its workers" is not permissible. If, in the law on the press, we are going abolish all preliminary censorship and proclaim full professional independence of journalists, including TV and radio journalists, such a clause in the ukase means a possibility (taking into account the legal culture and the culture of management within our country) to forbid expression of personal views and the holding of personal convictions. And here, I fear, I must be even sharper in my evaluation: I look upon this as an attempt to put a bridle on a press freedom that is only beginning to take form. Indeed, according to the law on the press—as it should be in principle—a journalist, in the final account, is responsible before the courts. If the leadership of television considers that he has violated the program of the given information medium, then it must prove this in court, having presented its arguments as to what, specifically, he violated, to support this with facts, etc. Otherwise, the chief will receive the right to decide the fate of the journalist: "You are expressing personal political views. This is impermissible. The President forbids it. I am firing you." And I would note still a third point: the necessity of preserving and, by contrast with the law on the press, even strengthening possibilities for protecting the rights of journalists in both an intellectual and a legal sense, as well, so to say, as in a material one. So that the journalist, the leadership of television and radio, and the founder—so that each of them can refer any question for legal review, with a demand, on one hand, for protection of legal rights and, on the other, for example, for compensation (to the full extent, including lost earnings) of material losses caused by one action or another.

[Correspondent] Do you take a broad view of the concept "journalist"—is this also the operator, and director, etc?

[Fedorov] Yes.

[Correspondent] It takes a minimum of three to four people to create a program. Let us say that the operator in some way has violated the law. Does this mean that all of them should be taken to court?

[Fedorov] It is necessary, when mastering the culture of a law-governed society, to change over to defining responsibility—both legal and material—in agreements. When you, for example, work together as a group, against which a claim may be lodged for production or another, you should conclude a very skillful, professional agreement, in which it is prescribed in advance who is responsible in what degree for what and before whom. And this will be the basic document for the court. This is how it is done all over the world.

[Correspondent] It is known that we have massive shortcomings in our legislation on intellectual property, including copyright law. In your view, will the situation change at sometime and, for example, will we join the Bern Convention?

[Fedorov] The problem of not having these questions regulated in our legislation is obvious. Here I am an advocate (and I am speaking as a minister of justice and a people's deputy) of not waiting until appropriate laws are developed. I will explain. On one hand, it is desirable to have a well-formulated, precise system of legislative acts. On the other, as long as we wait and do not initiate matters, the process can be dragged out for a long time, but it cannot be put off. And I am for accepting, as a practical guide to implementation for all those who apply the law, the principle of the direct applicability of international documents and pacts recognized by our country. Now, with regard to joining this kind of agreements. Here, without waiting for a positive reaction from the all-union leadership and being within the system of the Russian Federation, I will work to see that the Russian Federation, having proclaimed state sovereignty, has the possibility of ratifying a whole series of international documents that protect human rights in the broad sense, including copyright to intellectual property as well. A declaration of Russia's sovereignty will give me both the legal and constitutional basis for posing the question specifically in such a perspective.
[Correspondent] But, by the same measure the roots of many cable networks are chopped off?

[Fedorov] I think that we cannot be led by today's concrete situations. It is very dangerous both in politics and in any matter to be a prisoner of the interests of the moment. For all that, it is necessary to surrender—on the strategic plane, precisely in order to draw closer to civilized society—those losses that are likely (although each of us does not evaluate this phenomenon in the same way) in order to save what is most important—to observe international authority and to be on its level.

[Correspondent] In the law on the press and in your list of those provisions which should be taken into account in the law on television and radio, in my opinion, very little or almost nothing is said about the rights of the consumer—the reader, the television viewer, the radio listener.

[Fedorov] To fully guarantee by law the rights of the consumer is a hopeless cause, an unrealistic one. Nevertheless, the main guarantees are competition of the most varied mass information media along with legislative regulation, and also resolution of the problem of establishing professional requirements for journalists—in order to ensure that these will be highly qualified people, true professionals. From the beginning, even in the law on the press, we attempted to foresee that mass information media may also be established by individual citizens (if they are what we are talking about), but by ones who have a certain certificate, as we will term it provisionally, or a confirmation that they have certain abilities, professional training, etc. I believe that the demands which society places on people with pretensions to professional employment in the sphere of the mass information media should be regulated on the level of laws.

[Correspondent] Taking advantage of the occasion, I want to ask several questions concerning the press law. When, in the first chapter, it discusses freedom of choice of information, does this mean that, let us suppose, during the broadcast of a Supreme Soviet session or another event, the editors have the right to select a fragment at their own discretion?

[Fedorov] What is being talked about is that the state should concern itself that you have an opportunity to choose whether to watch the broadcast of the session or an art film, a cartoon, or something else. That is, this is a problem of de-monopolization, of a choice of various mass information media, and not of revision or montage of productions.

[Correspondent] "The mass information media carry out their activities using the languages of the peoples whom they serve and whose interests they represent." In other words, an information medium may select the specific people whom it will serve, for example, under the conditions of a union or autonomous republic, and do its broadcasting exclusively in the language of the core population?

[Fedorov] Yes, it may. But, on the other hand, the law stipulates that all peoples have the right to receive information in their own language, in the one they want. Plus, again, the norm of de-monopolization. Consequently, at the same time, another group of deputies with another language has the right, with reference to the law, to demand that a soviet resolve the question of providing information to representatives of other peoples within the territory of the given republic in their native language.

As a whole, the article which you have quoted bears a political character. In general, the law on the press was required to react specifically to the political side of freedom of the press. And to approve such norms—means to give the republic, kray, and oblast soviets the right, with reference to the law, to establish tasks on a practical plane within the given sphere plane and to set to work realizing desires that they connect with development of their own television and radio broadcasting.

[Correspondent] Consequently, you are inclined toward the idea that specifically the soviets should issue licenses for broadcasting.

[Fedorov] I think that, in any case, this question should be decided on the level of a legislative organ, that is, a soviet; let it decide who issues licenses. The soviet can create a special organ attached to itself or can give the corresponding assignment to the Council of Ministers, which in turn will impose these functions on some organization or another, form some kind of structure under the government, etc. But the sovereign, so to say, initial organ, which determines who will solve these questions, should be the soviet—the highest legislative organ. On all levels.

[Correspondent] Excuse me for it, would seem, delving into details, but they are very important for journalists. What, let us say, is the understanding of the divulging of state secrets under present conditions, and how can this be avoided? Or, for example, who will determine what pornography is, and how?

[Fedorov] We have the most highly developed (and I am not talking about quality and professionalism) system of punitive, repressive, and control organs—of the behavior both of individual citizens, and of journalists, etc. And in order to protect what are truly state interests and not those of individual chiefs and leaders, it urgently necessary to develop a law on state secrets—an open, clear, and understandable one where all criteria of a secret and the like are noted down. It should be universally accessible with its clauses ratified by the Supreme Soviet, as the lawmaker.

And a second point—with regard to pornography. This is also a problem of criteria, although different ones—of artistic, art criticism, and cultural criteria. In the final account, you, as a journalist, have full freedom to propagate anything that you want; there should be no preliminary censorship or control of you. But you know that pornography is punishable by law. And if somebody
(including your chief) wants to punish you for its dissemination, then he must prove the fact of violation of the law not in some kind of commission of a soviet or soviet executive committee, but in court, in the presence of expert evaluation by specialists. It is necessary to take into consideration that, in terms of the country, evaluations will differ greatly: The Baltic region is one matter, Central Asia another...

[Correspondent] I will continue to quote from the law on the press: “Utilization of the mass information media for interference in the personal lives of citizens, insults to their honor and merit, are forbidden and prosecuted in accordance with the law.” Further: “Misuse of freedom of speech, the dissemination of information which does not correspond to actuality and which denigrates the honor and merit of a citizen or an organization, and influence by journalists on the court shall entail criminal, administrative, or other penalties...” All correct, but it is, indeed, impossible to foresee all of life’s situations, the special features of individual perception. Let us take the television aspect. For example, placing of an image against a certain background: With the aid of electronic montage, it is possible to “write you into” a situation where you have never been. Any person can be photographed from an unfavorable angle. Is all this distortion of reality, an insult? Are photographs with a hidden camera, which have been discussed for a long time from a moral point of view, an interference in personal life?

[Fedorov] I will clarify once more: The final decision also with regard to questions of this type belongs to the court; it establishes whether there has been a premeditated violation or some other kind of distortion of reality or not. And if somebody presents a grievance on this account, the law provides him the right to appeal to the court. The plaintiff must pay a fee to the state.

[Correspondent] Ten rubles?

[Fedorov] This has been discussed, and in the Russian Federation we will increase the size of the court fee and tie the matter in with the civil process, taking account of world standards. At the same time, increasing it substantially, many times. If the plaintiff wins the process, his expenses are compensated at the expense of the guilty side. If he loses, he loses a sizeable sum.

[Correspondent] How will matters stand with the right, written into the law on the press, to obtain information from state organs, public associations, and official persons? Won’t it turn out like in the old anecdote, when a visitor asks a functionary: “Do I have the right?..” “Yes, you have.” “And, I can?..” “No, you cannot.”

[Fedorov] In fact this obligation, this norm is being held up by a failure to develop a whole series of draft laws. In order to resolve this problem it is necessary to back up the press law with laws on freedom of information, on state secrets, on archives. And also, probably, with an act (it is not excluded that it will go into the law on freedom of information) which will oblige state departments and organizations to give information to all upon presentation of a request in written form, as is done in a whole series of countries. In Finland, for example, any person, even a noncitizen, can apply to any state organ with a request that it provide official information, and they are obligated to provide it. In case of refusal, they must testify that: Inasmuch as the requested information by its nature a state secret, on the basis of the corresponding law, we, unfortunately, cannot satisfy your request. A similar system of relationships should be constructed in our society as well. And I hope that laws which are on the agendas or in the plans of the Supreme Soviets of both the USSR and the Russian Federation will definitely make it possible to do this.

[Correspondent] In the law on the press, it is stipulated that a journalist does not bear responsibility for the dissemination of information which does not correspond to reality, in particular, if it is contained in source statements that are broadcast without being taped in advance. And what if the interview is broadcast half an hour after being taped and there has been no opportunity to verify the facts?

[Fedorov] When necessary, in the final analysis, the court should—with the participation of both the journalist and his lawyer and of the opposing side—examine whether the journalist had an opportunity to check and recheck the facts and to what extent this incident can be viewed as a direct broadcast.

[Correspondent] But law makes specific reference to a direct broadcast...

[Fedorov] It is not excluded that, in fact, there is a flaw of some kind in the legislation and that it could have been written in a different way, having given a legal definition of direct broadcast. However, court examination of questions of this type would seem to be a guarantee of the journalist’s protection. In other words, a general legal principle should be operative—the principle of trust or a presumption of conscientiousness on the journalist’s part. And be so kind as to prove the contrary in an independent court.

[Correspondent] Your impressions from contacts with TV and radio?

[Fedorov] There are, of course, impressions—different, ambiguous, positive, and negative ones. But, of the many possible aspects, I would single out one, on account of which TV must be prepared. We are changing over to a market economy, and it is necessary to begin to consider everything. If you have invited a person to the studio and for some reason or another a transmission has not taken place—keep it in mind. I will stand on it—you must pay him for his empty effort and time spent. A similar thing also happened with me. They invited me, they taped me, and then, it seems, the phone rang: A broadcast with Fedorov participating is not desirable. I emphasize: In any case it is necessary to pay for the person’s participation in a program, having taken everything into account—how much time he in fact worked, whether or
not it went into a broadcast (or to compensate him for damages inflicted, including moral damage). Everything must be based on a carefully developed contract, which will guarantee that the parties are both the responsible and disciplined.

[ Correspondent] Do you see points of contact, ways for collaboration by your ministry with TV and radio?  

[Fedorov] Unconditionally. I, as Minister of Justice of the Russian Federation, would like to see the system of Russian television and radio include special cycles of programs and even an editorial staff concerned with providing timely information, explanations, and commentary on legal subjects. I myself was a sportsman and hold athletic training and sports in very high regard, but for a long time I have been troubled (not only as a jurist) that many times every day we hear who has beaten whom by what score, by what preponderance of points. But there is not a word about the fact that, on that same day, let us say, the Council of Ministers has passed a whole series of orders, instructions, and decrees regulating legal life in a new way. And, indeed, this has a somewhat greater importance for labor collectives, for whole sectors, for tens of millions of people. And, as Minister of Justice and hoping for support from television and radio, I will do everything to ensure legal information is made available on a permanent basis, in the final analysis, every day.

Local Soviets, Party Organizations Dispute Right to Sponsor Papers

91UN0508A Moskow SOVETS'KAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Dec 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by A. Smirnov, deputy chief of the Tver Oblast CPSU Committee Ideological Department: "A Loss To Both Sides: On the Fate of Oblast and Rayon Newspapers"]

[Text] No matter what some people say, life these days is far from boring. If there are no problems, we will make sure that we create them—and new ones every day at that. We have learned recently that the administration on printing and publishing had decided not to include TVERSAKAYA ZHIZN newspaper—an organ of the obkom and of the oblast people's deputies' soviet—into the state order for the oblast printing house. The explanation was that the printing house gives priority to recently established papers of the soviets—the oblast soviet's TVERSKIYE VEDOMOSTI and the city soviet's VECHE TVERI. At the same time, the newspaper that had been printed in this printing house since 1917, and has the highest distribution among all oblast publications, will now have to make contract arrangements with the printing house that will accommodate it only after the needs of the publications mentioned above have been met, and then depending on the capacity load, on commercial terms, and so on, and so on. The contemptulations over this fact are interrupted by a call from one of rayons. The news: The editor of "rayonka" reserves only one page a week for party materials.

Thank God, they are not charging for it yet. The editor of another rayon newspaper—since the paper has now declared itself independent—that the local party committee contribute money earmarked for a specific purpose, as if the party materials were an advertisement or an announcement.

There are heated debates going on in Ostashkov, Rzhev, and Udomy: Who is going to own the rayon newspaper—the soviets, the party, or should it be a joint ownership?

Not everything is clear with TVERSKAYA ZHIZN either. Having started another newspaper—TVERSKIYE VEDOMOSTI—the oblast soviet deputies stubbornly refuse to leave to the obkom the newspaper that had been published under the banner of the oblast party organization almost since the day it was founded.

What should we do? How should we live? We should live in accordance with the law. Especially considering that the USSR law on publishing and other mass media—be it, from my point of view, imperfect in many respects—does exist. However, like a Christmas tree sparkling with decorations and glitter, the new law started to immediately get wrapped in various statutory and illegal acts, instructions, and clarifications that are often quite removed from common sense but thick with political ambitions. Especially since there are more than enough volunteers to interpret it: the state committees, deputies' commissions, republic ministries, all of them collectively sowing discord and breeding strife.

All of this started with the letter from the RSFSR minister of publishing and mass media of 15 August 1990. It says: "Subsidies from the RSFSR state budget will be strictly limited and will not be able to cover all anticipated additional expenses resulting from the new wholesale prices on materials (newsprint, printer's ink, and so on) and services (postal delivery, transport, etc.). Under no circumstance will joint party-soviet publications be subsidized from the RSFSR state budget."

Just like that—"under no circumstance." And that is at a time when the overwhelming majority of rayon and city newspapers that are so popular among the people are still being published jointly by the CPSU and the soviets. In our oblast the press run for "rayonkas" is close to 300,000 copies. They go to almost every countryside family. They are familiar to people, they are liked, and it is not accidental that the minister's letter caused a flood of disagreeing, or even indignant, letters and telephone calls.

What will happen tomorrow? The market dictates new prices, new tariffs. The price of each three-kopek copy of "rayonka" goes up two or three times. Ten out of 36 rayon newspapers in our oblast will make it without subsidies. To cover the losses sustained by the rest of them, the state allocates 700,000 rubles [R]. Unfortunately, in 1991, this will already require (after the
mentioned above hike in subscription prices) almost R3 million. Does it make sense, considering that our state budget is full of holes?

It looks like considerable losses that followed such hasty reshuffling of the newspapers have baffled the Ministry of Press leaders themselves. Also, public opinion in localities clearly does not support them. So, after lengthy negotiations, concessions, and compromises, a new document saw the light of the day. I think it does not constitute a state or party secret: "In accordance with the agreement between the RSFSR Council of Ministers and the CPSU Central Committee on coordination of publishing activities, it is agreed that in 1991, the sides will share equally the financing of those periodic publications that people's deputies' Soviets consider expedient to be published jointly with CPSU territorial organizations. The sides will take equal part in partially subsidizing unprofitable publications out of the RSFSR budget, or the republics, krays, or oblasts budgets, and out of the CPSU budget, as well as supplying these joint publications with newsprint, also in equal shares. The supply of newsprint and other materials will be accomplished in centralized manner, as before... Signed by M. Poltoranin and N. Kruchina." This document is dated 22 October, it is officially in effect, and it finally shows some kind of coordinated and sensible approach. It is clear that this is a temporary measure, since the newspapers' staffs will have to think now how to earn money in the future and how to survive under market conditions. But at least they have a reprieve, a period of time that they should use for working out rational solutions, for showing their initiative and entrepreneurship.

It seems that all of this should have stopped right here. But no, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet committee on mass information, liaison with public organizations and mass popular movements, and public opinion studies decides to throw in its share of clarifications. The letter, signed by committee Chairman V. Yugin and addressed to the people's deputies' Soviets, is dated October 24, that is, literally a couple of days after the above mentioned telegram from Minister M. Poltoranin and N. Kruchina, chief of the administrative department of the CPSU Central Committee.

The new document is couched in quite categorical terms. Its substance can be squeezed into a few words: "The Soviets should refuse the cofounding activities where they would act jointly with the party committees." However, reading the document further we find: "Besides their official publications, the Soviets may additionally create other means of mass communications, in which they can have as cofounders their own executive committees, workers' collectives, and public organizations—including the CPSU." Can you make sense out of comparison of these documents?

It appears to be saying that the Soviets in an administrative rayon may publish not only official, but also unofficial publications. Is that it? That it is a time when it is hard enough to scrape up the energy, money, and paper for one publication, to make it businesslike and serious, and to truly direct it towards consolidation of efforts in these difficult conditions that do not get easier day by day. These are the issues that give all of us headaches and require solutions. Instead, it is being suggested that we spend money senselessly.

And one cannot disobey, either! The same V. Yugin emphasizes that deliberate failure to carry out the RSFSR laws in this case may bring a fine from R500 to R10,000! So that everybody knew how strict we are!

Time goes by, and in the December issue of TEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI I read the report by R. Sergiyev who has just returned from the conference of the chairmen of local Soviets' commissions on glasnost, organized by the committee headed by the same V.A. Yugin. The report says: "It is the party itself—not the party committee that is its elected organ, or, to be precise, its apparatus—that can act as a founder. This was brought to the attention of conference participants by M. Fedotov (RSFSR deputy minister on publishing and mass media—A.S.), who explained that, in the author's opinion of this law, the party and a party committee are not one and the same. Here we go again! Does this mean that a soviet or its executive committee can serve as a publication's founder, but a party committee can not?

Have not we made enough mess of this? Have not we already put up too many artificial obstructions? And who benefits from all this confusion?

Youth Paper's Editor Notes Changing Relationship With Komsomol
91UN0324A Moscow SOBESEDKIN in Russian No 41, Oct 90 p 7

[Interview with Vladislav Fronin, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editor-in-chief, conducted by SOBESEDKIN correspondent: "In Any Event We Will Still Be 'Komsomolka'"]

[Text] We met a few hours after Vladislav Fronin ceased being our boss. Otherwise this interview would probably not have taken place. You see, there is a certain awkwardness in an editor-in-chief giving an interview to his own correspondent in the pages of his own newspaper, or a supplement to it. Yet last week a truly notable event in the history of SOBESEDKIN occurred. Our weekly ceased being a supplement to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and became an independent publication.

[Fronin] On which I congratulate you!

[Correspondent] And I congratulate you, too!

[Fronin] Yes, us, too. This marks the end of the somewhat artificial "supplement" period in the life of SOBESEDKIN. For in financial terms it was a publication independent of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA from the very start. Then when it got on its feet it also gained creative independence. Now everything is as it
should be. And SOBESEDNIK has two founders. Not owners, I stress, but founders. You voted to make these the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the labor collective of your editorial staff. We agreed. Though it is strange that the “Komsomolka” should get its birth certificate in the 65th year of its existence and SOBESEDNIK in its seventh year. But such are the times we live in...

[Correspondent] That is what I wanted to talk about. Indeed: what times there are for the youth press! Former Komsomol publications are becoming simply youth publications, and some are even changing their names. We no longer have the magazine KOMSOMOLSKAYA ZHIZN, instead we have PULS. Instead of MOLODOY KOMMUNIST we find PERSPEKTIVY. Even KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, it seems, no longer has a Komsomol Affairs Department.

[Fronin] We have still not officially changed the name of that department. But we are moving in that direction. Incidentally, our VUZs as well are no longer teaching just CPSU history, but political history instead, and students are studying simply philosophy instead of Marxist-Leninist philosophy.

[Correspondent] Still, VUZs are state institutions. Yet KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is the organ of a social and political organization.

[Fronin] I agree. But in this country there is not nor has there ever been another nationwide organization for young people. So let us begin with the reality: KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA long ago ceased to be merely the organ of the Komsomol Central Committee. It reflects the broadest views and concepts which exist in society and among young people. Incidentally, the Komsomol itself is changing today and getting away from its narrow political orientation.

[Correspondent] There is another question which bothers me. Did the Komsomol really have its own daily newspaper all these years? The newspaper and the printing facilities were controlled by the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs, and all the profits went into the CPSU treasury, from which, it is true, a portion went to the Komsomol as well. And another thing: of whom were you as editor-in-chief more afraid, the Komsomol Central Committee Buro or the CPSU Central Committee ideologues?

[Fronin] Of course the party controlled our entire press, but so much has already been said on that point! In the heat of debate at our Komsomol plenums some people demanded that the Komsomol receive more of the profits, forgetting that since the printing equipment belonged to the party that also meant that the party had to worry about taking care of the equipment as well. There will be no profits without a printing plant or without newspaper. Profits do not simply fall from the sky; one must know how to run a printing operation. And what is freedom without that? A meaningless word... Incidentally, I am the 17th KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editor-in-chief, but perhaps the only one who was not confirmed by the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. This is how that came about: right after I was appointed a certain article in our newspaper greatly displeased someone on Staraya Square.

[Correspondent] Which article?

[Fronin] Bringing that up now would be dealing in populism. Though, incidentally... At issue was an interview with B. N. Yeltsin, at that time out of favor. It was prepared by the newspaper staff before I arrived. Was I, who had just assumed the position of editor-in-chief, to cut it out of that issue? In any event, that would have been impossible. The next day I got a call from a senior comrade. “O.K.,” he said, “I am not going to spoil your mood before New Year’s, but on the second of January come by and we will have a talk.” Subsequently there were a number of hard-hitting articles: “Novocherkassk 1962,” the interview with O. Kalugin, the pamphlet by A. Solzhenitsyn. At one meeting Vadim Andreyevich Medvedev blurted out: “You are a communist, yet you are in essence working against the party.” The Komsomol Central Committee Buro was evidently instructed to look into the matter of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. It is to the credit of then first secretary V. Mironenko and my comrades on the bureau that they did not give in to this pressure.

Yet in this regard as well we must proceed dialectically. There have been times in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA’s history when the party Central Committee protected the paper from especially zealous Komsomol leaders.

...The first time that Vladislav Fronin was “declared” editor-in-chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA was on 24 May 1975. When the newspaper celebrated its 50th anniversary virtually all its former editors-in-chief gathered. A trainee from the Working Youth Department was led over to one of them, Boris Dmitriyevich Pankin. “There he is,” they told him, “the future editor-in-chief.” “Well, that is fine,” replied Pankin. And how else could he respond to the joke? Especially since Pankin himself had once started out as a trainee.

[Correspondent] Vladislav, we are still talking about the past, though the recent past. What about the development of present-day relations with the Komsomol Central Committee?

[Fronin] They function in a new way. We must banish from our vocabulary the words “organ” and “guidance of the newspaper”; the most important term should be “mutually advantageous.” It seems to me that Vladimir Zyukin, All-Union Komsomol Central Committee first secretary and bureau member, also understands this. But is there any guarantee that tomorrow some young docent from Gorkiy with his unilinear “communist initiative” will not ascend to the leadership of our youth league and replace not only the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editor-in-chief, but also the entire editorial board and
newspaper staff? There is enough pressure in that direction, judging by many of the speeches given at the RSFSR CP founding congress. Therefore both we and the young people who read KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA should have guarantees that no matter what the turn of events we will remain the “Komsomolka.”

[Correspondent] But who will provide that kind of guarantees?

[Fronin] That is precisely why we have determined that KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA should have two founders: the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee and the editorial staff labor collective. We are basing this on the Press Law. On the fact that both of the proposed founders have positions which coincide on many issues, and that there is mutual support. Finally, we are acknowledging the fact that for a long time now KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has in fact been an independent enterprise. Now that must at least be stated in a legally binding way. The editorial staff labor collective has the right to this property. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA’s capital was accumulated by many generations of newspaper workers. A business should belong to those who run it.

[Correspondent] Generally speaking, I think that at this point in time the question of property is the principal issue within the All-Union Komsomol. An organization which is headed for disintegration (I can sense that you are about to object to that statement, but that is my personal view of the Komsomol, one which I have developed after much thought and anguish) is attempting to keep as many resources as possible for itself in the face of the inevitable dividing-up process. It seems to me that the real debates at the upcoming All-Union Komsomol Central Committee plenum will be over Komsomol property. Incidentally, the question of mass media outlets is also on the agenda.

[Fronin] And in that regard property is the cornerstone. Yes, the development of the situation within the Komsomol and in our country as a whole prompts concern for the future of our newspaper as well. Therefore we want to use our proposal of joint foundership to create certain economic and political guarantees for the continued existence of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA under any circumstances. I have already spoken of the need for political guarantees. But we also need economic guarantees. We must constantly bear in mind that presently there are 19 subjects of federation within the All-Union Komsomol. They definitely have a right to their portion of the profits from what our newspaper pays into the Komsomol Central Committee budget. But a newspaper cannot belong to 19 owners— it would be torn to pieces. It would cease to be precisely what it is, an all-union newspaper. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is not just an informational bulletin purely about what is happening, or when and where, within our youth league. It has never been that, is not today and, I am certain, never will be. The All-Union Komsomol Central Committee has other publications for that purpose.

[Correspondent] Then why is the Komsomol Central Committee one of the founders? Would it not be more logical to declare yourself an “independent youth newspaper”?

[Fronin] I have my own opinion about the fad of declaring oneself an “independent newspaper,” and in the largest possible type at that. If one writes “good cognac” on the label of a bottle, does that change the quality of the beverage? I do not know when truly independent newspapers will emerge, but before they do we must have independent journalists. Incidentally, even KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA does not have enough of those. I would go so far as to say we have finally become a real newspaper. As for what lies ahead... Our newspaper is to a large extent independent, especially in its line and position, but it is historically linked with our youth league. So we are proposing co-foundership.

[Correspondent] Does that mean everything will be fifty-fifty?

[Fronin] Not at all! A founder is a new concept. It does not have to mean master, and not always owner. Both the founder's rights and obligations (of which there are several) are determined with a view toward all the actual circumstances. In our case, it seems to me, it would be logical for precisely the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee to confirm editors-in-chief upon recommendation from the labor collective. This is an effective form of cooperation. The newspaper’s labor collective would pay a portion of its profits to the Komsomol Central Committee.

[Correspondent] What portion?

[Fronin] That we will determined by a contract between the founders. I cannot give you a figure off the top of my head. Our economists are presently working out the figures. This is also being done by the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee.

[Correspondent] And KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA will finally begin receiving what it earns. And that will be millions. What are you going to do with that money?

[Fronin] We will take a million apiece and flee the country. Don't smile at that! There are some Komsomol officials who actually think that. As if we were not a serious newspaper with traditions, just some fake cooperative. Maybe we will not raise journalists' pay, but we will raise editorial staff members' pay. It reaches a point of absurdity. At any new publication with a circulation of several tens of thousands of copies the pay is 50 rubles per typewritten page, while we pay only six. And that with a circulation of 22 million.

The newspaper needs funds above all for development. We have an outdated printing plant; the largest daily newspaper in the world is being published under ridiculously primitive conditions. We will remain independent within the system of party publishing houses, and we should invest our profits in our own printing plant. Right
now everything has to be paid for out of our own pockets. We also need to spend to maintain our regional offices and our publishers.

[Correspondent] In regard to the publishers, as far as I know, there is not any special break given to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, is there?

[Frönin] The same as for other youth newspapers printed by party printing plants. At first this was what was proposed: we will declare you independent and will publish your paper based on contractual rates, since we need to derive some financial benefit from you. They seemed to have completely forgotten about the tens of millions of rubles which KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA pays into party coffers each year. The same offer was made to the oblast youth newspapers, until a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo got wind of it. Revisions were made in the previous decision.

[Correspondent] But are youth newspapers unprofitable? And if so, then why do we have so many small provincial youth newspapers?

[Frönin] What does unprofitable mean? That is a myth. In this country there are 269 youth and children's publications, 160 of them printed by party publishing houses. Approximately 62 percent of them post losses. But those losses total only six million rubles a year. The profits of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA alone would cover those losses ten times over. Now a word about "provincial" newspapers. Can you call SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Riga "provincial"? I visited Naberezhnye Chelny—there the local newspaper competes with ours in popularity. What about MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS? What about SMENA in Leningrad? The problem lies elsewhere. Why do the central newspapers have more rights than local ones? Why do we have a hierarchical system under which KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is expected to have a staff correspondent in Kazan, while the Tatar youth paper in Moscow is for some reason not supposed to? Newspapers should have equal rights. Then their degree of popularity will be determined by the professional quality of the staff who make the newspaper.

...Frönin grew up along the Volga. He went from the Ulyanovsk Oblast Journalism Department to study at Kazan University's Department of Journalism. He decided not to go to Moscow at that time. His dream was to work for the Gorkiy youth newspaper LENINSKAYA SMENA. At that time it was very popular around the country.

[Correspondent] But KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has its place in the hierarchy. Why is its rank determined by the position in the state structure occupied by the organization or agency which publishes it? Or are things changing in this regard?

[Frönin] Little has changed. We have already mentioned the fact that publishers give special breaks to party newspapers. Now there is a trend toward daily newspapers becoming a thing of the past in this country. The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has decided that PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA will be published six days a week, and other newspapers five days a week. And this decision was presented like this: reach an agreement with communications people, publishing houses and editors regarding the introduction of a common day off. Agreement with what editors? We do not want to publish just five days a week. We promised our readers that we would publish a newspaper six days a week, 300 times a year, and that is what we intend to do. And we very much hope that this, something which is of benefit to all, will finally receive the support of the CPSU Central Committee Administration of Affairs. But the editors of party newspapers are keeping quiet. PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA are keeping quiet. Incidentally, if the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat can give the go-ahead for six-day publication of IZVESTIYA, the USSR Supreme Soviet's publication, by party printing plants, then why not save the daily KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA as well? If this conspiracy of silence between PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA continues, if they do not support other newspapers, then the daily press will cease to exist. And the printing presses will go on operating even on the "common day off." Only it might be wallpaper that they are printing...

...Frönin's three-member family lives in a two-room apartment measuring 30 square meters. Vladislav received this apartment back when he was a correspondent. Then he became deputy department head, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA senior secretary and deputy editor-in-chief. For two years he was head of the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Department. But he is uncomfortable talking about his personal life.

[Correspondent] One last question, Vladislav: why have you not become a people's deputy? There are quite a few deputies among the editors-in-chief of central newspapers. Especially since respect for KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA is probably mainly respect for its editor-in-chief.

[Frönin] I am clearly no great speaker, nor am I a parliamentarian; I am a newspaper man. My job is interesting. And not many people know me.

...That is true. Frönin seldom appears on television. He grants virtually no interviews. He makes a newspaper. That takes all his time.

KUBAN Editor Interviewed on Publishing Plans
PM0911114390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Nov 90 Single Edition p4

[Article by A. Knyazev under the rubric "What's New in the Journals?): "Get To Know KUBAN"]
MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

[Text] Our readers have asked the editorial office to tell them about the journal KUBAN. We put their questions to the chief editor of this publication, V. Kanashkin.

"First of all, I would like to say that KUBAN can confirm to its readers that it remains committed to its chosen course: to orient what it publishes toward Russia's spiritual revival," Vitaliy Alekseyevich said. "We make our pages available to works which reflect the spiritual, moral, and social foundations of our life. Next year, readers will be introduced to "The Tragedy of the Cossacks," a fundamental work about the journeys of the Cossacks during the revolution and the Civil War, and to chapters from the trilogy by Fedor Kubanskiy who lived for some time in the United States: 'In the Free Steppes of the Kuban,' 'Eagles of the Russian Land,' and 'Free Steppes Running with Blood.'

"Nowadays few people are satisfied by exposes as such: They are not at all productive. We have focused our efforts on seeking positive solutions: Everything that helps to bring people spiritually closer and arouses creative ideas is given particular support. I will name some of the articles coming up for publication: 'Kuban Emergency' by G. Lyusmarin; 'The Court Jeweler' and 'Counterrevolutionaries' by V. Krivorotov; and 'Vrangel's Notes,' 'From the Memoirs of General Kutepov,' and 'Cossacks on the Island of Lemnos' by P. Kryukov. These works help to soberly assess the historical process while avoiding idealization of a past 'golden age' and abuse of the 'impenetrable darkness' which, like any deliberate deception, only serves to deform people's minds.

"In the 'Russian Self-Awareness' section we will be offering works by I. Solonievich: 'Russia in a Concentration Camp' and 'Dictatorship of the Impotent.' It is right that this section should also include extracts from M. Menshikov's 'Letters to a Loved One' and V. Shulgin's 'The Things We Dislike in Them.'

"The history of the Kuban, both lofty and tragic, will not be overlooked either. We will be publishing works by F. Shcherbinina: 'The Cossacks' Land Ideology' and 'Laws of Evolution and Russian Bolshevism.' We will also be publishing the following in the near future: 'In the White Camp' by G. Rakovskiy; 'Laughter Under the Bayonet' by P. Morents; 'The Last Secret (The Tragedy of the Cossacks) by N. Bethell; and 'The Tragedy of Yalta' by N. Tolstoy.

"We intend to make our pages available to well known writers and critics: V. Belov, Yu. Bondarev, V. Kozhinov, M. Lobanov, V. Lichutin, V. Soloukhin, A. Znamenskiy, and V. Likhnosov from the Kuban, and others.

"One of the most important sections in the journal is 'Russia Today,' where various points of view are given expression. We will be publishing 'Open Letter to A.I. Solzhenitsyn' by V. Krivorotov, 'Who Does Solzhenitsyn Serve?' by N. Tetenov, and various other articles illustrating specific features of the so-called 'Russian question.'

"In a no less pointed rubric, 'Russian Cry,' the editorial office intends to introduce readers to works by Metropolitan Antoniy, I.A. Ilin, I.R. Shafarevich, and others.

"In the middle of October, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Communications, Information Science, and Space included the journal KUBAN in the RSFSR catalogue of newspapers and journals for 1991. Literally the other day the central retail-subscription agency Soyuzpochtay instructed its oblast branches to add KUBAN to its catalogue and organize subscription to the journal without any restrictions. Our index number is 73607. Annual subscription costs 14.40 rubles [R], six months' subscription costs R7.20, and a single issue costs R1.20."

Lag In Ukrainian-Language Oblast Newspapers Cited
91UN0483A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 2 Dec 90 p 3

[Reports by V. Pavlenko, M. Bidyna, L. Ivanova, and L. Ruta: "In which Language are Newspapers to be Published?"]

[Text] The editorial desk of our newspaper is receiving letters, the authors of whom are indignant about the fact that in a number of regions few newspapers are being published in the Ukrainian language. We asked our correspondents to clear up this issue on the spot and to present their findings to the newspaper. Below we present the results of their brief investigations.

Kharkov

When one looks into the journal of registered publications in the Oblast Committee of the Press, then Ukrainian language newspapers at first glance apparently are the most numerous. And how. Twenty-three out of 25 district publications are published in the Ukrainian language. Many newspapers with a wide circulation are being published in the state language of the Ukrainian SSR.

But this, so to speak, let my colleagues not take offense with me, is a press of a second class quality in terms of oblast publication. And what about the publications of a first class quality, what is their standing?

The Ukrainian CP Oblast Committee has become the founder of five publications. Number one on the list is a new civic-political and publicist-type journal POZITSIYA. Its language is Russian. The fifth publication on the list is the bilingual newspaper KRASNOE ZNAMYA [Russian] and CHERVONYYE PRAPOR [Ukrainian]. But from the day subscriptions were being accepted, the newspaper constantly informed people that
it will be published only in Russian, because, they say, a
duplicate [Ukrainian copy] requires extra costs.

Still another bilingual publication is VECIRNYI
KHARKIV [Ukrainian] and VECHERNYI
KHARKOV [Russian]. For already 21 years the newspa-
pers were being published only in Ukrainian. But now,
considering the fact, that this move will increase cir-
culation, they are being published in bilingual editions.

The situation is complex in regards to the newspapers
LEINSKA ZMINA and SLOBODSYY KRAY (the
former SOTSIALISTYCHNA KHARKIVSCHYNA).

The Leninist district council of Kharkov has asked that the
newspaper RAYONNI BUDNI be registered as Ukrainian
and that the revolutionary journal HOLOS DEPUTATA be
registered as a Russian language journal.

V. Pavlenko

Mykolayiv

In the oblast there resides a population which is almost
70 percent Ukrainian. But the majority of what they read
is published in Russian. Specifically, the oblast news-
paper PIVDENNA PRAVDA has been a bilingual news-
paper for several years already. Its circulation today is
220,000 copies, which is divided thus: 20 thousand
copies in Ukrainian and 200,000 copies in Russian. The
oblast Komsomol newspaper LENINSKE PLEYA,
which until recently was appearing only in the Ukrainian
language, for a year has had a Russian page. Now it
appears thus: of its 12 pages, four are in Ukrainian and
eight are in Russian.

RODNAY PARYCHL, the newspaper of the Associa-
tion of journalists comes out in the Russian language,
and it features a section “Let us get along in Ukrainian.”

The new newspaper VECHERNYY NYKOLAEV comes
out in the Russian language.

All the commercial publications are also published in Rus-
sian. The new newspaper of the Oblast Council of People’s
Deputies is being planned; it will be a Ukrainian publication.

M. Bidnyna

Lugansk

Out of 29 municipal and district newspapers, two munic-
ipal (Pervomaysk and Severodonetsk) and eight district
newspapers are being published in Ukrainian. Out of the
85 newspapers that have a high circulation, 27 are being
published in the Ukrainian language. From among those
17 publications registered by November 21, the majority
of them are Russian language publications.

According to the information provided by the Lugansk
Oblast Press Administration considering the number of
authors, there is a fairly active publication of works of
Ukrainian writers—prose writers, poets, and humorists.

D. Ivanova

As we see, the authors of the letters to the editorial board
have a point. Not everything is in order for us in terms of
the development of the Ukrainian language press. Some
people in a traditional manner, as was the case during
the time of stagnation and in the more distant past,
believe that Ukrainians are greater supporters of the
Russian language, than their own native language;
others, believe that, so to speak, there are people of the
sort who speak and therefore for the most part read in
Russian. Some people advocate a transfer of publica-
tions to the Russian language or to a bilingual format,
having commercial considerations in mind. They, so to
speak, suggest that the Russian language will increase
circulation, though practice does not confirm this view.

But haven’t we to a certain degree artificially divided the
oblasts into Ukrainian and Russian language areas? Isn’t
an old and rather odd tradition weighing heavily on us,
which one of the most prominent leaders of the nation in
his time formulated more or less thusly:

The faster we begin to speak in one language, the sooner
we will build communism.

The Ukrainian language in our republic has become the
state language. The point of this act obviously lies in the
fact that in order to return to the people their native
language, in order that they may use it, they should not
feel like second class citizens. And in order to do this, the
Ukrainian language must be applied to the widest extent
in all spheres of social life, including the press. In
accordance to the law.

L. Ruta

Journalist Investigates January 1990 Explosion at
Baku TV Center

[Article by D. Muratov, special correspondent: “How
They Blew Up the TV Center: An Investigation by
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA”]

[Text] The following is a Soviet phenomenon of recent years:
the more tragedies occur, the less emotion they evoke. We are
no longer struck or startled by the facts involved but by the
statistics, by the number of victims rather than by the reasons
why they perished. The “time intervals” between crimes are
becoming briefer, and these crimes pass into history without
having become the subjects of investigation in the present.

In contrast to “sensory hunger or starvation”—a disease
caused by the absence of emotions, what is prevalent in
the society today is “sensory fattening or obesity”—a
protective fatigue of the feelings. Just look at what has
happened: after Osh, Fergana, and Moldava, the events in
Baku seem to have occurred in the remote past; but they
took place just this year. And if an old “hit” was named
“The investigation is over, forget it...” nowadays when an
investigation is still in its initial stages, for society the case
has already been recorded in the archives. It would be banal to explain why this must not be done.

And so, during the night between 19 and 20 January 1990, troops accompanied by armored vehicles entered Baku. The official pretext for putting a state of emergency into effect was as follows: "the exacerbation of the situation in Baku, the subversive efforts of criminal and extremist forces, by violent means and by organizing mass disorders, to remove from power the legitimately acting state organs...and in the interests of the citizens' safety."

During the state of emergency, according to data furnished by experts, 121 persons died, more than 700 were wounded, and 12 disappeared without a trace. The army's losses in removing the barricades from the sites where troops clashed, in nighttime street fighting, and in rendering service to support the existing regime amounted to 21 persons killed and more than 90 wounded.

A Week Before the Explosion

Prior to the troops being introduced, sadistic pogroms against Armenians were carried out in Baku on 13-15 January and partially on 16-17 January. According to certain data, 56 persons were killed, while 112 persons suffered serious bodily harm. Parallel with this were political-type meetings attended by many thousands of people—meetings conducted by the NFA [People’s Front of Azerbaijan], which demanded the overthrow of Bezirov, the leader of the republic-level Communist Party. The NFA people blockaded the military and civilian airports as well as the military compound. The NFA leaders held the de facto power in this republic's capital. Their political "rating" was so high that it was clear to observers that the parliamentary elections which had been scheduled for the end of January were a foregone conclusion. The local authorities were paralyzed, whereas the military was inoperative; and a principal mistake was committed—the pogroms were not interdicted. By 19 January they were no longer occurring in the city; the efforts of the NFA and the rather small detachments of internal-affairs troops were normalizing the situation. It was already senseless to introduce a state of emergency, something which would be fraught with the danger of causing many victims. And, therefore, further actions by the troops and the politicians who gave them orders would be directed not so much at preserving individual rights as at struggling against the national-liberation movement, at preserving the existing regime. The threat that this regime would be replaced in the upcoming elections was absolutely real. Moreover, if the participation by the troops would have been justifiable a few days previously, on 19 January it took on a fundamentally different coloring. It was already possible to blame Moscow for having delayed when it had been a matter of people's lives but for using armed force when a threat to the existing regime had arisen. And so, in my opinion, it was necessary to have a new and convincing argument for instituting martial law and for postponing the date of the elections. And this argument was found.

Direct your attention to the logic of the official version. In explaining the reasons for introducing the troops, TASS—among the other reasons, which have been known for a long time—introducing the following new one: “direct action to seize the radio and television center.” The MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Press Center developed this theme: “a powerful explosion occurred in one of the sections of the TV Center’s main power units. In all probability, it was caused by a homemade (my emphasis—D. M.) explosive device.” But Lieutenant General Aleksandr Ovchinnikov drew the following conclusion for the press on 23 January: “Extremists put the TV station’s power unit out of commission.” And it was specifically this conclusion which was widely disseminated by the mass media and figured officially in the documents of the Union-level parliament. Such a version also allowed the introduction of troops to be justified, it explains why, on the afternoon of 19 January, Yevgeniy Primakov, at that time chairman of the Council of the Union, said not a word about the state of emergency, but it was put into effect at midnight without informing the population.

I am now convinced of the following: it is specifically the explosion at the TV Center which was used as the principal argument for applying force; it is specifically this explosion which served as the reason for the deaths of dozens of persons.

After the journalistic investigation conducted by us, I am prepared to assert this: the official point of view is a lie. And, in asserting that, I cannot accept the rebuke or reproach to the effect that “the investigation has not yet been completed, but the newspaper is drawing conclusions.” The case “as to the fact of the explosion” has, in fact, been “frozen” at its initial stage. It has wandered like a nomad from the republic's KGB to the republic-level procuracy, from there to the military procuracy of the Transcaucasus Military District, then once more to Azerbaijan’s procuracy. From there just a few weeks ago it was dumped into the lap of the Main Military Procuracy, and there too, according to my information, it was deemed “not within our field of competence or jurisdiction,” and so it was sent on to the USSR KGB.... Let me remind you that this ping pong game has already lasted for nine months. It is high time that something was given birth.... At various stages of this investigation journalists from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA have attempted to help as much as they could. They have given eyewitness testimony; they have presented video materials which we have at our disposal to the above-mentioned investigative organs; and they have conducted interviews with various officials. The result is well known. And so, here is our version of these events.

An Hour Before the Explosion

...On the evening of 19 January a political-type meeting was taking place in the courtyard facing the TV building.
The area was being guarded by cadets from the Baku Higher General Military Command College in the Azerbaijan SSR, Supreme Soviet. Located within the building were staff members on duty during their shift and some military personnel. There were no outsiders or passersby beyond the fence. At approximately 1900 hours four (or possibly five) unknown persons, accompanied by Colonel Mark Davydovich Shmotkin, a cadet company commander, entered the room where the power engineers Romanov and Guseynov were on duty. Guseynov and Romanov knew the cadets and Shmotkin by sight, but not these other persons. They are strangely dressed in sweatsuits under a kind of disguise and jerseys. They carried short-barreled automatic weapons. (As we have reliably informed, the cadets did not have such weapons). One of the unknown persons was carrying a dark-blue sports-bag in his hands. The gist of the questions posed by the newly arrived persons was simple: where was the main feeder-cable? was there no emergency system? was it possible to switch on diesel motors or generators to replace the power unit?

Having ascertained that there was no emergency system and that it was impossible to switch in the diesel units, one of the unknown persons scraped away the linoleum with a knife, thereby revealing the metal plates which covered the cables underneath. At an order from the “unknown persons,” the cadets who were standing at the entrance to the power unit “escorted” Romanov and Guseynov into the TV studio’s dressing room, where the other military personnel were located. After about 20 or 30 minutes the power engineers heard a muffled explosion. They were ordered not to worry. By the way, this turned out to be correct. There was no longer anything to worry about. After approximately an hour (possibly an hour and a half) Romanov and Guseynov, as it was explained to them, “for their own safety” had to change into military uniforms and were “escorted” by a roundabout way, through the fence and into the republic’s Supreme Soviet building, which stands opposite the TV studio.

Subsequently a certain “hitch” or lack of coordination occurred in this “operation.” It is necessary to explain—and this is important—that the Supreme Soviet building was never in the hands of the “extremists.” Both outside and inside it was being guarded by military personnel, and at the entrance there were also local policemen. And it was to these persons that Romanov and Guseynov began to shout that they were not really soldiers, that they had been forced to change into the military uniforms, and they presented their own service documents. A conflict occurred, as a result of which the guards turned the power engineers over to a unit of the local police....

After their interrogations, they both hid out at the homes of acquaintances, which is where we found them through certain intermediaries. Neither Romanov nor Guseynov suffered. But the person who gave us information to the effect that, possibly, it was “not extremists who blew up the power unit,” namely, Vasi' Babayev, the chief TV producer-director, was arrested. He was arrested at night, in front of his wife and daughters, with assurances that he “would be able to give his testimony and return home right away.” But he did not return “right away.” He was transferred to Ulyanovsk to the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] prison there. Along the road he was badly beaten, and he spent almost 40 days under guard....

Now some necessary details. As I came to know, the investigator from the republic-level KGB who arrived at the site of the explosion while the tracks were still hot was not allowed access to the military personnel under a threat to use armed force. M. Shmotkin refused to talk with me, although my question was a simple one: upon what orders did he allow “unknown persons” to have unhindered access to a facility which he was guarding? (By the way, these unknown persons were 30-35 years of age, i.e., they were not soldiers in short-term service nor cadets). I did manage to ascertain, however, that M. Shmotkin had reported directly to his superior concerning the execution of the order regarding the “escorting” of Romanov and Guseynov. I was not given the opportunity to familiarize myself with this matter. Nevertheless, according to certain sources of information, Shmotkin indicated that he had taken Romanov and Guseynov out of the power unit "for reasons of their own safety." Does that mean that he knew about some danger?

Nor was the explosive device, to speak bluntly, something that you would call “homemade.” According to my information, use was made in the explosion of high-explosive substances based on TNT and ammonium nitrate. They are utilized primarily for charging landmines and demolition charges. Of course, such “substances” could have been stolen and employed by the “extremists.” But, under the conditions whereby the TV Center was being guarded and all the above-cited circumstances, you will agree that such a conclusion is hardly admissible....

Immediately After the Explosion

It is understandable, in principle, that “military-service personnel” would have participated in this explosion. This conclusion has already been arrived at by the investigators who began to handle this “case.” It is understandable that it was not the cadets who set off the explosion; they were used merely to “cover the operation.” It may be assumed that I am already able to name the special unit which directly performed the explosion, but it is more interesting to wait a while for the results of the investigation of this case and to find out under what jurisdiction it finally turns out to be. (By the way, let’s give due respect to the professionalism of those people to whom the investigation has not yet reached). And it is no less important to understand who among the politicians gave the order to carry out this action. Here it is more likely that a parliamentary investigation and political evaluations cannot be avoided. Because, after all, we have again encountered a situation in which “state security” is under
stood solely as the security of the state rather than that of its “subjects.” We have again encountered a situation whereby guarding oneself makes the state dangerous. Yes, it is undoubtedly true that a revolution is worth something if it knows how to protect itself. But just what kind of revolution is it if it protects itself in such a manner?

P.S. And the elections in Azerbaijan were indeed postponed. They took place under the conditions of the state of emergency. Observers from other regions were detained and sent back where they came from; and the republic’s electoral commission has been snowed under with an avalanche of complaints.
Multi-Volume History of Belorussia Commissioned

Party Organizations Asked To Contribute
91UN0210A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 3

[Appeal: "Let Us Commemorate Everybody by Name: An Appeal of the Republic-Level Commission for Preparing a Memorial Book to Party and Soviet Organs, to the Collectives of Enterprises, Kolkhozes, Sovkhozes, Institutions, Organizations, Educational Institutions; Also to Creative Unions, Religious Associations, Trade-Union and Komsomol Organizations, and All the Inhabitants of Belorussia"]

[Text] The renewal of our society's spiritual life, humanization of relations between people, priority of common-human values, plus the rebirth or revival of the people's culture and national self-awareness have all led us objectively to the need for a profoundly thorough study and broad-based propaganda of Belorussia's history in its full scope.

Over the course of many years the Belorussian people lived in a stuffy, suffocating atmosphere of vulgar sociology, totalitarianism, Stalinism, and the dictatorship of the administrative-command system, which engaged in suppressing national self-awareness, as well as cultivating ideological and political myths. Nowadays, thanks to glasnost, openness, and a critical understanding of the past, these myths are bursting like soap-bubbles. The truth about the repressions of the 1930's, 1940's, and 1950's is being revealed and exposed. We have come to understand that, without a national revival, there can be no complete knowledge about the past, present, or future.

The invalidity of the conjectures that the truth about what was lived through casts a shadow on millions of those persons who toiled and fought honorably, performing their sacred duty to the Motherland, to the Fatherland is becoming evident. These people are beyond suspicion. Accounts have not been squared with the people's history or that of their own times. History is striking and is being comprehended.

In our stormy period of perestroika a genuine possibility has emerged for our people to participate in creating a 130-volume series of historico-documentary chronicles to be entitled "Memorial." Each of these volumes is being devoted to a specific city or rayon and discloses its history from ancient times to our own days. The experience of the Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House imeni Petrus Brovka testifies to the viability of this extremely important action. With the help of city and rayon commissions on compiling the "Memorial" book, the BelSE [Belorussian Soviet Encyclopedia] has already prepared, edited, and published chronicles of the Shumilinskii, Tołochinski, Berezovskii, Lakhovicki, and Bykhovskii rayons. Work is nearing completion of creating manuscripts for the Beshenkovichskii, Lioznenskii, Pružanski, and Grodnenski rayons. After the adoption in March 1989 of the decree of the Belorussian CP Central Committee approving this important initiative, the work was joined in by dozens of cities and rayons. The patriotic initiative was actively supported by the Soviets of People's Deputies and the Belorussian Branch of the Soviet Peace Fund. Eight Belorussian publishing house have proceeded to prepare the books and publish them. Their tasks consists of completing the collection of historical materials and publishing the maximum possible number of books by the 50th Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In connection with this, we call upon all party committees and ispolkins of the local Soviets of People's Deputies, as well as public organizations to activate the work of the commissions, and to involve the following in their participation: regional-studies specialists, school history teachers, VUZ lecturers, staff members of scientific research institutes, military commissariats, writers, and journalists.

The "Memorial" books are to become encyclopedias of the heart and duty, encyclopedias of our people's true history. They will immortalize the people's labor sacrifices, will give the gift of memory and respect to simple workers, to renowned scholars, figures and leaders in the fields of science and culture, writers, artists, and journalists who were born in a certain city or rayon.

The principal task assigned to this people's encyclopedia consists of re-creating the true history of all the regions of Belorussia, based on the genuine documents, publications, memoirs of those persons who participated in these historical events.

The commissions on collecting and systematizing materials for the "Memorial" books, with the aid of their creative activists must study the necessary materials in the holdings of the October Revolutionary Archive, the archive of the Institute of Party History under the Belorussian CP Central Committee, the military-historical archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, as well as materials from newspapers, journals, and books having to do with the city or rayon in question. We must make the rounds of the homesteads and apartments of all the inhabitants of a region, fill out questionnaires on the local people who perished during the years of the Great Patriotic War as well as during peacetime. The motto "Nobody is forgotten; nothing is forgotten!" must be transformed into a practical matter; it must yield results not merely through the "Memorial" books, but also by means of erecting memorials, boards of memory, monuments, and obelisks in honor of the warrior-heroes and the victims of mass genocide.

We call upon the ispolkins of the Soviets of People's Deputies to create the proper and suitable conditions for the complicated and difficult work being done by the rayon and city commissions. We recommend that branches of city and rayon banks open special accounts
under the motto “Memorial” and organize the contribution of funds to them—funds necessary for business-trip expenditures, for paying the wages of compilers, translators, and typists; also for textual editing of the books, and providing incentives for the most active compilers of factual and illustrative material.

Taking market-type relations and the operation of publishing houses on a cost-accounting—i.e., self-supporting, basis—into consideration, it would be feasible to provide for the conclusion well ahead of time of contracts between gorispolkoms, raiispolkoms, and publishing houses. Such contracts would specify the circulations and sums to be spent on reimbursing the losses incurred from publishing the books in question.

Dear fellow-countrymen!

Let us apply all our efforts, endeavors, and skills to the noble cause of reviving the historical memory of our Fatherland, of restoring its heroes and victims. Let each person’s burst of spiritual energy be embodied in the exciting pages of our Belorussian people’s true annals.

**Scope of Work Described**

91UN0210B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 25 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Arkadiy Vladimirovich Rusetskiy, chairman, Republic-Level Commission for Preparing a Memorial Book, by BELTA Correspondent]

[Text] Our press has published an Appeal by the Republic-Level Commission for Preparing a Memorial Book—an appeal to enterprises, organizations, and creative unions, as well as to all of Belorussia’s inhabitants. Our correspondent directed a request to Arkadiy Rusetskiy, this commission’s chairman, to comment on the appearance of this document.

[A. Rusetskiy] At the present time this republic is witnessing the unleashing of active searching and creative work with regard to creating the Memorial Book. By the time of the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet People’s Victory in the Great Patriotic War it is planned to prepare and to publish as much as possible of the 130-volume series of the historico-documentary the “Memorial” chronicles. Each book is devoted to a specific city or rayon and its history from ancient times to our own period. The realistic state of affairs in most of the rayons attests that the publication of such a number of books during the course of the next five years is extremely problematic. This too impelled us to appeal to everybody to whom the memory of our people is dear to participate as actively as possible in the searching or investigative work with regard to publishing these books, to draw Soviets of People’s Deputies, work collectives, and public organizations. This will enable us to solve many problems, including financial ones connected with outlays or expenditures for preparing, collecting, and checking materials, trips to and work in archives, and recording the memoirs of those persons who participated in the events concerned.

[Correspondent] And how will the publication of the “Memorial” Books be provided with the necessary quantity of paper, bindings, and other printing materials?

[A. Rusetskiy] These problems are now being worked out in this republic’s Council of Ministers, and they will be solved. The “Memorial” Books are scheduled to be published on the basis of a state order with all the consequences stemming from that.

[Correspondent] How is the documentary approach ensured when publishing such chronicles?

[A. Rusetskiy] Due to the events happening so long ago, the work of the investigative enthusiasts has been greatly complicated. A present-day innovation, for example, in the work of publishing the “Memorial Books” is the fact that, in addition to sketches, documents, and memoirs, they propose to print lists of persons in the following categories: participants in the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Civil War, laborers in the five-year plans and victims of the repressions which occurred in the 1930’s, 1940’s, and 1950’s, military servicemen, partisans, underground fighters and peaceful inhabitants, who died during the years of the Great Patriotic War, as well as in the fighting at Khalkin-Gol and near Lake Khasan, in the ranks of the Republican Army in Spain, during the liberation of Western Belorussia, in the Soviet-Finnish War, as well as in North Korea, in Vietnam, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan, and other countries. You will agree that it is a great deal of work to gather all these facts and materials into a single historical narrative. We need to study in depth and in detail the holdings of museum archives storing and preserving materials on Belorussia dating from the 14th through the 20th centuries, as well as the holdings of the October Revolution Archive, the archive of the USSR Ministry of Defense, along with materials from books, journals, and newspapers which pertain to the city or rayon involved.

And not until the factual, historical material has been collected do we recommend that the participants in the investigative work make the rounds of the homesteads and apartments of the region’s inhabitants and fill out the questionnaires concerning the countrymen who perished. Then, complete lists—in order to check them over and verify them—are published in the associations’ and rayons’ newspapers and are placed on Memorial Boards, monuments, and obelisks by way of honoring the heroic warriors and the victims of genocide.

The Republic-Level Commission for Preparing the “Memorial Books” has disseminated a questionnaire containing a detailed list of questions connected with perpetuating the memory of each person who perished for the Motherland. This questionnaire is filled out in each settlement, village, city, or rayon Soviet, attested by a seal, and sent on to the publishing house.
[Correspondent] The publishing houses and mass media—not often but sometimes—receive insulting or derogatory letters stating that the “Memorial Books” which have already come out have skipped a certain person and failed to perpetuate his or her memory. What is being done and will be done to prevent such errors in the future?

[A. Rusetskiy] Indeed, such instances do take place. For example, when preparing the historico-documentary chronicle of Bykhovskiy Rayon for publication, only two persons were put on the lists of persons who had perished from the village of Guta, Gorodetskiy Selsoviet. But at the time when the rounds of the homesteads were made, it turned out that 59 citizens had perished in Guta during the Patriotic War; among these, 43 were peaceful inhabitants. The mistake was corrected in time.

Buried on this republic’s territory are 1,827,586 people who perished during the war years, including 414,496 prisoners-of-war, 13,351 partisans, 751,404 peaceful inhabitants, and 648,334 unknowns. Only 231,374 of all those persons buried here have had monuments or markers placed to commemorate them. But there are a total of 3,406 burial grounds in our republic. Therefore, after new names of heroes have been discovered, special inserts will be published and added to those “Memorial Books” which have already come off the press. It has also been suggested that, after the entire “Memorial” series has been published, we publish two or three volumes containing lists of names of persons who had perished but which failed to be included in the basic volumes.

[Correspondent] Arkadiy Vladimirovich! What role is being played by the military commissariats in this work?

[A. Rusetskiy] This republic’s military commissariats conduct a great deal of investigative work, and we are grateful to them for that. All the rayon-level military commissariats have schematic maps of the military cemeteries. They have conducted a survey and a revision of them; they have made the lists of persons who died and are buried there more exact; they have discovered monuments or markers, and fraternal graves which are in need of repair or reconstruction. The Belorussian SSR Military Commissariat sent out to all the oblast-, kray-, and republic-level commissariats of the Soviet Union alphabetized cards on the persons who perished (died from their wounds) during the years of the Great Patriotic War and who were buried in the territory of Minsk Oblast either at the place where they were called up into the army or at the place where their next of kin were living.

With the aid of the military commissariats, 179 investigative detachments were created in this republic, along with 181 investigative groups. Last year alone investigative enthusiasts found 55 unaccounted-for burial sites on this republic’s territory, where 1,269 persons are at rest; and they ascertained 87 of their names.

[Correspondent] The Appeal talks principally about city and rayon Memorial Books. Tell us, please, is work being conducted with regard to compiling republic- or oblast-level Memorial Books?

[A. Rusetskiy] Yes, it is being conducted. After compiling the city and rayon books, we propose to publish six oblast-level books. Their materials will also constitute the skeleton or backbone of a republic-level Memorial Book.

In my opinion, our Appeal to this republic’s public opinion and organizations with regard to perpetuating the memory of its valiant citizens will help to develop and unleash a broad-based search having the following motto: “Let Us Commemorate Everybody by Name.”
ENVIROMENTAL AFFAIRS

ECOLOGICAL UNION TO HOLD CONFERENCE FOR ENVIRONMENT SECTOR

91WN0113E Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 90 Union Edition p 3

[Article by V. Vladin: “Ecological Union Convenes Congress”]

[Text] A founding congress to establish a federation of ecologically-oriented small enterprises, cost-accounting centers, organizations and cooperatives has been conducted by the USSR Ecological Union.

This is a statement by Nikolay Reymers, doctor of biological sciences:

“It is clear that the time has come to combine the interests of all enterprises which are preparing to protect nature. There are quite a few of these. We here at the Ecological Union are being approached by a wide range of scientific-technical and production-commercial organizations and cooperatives oriented toward ecological activities.”

“What could we do? Establish an information bank to encourage exchange of information. This in turn would help create a consumer market for ecologically-oriented scientific-technical and production-related products and would aid in the search for partners abroad. We could establish a special credit bank.”

“One point in particular: we are essentially holding this congress at our own expense. The participants make a small organizational contribution, up to 100 rubles, which includes hotel costs.”

RSFSR CHERNOBYL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHES NEWSPAPER

91WN0113C Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by L. Buzova: “SLAVYANSKOYE POLE”]

[Text] The RSFSR State Committee for Elimination of the Effects of the Chernobyl Disaster is to have its own press organ. This will be the interregional newspaper SLAVYANSKOYE POLE.

At the present time over 900,000 of the one-and-a-half million residents of Bryansk Oblast are living in areas contaminated by radiation. In some population centers the density of contamination reaches unimaginable proportions.

The staff of SLAVYANSKOYE POLE is now being assembled. Its core will be comprised of journalists from the oblast youth newspaper, who resigned as a group at an oblast Komsomol plenum. The problem was that the oblast Komsomol organization was unwilling to fund a newspaper which set an independent course.

INTERREGIONAL GROUP PLANS VOLGA ‘ECOLOGICAL PARLIAMENT’

91WN0113D Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Valeriy Kornev, Volgograd: “Ecological Parliament”]

[Text] An initiative group of deputies from the Volga basin has proposed the establishment of an ecological parliament in the Volga basin for the purpose of taking emergency measures to save the Volga.

Among the founders of this parliament are people’s deputies from the Mordovian, Mari, Chuvash and Kalmyk republics, and Tver, Nizhegorod, Saratov, Volgodonsk, Astrakhan and Vladimir oblasts. Of course I have not by any means listed all the areas which would be influenced by an ecological parliament encompassing the entire Volga, from its sources to the Caspian Sea.

The parliament will not duplicate or supplant public environmental protection movements. It has other goals. This was stressed immediately by L. Savelyeva, chairperson of the Lower Volga Ecological Association and co-chairperson of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet’s Permanent Commission on Environmental Protection and Rational Utilization of Natural Resources, who was given the privilege of opening the founding session.

What are those goals? The principal goal was clearly defined in the course of discussion: to coordinate actions by local authorities and deputies along the entire length of the Volga. There are plans to combine efforts to solve common ecological and economic problems, take coordinated steps in the event of an emergency situation in any region along the Volga, and approach the central authorities with proposals regarding the adoption of legislative acts concerning environmental protection. It was decided that each republic and oblast will delegate its own representatives to attend the ecological parliament.

The founders officially appealed to the republics’ supreme soviets and to oblast soviets, requesting support for their initiative. Documents were also sent to the USSR and RSFSR supreme soviets.

POLLUTION OF NEVA, ITS TRIBUTARIES IN LENINGRAD AREA EXAMINED

91WN0079A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 42, 13-20 Oct 90 pp 9-11

[Article by Arkadiy Sosnov: “Bitter Medicine for the Neva”]

[Text] An American woman journalist who had come to Leningrad made unflattering remarks about our water. She said that it was hazardous to one’s health. I should have kept quiet or passed it off with a joke, but instead I asked for confirmation. And I got it, in the form of excerpts from a tourist booklet. The U.S. Department of
Health and Welfare warns not to drink fresh water in Leningrad. One should only drink boiled or bottled water. The same thing applies to brushing one’s teeth. Some tourists who visited Leningrad last year returned home with a specific stomach disorder.

In school we were taught: “What is Leningrad famous for? Properly speaking, for its water…” But that miraculous body of water (the biggest and purest in Europe!) has been befouled to such an extent that in the past 15-25 years it has degenerated. Vast segments of the water surface have “blossomed,” and in the strata near the bottom there is an oxygen shortage and the fish are dying. Consequently [Gaff’s] disease, acute vitamin-B deficiency, has returned. Recently Vladislav Rumyantsev, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Lake Studies, who is overseeing the Ladoga Program, voiced utter distress: the state of the lake has deteriorated, its ability to purify itself has been lost, and the volume of polluted sewage entering it has risen.

How many times can one reiterate the elementary truths: DO NOT build facilities in the water-conservation zone; DO NOT release liquid manure into the lake; DO NOT float timber on rivers where salmon spawn; and so forth. Indeed, at the conference where Vladislav Aleksandrovich spoke I saw old acquaintances, regulators at such decorous seminars, who are powerless to change anything. It is said that the Neva bottom could be covered over from its source to its mouth with scientific recommendations for preserving water purity, and with blueprints that are lying untouched on shelves. But scientists are an imperturbable folk. They do not go on strike demanding: either you implement our recommendations, or we will immediately stop the creative process! By and large, they state facts.

Just recently we were confident that all that was necessary was to identify the source of pollution and measure its harmfulness, and a stop would be put to it. That was why the public knocked so stubbornly against the wall of environmental secrecy. The wall cracked and started to crumble when the newspapers first published information on the state of Leningrad water flows.

The medicine of glasnost proved revoltingly bitter. To start with, the degree of protection of the small, most defenseless streams feeding the Neva exceeded the worst expectations. The concentration of petroleum in the Yekateringofka was 37 times the norm, while that in the Okkervila was 100 times the norm. In these cases the concept of the maximum allowable concentration had lost all meaning. The famous Chernaya Stream, where Pushkin was shot in a duel, proved to be thoroughly “polluted” according to the classification of the State Committee for Hydrometeorology. The Izhora, the Slavyanka and the Karpovka were no better. On the other hand the waters of the Okhta were characterized as “extremely polluted.”

We found out that the Neva’s northern branches were teeming—excuse the pun—with intestinal bacteria [there is an untranslatable play on the Russian verb kishet, “to teem,” and kishechny, “intestinal”]. We learned that the Neva’s 26 tributaries were, in effect, fighting for the right to pollute it. Fortunately, the filth picked up by the high-volume flow is diluted and carried toward the gulf, but there it is accumulated in the cesspool at the Neva’s mouth, with the suppurring sore of the dike that is being constructed. Well, now what was left was to name the guilty and punish them. But it was easier to name those who were not involved in the poisoning. Because the poisoners included the flags of industry and small boiler plants, cooperative garages and enterprises belonging to the city soviet executive committee. A month passed. New information was published. The black streams had not started clearing up. Another month flew by. The city on the free Neva kept on living at the same measured pace, while vomiting forth “beneath itself” millions of cubic meters of filthy effluent.

What is frightening is not even this chronic “unrestrained filth.” What is frightening is that we have gotten used to it. We have reconciled ourselves to the fact that the Neva’s water constantly contains pesticides that should in no way be there, and that the Obvodny Canal has been turned into a sewer. That the Volkovka is fertilized by the Shushary Sovkhoz and the Leningrad Meatpacking Combine, which is why citizens hold their noses in the summer at the Kupchino subway station.

And the shocking figures on the pollution of the bodies of water put no one into a state of shock. It turned out that it was possible—now in a time of environmental glasnost—to discharge a volley of crude oil into Neva’s flow, befouling overflow wells and embankment slopes and destroying slow-witted ducks, and go unpunished. Or to calmly flush several tons of hydrochloric acid into the Neva. And all that is left for Gennadiy Kolesnikov, the city’s chief deputy sanitation inspector, to do is to note: “Fine, at least they are discharging oil—it can be seen. But what if it is a colorless poison that is water soluble?”

The habit of living in filth is no less contagious than other harmful habits. And we have grown accustomed to the crush on buses, wearisome waiting lines, leaking roofs, boorishness, empty store shelves, defaced facades and bad roads.

And in the midst of all this we have children are growing up. They look at us with amazement. And then they, too, get used to it. On Vasiyevsky Island schoolchildren (naive fourth-graders) got alarmed over the Smolnensk Stream, which was filled with patches of oil and green algae. Along with their biology teacher, they took water samples. But no one will take those samples. Or they take them but do not report the results of the analysis: it’s none of your business.

So far the Neva has come to our rescue. That’s the way it has been historically: the city has used the river as a giant sewer pipe. As late as 1963 engineering plans made no provision for treatment facilities. But today we need to
come to the river's rescue: to intercept the filth flowing in it and send it to city treatment facilities. In two years their capacity will make it possible to take all of Leningrad's sewage. But in order to deliver that sewage, it is necessary to break up pavement, cut into the city's subcutaneous layer, and stretch sewer pipes comparable to subway tunnels along the Neva. Laying them will take six to seven years, and approximately an equal amount of time will be required to install treatment facilities at enterprises.

What can we do? Put a seal on the Neva with a sign saying: "Sewage Prohibited"? Blow up the dike?

Inevitably, the problem arises of treating and detoxifying huge volumes of sewage, and recycling the city's adjacent fields of polluted silt. Specialists at the Environmental Safety Center (ESC) are working on that problem.

I personally felt a slight jolt of hope at yet another delicious and fruitless public and scientific conference—which, by number, I cannot recall. And I felt it not in the auditorium, where the speakers, one after another, were displaying charts and tables, but in the half-dark smoking lounge. Vladislav Donchenko, director of the ESC, held out to me two heavyish, dully glimmering metal nuts. He let me hold them and then put them back into his pocket. And his look while doing so was a bit enigmatic.

It turned out that those nuts had been extracted from sewage. The chief "suppliers" of metal to the sewerage system are printing plates production facilities and galvanized coatings shops. That is where a closed water-supply system and waste-free technology need to be introduced first of all. Treated effluent can be returned to the process and valuable components extracted. And promising materials can be obtained—metal composites containing zinc, copper, nickel, cobalt, chromium, etc. So the nuts in Donchenko's hand—made from such materials—were not ordinary nuts.

I am deliberately omitting the details. Those nuts (and they could be cutting tools or metal plates) are just a hint of the benefits promised by environmentally clean production processes. In the past five years at the Signal Association (one of the ESC's clients) the volume of effluent per unit of output has been reduced by a factor of eight. Imagine how much the load on city treatment facilities would be reduced if just 50 enterprises followed that example. It is the Signal Association that has the unit for treating effluent from the galvanizing process. So far it is just a pilot model, which has been incorporated in the technological chain. But what if a standardized automated unit were developed and examples of it produced for similar enterprises? It is attractive. The idea has been taken up in the city, and a joint-stock company has even been organized. Thus was formed the Ecological Association, which includes large concerns, associations and Leningrad scientific organizations.

Other areas of its activity include the development, installation and setting up of effective treatment facilities, and the financing of research to revive the city's small rivers. It has received a great many orders from enterprises for a system for the automated monitoring of effluent discharge. It is a kind of "environmental fool-proof system." If a given normative rate is exceeded, a slide valve on the pipe closes. And no ill-intentioned fool can open it.

It has already become a stereotyped notion that the environment is the concern of informal groups. But it wouldn't hurt us to take a look at what is going on in official spheres. An association has been established at the initiative of the Leningrad Environmental Protection Committee. It is a source of impetus for cooperation with scientists and plant managers. Fears that the Environmental Protection Committee would become yet another lifeless bureaucratic structure have proved unwarranted in Leningrad. To the contrary, the Leningrad Environmental Protection Committee is giving "what for" to industrial poachers and has marked its very first steps with merciless fines. And its dual subordination—to the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection and the city soviet executive committee—is allowing it to act in coordination with local authorities.

For example, the “city fathers” invite the chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee and reach an agreement with him that not a single production building, even the finest one, will not be erected on the Neva's banks as long as a single Leningrad enterprise belonging to the industry in question is violating environmental-protection norms. A joint protocol is drawn up, and monitoring is assigned to the Leningrad Environmental Protection Committee. The Ministry of the Aviation Industry has already encountered this strict approach.

And at the same time, a far more unusual visit. The city did not stint on the foreign currency required to invite the 89-year-old engineer Rostislav Nebolisin to visit. A native of St. Petersburg, the son of an admiral in the imperial navy, he left his native home in 1917 and since then has built a number of high-speed, compact stations for the treatment and purification of water in Italy, Spain and the United States. He announced his intention to give his fellow countrymen the blueprints and the recipes for “filling” those stations. And in response he heard something untraditional: it's good that we have our people "over there." Now they are no more. Nebolisin recently died.

A critical mass of people has arisen in the city, some of whom are decision-makers, who recognize that production for the sake of production is an absurdity, and that production on the brink of an environmental quagmire is a dangerous absurdity.

The club of fines is the crudest method of environmental education. There are also more subtle ones. At an
Moldavan Pollution of Dnestr, Tributaries Detailed

91WN0111A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 46, 17 Nov 90 p 5

[Article by Vadim Letov, SOVETSKAYA KULTURA correspondent: “Ave, Nistrul!”

[Text] Odessa is Odesa, Odesa laughs even when it is sad. Odessans, for example, will assure you that the Dnestr flows through Odesa, because it is Odesa’s water tap. The sad part about this joke is what flows out of the tap. From that tap flows a cocktail which Odessans call a “Moldavan.” Let us take a look at where that name originates.

About two years ago I happened to witness the Moldavan Supreme Soviet going through its newly-arrived and, it seemed, unexpected mail. There were many letters. Oddly enough, all of these letters, countless hundreds of them, came from Odesa. Furthermore, they differed only in the signatures, not their content. The numerous letter writers were asking the presidium chairman when their neighboring republic was going to begin serious implementation of its numerous decisions regarding strict sanitary protection for the basin of the Dnestr (or Nistru, as it is called in Moldovan).

VECHERNYAYA ODESSA, a newspaper with a nationwide reputation as a scrapper, mischievously carried out an ecological action in Odesa style. Instead of a boring half-column article it printed a form letter a few lines long and suggest that readers cut it out and put it in the mail. There is no need to tell Odessans how important the Dnestr is to them. It is not simply a water source, this river has literally eaten their liver. Odessans will tell you with a straight face that rarely will a bird reach the middle of the Dnestr near the city water intake if it drinks from the unpurified water first. And that is true: great efforts have to be made before the H2O from the Dnestr is drinkable. Odesa is presently building another water purification plant on the Dnestr, but it is already known that it will not solve the problems of water supply to this city of a million. Therefore Odesa is writing letters complaining and demanding money, and Kishinev is sending formal letters in reply.

But what does Moldova have to do with this? That longsuffering land also drinks from the Dnestr, drinks roughly the same thing. It is simply that the Nistru flows through three-quarters of the small republic’s territory, and is to it as the Volga is to Russia. Moldava sings of the Nistru. Cognacs and soccer teams bear its name. But a sacred thing has not only exaltation, but hidden sides as well...

Recently I witnessed a touching and beautiful procedure with prayers and dances. In a village near Rybnitsa a peasant was dedicating a new well. And what a well it was! No expense had been spared: the columns were covered with painted designs, and a sacred image under the roof was lit by a devotional lamp on a lace-covered
plate. The priest performed the service, and a crystal goblet with crystal-clear water made the round, greeted by oohs and ahhs. Ah, what wonderful water there is in the depths of Moldova!

Yet on the back side of that same farm, if you will excuse a little necessary coarseness, a wooden outhouse was suspended like a birdhouse over the steep bank of the Nistru.

“Don’t worry,” the peasant said, “it won’t fall—it’s mounted on steel rails.”

I am not going to single out the joyous host for his double standard toward a sacred thing. After all, what is one outhouse at one point above the Dnestr, when in nearby Rybnitsa there is a metallurgical plant, a giant of Moldovan industry, which dumps half-purified waste water into the river? The same is done without a twinge of conscience by Soroki and Rezina, Bendery and Tiraspol. Kishinev adds its share as well, because it is linked with the Nistru via the Byk River.

For fairness’ sake I should note that the Dnestr and the Prut River, its brother along the border, originate in the Carpathians, in the Ukraine. It is in the Ukraine that they gain strength and banks. At a border guards’ post I heard an appropriate story about a little factory located on the watershed between these little rivers near Ivanov-Frankovsk which once dumped its industrial waste water into the Prut River, which was of course observed by the neighboring country. A border declaration was issued, and the factory was forced to rectify the situation immediately. And so it did: it diverted its waste from west to east and began dumping it in the Dnestr. More “humane” for your own. Your own will not notice it, because they have cataracts on their eyes.

There it is, an “odoriferous” topic which even SOVETS’KAYA KULTURA cannot avoid if we hope someday to live in a cultured and civilized manner, according to the laws of our common European home. Otherwise they will not even let us in that house as the servant...

One statistic amazed me even as a child: in our country there are over three million rivers and streams. Within the Moldovan SSR alone approximately 2,000 tributaries flow into the Dnestr, the most important of which are not even 300 kilometers long. It is not length for which Moldovan rivers are known today. They are known for the pesticides they carry, exceeding established standards by factors of tens.

This summer I was called to Telenesht, a rayon center north of Kishinev. Called like an ambulance. The local authorities were hoping that an article in the central press about the miseries which had gripped that urban-type settlement would make everyone sit up and listen. And make them inspire correction of mistakes...

At the beginning of the 1980’s Telenesht, the heart of the Kodry Hills, an indescribably beautiful area, was the scene of ceremonies hauling the opening of the largest pork complex in the republic. Telenesht was destined to become Moldava’s meat capital. And the facade looked just fine: the porkers squealed, and the workers went around in white jackets. It was the back side of the complex that was bad. There, where visitors did not go, were the so-called “irrigation fields,” into which flowed daily thousands and thousands of tons of, excuse me again, pig manure. Telenesht is surrounded by the Kodry Hills on all sides, and among them flows the Little Chuluk River, Telenesht’s own river. Telenesht does not have any pasture land, or any place for strolling. Once upon a time they scraped out a place for a water plant. At the same site, about 100 meters or so away they also installed the manure storage tanks.

Then those tanks burst and poured out over the water intakes. That was on the surface. Underground the fecal matter penetrated into the groundwater and thoroughly polluted it with ammonia. And the mess that flowed from taps in Telenesht was like cholera extract. Everyone has his own Chernobyl. And let us be frank: Chernobyls are not created for us by foreign enemies.

It turns out that the ones to blame for what happened were the supervisors, who had gone on personal leave. Telenesht, with approximately 10,000 residents, is having to carry water from house to house in barrels, people bathe on trips out of town and the town cannot even build a Buratino bottling plant. Telenesht has said goodbye to its dream of becoming a city.

Incidentally, at the source of the Little Chuluk River, a brigade at Kukaroa Kolhoz showed me a sacred well with water so cold it will break your teeth and quench thirst at the mere sight of it. Moldovan distillers haul water from this well in tanker trucks for use in the manufacture of Kishinev vodka. Against the backdrop of a festively painted poster declaring “We will carry out decisions 100 percent and more” I was reminded of the monologue delivered by Bulgakov’s Voland to a tomat: “Why have you gilded your whiskers? And why the devil do you need a necktie, when you have no pants?”

Children are dying, and adults’ lives are being shortened. Soviet Switzerland has been poisoned by ammonia. And the local authorities are wondering whether they should declare their offices a disaster area or not. Will someone “there” suddenly slam down their fist and say “shoo!” to them? It is not the catastrophe which is so terrible; it is terrible that people have been taught to drink urine. They drink it and say that the planners are to blame, because they did not plan for the waste...

The czarina-little mother who planted Odessa on a high bluff above the sea two centuries ago did not foresee that one day Odessa would be facing a water shortage, that first the springs would dry up and then the artesian wells, that one day people would fertilize their fields “the wrong way” or build a pork processing complex nearby. Let us blame the arbitrariness of czarism, socialism, communism and any other “ism” and live the way we did before. Let us blame our present-day planners, completely ignoring the fact that they are us. And no one else.
As I leaf through my notebook I get angry, and not just as part of my publicistic style. The time has come to clean out our sacred wells, and they are within us. And only within us, not in the person whom we put in a position as a result of rallies, only to come back to accuse him over and over again and scream "Out!". The time has come to clean out the lack of professionalism in our wells, our willingness to do things we are not capable of. "Mitrofan is capable of everything, because he is willing to do anything," said the seditious apparatchik Saltykov-Shchedrin in "The Gentlemen From Tashkent" almost 120 years ago. And he could still say, addressed to the co-owners of the Dnestr-Nistru: "The Mitrofans have not changed..."

I regret that last year I passed up what was in my opinion a splendid moral topic. Other things came up, and I did not go to that trial. A woman was being tried along with her enterprise; she had worked for many, many years at a plant situated on the shore of the Black Sea. She received awards and bonuses for her work and sometimes was even a member of presidiums. An ordinary Odessa plant working three shifts. So this woman also worked on the night shifts. And in the middle of the night, before the cock crows and while the health inspectors still slept, the workers ever so quietly dumped everything the water treatment plant could not handle into the Black Sea, following a verbal order from the administration. Everything would have been just fine, both for this little plant's secret in a huge sea and for the complete "agreement" between water treatment and design specifications, had it not been for the fact that one time a young man, that worker's son, went swimming in the sea near his mother's plant. He swam and became covered with sores which even the best doctors in Odessa could not cure. And the mother took her employer to court.

That is a canvas of unwritten material, and at the time I really wanted to ask the worker whether she realized that the trial was also against her, a backward "cog" in a backward system.

Where have the days gone when in that same city of Odessa one hundred years ago a treatment facilities contract filled a glass from one of the pipes flowing out into the Black Sea, drank from it and offered the inspection committee a drink as well? After that the committee signed a document accepting the facility. In those days documents had to be signed. I am not talking here about point men. I am talking about a system which has made mitrofanism a system. With that burden we will not get out of yesterday, we will carry it with us into tomorrow. The Moldavian Government allocated 500 water cans to Telenesht and let it go at that. I read in information received from the environmental protection inspector that near Bendery a poultry plant, dairy farms and a pork processing plant are under construction with waste treatment systems which have officially been put into operation but which are not actually functioning. Do the pipes empty into the water? With millions and millions of rubles squandered? And what about health, upon which one cannot place a monetary value? I read addresses: village of Kopchak, Stefan Vodz Rayon; Ignatsevy outside of Sholdanesht; Chufsht it in Keinar-skii Rayon, and on and on. More and more new Tele-neshts are brewing. Stockpiles of hard-to-find aluminum water cans are being laid in. A cocktail is being mixed for Odessa, and the Moldavians are going to try it first.

Last year a comprehensive ecological expedition floated down the Dnestr and Prut on boats and rafts; its tasks included making an inventory of all the industrial and social tumors which are eating up nature in Moldava and the Ukraine. A Moldavan Greens League has been created. In Moldava it is called the "Assochiantsiy verde." Emil Lotyanu, who is not just creative on the screen, proposed this abbreviation based on the Moldavan initials: AVE. In Latin, the precursor of the Moldavan language, "ave"—and this is common knowledge—means "hail." Ave, Nistru! Hail, Nistru!

This summer Moldava established a department of environmental protection and natural resources. The state committee of the same name wished it all the best. Professor Ion Dedyu, an ecologist, was appointed general director of the department; he is the author of the interesting "Moldavan Ecological Dictionary." The department is only a couple of months old, so it is hard to demand that it produce any results.

"Crisis?" Ion Ilich said to me in a private conversation. "But not a disaster yet..."

And added, after pausing a moment: "It is already a disaster."

How do we recover from this disaster? By compiling lists of offenders? By fining the Dnestr steamship lines which are digging gravel out of the hydrologically exhausted Nistru? By establishing an ecological commission? Incidentally, in Odessa the same commission, or virtually the same, already exists, but that has not made the beaches any cleaner. The Moldavan capital is establishing a U.N. Ecological Center, but this will not make the air any more aesthetically pleasing; it will not even increase the number of water cans. "Speeches will not save the Volga" said a poet standing on other banks. Nor will the Dnestr-Nistru be saved by roundtables with sharp corners put on by the evening newspapers in Odessa and Kishinev. Proclaiming little local problems and striving to resolve them in a local way, without going beyond clearly-marked boundaries.

But nature does not recognize those boundaries, just as there are no bounds to the truth that the earth improves if it is treated properly. That was once said by V. I. Lenin, whom we want to casually accuse of the very sins which we ourselves have committed. We have become so
acustomed to accepting nature's bounty that we do not even want to give back to it the most available thing of all: our ideas.

An idea for the Dnestr is simple: establish an interrepublican center to save it, saving ourselves in the process. Save and be saved. Two thousand streams flow into the Nistru from the Moldavian side, and one thousand flow into the Dniestro from the Ukrainian side. So why do not all the associations, state committees, subcommittees and eco-centers which are presently busy drawing up papers unite their efforts in struggle? Yes, in a struggle for survival!

Holding my nose I sit on the banks of the Little Chuluk River, Telenesh's river. The Little Chuluk flows into the Middle Chuluk, the Middle Chuluk flows into the Big Chuluk, the Big Chuluk flows into the Reut, the Reut flows into the Dnestr, and the Dnestr flows either into the Black Sea or into Odessa, and the Black Sea flows into the World Ocean. And we must not ever forget that, else we will never stand up straight and assume the form of humans.

Recently Odessa earned half a million. A foreign dry-cargo ship was taking on bunker oil in the commercial harbor. The watch was careless, and oil spilled overboard. A commission assessed the damages to the sea and the city at half a million, and the captain nodded assent and said: “O.K.!”

The Black Sea. A black raid. The black, black Nistru. There is no need to write letters to presidents. Those letters are like requests for money from poor relations. Much ink has been wasted, but with no result. Let us protect our sacred wells ourselves, without political chicanery...

Initial Actions of Baykal Commission Noted
91WN0113A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 90 Union Edition p 2

[Article by Vladimir Sbitnev, Ulan-Ude: “United To Protect Baykal”]

[Text] Ulan-Ude was the scene of a meeting of ispolkom heads, environmental protection committee personnel and members of ecological committees under soviets in Chita and Irkutsk Oblast and the Buryat SSR (sic) held at the initiative of S. Shakhrayev, USSR people’s deputy. They adopted a resolution on the so-called Baykal Commission and began the formation of that organization.

The resolution states that the Baykal Commission is an international organization intended to plan and coordinate ecological policy within the Baykal region, which includes the Mongolian People’s Republic in addition to the geographical administrative areas listed above. If one takes into account the fact that decisions made by the commission will be implemented via the corresponding structures of state authority, then one could say that what is now emerging is a kind of ecological “government” for the region.

It will be comprised of the deputy chairmen of executive organs, chairmen of ecological commissions and environmental protection committees, including those of parallel organs in the Mongolian People’s Republic, and representatives of national and ethnic cultural centers and the Baykal Fund. This composition will make it possible to set priorities in socioeconomic, ethnocultural and ecological policy, to regulate economic activity and to establish a regional fund to finance major research and economic projects aimed at introducing ecological principles into the life of and all types of activities in a region of the planet which is of such great value to all humanity.

This somewhat unusual idea came was broached two years ago during the first All-Union social and ecological consultation on Baykal and took definite shape at a recent international conference entitled: “Human Beings Around Lake Baykal and Their Environment.”

It is envisioned that on the basis of international agreements an international center for ecological protection of the Baykal region will be established. Within the limits of its activities and in close cooperation with UNESCO it will provide a focus for specific scientific potential aimed at ensuring ecologically sustainable cultural development of the entire Baykal region and creating models of interaction between society and nature.

The commission members were familiarized with a draft RSFSR law on Lake Baykal drawn up by A. Kazannik, USSR people’s deputy. This unusual document, the first of its kind in our country, will be examined in greater detail at the next session of the Baykal Commission, which will be held a month from now in Ulan-Ude.

Baykal Movement Session Views Impact of Mongolian Lake
91WN0123A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 47, 21 Nov 90 p 11

[Article by Zoryi Balayan: “Before It’s Too Late”]

[Text] The fourth meeting of the Baykal Movement, an international ecological organization, recently took place at Lake Hovgol in Mongolia. It was dedicated to the problem of protecting fresh water and springs, which are the property of all mankind. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA has previously reported on meetings held at Lake Baykal and at Lake Sevan as well as at Lake Biwa in Japan. Today we bring to the attention of our readers the next report in this series.

For more than 30 years the tragedy of Lake Sevan has allowed the Armenian people no rest. Even Karabakh and Spitak have not overshadowed it. Last summer, at a time when rallies and demonstrations were being held in the republic and when the political situation reached its
peak of intensity, another in a series of meetings sponsored by the Baykal Movement took place at Lake Sevan, attended by writers and scientists from various parts of the country. A Japanese delegation, who were making a film about the movement, attended one of the conferences. Subsequently, at a joint session, members of the film crew made the point that Armenians who were deeply distressed by the prospect of the future had in mind not only Nagorno-Karabakh but also Lake Sevan, referring to it as their last fresh-water spring.

The Japanese have a last spring of their own—Lake Biwa. The Mongolians have Hövsgöl, a lake still called the Mongolian Baykal. This is not a fortuitous parallel. Lakes Hövsgöl and Baykal are linked with one another like two communicating blood vessels. The life of Mongolia is dependent upon Hövsgöl for its prosperity. Life is also dependent upon Lake Baykal, which is the recipient of four-fifths of the fresh-water springs in the region. Such is the gravity of the situation, and such is the cost. Suddenly, it, too, is a last spring.

The Mongolian writer Tserendorzhyn Baldorzh, an ardent advocate of ecology, said: “I do not know whether scientists are right in maintaining that our Gobi Desert at one time was the bottom of a fantastically large reservoir, but one thing I do know: Our generation alone has witnessed the desiccation of dozens if not hundreds of springs. Our Great Lakes have been destroyed. They were known as the Great Lakes not simply by association with those five wonders of nature in North America, but because they were indeed great. Yet today they are to be found only on obsolete maps.

“Water is vulnerable,” the sage commented, “like the soul of a man. Lake Hövsgöl has its own unique soul. It has been preserved until now largely because there are almost no populated areas near it. But there is some danger that the situation may be changing for the worse. And, of course, as is always the case, we are concerned with the possibility of human interference with the natural equilibrium. Soviet and Mongolian geologists have discovered deposits of phosphoritic rock in the area of Hövsgöl. One such deposit is right on the shore of the lake.”

It may be said under oath that perestroyka has saved Lake Hövsgöl. It is difficult to say what might have become of it but for the influence of perestroyka on Mongolian society and for the inroads made by glassnost and democratization. In any event, immediately following publication in a local newspaper of an article by Ts. Baldorzh entitled “Lake on the Executioner’s Block,” the Mongolian government adopted a decree halting the mining of phosphoritic rock and ending any further search for deposits.

Although it might appear on the surface that the people have left this unique lake in peace, the underlying problem persists. Persons attending the Mongolian meeting of the Baykal Movement issued a special declaration on this subject, which stated in part: “We share the concern of the Mongolian people with regard to refining phosphoritic rock at deposits in proximity to the lake. Everything that is potentially harmful to Lake Hövsgöl should be eliminated from plans of any kind.”

In saving Lake Hövsgöl, we save Lake Baykal. For the “sacred sea” obtains about 60 percent of its water supply by way of Lake Selenga, which is known in Mongolia as the “daughter of Hövsgöl.”

In spite of the absence of industrial sites in the vicinity of Lake Hövsgöl, water tests indicate that the lake has been losing its ideal standard of purity over the years. Though there are scarcely any industrial wastes or man-made discharges to be found, this body of water has been accumulating sulfur, nitrogen, and phosphorus. Such “anonymous” pollution is detectable today in many of the fresh-water springs. It may be recalled that at the Lake Sevan meeting Armenian researchers found a lot more nitrates and sulfuric acids than could either form or accumulate in the reservoir basin itself. Where do they come from? Each year about 120 cubic meters of rain water fall into the subsoil. It would seem that this is an enormous saving grace—a gift to all the lakes, rivers, and springs without exception. But with the passage of time the rain has been bringing not life but illness and even death.

In my native Stepanakert, I remember, my grandmother used to collect the rain water that fell off the roof in a barrel, Then I could see how rapidly this water warmed up. And the women used to like to wash their hair with it, praising its softness as a gift from the heavens—a gift of God. Today, I suppose, my late grandmother would have broken with this centuries-old tradition (as her granddaughters have done); for the “soft water” has become poisonous. Especially vulnerable are those regions where the soils and bedrock are not able to neutralize the acid silt. Moreover, it is a well-known fact that not only the regions with high-density industrial enterprises and urban congestion suffer from this condition, but also remote and pristine oases, including the virginal Lake Hövsgöl.

G. I. Galaziev, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and unflailing participant at the meetings of the Baykal Movement, expressed this thought in his report: “If we do not succeed in warding off disaster by applying the principle of prevention, then the time will come when mankind finds itself on the brink of a deadly drought.”

The focus of attention at the Mongolian meeting was the problem of reservoirs. A report on this subject was given by Valentin Rasputin, co-chairman of the Baykal Movement, who noted that more than 10 million hectares of what is perhaps the most fertile land in our country is today under depths of water. Today it can no longer even be called water.

There is another alarming aspect to this subject. It is the functional relationship between man-made reservoirs and earthquakes. And it has a direct bearing on the tragedy of
Armenia. It is, of course, well known that the subterranean disturbance occurred in precisely the region where the biggest reservoir in the republic had been erected. Other tragic examples of such stormy outbreaks of nature at the sites of power projects may be found in the professional literature. Subterranean quakes in association with man-made bodies of water may result in not only havoc, mutilation, and death, but in the ruination of springs and other sources of potable water. After the Spitak earthquake, we learned that in many of our villages springs that were centuries old had dried up. In many places the entire system of subterranean water flow was disrupted.

Vladimir Krupin cogently demonstrated with many examples that over the course of several decades our government had, in fact, deceived its own people, while depriving them not simply of their native land but also of the most vital means of subsistence such as earth and water. Was this not so? Not only did the man-made reservoirs bury thousands of village settlements, but the water in them was no longer suitable for use. The writer emphasized particularly the misfortunes of Lake Ladoga, which is now in need of ecological first aid. “In the old days,” he said, “when the enemy approached Lake Ladoga or calamity threatened, the Veche bell in Great Novgorod would raise a state of alarm throughout the land of the Rus. Now there is a drumbeat in our hearts demanding the removal of the catastrophe that hangs over it and urging the whole world to come to the defense of Lake Ladoga. Before it’s too late!”

The Karakalpak writer Tulebergen Kaipbergenov declared at the plenary meeting: “Once again the question is being raised by someone or other of diverting Siberian rivers into the Aral Sea. I am categorically opposed to this. We have long been deluded by this notorious “project of the century” until today we are at the brink of disaster. I have already forgotten when the last time was that I sat peacefully at my work table, contemplating the behavior of my fictional heroes. Recently, my days and nights have been filled with anxiety and pain for the Aral Sea. For I have come to realize that if the sea perishes, my people will perish. Then my novels will be needed by no one.”

The committee of the Baykal Movement adopted a resolution to hold its next meeting next summer on the shores of the Aral Sea.

Baykal Pulp Plant To Be Closed in 1993
91WN0113B Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by A. Vyborov, Irkutsk: “The Decision Has Been Made”]

[Text] Three years have passed since a government resolution was issued on reorganization of the Baykal Pulp and Paper Combine, but until now the question has remained open: will a pulp and paper combine continue to operate on Lake Baykal or not?

Many years of debate were brought to an end with the conclusion of the Irkutsk Oblast Soviet's second session. The deputies decided to halt pulp production operations in the Baykal region as of 1 January 1993 and not to issue permits for any more ecologically harmful production facilities on the shores of Lake Baykal in the future.

What about the combine's workers? A solution to this problem is not clear, but one must be sought. There are already plenty of proposals regarding their future. The Swedish-West German firm IKE is proposing the establishment of an environmentally safe furniture plant here, the International Red Cross wants to begin manufacturing disposable syringes and Coca-Cola has promised to begin production of diet drinks made from herbs and berries found in the Baykal region.

Official Updates Status of Foodstuff Radioactive Contamination in Ukraine
91WN0068B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAYNI in Russian 24 Oct 90 p 3

[Interview with Prof. V. I. Smolyar, doctor of medical sciences and director of the UKSSR Ministry of Health's Research Institute of Nutrition Hygiene, conducted by Ukrainian Information Agency correspondent D. Kiyanskiy: “Nuclides, Away From The Table!: The Source of Polluted Foodstuffs That Get Into Kievites' Diets”; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] According to a report by scientists who studied mushrooms following the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, they proved several times more contaminated by radionuclides than they had prior to 1986. Some news! those who have read these lines might think. The newspapers have repeatedly reported such facts already. Nonetheless, it really is surprising news: the place in question is the United States of America. Yes the Chernobyl disaster is global in scope. But, of course, its strongest impact has been on the “quality of life” of the population of the oblasts of Ukraine, Belorussia and Russia that suffered the disaster. Which products are we eating today, four and a half years after Chernobyl? How can the quantity of radionuclides in our diet be reduced? Professor V. I. Smolyar, doctor of medical sciences and director of the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health's Research Institute of Nutrition Hygiene, talks about this to a Ukrainian Information Agency correspondent.

[Kiyanskiy] Today many people are worried about the quality of milk, meat and vegetables. I would like to get the latest information.

[Smolyar] Most unfortunately, right now, in October, there is still no information for the first half of the year. The reasons are the very simplest—complacency and our general disorderliness. Nonetheless, research done in 1989 indicates that during the time that had passed since the accident the level of cesium in foodstuffs had become substantially lower. The explanation is that at first
contamination was on the surface, while in subsequent years radionuclides have entered plants primarily through the roots.

If you take foodstuffs on the average throughout the republic, right now their level of contamination is from two to four times as high as it was before the accident at the nuclear power plant (let me parenthetically note that, from the standpoint of the temporarily allowable level, it may be even 100 times as high, but one must not forget that we are talking here about norms for an emergency situation). The cleanest foodstuffs today are in the republic's southern oblasts. In the central and northern oblasts, contamination is four to six times the pre-accident level, while in the eastern oblasts it is three to four times as high. But I emphasize: on the average. As for individual foodstuffs, for example, mushrooms in Ukraine's forest zone remain 100 times more contaminated than before the accident. Moreover, Polish mushrooms and butter mushrooms accumulate the most radioactive substances. They are followed by chanterelles, birch mushrooms, edible boletuses and, finally, honey agarics.

Lately the newspapers have carried maps of radioactive contamination of the republic's forests. But even in places where consuming the forest's gifts is not forbidden, I nonetheless advise first boiling mushrooms two times for 10 minutes each, and pouring off the broth, before using them in prepared dishes. And I do not recommend gathering forest berries. In general, berries have proved more contaminated than fruits. That is due to their specific biological characteristics and their closeness to the soil.

[Kiyanyskiy] In that case, what should one do with potatoes?

[Smolyar] Well, first of all, they are relatively clean. Moreover, at least half of the radionuclides are transferred to the water during boiling. Therefore, for soup it is best to first boil potatoes (as well as beets, carrots and cabbage) five to 10 minutes, and then to use fresh water.

[Kiyanyskiy] Vladimir Ivanovich, speaking of food, we started with mushrooms. Shouldn't we perhaps return to more essential food—meat and milk?

[Smolyar] Fortunately, throughout the republic as a whole, milk has become less contaminated: from 500 to 600 times less, compared to the end of 1986. Meat today is 125 times less contaminated.

[Kiyanyskiy] Nonetheless, as you have already mentioned, even now they contain several times the amount of nucides as before the accident. Just what were they like then, four years ago?

[Smolyar] Very contaminated, I think. Such figures were secret at that time.

[Kiyanyskiy] All the figures cited above were calculated for cesium, yet there are also iodine and strontium.

[Smolyar] The iodine, fortunately, decomposed rapidly. As for the strontium, although there was much less of it than cesium in the fallout, a certain amount of it nonetheless did end up in foodstuffs, especially in the republic's central and northwestern regions. Therefore, that element should not be discounted, either, despite the fact that the methods for determining it are fairly labor-intensive.

[Kiyanyskiy] As it has recently become known, the environmental situation that has developed in Kiev since the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station is much worse than was previously thought. In this connection, the products that are being shipped into the city are obviously, by and large, uncontaminated, aren't they?

[Smolyar] I would not like to distress Kievites, but since you have mentioned the subject, we should dot all the "i"s. When I first saw the results of research conducted by our institute and the city's sanitation and epidemiological service, I simply could not believe my eyes: I asked that it be repeated. Unfortunately the results were the same the second time. So, here are the data obtained in September-October. In 1989 Kievites consumed meat that was 47 times as contaminated, milk that was 44 times as contaminated, and vegetables that were 17 times as contaminated as before the Chernobyl disaster. Whatever you say, the situation is extremely alarming. It turns out that in the capital, whose residents have, so to speak, drunk fully from the Chernobyl cup, foodstuffs are much more contaminated than in other cities. I think that the Kiev City Soviet and the republican government should take the most urgent measures.

[Kiyanyskiy] But why did that happen? What are the reasons for the situation that has developed?

[Smolyar] The first and, I dare say, principal one is complacency. Lately radiation monitoring has greatly deteriorated—both at food-industry enterprises and, especially, at markets. Yet Kiev is quite near to Chernobyl. Meat, milk and vegetables from strictly controlled regions can (and are!) shipped into the city. That must be constantly monitored. The supplying of the city must in no case be allowed simply to take care of itself. Today Kievites more than ever before need uncontaminated foodstuffs produced in Ukraine's southern oblasts.

[Kiyanyskiy] The newspapers once published recommendations by the American doctor R. Gale about how people should eat following the accident. Some of the advice differed somewhat among different publications. To what extent to R. Gale's recommendations accord with our own dietitians' viewpoint?

[Smolyar] By and large, they accord. However, one must take into account the fact that they were given immediately after the accident. Now, four and a half years later, some of the advice looks dubious. Why, for example, take one or two tablets of activated charcoal before eating? After all, it has now been proved that it does not remove radionuclides. It is incomprehensible why we would now need flax broth. The recommendation to
drink a little red wine before dinner draws no objections in and of itself (if, of course, you can buy it somewhere). Such beverages really do contain a certain amount of polyphenols and anthocyanins, which may remove radionuclides from the organism. Yet there are much more of those useful substances in tea, dark varieties of grapes, pomegranates, black rowanberries and oatmeal.

R. Gale recommends eliminating beef, boiled eggs and jelled meat or fish from the diet. As for the jelled meat or fish, I probably agree with him, but beef is one of the basic and most valuable food products. It is true that it contains several times the amount of radionuclides as pork, say. But the amount of them can be reduced through special preparation. As for hardboiled eggs, the shells of which contain a very insignificant amount of strontium, that method of cooking allows one to guard against salmonella.

I fully agree with the American doctor concerning carrot and tomato juices which contain carotene; garlic and horseradish, which are sources of vitamin C, which increases the organism’s resistance; and grated radishes, which contain many pectins. But I want to emphasize that all such advice makes sense only given a rational diet. Without a sufficient quantity of complete proteins, vitamins and mineral salts, their effect will be extremely minimal.

[Kiyaniskiy] R. Gale’s recommendations are good in that they are specific, simple and, therefore, comprehensible. Isn’t it time for our specialists in nutrition to finally speak their piece, taking the present situation into account? And not in general terms, as is often the case, but quite specifically, by putting out special instruction booklets.

[Smolyar] Yes, that is essential. Our institute is presently preparing a popular brochure that will be published in a mass printing. And one more thing. The union-republic program for 1991-1992 of urgent measures to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station sets the task of arranging the industrial production of products containing substances that accelerate the removal of radionuclides from the organism. They include special baked goods and pastries, beverage concentrates, and canned goods based on beets and carrots with carotene and pectin additives. The Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health’s Research Institute of Nutrition Hygiene is in charge of this problem. More than 80 the republic’s enterprises will take part in carrying out the project.

Impact, Benefits of Kaliningrad Pulp Plant Closure Weighed

91W/N06A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Nov 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Staff Correspondent Yu. Strojanov: “Debates by a Dead River”]

[Text] Kaliningrad—No one wants to live now near this once beautiful river. Its darkened waters are dead. But it is hard to get away from it—it flows through the center of the city. In many people’s opinion, it was the local pulp and paper combine that killed it. Should it be closed? Such, for all intents and purposes, was the decision of a session of the oblast soviet, a decision veiled in Aesopian wording about suspending the operation of the Kaliningrad Pulp and Paper Combine as of January 1991 with a proposal that it be converted to environmentally clean technology.

Leaning over the fence, I look into the water in an effort to discern any signs of life. But what could that absolutely opaque black suspension, as heavy as mercury, conceal? A snowy white ship hovers like a mirage along the bank in the stinking vapors.

“A sulfur pipeline,” explains A. Savkin, a consultant with the CPSU okbom’s social and economic department. “In the summer, especially when the wind drives the sea water, and the organic matter that have accumulated on the bottom for tens of years start to break down. And then the oxygen in the river is zero.”

The city sewerage system, A. Savkin adds, cannot cope with the sewage. Every 24 hours 200,000 cubic meters of such effluent is discharged into the river. Tons of tons of organic matter, pure slops.

“The river has lost its ability to cleanse itself and has turned into a source that releases hydrogen sulfide into the air; in the region of Moskovskiy Prospekt and the Oktyabr and other housing developments, the hydrogen sulfide content is 12 to 13 times the maximum allowable concentration. Moreover, methane, ammonia, phenol and benzpyrene have been found in the air. All this creates abnormal conditions for habitation and draws numerous complaints from people of headaches, asthma and allergic reactions,” states the preamble to the decision that was made at a session of the oblast soviet in connection with the emergency environmental situation. But the employees of the pulp and paper combine doubt its fairness.

“It was made on the basis of emotions,” believes V. Katin, secretary of the enterprise’s party committee.

V. Trofinov, chairman of the labor collective council, agrees with him.

“What are 2,500 employees to do now? And if you also take their family members into account, shutting down the combine will affect 10,000 people. Many of them will be deprived not just of work but of their places on waiting lists for apartments and kindergartens. The younger ones have already started to leave us.”

We take a look into one of the shops. A mighty two-story housing of antique design. A rebuilt machine. The combine originated with a 19th-century mill. A roll of unbleached pulp, moist and seemingly endless, enters the machine, drying out before our eyes.
"It is purchased both in our country and abroad," explains A. Tkachev, the combine's chief engineer. We export to Austria, the FRG and Britain."

The combine is one of the most important suppliers of pulp to Kondopoga, where the union's principal producer of newsprint is located. An open letter from the combine's labor collective warns that closing the combine will result in breakdowns in newspaper publication, interruptions in the sale of goods that require packaging, and a shortage of carbonic acid and nutrient yeast, which the enterprise produces.

Supporters of the two viewpoints as to the combine's future have crossed swords on the banks of the dead Pregolya. But in the meantime the participants in the debates are being increasingly buffeted by the vengeful forces of befouled nature, and the economic storms of hasty decisions are brewing. I never did manage to find out the main thing: Will the situation change fundamentally with the shutdown of the pulp and paper combine? Will the river become clean? Will the filth that has accumulated on its bottom over many years disappear? Will people stop getting sick? Will other proposals—reducing capacity, reorienting the mill toward the production of paper, rather than commodity pulp, as some specialists advise—do any real good? It seems that the scientific forecasts are still not based on sound calculations. What is going on is an emotional manipulation of figures. But the only fact is that 49 percent of the effluent discharged into the Pregolya comes from the pulp and paper combine.

"The pulp and paper combine is definitely harmful," says T. Grunicheva, the city's chief sanitation inspector. "Will things get better when it is shut down? Yes. But it won't solve the problem."

In her words, more than once now toxic waters driven by the sea wind have come up to the pumping stations of the city water system. There is a disaster in the making, the roots of which lie in the manured soil of stagnation. The construction of the city's sewage-treatment facilities began 15 years ago. If they had appeared, the Pregolya would sink in relief. But all deadlines for their completion have long since been missed. The people I talked with heaped unflattering epithets on the trust that was established to build the treatment facilities. But do phrases appropriate for rallies make things any better? The session of the oblast soviet ordered them to be put into operation in 1992. However, construction of the treatment facilities is being financed by—the pulp and paper combine! Is there any need to explain what will happen if the combine, which is the client, is shut down? That will not spur on the languid construction project; it will become completely paralyzed until lost economic ties are restored. It is easy to imagine: in a year or two the city's residents, having felt no relief, will once again set off to hold rallies. And what then? Close the remaining 26 enterprises?

Chairman Outlines Ukrainian Ecology Commission Work

91WN0112A Kiev RABOCHAYA GAZETA in Russian
24 Oct 90 p 1

[Interview with N.I. Zaludyak, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission on Ecology and the Rational Use of Nature, by A. Fomin, date and place not specified: "Ecology Above All," first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] N.I. Zaludyak, chairman of the Commission on Ecology and the Rational Use of Nature:

[Zaludyak] It is time for all of us to take a sober look at things. What is happening to nature? Our lands have become salinized and highly acidic; they are being destroyed by the processes of water erosion—they are being washed away. Pesticides have been discovered in the underground waters of every area. Every year enterprises discharge 2.634 million cubic meters of polluted waste water, while a third of the facilities to treat waste water do not operate effectively. Every year more than 10 million tons of pollutants go into the air that you and I breathe every day. Moreover, only about 40 percent of the emission sources are equipped with dust and gas treatment devices.

Naturally, the work of our commission is acquiring particular significance. The first thrust of our work is legislative. We are preparing the ecological section of the plan for the republic's transition to market conditions. What we had before—the remainder principle in the planning and financing of environmental protection—must go. We must create effective economic levers to regulate the use of nature.

This matter is very complex. Today our specialists are convinced of how badly we used to operate under the laws. The law to protect nature in the Ukrainian SSR—I will put it baldly—did not function at all. We had a sector-by-sector approach to environmental protection. And the laws were tuned to it: protection for the animal world existed, but for the plant world there was nothing. Land codes and water codes existed; there was a code on mineral wealth and a law to protect the air. In this way they divided the land into parts. And in general, as with Raykin, no one was responsible for anything. I think that there must be one law on the protection of nature and the approach to it must be a unified one.

The second thrust is to monitor the fulfillment of previously-adopted decisions. Now we will be examining the question of the Lisichansk- Rubezhnoye Industrial Complex and we shall ask of the leaders and the government: what has been done to restore natural resources? After all, there are many "polluters": the petroleum refinery, the soda plant, the Azot Production Association, the Krasitel Plant.
Gradually we are establishing inter-regional ties. For example, under the Azov program we will work together with the members of the Russian parliament.

Two groups of our deputies have already visited atomic power plants and studied with specialists, taking into account public opinion and the situation; they are preparing proposals on how to close—at least temporarily—units which are in a state of construction and to defuse the psychological tension in society.

The plans call for investigating the area around the Dnepr (from Kremenchug to Zaporozhye), where a very bad ecological situation has also developed.

We are establishing contacts with foreign partners. Ties are being initiated with the Association of Ukrainian Engineers in Canada. We would like to study their experiment in the formulation of laws to protect the environment. They began to do this before we did, and they are doing a better job of providing this kind of protection at the local level. We maintain ties with UNESCO, and we have held a meeting with representatives of the Greens of Australia. We are attempting to expand the range of these contacts.

[Fomin] Will it not be harder for the deputies to control the state of the environment after the republic has made the transition to a market and both large and small enterprises have been put into private hands for operation? After all, is it not much more difficult to exert an influence on millions of participants than on hundreds of state enterprises?

[Zaludyak] Yes, It will be very difficult to control. But we are hoping that help will come from ispolkins and the public. Polluting the environment must become economically unprofitable. Previously we were limited to imposing fines, but today, after we have done that once and then again, the third time we can close down such enterprises. The person who shows concern for environmental protection and establishes clean technologies must be encouraged in every way.

**Authorities Assailed for Stalling Halt to Protein Vitamin Concentrate Production**

9JWN0112B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Nov 90 p 1

[Article by S. Razin: “The KGB Against the PVC”]

[Text] Can one trust the head of government?

I pose this question without any sarcasm as I would answer it affirmatively if it were not for the perfidious intrigues of the departmental lobbies which, it seems to me, have manged to create shortages throughout the country. Why, for example, have medicines disappeared from the drug stores? Is it not because Minmedprom (Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological Industry) has taken the pharmaceutical industry into its hands and is keeping it on short rations, while it invests enormous funds only in the ecologically dangerous production of protein vitamin concentrate (PVC), i.e., in food supplements made from petroleum?

How naive we were! A year ago the head of the government promised the people’s deputies that the PVC plants would be reoriented. We thought that the informal organizations and the press had forced the prime minister to dare to take such radical measures in his support for the ecological war against Minmedprom. However, we did not suspect at that time what forces the prime minister was relying on and what forces would protect us from the inevitable reprisals.

Minister V. Bykov went to the top, using his ties with former members of the Politburo.

Today we understand why they did not fire us from our job. Document No 1696-K of 28 August 90, signed by V. Kryuchkov, chairman of the USSR KGB, says it all extremely clearly: “The Committee on State Security constantly monitors research on food protein. The KGB reported on the assessment by foreign specialists of problems in the production of PVC based on petroleum paraffins to the CPSU on 23 December 89 (No 25734) and on 11 May 88 (No 792-4)...”

Bravo, Chekists! A total of two reports which were made, incidentally, after mass rallies in Kirishi and presentations by the press, directed—unexpectedly for all—the development of this scandal in an unusual direction. The reports themselves, it is true, were impossible to obtain, but I can familiarize anyone wanting one with an extremely curious memorandum—No 151(4)5-30249. I will cite several extracts from it:

“For reasons of toxicity and the large capital investment required the developed capitalist countries have rejected the broad utilization of bioprotein made from petroleum paraffins.”

Let us give Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov his due—in this case you cannot accuse him of indecisiveness. It is true that the departmental officials seem to have interpreted this approach—from unusual for the prime minister—as an apparatus subterfuge. And there were weighty reasons for this. It was just at this time that the USSR Supreme Soviet confirmed the composition of the government, and the minister of the medical industry, V. Bykov, hung by a thread.

But the “bomb” set by the prime minister, nonetheless, went off. A year ago parliament unanimously approved a resolution: “Concerning Urgent Measures for the Ecological Recovery of the Country.” It was decided to reorient PVC production in 1991.

What has begun here? In their death throes the departmental monsters are especially dangerous, and one should not feed the illusions of their might.

Every agency still has major forces behind it. The unsinkability of the PVC plants is explained by the fact that they, along with Minmedprom, are interwoven into
the powerful structure of the chemical-forestry complex, which is a supermonopoly in an enormous sector of the economy. Doing without PVC production means losing billions in profits, it means undermining the financial power and weakening the positions of high officials—right up to one of the deputy chairmen of the USSR Sovmin (Council of Ministers), which directs this oligarchy.

The strong of this world will always find someone for their support base. The totalitarian system is so constructed that while it convulsed the country with some “project of the century,” it fenced itself in with a living chain of “hostages,” made up of thousands and thousands of scientists and specialists. In the 60’s PVC production was raised to the rank of a strategic industry and billions of rubles were forked over for its development. With this kind of money and power in their hands, the agencies drew into their adventures hundreds of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, the All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences imeni Lenin, the USSR Ministry of Health, etc.

Such are the roots of the scientific-apparatus lobby, which ensnares all the structures of power, including the Union parliament, which has become the main direction of the departmental thrust. Among the agrarians and doctors there are quite a few deputies who were willingly drawn into the campaign to repeal their own resolution on ecology.

Under such pressure the prime minister could not hold out. For this reason USSR Sovmin Resolution No 189 of 14 February 1990 stipulated an obvious loophole for the department: close the PVC plants or limit the work to renovation only, this problem to be resolved by one more state expert commission, which USSR Gosplan willingly assigned USSR Goskompriroda (State Committee for the Protection of Nature) to hold.

But times are different now! This time the commission proved to be uncommonly objective and prepared to break up the polluting plants completely. Of the many murderous arguments put forward by the experts, we shall single out only two.

The first: PVC, which contains ethalates and arsenic, is a toxic preparation which is dangerous to consumers of agricultural products.

Second: it is much more profitable to supply the petroleum paraffins from which PVC is obtained and buy for hard currency the vegetable feed which is lacking—soybean meal.

It goes without saying that the departmental “guard” tried to forestall these conclusions in advance. The tactic chosen was simple: get the experts fighting among themselves and in the noise declare that the commission has not coped with its task. No sooner said than done. Goskompriroda obediently added to the independent experts one more subcommittee, composed of fierce defenders of PVC. Finally the “circus” started; it dragged on for several months. As a result, the conclusion that was sent to the government was unusually contradictory and ambiguous; it could be interpreted in any way: if you want it, go ahead, if you do not want it, that is fine, too.

One can only guess how the head of the government will want to read this apparatus masterpiece. If desired, one can take note of the key phrase in this document: “Further operation of PVC production units without renovation is unacceptable...” But acceptable renovation, as the example of the fruitless experience of the Kirishi Plant has shown, is impossible.

What will the prime minister’s final word be? The scandal surrounding PVC clearly illuminates one of the real mechanisms of departmental sabotage, which has paralyzed the economy. But after all, is it not also a form of sabotage as well as absurdity that last year alone Minmedprom spent 600 million rubles on the development of the microbiological industry, but only one-third that amount to cover the shortage of medicines?

Where are the goods to come from? What kind of stabilization of the economy is this if the departmental monopolies pursue directly opposite goals?

Sabotage! There is a lot of talk about this now. Only there is no sense in looking for saboteurs. The root of the evil lies not in specific officials, but in the system, based on super exploitation of the individual and the diversion of the lion’s share of the national income into departmental pockets. The departmental oligarchies have concentrated in their own hands unlimited financial power and will defend it not unto life but unto death. And until this absurd economic structure collapses and until we root out departmental coercion—all market reforms and promises of quick abundance will remain sweet daydreams.
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