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THESIS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN EUROPE

by
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June 1999

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The Development of a Common Security and Defense Policy in Europe

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Since the end of the Cold War, multifaceted risks have constituted the main danger to the security of Europe. These range from interstate disputes and social, ethnic, religious and economic crises, to the effects of globalization on economic and ecological development. To face these risks, the European nations, unified within the European Union, are going to develop along with their common economic and financial policies a common, integrated, mutually agreed-upon security and defense policy. Last year, the British initiative to take the lead in creating a European Union defense force calls to mind the European Defense Community Treaty (EDC) of 1952, which was a remarkable attempt by Western European powers to develop a supranational European army. France's failure to endorse the EDC Treaty made it perfectly clear that France is a key actor in European security, and is crucial to the progress of a common security and defense policy in Europe. The recent Franco-British joint declaration on European defense is reminiscent of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which sketched out a new framework of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in Europe and will come into force this year. All have in common the attempt to integrate the European nations' security and defense policies into a common framework in order to overcome the prevalence of national interests in the area of security and defense issues.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY IN EUROPE

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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War, multifaceted risks have constituted the main danger to the security of Europe. These range from interstate disputes and social, ethnic, religious and economic crises, to the effects of globalization on economic and ecological development. To face these risks, the European nations, unified within the European Union, are going to develop along with their common economic and financial policies a common, integrated, mutually agreed-upon security and defense policy. Last year, the British initiative to take the lead in creating a European Union defense force calls to mind the European Defense Community Treaty (EDC) of 1952, which was a remarkable attempt by Western European powers to develop a supranational European army. France’s failure to endorse the EDC Treaty made it perfectly clear that France is a key actor in European security, and is crucial to the progress of a common security and defense policy in Europe. The recent Franco-British joint declaration on European defense is reminiscent of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which sketched out a new framework of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in Europe and will come into force this year. All have in common the attempt to integrate the European nations’ security and defense policies into a common framework in order to overcome the prevalence of national interests in the area of security and defense issues.
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<tr>
<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces Southern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>EADC</td>
<td>European Aerospace and Defense Company</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EUROCORPS</td>
<td>European Corps</td>
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<td>EUROFOR</td>
<td>European Rapid Operational Force</td>
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<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
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<td>FAWEU</td>
<td>Forces answerable to the WEU</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCCAR</td>
<td><em>Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement</em> (Joint Arms Cooperation Organization)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization of European Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Paris Charter</td>
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<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>UNC</td>
<td>United Nations Charter</td>
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<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Force</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, I have just directed SACEUR, General Clark, to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Ex-Yugoslavia.¹

On 23 March 1999, Dr. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO ordered NATO’s military commander in Europe to begin airstrikes against Ex-Yugoslavia after Belgrade rejected last-minute diplomatic efforts over Kosovo. The decision to launch airstrikes made it clear that all efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to stop the violence in Kosovo had failed. After the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the European continent was facing its second serious crisis in the post-Cold War period in the Balkans.

Furthermore, the crisis confirms that these kinds of conflicts will not easily disappear in the future and will constitute an inherent danger to the security of Europe. Hence, a viable political settlement of future crises and conflicts in Europe must be guaranteed by the willingness of the European nations to act resolutely against any violation of human rights, and to end human suffering not only inside the European Union, but also along its periphery.

Therefore, it has become increasingly necessary to develop a common security and defense policy in Europe to overcome the prevalence of national interests whose inconsistencies encourage people like the President of the Federal Republic of Ex-Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to play the European nations off against each other. In sensitive areas such as security and defense, national interests have to be embedded in a

European context as a mutually agreed-upon goal to be executed through firm and effective collective action.

The EDC Treaty of 1952 was a remarkable attempt by Western European powers to counterbalance the devastating conventional military ascendancy of the Soviet Union in Europe through forming a supranational European army and sharing the responsibility of the common defense of Europe. Although the political circumstances at that time were different than those of today since the Soviet threat and the economic recovery of Europe preoccupied the international theater of that time, the current framework of security and defense policies in Europe is facing similar challenges. Different national interests seized common solutions, and reducing them to the lowest common denominator.

France, which played a major role in the EDC’s failure, remains not only a key actor in European security, but also a continuous source of discrepancies in framing security and defense policies for the European nations. France’s search for equilibrium between national independence, European cohesion, and Atlantic solidarity reflects the French dilemma in the post-Cold War era, and hampers effective solutions to security and defense issues common to it and its European neighbors. However, in the recent joint declaration on European defense at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, France demonstrated its evolution in security and defense thinking through its contributions to the European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR), European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR), and European Corps (EUROCORPS); its subordination of its troops under Italian command at the ALBA-operation; and its shift toward more cooperation and integration in terms of procurement in its defense industry. However, 15 European
nations are currently unified within the European Union (EU) and are trying to develop an integrated mutually agreed-upon European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Progress can only be achieved if all member states overcome the alliance system of independent national states and build a unique European entity in the security and defense realm.

The Amsterdam Treaty, which will come into force in 1999, is an attempt to overcome the competing elements of the alliance system of national states, and incorporates the objective of a CFSP of the EU, thus holding out the prospect of a common defense in the longer term. Nevertheless, the Treaty's intergovernmentalism and unanimity procedures impose restrictions that will ensure that the lowest common denominator of agreement will determine all outcomes related to CFSP. At best, the EU can only hope to develop a harmonized CFSP. It will take time to establish a common European interest that will, in turn, lead to a CFSP that can cope with current crises, such as those caused by political leaders like Milosevic and his companions.
I. INTRODUCTION

BRITAIN is prepared for the first time to give the European Union a defense arm that would allow members' troops to cooperate in mounting military operations, the Prime Minister signaled last night. ... The Prime Minister said that the Kosovo crisis had underlined the need for Europe to take a very hardheaded view and to make sure that it could fulfill its obligations and responsibilities properly.²

Since the EU was not capable of employing crisis management to prevent conflict as a unique, political entity in Ex-Yugoslavia, and now again in Kosovo, it is commonly agreed upon in Europe that it is increasingly necessary to develop a CFSP in Europe to overcome the prevalence of national interests in the area of foreign and security policy. Therefore, the European nations unified within the European Union, must develop an integrated, mutually agreed-upon ESDI.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in an interview with the London Times in October 1998, motivated the UK and other European countries toward a more ambitious defense role within the EU. Blair said that his government was ready to take the lead in the creation of an EU defense force.³ The joint declaration on European defense at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo in December 1998 confirmed this approach and states that “to this end, the [European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous


³ Ibid.
Action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."\(^4\)

In the light of these remarkable shifts in the security and defense postures of some European countries, this thesis examines the development of a common security and defense policy in Europe. To confine the scope of the thesis, I will focus on three case studies. First, the EDC Treaty of 1952 will serve as a historical case study. Second, the question of to what extent France is “Europeanizing” its security and defense policies will provide the political case study. Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam and its prospect to the CFSP will serve as an institutional case study.

The EDC Treaty of 1952 had gone to the heart of the question and the very essential political sensitivities of European nations’ sovereignty after the Second World War. On the one hand the history of the EDC exhibited the ramifications of different national interests pursuing the goal of a common European defense against the Soviet Union commensurate with a German rearmament. On the other hand it offered a promising framework to build a European army under supranational authority. Furthermore, the EDC must be viewed in the context of other European integration movements and their spirit as a “United States of Europe”, a concept that was regarded as the only option that could guarantee peace and prosperity for the future of Europe.

Chapter II provides a detailed survey of the EDC and the security environment after the Second World War and a brief description of the EDC Treaty and the reasons for

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its failure. Although it is often difficult to apply historical events to the present as the circumstances in which the events occurred never repeat themselves in exactly the same way, the EDC could serve as a remarkable example of common security and defense policies in Europe since it fairly, accurately describes the complex interrelations of current security and defense issues in Europe. Then as now, France remains the key actor in European security. The tragedy of the EDC was that its initiator, France, was a part of its failure. Currently, France is at the center of European political ties and peacekeeping enterprises, as well as part of the plans for the EU’s CFSP. Therefore, the progress of Europeanization in French security and defense policies is essential for the development of both an ESDI within the EU, and hence for the achievement, a CFSP for the EU.

Chapter III analyses how France conducts its policies in the security and defense realm; how the overall changing security environment in Europe after the Cold War has affected French security and defense decisions in Europe; and how France is striving to solve its dilemma – that is, balancing its ambitions in acting as a global power with remaining overseas commitments (Africa, South Pacific, South America, etc.), while carrying out its comprehensive obligations in the EU’s integration process.

The Treaty of Amsterdam signed in Amsterdam on 2 October 1997 by the members of the EU, remains a remarkable milestone in the construction of a common European house. The form of foreign and security policy actions remain traditionally intergovernmental and subject to the principle of unanimity. This means that a single country can object to an action that is considered by all the other Member States of the EU. Obviously, it is impossible to have a foreign policy that embraces every single detail

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of relations with the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the Member States should speak with one voice on specific matters and particular regions of the world where the vital interests of the EU are at stake. Such areas of concern include Central and Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, the United States and Russia.

The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force 1993, sketched out a new framework for general actions in the CFSP and the common defense, though without any specific guidelines or strategies. Its successor, the Amsterdam Treaty is an attempt to clarify these ambiguities and turn them into efficient decision-making structures and capacities for actions in the area of CFSP.

Chapter IV includes a general survey about the Treaty’s objectives and the pursuit of them. Furthermore, it will answer the question of how the Amsterdam Treaty, despite the existing obstacles toward its implementation, improves the prospects for a CFSP, and hence, the Europeanization of security policies of separate European nations. Finally, the chapter will evaluate the efficiency of the Treaty in terms of decision-making structures and capacities for action as a path towards a CFSP for the EU.

Chapter V conveys the conclusion and will apply the findings of the case studies to the current development of a common security and defense policy in Europe.
II. EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY (EDC) TREATY – AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A COMMON DEFENSE IN EUROPE AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR?

A. INTRODUCTION

After the Second World War, Europeans suffered from a complete breakdown of their economy, infrastructure and social framework. All major German cities had about 80 percent of their prewar housing destroyed. Twenty-five million Russians were homeless. Half of France and Italy’s railroad equipment had been destroyed. Great Britain had used up one-quarter of its foreign investments to finance the war, and for a certain time it could not afford to run its public transportation system. Nine and a half million Germans from other regions were resettled in Germany. Four million Poles and Russians moved into the new areas of Poland acquired from Germany. One million Russians migrated within the Soviet Union.5

In every sense of the word, European life was unsettled. To regain the confidence of the people, the elected representatives needed to provide affluence, reestablish values, and restore stability quickly. The idea of European unity predominated in the rebuilding of economic and political stability. Transnational groups that had emerged both during and after the war were convinced that the postwar political system required the establishment of a supranational entity in Europe to diminish the threat of one nation

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dominating the others that is, to diminish the rivalry of national interests that had caused
the two great world wars.

B. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN
EUROPE

1. European Unity

After the Second World War, the need became apparent for an organization that
would erase the striving of nation-states to dominate in Europe, that would gain an
important position commensurate to the overwhelming position of the superpowers, and
that would coordinate the rebuilding of Europe in all realms of life. In his speech in
Zurich in September 1946, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill mentioned
the following:

We have to re-create the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and
provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and
in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe ... with a
spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany.⁶

However, within the same speech, he opposed a British participation in that
framework. This attitude influenced essentially the development of the EDC.
Furthermore, he stressed the strengthening of the United Nations by building a regional
structure in Europe. In addition, to build this kind of “United States of Europe”, Churchill
proposed as a first step “to format the Council of Europe.”⁷

⁶ Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll. Building European Union: A documentary history and analysis

⁷ Ibid.
Shortly after Churchill's famous speech, movements dedicated to European unity sprang up everywhere in Europe. All these organizations were to combine under the International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. Its first act was to organize The Hague Congress on 7 May 1948, remembered as “The Congress of Europe.” More than a thousand delegates from approximately twenty countries attended the conference together with a large number of observers including political and religious figures, academics, writers and journalists. Its purpose was to demonstrate the breadth of the movements in favor of European unification, and to determine the objectives, that had to be met in order to achieve such a union. It was remarkable that former adversaries assembled at this conference to try to build a common entity in Europe. Furthermore, the presence of like-minded people such as de Gaspari, Konrad Adenauer, Paul-Henri Spaak, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, etc. greatly encouraged creation of an economic and political union of Europe.

Two months after the Congress of Europe, Georges Bidault, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, issued an invitation to the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries to give substance to The Hague proposals. France, supported by Belgium in the person of its Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak, called for the creation of a European Assembly with wide-ranging powers, composed of members of the parliament from the various states and decided upon by majority vote. This plan, assigning a fundamental role to the Assembly, seemed revolutionary in the international order because it had a supranational authority, which eliminated the exclusive preserve of national governments to rule. However, Great Britain, which favored a form of intergovernmental cooperation in which
the Assembly would have a purely consultative function, rejected this approach. What were the reasons?

At that time, many Continental Europeans were convinced that a stable political and economic union in Europe could only exist under the leadership of Great Britain. Belgium's Prime Minister Paul-Henry Spaak summed up the reasons some years later when speaking to Anthony Nutting, the British parliamentary Under-Secretary of State:

You have no idea how much Europe looked to Britain for a moral lead: of how that Britain was of all the European countries involved in the World War II adventure the only one not occupied: the only one whose morals survived intact. Belgians and French and Dutch had been brought up in the war to believe that their patriotic duty was to cheat, to lie, to run a black market, to discredit and to defraud: these habits became ingrained after five years. This was not true of the British: they escaped all this: they were untainted, and this was very important to us. This moral leadership—it was yours for the asking. But—somehow—you failed us: alas, we looked in vain.

Nevertheless, even Winston Churchill's idea of Europe was one without Britain. It had other considerations. First, Great Britain saw itself as one of the major powers in the world, running an empire and not willing to give up its sovereignty to a supranational body, which might make decisions concerning the British Commonwealth.

Second, Britain was burdened at that time by the loans that it had to pay back to the United States from the Lend Lease policy of the Second World War. At times, Great

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Britain could not even afford to run its public transportation system, and the distribution of goods within the country suffered considerably.

Third, it was simultaneously meeting several commitments, for example, running its Occupation Zone in Germany and stationing troops in many parts of the world and preparing to give independence to India, Ceylon, and Burma. Moreover, it was maintaining and strengthening its "Special Relationship" with the United States.

Fourth, there was no strong and charismatic "European" figure in the Attlee Cabinet of 1945, who could manage a British European leadership in a supranational framework. Finally, Britain was uncertain about the Soviet reaction; that is, Stalin would perceive a European union under British leadership as a threat.\(^\text{10}\)

To summarize, Great Britain had reasonable grounds not to merge itself into a supranational European institution and play the leadership role in Europe. Later, these constraints clearly affected the British commitment toward the EDC and contributed to its failure.

On 5 May 1949, the treaty constituting the Statute of the Council of Europe (CoE) was signed, consisting of a ministerial committee, which would meet in private, and a consultative body, which would meet in public. The Assembly was only consultative in nature, with the decision-making powers vested in the Committee of Ministers. In order to meet the demands of the European federalists, members of the Assembly were independent of their governments, with full voting freedom. However, there was no supranational authority, and neither the decisions of the Assembly nor the decisions of the

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 19-20.
Committee of Ministers were binding on the governments of the member states. Such decisions were regarded as recommendations.\footnote{11}

The first result of the European movement and the outcome of The Hague Congress were sobering to many European idealists. The CoE was only a compromise and the Statute made no mention of either drawing up a constitution or pooling national sovereignty in order to achieve the “economic and political union” called for by The Hague delegates. Consequently, the need was felt to set up separate bodies to address the urgent questions, especially in the political and economic realm.

At Harvard University in June 1947, General George Marshall, the American Secretary of State, announced his famous plan, the European Recovery Program. In Marshall’s words:

It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of Europeans. The initiative must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in drafting a European program ... and of later support of such a program so far as may be practicable for us to do ... directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty desperation and chaos.\footnote{12}

Authorized by the United States Congress in 1948, the Marshall Plan poured some $12 billion worth of aid into Europe in the first four-year period to help the European economy recover. On the other hand, Marshall emphasized that stabilizing the European economy had to be accomplished by the Europeans. Therefore, it was clear that the


\footnote{12 Edward Fursdon, 22-23.}
European countries could only restore their economies effectively if they established a framework to channel and coordinate the American aid.

It is interesting to consider that the American aid was offered to all European nations. However, Stalin denied the East European nations under his influence this assistance program. He considered the Marshall Plan to be another form of American imperialism. This led to the result that only Western nations received the Marshall Plan aid. The result was the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was signed on 18 April 1948 and which came into being on 5 June 1948.\(^\text{13}\)

The results in the 4-year period were impressive. European industrial production rose to 35 percent and agricultural production to 10 percent, respectively, above their prewar levels. In four years the average prosperity of Europeans increased dramatically, a development that had not been expected, considering the economic situation after 1945.\(^\text{14}\)

Nevertheless, a stable European economy for the future without massive financial aid from the United States would only prosper if the European countries were able through the establishment of a political and economic framework to safeguard the economy from conflicting national interests. An important step in this direction was taken in May 1950 when the French foreign minister, Robert Schuman, proposed that a common market for coal and steel, should be set up by countries willing to delegate


control of these sectors of their economies to an independent authority. The signatories formally agreed to abolish all customs barriers and other restrictions on the movement of coal and steel between their countries. They agreed that a High Authority would govern the ECSC, assisted by a Consultative Committee, a Common Assembly, a special Council of Ministers, and a Court of Justice.

The High Authority was the permanent executive organ of the community. Its decisions, taken by majority vote, were fully binding on all member countries, each of which pledged to respect the "supranational character" of the High Authority. The authority was to refer important substantive matters to the Consultative Committee before making a decision. The latter was composed of representatives from the coal and steel industries, including producers, workers, users, and traders.

The Assembly was empowered to exercise only parliamentary control but could overrule the High Authority by a two-thirds majority. Its delegates were composed of deputies of national parliaments.

The function of the Council of Ministers was to "harmonize the action of the High Authority and the governments responsible for the economic policy of respective countries." It consisted of representatives from member countries, each of which delegated a member of its government. Most decisions of the council were valid if voted upon by a majority of representatives. Unanimous agreement was required only on

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15 Robert Schuman regarded a common market for coal and steel as absolute necessary to compete with the tremendous American steel market. The recovery of key industries in Europe was at stake.
decisions concerning production questions and shortages. Taken as a whole, the treaty was similar to a federal constitution.16

While the expectations of the CoE exaggerated its role as an instrument to establish a supranational entity in Europe and to overcome the principle of national sovereignty, the ECSC appeared to be the first successful, supranational European community after the Second World War. However, nearly the same reasons, that led the British to reject participation in the CoE (as it was conceived at first, with a supranational assembly) induced them to refuse membership in the ECSC. After a vigorous debate in the British Parliament, the National Executive Committee of the Labor Party, which took office at that time, published a document entitled “European Unity” declaring the following:

The European peoples do not want a supranational authority to impose agreements. They need international machinery to carry out agreements, which are reached without compulsion.... In every respect except distance, we in Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world, than we are in Europe.17

This declaration highlighted two attitudes regarding the future of British involvement on the continent. First, Britain’s role as the main player of the Commonwealth and as a strategic partner of the United States in Europe “... must not be affected in any way by any Continental association.”18 Second, Britain would never


17 Edward Fursdon, 62.

18 Ibid.
accept a supranational authority that could impinge upon the decision-making process of the Labor Government’s domestic policy. These perspectives continued to be the main obstacles to Britain’s participation in the EDC despite the election victory of the Conservatives on 27 October 1951, which brought Winston Churchill back to Downing Street 10.\textsuperscript{19}

2. European Security

Shortly after the Second World War, various factors destabilized the coherence of the European continent. The former Axis powers and their territories had lost their previous political and social frameworks and thus became vulnerable to Soviet expansionism.

France, occupied by Germany until 1944, had to rebuild its political, economic and social identity. Great Britain was facing serious challenges as mentioned before, \textit{inter alia} the burden of the loans that had to be paid back to the United States from the Lend Lease policy of the Second World War. The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union worsened. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Union’s foundation of the Cominform in September 1947 (the counterpart of the OEEC), the Berlin Blockade of 1948 and the Communist \textit{coup d’état} of February 1948 in Prague reflected the East-West split in Europe.

These factors also facilitated efforts to establish a Western defense alliance. Thus, Britain and France first signed the bilateral Dunkirk Treaty as of 1947, and following this

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
initial step for common defense and cooperation, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948 in order to build a security entity in Europe based on mutual defense and economic cooperation. Negotiations with the United States and Canada then followed with the creation of a single north Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America. These negotiations eventually culminated in the signature of the Treaty of Washington in April 1949, the foundation of NATO.\textsuperscript{20}

Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 deepened dramatically the split between Eastern and Western Europe. In 1950, a study from General Eisenhower's staff (General Eisenhower was at that time the first NATO supreme commander) determined that NATO needed another fourteen divisions to stop any attack by the Soviet Union. Therefore, President Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, favored a German rearmament to provide the fourteen divisions that the military deemed necessary. This rearmament would take place within a certain framework of collective defense in Europe that would control Germany's rearmament, on the one hand, and that would improve the cooperation of the armed forces in Europe under NATO auspices on the other hand.\textsuperscript{21}

In October 1950, France generated a proposal for a European Army, the Pléven Plan, which could operate within the framework of NATO. This proposal initiated the

\textsuperscript{20} Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll, 30-31.

\textsuperscript{21} Statement of Colonel Roessler, Lecturer at NPS in Monterey, on 26 October 1998 in his class, European Security Issues.
development of the EDC and led to its adoption in May 1952. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany were the signatory states.\textsuperscript{22}

The next two sections will focus in detail on the Soviet threat, which decisively changed United States policy not only towards Europe in general, but also towards the role of Germany in the Western European defense-planning process. The episode in history also solidified the inherent and almost paranoiac fear of a strong political and economic German recovery that dominated French thinking both at the time and subsequently throughout the EDC experience.

Churchill exhibited one of the first concerns about a Soviet threat in a telegram to President Truman in May 1945:

What will be the position in a year or two when the British and American Armies have melted, and the French have not yet been formed on any major scale, and when Russia may choose to keep 200 or 300 divisions on active service? An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going behind....\textsuperscript{23}

While the former Western allied powers had accomplished their post-war undertakings to reduce their defense expenditures and to demobilize their forces in Europe, the Soviet Union maintained approximately thirty divisions in Eastern Europe, 175 divisions in the Western Soviet Union and 125 divisions in strategic reserve.\textsuperscript{24} The Soviet Union’s behavior in the occupied zone of East Germany weakened the belief that

\textsuperscript{22} Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll, 49-50.

\textsuperscript{23} Edward Fursdon, 26.

the Soviet Union was a benign country that intended to stabilize the political, economic and social realm in its zones of influence without implementing totalitarian communist structures and undermining independence and sovereignty. However, Churchill’s warning was not seriously considered by the Truman administration. In 1946, the American government was still, thinking of a $1 billion loan to the Soviet Union.25

At that time, the presence of the United States in Western Europe was inadequate, because it was unable to send more than a division anywhere without resorting to partial mobilization. Simultaneously, the United States, as mentioned before, was dramatically reducing its troop presence in Europe. The remaining troops were of low combat status.

The crucial changes in the United States policy towards Europe resulted from some serious events in southern Eurasia. In 1946 and 1947, the Soviet Union coordinated its efforts to expand southward to the Eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, historically a region under the influence of British power. Furthermore, the Soviets sought to obtain control of the Dardenelles as the outlet of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Therefore, they put constant pressure on the Turkish government to guarantee free movement of the Soviet Black Sea fleet. Simultaneously, they supported the Communist guerrilla movement in the north of Greece against the British-backed royalist regime in Athens through their communist satellite states (Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria).

Because of its economic situation, Britain could no longer afford its commitments overseas, and London decided to withdraw its troops from the region, hoping that the United States would fill the gap. The United States responded with the Truman Doctrine,

and guaranteed American aid to Greece and Turkey to preserve the universal principles of democracy, freedom, and peace. At the same time, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced his economic-assistance plan for the recovery of Europe.

In 1948, during the Berlin Blockade and the coup d'état in Prague, it appeared clear to the Western powers that the Soviet Union would exploit any occasion to expand its policy of global hegemony, even to Western Europe. The United States was relying on its "atomic shield" over Europe; however on 14 July 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb and brought an end to the American nuclear monopoly.

In response to this turn of events, President Truman ordered the National Security Council to reevaluate the American policy toward the Soviet Union. The outcome of this investigation, the study known as NSC-68, confirmed the aggressive tendency of the Soviet Union's expansionism, which was additionally verified by the outbreak of the Korean War and the Soviet Union's support for North Korea. Furthermore, the Soviet command in East Germany had established an organization of fifty thousand military policemen and had transformed them into a powerful military force. Therefore, the NSC-68 recommendations "... included the development of the thermonuclear bomb, the expansion of American and West European forces, the mobilization of America's economic resources to sustain this military buildup, and the tightening of the bonds between the member states of the Western alliance system in order to meet the Communist threat."

This recommendation was accompanied by three proposals. First, to station large numbers of American ground forces in Europe. Second, to establish air bases on the
continent that facilitated bombers to carry the American nuclear deterrent. Third, to pursue the integration of procedures for joint military planning between the national armies of the alliance. The third proposal decisively led the way for the United States to deliver strong support to any kind of integration of armed forces in Europe. It was suggested that “... the national armies of the alliance (NATO) and the development of procedures for joint military planning should be closer integrated in order to remove the logistical inefficiencies that are endemic to a loosely organized coalition of sovereign states.”\textsuperscript{26}

Thus, in September 1950, the North Atlantic Council assembled in New York, unanimously bid for

“... an integrated military force adequate for the defense of freedom in Europe, and to related questions of the character of participation in the force, its military organizations and matters of supply, finance and raw materials. The proposal for such a force supported by appropriate supply and financial arrangements, based on collective effort, was warmly welcomed and it was decided that the Ministers should promptly consult their governments as to the way in which such a plan could be put into effect.”\textsuperscript{27}

Both, the massive threat of Soviet expansionism in various parts of the world and the efforts by the European countries to promote economic recovery as quickly as possible changed the American policy towards Europe decisively. The United States was well aware of the fact that only an economically and politically stabilized Europe could cope with the threat of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. The provisions of the

\textsuperscript{26} William R. Keylor, 275-278.

\textsuperscript{27}“NATO Ministerial Communiqué New York, 16\textsuperscript{th}-18\textsuperscript{th} September 1950.” \textit{Final Communiqué} Available [Online]: <http://www.vm.ee/nato/docu/comm/c500918a.htm> [24 November 1998]; Page 1 of 1.
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 provided the means to face these challenges. However, one problem remained and dominated transatlantic politics over the next six years: the question of Germany.

In early disputes over Germany, France often sided with the Soviet Union in order to keep Germany weak and to obtain reparations. The French believed strongly that only a weak and agrarian German state could forestall the danger of renewed militarism and unbalanced dominance in Europe. However, the Berlin crisis of 1948 and the expansionism of the Soviet Union convinced the French that a new way had to be found to reconcile German recovery with their own security.\(^{28}\) Robert Schuman, the foreign minister of France in 1950, and Jean Monnet, a French political economist and diplomat, insisted “... that Europe could be saved, but only by planning for the recovery of all Europe, including Germany. The day has gone by, when we can afford to have the energies of the French and German people dissipated by opposing each other.”\(^{29}\) Schuman summed up his views in front of the French assembly: “A European solution for the peace, a European solution for Germany, a European solution for the Ruhr, such is our vision of the future.”\(^{30}\) This so-called Schuman Plan, which led to the ECSC in April


\(^{29}\) Edward Fursdon, 52.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 55.
1951, was one of the essential cornerstones in embedding Germany into a security framework.

As mentioned before, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 raised serious challenges for Western Europe, which was deliberating the rearmament of Germany. The United States government confronted its European allies with the rearmament of Germany and “its adhesion to the Atlantic alliance.” A wave of opposition arose in France. Robert Schuman declared the following shortly after the American proposal:

“Germany has no army and cannot have one. It has no armaments and it will not have any.”

Nevertheless, the Western Allies still lacked fourteen divisions to pose a serious counter-threat to the Soviet Union.31

Under these circumstances, Winston Churchill made a crucial suggestion in front of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg:

We should make a gesture of practical and constructive guidance by declaring ourselves in favor of the immediate creation of a European Army under a unified command and in which we should all bear a worthy and honorable part....32

This was the starting point for the debate in the Assembly, which adopted the following vision as part of the final resolution:

The Assembly ... calls for the immediate creation of a unified European Army, under the authority of a European Minister of Defence, subject to proper European democratic control and acting in full cooperation with the United States and Canada.33

31 William R. Keylor, 279.

32 Edward Fursdon, 75.

33 Ibid., 76.
Two different directions of negotiations followed after the initial point of Germany's rearmament was made. At the Petersberg talks, the United States, Great Britain, France, and West Germany discussed a German contribution to NATO of 14 divisions. At the conference of Paris, France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg discussed the German contribution within a European Army. Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States participated as observers in the second set of negotiations. Both conferences started simultaneously in 1951.

There were a number of reasons for a NATO solution. First, because of the Soviet threat, there should be no delay in establishing "an effective NATO integrated force for Western defense with a Supreme Commander." Second, if a solution were not implemented quickly enough, the United States probably would think of cutting economic aid to Europe and withdrawing its troops. Third, the control of the German contribution would occur in an established international forum, which would be much stronger than a continental authority alone, thus averting the danger that Germany could dominate the European Army in the future. Fourth, NATO had taken the initiative, so, NATO should serve as the appropriate forum to supervise the fulfillment of German rearmament.\textsuperscript{34}

Two major obstacles hampered the progress of the Petersberg Talks and induced the United States to shift its support to the proposal for a European Defense Army. A German contribution to NATO would mean the acknowledgement of West Germany as
an equal partner in the North Atlantic community. This would mean equality of both
inguents for Germany, which had been demanded several times by the German Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer, but had been perceived as a nightmare to those, especially in France,
who saw in it the “awful specter of an unconstrained remilitarized Germany.”
Furthermore, France could not accept a German contribution of divisions to NATO
because, for them, the inherent perception of German militarism was directly linked to
this expression. Jean Monnet summarized the ambiguous feelings precisely:

Without unity, everyone will go on seeking power for himself — and
Germany will be tempted to seek it in an agreement with the East. Even at
best, that would mean neutrality, which would be a blow to all Europe's
morale. The strength of the West does not depend on how many divisions
it has, but on its unity and common will. To rush into raising a few
German divisions on a national basis, at the cost of reviving enmity
between our peoples, would be catastrophic for the very security of Europe
that such a step would be intended to ensure. If, on the other hand, you
give France, Germany, and their neighbors’ common resources to exploit
and defend, then Europe will recover the will to resist.

France could not support West Germany’s participation with its own divisions, but
could agree to a German contribution under a European umbrella in a European Army
with European units.

General Eisenhower, who was at that time in close contact with Monnet,
appreciated the approach, especially given the intention of the Europeans to combine in
wartime the European Defense Force under a common European commander,
subordinated under the Central European Command of the Supreme Allied Commander

34 Ibid., 94.
35 Ibid., 43.
36 Ibid., 118.
Europe (SACEUR). The support of General Eisenhower for the European forces marked a decisive change in the United States policy and cleared the way for the EDC. He stressed his view before the Sub-Committee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with these words:

I believe in it this much – when I came over here [to Europe] I disliked the whole idea of a European Army, and I had enough troubles without it. However, I have decided that it offers another chance for bringing another link in here, so I made up my mind to go into the thing with both feet.... So I am going to try to help, and I realize that a lot of my professional associates are going to think I am crazy. But I tell you that joining Europe together is the key to the whole question.\(^{37}\)

C. THE EDC TREATY AND ITS FAILURE

The EDC treaty was signed on 27 May 1952 in Paris by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. It comprised 132 articles and 12 Associated Protocols, a Common Declaration by Foreign Ministers on the duration of the Treaty, and an Agreement of Explanation of Article 107 concerning territorial definition.

The treaty also defined the mutual assistance agreement between NATO, the EDC, and the United Kingdom’s relations to the EDC partner nations.\(^{38}\) (see Table 1.)

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| Part II                               |
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\(^{37}\) Ibid., 119.

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 151.
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Chapter I. Organization and administration of the European Defense Forces. Articles 68–79 with an additional Article 78 bis
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Article 107 includes its own Annexes I and II

Part VI – General Provisions
Article 112–132


1. Principles

The fundamental principles of the EDC treaty were laid down in the Preamble and in Part I of the treaty. This section confirmed both that the EDC treaty had been concluded in the spirit of the United Nations Charter and that the aim of the participating nations was to ensure the defense of the West against aggression in close cooperation with other organizations of the same purpose. It included out the fundamental notion of supranationality that subordinated the member states to a high authority, using common institutions, a common budget and common armed forces. It stated that the common spiritual and moral values of the member states would be strengthened inter alia “within a common defense force formed without discrimination.”39 It formalized the EDC as an

39 Ibid., 152.
important step towards a United Europe. Furthermore, it spelled out the automatic action commitment, namely:

Any armed attack against any of the Member States in Europe or against the European Defense Forces shall be considered an armed attack on all Member States. The Member States and the European Defense Forces shall afford to the State or force so attacked all the military and other aid in their power.\textsuperscript{40}

In addition, it satisfied the essential condition for West Germany that “there should be no discrimination between member states.”\textsuperscript{41}

Part I of the treaty also described the constitution and organization of the European Defense Force. All member states had to make their forces available to the EDC with the prospect of their inclusion, and no member state could recruit or maintain national forces other than those the treaty provided for as exceptions. These exceptions were defense responsibilities of member states in non-European areas or international operations for the United Nations. The national forces for non-European areas were limited in that they did not jeopardize any contribution to the EDC force. A member state, if it had to withdraw its troops to meet national contingencies, could only obtain permission to do so from of the Board of Commissioners. The Board of Commissioners could decide certain contingencies, while other contingencies had to pass both the Council by a two-thirds majority and of the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 153.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 154.
2. Institutions

The Board of Commissioners was composed of nine members, who had to be representatives of member states. All delegates were approved among all governments. Article 20 stated their absolute independence:

In the accomplishment of their duties, the members of the Board of Commissioners shall neither ask for nor receive instructions from any Government. They shall refrain from any action inconsistent with the supranational character of their duties.\textsuperscript{43}

The members present, who always had to have a quorum of five, made their decisions by majority voting.

The Assembly was to be the same as envisaged in the ECSC Treaty. The Board of Commissioners had to submit an annual report on its work to the Assembly, which could be rejected by majority vote. In this case, the Board of Commissioners had to resign.

Article 38 of the treaty charged the signatory states of the EDC Treaty with examining "a new form of federal or confederal political superstructure for European unity" within six months of signing. The Assembly had to study the following:

1. The Constitution of an Assembly of the EDC elected on a democratic basis;
2. The powers which would devolve on such an Assembly; and
3. Any changes which might eventually have to be made to the EDC Treaty provisions concerning other institutions of the Community, particularly with a view to safeguarding an appropriate representation of the states' interests.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 155.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 156-57.
The Assembly was directed to take into consideration the "separation of powers ... having a two chamber system or representation." Literally, the Assembly had to work on the constitution of the "United States of Europe." After the proposed time frame of six months, the results of the study had to be delivered to the Council and, on its advice, distributed by the Chairman of the Assembly to the governments of the member states, "... who, within three months, would have to convene a conference for consideration of them."45

The Council was the institution that connected the governments of the member states to the Board of Commissioners. Its function was to issue directives and affirmative approvals to the Board of Commissioners and make decisions. The voting procedure was complicated, because many different types of decisions had to be covered:

The Council's unanimous vote was required on all key matters affecting the EDC generally, modification to any arrangements relative to the European Defense Force and their associated common equipment programs, on financial arrangements and the common budget. A qualified majority, specified as two-thirds, was required concerning matters of a lesser, managerial or administrative nature in these three areas. For example, any modifications to the plan for constituting the European Defense Force, the status of its personnel, its organization, recruitment, strength, and provision of officers required a unanimous Council vote. Acting on a two-third majority, the Council could invite the Board of Commissioners to take any measure within its competence; if the Board did not comply then the Council or any member state could call the Assembly into session with a view to obtaining a motion of censure and hence the Board's resignation. Lastly, the Council alone was responsible for decisions regarding any joint sessions with the North Atlantic Treaty Council or the Council of the Community, or in regard to the EDC-NATO Protocol. Any decisions taken unanimously during such joint meetings of the two Councils were to be automatically binding to the EDC's institutions.46

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., 158-59.
This complex decision-making process was designed to guarantee the supranational character on the one hand and on the other. The equality of every member state in the EDC.

Furthermore, in terms of relative voting power within the Council, there was an agreed-upon "weighting" scale commensurate with the relative contribution of national forces to the European Defense Force. This was very difficult for France to accept, because Germany and France had the same weighting of votes in the Council. This strengthened the fear in France of once more facing a strong Germany, which might try to overrule France with the help of the other states.

The Court of the EDC was to be the same as the Court of Justice for the ECSC. It was to have jurisdiction over the member states’ concerns and the Council’s or the Assembly’s concerns regarding decisions or recommendations made by the Board of Commissioners in cases of missing legal competence, violations of rules or regulations and abuse of power.

3. EDC and NATO

The relationship between EDC and NATO was set out in the Protocol regarding the Relations between the EDC and NATO and the Protocol on guarantees given by Member States of the EDC to Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty on the one hand. These two protocols described the relationship between the two Councils of the EDC and NATO, especially in case of threats to the territorial integrity of both areas of
responsibility. On the other hand, they guaranteed that any attack on any party to the NATO treaty was considered an attack on the parties to the EDC Treaty and vice versa. Furthermore, both protocols guaranteed mutual assistance. In addition, they described the nature of the cooperation and coordination between EDC forces and NATO forces on the technical, logistical and personnel levels. As soon as the EDC forces were placed under NATO, EDC representatives would enlarge NATO Headquarters.

The sensitivity of the EDC relationship to NATO was shown in an additional protocol. It mandated that the U.S. would be obligated through its endorsement of the NATO treaty to support the EDC members in case of an attack.

Also of crucial importance was the treaty between the United Kingdom and the EDC. The United Kingdom had postulated that it did not intend to join the EDC. However, one of the demands of France to sign the treaty was that the United Kingdom would have to contribute something towards the EDC. This treaty, with its “automatic action” clause, like that in the Brussels Treaty, was similar to the above-mentioned protocol, a confidence-building measure to reassure the parties of the EDC, especially France, that the United Kingdom and the United States would confirm their strong commitment to the EDC.

Finally, the Tripartite Declaration by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, established the EDC and the ECSC as the new means for uniting Europe and integrating Germany in the European Community. It demonstrated that despite all the spirit of unity in Europe, the fear of a revitalized Germany had to be
contained by an explicit, mutual obligation to Europe among the three leading Western Allies.47

4. Reasons for its failure

The international stage was always important to the development of the EDC, especially after the crucial change in world affairs upon the signing of the EDC Treaty in May 1952. The death of Stalin in March 1953 and the armistice of the Korean War in July 1953 induced the Soviet Union to make various “peace announcements” regarding the German question in order to weaken Western cohesion. For a short while, the perspective of a German reunification seemed conceivable. At the four-power conference in Berlin in 1954, the Soviet Union launched a proposal for a General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe with the prospect of a reunified Germany based upon the United Nations Charter. The Soviet initiative forced the Western European countries to doubt the need for the EDC when a comprehensive European peace solution seemed to be possible. However, the real purpose of the Soviet Union, which was to establish an unarmed, neutral Germany more or less under Soviet control, disturbed the cohesion of the Western alliance.48

Winston Churchill was convinced that there was a chance to solve the European security problem through high-level four-power talks and induced France to declare that “the ratification of the EDC could not be secured until a further attempt had been made to

47 Ibid., 179, 186.
48 Ibid., 240.
reach a European Settlement by negotiation. France was not prepared to make the sacrifice of sovereignty involved in EDC until she had final proof of Russian intransigence.  

49

\[ \textit{a) The National Viewpoints of France} \]

Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom from 1951 to 1955, perfectly expresses the French dilemma regarding the EDC in his memoirs:

Some felt that EDC conflicted with the imperial conception of \textit{Union Française}, and with the independent destiny of France as a great power in her own right. Others were made queasy by the permanent dilemma of French policy: whether Russia or Germany was more to be feared. If Russia, then the rearmament of Germany was a risk that must be taken. If Germany, then the revival of a Franco-Russian \textit{entente} were an alluring vision. From this emerged a period of hesitation and requests. Their confidence sapped by the steady drain of the Indo-China war, the French were tempted to postpone a final decision until Russian intentions had been fully tested.  

\[ \textit{50} \]

From the beginning of the EDC debate, France was possessed by the inherent fear of a rearmed Germany. The French government strictly refused any kind of process that could drive Germany into an uncontrollable situation where Germany would be able to re-establish armament-production capability or armed forces. Although France itself initiated the proposal of a European defense force with German contribution, it was not motivated solely by the belief that Europe could only survive with reconciliation between

\[ \textit{49} \text{Ibid., 219.} \]

France and Germany. France also wanted to ensure the ways and means to force Germany in a framework as an equal partner under the close control of its fellow members.

The refusal of the United Kingdom to join the EDC or to be merged into the European Defense Force was a constant obstacle for France to endorse the Treaty. The French strongly believed that Great Britain had to join the EDC to counterbalance Germany and to be the arbitrator in the complex supranational structure of the EDC. During a NATO council meeting in Rome, in November 1951, between Sir Anthony Eden, the new Foreign Secretary of the Conservative Government in Great Britain, and General Eisenhower, it became clear that the government of the United States had changed its view from one of wanting direct British participation to one of wanting the British to support it strongly from the outside.\(^{51}\) This was exactly the vision that Winston Churchill had long since announced. The belief that Britain would never join the EDC caused bitter disappointment among the EDC nations and particularly in France. Should France put an end to its Grande Armée and disappear from the international stage, while Britain excercised with a free military voice at international conferences? The French Army was a symbol of national pride for France and across its entire political party spectrum. To abolish it would mean to weaken that pride. The refusal of Great Britain to join the EDC was in the end unacceptable for France and hastened the EDC's failure.

In the end however, two other factors guaranteed the EDC's failure. First, France was fighting the Vietminh in Indo-China in 1953. To maintain parity with Germany in the EDC and to defend Indo-China against the Vietminh would have stretched the French

\(^{51}\) Ibid., 36.
resources beyond their limits and would probably have enabled Germany to dominate France in the EDC. Moreover, the complicated voting protocols of the Council of the EDC could have created obstacles to releasing French forces from the EDC force to cover the Indo-China conflict or any other conflict in French non-European territories.

Second, France was constantly apprehensive, probably because of the prospect of becoming “militarily inferior to a rearmed Western Germany.”52 Indeed, they would have had to confront Germany in the day-to-day business of the EDC without the backing of Britain as an equal participant in the EDC, despite all the reassuring British commitments and mutual-assistance declarations. These obstacles remained constant during the entire EDC process in France and caused the EDC to fail in the end.

b) The National Viewpoints of Great Britain

Britain's viewpoint towards the EDC was best described in Eden's speech at Columbia University, on January 11, 1952:

The American and British peoples should each understand the strong points in the other's national character. If you drive a nation to adopt procedures, which run counter to its instincts, you weaken and may destroy the motive force of its action. This is something you would not wish to do—or any of us would wish to do—to an ally on whose effective cooperation we depend. You will realize that I am speaking of the frequent suggestions that the United Kingdom should join a federation on the continent of Europe. This is something which we know, in our bones, we cannot do.53

52 Ibid., 92.

53 Ibid., 40.
From the beginning of the unification process in Europe, after Churchill had visualized his United States of Europe in his famous speech in 1946 and called for the creation of a European Army in his speech before the Council of Europe in 1950, Great Britain strongly supported a unified Europe, but without Britain. Churchill later often repeated: “We are with them, but not of them.” He saw Great Britain as a central element in “the three great concentric circles of the free world: that of the Anglo-American relationship, that of the Commonwealth and that of Western Europe.” Britain could not subordinate itself to a supranational continental authority if it simultaneously wished to pursue its other roles. Furthermore, Great Britain could never allow a supranational authority to overrule its own domestic decisions or its own command of the British armed forces. This was the corresponding sentiment at that time of the entire political party spectrum.

Churchill summarized the British viewpoint in his characteristic style in the House of Commons on 11 May 1953:

We are not members of the EDC, nor do we intend to be merged into a Federal European system ... we are ‘with’ them but not ‘of’ them ... We have the strongest armored force ... between the Rhine and the Elbe ... what more is there that we could give, apart from completely merging ourselves with the European military organization? We have not got a single divisional formation in our own island. No nation has ever run such risks in times, which I have read about or lived through, and no nation has ever received such little recognition for it.55

Britain perceived its commitments to the security of Europe accomplished, but this was not enough for the French.

54 Edward Fursdon, 15.
55 Ibid., 218.
Thus, it follows that the reasons for the failure of the EDC were complex. There is no single, overwhelming reason, to explain the failure of the first attempt in European history to build a common collective defense for Europe under a supranational authority failed.

Finally, Edward Fursdon described the EDC's failure in his book *The European Defense Community: A History* as follows:

It was the atmosphere, at times the mood, the domestic and international pressures, and the complex interrelated stresses of the moment against which decisions had to be made which often dictated the EDC's unique pattern of progress and setbacks, and hence the unfolding of the experience.\(^5\)

D. FINAL REMARKS

The EDC was a remarkable attempt to unify Europe under a supranational authority. The tragedy of it was that the initiator, France, was a part of its failure. But to accuse France for its dilemma would be unfair. One has to remember that, whatever constraints led it to reject the ratification of the treaty, France had made the proposal five years after the end of the Second World War to unify Europe side by side with Germany. For a moment in time, France was willing to give up its pride, the Grande Armée. Furthermore, it was willing to subordinate the entire nation to a supranational political instrument, a kind of United States of Europe. Indeed, Article 38 of the EDC Treaty, which was followed by the *Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European*

\(^5\) Ibid., 2.
Community Adopted by the Ad Hoc Assembly, described a political union in Europe that was far more integrated than any we have now in the European Union.

It is always difficult to apply historical lessons to the present, because the circumstances in which the events occurred never repeat themselves in exactly the same way. The Soviet threat and the economic recovery of Europe overwhelmingly preoccupied the international actors of the time. Nevertheless, the United States put enormous pressure on the European countries to make progress in their integration. The weight of America's engagement in Europe was much higher then it is today and provided a clear vision of what the United States thought about the future of Europe. Moreover, the European politicians of that time, such as Adenauer, Churchill, Schuman, and Monnet, were marked by a remarkable spirit of unification and the strong belief that the domination of nation-states could be overcome and replaced by a unified Europe with a strong economic and political framework.

All these circumstances, however, have changed. The European Union today is facing the problem of defining its scope of responsibility in Central and Eastern Europe and the question of enlarging and deepening at the same time without eroding its cohesion. On one hand, the design of the current European Union has allowed for as much economic unification as possible. On the other hand, it has hampered the development of a real political entity with a common foreign and security policy. In certain areas, revivals of nationalism and concentration on internal affairs have manifested themselves, because the people of the European Union have not been able to identify themselves with the institution as representatives of their needs.
The EDC Treaty tried to cover all these problems at a time when the value systems of entire European societies were slowly reforming after the Second World War. Sir Anthony Eden best described the mood of the people towards this remarkable attempt to unify Europe into one single entity:

I feared that the plan, imaginative as it was, might fail for just that reason. It seemed to attempt too much, to ask more of the nations concerned than they could freely give ...57

However, it seems that the problems of the past remain in the present. Although the Member States of the EU endeavored to cooperate on major international policy problems and incorporated the objective of a CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty, they are not able to subordinate themselves to a supranational authority in the security and defense realm. They fear surrendering this last bulwark of national sovereignty. Despite all the interlocking security and defense organizations in Europe, competing national interests still dominate in its area, and it would be naïve to believe that France, for example, perceives the conflict in Northern Ireland as a conflict of France, or that Ireland perceives France's commitment to Africa as its own. Nevertheless, a unique security and foreign policy in Europe could eliminate those differences and turn Europe into a strong entity, able to face the challenges of globalization on the one hand, and act resolutely against atrocities in its immediate neighborhood on the other. However, a perfect example of an obstacle to such a common security and defense policy in Europe is France.

Since Charles de Gaulle, France's security, and defense policies have revolved at heart around the need to avoid subordinating these realms of politics to any single ally or

57 Anthony Eden. 35.
alliance. Despite that, France simultaneously commits itself to the European integration under its leadership. This strain reflects the French dilemma: preserving its national independence against a strong and independent Europe, that discourages the ambitions of nation states. France is facing the challenge of searching for equilibrium between national independence, European cohesion, and Atlantic solidarity in the post-Cold War era.

However, France is undeniably a key actor in European security. It is a substantial, independent nuclear power. Moreover, because of its multifaceted special relationship with Germany, as well as its growing dealings in defense matters with Britain, France finds itself today both at the center of European political and peacekeeping enterprises, and as part of the plans for a European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). France’s complex role in this European security and defense architecture is an area, wide open for research. The next chapter will analyze whether current French security and defense policies in various realms can both promote Europeanization and solve France’s dilemma.
III. TO WHAT EXTENT IS FRANCE “EUROPEANIZING” ITS SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY?

A. INTRODUCTION

Since Charlemagne created the Holy Roman Empire in 800 and thereby reinstated the idea of European unity, France also has constantly pursued the idea of a unified Europe. However, the various frameworks to implement such an undertaking have varied significantly. Napoléon Bonaparte made France master of all Europe in dissolving the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and creating the Confederation of the Rhine. His famous Code Napoléon, dividing civil law into personal status, property and the acquisition of property not only was applied to the territories under his control, but also exerted a strong influence on Spain and on all European countries except England. It is still in force in France and still forms the underlying principles of public law in most of the European countries and in the European Union.

Facing the Soviet threat in the 1950’s, France led a remarkable attempt to unify Europe under a supranational authority. For a certain time, France appeared willing to subordinate the entire nation to a supranational political entity, the European Defense Community. Despite that, France was tragically also part of its failure. One of the reasons


was, as Anthony Eden, the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom in 1951-1955, wrote in his memoirs, that “some felt that the European Defense Community conflicted with the imperial conception of Union Française, and with the independent destiny of France as a great power in its own right.”

Although General de Gaulle advocated a “European confederation led by a council of governments and helped by international organizations,” and saw in general this kind of alliance as fundamental and indispensable, he considered France a country that “can be a member of an alliance ... and remain independent.” He understood independence to be a state in which “one is not at the mercy of any foreign power.” His conceptual view of commitment to an alliance, on the one hand, and independence in pursuing the vital interests of his country, on the other, still forms the foundation of the current objectives of French defense policy. Despite the need for “mutualization of power” in the European security and defense realm to face the current challenges in Europe, “France cannot rely on others to defend its vital interests ... the first objective of

60 Anthony Eden, 52.

61 Trevor Salmon and Sir William Nicoll, 7.


63 Ibid.

64 French Minister of Defense quoted in Livre Blanc sur la Défense (Service d’Information et de Relations Publiques des Armée, 1994).
its defense policy is to be [able to] ensure, alone if necessary, the ultimate defense of our vital interests against any threat, whatever its origin.\textsuperscript{65}

France’s dilemma in its relationship to Europe is based on two competing obligations: 1) the inherent commitment to perpetuate the glory of France as one of the global powers and to act independently in world politics; and 2) the need to contribute to the ESDI framework. In other words, France wants both to maintain its role as one of the leading nations in Europe and to influence the European security and defense posture.

B. FRANCE AND POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN SECURITY

1. De Gaulle’s Model for France’s National Security

To understand France’s security and defense attitudes in general, one has to consider de Gaulle’s model for French national security. Whether there were continuities or changes in France’s security and defense policies after 1989 in comparison to the Gaullist model is a question that has been much debated among politicians, authors, and scientists. Philip H. Gordon noted, “The Gaullist years may not represent an entirely new era in the history of France, but in a number of ways, they set a standard for continuity and change.”\textsuperscript{66}

The Gaullist framework of security and defense policies consisted of nine major rights: first, to preserve the absolute autonomy of decision; second, to perpetuate the

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid., 22. ([emphasis added; addition added.])

independence of France’s nuclear forces; third, to avoid automatic commitments as a result of an alliance; fourth, to refuse participation in military integrated structures; fifth, to assert a special role in world politics; sixth, to refuse the use of or access to France’s territory in time of peace or crisis; seventh, to reject participation in bloc to bloc negotiations; eighth, to produce the majority of French armaments (approximately 95%); and ninth, to produce and export the same range of weapons as other military powers.67

These Gaullist principles were based on two clear convictions. First, de Gaulle considered France’s place in the international system to be defined in part by continuous competition among nation-states. 68 Second, therefore, de Gaulle concluded that one should not be at the mercy of any foreign power (especially the United States).69 Indeed, de Gaulle’s conception of international relations was power-oriented and state-centric. Its mode of conflict consisted of formal aspects, which dominated state-to-state relations. That is, the sovereignty of all players was a major principle to be defended, especially since it was a bulwark against the demands and institutions of superpowers inclined to exercise systemic hegemony. The independence of France was crucial to de Gaulle’s foreign policy, and was defined not as an impossible autonomy or autarky, but as freedom

67 Philip H. Gordon, 164.


from subordination to the will of other states so that France could decide to cooperate or not according to the dictates of its own interests.70

Certain events in Franco-U.S. security relations confirmed de Gaulle’s viewpoint and taught France about unconditional reliance on allies. During the framing period of the Covenant of the League of Nations, after the First World War, France called for the formation of an international army, to enforce the Covenant and deter potential violations of it. The United States, although it was not a member of the League of Nations, rejected the proposal because of “constitutional impediments to their executive’s use of armed forces in international relations.”71 However, France perceived the incident as a serious back set and suspicious sentiments arose among French politicians as to the reliability of America’s commitment to the security of Europe. Furthermore, this event demonstrated how a nation’s scope of action would have been confined if its dependency on other nations had led it to subordinate itself to the will of those nations.72

On another occasion on 26 July 1956, the Egyptian Leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser, proclaimed the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company and set off the Suez crisis. The French were concerned not only by Nasser’s nationalization of the Canal Company, but also by his activities in supporting Algerian rebels against French rule. France allied

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72 The British rejected the French proposal, because they were convinced that the international army would be dominated by France and served as an instrument for its political ends. However, France’s dependency on the Anglo-Saxon powers after the First World War, especially in economic terms, limited its freedom of political decisions and forced it to withdraw the proposal of an international army.
with Great Britain and Israel to topple Nasser and started to land forces on the canal on 5 November 1956. The vehemence of America's condemnation of the attack, its active blocking of Britain's attempt to stabilize sterling during the crisis, and massive public protests caused Great Britain to withdraw its troops shortly after the beginning of the attack.\textsuperscript{73} In December 1956, British and French troops were entirely withdrawn and replaced by United Nation (UN) forces. Again, the dependency on other nations – in this case the dependency on the United States – confined France's scope of action and its potential for autonomous political decisions.

These two examples reflect perfectly the very distinct character of de Gaulle's nine principles – that is, "the absolute need for independence in decision making," and "a refusal to accept subordination to the United States."\textsuperscript{74} However, de Gaulle was also in favor of the grandeur of France. He felt no need to justify this. As Philipp Gordon puts it, "France had a special right and duty to play the role of a world power simply because it was France."\textsuperscript{75}

This political attitude became especially apparent in discussions between Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's emissary, and General de Gaulle prior to Yalta, from which he was to be excluded. Ronal Tiersky explains the situation as follows:

\textsuperscript{73} The vehemence of America's condemnation has to be seen under the Soviet threat of using nuclear weapons against Paris and London, and its resistance to take the Suez crises as an Alliance's case.

\textsuperscript{74} Philip H. Gordon, 3.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 15.
In de Gaulle’s *War Memoirs*, which must be the classic account of this incident, Hopkins observes that the French had let down their allies in the 1930s, became defeatist, and appeasement-oriented, the result of which was Vichy. How, Hopkins asked de Gaulle, could Americans, in “the stupefying disappointment we suffered when we saw France collapse and surrender in the disaster of 1940,” be expected any longer to have confidence in the French? De Gaulle replied that he, better than any other Frenchman, of course understood American disappointment with previous French military and defense policy, which he himself had denounced with so little success in the 1930s. But now, despite the success of the Resistance and of de Gaulle’s leadership, the French had reasons to believe that the American, who “after all took three years to get into the First World War and two years for the second war.” “The French,” he told Hopkins, “have the impression that you no longer consider the greatness of France necessary to the world and to yourself.”76

The claim of the *glory* of France and the desire for great power status remained imbedded in the country’s consciousness notwithstanding the experience of the Second World War.

Although de Gaulle sought for France a great power status and autonomy of political decisions for France while rejecting any subordination to a state or an alliance, he saw his vision of a European confederation to be fundamental and indispensable. He advocated “a powerful Europe capable of balancing and complementing American influence in a revised Atlantic Alliance.”77 De Gaulle never pursued the breakup of NATO. On the contrary, he wanted Europe to remain a close ally of the United States to face the Soviet threat.

Nevertheless, de Gaulle was determined to secure a structure “in which Europe would acquire effective political and military autonomy over its own security within the

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77 Jolyon Howorth, 28.
alliance.” It was intolerable for de Gaulle that the Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns “was not prepared even to brook autonomous European discussion of world affairs outside the framework of NATO.”

The Elysée Treaty of January 1963 between Germany and France marked the next step in de Gaulle’s own view of a desirable European security architecture. In framing the Elysée Treaty, de Gaulle pursued two major objectives: first, to moor Germany as closely as possible into a bilateral framework that facilitated France’s efforts to monitor any political and military revival of German hegemony in Europe; and second, to create a “framework for the launching of an autonomous European foreign and security policy within the context of a restructured Atlantic Alliance”—, in other words, “the construction of a new European security order, which would transcend NATO while at the same time strengthening the Alliance.”

De Gaulle’s withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated military structure, and his demand to remove both the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and the United States and other foreign forces from French soil demonstrated the enforcement of his principles of France’s national security, namely, independence from an external protector, restoring national self-confidence and promoting a new European security architecture under French leadership.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid., 29.
De Gaulle’s model for France’s national security and his vision of Europe were pursued at time when the United States dominated the Atlantic Alliance and Europe was divided into two antagonistic blocs, each preoccupied with, how best to ensure its defense.\(^{80}\) In the Cold War period, France could play the *balance-card* between the superpowers, especially after achieving a national nuclear deterrent force.

Furthermore, France could play a special role in world politics by shaping a more autonomous foreign policy for (diplomatic action *vis à vis* the Soviet Union, the Third World, etc.). That is, France could portray itself as a *third force*, distinct from the superpowers and sympathetic to non-alignment. In the post-Cold War period, the security environment has been transformed from a bipolar to a multipolar world and France could no longer try to be an arbitrator between the superpowers.

The effects of globalization do not exclude security and defense issues. It is becoming more and more difficult for a single nation to face the challenges of globalization alone. However, certain principles of the Gaullist model for France’s national security remain present in France’s security and defense policies of the post-Cold War era. France did not return to the integrated military structure of NATO. Despite the remarkable Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, which was established in July 1993, France is perpetuating the independence of its nuclear forces.

Although France accepts its comprehensive obligation to the EU and its integration process, it asserts its special role in world politics – that is, to occupy its place

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\(^{80}\) Philip H. Gordon, “Chapter Seven. The Gaullist Legacy Today.”, 183.
in the forefront of the EU, and to act as a global power with its remaining overseas commitments. Nevertheless, France tends to adopt a security and defense posture in alignment with requirements of the post-Cold War era. These requirements and their effects on France’s security posture after the end of the Cold War will be described in the next section.

2. Security Environment in the Post-Cold War Era

In the post-Cold War period, France and its allies have realized that multifaceted risks constitute the main dangers to the security of Europe. These large-scale risks range from social, ethnic, religious and economic crises and interstate disputes to the effects of globalization on economic and ecological development. Furthermore, these risks are less predictable than those during the Cold War. During the Cold War the code of conduct of each bloc remained constant and followed certain norms and standards. In the post-Cold War era, indications of what needs to be done are complex and often lead in more than one direction. Therefore, France could not proceed with the old policy of maximizing its security while pursuing influence and diplomatic room for maneuver independent of its allies.\(^{81}\)

The Gulf War, the first Ex-Yugoslavian crisis and the current Kosovo crisis have demonstrated on the one hand the increasing likelihood of armed conflicts after the end of the Cold War, and the acknowledgement by France that the security challenges of the post-Cold War era can only be solved by a strong and integrated Europe without the

\(^{81}\) Ronald Tiersky, Page 2 of 5.
competition of nation-states and their national interests in the security and defense realm on the other. François Léotard, then the minister of defense, emphasized the following in 1994:

“The European project will not succeed unless France actively contributes to it ... and accepting the sacrifices this involves. No longer by playing off one State against another, but by achieving ... a mutualization of power, at the service of Europe’s defense.”82

The Ex-Yugoslavian crisis clearly exhibited France’s challenge: to achieve equilibrium among national independence, European cohesion, and Atlantic solidarity. French policy had and still has to respond to a wide variety of conflicting interests.

First, France should maintain good relations with the Moslem world and support the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the French president, François Mitterand refused to break all ties to Serbia despite the ethnic cleansing policy carried out by the Serbs against the Moslems. France and Serbia have a legacy of friendship that dates back to World War I, when the French navy hastened to the rescue of the embattled Serb army under assault from Germany, and backed its revenge. In the aftermath of World War II, when former French resistance fighters took the helm of government, they saw Serbian resistance leaders as fellow victors against Germany, the traditional enemy of both countries.83

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82 French Minister of Defense quoted in Livre Blanc sur la Défense (Service d’Information et de Relations Publiques des Armée, 1994).

Second, France has preferred solutions involving the Western European Union (WEU) or the UN rather than NATO because the desire to demonstrate leadership has been perceived as more appropriate to WEU or UN than to NATO. Unfortunately, French leadership has occasionally downsized to the level of a *beau geste* (e.g., the Mitterand trip to Sarajevo).

Third, France has provided the largest contribution to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and has done the most to encourage the UN to take responsibility for the Yugoslav problem. However, despite the fact that French and British forces remained essentially in the role of hostages, France was reluctant to use military intervention, because it did not want to jeopardize its ties with the Moslem world and the Serbs simultaneously.84

France’s competing national interests caused the failure of its policy in the Ex-Yugoslavia crisis – that is, to achieve a common sentiment of the EU and convert France’s claim of a forefront position into political leadership. This reflects again the French dilemma – “that is, whether France can honor its European commitments and attend to the security problems facing the country as well as their own political concerns – and if so, how.”85

The German reunification significantly changed France’s quest for status as a “leading nation” in Europe. During the Cold War era, the Franco-German relationship was complementary: “Paris exerted political leadership and Bonn economic

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84 Steven Philip Kramer, 51-54.

leadership."\textsuperscript{86} Together, they had become "the basis for a West European Community that had moved toward complete economic integration through the Single European Act."\textsuperscript{87} After Germany’s reunification some observers in France expressed fear of a German Central Europe with France at its periphery.\textsuperscript{88} France assumed that Germany would use its new economic power and its geographic position to gain political leadership. Consequently, France received the old idea of mooring West Germany, (now a unified Germany), into the European framework by deepening European integration.\textsuperscript{89} In reviving the WEU and promoting the ESDI, France wanted to "guarantee the existence of a multilateral European security identity to ensure that Germany would not be tempted to develop an independent defense policy."\textsuperscript{90} The Kohl-Mitterrand statement of 6 December 1990, addressed to the president of the European Council, confirmed this attempt by asserting that: "... foreign policy and common security would have the vocation of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{86} Steven Philip Kramer, 2.
\item\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 12.
\item\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 33.
\item\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 3. The revival of the WEU occurred officially on 27 October 1987 when the WEU Ministerial Council inaugurated the “Platform on European Security Interests.” The incentive was given by the agreement between the US and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF missiles with a range between 500 km and 5500 km. On the same meeting the ESDI idea was born, emphasizing that the members of the European Community are convinced, that “the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.” Quoted from “WEU Ministerial Council – Platform on European Security Interests.” Western European Union Web Site Available [Online]: <http://www.weu.int/eng/comm/d871027a.htm > [11 March, 1999], Page 1 of 5.
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extending to all areas ... [and] that political union should include a genuine security policy that would lead in the end to a common defense.”

However, in the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty, Jacques Attali, one of President Mitterrand’s advisors, stated, “Maastricht was a long and complicated treaty with but one real goal – to get rid of the D-mark.” Edouard Balladur, the former French premier, defined the real strategic purpose of the referendum on the Maastricht Treaty:

“The rejection of Maastricht will not give France more liberty; it will simply allow Germany to act as it desires, without taking heed of its neighbors or its partners, without being constrained by any set of common European rules in its role as the military, economic, financial, and monetary power at the head of the continent.”

These two statements emphasized again the underlying French notion that Germany would strive for European supremacy if it were not embedded in a European framework of mutual commitments. Moreover, it also follows from this that France’s “long-standing desire to ‘moor’ Germany to Europe, intensified by German unification, was the major impulse behind France’s decision to advocate deepening European integration. ... The Treaty of Maastricht was above all a political document, designed to anchor Germany to Europe....”

91 Ibid., 34.


93 Ibid., 2.
C. THE SECURITY DIMENSION

The definition of security in post-Cold War times does not draw any longer from the overwhelmingly military emphasis of Cold War conceptions. The new broader understanding of security comprises economic, industrial policy, diplomatic, cultural, educational and other dimensions, which are not necessarily limited to a specific geographical area, but could quickly concern various countries.\textsuperscript{94}

How do these circumstances affect France’s nuclear doctrine and vital security interests? The security dimension of France’s nuclear arsenal is no longer an exclusively French affair. If the vital interests of member states of the European Union coincide and thereby constitute vital interests of the European Union, the nuclear deterrence capabilities of France and Great Britain could be transformed into a deterrent on behalf of the European Union.\textsuperscript{95} If this happened, institutional adjustments in the security architecture of the European and transatlantic institutions (NATO/WEU/EU/OSCE) would became indispensable.

1. France’s Strategic Culture

...Strategic culture is defined as the way in which a country views its relations with others on the world stage. His view derives from a country’s


\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., 31.
history, forms its geography and its instincts, and builds on the power of a nation’s self-assessment to both influence and explain its strategies.96

France’s strategic culture has to be defined via two basic reference points: first, territory; and second, extension beyond this territory. With respect to its territory, in the last few centuries, France, at the edge of the great northern European plain, has faced different concentrations of power in central Europe and has been invaded on several occasions. First, during the 100 Years War between France and England, King Henry V of England intervened in the French civil war, which involved fighting between the House of Burgundes and the House of Orléans, and defeated the French army at Agincourt on 1415. In the following years, the northern territory of France was occupied by English troops. Afterwards, the conflict between the Catholic Church in France and the growing influence of the Huguenots (Reformed – specifically, Calvinistic – communion of France in the 16th and 17th centuries) in government circles triggered a religious civil war from 1562 to 1598. Then, France and its allies Austria and Spain were heavily defeated by the Prussians in the Seven Years War of succession from 1756 to 1763. France lost its overseas territories in Canada and declined as a colonial power up through 1830. In 1871, France was defeated by Germany and had to cede Alsace-Lorraine. Although Germany lost the First World War and France could finally claim to herself to be victorious, most of the campaigns had occurred on French soil. Finally,

France was initially defeated in the Second World War by Germany and occupied until 1944.97

Thus, it follows that France has justifiable interest in making its territory impregnable. Historically, the French have sought protection against an adversary’s penetrative power with a force of numbers, maintained by a conscript army. The political tradition of conscription as the link between the armed forces and the nation since the French Revolution reflects the French idea of citizenship: “To speak about the creation of French citizenship by land-right is by extension to define a particular relationship with this land as territory to be defended against outside forces.”98 Therefore, France’s February 1996 decision to phase out conscription by the year 2002 and build a rapid deployment force of 50,000 professional soldiers constitutes a dramatic break with its political tradition of citizenship and reflects a new interpretation of the threats facing Europe. Finally, in an interview on 19 June 1996, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, General Jean-Philippe Douin, stated: “In assessing post-Cold War realities we realized the probability of a land attack against France itself from across its borders was virtually non-existent in the foreseeable future. ...”99

The second reference point for France’s strategic culture, the extension beyond its territory, derives from France’s preoccupation with great-power status and its


98 Dominique David, 66.


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assumptions about the superiority and universality of French civilization. The French revolution, the Code Napoléon and the age of Enlightenment are perceived as foundations of pluralism, democracy and human rights. Furthermore, the United Nations adopted these values as its founding principles, and hence solidified the belief of universality. The French people have implanted this universalism at the very heart of their national ideology: “The expression, ‘France, home of the rights of man’ does not imply that the rights of man flourish only in France, but rather that France reaffirms itself as the homeland of everyone who has rights, of every citizen.”100 France’s perception of the universality of its civilization be the reason behind France’s colonial policy of assimilation rather than trusteeship, its self-definition as the guardian of weak princes, its belief in the grandeur of France and its tendency to “wish Europe to adopt what Paris conceives as a European security policy.”101

The French defense White Paper of 1994 stated clearly the preference of protecting the survival of the nation and its vital interests: “… the first objective of our defense policy is to be able to ensure, alone if necessary, the ultimate defense of our vital interests against any threat, whatever its origin.” Although the White Paper confirmed its need to integrate into Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, the purpose of its membership is primarily the following:

“… to seek the best alliances and the best instruments for strengthening our power. That is why France’s action increasingly occurs within a

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100 Dominique David, 67.

multilateral framework of cooperation, especially the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance, the CSCE and UNO.\textsuperscript{102}

France seeks to preserve its capability to act in its national interests. France never supported the institutions of the Treaty of Rome to determine the future defense policy of the European Union. According to the French rather, the conduct of policy should remain in the hands of the states involved in its drafting and implementation. This approach reflects France's interpretation of the international system as involving continuous competition among nation-states.

The character of France's strategic culture and its self-perception is accurately described on the official web page of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as the principles of France's foreign policy:

As one of the oldest European nations, the country that inspired the ideals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and a former colonial power, France has always claimed the right to exert an influence in world affairs. ... France values its independence highly, and this principle guided the foreign policy. ... However, France's commitment to independence has not precluded efforts to develop solidarity with others. ... France is guided by the ambition to see that the values it has inspired – values enshrined in solemn documents by international institutions – prevail throughout the world. ... France's major foreign policy goals [are] to promote European integration in order to guarantee stability and prosperity on the continent, and to encourage progress toward peace, democracy, and development within the international community.\textsuperscript{103}

In other words, the grandeur of France will promote European integration.

\textsuperscript{102} "Chapter 2: The objectives of this defense policy." \textit{Livre Blanc sur la Défense} (Service d'Information et de Relations Publiques des Armée, 1994), 21-22.

2. France’s Nuclear Doctrine

Since the first French nuclear tests in 1960, the legitimacy of France’s nuclear forces has been vindicated by upholding nuclear deterrence “as a means of preventing war and assuring France’s independence and international status.”104 Furthermore, some French observers have argued that France’s status as a nuclear power is consistent with its permanent membership in the UN Security Council and hence, the possibility to shape world politics in the exclusive club of the Big Five (i.e., Great Britain, China, etc.). In addition, the “bomb” was seen by some of the French as a guarantee of diplomatic superiority over Germany, which in France’s view balanced the unequal Franco-German relationship caused by Germany’s overwhelming economic power, especially after its reunification. France’s no-use policy of nuclear weapons, which has been built around pure deterrence (in opposing the limited use of nuclear weapons in NATO’s flexible response strategy), “… helped ensure the creation of a stable political consensus around French nuclear policy. …” Although none of these principles has vanished, a report, which was published by the parliamentary defense commission in October 1993, recommended that France shift its non-use nuclear strategy to a more operational nuclear use strategy. 105


In French Cold War security strategy, the doctrinal use of the conventional forces was totally subordinated to the strategy of nuclear “dissuasion.” The French conventional forces could be sacrificed for a nuclear-deterrence maneuver. In other words:

“if the outgunned First Army were ever attacked and destroyed by an invading Soviet force [on German soil], this would be taken to mean that the Soviets were heading for French territory. The First Army’s sacrifice was a tripwire, the justification to begin nuclear retaliation.”\(^{106}\)

In post-Cold War military thinking, however, conventional forces are liberated from their sacrificial role in Cold War strategy. The role of conventional forces is to intervene somewhere abroad to prevent or stop conflicts that conceivably could threaten French territory. As conventional means are called upon in certain cases to play a strategic role themselves, the nuclear deterrence posture will guarantee that conventional forces will not be outflanked. This facilitates the pursuit of success in scenarios in which the operational use of tactical nuclear weapons might be possible. The 1994 French defense White Paper confirmed the more operational attitude toward the potential use of nuclear weapons with the following statement:

Now that the vital interests of France are no longer directly threatened, while those of the international community on which our security depends are endangered instead, it is not abnormal the conventional forces engaged in the service of collective security tend to occupy a more central place. In such situations, nuclear deterrence ultimately guarantees that the conventional forces are not bypassed. The part the latter played during the Cold War is then played by the nuclear forces; there is no break in the strategy, but an evolution in the respective roles of nuclear and conventional facilities, depending on the scenario.\(^{107}\)

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But if this is so, the ultimate role of nuclear weapons as deterrent is at stake. Although the current French president, Jacques Chirac, denied any French movement toward such a doctrine, the likelihood of France’s officially shifting toward this *more operational nuclear doctrine* seemed possible in 1995 and 1996, during President Chirac’s final series of nuclear tests. However, if France defines its nuclear weapons as only a means of deterrence to prevent war, then the disappearance of a designated enemy, such as the former Soviet Union, creates a dilemma of nuclear justification, and the need to recreate credible premises for maintaining a significant nuclear arsenal.\(^{108}\)

This recreation of credible premises could be seen in previous French attempts to move towards a European nuclear policy. Lucien Poirier, a *gaullien* defense thinker, stated the following:

> France must not turn its successful policy of national nuclear independence and refusal of nuclear disarmament in an eternal refusal of nuclear alliance with other states as part of the larger process of European integration. If the conditions came together for giving up definitively the status or autonomous nuclear power—meaning the definition of a European identity, thus of permanent common interests—France could agree to integrate its nuclear forces in a system of collective defense.\(^{109}\)

The 1994 French defense White Paper argued likewise:

> The issue of a European nuclear doctrine is destined to become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defense...Indeed, with nuclear weapons, Europe’s defense autonomy is possible. Without them, it is out of question.\(^{110}\)

\(^{108}\) Ibid., Page 7 of 9.

\(^{109}\) Ibid., Page 8 of 9.

\(^{110}\) “Second Part. Strategies and Capacities. Chapter 4: Our defense strategy. 1.2. - Nuclear Deterrence.”, 50.
The establishment of the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine as a permanent group in July 1993 might indicate the beginning of a process to put national nuclear forces at the service of Europe. However, European deterrence might only acquire some political and operational meaning if the vital interests of EU countries coincide a commonly reached consensus. Also, the fact that France has started discussions about its nuclear-deterrence policy with Britain appears to have broken with a fundamental principle of the Gaullist model: the absolute independence of France’s nuclear forces. France seems ready to move from its traditional insistence on its role as a nuclear deterrent to a Europeanization of its nuclear forces. However, it is not clear whether this readiness is based on budgetary constraints to share the increasing costs of updating the nuclear arsenals to modern standards, or on a redefinition of Europe’s power towards a superpower status as an equal partner of the United States with France at the forefront. According to Pascal Boniface, the most important challenge France has to face in future discussions of European nuclear deterrence is as follows:

There is a fundamental contradiction between the prospect of the Europeanization of French nuclear forces and the risk of shifting towards a nuclear policy which would no longer be purely deterrent. Our European partners will not follow us in the direction of nuclear use concepts, which we have ourselves rejected in the past.111

3. Institutional Adjustments

We recall our commitment to build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.\textsuperscript{112}

Three important factors explain France's eagerness to develop a strong European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and its new rapprochement to the EU/WEU/NATO nexus. First, France's idea of a European security entity is a matter of principle. If Europe is to merge into a full-fledged political union, it must be capable of dealing with security and defense issues, just as an independent and sovereign state must be able to conduct its own security and defense policy. Consequently, a European Union without a "... common security policy and, eventually, a common defense would be incomplete."\textsuperscript{113} In the light of the Ex-Yugoslavian crisis Nicole Gnesotto, the French deputy director of the Western European Union's Institute for Strategic Studies, confirmed the French position and argued in 1992:

Does the European community see itself in the future as a purely civilian and economic entity with a strictly European vocation...? Or does it see itself as a world power with global responsibilities and influence? ... The French clearly choose the second option. This is neither a militaristic vision of international relations nor a willingness to build Europe as a third bloc, but a matter of principle. ... Europe ... cannot be an effective diplomatic actor ... if its authority is not backed by serious military power.\textsuperscript{114}


\textsuperscript{113} Philip H. Gordon, 176.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 177.
Second, Germany’s reunification skewed off the well-kept bilateral balance between France and the former West Germany. The equilibrium of French political leadership and German economic leadership shifted toward Germany, a politically confident state of about eighty million inhabitants. France’s continuous goal of embedding Germany in an alliance in order to deter any German independent strength demanded a new assessment of France’s obligation to moor Germany effectively into the European framework. It became apparent that a reunified Germany would not endorse a French policy of imposing supranational constraints on Germany without a French commitment to approach a common European security framework.  

Third, the major breakthrough for France’s rapprochement to the EU/WEU/NATO nexus was facilitated by the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government at the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 10-11 January 1994. The Heads of State and Government agreed on “strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defense component of the European Union.” Furthermore, they decided “to make collective assets of Alliance available on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy.” They supported “the development of separable but not

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115 Ibid., 175–76.
separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.”

Despite the subsequent misunderstandings between France and the United States over the degree of autonomy of an ESDI within NATO and the adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) arrangements into effective military structures, the validity of the transatlantic link and the commitment of the United States in Europe have never been questioned by France. Jacque Chirac mentioned in 1993, that “… necessary rebalancing of relations within the Atlantic Alliance, relying on existing European institutions such as the WEU, can only take place from the inside, not against the United States, but in agreement with it.”

European impotence in the Yugoslav crisis and the changed European security environment (i.e., a unified Germany and instability in Central and Eastern Europe) have reinforced the French understanding that United States leadership in Europe remains essential. However, France believes that the likelihood of circumstances in which the Europeans might wish to intervene militarily in an operation, but in which the United States does not wish to be militarily involved could increase. Therefore, the Brussels summit declaration and the NATO Berlin meeting in June 1996 confirmed France’s view of the need to distinguish between Article 5 tasks of the Washington Treaty and Petersberg missions as set forth in the Petersberg Communiqué of the WEU-Ministers’


117 Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 34.
Council in 1992. Paris demanded an indispensability of the “institutional division of labor.” That is, placing the Article 5 tasks under the remaining NATO procedures and pursuing implementation of the Petersberg missions via the CJTF concept.

A variety of French initiatives followed the NATO Berlin meeting in June 1996. France, in collaboration with Germany, sought the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks and the security-solidarity clause in the Amsterdam Treaty. Furthermore, France voted for the reinforcement of the Council of Ministers of the EU in all defense matters and its empowerment to define aims and objectives of the EU in the defense and security realm. Finally, France took the lead in pressing for the reinforcement of the WEU’s operational powers and the eventual merger of the WEU and the EU. As long as the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has the authority to decide how NATO assets are placed at the WEU’s disposal for WEU-led operations, France will also be drawn closer to NATO. France did not leave the political committees of NATO. France takes part in their decision-making process and has to adapt to NATO procedures, which will give the WEU its full operational capabilities.

The overall picture shows that France adjusted its relationship to the European security framework. These initial, hesitant steps may eventually lead to fuller French

118 Ibid., 35.

119 Article 5 of the Washington Treaty tasks comprises the collective defense of NATO territory in case of an attack against the territory of a member state. The attack against a single member state is perceived as an attack against all members. The WEU Council of Ministers inaugurated the Petersberg Declaration in Bonn, June 19, 1992 stated: “...military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

120 Ibid., 33-36.
participation in the EU/WEU/NATO nexus. However, it would be going too far, to declare that France will return to NATO’s integrated military structure, or merge its security and defense policy under a supranational European entity as proposed in the 1950’s in the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty.\textsuperscript{121} French policy has never accepted the federalist idea that the European Commission should become the EU’s government, with the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers sharing the tasks of democratic and parliamentary control of this government.\textsuperscript{122} France’s contemporary Europe would remain a Europe of sovereign and independent states gathered under a common umbrella like the EU, WEU, OSCE or NATO, but would perpetuate each country’s sovereignty in decisions on security and defense policies.

In accordance with the principles of the Gaullist model, France has dramatically shifted its security and defense policies to a more integrated approach. Indeed, under de Gaulle’s auspices, it would have been unconceivable to subordinate French troops under an Italian command as happened in Operation ALBA in Albania in 1997.

However, the recent Franco-American quarrel about the replacement of the Commander in Chief (CINC) of the U.S.-led Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) with a European commander highlighted their different views on how to share in the burden of European security and defense issues.

\textsuperscript{121} The EDC Treaty was a remarkable attempt by Western European powers to counterbalance the overwhelming conventional military ascendency of the Soviet Union in Europe by the formation of a supranational European army and simultaneously dissolving the national armies.

Nevertheless, long-standing French policies toward European integration have changed. Examples that indicate a Europeanization of France’s security and defense policies include the joint declaration on European defense at the Franco-British summit of Saint-Malo in December 1998, the joint declaration on Franco-German security and defense of Nuremberg in December 1996 and the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, established as a permanent group in 1993. France is on its way but expectations on the progress of France’s integration process should remain realistic. France will not act against what it perceives to be its own interests, which again, are “to ensure the independence of the country and the defense of the nation’s vital interests.”  

The next chapter will examine the extent to which France’s armed forces, defense industry and procurement structure reflect a process of Europeanization.

D. THE DEFENSE DIMENSION

The constraints of the Monetary Union placed a heavy burden on the ambitious French armament program. Projects, such as the Rafale fighter aircraft, the Leclerc tank, and the additional aircraft carrier pose serious budgetary problems. On the other hand, France’s stated objective for the Army of 2015 is “to be able to project into a more or less distant combat zone either 50,000 professional soldiers in a single theatre or 35,000 in a major theatre with another 15,000 destined for a secondary theatre.” These demands

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123 French Prime Minister quoted in Livre Blanc sur la Défense (Service d’Information et de Relations Publiques des Armée, 1994).

124 Ibid. 38.

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require appropriate technical equipment and will force France to participate even more in multinational armament programs than in the past. The French defense industry has to be restructured in order to cooperate more effectively with the defense industry of current or future partner nations. The European defense industry must consolidate while facing the challenge of a powerful American industrial-defense complex.

1. French Armed Forces

Our defense strategy has as its purpose, ... to ensure the defense of France's vital interests, to confirm our country's European option and to respond to its international calling. Being both a continental and maritime power, our country has to be able to defend its interest, alone or with others, in numerous regions of the world, albeit without claiming a capacity for global action. This is a result of its geographic situation, the nature of its strategic needs and its responsibilities as a power. Its fundamental objectives lead to the choice of a balanced model avoiding two extremes.125

The French defense White Paper identified three major commitments of the French armed forces: to defend France's vital interests; to fulfill its European commitments; and to support France’s global role.

Furthermore, it defined four operational strategies of the armed forces to perform those commitments: (1) deterrence, (2) prevention, (3) projection, and (4) protection.126

Deterrence should help to prevent unacceptable damage and issue ultimatums under all circumstances. Prevention anticipates and forestalls the development of situations that could become conflicts. Projection is designed to hold the escalation of a conflict in


check by producing an immediate impression of superiority. Protection mainly aims to defend the national territory as a permanent objective.\textsuperscript{127}

All three services have to conduct several or all of these operational functions in various scenarios. The French defense White Paper described those scenarios as follows:

- Scenario 1 comprises a regional conflict, which does not challenge France's vital interests.
- Scenario 2 consists of a regional conflict, which may involve France's vital interests.
- Scenario 3 focuses on aggression against France's overseas region.
- Scenario 4 describes France's commitments due to bilateral agreements.
- Scenario 5 emphasizes operations for peace and international law, and scenario 6 concerns the potential resurgence of a major threat against Western Europe.\textsuperscript{128}

As long as these scenarios are dependent on one another and might occur simultaneously, one has to emphasize certain operational functions.

The defense reform of 1996 concentrated on two operational functions to cover most of the conflict scenarios: prevention and projection.\textsuperscript{129} Furthermore, four constraints were imposed on the adaptation of these operational functions into the military structures so that they could perform effectively in likely scenarios: first, in the future, most conflicts will have an international dimension. Second, the deployment of the necessary means to conduct a multinational military operation will be beyond the scope of any single country. Third, France therefore, must be capable of projecting its

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{128} Second Part: Strategies and Capacities. Chapter 4: Our defense strategy. 2 – Contingencies requiring the use of force.”, 55–61.

forces along with European and Allied partners. Finally, the financial constraints of the European Monetary Union, the high rate of unemployment, and President Chirac’s decisions to make the fight against unemployment a top priority and to increase social spending will shrink the defense budget considerably.\textsuperscript{130} \textsuperscript{131} The inescapable conclusion is that, to a certain extent, France must Europeanize its armed forces in order to meet its European commitment – that is, to enable the WEU to execute Petersberg-type operations as the defense arm of the EU.

In fact, France has situated itself at the heart of a European network of integrated military units. In 1991, France and Germany set up the Franco-German Brigade with operational status. This brigade served as the core unit for the European Corps (EUROCORPS), which was established in 1992 with a provisional Staff in Strasbourg. The Corps, declared operational in 1995, is composed of 50,000 men, and most of its manpower remains under national authority. The basic operational unit of the Corps is the division; hence the level of integration is comparable with the planned structure of the European Army that was envisaged in the EDC project of the early 1950s.

Furthermore, France had established the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) and the European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR) with Italy, Spain, and Portugal. EUROMARFOR was declared operational in October 1996 with its headquarters in Toulon, and EUROFOR was declared operational in November 1997

\textsuperscript{130} Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, “The ‘Europeanization’ of French Defense Policy. The institutional framework. “, 34.

with its headquarters in Florence. Neither forces have any standing units except the headquarters staffs. The participating nations put national units at EUROMARFOR’s and EUROFOR’s disposal.

EUROCORPS, EUROMARFOR and EUROFOR are all part of the Forces answerable to the WEU (FAWEU), which have been designated by the WEU nations. These FAWEU provide the WEU with operational capabilities to conduct Petersberg missions.132 Moreover, the Franco-British Euro Air Group, situated in High Wycombe was established in October 1995 “to co-ordinate international and European missions of various sorts.”134

It seems that the main structural features of the French Army of 2015 will provide “maximum flexibility for collaboration with allies wherever the need is felt.”135 However, a complete integration of the entire French armed forces as foreseen in the EDC treaty of 1952 can not be expected in so far as France has to fulfill its overseas commitments, which include nearly twenty defense and cooperation agreements in Africa, and a permanent deployment of approximately 10,000 soldiers in Africa, the South Pacific and South America.136 It would be also unrealistic to anticipate other


133 Sidney E. Dean, “Revolutionärer Schritt. EUROFOR und EUROMARFOR.” Information für die Truppe 1/99, 29-35.


135 Ibid., 37.

nations supporting France’s commitments. As the former German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe noted: “the Eurocorps is not the Afrikakorps.”

2. Procurement

As mentioned previously, factors that placed a heavy burden on France’s ambitious armament program included the constraints of the Monetary Union, the high unemployment rate, the extensive costs of the social security net and budgetary deficits. Furthermore, the pledge of President Chirac during the 1995 election to continue welfare benefits, to create more jobs and to lower taxes decreased the chances of the defense budget to recover.

The high costs of France’s nuclear arsenal, which represented between 0.4 and 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product and took up 30 percent of the defense budget annually for 30 years (1963 – 1992), were no longer affordable. Consequently, President Chirac took the necessary steps to start reducing the defense budget in 1996 by saving US$ 16.6 billion in the subsequent period. The major emphasis was placed on cutting nuclear forces. The proportion of the defense budget allocated to the nuclear forces was reduced to 10 percent in 1996. The surface-to-surface missiles on the Plateau d’Albion and the short-range missiles, Hades, were scrapped. The nuclear test facilities in Polynesia and the fissile material plants at Marcoule and Pierrelatte were closed.

137 Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 37.

138 Ibid.
Chirac also cut down on equipment for the conventional forces. For the Army, the production of Leclerc heavy battle tanks was reduced from 1400 units in 1987 to 400 in 1996. The defense-planning program of 1997-2002 now calls for a production of only 307 units. In addition, the production of Franco-German helicopter project *Tigre* was also limited to 25 anti-helicopter versions and zero anti-tank versions before 2002. A similar development was predicted for the NH-90 transport helicopter.\(^{139}\)

The Air Force suffered the heaviest burden. Since 1984, fifteen air bases have been closed. In terms of training, the Air Force has reduced the total number of flying hours by 3 percent since 1995. This lack is worrisome because, on the one hand, French training-time sank further below its annual average of 180 flying hours, and on the other hand, the French share of air operations is second to the United States in Bosnia.\(^{140}\) \(^{141}\)

Another major Air Force problem is the delivery of the Rafale aircraft. The global cost for the Rafale has been estimated at US$ 32.1billion. The total number of targeted aircraft is 320, including 86 of the naval version. The arithmetic costs would be fixed at over US$ 99.7million per unit. However, the annual Air Force budget amounts to US$ 6.14billion. If the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier *Charles de Gaulle* can be built as scheduled by 1999, the delivery of the naval version of the Rafale will take absolute priority, because until the Rafale comes on stream in 2002, the carrier will be without air

\(^{139}\) Ibid., 38.


\(^{141}\) If the annual air-training hours shrink to under 180, the combat-ready status of the pilots will be at stake.
protection. Therefore, it can be concluded that, as many consignments of the Rafale as possible will be delivered to the navy in order to secure full operational capability for the carrier. If that is the case, presumably no air force version of the Rafale will be delivered. This has been confirmed by many in the upper reaches of the defense establishment including the Chief of Air Staff, General Rannou, who believes that the Air Force version of Rafale will be abandoned and only the naval version will ever be deployed.¹⁴²

As mentioned in the previous section, the 1996 defense program and recent French procurement plans concentrated on two major operational functions, prevention and projection to cover the six conflict scenarios. The Gulf War taught the French a number of lessons about the weaknesses of their conventional force, especially the capability of projection — that is, of producing an immediate impression of authority. It took France more than three weeks to deploy 12,000 troops, including equipment, to the Gulf region. Furthermore, France’s tactical aircraft did not fit the avionics standard of the coalition partners. Although France sent the aircraft carrier *Clemenceau* to the Gulf, its aircraft were inadequate to harmonize with aircraft from the partner nations. In addition, France had completely relied on the strategic reconnaissance capacity of the United States. According to David Yost, France was unable to obtain “'[t]he necessary information in an autonomous and complete fashion.’”¹⁴³ ¹⁴⁴ Yost continues:

> Without allied intelligence [which was] American, we were almost blind. To leave our systems in their present state of insufficiency and dependence

¹⁴² Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 39.

¹⁴³ David S. Yost, 265.

¹⁴⁴ Philip H. Gordon, 176.
would amount to weakening our current and future defense effort to a considerable extent. In truth, in the long run, we would be disarmed.\textsuperscript{145}

Therefore, the major objective of projection, to create the immediate impression of superiority, failed because of obsolete equipment and its lack of strategic transport and intelligence capacity. Hence, recent defense-program plans have prioritized equipment, which could increase projection capability. The most intriguing issue, however, is the assumption that France has Europeanized its procurement because it has failed to become capable enough to reach the goal of projection as mentioned in the 1994 White Paper, and because it has to implement the inevitable defense budgetary cuts. The multinational armament programs (see Table 2) are mostly strategies to strengthen power projection.

The light armored-vehicle program (VBCI) has been perpetuated since being targeted at 600 units in 1987 and has been regarded as the most efficient means in future ground war scenarios, as in Ex-Yugoslavia or in Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{146} It is under construction in cooperation with Germany and the UK.\textsuperscript{147} France, Italy, and the UK will produce the Horizon Frigate, equipped with special anti aircraft facilities. The satellite observation systems, Helios I and Helios II, will provide intelligence data for strategic reconnaissance to the WEU, will be analyzed and utilized by the WEU satellite monitoring center at Torrejon in Spain, and hence it will be at France’s disposal.

\textsuperscript{145} David S. Yost, 265.

\textsuperscript{146} Kurdistan is not a state with defined borders. It is the term for an area between Turkey, Iraq and Iran, where an ethnic group, called Kurds, is living.

\textsuperscript{147} Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, 38.
## Table 2. Cooperation programs identified in the defense budget program for 1999

### PROJET DE BUDGET POUR 1999

#### LISTE DES PRINCIPAUX PROGRAMMES EN COOPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programmes</th>
<th>Partenaires</th>
<th>Allemagne</th>
<th>Italie</th>
<th>Espagne</th>
<th>Royaume-Uni</th>
<th>Etats-Unis</th>
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**Source:** Emmanuel Chavasse-Frétaz, “Presentation of French Defense Policy,” (French Ministry of Defense, presented at Naval Post Graduate School on 27 January 1999).
The French shift emphasizing on conventional weapons for power projection constitutes their move towards European integration in defense procurement.\textsuperscript{148}

3. Defense Industry

The four OCCAR nations do not view the organization as an exclusive club. We expect to extend membership in due course to other nations who accept the organization's underlying principles and are participants in future projects. OCCAR thus has the potential to act as a building block towards an eventual European Armaments Agency. It will also support the major European defense equipment producers in their determination to maintain a strong and competitive defense industrial base.\textsuperscript{149}

On 9 September 1998, the European Defense Ministers signed a new arms procurement treaty called OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement),\textsuperscript{150} which was established in order to become the basis for a European arms agency.

As Guillaume Parmentier has observed, "Maintaining an arms industry in Europe is one of the major issues at stake in the development of a European security policy."\textsuperscript{151} He states further that "a common foreign and defense policy not backed by a European industry would over time no longer enjoy the support of public opinion and political parties...."\textsuperscript{152} Therefore, France has realized that it can no longer afford to consider its

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 40.


\textsuperscript{150} Joint Armus Cooperation Organisation

\textsuperscript{151} Guillaume Parmentier, "The Structure of the Arms Industry." France and Japan in a Changing Security Environment (Tokyo: The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 34.

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
defense industry developing all necessary weapons for pursuing its security objectives if production costs for weapon systems continue to skyrocket. François Léotard, then the Defense Minister, outlined his three-point program on procurement policy in a major speech in September 1994:

First, to consolidate our national industry by giving it the necessary means to forge European alliances ...; Next, to conduct these European-wide industrial alliances in the tightest possible synergy with the cooperation programs. Finally, to agree on a division of labor among the European states for non-strategic programs.153

The developments in the American arms industry put additional pressure on France’s defense industry to consolidate and prepare for European integration. In 1994, the American arms company Martin Marietta merged with Lockheed; then in 1997, Boeing and McDonald Douglas were united to form a single enterprise. The merger between Martin Marietta and Lockheed created a company “… bigger than the entire French aeronautics industry with a turnover equivalent to one-third of the entire European aeronautics industry.”154

President Chirac made two decisions to meet the American challenge and to achieve the goal, which was set along with Léotard’s three-point program. He ordered a merger between the aircraft companies Aérospatiale and Dassault Aviation, and privatized Thomson CSF, a specialist in defense electronics. However, these measures

153 Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, “The defense industry and Europeanization.”, 41.

154 Ibid., 41.
were only initial steps in solving France’s defense-industry problems and moving toward European integration.\(^{155}\)

France pursues a policy on the export of arms as part of its sovereignty and is the world’s third greatest arms exporter after the United States and Great Britain.\(^{156}\) The main recipients of France’s arms products are countries in the Middle East, Latin America, and South East Asia. Among them are critical countries like Libya and Taiwan. Currently, a European arms export policy does not exist. However, arms exports to countries like Libya, which has a totalitarian regime and is suspected of producing biological and chemical weapons, and Taiwan, which appears to be a constant source of tensions with China, seem to hamper the development of a common export policy, especially in view of the restrictive German export policy in those regions.\(^{157}\)

Furthermore, the privatization of only one French arms company (Thomson CSF) in 1996 has not solved the problem of France’s general principle of state-owned arms enterprises. Despite the statement in France’s 1994 Defense White paper that “the state can no longer support the arms industry in all areas, as in the past.”\(^{158}\) France has started a national light armored-vehicle program (VBCI, see table 1) parallel to the trinational

\(^{155}\) Ibid., 42.


\(^{157}\) Ibid.

cooperation with Germany and Great Britain on a similar product. This national program will be pursued, if the trinational concept is not economical. The purpose of this redundant venture is to secure the survival of GIAT Industry, the single state-owned arms company for French Army products.

In addition, the current socialist government is not as keen about privatizing France’s arms industry as President Chirac, because privatization will inevitably cut jobs. Pressures from labor unions in times of high unemployment will have a much greater impact on the decisions of a socialist government than on a conservative president.

France fervently attempts to dissociate the European arms industry from that of the United States. The French 1994 Defense White Paper stated the following in this regard:

By working together, European partners will be evenly matched against world competition, and can thus increase their competitiveness. This policy also means that European countries should express their solidarity through European preference. France must persuade its partners of the need for a common strategy, without which the European arms industry will start declining and European independence will be called into question.\textsuperscript{159}

This attitude conflict with Germany and Great Britain’s procurement procedures and respective interests, which are to cooperate with the United States, especially within NATO. These differences will inevitably affect the recent prospects for a European Aerospace and Defense Company (EADC).\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} "Third Part: The Resources. Chapter 7: Arms Policy and Industrial Strategy. 2 – The European Dimension."); emphasis added, 103.

\textsuperscript{160} "Export von Ruestungsguetern.", Page 6 of 11.
On 27 March 1998, the participating companies of Airbus, (British Aerospace (United Kingdom), Aérospatiale (France), Daimler Benz Aerospace Airbus (Germany), and CASA (Spain)) conveyed a common report to their governments. They would try to merge their future activities in the aeronautic, space, and arms realms into one comprehensive company. The company would be privatized and have a single leadership with four major elements:

- central management in the areas of finance, controlling, strategy and policy;
- control in operational areas like Airbus;
- national elements, which are connected to the relevant governments;
- primary company goals should be determined by economic criteria and should be independent from national arms policy.¹⁶¹

Despite the consensus among the companies and the governments, France and its defense industry will face serious problems because Paris has to abandon its long-lasting principle of independence and its state-centered procurement procedures, which happen to be supported by the current socialist government.¹⁶²

In sum, one can conclude that France has taken its first steps toward the Europeanization of its defense industry. However, the French have to undergo painful adjustments concerning privatization and have to allow companies latitude to act independently from national arms policy in order to promote the emergence of a viable European arms industry. President Chirac seems to be ready to go through with such a restructuring of France’s defense industry, but the current socialist government might hamper the process because of domestic reasons. The progress of OCCAR in the future

¹⁶¹ “Restrukturierung der europäischen Verteidigungsindustrie.”, Page 7 of 11.
might be an indication, though, not a guarantee of France’s successful Europeanization of its defense industry.

E. FINAL REMARKS

France’s commitment to the creation of an integrated European security and defense structure remains to a certain extent congruent with de Gaulle’s model for France’s national security in the 1960s. Although de Gaulle strongly opposed the EDC treaty of 1952 and the model of an integrated European army, he strongly supported the Elysée Treaty of 1963. This treaty reflected his view of the appropriate European security architecture: to create a “framework for the launching of an autonomous European foreign and security policy within the context of a restructured Atlantic Alliance;” and “the construction of a new European security order, which would transcend NATO while at the same time strengthening the Alliance.”163 These statements were reflected almost exactly by the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994:

We agreed to adapt further the Alliance’s political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defense Identity. … We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, … and support the development of separable but not separate capabilities, which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security.

162 Ibid., Page 10 of 11.

Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself.\textsuperscript{164}

In view of these statements by de Gaulle in the 1960's and by the Heads of State and Government in Brussels in 1994, one can conclude that since de Gaulle, France's strategy has been to Europeanize its security and defense policies. However, there is a difference between de Gaulle's statements in the 1960's and the Alliance's statements in 1994. De Gaulle pursued policies, which stressed autonomy in the national decision-making process. He emphasized the ability of a nation-state to assert itself and not to be at the mercy of any foreign power. When he spoke of Europe, he favored the absolute sovereignty of all nation states and their autarky in the security and defense realm. Although France today tries to perpetuate the independence and autonomy of decision-making in its security and defense posture, it realizes that "the framework for any engagement can only be multinational, ... because the overall deployment of the necessary means... is now beyond the scope of any singly country."\textsuperscript{165}

This attitude reflects France's old dilemma, which has not been solved yet: contributing to the European integration process, while at the same time perpetuating its independence in world politics and its glory as a world power. France attempts to reconcile itself, while it also seeks to "wish Europe to adopt what Paris conceives as a European security policy,"\textsuperscript{166} and strives for an autonomous European security and


\textsuperscript{165} Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, "The institutional framework.", 34.

\textsuperscript{166} Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon, "The 1980s and the Emergence of 'Europeanization.'", 27.
defense framework under French leadership. However, the realization of an increasingly autonomous European security and defense entity under French leadership requires strong French commitments to the integration process of Europe. However, these commitments would irrevocably compel France to integrate and to comply with European security and defense structures, which sooner or later will Europeanize France’s entire security and defense realm.

France interprets security now as a “collective endeavor and collective goal.”\textsuperscript{167} In terms of its nuclear doctrine, France has begun to share its knowledge with some of its European partners: “In terms of force missions and military involvement, the previous record of embolism has been replaced by an almost frenetic activism.”\textsuperscript{168} France’s contributions to EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, and EUROCORPS, and the subordination of French troops under Italian command in the ALBA-operation would have been inconceivable under de Gaulle’s authority and his principles of independence.

Furthermore, France’s shift toward not only more cooperation and integration in terms of procurement but also international joint ventures in its defense industry demonstrates its evolution in defense thinking. Although domestic factors, budgetary constraints and recent experiences like the Gulf War and the Ex-Yugoslavian crisis have encouraged France to Europeanize and share security and defense burdens with its European neighbors, France’s entire approach to questions of defense and security is beginning to integrate with those of its European neighbors. François Léotard, then the

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid., 43.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
Minister of Defense, verified France's Europeanization of its security and defense posture when he presented the 1995 defense budget to parliament in November 1994:

Our defense policy ... and this is our conscious choice, must be situated in the perspective of a European defense, without which we would be faced with nothing but a constant exhaustion of our resources, our willpower and our capacities.169

France's entire approach integrating its defense and security with those of its European neighbors includes one legal, contractual, commonly agreed-upon framework: the Amsterdam Treaty. The next chapter will analyze its efficiency in terms of a CFSP in Europe.

169 Ibid.
IV. THE AMSTERDAM TREATY – THE REAL WAY AHEAD TOWARD A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY (CFSP) OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS?

A. INTRODUCTION

As of 1993, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union states that one of the objectives of the EU is to “assert its identity on the international scene, in particular through the implementation of a CFSP, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense.”

The reforms in the Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997, were designed to make the CFSP more effective and to equip the European Union better for its role in international politics. Currently, the EU does not wield a diplomatic and political weight commensurate with its economic strength. In 1995 the EU gave US$1.5 billion to assist in Russia's transition to democracy (seven times more than did the U.S.) and in 1996, the EU gave almost US$2 billion in global humanitarian aid (one third more than the U.S.). The lack of the CFSP however, has prevented the EU from attaining influence on the international stage in proportion to its considerable contributions. The Amsterdam Treaty aims to overcome the contradictions between the ambitious objectives of the CFSP and the means available to the EU for achieving those objectives.

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B. CONTENT OF THE TREATY

To understand European issues, it is always worthwhile to have a basic understanding of the content of the relevant treaties. Without a profound and well-informed background, one would not be able to evaluate these treaties in their political contexts. The outcomes and conclusions are often deeply dependent upon specific regulations and their context within the treaty. Misleading interpretations can occur easily.

1. Character

The Amsterdam Treaty is actually a summary of amendments of treaties that had already existed. The provisions for the CFSP had already been laid down in Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, but the lack of progress in implementing the CFSP made it necessary to think about amendments. The Treaty introduces more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making structures in the area of CFSP designed to strengthen its capacity for action. This will be discussed later and described in more detail in the section concerning the Amsterdam Treaty’s prospects for the CFSP.172

2. Objectives

The objectives of the CFSP are based on the mutual desire of the member states to strengthen security and peace in the European Union and in the world. They rely on the

tenets of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Paris Charter as core principles for the Treaty. Furthermore, through the Treaty, the member states reaffirm their view of acting "in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" and try "to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU."\textsuperscript{173}

However, the basic issue at stake is: how the Amsterdam Treaty pursues the objectives. First of all, a lack of principles and general guidelines for the CFSP compels the European Council to define those. Afterwards, the Council of Ministers must decide on common strategies to transform the CFSP into something practical. These common strategies will be implemented by adopting joint actions and common positions in scenarios that force the Member States to act as a unanimous, political entity. In the long run, they must systematically strengthen their cooperation in the conduct of policy. The next section concerns the functional interrelations that connect the bodies of the European Union and how the member states are involved in its framework.\textsuperscript{174}

3. Functional Interrelations

The European Council plays the major role in defining the guidelines and principles of the CFSP. These guidelines and principles will be given to the Council of Ministers who will decide on the objectives, scope, duration, and conditions for their implementation and adopt them into joint actions. A qualified majority can validate this decision process; however, if basic interests are at stake and called to attention by a

\textsuperscript{173} \textsuperscript{173} \textit{Title V. Article J.1}

\textsuperscript{174} \textsuperscript{174} \textit{Title V. Article J.3}
member state, the process changes to the unanimous-vote principle. In addition, the Commission is required by the Council to submit proposals for implementation of joint actions.\textsuperscript{175}

The Council of Ministers, with its Presidency and Secretary General, is the main executive body for CFSP issues. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers represents the EU in CFSP issues, and in association with the Commission negotiates on behalf of the Council, in CFSP matters with other states and international organizations. The Secretary General exercises the function of a High Representative for the CFSP and conducts political dialogues with third parties also on behalf of the Council.\textsuperscript{176} For example, this occurred during negotiations between the Secretary General (in the function of a High Representative for the CFSP of the EU) and the belligerent parties in the former Ex-Yugoslavian conflict.

The European Parliament must hold an annual debate about the progress in implementing the CFSP. In addition, the Political Committee must monitor the international situation and the implementation of common agreed-upon policies in areas covered by the CFSP, and they must contribute to the CFSP's definitions.\textsuperscript{177}

Finally, the Member States should use the Council as a platform to inform and consult one another on any CFSP matter and uphold their common EU positions in

\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Title V. Article J.3 to J.4}

\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Title V. Article J.8, J.16}

\textsuperscript{177} \textit{Title V. Article J.11, J.15}
international organizations and conferences. Furthermore, the member states that are members in the UNSC should execute their functions with concern for the EU interests.

The CFSP involves not only the bodies of the EU, but also the WEU as an integral part of the Union in framing a common defense policy. Therefore, the focus of this thesis will now shift to the role of the WEU in CFSP.

4. Role of the WEU

In Article J.4 of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union “requests the WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defense implications.” The Amsterdam Treaty concretizes the role of the WEU in providing operational capability to the EU in humanitarian, rescue, peace-keeping, and peace-making tasks, and tasks requiring combat forces and crisis management.178 It binds the WEU closer to the bodies of the EU such that “the Council, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU shall adopt necessary practical arrangements to allow all Member States contributing to the tasks in question to participate fully and on an equal footing in planning and decision taking in the WEU.”179

C. EVALUATION OF THE TREATY TOWARD THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

178 see footnote 118.

179 ____. Title V. Article J.7
Since the Amsterdam Treaty is not yet in force, the evaluation is not based on the political events, that are yet to occur as an outcome of the treaty and its implementation into the decision-making process of the European Union in foreign and security affairs. Therefore, this analysis is based on a basic understanding of the contents of the treaty and other research.

1. Obstacles to the development of a CFSP

Many of the obstacles to developing a CFSP are identical to those, that have stood impeded general EU integration. Some have viable practical solutions, while others seemingly have no remedy. The most formidable challenges to the development of a CFSP are listed here:

\( a) \) Historic rivalries, cultural differences, and separate ambitions:

The member nations of the EU have had historical differences that have led to rivalries, competition, and war. It will be extremely difficult to overcome the national sentiments that have developed within each European throughout his or her lifetime, and even more difficult to convince them that it is in his or her best interest to act as a European first, and a countryman second. This problem is evidenced in the fact that there has not yet been developed any European interest that can unite the members of the EU on a majority of CFSP issues.
b) The intergovernmental process and the unanimous voting principle:

Until the EU fully implements the majority-voting principle on matters of CFSP, the results of negotiations between the member states will be reduced to the lowest common denominator of agreement for decision making. That will require a decision-making process more closely resembling that of the EU economic pillar. Currently, the members of the European Council are responsible more to their respective national bureaucracies than to the EU. This multiplies the inefficiencies of the national bureaucracies by a factor of fifteen and results in a very indecisive decision making.

c) Weakness of the European Parliament:

This is perhaps the most daunting obstacle to the development of a CFSP and to further EU integration. Because of the weakness of the EP, which has no real legislative power except some control authority over the budget, there is no sense of subordination to the EU on the part of the member states. Unless the EP has supranational authority and budgetary control, it will wield no real power over the national governments.

d) Unwillingness of Member States to delegate sovereignty:

It has proven difficult to convince the member states that it would be in their best interests to forfeit some of their national sovereignty to an uncertain entity. No nation has any guarantee that a supranational governmental structure will support their vital interests above those of the other nations.180 The paradox here is that conceptually

speaking, the interests of one nation should coincide with those of the other nations in most matters. This would be the case if there were a real European interest, but the difficulty of reaching agreement on even the most minor of points has proven that this ideal situation does not exist.

e) **Integration of British and French nuclear forces:**

While this could be considered an issue of national sovereignty, it should also receive special mention as a major security issue. Both France and the United Kingdom are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. As EU members, they are supposed to execute their duties in this position with full concern for the other members of the EU. The issue of nuclear forces will prove divisive, as it is unlikely that either nation will delegate or forfeit any portion of its sovereignty concerning nuclear weapons. Some functional solution will have to be achieved as part of the integration process.

f) **Expansion leading to “policy paralysis”**\(^{181}\):

It is difficult enough for the current 15 members of the EU to reach common positions. When that number expands to 20 or 28, there will be real concern that these difficulties will multiply exponentially and hamper the CFSP’s implementation.

g) **Decline of military/defense budgets and the existence of NATO:**

Since the end of the Cold War, defense budgets in Europe have been declining. NATO remains the security umbrella for Europe and will strain the defense

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\(^{181}\) "European Foreign Policy: Unity by Machinery?" *The Economist* (Volume 338, no. 7955, 2 March 96), 3.
budgets of its member states to fulfill its mission. Therefore, there is no urgency on the part of the member states to develop a separate, functional security organization. The member states are being very careful not to duplicate the capabilities of NATO, and it will be difficult to meet the obligations of membership in both NATO and the WEU/EU. As long as the security umbrella provided by NATO exists and its member states can harmonize their security concerns to a certain extent, there will be no immediate implementation of an effective CFSP.

h) Post-Cold War multi-polarity:

During the Cold War, it was much easier to identify a common interest: security against the Soviet threat. Now that threat has dissolved, and the world has shifted from being bi-polar to being multi-polar. Where issues cannot be framed in terms of East versus West, the lines of demarcation are not so clear. It is more likely now than ever that individual countries will disagree on a higher number of issues than in the past.

2. Improvements to the Prospects of the CFSP

The treaty introduces more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making structures in the area of CFSP in order to strengthen its capacity for action. The goal of the treaty is to overcome the contradictions between the objectives of the CFSP

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and the means available to the EU for achieving those objectives. It targets specifically the following areas.

a) Common Strategies [Art. J.3]:

In addition to the existing “joint actions” and “common positions,” a new foreign policy instrument is added, “common strategies,” to be defined by consensus within the European Council in areas where member states have important interests in common. The Council is responsible for implementing common strategies through joint actions and common positions voted for by a qualified majority. The problem with these “common strategies” is that until a common European interest is defined, they will continue to be decided upon using the lowest common denominator of agreement among the member states.

b) Decision Making [Art. J.13]:

CFSP decisions still require unanimous approval but now member states will be able to exercise a “constructive abstention”, which does not cause a veto on the decision under consideration. Members who abstain are not required to act on the decision but are expected to maintain a spirit of solidarity with the Union members who do act under that decision. In addition, this amendment allows for qualified-majority voting in two CFSP cases: for decisions applying to a common strategy defined by the European Council; and for any decision implementing a joint action or common position already adopted by the European Council. It is important to open the door to qualified-
majority voting in the area of CFSP, and this appears to be a logical step toward that objective.

c) **Representation [Art. J.3, J.8]:**

The European Council defines the principles and general guidelines of the CFSP. The Presidency represents the Union in matters concerning the CFSP. The Secretary General of the Council is the “High Representative for the CFSP” and is responsible to the Presidency for contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of CFSP decisions. He also acts on behalf of the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties.

d) **Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit [Art. J.8]:**

This unit will be set up in and answer to the General Secretariat of the Council and it will be made up of specialists from the General Secretariat, the Member States, the Commission, and the WEU. It will provide analyses of international issues and their impact in areas relevant to the CFSP, will help prepare the Council for meetings, and will draw up CFSP-related documents.

e) **Petersberg Tasks [Art. J.1]:**

Once the Amsterdam Treaty is in force, the Petersberg tasks will be integrated into Title V of the Treaty on European Union. This acknowledges that the risk of large-scale conflict has lessened while the risk of threats to European security has increased through the resurgence of local conflicts. The intention of the member states is
to safeguard European security through operations such as humanitarian aid, peacekeeping missions, and, the tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

f) Security and the WEU [Art. J.7]:

The Amsterdam Treaty includes the possibility of the “progressive framing of a common defense policy...which might lead to a common defense should the European Council so decide.” The treaty also states that the EU shall “foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the Council so decide.” This is an historic statement because it recognizes, for the first time, the integration of the WEU into the EU as a goal of European integration. This will prove to be a necessary step for the development of a CFSP and eventually, a common defense policy. It will also give the EU an operational armed element that will be more tangible than the current arrangement with the WEU.

g) Financing of Operations [Art. J.18]:

The arrangement for funding of CFSP operations will shift from a case-to-case basis to one where expenditures will be financed from the Community Budget, unless the European Council unanimously decides otherwise. National shares will be scaled to Gross National Product and nations whom abstain from voting on an issue will not be required to fund the related operations.
3. Expectations

No agreement was reached on the integration of the WEU into the EU. Had this been done, it would have allowed for the possibility of a genuine European defense policy while maintaining solid ties with the United States through NATO. However, the fact that this integration was recognized for the first time as a goal is an indicator of progress. The member states have agreed to hold another Intergovernmental Conference to discuss this. NATO will remain the transatlantic security blanket of European defense while the WEU assumes more and more responsibility for defense through the CJTF concept. This is in line with the gradual shift of military responsibilities from NATO to the WEU and will lead to a situation where the only United States involvement would be in the case of an attack on Europe.

The principle of unanimity combined with the inefficiency and stalemate of intergovernmentalism will continue to limit the development of a CFSP. As long as the principle member states are not willing to relinquish their prerogatives, the EU will not develop a political and diplomatic weight commensurate with its economic strength. The Catch-22 is that people have lost trust in European institutions because of the way those institutions operate; thus the people are less willing to delegate sovereignty, even if that might make the institutions more effective.\(^{183}\) This partial relinquishment of sovereignty will be absolutely necessary if the EU is to develop a CFSP.

\(^{183}\) Soros, 5.
One of the most telling indicators of the success of the CFSP will be not only the success of "active crisis management - where the EU is plainly weak - but [more importantly], in terms of containing differences among the Member States themselves."\textsuperscript{184} The ability to cooperate and compromise in areas concerning national interests to develop common positions will be the ideal end-state for the second pillar of the EU.

D. FINAL REMARKS

The Amsterdam Treaty, while not yet in force, should be seen as the latest stage of the European integration process and is the appropriate path towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European nations. Like the economic pillar before it, the CFSP will continue to develop over time through a series of functional, bureaucratic phases that will reduce the barriers between nations. However, this treaty is only a limited step in this direction, and there will be many further steps required before a supranational constitutional CFSP can be truly developed. Perhaps the most important step that can be made is the strengthening and the legitimization of the European Parliament in security and defense issues. A stronger, more unified EP, combined with supranational authority in the area of CFSP, will allow for the development of a true CFSP.

Currently, the limitations of intergovernmentalism and unanimity will ensure that the lowest common denominator of agreement will determine all outcomes related to CFSP, and the EU can at best hope to develop a harmonized CFSP. The overwhelming

\textsuperscript{184} Lionel Barber, "EU's Emerging Foreign Policy", \textit{Europe} 371 (Nov 1997), 3.
obstacles to a CFSP suggest that it will take several generations to establish a common European interest that will in turn lead to a truly Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Amsterdam Treaty is a positive step in the right direction, but it will be up to the people of Europe to develop and advance a common European vision that will truly overcome these barriers.
V. CONCLUSION

Former EU President Jacques Delors posed three questions about foreign policy to member states of the EU: "What are our essential common interests? Are we prepared to act together to defend these interests? If so, with what resources?"\(^{185}\) These questions remain not only valid for foreign policy, but also for the prospect of a common security and defense policy in Europe.

The EDC Treaty of 1952 was a remarkable attempt to unify Europe under a supranational authority. The conditions and circumstances for forming a unique European entity were favorable. The Western European powers were facing the devastating conventional military ascendancy of the Soviet Union. The Heads of State and Governments at that time were marked by a remarkable spirit of unification and the strong belief that the domination of nation states could be overcome and replaced by a unified Europe with a strong economic and political framework. However, the attempt failed to the inherent fear of losing the last bastion of sovereignty – that is the national freedom of decision-making in the security and defense realm began overwhelmingly to determine the thinking of the political decision-makers at that time.

In the post-Cold War period, the predictable big bloc confrontation was removed by multifaceted and non-predictable risks. These range from social, ethnic, religious and economic crisis and interstate disputes to the effects of globalization on economic and

\(^{185}\) "EU tries to build an effective CFSP." *European Dialogue: 1997 supplement: EU policy positions*
ecological development. Crises, like the internal conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, the economic disaster in Russia, and the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the European economy, confirm the character range of future crises and conflicts in Europe. It is a fact that a broader understanding of security “embraces economic and industrial policy as well as diplomatic, cultural, educational and other dimensions.” Therefore, in the post-Cold War era such risks and threats are “thought to stem above all from indirect causes such as economic chaos, social and demographic instability and their attendant political upheavals.” Hence, whereas it was simple to define and plan for the protection of vital national interests prior to the nuclear age and throughout the Cold War, it is not in the post-Cold War world.⁸⁶

How can a common security and defense policy cover a multitude of complex risks and threats in Europe if neither a common European security nor defense identity literally exists? To a certain extent, interests of the European nations do converge, especially in economic terms like the foundation of the Euro, the single currency of the European Union, and the European Central Bank to manage independently the European Monetary Union. However, how can different vital interests coincide with each other if there is no willingness to relinquish sovereignty in the security and defense realm?

The Amsterdam Treaty was a small step in the right direction, but as long as people perceive Europe as an artificial, bureaucratic construction and do not perceive themselves as represented by their elected officials, it will take several generations to establish a common European interest to overcome cultural differences and separate the

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ambitions of the independent European nations. However, the mere acknowledgement both that the framework for any engagement in future conflicts can only be multinational, and that providing the necessary means is beyond the scope of any single country will force the nations in Europe to co-operate in the security and defense realm.

France, who is indispensable to any common security and defense policy in Europe, reflects the European dilemma of competing national interests perfectly. On the one hand, France contributes to the European integration process. On the other hand however, it tries at the same time to perpetuate its independence in world politics and its glory of a global and nuclear power. France is trying to gain leadership in Europe, but in doing so, it is mooring itself deeper into the European framework and facing itself to integrate and to comply with security and defense concerns of its neighbors. However, domestic pressure in France is facilitating its recent shift toward more cooperation and integration in security and defense issues and more willingness to share the security and defense burden with its European neighbors.

More and more shrinking defense budgets will constrain the commonly agreed-upon procedures in security and defense policies of France. The EUROCORPS, EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the foundation of OCCAR, and the idea of a EADC all reflect the evolution of security and defense thinking: cooperate, merge and integrate.

The overall picture of a common security and defense policy in Europe is not unique. Its prospect and its future development are difficult to predict. Declarations of intent among politicians in the security and defense realm will only be reliable if they are backed up by national parliaments and transferred to workable procedures in the
European security and defense framework. Although the EU maintained a unique position against the politics of Slobodan Milosevic during its recent summit in Berlin, the current NATO air strikes against targets in Ex-Yugoslavia would not have taken place if the United States had refused to offer its massive military support. Nevertheless, the European nations unified in the EU cannot continue to focus too much on its role as a financial partner in peace-and-reconstruction processes, leaving others to reap the political dividends. The credibility of the EU’s foreign policy hinges on a coherent European security and defense structure. In sensitive areas such as security, national interests can only be achieved in a European context, and then only through firm and effective collective action.

Like passengers in an old railway carriage, we appear taken aback by the sign next to the window, written in several languages, which reads: ‘It is dangerous to lean out of the window.’ We must overcome this situation.\(^{187}\)

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