Soviet Union
Political Affairs

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18 July 1991

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USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Law
91UN1719A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jun 91
Union Edition p 4

[Text of the “Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ‘On the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court’”]

[Text] Article 1. The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court exercises judicial authority within the limits of the powers of the USSR through the resolution of economic disputes between enterprises, institutions and organizations, including kolkhozes, individual and joint enterprises and international associations of organizations of the USSR and other countries, state and other organs.

[Note:] *Subsequently called organizations

Article 2. Legislative Acts on the Organization, Procedure of Activity, and Competence of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The organization, procedure of activity, and competence of the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration are determined by the present Law and other legislative acts of the USSR.

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court resolves economic arguments in accordance with the present Law and the USSR Law “On the Procedure for Solving Economic Disputes by the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.” The special features of the resolution of individual types of disputes may be established by legislative acts of the USSR.

Article 3. Tasks of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The tasks of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are:

—securing the protection of the rights and interests of organizations protected by the law through the implementation of justice;

—promoting through legal means the observance of legislation in economic relations;

—securing the uniform and correct application of legislation in the resolution of economic disputes.

Article 4. Subordination of Economic Disputes to the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court resolves disputes arising in the conclusion, change, abrogation, and execution of agreements or for other reasons (except disputes whose resolution in accordance with the legislative acts of the USSR are referred to the jurisdiction of other organs);

1) about the recognition as invalid (fully or partially) of acts of the organs of state administration of the USSR and other all-union organs that do not have a normative character and do not correspond to legislation and violate the rights and legal interests of organizations;

2) about the compensation of losses inflicted on organizations by organs of USSR state administration as the result of the promulgation of acts that do not have a normative character, do not correspond to legislation, and violate the rights and lawful interests of organizations, or as the result of the improper execution, by the indicated organs, of their obligations with respect to them;

3) resulting from economic agreements between union and republic organs of administration and organs of administration of the republics;

4) resulting from relations regarding the creation and delivery of arms and arms technology;

5) between organizations located on the territory of various republics, when this is provided for by an agreement between the republics;

6) other disputes connected with the application of the legislation of the USSR and included in the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court by legislative acts of the USSR or international agreements.

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court has the right to accept for its execution a dispute between organizations, regardless of their subordination, location, and form of property if there is a written agreement between the parties concerning the handing over of a dispute that has already arisen or may arise.

Article 5. Verification of the Legality and Validity of a Decision in an Economic Dispute by the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court verifies the legality and validity of decisions:

1) in a dispute resolved in the Arbitration Collegium for the Resolution of Economic Disputes;

2) in a dispute resolved in the republic, after verification of the legality and validity of the decision in the manner established by the law of the corresponding republic;

—between organizations located on the territory of various republics, when there exists an agreement about this between the corresponding republics or parties, including the disputes are connected with the application of USSR legislation;

—in which if only one of the organizations is in the jurisdiction of the USSR or is an all-union organization;

—if this is envisaged by the law of the republic in which the dispute has been resolved.
Article 6. Legislation Applied by the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court is guided in its activity by the USSR Constitution, the existing Law, other legislation of the USSR, the legislation of the republics, agreements of the USSR and republics, multilateral and bilateral treaties and agreements between republics, and international agreements.

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, having established, in connection with the resolution of an economic dispute, the discrepancy of an act of an organ of state administration, the decision of a local organ of self-government, its executive and administrative organ, with the USSR Constitution, USSR laws, the constitutions of the republics, the laws of the republics, other acts of the supreme organs of state power promulgated within the limits of their powers, makes a decision on the basis of the USSR Constitution, USSR laws, the laws of the republics, and other acts of the supreme organs of state power of the USSR and the republics.

Article 7. Obligatory Nature of the Decision of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The decision, decree, and determination of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are subject to obligatory execution by all organizations and their officials throughout the territory of the USSR.

Article 8. Legislative Initiative of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

In accordance with the USSR Constitution, the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court has the right of legislative initiative at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 9. Composition of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court consists of the Chairman, Deputy Chairmen, chairmen of the Arbitration Collegium, and judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

The following act in the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court:
— the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court;
— the Arbitration Collegium for the Resolution of Economic Disputes; and
— the Arbitration Collegium for the Verification of the Legality and Validity of Decisions.

Article 10. Procedure for the Election of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court is elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet and confirmed by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies upon representation by the USSR President.

The First Deputy Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, the chairmen of the arbitration collegia, and the judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are elected by the USSR Supreme Soviet upon representation of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are elected without a fixed term. Any citizen of the USSR who has attained the age of 25, has a higher education in law, and a record of service in a legal specialty of not less than five years may be elected as a judge.

Article 11. Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court is headed by the Chairman.

The Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court:
— directs the activity of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and organizes its work;
— convenes the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and presides at its session; may preside at the sessions of the arbitration court collegia of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court; if necessary, involves judges that are members of one collegium for a review of cases as a member of the other collegium;
— submits to the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court protests of decisions in economic disputes of the Arbitration Collegium for the Verification of the Legality and Validity of Decisions;
— submits to the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court proposals by way of legislative initiative;
— distributes the duties among the Deputy Chairmen, as well as among the judges;
— appoints and dismisses officials, with the exception of the workers who in accordance with the present law are elected and dismissed by following a different procedure;
— executes other powers granted him by the present Law.

The Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, within the limits of his powers, submits proposals to the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision concerning a decision regarding the conformity of normative legal acts of the state organs and public organizations to the USSR Constitution and the laws of the USSR, with respect to which, in accordance with the USSR Constitution no procuratorial supervision is carried out.
Article 12. Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court have the right to preside at sessions of the arbitration court collegia for the resolution economic disputes and for the verification of the legality and validity of decisions.

When the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court is absent, his powers are executed by the First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, and during the absence of the First Deputy Chairman—by one of the Deputy Chairmen of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

Article 13. Chairman of the Arbitration Collegia of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The chairman of the arbitration collegia of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court:

1) Organize the work of the collegia and form the membership of the court for the solution of economic disputes, and for the verification of the legality and validity of decisions;

2) preside at sessions of the arbitration court collegia;

3) submit to the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court reports on the activity of the collegia;

4) obtain records for the verification of the legality and validity of decisions, as well as for the generalization of arbitration practice;

Article 14. Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The judge of the Arbitration Collegium for the Resolution of Economic Disputes USSR Supreme Arbitration Court resolves disputes between organizations.

The judge of the Arbitration Collegium for the Verification of the Legality and Validity of Decisions carries out the verification of the legality and validity of decisions regarding disputes.

The judge guides the examination of the dispute and promotes the attainment of an agreement between the parties.

The judge studies and generalizes the practice of the resolution of disputes, develops proposals for the improvement of legislation, as well as conducts work to prevent violations of legislation in economic relations.

A judge may be the director of a department and other subdivision of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

The work of a judge in other organizations by way of having a second job is not allowed, with the exception of educational and scientific research activity.

Judges, in a manner established by the USSR Supreme Soviet, go through certification. Based on its results and taking into account their qualification and work experience, they are given qualification classes.

Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are given their certifications by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 15. Rights of the Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

Judges have the right to:

—demand from state and other organs, organizations, and their officials the execution of their orders that are connected with the realization of the responsibilities entrusted to them;

—to send to organizations, state and other organs, court reports and reports on violations of legislations that have been brought to light, with proposals for their elimination;

—to demand information from state and other organs, scientific organizations, scientific institutions, and information centers.

Demands of a judge that are made within the limits of his the powers of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are obligatory for state and other organs, organizations, and officials to whom these demands are made.

Judges also possess other powers necessary for the realization of their activity defined by legislative acts of the USSR.

Article 16. Duties of Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

In their activity judges are obligated to carry out precisely the demands of legislation, to carry out high standards and the educational influence of the arbitration process, and to be just.

Judges are obligated to raise the level of their professional knowledge.

In the fulfillment of their official duties, as well as in their out-of-office relations, must avoid everything that could belittle the authority of justice, the dignity of judges, or call forth doubt of his objectivity and impartiality.

Article 17. Independence of Judges

Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are independent and subordinate only to the law. The interference of any organs, organizations and officials in the activity of judges regarding the resolution of economic disputes is not allowed.

The independence of judges is guaranteed by the procedure of their election and dismissal, the legal procedure for the resolution of disputes, the creation of the necessary conditions for the activity of the arbitration court, as well as the material and social security of the judges.
The mass media do not have the right to prejudge in their reports the results of the arbitration investigation in a concrete case before the adoption of a decision.

Article 18. Inviolability of Judges

Judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court cannot have criminal proceedings or be arrested without the consent of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and during the period between sessions—of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Criminal proceedings against judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court may be instituted only by the USSR Procurator General.

Criminal cases against judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are within the jurisdiction of the USSR Supreme Court.

Article 19. Responsibility for Disrespect for USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Judges

The manifestation of disrespect for judges on the part of participants in the arbitration process or citizens present in sessions of the arbitration court, as well as perpetration of actions by anyone indicating clear contempt for a judge entail responsibility in accordance with USSR legislation.

Article 20. Dismissal of USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Judges from Their Posts

Judges may be dismissed by the USSR Supreme Soviet from their posts:

—for violation of legality or the perpetration of a vicious act incompatible with their calling, as well as because of a verdict of guilty against them that has entered into legal force;

—for reasons of health that prevent the continuation of work;

—as a result of the election to another post or transfer with their consent to other work;

—at their own request.

The question of the dismissal of judges is decided taking into account a finding of the qualification collegium of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court judges.

Article 21. Composition of the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and the Procedure of Its Activity

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Plenum acts in matters of the review of the most important questions of the activity of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and other organs resolving economic questions. The Plenum is convened at least once every four months.

The membership of the Plenum includes the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, his deputies, the chairmen of the arbitration, the judges of the of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, as well as on a voluntary basis the executives of the highest organs resolving economic disputes in the republics—subjects of the USSR.

The Procurator General and the USSR Minister of Justice may take part in the sessions of the Plenum.

The session of the Plenum is competent if at least two-thirds of the members are present.

Based on the results of the examination of the questions by the Plenum, a resolution is adopted by an open vote. A resolution is considered as adopted if it receives the majority of votes of the Plenum of those taking part in the voting. A member of the Plenum who does not agree with the resolution has the right to set out his opinion, which is attached to the resolution.

A resolution of the Plenum is signed by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and the secretary of the Plenum.

Article 22. Powers of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Plenum

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Plenum:

1) Examines questions of coordinating the activity of the organs resolving economic disputes and questions regarding the implementation of joint measures within the limits of the competence of these organs;

2) Examines materials generalizing the practice of the resolution of economic disputes and gives in the manner of a judicial interpretation explanations regarding questions of the application of USSR legislation;

3) Confirms, upon recommendation of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, the memberships of the arbitration collegia, the deputy chairmen of the arbitration collegia, and the secretary of the Plenum from among the judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court;

4) Confirms, upon recommendation of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, the membership of the scientific advisory council attached to the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court;

5) Hears reports of the chairmen of the arbitration collegia of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court on the activity of the corresponding collegia;

6) Examines questions concerning the introduction, at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and in the USSR Supreme Soviet, of proposals by way of legislative initiative, as well as proposals regarding the improvement of the legal regulation of economic relations and the activity of organs resolving economic disputes in other organs;

7) Elects the qualification collegium of judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and hears reports about its activity;
8) examines the findings of the USSR Committee on Constitutional Supervision on the nonconformity of explanations of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Plenum and USSR laws;

9) examines by way of supervision of a case upon protests of the USSR Procurator General, the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, the executives of the supreme republic organs resolving economic disputes in decisions taken by the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and the republic organs in connection with their contradiction to USSR legislation or the violation of other republics.

Article 23. Generalizing the Practice of the Application of Legislation

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court studies and generalizes arbitration practice, prepares proposals for its improvement, analyzes the experience of the application of legislation by the organs resolving economic disputes with a view to its dissemination.

Article 24. Development of Proposals to Improve Legislation

On the basis of the study and generalization of arbitration practice, the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court develops and in accordance with established procedure introduces proposals concerning the improvement of legislation. The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court has the right to involve in this work, by agreement with the directors of organizations, their specialists and scientists.

Article 25. Prevention of Violations of Legislation in Economic Relations

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court works to prevent violations of legislation in economic relations and toward these ends:

1) Conducts a systems analysis of the data and materials characterizing the reasons for violations of legislation in economic relations and develops and takes measures for their elimination within the limits of its competence;

2) resolves cases directly in organizations;

3) sends to the executives of organizations, state and other organs, court reports, reports on the violations of legislation brought to light, on the circumstances conducive to these violations demanding the adoption of corresponding measures.

Not later than within a month, an answer must be given to the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court about the adoption of necessary measures in regard to a court report or reports.

In necessary instances, reports on the violations of legislation that have been brought to light are sent to the organs of the procuracy;

4) reports on the most serious violations of legislation allowed in economic relations to the USSR Supreme Soviet and informs the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

Article 26. The Scientific Advisory Council Attached to the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

For the preparation of scientifically-grounded recommendations to organs resolving economic disputes and in questions connected with the formation of arbitration practice, the development of proposals and the preparation of information about the improvement of legislation, as well as with the prevention and elimination of violations of legislation that have been brought to light, a scientific advisory council is created under the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court. The Scientific Advisory Council is a consultative organ and acts on the basis of general principles.

Article 27. Statistical Record

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, following established procedure, keeps arbitration statistics and analyzes statistical data on the activity of organs resolving economic disputes in the republics.

Article 28. Cooperation With Other Organs and International Relations

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court realizes cooperation with other organs resolving economic disputes (courts, arbitration boards, and arbitration tribunals consisting of arbitrators chosen by the parties).

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court carries out international relations in accordance with established procedure.

Article 29. Structure and Staff of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

Departments and other subdivisions are established for the study and analysis of arbitration practice, the preparation of proposals for the improvement of legislation, the development of measures to prevent the violation of legislation in economic relations, the execution of other functions connected with the activity of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

In arbitration colleges and departments there are chief and senior consultants and other specialists, chief and senior inspectors, inspectors, as well as other employees and junior service personnel.

The staff size of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, including the judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, is confirmed by the USSR Supreme Soviet upon recommendation of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

The Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, in accordance with the present law and within the limits of the established staff size, determines the structure and staffs of departments and other subdivisions of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, confirms the staff roster, and provisions concerning departments and other subdivisions of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.
Article 30. The Qualification Collegium of the Judges of the Supreme Arbitration Court

The qualification collegium of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court is elected for a 5-year term by the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Plenum in a secret vote from among the judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court, including a chairman, his deputies and five members. The Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and his deputies are not members of the qualification collegium.

The qualification collegium of judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court give an account of their activity before the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court Plenum.

Article 31. Powers of the Qualification Collegia of Judges of the Supreme Arbitration Court

The qualification collegium:
—makes findings concerning the possibility of promotion to judge of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court;
—conducts the qualification certification of judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court;
—makes findings concerning the recall of judges of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court and examines questions concerning their disciplinary responsibility.

Article 32. Attestation

Top officials (besides those elected to a post) and specialists of the Supreme Arbitration Court are subject to certification in accordance with USSR legislation. The rules concerning the procedure for the conduct of certification are established by the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

Article 33. Financing and Material-Technical Provision for the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court

The financing, material-technical provision and servicing of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court are effected at the expense of assignments from the union budget. The size of the assignments is confirmed by the USSR Supreme Soviet upon recommendation of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Arbitration Court.

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court is a juridical person.

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court has a seal with the imprint of the state coat of arms of the USSR and with its name.

Article 34. Printed Organ

The USSR Supreme Arbitration Court publishes the VESTNIK VYSSHEGO ARBITRAZHNOGO SUDA SSSR.

M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR
Moscow, Kremlin, 17 May 1991

Law on Procedure for Sending Personal Documents Abroad
91UN2002A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

[Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: "On the Procedure for Removal, Forwarding Abroad from the USSR and Obtaining on Demand Personal Documents of Soviet and Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons"]


Citizens of the USSR, foreign citizens and stateless persons going abroad from the USSR shall have the right to remove or forward via international mail the originals, or copies certified by state notarial offices, of documents belonging to them; personal documents on the registration of civil acts; documents attesting to education, academic degrees and titles, or increased skill-level; registration of a vehicle or other mechanical conveyance and the licence to operate them; work record or military service record; documents on participation in the Great Patriotic War, on wounds, treatment and decorations; and, documents on pensions, inheritance and other documents which ensure the rights and legal interests of citizens and stateless persons.

Article 2. Removal and Forwarding of Other Personal Documents

Documents, including warrants on the possession of assets in Soviet and foreign currency or other currency valuables and other property shall be removed or sent abroad in accordance with procedure stipulated by legislation of the USSR.

The procedure for removal and sending abroad of membership cards in social organizations established and operating on USSR territory shall be determined by those organizations.

Article 3. Personal Documents Not Subject to Removal or Forwarding Abroad

Labor books, military records and military identification cards shall not be subject to removal or forwarding.

In case of departure for permanent residence abroad, the indicated documents shall be surrendered to the corresponding organization or institution at one's last place of work (or service), or the place of registration, for departing citizens and stateless persons. Upon the request of interested persons, references shall be officially registered, according to established procedure, on the labor record or military service record, on the basis of information contained in labor booklets or service records and other corresponding documents.
Article 4. Demand for Obtaining Personal Documents

Demands for obtaining from the USSR personal documents authorized for removal and forwarding abroad shall be accomplished by citizens of the USSR, foreign citizens and stateless persons located abroad, via Soviet diplomatic representatives and consulates.

Article 5. Establishment and Certification of Authenticity of Personal Documents (Legalization)

Originals or officially notarized copies of personal documents authorized for removal or forwarding abroad via mail shall be legalized (for those countries where such legalization is required) at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, or at the union republic ministries of internal affairs.

Article 6. Procedure for Obtaining and Legalization of Personal Documents

The procedure for obtaining and legalization of personal documents shall be established by the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the USSR Ministry of Justice, upon coordination with the interested ministries and departments.

Article 7. Prohibition of Removal and Forwarding or Refusal to Provide Documents on Demand

Prohibition of removal or mailing abroad or refusal to provide documents on demand may be appealed to higher authority in accordance with procedure established by law, and then to the court.

Article 8. International Agreements of the USSR

If international agreements of the USSR have established rules other than those contained in the present Law, the rules of the international agreement shall be applied.

M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, Moscow, the Kremlin, 24 June 1991.

Decree Enacting Law on Personal Documents

91UN2002B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Jul 91 Union Edition p 2

[Decree of USSR Supreme Soviet: "On Putting into Effect the USSR Law 'On the Procedure for Removal, Forwarding Abroad from the USSR and Obtaining on Demand of Personal Documents of Soviet and Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons'""]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. Put into effect the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Removal, Forwarding Abroad from the USSR and Obtaining on Demand of Personal Documents of Soviet and Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons," effective 1 October 1991;

2. The USSR Cabinet of Ministers, on 1 September 1991, will:

In case of necessity, present proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet on bringing the legislative acts of the USSR into alignment with the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Removal, Forwarding Abroad from the USSR and Obtaining on Demand of Personal Documents of Soviet and Foreign Citizens and Stateless Persons";

Bring the decrees and instructions of the Government of the USSR into alignment with the Law specified;

Take decisions which ensure that this law is implemented;

Ensure that USSR ministries and other central organs of state government re-examine and amend the normative acts which conflict with the specified Law.

A. Lukyanov, chairman, USSR Supreme Soviet. Moscow, the Kremlin, 24 June 1991.

Importance of Civil Legislation Draft Law Rights Cited

91UN1599A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 May 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article by G. Tolstoy, member of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee and Leningrad University professor: "Legal Property is Inviolable: On the Draft Fundamentals of Civil Legislation"]

[Text] On 21 March the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the draft Fundamentals of Civil Legislation it its first reading. This legislative act is of great significance as our country makes its agonizing way toward a market economy and undergoes the no less complex and contradictory process of establishing a rule-of-law state.

The Fundamentals are intended to ensure each owner of goods, whether a state enterprise, a cooperative, a shareholder company or an individual producer, the economic latitude necessary and sufficient for normal commercial activity for the purpose of making a profit and increasing public wealth. That is on the one hand. On the other their goal is to raise protection of citizens' rights and interests to a new level and guarantee each citizen an opportunity to realize his or her creative abilities and gifts.

One important aspect of the draft is the fact that it brings back a number of forgotten civil law categories and institutions which were once relegated to the archives as incompatible with the building of a new society. It is as if we are gradually curing the childhood illness of leftist in the field of legal norms as well. We are witnessing something of a legal rehabilitation of many categories, institutions and concepts. In this way the category of property rights is being reborn. Those rights include the
right to ownership, the right to full commercial management, the right to day-to-day management and the right to lifelong bequeathable possession. Among the institutions encompassed by so-called intellectual property are industrial rights: the right to inventions, efficiency proposals, industrial models, production secrets (know-how), etc.

It has been proposed that the classification of property as chattel or real estate be restored and that the institution of a statute of limitations on ownership be introduced, i.e. acquisition of the right to ownership based on a specified term of possession.

The problem of how to compensate for moral damages is worthy of attention. For a long time now we have had a negative attitude toward monetary compensation for moral damages, i.e. damages causing physical or moral suffering. Incidentally, it should be noted that moral damages can also be incurred by an organization, for example through dissemination of false information regarding its business reputation. As justification for the fact that moral damages were not subject to monetary compensation we, Pharisee-like, declared that the personality of Soviet man had been elevated to such a lofty plane that there was no way that it could be brought down to this sinful earth. That being the case, it was not possible to compensate for moral damages with money. Nowadays these "arguments" have been rightly discarded. Compensation for moral damages is provided for in the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media, as well as in the draft Law on Consumer Rights Protection, which was approved in its first reading. However, the first universal legal norm regarding compensation for moral damages appears in the draft Fundamentals of Civil Legislation. That is definitely a positive feature of the draft.

Special notice should be given to the basis for liability with regard to failure to meet obligations. Just as in current legislation, it is stipulated that as a general rule liability arises only in cases where the person who failed to meet an obligation was at fault. Yet at the same time it is stated that if an obligation was not met in connection with the conducting of commercial activity, then liability for non-fulfillment of that obligation arises regardless of who is at fault. Only the action of an insurmountable force, i.e. extreme and unforeseen circumstances (natural disasters, acts of war, etc.) relieve a debtor from liability. In other words, in these cases liability is based on the principle of risk.

The question arises as to whether we are perhaps being premature in establishing stricter liability for failure to perform obligations connected with the conducting of commercial activity. We do have an interest in attracting foreign investors, and our domestic entrepreneurs have not gotten on their feet yet. Are we not frightening people away from entrepreneurial activity by establishing stricter liability with regard to it? We feel that these fears are groundless. Entrepreneurs engage in commercial activity for the purpose of making a profit. That is why they accept the risk connected with such activity. In order to avoid getting burned and to protect themselves from possible negative consequences, primarily in the initial stages, they may insure their risk by employing the services of the State Insurance Administration or another insurer authorized to engage in insurance operations. Generally speaking, the importance of insurance will have to increase greatly in a market economy.

We note with satisfaction that the draft lifts restrictions on protection for the rights of consumers who are sold shoddy goods on the retail market. When the Fundamentals are made law there will be no doubt whatsoever that a customer who is sold an item of inappropriate quality will have the right to choose one of the demands which may be made of the seller or manufacturer of the item in question. In one of its first conclusions the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee declared unconstitutional legal norms which restrict consumers' retail trade rights. On this point the draft is wholly in step with the position of the Constitutional Oversight Committee, the conclusion of which served as a social catalyst which accelerated the legislative drafting of the sole correct decision. But the draft does not settle the issue once and for all by also making provision for liability for damages caused to citizens by faulty products, work and services (say by the spontaneous combustion or explosion of a television set, a refrigerator or other household appliance).

On the whole the draft Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, drawn up by an eminently qualified group of scientists and practical legal experts, is a solid legal document which will significantly ease the transition to a market economy and be of great significance in establishing relations based on partnership and businesslike cooperation both domestically and in foreign trade. Nevertheless, it does contain a number of omissions and statements requiring further elaboration.

In our opinion, the example of the current Fundamentals of Civil Legislation should be followed and a section entitled "Inheritance Law" included in the draft. The basic principles of such law are well established and have been worked out in judicial and notarial practice, and could be set forth in law on a Union-wide level.

The same applies to the institution of unjustified enrichment. A conflict norm exists, but the institution itself does not. Legal stipulation of it is necessary also because non-labor income as a legal category is disappearing as a result of the authorization to employ hired labor, but there still exists illegal income, and the amount of such income is on the rise as the methods of obtaining it become ever more ingenious. There should be a negative response to illegal income in civil law as well as in criminal, administrative and financial law.

Under current civil legislation both at the Union and republic levels there exists the obligation to make compensation for damages incurred by a citizen in the process of saving socialist property (for example during
the extinguishing of a fire at plant by volunteers). Of course we are not talking about reverting to excessive ideological emphasis in legal categories and concepts. But we should think about ways of making good the losses which we have incurred as a result of the discarding of ideology. Provision should be made for obligatory compensation for damages incurred by a citizen while saving property belonging to the state as well as to organizations engaged in commercial activity.

There is one other issue which is of fundamental importance: the principles governing liability for damages caused to citizens' life and health. Under current legislation for damages incurred from a source of hazard liability arises regardless of guilt, if the owner of the source is not the victim's insurer. If the owner is the victim's insurer, then the owner is liable only if guilt is proven. Thereby citizens who, for instance, suffer dismemberment or death on the job are placed in a worse position than outsiders injured by the same hazard. In our opinion it is high time for the principles regarding liability in such cases to be unified and for it to be established that the owner of a hazard is responsible to the victim, and in the event of a fatality to the victim's dependents, regardless of guilt and even though the owner was the victim's insurer. It is important that this matter be resolved in favor of workers who suffer dismemberment or death on the job, and that it be resolved in a unified manner throughout the entire Union. Unfortunately the draft makes no provision for this.

The Fundamentals of Civil Legislation, which could more precisely be termed “Fundamentals of Civil Legislation in the USSR,” despite all the good intentions which went into framing them will not live up to the hopes pinned on them so long as there continues to be a conflict of laws and other legal norms at the Union, the republic and now the municipal levels. As a result of this conflict nothing will be left of equality among parties to civil transactions, or of the emphasis on authorization in their behavior, or of restrictions on interference by courts in civil cases unless so requested. These will be gone because at every turn the owner of goods will run into a legal barrier. No matter which type of behavior he choose he will find that he is a lawbreaker, violating either Union or republic law. In this situation the very heart of civil legal regulation is torn out, and nothing will be left of the unified economic space required for normal commercial activity. Furthermore, the diversity of legal standards will cause numerous conflicts of laws, numerous enough to keep more than one jurists' guild in business. This will only make things much worse for owners of goods, not better.

In the legislative field we should not be reinventing the wheel, nor constructing legal edifices which are worse than those which presently exist.

Bakatin on Security Council, Politics
91UN1627A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Apr 91 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Vadim Bakatin, member of the Security Council, by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA commentator Andrey Karaulov on 2 April 1991, place not given; recorded by Olga Dremina: “I Made a Bet on Gorbachev”; “A Self-Portrait”]

[Text] [Karaulov] When Gorbachev presented you to the deputies as a member of the Security Council, there was applause in the audience. Not everybody received applause...

[Bakatin] And not everybody applauded.

[Karaulov] This means you are a popular man, Vadim Victorovich.

[Bakatin] The position of the minister of internal affairs has always been a subject of interest: Yezhov, Beriya, Shchelokov—this kind of “popularity,” in quotes, is always there. Now the rotation in the Supreme Soviet has changed its composition considerably; therefore, I was even somewhat surprised that they... gave me some applause, although I am pleased, of course—I did not expect it.

[Karaulov] What is the Security Council? Is this something unexpected for you? What will you be doing there?

[Bakatin] No, it is not unexpected; there was talk about it earlier, and I was immediately predisposed to this structure; I cannot answer clearly and precisely now, however, because I do not know myself yet what exactly we will be doing.

Right now Primakov and I are actively working on a Security Council statute; yesterday we put together the first draft, but have not shown it to the president yet. In my opinion, the Security Council will be a very unusual body, and I am convinced that it is very much needed. In the past, we had a party-government system where the stability of society was ensured only by a repressive regime and all issues were decided very simply—by exiling people to France or, to use plain language, by locking them up in a nuthouse. Then perestroika started; it gradually transformed itself from acceleration to democracy. The office of the president was created. But it only appeared recently; it still has no structures, no apparatus—nothing. In the final count, there is no mechanism that will implement all the president's decisions.

[Karaulov] Is it that bad?

[Bakatin] That is the problem. The Council of the Federation has emerged; this has specific meaning for us, because we have a federative state. But look: There is a president. Under him is the Cabinet of Ministers, all these committees... That is, our president is, generally speaking, naked; he is only surrounded by advisers, and there are not too many of them; they are quiet people—
they advise him in favor of some things, advise against other things, but this is his own business... But who is protecting the president from surprises, so that somebody cannot put in front of him some decree and say that it needs to be signed immediately, right away—for instance, on South Ossetia, or on the referendum, or on Kuwait—whatever? Where is the organ that would continuously monitor everything and have its own information? Right now the president does not even have his own information! He gets it from the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the KGB, the Army, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and TASS; he takes home three briefcases filled with papers every night, do you understand? The president must have his own service that gets all the necessary information and decides: This paper goes straight to the basket, there is no need to show it to the president; this one needs to be sent, let us say, to Bakatin—if you forgive me; and there are some that require the president to be roused in the middle of the night.

[Karaulov] Who are the Security Council members? Pavlov, Pugo, Kryuchkov, Yazov. All of them have their own special interests. There are only two “full-time” members of the council: yourself and Primakov.

[Bakatin] Yes. But we will have our staff; that is point number one. First of all, it will be experts. We will create a group of about 30 people, a current information group. That is, round the clock. We will do our work drawing on already existing structures—this does not mean that we are immediately creating some huge office, although in the future, of course, it will be good to have a large analytical center, scientific, with 500 to 600 people—I do not know, maybe even 1,000. I will tell you right away that these issues are new to me, of course. I am not a specialist, but Primakov, for instance, knows all of this very well. Any country has such centers.

[Karaulov] But why is it that there are only two of you for the entire country?

[Bakatin] How many should there be? How many are needed? First of all, Gorbachev said that this question about the Security Council is still open; then—all right, there will be four, or even six—then what? I want to emphasize that our activity does not remove responsibility from other departments. Miners are on strike—there is the Council of Ministers, Comrade Pavlov, let him take care of it. We are not going to do their work for them, you see? Security... how should I put it... it is just one more check.

[Karaulov] But still, you and Primakov do not have real power?

[Bakatin] This is an interesting question. Not real power—administrative.

[Karaulov] Well, let us say you catch the KGB delivering information that is not objective. Can you call Kryuchkov and tell him plainly that the KGB is lying?

[Bakatin] Of course. Do it all the time.

[Karaulov] And he will tell you to get lost.

[Bakatin] No. He will not tell me to get lost. He will not! Let me tell you, there was an incident just recently: I received information that some idiot called for troops in Moldavia—ostensibly to ensure that the referendum would be conducted in a calm atmosphere. Never mind that it was done by their local military draft offices and that it involved only 200 or 300 soldiers; this is not important. I immediately got in touch with the General Staff, called Kryuchkov, he did not know anything, I gave him the information, he reacted quickly, but I had already straightened things out by then on my own. You see? It does not matter who was ahead of whom: Whether I was ahead of Kryuchkov or he ahead of me; the important thing is that we have dealt with this idiocy. Another example: I receive information recently: The Georgians decided to evict Ossetians from Tbilisi and other regions. I do not believe it for a minute, check it out immediately and see that nothing like that is happening, but still, I ask Pugo—and I emphasize, ask: Boris Karlovich, we have this information, do you confirm it or not? He calls me back: No, Vadim Victorovich, I do not confirm it. This means that somebody had circulated this information to fan up the hatred between Georgians and Ossetians. This is the way we ought to work, in relations of trust. On the other hand, when the president does approve the statute on the Security Council—of course, if we do not get our own administrative functions, what will be the difference between us and regular advisers?

[Karaulov] When was the last time you talked to Gorbachev?


[Karaulov] How is he?

[Bakatin] What do you mean... how?!

[Karaulov] In what state is he? What does he hope for, in your opinion?

[Bakatin] Here, you answered your own question. Gorbachev works a lot. Gorbachev is having a difficult time. But Gorbachev has strength, do not be deceived. He is a courageous man, what else is there to say. I was making a speech recently, was not able to squeeze it into the allotted time, and was cut off—that is all right; I was just saying that I did not want to start polemics with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, but this is not even related to Yeltsin, I am simply using his expression. Do you remember what he said? That I finally—on 19 February, I think—gathered enough courage to distance myself from Gorbachev. You know, right now, with empty shelves, and with general dissatisfaction, to gather courage to distance oneself—this is not what is needed; courage is needed now to stay with Gorbachev. His boat
is now racing over such potholes that hell only knows what is going to happen, or, in general, what is going to come out of all of this...

I believe that Gorbachev has not lost confidence in himself, but we—and here is the main mistake—have driven our economy into such a state that... well, I do not know, what can one say? To move forward toward normal life we need an economy based on private entrepreneurial activity; it is not possible to achieve freedom of conscience while leaving the producer unfree. We need to set a goal. We have not even set a proper goal yet! That is, we still put ideology at the forefront: to preserve “socialist principles.” So our goal, you see, appears double, as it is with that drunk who thinks he is going home while his feet take him who the hell knows where. We, too, are zigzagging—maybe it is already capitalism, or maybe it is still socialism; we got totally confused, while in reality all these “capitalisms” and “socialisms” had merged a long time ago; therefore, instead of holding on to ideology, it is much easier (while preserving the socialist hat on the top) to fit the market under this boundary line, and then we will have everything—not soon, it is true, but we will! In about 30 years.

Abalkin told me: 30 years. That is, in one generation. I agree, I told him. Thirty years.

[Karaulov] And you believe that it will happen?

[Bakatin] You know what? If we do not believe, then we should not be involved in all this; we should just say: The hell with everything—I can find things to do that will keep me busy, anyway.

[Karaulov] But if Gorbachev thinks the same way you do, why did Shatalin leave Gorbachev?

[Bakatin] Wait a minute; I understand. Why, there is also... Shevardnadze left, yes? Every man has his own head on his shoulders. And his own destiny, this is what I will say. Here, look, I am drawing again. Shatalin. Here is Gorbachev. And here, excuse me, appears Ryzhkov. Gorbachev and Ryzhkov have their own relationship. Here also pops up the CPSU and also puts pressure on Gorbachev. And Gorbachev, by the way, is a decent man. I, for instance, will not resign from the CPSU, although “Polozkov’s” party—I beg your pardon for using this expression—that dogma of theirs does not satisfy anybody at all; nevertheless, I am staying there, and Gorbachev cannot, either... today there is one, tomorrow another—still, he had been brought up by the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], you understand?

This means, the CPSU has influence. That is number one. Gorbachev, what about him... he is not a fool, he sees that the market is far more effective. But here comes—and this is number two—the military-industrial complex, which also has certain weight. Number three, there also was Ryzhkov’s position. Each of these had its own influence. Gorbachev chose an option that was far from the best, this I will tell you straight—not the best; I recently went to visit Shatalin, we are on first name basis, I have great respect for him, he is a very courageous man, very ill but holding up—so I tell him: “Look, 500 days—it is nonsense!” Of course it is nonsense, he says, nonsense. In what sense? As 500. But not in general, yes? As a logical construction, 500 Days is a wonderful thing, everything we need is there, from A to Z, as they say, but I could see, I understood right away that it was not realistic to do it in 500 days. Still, I was for Shatalin’s program. Why? Because it had a political meaning; it was that nail that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin were hammering into themselves tightly, and in general—I will use Shatalin’s expression: “Who cares—it may even be a felt boot, but let everybody unite around that felt boot,” you understand?

[Karaulov] But still, the 500 Days program was rejected.

[Bakatin] I think the relationship between Gorbachev and Ryzhkov had an influence here. So... Ryzhkov’s role was the most negative one. And Gorbachev decided not to quarrel with him. Gorbachev wanted to somehow... average it all. As a result, this middle-of-the-road idea to arrive at “main directions” was born. Seemingly—not so bad, and not stupid, but what needed to be done was to decide in principle: We are no longer going to stick ideology into economics.

Here, this telegram arrived today: The military wrote a statement. A good statement, a needed one, cannot object to it: The Army will never put itself against the people, there is no reason to pitch the Army against the people—everything is normal, in short, but then here they go again: We are not going to allow the socialist choice to be mocked and derailed from the road to communism. That is, ideology again, God damn it.

[Karaulov] Ryzhkov simply saw very well that 500 Days was more significant in a political sense. And only then comes the economy.

[Bakatin] But the program itself contained no politics; very simply, this program could have united Russia and the Union; this is generally absurd, you see, when Russia and the Union quarrel. It is not Lithuania or Georgia that are killing the Union. Russia is killing the Union. It is laughable to talk about Russian sovereignty—in principle laughable, you understand? Take our republics, and everybody will say: Yes, we are equal both in the Constitution and in fact, but we do have to understand that Russia is bigger, it has more resources, and that is why it gathered people under its wing—sometimes benevolently, sometimes, perhaps, it conquered them, and now some people out there are upset, but they should not, perhaps, be so upset; maybe it is better to use this infrastructure that already exists. Russia cannot say: I will not sign the Union treaty, I will not sit down at the negotiating table. With whom? All of this, theoretically, has been created by Russia. And now it says: I will not do it. What does it mean—that it is leaving the Union? And what will be left then? I do not understand it, honest to God. Because it is stronger, Russia should be more
tolerant, if it comes to that. Instead, we hear now: It has been left naked and barefoot—who left it naked and barefoot? The center. Wait a minute—what is the center? It is Russia...

Then—the market, those economic laws that have already become entrenched: They will not let these republics go free anyway. That is, it is possible, of course, but who will be better off from it? The separation process will be very painful. Then what for?

[Karaulov] Have you asked Zviad Gamsakhurdia this question?

[Bakatin] You know what—if I met him even once in person, you understand? In all this time, I have only spoken to him on the telephone twice: I asked him to do something to get electricity back in Tskhinvali. You see, simply... from the point of view of a Russian (and that was at a time when I did not hold any official position), you know, we have this image of Georgians as noble knights, and people in Tskhinvali were without heat, so let us, Zviad Konstantinovich, do something, help them somehow... He says: Yes, I will try, but not everything depends on me... Such was the conversation. I do not know, I have not been there these days, but I also have some experience and I will tell you: The situation in Tskhinvali is being heated up by North Ossetia. Here is an example: North Ossetia sends a telegram: Mikhail Sergeyevich, request you impose martial law on nearly entire Georgia. Why? What is happening? That thing I told you about: The Georgians decided to evict all Ossetians from Tbilisi. I do not believe it for a moment, this is nonsense. Who made this decision? The telegram does not say, I begin to check—it is all fabrication. There are bandits in Tskhinvali among both Georgians and Ossetians; Georgia supports the former, Ossetia, the latter; it is not clear yet how to stop them, but still, I do not think that Gamsakhurdia needs this conflict, he has power now and I am sure he wants to have peace in Georgia.

[Karaulov] Zviad Gamsakhurdia clearly said in NEZA VISIMAYA GAZETA: Everything that is taking place in Ossetia is a “punitive operation by Moscow,” that the “Baltic scenario” is being played out here, except that Ossetian extremists under the guidance of the KGB substitute for the Interfront.

[Bakatin] This is kind of murky; there is no logic in it. “Punitive operation?” Against whom?

[Karaulov] Against Georgia, which will not sign the Union treaty.

[Bakatin] This only shows that he is this kind of politician. We have quite a few people now who talk before they think.

[Karaulov] Pavlov, for instance?

[Bakatin] You mean the TRUD staff, is that it? The bankers’ plot? This is silly. Pure nonsense. I think Pavlov, being still a young and inexperienced premier, said something there that he probably later regretted 10 times over...

[Karaulov] Pavlov could have issued an apology, if he wanted to. Or at the very least offered some clarification.

[Bakatin] That would not look good, probably; besides, Pavlov is a rather hard man, and his character, too—he is stubborn.

[Karaulov] Do you believe in this government?

[Bakatin] You know, I would rather not answer this way. What does it mean: “believe in?” I can say whether I trust or do not trust the government, you see? So: yes, I do trust it. It is possible, of course, that we will have to form some kind of coalition government—maybe; it all depends on the political equilibrium. You will see, the CPSU will still have a word in it, especially its “Russia’s” part, the most prominent now, so to say. It has a “trump card” now—the real failure of the democrats who got power but have not given anything to the people. If in the past the CPSU defended the people from who knows whom (since it was at the helm itself), it is now defending the people from the very real Gavriil Popov: See what these democrats are like? They have not been able to harvest the potatoes, everything is abandoned in the fields. On the other hand, the other side is getting stronger, too—the entire camp that produced Yeltsin, as a banner, and is using his authority. Or, rather, not authority but popularity, I would describe it this way.

[Karaulov] Yeltsin says that Gorbachev deceives him all the time.

[Bakatin] No. No, I do not believe it. This is not true. I would even say this is dishonest. In what way does he deceive him?

[Karaulov] The same 500 Days.

[Bakatin] No. He did not deceive anybody. Where is the deception here? In his very first speech Gorbachev says: I am leaning more toward the 500 Days program, I like it. Right away. Then, when the debates started, and when Ryzhkov started to torpedo it—remember? Ryzhkov even said: I will not deliver this report; I will have my own report...

I want to say this: When such depolarization [depolyarizatsiya] starts, it is very dangerous, because, as a result, Gorbachev is left at the center alone. Not as Gorbachev—but as president. He will never be with either the “right” or the “left” (and who can figure them out now?) wing of the CPSU, and will never join the extremists, because all their politics is—“down with,” “resign,” and “get out...”

[Karaulov] Does it mean that Gavriil Popov is an extremist?

[Bakatin] Gavriil Popov is not an extremist, but, frankly, I would like to have a word with him. Recently, when I
was already in this structure, I called him, and we agreed to get together. But I, for instance, will be arguing with him, because his idea to privatize 80 percent of all means of production in two years... it is... how to put it—collectivization in reverse. In the past, we were forcing people to join kolkhozes and reported: Everybody is collectivized to hell. And now—here, you have two years to privatize everything. This is nonsense!

[Karaulov] But there is no more time left! The stores are empty.

[Bakatin] We do not have a choice. Nothing is going to work if it is imposed by force. The 30 years Abalkin was talking about—that will work.

[Karaulov] Were you liked in the MVD?

[Bakatin] How would I know?

[Karaulov] I think they did not fear you there.

[Bakatin] No. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA has incorrect information about the MVD. They did fear me. I do not want, you know, this false modesty, or whatever you call it: I am a hard man—very hard, probably; I was driving this MVD hard, believe me. This is probably not to be proud of, and I am not proud of it (I even overstepped some limits, I have certain shortcomings in this respect). It is another matter that there were a lot of people there whom I respected as specialists: If a man is a professional, he is not afraid of anybody. The only people who are afraid to be called to the boss are those who do not know how to answer an unexpected question...

[Karaulov] Shevardnadze said in OGONEK that when he was a minister he always felt the presence of some kind of “shadow cabinet.” Did you?

[Bakatin] You see... depends how you look at it.

[Karaulov] There are certain forces in the higher echelons of power that are hidden from everybody, that are... I do not know... influential, perhaps...

[Bakatin] Here is the situation. Of course, the same KGB, if we call everything by its name... or someone, has influence over the authorities, lawmakers and, I beg your pardon, the court and law enforcement system. But not in such a way that there is some kind of monster “up there” that presides over us and issues orders.

[Karaulov] And who is this “someone”?

[Bakatin] Well, let us take, for instance, an average structure. There is, of course, a certain clannishness there; they have their own money sacks that exert a certain influence, but this does not mean at all that there is, let us say, a Masonic lodge in the Gosplan [State Planning Commission] which runs things—no. It is just that there is tremendous corruption everywhere, of course, that is the crux of the matter.

In our society, somebody always influences somebody, and if this is what Shevardnadze is talking about, such things do exist. Does the military-industrial complex have its own interests? It does. They have always lived very well, their salary levels were higher, etc. Or: Does science have its own interests? We have a lot of science that is just... a barren flower... Is it not true that the press has its interests? All “independent” newspapers depend on something. Just today a journalist came to me and said: I have scanned the headlines of KURANTY and NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; 60 headlines are against the Union. What does this say? It says that they are pushing someone’s line...


[Bakatin] I do not understand. Who?

[Karaulov] Your journalist. Instead of listening to these “volunteers” and, on top of that, drawing instant conclusions, maybe you should take the newspaper file and leaf through it. Find a minute or at least ask somebody else to do it. These... visitors will some day put you on the spot. You know, it was Leo Tolstoy who said: “The last refuge of a scoundrel is patriotism...”

[Bakatin] Well, all right, maybe I should not have said that... Still, let me continue: Such honest politicians as Shevardnadze should, in my opinion, have somehow stayed in these structures. This is not a solution, you know: I am leaving because “a dictatorship is looming” or there is some kind of “shadow cabinet.” The more reason to fight, if it comes down to that; in this sense I am arguing with him, although I have not read OGONEK. If I am asked, I always say that I am not to judge Eduard Amvrosievich, he did what he wanted to; he felt it was better to leave—and he left. It was his decision. I would not have left; the devil only knows what would have happened if I were not confirmed, but I believe that we have to help Gorbachev, you see? He is the president. He was elected by everyone. Now it is beginning... and here it is—Lithuania. I, for myself, am convinced that Gorbachev is a democrat to his bones. But here is Lithuania. And immediately a conclusion is drawn against this background—Gorbachev is... some kind of a monster, a dictator, you see, or they would call him some other nasty names...

Let us deliberate on it a bit. Lithuania itself decided on its destiny: secession from the Union. Does everybody like it? No, not everybody. The are certain forces in Lithuania, communists, Burokevicus and others. There is the Army, what is there... to talk about. There are also influential forces in the Union as well, which support the centrist ideology: What do you mean, let some of them go? They, I think, put pressure on Gorbachev. At most, he said: Well, maybe, take care of it. That is all! They, on the other hand, first of all did not properly forecast the consequences, and second, forgot about the social forces that united them around the parliament. They thought that, just as on the night of 11 March, I think, Lithuania decided to leave the Union, the same way they, on 13 January, would bring it back. This is pure adventurism; they simply let Gorbachev down, that is all. But now, on
the basis of Lithuania and the events in Riga (although that was a somewhat different scenario) conclusions are being reached that Gorbachev has changed. I think not. Absolutely not. What Gorbachev has already done from the point of view of the democratization of society...

[Karaulov] Of course. I had a BTR [armored personnel vehicle] standing under my balcony, on Delegatskaya, on the 28th from 1500 on. And about 10 military vehicles. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA may be closed at any moment; just like—some journalist will come to Bakatin (or Gorbachev): They have 60 headlines—and here we go, for disruption. Gorbachev, by the way, went as far as proposing at the Supreme Soviet to suspend the Law on the Press...

[Bakatin] Look, you cannot just put the man on the spot for any word he says. There are polemics going on, emotions flaring up, and amidst these emotions he says: Well, then let us suspend the law! That is, he clearly is putting someone else on the spot, do you not see? But there is a hullabaloo about it right away, everything is blown out of proportion...

[Karaulov] He is the president, by the way. And the president, I think, should be responsible for his words.

[Bakatin] But there is nothing there! Everybody sees only what they want to see. I recently told a Western reporter: I am sure you are writing the truth, but you are only writing the truth that is in your favor, right? The same here. Did Gorbachev speak? He did. Did he say it? He did. But in what context, eh? And, by the way, he immediately corrected himself. But now this phrase is being quoted and spread around. Why? Because it is profitable now: Look, you have now only one way—toward dictatorship. And everything that fits is being squeezed under this “dictatorship” heading: All the facts are being strung like beads on a string. While everything that does not fit is either simply not mentioned or is mentioned in passing: Maybe it is there, or maybe it is not...

[Karaulov] But it was not only journalists who were talking about dictatorship. Shevardnadze said that, too.

[Bakatin] I was very concerned about that. I do not know what he meant, but if we follow this line of reasoning, then we can have—on the basis of our empty markets, raised prices, this... devil only knows... incomprehensible policy of our government which scares the people more than anything else—mass unrest; this is quite possible. And then what do we do?

[Karaulov] Call the military, as Sobchak said at the latest congress, and tell them: Come and rule us...

[Bakatin] This is not “rule us”—who do you think will be talking like this; simply, this mass unrest will have to be stopped somehow. But how? By word? God help us. But, most likely, we will be forced to use force; I do not know whether it is a dictatorship or not, but there will be nothing left of democracy, that is for certain.

[Karaulov] In my opinion, the main danger to the country is the price increase. Perhaps, they should not have been raised so drastically?

[Bakatin] They were supposed to be raised last May; this is a nightmare, really: to announce that we intend to raise prices and to do nothing. This is the result. It started panic buying, and now the stores are simply empty. Everything is swept away, especially considering that there is a hell of a lot of money. No, prices should have been raised a long time ago, but the problem should not be reduced to a price increase alone—we still have an idiotic system of labor remuneration; labor still costs nothing, etc. But since we are moving toward a market, prices should at least correspond to the world level...

[Karaulov] But, as a result, people live very poorly, Vadim Victorovich. Much worse than in the 1970’s.

[Bakatin] True. But we have to... you know, like in Russian fairy tales, before you get to the scarlet flower or the crystal castle you have to fight your way past the wicked witch, a bog, and a forest of evil. By the way, one of Gorbachev’s mistakes was to promise people a “manna from heaven”: here is perestroika, just wait and we will have abundance, and so on. No. This was not to happen. It is another matter that when a goal is defined and there are different programs, different options, you can choose one, the optimal one, and not allow, for instance, unemployment—listen, this borders on idiocy: Unemployment caused by overproduction—let us hope to God that we will live to see it, but unemployment when there is nothing?! I was telling Gorbachev and even wrote to him that his statements need a more precise... “this way” or “that way,” you understand? Second, it is time to tell people honestly: Yes, we have made mistakes. A lot of them.

[Karaulov] The main mistake, I think, was to keep saying: I did not know anything about Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, or Riga... Is this not stupid?

[Bakatin] What does it mean “did not know?” How could Gorbachev, let us say, not know that mass demonstrations were taking place in Tbilisi? Everything was boiling there for almost half a year, this permanent rally on the square was going on for who the hell knows how long. Gorbachev appealed to them, his statement was read on the radio. It was decided to clear the square. Their minister of internal affairs called me from Tbilisi and said: Here, we have such an order. I told him... not because I am so smart or could foresee that somebody would die—no. I simply, as a human being, told him: Look, do not do it in the middle of the night, it is, after all, a day off, people are not working—tell them not to do it. But in principle—it was a regular operation to clear the square. What is so special about that? It is another matter that it was conducted in a very unprofessional way, plus some weak people got crushed in the crowd; the Sobchak commission, I think, showed all of this quite objectively; I spent about three hours giving them my explanations, and then later had to report on it to the
Supreme Soviet. That is, I will say once again: It was a regular operation to clear the square. Baku was a completely different matter; in Baku, the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet made a decision to impose an emergency regime; in accordance with this decision, troops were brought into the city; they encountered resistance, but the troops themselves entered [begin bold]legally[non-bold], here the question was the protection of the soviet power—and this was not at all Tbilisi—and not Vilnius, since we are subject, because in Vilnius everything was in reverse: There, the troops acted against the legal authorities—who knows by whose decision. Vilnius—this is totally unconstitutional!

[Karaulov] But who gave the order to the troops? What does the Security Council know about it?

[Bakatin] You know, I am the wrong person to ask: I no longer held my position at that point and the only information I had was from the newspapers—that is, I know no more than you do. I cannot say whether Yazov got together with some others or not—I do not know, although I have certain doubts about doing it without the knowledge...—but, it is hard to tell. In reality, this is all very stupid: Some street, excuse me, “salvation committee,” nobody knows the names of its members... Pugo makes a statement the next day—do you know their names, he is asked? Yes, he says, I know but I will not tell... That puts Pugo in a very strange situation, by the way. As for Tbilisi—this is stupidity, if not provocation. And Gorbachev...

[Karaulov] Is tormented?

[Bakatin] My God, do you think he is not? Do you think he is made of stone? I do not know, of course, I do not sit at home around the kitchen table with him, I do not know how he is... but I can see that it is very hard on him. Even these problems in Karabakh, you report to him and hear: God damn it, what is all this, how can it... He is upset.

[Karaulov] But he is not going there.

[Bakatin] Where?

[Karaulov] The same Karabakh, for instance.

[Bakatin] Listen, why should he go to Karabakh? What for? If he cannot decide here, do you think he will decide there? Why necessarily to Karabakh? Why not go now to Ossetia or Osh?

[Karaulov] To make a more intelligent decision here, I think, one needs to have been there.

[Bakatin] But why should we decide where he should go and where he should not? I have been to Karabakh—quite a while ago, though, when I was a minister.

[Karaulov] There must be a colossal difference between the Bakatin who came to Moscow from Kemerovo three years ago and the current member of the Security Council?

[Bakatin] Of course. But I came to Moscow not three years ago but earlier: October... November, December—yes, two years and five months.

[Karaulov] You have become a politician?

[Bakatin] Who the hell knows whether I have or not; I have one quality that may be valuable for a politician, but at the same time, it is doubtful that it is. I cannot talk to a person if I know that there is something I should not tell him. I will just sit and stay silent... It is all nonsense, really.

[Karaulov] You are nominated for particular positions at every congress, twice by now...

[Bakatin] No, not twice—more: For president, for the Communist Party of Russia, for “deputy” general [secretary]... I keep refusing.

[Karaulov] How long will you keep refusing?

[Bakatin] First, all of this is not serious. What does it mean—for president? What for? Especially at that time? Gorbachev was, is, and always will be Gorbachev for me; I have no intention of becoming his competitor. And there they go—nominate me... as a joke, is that it? The party job I did not want myself; I had the MVD, so for me... bouncing back and forth? Then somewhere in Khakassia somehow on a moment's notice I am nominated for deputy. I work in Moscow, busy over my head, and here comes Khakassia. I refused that, too.

[Karaulov] Now imagine that two years from now (or maybe earlier) our country will be electing the president, and in a secret ballot...

[Bakatin] I do not know. Do not know! I will not answer this question.

[Karaulov] But I have not asked it yet.

[Bakatin] And I already know what it is.

[Karaulov] There will be several names on the ballot: Shevardnadze, Sobchak...

[Bakatin] Then it is all right...

[Karaulov] I am picking them at random: Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Polozkov and, let us say, Bakatin. Then it would so happen that you become president.

[Bakatin] First of all, people will not elect me. And, second... you know, one has to honestly appraise both the level of his intellect and organizational abilities—I do not think I would be qualified for this job.

[Karaulov] People say that you wanted to pull the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments] from the Baltics. Is this true?

[Bakatin] This is what happened there. Everybody was nuts about these issues of depoliticization, departy-ization, etc.; in the final count, Rubiks and those
around him found, among OMON personnel, such hard-boiled communists, Leninists, so to say, who declared right away that they would not answer to the separatist minister but would only answer to USSR Minister Bakatin. They did not expect that I would not be happy about this. They thought Bakatin would say: Oh, how wonderful, thank you for your confidence. It is very dangerous to split the MVD on the basis of political motives, because the "splitters" are armed. In short, I sent Eduard Vasilyevich—the last name escapes me, would you believe it—the chief of the division that included OMON, while I myself went to Canada. Shilov, first deputy minister, stayed to mind the shop; he meets me at the airport, we exchange greetings, naturally, and I ask: How is business, how is OMON? And I also say: Listen, keep it in mind—either they return, so to say, to the bosom of Christianity, or the hell with it, we will just disband them.

You know, Shilov tells me, some people interfered here, the same Rubiks asked—in short, I made a decision to transfer them to the Internal Troops. All right? All right. The Internal Troops answer directly to the minister. I later told Shatalin, commander of the Internal Troops: Bring some discipline in there, if you can. I will get things in order, he says, I will send them to Karabakh, let them get busy there. By the way, they did go to Karabakh and showed themselves quite well there; Shatalin tells me later: They did a great job there, caught somebody, disarmed, in short, everything is fine. But then this OMON somehow, I do not know how, fell out from under Shatalin, too: He gave them their own commander, and they did not accept this commander—I learned all of that later, after I already left. So, there is October and November—these two months; something should have been done, of course, this is not normal in principle: to put militia under the jurisdiction of Internal Troops. But—the devil tempted us, we followed Rubiks' lead—and I did not insist. So it turned out that our OMON is an armed party detachment. You understand? But this is nonsense. If each party starts forming its own detachments... Look at Georgia—over there every party has its own "shock troops," but it comes out as if we are "against" it there while ostensibly "for" it here. But the law, excuse me, should be the same for everybody: The CPSU does not have a right to maintain armed brigades. And the MVD serves the state, not an ideology.

[Karaulov] Is Polozkov's influence felt here, in the Kremlin?

[Bakatin] I do not feel it.

[Karaulov] And in the party?

[Bakatin] Of course. Polozkov is rather energetic and strong; now he is gathering around himself all these former lecturers, they are almost every day at factories and plants, speaking to the workers, trying to reanimate socialist values, so to say.

[Karaulov] But this is dangerous, Vadim Viktorovich—is it not? People are embittered; prices went up and will probably continue to go up, and there is still nothing to eat...

[Bakatin] Very dangerous, I will not deny it; this bipolarization [bipoliarizatsiya] is dangerous: the CPSU, on the one hand, and anticommunism, on the other; very nasty things can happen.

[Karaulov] In addition to this, Gorbachev has terrible relations with the democrats.

[Bakatin] To be honest, I am very surprised in this respect. His speech in Belorussia surprised me—not the part that contains general positions, there are many things there that I fully agree with, especially the theory of approaching the problem of the center, the centrifism, where he even remembered Solzhentysyn, I think—I share all of this. But his criticism addressed to the democrats...

[Karaulov] Did you tell him all of that.

[Bakatin] No, I did not.

[Karaulov] Will you tell him, perhaps?

[Bakatin] In this case...although—no, actually, we had a conversation, by the way; we gathered several times, so to say, at the round table in the Security Council—yes, there was—that it is not done, that he should not this way... Also, Gorbachev often receives intentionally distorted information on these very democrats.

[Karaulov] I do not understand. Who gives it? His assistants?

[Bakatin] Those who have this information. Not necessarily assistants—some departments, perhaps, whose business it is, I cannot say with a 100 percent guarantee, but possibly the KGB does it, too, I do not know. Definitely, some people among those who surround him do the snitching, or maybe it comes from the Politburo, from communists—everything is possible. Here, Mikhail Sergeyevich, is what they say about you... and so it goes!

[Karaulov] Are you sure that Gorbachev removed you from the MVD because some "opposition" insisted on it?

[Bakatin] Absolutely. That is the only reason he did it.

[Karaulov] Are you sure that Gorbachev really needs you as a member of the Security Council?

[Bakatin] Well... it is hard to say—if he kept me, that means he needs me. I think I can still be useful to Mikhail Sergeyevich to a certain extent.

[Karaulov] Is some kind of game not being played here?

[Bakatin] What game? He knows my views—on private property, on the Union, and on the CPSU; in some respects (I know this) he does not agree with me—for
instance, the blockade of Lithuania or whether to, say... conduct or not conduct a demonstration in Moscow... But it seems to me that Gorbachev needs me because my views are different from, let us say... some other part of his team; I can maintain contact with the same Yeltsin or Popov, while somebody else may not want to; this is where I can be very useful.

[Karaulov] Tomorrow the USSR Congress of People's Deputies removes Gorbachev from his position. What is your next step?

[Bakatin] I leave together with him. Without question. I am a man who made a bet on Gorbachev, who believes him, wants to help him, and believes that Gorbachev's policy has not manifested itself yet the way it should, and that everything still lies ahead of him. In principle, everything Gorbachev does is right. That is, not what he does—he thinks right. What he does, of course, is not the same. He thinks right, but does not do everything.

[Karaulov] You probably know that the rally at Manezhnaya Square (the one before last) ended with a collective, half-a-million strong singing of “Dubinushka.” Why do you not speak at these rallies?

[Bakatin] I do not believe that anything is decided there.

[Karaulov] This is probably true...

[Bakatin] So why go—just to show yourself?

[Karaulov] Do you walk around Moscow?

[Bakatin] Yes.

[Karaulov] Do you stop at the stores?

[Bakatin] My wife usually does the shopping, but last Sunday we happened to go together (I live on Komsomolskiy Prospect, not far from the Youth House) to the market. We stopped at the store—absolutely empty, not even Turkish tea or juice in those immense jars—nothing at all, zero! And three sales ladies are standing and smiling. And this is what is interesting: While at the MVD, I was involved closely in the problem of all kinds of distortions of the flow of goods. Combating speculation is a separate topic; I was simply tracing the flow of goods that bypassed the stores; now it is an almost all-encompassing phenomenon, and trade departments themselves do not want to get involved in that, they do not care—they fulfill the plan and get their bonuses. My driver’s wife works in retail, and he says: She brings home more than I do, she gets bonuses all the time. I do not believe it: What kind of bonuses? There is nothing in the stores. I do not know, he says, they have such a goods turnover now that everybody gets them. That is, a completely idiotic distribution system has been created: Everything is sold either under the counter or for double the price—in short, it is a nightmare.

[Karaulov] When you were working as a minister, did you feel that the KGB was watching over you?

[Bakatin] I was told immediately, on the very first day, or maybe on the second: Vadim Victorovich, the KGB is watching over us, keep it in mind, so to say. I call Kryuchkov right away and—absolutely sincerely—say: Vladimir Aleksandrovich, do watch over us more actively. What is there to be afraid of? If you are clean, it does not matter. And this is very bad—that the MVD still does not have its own counterintelligence, these functions rest with the KGB, they are the ones who are fighting corruption in law enforcement organs, and very poorly, I must say, they really do nothing about it. At the time I was there, other than general memos—that someone said something somewhere and it seems... This is total nonsense, during the entire year before last (I do not remember last year’s figures) about 130 or 140 bribe-takers were uncovered in the MVD—this is in the entire system, that is, 1.5 million people; it comes out that for 4,500 units we have 140 crooks. Just look at the State Motor Vehicles inspection alone!

[Karaulov] Who will be working on your team?

[Bakatin] Give me offers. I will have eight or nine people, all of them, of course, will specialize in something, we need a lawyer and an economist, but they should be people with sufficiently wide horizons; that is, we need people, preferably young, with modern thinking and—with certain connections.

[Karaulov] What is the salary?

[Bakatin] Between 800 and 1,000. By the way, a journalist can also work there...

[Karaulov] During three years in the Kremlin, or just “at the top,” have you acquired friends—people with whom you socialize, who visit you at home?

[Bakatin] I do not have friends. Maybe one or two schoolmates, but even these I sort of lost contact with, except one person—we maintain contact; otherwise... There is only work. Lately I do not even watch television at all—I have decided to catch up with reading something. Hell, I was not even reading anything! Coming home at 2200, sometimes trying to make it in time to watch “Vremya”; wife watches television until late at night, while I get something to eat, get a book and head for the chair under a floor lamp...

Generally, I do not know Moscow well. I do not know people here. How would I? I know, for instance, that Faxil Iskander lives somewhere here. But then what...

[Karaulov] But who keeps you from coming over to Iskander during the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies, shaking his hand and saying: I would like to stay in touch with you?

[Bakatin] I am not acquainted with him... I was introduced to some people—for instance, artists, I even visited them. In general, when I was working in Kirov, I knew almost everybody; now artists from Kirov come to my home, we sit in the kitchen and drink vodka, beg your pardon. Tonight, though, I just happen to be going
visiting. I have a foreign, so to say, friend, he invited me. There will be an artist there, by the way. Belyutin—I know he was one of participants in the Manezh exhibit when Khrushchev cracked down on them.

[Karaulov] But do you go visiting often?

[Bakatin] Seldom.

Constitutional Oversight Chairman on Needed Steps to Rule-of-Law State

91UN1885A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Jun 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member S. Aleksayev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee: "One Year on the Path to the Supremacy of Law"; Reflections on the Anniversary"]

[Text] When I first became acquainted with the statements of A. Melnikov, RSFSR CP Central Committee secretary, which sharply reacted to the policy of searching for an alternative to party-political life (and in this connection, referring to the work of the author of these lines in the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, and the fact that it was "not very prominent in the support of legality and law-and-order"), I experienced, I won't deny it, even a sense of satisfaction: it was all correct. Jupiter, you are angry; let deeds, the very course of events, and time speak for you.

But after I compared Melnikov's judgements with the views of his close colleagues, it became clear that there is something to talk about here—something serious.

But first, about the work of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee. And time has made it possible to do this. It is a kind of celebration. A year of Committee work has gone by. Soon, by all indications, it will be replaced by a Union Constitutional Court. And so, it is time to sum up certain results.

I will state frankly, that when the Committee set about its work a year ago, we observed in certain of its features fixed in the law on its status—and even more so according to the convictions of a number of high authorities—that the role prepared for it was one of yet another institution called upon to implement inspection and oversight functions in the support of legality.

Meanwhile, in terms of its destiny, and according to the very logic of building a rule-of-law state, a permanent attribute of which is a strict division of powers, the mission of an organ such as our Committee lies elsewhere—to be, together with the entire judicial system, a "third estate" in the state—no less weighty and powerful than the two others—the legislative and the executive.

It is altogether obvious how complex it is even to entertain the idea of such a "third estate" in the conditions of our society, which has only just emerged from a strict regime of totalitarianism—much less to actually introduce it to the life of the state. And then there is the disorienting title of the Committee ("surveillance"), and at the same time the narrow scope of its functions and the lack of legal power behind its authority... To this day there are people who believe that our Committee, like the Supreme Court and other central institutions of justice, is no more than a subdivision of the central agencies, or at best—something like an all-union ministry.

And if at the same time the Committee managed to do something rather important during the past year, that would be above all—starting the process of becoming the "third" judicial power at the level of the highest national organs.

In examining a number of cases, the Committee subjected the normative acts of the all-powerful USSR Council of Ministers to constitutional analysis; it was remarkable, that in the course of examining one such case—on the constitutional institution of residence permits [propiski]—the USSR Council of Ministers itself abolished about 30 of its own decrees, which had established discriminatory rules for a number of categories of citizens.

The normative ukases of the President of the USSR also fell into the Committee's orbit of activities. On 14 September 1990, the Committee halted the Ukase of the President of the USSR on regulating the holding of mass demonstrations [meropriyatiy] within the bounds of the Sadovskoye Kolso in the city of Moscow; and this, it seems, became the first instance in the history of our country in which an act by the highest official lost its juridical force by official decision "from the side." It is true that subsequently, constitutional analysis of presidential ukases became more complicated, since by a law of 24 September 1990 the USSR Supreme Soviet delegated to the President of the USSR for a one-and-one-half-year period, legal authority on a rather broad range of questions, and ukases on these questions have acquired the force of law.

Finally, the activities of the Committee also embrace the laws of the "very" USSR Supreme Soviet. In addition to the legal statutes previously analyzed, the aforementioned Law on Delegating Legislative Authority to the President of the USSR, and laws on the police and on state security where they concern the rights of citizens in the sphere of economic activity, are today under examination of the Committee.

And the second thing that I would like to take note of, in summing up the Committee's year of work is its activity directed at ensuring that the supremacy of the law is affirmed, and that internationally-recognized human rights become fixed in the very flesh of the Soviet legal system. After all, the designation of our Committee as an organ of constitutional justice does not mean simply examining cases and then stamping them "yes" or "no," of "constitutional" or "unconstitutional," (fortunately, by law the Committee has received such a capability) to
put the initial, fundamental constitutional principles into effect, based on the USSR Constitution and international legal documents on human rights. And, I hope, one may sense the essence of such principles, if one examines the decisions taken by the Committee—and particularly those on the unconstitutionality of laws and other normative acts, which make exceptions to legal procedure for examining labor disputes for a number of categories of citizens (21 June 1990); on the unconstitutionality of legislative acts which establish forced treatment for those suffering from alcoholism and drug addiction (24 October 1990); on the unconstitutionality of the institution of residence permits (26 October 1990); on the unconstitutionality of statutes which exacerbate the position of certain categories of citizens in exercising their right to defense (3 April 1991); and others.

Of course, in the aforementioned and similar situations, the Committee cannot and should not concretely regulate the corresponding problems; that is the business of the legislators, as for example, establishing the exchange of residence permits for a registration procedure—and thus far no such procedure has been put into practice; the residence permit remains. But nevertheless, the problem has been basically prepared for solution, and—what is especially significant—a rather high threshold has been established for its solution—one which coincides with contemporary high standards for human rights, stipulated in international documents. Consequently, in such instances, the Committee reveals its potency as an organ capable of influencing the level and the quality of legislation; moreover, on the most important positions—it reinforces the idea of the supremacy of the law, and the fundamental rights of man.

From this point of view, I believe that two of the Committee’s decisions are worthy of attention, decisions which may possibly serve as the point of departure for including the principles contained therein in the new all-union Constitution. These are, first: the conclusion on the unconstitutionality of unpublished, “secret” acts on the rights, liberties and obligations of citizens (29 November 1990); and, secondly, the statement on the necessity for legislative regulation of the bases and procedures for enlisting the services of military personnel for protecting public order, and the solution of other internal political questions (13 February 1991). It would probably not be a great exaggeration to say that these decisions are in the same category with the major legislative actions of recent times—the introduction of the principle of the stability of property rights, the establishment of liability for contempt of court, and others.

Well, just what is the role of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee in upholding legality in the country?

I would note first of all, that the law excludes the very possibility of the Committee’s participation in what is ordinarily understood by “upholding legality,” or of any reaction whatsoever to specific instances of violating the Constitution and legislation (That is the business of the procurators, the police, and the judicial organs). The objects of its jurisdiction are the laws themselves, and other important normative, legal documents.

And it is here, in this sphere, that the Committee has examined, I believe, all cases in which a blow may have been dealt to the constitutional system and the corresponding question—Pay attention to this point!—represented under legally-established procedure (For your information: even in those narrow limits in which the Committee may react to the laws of the union republics—that is, on human rights—it does not have the right to raise the question on its own initiative, but is forced to “wait upon” the representations of the President of the USSR and the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet). Specifically, the Committee has taken decisions on the unconstitutionality of the acts of a number of republics limiting the right of military serviceman to housing (25 October 1990), acts limiting the citizens’ right to take part in a referendum (5 March 1991), the judicial ban established in the RSFSR on combining a state office with any other kind of office (25 October 1990), the legal statutes of the Lithuanian Republic on criminal liability, including the death sentence, for creating and participating in the actions of socio-political organizations (15 February 1991), and others.

But that is not the main thing on which I would like to place the emphasis.

Perhaps it will come as a considerable surprise to the readers if I would say that in our country the slogans, “the strictest legality,” and the “upholding of legality” by all means, were widely touted at the very peak of the bloody Stalinist repression and merciless terror—in the second half of the 1930’s (Until that time the prevailing ideology was “revolutionary legal consciousness,” while legality was frequently rejected altogether as a “bourgeois” institution). How can one explain such a paradox? Only by the fact that totalitarian regimes always seek some kind of noble and respectable cover for themselves?

Yes, that is one of the reasons. But nevertheless, the principal basis for the aforementioned paradox lies elsewhere. In and of itself, legality as merely a requirement to execute the existing legal norms, is altogether compatible with totalitarianism. Moreover, it seems to me that a totalitarian regime needs “such” legality very badly.

You see, under totalitarianism, the existing laws do not address on the whole the organs of power: they leave them broad and uncontrolled scope for tyranny, and come down on the citizens and their associations with full force. And you see, here, in this direction a totalitarian regime needs, understandably so, the strictest of legality, and unconditional execution of juridical norms; such as, for example, those which were in effect here in the 1930’s—and on the severest criminal liability even for minor pilferage of public property (the law of 8
August 1932), and on the acceleration of “counterrevolutionary” cases, without procedural guarantees or examination (the law of 1 December 1934), and on criminal liability for shirking, for being late for work, and on enslavement of the citizens by means of registration to their place of residence, kolkhoz members to the kolkhoz, and so on and so forth. After all, even the repressive authority of the direct organs of the terror—the “special conference,” and the “troykas,” was established by legislation.

It goes without saying, the laws must be executed. Otherwise the very phenomenon of the state and organized society will be destroyed. This comprises the significant civilizing potential of the law. But the profound tragedy of the entire matter of legality under conditions of a totalitarian state consists of the fact that the very laws which are by their legal nature supposed to be common norms, are utilized under such a regime for the political struggle, and become the “driving wheel” of the entire totalitarian system.

During the years of perestroika, and especially in the years 1988-1991, the situation in our country has changed with respect to legislation. Repressive legal statutes were abolished, and nationwide and republican laws of a truly democratic nature have been adopted and are being put into effect; and the Constitution has been partially renewed. Consequently, the law too is more and more acquiring true, and general civilizing significance. Nevertheless, now that the formulation “dictatorship of the law” has become widespread, I allow that it is justifiably only as a colorful expression; according to strict humanitarian criteria, the terms “dictatorship” and “law” are incompatible phenomena. A democratic civil society does not need a “dictatorship” no matter what kind it is, but the SUPREMACY OF THE LAW.

Until now, while finally giving such institutions of civilization as “democracy” and “the market” their due, we have apparently not fully grasped the essential nature and mission of what is perhaps the very greatest achievement in world civilization and culture—the law; or more precisely—the law and justice.

It was in the time of the limitless, universal reign of Stalinist ideology, hidden under the guise of “Marxism-Leninism,” that we reduced the law to “political measures,” “an instrument of a class state,” “the will of the ruling class,” or to a kind of appendage of the all-powerful state. Incidentally, in a totalitarian society, that is just what it is—punitive and prohibitive, having withdrawn from common human positions; ideologized, and constrained by the unrelenting control of the party-political structure.

But by its very primal nature, the law has been summoned not as a weapon for class dictatorship, but just the opposite—as a counterbalance to violence, a stabilizing, calming, and pacifying factor; capable of curbing, and directing clashes and conflicts into civilized channels, including those caused by class and nationalistic conflicts, and political and personal confrontations. Its purpose is to introduce to the stormy life of society the principles of concord, civil peace, dialogue and understanding. And that is why it received the name of “law” [pravo]—a system of common norms which are the criteria for rightful behavior, and which are oriented on the right [pravo] of the people to truth [pravda] (Many major legal documents of the past were called just that—“Pravdas” [The Law]).

The implementation of two genuinely civilizing and historic tasks fell to the portion of the law; tasks of which no other institution of civilization was capable. First of all, to stand above the state, to “bind the ruler” with strict norms and thereby not allow the state to become the absolute power, or turn into a force which tramples the rights of man. And secondly, to embody in the law and to make universal the principles of justice and truth, to gather and express in finished legal mechanisms the age-old wisdom of man, and the finely-honed art of solving conflicts and disputes.

And thus, such law (and the legality proceeding from it, “rightful legality”), continually reveals its civilizing and common human nature, and does not permit itself to be used for narrow class or political purposes—for the ends of the political struggle, persecution or reprisal. Why, for example, did the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee overturn the judicial ban established in the RSFSR on the combination of state and social positions? Just because it conflicts with international pacts on human rights? No, not only that. If the law is subordinated to the interests of the political struggle and political passions—that is the end of the law. One does not have to be a prophet in order to guess the outcome of such kinds of judicial bans; for after a year or two both the bans and also the punitive measures which proceed from them will be politicized, and will be used against anyone at all; moreover, as historic experience shows, it will be used above all on its creators, and there will be no refuge for them nor for anyone at all, where one may take shelter from tyranny and persecution—the true law; Law and Justice.

Right now it seems that our entire society, and all or nearly all parties and movements are in agreement on the fact that the optimal path for our development is movement toward a civil society, a society of high status for citizens, the personification of which are property and the inalienable rights of man.

But I must say very definitively, that a true civil society will never come to pass if the supremacy of the law is not achieved, and the society does not become a rule-of-law society, a rule-of-law civil society.

We often complain about the fact that the nation’s leadership is tardy in some things—with the Union Treaty, or with the market. One can analyze all this in different ways; and at times, the time for the innovation has simply not yet come.
But here is where we are in fact tardy, seriously and in a major way, along with the cardinal transformations in property, and that is—in the affirmation in the country of the indisputable supremacy of law and justice.

Had we only truly and consistently implemented this policy from the very beginning of perestroika, or at least from the time of the proclamation of the slogan about the "rule-of-law state" (the first stage of a rule-of-law society) I dare say, that many of today's misfortunes and catastrophes might have been avoided, if not at least alleviated, had we directed their solution into the normal, civilized channel.

One may announce dozens of declarations, pass hundreds of laws, and insist on the upholding of legality; but if society does not acknowledge the supremacy of the law and its priority, if justice is not elevated to the level of the highest power in the state, the absolute value of human rights will not come to pass, and all the changes will be threatened. In this case, even the most magnificent laws will be silent, and that which is called "upholding legality" will turn into administrative-repressive practice—the kind hoped for by the figures who dream about returning to the previous system; but the main thing is that our hopes for cardinal revitalization of society will collapse, and the fate of the country will be tragic.

**Bypassing Legislature in Union Treaty Process Seen as 'Fatal' Precendent**

914B0214A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Jul 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by Sergey Baburin: "Starting From Scratch..."]

[Text] Perestroika with its new thinking has not only engendered new concepts and ideas but also filled with new content those that were, seemingly, already a thing of the past. Thus for the past two or three years practically all the principal versions of the transformation of Soviet society and the Soviet state have been built on the Union treaty concept.

Having achieved accord to a large extent, representatives of the republics and the president of the USSR frequently reduce the problem to questions of who will "join" or "secede" and how and in what way the former autonomies will sign the treaty—"as a part of" or not. There are enervating arguments about terms and ideological myths. A kind of collective eclipse of the consciousness! But perhaps the problem lies elsewhere? Primarily in the possibility or impossibility of the creation of a "common European home" by blowing up the all-Union home, the home in which one lives?

Nonetheless, the latest concerted plan of the transformation of the USSR into a Union of Sovereign States has been prepared in Novo-Ogaryev. An alluring approach, seemingly, but before moving in this direction, dotting the final "i" even more, it might be worth stopping and taking a look around. Looking around after the Union treaty has been signed would be absurd, and forecasting future problems, simply too late.

First of all, a brief excursion into history. It is not, after all, a question of the creation of a new state on the barren rocks of a hitherto uninhabited island but of the transformation of a multinational society, whose culture has taken shape down the ages.

The Russian Empire was spoken of for decades as the "prison of the peoples." This was truth and untruth simultaneously.

That Russia had since time immemorial represented a classical example of a multinational state uniting peoples not only on a military and economic basis but via a strengthened spiritual community also was the truth.

The tragedy of the multinational people of former autocratic Russia was the fact that when, following the February revolution of 1917, the consciousness of millions divided the world into "reds" and "whites," "right" and "guilty," the processes which developed in society "severed the link of the times." A millennial statehood, traditions going back many centuries, and often culture going back many centuries also fell headlong into the conflagration of world revolution which flared up.

The 1922 treaty on the formation of the USSR was an attempt to find a compromise between centrifugal and centripetal forces and to combine the blandishments of sovereign national republics with the virtues of a unitary state. The compromise in the form of a federation did not last long, and with the consolidation of totalitarianism the USSR rapidly started to become an oversimplified unitary formation. As of 1936 federalism conclusively receded into the world of declarations.

The revival of the idea of a Union treaty occurred at a time when, toward the end of 1987, many politicians and, even earlier, industrial managers had begun to recognize that the main reason, virtually, for the economic and, yes, political retardation of the country's development was the hypercentralization of power and property at the Union level. Given the state's suppression of the individual and any initiative, this was laid manifestly bare. The question of a redistribution of property and jurisdiction between the center, the republics, and the local soviets and of a different status of the individual was the order of the day.

The first to begin to talk about this were the Baltic republics, which demanded economic independence and then a new Union treaty. There was a possibility of the prevention of the disintegration of the country, if not in 1983, when much was recognized only intuitively, then in 1987 and even in 1989. But the Union leadership, primarily the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee, rejecting at that time the idea of a Union treaty and offering nothing in exchange, lost time. Just as the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR lost time also. And in 1990 the center had lost control of events,
and the initiative switched to the Union republics. An era of total sovereignization set in.

Today it has to be said with all certainty that in the struggle for democratic transformations of our country we have jeopardized its very existence, as, equally, the existence of our people.

Just as with influenza: having come down with administrative-bureaucratic totalitarianism, our society proved defenseless in the face of national totalitarianism. The radicalism of the republics and the strange impotence of the center have already in fact brought us to catastrophe.

Not counting those who completely reject the possibilities of our further joint existence, two approaches may be distinguished. Some people (radical democrats of varying coloration) are demanding that the Union be transformed into a community of sovereign states connected in fact by nothing. Others (moderate democrats) are oriented toward the establishment of federal relations. Both believe for some reason or other that it is essential to make a choice between a federation and a confederation. As of the start of 1991, alas, the problem has gradually switched to a different plane. The increasing interethnic clashes and the "breakup" of the economy are consolidating the trend toward a return to unitarism, which, in particular, was strikingly manifested in June 1991 at the election of the president of the RSFSR, when millions of voters cast their vote for a program to eliminate the national-state arrangement and substitute for it administrative-territorial division. And it was clear to everyone, what is more, that it was a question not of the RSFSR but of the USSR. By the fall this trend will have strengthened incredibly.

In this situation it is essential that we recognize that both unitarism and confederation and a complete break between the republics even more will equally lead to the abyss. The first via an upsurge of nationalist movements, the second and third, via a forced revision of borders, which would never be peaceful. The sole opportunity for the preservation of civil peace is the renewal of the Soviet Union as a federation, as a federal state. Such was the decision of the all-Union referendum also.

When we speak of the primacy of the sovereignty of the republics, this is correct if everyone—both communists and anticommunists—has accepted the Lenin-Stalin concept of national-state arrangement. It is distressing that in all versions of the Union treaty we have attempted to enter the river of history twice.

We entered for the first time in 1922. Entered without looking, full of enthusiasm and romance. The river proved turbulent and hurled us against the rocks at will. We did not make it to the other side. Instead of taking our lumps and learning lessons from this, we are now pretending that we have approached the bank for the first time and are arguing how to proceed further: by ship, that is, in a federation, on a raft, that is, in a community or confederation, or each on his own log. And our neighbor swimmers are not averse to testing us increasingly seriously for unsinkability. It is not fortuitous that leaders of the United States, following discussions with leaders of the republics, have all of sudden announced that they have always, apparently, recognized the USSR only within its 1933 borders (that is, without the Baltic, Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, Moldova, Tuva, the Kurils, South Sakhalin, Kaliningrad, and the territory on the Karelian isthmus). For the first time in many years, decades and, at times, centuries even the "carrot and stick" policy—sometimes sanctions, sometimes credit—in attitudes toward our country is not even being camouflaged. And if credit, then on conditions.

Let us leave aside the infantile notions concerning a general interest in our welfare. It is now obvious to everyone that the interest of many of our partners amounts merely to substitution for a great power of an amorphous conglomerate of dependently independent republics.

But all these are external factors. The internal factor, which is also stimulating the signing of the Union treaty, is the fact that this idea has not only taken possession of the minds of politicians but has taken root in the consciousness of the broadest strata of the population also.

The meaning of the Union treaty today is that agreement will finally be achieved on a delineation of property, on the jurisdiction of the Union authorities and the joint jurisdiction of the center and the republics (everything else will remain within the jurisdiction of the republics), on the procedure of the operation of laws of the Union and the republics, on tax and fiscal systems....

All this and much else is needed, and urgently, what is more. But the authors of the treaty drafts, as also, incidentally, the "nine plus one" statement, have forgotten that it is not now 1922 and that we have the 1977 USSR Constitution. Talk about the 1922 treaty is absurd. It formed the basis of the 1924 USSR Constitution and was finally replaced in 1936 by the new USSR Basic Law.

But whereas the April statement of the president of the USSR and the leaders of nine republics, not uncontrollable but, on the whole, positive, is nothing other than a declaration of intent (it is a pity that it came to be violated immediately it was signed), the Union treaty, in the general opinion, is a document of a legislative nature. So what does it symbolize—new thinking or the twilight of a newly deceived public intellect evoked by a long night of totalitarianism?

Whether we like it or not, the alternative is simple. Either taking the constitutional path, and then the Union treaty would have to be nothing other than the joint legislative initiative of the republics before the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. Or we sign the Union treaty in the pretense that we are starting life "from scratch" and putting it above the USSR Constitution.
But then let us cast off the fig leaf of constitutionality. This is something else. We had this in 1917.

Only the first path can appeal to those who are truly thinking about democracy and a state based on the rule of law and want to bring them closer. The Union treaty can and must be not only the basis of a new Union constitution but also a bill concerning revisions to the current USSR Constitution, and one such revision, furthermore, should be that all revisions of the country’s Basic Law are to be ratified by the Supreme Soviets of the republics. It is important in this respect to obtain the concerted wishes of the republics, but, in any event, revisions to the USSR Constitution would extend to the entire territory of the USSR. If there is no Union treaty, we will live in accordance with the USSR Constitution which is in force currently. That is it. There is no other way. More precisely, the other way is revolution. War.

Concerning the second way. When in ecstasy over the treaty campaign we forget about the existing political and legal systems, this path, aside from all else, undermines the foundations of any stability. We are right not to like the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR monster, but, whether we like it or not, it is the country’s highest organ of state power. Having ignored it in the realization of a new Union treaty, we would be engaging in a fatal precedent and should be prepared, for example, for the former autonomous, krays, and oblasts of the RSFSR signing the Federal Treaty while also having “forgotten” about the congress, Supreme Soviet, and constitution of the Russian Federation. And by and by the process would go further. And not only in the RSFSR.

The statements of high-ranking politicians to the effect that the Union treaty will be signed by a delegation of the Union and delegations of the republics sound simply anecdotal. A sensation of something unreal arises. Are Union officials the Union? Is this also new thinking? And, in point of essence, how can the whole and its parts be juxtaposed?

It is distressing and frightening to read in today’s press statements of the following type: “The end of empire is not the end of the world.” Or: “Our Union state is reminiscent of nested dolls, within which peoples without rights languish in captivity.” Have you ever heard of a state (and frequently official publications) financing propaganda of its destruction? We can hardly speak of new thinking here. This is manifestly an eclipse of the intellect. What is reassuring is that the peoples’ consciousness cannot sleep forever. And the narcotic of false ideals is already beginning to wear off. I greatly desire that our dreams of democracy not evanescence together with it, like smoke. For without democracy, federalism is inconceivable also.

Whether the Union treaty becomes for us the key opening the door to the future or the key opening a Pandora’s box will be up to us. Let us try to prevent the mistake.

Commentator Warns of ‘New Frictions’ Resulting from Union Treaty

91UN1975B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Jun 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by V. Litov: “Observations of a Stubborn Conservative: Sanctions for Disintegration:”]

[Text] To preserve a unified federal union, having consolidated in the “9+1” agreement the projected trend for stabilizing the internal political situation in the country; such is the primary goal of the draft of the new Union Treaty, as viewed by the republic leaders and the President of the USSR, and sent to parliaments at various levels for discussion, if one can believe the official assurances. I have, however, grave doubts on whether this goal will be achieved.

Let us take the best-case scenario, and let us suppose that the treaty passes through all the necessary levels at record speed. Where are the firm guarantees that it will be observed; that the new solemn declarations and obligations will adhere to “the priority of human rights,” and “the freedom and welfare of the people” and the like, and that it comprehends the fate of the old people? In terms of the number of union and republic laws and decrees passed in the last two years, we are the undisputed favorites in Guiness’ Book of Records. Just as in terms of the steadily-worsening situation, which is in direct proportion to the enormous number of legal acts passed.

But the Union Treaty, its supporters object, is aimed precisely at creating such conditions and stabilizing the situation. Typical, and forgive me for my bluntness, cabinet-bureaucratic logic! According to such logic, a few highly-placed signatures on documents with fancy seals are all that is needed in order for the situation to begin to improve. In reality, everything is much more complicated.

When, for example, there is a fire in the house, and the ceilings and walls are about to be consumed, the inhabitants can be saved only by extreme and highly prosaic measures; not by redesigning the rooms with partitions, or moving the furniture from one room to another... Not to mention the fact that to redesign and distribute in complete accordance with the will of the “sovereign” owners is simply impossible: each one, naturally, strives to take more and to give less to the general fund. The process of regulating mutual complaints and grievances alone could go on for decades.

I will risk making a prediction, that the new Union Treaty in its present form will become the source of new frictions and conflicts, and in the final analysis will not lessen, but only strengthen the process of disintegration of the federative state which has begun.

First of all, the document completely lacks not only a “strong” but any sort of capable union center at all. Besides administering space research and control of
atomic energy, the sphere of its jurisdiction in Article 5 is limited merely to questions of defense, security, foreign contacts, and health-care federal functions—moreover, in only the most general and “coordinated” form. In world experience, beyond doubt, there has never yet been a confederative, not to mention the federative state declared in the treaty, with such an ephemeral range of powers. Once again, and moreover in an explosive situation, we are setting out on an experiment unique in history, in comparison with which the adventurous “research” on power unit number four in Chernobyl was an innocent child’s game...

Secondly, the sphere of joint Union and republic jurisdiction (Article 6) is set out in such a vague and contradictory manner, that it provides broad opportunities for the most varied interpretations. What, for example, does the transfer to joint jurisdiction of “establishing a uniform procedure for call-up for and completion of military service” mean? Apparently, only the fact that it will not be “uniform” for the entire country. But if that is so, then neither will the Union army be uniform, which clearly does not correspond with the content of Article 5. And there are similar incongruities in many articles...

And finally, on the specific mechanism for redistributing the authority of the Center and the republics, and union and republic property: This mechanism, as seen from Article 7, is to be set up by means of special agreements on both bilateral and multilateral bases. But why, one might ask, put the cart before the horse? Would it not be better to work out such a mechanism on the example of two or three republics; see what becomes of it, consider the practical results, both the positive and negative, and only then conclude a Union Treaty?

There’s no denying that our state in its present form is too centralized and unified. But is it justified, in correcting this “tilt,” to embark on even more dangerous initiatives, while actually negating the need for a capable operating center and united federative principles? One understands that the draft treaty is the result of compromise. But has not too much been conceded to local egoism, to the obvious ambition of republic leaders to become complete “separatists,” not under the control any kind of higher authority? Intensification of republic bureaucratism and arbitrariness, which is more unbribed and merciless by nature than similar diseases of the center, will have an even more ruinous effect—and already is—on the ordinary worker, on those, who live on their wages alone.

Supreme Soviet Support for Center Analyzed by Republic, Group
91UN1805A Minsk ZNAMYA YUNOSTI in Russian
18 Dec 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: “By An Open Text....”]

[Text] The Fourth Congress of USSR People’s Deputies has begun in Moscow. As announced by A.I. Lakyanov, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, 1,979 out of 2,240 people’s deputies are in attendance. From the very first moments M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, had to listen to sharp criticism directed at him. A number of speeches by the people’s deputies sounded a demand for the president’s resignation. However, when the question of putting this matter on the agenda came to a vote, it was defeated by a majority.

M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, delivered his report at the evening session.

By the way, the newspaper PRATSA published a table showing the “coefficients of support” by the people’s deputies from all the republics and various deputy groups for the political decisions proposed by the country’s leadership.

Basing their efforts on scientific methods, E. Gams, a USSR people’s deputy, and G. Saratov, an expert on the Ecological Committee, thoroughly analyzed the results of the roll-call balloting at the Second Congress. The greater the coefficient, the more complete is the support by the delegation from a republic or the members of this or that committee for the group of proposals put forth by the “center.” And here’s how things turned out:

Uzbekistan—1.33
Kirghizia—1.29
Tajikistan—1.26
Turkmenia—1.23
Kazakhstan—1.22
CPSU—1.16
Committee for Women’s Affairs—1.15
Belorussia—1.15
Azerbaijan—1.10
Ukraine—1.01
All deputies—1
Russian Federation—0.92
Committee on Glasnost Issues—0.9
Komsomol—0.86
Moldova—0.84
Armenia—0.81
Georgia—0.59
Latvia—0.44
Estonia—0.35
Lithuania—0.27
Inter-Regional Deputies’ Group—0.24
Well now, as always, our Belorussian deputies respected the wishes of the "center" by an amount slightly higher than average. We anticipate, however, that the results of the roll-call balloting on the first day of the Fourth Congress' work will show the feasibility of putting the question of a lack of confidence in the President on its agenda. Was the usually solid Belorussian delegation so unified on this question?

'**Soyuz**' Deputy Disagrees With Group's Official Position

91UN1584A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA
in Ukrainian 17 May 91 p 2

[Article by Yu. Yelchenko, USSR people's deputy: "Where Is 'Soyuz' Headed?"]

[Text] As everyone knows, the Second "Soyuz" Congress, the All-Urban Voluntary Association of People's Deputies of all Levels, was held at the end of April in Moscow. Our correspondent asked Yu.N. Yelchenko, a participant and a USSR people's deputy, to share his impressions of the congress.

First of all I would like to remind the readers of RADYANSKA UKRAYINA that the "Soyuz" group was begun by USSR people's deputies with the goal of fighting for the unity of the USSR. Then in December of last year an association of people's deputies of various levels was created at the initiative of that group on this same political platform. I will say in advance that the congress has now decided to transform it into a sociopolitical movement which will consolidate on these issues not only people's deputies but even voters. At the congress, according to the credentials committee, over 700 participants were registered, including close to 370 people's deputies (USSR people's deputies—164, republic-level people's deputies—46, and people's deputies of local soviets—157). The remainder consisted of representatives of various parties, sociopolitical movements, and journalists.

The organizational committee of the congress asked all the participants to concentrate on such issues as: introduction of a state of emergency in the country; improvement of the supply of food and nonfood goods to the population; renewal and development of production; elimination of sociopsychological tensions in society; and reinforcement of vertical structures of power. A proposal was also made to speak out on the wording of the draft of the new Union treaty from the point of view of the need to bring it into correspondence with the results of the all-Union referendum concerning the future of the USSR, as well as to express our opinion on the drafts of the final documents of the congress: The Statute, Declaration, and Program of the association.

Without aspiring to an in-depth analysis of the work of the congress, I would like to note the facets that were most significant in my opinion. In the first place this consisted of the wide range of opinions, assertions, and propositions, including some rather sharp ones. After all, the congress as a whole reflected the political state of society and its catastrophes. At the same time, the central idea at the congress was to convene a special USSR Congress of People's Deputies and there demand an account by the president of the country and declare a state of emergency over the entire territory of the Soviet Union. It was noted that the presidential authority has not yet demonstrated its viability—and therefore, if the president will not take such decisive measures, the USSR Supreme Soviet should take responsibility for them upon itself. At the very least "Soyuz" is prepared to do this. As a result, there is talk of ensuring public order in this fashion and halting complete economic and political collapse. Incidentally, it should be observed that the press says the desire to declare a state of emergency in the country prevailed at the "Soyuz" congress. That is not entirely true. At the least, many representatives from the republics, including the Ukraine, myself among them, opposed this. It is also necessary to emphasize that even the supporters of this idea tried to convince the congress that the introduction of a state of emergency does not mean tanks and soldiers in each population center but a differentiated approach to the various territories and zones of the country as well as to the individual sectors of the national economy according to which one's "own" appropriate measures should be applied. Participants of the congress expressed their displeasure with this "version" as well, correctly observing that in general we are too fond of calling for extreme measures in place of constructive but decisive actions within the framework of the existing laws and the powers of the president and within the framework of genuine state responsibility for their implementation, using all official means without exception and using employees of all ranks, from the common manager to the leaders of the country and the republics. And of course this includes, in particular, employees of the law enforcement organs, whose activities, under the pressure of the psychological attacks from so-called "democrats," often evidence instances of corrupt liberalism and tolerance of illegality.

There were various points of view concerning the Union treaty as well. Is an entirely new document needed, or is it only necessary to amend the treaty of 1922 appropriately—in other words, proceeding from the existing situation of the declaration of state sovereignty by the republics, is it only necessary to note the powers that they leave for the Union? And if one insists on a new treaty, when should it be adopted—before or after formulation and adoption of a new USSR constitution? What will the future USSR be—a federative state, an association, or a community of sovereign republics? The draft treaty published in April was declared both a constitutional catastrophe and a means of ruining the Union state. In short, there was heated debate. Numerous charges were also made on the personal level concerning incompetence in state leadership and a crisis of political leadership ("today's catastrophe has its heroes and they should be held responsible," etc.).
Of course, the congress did not skirt the problem of surmounting the confrontations between various political forces. An appeal for consolidation, unity, and preservation of the statehood of the Union and of the future peoples of the country dominated the congress.

An analysis of documents adopted by the congress, to which in addition to those aforementioned should be added a Declaration on the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens, is the topic of a separate discussion. On the most general level there are grounds to say that a desire to strengthen the USSR and restructure it on a fundamentally new basis is not supported in these documents by the sort of program of actions which would not simply be distinguished by originality but would define truly new paths to that goal...

Everything proposed in the documents of the congress is familiar territory. It was culled in part from the USSR Constitution, decrees of USSR congresses of people’s deputies, laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet, ukases of the president of the country, and declarations on state sovereignty of the republics.

Is it worth compiling all this again and again in new programs, declarations, and statutes? Nonetheless, a new goal has been revealed. This is the gradual transformation of the Association “Soyuz” into a “party of federalists,” a party which will act as a “constructive opposition” to the current leadership of the country and the CPSU. What kind of path does “Soyuz,” the “party of federalists” and for the present a movement of deputies and voters, intend to travel? It appears that the path will be “its own,” “an original path,” “a third path.” Not with the “leftists,” not with the “rightists,” and not with the “center.” Utilizing the idea of “social convergence.” One wishes to ask whether we do not already have enough of these sociopolitical constructions, which are for the most part far-fetched. Does not political pluralism turn into its opposite? I am convinced that the attempt to turn the deputies’ group “Soyuz” into a movement of deputies and voters and eventually into a party is not consolidation of social forces but rather their dissipation. I know the point of view of some of my colleagues, USSR people’s deputies, and I adhere to it myself: If the deputies’ group “Soyuz” is dragged into one more “reorganization,” they intend to quit it altogether. On the other hand, this group could carry out work on the draft of the new Union treaty more effectively and with more initiative. The leaders of the groups who declare their interest in the establishment of a new Union of sovereign states could work to good effect on this issue.

In this fashion, there are grounds to assert that the congress of the reformed deputies’ group “Soyuz” reflected the mood of various sociopolitical forces and currents and to some degree of public thinking. But it seems that there is little reason to believe that its results will have a significant influence on the formation of new public thinking concerning solutions for our society to the crisis. This convinces me that “Soyuz” should return to its initial political positions.

Debate Over Delegation’s Trip to Kansas City Continues

[Letters and opinions on previously published article “Half a Million for a Junket,” compiled by S. Karkhanin: “The Echo of a Voyage”]

[Text] “Half a Million for a Junket” was the title of our report from the USSR Supreme Soviet session, in which it was said that Deputy V. Yerokhin, speaking before his colleagues, related the circumstances of a trip to the United States by a large delegation of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace. The newspaper later returned to this topic several times, expanding the factual evidence that grandiose expenditures, in both hard currency and rubles, for a trip to Kansas City could hardly be justified. The deputy demanded that this profligate spending be stopped and that the degree of responsibility of the organizers of this “jubilee voyage” be determined. What has happened since then? This is the topic of today’s publication.

Letter from A. Denisov, chairman of the Commission on Deputies’ Ethics:

On 23 October 1990, your newspaper published S. Karkhanin’s article “Half a Million for a Junket,” in which the author reported on the speech by USSR people’s deputy, Comrade V.L. Yerokhin on the topic of the participation of a large delegation of Soviet citizens in the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of former U.S. President D. Eisenhower.

In particular, the deputy made this statement in the article: “I do not know the source of the money for the trip, although one of the people in charge and the main organizer was the director of the U.S. and Canada Institute, USSR People’s Deputy G. Arbatov.”

Following Comrade V.L. Yerokhin’s speeches at the USSR Supreme Soviet sessions and his interview for your newspaper, G.A. Arbatov appealed to the Commission on Deputies’ Ethics. In his appeal, he stated the following: “I had nothing to do with the organization of this trip (other than registering the fact that it was being planned by the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Union of Friendship Societies in the memorandum sent to the CPSU Central Committee, for which an approval was received in May 1990); I did not go to the United States with this group, did not select the delegation members, and did not lobby for an airplane or for financing of this trip. In short, all of this is conjecture and slander.”

Having heard the parties involved, and having studied relevant documents, on 5 May the Commission of Deputies’ Ethics adopted the following decision: “To oblige
USSR people's deputy, Comrade V.L. Yerokhin to issue a public apology to USSR people's deputy, Comrade G.A. Arbatov at a USSR Supreme Soviet session before 15 May 1991. To release for publication in the mass media information on the decision adopted by the Commission on Deputies' Ethics.

The decision was made in accordance with Point 4 of the General Provisions of the "Rules on Deputies' Ethics," which recommends that USSR people's deputies refrain from using unconfirmed data in their public appearances.

Please publish this letter in your newspaper.

Position of V. Yerokhin, USSR people's deputy, engineer at a Nizhniy Novgorod aviation plant:

I do not agree with the decision of the Commission on Deputies' Ethics, and I do not think I should apologize. In speaking at the session about the Kansas trip, I did not mention G. Borovik; in my opinion, he compromised himself when he attempted to publicly vindicate himself. As to G. Arbatov, the commission did not listen to my argument, backed up by documents, that the academician was the chairman of a public group created to prepare for the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Eisenhower's birth. The group's draft working plan included, among other things, a trip to Kansas City, so why could G. Arbatov not be called one of the organizers even though he himself was not a member of the delegation? I should add that he prepared a draft of the Central Committee's affirmative decision on the celebration.

This is why I spoke again at the Supreme Soviet, read out the documents, and explained that I did not feel myself at fault. The audience supported me. After the session was televised, however, I received threatening phone calls, and newspapers that call themselves "democratic" refused to publish my articles... I wanted to say that at the session G. Borovik claimed that allegedly not a kopek of people's money had been spent on this trip. Although it turned out that in reality things were quite different... It is not accidental that some deputies proposed to find out why Borovik's words diverged from the facts. This proposal, however, went unheeded.

What is the reason? I think, there are people who flourish under any government; their favor is sought by many for personal purposes. The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace has a right to provide the so-called "visa support"—or, plainly speaking, it can help get a visa abroad on a priority basis. It is clear that few people would risk aggravating its chairman.

Opinion of N. Ignatovich, chairman of the Commission on Preferences and Privileges:

I think it is too early to put a period after this story. Part of our commission's work is to study the circumstances of the Kansas trip. We intend to seriously investigate the issue of privileges related to the foreign visits of Soviet delegations. Such privileges do exist, and a clearly defined circle of people enjoys them. They travel without customs inspection, duty-free, and they have "visa support."

As for the decision that, ostensibly, People's Deputy V. Yerokhin is wrong about everything, while People's Deputy G. Borovik is right about everything, in my opinion it is at the very least premature. One only needs to go to the Moscow International Airport to see for himself how great is the difference between regular and "privileged" travelers. We are concerned about it, and we will research the circumstances of this problem.

Weaknesses of Local Soviets Examined

Paralysis Leads to 'Chaos'

91UN1651A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 12, 24-31 Mar 91 p 8

[Unattributed article: "Paralysis of Power"]

[Text] Parade of sovereignties at local level. "Once monolithic, the Tyumen Region is heading for disintegration"—this was understood by the chairmen of the ECs and Soviets at the region's different levels last January. The Yamal-Nenets National Area is declaring itself a Republic, the Khanty-Mansi Area is pursuing a policy of its own... After long discussions it is becoming necessary to pass a special decision on the need to keep intact the region's integrity as a socio-economic and natural-ecological complex.

Pereslavi-Zalessky is announcing its independence from the decisions of the Yaroslavl Regional Soviet. Moscow's Oktayovsky District Soviet is proclaiming the establishment of a free economic zone. The Krasnopresensky Soviet, also in Moscow, is declaring its right to own the land, mineral wealth and air space over the District's territory...

On the other hand, Soviets are appearing which are trying to counterpose their regional affiliations to the "war of laws" and "war of customs." Representatives from the Soviet authorities in the Ural regions are merging to form a Ural parliament. The republics and regions of the Volga area are taking a step towards the establishment of their own association.

How to feed the people? At the close of last year the miners in Severouralsk put forward their demands to the Sverdlovsk Regional Soviet and threatened to strike. Their claims focused on the low prices of bauxite and the catastrophic shortage of food products. After negotiations it becomes clear that the situation can be lightened rapidly, if it can at all, only by redistributing incomes and commodities...

The Karaganda Regional Soviet has likewise attempted to solve the redistribution problem: the benefits to miners, chemical industry workers and metallurgists were cancelled in January. The reason: the acute
shortage of food products and the introduction of a single rationing system in the region.

Leningrad began preparing for rationing as early as November, discussion of the problems of creating a free economic zone was put off. In February the staffs of Leningrad’s largest enterprises demanded the conviction of an emergency session with the key item on the agenda being prices and city residents’ standard of living.

The Sverdlovsk Regional Soviet is discussing the proposal of its EC on raising the retail prices of food products in the first quarter of this year. Both deputies and voters are taking part in the debates. The Regional Soviet has to repeat that it has no power over prices—and the point is by far not only in the deputies’ low economic competence. The Soviet decides: first subsidies, then market prices. The supply, however, remains at the previous level.

Is the paralysis of power curable? At the very beginning of the session of the new Leningrad City Soviet (last April) the deputies put a proposal to a vote: discontinue live telecasts—too unfavourable was the light in which deputies were seen by their own voters. The proposal was turned down and the debate continued. The session passed an appeal to Leningraders: be patient, don’t rush developments. Half a year later a Vice-Chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet declared: the city’s parliament is heading for self-disbandment, it can in general discontinue its existence due to the participation in its work of a large number of unprofessionals. Another three months later (in December 1990) about 20,000 Leningraders came to Palace Square and demanded that a referendum on a vote of no confidence in the Leningrad City Soviet be held. The rally charged deputies with failing to keep their election promises, and with failing to ensure enough foodstuffs and commodities.

“We have not stood the test of democracy,” deputies to the Kemerovo Regional Soviet stated at nearly the same time. It was decided that one of the measures to overcome the regime’s impotence would be to combine the posts of chairmen of the Soviet and the EC. The former chairman of the EC voted “for”. At the Leningrad City Soviet, incidentally, a similar decision found no support.

...The chaos keeps mounting. Communists accuse democrats of this, and democrats charge communists. However, all the Soviets (Councils) are sick with the same disease—inability to make decisions and translate them into life. What will happen next?

Popov on Needed Local Self-Management Reform
91UN1651B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 12, 24-31 Mar 91 p 9

[Article by Gavriil Popov: “Too Many Parliaments...We Need a Municipality!”—first paragraph is MOSCOW NEWS introduction]
control (something which the Mossovet has long and fruitlessly asked the government to do) for purposes of exchange.

But in general there is a need to follow a different path: it is imperative that both the producers of television sets and the producers of meat should take everything right to the market, bypassing both the Centre and the Mossovet.

A different solution is also possible: the Mossovet turns over all Moscow stores into the hands of those who must fill their shelves: the shoe industry, the agro-industrial complex, etc. Justice will be restored, and townspeople will know who has not provided them with meat or footwear. But this is not a solution either. The only way out here is denationalization, privatization, competition and the market.

Of course, denationalization cannot affect spheres of the municipal economy such as water, gas or electricity supply, garbage disposal and many other things which everywhere in the world remain within the municipal economy even when the city attracts private companies as executives into these spheres.

The process of denationalization is essential in housing, community services, health care, public education, sports and culture. Here there is a need clearly to identify what must remain in the city’s hands and what must escape its hands and become the sphere of entrepreneurship, competition and the market.

In summing up I would formulate the first group of measures needed to extricate the cities from the crisis as follows: vigorous denationalization of a considerable number of spheres now comprising the municipal economy, their transfer into the sphere of the market, and concentrating municipal authorities’ efforts on the development of the municipal economy proper—from the power industry to ecology. And the city will affect the remaining sectors with the help of economic levers by standing up for the inhabitants’ interests.

The second group of crisis-generating reasons is the present mechanism of municipal authority. The root cause here lies in the defects of Soviet power as such.

It has been clearly delineated what questions the municipality can tackle at every level. Sometimes this sector is small, but at all times it is something which no one else may interfere in.

All the laws are formulated “at the top” in such a way that they need not be specified “at the bottom.” Therefore local authorities never interfere in the affairs of the upper echelon.

One more important feature—the population in the localities elects by direct vote the mayor as the head of the administration and the municipality. In other words, the municipality and the mayor cannot “unseat” each other. They may conflict but if they go too far, they have to go to reelections.

A radical reform of local self-management is clearly needed.

For this it is imperative to:

—Abolish the local Soviet’s omnipotence, growing in fact into anarchy;

—identify the sphere of direct administration from above and define the role of authorized representatives from the Centre;

—exactly delineate the functions of local authority;

—eliminate all spheres of joint competence requiring coordination;

—inside the local authority divide the functions of the elected municipality and the elected mayor, and define the order of their interaction.

It should be noted that the lower the level of administration the more important the execution function.

The term of the local bodies’ powers must not exceed two years. Moreover, a half of the council’s members must be re-elected each year—so that the council should mirror the sentiments of the citizens. It is important to introduce a provision on the municipal service. The new mayor and the new council can be a substitute for only a few administrators. In several countries this is not more than 5 per cent of the apparat (the so-called prey of the winners in the elections). The remaining 95 per cent of municipal officials always remain in their places, and they can be dismissed only for specific deeds and by court ruling.

It is important that the membership of the municipal council not exceed 50 persons, and it should be clearly fixed how many days it can meet in session, how often, etc.

Today the democrats often say that under the existing system they are being turned into “scapegoats”. This is absolutely true. We in Moscow must be held responsible for the price of a Metro ticket which does not come under our control, and so on and so forth. A conclusion suggests itself: to prevent the democrats from being turned into a smokescreen, we must resign. But if a real law on local self-management were adopted, the democrats would acquire the prospects of having their own “field” and doing something in it for their voters, even though still within a system controlled by the CPSU’s apparat.

Decline of CPSU Prestige, Popularity Examined
91UN1738A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Jun 91 Second Edition p 4

[Text] This conclusion has come to be universally accepted, and there is probably no one who would dispute it: the CPSU’s prestige has declined during the perestroika years, particularly the past three years, and continues to decline. This is a phenomenon of colossal historical significance, because we are talking about an organization which not only has a tremendous number of members, encompasses a large segment of the active population and has held state power for decades, but also one which has governed virtually all aspects of life, from the economy and ideology to sports. Thousands of scientists will spend many years studying the CPSU phenomenon, sharpening their quills and breaking lances in defense of their ideas.

Are There Objective Reasons?

Yes, of course there are. The two main reasons, ones which are inseparably interconnected, are objective in nature. The first reason is the lack of success in building socialism in the forms and using the methods which formed the foundation upon which socialism was realized in the USSR and a number of other countries for many years. The idea of creating a socialist society is undoubtedly progressive and was accepted by the majority of our people. Socialist transformations produced many positive results, creating new successes and laying necessary foundations; however, they were accompanied by losses and mistakes and in the end led to economic inefficiency and disruption of the principles of social justice.

Acknowledgement of this fundamental fact has had a significant impact on the party which led the people’s movement toward the socialist goal. Hence the origin of the second objective reason for decline in the party’s influence. That reason is the change in the CPSU’s constitutional status in the state and in society as a result of the repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution. In other words, the failure of socialist building objectively weakened the party and made a change in its status inevitable, and the change in its status in turn became an objective factor leading to changes in the role, place and position of the party and to further weakening of it.

Some theoreticians have attempted in vain to claim that supposedly the change in status has merely served to strengthen the party. That is not true. Perhaps at some point in the future the party will in a new form acquire new strength and influence greater than before, after ridding itself of unnecessary ballast and restructuring itself on a democratic basis. Perhaps it will be found that the break with official patronage will be to the party’s benefit. But at the present stage the change in status has caused negative consequences. Firstly, the party finds itself shorn of its decisive influence on economic affairs, cadre policy and the mass media and consequently deprived of many levers of influence over the masses. Secondly, the change in status has resulted in the loss of significant party forces. Taken all together this has naturally reduced the size of the Communist Party, reduced its intellectual potential and correspondingly weakened its influence throughout the country as a whole.

‘Guilty of Every Sin’

However, along with the objective reasons there were also subjective strategic miscalculations made by the CPSU leadership. They did not understand the dialectic of development, the fact that much which yesterday was a plus is now a minus.

The party itself began perestroika and itself subjected a number of its mistakes along the historical path to criticism. The party’s role as initiator of criticism of its own mistakes is undisputed, and for a long time party propaganda took pride in this fact, regarding it as evidence of its strength, its ability to make a self-critical assessment and, consequently, its capacity for self-cleansing and renewal. I think that this argument was a strong one and a correct one, and for a time it was effective. But the party leadership did not understand that it contained a powerful time bomb, and that it was not provide safe conduct forever.

Every negative fact, every self-revelation and revelation of the past wound up hurting the party, and each time hurting it more. Every negative fact from history revealed by the party itself turned around and struck a blow at the party. There is an old saying that goes: never say bad things about yourself, because people will spread them around without mentioning the source. No one cared about the source anymore. It was forgotten. Criticism of the party’s mistakes began to multiply rapidly, passing into the hands of the party’s opponents, who immediately realized what a powerful weapon the party itself had presented them with. A connection began to form in many people’s minds: the party was to blame for all their problems. There emerged an “original sin syndrome,” i.e. the idea that the party’s original theoretical and political positions were fundamentally flawed, and that as a consequence everything that followed was an inevitable result of those incorrect and harmful original ideas and practices.

There is no need to demonstrate how negatively this reassessment of the past affected the party’s position and prestige.

Could the party have prevented this paradoxical turn of events? It certainly could have. In order to do this it would have had to create a new, truthful, truly scientific, fact-based and creative interpretation of its concept of the historical path taken by the party and the country. Old dogmatic perceptions of complex and contradictory phenomena and events should have been shattered, without the party yielding to the temptation to create more new improbable and primitive stereotypes with a powerful emotional appeal.

History rejects those who regard the 74-year path of the Soviet Union as a continuous tragedy, a diabolical opiate, a delusion. The facts refute nostalgic and naive
notions about old Russia as the most flourishing and most democratic power on the planet.

Yet the party leadership was either unwilling or unable to create a new, scientific and convincing historical concept showing the party's mistakes and miscalculations and Stalin's crimes as well as the objective reasons for the emergence of the socialist idea, the historical correctness of the revolution, and the significance of the main achievements of the party and the people. Rank-and-file communists and mid-level leaders have felt (and continue to feel) a burning need for ideological assistance.

They have not gotten it. They have had nothing with which to counter the growing stream of increasingly groundless and unproven anti-communist, restorationist propaganda. The past has been smashed to pieces and the present speaks for itself, but the path into the future is cloaked in a dense fog.

The people who head the party's ideological departments have behaved in a completely impotent manner. They were unable or unwilling to understand urgent needs and tasks in the party's ideological work. The group of historians assigned to write "CPSU History Essays," a group which was capable of creating a truthful and rational concept, is oriented toward writing thousand-page treatises. Those excerpts and fragments which have been published in KOMMUNIST cannot in any way serve as a substitute for a consistently expounded and genuinely interpreted concept of our difficult and contradictory path.

Who Started Perestroika?

In fact it was the party itself, without any pressure or coercion on the party of external forces, which unleashed criticism not only of the past but also of the present, opening the floodgates of glasnost and proclaiming a course toward radical transformations and renewal of society. Is this not proof of the party's confidence in its own strength and of its goodwill?

But in this regard as well a plus was over time transformed into a minus. Yet another historical paradox was created.

The initiator of an undertaking will be crowned with laurels if that undertaking is successful. The initiator of an undertaking which goes badly will lose people's sympathy. That is what happened here. As the gears of perestroika began to creak and the machine began to slow down and then break down the argument that it was in fact the party which had initiated and guided perestroika was transformed from a positive to a negative. The tree stopped bearing fruit or, more precisely, it dried up altogether. The argument that the party had taken the initiative withered like a leaf in autumn, dropped off and ceased to be used. Its use today could evoke a most negative reaction. It has become clear that the party leadership has begun to break down old established mechanisms without having a clear and well-defined program for creating a new infrastructure. The English say that you cannot make scrambled eggs without breaking a few eggs first, but what we did was break our eggs and then find out that there was no gas, no pan and no butter, and worst of all we had not yet decided whether we were going to make an omelette or fried eggs.

The party leadership was unable to foresee a fairly elementary thing: that in the course of perestroika there would necessarily be zigzags, difficulties and painful phenomena. In principle there is nothing tragic about this. Mistakes and excesses are also not so dangerous. Who would be so naive as to hope for implementation of tremendous, unprecedented transformations without mistakes and excesses? The danger lies elsewhere: in becoming euphoric after the initial successes and failing to see impending difficulties, not stamping out in time the fuses leading to the explosions of economic, social and political crisis. But even now it would be easier to overcome or ease the crisis if the mistakes and miscalculations of the first years of perestroika were subjected to strict critical analysis. May the slogan of acceleration which was proclaimed in 1985-86 rest in peace; now it is clear just how far removed it was from real life. The anti-alcohol campaign can rest in peace, too—there is no bringing back the wasted millions, and lost hopes cannot be reawakened. But critical interpretation of what has been done, not done completely or not done at all is essential for the sake of the present and the future. Most importantly, an open and public assessment would lend popular support to the standing of the party and its leadership as such. Not self-flagellation, not confession, just a sober, thoughtful analysis: that is what people need from their leaders. Silence and half-admissions only cause more anger. The depth and scientific nature of the assessment not only proves an awareness of responsibility, but also attests to an ability to develop and implement a correct course for the future.

Without this kind of merciless interpretation and analysis of the positive and negative experiences of recent years it will be difficult to restore the party's prestige.

The Old Job Syndrome

A person who gets a new job does not always learn his role all at once. For a long time he feels the "old job syndrome." Something like that has happened to the communist party. Its situation has changed in a qualitative way, but its realization of this new situation is a long and painful process. The communist party did not immediately realize that it now has open political opponents—relatively weak ones, but possessing a number of significant advantages. They have acquired a temporary monopoly on criticism; temporary, but nonetheless sufficient for them to put forward their own leaders and get on their feet. They have an easy target: the communist party with all of its weaknesses and shortcomings, a party which has voluntarily donned a shirt reading "Aim here." They are protected from criticism by their lack of practical actions. Incidentally, the first steps by those
soviet in which supporters of the new political movements have won power have illustrated their astounding practical weakness and vulnerability. They have proven to be more prone to those weaknesses which they criticized in order to gain power than were their predecessors. These include expansion of the administrative apparatus, the scramble for privileges, from special food and special polyclinics to trips abroad, cars and apartments, a lack of culture, incompetence in practical affairs, demagoguery and new corruption plus the traditional fondness for rally-oriented politics and personal political ambitions.

Their trial by practical work resulted in an immediate decline in their popularity among the people. Among other things we have still not fully comprehended the astounding significance of the fact that on 25 November the voters of Moscow and Leningrad failed to elect RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Moscow City Soviet and Leningrad City Soviet deputies in any of the 45 electoral districts involved, despite all the democrats' efforts. Subsequently the "democrats'" weakness with regard to practical tasks became even more obvious. The experience of the Moscow City Soviet, the Leningrad City Soviet and a number of rayon soviets such as Moscow's Okhtubsky Soviet indicates that this particular opposition group is not capable of demonstrating practical leadership.

Nevertheless the target for criticism of the communist party's opponents is still too small. The communist party itself has proven completely unprepared for the storm of criticism which has been unleashed against it. It seems to me that the upper leadership simply does not comprehend the new situation. Leaders at the middle and lower levels have by and large appeared helpless in their face-to-face encounters with young and energetic opponents. The old job syndrome is at work everywhere.

The situation has been worsened by the fact that many of the more or less notable functionaries in the apparatus, scientists, literary figures and publicists have quit the communist party, either remaining outside of all parties or becoming the organizers of new parties, groups and schools of thought. This situation is completely natural when viewed from a general historical perspective. Now people have a unique opportunity not only to simply choose a party in accordance with their beliefs, but also to profit substantially by breaking with their old party. It has become possible—and to many this seems the most promising route—to make a political career outside of the communist party, without the communist party and in opposition to the communist party.

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The party's basic strategic tasks are clear. They entail finding the correct path which will lead to a way out of the present crisis. It is essential that we put an end to the paralysis of power, overcome disintegration of the economy, end the tragedy of interethnic conflict and ensure social protection for working people as we make the transition to a market economy.

The party can even now play a major and positive role in finding solutions to these problems. But that will only be possible if the party gets over its old job syndrome.

There is only one solution: for all communists from top to bottom to comprehend the new situation, give up old habits and traditions, learn to live and function under new conditions, and learn to wage the political struggle on an equal footing. This is by no means easy, especially for "leadership cadres with a long record of service."

But otherwise the death of the party is inevitable. We must respond to the unbridled expansion of the apparatus in "democratic" soviets by reducing the size of the party apparatus. We must respond to inefficiency and incompetence with businesslike actions, practical experience and knowledge. We must respond to the fact that the new Soviet functionaries are receiving new privileges by renouncing all our remaining unjustified material privileges.

We must be able to assemble a new non-party aktiv and to form blocs and alliances with all progressive, healthy political groups, parties, schools of thought and movements. We must respond quickly to militant anti-communism, not keeping silent in the face of pointed criticism and not hiding in the bushes, but instead responding firmly and bluntly.

Great difficulties and trials still lie ahead for the communist party. The swollen stream will not soon return to its banks; most likely it will continue to rise.

Without good helmsmen the party ship will not be able to move against the current. But the whole millions-strong crew—the party—should also be in peak condition and understand the full weight of historical responsibility.

Officials View Work of Party Apparatus
91UN1676A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian No 17, 25 Apr 91 p 3

[A. Veretenikov roundup: "Central Committee Apparatus: What Is in Prospect"]

[Text] The party is operating under the conditions of an intensifying economic crisis and the growth of political and social tension. Those who are advocating the removal of the CPSU from the political scene and a change in the social system are becoming increasingly assertive and high-handed. It was for this reason that a discussion of the activity of the party administrative system in the CPSU Central Committee was distinguished by candor and keenness.

Among those assembled were secretaries of party organizations and their deputies, party bureau members, party group organizers and leaders of Central Committee and Central Control Commission administrative system
departments and subdivisions. The gathering was attended and addressed by O.S. Sheny, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Ye.N. Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission.

We reproduce fragments of some speeches.

From the paper of V.V. Ryabov, secretary of a party committee and head of the CPSU Central Committee Humanitarian Department:  

Together with the profound social crisis, many negative phenomena have arisen in the internal life of the party itself. An ideological Babel may be observed in the party ranks, adopted decisions are being implemented inadequately, and the new CPSU Rules have not started to work properly as yet. Many primary organizations are failing to conduct party meetings, more than 1 million Communists are not paying their membership dues, there is a great seepage from the party ranks, and there are instances of party organizations going into self-liquidation. Lack of dispatch and indecision have become our chronic ailment.

The considerable weakening of the party committees' vertical communication cannot fail to disturb us; the lack of mutual understanding is creating a danger of the destructive confrontation of the masses and the upper strata. Under conditions where the opposition forces are launching a growing attack on the party, indulging in inordinate self-abasement is impermissible.

There are many instances of Communists and, at times, whole party organizations not deeming it necessary to abide by the CPSU Rules and attempting to modify them to conform to their own way of thinking. Nor is it a number of positions of the rules themselves contributing to the organizational reinforcement of the party.

Very many controversial and complex issues have arisen in the course of the work on the CPSU Program. I shall cite some of them: concerning the party's name, the concept of a vanguard party in a multinational system, the party's social base in a multistructure economy and in social and class stratification and the party's attitude toward the new social strata oriented toward private ownership, concerning the philosophical principles of the party's activity, What is humane democratic socialism? What is the fundamental difference between this definition and the ideological foundations of the CPSU and the ideology of social democracy? an evaluation of perestroika—results and contradictions, and the correlation of class values and those common to all mankind in party policy.

Many departments of the CPSU Central Committee remain under strength. Approximately 10 percent of full-time party employee positions are vacant currently in the party as a whole.

Despite the difficulties which have befallen employees of the Central Committee administrative system in recent years, the staff has preserved its best qualities—professionalism, competence and high organization. And it would be unforgivable to continue to use this potential ineffectively, as is the case now, unfortunately.

From the speech of M.P. Chemodanov, head of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Department Regulations Division:

What is meant by the pluralism of opinions and defense of the rights of the minority in the party which we have proclaimed? It means the right to one's own line of political behavior and one's own discipline in the party. Individual members of the Central Committee and obkom secretaries are employing not the platform of their organization but various news media to abuse a communist president and make common cause with the opposition. Such people end up as political deserters, which we can see with our own eyes. In addition, such "pluralism" is enabling the heroes of the collapse of the party to escape in style also. The rules should not, evidently, contain such loopholes.

There is no greater danger for the party currently, in my view, than succumbing to the phrase-mongering of the liberals and social democrats. Their sticky terminology is being hurled at us constantly. You cannot get it out of your mind. We are once again hearing the abstract framing of the question of liberties and the individual and simply cannot insert the communist idea in the system of values common to all mankind.

The CPSU Program should be as concise and specific as possible. If we publish a voluminous sociopolitical treatise and involve the party in debate at this level, we are sunk.

From the speech of P.A. Myagkov, head of a division of the Socioeconomic Policy Department:

A leading party is distinguished by the fact that it calls the tune in personnel policy per the criterion of ideological conviction. We have ceased to perform this function.

We perceive, as before, any pronouncement of the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee as a final decision. We personally are to blame here to some extent. When, for example, Mikhail Sergeyevich expressed sympathy for the "500 days" program, the Communists took this to be a command, virtually. But these words of the general secretary were the personal opinion of the Communist Gorbachev, and no more. We should not be bound by any personal opinion, even one so authoritative. Otherwise a relapse into totalitarianism in the party is possible.

From the speech of A.N. Molokoyedov, head of the CPSU Central Committee General Department Information and Reception Desk:

The departments' coordinated actions pertaining to an analysis of political realities and a forecasting of possible situations and the political consequences of this party activity or the other are needed. The departments' joint
efforts pertaining to organization of the supervision and inspection of compliance with party decisions and a strengthening of performance discipline are needed.

Last year the CPSU Central Committee received over 630,000 letters, 160,000 in January-March of this year.

Members of the CPSU Central Committee, members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee receive the citizens regularly. More than 13,000 citizens were received last year.

From the speech of A.K. MASYAGIN, consultant of the CPSU Central Committee Organizational Department:

What is our Central Committee administrative system? I would compare it with a submarine. Everyone sits in a compartment, tightly battened down, and the commanders peer into the periscope to see how the political engagements are unfolding up there and tell us what levers to pull and controls to turn. The crew gets together twice a year on holidays....

From the speech of B.K. VOLKOV, consultant of the CPSU Central Committee Socioeconomic Policy Department:

Wherever I go, I am constantly asked: Who is Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev? And this is by no means idle curiosity. We recently learned that he is the president's senior adviser. But he is also a co-founder of the most ferocious anticommunist newspaper—MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI. I would like to say this in this connection. You will most likely have noticed that our opponents have of late constantly been emphasizing their allegiance to the party. Shakhray and Khasbulatov and Bunich are repeating incessantly that they are Communists. Why are they doing so? To recruit for themselves allies within the CPSU, I believe. We are manifestly lacking in high-mindedness here.

From the speech of O.S. SHENIN, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee:

What may be said in connection with personnel policy? Some people would like the party altogether to return to the former practices and assign people their positions. This is impossible. Others believe that time has been let slip and that we will no longer influence anything. This also, I would say, is quite foolish because unless we undertake work with the personnel with regard for all ongoing events, we will see no ray of hope ahead. Perhaps some people will think that in speaking of personnel policy we are displaying a concern for the prosperity of the party. No, of course not. We need people who will think about the nation, about the Fatherland, who will get the job done, not become involved in petty politicking. And that is all. This is the main direction of our personnel policy.

And, finally, I would like to see a little less gloom and a little more practical efficiency. It is painful that we are becoming some kind of cowed people. It is understandable that people are making a noise on the street, causing a racket on the radio and writing in the newspapers God knows what. I believe that we need to strengthen the leadership of the party media—there is no other way. Something else is evident also: Very many people are regaining their sight and are beginning to understand what all the latter-day "democrats" are worth.

Roundtable on Changing Role of Primary Party Organizations
91UN1732A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 4, Feb 91 pp 14-22

[Roundtable discussion, edited by Igor Ivanov: "Difficult Steps to Independence: PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN Roundtable"]

[Text] City and rayon CPSU organizations occupy a special niche. They coordinate and join into a unified whole the efforts of primary party organizations and their work to realize party policy and carry out decisions by higher-level party organs. It is here that one primarily finds the practical embodiment of the party masses' power. However, in the process of democratization of society and the party it is precisely at this level that one often observes a state of amorphism, organizational and ideological passivity and lack of coordination in actions by primary party organizations.

Participating in our editorial office's roundtable on emerging problems we were primary party organization secretaries, party officials and scientists from the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences.

Reinventing Themselves
[Ivanov] Repeal of Article 6 of the Constitution, political pluralism, the emerging multiparty system, the transition to a market economy and adoption of a new CPSU Charter have all left their mark on the style, forms and methods of party work and on intraparty relations. Former ties between party committees and primary party organizations which were based on the latter being ordered around have been disrupted or are in the process of being disrupted. There have been cases of open confrontation.

In this context we would like to discuss the way primary party organizations function in labor collectives and at people's places of residence, and how and to what ends they use the broad rights and independence granted them by the Charter. How is that independence manifested, and of what does it consist? What kind of assistance is being rendered to primary party organizations by party raykoms, and what kind of help are they getting from the primary party organizations? In short, how are primary party organizations and party committees reinventing themselves under new conditions?

O. Yegorkin, Mashinostroitellel Interbranch PO party committee secretary and deputy chairman of the Reutovo
Primary Party Organizations Secretaries' Council, Balashikhinskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast

I feel that basically conflicts between primary party organizations and party raykoms and gorkoms boil down to procedures governing the payment of membership dues. Even before the congress our party organization had decided to keep 50 percent for itself. There was a conflict with both the party raykoms and with the okkom. But we stuck by our guns, because we realized that without funds problems which arise cannot be solved. When we got funds we also acquired new opportunities. Here is one small proof of that: we have rendered material assistance to poorly paid communists and spent R13,000 [rubles] to subsidize subscriptions to the party press. We have established a small enterprise and made our Charter-mandated contribution.

At the present time our relations with the raykoms are normal on all fundamental issues. We support it, and it helps us.

O. Obichkin, head of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Sciences Department of the Theory of Parties and Social Organizations, doctor of historical sciences and professor

The party is undergoing a difficult process. The disruption will be quite severe. Our entire party system was built as a system of transmission links. Commands traveled along it from the top down. Information and accounts flowed from bottom to top. People have grown accustomed to this, but now we are not only dismantling and restructuring those relationships, we are also carrying out psychological restructuring of the cadres, which is even more difficult. It is important that we instill in everyone the awareness that under the new Charter the party basic functions will be performed mainly through primary party organizations.

To what functions am I referring?

First of all, theoretical and ideological ones. Drafting of proposals for the draft of a new Party Program and positions on a broad range of ideological issues will demand not only activism on the part of communists, but also mobilization of their intellectual powers. We must halt the process of taking ideological work out of labor collectives. It is precisely there that difficult theoretical issues should be discussed persistently and broadly.

The political function. Quite frankly, in many party organizations the political approach has been lost and it seems that political influence over collectives has waned as well. Is this not the reason that demands that party committees and party organizations be removed from enterprises are becoming more and more insistent?

Of course, when our opponents talk about depoliticization and removal of the party from public life they are obviously scheming. It would be more honest to talk about repoliticization and insertion of a new party, but unfortunately not everyone uses honest methods of political struggle.

The organizational function. It is to be realized according to the Charter through special determination of the structure of party organizations, schedules for the conducting of party meetings, the forms and methods of intraparty work, relations with non-party members and members of other social and political associations both in labor collectives and at places of residence, resolution of matters pertaining to party membership, etc.

The independence of primary party organizations consists of creative and active mastery of these functions without guidelines from above. They should probably be quite fully reflected in programs for specific activities by primary party organizations.

R. Zhukova, Taganskiy Party Raykom first secretary (Moscow) and 28th CPSU Congress delegate

It should be noted that the first of the aforementioned functions are being carried out the most tidily by primary party organizations. This shows the effects of the brazen attack being made on the party and the socialist idea. Furthermore, anxiety, lack of confidence in the future and fear of a return to capitalist relationships via the market economy have given rise to mistrust of the party's course.

The situation demands that the party's objectives not only be clearly defined, but also clearly explained. To every collective.

If that is not done there will continue to be an exodus of communists from the party and alienation of non-party members. We can see this at reports and election meetings, which are public. The number of non-party members attending them has decreased substantially, and the number of speeches made by such individuals has decreased even more.

Two years ago non-party members frequently spoke at meetings and criticized communists. That meant that they had confidence that primary party organizations were capable of solving key problems. That situation no longer exists. Many party organizations have been busy doing something which is more familiar and understandable for them: organizational work. That must be done, too, but dealing only with organizational matters means becoming isolated from the collective.

A. Burnistrov, candidate of economic sciences and CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences docent

Recall V. I. Lenin and his injunction that under all circumstances a party organization should pursue its own party line (see the "Complete Works," Vol 17, p 364). What kind of party organization is it, he asked, that cannot manage to carry out its own policy? Is anyone formulating the issue of primary party organizations' activities in that way today? Go back to the sociological study done by Academy of Social Sciences scientists in
1990 in a number of regions of the country. In the opinion of 39 percent of those surveyed primary party organizations had no authority. Approximately one-half of those surveyed (46 percent) stated that the gap between words and actions at that level was widening. One-third indicated that party organizations are not capable of foreseeing crisis situations within labor collectives and helping resolve them. There are tens and hundreds or even more such party organizations.

One of the ways of rectifying this situation pointed out at the congress was to appeal to individual communists and to ensure real collective leadership in the work of primary party organizations, ensure that they can run themselves.

S. Lutsenko, department chief of the Kaluga Oblast Board of the USSR Agroindustrial Bank and party organization secretary

In order to increase the political activism of each communist it is essential first of all to make sure that each communist is heard, that his opinion or the opinion of the primary party organization is not brushed off like a pesky fly. Unfortunately our past experience tells us otherwise.

There was much about the bank reform of 1987 that alarmed our specialists. On behalf of primary party organizations we appealed to all the various agencies and to the party press, presenting them with comments and suggestions. Our viewpoint, and it was one also held by banking officials in other central Russian cities, including Moscow, was not presented to the public. Nor did we receive an answer from the CPSU Central Committee. No one explained to us where we were wrong. And what has experience shown? Interrepublic and interoblast banking has become more complicated; accounts are mixed up and the terms have been overextended. This has had a negative effect directly on production relations. Now we are having to reorganize the banking system again.

In our collective this attitude toward communists' opinions has, if you will pardon the expression, made people more actively passive.

V. Mikhaylov, Lyubertsy Party Gorkom (Moscow Oblast) first secretary and 28th CPSU Congress delegate

Slacking of ideological and political work in labor collectives is a result of the fact that primary party organizations have been virtually shut out of the handling of the most important issues in political life. Even in the perestroika years. At a recent expanded session of our carpet combine's party committee there was heated discussion of this. Carpet weaver M. Shivora, labor collective council chairman L. Kananina and others who spoke at the meeting asked me: how long will the center's words and deeds continue to diverge, and why has implementation of Central Committee decisions been allowed to simply drift? Party committee members also brought up the matter of the energetic attack being launched against the CPSU by certain new parties. We must be able to counter them skillfully. Yet where can we find out about those parties' programs and their viewpoint, or about the commentary of scientists and CPSU Central Committee officials? And how can we do ideological work without the necessary information?

(Recently V. Mikhaylov was elected secretary of Moscow Party Obkom.)

G. Bachurin, Kaluga Electrical Equipment Plant party committee secretary

Let us get to the heart of the issue of democratization of primary party organizations' affairs. Back to the matter of how shop-level party organizations function in this regard. Have they become independent? Or are they still waiting for instructions from the party committee on when to hold a party meeting, what to put on the agenda, etc.? What are they doing to improve discipline and order and to affirm an atmosphere of party-like comradeship and concern for people? What influence do they have on production operations? Especially now, when many people do not have the vaguest idea of how to approach this matter.

I have been party committee secretary for seven years now, and I am well aware of the mood in which shop supervisors and representatives of the plant administration came here to present reports. Familiar with the great powers which shop-level party organization secretaries possessed. Today the situation is different. We must seek new approaches. And I think we have already found some. The agenda on production matters now sounds different in the party committee and at sessions of shop-level party committees. Formulations like “such-and-such shop has fulfilled its plan” are a thing of the past. Today discussion takes place on a different level: what is the role of shop-level party organizations and communist administrators in improving social and day-to-day conditions in the shops or in producing consumer goods; how do they work together with the engineering and technical intelligentsia, the political and production culture of whom often determines the atmosphere in collectives and affects the results of labor?

Party committee resolutions are now in the form of recommendations. We avoid imperative formulations.

Production-related problems are also discussed by the shop party organizations council. It is headed by A. Bogoradnov, secretary of the labor collective council party bureau. The council draws up a common course of action and decides which issues should be discussed with communists and which should be brought to the attention or shop or plant administration. Of course, the council also devotes attention to other problems. Recently, for example, a meeting was held with G. Zarapin, party obkom second secretary, who is in charge of ideological matters.
Levers of Influence

[Ivanov] Today as never before we need political analysis, well-considered advice, well-founded recommendations and support for initiative. In indoctrination work the emphasis is being shifted to communists' personal example.

Yu. Vinogradov, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences docent and candidate of historical sciences

In party work we are witnessing a difficult break with old methods and old approaches at all levels. At the 17th All-Union CP (Bolshevik) Congress Stalin said that the strength of our party organs, economic organs and all other organs had increased to an unprecedented degree. The role of objective circumstances had been reduced to a minimum, while the role of organizations and their heads has become decisive.

No one needs to be told where ignoring objective factors in this way has led. Only by taking them into account and mastering the methods of political work will the party be able to lead society out of this dead end.

There is an ever greater need for initiative on the party of primary party organizations when it comes to presenting a matter to local soviets, enterprise administration and collectives' socioeconomic development institutions. If necessary active use should be made of the opposition method. That opposition should be based on convincing arguments and contain clear-cut, specific counterproposals.

A. Boyko, Elektrostal Machine Building Plant (Moscow Oblast) party committee secretary

We have seen that the slackening of ideological work is accompanied by a decline in the party organization's influence over production. That is why the program of action currently being actively discussed gives priority to communists' propaganda efforts and to political instruction. It has been said here today that some party organizations are dropping this work. We do not take that attitude. Furthermore, right now we are setting up a lecturers' group to be comprised of the best professionally trained individuals. There is a clear need for such a group. We are not able to meet the demand from shop-level party organizations through the Znaniye Society alone. We will finance our lecture propaganda with money from party membership dues.

We are getting 28th CPSU Congress delegates, republic people's deputies and party officials from the oblast level involved in propaganda and information work. I must say that the Elektrostal Party Gorkom and the Moscow Party Obkom have always responded to our requests. Yet there is no way that we can establish relations of this nature with the RSFSR CP Central Committee. I think that Central Committee officials should meet with communists directly at enterprises, not just with the party aktiv of cities and oblasts. Contacts at that level are the most valuable.

In our program of action there are measures concerning development of the enterprise, the transition to market relationships, socioeconomic protection for members of the collective, interaction with other social organizations, work with young people and organizational work.

We deemed it necessary to devote a special section to cadre work. Here is why. Some people feel that when Article 6 of the Constitution was repealed cadre work ceased to fall under the jurisdiction of the party organization. We are of a different opinion. Of course we are not talking about the party committee approving officials, as was formerly the case. But it is our right and our duty to look for promising individuals, train them for economic administrative positions, nominate them and defend our nominations. An administrator is not just a supervisor; to a large extent he also indoctrinates. And it is a matter of concern to the party organization who is defending which world view and which moral principles are being applied.

[Mikhaylov] I would like to express my support for the workers of Elektrostal and their efforts to intensify party ideological work despite all the difficulty of the present situation. Today there are many who want to bury the socialist idea. Some people are trying to turn the words "communism" and "communist" into bugbears, in hopes that they will be able to utilize the transition to a market economy to resurrect capitalist relationships. Our common objective is to make the broad masses aware that it is not the socialist idea and the prospect of communism which are against the people, as anti-communists forces would have them believe, but rather the distortion of those concepts, the deformations which have occurred in our society.

The flood of criticism of our country's past and present is erasing or obscuring in people's minds such concepts as love for their Motherland, Soviet patriotism, internationalism, honesty and conscientious labor. Who else but communists can resist this in every collective?

And, of course, we must not stop paying attention to production operations. Nowadays everyone seems to be worrying about distribution. Production has been cast adrift. Yet much is being accomplished wherever party organizations are not sitting idly by waiting for orders, which incidentally no one today intends to issue.

Let me give you one example. Everyone knows how difficult the fall harvest was this year. Yet our agricultural enterprises somehow saved the harvest anyway. And did it without so-called party interference. The secretaries of rural party organizations assessed the situation and saw that the cities had reduced their level of assistance, so they went to industrial enterprises,
appealed to party committees, met with communists and told them about the situation in the rayon's fields. And help arrived.

T. Polkova, Vnukovskiy Sovkhoz party committee secretary (Dmitrovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast)

All year long we have been working on a program of action which was adopted at a general party meeting. I will share with you its economic section. It is designed to get communists involved in the development of lease relationships within the collective. All the main subunits have already made the transition to leasing. But...

The administration is not always capable of ensuring fulfillment of contractual obligations, as the supply of building materials, combined fodder, etc. to our farm is being cut back. As a result a number of tenants are getting a defeatist outlook. The party committee together with the lease collectives and individual tenants is thinking about what should go into a new contract with the administration; we are arranging economic, legal and technical instruction, working through communists.

[Yegorkin] As we strove to come up with a program of specific actions we improved the party organization's structure and made shop-level organizations larger by combining them, taking the production structure into account. We also established a schedule of party meetings. By general agreement (I am referring to shop-level party organizations) we arrived at the decision to hold meetings monthly. We have not rejected forms of work such as accounts by communist administrators and rank-and-file communists at party meetings and before the party bureau and the party committee.

In the production section of the program we emphasize preparation for market-based relationships. In this connection we are pinning great hopes on a small enterprise which the party committee has established. Its director, thus far still on a volunteer basis, is Yu. Kozlov, a department head, and L. Aleksandrovskiy, his deputy and the head of one of the department's groups. Both are party committee members.

The goal of this small enterprise is to carry out necessary retraining of personnel and have an influence on cadre stabilization. The problem is that conversion, which has affected us, and market-based relationships are causing personnel cutbacks. Yet it is not to our association's advantage to lose experienced specialists. However, restructuring production in a swift and efficient manner is also quite difficult. Our small enterprise will create new jobs, including jobs producing consumer goods. Overall the main objective is not to lose people before we have completed an in-depth reorientation of production. The goods will be primarily for members of our own collective.

Our small enterprise has one other function: to lend financial assistance to shop-level party organizations. Consider visual agitation, for example. An artist may do a job on a volunteer basis. But he needs appropriate materials, brushes and paints. Party dues are not enough to pay for everything. We also hope that commercial activity will permit the party committee to have enough funds to bring in highly skilled lecturers and conduct sociological research.

What is Beyond the Front Door?

[Ivanov] The program of action of a labor collectives primary party organization naturally also includes work at places of residence. In this area it is important to build contacts with territorial party organizations, of which retirees and non-working communists in the microrayons are members.

I. Maksimov, sector chief under Babushkinskiy Party Raykom, Moscow

By tradition in our area these primary party organizations interact with communists in social organizations: people's volunteer militia units, councils of war and labor veterans, comradely courts, women's councils, building committees, etc.

Recently six labor collectives' primary party organizations decided that communists should be listed on the rolls at their places of residence. They included the party organization of the rayon public education administration's kindergartens and the pharmacy association. The party raykom lent its support to this effort. People who are well acquainted with the populace are doing more there. In all likelihood precinct militiamen will also be placed on party rolls at their places of residence.

Party influence at the places where people live also had an effect on the outcome of the election campaign for deputies' seats.

Six communists nominated by councils of war and labor veterans were elected people's deputies from the rayon, as were five nominated by women's councils. One secretary of the territorial party organization was elected deputy.

Party organizations supported candidates for deputy from among non-communists as well, that is those of them who had proven that they were sincerely interested in improving the situation and that they would work for people. Now there is no friction between the party raykom and the rayon soviet.

[Polkova] We were fairly active in the last elections. And we are enjoying the fruits of that now. Our sovkhoz falls within the territory of two village soviets. People often used to come to our party committee asking us to influence village soviet officials and deputies. Some of them, feeling "powerful," were condescending and acted like dyed-in-the-wool bureaucrats. I think that we should start preparing for the next elections now. We should be taking a look at people, trying them out on various assignments and "showing" them to the people, so that the voters will know their future candidates for deputy by their deeds, not just by their high-sounding words.
You have touched upon very serious questions regarding party organizations’ political work with the public during the election campaign and their interaction with communist people’s deputies in their electoral districts.

I recall how insistently the party organization of the First State Ball Bearing Plant defended their candidates for rayon soviet deputy. The result was this: in that microrayon the group of deputies is composed primarily of people who work at that plant. Even today, when they want to solve various problems put before them by the voters they meet for consultation at the plant’s party committee. There one finds an enthusiastic response to deputies’ requests. The party committee quickly and efficiently determines together with the plant administration in what way it can help, whether with building materials, equipment, workers, etc.

Of course, not everything is on that level of cooperation yet. The interaction of organizations with microrayon soviets and with the emerging self-government committees is somewhat better.

I would like to get back to the issue of territorial councils of party organization secretaries.

In the city of Reutovo such a council was established just recently. We exchange information on intraparty affairs and coordinate our actions. At one session we agreed to set up a communist deputies’ faction in the city soviet; we discuss what should be done to preserve public order in the city. One year ago our party committee took the initiative of establishing a more effective unit in place of the people’s volunteer militia, in which people had not been serving with any great enthusiasm, especially after the practice of giving an extra three vacation days as an incentive to join was halted. Using party dues we allocated funds to provide an incentive for off-duty militiamen and security guards and other specially trained individuals to serve in it. In number the new unit is only one-tenth the size of the people’s volunteer militia, but its effectiveness is greater. We talked about our experience at a council meeting. Many people were interested by this. We may decide to set up a unit of this type at the citywide level.

Respect in the city for the council increased after the city soviet’s ispolkom declared that it was inappropriate to hold a parade in celebration of 7 November. The communists (and others besides them) did not accept that idea. The matter was discussed by the secretaries’ council and the decision was made to hold a rally in the city. A request for a permit was made to the city soviet, and it could not refuse.

The Raykom: Superfluous?

The process of democratization of party relations has resulted in increased interest in the role of party raykoms and gorkoms and in the style of their work, the interaction between members of the elective organ and the apparatus, and between the party committee and primary party organizations. However, extreme views have been expressed, not to mention the aspirations of certain social and political groups of anti-communist orientation to get rid of party gorkoms and raykoms altogether.

Thus, attempts have been made to pit party raykoms against primary party organization secretaries’ councils and party clubs. Is there in your opinion a kernel of sense in notions of this sort? What that is new has been introduced into the operations of party raykoms and gorkoms? What of this should be reinforced and developed, and what should be rejected?

V. Barkov, Novomoskovskiy Bolshevik State Animal Husbandry Plant, Tula Oblast

In our area a council of village party organization secretaries has been in existence for years. And it has never occurred to anyone to pit it against the gorkom. We work under the gorkom’s direction, in close contact with it. In my opinion it would be foolish to get rid of party committees at the rayon and city level. The apparatus is also essential to party committees. No party can survive without professionals, if only a party aktiv.

The question, of course, is not whether or not there will be party raykoms or gorkoms, but rather what they will be like. I must say that we are only beginning to reinvent ourselves through perestroika.

From my own experience I know how difficult it can be to overcome the desire to go on functioning in the old directive style.

But we cannot go back to that. That would only alienate the aktiv. Who are they, the members of our raykom’s apparatus? They are people who have specialized higher education, who have a lot of experience behind them, who have gone through the schooling of economic and party work in primary party organizations and entered the apparatus at those organizations’ recommendation.

The new thing about the functioning of the apparatus is that virtually all members of the apparatus are also members of party raykom permanent commissions, of which we have seven.

The nature of the commissions’ work is also changing. Whereas previously more time was spent listening to various reports, now the emphasis is on analytical and forecasting work, preparation of matters for the bureau or a plenum, and drafting of recommendations for primary party organizations. The commissions organize sociological research at the rayon level and studies on the situation within a specific collective. Ongoing monitoring of the way decisions are implemented is mainly a function of officials in the apparatus. It is they who continue to oversee the various aspects of primary party organizations’ activities.
Now that it is free of its distributive functions the party raykom is getting more and more involved in the day-to-day affairs of primary party organizations. Our observations are these: whereas previously the level of their work depended on careful implementation of our instructions, now it depends on the initiative and independence of the secretaries, party bureaus and party committees. It is a question of their professional training, and therefore a matter for the party raykom. We are developing a system for this, setting up courses and conducting seminars.

[Obichkin] It is silly to talk about conflict between secretaries’ councils and the party raykoms, especially if you are talking about one replacing the other. They have different functions, tasks and powers. The party organization secretary represents only his own communists on the council. The party raykom member represents not only them. Through conference delegates he is empowered to make decisions on behalf of all the communists in a rayon or city. Mechanistic substitution of one party structure for another is just as pointless as trying to make one elephant out of a thousand mice.

[Lutsenko] We in Kaluga can well imagine what it means to be without a raykom. In connection with cutbacks in the party budget those who favored elimination of party raykoms prevailed in our city. Only the party gorkom was left. Things did not improve for primary party organization secretaries as a result. Especially in small organizations. Independence is of course a good thing. But we still need the help and support of a party committee, especially at a time when new parties are emerging. Yet there is less help available. The party aktiv has gotten smaller. Whereas previously commissions were active in every party raykom, now they only exist under the gorkom. The gorkom is attempting to compensate for the smaller number of professional officials and elective aktiv by developing horizontal structures, but thus far the damage seems irreparable to me.

V. Kontsevov, deputy department chief and party bureau secretary at New Information Technologies (NOVITEK) joint venture

In my opinion party committees are looking at life through a mirror. They do not have enough direct contact with communists on the job or at their places of residence. I have worked in the apparatus of a party committee for seven years. I came to the conclusion that party work should mainly be carried on in collectives, in the thick of real life. And so I asked for reassignment to an enterprise. The second conclusion at which I arrived was that party raykoms and gorkoms will be whatever we, primary party organization secretaries, want them to be. Passivity on this matter will boomerang on us.

As for work by raykom commissions, and I am a member of one such commission, it is clear that in addition to its permanent commissions a raykom should also have “problem-oriented” commissions. Those who are capable of solving a given problem should be recruited to deal with it. Once the problem is solved the commission is dissolved.

[Mikhaylov] That is a very good idea. Party committees at the rayon and city level should not be bound by strict diagrams in their work.

They should be more flexible and able to react more quickly to problems and discern trends. For example, we can see that party admissions are often allowed to drift along without any attention, that withdrawal from the party has been overly simplified, and that communists do not show any enthusiasm about working with a comrade who has made the decision to quit. The number of party groups is decreasing. From its “vantage point” a party organization often sees nothing alarming about this. Yet when the gorkom shows it the overall picture people have to stop and think.

One of the ideas which we are working on now is this. Under privatization and destatization of property labor relationships within collectives will change as well.

What will be communists’ role under these new conditions? This problem must be studied now so that party organizations will not be caught unprepared later on. We are going to look at what new things cooperatives and lease collectives have already done in this regard. Recommendations will be prepared.

[Polkova] What the party raykom and gorkom will be like, how they will function, depends on primary party organizations. Especially now, in view of statements contained in the CPSU Charter. But we are not making good use of our rights. I am judging by my own organization. We are not demanding an accounting of those whom we recommended as gorkom members or members of its apparatus. Nor are we working through them to influence the work of that executive organ.

[Yegorkin] I think that party committees at the rayon and city level have now more clearly defined one other function: social protection for primary party organization secretaries. One could say that now they are under the protection of the law. However, let us consider this soberly. As a rule full-time secretaries are former economic officials and specialists. Their old jobs have been filled, obviously. And if there is a conflict with the leadership it will not be easy to find a job in their specialized field even if the law so requires. We should also take into account the fact that party officials have a certain job handicap. Opportunities to transfer to the party apparatus are also limited. Gorkoms and raykoms could sponsor a managers’ school, for example, or various cadre training and retraining courses to help people train for jobs which will soon be in demand on the labor market.

L. Loginova, candidate of historical sciences and CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences docent
The problem of interaction between party committees and primary party organizations and of vertical and horizontal party structures is a problem of unity of connections, of organizational, ideological, political and also moral criteria.

Excessive centralization of the party has led to deformations and distortions. The dictates of higher-ups have predominated. Democratization in society and in the party has destroyed this dictatorship; it has lost its former power. Yet one cannot help but notice that party discipline has also declined. And that the influence of higher-level structures on lower-level ones is not what it used to be. We face the task of establishing their relations on a new basis and thereby strengthening the might of the party ranks.

The party has no right to lose the political and ideological initiative. The rayon and city level has a significant part to play in this. Intraparty relations at that level have the advantage of being a direct influence on individual communists, on their views, positions and behavior, and through them on those around them.

We should all be well aware that the party's authority and exercise of its vanguard role is a derivative of its successes and failures at this key level of the party.

The participants in this roundtable have concluded that primary party organizations are beginning to perceive themselves as independent subjects of political, ideological and organizational work and with regard to the protection of working people's interests. This process is going slowly and is accompanied by contradictions, and sometimes by clashes.

The new is emerging with difficulty from beneath the rubble of old stereotypes. Under these conditions the role of rayon and city party committees as nerve centers capable of swift and effective analysis of the sociopolitical situation in a given region, projection of the direction in which events will unfold, drafting of recommendations and coordination of primary party organizations' activities is becoming more and more significant. Complaints were made about the center: communists expect from it more practical work at the local level.

In the course of this discussion it was emphasized that the party will be stronger in proportion to the strength of influence by rayon and city party organizations within their own territory.


Adoption of New Party Program Urged to Halt Splinter Groups
91UN1961A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jun 91 Second Edition p 4

[Article by CPSU Central Committee Member A. Prigarin: “A Division or a 'Splintering'?”]
and there is no power that can resurrect it. But today there is another alternative: either our country follows the countries of Eastern Europe on the path of “building capitalism,” or it enters a qualitatively new stage of development of socialism. That is where the watershed is. And although today some “ideologues” are trying to convince us that in the contemporary world the principal differences between capitalism and socialism are disappearing—others are saying that in any case, all “isms” are fantasies, and only “common sense” is important; and still others, that a mixed economy with a strong private sector is “true” socialism—it is hard to arouse the people. Most people understand that the original values of socialism—the right to work (and not compensation for unemployment), the right of access to work (and not through capital investment), the right of every person (by virtue of the fact that he was born in the Soviet Union and is the co-owner of the means of production) to free education, health care and care in his old age—are all based on social property.

Of course, as always happens everywhere at the sharp turning points of history, a process of demarcation is going on in the party. In early 1990, the “Travkin Group” emerged from the CPSU—people who according to “world political standards” should be ranked with right-wing conservatives. In the summer, during the period of the 28th Congress, there were the “liberals,” Sobchak, Popov and Yeltsin. In the fall, there were the right-wing social democrats—former supporters of the “Democratic platform in the CPSU.” In early 1991, Shatalin’s time came. And now, by all accounts, it is the turn of the people whom one might arbitrarily call left-wing social democrats. Arbitrarily, because this is a rather mixed group, ideologically, as evidenced by the declaration of the founders of the right-wing liberal-conservative party of Kasparov and Murashev, that a part of the communists who have not yet left the CPSU are joining this future party. Therefore, the report of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (No 64, 1 June) about the meeting of members of the Coordinating Council of “Democratic Rossiya” with Aleksandr Yakovlev, is rather alarming. In the words of Murashev himself, they “have reached agreement on mutual support and coordination of efforts.” But no matter which prestigious figures of the CPSU subsequently cross over to the platform of “social democratic traditions,” they will not attract the rank and file communists. And so, evidently, one should be talking not about a division, but rather about another splintering-off of people from the CPSU, people who have shifted their ideals.

**A Hot Spot**

And there is more. Lipitskiy writes, not without ostentatious bitterness: “While reading Lenin’s works today, one automatically asks oneself, just who was Enemy No 1 for the Bolsheviks? The bourgeois or their former comrades-in-arms in the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party]?” But you see, October 1917 gave an unequivocal reply to that precisely-phrased question. I would like to pose it to Lipitskiy himself: And who is Enemy No 1 today for you, a leader of the “Democratic Movement of Communists”? I am not asking about former members of the CPSU—Shostakovich, Travkin, Shatalin and others—with them all is clear; but your speeches and articles, just like the speeches of Rutskoy, which called “socialism” and “communism” bloody words—are they not actually directed unequivocally against their current, not even former, comrades-in-arms in the CPSU? And most important—if you do not acknowledge that in recent years a new stratum of ultra-wealthy people, not yet very thick but very noticeable, is taking shape right before our eyes, and with complete legality? Do you consider the property differentiation, unprecedented for our country, to be the norm, when the enrichment of some people proceeds in parallel with the impoverishment of the millions?

These questions are of a rhetorical nature, of course, for the actual deeds of the “communist-democrats” have already answered them. The first of their actions was the creation of a voting bloc with such “defenders of the workers” as Yu. Afanasiev, G. Yakunin, O. Rumiantsev, N. Travkin, V. Shostakovich, V. Akyschits and so on; that is, with the leaders of practically every anti-communist party, who are openly calling for changing our social structure. Action number two is—holding the First Assembly of Business Circles (Entrepreneurs) of Russia. Moreover, ten days prior to this event, the Congress of Russian Business Circles was established, for which the Assembly is the authorized representative, to protect the interests of Russian entrepreneurial structures in the organs of state power. All this would be rather far removed from our intra-party affairs, were it not for one circumstance: A. Rutskoy became—the deputy chairman of the board for the Congress of Russian Business Circles. This, however, did not prevent him, in an interview for MOSKOVSKY KOMSOMOLETS, from not only declaring himself a “true” communist, but also stating that he cannot remain in the same party with Polozkov and his Politburo.

Well, if he can’t, he can’t; what else can one do? But what next? It would seem befitting that after such words, a responsible politician would turn in his party card and either switch to another party (to Kasparov’s party, for example), or would form his own. I am confident, however, that this will not happen. And not only because the general membership of the Communist Party will not support the “splitters,” but chiefly because the discussion and adoption of a new CPSU Program lies ahead. And the supporters of “social-democratizing” the party will be doing everything possible to see that the CPSU is turned into another party—“not only in essence, but also in name,” as the authors of the “Plan for the CPSU Program” reported to the readers with such disarming candor in issue number four of IVVESTIYA TsK KPSS.

By all accounts, they themselves have already rejected this idea; but nevertheless the word has been spoken... There is no doubt that similar attempts will arouse resistance, and that means that the discussion of the
draft of the new Program might strain intra-party relations. But does it follow from this, that this will weaken the party and will not permit it to concentrate its efforts on the practical work of leading the country out of the crisis? I am convinced that, being a part of the general crisis taking place in the country (economic, political and ideological), the party crisis itself has become a powerful catalyst of the destructive processes now going on. And that is why overcoming the intra-party crisis has become a necessary condition for restoring the health of our entire society.

One cannot but agree with M.S. Gorbachev: “The new Program is the base on which the party will be ultimately defined. And he who cannot accept this Program, must decide what to do.” Taking this as the starting point, the entire party and all its primary organizations must take part in the discussion and drafting of the Program.

The recently-held Fourth All-Union Conference of the Marxist Platform in the CPSU has offered suggestions which, in brief, can be reduced to the following:

First of all, to hold a general party discussion in July-October 1991, during which two main questions are to be discussed: the situation in the party and measures for emerging from the crisis, and the new CPSU Program. At the same time, all currents and movements in the CPSU must be offered broad opportunities to expound and defend their positions, including alternative drafts of the party Program, and to organize their discussion in the primary organizations.

Secondly, to convene in November-December 1991 the 29th (Extraordinary) CPSU Congress, to sum up the results of the discussion and to adopt the new CPSU Program. We believe that the more critical the period the country is experiencing, the more acute the necessity for holding the highest CPSU forum annually. It is principally important that the election of delegates to the congress be conducted by platform, which will ultimately permit the will of the communists to become clear.

Thirdly, to hold re-registration of CPSU members in January-March 1992. This will allow every member of the party to define himself, and will rid the CPSU of both people who do not share its program goals, and also the passive portion. And those who remain in the party will be the same ones who used to bear their membership card with pride, namely the card of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

New CPSU Program Debated

NATIONAL PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Vladimirovich Bugzalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, and Andrey Ivanovich Kolganov, member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, who are ideologists and activists with the Marxist Platform in the CPSU. The article published below is their reply to GLASNOST’ s appeal for continuation of the debate on the new CPSU Program that was begun in the weekly’s Issue No 5 with the publication of S. Aleksyev’s article “On the Conception of Our Party’s Program.”

The model of the party, if it wants to be a modern, combat-ready political force, should be drastically changed. The drafting of the Program should provide such an opportunity—the opportunity for consolidation on a principled ideological basis. And that means that not one and, most likely, not even two parties would be consolidating. As many parties would be consolidating as proved to be different in terms of the ideological and political basis of their programs.

In the CPSU at present there is an extremely conservative wing, up to and including open Stalinists, and there are moderate conservatives—supporters “the renewal of socialism,” who are unhappy, however, with the pace, scope and content of the changes that are taking place. They are the basis for an independent party that would not reject the name “communist.”

In the CPSU there are pragmatists who think only about political control, a stable economy and their personal incomes and careers. If it is convenient, they use communist slogans, and if it ceases to be convenient, they quietly and without fuss consign them to the archives. There are people who like to call themselves centrists and who do not want any consolidation at all on a principled ideological basis and have been quite effectively resisting it, not wanting to lose control over the vast “old” CPSU and thereby interfering with its renewal and successfully leading it toward political bankruptcy.

Finally, in the CPSU there are ideological reformists of various shades—from communist to social-democratic. At the present time they are brought together by a desire to realize the humanistic and democratic potential of the socialist idea. Later their paths could part.

Thus, a single Program for the entire present CPSU is simply unrealistic. Even if the CPSU formally remains a single party with a single Program, that would merely be the worst form of the party’s collapse—with growing passivity and an internal party struggle that was agonizing because of its futility.

For these reasons, we will not attempt to guess what program guidelines should look like for all of the ideological and political currents that actually exist in the CPSU. We can only share our thoughts about the Program for those Communists for whom the creative and critical spirit of Marxism is not alien, and who see the country’s future not in a 180 degree turn and not in a
fruitless “defense of principles,” but in a solicitous nurturing of the real tender shoots of socialism.

The Program should contain a characterization of the present era in historical development, of that critical stage in world civilization when, together with the movement toward postindustrial society, people are beginning to recognize the need for a radical change in all the criteria and guidelines of social and, especially, economic progress, and for its orientation toward the socialization of societal relations on the basis of the human being’s liberation from alienation (both bureaucratic and bourgeois) and the unleashing of the individual’s creative potential. It is also necessary, of course, to show our country’s place in this process.

Furthermore, there must be an analysis of the socioeconomic situation in our country. It must be shown what sort of socioeconomic model is disintegrating, what the course and results of that process are, and what sort of consequences it will have, depending on various possible influences on it. (In our view, what is happening is the disintegration of an authoritarian bureaucratic system in which elements of socialism, state capitalism, and pre-capitalist relations have been cemented by violence.) In that process one must identify the different, contradictory socioeconomic tendencies and show which interests of which classes and social groups are connected with which specific tendencies. The bulwark of the Marxist party can become that part of the “100-ruble” intelligentsia and proletariat that is oriented toward the development of social creativity, self-government, and so forth.

It is necessary to show the real socialist tendencies in the country’s socioeconomic development that are expressed in the socially conscious social creativity of the working people and in their desire to build a new system of social relations on the basis of self-organization and self-government.

Proceeding from this analysis, a picture must be provided of the principal sociopolitical forces and the political organizations that express their interests. An answer should also be given to the question of why the CPSU has not only not proved to be the political leader of those social forces that have actively involved themselves in the free creativity of new social relations built on the foundations of humanism, solidarity and democracy, but has sometimes found itself in conflict with those forces, and to understand the reasons for the persistence of vestiges of the former model of the CPSU as the party of barracks communism.

And finally, there must be a new model of a party that combines parliamentary methods of political struggle with broad nonparliamentary activities. In this connection, the repudiation of the CPSU’s political privileges should be combined with a repudiation of the attempt to have party cells in all of society’s units and economic and political structures, and to carry out its “vanguard” role through those cells. Party organizations should not be established according to the departmental principle, but should be committees of political activists who carry out their work in social movements that actually express and defend the working masses’ interests and general democratic tendencies.

**Split Platform ‘Beginning of End’**

91UN1538B Moscow GLASNOST in Russian 21 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by N. Vazetskiy, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and director of the ideological and political propaganda group in the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee’s Department of Humanitarian and Ideological Problems: “Not to Scatter, But to Gather Together”]

[Text] In the article “Toward Guidelines for Social Creativity” (GLASNOST, No 7, 1991), its authors Doctors of Economic Sciences A. Buzgalin and A. Kolganov formulated not simply a main premise but a kind of categorical imperative that should be followed in developing the new party Program.

Let me recall it: “A single Program for the entire present CPSU is simply unrealistic. Even if the CPSU formally remains a single party with a single Program, that would merely be the worst form of the party’s collapse—with growing passivity and an internal party struggle that was agonizing because of its futility.”

A gloomy prospect, there’s no denying.

In turning toward our party’s history, it is impossible not to recognize that it has always, even during the period of the most unrestrained rampage of Stalinism, had “wings,” that is, supporters of various views of what was happening and of the prospects for development. I stress—always. There have also been episodes in party history in which the difference in views has resulted in the formation of factions or, to use the terminology of Buzgalin and Kolganov, platforms.

I shall take the first Program of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party, because I consider it to be the best program, a kind of now-unattainable standard. I ask that it be noted that I am speaking precisely of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party, without any of the familiar suffixes—“m” for “Mensheviks,” or the more familiar “b” for Bolsheviks. The program document was adopted by the entire party, and not by individual factions of it. It was adopted at that same Second Congress about which many generations of Soviet people have known only one thing—that the party split at it.

The prehistory of the appearance of the first Program is itself characteristic. At first there was Lenin’s version, then Plekhanov’s. After bitter disputes on the ISKRA editorial staff, on which both patriarchs of social democracy served, it was decided to establish a program or, more accurately, reconciliation commission. It did not, incidentally, include a single future Bolshevik. It
included three future Mensheviks: Martov, Zasulich and Deych. The commission’s work was extremely difficult. Nonetheless, it made progress. Consequently, a joint document was produced that the ISKRA editorial staff presented to the Second Congress.

The success was evidently predetermined by the fact that the commission did not operate mechanically but made a considerable contribution to the development of fundamental positions and propositions. And the second guarantee of success was that people were fighting for principles. If personal ambitions were present—and in what major undertaking are they not?—they were not the motive force in the final preparation of the document. It was not personal arrogance but His Majesty the Cause that governed the interested persons.

There were disputes over the Program at the congress itself, where, in addition to the ISKRA staffers, there were also staff members of the magazine RABOCHYE DELO, who were supporters of the Russian Bernsteinists, Bundists, Polish Social Democrats and other factions. But congress participants, despite the extreme diversity of opinions, strove not to follow their own ambitious ideas, but to be spokesmen for the masses for whose sake each of the factions proclaimed its uniqueness.

Disputes in 1919 over the Second Program of what was by then the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) were no less intense. Suffice it to read Lenin’s report at the Eighth Congress to be convinced of that. But, as in the case of the First Program, the existence in the party of a left-communist tendency that was strong for that time, whose leaders, especially Bukharin, Pyatakov and Osinsky, criticized Lenin on issues of state capitalism, nationalities policy, economic development and other fundamental issues that were absolutely central to the platform, did not prevent an ultimate solution.

It turns out that the main thing in the development and adoption of program documents is not concern for the preservation or protection of the idea of the platform per se, but a desire to seek and an ability to find ways and forms of bringing together party forces. The art of party leadership lies not in separation but in overcoming contradictions. Lenin, as we know, thoroughly mastered that art. Let us recall his experience, in particular, at the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), which, as we know, took place in March 1921 and had immense importance for the fortunes of the party and the country as a whole thanks to its adoption of the new economic policy and a number of resolutions on party construction that, in my opinion, were of a programmatic nature.

Lenin did not object to the creation of platforms in the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Unlike the “democrat” Trotsky, it was he who insisted that the election of delegates to the congress be based on platforms. But in doing so Lenin was in no hurry to turn the fact of the emergence of platforms into an absolute, and even less did he have any intention of proclaiming it as an inherent structural element of internal party democracy.

His attitude toward debates was similar. Here is what Lenin said in his report to the congress: “...We have experienced an exceptional year (i.e., not ordinary, not normal—N.V.); we have allowed ourselves the luxury (my emphasis—N. V.) of discussions and debates within our party.” (“Desyatyi sjezd RKP (b): Stenograficheskii otchet” [Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Stenographic Record], Moscow, 1963, p 2). And then: “...Here, at this congress, we should make it our slogan, our chief goal and objective, which we should carry out no matter what, that we emerge from the discussions and debates stronger than when we began them” (Ibid.).

These aphoristically engraved texts, the very form of which attested to Lenin’s profoundly matured approach, recorded two fundamental elements of Lenin’s methodology for assessing the internal party platform situation. First of all, to identify disagreements that emerged in time. Secondly, to conduct a joint search for ways to surmount them on a principled basis, i.e., on the basis of the Party Statutes and Program.

Only after all possibilities for such a search proved to be exhausted, and the majority of the party had become convinced of the stubbornness of the other side, which insisted on its own mistaken platform, did Lenin not rule out the adoption of organizational measures vis-a-vis those who remained stubborn.

I am convinced that my historical excursion is not just history. It has direct bearing on the present day, as well. If the party is really developing and not just running in place, contradictions in it are inevitable. Because it is inevitable that assessments of the processes taking place differ in time, and approaches differ among the different social, nationality and, finally, occupational groups represented in the CPSU.

Contradictions in development and disagreements in the party are natural phenomena. And God forbid that we, recognizing this natural development, should start crying for help or, worse, proposing that everyone split up and go to separate "platform quarters." Then the beginning of the end of the CPSU would be no longer hypothetical but actual. One would like to believe that subjectively neither Buzgulin nor Kolganov, nor those who share their views desire that sort of outcome.

'Party With Many Programs Is No Party at All'
91UN1538C Moscow GLASNOST in Russian 18 Apr 91 pp 2-3

[Article by V. Shapko, doctor of historical sciences: "It Should Unite Us"]

[Text] It seems that work on the draft of the new CPSU Program is starting to speed up. In addition to the
conception published by the Program Commission, the initial text of the draft already exists, as M. S. Gorbachev recently reported, and the possibility is seemingly emerging of adopting the Program this year.

So in the near future we will have a draft Program to discuss, and not just the conception of it. Evidently it will then be more appropriate to express one's views on the essence of various specific program provisions. But now I would like to share my opinions regarding certain practical questions that may arise in the course of the further preparation of the draft new CPSU Program.

First of all, about the time schedule for carrying out this work. As we know, the 28th CPSU Congress resolved to complete it no later than the first quarter of 1991. However, if we aim to reduce the projected time, we will obviously have to hold an extraordinary party congress this year. And that means that to prepare and hold the congress it will be necessary to divert considerable party forces that are so needed today to address the urgent tasks associated with stabilizing the situation in the country and surmounting the crisis that grips it.

Should we undertake those costs in order to adopt a new party Program more quickly? Perhaps we should if one considers that such is the urgent demand of many Communists. It is in the prompt adoption of a new Program that they see the possibility of overcoming the ideological confusion that is presently shaking the party, weakening it politically and organizationally. It is impossible not to reckon with such attitudes. But I think that we must not reckon with them in the sense of rushing the preparation and adoption of the Program. The main thing that should move this work and determine its course and results is an understanding of the immense responsibility that it entails.

We must not allow the Fourth Party Program to suffer the lot of the third, which proved to be flawed and unfulfilled, partly because it was the product of voluntarism and hare-brained schemes. The time is past when the CPSU, possessing a monopoly in politics and ideology, could govern the country even with program documents like that. Now we have political pluralism, and a power struggle among parties is beginning. Victory in that struggle can be won only by a party that has a realistic program that is comprehensible to its members and the people as a whole, a Program that accords with their interests and wins the masses' trust and support. That is the sort of program with which the CPSU must come forward today if it wants to remain a ruling party that is capable of influencing societal development.

It is incredibly difficult to create such a document in our dynamic times, when the heads spins from the kaleidoscope of changes that are taking place in the world and country. That is why it is so important to act without haste, and to work through every program provision in a thorough fashion. The theoretical bases incorporated in party documents, especially the Program Statement of the 28th CPSU Congress, should be fully and, of course, creatively utilized.

If we take, for example, such an essential component of the Program as analysis of the present era and present-day world development, the concept of the new political thinking will provide true guidelines for it. However, that concept itself requires further deepening with a view to the radical changes in the international situation that have been brought about by events in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and other regions of the world. And that should be done in the new CPSU Program.

The same can be said regarding the concept of a humane, democratic socialism, a concept on which key program provisions will doubtless be based. It too needs to be deepened and enriched with new ideas and conclusions based on the experience with reforms carried out in the course of perestroika. Unquestionably, that creative work should also be done in preparing the new CPSU Program.

It is important in this connection to look at the present situation in society and the whole set of the CPSU's specific program requirements through the prism of the provisions of the Union Treaty and the new USSR Constitution. Their approval and entry into force are now a matter of the not-so-distant future. I think that the work on the draft party Program should in one way or another be synchronized with the appearance of those fundamental acts of state and law. After all, they are what will reflect and codify the main parameters of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical environment in which Communists will have to act and with regard for whose conditions they will have to define their programmatic goals and objectives.

Thus, preparation of the CPSU Program will require extremely intense work that will take longer than one might think. The party's best intellectual forces and, in general, all Communists who desire to participate in it and are capable of doing so should be enlisted in this extremely important job.

Today, in a situation of democratization, numerous shades of opinion and disagreements have emerged on a whole series of questions of party theory, policy and practical activities. The existence on this basis of internal party tendencies and platforms is now a commonly known fact, and it cannot help being reflected in the course of the drafting of the new CPSU Program. Various alternative draft Programs will be put forward on behalf of these tendencies and platforms, and possibly on an individual basis, as well. They should be recognized by the Program Commission and submitted for party-wide discussion along with its own draft. That will be truly collective creative work. And it should end not in disorder but with the approval at a congress of a single program that is the same for all, incorporates everything progressive and of general significance that the collective thought of party members provides, and strengthens the
foundations and principles of the party’s ideology, which embody the convictions of the majority of Communists.

There is, however, a different view on this issue. In Issue No 7 of GLASNOST A. Buzgalin and A. Kolganov came out, for all intents and purposes, for the adoption of all the programs that are presented by the different platforms existing within the CPSU. They believe that a single program for our whole party is unrealistic.

I cannot agree with that view. It’s lack of validity is confirmed not only by the historical experience about which N. Vasteskiy writes (see his article in No 12 of GLASNOST), but by the logic itself of political life. Can one find a party anywhere that has several different programs? Then what will it fight for, and what goals will it pursue? A party with a multiplicity of programs is no longer a party. It is a flexible conglomerate of factions that is ultimately doomed to complete organizational collapse and political death.

I am certain that all party members who are sincerely interested in its recovery of health do not want that sort of outcome. And if, after the broadest debate and as a result of competition among the most diverse ideas, a single Program is drawn up that proclaims the foundations of a renewed ideology for Communists and their common goals and demands, that will help us realize our hopes for the strengthening of the party, the consolidation of its forces, and the rebirth of its political active ness.

‘Communists for Democracy’ Movement’s Goals Viewed

91UN1654A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Apr 91 p 3

[Statement by the Organizational Committee of the ‘Communists for Democracy’ Movement: “On the Situation in the Party”]

[Text] The regular CPSU Central Committee Plenum opened on 24 April. This is not the first week during which forecasts on its possible results and consequences are being made by political experts, social scientists and journalists. Not one among us can remain indifferent as to the direction which will be followed and the ideas which the CPSU will submit to society. However, there are all indications that the CPSU as well will have to take into consideration trends, the manifestations of which were neither anticipated or planned for at Staraya Square. One of them is the “Communists for Democracy” Movement. What is its purpose?

The country is in the throes of a most acute political crisis. All the efforts of the current leadership to surmount it are proving to be futile. What is the reason for this situation?

The roots of the present situation may be sought in the unrealistic course charted by the ruling party and state bureaucracy which, in the name of the people, for decades exercised the power in the country, consciously or subconsciously taking society to the precipice. The proclamation of perestroika in 1985 was a kind of reaction on the part of common sense against the catastrophic policy followed by the interchanging groups of the party oligarchy. The resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference (June-July 1988) directly indicated that the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation had triggered profound deformations within society, “holding back its development for entire decades, resulting in tremendous human sacrifices and incalculable moral and ideological losses.”

Under those circumstances, the conference called for a “definitive rejection of command-order methods in the work of the party organization’s strictest possible observance of the democratic principles and stipulations of the USSR Constitution and other laws.” At the same time, the resolution passed by the conference identified the main force which was opposing changes in the country: the bureaucratic managerial stratum, which was alienated from the people. “Bureaucratism has spread to a dangerous extent and become an obstacle to social development.... The radical economic reform, a reform of the political system, and the processes of democratization in the party and society, glasnost, the development of criticism and self-criticism, and the actual involvement of the people in the administration of society are thoroughly undermining the positions of bureaucratism. However, the entire struggle lies ahead (emphasized by us).

Subsequent developments clearly confirmed this warning. The bankrupted autocracy made desperate attempts to preserve the foundations of its rule by launching an active electoral campaign initially for the supreme power authorities and, subsequently, for delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. The campaign was quite successful.

The consequence of this was the appearance, both within the party itself as well as in the power organs, of two opposing groups: the forces of the past and present party-bureaucratic rule and the broad popular and democratic forces, which favored the rescuing of the country, the society and the state. A sharp struggle between these forces broke out also in the course of preparations for and during the 28th CPSU Congress. Despite the halfway and inconsistent nature of its resolutions, nonetheless the congress was able to strengthen the line of social rebirth. The resolution passed by the congress on the political report of the CPSU Central Committee, characterized the society established in the USSR as a “totalitarian Stalinist system,” in which there had occurred an “alienation of the working people from ownership and the results of their labor,” setting the task of “restoring democracy” and reorganizing the CPSU itself “from a government party to a political leader.”

The congress’ programmatic declaration entitled “For a Humane and Democratic Socialism” stipulated: “The
statification of all aspects of social life and the dictatorship applied by the party-state rulers on behalf of the proletariat triggered new forms of alienation of man from ownership and power and led to arbitrariness and lawlessness.”

The congress’ resolutions were oriented toward breaking down the role of the bureaucratic oligarchy. They put in the center of political activities the priority of universal human values. They were aimed at a realistic transition to a market economy, the establishment of a truly competitive multiparty political system, and the creation of a humane and democratic socialism.

The codification of these values in the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress was the victory of the soberly thinking and politically responsible wing within the party. At the same time, the programmatic declaration noted with concern that “the conservative-dogmatist trend, whose representatives consider the policy of renovation a violation of the principles of socialism and preach a return to authoritarianism, became activated. Objectively, they are supported by that part of the bureaucratic structures which is unable to reorganize itself, considering the democratization of society a threat to its influence and social status, for which reason it is doing everything possible to halt the process of change.”

The programmatic statement of the congress, naturally, bears the marks of a compromise among the different ideological trends which existed at that time within the party and, to a certain extent, reflects a number of concepts included in the "democratic platform.” The withdrawal of the representatives of this trend from the party determined, to a certain extent, the present predominance of openly conservative “neo-Stalinist” forces, the result of whose activities became a turn to the right not only within the RSFSR Communist Party but in the CPSU itself.

It was at that congress and, even earlier, at the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party that conservative segments of the party bureaucracy launched a concentrated attack on the policy of progressive changes in the country and on M. Gorbachev personally. Subsequent events indicated that these forces were able to push back the reformist wing within the CPSU and to secure for themselves command positions in the new leadership of the Union and the Russian communist parties. The result of this development of events was a drastic obstruction of reforms in the country, a revision of the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress, and support by individual republic detachments of the CPSU of the activities of illegal and anticonstitutional groups.

We consider the reason for this situation to be the indecisive nature of the measures taken for its political reforming and the filling of some of the party's leadership positions (in the RSFSR Communist Party in particular) with open conservatives, including individuals who had been elected by the party members themselves in the course of the elections for delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and, subsequently “promoted” to the high leadership of the Russian Communist Party, which had become a hindrance in the development of democratic processes in the country.

The present leadership of the RSFSR Communist Party, relying on an incompetent nomenclatural bureaucracy, which fears the loss of its privileges, is trying to dominate the political leadership of the CPSU which has become confused and has lost its ability to engage in political activities. It has been largely successful in this attempt.

At the constituent congress of the RSFSR Communist Party itself and the subsequent plenums of its Central Committee and, subsequently, at the January (1991) joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission, a revision of the resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress was persistently and systematically promoted; their democratic concepts are not only not being developed but an ideological restoration of neo-Stalinism is being implemented and a course is being charted toward the restoration of the “totalitarian model” of socialism. The failure of the draft program of action of the RSFSR Communist Party at the second stage of the work of its constituent congress did not bring its leadership to its senses. A number of members of the RSFSR Central Committee Politburo—L. Antonovich, G. Zyuganov, A. Ilin, I. Polozkov, and A. Sokolov—are trying today ideologically to ensure a turn back to the “communist middle ages.”

Once again the “trench” spirit is being revived—the ideology and practices of the “class” struggle. At the January (1991) CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission Plenum the deployment of the social forces in the country was reassessed radically. The political declaration of the plenum codified this revision “programmatically;” “On the political arena forces, the objective of which is to change the social system in the USSR, have defined themselves and are trying to unite. Their intention is to remove from power the supporters of the socialist choice and to give forthcoming changes an antisocialist and antipeople's character.” In our view, we have here a deliberate substitution of concepts: a “totalitarian Stalinist model” (Soviet society as defined by the 28th CPSU Congress) is once again being presented as “socialism,” while the party bureaucracy, against which, precisely, the resolutions of the congress were aimed, as “supporters of the socialist choice.” The campaign in the “communist press” against the “democrats” discredits the honest party cadres, pits the party against the people, and is triggering a wave of anticommunism.

These concepts were adopted under the pressure of the conservative wing within the RSFSR Communist Party. In his address on 4 February 1991 at the Dinamo Plant, I. Polozkov questioned the possible priority of universal human values: in his words, we have “weakened the class vision of the party and suppressed the real contradictions among the individual social groups within society.” It would be sensible to ask here, which ones? On 6
March, at the joint plenum of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee and Central Control Commission, I. Polozkov answered: "Today the main contradiction runs between the working people and the bourgeoisie-bureaucratic group which is ready to engage in an open betrayal of the national interests. This is a true class contradiction. It is no longer a question of avoiding a class struggle but of preventing it from developing into its extreme form, into a civil war." This indicates a full revision of the stipulations of the 28th CPSU Congress on the social deployment of forces in the country and the dictatorship of the party-government leadership. The consequences of such a revision are the following:

—Introducing the mentality of civil war in the social consciousness;

—Deliberately pitting democratic and intellectual forces within society against the people's masses;

—Making a new attempt to convince society of the "salutary" role of the party bureaucracy;

—Reviving the terminology of the psychological warfare which was waged by the bureaucracy for decades on end against its own people; intensifying hatred for the democratic and truly people's forces.

According to I. Polozkov, "on the right flank are the reactionary circles who describe themselves as 'democrats' or as 'left-wing radicals'. It is those who wish to replace perestroika and turn it into a process of 'construction' of a system entirely alien to us; it is those who are breaking down our economy and culture and subjecting the people to moral terror and denigration and maiming its historical memory." Let us point out most definitely that here the fault is not only that of the total theoretical helplessness of the "leaders" of the Russian communists but also a deliberate attempt at turning one segment of society against another and depriving the people who are trying to stand up of their intellectual support. Such a political line can only raise a wave of anti-communism and direct the people's anger against the honest party members.

Despite their wish, the present leaders of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee are provoking anticommunist moods in the country. In his article in the journal KOMMUNIST (No. 2, 1991) I. Polozkov actually called for a restoration of the totalitarian command-administrative system and for making an attempt to rehabilitate the Stalinist system, which had brought to the people a sea of blood and suffering.

I. Antonovich, another RSFSR Communist Party ideologue, propagandizes in a more refined fashion and "theoretically" substantiates that same conservative line which revises the basic stipulations of the 28th CPSU Congress. What is the worth of his claim to the effect that the USSR has developed a "unique organization of the socioproduction process, still largely imperfect but, for the first time in world civilization, trying to implement the right of reward according to labor" (emphasized by us)!

This despite the mass poverty of our people, the living standard and labor conditions of which are below any comparison even to averagely developed countries, and a drastic increase of social contrasts which exceed today the social inequality existing in any developed "capitalist" state. Any honest party member can only be ashamed by such open demagogy.

Let us consider another view by that same author, to the effect that suggesting today a course of "restoration of the forms of bourgeois parliamentarism means an effort to consolidate through political means the turn from socialism to capitalism, which is suggested by the democratic forces and who the country's labor movement rejected a long time ago." It is embarrassing to remind Professor I. Antonovich that today "bourgeois parliamentarism" as practiced in the developed Western countries has provided modern societies with a developed social market economy, a social state, and effective programs in the areas of employment, well-being, social security, education, and culture. It is a paradoxical fact of history that it was the developed "capitalist" countries that turned out to be closer to real socialism than we did.

For practical purposes, such "theoretical" conclusions are aimed at preventing any improvements in the political system in the Soviet Union and protecting the power of the party bureaucracy, which also includes a combination of elective party and soviet positions. It is no accident that the leadership of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee opposed the introduction of a presidential system in Russia and engaged in a destructive political line against the Russian state authorities, desperately opposing the real (and not fictitious) multiparty system and blocking the implementation in the localities of the land reform and the application of the laws issued by the supreme authorities of the Russian Federation.

Conclusion: at the present stage the leadership of the Russian Communist Party is dominated by dogmatic conservative groups, closely linked to the entire class of party and nomenclature bureaucracy. The trend followed by their course is obvious: a revision of the programmatic resolutions of the 28th CPSU Congress, rejection of the electoral platform of the CPSU, establishment of a dictatorship by the bureaucracy, and blocking any progressive and democratic reforms in the country. With such a course, the leadership dooms the party to political death and makes honest communists hostages of political adventurists. In our view, under the conditions of the present most acute social crisis in the country, democratic party members must not abandon their active political efforts but, conversely, promote them most firmly. The organizational committee of the "Communists for Democracy" Movement suggests the following:

1. The party organizations to discuss the present situation in the country and the effectiveness of the political course pursued by the leadership of the RSFSR Communist Party;
2. Raise the question of accountability by the leaderships of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party on all levels to the party masses concerning their activities and, above all, their implementation of the resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference and the 28th Party Congress on the implementation of the CPSU electoral platform;

3. Promote in cities, rayons, oblasts and republics a broad social dialogue within a roundtable with the participation of all democratic forces and political and social movements, mass organizations and parties, with a view to easing the sociopolitical and international situation in the country and finding ways of resolving the crisis;

4. Actively to implement the basic resolutions of the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies ("On the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in the RSFSR and the Measures to Resolve the Crisis," and "On the Reassignment of the Rights Among the Supreme State Authorities of the RSFSR With a View to the Implementation of Anti-Crisis Measures and of the Resolutions of the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies");

5. Encourage broad mass actions in support of the supreme Russian authorities;

6. Dedicate all possible efforts to prevent the establishment of a new dictatorship in our country by organizing a broad movement for popular consensus;

7. Create within the soviets of people's deputies on all levels deputy groups of "Communists for Democracy," organize at places of residence and work groups, clubs and cells of the "Communists for Democracy" Movement, and thus secure the alliance between democratically thinking party members and all progressive people's forces;

8. Organize and conduct in the localities conferences of communists who support democratic and people's positions, having created the necessary prerequisites for the organization of a nationwide "Communists for Democracy" Movement.

Members of this movement could include both individual communists as well as party organizations. Its participants could also include any citizen of the USSR who is not member of the CPSU but who shares the objectives of the movement.

Please communicate support for the "Communists for Democracy" Movement as well as specific suggestions to the following address: 103274, Moscow, Krasnopresnenskaya Naberezhnaya, D. 2, Dom Sovetov RSFSR.


Fax: 205-48-06.

Account No. 1700453 of the OPERO, Moscow Vozrozhdeniye Stock Holding Bank, MFO 211015.

Methods for Reforming CPSU Debated

Rutskoy Aims for Democratization from Within

91UN1740A Moscow GOSPODIN NAROD in Russian No 5, 1991 p 10

[Interview with Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, Hero of the Soviet Union, people's deputy, by Yu. Bychkov: "We Have Learned from the Mistakes Made by the Democratic Platform in the CPSU"]

[Text] At the Third Extraordinary Congress of Russian People's Deputies Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, Hero of the Soviet Union, proclaimed the creation of a parliamentary group to be entitled "Communists for Democracy." What occurred was essentially a split in the monolithic bloc known as the "Russian Communists." One gets the feeling that a new democratic wave is coming into being within the CPSU.

[Bychkov] Aleksandr Vladimirovich, there have already been several attempts to democratize the Communist Party. And nobody has succeeded in doing this. A year and a half ago, for example, the Democratic Platform left the CPSU. Those communists who held democratic views had decided that it was better to create a new party than to re-animate the old one. But you, from what I've heard, don't intend to quit the CPSU. Is that correct?

[Rutskoy] Yes, we want to create a democratic movement within the CPSU. The Democratic Platform's mistake consists specifically in the fact that it split off, i.e., broke away, from our party. That signifies a retreat. What it should have done was to struggle for democracy within the CPSU. As sociological investigations and studies have shown, most rank-and-file communists hold democratic views. And we hope to find support and backing among them.

[Bychkov] But, in fact, haven't you really proclaimed the creation of an opposition within the Communist Party?

[Rutskoy] The Democratic movement is hardly an opposition. We have not set ourselves any goals or tasks which would contradict the party's program documents, as adopted at the 28th CPSU Congress. On the contrary, we advocate unconditional support for the course which was worked out at that congress. Unfortunately, a deviation from this course—a turning to the right—has become clearly marked in the ranks of the party officials and staff members. Rank-and-file communists do not approve of this "listing" to the right. But so far they have been unable to directly influence the viewpoint of the party leaders. To change the reciprocal relations between the rank-and-file communists and the party officials is one of our principal tasks. Secretaries at all levels should be elected rather than appointed. Only then will we put an end to the "partocracy," for which the struggle for power has long been a goal in and by itself.

[Bychkov] How many like-minded persons do you hope to attract or win over to your side?
Rutskoy: When I proclaimed the creation of this parliamentary group, it consisted of 179 persons. Basically, these were rank-and-file communists. Unfortunately, we were not supported by a single raion or okbom secretary. But on the following day, when personal signatures were required to join the group, only 98 persons remained in it. I talked with those who had changed their minds overnight. And I have the feeling that people are afraid to openly declare their own convictions. Moreover, important party officials had done some specific work with them.

Fear among rank-and-file communists is the main brake upon the emergence of our movement. But the expansion of democracy in the society will eliminate this fear within our souls. We don’t intend to confine ourselves merely to parliamentary work. We will appeal to all party organizations throughout the country to support our movement. Not only communists will be able to join it, but also non-party persons and people who have quit the CPSU.

Bychkov: You must understand very well that such actions contradict the Party Charter. Comrade Polozkov could simply expel you as “schismatics.” Aren’t you afraid of being expelled?

Rutskoy: I’m a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But I’ve never signed up for the Russian Communist Party. Therefore, I cannot be expelled from the Russian Communist Party. But if we are, nevertheless, expelled from the party for adhering to democracy, we ourselves in our own party groups will restore ourselves within the CPSU. But I don’t think that matters will get to that stage. The Communist Party is no longer the “Order of Sword-Bearers” that it used to be.

Bychkov: You don’t consider yourself to be a member of the Russian Communist Party, but, after all, you are a member of the Russian CP Central Committee. How do you explain that?

Rutskoy: I became a member of the Russian CP Central Committee because of a misunderstanding. At this party’s constituent congress I was approached by Polozkov, and he said that they were planning to include me in their Central Committee. I categorically refused this offer. But on the following day I opened up the newspaper SOVETS’KAYA ROSSIYA and saw my name included on the list of Central Committee members. At first I wanted to reject this membership, but then I decided to remain. As a member of the Central Committee, I can do a great deal to democratize the party. At least, significantly more than I could as a rank-and-file communist. Moreover, I’m convinced that it is impossible for the conservative forces to “farm out” such an important instrument of party administration as the Central Committee.

Bychkov: Do you think that you can change the mind of, or even “win over,” such a legitimate, “orthodox” person as Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, the leader of the Russian Communists?

Rutskoy: With regard to changing his mind or “winning him over,” I don’t know. But Ivan Kuzmich is also changing. He has become considerably more tolerant of other people’s opinions. The processes now taking place in the party show that the CPSU is gradually making the transition from a policy of bans, prohibition, interdiction, violence, and force to a policy of dialogue and public consensus.

Bychkov: But the entire history of the Communist Party attests to the fact that the CPSU cannot be a parliamentary type of party. At least, no attempts along those lines have been observed.

Rutskoy: Our country never had a President before. Recently we introduced such a post. And whereas the Communist Party in our country has never been a parliamentary type of party, that doesn’t mean that it cannot become such a party. And we, the “Communists for Democracy,” will struggle to achieve this goal.

Shostakovskiy: Reform, Renewal Not Possible

91UN1740B Moscow GOSPODIN NAROD in Russian No 5, 1991 p 10

[Text] The proclamation by Deputy Rutskoy concerning the creation of a faction to be called “Communists for Democracy”—a proclamation made at the Third Congress of Russian People’s Deputies—was evaluated in the democratic press as a significant event, as something virtually making a radical change in the course of the Congress, something specifying or determining extremely serious changes in the Communist Party. While assessing Rutskoy’s step positively, I would like to utilize this situation as an example in drawing attention to the following three things: the genuine, present-day status of the Communist Party, the action taken by this communist deputy, as something completely determined by this status, and the further social-democratization of the CPSU.

The fact that the foundation of the CPSU—its primary structures—died off after the 28th CPSU Congress was evident even for its functionaries, nor was it concealed by the party press. The fact that this “dying off” did not bear within itself any sort of hope for revival, inasmuch as the primary party structures had proved to be simply dead by that time, was obvious for any normal person who desired to look at the matter calmly and soberly. Everything had turned out to be dead—the organization, structure, goals, means, and ideology. In that sense, disputes about how many persons are still members of the CPSU—16 million or 15 million—have no meaning. The CPSU is now perceived, whether by its members or by non-party persons, as a party based on an “anti-people” doctrine.
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Let me single out, first of all, the moral aspect of the action taken by Deputy Rutskoy. This was an attempt to express a protest against the deeds committed by the apparatchik-type communists, those who have compelled the member-deputies of this party to act against the interests of their own people. And this was, perhaps, one of the last attempts to prove or demonstrate that it is possible to act otherwise, while still remaining within this party. It was an attempt to create a democratic opposition within the CPSU; moreover, it was done exclusively on the deputies' level. It was an attempt to turn the CPSU into a parliamentary type of party. It proposed to learn from the mistakes made by the Democratic Platform, the principal one of these mistakes being—in Rutskoy's opinion—quitting the CPSU.

But the fact of the matter is that these or other actions by the Democratic Platform were dictated not by emotions or short-term, ad hoc considerations, but specifically by an analysis of the party's status or condition—whether the leaders or the primary structures. We used the pre-congress discuss to conduct a broad-based propaganda for our own views, and we achieved the tasks which we had set out to attain—according to even the most modest sociological data, more than 40 percent of the communists were actively supporting the stance taken by the Democratic Platform. In quitting the CPSU after the congress, the Democratic Platform certainly did not figure on the immediate and mass exodus of CPSU members following after them. These members understand that the process of this party's dying and decay is an objective one and will continue, regardless of anyone's plans or theories. Attempts to somehow reform, humanize, and democratize this political structure, and thereby breathe life into it—no matter for what purpose they may be undertaken—will also proceed within the framework of the process of decay and disintegration. And it's precisely in this way that I understand the genuine consequences of the action taken by this communist deputy.

What does it mean—this decision to create a deputy-type opposition to the Russian Communist Party leadership at all levels and no matter what may be its consequences? Its initiators assert that they are not a faction within the Russian Communist Party; they simply want to make it possible for the honest communists to act or function in the name of the people's interests. Splendid! It will be obvious very soon that the former and the latter are two incommensurate things. That is, it is impossible to remain within the Russian Communist Party and act or operate for the benefit of one's own people.

And the initial assessments after the congress by the Russian Communist Party leaders attest to the following: No such Russian communists will be permitted or allowed. The plenums of the local party committees have begun the process of working out the traditional unanimity and standardization in the conduct of the "corps" of communist deputies. Further events will develop and unfold within the framework of communist democratic centralism, with a "quiet purge" of the advocates of the

"Communists for Democracy," who have dared to espouse views other than those of the Russian Communist Party and CPSU upper echelons. Rutskoy's initiative only confirms spontaneously what the Democratic Platform demonstrated with full awareness.

Now about the slogan: Let's turn the CPSU into a parliamentary type of party. What would the CPSU as a parliamentary type of party be like, and what part of it could lay claim to this title at the present time? In Russia it would be that dogmatic, veteran group of communists which follows the Leningrad initiators and the Unity group of Nina Andreyeva, which does not wish to change a single letter in the works of Lenin, Marx, or Stalin, a wish which they have once more reaffirmed at their own regular congress. In any, even slightly honest, multi-party election this party—which does not enjoy support by the people, but which is, however, a truly communist party—would suffer defeat (although there is little likelihood that this particular party would risk taking part in such an election because its path to power would lie through the putsch, seizure, coup, and use of force).

It is clear that Deputy Rutskoy, in speaking about a Communist Parliamentary Party, had in mind a majority in the CPSU, headed by that portion of the present-day leadership and apparat which is inclined toward the ideas of the social democracy. This is already closer to a reality. But, pardon me, why then have a Communist Party per se at all? It is, in point of fact, absurd to drag into a parliamentary struggle any sort of communist element or quality if it itself has recognized that it has already compromised the remnants of the people's trust. Objectively speaking, the actions of Rutskoy and his like-minded associates signify nudging the CPSU from below toward further social-democratization.

And as to the present-day, tactical tasks which the "Communists for Democracy" have set for themselves, they are very meaningful, well-conceived, and even evoke sympathy. It is necessary and noble to struggle against the bare-faced "orthodox" types in the Russian Communist Party and the CPSU, and in struggling against their conservative leadership, one does not bear the responsibility for their actions, for the communist Union-level government, and for the combined President-General Secretary. A multi-party system has been set up in this country and is functioning. And every member of this or that party bears full responsibility for the actions of the leadership elected in accordance with the charter of this party. All the more so is this true in that the present-day leaders, for the most part, are completely communist.

'Social Centrism' Viewed as Optimal Option for CPSU

91UN19864 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian
26 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by Professor I. Fel'firov, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Is There a Path to Agreement?"]
The editorial office is receiving a lot of letters from readers expressing their attitude toward the CPSU and other parties, and reflecting their concern about the communists' lack of a clear-cut program of action and their loss of initiative in the country's political life. "A multiparty system is a step toward the breakup of the CPSU, and the separation of the people," says G. Lobach from the village of Vasilyevka, Chutovsky Rayon, Poltava Oblast. "The democrats have heaped filth and serious accusations on the Communist Party. Is any kind of agreement possible after that?" asks F. Kornilov from Roslav in Smolensk Oblast. "Does social science have any theories or concepts which would strengthen our society, and lead the country out of the crisis?" frets K. Pukhalskiy of Mogilev Oblast.

The editors have asked a competent specialist to reply to these and other questions.

The contemporary political, economic and ideological struggle in our country has divided its participants into three basic groups: radicals, conservatives and centrists. In addition, there are two other groups which occupy the right- and left-center positions; they themselves do not represent independent forces as much as they adhere to an intermediate orientation.

Radicals, which make up the basic part of the so-called democrats, are essentially opposed to the socialist orientation, and pursue a policy of restoration of capitalism in the country. Evidence of this is the recently-published book, "What is to be done?" [Chto delat?] by G. Kh. Popov, one of their leaders, in which he asserts that the economy must be based upon private ownership and that de-nationalization, de-sovietization and de-federalization are necessary. One does not have to be especially far-sighted to see the author's desire to raze the existing system to the ground and to set up capitalism in its place.

Conservatives essentially wish to preserve the former totalitarian model of socialism, while merely making some small cosmetic changes in it. This is expressed most distinctly in the positions of the Leningrad society, "Unity—For Leninism and Communist Ideals," headed by N.A. Andreyeva, which openly proclaims a return to a Stalinist regime, and the necessity for restoring a party of the Stalinist type. This society is preparing to hold the so-called "20th Congress of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)]," which is to restore such a party.

The ideas and actions of the radicals and centrists are constructed according to the formula: forward—reverse! The former strives for the return of capitalism; the latter for the preservation of egalitarian socialism. But all this has already been, and our people have doubly experienced the "delights" of both one and the other. They are vitally interested in a concept of social development which would in the near future lead the country out of the state of crisis, and society to a better future.

Such a conception, in our view, is being developed and put into practice by the forces which stand on positions of social centrism.

In his speeches on his trip to Belorussia Gorbachev outlined certain of its aspects and indicated the necessity of its practical implementation. This conception is distinguished by its realism, its thoughtful consideration, its orientation toward improving the people's lives, the development of genuine democracy, and the elevation of the individual.

In the economic sphere, for example, it envisages a policy on reforming property relationships, removal from state control [razgosudarstvenienie], and formation of market relationships. In agriculture, it establishes private farming, while preserving economically-strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes.

In the socio-political area, the centrists conception envisages implementing such very important measures as ensuring the priority of social interests, as well as consideration for the interests of all classes and other social strata in society. For this reason, complete restoration of the rights of Soviets of People's Deputies—the most representative organs of state power—is being implemented; and the goal is being established to create the legal principle for their material support, to liberate this area from one-party monopoly and to fundamentally restructure all ideological work. At the center of its attention is the individual and his spiritual enrichment.

No matter which aspect of social development we take, each of them possesses permanent features or attributes of two social systems—the socialist and the capitalist. And in this respect it appears that social centrism expresses the best that is in them. From capitalism, for example, it takes the experience of effective management, the solution of social problems, and the democratization of the political structure of society.

Such is one facet of social centrism. The second consists of the fact that in essence it creates a unified and at the very same time bifurcated society, in which all opposing aspects will be able to develop freely. Each of them will strive to demonstrate its superiority for the people's judgement; and that means, they will also actively take part in competition with one another. This should ensure genuine progress in all spheres of society, and make it a truly flourishing and democratic society in the full meaning of the word.

Centrism, as we see, does not occupy an intermediate position between the social doctrines of radicals and centrists, but represents a peculiar model or program for building and developing democratic socialism.

The model for social centrism has not yet been completely developed, but certain of its features have found embodiment in the Program Declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress. "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism:" and in certain of the country's laws passed.
recently. One would think that it should find exhaustive expression in the new CPSU Program.

Social centrism provides an opportunity to support multi-faceted societal development and an optimal approach to the solution of current and future social problems; and to get rid of over-simplification and one-sidedness, by which we have sinned greatly in the past, and in the present as well. Here is an example: when the question is one of attitudes toward a market or state economy, the radicals believe that only a market can provide economic growth, and only the market will lead our economy out of the situation of crisis and stagnation. Conservatives, on the other hand, insist on the state-administrative forms and methods of regulating production, and they assume that only state control is capable of creating an effective economy. But after all, world experience convinces one of the necessity of creating the kind of economic control mechanism which combines both market and state methods of control. This is all the more necessary in conditions of a multimode economy, where only such a mechanism can ensure its effective development.

The second example: Today under the influence of the multimode idea the role of kolkhozes and sovkhozes is belittled and the significance of other, free forms of economy are absolutized. In practice, these extremes lead to distortions and to retarding the development of agricultural production.

Rejecting a unilateral approach of these and others, the majority of workers, including agricultural workers, stand on positions of centrism; they believe that it is necessary to more actively introduce private farming and at the same time create strong kolkhozes and sovkhozes. For the next few years private farmers will not be able to feed the populace; and that means, that for the time being we will not be able to get along without social forms of management. On the other hand, without private farmers in society, it will also be difficult to solve the food problem.

Social centrism will provide the opportunity to protect our society from destruction, and ensure a stable peace and civil harmony. This is especially important; for the country is on the threshold of civil war and economic chaos. Blood has been spilled in South Ossetia, in Nagornyy Karabakh, and in the Baltic States. The miners' strikes in 1990-1991 have done hundreds of millions of rubles worth of damage to the state: and in such a difficult time for the country!

Based on the concept of social centrism, one can resolve many of the contradictions which now divide our society. It is better than any other contemporary social doctrine; it helps combine the interests of opposing sides, establish compromise between them, organize constructive cooperation of various political forces for the purposes of realizing the programs of democratic socialism. Moreover, it requires finding points of contact, the “golden mean,” wherein truth is found in most instances.

Whereas the views and actions of contemporary radicals and conservatives lead to confrontation and to deepening the crisis in society, those of the adherents of social centrism lead to agreement, and preservation of the social system in a qualitatively revitalized form, and to overcoming the economic, political and ideological crisis in the country.

Society must say, “Yes,” to social centrism if it does not want to commit suicide. And this must take place immediately, since the majority of workers tend to support its positions, which is confirmed by sociological research conducted in the last two years in many union republics by the Academy of Social Sciences at the CPSU Central Committee. More than 10,000 different categories of workers were polled. The surveys showed that the basic part of the people stand for the creation of democratic socialism, which envisages both a privatized economy and the introduction of market relationships in the country, and other progressive innovations. For example, in 1990, 86 percent supported the proposition on introducing a planned-market economy and 84 percent supported leased forms of enterprise.

Practical experience confirms that social centrism has a firm social foundation. A significant portion of the Soviet people support it, for whom ideas of democratic socialism represent a permanent value. Out of the political organizations, its basic subject is and should be the CPSU. For it is namely the CPSU that can rally all centrist forces around itself, and everyone to whom the fate of the country is dear, who struggle for creativity. The party is obliged to do this, for it is the initiator of perestroyka.

The task is quite complex, if one considers that at the present time there are up to ten different currents and platforms in the party, which intensifies the centrifugal tendency. The poll showed that today 48 percent of the communists orient on the documents of the 28th CPSU Congress; 14 percent of those surveyed support the Marxist platform; 12 percent support the movement of communist reformers; and 3.0 percent support the movement “Unity—for Leninism and Communist Ideals.” Many communists believe it is natural for various trends and platforms to exist in the party, but they are convinced that along with this, it is necessary to actively strengthen unity and discipline.

One must say that during the years of the cult and the stagnation, the concern of the party for the workers was merely declamatory. And today it has been weakened to such an extent that every communist has feelings of serious alarm. Hence the negative attitude of certain workers toward the party. After all, if one speaks without equivocation, it is obvious that today many working
collectives are not rendering any support at all to party committees and organizations, even when they need it themselves.

A special concern of the CPSU at the contemporary stage is the party's decreasing influence in the Soviet state. Now, thanks to perestroika, the Soviet system is independently exercising its authority and no party organs are commanding them, as in the past. But many party committees and organizations are aloof from the formation and activities of the Soviets. Life demands the creation and effective use of new mechanisms for interaction between the CPSU and the Soviets. The chief of them is carrying out party policy by means of communist-deputies, and through party groups by means of methods of persuasion and education.

New approaches are also needed to questions of interaction with the political parties and movements in the country. Today there are nearly two dozen parties and socio-political movements, which have declared themselves-all union parties and organizations.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo, in its resolution, "On the Position of the CPSU in Relationships with Socio-Political Organizations and Movements," stresses the necessity for the CPSU to cooperate first of all with those that stand for the socialist option, and are fighting for the unity of society. As far as parties and organizations which take anti-communist positions are concerned, the CPSU and its organizations are summoned to energetically oppose them. Life demands that communists do not sit idly by, but actively influence the minds and mood of the people. The basic principles of CPSU interaction with other parties are—equality, cooperation, and partnership.

Thus, contemporary practical experience, no matter what the difficulties, demands the formation of, and is forming, the conception of social centrism. The most important thing in this process is the creation of a society of democratic socialism. It will provide the capability for emerging from the state of severe crisis in which our country has found itself, and will ensure its all-round development.

Decline of CPSU in Workers Movement Viewed
91UN1802A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Jun 91 Second Edition p 2

[Text] It is these words in the title that were heard frequently at a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Standing Sociopolitical Commission headed by V. Kuptsov, secretary of the Central Committee. A question of exceptional importance was being discussed: "The Situation in the Workers Movement and the Tasks of the Party Organizations."

The discussion was unusually keen and candid. The participants in the meeting—workers, party committee secretaries, leaders of various levels, social scientists—were attempting to find an answer to the main questions: What is the reason for the exodus of workers from the CPSU? Why is a party designed to uphold the vital interests of the working people losing its positions and authority in the worker milieu?

"It is difficult to pursue party policy in the workers movement.... The CPSU is adopting good documents, but they are inoperative. The party committees are confused and have been distanced from economic concerns. Government ordinances are hitting at the workers of state-owned enterprises, and they are in a disadvantageous position. The people do not read or take in official party information—they are just declarations...."

These are summary notes from the speech of I. Fomin, leader of a team of drivers of the Mosavtrottrans Association. Sharply and directly put and not entirely to the point, perhaps, but close to the truth. Each of the worker's points is food for thought. There is, indeed, something to think about here....

In April 1985 when, on the initiative of the party, more precisely its new leader, we adopted a policy of a renewal of all spheres of the life of society, few people suspected that in three or four years the country would find itself deep in crisis. This today has been announced by a mass of prophets, who allegedly foresaw the dramatic development of future events. But at that time, six years ago, they were avidly extolling perestroika, glasnost, pluralism, and democracy.

Then truly nationwide elections to the soviets of all levels and the abrogation of Article 6 of the Constitution occurred, and new parties and an unprecedented number of every conceivable press organ attracting the reader by its "independent" position began to appear, like mushrooms after the rain.

Society became politicized at a rapid pace, a war of laws and sovereignties shook the Union, interethnic conflicts erupted now in one, now in another region, intra-Union economic relations were disrupted, recession grew.... A sorry result—a protracted, profound crisis shook the country and public institutions, the party included.

All these socioeconomic and political cataclysms reduced the people to despair, to open mass discontent. Its peak was the summer of 1989: The Kuzbass miners' strikes lent powerful impetus to a revival of the workers movement, of which we had earlier spoken only in an international context.

The participants in the meeting were forced to confess with particular concern that the role and influence of the CPSU in the workers movement remain negligible and have in places been reduced to zero. Why, however, is the workers movement rejecting a party in whose ranks there are millions of workers? Various, at times contradictory, opinions were voiced on this score.
A. Melnikov, secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, attempted in his speech to answer this question. Aleksandr Grigoryevich sees as a principal cause of the decline in the party’s authority in the work force the position of the CPSU leadership, which failed in good time to express its attitude toward the miners’ original demands and failed to support them, thereby pushing the oblast party organization into wait-and-see tactics. The former first secretary of Kemerovo Obkom can from a purely human angle be understood. He found himself in this position in the Kuzbass, which was unfamiliar territory to him, just a few months prior to the July 1989 events. There was reason for losing one’s head, but Melnikov held together and did not sit out the days of the strike in his office.

But he could no longer influence the development of events. But all could have been different. And Aleksandr Grigoryevich knows this. I refer to that ill-starred decision of the obkom: to deem the title of communist incompatible with participation in the strikes. It was quickly reversed, it is true, but time was lost. At that time, in July 1989, he himself in conversation with PRAVDA correspondents acknowledged it to be a mistake, but did not breathe a word about the fact that the decision had been “imposed from above.” Let us assume that this was the case. But what prevented him refusing to submit to pressure or resisting it? It was not, after all, 1937 but 1989!

I wrote frequently about the strikes in the Kuzbass and the socioeconomic situation in this region. I venture to maintain that the party had a magnificent opportunity to revive its authority in the worker milieu had the communists headed the miners’ strike movement and supported at that time their undoubtedly just demands. It is now necessary to rectify the situation. And it is disturbing.

The unjustified expectations of rapid positive changes, the decline in the working people’s living standard, and the polarization of social groups by income and property situation are evoking in the workers a feeling of disenchantment. According to the data of sociological research conducted by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences, 40 percent of workers polled are unhappy with life and 40 percent see no prospect of anything better. These indicators have most likely deteriorated sharply with the start of the retail price reform.

Yes, the party is today experiencing a critical time. But under these conditions it considers it essential, as distinct from its opponents, to tell the truth, even if bitter for the communists: 66 percent of those polled declared that the activity of the CPSU does not correspond to the working people’s interests.

It has not been possible in the time of perestroika to preserve the gap between the declared leading role of the working class in the life of society and its actual alienation from ownership and power. Whereas in 1984 workers in the country’s Supreme Soviet constituted 35.1 percent, they constitute among the deputies elected in 1989 only 18.4 percent. In the Ukraine and Belorussia representation of the workers and peasants in the highest republic organs of power has declined almost fivefold, and in Russia, up to eightfold, constituting only 6.4 percent. The picture is approximately the same in the oblast soviets also. The inadequate representation in the organs of power has led, inter alia, to worker committees in a number of places duplicating unbidden and, here and there, also blocking the work of the legitimately elected soviets of people’s deputies.

The participants in the meeting concluded that the workers movement needed to be evaluated not only in terms of the development of events in the coal industry. It is far more multifaceted and encompasses other sectors also. “And the main reason for its emergence in the country,” bulldozer operator K. Nikolayev, member of the CPSU Central Committee, believes, “is that the party has ceased to defend the fundamental interests of the working class and to concern itself with the working man.” A peremptory statement, but not without foundation. Otherwise how do we explain the mass exodus of the workers from the CPSU and the sharp diminution in the number of those joining the party? And the most distressing thing in these statistics is the fact that they are extending to major industrial regions of the country—the party’s main social base. Thus whereas in 1990 the party organization of Novokuznetsk numbered 48,000 communists, this year it has declined to 26,000. Half of those remaining in the party are people over 50 years of age. At the celebrated West Siberian Foundry just half of the 4,000 communists remain. This trend persists, on the whole, throughout the Kuzbass.

In order to rectify the situation the party, losing no time, must unambiguously declare its aspiration to ensure the protection of the political and socioeconomic interests of the working class under the conditions of the transition to market relations. And not simply declare its intentions, but, and this is the main thing, buttress them with specific action, legal initiatives, and the daily work of the party organizations. Only in this case will the working class follow the CPSU.

Today it may confidently be claimed that the workers movement has become a determining factor capable of appreciably influencing the state of affairs in all spheres of the activity of our society. It is for this reason that many of the latter-day parties and organizations are so actively engaged in political work in the industrial outfits. Some see in the working class potential for a broadening of their social base, others, a temporary ally for realization of their program aims, and yet others are simply using the working class for the purpose of destabilizing the situation in the country and removing their adversaries from the political scene.

Practical recommendations for the party organizations for the establishment of constructive cooperation with the workers committees, unions, and other political
parties prepared for specific practical steps aimed at the extrication of the country from the crisis and defense of the working people's vitally important interests were discussed in the course of the meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Sociopolitical Commission. A proposal concerning examination of the question "The Situation in the Workers Movement and the Tasks of the Party Organizations" at the next CPSU Central Committee plenum was expressed.

Conservative Character of Neobolshevism Viewed
91UN1962A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 21 Jun 91 p 2

[Article by Yevgeniy Chernikov, political expert: "Who Is Walking on the Right There?: The Chronic Disease of 'Leftism' in Our Time"]

[Text] Surprising metamorphoses are occurring at the present time. One and the same definitions—"rightists," "leftists," "reactionaries," "the revolution"—are being pronounced by people of various moral convictions, and completely different meaning is being put into them. There has been particular confusion with the concepts of "leftist" and "rightist" as applied to the political process. No, not confusion, but deliberate demagoguery by one side. Let us consider this in detail using one typical example. Here are its initial premises.

In the USSR, as a result of the monstrous perversions of the development of civilization as a whole, there was created a totalitarian system that does not have anything in common even with the original Utopian plan. That system, under the name of "socialism," was imposed by force, basically by weapons, on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. What became the result was the appearance of the "worldwide socialist community." (We might recall in parentheses that, at a definite stage in perestroika in the USSR, the actions to destroy the totalitarian system were given the definition "revolution.") So, when, in 1989-1990 in the countries of that "community," as a result of the actions taken by the masses of the people, the uncompromising breakup of the totalitarian systems began (and that process is successfully continuing), the definition of the events that was accepted, and that was not subjected to doubt anywhere, was that they were revolutions—"velvet," "quiet" revolutions, etc. But, nevertheless, revolutions. And democratic ones. They decided fundamental questions: the changeover to genuine rule by the people through free elections on the basis of party platforms; the completely equal and free development of all forms of ownership; the elimination of the Communist Parties from power; and rejection of the totalitarian ideology as a state ideology.

All these things—if we recall once again the generally accepted terminology—are revolutions.

But in our country, in certain republics, including Russia, shy attempts are being undertaken to resolve at least some of these problems. In a few places there have been free elections (and the CPSU is proving to be in the minority). One can hear appeals to reject ideological monopoly and to depurate definite agencies of the state and administration. People are asking and discussing questions pertaining to the equal rights of all forms of ownership without any ideological exception, and questions pertaining to the changeover to market relations without any mythical regulation. People are developing drafts of Constitutions that guarantee the legal substantiation of all questions and the growth of civil society.

If one follows logic, these are actions that are preparing a revolution, but a peaceful one, in the interests of the nation.

But the CPSU apparatus, as always, is guided not by logic, but by considerations of its own clan interest. As a result, all the actions mentioned are characterized as the rejection of socialism (what kind?), attempts to restore capitalism and the bourgeois system, and, consequently, the counterrevolution of the rightist forces. It is paradoxical, but a fact. All the events in Eastern Europe are a revolution (the changeover to a progressive system), and, consequently, the entry of the leftist forces onto the scene (since rightist revolutions are not being carried out). The striving to take the initial positions in various actions in our country represents the attempts of a rightist overthrow and, as a whole, revolution. It is surprising, but not convincing.

Let us return to our reality. Gorbachev has repeatedly set the task of changing over from totalitarianism (where everything has "rotted through") to democracy. It is no longer necessary now to speak about the uniqueness of that path. With various degrees of painfulness that path has already been taken by the countries of "socialism." How, then, does one characterize that path? By using the customary terminology, is it "to the left" or "to the right"?

And what about the stereotype that has etched itself into our consciousness, the stereotype that the Communist Party is the only exposer of the interests of the working nation? Because it is precisely that "classic" postulate that serves as the basis for the axiom (as the attempt was made to prove to everyone) of the presence of the Communist ideology and the Communist Parties in the left spectrum of the political process. But the East European workers rejected, when they got the first opportunity to do so, to trust those Communist Parties.

And what about the multiparty election in Georgia? The victory of the people's fronts in the Baltic? Or wasn't this the workers expressing their opinion?

Here we come up against a complicated problem, both theoretically and psychologically. How, on the threshold of the 21st century, do we define various spectra of the political process, by using the terminology of the Bolshevism of the beginning of the 20th century, or by proceeding from the real-life situation in modern times?
Of course, during the initial period of its development, Marxist theory could lay claim to the radicalism of its slogans and principles, by proclaiming the liberation of the workers from exploitation and poverty. It proclaimed the genuine liberation, both economic and political, of the workers, but did not lead them to it in the practical situation when the opportunity to implement that liberation presented itself. We shall not repeat the reasons why the chief content of the totalitarian system that was created was the suppression of the man of labor.

At the present time the situation is both simpler and more complicated. In the developed countries a considerable majority of the population no longer views the Communist forces as civilized leftists. Civilized nations cannot perceive the doctrinal ideas—concerning the bipolar structure of society, the antagonism between two classes, and the sole method of resolving conflicts—of socialist revolution. The workers, by the free expression of their will, refused long ago to allow the Communist Parties the right to consider themselves the expressers of the workers’ interests, or the right to be called leftists. And that led to the downfall of the international communist movement.

The situation is more complicated in one country taken individually. For more than 70 years it was propagated that it was precisely the CPSU that was the expresser of the interests of the nation. But it has turned out that it is the chief pivot of the totalitarian system. But have its strategy and tactics changed? The past half-year attests that they have not. The phraseology concerning “humane, democratic socialism” in the mouths of many newly appeared party leaders has become a thing of the past. Counting on the lumpenized segments and intimidating them with the coming market, they declare themselves to be the sole protectors of the interests of the workers, the peasants, and the labor intelligentsia (I could never understand who the “nonlabor” intelligentsia are). Once again we observe the blindly stubborn exploitation of the thesis concerning class values and approaches, and concerning the need to fight against a new class of entrepreneurs.

How far these worn-out structures are from dialectics, with its demand for flexibility of thought and with its denial, once and for all, of what has been established and what is unconditional. Dialectics considers the use of multiple gauges, multiple alternatives, in analyzing and evaluating any phenomenon. And, conversely, metaphysics absolutizes the extremes, and rejects the possibility of changes. Or, rather, in general, it acts in accordance with the principle of “either or.” We might recall how frequently Lenin use these expressions: whoever does not recognize this is not a Marxist; whoever considers it differently is an opportunist; etc. According to Gertsen’s apt expression, the dogmatism of metaphysics leads to lethargic sleep. Are not certain “protectors” of the nation’s interests in a state of such a sleep, those “protectors” whom Aleksandr Yakovlev, who always has an apt phrase, has defined as a vengeful and merciless conservative wave that has changed over to the offensive?

To the offensive, for the sake of returning to the old. Moreover, attempts are being made to prove that the carrying out of democratization depends not upon the mechanism of popular elections, but upon the nature of the political organizations that are used by them. But the fascistic nature of certain political organizations in the West does not allow them to come to power, precisely as a result of the mechanism of free elections. But what does political logic mean to these Neobolshevik figures? Apparently Aleksandr Zinovyev is correct in his definition that perestroyka is a revolution carried out by the authorities in the interests of reinforcing the authority. But where here is the “protection and expression of the workers’ interests”? The conservation of the old has never been the attribute of “leftism,” but, on the contrary, is in the rightist part of political actions.

We shall never make any final determination of this question until we decide to make fundamental changes in the concepts that have formed in us, until we cross over the ideological taboos. Bolshevist ideology has developed from the leftist-radical ideology it had been at one time to what is, in “one-sixth” of the earth’s surface, a rightist-conservative, political doctrine of both the theory and practice of social development. Because today the bearers of the orthodox communist ideology have become the basic hindrance on the path of social progress. And it is difficult to convince the nation that appeals to return to the “socialist values” are in the interests of the advanced segment of society. They are in someone’s interests, but whose?

The answer to this question, under conditions of the undefined transitional period that is characterized by the unstable mosaic of political awareness, is extremely important for the country’s future.

Sobchak Outlines Aspirations of Democratic Groups

91UN1711A Leningrad CHAS PIK in Russian No 20, 20 May 91 p 3

[Interview with Anatoly Sobchak by Vladimir Nevelskiy; place and date not given: “In Politics It Is Essential Not To Take Offense.”]

[Text] Anatoly Aleksandrovich, I did not prepare questions beforehand, I decided to give you the opportunity to choose the subject of our interview yourself. So how shall we begin?

[Sobchak] Perhaps from the point that the times always pose their own problems, and the important thing is to distinguish the most important ones. Let us remember 1989. The elections to the First Congress of People’s Deputies... What defined all political life in the country
for the entire year? Of course it was the struggle about Article 6 of the Constitution and the demands to remove it.

If in February and March of 1989, when the election campaign was under way, someone had said to me that in about a year the Communist Party itself in the person of a Central Committee plenum would adopt a decision to abolish that notorious article and voluntarily relinquish its monopoly on power I would not have believed him. And indeed no one would have done so.

Even in December 1989 at the second congress it was not possible to collect sufficient votes to include this issue on the agenda. And suddenly, two months later, we had the decision of the Central Committee plenum. It caused universal euphoria. We did not attach significance to this fact, and we accepted it so lightly. Meanwhile, party functionaries experienced in politics read the situation much better. First they calculated that in the upcoming elections in March they would finally lose. So the Communist Party did not nominate its own candidates and did not even make public who it supported. In Leningrad, for example, the People's Front and the Social Democratic Party and many other sociopolitical organizations published lists of candidates whom they were supporting, but there was no list from the Communist Party. Second, they read clearly that the situation within the country, primarily the economic situation, would worsen. Thus, while temporarily moving off to the side, the Communist Party preserved its own organs, from the party cells in the plants and factories to the Central Committee, and gained, it seemed, a wonderful chance to maintain its influence in society and remain the ruling party. It gave the democrats opportunities to manage things under conditions in which they were really able to change nothing, so that subsequently it could try to discredit the very idea of democratic development in the country.

A year passed. A year of complex political struggle. The longer it went on the worse it became. The president and other representatives of the Communist Party accused the democrats of lust for power. I admit that I do not understand the logic of accusations of this kind. I would like to ask those who say such things this: What about you, do your consider yourselves hereditary monarchs? Or have you been granted this power by God and therefore anyone who lays claim to it can rightly be accused of conspiracy and mercenary motives? For if we have recognized the multiparty system, it is normal and natural that there will be opposition among the various political trends. Any party is created precisely for this, is created so as to try to gain power.

Incidentally, on the first day the democrats should have said: "Yes, we want to exclude you from power because you have lost authority among the population, and your people do not believe in you and we really do intend to seize power for ourselves in order to try to extricate the country from the impasse into which you have driven it."

But this is the question that arises: What is the main thing today? In my opinion the pivotal issue today was signed in the statement signed by the leaders of the nine republics and by Gorbachev. The essence of this statement is that in order to complete the first stage of the political and economic changes it is necessary to sign a Union treaty as soon as possible, at least for those republics that are ready to do so, and it is essential to move as soon as possible to adopt a new constitution and hold elections for all the Union organs of power—the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and the country's leadership. We must hold all these elections proceeding from a basically new concept, namely, that the Union is a secondary formation; the primary formation is the republics. This represents the only opportunity for trying in as short a time as possible to accomplish political transformations, the only path leading to the most rapid and—and I emphasize this—legal constitutional resolution of the issue of power.

Yes, today it is of the utmost necessity to unite all democratic forces and create a strong opposition structure. Nevertheless, our aim is to achieve adoption of a new constitution as soon as possible and elect the Union organs of power on that basis. If we do not do this a change of power will occur anyway, but it will not depend on us, but it will take place by the path of revolution. And that way have very serious consequences.

I never grow tired of repeating that the Communist Party still has millions of members, of whom the overwhelming majority, if not responsible for what has happened in the country, then at least remained silent and did not interfere. However, the rank-and-file party members were unable to interfere anyway. The party leaders assigned to the party masses the role of the choir in an Greek tragedy, which is heard from behind the scenes when the director waves his hands.

But times have changed. And today the democrats, particularly the most radical of them, the activists in the democratic movements and organizations who think least, or who simply are unable to think, are allowing very significant blunders. They are increasingly whipping up anticommunist propaganda and calling for uncompromising struggle against the Communists, and even for their destruction, not realizing that there are millions and millions of them, with whom it is essential to find a common language; that these are people who live and will live alongside us and play an important role in the life of the country. And we cannot just keep on repeating what Stalin did to the country at one time. The legacy of Stalinism is, unfortunately, present in each of us. To some degree or other people who think differently are unacceptable to us. We do not have the ability to hear, to listen to each other. So the struggle goes on to achieve truth and agreement, and to destroy the political opponent. It is going on in the seemingly new organs of power—the Leningrad Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, the Supreme Soviet of Russia, not to mention the other
republics, where political opponents are beginning to be eliminated with the help of weapons.

[Nevelskiy] You are right. Much of the past does remain in each of us. No one expected that after it had come to power democracy would behave not in the best of manners, and no one suggested that they would distinguish only two colors—black and white.

[Sobchak] Yes, that is correct. How was it possible to suppose, for example, that Z. Gamsakhurdia, a former dissident who spent time in prison with other people who thought differently, would have such a rigid attitude toward his own political opponents. The fact that he is persecuting them bears no comparison with how the authorities in the 1970's persecuted him and his companions-in-arms. They survived then after being given relatively light punishments. But now, as he persecutes his own opponents, he stops at nothing. For example, when V. Advadze tried to create an opposition and oppose Z. Gamsakhurdia and his nomination in the elections for the post of chairman of the Georgian Republic Supreme Council by having himself nominated, the bullets flew at him and his family and his home.

[Nevelskiy] It is hard for me to grasp all this. I know the Georgians well and have always admired their nobility and cordiality, and their unusual tolerance of everything. And now, when a feature quite out of place for that nation erupts there—intolerance—it is hard for me to believe that we are talking about Georgia.

[Sobchak] It did not simply erupt all by itself. Time was needed for very purposeful propaganda that Georgia is only for the Georgians. It needed the tragedy of Tbilisi, hard, forceful, senseless outside pressure, finally to convince the Georgians that the real enemy of their motherland is Russia, precisely from where the imperial pressure was coming.

All of this testifies to our unpreparedness for democracy, our lack of democratic traditions. And indeed, from where would we get them?

[Nevelskiy] Is this not why in recent times the little-understood phrase "so-called democrats" has been heard from high tribunes? The president himself makes increasingly frequent use of it.

[Sobchak] It does not become the president. By calling for consolidation one does not have the right to disparage and insult one's own political opponents. One must learn to talk with them.

Essentially Gorbachev is right that in the democratic movement, and more accurately, in a movement that opposes the Communist Party, there are in fact many pseudodemocrats, people whose concepts are not about democracy as such, and there are many political trends and parties that have assumed purely nationalist stances. They fail to recognize that attempts to build a society or state on a nationalist idea leads ineluctably to fascism. Such is the objective course of history. It has always led to fascism if the national idea is paramount. So I observe with alarm the processes in some republics. The demon of nationalism, which has today been set free there, is capable of creating a multitude of evils.

[Nevelskiy] You talk about Gorbachev's correctness. But where, in your opinion, is he wrong?

[Sobchak] He is wrong in that, as leader of the country, as president, he is not offering any clear-cut analysis of the political situation and the disposition of political forces, and does not distinguish between the truly democratic and the pseudodemocratic. He is trying to tar them all with the same brush, clearly demonstrating his mistrust both in the democratic movement as a whole and in the people who represent it. There used to be progressive figures in the president's entourage but he did everything possible to push them away from him.

Even if Gorbachev were 100-percent right when he called someone a pseudodemocrat, his political mistake is that he tries to discredit the democratic idea itself and the entire democratic movement, estranging its leaders and thus the people who support the movement.

In politics it is essential not to take offense. This is not easy. But if you become a politician, the more so one of Gorbachev's caliber, then learn to master yourself. For Gorbachev has done for the country and for the emergence of the democratic movement into the light of day what no other has done. And now the impression has been created that he has reached some sort of boundary beyond which he cannot step. Or does not want to.

However, that is his personal problem. Neither the fate of the entire country nor the fate of the democratic movement now depends on individual personalities. Objective processes are under way, there is a avalanche that no one can stop. Any particular political figure is able only to deepen or complicate these processes and create within the country the corresponding backdrop, nothing more.

Incidentally, the economic backdrop is today by no means the best for democratic changes. If we had succeeded in making it more favorable then everything would have been different.

[Nevelskiy] Forgive me, but a working power structure must be created for this. You say that it is necessary to wait for the moment when the Union organs have been elected. Do you have any ideas about how to build new power structures on the old that are capable and effective? Are there politicians up to this?

[Sobchak] Yes, I know people who could do this today. There are many of them—those whose abilities have by no means been fully revealed. But the main thing is that I see the objective need to create a serious political structure to oppose the Communist Party. We are now
trying to unite the left progressive wing of the Communist Party with the democratic movement and the centrist, liberal, social democrat, and national movements in the republic by imparting a common democratic nature to it. Only after that will a real political force emerge capable of becoming the foundation for the function of a new state structure.

I believe that in the summer of last year Gorbachev and his progressive entourage made a very serious political mistake. If at the 28th CPSU Congress he along with Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Bakatin, Shatalin, and other eminent figures had recognized the need to bring the split to its logical conclusion—to a conservative, orthodox communist part and a democratic part—and shared the property and helped the democrats to get on their feet, then first a political structure with a certain balance of forces would have been created in the country, and second, the Communist Party would have obtained a political opponent with similar positions.

But again the stereotype worked. The Communists hurled accusations of factionalism and other mortal sins at the democratically inclined Communists. The orthodox people began to drive from the party all those who did not share their views. And as a result the Communist Party obtained opponents who stand not at socialist positions but at anticomunist positions. And this may lead to a situation in which it will be forced from the political arena just as the communist parties in East Europe were.

I find the assertions that Gorbachev has destroyed the party risible. It can only be destroyed when it has no ideas, no uniting foundation. And this is exactly what we see: The present Communist Party has no realistic program, it has nothing to say or propose to the people. Under conditions of total disrespect of the ideas of communism it has nothing to offer apart from a return to the old ideas. But today, as was stated at the latest Central Committee plenum by Gorbachev, the CPSU has been split into three or four parties.

Consider. The idea of returning to the past would be consistently very unfortunate for the people. Let me remind you of its milestones. Suddenly a soap crisis arose in the country, which also ended "suddenly" and it seemed that everything had been put right. Why did it arise, and why did it end? No one really explained that to people. Then there was the tobacco crisis. I told the story at one time about the efforts I had to make to prevent tobacco riots in Leningrad and deal with people's outrage. For we were faced with the need for extreme measures. Those who organized the riots and the explosive situation in the large cities wanted very much for the democrats in power to use the troops against the people. And the danger was real because the riots were organized in a deliberate way by people who knew what they were doing. For example, on Nevsky Prospekt construction timber had been brought from somewhere, even though no repairs were planned. And by evening, when, aroused by the lack of tobacco, people were returning from their work, barricades were erected very skillfully and quickly from those timbers.

Then there was a very acute situation with bread, when—again suddenly!—most of the bakeries in Leningrad and Moscow were supposedly undergoing preventive repair. All immediately, in a single day.

[Nevelskiy] You are sure that each time everything happened in accordance with a previously planned scenario?

[Sobchak] I have no doubts at all. What we were dealing with was deliberate sabotage that was, true, essentially foolhardy because the organizers of those actions failed to understand that such an explosive force had been built up in the people as would have swept them from the face of the land. They reckoned to direct that force against the democrats. But no matter how much the people reproached the democrats for their omissions and mistakes, they would have first ripped of the heads of those who in 73 cities created a situation unfit for human life. People can see that today, too, the main obstacle on the road to progress, to the movement of the country ahead, remains the splinters of the Communist Party and its pillars—the party functionaries, who are holding on to their position with all their strength.

Political, Economic Reforms Give Rise to "Third Force"

91UN1721A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 22, 5 Jun 91 p 6

[Article by Andrey Bunich: "The Third Force: A Social Portrait"]

[Text] It is indeed wrong to attempt to reduce our problems to a conflict between two forces, between left and right, good and bad. During the perestroika years alone entire social groups have changed orientation several times each. Nor can it be assumed that the "third force," the nature and significance of which was correctly defined by V. Sokolov (in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No 15) represents a homogeneous entity. The success of reform will depend on the role which has been played in the past by specific representatives of that force, and on the role which they intend to play in the future.

Consider the so-called conservative bureaucratic apparatus. This stereotypical expression encompasses at least three groups within the apparatus. They each have different goals and functions, and in the near future they will take action in different directions. The influence of these groups is enormous, and the success of perestroika to a large extent will be determined by how successfully a force to counterbalance them is found.

Conservatives are presently interpreted to include the party and governmental apparatus, the military-industrial complex, the army and the KGB. But is this
massive group really that homogeneous? We can already be so bold as to call some of its members entrepreneurs. Some members of these circles started reaping quite substantial earnings at the very start of perestroika, when the Law on Cooperatives was passed. Bright managers and forward-looking officials accumulated substantial amounts of capital in 1988-90. These people, who belong to the most resourceful and corrupt segment of the bureaucracy, are wholeheartedly in favor of market-oriented transformations. Today they fully support accelerated privatization, liberalization of prices and free trade. Do they ever! They have in their hands both money and the opportunities to invest it to the greatest advantage.

The majority of this segment of the apparatus were “second echelon” in pre-perestroika years, not “first echelon”; they simply got their bearings in a new situation at the right time. The real “lords” often simply failed to notice the marked change in the forms and methods of economic management and accumulation of wealth which took place in 1987-88. Many of the deputies and aides and other mid-level administrators took advantage of the situation much better than did the upper level. The higher-ups had been coddled too much during the stagnation years; they had become cut off from real life and gotten out of the habit of making the right connections. It should not be forgotten that under the administrative system there was bitter competition among administrators for posts and benefits. The winner took over key positions with regard to distribution of funds and materials, investment, planning indices, taxation and, quite simply, “taking care” of his own people.

But in the mid-1980’s there occurred a realignment of forces; those who had bet at the right time on the development of cooperatives (and a bit later on the first wave of joint ventures) found cash, information and key connections concentrated in their hands. Over a period of two or three years they were transformed into practical market businessmen and zealous proponents of accelerated formation of a market in which their initial lead could be turned into an unstoppable finish.

The “entrepreneurial” portion of the conservatives today includes mid-level officials, production-related managers and mass media workers. They are most active in those sectors where it is easiest to get rich: trade, food service, etc., and also in those areas where it is possible to put in advantageous orders for computers in exchange for so-called waste products and raw materials. It is clear that this sort of transaction does not require any particularly outstanding mental abilities.

The greater portion of the apparatus gained virtually nothing from this process. That was not because, as some newspapers claim, these people are fools. For various reasons (caution, the specific nature of the production process, etc.) they did not get anything positive out of the market. Of course, this group also includes some people who are absolutely unsuited for the new conditions. These have naturally opposed the changes and will continue to oppose them in the future, even though they will very swiftly begin to lose their “economic base.” But today they are not the ones who are determining our development prospects, even though the first group, i.e. the entrepreneur bureaucrats, would like to portray their conflict with society as a struggle against a benighted and stupid reactionary force. In fact what we are seeing are attempts by an as yet small group of resourceful bureaucratic deal-makers, intoxicated by their initial successes in the market environment, to drive out the other segments of the state and party apparatus and other hierarchical structures in order to capture economic and political power in its entirety.

Why did they take the lead at the very start? Largely thanks to their better information and their ability to tell which way the wind was blowing—the sixth sense of these experienced functionaries did not steer them wrong! Many people in this wing are former Komsomol officials; just yesterday they were fighting to win secretarial posts, now today they have seats in the markets. A significant role was also played by the patronage of the “godfathers” of stagnation: it was primarily those who had protection who succeeded in setting up the most profitable operations. True, the new businessmen did not remember their benefactors for very long—as soon as things got a bit easier the old guard found itself on the ash heap, from where it frothed at the mouth and tried to warn the man on the street about the “market plague.” The old guys were mad because they had lost their seat at the table!

Of late we have been moving step by step toward a new confrontation. The portion of the state apparatus which did not cut itself a piece of the pie before because it was busy doing its job is now making itself heard ever more loudly. These people did not manage to snatch a pile of money in the cooperative sector. In the former economic hierarchy they were the workhorses, giving the state more than they took from it. Of course, these directors of state enterprises or officials in agencies lived fairly well-heeled lives, but they did not steal. Seeing that as a result of perestroika they could find themselves shut out altogether, that money, resources and opportunities were being redistributed for the benefit of the entrepreneurs, this part of the apparatus initially attempted to put the brakes on market processes. But the principal motive for this “reactionary attitude” on the part of this segment of the apparatus was different than that of political reactions a la Yegor Ligachev.

In contrast to the party elite, which besides its experience at behind-the-scenes intrigues has no useful qualities, these people have administrative experience, good work skills and, quite importantly, a sense of business honesty. That means that under a good economic system they could join together and occupy a position worthy of them. Furthermore it should be noted that it is at enterprises that the best personnel are concentrated, as well as the equipment, and each enterprise has its own well-established connections with regard to supply and sales. Why should they be afraid of the market? Even
components of the military-industrial complex need not worry about the future, though some writers have claimed the opposite. Enterprises in the military-industrial complex have the most skilled personnel, advanced technology and a well-functioning chain of suppliers; most importantly, they are often the sole suppliers of goods which are up to world standards. On the contrary, it is precisely in a market economy where these enterprises would be able to really develop and make enormous profits, including profits in convertible currency. There are also many unutilized capabilities in the civilian sectors, though in many cases they will only yield a real return if lots of money is invested in production. But that is a task which can be accomplished via commercial structures.

So it is these three groups which comprise the seemingly homogeneous “apparatus”; in the future they will perceive economic and political reforms in different ways and react accordingly. And that will not be because of their “reactionary” or “progressive” nature, but instead will be based on their specific material stake in specific situations.

A special stratum (a small one, but one which is closely connected with the apparatchiks and therefore influences the decisions made in society) are the teneviki: the businessmen of the shadow economy. Even before perestroika they had connections with the corrupt portion of the apparatus and made enormous profits through the illegal market activity in which only they were permitted to engage. In the early 1980's the “shadow businessmen” acquired substantial influence in society and began exerting a direct influence on the power structure. But subsequently there occurred a transformation of their interests. At the start of the economic reforms the “shadow” kingpins supported them as a way of laundering money. In that way they could become legitimate property owners and no longer have to fear law enforcement organs. During the first stage (the Law on Cooperatives) a substantial reinforcement of mafia structures’ positions occurred. Through legalization of long-established types of production and connections the teneviki achieved rapid and major results.

However, after this there began to be changes both in those structures and among the apparatchiks. At some point the higher-ups among the teneviki lost interest in market-oriented transformations, noticing that along with legalization of their own money the people who had formerly depended on them were also becoming legitimate. Furthermore, the increasing complexity of market relationships required a higher level of skills. As soon as the small-scale entrepreneurs began moving out of the shashlik stand business into foreign trade and financial operations the mafia lost its levers of control over the income of former speculators, who have now become members of cooperatives. The criminal hierarchy collapsed. The mafia structure is well equipped to handle the Riga Market [private produce market in Moscow], but does not have a clue about how to run a bank or a stock market. It turned out that the old administrative-police state system in the economy was preferable to the mafia over a finance-based system. Therefore it is clear that in the near future the mafia gangs operating in the shadow economy are going to come out in favor of a “regulated” market.

Whereas the visible and invisible, the official and unofficial representatives of the power structures have already divided up and taken a stand, the people, about whom so much has been said, still have this process ahead of them. The members of the intelligentsia, who are presented on television as virtual political stars, do not have any real power and in this sense are closer to the people than to those who actually decide people’s fates today. The governed, in contrast to those who govern, are only now beginning to become aware of their own interests and to form a model for behavior in the future. This is manifested through a more active political struggle and through ethnic, territorial and professional conflicts. Whereas at first the personal ambitions of political or economic leaders were clearly visible behind all this unrest, now we are witnessing the emergence of new trends which probably came as a surprise even to those who are organizing these conflicts. The effectiveness of these new forces could prove to be much greater than the initiators had planned, and it could be directed in an unpredictable direction.

Yakovlev Defends Choices Made Under Perestroika
91UN1839A Moscow SOBESENOK in Russian No 16, Apr 91 p 10

[Interview with Aleksandr Yakovlev, place not given, by M. Dmukhovsky: “Aleksandr Yakovlev: We Were Beating an Old Horse”]

[Text] One publicist wrote about him: “The influence of Yakovlev is based not on his rank or any power conferred upon him, but rather on his thoughts, his ideas, and his prestige. This is the rarest of occasions in a system where one’s place is everything and the person is nothing.” His references, considering their brevity, are sufficiently full.

We would remind you that Yakovlev was brought back to Moscow from Canada in 1983. One could say - returned from exile, albeit an honorable one. What was the reason for his return? Was it the publication in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of the article “Against Anti-Historicalism”, which was in essence against nationalism? Was it other unseen, undiscussed disagreements with the “gray cardinal” Brezhnev? One can only guess. It is exactly the same about both the driving force and the initiator of his return. Someone, apparently, needed his help or his support. (Here it is opportune to mention a curious fact: the years of exile for important political and even literary figures do not pass without leaving a trace in Russia.) No matter how it came about, the second invitation to work in the Central Committee of the CPSU turned out to be much more productive: 1985 - head of the Propaganda Department, 1986 - Secretary of the Central Committee
of the CPSU responsible for ideology, January, 1987 - candidate member, and in June - full member of the Politburo. This career is different from, say, the ascent of Ligachev, and no matter what we think today about the CPSU, it could not but have made those people happy who "bet on perestroika". After the 19th Party Conference Yakovlev headed the Central Committee commission on international affairs, and at the 28th Party Congress he refused to run for any kind of post. He was a member of the Presidential Council, while it existed.

And what about us?

What has come about in the past six years? Glasnost. Democracy. The establishment of personal freedoms and the freedom of expression. New thinking. The hopes of the Baltic people's have been raised... and in my mind, which is fed by official information, rumors, and unexpected revelations from highly-placed colleagues, all of this is connected with the name of Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, who was at first involved with ideology, then with international affairs in that system of power which was truly real power.

[SOBSEEDNIK] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, would you have changed your decisions or actions then, in the first years of perestroika, had you been able to surmise (to see in a strange dream) the present condition of the USSR?

[Yakovlev] No, they would not have changed. Of course, all of this is in retrospect, and retrospect, as is well known, means: once something has happened, it means that it was inevitable. However, it is possible, in all likelihood, to debate about the methods of our actions for lessons learned. Had I, let's say, or my colleagues (primarily Mikhail Sergeyevich) known the depth of the economic abyss in which the country found itself or into which it very nearly fell, then perhaps our tactics might have been different.

Nevertheless, the basic shortcoming of perestroika was that the necessity of qualitative changes was evident and clearly surmised, yet at the same time, for many reasons, about which it is possible to write entire treatises, we went along the path of improvement in many aspects through inertia... We were whipping an old horse, while alongside us ran automobiles, one faster and better than the next.

We did not immediately come to this understanding. It is possible that we couldn't come to this understanding then, because for any serious conclusions one needs foundations and knowledge.

[SOBSEEDNIK] In the beginning, in so far as I remember, perestroika was regarded as the first stage of economic acceleration. It was presumed to change the methods of economic management and reform the economy through the "correct" decrees so that it would develop faster and in such a way improve the welfare of the people.

[Yakovlev] The Khrushchevian thaw did not take place for a variety of reasons (he himself was afraid of democratic changes); therefore, there simply was no actual social experience of these types of transformations, which are evolutionary in methodology and revolutionary in essence. Sometimes they get things confused: they identify revolution with the occurrence of a coup, with the actual transfer of power. This is important. However, society changes in an evolutionary way... And here, in the beginning, confusing the ends with the means created a series of contradictions between the old command-administrative system and the demands of time and of life itself which came flooding in. After all, there were plenums, meetings, conferences - all of them dedicated just to the transformation of the economic system. However, the resistance from the state and economic apparatus of that time was underestimated, and the generally progressive decisions that were made concerning enterprises and cooperatives were first deformed in preparation and then in practice. This was because changes - huge changes - were demanded in all spheres. They were needed in the economy, in the political system, in social relationships, and in the spiritual sphere. At one or another stage this became understood, but other impediments arose. As soon as the actual goal of the transformations became understood, their implementation began to affect very serious interests on many levels, and interests are stubborn, capricious, and prepared for everything. These contradictory interests, in a socially abstract form, began to stand in the way of perestroika.

[SOBSEEDNIK] Thus it becomes clear why changes in the cultural, spiritual, and ideological spheres outpaced economic transformations. Here, certain people's interests were less directly affected. On the other hand, the opinion exists that perestroika of the "superstructure" (now that we have recalled this word, let us use it as often as we did before), having outpaced the deep transformations of the "base", became one of the factors destabilizing society. Public opinion says that glasnost, freedom of speech, and ideological liberation are very much connected with your name. In connection with everything that has been said: do you not wish that they opened these gates?

[Yakovlev] I do not relieve myself of responsibility for that which the right wing today so loudly accuses me. However, accepting these accusations with deep satisfaction I must add that life, not just specific personalities, determines fundamental changes. I am convinced that there would not be freedom of the press, a different relationship to culture or to the spiritual sphere - there would not even be perestroika. I stood for, stand for, and will continue to stand for overcoming the crisis only by way of political and economic freedoms, further democratization, and the creation of a society based on citizen's rights, capable of creating the maximal conditions for personal self-realization. There is no other way.

If a person is spiritually enslaved or constrained, civilization will not move forward. Man can create the most
up-to-date system and be able to control it, but in any case an absence of freedom is a sure way to degradation.

[SOBESEDKI] You once said that the main thing for you is to preserve one's self, not in the physical sense, but in the moral sense. Of course, each must judge for himself, but I, for example, find a reflection of this thesis in your speeches in the Baltics. Meanwhile, many cannot "forgive" Yakovlev for Lithuania.

[Yakovlev] Not just for that. As far as the Baltics are concerned, here there is something odd going on. During my trip to Lithuania and Latvia I said that which all the old birds are now twitting about from every tree. It seems, though, that at that time this sounded somewhat sacramental to some. Their point was that they need sovereignty, that all people have the right to build their lives as they deem necessary, that centralization in the form that it was at that time was, generally speaking, a distortion of any economic relationships, and ruinous. At the same time, I then warned that, God forbid, if they rise up on a path of national opposition or prefer the path of confrontation to a calm, legal, civilized discussion of everything in question... Alas. If we talk about Lithuania now, I completely disagree with their conflict with the army, or attempts to disfigure the graves of those who have fallen or the monuments to soldiers.

Someone, though, is very interested in again finding a "scapegoat". Is that not how we do things? If you do not want or are unable to resolve a problem, find someone to blame, who supposedly created the problem. Then you calm down, but the problem still remains. It has always been this way. Dyak Viskovaty, if my memory does not betray me, (I read this a long time ago) by order of his embassy, once told Ivan the Terrible, "We have food to eat, and something to drink. But we are Russians, and we love to provoke one another. Only from this are we satisfied."

This is characteristic for our society - first we move to confrontation, then we search for accommodation and consolidation. Would it not be better, though, to start with the latter, to find a common language? Would it not be better to remove ideology from economic relationships, and for what remains - if something remains - for a more intense debate, hash it out to the end? Why heap everything into one pile, as those on the right wing do, for example. One hears: "pseudo-democrats", "democrats in quotation marks", "so-called democrats", without any understanding of who or what these are, about whom they are talking, or which of them supports what. No, everything in one trash pile. Perestroyka itself is, after all, a democratic movement, a huge democratic change in our country. Suddenly, they put up this trash pile of words derived from the word "democracy". This is a surprising paradox. However, there really is no paradox: attacks on democracy are a form of struggle with the perestroyka policy. They are not fooling anyone.

We have always had an abundance of witch hunts, and we are professionals at looking for guilty parties. Our people have suffered from this more than once, and more than once this has caused the country to backslide (not only from this, but for other reasons also), again into a swamp, and we begin to grow over with weeds, both factually and spiritually. Nevertheless, I do not think that there will be a return to this now. I believe in common sense, and common sense is not conservative, it is not liberal, it is not democratic, nor is it reactionary. It is sensible. It judges things not by their labels or by some cassette planted in the head, but rather by the real situation. We know, for example, that you do not plant in the winter. We need to understand more complex matters in exactly the same way.

[SOBESEDKI] But they have planted corn where it has never grown and cannot grow; they have settled the Malaya Zemlya; they have rewritten history several times over the past 70 years.

[Yakovlev] This was an epoch of creating myths, but people believe in myths. I also believe in myths, but only to a certain limit, of course. I think that we still have a long way to go before our social sciences begin on the path of a real priority of scientific methods and truths that are independent of whether or not someone likes them or not, no matter what they may be.

[SOBESEDKI] But, by classical definition, this is what journalists are called to do - to write truthfully for history about modern times. If this is more or less clear with newspapers, (here the achievements of glasnost are unarguable - one just reads, compares, and makes conclusions), then on television strange things are going on, in my opinion. Not only are the programs disappearing, but so are the writers. What do you think, is Kravchenko doing this arbitrarily, is he fulfilling some special social order, or does he just see much farther than we do?

[Yakovlev] I have my own thoughts on this score, but in this case it would be better for you to ask Kravchenko himself about this. I urgently advise you to interview him.

[SOBESEDKI] He does not want to meet with us. What do you personally think about the fact that there is no more "Vzglyad" or that those doing "Tele-Satellite News" are not the same people who were doing it before.

[Yakovlev] I do not watch much television, but I know that a lot of people who used to sit in front of their TV screens now have a lot of free time. Before, they did not have enough free time.

[SOBESEDKI] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, if the president were to offer you a serious government post now (let's say, as chairman of the all-union television and radio broadcasting company), would you accept it?

[Yakovlev] No. I have no intentions on taking any government or party posts. By the way, I have already spoken about this. If you will remember, no matter where my name has been heard, I have come forward and refused any possible positions.
But the situation is changing. Shevardnadze has left. People are saying that the “best people” have abandoned Gorbachev, thereby putting perestroika at risk.

Yakovlev] I have heard such things. But neither I nor Shevardnadze are distancing ourselves from perestroika.

[SOBESEDKI] What kind of impression did his speech at the congress make on you?

Yakovlev] I very much regretted his resignation. Eduard Amvrosiyevich was a wonderful conductor of foreign policy during this period. Our foreign policy has gone through a fundamental change. This change has a huge historical significance which still remains to be evaluated. But I understand the motives for his resignation. Foreign policy and the most obvious achievements of perestroika came under attack. Some began to accuse Shevardnadze of making concessions contrary to the national interest. They began to publicly discuss the most delicate problems of foreign policy, something no country does. They began to put him on the spot. This is an altogether immoral practice... I understand what he did.

[SOBESEDKI] But now neither you nor he have the possibility to actively influence the decision-making process as before.

Yakovlev] So what. New people are coming on board. This does not bother me. [SOBESEDKI] New does not always mean better.

Yakovlev] I yield to the president to resolve such questions. He bears responsibility for the fate of the country, and he should decide who is able to conduct various affairs.

[SOBESEDKI] But you yourself decided...

Yakovlev] As concerns me, I feel no anxiety for myself.

[SOBESEDKI] Do you associate with the president now? Do you help him? Advise him?

Yakovlev] This is an internal matter.

[SOBESEDKI] The last question: Perhaps the time has come (in your interview last summer with KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA you promised to tell us at a later time) to unlock a secret: Are you involved in writing an answer in PRAVDA to the well known letter of Nina Andreyeva?

Yakovlev] I am.

[SOBESEDKI] Then I must ask: Have you already written it?

Yakovlev] I have already answered you. I am involved with it.

Everything in its own time. Several years will pass, and we will know much more about today (if there is any interest) than we know now. True, it will be a different kind of knowledge. But I, for example would not want that this knowledge would change my opinion about people close to me or people in the public eye. I would not want fate or simply the will of voting slips dropped into a ballet box to affect my fate.

Academicians Clash Over Perestroika
91UN1975A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 27 Jun 91 First Edition

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Ye. Semenov: “To Tear Down, Not to Build”]

[Text] I was amazed to see Academician V.A. Koptuyg’s article, “Dangerous Attempts,” in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. What amazed me was both the association of the author with the newspaper, and the association of the title with the author’s name. One of the leading scholars and organizers of science might have chosen for his article a more respectable publication than a sharply polemic (of late) newspaper. And the alarming title of the article somehow did not sound like the traditional academic manner of V.A. Koptuyg. But my amazement vanished as I read his courageous article, which he wrote out of a sense of civic duty. It was precisely his clear recognition of the danger of the total disintegration and degradation that is bearing down on the country that no doubt explains my initial amazement.

But after this, the feeling arose that Koptuyg’s article is in direct response to a recent interview with another of our academicians, A.N. Yakovlev, which was reprinted from the Italian newspaper LA REPUBLICA, in SOVETSKAYA KULTURA (No 21, 1991). I cannot rid myself of the thought that the correspondence of theses in Yakovlev’s interview with the antithesis in Koptuyg’s article is no coincidence. But even if this is a simple coincidence, the dispute in the press of two academicians is of considerable interest, for this is a dispute of world-views.

What are the concerns of the principal actors in today’s social drama? What are the concerns, for example, of both academicians?

A.N. Yakovlev states quite definitively that he is concerned about the fate of perestroika, which he continues to call a revolution. Characterizing the present situation, he notes that “from an emotional point of view, one can even regret the fact that the euphoria of perestroika has come to an end. But even this is useful, for the euphoria has been replaced with realism and realism. Revolutions always lack a sense of reality,” he writes; and goes on: “The struggle, of course, continues. A great deal depends upon the possibility of achieving certain economic improvements.” So there you have it: the real purpose of this activity is—revolution, and not the flourishing of the country and the welfare of the people. He speaks about that too, but in the context of a means
for pursuing the goal. And if he shows concern for the economic situation, it is in the context of struggle, which, "of course, continues" and in which, in order to win, it would be well to have "certain economic improvements." This is the classic position of revolutionary, who thinks in categories of the struggle, and not in creation; who is more concerned with the process of smashing the system, than in the genuine interests of real people. The regret which Yakovlev expresses with respect to the disappearance of the "euphoria of perestroika" is therefore understandable as well. If it would be well to journey further, fueled by revolutionary enthusiasm; then one would think thus about economic improvements as well.

Koptyug defines his position differently. He is not terribly concerned with acts of revolution; but he is concerned about the downfall of the Fatherland, which is taking place before our eyes. He speaks not about the desirability of continuing the euphoria, but about the "present troublesome period of economic and political lawlessness," "of the looting of our national wealth on a grand scale," of the "chaos" and "disintegration of the country," of the "collapse of the economy, and the political and national civil strife." He does, by the way, speak about euphoria as well, but in other terms: "It seems that our social ideals have been lost. And what, in this situation, can unite the 'vital creativity of the masses'? Thus far they have torn down the old building—the enthusiasm of the start." The euphoria of perestroika—that is also the enthusiasm of tearing down. Is it worth grieving over the fact that it has diminished? There is nothing left to tear down. The country itself, its productive forces and the state have already been pulled down to the very foundation.

From Koptyug's point of view, one should seek the goal for development along the paths of "stable development." But then what about the revolutionaries? Koptyug defines his own attitude. He writes: "But it seems that today many people are oriented not toward radical renewal of the system, nor toward improving it in accordance with the experiences of the developed nations; but toward its complete disintegration, striking out 74 years of history (as was done with the 1,000-year history of Russia in October 1917)." Enthusiasm and euphoria are characteristics of both of these revolutions; whereas, to achieve success in social change, one must act "very perspicaciously, and not like a cavalry charge."

For pity's sake! He does not object to the lost euphoria of perestroika as a revolutionary; perestroika was well-thought-out. It is simply that not everyone was able to speak out publicly right away. One simply doesn't tell people everything. Yakovlev explains as follows: "I am convinced that it was necessary to begin with agrarian reform; but to speak of ownership of the land in 1985 meant to lay your party card on the table." And so it was necessary to be a little crafty, and the party card was not yet needed. But even this admission does not dispel the doubts about whether the revolutionaries had a plan in their heads: a plan for work and not for struggle; transformations and not destruction. There was none. What they did offer as a plan and call a "conception of perestroika," Koptyug analyzes laconically and capriciously: within the framework of the conception of the new thinking "the architectural model" of that which should be built was unclear, and remains so." One can also say it less like an academician: they undertook a venture without thinking.

That was not a coincidence, for that is the way revolutionaries typically act, when their senses are dulled by revolutionary euphoria. For the present generation, which has adopted the idea of "putting Western clothes on our people without a fitting," Koptyug has this to say: "It would not be a bad idea, however, to take a look at the same time at the experiences of a number of other countries—Japan, for example, which charted a course for herself in a world which was new to her, making adjustments at every step to adapt to the traditions and peculiarities of the consciousness of her own people."

There is a serious watershed between revolutionaries and reformers in their estimation of the results of perestroika. For a revolutionary it is obvious that perestroika has carried the day—the old system has been smashed. For the reformer it is clear that perestroika has not succeeded, for one cannot consider destruction a blessing. One's attitude toward the interview with A.N. Yakovlev and the article of V.A. Koptyug confirms such a difference in approach.

Responding to a question on pessimism and optimism, Yakovlev said: "To call oneself an optimist or a pessimist is not sufficient, and is vague. It would be better to ask ourselves, 'Could the USSR return to the situation which existed prior to 1985?' No, that is impossible. Thus, in this sense, perestroika has succeeded." And not one word about the real problems of the mutilated society.

As if responding to the interviewer, Koptyug writes that the fundamental cause of the national calamity lies in the "chaos which sprang up in connection with the destruction of the existing system, without a sufficiently clear plan for building a new one; when all efforts were focused on making the disassembly of the old building irreversible (which, it goes without saying, certain people view as an end in itself)."

Thus, the revolutionary speaks of the impossibility of returning to the pre-1985 situation, and sees in that fact itself the success of perestroika. For the reformer, the disassembly of the old cannot be considered a value in and of itself. Hence the conclusion: perestroika has degenerated into revolutionary destruction, which for "certain people" became an end in itself. But a person who thinks in categories of creation and not destruction cannot acknowledge that perestroika, if it is to be considered a good thing, has taken place; for he does not consider the destruction of his own society a blessing. The difference in attitudes and world-views is such, that it is difficult to prove anything to one another.
And finally, the question arises: In just whose interests, and on whose account was perestroika undertaken?

Speaking of mistakes committed in the policy of perestroika, Yakovlev cites the first of them as the orientation for the good of all. “The first mistake was to say that perestroika would provide opportunities to everyone. This promise was based on idealism.” And prior to this he bluntly stated against whom perestroika must be directed. “Just think, for example, about the huge state apparatus, of the thousands and thousands of functionaries, threatened with the loss of their jobs. Economist Shatalov would have to retire, but he is an academician and would not be left without food or a roof over his head. For a person from the apparat, the situation is altogether different, and his future is much less hopeful.”

All of these statements deserve some thought. One must comprehend the question of whether it is truly idealism to focus on taking everyone’s interest into consideration. If that is so, then one need not deceive oneself with lofty statements about human rights (for one and all, incidentally), or about democracy. But, I think the words about idealism are too superficial an explanation of why the policy of perestroika is built on suppressing the interests of some in favor of the interests of others.

Nor is everything quite so simple with the “thousands and thousands of functionaries” from the state apparatus. He speaks of them as if they were clouds of evil locusts, which one must combat. What is actually needed is not the destruction of the functionary-locusts, but a reorientation of the state apparatus into functions more constructive and natural for it, functions which correspond with its structure; retraining the specialists employed in the administrative sphere, and so on—not more revolutionary extremism.

Administrative labor is no less important for a society than the labor of a grain producer or a steel maker. There are highly successful societies which do not build their welfare on the labor of steel workers or grain farmers—societies with different specializations in the international division of labor. But there are no smoothly-operating societies without effective administrative labor. The latter is a mandatory condition in order for society to flourish, no matter what its economic orientation. Therefore, it is doubtful that an ideology of disparaging administrative labor will bring society anything besides harm.

But I digress. Yakovlev clearly stated against whom perestroika, as he understands it, is directed. Perestroika is against the old elite; therefore, it is revolutionary. But he did not say in whose interests. And one should not hasten to fill this gap with the word “the people.” The answer is contained in Koptuug’s article, as if continuing the interrupted thought of A.N. Yakovlev. Perestroika is a ‘policy in the interests of the new elite which is being formed. This is ‘primarily the class of the 'knights of profit' which is being formed, who consider themselves free-and-easy in this troubled period of economic and political lawlessness.”

I disagree with V.A. Koptuug only in his characterization of this class as, namely, capitalistic. Money-grubbing and profiteering do not comprise the essence of capitalism. They existed before and in spite of capitalism. The infamous Adylov was a money-grubber, but his money-grubbing had no relationship to capitalism whatsoever. Among the contemporary “knights of profit” there are, of course, capitalistically-oriented entrepreneurs, but the dominant vector of our development at the given moment is such, that it is not the entrepreneurs who have the greater chance to prevail, but the Adylovs and their ilk.

And one more observation. The formation of a new elite is always an extremely costly enterprise for a society. This can be seen, for example, in our native development since the revolution of 1917. A new elite must thoroughly plunder everyone in order to acquire for itself something to satisfy its high material needs. The revolutionaries deserve nothing more from perestroika. And therefore, it was not only the “functionaries” who suffered from the perestroika-revolution, and not even they above all, but practically the entire society.

Nomenklatura’s Transformation, Survival During Perestroika Observed
UN17394 Moscow GOSPODIN NAROD in Russian No 5, 1991 p 7

[Article by I. Bunin, A. Salmin and M. Urnov: “The Perestroika of the Nomenklatura and the Nomenklatura of Perestroika:]

[Text] The events taking place today in the USSR—Gorbachev’s “turn to the right,” the government’s attempts to implement “creeping” counter-reform and a sharply intensified confrontation between the “democrats” and the so-called “nomenklatura” (that is, the leading links of the party-state hierarchy)—are quite naturally attracting the attention of society, journalists and political scientists to the nomenklatura. The question, just what is the nomenklatura at the present time in a political and ideological sense, is of much more than academic interest. The development of the situation in the country depends largely upon how it will operate.

It would not be correct to assert that the nomenklatura of today is identical to the ruling stratum of the Brezhnev epoch. During the years of perestroika it has undergone rather profound changes, caused primarily by the influence of two factors. The first is Gorbachev’s cadre policy, which right up until the Fall of 1990, was striving to purge the most ardent proponents of communist fundamentalism from the nomenklatura. The second factor is the experience of living under the principally new and extremely complex “revision of the fundamentals,” glasnost and open political struggle, in the presence of increasingly intense pressure “from below” and on the part of non-communist political forces.
As far as the personal make-up of the nomenklatura is concerned, during the six years of perestroika, it has been almost completely replaced. As early as the 27th CPSU Congress, that is, at the very beginning of perestroika, 55 percent of the members of the leading party organs were elected for the first time. At the celebrated April (1989) Central Committee Plenum, at Gorbachev's initiative 122 persons were immediately removed from it. The March 1989 USSR People's Deputies elections were another serious factor that stimulated the renewal of the nomenklatura.

What many at first considered a "reactionary" idea, combining the posts of local party leaders and the elected deputies of the local Soviet chairman, also had its role in the renewal of the nomenklatura.

Having suffered defeat in the general elections, many of them lost their party post as well: the party nomenklatura was, as a result, judged in the court of the non-party members, which comprise the majority of the electorate. The so-called "oblast revolutions," which took place in late 1989 and early 1990, also operated in the same direction, having accomplished the re-election of a number of conservative first secretaries of the CPSU Obkoms.

One can judge the scope of the cadre changes by the results of research conducted by the French newspaper LE MONDE. The research properly stressed that during the years of perestroika (1985-1990) the CPSU Central Committee was renewed to a greater degree than during the five years of the "great purges" (1935-1939); or, by 86 and 77 percent, respectively.

There were also noteworthy changes in the mechanisms for cadre replenishment at the highest nomenklatura echelons. In the pre-perestroika years, it recruited predominantly by means of co-optation, with quite strict observance of the "table of ranks" and the principle of seniority, and also proceeding from strict but arduously formulated personal criteria. During the period of perestroika the nomenklatura began to be shaped more and more by new parameters: for example, by the ability to carry on open political struggle. The "table of ranks" and the principle of seniority gradually lost their former significance. And people with "non-traditional" biographies began to appear at the highest nomenklatura.

To the extent that perestroika was unfurling, the nomenklatura was forced to master spheres of activity that were psychologically foreign and completely unknown to it in the past; participation in the pre-election battle, carrying on debate in parliament, making speeches at political meetings, and establishing a social base for itself. Involvement in this kind of work did not take place right away, and was far from painless; however, there were no alternatives. The elections of 1989—the first relatively democratic elections in USSR history—clearly demonstrated to the nomenklatura that henceforth it would have to fight for its existence, and that in this struggle it was necessary to employ, if not democratic methods, then at least democratic institutions. The challenge was accepted. And the local, including republic, elections of 1990 demonstrated that the nomenklatura on the whole had learned to fight, and took advantage of all its legal and extralegal advantages with considerable skill. As a result, among the people's deputies of the RSFSR, for example, the proportion of representatives of the party-state nomenklatura amounted to about 25 percent, and the proportion of the deputies which oriented itself on the nomenklatura (at least at the First Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies) was about 50 percent.

The purge of the old cadres and the appearance of new figures and non-traditional types of activities have led to the renewal of the image of the nomenklatura. The technical specialists and "masters of individual work with cadres" of the Brezhnev school, who did not know how and did not like to fight for power in the open, are being pushed into the background. Increasingly prominent in the nomenklatura is the figure of a political activist who is capable of improvisation on the rostrum, who is openly aggressive with respect to his opponents, and understands full well that his status and his career depend not at all so much on the favor of the leader, as on his popularity among the electorate.

Ideologically, the nomenklatura of today is quite extraordinary. Yet one can get a knowledgeable impression of this from data a survey of RSFSR People's Deputies conducted in 1990 by one of the authors of the present article. According to the investigation, about 25-30 percent of the nomenklatura officials who have become Russian parliamentarians could be properly called "nomenklatura fundamentalists." These people categorically cannot accept private enterprise; they consider it unacceptable to attract a lot of foreign capital to the country; they think that preserving superpower status for the USSR is much more important than carrying out democratic transformations; and finally, they are convinced of the fact that the "unity of all the sound forces in society" is clearly preferable for the country, than competition among various kinds of political currents, parties and platforms. I believe that the most outstanding representative of this part of the nomenklatura is RSFSR Communist Party leader I. Polozkov.

The proportion of nomenklatura deputies in Russia who subscribe to views opposite of the "fundamentalists," and actually close ranks with the radically-oriented democrats in terms of ideology, is not very large—no more than 10-15 percent. The remaining 55-65 percent of RSFSR People's Deputies who belong to the nomenklatura have either conflicting or undefined positions with respect to all key political questions. They vote, more than likely, according to considerations of party discipline.

It is important to note that for the "fundamentalists," and particularly for the reformers, four ideological symbols, a positive attitude toward which is very significant, are blended in their consciousness with their conception
of a "communist." These are: the October Revolution, Lenin, the socialist option, and the "great and mighty Soviet Union."

From the point of view of the situation of the nomenklatura in society and the development of perestroika, one can single out two stages, qualitatively different from one another. The first stage begins in 1985 and ends in 1988. During this period, perestroika had not gone beyond the bounds of purely technocratic efforts toward improving the existing mechanisms, and the nomenklatura with a certain degree of success was able to find a place for the new phenomena in the system of their own perceptions, customs and associations. Beginning in 1989, the situation gradually changes in a qualitative way. Normalization of relations between the state and the Orthodox Church, the abolishment of Article Six of the USSR Constitution and the leading role of the CPSU in society, the appearance of new parties and an independent press, the failure of attempts to overcome the economic crisis while remaining in the framework of the "planned economy," and the forced (although timid) steps toward a market economy—in aggregate, all these and other decisions led to the fact that the nomenklatura had lost control over the situation, not only in the sphere of reality, but also in the sphere of legality. Forces independent of the nomenklatura began to operate in the USSR, whose destruction by legal means became impossible. And finally, the departure of the chief of state from party control occurred. For a certain time, the nomenklatura carried on an intensive search for itself, and even questions of the ideological and organizational transformation of the CPSU itself were placed on the agenda. In the Central Committee, serious discussions were held on plans for a social-democratic party or on turning it into a presidential party. In the reformist wing, the idea of creating a left-center coalition with non-communist parties and movements was very popular. The realization of any of these projects could have established for the reformists the position of first violin in the nomenklatura orchestra.

None of this, however, took place. The nomenklatura, with the President at the head, preferred counter-reform to attempts to smoothly blend into the new society that was being born. The principal reason for such a turnabout consists, evidently, in the fact that as early as the summer of 1990, both the nomenklatura as a whole, and Gorbachev himself, began to clearly recognize that carrying the reforms farther would threaten them with removal from power. In actual fact, against the background of completely discrediting the communist ideal and the loss of faith in socialism in society, data from sociological surveys showed that faith in the CPSU and Gorbachev's popularity were beginning to fall rapidly.

Events in Eastern Europe played an important role in the nomenklatura's "regaining its sight," vividly demonstrating that under conditions of free play of political forces and the decommunization of the mass consciousness, no ideological recoloration or organizational transformations of former "leading and guiding" parties whatsoever could save them from political downfall. Judicial proceedings against a number of former communist leaders could not but make the proper impression on the nomenklatura.

Finally, the process of sovereignty of the union republics, and above all the RSFSR, which significantly strengthened the positions of the new elite that was trying to compete with the nomenklatura, began to dislodge the underpinnings of the union power structure—the traditional patriarchy, in essence, the only reliable stronghold of the nomenklatura.

The turn to confrontation, naturally, changed the internal structure of the nomenklatura, inasmuch as it signified that the President and his close confidants were in tandem with "fundamentalists" of the Polozkov type. Those of the presidential team for whom such an alliance was not to their taste were replaced (like, for example, Bakatin) or departed of their own accord (Shevardnadze, Yakovlev). The reorientation of the obedient majority of the nomenklatura did not occur quite so painfully.

The ideological banners of the counterreformist bloc remain the aforementioned October Revolution, Lenin, the socialist option, and the Great Soviet Union. However, the present methods for legitimizing these symbols differs markedly from the methods used just a year ago. Then, they largely appealed to them in the party press as values not requiring justification. Today the situation has changed, and the President himself, as well as the more intellectual of the party ideologues such as B. Olevnik are attempting, on the one hand, to justify the necessity for defending these symbols, associating them with common human morals and traditions, and respect for one's forefathers; and on the other, are attempting to demonstrate their practical significance for success in the battle with nationalism, the shadow economy and other plagues of contemporary Soviet society. It is as if the decommunication of the public consciousness is significantly influencing the communists themselves, turning their ultimate values into instrumental values.

What then will the nomenklatura stand for in this critical period for the Union? The CPSU, which had been the legitimizing basis of the nomenklatura for many years, and which has lost what seems at first glance a few members (something like two or three million out of 20!), has turned out to be practically paralyzed at the level of the lowest link: the primary organization. As far as the rayon, city, oblast and republic commitees are concerned, in those places where they have remained afloat, they seem to be espousing the principle of "every man for himself, and the General Secretary for everyone," acting and proceeding from the conditions of time and place, but on the whole, displaying a striking similarity, which is explained by the logic of survival.

In spite of these conditions, in certain republics the party has practically ceased to exist (Georgia), and in many the nomenklatura has reoriented itself from the union center to its own republican center. This process is going on
How ingrained has the typical set of concepts designating the most outstanding political movements and positions in modern European history become in public opinion? With which meanings are these words being used and who is thus giving the assessment of the phenomena and forces behind them which are entering the social scene today?

In January of this year the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) addressed 4,850 respondents who were representative in terms of the main characteristics of the country's population and asked them whether a positive or negative evaluation was contained in the six terms characterizing political positions which are widespread in our modern life and are constantly being repeated by the television and press. Here are the general results (in percentages of the total number of people questioned).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;nationalist&quot;</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;conservative&quot;</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;populist&quot;</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;liberal&quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;radical&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;reformer&quot;</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The first thing to strike one is the high percentage of people who were undecided: One of the lines that divide up society today is uncertainty in the selection of political positions. The majority either do not see any difference among these positions or—and this probably occurs much more frequently—in general they attach no significance to the political sphere, their interests do not lie here, and they express no clear political will. At least the social composition and the cultural milieu of those who found it difficult to give an assessment of all the roles listed was extremely stable: This refusal to make a judgment is encountered among people who are older and have less education, and residents of small cities and villages who have a low status and insignificant income, who do not subscribe to periodicals and do not buy books. They neither support nor oppose the positions that were listed; they withhold judgment, regardless of what alternative may be suggested to them. The fact that it was positions and not slogans or concrete figures that were suggested also had an influence, of course: The aforementioned segments were considerably more active and certain in their assessments of the latter.

The second aspect that attracted attention was the sharp contrast between the positive assessments of the reformer, again as compared to all other generalized roles of political leaders: If one were to ask himself who, as it were, was the "compiler" of this micro-glossary, whose position and set of priorities gave it its internal structure, one would arrive at a quite unequivocal answer—the reformer himself has the floor here, and the rest of the terms refer almost exclusively to the figures of his opponents, rivals, and enemies. One might say that...
the main problem with a society that sees itself in these terms are the reforms, and the central figure is the one who initiates and supports them.

It is important—and this is the third essential aspect—that this position is also defended by a segment with extremely homogeneous characteristics: its parameters are diametrically opposed to the indicators of those who withhold their opinions. Judge for yourselves: In the negative assessments of those positions which on the whole are regarded as negative (that is, the first three on our list) and, conversely, in the positive assessments of the other two, the total assessment of which was positive, there was a predominance of people with higher and incomplete higher (student youth) education, the engineering-technical and liberal-arts intelligentsia, and especially their leading group, residents of the republic capitals who subscribe to “thick” literary and artistic journals and democratic newspapers (MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and so forth) and who have collected fairly significant home libraries—frequently more than 1,000 titles. In the aforementioned groups a positive evaluation of reformism and a negative one for elements that oppose it are encountered approximately twice as frequently as in segments that “contrast” to them in terms of status, education, income, and so forth: For instance, support for reformism was found in up to two-thirds of the more “advanced” respondents (subscribers to NOVYY MIR or owners of large libraries) and no more than one-third among segments that have shifted to the social “periphery.” As we can see, the socially disenfranchised segments have no feelings about either reforms or radicalism—at least not at the level of ideas.

And the fourth and last thing: Judging from the arrangement of the assessments and the connections between them, reformism continues to be viewed as official initiatives from the supreme power, the center. Other variants of reformist strategy (conservative, for example, according to the British model, liberal and also radical—and this last characterization in the life of the West means not only left-wing but also centrist movements and parties) receive no appreciable support. And competition for a mass base which is integrated by national ideas or affiliation with groups subject to discrimination (populism) is regarded simply as negative. Rather, they accept the position regarding them held by the center, which acts on behalf of and in defense of the interests of the “whole,” and hence the prejudiced qualification of national movements as nationalistic and separatist and the persistent emphasis by the apparatus and the official press on the “populist” features in the image of the “pretender”—Yeltsin, and so forth. Perhaps the only criterion for internal differences in the entire segment which gave high evaluations of reformism is their attitude toward populism and partially toward liberals: Their negative evaluation is shared somewhat more frequently by leaders and the mass liberal-arts intelligentsia, which frequently takes into account the evaluations of such organs as PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, while engineering and technical personnel and student youth display a positive attitude relatively more frequently.

Let us sum up. The choice of ideological orientations now proceeds mainly within the bounds of a single segment—the younger, more educated, and more skilled city dwellers. The terms given in our poll are elements of their political language which embody their positions and predilections. The uniformity of the possible variants of behavior here shows a certain structure of society (which is still drawn to the center and poorly differentiated according to “independent” indicators) and a concrete stage in the process of a necessary and very slowly developing dynamic—a stage of ideological mobilization of educated segments around the reforms proclaimed by the center. As one can see from our data, it has been proceeding fairly successfully; it has rallied up to two-thirds of this contingent; outside of it, the successes are more modest. Further prolonging the “phase of slogans and labels” will show atrophy of political will among the socially and culturally active groups and support the passivity of the power structures and thus preserve the alignment of forces in the higher echelons. The preservation of the monopoly on speech indicates a much more serious monopoly on power and the powerlessness of society.
SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Germans
91UN17244 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 13, Mar 91 p 19

[“Ethnographic Dictionary” series edited by Dr of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: “Germans”]

[Text] Self-designation: Deutsch, Deutschen. The Soviet Germans are mostly the descendants of the German colonists who migrated to Russia in the 18th-19th centuries. The 1989 population census registered about 2.4 million Germans living in the USSR.

Anthropologically, most Soviet Germans are members of the Atlantic-Baltic race of the big European race.

The German language is part of the German group of the Indo-European language family. The spoken language has several dialects (including high, middle and low German).

The migration of Germans into Russia has a distinct history. The first groups of Germans began to settle in the Baltic area in the early Middle Ages, subsequently accounting for a considerable segment of the local nobility.

The major migration of the Germans took place during the second half of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries, triggered by the manifestos promulgated by Catherine the Great, which, starting with 1762-1763 widely opened the door to anyone wishing to emigrate. The empty lands of Russia needed strong and skillful manpower. This attracted many migrants who settled in “colonies.” By 1764-1774 there were 106 colonies along the Volga, in the areas between Saratov and Kamyshin. At the same time, Germans began to migrate to the Transcaucasia.

The second stage of the mass migration of colonists coming from southwestern German lands, Bavaria, eastern Thuringia, upper Saxony, and Westphalia, was related to the unification of the Crimea and the steppes around the Black Sea with Russia, and the far-sighted policy of Catherine II concerning the liberation of the newly acquired area and the protection of the restless borders. Somewhat later, in the first quarter of the 19th century, under the rule of Alexander I, 134 German settlements appeared in the south of the Ukraine, 17 in Bessarabia, eight in the Crimea, and a few in the Caucasus.

The third (internal, within the Russian Empire) stage of German migration took place by the turn of the 20th century and was largely related to the eve of and implementation of Stolypin’s agrarian reform. The new migration at that time was to the east. Substantial contingents of the German population left the areas they had settled along the Volga, along the Black Sea coast, and Volynia, and moved beyond the southern Urals, far into the north of Kazakhstan, in the Altay, and in Siberia.

The substantial migration of the German population, which led to an overall reduction of its size, took place on the eve of and during World War II. By USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase “On the Resettlement of Germans Living in the Volga Areas,” dated 28 August 1941, the Germans were resettled from the European part of the USSR to Kazakhstan and the eastern areas of the RSFSR, while “the rayons of the former German Republic on the Volga” became part of Saratov and Stalingrad Oblasts by USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase, dated 7 September 1941.

Three hundred and fifty thousand Germans of those who, during the period of the advance of the German-Fascist forces had been unable to move away from the western parts of the country, were proclaimed “Volksdeutsche” (ethnic Germans, citizens of the Reich) and removed from the USSR along with the retreating forces of the Wehrmacht. By the end of the war, more than 200,000 were repatriated and sent to special settlements and included in the labor forces; about 150,000 remained abroad.

Religious Soviet Germans practice several faiths. In addition to Roman Catholics and Lutherans there are various sects and trends, including Reformists, Wurttemberg Separatists, Baptists, Adventists, Mennonites, and others.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Nganasan
91UN1698B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 11, Mar 91 p 19

[“Ethnographic Dictionary” series edited by Dr of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: “Nganasan”]

[Text] Self-designation: Nya, which means “comrade,” “fellow member of the tribe,” “friend,” or “relative.” They were previously known as “Avam Samoyeds.” The name “Nganasan” was introduced at the end of the 1920s.

According to the 1989 census there were some 1,300 Nganasan in the USSR.

Along with the Nenets, Enets, and Selkup languages, the Nganasan language is part of the Samoyedic division of the Uralic language family.

The Nganasan are the descendants of the native population of the Taymyr Peninsula.

They are divided into two groups: the Avam Nganasan and the Vadeyev Nganasan. The Avam live in the central tundras of Taymyr, in the Dikson Rayon of the Taymyr Autonomous Okrug; the Vadeyev live in Khantanskiy Rayon in the same okrug. The Avam Nganasan were the native population which the Russian tax collectors found in the Taymyr in the 17th century. The Vadeyev Nganasan appeared only in the 18th century, when 19 “Tungus of the Kharitonov family” moved from the
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The contemporary Avam Nganasan consist of five families: Linanchera-Turagin; Chunanchera-Chunanchara; Ngomde-Momde; Ngantuho-Kosterkina; Nyunonde-Norina and Oko-Yarotskiye, who trace their origins to the Nganasan Dolgan. The Vadeyev Nganasan consist of the following families: Asyandu, Kupchik, Nerkho, Ngoryu, Kokury, and Lapsakha.

There are more Avam than Vadeyev Nganasan.

The Nganasan are the only people on earth who have preserved the ancient culture of hunters of wild northern reindeer. The largest herd of wild northern reindeer is found to this day on the Taymyr. It numbers approximately half a million head.

In the past hunting for wild reindeer was the main occupation of the Nganasan. Even reindeer breeding, quite well-developed in the Nganasan, was oriented toward hunting. Domesticated reindeer were used as pack animals while wild reindeer were hunted for food. The Nganasan were familiar with several ways of hunting reindeer. However, the main one was catching the reindeer in the water, as they crossed rivers during their seasonal migrations.

The wild reindeer crossed rivers in the tundra in the very same spots for centuries. These places were known as "pokoljki" and were the summer bases for groups of Nganasan families inherited from their ancestors.

Year after year, the Nganasan spend their summers at the crossing areas, waiting for the reindeer. In the autumn the hunters would let the herd get into the water and attacked it in small boats. This required training since childhood in order to be able to hit the reindeer with simple spears.

The best reindeer were selected and the carcasses were allowed to float down the river and were picked up by the older members of society.

At all summer camps extensive racks were set up near the tents, on which the meat which was to last the entire winter was cured. The hide was used for clothing and for building tents. The Nganasan did not hunt for fur and the tsarist government collected from them a tax of suede leather in which the other furs were packed.

Reindeer were hunted with dogs as well. The Nganasan dogs were able to drive the reindeer to the spots where the hunters were hidden and who killed the reindeer with arrows or spears.

The Nganasan were shamanists. To this day the elders have retained their belief in many traditional cults.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Nivkh
91UN1724B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 15, Apr 91 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Dr of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: "Nivkh"]


According to the 1989 census, there are 4,673 Nivkh in the Soviet Union.

The Nivkh language is classified as a "Paleoasiatic language." It has no analogue.

The Nivkh are divided into two unequal groups: those who live at the estuary of the Amur and the banks of the Amur floodplain, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Tatar estuary, and those who inhabit the island of Sakhalin, its northern areas mainly.

The first information about the Nivkh is traced to the beginning of the 18th century.

Maksim Perfiliev, a military serviceman and one of the founders of the Bratsk stockaded town, reported that, according to the Tungus, a group speaking a particular language inhabited the estuary of the Amur. More detailed information was provided by Ivan Moskvitin, who was the first to reach the Pacific coast.

In 1640 Moskvitin reported that "at sea and in the islands there were Gilyaks with tame bears."

In this area the Moskvitin also noted a peculiarity of Gilyak life—the cult of the bear.

For a long time after the Russians reached the lower reaches of the Amur, Nivkh were subject to raids by the Chinese as well as American whalers and the Japanese, from the sea.

In 1850 the Nivkh sent delegates to Ayan, requesting a Russian maritime expedition to protect them. On 1 August 1850 the Russian flag was raised by G.I. Nevelskaya near the Nivkh village of Kuyego.

The Nivkh were essentially fishermen. Their entire way of life was related to fishing. Fish were consumed by people and dogs and were also used as materials for clothing and shoes.

The Nivkh were superb fishermen. They expended a great deal of effort to organize their age-old possessions. Every year they cleared from alluvial deposits the spawning sectors and the winter holes, and used a variety of fishing methods. The Nivkh were familiar with the habits of the various fish species and the influence of weather conditions on their behavior, and were extremely thrifty in the use of natural resources.
They fished both summer and winter. The fish were sun-cured, frozen or smoked.

The next most important occupation was the hunting of marine pinnipeds. The Nivkhki hunted for seals of all varieties and, to a lesser extent, beluga sturgeons.

The Nivkh did not hunt whales, considering them to be sacred animals. They hunted for sea game in summer and winter, in open waters, between the ice and through the ice.

The Nivkh had developed an original floating harpoon which has never been used by anyone else.

Hunting for the sacred animal—the bear—played a special role in the life of the Nivkhki. Bears were hunted in lairs and killed with spears. Cubs were raised for the special bear holiday.

The Nivkh lived in settlements which were quite large for the north. They built log cabins and could manufacture boats of different types, ranging from one-person canoes to boats for several oarsmen. They had mastered the manufacturing of wooden implements which were richly decorated, birch-bark implements, etc.

The Nivkh were shamanists, professing a variety of cults related to their occupation.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Mordvinians

91UN1698A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 9, Feb 91 p 19

[“Ethnographic Dictionary” series edited by Dr of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Dr of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko: “Mordvinians”]

[Text] There is no self-designation common to the entire people. The term Mordva is used by their neighbors. The Mordvinians call themselves according to the two groups to which they belong: Erzya and Moksha.

According to the 1989 census, there are more than 1,150,000 Mordvinians.

The Erzya and Moksha languages form the Mordvinian group of the Finno-Ugric branch of the Uralic language family.

Mordvinians are more or less compactly settled in the Mordovian Republic: the Erzya in the northeastern and eastern areas and in the Tenguzevo, Drakino, and Kozhloka settlements along the lower reaches of the Soksha River; the Moksha are settled in the western part of the Republic. Outside the republics, Mordvinians live in Saratov, Penza, Ulyanovsk, Nizhegorod, Orenburg, and Samara Oblasts, in the Tatar and Bashkir Republics, in Siberia, and Central Asia.

Mordvinians are mentioned as a nation in historical sources of the middle of the first millennium A.D.

In describing the Volga peoples, Jordan, the Gotha historian called them Mordens. The Byzantine Konstantin Porphyrogenite mentions a country named “Mordia.”

Archaeologists have found a number of common features of Mordvinian material culture and archaeological monuments dating from the Bronze Age. Today it is entirely obvious that the Mordvinians are the descendants of the local most ancient population.

Mordvinians settled over a very vast territory, earlier than the Slavs, as confirmed by the following: the early Slavic burial grounds are above those of the early Mordvinian. The process of mixing the ancestors of the Mordvinians with the Slavs began in deep antiquity. This process of the merger of the native Mordvinian population with the Slavs occurred in the area of the Oka River, and the name “Ryazan” possibly reflects the Mordvinian ethnonym “Erzya.”

A 10th-century Russian chronicle mentions the “Muroma,” related to the Mordvinians, living along the Oka which, by the end of the century was already within the Russian principality.

The cultural differences between the Moksha and Erzya may be traced from the sixth-seventh centuries, although linguistic unity and blood and economic relations were preserved. In the ninth to the 12th centuries the Mordvin tribes were under the influence of the Bulgarian Khannate, the Russian state, and the southern nomads.

Russian influence on Mordvinian lands was strengthened with the founding of Nizhny Novgorod in the lower reaches of the Oka. The western groups of Mordvinians and their related Murona gradually merged with the Russian population, while the eastern groups in the basins of the Tsna, Moksha, Sura, and Pyana developed close relations with the Bulgars. In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mordvinian tribes fell under the power of the Mongols. Moksha (today’s Narovchat), a city of nomads, was built in the south. The southern segment of the people fell under the influence of southern Tatar culture. The northern group of Mordvinians, the Erzya, conversely, paid tribute to the Russian princes.

Gradually, all Mordvinian groups became oriented toward Moscow. During the siege of Kazan, Mordvinians actively participated in the defeat of the TatarKhannate. After its fall, Mordvinian lands became part of the Russian state. In the 17th-18th centuries, a large number of Russian settlements and monasteries appeared on Mordvinian lands, while the Mordvinian leadership accepted Christianity and merged with the Russian nobility.

Starting with the 18th century, most Mordvinian peasants became the property of the state; a few became workers for the tsar and plant workers, and one-fifth became serfs.

Mordovia became autonomous after the October Revolution. It became an autonomous republic within the RSFSR in 1934.

The official Mordvinian religion is Christian Orthodox.
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