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PARTIES' CONFIGURATIONS, STRATEGY AFTER ELECTION VIEWED

Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 20 Sep 87 p 10

[Commentary by Erik Meier Carlsen]

[Text] Five years after its formation, the Schluter government is surrounded by a glory that is as brilliant as ever. On Thursday, 10 September 1987, on the birthday of the Four-Leaf-Clover government, the newly formed parlia-
mentary group of the Radical Liberal Party gathered in its office on the third floor of Christiansborg. Niels Helveg Petersen forestalled any protests in presenting his draft "letter of independence" of the Radical Liberal Party. The strong alliance between him and Schluter had not been destroyed, but the party now had to dissociate itself from that alliance in public. Just as Poul Schluter had had to dissociate himself from it the previous evening when going directly to the Queen in reshaping his four-party government.

While the Radical Liberal Party was putting the final touch to Helveg Petersen's "letter of independence," Anker Jørgensen's withdrawal was announced on the radio.

In a few hours the political map of Denmark had become changed.

Following another week of Social Democratic power struggle, nonsocialist squabble and self-reproach as well as frequent analyses of the election results, a remarkable agreement exists in various camps on the prognosis.

Even among quite central figures within the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Radical Liberal Party, provided the names are not announced in public:

The Schluter government will remain in power for another 2 years. During that period, the Social Democratic Party will get the opportunity to show its unity and strength by way of an offensive, though cooperative, opposition policy, which will wear down the government and result in closer ties to the Radical Liberal Party. When the time for the election comes, Svend Auken will be the obvious candidate to become the next prime minister of Denmark.
Government Composed of the Conservative Party and the Radical Liberal Party

Of recent years, Denmark has only once experienced an election period that was shorter than 12 months. When following the earthquake election in 1973 Hartling seized the government power alone and abandoned it voluntarily 14 months later. Today Schluter is hardly prepared to give up his government power. And if the Social Democrats force him to do so prematurely, the risk is obviously that in order to preserve the coherence and continuity of its policy, the Radical Liberal Party may be forced to assume the government responsibility, alone or with the Conservative Party--without a new election.

Conversely, the situation of the Danish parliament calls for historical agreements across the center. There are indications that the country's competitiveness may release an economic disaster unless measures of intervention are taken, a pension reform is urgent for short-term economic reasons but also for long-term distribution policy reasons. The takeover by the employees' funds of the Danish economic life is a process that cannot be stopped but which, on the whole, is being arranged with a view to the future, the education of the Danish work force is the key to our national survival.

Tactical Social Democratic Leadership

A new generation is assuming the leading posts within the Social Democratic Party, and the introductory elections may indicate the possibility of overcoming exhausting struggles between persons. The decisive strength of the Auker-Bjerregaard alliance is that there is a majority for accepting a policy of cooperation to the right. For that reason, they will be able to negotiate with vigor and authority.

They will also be able to adopt the necessary but difficult line which while maintaining the contact to the Socialist People's Party at the same time will aim toward tangible results in the negotiations with a weakened nonsocialist government.

The showdown concerning the top leadership posts of the Social Democratic Party has developed into a showdown between the Right and the Left wings of the party. However, many know Ritt Bjerregaard not merely as a pragmatist who looks for results, and among Auker's most marked political efforts is the attempt to obtain a truce with regard to the security policy, an attempt which after having been at a standstill has now been given new impetus following the improvement in the international situation.

At the base of the support of the Social Democratic Party, the Federation of Trade Unions is aware of the threat of the problem of competitiveness, as far as the employment situation is concerned. It also has got Georg Poulsen, who threatens to act on his own unless the Federation of Trade Unions and the Social Democratic Party launch the issue of pensions.

The very fact that the Social Democratic Party, which has been advocating a rapprochement toward the Socialist People's Party, has now come into power provides the possibility of an actual cooperation policy.
The course of events this winter will become decisive.

There are guarded expectations that an actual budgetary agreement may be arranged; on the other hand, nobody expects the government to fall on the budget. Before the budget comes to the vote, the initial broad economic policy agreement on the government's export package will probably have been arranged. Although presented during the election campaign, it was viewed in an extremely positive manner by the Social Democratic Party.

Against the background of such an agreement, and against the background of the fact that the government will be forced to accept the budgetary changes on which the Radical Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party and the Socialist People's Party may reach an agreement, in particular, in the "social recovery" area, the total budget will get an appearance that will enable the Social Democratic Party to vote for it.

This will provide the basis for tripartite negotiations in the labor market, the initial stage of which will concern a revision of the so-called employers' contributions, i.e., the funds contributed by employers for each individual employee to the daily unemployment benefits fund, to the wage-earners' supplementary pension fund and to the educational fund, etc. A revision of these contributions may substantially reduce the costs of enterprises, but the way in which it will take place will have important effects on the labor market policy and the employment situation. Neither the labor movement nor the Social Democratic Party will be in a position to decline an invitation to exert a decisive influence on this important maneuver.

The extent to which the government will be willing to make concessions will, of course, have a decisive effect on developments. Poul Schluter lost votes to the Progressive Party on account of his policy of rapprochement toward the center. Will he now have to shift to the right? He cannot do that. Despite the shocking election result, the strengths of the blocs have not changed decisively. The struggle is still for the support of the Radical Liberal Party.

The Center Road

Only via the alliance with the Radical Liberal Party has it been possible in post-World War II years to create a nonsocialist alternative capable of governing the country. This alliance would be the last thing a nonsocialist prime minister would want to jeopardize. That is why there will be no negotiations with the Progressive Party and that is why Poul Schluter will still have to seek toward the center. If the Social Democratic Party pursues a line of noncooperation, it may force Poul Schluter to step down. He will then have the alibi he lacked on 9 September in forming his coalition of the Conservative Party and the Radical Liberal Party. The Radical Liberal Party has indicated its readiness to participate in such a government. On 9 September Schluter met his obligation toward the other three Four-Leaf-Clover parties, the result of which was that the Liberal Party, which had become extremely weakened, actually demanded that it participate in the reshaped
government. He gave them ministerial posts, the number of which exceeded the number warranted by the election result, but decided, on the other hand, on their distribution and got a government comprising prominent Liberals with a passivist ideological outlook, such as former Minister of Housing Thor Pedersen, who will now be making cutbacks within the municipalities, and the ideological advocate of tax reductions, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who will now administer the world's second highest tax rate and a Social Democratic tax reform.

In the election, the Liberal Party suffered a historical defeat, and the party chairman, in particular, has been weakened. Prominent members of the Liberal Party expect a showdown in the course of the next 12 months which may cause Uffe Ellemann-Jensen to have to step down from his chairmanship. But until that happens, the party will lack the possibility of actively opposing the line of negotiation toward the center pursued by Poul Schluter.

A couple of years ago, Poul Schluter predicted that the threat to his government will emerge from the Right. The election result confirmed his fears. However, he is largely incapable of doing anything about the attacks from the Right wing. In the coming months, the struggle will concern the center.

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CSO: 36130003
PROGRESSIVE PARTY CONGRESS ELECTS NEW CHAIRMAN, VIEWS SDP TIE

'Revolt' Against MP

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Sep 87 p 5

[Text] The Progressive Party does not want its chairman to be a member of the Folketing.

The Progressive Party, after all, had its showdown among persons at its national congress in Næstved.

This time, it concerned the post of national chairman, and Annette Just, who following her election to the Folketing was unable to convince the national congress that she would be able to devote an equal amount of energy to the chairmanship, became the victim.

With 239 votes, Johs. Sørensen, deputy mayor and school principal, was elected the next national chairman. Annette Just got 157 votes. Ib Stæhr, Silkeborg, and Aage Brusgaard, Nykøbing Mors, were reelected.

Annette Just herself does not view her defeat as the result of opposition to a candidate holding dual jobs.

"If that had been the case, the national congress would presumably not have elected Johs. Sørensen, who is a deputy mayor," she told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

On the reason for her defeat, she said: "It has got to be a question of persons."

She declined to discuss the question as to who opposed her.

"It might sadden me to find out. However, I am not the kind of person who will withdraw into a corner crying. It will now be important for us to continue along the line of progress that has been pursued of recent years."

Annette Just does not believe that there will be any political changes under the new chairman compared to the line she has been pursuing."
The executive committee, subsequently, elected its officers, with the former deputy chairman, Kim Behnke, remaining in his post of deputy chairman. He, too, was criticized by the national congress for holding on to his post.

The architects behind the action against Annette Just were Pia Kjærgaard, political spokesman, and Kirsten Jakobsen, a former member of the Folketing.

Pia Kjærgaard had agreed to become nominated for the executive committee but withdrew her candidacy in the last minute on the grounds that it would not be right to be a member of the Folketing as well as a member of the executive committee.

She received much applause for this, and she also received the most rounds of applause during the national congress. The national congress reflected her strong position, which almost poses a threat to the founder, Mogens Glistrup. He certainly did not agree to the action against the former national chairman.

Party Chairman Sørensen Profiled

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Sep 87 p 10

[Article by Carl Otto Brix]

[Text] Identifying the future of Denmark with that of the Progressive Party takes a lot of courage or a great amount of naiveté.

The new national chairman of the Progressive Party, Johannes Sørensen, did not hesitate to associate the two things when thanking for the election in Næstved yesterday under much applause from the party spokesman.

There was grumbling among the delegates when last Saturday Annette Just announced that she wanted to continue in her post of national chairman although she has now become a member of the Folketing, but nobody expected her defeat to the school principal from Himmerland to be as large as it was.

He is friendly and works like a beaver, is the comment of people who know him. In addition, he possesses the remarkable ability of being able to give higher priority to the cause than the person.

There must be something to him. Otherwise, it is hard to believe that he would have been able to become deputy mayor in a Social Democratic municipality such as Skørping. In addition, he is the only Z member [expansion unknown to translator] of the municipal board.

Johs. Sørensen is 59 years old, married and has two daughters of 28 and 19, respectively. Since 1965 he has been working at a school for retarded in Skibsted near Kongerslev. The school has a total of 35 students. He came to that school from a job in the Mentally Deficient Services in North Jutland.
He has been a member of the Progressive Party for 12 years, and 2 years ago he was elected an officer of the executive committee for a period of 3 years.

His platform is very similar to that of the Progressive Party, which is not a surprise. "The burden of taxation is much too heavy. That ruins the economic life. The society is too bureaucratic. The public sector is too large."

Such things have probably been heard before from those quarters.

However, bear in mind that this comes from an employee within the public sector. Incidentally, the first one to reach the top of the Progressive Party organization.

Glistrup Floats SDP Support

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 28 Sep 87 p 5

[Excerpts] If things do not work out with the coalition parties and the Radical Liberal Party, Mogens Glistrup is prepared to cooperate with, for example, the Social Democratic Party.

If the Progressive Party is unable to get its policy through in a cooperation with the coalition parties and the Radical Liberal Party, the party will be prepared to add its nine seats to those of other parties with which it may be able to create a majority.

These were the words of the founder of the party, Mogens Glistrup, who remains its top man, when yesterday he made his traditional concluding statement at the national congress of the party in Næstved.

In his talk with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE, Mogens Glistrup elaborates on his statements by pointing to the Social Democratic Party and the Center Democrats as potential cooperation partners.

Mogens Glistrup started his statement by giving expression to the desire that the Four-Leaf-Clover be replaced by a six-party coalition.

"However, one of the parties is still in need of a therapist," he went on to say. "That is the Radical Liberal Party, which has difficulty understanding how a democracy works. The Radical Liberals believe that they own the Folketing.

They are now copying Preben, the Sailor: Me, Helveg, me, the prime minister."

Mogens Glistrup referred to the conduct of the Radical Liberal Party as undemocratic, adding, however, that "those of us who went to school before Rita Bjerregaard managed to ruin it, are, in fact, able to count to 90, and that is what it is all about at Christiansborg."
He warned his fellow party members that in the future they will find that the Folketing group will time and again have to vote for things which have got no relation to a progressive policy. But that is necessary.

"The most important issue for the Progressive Party is a lower tax burden, but we do not mind, for example, to raise the tax on playing cards if, by doing so, we shall be able to procure part of the 4-5 billion kroner which we find the national pensioners need to improve their economic situation," Mogens Glistrup said, while his supporters stood up to cheer him.

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CSO" 36130005
LIST OF UN VOTING PATTERNS ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVHEROTYPIA in Greek 15-16 Aug 87 p 13

[Article by Kyra Adam]

[Text] Throughout 1986, Greece behaved in the United Nations quite moderately and, above all, weighing well the possible effects on other ballots which are of concern to it.

In the period September to December 1986, on a total of 305 UN resolutions, our country gave a positive vote approximately 150 times and abstained from voting approximately 50 times, while its negative votes were minimal, and even fewer the cases in which it stated "absent."

Identity

An overall observation is that Greece was careful not to deviate particularly from the position the United States took on issues which are of special interest to Washington, though on many other issues it maintained its autonomy and many times was in opposition to the vote of the other West European countries.

Listed below are certain instances of voting in the United Nations; this is a first attempt to present all the ways in which Greece voted.

Thus, on the issue of the Law of the Sea, it is worth noting the United States' identity with Turkey in their negative vote and to point out the abstentions of Great Britain, Israel and West Germany on this issue.

On Libya

Also characteristic is Greece's abstention (but also Turkey's) on condemning the U.S. invasion on Libya, though all the western countries in the list (U.S.A, France, Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, Italy, Spain and Israel) voted against the resolution.

Similarly characteristic is Greece's abstention on the issue of Namibia (thus "traveling along" with the United States), as well as its "mild" stance, again with an abstention, on the specific resolution for the prohibition of nuclear tests.
Finally, it is worth noting that, of the countries in the list, the only one which voted steadily in favor of all the resolutions is Yugoslavia, followed by Cyprus which abstained only on the issue of Afghanistan.

1986 UN RESOLUTIONS

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International Court Decision, 27 May 1986, related to military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua:

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Situation in Afghanistan and effects on international peace and security:

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Law of the Sea (related to the observance and implementation of the Law of the Sea Treaty):

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Situation in South Africa and aid to the freedom movements:

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Condemnation of the U.S. invasion against Libya, April 1986:

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### Situation in Namibia following its illegal occupation by South Africa:
- **Greece** - Abstain
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - Absent
- **USA** - Abstain
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Abstain
- **France** - Abstain
- **Great Britain** - Abstain
- **Bulgaria** - For
- **Israel** - Abstain
- **Spain** - Abstain
- **Italy** - Abstain
- **China** - For
- **West Germany** - Abstain
- **Yugoslavia** - For

### Situation in the Middle East on the basis of UN resolutions on withdrawal of Israeli troops from Palestine and solution of the Palestinian problem with participation of the PLO:
- **Greece** - For
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - For
- **USA** - Against
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Against
- **France** - Against
- **Great Britain** - Against
- **Bulgaria** - For
- **Israel** - Against
- **Spain** - Abstain
- **Italy** - Against
- **China** - For
- **West Germany** - Against
- **Yugoslavia** - For

### Abolishment of all nuclear tests:
- **Greece** - For
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - Abstain
- **USA** - Against
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Abstain
- **France** - Against
- **Great Britain** - Against
- **Bulgaria** - For
- **Israel** - Abstain
- **Spain** - Abstain
- **Italy** - Abstain
- **China** - Abstain
- **West Germany** - Abstain
- **Yugoslavia** - For

### Implementation of General Assembly resolution 40/88 on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear tests:
- **Greece** - Abstain
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - Abstain
- **USA** - Against
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Abstain
- **France** - Against
- **Great Britain** - Against
- **Bulgaria** - For
- **Israel** - Abstain
- **Spain** - Abstain
- **Italy** - Abstain
- **China** - Abstain
- **West Germany** - Abstain
- **Yugoslavia** - For

### Prohibition of chemical and bacterial weapons:
- **Greece** - Abstain
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - Against
- **USA** - Against
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Abstain
- **France** - Against
- **Great Britain** - Against
- **Bulgaria** - For
- **Israel** - Abstain
- **Spain** - Against
- **Italy** - Against
- **China** - Abstain
- **West Germany** - Against
- **Yugoslavia** - For

### Condemnatory resolution on nuclear arming of Israel:
- **Greece** - For
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - For
- **USA** - Against
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Abstain
- **France** - Abstain
- **Great Britain** - Abstain
- **Bulgaria** - Abstain
- **Israel** - Against
- **Spain** - Abstain
- **Italy** - Abstain
- **China** - For
- **West Germany** - Abstain
- **Yugoslavia** - For

### Implementation of an extensive system of international peace and security:
- **Greece** - Abstain
- **Cyprus** - For
- **Turkey** - Abstain
- **USA** - Against
- **USSR** - For
- **Canada** - Abstain
- **France** - Against
- **Great Britain** - Abstain
- **Bulgaria** - For
- **Israel** - Abstain
- **Spain** - Abstain
- **Italy** - Abstain
- **China** - For
- **West Germany** - Abstain
- **Yugoslavia** - For
### Human rights situation in Chile:
- Greece - For
- Cyprus - For
- Turkey - Against
- USA - Against
- USSR - For
  
  - Canada - For
  - France - For
  - Great Britain - For
  - Bulgaria - For
  - Israel - Against
  
  - Spain - For
  - Italy - For
  - China - Against
  - West Germany - For
  - Yugoslavia - For

### Restrictions on transfer of funds from developed to undeveloped countries:
- Greece - Abstain
- Cyprus - Absent
- Turkey - For
- USA - Against
- USSR - For
  
  - Canada - Abstain
  - France - Against
  - Great Britain - Against
  - Bulgaria - For
  - Israel - Abstain
  
  - Spain - For
  - Italy - Against
  - China - For
  - West Germany - Against
  - Yugoslavia - For

CSO: 35210181b
9247
GREECE

POLITICAL

BRIEFS

KKE REPUTATION UP--For the first time the delegates from the socialist countries attending the 12th KKE Congress were of such high rank. This observation is attributed to foreign diplomats with the remark that, until now, such representation honored only the French Communist Party because of its close connections with Moscow. According to the same sources, the presence of top cadres from the countries of the Eastern Bloc was tantamount to approval of FloraKis' role in our political affairs in addition to being a confirmation that the official KKE has increased its standing in the electorate by holding on to part of the gains obtained in the municipal elections. In view of the above, it is not by accident that "the reformer," Mr. M. Androulakis, remained as an alternate member of the Politburo and that his remarks found no echo among the party cadres. [Text] [35210141 Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 20 May 87 p 6] 9731

CSO: 3521/141
REASONS FOR FREITAS DO AMARAL'S RETURN TO CDS

December Deadline

35420001a Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 Oct 87 p 1

[Excerpts] Freitas do Amaral is "available to assume the leadership of the CDS" the former party leader stated himself to EXPRESSO, adding that this could be the case at the party's congress to be held in December or, at the latest, in January of next year. As a fundamental condition for his return, Freitas do Amaral asks that his initiative not create a gap between him and the present leader, Adriano Moreira.

Speculation on Reasons

35420001b Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 10 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Teresa de Sousa: "Freitas: First Headache for Cavaco Silva"]

[Excerpt] What leads a man who attracted the vote of almost 49 percent of the national electorate to decide to return to a party he left when it held 16 percent of the Portuguese electorate and which he is thinking of rejoining when it stands at 4 percent? The reply seems obvious: if Freitas do Amaral did not have the courage to return to the CDS at the moment when this party is slowly dissolving in the "orange" wave [translator's note: the PSD's party color is orange] that is engulfing the country, then he would run the risk of being a man forever lost for political life.

It is possible to return at this time. No one within the CDS is strong enough to raise any objection to the return of the party's founder—even if they had differed with him at the political level, or even if there are many reasons to remember that he "destroyed" the CDS in exchange for his candidacy to the presidency.

As brilliant as Lucas Pires' ideas may be, or as proud as he is of the 15 percent of the votes he garnered in his election to the European Parliament, he has little to do now with a party that is essentially conservative.
As for Adriano Moreira, it is obvious that opportunities for him are lagging, and the only thing left for him to do is a dignified departure.

Freitas can now impose anything, simply because he is "Dom Sebastiao" come alive for the CDS, he will easily attract the centrists and the group of notables who supported his presidential campaign. He will be able, because he possesses domestic and international credibility, to ask Cavaco Silva—until now the absolute owner of the Portuguese right—many troubling questions. Moreover, Freitas do Amaral could not let more time elapse. If he wanted to wait, both his popularity—quite reduced from the 49 percent of 16 February 1986—and that of his party would inexorably continue to drop.

Ironically, Freitas can return to the CDS as the unifier of that party and of a certain Portuguese right because he is able to use as a focal point of reference his criticism of (and perhaps, later, his opposition to) Cavaco Silva. It is very probable that the prime minister's task will be made more difficult because of Freitas' presence in the CDS. If such would be the case, the former presidential candidate may come to enjoy the (small) victory of having made Cavaco Silva pay the price for the disdain with which he treated Freitas after the failure (both of them) suffered in the 1986 campaign.

Freitas' political goals remain to be ascertained. Will he continue to dream of Belem [the presidency] or has he decided to take the road he suddenly interrupted in December 1982, when the AD was losing itself in contradictions, the road of a leader of a small party who, like the leaders of other parties (after 19 July 1967) knows that he does not have now or will not soon have the power within reach?

/9274
PAPER COMMENTS ON GORBACHEV RECORD, ARCTIC SECURITY SPEECH

36500004 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Oct 87 p 2

[Unattributed editorial: "He Who Is Going To Do It"]

[Text] Order prevails in Moscow. Mikhail Gorbachev has appeared after the long vacation. The rumor-spreading about his absence is over. The world is returning to discuss the big question of the hour: What will be the effects of the new openness, glasnost, and the restructuring of Soviet society, perestroika, both nationally and internationally? The answer must await a long time; he himself does not know.

It has been a long time since the work of one man was attributed such great significance, if ever at all. This gigantic task alone is fascinating. Gorbachev has not made it easy for himself. Cultural life is flaming up; the intelligentsia recognizes itself as having been given a starring role in this great reform work. Otherwise there are few who have gained advantage for his efforts.

The Soviet workers are being forced to work harder and cut down on their old alcohol rations. Nothing has really gotten better. News has just appeared on the miserable housing problem and on the heating in assigning of available apartments. The military feels understandably little enthusiasm in being confronted with prospects for arms limitations. The bureaucracy is offering resistance against changes. Both the number two man in the Soviet Union, Ligachev, and KGB head Chebrikov are warning of journalistic exaggerations in description of, for example, the Stalin era in tones which absolutely conflict with the party chief's own challenge to openness in dealing with the past.

Neverthelesss, Gorbachev is steaming ahead, restless and apparently unbothered about protests and opposition. Most recently, he has presented a proposal to limit military activity in the Baltic, North Sea and Norwegian Sea, and he even wants to discuss prohibiting naval activity in certain channels and areas in international waters—all this even though he knows how sullen the United States' reaction will be. Freedom of the sea must here be precisely weighed against the obvious need for military restrictions at sea.

Another item of particular note is the recent extensive newspaper article on a new "generally approved system for international peace and security." It is
said not only that Gorbachev so enthusiastically will strengthen the role of the United Nations, but that he is believed to have solutions to almost all international problems, and describes them in anything but Marxist terms. "If there do exist [conventional military] imbalance and disproportion, then let us get rid of them," reads a typical quick example.

The problem with this enormous wealth of new ideas is that it does not always seem to be adequately serious—sweeping gestures are unfortunately an old suspect Soviet speciality. In the volume GORBATJOV OCH SAKERHETEN ["Gorbachev and Security"], in the Foreign Policy Institute's series VÅRLDSPOLITIKENS DAGSFRAKOR ["World Political Issues of the Day"], Julian Lider points to the limitations in the Soviet leader's new international security system.

The Soviets are retaining their doctrine; Marxism-Leninism is not affected. To prevent world war, to restrain the arms race and to establish new international relations are described in Soviet statements as conditions for a future revolutionary reorganizing of the world. This is what is meant by "solving the world's social problems" or "preparing the way for social progress." We are a long, long way from that self-determination for East Europe which Reagan is making a test for Gorbachev's goodwill.

One can go still further by saying that the Soviets still deal out punishment for "anti-Soviet propaganda," interpreted to mean that the state must not "be undermined." The strived-for "complete doctrine"—in Lenin's words—must be in harmony with the interests of society. And who has as yet seen any criticism of security and foreign policy? Amnesty International directs sharp criticism against tough treatment of prisoners in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Dogmatic, nationalistic relapses must be feared as the 70th anniversary of the Revolution approaches.

But it would be extremely one-sided not to realize that something remarkable is going on in Soviet society. So much is being torn up and questioned, above all in the economic area, that it is possible to understand that official in the Soviet Embassy who spoke of an "endless moment."

Even if Gorbachev intends to retain much of central planning and price-restructuring, he envisions testing of amazing flexibility and freedom of action across the whole spectrum, from consumer policy to nuclear superiority. It is this which justifiably arouses attention.

The Soviet Union remains a superpower, frightening for many, uncomfortable for others. Gorbachev and his possibilities to correct big problems should be viewed without illusion. But when there was silence during the several weeks about Gorbachev, people began to wonder. Everything is thought to depend on this one man. He should be able to do it, no one else. This gives reason for pondering.

/9274
FIRST OF NAVY'S STANDARD FLEX 300 SHIPS LAUNCHED

36130002 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 26 Sep 67 Sec III p 5

[Article by Nils Eric Bøesgaard: "Ready for New Warship"]

[Text] Danyard A/S in January will start delivery of six new plastic warships for the Danish fleet. A new building shed costing 50 million kroner and where 120 men will work has been constructed for this purpose.

Danyard A/S in Aalborg yesterday [25 September] held a completion ceremony for the new 50 million kroner concrete and stainless-steel building shed, which will form the framework around the 16 ultra-modern warships for the Danish fleet.

The new shed on Gasvaerksvej in Allborg is 132 meters long, 34 meters wide and 17 meters high, and will be capable of holding two of the 300-ton navy ships at a time, so that from January 1968, it will be possible to deliver one completed ship every six months.

Danyard A/S currently has seven ships on order, but expects that this will be expanded to cover an additional nine ships, stated Project Director Troels Posborg.

The first of the new Standard Flex 300 ships is already launched and is being fitted out in Allborg. The plan is to christen it by Queen Margrethe in a ceremony on 26 October.

Standard Flex 300 is an entirely new warship design, which is being followed with interest the world over. The ship is built of a fiber-glas reinforced plastic sandwich material. This means use of very toxic solvents, and Danyard A/S has therefore had to devote over a fourth of its investment money in the new fabrication shed for exhausting and air-cleaning systems, said engineer Steen Martinsen.
Caption: The first of the fleet's Standard Flex 300 ships has been launched and is being fitted out at a Danyard wharf in Allborg. The ship will be christened by the Queen on 26 October, after which she will undergo sea trials.

/9274
IRREGULARITIES DENOUNCED IN DEI-PYRKAL COOPERATION

Athens TA NEA in Greek 13 May 87 p 3

[Text] Yesterday very serious charges about the involvement of private interests in the DEI-PYRKAL program agreement as well as criticism of the defense industry at its board of directors meeting were levelled by employees of the enterprise.

The matter of awarding the contract for the construction provided in the program agreement and the criticism raised day before yesterday during PYRKAL's board of directors meeting will be discussed today during a conference at the ministry of Industry that will be attended by the minister, Mr. A. Peponis, the deputy minister, Mr. G. Petsos, and representatives of DEI and the defense industry.

Also yesterday, the official opposition intervened in the PYRKAL affair. During the debate in the Chamber of Deputies of an inquiry by ND deputy, Mr. I Palaichkassas, there was an intervention by Mr. Mitsotakis who accused the administration of refusing to control the industry and that the latter sells projectiles to the Greek Army at a higher price than it does to foreigners.

The Employees

The charges about involvement of private interests were levelled yesterday morning during the plenary meeting of the union of PYRKAL employees by its president, Mr. And. Alexandris, and the representative at the board of directors of the company, Mr. S. Khoundras. According to the charges, the private interests that have already shown an interest in undertaking the construction of the DEI-PYRKAL program agreement, can profit by the artful—as it was characterized—delay of the implementation of the specific agreement and the creation of the recent "crisis" in the board of directors of the defense industry.

The specific charges were levelled yesterday morning during the plenary meeting of the PYRKAL employees union by union president Mr. And. Alexandris and its representative on the board of directors of the company, Mr. S. Khoundras, while at the same time:

Highly placed officials of PYRKAL speculated yesterday that, in the event this effort succeeds and the DEI-PYRKAL program agreement is "blown out of the water," the only solution for preventing the country's energy program from "running aground" would be to grant the construction of the specific installations to the private enterprises that have already submitted bids (VIOKAT, METKA and INTRAKOM).
Grant

According to other reports, in view of the delay being observed, officers of the newly-appointed board of directors of the Organization for the Reform of Enterprises (OAE) are reported to support indirectly the granting of the construction contract to private enterprises.

The charges of the employees "about a combined attack against PYRKAL and the program agreement itself," in combination with the recent "crisis" that arose among PYRKAL's board of directors, raise suspicions that:

Based on the scheming "by unknown elements, attempts are being made to prevent the implementation of the DEI-PYRKAL program agreement, which, as is known, provides for construction works for DEI by the country's defense industry in the amount of 12.6 billion drachmae.

Already, as is known, after the unexplainable attitude of PYRKAL's executive board (Kh. Papageorgiou and A. Velis), there has been significant delay in the implementation of this agreement to such a degree that, if the relative contracts between DEI, PYRKAL and ETEKA (a PYRKAL subsidiary that will undertake the construction in accordance with the current ministerial decrees) are not signed by 16 May there is the danger that the second construction "package" will not proceed.

Consequences

At the same time, it has become evident to every agency having jurisdiction that "additional delays are being created in the orderly implementation of the DEI energy program--at least where the development of the mines is concerned, according to the program agreement--with unforeseen consequences for the national economy as well as PYRKAL's credibility."

At this point it should be remembered that the matter at the root of DEI's building program is its timely execution because the more it is delayed the more the energy balance is affected and the importation of thermoelectric energy increases while the dependence on energy produced with foreign exchange-guzzling oil remains.

The fact that the relative soundings had been made "at an unexpected time" raises reasonable questions about the procedures followed by the executive board of PYRKAL on this particular subject in contrast to the decisions of the board of directors of the company and the directives of OAE and deputy minister of Industry, Mr. G. Petsos.

According to information obtained by NEA, the affair developed in the following manner:

Towards the end of 1986 the ministry of Industry, Research and Technology decided to found ETEKA (a subsidiary of OAE and PYRKAL) for a better implementation of the objectives of the DEI-Pyrkal program agreement.
In December 1986 (decree 545 of the Executive Board dated 14 December 1986) PYRKAL decided to transfer the construction to ETEKA and entrust the execution of this decision the Executive Board (Kh. Papageorgiou- A. Velis).

This implementation occurred after 3½ months under the responsibility of the chairman of the company's board of directors, Mr. Kh. Papageorgiou, while the charges levelled by the employees of DEI and PYRKAL that the program agreement was already the target of organized private interests were already known.

The same day, during a conference between the members of the executive board and the chairman of the board having jurisdiction over P.S.'s works, Mr. P. Tsangarakis, the means for the implementation of the relative decision by the board of directors of PYRKAL were set forth.

The aforementioned agreement was approved by OAE (9 April 1987) and on 16 April 1987 deputy minister of VET, Mr. Petsos ordered that the transfer to ETEKA of the construction contract be finalized by the end of April.

Problems

In the meantime, after day before yesterday's disagreement between the members of PYRKAL's executive board on the one side and the representatives of he employees of the ministries of National Defense and National Economy on the other, it was discovered that the Papageorgiou-Velis insistence and directive that the proposals of the committees not go into effect, have had, according to current evaluations, the following consequences:

The blocked Petsos decree, in view of the fact that legislative regulation is necessary for the enactment of a new ETEKA-DEI program agreement.

PYRKAL's contribution to the joint capital of ETEKA with amounts equal to its real worth would mean the annulment of YVET's [Ministry of Industry, Research and Technology] decree for the formation of ETEKA, because, as has been claimed, in order to keep the make up of ETEKA's joint capital, PYRKAL should contribute 1 billion drachmae and OAE 7 billion drachmae.

In the Chamber of Deputies

The debate on Mr. Palaiokrassas' question degenerated into a duel between deputy minister of Industry, Mr. G. Petsos, and ND leader, Mr. K. Mitsotakis, who took the floor four times.

In other words, Mr. Palaiokrassas' inquiry claimed that PYRKAL has purchased 75,000 fire hoses from an American broker instead of the manufacturing company.

According to Mr. Palaiokrassas, the documents he has in his possession "reveal that there were many improprieties during the purchase of these fire hoses and, among other things, that the head of the directorate having jurisdiction was replaced and when the scandal became public, there was even the forgery of a company telex."

In addition, ND's deputy reported that PYRKAL's balance sheets had been altered and recalled day before yesterday's events when PYRKAL's budget was voted down during the meeting. The data in Mr. Palaiokrassas' possession raise PYRKAL's overall losses to 6 billion drachmae.
Mr. Petsos

"The only way," Mr. Petsos stated, "is the path that leads to justice. This is the path we follow. However, we should not conclude that every time we proceed with making an administrative audit there exists a scandal. There is quite a difference between the two."

Speaking about the purchase of the fire hoses, the deputy minister mentioned that the bidding had taken place openly and that six firms had bid, "Hamilton" being the only one able to meet the specifications.

Regarding the data requested by ND, Mr. Petsos called Mr. Mitsotakis and Mr. Palaiokrassas in order to give them the data privately, but he refused to submit them to the Chamber of Deputies, insisting that they were classified as "top secret."

Finally, in response to the allegation that the balance sheets had been altered, Mr. Petsos stated that is only a matter of accounting entries.

For his part, the ND leader, Mr. K. Mitsotakis in his repeated inquiries, reiterated his allegations that PASOK does not want any control and claimed also that PYRKAL sells projectiles to the Greek Army at a higher price than to foreign countries.

9731
CSO:3521/141
'SCANDALOUS' SHIP CONTRACT AWARD

Athens I VRADYN I in Greek 27 May 87 p 6

[Text] The Ministry of National Defense is going ahead, by "direct award," in the building of five ships required by the Navy. It involves five 300-ton-capacity barges, four of which will be used to transport oil and one water.

The "direct award" signed by the deputy minister of National Defense, Mr. Th. Stathis, was made to the "Elefsina Shipyards, Ltd.," after modifying a disapproving decision of the GEN [General Naval Staff].

The cost of building the five barges is 188 million drachmae. This price is considered to be an initial one and can be raised by 3 million "to cover eventual improvements that may become necessary in the building designs and any additional work to be performed."

In addition to the "direct award," even the manner of payment to the Elefsina Shipyards is considered scandalous because it provides for: the payment of 45 percent of the price, that is, approximately 78 million drachmae within 30 days from the day of the signing of the contract.

According to reports, the initial price that had been agreed upon was 165 million drachmae; and this price was increased by 23 million drachmae with the modification of the disapproving decision.

The justification provided was that the horsepower of the power plant of the four barges being built was increased from 48 hp to 100 hp.

9731
CSD: 3521/141
EQUIPMENT COPRODUCTION SOUGHT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29 May 87 p 15

[Text] The cooperation and coproduction of equipment with foreign industrial complexes is now being used by the ministry of Industry as the "pivot" for industrial development.

As Deputy of Industry G. Petsos announced, this policy will be followed on a permanent basis and will be combined as much as possible with the greater utilization of the offset benefits offered.

Mr. Petsos mentioned ELVO (formerly STEYR) as a model for this policy for industrial development and gave the following details regarding its operations program:

a. The production of 4,500 Jeeps for the Armed Forces in combination with a plan for improving them for use as weapons carriers;

b. A plan for manufacturing 292 "Leonidas II" armored personnel carriers in combination with a program to improve them for use as combat armored vehicles (by adding a turret).

In addition to the above, the adoption of large programs in the area of taxis and civilian Jeeps that fit in with the strategic plans of the company is in the process of being studied.

The majority of the above programs will be implemented in cooperation with ELVO's former controlling company, STEYR of Austria, which, according to reliable sources, has agreed to participate in the imminent increase of ELVO's capital by converting into shares part of the capital demands that exceed 1 billion drachmae in foreign exchange.

9731
CSO: 3521/141
INCREASED ELVO CAPITALIZATION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 30 May 87 p 14

[Text] The increase in the joint capital of EVO [as published in original article; however, throughout the article, should be ELVO (Hellenic Vehicle Industry)] will surpass 2 billion drachmas and, according to reports, is to be announced by the middle of June. Participating in the increase will be ETVA [Hellenic Industrial Development Bank] and STEYR of Austria, according to an agreement reached by the deputy minister of industry during his recent trip to Vienna. It is expected that ETVA's participation will be substantial enough so as not to upset the percentage of the government's participation in the company and its control of it.

As far as STEYR of Austria (formerly the controlling company of EVO) is concerned, its decision to participate in the increase of the joint capital is directly connected to the agreements made with EVO on coproduction in a series of projects involving Army procurements. Moreover, the participation will be effected by converting EVO's debts to STEYR into shares, a solution that is reported to be advantageous to the Austrian company.

The most recent EVO-STEYR coproduction project involves the manufacture of 292 armored vehicles (Leonidas II) for the Greek Army. According to reports regarding this project, ETVA will undertake the financing of the agreement (in essence, the Army) and will in turn be refinanced by the Austrian banking group headed by CREDITANSTALT BANK. The capital for the financing will be provided by 10 billion drachmas from ETVA and by 1.3 billion shillings, which is approximately 13 billion drachmas, from the Austrian group. The advance payment for initiating the project will amount to 10 percent of the overall financing and will be provided by the Austrian banking group.

9731
CSO: 3521/141
BRIEFS

DEI-PYRKAL COOPERATION--A plan for the participation of DEI in the PYRKAL subsidiary company, which will undertake all manufacturing, is being pushed by DEI with the consent of Mr. A. Peponis, minister of Industry and Energy. Prior to DEI's participation in PYRKAL, the process of splitting the latter into two companies will be finalized. Of the two new companies, one will continue to produce military materiel, while the other will be a manufacturing enterprise. DEI believes that its partnership with PYRKAL will speed up the planning agreements undertaken by the government-controlled industry, which is considered to be of strategic importance. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 10 Jun 87 p 7] 9731

FRENCH MISSILES PURCHASE--The government is about to order 300 French "Magic 2" rockets for aircraft despite the fact that these missiles are not compatible for use by F-16 aircraft. The order is being placed to cover the French loan we contracted in order to facilitate the purchase of the "Mirage." [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 10 Jun 87 p 2] 9731

SOVIET AIR PENETRATION--The government is keeping silent regarding the violation of air traffic regulations by two Soviet combat aircraft in contrast to the procedure it follows when the aircraft are American. The aircraft refused to submit a flight plan, following the same procedure used by Turkey and the United States. This fact is disturbing because when these violations are perpetrated by two superpowers the example they set for other countries is somewhat damaging to Greek interests. [Text] [Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 3 Jun 87 p 1] 9731

CSO: 3521/141
FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL: NATO PRESENCE IN NORTH NECESSARY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 23 Sep 87 p 5

[Article by Paul Einar Vatne: "NATO Presence Necessary"]

[Text] "An approximate balance of conventional forces can be a realistic, if long-range, goal in Central Europe. We on the northern flank must be prepared in the foreseeable future to live with a local balance of forces in the Soviet Union's favor."

It was Undersecretary Arne Karstad who said this when he delivered a lecture on current issues in Norwegian security policy at the opening of the Joint Staff College's main course. Karstad stressed the need for a perpetual Norwegian and NATO presence in the Norwegian Sea "in order to prevent the Soviet Union from having cause to regard the northern seas as its sphere of influence.

"The Storting report on the activity of the Defense Forces from 1983 to 1993, which comes out this autumn, concludes by saying that it does not appear necessary to modify the importance given to northern Norway," said Karstad.

Isolated Attack

"It is still our assessment that the standing Soviet forces in the north—perhaps with reinforcements which can be brought in quickly—have at most the capacity for nothing but an isolated and limited attack across the Norwegian-Soviet border and towards the northernmost parts of Norwegian territory, including the Arctic islands," said Undersecretary Karstad.

"Any attack beyond a limited attack will require considerable preparations and the introduction of combined forces on a large scale, which will give us ample warning time.

"Before a sea-based invasion of Trondelag or southern Norway can take place, allied naval and air power in the Norwegian, North, and Baltic seas must be wiped out. In the initial phases of a war, we therefore still regard southern Norway as relatively secure from any form of attack other than sabotage and limited actions with well-defined goals. A large-scale invasion in the initial phase seems very unlikely," asserted the undersecretary.
Control of Seas

He continued: "A credible conventional defense of the northern region and the central frontal sector of NATO presupposes that we in the west control the seas outside Norway. Both our own and the alliance's security would be jeopardized if the Soviet Union managed to establish control outside Norway. It would lead to fateful scrambles in times of crisis, and Norway would be placed under enormous pressure.

"We are therefore interested in increased participation of American aircraft carriers in NATO maneuvers in the Norwegian Sea. It is also in our interest that other allied naval forces show the flag in the northern seas on a routine basis. And it is of special importance that gray-painted Norwegian vessels with naval ensign be seen in northern waters in order to prevent the Soviet Union from having cause to regard the northern seas as its sphere of influence," said Undersecretary Arne Karstad. However, he opposes the permanent presence of offensive naval forces, such as fleets of American aircraft carriers. That would certainly lead to Soviet countermeasures in the form of similar patrol activity, he believed.

12327
CSO: 3639/2
PAPER VIEWS PROBLEM OF FINDING REPLACEMENT FOR CAST BRIGADE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Sep 87 p 2

[Editorial: "An Allied Brigade in North"; passage in slantlines in italics in original]

[Text] Canada's decision not to go in for advance storage and not to earmark special funds for a CAST brigade in northern Norway has created a "void" in Norwegian and allied defense planning—and launched a difficult and delicate search for a substitute. Other countries are not exactly standing in line to get permission to contribute to Norway's defense. Nor is the situation such that it would be wise for Norway to divide its allies into "suitable" and "unsuitable" countries. "It would look less like an escalation if Canadian rather than American troops were brought in during a crisis," said Defense Minister Johan Jorgen Holst this week to the North Atlantic Assembly in Oslo. That is a statement which is probably more judicious when it comes from a seminar participant than from a responsible Norwegian cabinet minister. In Norwegian self-interest, we should also avoid discrimination among our European allies, especially when the government is trying in a praiseworthy way to expand our military contacts with a string of West European countries.

When we Norwegians go out and request support for the defense of our country—something which geography and demography make necessary—then we must expect our allies to focus the spotlight on what we ourselves do to improve our defensive capacity. Robert Hicks, leader of Canada's delegation to the conference in the North Atlantic Assembly, has said that some of the problems surrounding the CAST brigade would have been solved if Norway had handled its military base policy—no stationing of foreign forces in peacetime—in another manner. He points out a connection between Norwegian and allied policy which we ourselves should not overlook: if we formulate too many special rules for Norway and enforce them too rigidly, then we must accept the preference of some allies to make their contribution to the common defense within the borders of other countries. It is no doubt correct that broader political judgments lay behind the Canadian decision, but it is also clear that Norwegian attitudes contributed to the rejection which came.
If the Canadians' decision, which was handed down earlier this summer, also means that they renounce northern Norway as a possible area of operations, then this is a step backward in Norwegian-Canadian teamwork that has existed for several decades. It is therefore important both for NATO's military committee to come up with a proposal for substitutes and for Norway not to place political obstacles in the road to possible solutions. The relative strength of military forces calls for realistic measures in the north.

12327
CSO: 3639/2
AIR COLLISION OVER BARENTS VIEWED IN CONTEXT OF USSR POLICY

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 Sep 87 p 2

[Op Ed Article by John Kristen Skogan: "Is Norway Obliged to Yield Right of Way in North?"]

[Text] Researcher John Kristen Skogan of the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs places the recent and serious airplane episode over the Barents Sea in a broader context: unless we handle such events with a firmer hand, Soviet assumptions about Norway's duty to yield the right of way in the north may be strengthened.

Since the mid-1970s, a series of episodes in the north has left its mark on relations between Norway and the Soviet Union. The incidents have been very dissimilar. Some, like the airplane crash at Hopen in 1978, have had an undisguised element of the dramatic. Others have seemed more innocent. The so-called wives' affair from 1975-76, when Soviet officials at the Longyearby airport brought along their wives in defiance of housing regulations and garrison plans, even had a comic tinge.

More Serious

The general impression is, moreover, that the incidents in the second half of the 1970s were more serious than those in the 1980s. But there have also been several incidents during the current decade. And the one over the Barents Sea barely 2 weeks ago was not just a new one in the series. To judge by the report, the pilot of the Soviet fighter plane came within centimeters of turning the incident into the most serious one in a long time in the relationship between Norway and the Soviet Union.

Sporadic incidents and difficulties between our two countries in the north are nothing new at all. If since the mid-1970s they have nevertheless begun to color our relations with the Soviet Union more intensely and if they are accorded increased attention in the news media, it is partly due to their greater frequency. But maybe even more important is the fact that they have occurred at the same time as thorny aspects of our relations with the Soviet Union have taken on greater weight and revealed themselves more clearly to most Norwegians.
Desired Special Standing

It became evident during the 1970s that the Soviet Union sought special standing and special treatment on Svalbard which were incompatible with Norwegian interests. In the question of exploiting resources and establishing boundaries in the Barents Sea, it also became obvious little by little that the Soviet Union required priority for its interests. Fundamental incongruities between Norwegian and Soviet views were unveiled; they made Norwegian-Soviet relations more burdensome in the last half of the 1970s.

Military Buildup

In addition, we began to learn more about the major naval buildup that had taken place on the Soviet side in the north. It gave rise to the Soviets' new and powerful military interests in the area. In the 1970s it was common in Norway to speak about the Soviet Union's "legitimate security interests" in the north. Yet most Norwegians understood that the Soviet military power there might also manifest itself in interests which, from a Norwegian viewpoint, could not in any way be regarded as "legitimate" and justified. This formed a significant part of the upstage scenery for the disagreements between Norway and the Soviet Union over the northern territories.

These disagreements still exist, even though they are not felt as acutely today as they were 10 years ago. The need to live with them has led in part to their being swept under the rug. But they can suddenly reemerge—in connection with the new negotiations on partition lines, for example. The disagreements involve positions, rights, and "traffic laws" in the north. Underneath is perceptible a Soviet demand for fortification of its positions, for recognition of special Soviet privileges in the area, and for the priority of Soviet interests there. Soviet military power in the north heightens the feeling of such a demand.

Staged?

The numerous minor and major incidents in the north—and particularly the way they are handled—can quite clearly influence the issues which these disagreements involve. One may even harbor the suspicion that some of the incidents were staged by the Soviet Union in order to exert just such an influence. This applies, among other things, to the Soviet missile tests in the Barents Sea in 1975–76. That is why the incidents have received so much attention. They can be used not only to define Soviet interests and demands but also to attempt to get Norwegian authorities to give special attention to the Soviet interests involved and to "temper justice with mercy" when it comes to Soviet conduct, in order not to worsen the problems created by the incidents. If such attempts succeed, the "traffic laws" can gradually be changed in the Soviets' favor. But we Norwegians have understood this.

Cold Comfort

Still, in recent years there has been a tendency in Norway to seek consolation in the fact that some of the episodes were obviously sheer accidents, that
other countries could have caused them, and that therefore perhaps they were not so serious. But this is cold and fallacious comfort.

In the first place, it is often hard to know for certain whether an episode was accidental. It is my impression that Norwegian authorities have a desire and a tendency to construe such episodes as accidents, find it tempting to make them look that way, and hope for a tepid reaction by the Norwegian public.

Must Expect New Ones

In the second place, it is the way episodes are handled, regardless of their cause, which determines whether they will influence positions, privileges, and rules of conduct in the north. The plane crash at Hopen was certainly an accident. But had it been handled with less firmness by the Norwegian authorities, it could have weakened our standing and our rights in that area. With the increasing nearness of Norwegian and Soviet activity in the north, we should expect new incidents in the future. If we believe they are accidents and start to take them less seriously, this can easily become a habit and can reinforce Soviet assumptions about Norway's duty to yield to Soviet interests and conduct— even if an episode was deliberately staged.
OVERVIEW OF REORGANIZED DEFENSE MINISTRY

Madrid DEFENSA in Spanish Mar 87 pp 17-28

[Article by Infantry Col Antonio Torrecillas Velasco: "The Reorganization of the Defense Ministry"]

[Text] On 14 July of this year we shall mark the 10th anniversary of the creation of the Defense Ministry based on the provisions of Royal Decree 1588/77, which restructured certain organs of the Central State Administration. Although the period of time that has elapsed since then is not lengthy enough to allow us to assess the results of the performance of an agency of this type, whose planning and management activities must be carried out over a long period, the 10 years that have passed are years of intensive activity and replete with experience and actions of quite varying types.

We consider it beneficial to disseminate among the members of the Armed Forces as a whole the information regarding the criteria that have governed the new restructuring of the department, as a development of the consolidation process undertaken in 1977, which to some extent may be considered a factor to justify its consecutive reorganizations, stemming from:

The existence for nearly 40 years of three military departments, with a large degree of autonomy in their management;

The meager engagement on the part of our administration in activities relating to national defense;

The desire, felt from the outset, to achieve a genuine Defense Ministry, and not a mere department, integrating the three branches of service.

The new Ministry was incorporated into the State Administration as the organ responsible for:

"The organization and coordination of the government's general policy insofar as national defense is concerned."

"The execution of the pertinent military policy."
Upon the passage of the 4-month period that Royal Decree 1558/77, in creating the Ministry, granted to establish the corresponding organization, on 2 November, by virtue of Royal Decree 2723/77, the first structure of a unifying and functional nature was adopted, making a distinction between two areas of management therein:

On the one hand, the organs of command and leadership of the "military chain of command," from which the then Higher Staff was excluded.

On the other, the organs of leadership of the "político-administrative branch," with a mission to provide the branches of services with the necessary resources.

It was still a somewhat embryonic organization which, nevertheless, showed some features of unquestionable interest, owing to their permanence throughout the different reorganizations that have affected the department.

In fact:

The organs for management of personnel, materiel, and economic-financial resources now appear clearly defined. This functional organization for resources, easily in keeping with the Armed Forces' functional logistical organization, would remain unchanged in essence during consecutive reorganizations.

The organ to back the Ministry in the "definition, organization, and coordination" of the defense police has been created, under the aegis of the department's undersecretariat.

Also created is the Technical General Secretary's Office, similar to other departments, as well as the Office of Public Information, Dissemination, and Relations.

Subsequently, and as fundamental phases in that consolidation process that we have cited previously, we shall emphasize:

The JUJEM's [Joint Chiefs of Staff] "administrative" attachment to the department, on 27 March 1978, by Royal Decree 836/78, and the channeling of its dependence on the prime minister of the government, through the defense minister.

The organization of the "político-administrative" branch into two blocs, for the purpose of lending greater effectiveness to its management, in February 1982 (Royal Decree 252/82):

An Undersecretariat of Defense Policy;

An Undersecretariat of Defense for economic resources and those for weaponry and materiel.

On 5 June 1984, the amendment of Organic Law 6/80 occurred, by virtue of one of equal rank, namely, 1/84. The first law cited only restated, in its general
lines, the criteria existing up until that time; and hence it was unnecessary to make any change in the organization in effect at that time. But the one cited secondly would make some fundamental changes in the concept of our defense (Tables Nos. 1 and 2):

The prime minister of the government now added to his previous powers those of:

Ordering, coordinating, and directing the Armed Forces' activities, approving their distribution and the measures intended to provide for their needs.

To determine the major strategic plans, those on military policy, and the major strategic objectives.

The image of the defense minister is clearly defined in relation to:

The defense policy: direction thereof, by delegation from the prime minister of the government.

The military policy: in addition to the powers that he already had relating to its preparation, determination, and execution, he was assigned those of:

Formulating the joint strategic plan, determining within it the joint force objective (that is, the military potential to be created).

To direct and coordinate the policy on resources (personnel, materiel, infrastructure, and economic-financial).

The military administration: the direction thereof was assigned to him by delegation from the government.

The Armed Forces: to order, coordinate, and direct their activity, by delegation from the prime minister of the government.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff lose their nature as a collegial organ of command, acquiring the nature of an advisory organ.

The position of defense chief of staff was created as:

The minister's leading collaborator in the operational aspects of the military policy, and leading member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Possible general chief of the Armed Forces Operational Command in wartime, under the authority of the prime minister of the government.

As a result of these new criteria in the concept of our defense, it was necessary to undertake the immediate modification of the existing structures. Therefore, 20 days later, through Royal Decree 135/84, of 25 January, the ministry's organization was geared to those new criteria, also attempting to achieve an organic structure:

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Capable of guaranteeing "the formulation of a common policy and a coordinated management for it in the three branches of service"

"Similar to that of the other Ministries"

For these purposes:

The distinction disappeared between military chain of command and politico-administrative branch, whereby, for the first time, the former was fully integrated into the department.

A "functional dependence" was established in the common areas of activity of certain organs of the branches of service regarding the general directorates created.

The department was structured as a single entity, based on the following organs:

Defense Chief of Staff, under whom the General Directorate of Defense Policy was placed.

State Secretariat, as an organ responsible for the economic, materiel, and infrastructural resources.

Undersecretariat of Defense, which contains the Technical General Secretariat, including the legislative program and the organs responsible for personnel resources and informational and social relations.

The three branches of service appear for the first time (and not only their general headquarters), forming a part of the Ministry's organization.

Also included as organs directly dependent on the minister were:

The Civil Guard, in the terms stipulated by Organic Law 6/80.

The Superior Center for Defense Intelligence, which, following the criteria in Ministerial Order 135/82, of 30 September, now appeared as an intelligence organ of the prime minister of the government and not merely of the minister.

With regard to the former: insofar as defense policy and defense of the state are concerned.

With regard to the latter: insofar as defense policy and military policy are concerned.

As advisory and consultative organs, the Supreme Council of Military Justice, and the Superior Councils of the branches of service.

The comment made thus far on the department's progress will help us to better understand the reorganization of January 1987, which, with its fundamental features inspired by that of 1984, would remodel the existing structures in keeping with the following criteria:
a. To rationally arrange and demarcate the powers of the superior organs, chiefs of staff of the branches of service, control centers, and general headquarters in the areas of defense policy, military policy, military administration, and Armed Forces.

Tables Nos. 1 and 2 detail the authority of the various superior organs of national defense in these areas of activity.

b. To reinforce and improve the functional relations among the general directorates and the authorized organs of the branches of service, reinforcing the role of the former in the procurement of resources, and unburdening the latter of bureaucratic-administrative functions.

c. To emphasize the operational nature of the Defense Staff.

The new structure may be regarded as basically divided into:

Leadership organs:

Defense Staff

Two "superior organs" (State Secretariat and Undersecretariat), the minister's main collaborators in the:

Preparation, direction, and development of the policy pertaining to the resources or functions assigned to them.

The three branches of service, structured in a General Headquarters, Force, and Force Backup.

Directional Centers (general directorates), some directly subordinate to the minister, and others to the superior organs, charged with:

Preparing, planning, developing, supervising, and directing the execution of the policy pertaining to the resources or functions assigned to them.


Advisory and consultative organs of the minister.

We shall now proceed to examine each of these agencies, in the same order in which they appear in Royal Decree 1/87, of 1 January, taking more of an interest in the philosophy of the role played by each of them than in the details of their missions and internal composition (Tables Nos 3 and 4).
The Superior Center for Defense Intelligence (CESID)

It retains the functions and offices assigned to it in the 1984 reorganization. We might mention that, on 27 December 1985, by Royal Decree 2632/85, its internal structure and its relations were regulated.

We should stress that the reorganization of January of this year assigns a new function to this directive center:

"To coordinate the action of the various agencies using code methods or procedures, to guarantee cryptographic security, to promote the coordinated acquisition of material, and to train specialized personnel."

The General Directorate of Defense Policy (DIGENPOL)

It has been organized for the first time under the direct subordination of the minister. An agency of this type, responsible for the defense policy in general, must preferably engage in planning, and not carrying out, activities. As a result, it has been relieved of executive functions such as:

Those relating to zones and installations of interest to national defense.

Certain activities relating to defense telecommunications, which have been turned over to the headquarters with that name, created in February of last year.

In short, the areas in which this directorate will exercise its action are:

Studies and reports on defense (directives, national defense objectives, lines of action, major strategic objectives, etc.); in brief, all those relating to the general defense plan.

Civil defense: to "manage" the Ministry's own participation in it, and to "coordinate" that of the other departments.

Mobilization: to direct it on the ministerial level, and to coordinate it in the interministerial area.

International aspects of defense policy: the only activity in which the directorate will also act as a management organ.

In accordance with this, this directive center has been structured as:

A General Subdirectorate of Studies and Plans

A General Subdirectorate of Civil Defense, which assumes the powers previously assigned to the defunct General Subdirectorate of National Defense Affairs and the Central Mobilization Service.

A General Subdirectorate of International Defense Affairs.
The general director of defense policy will also act as secretary of the National Defense Board.

The General Directorate of Defense Informational and Social Relations (DRISDE)

This agency is directly under the head of the department for all purposes.

DRISDE's action applies fundamentally to the following areas:

Informational policy of a general nature, of great significance to the development of defense policy;

Protocol and public relations;

Cultural policy, also including recreational, sports, and training activities.

For these purposes, this general directorate is organized as:

A General Subdirectorate of News Media

A general Subdirectorate of Cultural Action and Dissemination, newly created, the need for which was clearly felt in view of the increase in activities of this type carried out by the department, particularly in support of the units and agencies.

Defense Staff (EMAD)

It constitutes one of the basic reasons for the reorganization carried out, because without a complete development of the operational framework for unified action, the military aspects of defense could never be put into effect.

It was necessary to develop DEMAD's [Joint Defense Staff's] role in connection with:

The determination of the volume and features of the force to be created.

Its capacity for planning the operations resulting from the PEC [Joint Strategic Plan].

The creation and command of the Unified and/or Specified Commands, as well as the provision of operational and logistical resources for them.

The training of the forces that would have to carry out such operations.

For these purposes, in Royal Decree 1/87, of 1 January:

DEMAD has been assigned the responsibility for devising and submitting to the minister the proposal for the Joint Strategic Plan (and, as part thereof, the Joint Force Objective), as well as that for the "Force Plan," a new concept
to be introduced into our planning system, which resembles that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In their general lines, the authority that the defense chief of staff has been exercising to date is maintained, with regard to:

The unified and specific commands, operations directives and documents, intelligence, electronic warfare, telecommunications, unification of services, and doctrine for unified action.

The strategic leadership, in the event that the situation arises, but now with the specification that he will be "assisted" in these duties by the JEM's [staff chiefs] of the branches of service.

The logistical plans and those on mobilization to conduct military operations, also assigning him the mission of "fostering the latter's satisfactory implementation."

His authority has been intensified in connection with the preparation and testing of the effectiveness of the plans devised, because he is authorized to:

Program, direct, and lead the conducting of exercises for this purpose;

Supervise the status of the Armed Forces' training and operational effectiveness, through delegation from the minister, "in accordance with the directives that are submitted for his approval."

State Defense Secretariat (SEDEF)

In its fundamental lines, it continues to maintain the authority and basic structure that it was assigned in the 1984 organization, as a superior organ responsible for the resources involving:

Materiel
Infraestructure
Economic and financial areas.

Its powers are reinforced with the delegation that the minister makes of said authority related to the powers granted him by Organic Law 6/80, amended by 1/84; and his authority is also clearly depicted with regard to:

The international aspects of the policies on weaponry and infrastructure;

The joint proposal, with JEMAD, of the programs for equipment and infrastructure, to the minister.

In connection with the directive centers subordinate to this superior organ, we deem it fitting to emphasize:
General Directorate of Weaponry and Materiel

A fundamental directive center in the process of determining requirements, procuring resources, and managing them, which will carry out its activity in the following areas:

Research and development: proposal, promotion, and also management of the programs that are devised.

Purchases: there are two possibilities, which are handled by the branches of service or the DGAM itself.

The international aspects of the policy on weaponry and materiel, in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DIGENPOL.

The national defense industrial policy, with the authority to:

Collaborate in its formulation and execution;

To become apprised of its own capacities and to rate the enterprises;

To inspect this activity technically and economically;

To oversee the industrial safety within its area of authority.

Industrial mobilization: in collaboration with the General Directorate of Defense Policy.

As a new activity assigned to this directorate in that attempt to improve the support to the arms and equipment systems, it is fitting to stress that relating to "logistical support on the industrial level to said systems," which will be combined with that already assigned previously, of "intervening" as a technical quality control organ in the reception of weaponry and materiel.

And, as activities in collaboration with the foregoing, all matters relating to standardization, cataloging, and approval of products of interest to the Armed Forces.

As for the organization of this directorate, we shall emphasize:

The abolition of the General Subdirectorates of Centers, as a development in the process of transferring the manufacturing authority to entities that are not dependent on the Defense Ministry.

The creation of the General Subdirectorates of International Cooperation, in keeping with the importance that such activities have acquired.

The other four General Subdirectorates of the 1984 reorganization are retained.
General Directorate of Economic Affairs (DIGENECO)

This general directorate continues to retain its powers in connection with the budgetary activities, organization of payments, economic programming, cost control, administration of certain resources, and contracting.

As activities lending a new dimension to this directive center, we shall cite those relating to:

The general public and accounting (analytical and financial) plan;

The administration of the resources of the Defense Attache Offices and economic and financial control of purchases abroad.

Other aspects which will undergo a gradual development as the department's new structure is adopted are those pertaining to:

Personnel expenses: regarding which powers have been given to the general directorate responsible for these resources;

All those activities related to the Central Defense Organ, such as personnel of that central organ, paymaster's offices for active reserve, temporary reserve, and disabled ex-servicemen, purchase of materiel, etc.

Insofar as the organization of this general directorate is concerned, we shall cite:

The abolition of the General Payment Organization (Budget Law of 1986);

The abolition of the General Subdirectorates of Personnel Expenses;

The creation of the General Subdirectorates of Accounting, which will assume some of the authority of the foregoing organ and that relating to financial and analytical accounting.

The Budget Office and the General Subdirectorates of Programming and Monitoring, Economic Management, and Contracting are maintained.

General Directorate of Infrastructure (DIGEWIN)

This directive center is assigned responsibility for the infrastructure policy in general, without the details specified in Royal Decree 135/84 (construction, installations, firing and maneuvers ranges, etc.).

Its authority is maintained, in general lines, with respect to:

Plans and programs for infrastructure, projects, studies, inspections, judgments, and reports;

Management of properties, purchases, and expropriations;
and, as activities that will lend it another new dimension in keeping with the features that the management of these resources has, we shall mention:

Those of territorial organization and environmental protection;

Those of classifying installations;

Those relating to zones and installations of defense interest which were previously exercised by DIGENPOL.

In accordance with this, the two General Subdirectorates of Patrimony and Projects and Works (formerly called Works and Installations) are maintained.

The General Subdirectorate of Planning and Classification is created to deal with the new missions.

General Defense Intervention

This agency is again integrated into the bloc responsible for economic resources as specified in the organization of 12 February 1982 (Royal Decree 252/82).

The Undersecretariat of Defense (SUBDEF)

As we noted for the State Secretariat, its authority has been reinforced with the delegation that the minister makes to this authority of the powers assigned it by Organic Law 6/80, of 1 July, amended by 1/84, of 5 January, in connection with the policy on personnel, payment, social action, and supervision of military instruction.

As in the case of any other resource, for personnel resources there is a need to determine their requirements, procure them, and administer them. Now then, this resource is the only one ordinarily procured by the military institution virtually in its entirety within the institution itself, with military instruction playing a fundamental role in said procurement.

Moreover, the Undersecretariat of Defense appears as the organ responsible for the activities relating to "military administration." This area of activity will undergo considerable development based on the still embryonic organization that has been given in this regard to the department, for the purpose of relieving the branches of service of them, for the benefit of those of an operational nature.

Based on these criteria, the Undersecretariat of Defense is divided into:

Technical General Secretariat (SEGENTE):

Similar to those of other departments, whose specific areas of activity may be summarized as:
General provisions of the department and administrative procedure;

Organization and methods, technical services to support decisions and management, including: data processing, statistics, operational research, cartography, documentation, social studies, psychology, and psychotechnology.

Resources, right to petition, conflicts of authority, and administrative information;

Official publications.

Consequently, this directive center on the organic level of a general directorate maintains the 1984 structure along its general lines:

Technical General Vicesecretariat;

General Subdirectorates of Technical Services;

General Subdirectorates of Resources and Administrative Information;

Publications Center (which was not included in the 1984 organization, since it was created on 1 August 1985 by Royal Decree 1434/85).

General Directorate of Personnel (DIGENPER)

This directive center appears as the organ responsible for:

The determination of personnel requirements based on the Joint Force objective;

The management of affairs relating to personnel policy (military and civilian) and, in particular, those relating to:

Recruitment, general conditions for rendering military service, and control of reserve personnel;

Social action;

Payment.

Special attention should be given to the first mission now assigned to this general directorate:

"To devise and propose the general system of the military function," the material development of which must be carried out gradually, in view of the complexity of the matters to be covered.

According to the new concept given to this directorate, its division has been made, in keeping with the following criteria:
Two general subdirectorates responsible for matters pertaining to military personnel and civilian personnel, respectively;

A general subdirectorate responsible for matters relating to "military service," abolishing the General Subdirectorate of Education, which has been raised to the rank of a general directorate, and the General Subdirectorate of Social Action, whose activities are integrated into the foregoing.

General Directorate of Education (newly created)

This directional center is the one that appears to have aroused the most suspense in the department's reorganization, and this is unquestionably one of the fundamental reasons for its restructuring.

Traditionally, and this is also very widespread, as a rule in the branches of services of the various countries, education is usually a function very closely linked to the military command, owing to its connection with the instruction and training activities.

Now then, the breadth that the process of training the command cadres of the branches of service has been acquiring, and the increasingly close interconnection between the knowledge that those responsible for defense must have and that in other areas of state administration, lend a new dimension to military education; which can no longer be thought of as an isolated activity without connections to the other areas. Our administration may perhaps be regarded as a pioneer, from the standpoint of the new concept attached to this activity.

The newly created directorate appears with two well-defined areas of management:

One of general planning and organization: design of the general educational system, study programs and plans, teaching methods, evaluation systems, relations with other native and foreign educational centers, statutes for faculty and students, etc;

Another, for management: leadership of the centers situated under the direct subordination of this directional center.

For these purposes, the directorate is organized into two general subdirectories:

One for educational organization;

Another for educational management.

General Directorate of Services (newly created)

To be organized based on the former General Subdirectorate of Services, which was directly subordinate to the Underscretariat of Defense. This new directorate will apply its action to the following areas of activity:
The traditional ones of a Chief Clerk's Office, similar to that of any other ministry (internal government, records, files, etc.);

Those relating to the administration and operation of the Central Organ: management of personnel assigned to it, conservation and security of the installations, equipment, general services, etc., also associated with a General Directorate of Services of any department;

The administration and management of the centers, agencies, and services which constitute the peripheral structure of the department, a new function of great significance, the development of which will be essential for relieving the force of authority relating to the military administration that it has been carrying out up until now;

The administration and management of communications systems and networks of defense interest (except the specific ones for directing operations); a new function assigned to this directorate, under the Superior Defense Telecommunications Headquarters, created on an organic level of a general subdirectorate on 21 February of last year (Royal Decree 394/86).

Consequently, the General Directorate of Services is structured as:

General Subdirectorate of Internal System;

General Subdirectorate of Centers and Services;

Defense Telecommunications Headquarters.

Defense Legal Consultation

It is still included in the Undersecretariat of Defense as in the 1984 organization.

Army, Navy, and Air Force

As in the 1984 organization, it is still specified that they will be comprised of the General Headquarters, the Force, and the Force Backup.

The functions of the staff chiefs of the branches of service are retained with respect to effectiveness, morale, discipline, military doctrine, organic plans, those for instruction, training, preparation, and formation, pertaining to their branch of service.

Others are clearly defined and developed, which had already been assigned, in connection with:

The Joint Strategic Plan: they are assigned the mission of serving as collaborators with JENAD, and not merely for development of that plan in the section pertaining to their branch of service.
Unified and Specific Commands subordinate to JEMAD: with the responsibility of organizing, training, equipping, administering, and providing logistical backup to the forces of their branch of service assigned to them.

Forces not assigned to the unified and specific commands: to formulate their plans for employment, based on the directives which they receive from the minister.

They are also authorized to technically inspect the execution of the programs for military equipment and infrastructure pertaining to their branch of service; which will facilitate making these programs fully meet the requirements thereof, whatever the managing organ may be.

Advisory and Consultative Organs

Joint Chiefs of Staff, who appear for the first time in a general provision on the structuring of the Ministry that is organically and functionally included therein.

The Superior Council of Military Justice, without precluding its judicial functions.

The Superior Councils of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, whose authority in connection with the legislation that governed the 1984 organization was changed by a Royal Decree-Law of 10 July 1985, which defined their nature as advisory and consultative organs.

The Ministry Leadership Council (newly created), an advisory and consultative organ of the minister in the "leadership and administration of the department."

"The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is stupidity: strike first, strike hard, strike everywhere." Admiral John Fisher
### Table No 1

**Superior Organs of National Defense**

**Powers in Their Areas of Authority in Normal Situations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Authority</th>
<th>Organs</th>
<th>Defense Policy</th>
<th>Military Policy</th>
<th>Military Administration</th>
<th>Armed Forces</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cortes</td>
<td>- Debate its general lines</td>
<td>- Debate weaponry programs</td>
<td>- Control it</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Pass laws relating to defense and budgets</td>
<td>- Set personnel through budget laws</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Give the government authorization to bind itself through treaties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>- Determine it</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Direct it</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Prime Minister of the Government</td>
<td>- Direct it</td>
<td>- Devise directives for foreign relations</td>
<td>- Decide the main proposals</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Defense Minister</td>
<td>- Propose to the government defense policy and execute it through objectives</td>
<td>- Determine the OFC government delegation except in areas reserved for the prime minister of the government</td>
<td>- Direct and coordinate: Personnel, education and social action</td>
<td>- Order, coordinate and direct their action through delegation of the prime minister of the government</td>
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### Areas of Authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organs</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Ministers</td>
<td>- Responsible for part affecting them</td>
<td>- Minister's main collaborator in planning and executing operational aspects of military policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense Chief of Staff</td>
<td>- Submit reports and proposals prepared by JUJEM to minister</td>
<td>- Submit reports and proposals prepared by JUJEM to minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>Branches Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>- Inform minister on effects of state of efficiency and needs of their branches in defense policy</td>
<td>- Inform minister on effects of state of efficiency of their branches on military policy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense Board</td>
<td>- Advisor to king, government and government prime minister</td>
<td>- Report on its main guidelines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>- Advise government prime minister and defense minister on general strategic situation and possible threats</td>
<td>- Advise government prime minister and defense minister (especially in devising the PEC, including the OFC)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Advise government prime minister and defense minister so that branches may maintain maximum efficiency</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table No 2
Authority and Responsibility in Wartime/Crisis Situations
Of the Legislative Branch: General Cortes

They grant authority,

To the king: to declare war and make peace
To the government: to declare stand-by status and martial law
to bind itself by treaties or conventions

Of the Government

The government:

. Directs the defense of the state.
. Assumes the special powers called for in special statuses and appoints the military authority which, under its direction, must carry out the pertinent measures in the territory to which the martial law relates.

The prime minister of the government:

. Decides on major strategic objectives (namely, the objectives that the Armed Forces must attain).
. Approves the plans resulting therefrom and the general distribution of forces
. If need be, directs the war.

The defense minister:

. Devises the joint strategic plan (which, among other points, contains provisions for acting in wartime and crisis situations).
. Directs the purchase and administration of resources for the Armed Forces.

The defense chief of staff:

. Devises for MINISDE's [Defense Ministry] approval, the necessary operational and logistical plans and directives.
. Proposes the creation of unified or necessary specific commands, and exercises their command, or delegates it to the chief of staff of the branch of service that is considered most suitable.
May be appointed by the government to exercise the strategic leadership of the military action. He will be assisted in these functions by the Army, Navy, and Air Force chiefs of staff.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Branches

- Provide the necessary facilities to the unified/specific commands dependent on JEMAD, suitably organized, equipped and trained, and backs them.

- Based on the minister's directives, devises the plans for employment of the forces of their branch which are not assigned to those unified/specified commands.

National Defense Board:

Assists the prime minister of the government in:

- The determination of the major strategic objectives.

- The approval of the plans stemming from them.

- The leadership of the war.

Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Advise the prime minister of the government and the defense minister in the evaluation and strategic leadership of the operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultative and Advisory Organs</th>
<th>Leadership Organs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Superior Councils</td>
<td>Superior Organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Council of Military Justice</td>
<td>Directional Centers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Defense</th>
<th>JEMAD</th>
<th>SEDEF</th>
<th>SUBDEF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JUJEM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Superior Councils</td>
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<td>JEME</td>
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<td>Leadership Council</td>
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<td>AJEMA</td>
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(1) - General Directorates of: Weaponry and Materiel, Economic Affairs, and Infrastructure

Table No 4

Ministry of Defense (Functional Table of Organization)

MINISDEF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior Organs</th>
<th>JFM's</th>
<th>JEMAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CG's</td>
<td>EMACON</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Directorates

| Unified/Specific Operational Commands |
|____________________________________|
| (Backup for the Force) |
| (Force) |

Logistical Directorates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces not assigned to back up the CG's</th>
<th>Forces assigned to Unified/Specific Operational Commands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- = organic and functional dependence

_____ = organic dependence

......... = functional leadership

- - - - - = operational command in the terms stipulated by the DAUFAS

- . . . = backup relationship

2909
CSO: 3548/95
ARMS PURCHASES REVIEW REVEALS MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Athens EMBISTEVTIKO GRAMMA in Greek 10 Jun 87 pp 17-18

[Text] The government is particularly disturbed because of the development of Turkish armaments and this observation is an additional reason for its being compelled to begin a dialogue with Ankara, albeit indirectly. One of the latest findings is that Turkey has pushed the plans for updating 11 military airfields as well as plans to build a large naval base in the Aegean. More specifically, as the defense situation of Turkey is described in a confidential document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plans are as follows, according to military branch:

Air Force

"The Turks have realized that they must give a higher priority to air superiority. The United States plays a primary role in the aircraft sector and the overall arming of Turkey.

In fact, the United States offered, in mid-February 1984, to provide Turkey with 15 F-4s, the cost of which would be covered by U.S. aid.

There was opposition, but the Reagan administration did not change its decision.

In June 1984 the question arose when the Iranians made inquiries for the purpose of exchanging 30-40 F-14s for an equal number of F-4 aircraft. The apparent reason was that they did not have spare parts for such technologically advanced aircraft and, therefore, would have liked to obtain Turkish F-4s for which they had the necessary spare parts. In the end they did not implement this plan because of U.S. opposition.

Since July 1984 there arose the matter of the availability of F-5s that were being used by Norway, but were owned by the USA. Greece approached both Norway and the United States to prevent the transfer, but was unsuccessful.

It was decided by the United States that the number be reduced from 16 to 12.

On the other hand, after a request by Turkey, Canada is about to turn over, free of any payment, 20 F-104s that it no longer needs. There were Greek objections made to Canada, which only recently decided to get in touch with Greece for the supply of various weapons systems.
Turkey is also negotiating with three other countries (Italy, Spain and Canada) for the purchase of transport aircraft.

In previous statements the Turkish minister of National Defense mentioned that the Turks mean to purchase only two such aircraft and coproduce approximately 50 more in Turkey. However, recent reports from our embassy in Ankara as well as yesterday’s stories in the Turkish press indicate that the program for the transport aircraft is going to be delayed and that it will not be implemented prior to 1990.

With regard to the Egyptian "Phantoms," there is a serious problem with funding. Initially, the Turks claimed that Saudi Arabia might finance them; however, the latter is not going to guarantee the expenditure because it does not want to upset the balance of relations with our country. Of course, we cannot be totally certain because there is a possibility that Saudi Arabia may grant some funds to Turkey to cover other needs in view of the fact that Turkey may make available some funds to cover the expenditures for the purchase of the Egyptian aircraft.

The recent visit to Cairo by the Turkish military mission to begin negotiations after a long hiatus leads us to believe that the problem of financing is headed towards a solution.

There are indications, however, that the Egyptian Armed Forces oppose the sale of the aircraft because they believe that they can still be of use to them.

Turkey received 75 F-104 aircraft from West Germany up until the end of 1984 and was to receive another 95 by the end of 1986.

The agreement for the sale of the aircraft at a low price was made last year.

In October 1984, the Netherlands decided to sell 23 F-104 Starfighter aircraft that it had embargoed until then because of Turkey’s dictatorial regime. The matter was debated by the Netherlands Parliament on 5 November 1984. The Netherlands Parliament, satisfied with Turkey's decision to return to democratic rule, lifted the objections.

Turkey began receiving the aircraft in December 1984 along with spare parts for them, a fact that indicated that the aircraft were going to be placed in active service and not used as a source of spare parts.

The largest modernization program of the Turkish Air Force is, however, that of the F-16s. The charter of the new enterprise that will assemble the F-16 aircraft and will manufacture their components was signed on 2 May 1984. The cost of the entire program will reach 4.2 billion dollars, of which the Turks will pay 1 billion and the remaining 3 will be paid by the United States under the guise of FMS credits. In the end, however, it is believed that, despite the agreements, the cost will come to $5 billion. It will take 10 years to produce the last 160 aircraft that Turkey requires. It is foreseen that by 1990 Turkey will have 56 aircraft, and 160 by 1995.

The conclusion to be drawn from this agreement is that Turkey is going to have a substantial military industry financed by the United States.
Finally, it is the financial aspect that poses an obstacle to the negotiations between Turkey and Great Britain for the purchase of 40 "Tornados." The Turkish side proposes that part of the overall cost (approximately $1 billion) be paid by barter; Great Britain, however, does not seem to be amenable to such a transaction, at least not for the time being.

On the other hand, in March 1984 Turkey received 36 Rapier antiaircraft missiles built in Great Britain.

Navy

Regarding the Navy, where Turkey enjoys a numerical superiority over our country, there was a purchase of "Zodiac" rubber landing boats, while the building of two "Meko"-type frigates has already begun in West German shipyards. In 1986 there will follow the building of an additional two at the Turkish shipyards of Golcuk. By the end of 1984, two submarines had been built at the Golcuk shipyards, to be followed by a third, whose building will begin soon according to statements by Turkish officials.

According to reports provided to us by the embassy in Rome (26 January 1984) eight "Sea Guard" systems to counter the Greek "Exocets" were also ordered by Turkey.

Army

The most important aspect is the coproduction with West Germany of "Leopard" tanks in Turkey and the subsequent export of part of these tanks to Saudi Arabia.

In the meantime, Turkey has received a number of "Leopard" tanks, while the work to modernize the existing tanks with motors and armament continues. The modernization of the tanks and the manufacture of newer types of tanks are priority items on the 1985 agenda, according to statements by the Turkish minister of national defense.

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CSO: 3521/142

- END -