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Prospects for 13th General Election Following 'Defusing' Presidential Race
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[Article by the Deputy Chief of the WOLGAN CHO-SUN Cho Kap-che: "Public Sentiment Has Turned to Conservatism, Optimism; How Public Opinion Renewed In Presidential Election Can Emerge?"]

[Text]

National Assembly Elections—First Page in New Chapter

The presidential election on 16 December served a dual role as a defusing event and trash bin. It allowed us, during the campaign period, to spit out innumerable conflicts which had remained undigested over the past decades. Hundreds of thousands and millions of people were gathering here and there, vehemently hating and intensely loving. The result of those activities left us with feelings such as an “emptiness after being forsaken” and “recovery after a high fever.” By solving the problem of legitimacy of power which has been a fundamental element of social unrest in South Korea, this election has accomplished its role as a defusing event. However, a residue remains in light of the fact that the issue of the “deepening of regional sentiment” was not resolved.

The anger of the people at the failure of a power transfer in spite of 63.4 percent of the vote being antigovernment was concentrated on Mr Kim Yae-chung and Mr Kim Yong-sam who failed to unite in a single presidential candidacy, thus demanding a revolutionary change of structure in the opposition parties. Public opinion shows that the people, who have been urging democratization of political parties after being frustrated by the two Kims, eagerly desire a new political culture. The success of the upcoming National Assembly elections will depend on the way in which the existing politicians will accommodate this ardent wish of the people.

The past presidential election has closed one chapter in South Korean political history. The upcoming National Assembly elections will open the first page of another chapter. How the first page will be written will determine the whole content of the following chapter. This article will outline roughly the historical phase and meaning of the upcoming National Assembly elections.

Forty million people have poured out their love and hatred for the four candidates, one No and three Kims, through the presidential election. The fact that anyone who wanted to run for presidency was able to run because of the failure to unite behind a single candidacy can be positively interpreted in light of the fact that all their wishes and desires were satisfied. It is said that catharsis is good for one’s mental health. There are many indications that the general atmosphere of our country, which has passed through a phase of fever, passion, and passionate love mixed with love and hatred, has fundamentally changed.

First of all, various public opinion polls indicate that the past presidential election has frustrated many people, but has caused a change in public attitudes, bringing about more optimistic and conservative attitudes in a greater number of people.

According to a nationwide public opinion poll of 1,520 adults over the age of 20 conducted by the Institute of Social Science at Seoul National University (headed by Professor Kim Se-won), during the presidential campaign period between 19 November and 24 November, “the rate of dissatisfaction with political reality” dropped by 9 percent from 59 percent to 50 percent compared to 1 year ago in December 1986. The survey’s analysis was that “it was because the peoples’ desire for political expression had, to a certain extent, been allowed since the 29 June Declaration and freedom of expression had increased considerably, particularly during the campaign period.

At the end of December 1987, the International Gallup Poll Organization conducted opinion polls on “the world in 1988” with people from 39 countries.

To the question “what is your opinion about the economic situation in 1988 compared with 1987?”, 58 percent of the Korean people answered “it will get better,” (8 percent said it would get worse), thus showing the strongest optimism concerning 1988 among the 39 countries. Koreans also showed considerably more optimistic attitudes, compared to 1 year earlier, toward the prospect of labor disputes. That is, 1 year earlier, 49 percent of the respondents predicted that “labor disputes will increase compared to the previous year (1986).” However, only 19 percent of the respondents predicted that labor disputes would deteriorate this year (the 3rd most optimistic country among 39 countries).

A good economic situation is frequently said to be a necessity for democratization. Our economic development this year also appears to act as a strong support for democratization.

Public Opinion Which Has Become Optimistic and Conservative

According to a poll conducted by the Korea Gallup Poll Institute of 1,500 eligible voters across the nation 7 days after the presidential election on 16 December, 74 percent of those polled stated that “One should approve President-elect No Tae-u as president legitimately chosen by the people.” Out of the respondents, 14.9 percent said “one cannot approve” and 10.5 percent said “one cannot tell.”
Kyongsang Province had the strongest support for "one should approve" (92.3 percent), followed by Seoul (81.9 percent) and Kyonggi Province (80.8 percent). The Honam region was the only region which had stronger support for the view that "one cannot approve" (41.1 percent) than for the view that "one should approve" (35.4 percent).

While 68 percent of those who voted for candidate Kim Yong-sam said that they "should approve," 42.8 percent of Kim Tae-chung supporters said that they "should approve" and 38.8 percent of them said that they "cannot approve." This difference also reflects the difference in their confidence in their candidate's victory, that is, that about 21 percent of Kim Yong-sam supporters regarded the victory of candidate No Tae-u unexpected, while 47 percent of Kim Tae-chung supporters responded to it as unexpected.

According to occupation, blue collar workers showed the highest support for "one should approve" by 83.6 percent. Among college students, 47.5 percent said that they "cannot approve." Among social groups, only college students had more respondents with the view that "one cannot approve No Tae-u as president" than those saying "one should approve." (41.3 percent). In other words, the No Tae-u regime did not solve the problem of legitimacy of power within the Honam region and college student groups.

In the same Gallup poll, 45.1 percent of those who responded expressed the view that "excessive political change is not good," and 43.6 percent said that they supported many political changes. According to the result of the Gallup poll conducted in early November 1987, 46.3 percent of the respondents "supported much change" while 39.9 percent were "opposed to much change." This shows that peoples' thoughts swung in the direction of conservatism during the election period.

While those groups which showed a stronger support rate for "much change" included college students (67.5 percent), white collar workers (56.9 percent), and self-employed merchants and industrialists (53.7 percent), the social groups who had a tendency to be stronger in their opposition turned out to be "the people" such as blue collar workers and farmers, whom some of the opposition movement circles had categorized as that class of society with definite revolutionary tendencies. The fact that middle class people, whom the opposition and student forces criticized as conservative, turned out to be rather more innovative, and the people in the lower echelon of the society, who were thought to be more revolutionary, turned out to have a more conservative tendency suggests a great deal. Those forces which pursue an extreme mass movement while depending on the expectation of the people's revolutionary capacity will ultimately come to isolate themselves.

The respondents who scored highest on the question whether "there should be vast change," in politics, were Kim Tae-chung supporters with 68.3 percent, followed by supporters of Kim Yong-sam with 55.5 percent and of No Tae-u with the lowest 24.5 percent. In other words, that means that the conservative class of common people was the stronghold of votes for candidate No Tae-u. Some people even say that "the common people are the reason why power transfer did not take place this time."

**Starting Point for Healthy Conservatism**

The fact that the problem of legitimacy of power was solved by the presidential election means that "the object of hatred has disappeared" from the viewpoint of the opposition camps. A "clear fighting characteristic" had been a supreme criteria of value for opposition leaders because they had an object to overthrow. The opposition party and opposition forces are now forced to adjust their existing political behavior because political power has become the object of competition and their dialogue must become more conciliatory and change from hatred and overthrow.

In a survey conducted by the Institute of Social Science at Seoul National University in November 1987, the majority of Korean people pointed out "the establishment of a sound relationship between the ruling and the opposition party" as the first task which needs to be addressed immediately in the political area. (Freedom of speech was the second.) Such desires of the people have been eloquently expressed by their strong rejection of the exclusive traditional maneuvering and fighting following the presidential election. While many people applauded former President of the Republican Party Kim Chong-pil for sending a flower wreath to the winner of the presidential election, they strongly criticized the two Kims who did not concede to the election results, results which forced the two Kims to change their line of struggle.

One opposition party member said that "boycotts of National Assembly meetings or sit-ins do not seem to work effectively any more." Representative Pak Kwan-yong of the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) said "the polarized conflict between the ruling and the opposition party has created a war-like atmosphere throughout the country. From now on, disputes on the state of affairs of the country cannot help being drawn into the chamber of the National Assembly."

A certain representative from an opposition party, who was elected in the 12 February election with a clear image as a fighter and has established a hardline image continuously since then said, "Now, such an image has become a burden for me. During this election campaign, I will make an effort to give people the impression that I am a moderate and a rational politician, and that I will be of service to them with constructive but not destructive politics."
A RDP representative said that "I cannot go through an election selling such issues as an end to military rule and democratization. It appears that I have to give people the impression that I am a worker not a man of combative spirit and I also have to make local election pledges."

The change in the people's criteria for electing a congressman has also been noted in the opinion poll survey conducted by the Institute of Social Science at Seoul National University during the past presidential election period. That is, there is no change in the first criteria which is political democratization, even though the ratio has decreased from 50 percent to 31 percent compared to 1 year earlier. At that time, only 6 percent of the respondents indicated economic growth as a criterion for selecting a congressman, however, in this survey, the number has leaped to 17 percent. The surveyors analyzed that "only when steady political democratization is achieved, can the importance of economic growth policy be recognized."

Professor Kim Kwang-ung of the Graduate School of Government Administration at Seoul National University said that the introduction of a legitimate regime would provide an opportunity for settlement of healthy conservatism and a foundation for making meaningful discussion of ideas possible on which innovative and ideological political parties can appear.

"Until now, only defensive conservatism has existed in South Korea. It has been nothing but government patronization in the sense that it was busy making excuses to appease forces challenging the political regime. A true conservatism could not take place in the total absence of a structure which possessed any value worth preserving."

A government elected by the people becomes a standard of conservative value. Only when conservatism is established with such a standard, can liberalism be introduced in a productive and rational way in order to cope with such conservatism.

Creative Destruction Provides Foundation

Professor Pak Chae-chang (government administration department of Sukmyung Women's University) evaluated the past presidential election as a preparation of the soil for the blooming of a new political culture through "creative destruction." According to him, South Koreans may well have made a philosophical reflection not only on Korean political reality but also on such a fundamental question as "What is a human being?" through the blazing fire-like presidential election. Professor Pak indicated that the people have become completely disillusioned with the current politics and have come to realize that "we people are the only trustworthy ones." This has come about by having witnessed such tragedies as a great opposition leader making mistakes that even a child would not make in challenging for the highest office, a political leader, once nominated for a Nobel Prize, being reduced to a leader of one region, and leaders of opposition camps, who have demonstrated for reason and conscience, falling to the level of publicity men for one political faction. They have also witnessed formidable public power produce a fundamentally unfair election, which has caused people to be disillusioned with human nature. All this has been done through a total mobilization of the television media and negative advertising. Professor Pak indicates that such disillusionment and self-realization of the people appears along with their strong desire for a new political culture.

"In light of the fact that politics advocates the interests of social groups, domination and resistance have only existed when disguised as politics, but not as a true politics in the textbook sense. The mask of this 'false politics' has been removed by this election. Under this cruel realization, the people, who believe that they should start fresh, and the political parties, which believe that they should be born again, have reached a natural mutual agreement."

Through the presidential election, the moral authority and political influence of the two Kims and opposition forces has greatly suffered. They were even mentioned as "targets to be terminated." Many people think that the opposition camps will suffer a vast loss of their political power because of their loss of a political cause. Their argument is that many opposition leaders gave up their neutral positions and supported a particular candidate during the presidential election campaign period, thus losing ground voluntarily.

Vice President of Federation for Democratic Unification Kye Hun-che, who had kept himself neutral and insisted on a single candidacy to the last minute, made an announcement on 10 January which called for an immediate dismissal of the Federation for Democratic Unification, in which he argued that "The Federation for Democratic Unification has become a seed for dividing the conservative opposition party through its support for a particular person and has brought irreversible defeat by transforming itself from critical support to zealous support. Therefore, existing politicians should no longer take political advantage of the Federation for Democratic Unification, which is now only a shell having had its innocence as a people's movement destroyed."

As the Federation for Democratic Unification of Seoul (headed by chairman Yi Chae-o) seceded from the Federation for Democratic Unification, which is likely to join the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD), it issued a statement of criticism on its support for Mr Kim Tae-chung, which was a part of the failure to unite behind a single candidate.

The chairman of the South Korean Catholic Diocese, Bishop Kim Nam-su (head of Suwon parish) discussed in this way the statement made by priests supporting Kim Tae-chung as the people's single candidate at the end of the election campaign.
"What has been the result? Mr Kim Tae-chung finished third. They said that the people also supported Mr Kim Tae-chung, but the result was the contrary. The priests have lost credibility, and thus have come to have made false prophecies. I viewed favorably the advocating of human rights and the movement for a single candidacy of the priests. However, they should have stopped there. They should have stopped at the point where the single candidacy failed. I wonder why they continued to support a particular candidate" (interview from KAJONG CHOSUN January 1988).

Professor Pak Chae-chang said that "With the 29 June Declaration and the past presidential election, the people's criteria for evaluating politicians have collapsed. People used to have a fixed concept, which was that the opposition party was good and the ruling party was bad because of the struggle for democratization. However, they now have come to realize that the opposition party is not always good and the ruling party is not always bad, either. This will weaken the differences between political parties and therefore, people will vote on the basis of personalities in the coming National Assembly elections."

Accommodative Capacity of Existing Politicians Showed Its Limitations

One RDP Representative said that "The structure of the opposition party, which has become undemocratic in the process of struggle against dictatorship, cannot be changed simply by words. It can be changed only through a change of people. I wish that the people will make such a choice."

"If the DJP could accomodate different opinions in a wide range of the society through democratization within the party while the opposition camps fail to reorganize and turn into minor political parties because of the handicap of the two Kims, the chance for the conservative opposition party to come to power is very remote for the time being."

According to a "survey on image of professionals" of 2,500 students from 40 universities in the country conducted by the Unicup Promotion Committee of the Institute of Behavioral Science attached to Korea University, politicians scored lowest in their job image among 11 categories of professionals such as government officials, teachers, military, businessmen, college professors, literary men, members of the legal profession, journalists, medical doctors, and clergymen. While the military profession, which was expected to score lowest among college students, scored 3.46 points, politicians finished last with 2.87 points. In the seven categories of evaluation such as honesty, responsibility, uprightness, egotism (or altruism), vanity (or frugality), sincerity, and trustworthiness, politicians scored the lowest.

College students' impression of the current political situation in South Korea is reflected in their assessment that "While politicians enjoy great social benefits, they completely fail to contribute to social development." While the intellectually elite have avoided politics, those persons who are morally and functionally deficient have stepped in. The intellectuals are now paying for their behavior of avoiding and loathing politics. Even though it is obvious that people throughout the nation desire a new political culture, the absence of a driving force to realize that desire remains a practical problem. The National Assembly elections will be a testing ground for such demand and supply.

Second Sin for Failure To Unite in a Single Candidacy

In order to analyze the prospects for the coming National Assembly elections, it is necessary to predict the election campaign issues first. Vice President of the RDP Kim Sang-hyon said that "It seems that there are no large issues of conflict between the ruling and opposition parties." Representative Pak Kwan-yong also said that "It is questionable how much the opposition party's logic of checks and balances in opposition to the ruling party's logic of security will appeal to the people. I am concerned whether the opposition camps will have a weakened persuasive power because they have not been able to unify their organizations."

The DJP is likely to appeal to the people to give them control of the National Assembly in order to manage national affairs with conviction, and the opposition parties will ask the people to vote for them in order to let them act as a checking force on the powerful government. RDP President Kim Yong-sam is using expressions such as "Let's substantially end military rule with a National Assembly elections revolution."

The problem still exists that votes for the opposition camps might be scattered and less effective just as in the presidential election if they fail to become unified. Above all, the opposition camps will not be able to appeal to the people for the establishment of a checks-and-balance force. Independent Representative Pak Chan-chong pointed out the following in his "petition statement calling for unification of the opposition parties."

"The 16 December election allowed the people to confirm the structural corruption within the opposition parties. It is very clear that the people will sternly judge the opposition parties and democratic camps in the 13th National Assembly elections. Can you not hear the sound of 12.5 million votes for the opposition camps now leaning toward Mr No Tae-u? Strangely enough, the move toward democratization has been turned over to the hands of Mr No Tae-u. This has reached the point where if our democratic camps even discuss democratization, the people will react with bitter smiles. Even
though the people acknowledge a rigged election, they avoid our criticism of it. The RDP and the PPD should unify or withdraw, that is the demand of the people and history."

Professor Yi Kap-yoon of Sogang University (political analysis theory major) said that "Candidate No Tae-u did not win a particularly large vote in the last presidential election. The votes to support either the ruling party or opposition parties were even. The winning votes for Candidate No Tae-u simply seem like a landslide because the two Kims shared the opposition votes almost equally."

This means that the percentage of votes for president-elect No Tae-u, 36.6 percent, is not particularly high compared to the the percentage of votes for the ruling party in recent parliamentary elections.

Since the ninth National Assembly elections when the two for one electorate system was adopted in 1973, the percentage of votes of the ruling party has hovered from 31.7 to 38.7 percent. That is, the Republican Party won by 38.7 percent in the 9th National Assembly elections and 31.7 percent in the 10th National Assembly elections in 1978, and the DJP won by 35.6 percent in the 11th National Assembly elections in 1981 and 35.2 percent in the 12th National Assembly elections in 1985. This makes possible the assumption that one-third of our people have been regularly voting for the ruling party.

If the opposition parties do not unify, the coming National Assembly elections will show basically the same divisions as the 12 February National Assembly elections in terms of distribution of votes. The current structure of four parties, the DJP, the RDP, the PPD, and the Republican Party is similar to that of the DJP, NKDP, the DKP, and the KNP in the 12 February National Assembly elections in their party structure and support base.

During the 12 February National Assembly elections, the percentage of total votes were; DJP-35.2 percent, NKDP-29.2 percent, DKP-19.6 percent, and KNP-9.16 percent. However, the number of the National Assembly seats according to the electorates were; 87 for the DJP, 50 for the NKDP, 26 for the DKP, and 15 for the KNP. While the DJP acquired 47 percent of the parliamentary seats by gaining approximately 35 percent of the popular vote, the third opposition party, the DKP, received only 14 percent of the parliamentary seats with about 20 percent of popular votes. That is, in the four-party system, the ruling party has a unilateral advantage in terms of effectiveness of votes.

If the four parties score similarly to the percentages of 1 No and 3 Kims during the 16 December presidential election (36.6-28. 27.1-8.1) in the coming National Assembly elections, the percentages of parliamentary seats will be also similar to the result of the 12 February National Assembly elections. The failure to unite behind a single candidate not only resulted in a failure to transfer power in the presidential election, but also is highly likely to transform the opposition into minor political parties in the coming National Assembly elections. That will bring about a second historical mistake which will guarantee that the DJP will become a dominant political party like the LDP of Japan, and allow it to stay in power for a long time. It seems that success in unifying the opposition camps will depend on whether the imminent criticism that the two Kims are the stumbling block for the unification of the opposition camps can prevail on them to become one voice.

Responsibility for Failure To Unite Behind a Single Candidate Appears To Be a Campaign Issue

If the National Assembly elections are held in a situation where there is no unification of the opposition parties, and there is no particular campaign issue between the ruling and the opposition party, many opposition leaders fear that the opposition parties themselves will fight more fiercely among themselves. In such a case, the biggest campaign issue would be blaming each other for the failure to unite behind a single candidate. Areas other than Kyongsang and Cholla Provinces such as the central region are likely to have a more heated debate on this issue.

One expert analyst from the Korea Gallup Poll Institute said that "In the coming National Assembly elections, people will judge the two Kims for their failure to unite as a single candidacy. He also said that people will decide by their votes which of the two Kims is more responsible for the failure. In such a case, he added, whoever makes more excuses during the election campaign will do more damage to themselves than to the other.

"I think that the failure to unite behind a single candidate will burden the two Kims and ultimately force them to retire from the political scene. When I conduct public opinion polls, I realize how really good people are in their assessment of these matters. For a significant time in the future, people will criticize this failure, and the responsibility for it, and during that process, the authority of the two Kims will be hurt and will slowly disappear. The two Kims have already lost twice. The first is by losing in the presidential election and the second is by not submitting to the result of the election. If things continue this way, they will suffer the third loss in the coming National Assembly elections. Can history be that generous?"

Fierce fighting among the opposition parties will be a shortcut for their destruction, poll experts stated in unison.

"Our voters who have been used to seeing fights without any rules are now yearning for fair play. We should be aware of the reason why the popularity of former President of the Republican Party Kim Chong-pil has soared
after one flower wreath. The losers are regarded as winners by the people, who wish to applaud those who concede and yield. However, politicians of the opposition parties seem to be obsessed by the notion that their careers would come to an end the moment that they acknowledge their faults. If the opposition parties fight among each other over the failure to unite behind a single candidate, the DJP would be the only one that benefits.”

**Weakened Enthusiasm Likely To Lower Voter Turnout**

If the unification of the opposition camps does not occur, regional sentiment will also act as an important element in the election psychology in the coming National Assembly elections, and it is feared this will aggravate and permanently the regionalism that surfaced in the presidential election. The prevailing view is that the regionalism expected to surface is so powerful in the Yongnam and Honam regions, which are the home regions for the two Kims, that not a single candidate from one Kim’s side will be elected in the other Kim’s territory. The thought that “I feel sorry for what happened to candidate Kim” is widely spread among the people in the Pusan and Kyongnam areas where the tendency for mass voting was relatively weak compared to the Taegu and Honam areas, so that it is expected that the people will vote en masse reflexively for the RDP candidates.

One opposition party representative said that “The RDP candidates should not run in Cholla Province and the PPD should not run in Kyongsang Province, because neither of them can successfully launch campaign movements, and they would only create fierce fights among the opposition parties as a result, which would additionally have a negative affect on opposition party candidates in the other areas. Therefore, one should not engage in such a situation where there is no practical benefit. This is all the more necessary for the unification of the opposition parties after the National Assembly elections.”

In opposition circles, observers say that Cholla Province, Pusan, and the Kyongnam area will be the only places where the two Kims’ name recognition and speeches of support will be well received. Regionalism can be used advantageously in these areas by those candidates who are willing to mobilize the influence of the two Kims, and by the central party which may nominate two of its members.

According to a survey conducted by the Korea Gallup Poll Institute, the Honam and Pusan-Kyongnam areas are the two areas which scored the highest rate of dissatisfaction with the election results—41.1 percent and 16.9 percent respectively. That means that among the people in the hometowns of the two Kims there remains a lot of attachment, which can be misused as regional sentiment. According to one study, 60 percent of Seoul residents whose great-grandfathers had lived in the Honam region were reported to have voted for candidate Kim Taeg-chung. This survey eloquently shows that it takes a long time for regionalism to disappear.

In a situation where the legitimacy of power has disappeared from the list of election campaign issues, the parliamentary election campaign will take a subdued and practical form. Some candidates of the opposition parties are already making efforts to change their images from that of a fighter to that of a worker or a guardian of their constituency. One opposition party candidate said that he would follow the logic that “Taegu citizens might be more likely to lose because President No Tae-ju, too conscious of regional sentiment, might treat his hometown people poorly. If, at this time, you vote for someone like me from the opposition party, I can take on the role of a ruling party member.”

The atmosphere of election campaign sites will also be very subdued because the campaign issues of this National Assembly election, compared to the 12 February National Assembly elections, will be reduced from the abstract and fundamental level to specific and unessential matters which are closely related to people’s daily lives.

Shortly after the 12 February National Assembly elections, one voter in his thirties in Pusan said the following.

“I have been to a campaign site for the first time in my life. The opposition party candidate’s speech was extremely critical, which was quite a contrast to that of the ruling party candidate whose speech emphasized businesses for the local constituencies. The opposition party candidate spoke about the fundamental problems of the national foundation for basic human rights as his major points, and dealt with such big themes as the legitimacy of the government, the Kwangju Incident, various corruption cases, and the direct presidential election. On the other hand, the ruling party candidate spoke about very petty subjects such as building sewer systems or constructing bridges in certain places, which I felt to be absolutely incongruous with the excited atmosphere of the campaign site. As the opposition party candidate continued to speak, I felt something bursting up from my chest. Those suffocating memories, of which I have been aware but tried to forget, suddenly burst into uncontrollable anger.”

One opposition party representative said that “During the 12 February National Assembly elections, it seemed to me that the audience had come to watch a boxing match instead of listening to my stump speech. I kept on criticizing the government after I realized from the atmosphere that people were not in a mood to compromise, even though I had thought about making a speech on more constructive issues such as local campaign pledges. However, I think quiet persuasion would be more effective than loud criticism.”
If the election campaign becomes subdued, there will be no opposition party driving force, which will in turn bring about a low voter participation rate in the metropolitan areas, which can be ultimately unfavorable to the opposition parties. Professor Yi Kap-yun at Sogang University analyzed that the big victory of the NKDP in the large cities in the 12 February National Assembly elections was due to the increased voter turnout in those areas. Professor Yi, who is studying the behavior of voters by a measurable method, once made the analysis that the NKDP boom in the large cities was made "because the voters who had not voted and had become from the 11th National Assembly elections began to participate. It seems to me that a 10-percent voter participation rate increase in the six metropolitan cities resulted in a 13-percent increase of support for the NKDP."

In the coming National Assembly elections, these 10 percent of voters, who caused a whirlwind in the 12 February National Assembly elections, might rather abstain from the election this time, thus contributing to lowered support for the opposition parties.

**Single Representative Electoral System Favors Ruling Party**

According to a poll conducted by the Korea Gallup Poll Institute of 1,464 eligible voters across the nation 7 days after the presidential election, 36.9 percent of the respondents, when asked the question "Whom did you vote for?", answered that they had voted for candidate No Tae-u, which almost coincides with his actual share of votes, 36.6 percent. Those who answered that they had voted for Kim Tae-chung were 25.2 percent, which was 1.9 percent lower than the actual vote percentage of 27.1 percent. On the other hand, those who answered that they had voted for Kim Yong-sam scored 22.8 percent, which was 5-percent lower than the actual percentage of votes, 28 percent. That is, the percentage of people who actually had voted for candidate Kim Yong-sam, but did not answer that they had voted for him because he lost, was the highest among all the candidates. This evidently shows that the enthusiasm of support is weakest in the case of candidate Kim Yong-sam.

The votes of president-elect No Tae-u and President of the PPD Kim Tae-chung have a less variable tendency than those of President of the RDP Kim Yong-sam. There is a strong argument that the percentage of support for the ruling party is almost so stable that it can be predicted in advance.

In the case of the 12 February National Assembly elections, the DJP won almost the same percentage of votes as in the 11th National Assembly elections. However, the political layout was completely reorganized because people who were supporting the opposition parties were voting en masse for the NKDP, the clear opposition party. That is the "true picture of the extraordinary phenomenon." In the 12 December presidential election, all the voters supporting the opposition parties that were meant to emerge did so. However, the even distribution of those votes resulted in the victory by candidate No Tae-u.

Political pundits say that these phenomena show that our people's political tendency of favoring the ruling or the opposition parties stands at an almost fixed percentage.

Professor Pak Chae-chang said that if one applies "desire for democratization" as a criteria for voting in the past presidential election, the result can be seen as 36.6 percent versus 63.4 percent. However, if one applies people's desire for reform or security as a criteria for voting in the past presidential election, the result can be seen as 27 percent (the percentage of votes in favor of candidate Kim Tae-chung) versus 73 percent.

The share of parliamentary seats between the ruling and the opposition parties will depend on how these tendencies of eligible voters are expressed in the coming National Assembly elections.

**Winning by More Than 30 Percent in 68 Percent of Cities and Counties**

For reference, if one looks at the percentage of votes supporting candidate No Tae-u in each DJP district party chapter with the assumption that the same phenomenon can be repeated in the coming National Assembly elections, one realizes that 46 percent, that is 42 out of its total of 92 district party chapters, had voted for Candidate No with a margin of more than 35 percent which can be regarded as a prospective margin for a successful election. On the other hand, 64 percent, that is, 59 district party chapters, had voted for Mr No with a margin of more than 30 percent, which can be regarded as a possible margin for a successful election, whereas 17 district party chapters, all of which are from the Honam region, had voted for him with a margin of less than 20 percent, which can be regarded as a very difficult margin for a successful election.

Candidate No won by more than 35 percent in 132 cities and counties nationwide out of a total of 237 cities and counties, which amounts to 55.7 percent of the total, whereas he scored more than 30 percent of the votes in 162 cities and counties, which amounts to approximately 68 percent of the total. One can presume from the above facts that the DJP can win a plurality of the parliamentary seats more easily with the single representative electoral system. If the opposition parties wish to take advantage of the single representative electoral system, they should first achieve the unification of the opposition parties.
In terms of the number of highest votes in a total of 237 cities, counties, and districts, the DJP (No Tae-yo) won in 120, the PPD (Kim Tae-chung) in 66, the RDP (Kim Yong-sam) in 32, and the Republican Party (Kim Chong-pil) in 19.

In terms of the number of second highest votes in the same areas as above, the RDP achieved this level in 120, the DJP in 113, and both the PPD and the Republican Party in 2. While any type of electoral system can give a comfortable victory to the DJP, the dual representative electoral system, which is similar to the current system, will absolutely favor the RDP, which finished second in an overwhelming number of electorates, whereas a single representative electoral system will be more beneficial for the PPD.

If one compares the vote distribution of the winners in the local electorates in the 12th National Assembly elections with that of the DJP's in the 16 December presidential election, one can easily come to the conclusion that the DJP has an absolute advantage whether it competes in the single representative electoral system or in the dual representative electoral system or a compromise system, and that it can control the National Assembly by a plurality. (Representative Kim Yong-saeng (then member of the KNP) from the electorate of Andong City, Uisong County, and Andong County had been elected with the lowest share of votes, or 15.4 percent in the 12 February National Assembly elections. On the other hand, DJP Representative Kim Chong-ho from the electorate of Koesan, Chinchon, and Umsong of the Chongbuk Province had been elected with the highest share of votes, or 67 percent. In other words, there was a 4-fold difference between the highest and the lowest percentage of votes.)

One opposition party leader of Kyongbuk Province said that if the DJP nominated dual candidates in Taegu and Kyongbuk Province, many of them could win. Candidate No had won more than 60 percent of the votes in 12 local electorates in Taegu and Kyongbuk Province. Presuming that this rate of support will also be reflected in the National Assembly elections and that the central party recommends dual nominees by paying more attention to its share of the parliamentary seats, it is mathematically certain that at least one candidate will be elected.

One opposition party representative, who has been arguing for the single representative electoral system in the media, has confessed in private that "the single representative electoral system should be avoided to foster democratization and the existence of the opposition parties." The RDP and the PPD have traditionally insisted on the single representative electoral system.

"The wider the electorate, the more difficult it is to commit corruption using public authority and money. With the single representative electoral system, one cannot help launching a life and death election campaign for one parliamentary seat as in the presidential election, in which case public officials are left with no other choice but to vote for the ruling party. The aftermath of a fierce election also can be a serious problem. There are some places in the provincial regions where the emotional aftermath of the elections held during the time of the Liberal Party still remains in the visible disintegration of families and competitive spirit among cities and counties. The single representative electoral system is undesirable not only because it creates many wasted votes but also because it makes it difficult for politicians newly entering the system to be elected. The electoral representative system suggested by the DJP, which will allow one to four candidates to win, is in fact a single representative electoral system. I am afraid that the DJP would accept without the slightest hesitation the total single representative electoral system that we had suggested."

An opposition party leader who had worked on the presidential election in the provincial areas said that "As the tide began to turn toward Mr. No, government officials confidently began to actively participate in the election campaign 7 days prior to the election. During the coming National Assembly elections with the DJP already in power, corruption by government officials will continue. In particular, if the single representative electoral system is adopted, opposition party candidates will have to compete not only with ruling party candidates but with the government in power."

The RDP had to give up and change its former party platform which favored the single representative electoral system to move in the direction of supplementing the current dual representative electoral system because of fear within the party.

**Problem of Absentee Ballots**

The absentee ballot, which will remain a problem in the coming National Assembly elections unless there is a special provision for it, can be a deciding vote in several electorates. This was shown in the twelfth 12 February National Assembly elections when the share of the votes supporting the opposition candidates soared extraordinarily.

It was a DJP Representative Kim Chong-rye who had been elected with the second highest share of the votes in the Songbuk district in Seoul, who benefitted most from absentee ballots. Representative Kim defeated candidate Cho Yun-hyong (the DKP candidate), who had finished third with 79,991 votes, by 1,023 votes. The total number of absentee ballots in Songbuk district was 8,785, which were added to the first ballot site of Songbuk 1-tong. If these absentee ballots had been eliminated, Representative Kim would have lost to candidate Cho by 4,215 votes. The ballot box of the first voting place of Songbuk 1-tong contained a total of 16,834 votes, 2,191 regular ballots plus 8,785 absentee ballots, out of which Representative Kim had received 6,834 and candidate
Cho 1,586. The absentee ballots are not counted separately in any one of the electorates in the nation, so that an exact number of votes for a specific candidate cannot be known. However, an estimate is possible because absentee ballots compose 80 to 90 percent of votes in those electoral districts where absentee ballots are added. That is, first, divide the regular votes according to each candidate’s average percentage of votes in that electoral district. Then, subtract “each candidate’s estimated votes” from “each candidate’s total number of votes, including absentee ballots and regular votes.” The result will be “each candidate’s number of absentee votes.” By using this method, one can estimate each candidate’s share of absentee ballots with a 5-percent margin of error because the number of absentee ballots is overwhelmingly large.

According to this method, Representative Kim received approximately 74 percent of the absentee ballots and candidate Cho, 11 percent. If the distribution rate of absentee ballots had been similar to that of the regular votes, candidate Cho could have won by a margin of approximately 3,000 votes. If one used the above-mentioned method and made an estimate of “the percentage of absentee votes in support of the ruling party candidates” in such electorates as Seoul, Pusan, and Taegu during the 12 February National Assembly elections and compared the result with that of the 11th National Assembly elections, one can find very important differences between the two.

1. The uniformity of the ruling party’s percentage of absentee votes = Fourteen ruling party candidates won with totals of 67 to 77 percent. Eleven candidates won with totals of 70 to 75 percent, therefore there were no noticeable individual deviations among the candidates. Out of seven candidates in Pusan and Taegu who had won with totals of 63 to 71 percent, six of them won with totals of 67 to 71 percent, which shows an extraordinary uniformity with only a 4 percent deviation.

2. The percentage of absentee votes in the 12th National Assembly elections was twice that in the 11th National Assembly elections. = The ruling party candidates won with totals of 24.8 to 52.3 percent of the absentee ballots. The percentage of absentee votes in the 12th National Assembly elections was twice that in the 11th National Assembly elections. Furthermore, in the 11th National Assembly elections, the deviation of individual percentages of absentee votes was extremely wide so that one could get almost an unstrained and inconsistent impression. In eight electorates, the absentee ballots in support of ruling party candidates were outnumbered by the regular ballots.

3. Three times as big as the regular ballots = The strong tendency of the absentee ballots favoring the ruling party in the 12 February National Assembly elections was quite contrary to that of the regular votes which favored the opposition parties by an overwhelming majority. In general, the percentage of the absentee ballots supporting the ruling party was 2.5 to 3 times that of the regular votes. There had not been a considerable difference in the tendency of votes between the regular and the absentee votes during the 11th National Assembly elections. It might be a very important subject of study to find out why the absentee votes suddenly turned toward the ruling party after 4 years. It is worth noting that there were several electorates where opposition party candidates had been favored over ruling party candidates (DJP candidate Kim Chin-chae of the Tongrae district in Pusan received 28.2 percent of the votes while KNP candidate Yang Chan-u received 30 percent of the votes. DJP candidate Yi Hung-su of South district-Haeundae district in Pusan received 28.8 percent while DKP candidate Kim Sung-mok received 31.4 percent of the votes).

Candidate No Received Approximately 70 Percent of Absentee Votes

Even though the exact percentage of absentee votes during the past presidential election also cannot be known because the ballot boxes containing absentee votes were not counted separately, a rough estimate is possible by comparison with the percentage of the votes in neighboring districts.

In Yongjong-Myon, Ongjin-Kun, Kyonggi Province, candidate No’s percentage of absentee votes was 90 percent, which was 40 percent higher than his percentage of regular votes.

In Simgok-tong, Puchon, Kyonggi Province, candidate No’s percentage of absentee votes is estimated to have been 71 percent, which was approximately twice that of the regular votes, while candidate Kim Yong-sam and candidate Kim Tae-chung’s percentages are estimated to have been approximately one-third and one-half of their percentages of regular votes respectively.

In Chungang-tong, Kwachon, Kyonggi Province, candidate No’s percentage of absentee votes is estimated to have been approximately 67 percent, which was approximately twice that of the regular votes, while candidate Kim Yong-sam and candidate Kim Tae-chung’s percentages are estimated to have been approximately one-third and one-half of their percentages of regular votes respectively.

In Sanjong-tong, Mokpo, South Cholla Province, candidate No’s percentage of absentee votes is estimated to have been 48 percent, which was approximately ten times that of the regular votes, while candidate Kim Tae-chung’s percentage is estimated to have been about 47 percent, one-half of his percentage of regular votes.

In Puk 3-tong, Chonji, North Chungchong Province, candidate No’s percentage of the absentee votes is estimated to have been 71 percent, which was approximately twice that of the regular votes, while candidate
Kim Yong-sam, candidate Kim Tae-chung, and candidate Kim Chong-pil's percentages are estimated to have been about one-third, one-half, and one-half of their percentages of regular votes respectively.

In Hyo-tong, Taejon, South Chungchong Province, candidate No's percentage of absentee votes is estimated to have been 66 percent, which was approximately three times that of the regular votes, while candidate Kim Yong-sam, candidate Kim Tae-chung, and candidate Kim Chong-pil's percentages are estimated to have been 10.8 percent, 7.9 percent, and 13 percent which are one-half, one-half, and one-third of their percentages of regular votes respectively.

In Chungang-tong, Pohang, North Kyongbuk Province, candidate No's percentage of absentee votes is estimated to have been 74.8 percent, which was approximately 20 percent more than that of the regular votes, while candidate Kim Yong-sam's percentage (15.7 percent) is estimated to have been about one-half of his percentage of regular votes and candidate Kim Tae-chung is estimated to have received a percentage of absentee votes similar to his percentage of regular votes.

The number of absentees, a majority of whom are in the military, in the past presidential election was 827,378, which was approximately 3.6 percent of the total eligible voters. In their negotiations over the presidential election law, the opposition parties had argued that the military should either be allowed to leave military camps and vote in regular voting places, or observers of each political party should attend the voting places within the military camps. The ruling party had strongly opposed those ideas on the ground of security problems of military secrecy.

The argument was that the deployment of military forces could be exposed if the military had voted in regular voting places. It is reported that the opposition parties intend to insist strongly in the negotiation over the parliamentary election law either that some observers be allowed into military camps after a strict background investigation or at least that members of the Central Election Committee be allowed into military camps in order to oversee absentee voting procedures.

Negative Election Campaign Can Decide Success or Failure of Election

It is indicated that three problems in the past presidential election such as absentee ballots, negative campaigning directed mainly at candidate Kim Yong-sam, and one-sided television reporting from a qualitative perspective have had the greatest influence on the resulting percentage of votes. Unless there is a special provision for them, these three problems are likely to continue and it will be the opposition party candidates who will suffer from them.

Analysis shows that such negative advertisements near the end of the campaign period had a direct impact on the failure of candidate Kim Yong-sam's election campaign, because they resulted in a significant drop in female voters' support for him.

The public opinion poll of the Korea Gallup Poll Institute indicated that the support rate of candidate Kim Yong-sam among female voters shortly before the end of the campaign period was significantly higher than that of candidate Kim Tae-chung but slightly lower than that of candidate No, while male voters showed a slightly higher support rate for candidate Kim Yong-sam. For example, according to an opinion poll conducted 10 days before election day, the female voters' support rate for candidate Kim Yong-sam, candidate Kim Tae-chung, and candidate No Tae-u was 21.3 percent, 17.8 percent, and 24.3 percent respectively.

However, as the election drew near, female voters' support for candidate Kim Yong-sam suddenly dropped precipitously and turned extraordinarily in the direction of supporting candidate No. Looking at the almost perfect prediction of the election result made by the Gallup Poll which used the result of an opinion poll conducted 2 days before the election day as its basis, one can even wonder whether candidate Kim Yong-sam failed in the election because of the extreme drop in female voters' support.

In other words, if one looked at the male voters' support rates for 1 No, 3 Kims only (estimated rates), candidate Kim Yong-sam scored the highest by 31.4 percent, followed by No Tae-u by 31.1 percent and Kim Tae-chung by 28.7 percent. However, with the female voters' support rate for Kim Yong-sam at 26 percent, he finished third after No Tae-u with 37.7 percent and Kim Tae-chung with 27.4 percent. The margin between candidate Kim Yong-sam's support rate in comparison with that of candidate No was an enormous 11.7 percent.

The margin of married female voters' support rates for each candidate was even greater, being 24.8 percent for Kim Yong-sam, 26.4 percent for Kim Tae-chung, and 39.6 percent for No Tae-u. Such a phenomenon might not have been completely unrelated to the negative
election campaign tactic used against candidate Kim Yong-sam regarding his relationships with women, which was targeted mainly at housewives.

Professor Kim Kwang-ung of the Graduate School of Government Administration at Seoul National University said that “It might have been more beneficial for Mr Kim Tae-chung if he had demanded a truthful public broadcasting system rather than a unified national government during the presidential election.”

Another professor criticized by saying that “The election campaign should take advantage of the television broadcasting media. However, in the presidential election, the television media conducted the election campaign instead.”

It appears that the result of the National Assembly elections will be greatly influenced by whether the opposition parties can manage to put broadcasting companies and information agencies in neutral positions in the election campaign before the National Assembly elections.

Test For Making Election Campaign Scientific

It seems that this coming National Assembly election campaign will be very scientific following the lesson of the presidential election. An increasing number of people are planning to revise and supplement campaign tactics while closely monitoring the election campaign process by contracting with public opinion poll agencies such as the Korea Gallup Poll Institute. One representative said that “The campaign fund should not be used to buy voters, but to manage the campaign in a scientific way.”

The Korea Gallup Poll Institute has made a “public opinion poll program for the National Assembly elections campaign” and has been responding to consultation requests by representative candidates.

This program manages to thoroughly commercialize candidates with the marketing management techniques of business administration rather than the political science approach. Director Pak Mu-ik said that “It is because there is a similarity between the election campaign process and the product development and sales process.”

In order to launch such a scientific election campaign, public opinion polls are indispensable as a guide. The Korea Gallup Poll Institute plans to conduct four public opinion polls with 1,000 eligible voters throughout the National Assembly elections campaign period.

During the first poll, it will collect the basic materials which will be used for establishing the candidate’s election campaign tactics; they are, first, ideal criteria of candidate’s image, second, development of highly acceptable election pledges, third, hardship and expectations of residents, fourth, political tendency of residents, fifth, past electoral behavior of residents, and sixth, understanding socio-demographic characteristics of residents. While it puts the basic strategy established with this information into practice, it will also simultaneously conduct a public opinion poll once every week in order to make interim checks of the results of the election campaign. By revising and supplementing this strategy, it says, a definite election result can be predicted prior to election day.

This kind of program is said to cost approximately 40 million won.

Director Pak Mu-ik said that “If an accurate opinion poll was publicized by the media in the last presidential election, the degree of corruption in the election could have been reduced significantly and election campaign movements could also have been more scientific.” He argued that “It was proven that the opposition parties suffered because the media did not publicize public opinion polls.”

“The people should be able to clearly look into the election process and even predict the result. The result should not come as a surprise show to the people, with no knowledge of which candidate is favored and which one is not, the same as treasure hunt in the night, because it can decide the destiny of the nation.

In the past presidential election, our media was greatly to blame for their distortion of aspects of the election by not reporting the results of public opinion polls. The opposition party candidates suffered most because the media had reported to the end that it was a very close competition in spite of the fact that candidate No Tae-u was definitely a strong leading candidate.

The people’s own single candidacy vote movement was frustrated because voters became confused. The opposition party election campaign tactic was confounded. The election campaign has been degraded to the level of negative campaigns, violence, and instigation of regional sentiment instead of competition of planned policies and election pledges. The current prohibition in the National Assembly election law should definitely be revised.

Election Process Should be Clearly Watched With Public Opinion Polls

The media did not report the results of the public opinion polls, which they feared would influence the election result, and in whose accuracy they lacked trust.

Public opinion poll experts indicate that false opinion poll results circulating in opposition circles caused the two Kims to make false judgments.
In spite of the fact that a survey to predict an election result should select its population on a nationwide basis, many of these circulating survey results were based on certain limited areas.

Telephone and questionnaire surveys distorted facts. Telephone surveys are likely to produce results biased toward the middle class because only 71 percent of households in the country have telephones. On the other hand, questionnaire survey results can tilt toward the upper class because illiterate people are excluded. Face to face interviews proved to be most accurate in the past election.

Koreans, who tend to pay little attention to the preconditions of a survey and remember only its results, have a tendency to confuse the result of a survey conducted in a certain limited area (or class) with that of a nationwide survey.

When the percentage of those who did not respond amounts to 30 to 40 percent of the total percentage, it is very important to analyze their tendency. The Korea Gallup Poll Institute was able to predict precisely the result of the past election with a margin of error of 1.3 percent because it was able to accurately analyze, up to the end, the tendency of those 13.1 percent of voters who did not respond.

If accurate results of public opinion polls are reported in the election process, voters can predict the election result, which has the effect of reducing the unfavorable after effects of the election.

According to a survey conducted by the Korea Gallup Poll Institute immediately after the presidential election, 71.5 percent of candidate Kim Yong-sam’s supporters, 45 percent of candidate Kim Tae-Chung’s supporters, and 83.1 percent of candidate Kim Chong-pil’s supporters voted for their candidates even though the result had been predicted (failure in the election). This result is contradictory to the hypothesis that “If a candidate that one intended to vote for has an unfavorable rating, then one will vote for someone else who could be elected in order to avoid wasting one’s vote.” Director Pak Mu-ik said that “Koreans have a strong tendency to vote for someone according to their political beliefs regardless of their favored candidate’s chance of being elected. In such cases, publicizing the results of the public opinion poll would rather place someone with a top rating at a more disadvantageous position.”

It is a law discovered in foreign countries that the margin between the level of support for the leader and that of the runner-up usually becomes smaller when the result of an opinion poll is publicly known. The DJP, being conscious of this, never publicized the results of numerous public opinion polls which showed candidate No Tae-uk as the leader, whereas the two Kims’ widely advertised inaccurate opinion results showing that each one of them was the leading candidate. As for candidate Kim Yong-sam, he cited overwhelming support for his candidacy in public opinion polls as a ground for his argument that the election was rigged. But the result of this exposed the fact that candidate Kim’s camp had failed in their election campaign because they were mesmerized by inaccurate opinion poll results.

**Incapable of Accomodating New Political Demand of the People**

The supporters of candidate Kim Yong-sam in the last presidential election were in the highest social class among the various candidates’ supporters. In various public opinion polls, candidate Kim received the highest support from the upper class such as people with high academic background at the college level or above, white collar workers, college students, and people with monthly income of more than 500,000 won.

The public opinion poll conducted by the Institute of Social Science at Seoul National University in November 1987 indicated that the RDP had contributed most to democratization (74 percent), followed by the PPD (62 percent) and the DJP (55 percent).

The Institute also surveyed people’s evaluation of the four parties’ platforms. The DJP was perceived as the most conservative political party and the Republican Party as the second most conservative party. The RDP was evaluated as a centrist liberal political party while the PPD was regarded as the most liberal one.

The political tendency of these respondents was moderately liberal. In other words, the political propensity of the RDP most closely resembles that of our people.

This means that the RDP has the potential of coming out ahead in the coming National Assembly elections. However, many scholars and RDP members that I have met have told me that the RDP cannot realize its potential without undergoing a true self-revaluation. The RDP was strongly criticized because it was too undemocratic and unscientific to accommodate the expectations of its supporters.

Since the supporters of candidate Kim Yong-sam, who are mostly from the upper class, are analyzed as possessing a highly demanding political taste, their support could be tenuous, and thus they might be greatly disappointed at the RDP’s attitudes after the election.

As was indicated by the survey of the Korea Gallup Poll Institute, candidate Kim Yong-sam’s supporters disappointment was clearly reflected in the fact that he had the relatively highest percentage of supporters who actually voted for their candidate, but were reluctant to admit it.
One RDP representative said that "If President Kim had demanded an investigation of election fraud after he had initially fully accepted the result of the election, he would have been relieved from criticism for the failure of a single candidacy, attracted grass-roots support for pressing hard against election fraud, and taken the political initiative. I feel it is very regretttable that he was not able to make such a decision because of his personal grudges."

It is said that President Kim Tae-chung's faction has analyzed that their election campaign directed at the middle class was ineffective. In the reflection that "We wish we had made a clearer choice of selecting such alienated groups as workers, farmers, and the poor urban population as our target populations, and made concentrated efforts...", there are strong voices saying that the FPD should become a political party that represents class interests.

Candidate Kim Tae-chung's percentage of support in the past presidential election, 27.1 percent, was 4 percent more than the nationwide percentage of people with ties to the Honam region (23.3 percent). In light of this fact, some people analyze that the PDP failed to gain large support from the alienated groups of people such as workers, farmers, and the poor urban population.

However, there is evidence that candidate Kim Tae-chung was favored by some people in Seoul and Kyonggi Province who did not come from the Honam region such as workers, small merchants, and people in their twenties and thirties. The percentage of candidate Kim's supporters in Seoul was 32.1 percent, which is about 9 percent more than that of Seoul residents with ties to the Honam region (23.3 percent), while it was 21.7 percent in Kyonggi Province, which is approximately 7 percent more than that of Kyonggi residents with ties to the Honam region (14.7 percent).

Some people analyzed that candidate Kim Tae-chung's election campaign, which concentrated mainly on the Seoul and Kyonggi areas in which he announced many election pledges directed at alienated social groups, had been very effective. Many political science scholars argue that the PDP's change of its party platform in the definite direction of representing the interests of a specific class while accepting wide opposition forces can advance Korea's political culture one step further. However, as was indicated in the result of the past election, some raise the problem that as long as President Kim Tae-chung remains its head, the PPD will have difficulty in overcoming the barrier of regionalism, which became the broader phenomenon of Honam versus non-Honam.

Opposition Forces Are Likely To Enter Political Arena

People, in their desire for a new politics, are likely to look outside the existing political arena for some object that can satisfy them because it is almost certain that the existing opposition parties, the RDP and the PPD, will face the coming National Assembly elections in a situation where they will not be able to completely eliminate undemocratic elements within the parties and thus will be trapped under authoritarian leaderships around the two Kims.

It is uncertain whether the opposition forces, which did not support a single candidate in the past election, and forces that promoted a single candidacy such as representatives Pak Chan-chong and Cho Sun-hyong will be able to satisfy the people's desire for "originality." The driving forces that are behind the efforts to create a new party are currently caught in the dilemma that if they choose a clear platform, that might restrict the realm of support of voters, and on the other hand, if they are too conscious about the support of voters and gather around National Assemblymen and famous people, it will prove to be difficult to differentiate themselves from the existing political parties.

It seems that the appearance of a new party will depend on whether its objective is to obtain many parliamentary seats or to create a political party with a true ideology. There is a dominant observation that a new party will not be able to benefit greatly from promoting its ideology or its nature as an opposition force as far as obtaining voters' support in light of the fact that the authority of opposition forces has decreased significantly in the past presidential election. However, either a new party or the PPD will be unable to resist formulating a new program which can accommodate the political propensity of those young voters in their twenties and thirties who desire social reform as long as there is clear evidence that they exist.

It seems that a political party whose support base does not come from student opposition forces but from such middle class professionals in society as lawyers and professors, will resemble the appearance of the Peace and Justice Party (head of Preparation Committee, Kim Sang-chol) in its recognition that opposition forces, whose disintegration was disclosed in the presidential election, will not be able to command great power in this political era.

This kind of political party based on intellectuals can be evaluated in the perspective that it can attract a group of intellectuals onto the political scene. However, some people fear that if the movement to create a new party, which currently is being pursued in various directions, is not sufficiently consolidated and results in creating numerous parties, its image of originality would be greatly damaged, and thus it would eventually fail in the National Assembly elections.

It is said that the realization that they should actively participate in autonomous local elections is currently rising among the opposition forces in provincial areas. Such a movement can be interpreted in the context that the opposition forces can no longer struggle in the streets under a legitimate regime. Therefore, they should direct
their energy to working in the political arena and pursuing social democratization in specific areas of the people’s daily life, for which the local autonomous elections are the perfect testing ground.

Some people make very optimistic predictions that the opposition forces which had promoted theory and struggle will, through this process, become moderate by becoming more realistic, and thus will be drawn into the political arena. This will make current politics more vigorous through internal reformation. This National Assembly election is expected to send a message that “This is the politics that people desire.” This will be accomplished by the defeat of a considerable number of politicians from the old era, and the election of several politicians new on the scene. This coming National Assembly election seems to have the special meaning that it is the first step in our political process, which has has broken from the past, and now enters a new future.

He also expressed a deep feeling for and great pride in the result of his devotion to economic recovery and growth as he was able to overcome the miserable situation and chaos of the early 1980’s. In addition, his self-evaluation was that his retirement after fulfilling his tenure is after all an honorable one, as he enumerated such events as price stabilizing policies and their success, the positive far-reaching influence in the sponsoring of the Olympic Games, and the reinforcement of self-defense capability through summit meetings with foreign countries.

President Chon also frankly acknowledged his faults and incompetence. He confessed that he has been suffering most of all from vicious rumors about him. He said he felt a deep sorrow concerning excessive mistrust of him and for misinterpretation of his sincere intentions.

He was well aware that he was an unpopular president and explained why in his own way. He cited the major reasons as follows: the budget freeze, the government’s price ceilings, and the freeze of civil servants’ salaries right before the election in 1984; his first TV press conference after the 26 October incident [the coup that brought him into power in 1980] as a chief investigator of the incident; the lack of consistency concerning constitutional revision as demonstrated in his talk on constitutional revision on 13 April [1987]; and the reinforced personal bodyguard after the Rangoon terrorist incident.

He appeared to be confident, and not remorseful concerning these inhumane acts. He acted as a president who is conscious of history not as an individual who acting to attract immediate popularity. He also believed that as time passes he will be evaluated as a “president who did his best.” He explained that although he has been strict in carrying out government administration, he was not a “dictator,” and he confessed that his greatest burden of the was the unresolved Kwangju incident.

It is difficult to predict how his recollections and analyses will be accepted by different groups of people. It seems, as he has indicated, that there are a number of items which will require historical evaluation after the passage of time.

We have seen numerous precedents, however, of leaders’ accomplishments being downgraded according to the current trend, and the reactions were easily justified.

For example, some of the election campaign issues raised by the then-presidential candidate No Tae-u brought into the open President Chon’s unpopular characteristics such as the “termination of authoritarianism” and an “ordinary president.”

President Chon mentioned the realization of his promise of a single term presidency as his biggest accomplishment, and his belief that this will be accorded a place in historical records. He explained his religious devotion to carry out this promise of a single term presidency, and expressed his expectation that this will be a precedent for recovering trust in our politics and democracy.

Text] The era of President Chon Tu-hwan’s 5th republic is drawing to a close. The general feeling is that his retirement is taking place in an unexpectedly calm atmosphere, contrary to the loud noises at the beginning of his presidency, and the continuously repeated turmoil during his 7 and 1/2 year tenure, and despite people’s ambivalent feelings of love and hatred toward him.

Is this because his accomplishments have been highly overrated, or because the people wish to show affection and support to their leader regardless of his intentions, or because they are just quietly watching a new experience in our constitutional history?

In any event, President Chon affirmed his accomplishments and confessed his deficiencies relatively frankly in his farewell press conference on 20 February. He made certain matters clear, and asked for the people’s understanding concerning others. The conference, which spoke to all the appraisals of him during his 7 and 1/2 year tenure, was delivered with subtlety under the designation of a farewell conference.

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can be seen as a measure representative of the realities in politics. We can guess from this what President Chon’s weak points in political style were, aside from the fundamentals of politics.

President Chon started off his presidency with the inherent difficulty of expediting the tempo of progress in order to secure and maintain his power base and overcome the weakness of lacking legitimacy.

It is difficult to deny that there have been many examples of his excessive threats and provocations directed at the people. But the background of this could be a strong self-awareness that “since I am determined to retire after my tenure anyway, I can do whatever will benefit the people” and this might have influenced his style.

On the other hand, if we discard our hatred of his political style, there are many achievements that we cannot underevaluate. It may be especially interesting when we compare them with what his critics accomplished.

It would be interesting to see which group of people would be in the majority, those who acknowledge as good aspects of his leadership such as his realization of a one-term presidency which sets a precedent for political democratization and who respect the beneficial actions such as price stabilization, or those who hold him responsible for the ordeals and trials and errors of his term.

13302

**Yongchong Training Center To Be Closed Under Saemaul Movement Reform Plan**

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[Text] The organization and operation of the much-disputed Headquarters of Saemaul Movement will be trimmed to a considerable extent under overall reform plan, the Home Ministry announced yesterday.

According to the ministry, various organizations affiliated with the Saemaul headquarters will be merged or abolished and the scope of operation reduced.

In particular, Saemaul training center in Yongjig-do in Ongjin-gun, Kyonggi-do, will be closed down under the ministry plan to reform the movement.

The training center on the island adjacent to Incheon City has been the target of mounting criticism because the center was built on a large tract of land illegally appropriated by the headquarters then headed by Chun Kyong-hwan.

Chun, who stepped down from the president of the Saemaul body last year was criticized for exercising “too much” power in the operation of the headquarters. The Saemaul headquarters has long been regarded as a “sanctuary” free from the inspection by the Board of Audit and Inspection as well as the Home Ministry, supervisor of the headquarters under law.

As the public criticism against the Saemaul headquarters intensifies, the government decided to reform the Saemaul body and the Home Ministry finalized the reform plan yesterday.

Under the plan, number of staff at the headquarters will be slashed from the current 221 to 124 within six months.

Staff working at special city and provincial chapters of the Saemaul headquarters will also be halved from the present 241 to 121, while those at city, county and ward branches will be cut from 723 to 496, according to the ministry plan.

At the same time, 43 government officials dispatched to the Saemaul body will be sent back to their original posts.

With the closedown of the Saemaul training center on Yongjig-do, the staff members at the center will be sent to the to the training institute at the headquarters.

The property of the training center will be returned to the state along with 745,000 pyong of state-owned land the headquarters leased free of charge across the nation, according to the ministry plan.

A ministry spokesman said that there has been mounting public criticism against the wayward operation of the Saemaul headquarters since it setup in December, 1980, and his ministry came to draft a plan to streamline and rectify the operations of Saemaul movement.

He said that various sports events sponsored by the headquarters such as Saemaul Football Games, Saemaul Cycling March and Saemaul Mothers’ Volleyball Games, will be discontinued beginning this year.

At the same time, various sumptuous events, jamborees and festivals will be abolished or reduced in their scale under the reform plan.

Reckless dispatch of Saemaul leaders to foreign countries under the pretext of observation tours will also be restricted, the ministry spokesman said.

Financial contribution to the United Nations Volunteers, a non-official U.N.-affiliated body in charge of aiding the Third World countries, will be stopped along with the manpower training necessary for the project.

The ministry revealed that the government subsidies to the Saemaul headquarters will be slashed year by year and budget of the headquarters will be trimmed considerably from this year.
Instead, the Saemaul headquarters will form 50 billion won fund on its own and with the aid from the government for its operation, but the use of the fund will be strictly supervised by a committee composed of citizens.

The centrally-controlled operation of the headquarters will give way to an autonomous one in the future, the ministry said.

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ECONOMIC

SNU Produces Country's New Economic Team
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[Article by reporter Kim Mun-sun “Prime Minister-Deputy Prime Minister-Treasury Minister-Energy Minister-Chief Presidential Economic Advisor: All SNU Alumni”]

[Text] The birth of a new economic team headed by Na Ung-pae implies the beginning of the “era of the Commerce College of Seoul National University (SNU).” It is because the three core members of the new economic team: the official who holds the dual position of deputy prime minister and minister of economic planning board; the finance minister; and the chief presidential economic advisor, all of whom have a similar philosophy of economic policymaking and are good friends, are all from SNU’s Commerce College.

The new Deputy Prime Minister Na Ung-pae, Finance Minister Sogong Il, and the Chief Presidential Economic Advisor Pak Sung, who are SNU Commerce College’s class of 11 [different from the class of 1911], 16, and 13, respectively, are expected to establish the major direction of initial economic policies of the 6th republic. It can be easily predicted that these three college alumni will play an important role if we take a close look at this new economic team. In addition, it is expected that Prime Minister Yi Hyon-chae and the prospective Energy and Resources Minister Yi Pong-so, both of whom are class of 7 and 13 [although the energy minister did not finish school], respectively, from the same college, will indirectly cooperate with the new economic team.

The three named above share a lot in common. After graduating from SNU, they received PhD’s in the area of either business administration or economics in the United States and have taught at universities. In addition, they have administrative experience as university president (Na Ung-pae as Aju University President), as college dean (Pak Sung as dean of commerce college of Chungang University), or as director of a research institute (Sogong Il as director of Korea Institute of Economics and Technology (KIET)). Furthermore, they have so far been deeply involved in setting up economic policies, both directly and indirectly.

Deputy Prime Minister Na has been dealing with details of economic policies himself as an economic bureaucrat in his former role as finance minister, and trade and industry minister; Minister Sogong is a man who has has held key policy positions as former chief presidential economic advisor and as finance minister. The new Chief Presidential Economic Advisor Pak is a pro-government economist who has been involved in the nation’s economic policymaking as a member of the financial and monetary committee and as a coordinating chairman of the sixth 5-year economic plan, while he was professor at Chungang University.

The fact that the three, who have been deeply involved in the nation’s economic policy establishment, directly and indirectly, have been appointed to core economic positions in the new government tells us that the basic existing economic policies, the “continued growth in a stable environment” and the “reinforcement of competitiveness through the opening of the domestic market to foreign countries”; will be continued. Based on these basic existing economic policies, the Na economic team is expected to deal more actively with the pending problems of rising consumer prices, currency-related friction with foreign countries, management of trade surplus, and reorganization of the financial structure.

It is especially expected from the three, who are known to be straightforward, and have a superior perception of reality, that they will exercise flexibility in dealing with reality rather than stubbornly adhering to principles, and will actively cope with pending problems. Moreover, since the team leader Na is known to be personable, and the three are good friends, smooth cooperation is expected.

Economic bureaucrats believe that unlike the incumbent team headed by Chong In-yong, the new team will take a teamwork approach in handling the pending problems by cooperating with different government economic branches.

It is a general consensus that the new Deputy Prime Minister Na will lead the economic team after adequate discussions and with cooperation among team members rather than exercising strong power and controlling functions. In view of the fact that our economy is facing a substantially difficult period, it seems desirable to have a “strong economic team” rather than have the deputy prime minister himself exercise all the power and single handedly play the game. Therefore, great results are expected from the new economic team’s harmonious teamwork. The new economic team headed by Na is expected to play a significant role not only in the teamwork among various government economic branches but also in establishing a cooperative system with business and financial circles whose voices will be louder in the new democratic era.
This is because many alumni of SNU's Commerce School who are in every corner of business and financial circles are expected to show an unprecedented cooperative mood with the new economic team.

In addition to the fact that the core members of the new economic team are alumni of SNU's Commerce School who maintain broad relationships with other alumni in business and financial circles, the new deputy prime minister himself has substantial industrial management experience as former president of Haitai Confectionery and Hankook Tire Company. Thus, it seems that the new team will establish a more solid cooperative system with economic circles than any other previous economic team.

Moreover, the appointment of An Pyong-hwa as minister of trade and industry, who was president of Tongbu Iron Company, Pohang Iron and Steel Company, and more recently Korea Heavy Industries, will help the new economic team understand difficulties in industries, and thus develop and expand realistic policies.

The new economic team headed by Na starts with a heavy burden to solve many pending problems. And depending upon how these pending problems are resolved, the basis of our economy to make a new leap will be established.

This is why our expectations from the new economic team headed by deputy Prime Minister Na are high.

In 1979, there were only 46 industry-funded R&D facilities, which increased to 92 in 1982 and 183 in 1985, giving a high annual average of 30 percent increase. In 1986, the number of facilities increased to 290, giving a 58.5 percent increase over prior year.

Of the 290 facilities at the end of 1986, 89 facilities or 30.7 percent belonged to the chemical industry, 66 facilities or 22.8 percent belong to the electrical/electronics industry. Thus, the three industries altogether occupied 70.7 percent of all industry-funded R&D facilities, indicating that the technology-oriented industries, such as precision chemistry, electrical/electronics and machinery, lead the activities of industrial technology R&D. In addition, the food and drink industry had 26 facilities (9.0 percent), the metal/nonmetal industry had 19 facilities (6.6 percent), and the construction/service industry had 14 facilities (4.8 percent).

In particular, the chemical industry established 45 new R&D facilities in 1986 alone, giving a 102.3 percent increase from the 44 facilities in 1985. The electrical/electronics industry and the machinery industry, too, showed a 61.0 percent increase and 66.7 percent increase, respectively, over the prior year, both of which are far above the overall industry average of 58.5 percent. Except for the textile industry, almost all industries showed a high rate of increase in establishment of R&D facilities compared with prior year.

In addition, the information industry established its first R&D facilities in 1984, and since then, the number of its industry-funded R&D facilities has been steadily growing. This could be a reflection of a growing importance in technology R&D in the information industry, as the industrial structure in this information age is gradually changing from the equipment-oriented types to the so-called software-oriented types, including data processing and services.

2. Status of Industry-Funded R&D Facilities by Company Size

Of the 290 R&D facilities at the end of 1986, 200 facilities or 69.0 percent were funded by the large corporations and 90 facilities or 31.0 percent were funded by the medium and small companies. In 1985, there were 183 R&D facilities, of which 81.9 percent (150 facilities) were funded by the large corporations and 18.1 percent (33 facilities) were funded by the medium and small companies. Thus, the proportion of the medium and small company-funded facilities increased greatly in 1986.

Furthermore, compared with prior year, the medium and small companies showed a geometric growth rate of 172.7 percent while the large corporations showed a 33.3 percent increase. This could be partly due to the government's special support in taxation and finance and relief of conditions for establishing R&D facilities for the activities of technology R&D by the medium and small
companies. But also it could be due to the fact that the managers of the medium and small companies, and especially those of the technology-oriented companies, adopted technology R&D activities as their business strategies just like their counterparts in the large corporations did and that they are concentrating their efforts on R&D investment and recruitment of R&D manpower through the establishment of R&D facilities.

In 1986, the large corporations established 26 new R&D facilities in the chemical industry, seven facilities in the electrical/electronics industry, six facilities in the machinery industry, and five facilities in the food and drink industry.

In 1986, the most active areas in the establishment of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities were also in the machinery, electrical/electronics and chemical industries. The machinery industry had three R&D facilities funded by the medium and small companies in 1985, which increased to 17 facilities in 1986. These numbers represent 10.0 percent and 34.0 percent of all machinery R&D facilities in 1985 and 1986 respectively. The medium and small companies established 18 new R&D facilities in the electrical/electronics industry in 1986 alone, which represents an increase to 36.4 percent of all electrical/electronic industries in 1986 from 14.6 percent in 1985.

The ratio of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities in the chemical industry did not increase much from 1985, but the number of such facilities increased to 33 in 1986 from 14 facilities in 1985, 2.4 times the number in 1985.

This shows that the technology R&D activities by the medium and small companies are rapidly increasing in the electrical/electronics, machinery and chemical industries. In 1986, the medium and small companies established their first three R&D facilities in the metal/nonmetal industry, indicating that this industry, too, is gradually speeding up its technology development activities.

3. Scale of R&D Facilities and Manpower

As the number of private industry-funded R&D facilities increase, the scale of R&D facilities and manpower range widely from gigantic facilities to tiny ones. Accordingly, the technology R&D capacity varies widely.

In other words, the large corporations actively establish branch R&D offices and comprehensive R&D facilities, while the medium and small companies are limited to the establishment of basic research facilities. At the end of 1986, there were 106 industry-funded R&D facilities (36.6 percent) that use independent buildings, and there were 184 facilities (63.4 percent) that use detached spaces either owned or leased by the factories or company offices.

Compared with prior year, the ratio of independent R&D buildings fell to 36.6 percent in 1986 from 48.6 percent in 1985, but the actual number of such facilities increased by 17. The ratio of detached R&D facilities, including the leased ones, increased to 63.4 percent in 1986 from 51.4 percent in 1985, showing an active establishment of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities that did not have independent buildings.

On the other hand, the industry-funded R&D facilities were analyzed by their R&D manpower in the categories of: fewer than 30 people, 30-100 people, and more than 100 people. The survey shows that at the end of 1986, there were 171 facilities (59.0 percent) with fewer than 30 R&D staff employees, there were 90 facilities (31.0 percent) with 30-100 R&D staff employees, and there were 29 facilities (10.0 percent) with 100 or more R&D staff employees.

As depicted in Figure 2 [not reproduced], the number of R&D facilities with 30-100 people and those with more than 100 people increased by 20.0 percent and 16.0 percent respectively over the past year. On the other hand, the number of R&D facilities with fewer than 30 people increased more than 100 percent from 83 facilities in 1985 to 171 facilities in 1986.

This is because the conditions for the registration of industry-funded R&D facilities at the Ministry of Science and Technology for various supports have been eased by the amended statute of March 1986, which changed the former regulation that restricted such registration only to the R&D facilities with 10 or more R&D people. The new law specifies that such registration is also applicable to the medium and small company-funded facilities and overseas facilities with five or more people. This resulted in a rapid increase of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities in 1986.

II. Status of Technology R&D Investment

1. Trend on Technology R&D Investment

The rate of technology R&D investment measured as a proportion of sales revenue, which is used as an index of evaluating the industrial technology R&D activities in terms of input, has been rising rapidly every year.

The total investment on technology R&D was 140 billion won for 92 industry-funded R&D facilities in 1982, 401.3 billion won for 152 facilities in 1984, 568 billion won for 183 facilities in 1985, and 772.4 billion won for 290 facilities in 1986, giving an annual average increase of 53.2 percent for the 5 years.

In terms of the proportion of sales revenues, the technology R&D investment was 0.97 percent in 1982, 1.16 percent in 1983, and 1.67 percent in 1986, giving about 0.3 percent increase from previous year.
As depicted in Figure 3 [not reproduced], distribution of R&D facilities has been analyzed in seven categories, depending on the ratio of technology R&D investment to sales revenues in 1986. The analysis shows that there were 68 facilities or 23.4 percent of all facilities with technology R&D investment rate of 1.1-2.0 percent, and there were 32 facilities or 17.9 percent of all facilities with technology R&D investment rate of 2.1-3 percent, giving a total of 41.3 percent of all R&D facilities concentrated within the group of technology R&D investment rate of 1.1-3 percent.

There are 47 industry-funded R&D facilities which invest more than 5 percent of sales revenue in technology R&D, and these take up 16.2 percent of all facilities. In the case of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities, 33 facilities invest more than 5 percent of sales revenue in technology R&D. This shows that there is a large number of companies that concentrate their efforts on development of new technologies and new products through investments in technology R&D and that the technology-oriented medium and small companies have a relatively large investment on technology R&D.

In 1986, the ratio of investment on technology R&D to sales revenue was: 8.0 percent for the information industry, 4.32 percent for the electrical/electronics industry, and 1.98 percent for the machinery industry, all of which showed relatively high rates compared with other industries. Most other industries, too, showed a high rate of investment on technology R&D compared with 1985. However, Korea trails far behind Japan (1985) and the United States (1986) in technology R&D investments in all industries, particularly in the key industries that lead development of industrial technology such as the electrical/electronics and machinery industries.

2. Technology R&D Investment per R&D Facility

During 1986, the average use of technology R&D fund was 2.66 billion won for each of the 290 industry-funded R&D facilities. This is in line with continuous increase from 1.52 billion won in 1982 to 2.6 billion won in 1984 to 3.1 billion won in 1985. But the decline in 1986 resulted from the weakened ability in fund raising and the rapid increase of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities whose capacity of technology R&D is small.

The electrical/electronics industry invested 5.43 billion won, which is the largest, on technology R&D. This could be because of the fact that the number of R&D facilities (66 R&D facilities) and the number of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities (34.0 percent) are relatively large in this industry, which means that the large corporations' technology R&D funds are relatively large in this industry. And the average use of the technology R&D fund in the machinery and textile industries was 3.56 billion won per facility respectively, both of which exceed the average of all industries.

Of the 290 R&D facilities at the end of 1986, there were four facilities with more than 50 billion won in technology R&D funds, and nine facilities had 10-50 billion won, meaning that 4.5 percent of the industry-funded R&D facilities invested more than 10 billion won on technology R&D. This also shows a real picture of the large-scale industry-funded R&D facilities.

However, there are 130 R&D facilities (44.9 percent) with less than 500 million won, and there are 45 R&D facilities (15.5 percent) with 0.5-1 billion won, showing that about 60 percent of the industry-funded R&D facilities still invest less than 1 billion won on technology R&D.

In the case of large corporations, those with technology R&D fund of 5-10 billion won were 14 (7.0 percent), those with 1-5 billion won were 85 (42.5 percent), and those with less than 1 billion won were 68 (44.0 percent). In the case of the medium and small companies, those with technology R&D fund of more than 1 billion won were only 3 (3.3 percent), those with 0.5-1 billion won were 10 (11.1 percent), and those with less than 500 million won were 77 (85.6 percent), showing that 96.7 percent of the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities had a technology R&D investment of less than 1 billion won.

3. Particulars of Technology R&D Investment Funds

The largest portion, 36.0 percent, of technology R&D funds for the industry-funded R&D facilities is spent on acquisition of facilities, equipment, and materials. The next largest portions, 27.0 percent, 23.0 percent, and 14.0 percent, are for personnel expenditures, general expenses, and expenses for raw materials, respectively.

In the case of large corporation-funded R&D facilities, expenses for acquisition of facilities, equipment, and materials take up 36.1 percent, which far exceeds the personnel expense which is 26.8 percent. On the other hand, the personnel expense for the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities was 31.7 percent, and the expenses on facilities, equipment, and materials for the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities were 32.4 percent.

For the large corporations, expenses for capital goods, such as land, building, machinery, equipment and the like, are higher than the operating expenses, such as researchers' salary, bonus and retirement pension. On the other hand, the personnel expense for the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities is relatively high. This is because the medium and small company-funded R&D facilities are unable to heavily invest on capital goods, although such investment is needed.
The electrical/electronics industry uses more than 40 percent of the expenditures for acquisition of facilities, equipment, and materials, whereas the chemical, metal/nonmetal and information industries spend more for personnel accounts than for facilities, equipment, and materials.

In 1985, Japanese industries spent 40.7 percent on personnel accounts, 16.4 percent on facilities, equipment, and materials, and 20.5 percent on raw materials, showing that expenses for personnel accounts and raw materials far exceeded expenses for acquisition of facilities, equipment, and materials. In view of this, we can say that the technology R&D activities of the Korean industries are still heavy on formation of the basic R&D environment such as establishment of industry-funded R&D facilities.

4. Technology R&D Expense per Researcher

The average R&D expense per researcher in 1986 was 55 million won, which is a large increase from 38 million won in 1983 and 48 million won in 1985. But this is far different from 86 million won per researcher in Japan. Considering that the Japanese figure includes all researchers in the private industries, we think the difference in technology R&D expense per researcher between Korea and Japan could be even greater.

Compared with 1985, the technology R&D expense per researcher has increased in all areas except for the information and miscellaneous industries. In parties, the technology R&D expense per researcher was 81 million won for the textile industry and about 60 million won for the electrical/electronics and metal/nonmetal industries, which is relatively high. The technology R&D expenses per researcher in the food and drink industry, chemical industry, construction/service industry, and information industry were below 45 million won.

In the case of Japanese industries, the R&D expense per researcher in the metal/nonmetal industry was about 120 million won, which is the highest of all industries, and the R&D expenses per researcher in the machinery, electrical/electronics and chemical industries were in the range of 81-97 million won, whereas the R&D expenses per researcher for the corresponding increases in Korea were in the range of 43-67 million won, which is significantly different from that of the Japanese industries.

The R&D expense of about 80 million won per researcher in the Korean textile industry could be due to the fact that the textile industry-funded R&D facilities heavily invested in research and development of a high molecular substance and that the number of researchers in this area are relatively small.

Unlike other industries, the textile industry receive a relatively low level of R&D support and its R&D activities in improvement of existing products and processes have little connection with other industries. In addition, a majority of the researchers focus on research and development of new products and new materials separately from the areas of improvement of existing products and processes. This results in a relatively low ratio of researchers to the total R&D expense.

Considering the high rate of expenses for acquisition of facilities, equipment, and materials, we think the per-researcher expense for pure R&D activities would be much lower.

III. Status of R&D Manpower

1. Yearly Trend of R&D Manpower

At the end of 1986, there was a total of 24,399 people engaged in R&D activities at the industry-funded R&D facilities. Of these, there were 14,085 researchers (57.7 percent) with a bachelor's degree or higher with a major in the natural sciences. There were 7,436 R&D assistants (30.5 percent) and 2,878 workers in administrative areas (11.8 percent).

The number of researchers increased about 20.1 percent from 11,728 people in 1985, which is a slight decline compared with the increase rate of 30-80 percent during the period of 1982-1985. However, the proportion of top-flight researchers with a master's degree or a doctoral degree is a high 25.9 percent, which is in line with continuous increase.

In particular, there are 273 key researchers with a doctoral degree, which is 1.5 times the 180 people in 1985. This indicates that as technology competition and R&D activities increase here and abroad, the increase-funded R&D facilities, too, are working hard to develop top-flight R&D manpower in order to strengthen their competitive power of R&D personnel.

2. Distribution of R&D Manpower

Of the total 14,089 researchers, 38.1 percent or 5,363 people belong to the electrical/electronics industry (the largest), 26.5 percent or 3,727 people belong to the machinery industry, and 16.4 percent or 2,309 people belong to the chemical industry, showing that the three industries are the leaders in domestic industries' technology R&D not only in view of their leadership in technology R&D investment but also in view of their size of R&D manpower.

The top-flight R&D personnel with master’s or doctoral degrees occupy 52.1 percent or all R&D manpower in the metal/nonmetal industry, and the corresponding ratio for the textile, food and drink, and construction/service industries is in the range of 30-50 percent. The top-flight R&D manpower with master's or doctoral degrees in the machinery, electrical/electronics and miscellaneous industries are about 20 percent of all R&D manpower in these industries.
Compared with other industries, the machinery, electrical/electronics, and chemical industries possess a relatively smaller portion of all R&D manpower with master's or doctoral degrees, but they possess 69.5 percent of all top-flight R&D manpower with master's or doctoral degrees, with 574 people in the machinery industry, 1,231 people in the electrical/electronics industry, and 734 people in the chemical industry. In particular, 86 people or 31.5 percent of the R&D personnel in the chemical industry possess a doctoral degree, the largest of all industries.

Of the total 14,085 personnel, 91.2 percent or 12,850 people are employed by the large corporations, and 8.8 percent or 1,235 people are employed by the medium and small companies. In the case of top-flight R&D personnel with master's or doctoral degrees, 94.6 percent or 3,455 people are employed by the large corporations, and 5.4 percent or 197 people are employed by the medium and small companies.

However, the R&D manpower of 1,235 people in the medium and small companies is about 2.1 times 581 people in 1985. This indicates that the medium and small companies are actively establishing the base of their technology R&D manpower as their interest in technology R&D increases.

3. Occupational Status of R&D Personnel

For the purpose of analysis, the occupational status of R&D personnel was divided into three classes: First, the responsible R&D personnel including responsible researcher, chief researcher, staff researcher, and researchers at or above the rank of a department director, who can independently select, pursue and solve given R&D tasks; second, the senior R&D personnel including senior researchers and researchers at the section chief rank who can independently suggest and develop solutions for given R&D tasks; and third, the general R&D personnel including all others.

The analysis shows that of the total 14,085 R&D personnel, 8.4 percent or 1,182 people belong to the class of responsible R&D personnel, 18.8 percent or 2,653 people belong to the class of senior R&D personnel, and 72.8 percent or 10,250 people belong to class of the general R&D personnel.

There are 273 R&D personnel with a doctoral degree. Of these, 87.5 percent or 239 people belong to the class of responsible R&D personnel, 12.5 percent or 34 people belong to the class of senior R&D personnel, and none of them belong to the class of general R&D personnel.

There are 3,379 R&D personnel with a master's degree. Of these, 7.3 percent or 247 people belong to the class of responsible R&D personnel, 23.1 percent or 779 people belong to the class of senior R&D personnel, and 69.6 percent or 2,353 people belong to the class of general R&D personnel. The reason for the large number of R&D personnel with a master's degree being classified in the general R&D category is because the number of industry-funded R&D facilities increased significantly for the past few years and because the R&D personnel with a master's degree possess a relatively low level of experience in R&D and occupation.

On the other hand, there are 10,433 R&D personnel with a bachelor's degree. Of these, 6.8 percent or 696 people belong to the class of responsible R&D personnel, 17.6 percent or 1,840 people belong to the class of senior R&D personnel, and 72.6 percent or 7,897 people belong to the class of general R&D personnel.

The metal/nonmetal, food and drink, and textile industries have 40 percent or their R&D personnel in the responsible and senior status. On the other hand, the machinery, electrical/electronics and construction industries have more than 70 percent of their R&D personnel in the general R&D status.

In the case of the R&D personnel with a doctoral degree, the metal/nonmetal, construction/service, information, and miscellaneous industries have all of such personnel in the class of responsible R&D personnel. In the food and drink industry and the textile, chemical and electrical/electronics industries, more than 10 percent of the R&D personnel with a doctoral degree belong to the class of senior R&D personnel. In the case of the R&D personnel with a master's degree, 30-50 percent of them belong to the class of senior R&D personnel and 50-70 percent of them belong to the class of general R&D personnel.

4. Number of R&D Personnel per R&D Facility

The average number of R&D personnel per individual industry-funded R&D facility, which serves as an index for measuring the scale of the R&D facility and the degree of its R&D activity, was 49 at the end of 1986. This number is lower than 64 in 1985, and this is because establishment of R&D facilities in 1986 was centered mostly on the medium and small companies which have a relatively small number of R&D personnel, and this resulted in a 58.5 percent increase in the number of R&D facilities while there was only 20.1 percent increase in the number of R&D personnel.

The average number of R&D personnel per R&D facility in the electrical/electronic and machinery industries was 81 and 75 respectively, which is much higher than those in other industries.

Of the 290 increase-funded R&D facilities at the end of 1986, there were three R&D facilities with 500 or more R&D personnel, there were 26 R&D facilities with 100-499 R&D personnel, and there were 29 R&D facilities (10.0 percent) with 100 or more R&D personnel.
In addition, 42.1 percent or 122 R&D facilities possess 10-29 R&D personnel, 19.6 percent or 57 R&D facilities possess 30-90 R&D personnel, 16.9 percent or 49 R&D facilities possess fewer than 10 R&D personnel, and 7.2 percent or 21 R&D facilities possess five R&D personnel.

The large corporations had a distribution that is similar to the overall distribution, but none of them had fewer than 10 R&D personnel. On the other hand, there was only one R&D facility with more than 50 R&D personnel in the medium and small company-funded industries. There were 49 medium and small company-funded R&D facilities, which is more than 50 percent, with fewer than 10 R&D personnel. In particular, there are 21 medium and small company-funded R&D facilities with five R&D personnel, which is the basic condition for obtaining the industry-funded R&D facility permit.

5. Number of R&D Personnel per 1,000 Employees

The number of R&D personnel per 1,000 employees in the industry-funded R&D facilities, which is used as an index for measuring the industry's technology R&D capacity and concentration in terms of manpower, was 20.1 which is close to 19.1 in 1985.

The largest number of R&D personnel per 1,000 employees is 107 in the information industry, and the electrical/electronics, chemical and machinery industries have 24-36 R&D personnel per 1,000 employees, which is higher than the average of all industries. On the other hand, the number of R&D personnel per 1,000 employees in the textile, metal/nonmetal, and construction/service industries is more or less than 10, which is relatively low.

In the case of Japan (1986), the chemical and electrical/electronic industries had more than 50 R&D personnel per 1,000 employees, and the average number of R&D personnel per 1,000 employees in all industries was 46.8. Compared with this, the technology R&D capacity and concentration of industry-funded R&D facilities in Korea is still inferior in terms of manpower.

Industial Technology R&D Associations

1. Present Status of the Establishments

In an attempt to promote development of shared technologies and to maximize the R&D efficiency through joint R&D projects, the Korea Film Condenser R&D Association was first formed in 1982. Since then, formation of such R&D associations has been increasingly active.

At the end of August 1987, there was a total of 33 industrial technology R&D associations in operation, and there were 414 companies that joined of the associations. The electrical/electronics industry was 17 associations (the largest), the automobile parts industry has nine associations, and the textile industry has two associations. The genetic engineering industry, information industry, the energy/resource application industry, and the medical industry have one association each. The Korea Communications Equipment R&D Association was dissolved in May 1985 after the accomplishment of its intended objectives.

In terms of their characteristics, there are 22 R&D associations whose objective is to develop technologies jointly for the medium and small companies, and there are 11 R&D associations formed by the large corporations to work jointly on high technology R&D including semiconductors and computers.

II. Status of Technology R&D Investment

The technology R&D investment by the industrial technology R&D associations increased from 2.2 billion won in 1983 to 4 billion won in 1985 to a total of 5.8 billion won in 1986.

The participation of R&D associations in the government's special R&D projects include: 4 projects for 300 million won in 1982, 10 projects for 1.38 billion won in 1983, 16 projects for 1.55 billion won in 1984, 22 projects for 2.36 billion won in 1985, and 21 projects for 2.4 billion won in 1986. This demonstrates a [continuous] increase in the scale of technology R&D activities by the R&D associations.

Although there were only 21 projects in which the R&D associations participated in 1986, if we include the 8 projects which the R&D associations proposed but were carried out by the government-funded R&D facilities, the total number of projects with which the R&D associations were associated amount to 29 projects and 33.8 billion won.

The R&D projects in which the R&D associations were involved include: 15 projects for 1.2 billion won in the genetic engineering industry, 4 projects for some 300 million won in the information industry, and 2 projects for some 80 million won in the automobile parts industry.

The projects carried out by the government-funded R&D facilities include some 31.7 billion won for the development of 4M DRAM chips in the electrical/electronics industry, some 300 million won for the development of general-purpose personal computers, one project in the automobile parts industry, and five projects in the application of energy and resources.

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ECONOMIC

Editorial Stresses Chuche Farm Method for Agricultural Productivity
41100044 Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean
5 Feb 88 p 1

[Editorial: “Let Us Thoroughly Implement the Agriculture First Policy and Thereby Effect Fresh Transformation in Agricultural Production This Year!”]

[Text] The functionaries and agricultural workers in the area of the rural economy are faced this year with a heavy and honorable task of effecting a fresh and great transformation in agricultural production by upholding the New Year’s message of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song.

In his New Year’s message this year, the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song taught as follows:

“With their lofty self-consciousness that they are masters of the rice chest of the nation, the guidance functionaries and agricultural workers in the field of the rural economy must do their farming well in compliance with the requirements for the chuche farming method and thereby effect fresh transformation in agricultural production this year.”

It is importantly significant to bring about a fresh transformation in agricultural production this year. This year is a significant year in which the 40th anniversary of the founding of the republic arrives; it is the second year of the Third 7-Year Plan.

It is a sacred and rewarding task for us to effect this year a fresh upsurge in agricultural production, and thereby to successfully bring about unprecedented bumper crops in this significant year. It is a task designed to fill more fully the rice chest of the nation, to further improve the peoples’ livelihood, and to display the cause of the republic more forcefully. Only when the farming is done efficiently, can the food problem be solved more satisfactorily, the stock farming be further developed, and the people provided with a higher standard of living. We must supply more raw materials to light industries in order to make the country rich by moving forward the overall national economy, and in this way we can staunchly safeguard the dignity and independence of the nation.

Firmly upholding continuously the agriculture first policy and thoroughly implementing it are a basic guarantee for effecting fresh transformation in agricultural production this year.

The agriculture first policy set forth by our party is a policy designed to epoch makingly increase agricultural production by giving first priority to agriculture, and making all things second to it. It is a policy designed to satisfactorily solve the food problem of the people. It is a most just policy whose superiority and vitality have been fully displayed.

Guidance functionaries of the party organizations at all levels and of the administrative and economic organizations must see to it that the party members and workers will deeply understand the importance and significance of the agriculture first policy, and that they will enjoy stands and views of constantly attaching importance to agriculture and making all things yield to it. Thus they must see to it that all functionaries and workers are determined to work at their farming tasks well at any cost, and that they will consciously launch into the implementation of the agriculture first policy of the party.

They must further step up the material, technological, and labor assistance to rural villages and thereby carry out more quickly those tasks set forth in the agrarian thesis. Thus, they must effect a fresh transformation in the agricultural production this year.

It is our party’s resolute determination to consummate during the coming few years the tasks of the four revolutions of irrigationization, electrification, mechanization, and chemicalization in the rural economy.

It is imperative for us to firmly uphold the party’s agriculture first policy and to accomplish decisive advances in implementing the tasks of the four technological revolutions set forth in the agrarian thesis.

Above all, we must accelerate overall mechanization in the rural economy. Under the judicious leadership of the party, our scientists and technicians originally designed various new agricultural machines in conformity with our country’s topographical and farming conditions and manufactured them during the last year. Thus they opened up firm prospects in which they may accomplish a comprehensive mechanization in the rural economy in a few years. Now an important task we are facing this year is to produce more tractors and cars and more of those modern agricultural machines that fit the reality of our country and to supply them to rural villages. The functionaries and workers in the field of agricultural machine production must conspicuously increase the production of tractors and cars, must take a bold leap forward in producing those various agricultural machines that fit the reality of our country, and thereby must make this significant year a year in which they score a great victory in the struggle designed to accomplish an overall mechanization in the rural economy. At the same time, those scientists and technicians in many units, including the research institutes for agricultural mechanization, must quickly complete the research for producing agricultural machines which could be employed in fields with great gradients. Thus they must see to it that not only open field farming, but also the farming in mountainous regions will be comprehensively
mechanized. The party organizations in rural areas, the functionaries in the field of agriculture, and those soldiers at the forefront of agricultural mechanization must make land readjustments on a large scale, and must see to it that the clanger of mechanization is heard everywhere.

The production of various chemical fertilizers and agricultural chemicals must be epoch-makingly increased. Fertilizer must be regarded as rice; rice production is higher in proportion to the fertilizer used. Therefore, the functionaries and workers in the field of fertilizer production must operate equipment at full capacity from the position that fertilizer should come first at all times. They must produce decisively and in a more timely manner highly efficient fertilizers, which fit the soil conditions and the biological characteristics of the crops, including nitrogenous fertilizer, phosphorous fertilizer, potassic fertilizer, silicon fertilizer, and various microelement fertilizers. The functionaries in the field of transportation must plan and coordinate transportation, and ship fertilizers to cooperative farms prior to each farming process so that the farms may have available appropriate fertilizers for each farming process at the most appropriate time in conformity with the requirements for the chuche farming method. Thus they must see to it that the farms will be able to improve efficiency to the greatest extent.

The sprinkler irrigation work for dry fields covering an area of 500,000 chon is a stupendous large-scale project to remake nature that is designed to complete at a new higher level the irrigation projects of the rural economy that have already been materialized in our country. It is a rewarding project that would mobilize the stupendous potentials for food grain production. At present, the local party organizations, functionaries in the field of agriculture, the workers, and the members of Three Revolutions Teams, setting forth a lofty target of finishing a sprinkler irrigation project for dry fields that cover an area of 200,000 chon before the middle part of April this year, are launching a forceful struggle with mass movement. The first problem that should be solved to attain that target is to actively accelerate the production of those concrete plates, equipment and material which would be used for installing sprinkler irrigation for dry fields as well as the work of building the storage for water supply. How to produce these and guarantee them depends upon the problem of whether or not the sprinkler irrigation project for dry fields that covers an area of 200,000 chon can be finished in time. The party organizations and the functionaries of administrative and economic organizations, and of pertinent plants and business enterprises, displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance, must revolutionarily push the production of the equipment and material to be used for the sprinkler irrigation of dry fields and the work of building the source of water supply. At the same time, they must forcefully launch a movement of the entire masses for the work of mobilizing inner reserves.

Along with that, the functionaries in the field of agriculture and the cooperative farms must thoroughly establish the measures designed to effectively utilize the already built facilities of sprinkler irrigation for dry fields.

It is imperative that various farming resources be supplied in time in conformity with the demand of the agriculture first policy. At this juncture, it is of special importance that the roles and responsibility of functionaries of the State Administration Council and the State Planning Committee be enhanced.

The guidance functionaries of the State Administrative Council and the State Planning Committee must constantly oversee and keep a good hold of the situation surrounding not only the production of tractors, cars, various agricultural machines that fit the topographical conditions of our country, chemical fertilizers, and agricultural chemicals but also the production and supply of tires, oil, and various farming resources, including tractor parts and steel material to be used in repairing agricultural machines. They must solve pending problems in time, establish necessary measures, and thereby see to it that there is not even a small hitch in the farming struggle.

Forcefully launching tideland reclamation and the movement for finding new land is one of the important tasks that should be carried out to increase food grain production. In this year, we must forcefully launch tideland reclamation and the movement for finding new land and thereby further increase the area of arable land.

Thoroughly implementing the chuche farming method is a decisive guarantee for enabling us to bring about fresh transformation in agricultural production this year.

Functionaries in the field of the rural economy and agricultural workers must thoroughly meet this year the demands of the chuche farming method in all farming processes, and thereby effect a great innovation in the production of agricultural products, including food grains.

It is of utmost importance at this juncture that the lifestyle of establishing absoluteness of the chuche farming method be firmly established among the functionaries in the field of the rural economy. As emphasized by our party, thoroughly employing the chuche farming method is the way through which the guidance functionaries in the field of the rural economy can answer the trust and expectations of the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song. The party organizations in rural villages and the party functionaries must see to it that functionaries in the field of agriculture will have a deep understanding of the fact that thoroughly implementing the chuche farming method represents the stand and attitude of looking up to the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song. It is he who hammered out the chuche farming method, and the thorough implementation of that method brings about the realization of absoluteness and unconditionality
toward the respected and beloved leader's instructions. Thus they must see to it that the functionaries in the field of agriculture make the chuche farming method absolute before anyone else, and that they display a comprehensive stand in implementing the method.

Stepping up technical guidance is one of the most important demands that has to be met in implementing the chuche farming method. This guidance in agricultural production is seeing to it that the farming is done in essence in compliance with the demands of the chuche farming method from first to last. There must be no yielding or additions in doing that. The guidance functionaries in the field of agriculture, adhering to the chuche farming method, must go down to sub-work teams, and must conduct technical guidance in depth so that the demands of the chuche farming method may be thoroughly implemented in all farming processes, including making thorough preparations for sowing cold-frame rice seedling, taking a good care of these seedlings, raising strong seedlings and carrying out rice transplanting at the right time, carefully raising corn humus pot seedlings of good quality and transplanting them at the right time, and scientifically and technically fertilizing in conformity with the topographical conditions and the biological demands of food grains.

In order to efficiently implement the chuche farming method, it is imperative that the lifestyle that fits the master be highly displayed among the functionaries in the field of agriculture and members of the farms.

When the functionaries in the field of agriculture and members of the farms, who are the masters of the socialist rural villages, who are directly in charge of food grain production, and who know the soil and the chuche farming method better than anyone else, responsibly do the farming with the consciousness that fits the master, the demands of the chuche farming method can be met more effectively in all farming processes, and the agricultural production can be epoch makingly increased.

The party organizations in rural villages and functionaries of the party, upholding the party slogan "Fields of the farm are my fields," must go down among them the functionaries in the field of agriculture and members of the farm and give active priority to political work. Thus they must see to it that everyone does their farming work, whatever it is, only in conformity with the demands of the chuche farming method, with the high consciousness of being the masters who are in charge of the rice chest of the nation.

At this moment, it is imperative that all the efforts of rural villages be concentrated on farming preparations, such as producing and shipping fertilizers, soil leveling, and getting ready the material for nursery cold frames, and thereby that we see to it that all the processes be carried out thoroughly in conformity with the demands of the chuche farming method.

Whether or not a fresh transformation can be effected in agricultural production largely depends on the roles and responsibilities of the guidance functionaries. The party organizations and the party functionaries must adequately guide and spur on the guidance functionaries in the field of agriculture so that they may go down to the farms and organize and lead, with ambitious spirit and the determination for efficient farming, the farming battle in conformity with the demands of the Ch'ongsanri method, so that they may constantly improve and step up management activities in conformity with the demands of the chuche oriented agricultural guidance system, and so that they may actively scientize the agricultural production. Effecting a fresh transformation in agricultural production in this significant year in which the 40th anniversary of the founding of the republic arrives is a determined will of the party and the state. It is a wholehearted intention of our people.

Let us all uphold the party's agriculture first policy and accomplish a decisive advance in this year's agricultural production, improve the peoples' livelihood further, and thereby again forcefully display both at home and abroad the cause of the republic and the superiority of the system of the socialist rural economy of our country.

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Seoul Paper Assesses Taean Work System, Operations
41100045 Seoul NAEWOE TONGSIN in Korean
No 573, 29 Jan 88 pp 1C-8C

[Text] (Seoul—Naewoe) Emphasizing that strengthening its economic management system is an urgent task that must be carried out before anything else in order to accomplish this year's economic task of the Third 7-Year Plan, North Korea urged [its people] to actively implement "the Taean Work System" which was reportedly set forth by Kim Il-song.

After Kim II-song's New Year's message was made public this year, North Korea's propaganda organizations were vying in stepping up economic agitations designed to urge the accomplishment of the second year tasks of the Third 7-Year Plan. The 21 January issue of NODONG SINMUN, organ of the party, elucidated, in its editorial entitled "Let Us Hold Fast to the Taean Work System and Forcefully Accelerate Production and Construction!", the principles governing and the policy toward the problem of the economic management system in North Korea.

The paper said that "the Taean Work System" must be thoroughly implemented in order to carry out the political tasks of the year 1988 that were set forth in the New Year's message of Kim II-song. It then asserted that "no economic management system is more superior and revolutionary than the Taean Work System," and that "when we strongly adhere to this economic management system, we can successfully carry out any stupendous
economic tasks confronting us.” Such an assertion in NODONG SINMUN, while attaching great significance to the fact that “the Taean Work System” was set forth by Kim Il-song, gives compulsory significance to [the proposition] that the economic management system that meets the criteria of “the Taean Work System” must be unconditionally employed in order to efficiently accomplish impending economic tasks. 

As for the characteristics of “the Taean Work System,” as emphasized by NODONG SINMUN, the first characteristic is that “it is a chuche-oriented form of economic management that thoroughly embodies the policies of the masses and scientifically operates the economy under the collective guidance of the party committee.” The second is that “it makes the producers the real masters of business enterprise management and production,” and “it forcefully accelerates socialist construction on the basis of revolutionary and creative enterprises.”

In other words, “the Taean Work System” is one based on responsibility for management of pertinent plants and business enterprises belonging to “the party committee,” and all the workers of the plants share the responsibility for management—a collective management, that is.

North Korea, at present, makes it the duty of all economic units, including plants and business enterprises, to practice the form of economic management which is called “the Taean Work System.” And it publicizes the system as the best one which displays the superiority of North Korea’s form of economic management. It has also made it clear that “the Taean Work System” will be thoroughly implemented, as policy, in the impending process of carrying out the Third 7-Year Plan.

Other examples of propaganda from North Korean propaganda organizations concerning “the Taean Work System,” besides the recent NODONG SINMUN editorial, were emphatic on the importance of the system. They stated that it is “a programmatic policy making plainlucidating that all stupendous economic tasks can be successfully implemented,” and that “it is a new and original system of industrial management.” On the other hand, key officers and the workers of the party and government organizations at all levels have been forced to make a study of the system.

Thus realities there are such that “the Taean Work System” has been a sacred code for North Korea’s form of economic management from 9 November 1962 when Kim Il-song set forth the system for the first time at an expanded meeting of the Taean Electric Plant Party [Branch].”

Meanwhile, it is a fact that, in the economic situation of North Korea at that time was based on a management form which allowed for great economic accomplishment. This is because from 1958 on North Korea transformed its economic system into a socialist economic system, and made all production organizations carry out production in accordance with the amount of production assigned to them by central planning authorities. However, as the situation developed most plants and business enterprises failed to accomplish assigned production targets; and economic planning itself that time reached a deadend. Furthermore, when Kim Il-song launched a pro-PRC policy in the face of the Sino-Soviet disputes which began in 1961, the Soviet Union suspended its existing economic cooperation with North Korea. Thus North Korea’s economy continued to deteriorate.

When he came to face international and domestic economic difficulties everywhere Kim Il-song took some self-help measures designed to overcome the difficulties. In order to do so, he thought that he had to employ a method of self-reliance with which the labor force of North Korean workers might be maximally mobilized. Thus he set forth the so-called “Taean Work System” as a substitute method.

The circumstances under which Kim Il-song put forth “the Taean Work System” may be summarized as follows:

First, all responsibilities were placed on one person, that is, the responsible manager (manager of a plant or a business enterprise), general workers and middle managers had no sense of responsibility. Second, managers did not grasp the situation of production sites and employed the bureaucratic management method in which they issued orders from the front office. Last, the prevailing situation was that workers felt discontented with the failure on the part of responsible managers, and desire to produce was frequently lost and acts of sabotage occurred.

Under the new economic management system which was set forth with the idea of eliminating these negative factors and phenomena, the responsibility for the management of the plant becomes the joint responsibility of all and is not put on a specific person (plant manager); the plant party committee takes the responsibility for management; and the political and ideological work is to be stepped up under the guidance of the party committee in order to enhance the workers’ desire for production.

And upper level officials must abandon the type of bureaucratic guidance method of issuing orders and must constantly grasp the real situation of production sites directly; and they must adopt the guidance method of taking the lead and setting an example in which they themselves take part in production activities together with workers. These are the essence of “the Taean Work System.”

From that time on, the Taean Work System has been applied like a common law as a form of economic management over the past 30-odd years as North Korea has strived to implement all economic policies and economic planning. Thus it has been the economic leader overall.
This form of economic management seemed, in its early stage, to accomplish greater labor productivity for a certain period of time by stirring up the workers' desire for the revolutionary and ideological struggle. However, as time went on, contrary to what was originally intended, economic officials' inexperienced and insincere attitude toward business became chronic and even the workers' desire for labor decreased. Thus the system reached a limit.

For example, there were many economic guidance officials who attempted to solve even such problems as an inadequate supply of materials, replacing old equipment and facilities, and replenishing manpower and technology by using political and ideological measures of accelerating the display of revolutionary consciousness and the consciousness of so-called loyalty toward Kim Il-sung.

This has been a typical method of economic agitation launched so far in North Korea. However, its electrifying effect in an economic sense, including actual spiritual incentives designed to enhance labor efficiency and production accomplishment, is restricted.

Let us cite an example in order to demonstrate this. Responsible men of a certain plant party committee cannot help being intent on mastering "tactics for getting a lesser production assignment, and yet getting more material supplies" for the purpose of avoiding their responsibility for the economic tasks assigned to their plant. In other words, in order to accomplish more surely and easily the production target, the best policy is to get the quota of production capability lower than could be accomplished by means of reporting to upper echelons the circumstances of possible shortages of support materials.

At the same time, it would be more realistic for them to employ the method of stimulating the workers' desire for production and work efficiency. Moreover, under the economic conditions of North Korea in which there is a great shortage of all kinds of production equipment, technological capability, and resources and raw materials, there cannot be any other ingenious means of accomplishing the economic tasks assigned to the plant at issue.

In reality, both in the communist countries and in the capitalist countries, the only way of effectively maximizing production workers' desire for labor and production efficiency is material stimulation. In other words, when workers get high enough wages in accordance with their sweat, and when they can achieve an affluent living environment, their desire for labor can be heightened.

That is why, in the PRC, Soviet Union, and all the East European communist countries, too, a recent tendency is that the socialist economic management system is being set aside and an economic management system with capitalistic characteristics is being adopted. Despite such a tendency, North Korea, an economically underdeveloped country, is trying to implement its Third 7-Year Plan by means of employing an old-fashioned economic management method that was practiced more than 30 years ago. In short, that simply indicates that North Korea is still incapable of breaking away from an immature infant-like economic status.
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