Near East & South Asia
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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

Iranian Mullahs' Activities Observed [Istanbul MILLIYET 6-12 Jun] ......................................................... 1

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

AL-TADAMUN Discusses ACC Capabilities [London AL-TADAMUN 3 Jul] ..................................................... 16
Korean Electronic Firms Capture Gulf Market [Doha GULF TIMES 27 Jul] ...................................................... 16

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Al-Fahum Interviewed on 'Arafat, Syria [Kuwait AL-ANBA' 10 Aug] ........................................................... 17
DFLP Leader Interviewed on Elections, Bilateral Relations [Dubayy AL-BAYAN 12 Jul] .............................. 20
Red Crescent Supports Palestinian Uprising [Muscat TIMES OF OMAN 6 Jul] ............................................. 24
Jordanian Regime's Stability Said Top PLO Aim [WAKH Radio] .............................................................. 24

EGYPT

Government Reports on Progress of Land Reclamation [London AL-HAWADITH 7 Jul] ............................ 24
Vice Chairman of General Authority for Investment Discusses Corporation Law [London AL-HAWADITH 21 Jul] ................................................................. 25
Union Leader's Comments Provide Case Study of Factory Strike [AL-SHA'B 25 Jul] ............................. 26
Imams, Officials Discuss Threats to Islam [AL-NUR 19 Jul] ................................................................. 28
Agricultural Land Statistics Provided [AL-ÄHRAM AL-DÜWALI 4 Jul] ....................................................... 31
Citizens, Officials, Bakers React to Bakery Slowdown [AL-SHA'B 25 Jul] .................................................... 31

IRAQ

Highway Construction Projects Completed [BAGHDAD OBSERVER 11 Jul] ............................................ 33

ISRAEL

'Source' Claims No Objection to Joint Funds in Territories [AL-QUDS 21 Aug] ........................................ 33
Reduction in Arab Sector Aid to Territories [Jerusalem Radio] ............................................................... 34
Rabin's Office Releases Data on Effects of Jibril Deal [Jerusalem Radio] .................................................... 34
Maximum Administrative Detention Extended to One Year [Jerusalem Radio] ......................................... 34
Detainment of Tourist Provokes Strong Danish Press Reaction ................................................................. 34
Attorney Complains of Mistreatment [HADASHOT 16 Jul] ........................................................................ 34
Wave of Anti-Israeli Sentiment [HADASHOT 13 Jul] .............................................................................. 35
Army Mental Health Officer Discusses Those Exempt From IDF Service [HA'ARETZ 9 Jul] .................... 36
Levinger Discusses Politics, Arabs [HA'ARETZ 7 Jul] ............................................................................. 37
General Ehud Baraq Profiled [HADASHOT 21 Jul] ................................................................................. 40
Al-Turayfi Denies Threats, Will No Longer Meet With Shamir [Jerusalem Radio] .................................... 44
IDF Operates Five Medical Clinics on Lebanese Border [Jerusalem Radio] ............................................. 45
Favorable Trade Balance With Romania Reported [DAVAR 16 Aug] .................................................... 45

KUWAIT

Figures Indicate Improvement in Economy [London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT 9 Aug] .............................. 45
LEBANON


MOROCCO

Planning Minister Discusses Trade Balance  [London AL-TADAMUN 17 Jul]  ......................... 50
Local Councils Experiment With Democracy  [London AL-HAWADITH 14 Jul]  ......................... 52
Transportation Sector Suffers From New Taxes  [AL-ALAM 18 Jul]  ............................. 54

SUDAN

Omdurman Officials Prepare for Annual Flood  [AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH 17 Jul] ....... 55
Editorial Rejects 'Importing Government Theory'  [AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH 10 Jul] .... 57

SYRIA

Black Bread Market Thriving  ................................................................. 58
Shortage Creates New Phenomena  [AL-THAWRAH 19 Jul]  .......................................... 58
Measures To Stem Child Vendor Phenomenon  [AL-THAWRAH 19 Jul]  .................................. 60
Slow Production and Maldistribution Cause Chaos  [AL-THAWRAH 19 Jul]  ......................... 62

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Taxation Agreement Signed With France  [GULF NEWS 20 Jul]  ........................................... 64
Economic, Technical Agreement To Be Signed with Soviet Union  [Dubayy AL-BAYAN 18 Jul] .... 64

SOUTH ASIA

BANGLADESH

Parliament Told of Bangladeshis in Indian Jails  [THE NEW NATION 23 Jun]  ......................... 66

INDIA

Revised Estimates Show Reduced Budget Deficit  [THE TIMES OF INDIA 6 Jul]  .............. 66
Papers Give Details on Government Changes  .............................................................. 66
Cabinet, Other Ministers  [THE HINDU 5 Jul]  ......................................................... 66
Some Deputy Ministers Promoted  [THE HINDU 5 Jul]  .............................................. 67
Promotions to Secretary Rank  [PATRIOT 11 Jul]  ..................................................... 67
Papers Report on Meeting of CPI Executive Committee  ................................................. 68
Resolutions on Sri Lanka, PRC  [THE TIMES OF INDIA 5 Jul]  ........................................ 68
Stand on Other Indian Parties  [THE TIMES OF INDIA 6 Jul]  .................................... 69
In fact, a report appearing in the earliest days of the Iranian Islamic Revolution in an English-language publication, NEWS AND VIEWS, put out by the information and publications office of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, showed the direction in which this revolution was going to develop. The 26 August 1979 issue reported that in Bakhar, a town near Isfahan, a 70-year-old man and a 75-year-old woman had each been given 100 lashes of the whip for adultery. A law passed in March of this year, 10 years later, provides for 70 lashes for dressing in violation of the Holy Law. The interesting thing about this law is that no distinction is made between women and men; in other words, men are also ordered to dress in accordance with the Holy Law. Moreover, women are forbidden to wear bright colored chadors. And speaking of whips, we are reminded of this report that appeared in MILLIYET on 8 April 1989: “In a bulletin published on Ramadan, which began yesterday, the Iranian Interior Ministry exhorts the people to observe the rules of the fast. Those who do not comply will be prosecuted. Those who eat in public during the fast in Iran will be punished by being whipped.”

Another practice involving punishment by whipping in Iran which is also difficult to believe is this: Certain persons condemned to die may also be sentenced to lashes of the whip. Thus, they are whipped first and then executed.

Another practice that has entered daily life is the separation of men and women on public transportation. This practice was begun in Tehran in 1985. On double-decker buses, the lower one is reserved for women. Regular buses are divided by an iron pipe in the middle and men go to the front, women to the back.

In fact, this practice is still in effect today only on buses operating in certain quarters of Tehran because of various difficulties in implementation and even some comical situations that resulted occasionally. For example, if a husband and wife wished to board the bus with their son, the husband and son had to sit in the men’s section while the mother had to ride in the section reserved for women. If the woman’s husband was not with her, she could not ride the bus with her son. Also, if there were more men on the bus than women, the men’s section might be overflowing while the women’s section was empty. In other words, half the bus would be packed in like sardines and the other half would be empty.

It is seen that the universities in Iran are now also supporting the Islamic Revolution.

First, let us read a report from the 20 October 1984 issue of the newspaper KEYHAN:

“Justice Department police announcement: A new section will go into service at the Kizilhisar Prison next week. This section consists of two wards. Sentences of criminals in this section will be carried out in accordance with the Holy Law. Thieves’ hands will also be cut off here. A hand-severing machine has been installed for this purpose. The machine is noted for the speed with which
it works, severing the hand without excess damage. It was built through the cooperation of Tehran University, Shahid Beheshti University, and the Ministry of Forensic Medicine and Health.” [as published]

This is the level to which Iran [as published] University, which at first opposed the revolution, has fallen in so short a time. One wonders how anybody who dares to place the title “professor” before his name could have started building hand-severing machines. Let us find the answer to this question by reading from a book by an Iranian university instructor:

“One day a letter arrived from the Cultural Revolutionary Command. This letter asked us to prepare a new curriculum for each department, bearing in mind Islamic principles. Talk about absurdity! What do physics and mathematics have to do with Islamic principles? It is impossible to do what the mullahs asked in the language and literature department. But at our meeting the next day one of our colleagues, a professor of Western languages and literature, came up with something that would never have entered my mind. He had made a list of French translations of the Koran and books on Islam and was going to teach students the French language and literature with these books!” (Bahman Nirumand: “Iran: Flowers Wilting Behind Bars,” translated by Kemal Kurt, Belge Publishers, Istanbul, 1988, pp 229-230)

**You Will Turn Him In Even If He Is Your Son**

Parents are sacrificing their children to the revolution in this country, where all music except revolutionary marches is forbidden, where beaches have been closed, where the minimum marriage age for girls has been reduced to 13 and where fun is considered a sin.

Having parents turn their children in to the mullahs began in the very first year of the Islamic Revolution with the announcement that it was the parents’ religious duty to report to police their children who did not heed Khomeyni’s guidance. Let us again turn to Bahman Nirumand’s book to see how this injunction by Khomeyni affected daily life:

“A few days later we read a report in the newspapers about a mother who had reported her son to the prosecutor. And, in fact, on television one night we saw the woman who had performed this act of heroism. She seemed very happy that her son had been arrested and insisted that the revolutionary court condemn her son to death. The woman was held up as a model mother for our country. She was received by Khomeyni. What you did is an example for everyone; may everyone follow your lead, Khomeyni told her. Another woman appeared on television 2 days later. This woman went even further and asked the high court to allow her to hang her son with her own hands!” (page 249)

Revolutionary Courts President Gilani tried one of his own sons and condemned him to death, finding this in compliance with Khomeyni’s orders. This ruling was a source of great pride to him. However, if one looks into the facts of the matter, it is necessary to say that the mullahs’ own children are the worst offenders keeping them awake at night. For example, Revolutionary Courts President Gilani has three other sons besides the one condemned to death. One of them died in an armed clash with revolutionary guards, another is wanted for desertion, and the third is in prison. Two of Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani’s daughters and their husbands were arrested and imprisoned at Evin Prison for being members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, and one of his sons-in-law was executed. His son-in-law Mehdi Hashemi, who was in line as Khomeyni’s successor and ran Montazeri’s office but resigned 2 months ago, has been executed on charges of being an American spy. Khomeyni’s grandson, the child of his son Mustafa who lost his life during the Shah’s reign, has been under house arrest at Khomeyni’s residence since 1981 for being a member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq. Nevertheless, it seems that Khomeyni, who has put more than 70,000 people to death, thousands of them for membership in the Mojahedin-e Khalq, has spared the life of his grandson.

**Penalty for Going on Strike: Firing Squad**

To this sketch that we have drawn to document what the Islamic Revolution has introduced to daily life in Iran, let us add this report that appeared in the December 1984 issue of NAMEH-YE MARDOM, numbers 28-29:

“The strike begun by 10,000 of the 40,000 workers at the steel plant in Isfahan has spread to 20,000 workers. The strike began when the Iranian Islamic Republic announced that the plant would be sold to the private sector because it was not profitable. At first, 10,000 workers joined the strike, but when they were attacked by police and Revolutionary Guards, the number rose to 20,000. The Revolutionary Guards first surrounded the factory and tried to prevent workers from leaving or getting communications out. Then they arrested 20 worker representatives and asked them to end the strike. The worker representatives did not agree to this, and 10 of them were shot to death in the plant to intimidate the workers and break the strike.”

**Now to Turkey**

If this new way of life in Iran affected only Iran, it would perhaps have been a topic for us to research only from the standpoint of the people living on Iranian territory. However, as we will soon see, while on the one hand Iran is trying to export this regime to us and to get it established here also, on the other hand there are people on both the left and the right in our country who admire this regime and, further, are trying to take advantage of the opportune political climate to implement this kind of social order.

Some leftist intellectuals consider the Iranian Islamic Republic’s obstinate opposition to the West, primarily the United States, to be antiprimperialism and feel kinship with the mullahs for this reason. The shooting execution
of the worker leaders ought to be a sufficient lesson for these people. It is necessary to bear in mind also that the Iranian left supported Khomeiny for the same reason at the beginning, and the U.S. embassy employees were taken hostage and exploited until Khomeiny took full control of the situation, but some of the same leftists have been shot or hanged today, and those who managed to escape are trying to resume their lives in foreign countries. Moreover, Khomeiny supporters have such a deep hatred of leftists, in fact, that they refuse to even touch leftists that they are going to torture or execute, considering them “unclean,” and guide them by poking and prodding with a club. This hatred is nothing new. According to a source who was imprisoned in Evin Prison during the Shah’s reign, Lajevardi, who is a leader of the Iranian secret service today and was director of Evin Prison for a while after the Islamic Revolution but was imprisoned there for a long time under the shah, refused to eat food from the same dish from which leftist prisoners were served, or to hang his clothes on the same line where they hung their clothes to dry during the years of his imprisonment!

Meanwhile, clothing ads for the “latest style suitable for the veil” and the “only name in Islamic styles” appear in the pages of certain newspapers, stores selling alcoholic beverages are torn down and burned, people who eat during the fast are beaten or even killed, men and women are separated on the buses, police watch while reporters are attacked after mass services, the turban is officially approved, society is forced to conform to the “religious principles of the basic rules of law.” These are all things that have begun to happen in our country. And it is true that the religious segment in our country that admires the Khomeiny regime is growing larger with each passing day.

[7 Jun 89 p 11]

[Text] Mullahs’ Nightmare

Turkish Islamic Republic support and tolerance of the Iranian Islamic Republic is a contradiction in terms. The Turkish Republic is the only one of all the Islamic countries to have secularism in effect through its constitution and laws. Turkey is a state in which those who are still sincerely committed to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk have the right to live. Even if we come to a standpoint occasionally, or certain influential people emerge who want to hold the country back, it is not our intention to arrest civilization or return to the Middle Ages. And for this reason the administrators of the Iranian Islamic Republic started from the first day they seized power trying to liken Turkey to themselves. This effort has been especially visible in the form of cooperation with the reactionary circles that have been unable to penetrate the secularism in our country, and with those who have made the banner of anti-Ataturkism their own. In addition, Iran has subversive and propaganda agents and organizations in our country. Iran fosters support of Turkey’s enemies in its own territory. In contrast, while the Iranian Islamic Republic government has engaged in various attacks on Ataturk and our republican reforms, and while the mullahs have been interfering in our internal affairs, Turkey has been incredibly tolerant towards Iran and has never even occasionally raised its voice against its activities in our country!

Mullahs’ Nightmare: Secular, Nationalist Turkish State

The Iranian Islamic Republic’s plans for Turkey appeared in an Iranian Foreign Ministry publication in the earliest days of power. The article, entitled “The Islamic Revolution and World Muslims,” first says that Khomeiny insists on the need for Shiite-Sunni unity and opposes nationalism because it is the greatest obstacle to unity. The article goes on to say that Islamic activism has increased in many countries, including Turkey, in the past 40 years, that numerous organizations are involved in these activities, and that Khomeiny is the true leader who can now eliminate the obstacles to Islamic unity. We also learned from the article that delegations from Turkey visit Khomeiny for this purpose.

The Iranian Islamic Republic Foreign Ministry also reported in this publication that a world-wide “international holy fighters organization” would be formed under Khomeiny’s leadership to bring about Islamic unity. It promises that Iran will help the leaders of all Islamic movements having adequate popular support to overthrow established secular governments in their countries. The only condition for this is: “These religious leaders must follow the Prophet’s practices in their daily lives” (NEWS AND VIEWS, C.I. No 38, 39, 40).

Let us also look at these excerpts from published works:

From the book “The Iranian Revolution As Seen by World Muslims,” published in 1987 by the Culture Office of Iran’s Istanbul Consulate General: “We cannot maintain friendly and peaceful relations with satans and those who have gone astray; indeed, we cannot coexist with them. Islamic governments have charged us with fighting against all errant and irreligious people everywhere in the world” (p 14).

From “Imam Khomeiny’s Historic Message on Important Internal and External Problems,” published in Ankara in 1988 by the Iranian Cultural Center: “I publicly announce that the Iranian Islamic Republic is investing its total wealth in all the world to revive the Islamic identity of Muslims” (p 33).

These lines make Iran’s intentions clear enough to require no further comment or additional examples. However, quoting some of the headlines appearing in the press in the past will once again make the enormity of the danger self-explanatory:

• “Turks Attend Memorial Rally at Iranian Consulate” (MILLIYET 4 July 1981)
• “Thousands of Muslim Militants from Foreign Countries Undergo Intensive Training in Iran” (HUR-RIYET 13 April 1982)
“Ataturk Avenue Name Changed in Tehran” (MILLYET 12 October 1984)

“Khomeyni Now Targets 1.5 Million Turks Living in West Germany, Khomeyni Prepared to Send Many Trained Agents, Intensify Holy Law Propaganda Long Current among Turkish Workers There under Islamic Revolution Export Program” (MILLYET 6 September 1986)


“Leaflet Distributed by ‘Muslim Militants Organization’ in Ankara Proclaims Islamic Movement to Begin at Signal by Khomeyni” (MILLYET 15 November 1987)


“Iran Smuggles Tons of Propaganda Materials into Turkey” (HURRIYET 26 March 1989)

“Iran Courts Armenians” (HURRIYET 30 April 1984)

“Kurdish-Armenian Cooperation in Iran” (MILLYET 11 October 1984)

“Revolutionary Guards in Contact with Hezbollah, ASALA, Order for Action to Turkey from Mullah” (HURRIYET 21 April 1989)

Thief Bold, Homeowner Coward?

Certainly Iran’s hostile attitude, which we have tried to describe briefly and which goes so far as to interfere in our internal affairs, does not go this far. But Iran has acted on many occasions like the bold thief that beats up the homeowner. So what has Turkey done to date to counteract this Iranian attitude? We expelled two Iranian diplomats who were involved in the escape of an Iranian suspect 7 months ago. We demanded the recall of Ambassador Manushehr Mottaki because the attitudes of both Iranian government members and their ambassadors in Turkey totally ignored the rules of international law and because of his behavior in the turban and Salman Rushdie incidents. The Foreign Ministry has cautioned Iran once or twice recently. Aside from the fact that these reactions are extremely inadequate in the face of Iran’s attitude, it is puzzling and alarming in itself that they have been exhibited only after 10 years although Iran has been acting the same way ever since 1979.

Of essential importance, however, is that Iran has its own schools and mosques in Turkey, has opened cultural centers where it can conduct all kinds of propaganda, and allows its consulates to distribute all the brochures they want to. There are 1 million Iranians in Turkey, the large majority of them inaccessible by any sort of oversight. We do not know how many of them really came to escape the oppression of the Khomeyni regime and how many are agents or require visas for Iranians coming to Turkey, ignoring the fact that the Foreign Ministry disagrees. There are two countries in the entire world that do not require visas for Iranians: Japan and Turkey. In contrast, we require visas for our other southern and eastern neighbors with whom we have no such problems!

In fact, we are being so tolerant towards Iran that nothing is said when Iranian officials, who have had no objections to visiting Lenin’s tomb while in Russia for instance, do not visit Ataturk’s Mausoleum when in Turkey. Members of the Council of Ministers saw no objection to placing the Bismillah at the beginning of the aviation treaty between the secular Republic of Turkey and Iran. They signed it, and it was published in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE of the Turkish Republic on 30 April 1989.

And this is not all. As we will detail later, we have done certain “favors” for Iran! Perhaps the authorities have never read article 11 of the Iranian Islamic Republic’s constitution, which reads: “All Muslims are a single nation and the full political purpose of the Iranian Islamic Republic is the unity and cohesiveness of the Islamic nations, and its duty is to strive continuously for the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.”

Need we say that, if this goal of Iran’s were to be realized, the “national” and “secular” Turkish Republic envisaged by our constitution would be a thing of the past?

[8 Jun 89 p 11]

[Text] Iran Copies Bulgarians

The leaders of our eastern neighbor, the Iranian Islamic Republic, are intrinsically and perpetually hostile to the Turkey of Ataturk, as we documented yesterday. They make this perfectly clear, as we also saw. But not content with this, the mullahs are also hostile toward the Turks living in Iran. Meanwhile, everyone knows that the mullahs, who expostulate on Muslim unity and brotherhood despite their enmity against the Muslim Azerbaijan Turks, have declared the state of Israel and the Jews the mortal enemies of the entire Islamic world. Nevertheless, Iran’s anti-Turkish leaders pretend to the world that they are not talking to Israel and the Jews, while secretly they are trading with Israel and taking good care of the Jews in their country. In fact, Iran has bought arms from Israel and in exchange permits the Jews who wish to do so to leave Iran and go to Israel and keeps the ones who stay happy. The most important aspect of concern to us is that Turkey is the bridge they use for both the shipment of arms from Israel to Iran and the emigration of Jews from Iran to Israel! And this while Iran’s attitude toward us and the Azerbaijani Turks is clear!
Iran Following Bulgarians

First let us discuss the fate of the Azerbaijani Turks in Iran and quote an Iranian Azerbaijani whom we interviewed for this research: "Iran has cultural associations in Turkey, they give courses in Farsi, they have their own schools, they can publish materials through the diplomatic missions and consulates. However, 5 million Turks live in Iran but there is not a Turkish association for us in Iran, nor a course to teach Turkish, nor any Turkish schools. Have you ever wondered why this is so? Do you know that we cannot give our children Azerbaijani-Turkish names?"

In fact, one thing that came out in our conversations with Azerbaijanis who escaped to Turkey in the first stage, and then in more detailed research we did with other sources later is this: The mullahs' regime wants to follow the Bulgarians' path and erase the Turks from history!

It is an undeniable fact that nearly 15 million Azerbaijanis live in Iran. Nevertheless, these are not actually Turks but Persians who were Turkish-ized by force according to the Khomeyni regime. Moreover, the mullahs say that speaking of Azerbaijanis Turks and Azerbaijan is nothing but the propaganda of imperialistic states to weaken and divide Iran. So this is why the Iranian Islamic Republic worked so hard through diplomatic channels to prevent them from attending the Azerbaijan Cultural Association in Turkey when Ayatollah Shariat-madari, the leader of the Azerbaijani Turks, died.

To reduce the density of the Turkish population, non-Turkish ethnic groups have been brought in in the past few months and settled in the areas inhabited by Iranian Turks, who are forbidden to give their children Turkish names (if their names are not Arabic or Persian, the bureaus of vital statistics change them). Turkish place names are also being changed.

Zoroastrians, Jews, Syrians, Armenians, and Christians are granted "minority" status and have representative quotas in the assembly under article 64 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic; however, the Azerbaijanis are not granted this right.

Also, the sending of newspapers, magazines and books from Turkey to the Azerbaijanis is prohibited, and the Turkish-Iranian Friendship Society has been closed. Educational scholarships awarded in Turkey are not used. All educational institutions where Azerbaijanis improved their Turkish have also been closed.

Muhammed Adaleti, the Azerbaijani leader in exile in Turkey, who rebelled first against the shah and later against Khomeyni, and to whom we went for information, described Khomeyni's attacks on and oppression of the Azerbaijani religious leader Ayatollah Shariatmadari and said that the Iranian Islamic Republic's leaders deliberately sent Azerbaijanis to the front in the Iran-Iraq war to decimate the Turks. He said that many Azerbaijanis had taken refuge in Turkey and had some interesting observations about those who have taken it in their heads to have a Khomeyni-style regime in Turkey: "They don't understand being Turkish; they understand Khomeyni Islam. But Khomeyni calls his own laws Islam. We are Koranic Muslims."

We must not forget that Bulgaria is not the only place where Turks are living, that Turks are also fighting for their lives in Khomeyni's Iran.

Iran-Israel Cooperation

The Jews in Iran are understood to have been sent to Israel, via Turkey, in accordance with a secret agreement reached between the Israeli state and the Iranian Islamic Republic. The reason for Iran's permitting its Jews to migrate and behaving so "well" toward the Jews who do not want to migrate is Israel's arms sales to Iran. A large portion of Iran's Jews, which numbered around 70,000 at the beginning of the Islamic revolution, have been permitted to go to Israel.

Since Turkey is Iran's gateway to the West, escapees from Iran take refuge in Turkey. However, although Turkey is a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and the related protocol of 1967, it does not accept refugees across its eastern border because of the geographical restriction placed in the convention. Therefore, escapees from the Iranian regime are given refuge in Turkey only temporarily and have to go on to another country. According to the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is tasked with sending these refugees to other countries. Europe accepts refugees only through UNHCR channels.

The UNHCR representative in Ankara examined the status of those seeking refuge in Turkey and granted them refugee status if they qualified. To be granted refugee status, a person must be in danger of prosecution or punishment for reasons of religion, race, sex, political opinion, or belonging to a social group. If the refugee causes do not apply to them, those persons must either be sent back to the country from which they came or leave Turkey for a third country.

Those not granted refugee status by the UNHCR cannot go to another country as refugees. Likewise, those granted this status must be sent through UNHCR channels only to a country that will accept them.

According to the UNHCR Turkish representative, thousands of refugees from Iran have applied to the UNHCR in Turkey. However, only a few Jews have been among them. There were none in 1987. One Iranian Jew applied in 1988 to go to America, but still has not left Turkey. However, it is true that thousands of Jews have fled Iran. Thus it seems that these Jews have left Turkey and gone to Israel through other channels.

UNHCR Deputy Turkish Representative Stefan Berglund told MILLIYET that the United Nations has
nothing to do with sending Iranian Jews to Israel. However, Berglund also said that he had learned from another UNHCR official that Iranian Jews had gone to Israel on their own.

Secret Emigration

It seems that there has been a careful effort to conceal the Iranian Jews' being sent to Israel via Turkey from both Turkish and world public opinion. Aside from the fact that no announcement has been made about this to date, the officials we asked for information on it refused to make any statement.

A top officer of the Turkish Foreign Ministry asked us not to ask questions about it. However, the same officer said that Turkey would have been able to play a role only for humanitarian reasons.

Yigal Lavie, Israel's Istanbul consul general, said that he could not provide any information. Even though we said that some of the Jews who were sent or fled to Israel would have had to get their papers from the Istanbul consulate general and asked that he at least tell us how many had done so, he said that he could not even reveal this. The Iranian consul general, meanwhile, turned down our request for an interview saying that he would not discuss those who had fled Iran.

Why This Secrecy?

It is understood that Turkey, Israel and Iran may have certain reasons for keeping the matter secret. Looking at it from Iran's point of view, this country is known both to have conducted an intensive campaign against its own Jews and to have objected violently to Israel's presence in the Middle East and especially in Palestine. Thus reaching any kind of agreement with Israel would make Iran, which invited all Muslims to start a holy war against Israel, look small in Islamic public opinion and would be interpreted as hypocrisy.

It is also true that Iran would not turn thousands of Jews over to Israel without compensation. In fact, Israel established an airlift to carry more than 10,000 Jews who were threatened by starvation in Ethiopia to Israel and informed the press that Ethiopia permitted this in exchange for the arms received from Israel. Meanwhile, Israel sold arms to Iran because it considered Iraq and the other Arab states to be a nearer and greater threat to itself. According to a report in the 30 October 1984 issue of the German SUELDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, Iran permitted Jews to emigrate in exchange for arms.

Turkey's permitting these Jews to emigrate to Israel via its own territory was doubtless prompted by humanitarian concerns. Nevertheless, Turkey is trying to develop good relations with the Arab countries and, bearing in mind that these countries would be somewhat unhappy about its offering such an opportunity to Israel, the advantages of keeping this incident secret from Turkey's standpoint are immediately apparent. Moreover, official American documents have proven that the arms sold secretly by the United States to Iran for the purpose of rescuing the American hostages in Iranian hands, in the incident known to world public opinion as Irangate, were transported to Iran by Israeli aircraft via Turkey for lack of any other route. And for the same reason, the Israeli arms also had to be sent to Iran via Turkey in this incident, and it is known that this may cause reactions in all of the Arab countries, first of all Iraq.

Nevertheless, the fact that we must confront in the final analysis is that we made it possible, albeit for humanitarian reasons, for Israel to send arms to Iran, which harbors such deep feelings of hostility against Turkey and the Turks!

[9 Jun 89 p 11]

[Text]Turkey Returned Many Iranians

The number of those who have fled the oppression of the Khomeyni regime which is still in effect in Iran and sought refuge in Turkey is known to be around 1 million. The primary reason for the number's being so large is that Turkey is Iran's gateway to the West. Another reason is that Turkey is being flexible on this issue. In fact, even though Turkey signed the "Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees" and the subsequent "Protocol" in 1961 [as published] and cannot accept refugees from countries outside Europe because of provisos in the convention, escapees from Iran have been given temporary residential permits provided they go on to other countries. Nevertheless, both Iranians taking refuge in Turkey and certain international organizations claim that Turkish authorities have occasionally returned some of these Iranians and thus sent them to certain death. Persons granted "refugee" status by the UNHCR and some ready to go to other countries have reportedly been among those surrendered to the mullahs.

Claims by 'Militant' Iranian Refugees

Some Iranians whom we might describe as "militants," who were forced to flee to Turkey following active struggles against the Khomeyni regime, make these claims:

1. More than 70,000 opponents of the regime have been executed since the Islamic Revolution in Iran. These executions have had an enormously negative effect on the Iranian people in addition to the reactions of world public opinion. Further political executions could lead to social eruption. In fact, this is why ordinary crimes have been given as the reason for recent executions. This is why the mullahs are ignoring escaping rebels, hoping to completely clear the country of the opposition. Turkey has been acting in line with this desire of the mullahs in permitting so many Iranians to enter the country.

2. However, there may be persons among those fleeing Iran and taking refuge in Turkey who would be a threat to the Khomeyni regime if they reached Europe or
America. The Turkish authorities, then, return these persons to Iran. Those returned in this way are overwhelmingly left-wing opponents. Doubtless, this is a very serious accusation. We must hear the other side before deciding whether these claims are true.

The Iranian Human Rights Association, operating outside Iran, has said in reports published in occasional leaflets or their regular publications that some of the Iranians who fled to Turkey were sent back. For example, the Hamburg branch of the Iranian Human Rights Association gave extensive coverage to this in their “IRANA VOX” newsletter No 39, October 1988.

According to a leaflet published on 19 November 1988 by the association’s Paris office and the fall issue of the association’s Farsi-language magazine AZADE, refugees named Muhammed Abul Hasseni, Vahit Narakizade, Gulam Riza Fuladi, Mahmudi Arap Muzaffar, and Rahmeti Pendar, who were waiting for the completion of UNHCR refugee procedures, were arrested by Turkish police and returned to Iran. These persons were reportedly turned over to the Iranian police.

The same sources point out that they hold information to the effect that other persons have also been sent back to Iran and some of them executed, and that many Iranians have applied to Amnesty International who report that they have witnessed these extradition incidents. Among the examples given is the return of 3 of the 60 Iranians who sought refuge en masse in late 1987. It is also noted that three Iranians whose initials are G.N.Z., I.Z.Z., and Y.K. suffered the same fate, and that H.A.F., M.F.C., and A.R.G., who had fled to Iraq from Iran in January 1988 and had been granted refugee status by the UNHCR, were turned over to Turkish police by Iraqi police at Mardin and were surrendered to Iran by the Turkish police. In addition, Iranian army officer Dr C.A. was reportedly supposed to be sent all the way to Canada by the UNHCR in Ankara, but was turned over to Iran after being taken to the Foreigners Branch at the Security Directorate on 1 February 1988. The sudden disappearance of four Iranian officers who had fled to Turkey is attributed to their having been arrested and secretly returned.

According to Amnesty International

Amnesty International [AI] makes the same claims. AI sent a delegation to Turkey to investigate. The delegation published a report following its investigations in Turkey 7-15 November 1985. Based on this report, Amnesty International handed the Turkish government a “memorandum” on 5 February 1986, article 3/5 of which read as follows:

“Amnesty International has obtained information to the effect that Iranian refugees were forcibly returned in 1984 and 1985. The list of incidents reported to the organization is enclosed with the request that they be elucidated (AI Index: EUR 44/17/86).” AI’s 27 May 1987 REGIONAL NEWS BULLETIN also says that Turkey sent back hundreds of Iranian escapees, without regard to whether they were men or women. According to this bulletin, 400 Iranians met this fate within the 6 months prior to May 1987 alone. Also according to AI, these 400 people were not even allowed to appeal to the UNHCR (AI Index: EUR 44/27/87).

Have We Sent Our Refugees to Death?

Let us just point out before making a decision that the authorities whom we have been able to reach and interview have denied these claims. These authorities say that there may be a question only of returning ordinary criminals, but problems exist between us and Iran on this because we have refused to return persons in cases in which the punishment to be given in Iran for ordinary extraditable crimes included hand severing and whipping, which are not covered by international law. They note in addition that some Iranians have indeed been returned to Iran, but they are persons who were engaging in activities harmful to Turkey on behalf of the Islamic Republic.

Nevertheless, some reports, though only a few, have appeared in the Turkish press seeming to confirm the claims. For example, this MILLIYET report on 1 August 1988:

“Fifty Iranian refugees, including women and children, who sought refuge yesterday morning in the Social Democratic Populist Party’s Van provincial building, said:

‘‘We were told that 58 of our friends who were taken from the hotels the day before yesterday were being taken to Ankara. But these friends were turned over to the Iranians at Koykapi. Revolutionary Guards lined up our friends at the Koykapi border and shot them. The police told us that we would be returned to Iran on 2 August. If they return us, they will shoot us by firing squad as they did our other friends.’”

“The Iranian refugees claimed that Turkey would be signing their death warrants if it returned them.”

This report was not denied by the authorities at that time!

TERCUMAN published this report on 20 May 1989:

“Civilian police are raiding hotels, motels and rooming houses everywhere in which antigovernment escapees may be staying and are immediately deporting the people they arrest. The Iranians are afraid they will be executed if they are wanted by the Khomeini regime. Escapees are therefore hiding from police anywhere they can for fear of being deported and hanged.”

Why No Visas?

This report was not denied either.

Important questions that authorities need to answer here are: If there is a need to extradite Iranians in Turkey occasionally, why is there no visa requirement for Iran?
Why is Turkey one of only two countries in the world without a visa agreement with Iran? Moreover, most of these people come to Turkey with passports and request asylum after they arrive. Since it is obvious that some Iranians are engaging in subversive, reactionary behavior in our country, why, with no visa arrangement, are they allowed to enter Turkey in the first place? Why is no attention paid to the European requests for visa arrangements? And more importantly, why is it that, despite the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s insistence that we should have a visa agreement with Iran, this Foreign Ministry request is ignored?

It will not do to say, “We are not requiring visas for the Iranians because we do not want to ruin our good neighborly relations and cause them to feel the way we do about the countries who require visas for us,” because first, most who come to Turkey without visas are opponents of the mullahs, and second, what good neighborly relations? Yes, why has Turkey consented to having around 1 million Iranians who are in trouble in many aspects enter the country? Why have some refugees been returned to Iran if this consent is for humanitarian reasons only?

As long as there are no credible answers to these questions, the claims that we opened our gates to the mullahs’ opponents at their request and surrender the ones they want back to Iran from time to time will retain their seriousness.

Let us also add to this that the basic reason for the attempts by those who escape from Iran to Turkey, and who are actually threats to the mullahs in going to Europe by illegal means without applying to the police in Turkey, is that they are afraid they will be returned to Iran by the Turkish authorities!

[10 Jun 89 p 11]

[Text] Drama of Iranian Escapes

Turkey is the nearest refuge for opponents of the Islamic Revolution in Iran who manage to escape its oppression alive. However, these people do not find their problems over with their arrival in Turkey; indeed, they are confronted with a whole new set of problems. Except for the ones who try to escape to Europe via Turkey without reporting to the Turkish authorities, the Iranians have to wait for months at the UNHCR in Ankara for a decision on refugee procedures. There are also some who cannot stand the living conditions they have to put up with in Turkey. For example, so far in front of the UNHCR building in Ankara one Iranian has tried to hang himself, another slashed his throat, an elderly woman took an overdose of 30 Insidon tablets, and someone else immolated himself.

We went twice to mingle and talk with these people waiting in front of the UNHCR building to learn first hand about their misery and problems, speaking English with those who knew it, and using an interpreter with those who did not. Some refused to give their names, others had no objection to revealing their identities. We present here the transcripts of these recorded conversations. We would not attempt to evaluate the truth of what the Iranians said. We have not had the chance to research what they said. Our purpose is to try to see through their eyes the events these people who have fled their own country say they have experienced in our country and present them in their own words. Doubtless the authorities will be able to make the necessary inquiries if they wish to determine what is true and what is not.

UNHCR Not on Our Side

We first joined two young women waiting in a corner. One of them refused to talk, but the other answered our questions. She explained that her father had been executed, that her husband had been fired from his job and that she had come to Turkey with her husband and two children. She said:

“The United Nations accepted my request for asylum. They said my husband’s was forged, however, and turned it down. Then they said, ‘We cannot send you because we cannot accept your husband’s asylum request. You will have to apply separately.’ We applied again. Now they tell me, ‘You and your children can go to Sweden,’ but my husband will stay here.”

We asked what they would do and she answered:

“I don’t know. We have no money. If my husband cannot come with us, they will send him back to Iran. I don’t know what will happen.”

An Iranian who appeared to be about 50 years old, who said that he was a pharmacist and that his name was Faridun, said:

“I requested asylum 7 months ago and was accepted. They executed my three brothers who were members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, and I was in Evin Prison in 1984-85. I fled to save my life. When I arrived in Turkey, the United Nations gave me an appointment 2 months later. I am still doing all right, but no thought is given to what the people who have no money with them are going to do for such a long period of time. There are people who have been waiting for 2 years. They even told one person who had been waiting for 2 years like this that they could not accept him as a refugee. The United Nations considers all of us liars. But the situation in Iran is known.”

The complaints go on and on when the subject turns to the UNHCR. Let’s settle for only a few of these complaints:

“I have been in Ankara for 1.5 years. I have papers to prove that I am wanted in Iran. The UNHCR accepted this. But they have done nothing for 1.5 years. Still I see some people who get everything taken care of within a week and leave. I have been coming here every day for 1.5 years. During this time I have learned this: The
UNHCR people don’t solve anything here if they don’t want to. They are obviously patronizing us here. This place is meant to protect refugees, but they have withdrawn behind their fences. It reminds me of Evin Prison. Their interviews are like interrogations of people in prison."

"I escaped to Turkey, coming over the mountains. Mrs Ingrid conducted my first interview. Although she knew my situation, she said, ‘We cannot do anything for you. You will have to solve your problem yourself. Do whatever you can. Your situation does not concern us.’ And they are supposed to protect refugees!"

"Two Turkish employees at the UNHCR named (...) and (...) take money from the refugees and process their files in exchange, expediting their affairs. We can prove this. But we are afraid that the UNHCR wouldn’t process our files and the police would turn us over to Iran. It would be easy to prove this; just let them compare our files and it would be clear!"

Complaints About Police

When one mentions the police, the Iranians have so many complaints they interrupt each other to express them. One young Iranian said:

"The police are always insulting us. I have had no problem with the police, but I encountered insults when I went to entry-exit (since those who have passports are able to stay only 3 months in Turkey, they can go, for example, to Cyprus and come back, earning the right to stay for 3 more months). The police treat us worse than animals."

An Iranian woman living temporarily in Sivas said this about the police attitude:

"They beat an elderly Iranian in Sivas so bad once that he passed out. When the other Iranians raised objections to this, a policeman said, ‘We’ll get you.’"

An Iranian who said that he had come to Turkey 10 months ago, and that the UNHCR had accepted his request for asylum but he was waiting to find out which country he would be going to joined the conversation, saying:

"The police will no longer extend my residency period, saying that the UNHCR should now handle my affairs. I have been coming here for a week but they have given no answer. And the police will not extend my residency permit. If I cannot go to another country within a few days, they will send me back to Iran."

Other rapid-fire complaints about the police:

"Police behavior toward us changed after the Iranian Interior Minister came to Turkey."

"The police brought me for interrogation eight times. The police commissioner who cross-examined us in the basement of the Political Branch was named (...). They beat us a lot there, but later gave us residency permits."

"I am living illegally in Ankara. The police arrested me once and took all my money, but they did not send me back to Iran."

Sent Back to Iran

We asked the young woman who was going to Sweden with her two children leaving her husband behind whether she knew anything about escapees from Iran being sent back.

"They have returned many people," she said, but did not know any names.

A bystander joined in, saying: "They returned an Iranian named Majid. Another’s passport expired and they took him to the border and left him in the snow."

Another Iranian interjected:

"They wanted to return five Iranians 2-3 months ago. One of them managed to escape and came to Ankara, where he reported his situation to the United Nations. There was nothing they didn’t do. The United Nations tries to intervene in the incidents they learn about, they go to Van, they go to Agri, but they can do nothing. They say the police have more power than we do."

Others began describing the incidents they knew about:

"Fifty-eight Iranians were returned in August 1988. They executed one of them, Haseni Bezzeger [as published], in Iran. He was a member of the organization Fedayian-e-Khalq. His wife in now in Norway. The UNHCR had accepted their asylum requests. They were sent to Van from Ankara when their processing was finished and were supposed to return to Ankara later. But Haseni Bezzeger was turned over to Iran."

"I was with that group of 58. The police brought them, saying they would be settled in the surrounding towns. Then I learned that they had surrendered them to Iran."

"They do not leave the returnees at the border. They turn them over to the Iranian authorities and get receipts for them."

"Iran pays $700 a head transportation costs for refugees that are returned."

"A member of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq named Irfan came to Turkey from Iraq last summer and the Turkish authorities turned him over to Iran. He was probably executed. Eight other Iranians were returned along with Irfan at that time. One of them was a pilot. His wife reported his situation to the UNHCR at the time. The UNHCR tried to halt the return at Agri, but did not succeed."

Assume for a moment that all they are saying is true and put yourself in their place. Suppose your father, your brothers or someone else close to you had been executed.
simply for opposing this inhumane regime of the mullahs. And that you left everything behind, used all your money to bribe the Revolutionary Guards or the smugglers in Iran in order to save your life, and after suffering a thousand difficulties crossing the mountains managed to take refuge in Turkey. Perhaps you have a few hundred dollars in your pocket from selling your house on the black market. But, “So what,” you say, “this nightmare is now behind.” But what if the stories about faits accomplis in Turkey are true? Yes, imagine yourself as someone who, just when you relax, thinking you are safe, is beaten up, left with no money in your pocket, and looked upon by the United Nations as nothing but a file, not a human being, as an utterly destitute person who may be sent back to certain death at any moment.

[11 Jun 89 p 13]

[Text]Mullahs' Role in Terrorism and Smuggling

There are 115 Iranian Islamic Republic companies active in Istanbul alone. However, most of them are phony.

Iran has no more open support among the Arab countries than from Syria. Syria’s unfriendly attitude toward Turkey, especially its ongoing desire to add Hatay to its own territory, is nothing new. Syria is the only country that desires Turkish territory. To think that our country would not be harmed by Iranian-Syrian cooperation is, to be kind, naive! ...Especially when various groups engaged in subversive activities against Turkey are obviously hiding out in Syrian territory! So Iran will leave no stone unturned as a partner on this front. Nevertheless, Iran has one large opportunity for anti-Turkish activity that Syria does not have: the Iranians in Turkey! Let us repeat here a question that we asked earlier: How many of the Iranians in Turkey are opposed to the mullahs and how many are their agents? Who knows the answer to this? In fact, if we mobilized the entire Turkish police force to oversee and determine the true identities of the more than 1 million Iranians in our country, it would still be insufficient for the job. Moreover, there is a large segment of the Turkish public that is unaware of these designs against the existence of our country by the Iranian Islamic Republic and contributes to the realization of Iran’s designs on Turkey because it can evaluate developments only from the standpoint of Islam.

Iran Only Islamic Country Harboring Armenian Terrorists


29 March 1984—Bomb placed in automobile of our deputy trade counselor, Isil Unel. First Secretary Servet Oktem of our Tehran Embassy wounded by Armenian terrorists. [as published]

31 March 1984—Armenians shot and wounded Servet Oktem, first secretary of Turkey’s Tehran embassy. [as published]

16 April 1984—Armenians opened fire on the home of our Tehran Administrative Attaché Ibrahim Ozdemir, injuring Ozdemir. Same attack wounded our military attaché, Ismail Pamincu.

28 April 1984—Embassy secretary Sadiye Yonder’s wife, Isik Yonder, shot by Armenians. Yonder died 2 days later.

24 April 1989—Shot fired at home of Selami Demirbas, administrative attaché at our Orumiyeh [Reza’iyeh] Consulate General in Iran.

Yes, Iran is the only Islamic country that has been the scene of attacks on Turkish diplomats by Armenian terrorists. One wonders if this is a coincidence. We do not think so. We do not think it is a fact unknown to the Turkish authorities that Vartan Vartanian, who once represented the Armenians as a deputy in the Iranian Assembly, is a leader of the Armenian terrorist organization in Iran, ARA [Armenian Revolutionary Army], and has links with Syrian and Lebanese Armenians.

Iran is also among the very few countries in the world where Armenians have erected memorials. There is a memorial on Villa Avenue in Tehran. The Iranian Islamic Republic must have given permission for this for humanitarian reasons!

Perhaps it is a coincidence that the Armenian terrorist caught snooping around the home of the administration attaché of the Turkish embassy in Tehran was a Syrian citizen!

Let us not fail to point out, either, that the regime of the Muslim mullahs is in cooperation with the Armenian Church in Iran and that the Armenians have provided material support to the Iranian Islamic Republic.

We have explained why the “nationalist” and “secular” Turkish Republic is a target for the Iranian Islamic Republic and a nightmare for the mullahs. Another fact that we have discussed in this connection is that Kemalists are trying to implant their “antinationalist” values in our country under the guise of Islamic unity with the goal of bringing an end to our existence as a nation. We have seen that the mullahs, embracing the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” maintain a climate in which Armenian terrorism is acceptable for this reason. Meanwhile, it is known that they provide bases and camps for the Kurds at Orumiyeh and that PKK [Kurdish Workers Party] agents have links with Orumiyeh. And it is no longer a secret that Turks from Turkey were given ideological training at the place called “Juma Mesjid” in Tabriz and in Qom.

Iran Creating ‘Instability’ in Turkey

Nevertheless, what must essentially be stressed is that the heaviest weapon trained on Turkish integrity by the Iranian Islamic Republic is the Iranians to whose haphazard acceptance into our country we see no objection!
Even if we ignore for a moment those who claim to be fleeing oppression of the mullahs but are actually working on behalf of the Iranian Islamic Republic, we see that the true Iranian refugees in Turkey, numbering around 1 million, are harmful to our country because of the conditions in which they are forced to live. In fact, we know that at least some of these hungry and penniless people try to stay alive by making money in illegal ways. Moreover, the fact that the ones who come to Turkey with passports have to leave and come back every 3 months makes them vulnerable to smugglers. This can only have a negative effect on the social and economic structure of our country.

The most significant result shows up in drug trafficking. The large majority of drugs in our country come from Afghanistan via Iran. Iranians have been involved in almost all of the drug rings apprehended, and 1,200 kilograms of heroin were seized last year alone!

We are a country that has seen, through the painful events we experienced in the era leading to 12 September 1980, that smuggling in general, but drug smuggling in particular, is directly proportional and has strong links to terrorism. Moreover, all the world knows that drug trafficking degrades the people of the target country, but, more important, provides material resources to the terrorist organizations in that country. At present, drugs come to Turkey via Iran or from the Al Bqa Valley which is under pro-Iranian Shiite control. In other words, drugs enter our country from our two neighbors: Iran and its friend Syria. This is undeniably true. Now, before making any comment, let us read at this point a line or two from an intelligence report entitled “Smuggling and State Security”: “A concept has emerged today called ‘narcoterrorism.’ We might also call it revolution by narcotics.”

**Mullahs’ Merchants in Turkey**

A full 115 Iranian Islamic Republic companies are active in Istanbul, according to the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. All of the owners of these 115 companies are Iranian citizens. They are able to transfer money through these companies, they can come and go as they wish, and they can travel anywhere in Turkey.

When we looked up these companies according to their addresses at the Chamber of Commerce, we found that most of them were either storefronts and did nothing tangible, or were not at the given addresses and had not reported their address changes to the Chamber of Commerce. For example, one Iranian company is listed at Dogubank Building, 6th Floor, No 646, but someone else was located at this address and had never heard of this company. The same situation occurred for an Iranian company that should have been at Omer Fuat Building 63/4, Nuruosmaniye Avenue. The owner of an Iranian company at 10 Terzibi Street in the Covered Bazaar had closed up and disappeared, but was shown as active in Chamber of Commerce records. Some companies
were found at the addresses given but consisted of an office, a desk, and a few chairs, and were conducting no visible business.

Perhaps someone should just get curious now and find out what all of these Iranian Islamic Republic companies are doing in Turkey.

We have tried to outline in this paper the true purpose behind the Iranian Islamic Republic's desire to export its own ideology to Turkey and how it is trying to accomplish this. In the process, we have seen that those governing Turkey, for some reason, are not reacting as they should to the hostility which the mullahs feel no need to conceal. Indeed, they even managed to lower the flag of the state that Ataturk established when the anti-Ataturkist Khomeyni died, and to describe the Iranian Islamic Revolution that has returned Iran to the Dark Ages as "one of the great revolutions of history."

Let us not fail to point out this: One must not think that certain circles in Turkey, which is Sunni, cannot adopt the social and political views of the Shiite Iranian mullahs, because, as one pro-Iranian Islamic Revolution writer said, "Our century has witnessed an Islamic revolution for the first time" (Asaf Huseyn, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Iran," Istanbul, 1988, p. 9). Thus Iran is the only model for circles harboring desires for the past.

We would like to bring the topic to a conclusion by taking a few lines here from the answer given by Iranian author Bahman Nirumand, whose book we quoted earlier, to the question asked by the book's translator, "Can the revolution in Iran spread to Turkey?"

"After 25 years of oppression (in Iran) an eruption occurred, a search for identity. Islam, deeply rooted in the majority of the population, especially the substrata, promised the masses a brand new identity. If you ask me, the same identity crisis exists in Turkey. One must not be deceived by appearances. If you had asked me 10 years ago if an Islamic revolution were possible in Iran, I would have died laughing. The lack of a leader like Khomeyni at the moment (in Turkey) is no problem. When the time comes and the masses are ready, someone can be found overnight. When events exploded in Iran, noone had even heard of Khomeyni. He had been in exile for 50 years and noone remembered him. He just suddenly appeared on the scene."

[12 Jun 89 p 11]

[Text]Khomeyni Deceived Tudeh

A man and a woman in Turkey, members of Tudeh, the Iranian pro-Soviet party, telephoned us after publication had begun of this series on "Iran in Turkey," and asked to talk to us on behalf of their party. When we met with them, the woman would not reveal her true name but said she is known among her friends as "Jamile," while the man would not even say what his friends call him.

These two Tudeh members said they maintain links with Iran. Our conversation follows:

[MILLIYET] As an active Tudeh member, how do you see the Iranian Islamic Revolution?

[Jamile] The Iranian Islamic Revolution was a democratic revolution in the early stages, but it could not achieve its purpose. It turned to the past in line with the desires of the mullahs. Our party's stance at the beginning of the revolution was expressed in the slogan, "Be critical of policy, but work together." That is, government policy was supported as long as it was anti-imperialistic and the government was criticized insofar as it strayed from this line. However, democracy was not stressed very much in this connection, and events proved this to be a mistake. But it is all long past now.

[MILLIYET] So you perceived this as an anti-imperialistic movement at the beginning and, thus, did not pay too much attention to or care much about the lack of democratic principles in practice. But this movement turned against you later, is that right?

[Jamile] Not just against us but against all leftist organizations. Pressure increased. There were arrests and torture. Tudeh was given permission to continue to operate for only 2 years, at any rate, and arrests continued even during this period. Party buildings were raided, party records burned, and members jailed for 2-3 months at the time. But they switched to direct attacks on our party at the end of the 2 years. This was stepped up after the Iran-Iraq war began. Tudeh's view was that the war should be ended after Iran got its territory back. We believed that prolongation of the war would be damaging to the people of both countries and that the imperialist states, primarily America, would take advantage of it. This stance by the party gave the mullahs the opportunity to proceed with open attacks against us. All but a few of the party's Central Committee, and more than 10,000 party members were arrested and mass executions took place. These executions are still going on now.

[MILLIYET] How many members were killed?

[Jamile] Nobody knows exactly. It is kept secret. We do know that 1,700 women and girls who were Tudeh members were executed.

[MILLIYET] Were the mullahs more hostile toward your party than the other political groups in Iran?

[Other Tudeh member] Yes, because we were the most serious opponent of the mullahs. We never engaged in an armed struggle with the mullahs as did the Mojahedin-e Khalq, but we criticized them constantly and demanded that they keep their word, especially in the economic area. There were even roundtable meetings on television at first, in which the mullahs were always bested, and they would leave in the middle of the meetings. Tudeh was becoming more and more successful among the
people and was taking care of the people's problems. Khomeyni even said at that time, "I am afraid of Tudeh."

[MILLIYET] Why did the Mojahedin-e Khalq come out against Khomeyni? Don't they also hold extremist religious views?

[Other Tudeh member] The Mojahedin-e Khalq wanted either to hold power or to exercise influence. So they inappropriately started an armed struggle and stepped up the process of Khomeyni's becoming a dictator.

[MILLIYET] What other mistakes can you see after an interval of 10 years that Tudeh made, other than failing to stress democracy?

[Jamile] Our second mistake was in ascribing more importance than necessary to Khomeyni. His leadership was supported unconditionally. Even when the attacks against us started, most of us still thought Khomeyni would stop them. We were constantly giving Khomeyni the benefit of the doubt.

[MILLIYET] You are living in Turkey. What do you know about the status of Iranians in Turkey?

[Jamile] There is always pressure on the Iranians.

[MILLIYET] From whom?

[Jamile] From the Turkish police.

[MILLIYET] What kind of pressure?

[Jamile] There is pressure on those who escaped to Turkey, especially because they are leftist organization members. For example, they arrested our friends in Ankara several years ago. They were tortured for 3 months and then expelled from the country. If we had not worked so hard to get visas from other countries, they would have sent us back to Iran. Moreover, they were students who had come to Turkey with passports, had residency permits, and were studying in Turkey.

[MILLIYET] Did they engage in any activities in Turkey?

[Jamile] No, never. As Iranians, they were concerned with Iran's problems only. In addition, 106 Iranians who sought asylum in Turkey were returned. A party member came to Turkey 5 months ago after being released from prison. The Turkish police returned him and he is now under detention in Iran. However, the Turkish police do not behave this way towards pro-shah Iranians. Leftist Iranians are arrested and sent back. A pro-shah organization was even formed in Turkey in 1980. Civil servants under the shah and members of SAVAK [Iranian security and intelligence organization] who escaped the Khomeyni regime went to form an organization in Turkey against the Iranian Islamic Republic and none said anything to them, but helped them. As soon as the left ceased to be a threat in Iran, this organization dispersed and most of its members went to other countries, mainly America.

[Other Tudeh member] I would like to say this: Khomeyni formed a special organization called the "Jerusalem Army" in 1984, whose purpose was to monitor the activities of regime opponents living outside of Iran, determine their identities, and find out what they were doing. It operates in conjunction with the Iranian secret service. Most of them came to Turkey, but some went to other countries. They are still active in Turkey.

[Jamile] What we want to convey to Turkish public opinion is our party's view at this stage. We are open to cooperation with all forces that believe in peace and democracy in our struggle against the mullahs' regime in Iran. We are working to form an extensive united popular front. We believe that we will be successful in this, even if not in the very near future, and that peace, democracy, and social justice will come about in our country.

[Boxed interview with former KEYHAN editor Amir Taheri in London]

Amir Taheri, former editor of one of Iran's largest newspapers KEYHAN, is an escapee from the regime the mullahs brought to Iran. He is now living in London, where MILLIYET conducted the following interview:

[MILLIYET] What do you think about the Turkish government's attitude toward Iran's anti-Turkish behavior?

[Taheri] The Turkish government's attitude has been a basically opportunist attitude, for three reasons.

1. First of all, your government tried to take advantage of the economic aspect of the Iran-Iraq war. But this was a dream, an impossible thing, because if you increase a country's exports without increasing its production capacity, you stimulate inflation in that country. In my opinion, one of the reasons for the inflation in Turkey is all the goods you have sold to Iran and Iraq. When you spur inflation, you eventually have to buy more raw materials and oil, and that means you are being hurt in two ways. The loser in this trade is Turkey.

2. Turkish leaders have been trying hard and giving concessions to keep the mullahs from engaging in sabotage, terrorism, and propaganda in Turkey. But this was doomed to failure because the other side does not play the same game by the rules.

3. Another reason is the Kurdish problem. Turkey does not want the Iranian Islamic Republic to play its Kurdish trump card against Turkey.

These are the reasons, but it is my opinion that Turkey does not have a clear and firm policy in its dealings with the Iranian Islamic Republic. Turkish statesmen have not sat down and said, this is the situation, these are the problems, so what should our policy be. On the contrary,
they have been following an indecisive policy that changes according to the circumstances. The situation has never been evaluated from a general perspective.

[MILLIYET] Could you say that the Turkish government feels an affinity to any degree with the regime in Iran?

[Taheri] No. I do not think they have any sympathy for the Khomeini regime. But it may be said that they feel a kinship for a regime similar to it. There are probably seven or eight members of brotherhoods on your Council of Ministers today and, by their own admission, they are a conservative lot. They always stop short of the tendency to exercise this conservatism for election reasons. However, regardless of that distinction, the outcome is the same.

Refugees Have Been Returned

[MILLIYET] Are there Iranians who have been returned to Iran from Turkey? If so, how would you evaluate these returns in the context of what you were just saying?

[Taheri] I know people have been returned. They have to be divided into two groups. One part consists of the mullahs' agents in the guise of refugees whose true identities are known to the Turkish authorities, and the other consists of the real refugees.

Actually, what is done from the standpoint of real refugees who oppose the regime is to make a gesture to Iran saying, "See, we are struggling against your opponents and returning them." I have no indication that a written agreement has been signed between the Iranian Islamic Republic and Turkey on this, but a tacit agreement without a written text between the two sides is possible. Let me say this: A joint commission was formed by Turkey and Iran before the revolution to monitor the border activities of the Kurds. Moreover, this commission was also keeping an eye on leftists because they were engaged in both anti-Turkish and anti-Iranian activities. It was dismantled after the revolution, but was revived 2.5 years ago.

[MILLIYET] Could the omission of a visa requirement for Iranians be considered a gesture by the Turkish government toward the Iranian Islamic Republic?

[Taheri] Every country except Turkey and Japan require visas for Iranians. The mullahs want their opponents to leave the country. These opponents cannot go to Japan. Turkey is the only country where they can go. The Turkish government does not require a visa despite pressure from all the European countries and America.

United Nations Takes Bribes

[MILLIYET] Many Iranian refugees whom we interviewed said that some UNHCR employees took bribes. Would you have any information on this?

[Taheri] Yes, what they said is definitely true. And it is not just in Turkey that this is true. Everybody knows that the UNHCR has taken bribes in Pakistan, Somalia, and everywhere. We may say that the UNHCR has become world famous for its rot and stink. I do not know how many people are involved in this, but I have heard many stories about how the UNHCR takes money from refugees.

Mullahs Living in Seventh Century

[MILLIYET] I would like to go on to another subject if I may. What, in your opinion, is the greatest difference between the shah's regime and the Khomeini regime?

[Taheri] In spite of all his faults, the shah lived in the 20th century. The mullahs are living in the 7th century. I would like to give an example of this. University entrance exams during the shah's reign were the same as they are in Turkey today. University candidates under the mullahs, however, first have to go through an extremely confusing religious examination. These examinations ask questions such as what you must do if a donkey passes in front of you while you are saying your prayers and how you can tell when to begin the fast if you cannot see the sun when you get up in the morning.

Who Joined and Why

[MILLIYET] Okay, since it is true that the masses at first joined in this Islamic revolution, which you describe as obsolete, how do you explain that? In other words, who joined in this revolution and why?

[Taheri] The shah, it is true, built the infrastructure necessary for the development of Iran, but the bourgeoisie in Iran had no democratic rights and freedoms. So the intellectuals and people from the middle and upper classes who were educated in the West or adopted Western values longed for these freedoms. However, they were not strong enough to launch extensive mass movements. You cannot get the popular masses to go into action by talking about bourgeois democracy. Moreover, there was no question of their influencing a movement that would result in armed conflict. The mullahs mobilized the masses by exploiting their religious sensibilities and, therefore, this class accepted them in this role in the revolution. Armed organizations such as Mojahedin-e Khalq functioned as the striking force of the revolution. Thus the intellectuals took on the task of spokesman and defender of the revolution vis-a-vis the West.

Armed organizations that had been formed in opposition to the shah's regime found the mullahs' place in the revolution acceptable for the same reason, that is, for their potential in mobilizing the masses.

From the mullahs' point of view, meanwhile, the intellectuals were necessary in the beginning in their role as spokesmen for the revolution and showing the West that it would develop along the lines of the bourgeois democracies. The armed organizations could give the people courage through actions such as sabotage and armed attacks against the shah's army, meeting weapons with
weapons, and, though leftist, were strong enough to contribute to the advancement of the revolution.

This is the reason, in my opinion, why the various segments of society acted together in the beginning.

Mullahs' Target: Turkey

[MILLIYET] How do you see Turkey's future vis-a-vis developments in Iran?

[Taheri] Turkey is the only country to which Iran can export its revolution. This is why the mullahs have targeted Turkey. They hope that a strong religious movement will occur in Turkey in the next 5-6 years. Of course, it is not as if there were not many indications in your country to justify this, such as the increased sales of religious books and audio and video cassettes, and rising numbers of students attending Koran courses. To parallel this, the mullahs are increasing their propaganda against Ataturk and the principles he stood for. The leaders of the Iranian Islamic Republic make Turkey's difficult problems worse by exploiting them, hoping for a solution to their liking.
REGIONAL AFFAIRS

AL-TADAMUN Discusses ACC Capabilities
45040411 London AL-TADAMUN
in Arabic 3 Jul 89 p 35

[Text] The first summit was in Baghdad in February 1989, and the second summit was held 4 months later in Alexandria in June 1989.

On February 16 1989 the leaders Colonel 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the Yemen Arab Republic; Muhammad Husni Mubarak, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt; Saddam Husayn, president of the Republic of Iraq; and Husayn Ibn-Talal, king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, signed an agreement establishing the Arab Cooperation Council [ACC] as "one of the organizations of the Arab nation."

The new organization occupies the heartland of the Arab region. It is not locked into a limited geographic area, rather its membership is open to any Arab state that wants to join it. It is an organization with an Arab identity, extending the hand of cooperation to all other organizations of the Arab nation.

The capabilities and resources of the states of the ACC are clearly indicated by figures: it represents a human resource that cannot be taken lightly of now up to 80 million citizens that within 10 years will reach 112 million by the year 2000. It includes an enormous labor force of close to 40 million. The member nations have establishments for building their human capital, for there are 29,500 elementary schools, 5,000 secondary schools, and more than 27 universities, and a huge number of technical institutions and middle colleges. Overseeing health care in these states are about 80,000 doctors.

As for natural resources, they include around 9.7 million hectares of cultivated and arable land; 11.1 million hectares of pastureage; 6.6 million head of cattle; 10.5 million head of sheep, 8.5 million head of goats, and more than 120 million chickens.

The ACC countries have more than 50 billion barrels of petroleum reserves and large quantities of natural gas. Jordan is considered one of the two principal producers of phosphate in the world; Egypt produces steel; Iraq produces sulphur, and the Yemen is entering the field of oil production and export.

ACC leaders believe that economic unity based on logical steps aimed at achieving integration between the four states comprises the real basis of political unity at the level of the Arab nation. Therefore the ACC concentrated on economic activity as a goal of it work, and it appointed an economics expert, Dr. Hilmi Nimr, to its general secretariat.

Economic observers believe that the existence of three Arab groups, the ACC, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Maghreb Union, reduces the number of economic decision making centers and facilitates the task of coordination between most of the Arab states, through their unions, within the framework of the agreement of Arab economic union.

Korean Electronic Firms Capture Gulf Market
44000622b Doha GULF TIMES in English
27 Jul 89 p 22

[Article by K.N. Sharma]

[Text] Three years ago they came selling shirts and trousers in the Arab Gulf market. Now they control nearly 30 percent of the Arab electronic market and, in certain home appliance products, they control up to 90 percent of the market in certain countries.

Korean electronic makers have penetrated the Gulf market remarkably during the past two years, cashing in on increasing cost consciousness among the native population. And, the surging Japanese yen against all other world currencies has helped.

"Qatars are our main buyers," says Mr C.V. Rappai, general manager of Video Home and Electronic Center, sole agents of South Korea's Goldstar group.

Of the $700,000 worth of air-conditioners, refrigerators and televisions sold by Video Home during the past nine months, nearly three-quarters have gone to the Qataris and other Arabs, and the rest to expatriates.

Contrary to the earlier belief, the Qataris are more cost-conscious than expatriates. "They generally buy goods for the value of their money, and change them when necessary. They do not bother much about the brand. But expatriates generally go in on brands and tend to buy products for a "lifetime", said Mr Rappai.

So Korean products, up to 40 percent cheaper than Japanese merchandises, but almost comparable to Japanese goods in quality—have dented the Japanese position.

Mr Ashfaq Husayn, general manager of Audiovision—sole agents for Hitachi—however, says an average Qatari has always been cost-conscious in home items, except furniture. But for 10 percent upper class Qataris who are quality conscious, most Qataris generally do not go in for brand names. "Mostly they intend to buy low-priced products and change them every six months or a year," he said.

For his company, he says, expatriate laborers continue to be main customers. But presently there is a shortage of customers. Most old-time laborers have left. The new ones it seems are on salaries whereby they cannot afford to buy up-brand products.

Mr Husayn said people are, no doubt, increasingly going in for cheaper Korean and Taiwanese products. But the
Japanese would continue to dominate quality electronics. The Koreans, he felt, have improved quality. But advances incorporated by the Japanese in their products would still weigh heavily in their favor.

Mr Husayn said the sharp price rises of Japanese goods in 1987 due to the yen spiral were not accepted by customers. But the market has now stabilized, and during the past two years the Korean won has also appreciated up to 40 percent.

Meanwhile, after penetrating in the native Gulf market the Koreans are trying to promote their brand popularity in home countries of the Gulf expats.

Mr K.S. Shin, director of Goldstar's Middle East operations, who recently visited Qatar, said his company was trying to popularize its products in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan and Egypt, which supply most of the expatriate work-force in the Gulf.

The company is also trying to set up manufacturing facilities of certain of its products in Saudi Arabia and a warehouse and service center in Dubai. This would help strengthen the group's marketing thrust in the area.

"In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait we already sell more refrigerators than the Japanese," Mr Shin claimed.

**PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS**

Al-Fahum Interviewed on 'Arafat, Syria

JN1208152889 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 10 Aug 89 p 25

[Interview with Khalid al-Fahum, former speaker of the Palestine National Council (PNC) and chairman of the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF), by Sulayman al-Hakim in Damascus; date not given]

[Text] [Al-Hakim] Reports have been circulated about a close meeting between PLO and Syrian officials. What do you expect from such meetings, and how will they affect the march of the Palestine question now and in the future?

[Al-Fahum] President al-Asad met brother Abu-Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] twice during the recent summit in Casablanca, and both meetings were held in a friendly and frank atmosphere. The difference between the two men is not personal, but it is over some political issues and questions. Against the steps made by the PLO, we find Shamir getting more intransigent; so is the Likud, whose positions became very audacious.

Hence, and despite the fact that there were many of them, these concessions did not give us anything except some moral support from West European states and the dialogue with the United States, which is mere dialogue and not negotiations. Our cause is still rejected and the minimum level of our rights is still unanswered by Israel. Therefore, I say that the difference between President al-Asad and brother 'Arafat was over the concessions. I believe that no Palestinian should offer concessions unless the other side meets him halfway. Concessions by one side alone will weaken the Palestinian position and the Palestinian negotiator. In spite of this, I believe there is not any estrangement between us and brother 'Arafat and that understanding is possible at any moment.

'Arafat was supposed to visit Syria on 9 May together with the Algerian foreign minister. We, and the brothers in Syria, were waiting for the delegation members, whose names were actually sent. However, they did not come, and no apology was sent.

Anyway, and according to my information, Syria's door is open for them at any moment they wish. Hence, I say that things are now left for the Palestinian, not the Syrian, side.

[Al-Hakim] Will you meet 'Arafat when he comes to Syria?

[Al-Fahum] 'Arafat came to Syria to attend the funeral of Khalil al-Wazir, alias Abu-Jihad. He stayed for 1 or 2 nights, and I did not meet him because we were all busy due to the atmosphere of mourning we were passing through.

[Al-Hakim] Do you have any conditions to return to the PNC or to work with the PLO under 'Arafat's command?

[Al-Fahum] First of all, I am still a member of the PNC. My failure to attend the recent PNC sessions does not cancel my membership. Many members do not attend the sessions, and this is normal. As for my conditions, they are known. I am the PNC speaker, and I took the oath to preserve the PNC resolutions and the [Palestine National] Charter until the PNC changes them. I believe that we must adhere to the laws regulating national action so that violating laws will not become the norm and, therefore, that chaos will not spread and individualism and self-interest will not prevail. I also differ with 'Arafat over the many steps he offered. These I specify as follows:

First, he recognized Israel's right to exist without obtaining in exchange recognition from Israel of the Palestinian people's rights—neither their right to a state nor to self-determination. He did not even obtain recognition of the PLO, and the Israeli no's in this regard are famous.

Second, 'Arafat made a statement about the Palestine National Charter whereby he deemed the Palestine National Charter obsolete or superseded by events. The charter was drawn up by the Palestinian people in 1964, when neither the West Bank nor Gaza were under occupation. There is an article in the charter that rules out amendment except by a two-thirds majority of votes. Abu-Am'mar [Yasir 'Arafat] not only amended the charter; he scrapped it altogether. No individual in the Palestinian action arena has the mandate to do that. This is another point of contention with 'Arafat.
Third, I would like relations between the Palestinian revolution and the Syrian brothers to be good, given that Syria and Egypt have a distinct bearing on Palestine and the Palestinians and their cause. No other Arab country can claim such a distinction in light of the fact that both are frontline states; besides, the Syrian and Egyptian peoples have made many sacrifices on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Relations with Syria mean the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Severing ties with Syria, on the other hand, means self-rule, which our Palestinian people inside and outside Palestine have rejected. These are the points on which we disagree with Abu-'Ammar. These differences need not last forever. I am positive that somewhere down the line, maybe in 6 months or so, 'Arafat will come around to what I am saying, especially given that recent developments have only led to more arrogance and oppression by Israel, leading to further repression of our people in the occupied land.

[Al-Hakim] What if 'Arafat stayed his course and did not arrive at this conviction?

[Al-Fahum] If he should continue on the same road, he will find Israel unresponsive. The United States will remain biased toward Israel. Washington will not and cannot impose anything on Israel that Israel does not want. The United States counts on Israel as a regional ally. A while back, the Likud imposed some restrictions on Shamir's initiative, which we reject anyway. This shows that 'Arafat's steps bring us further Israeli obstinacy and arrogance. Add to that the fact that short of national unity, we remain emasculated and weak.

[Al-Hakim] The last PNC session in Algiers endorsed UN Resolution 181 on partition [of Palestine]. How do you view that?

[Al-Fahum] The PNC resolutions are clear. We want self-determination, repatriation, and an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil or part of it—any part evacuated by Israel. It may strike you as strange that at the Casablanca summit they did not endorse UN Resolution 181 but accepted Resolutions 242 and 338, which are less favorable than Resolution 181. Acceptance or nonacceptance of Resolution 181 is tied to a strategy. We would be making a mistake to accept implementation of the partition resolution as a definitive solution to our problem. If, however, we accepted it as a short-term step down the road to a Palestinian state in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived side by side enjoying the same rights and subject to the same obligations, there is nothing wrong with that.

[Al-Hakim] What is your opinion about the intifadah [uprising] now as a big factor in the equation?

[Al-Fahum] Without the valiant intifadah, our situation could have been the worst. At the Amman summit, which was held before the Algiers and Casablanca summits, the Palestine question was a secondary issue, and even less than that. This was the level of interest in the Palestine question, not only on the Arab level, but also on the international level. However, when the intifadah erupted in the occupied territories a few days after this summit, we found that the Arab and international interest in the Palestine question reached its peak. Before the intifadah, our Russian friends were equal to the enemies in the United States. Their interest in the Palestine question was marginal. The intifadah has restored to the Palestine question the rightful position it deserves at the top of the Arab and international interest, and it has gained the Palestinian people great respect among friendly and unfriendly circles. Europe's stand toward the Palestinian people is now much better than it was 3 years ago. The intifadah has enabled brother Yasir 'Arafat to visit several states, meet several leaders and officials, and speak with them with a stronger voice and enhanced authority. Therefore, we do not agree with Shamir's plan, because its major objective is to terminate the intifadah. The United States supports Shamir's plan to terminate the intifadah. This is unacceptable, for if the intifadah were terminated, we would not have bargaining power. So, the intifadah is our capital and it must continue, and I am certain that it will continue.

[Al-Hakim] What do you think of the way 'Arafat deals with and exploits the intifadah?

[Al-Fahum] 'Arafat exploits the intifadah sometimes in the right direction and sometimes in the wrong direction. At the same time, I do not say that 'Arafat's stands toward the intifadah are all negative. He supports the intifadah financially, and without 'Arafat's financial support, it would not be able to continue its march. This is because revolutionaries need food in order to stand fast, and this 'Arafat extends to them. However, he has wasted this by exploiting the intifadah politically in the wrong direction.

[Al-Hakim] How do you envisage the future of the intifadah in light of varying Palestinian trends and opinions?

[Al-Fahum] The intifadah is continuing, and will continue. Our kinfolk in the occupied territories want the closest possible ties with the Palestinians abroad, because the Palestinian people, inside the occupied territories and abroad, are one people.

I believe the intifadah will not accept any concessions, whoever makes them. It will not heed any person or party ordering it to stop. I am convinced that brother 'Arafat will reconsider his steps when he realizes that they harmed the intifadah and gave him nothing of significance from Israel or the United States.

[Al-Hakim] What are the goals pursued by the intifadah, after the realization of which it will stop?

[Al-Fahum] The aim of the intifadah is to end the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. This is a simple goal; the intifadah does not want to set complicated goals. The first aim is to end coexistence with Israel, reject occupation, and achieve independence of the Palestinian land and life.
[Al-Hakim] Do you expect Shamir's plan to be implemented?

[Al-Fahum] Shamir's plan was stillborn. I do not expect it to be implemented, despite the amendments the United States is trying to introduce. Israel will not allow a Palestinian state, nor will it concede Jerusalem or recognize the PLO.

[Al-Hakim] Do you expect the Palestine question to be resolved if the Israeli Labor Party assumes power?

[Al-Fahum] First, we should know that the Labor Party, in its strategic aims, is no different than the Likud. It wants the entire Palestinian territories. The party's flexibility is part of its tactics; the strategy of Labor and Likud is one and the same. If some in the Labor Party are talking about withdrawal from the government and holding new elections, this shows the opportunistic nature of Shimon Peres' policy. Even if the elections are held, Peres will not win because the right wing is still stronger than the Labor Party.

[Al-Hakim] Egyptian-Syrian relations are currently progressing. Will this affect the Palestine question? And how?

[Al-Fahum] Throughout history, Egyptian-Syrian relations have been strong, with the main strengthening factor being Palestine. Unity between Egypt and Syria has always been achieved for the sake of Palestine. This happened in ancient history—in the days of Saladin and the crusades—and in the contemporary age—during ‘Abd-al-Nasir's days in the unity of 1958. This also happened during the Tartars invasion, the ‘Ayn Jalut battle, the battles of 1948 and 1973, and other wars in which Syria and Egypt joined forces for the sake of Palestine.

I therefore say that Egyptian-Syrian relations can only be strong for the sake of Palestine. The loss of Palestine is a threat to both Syria and Egypt, and its regaining is a protection of the border of both. That is why Syria has always met with Egypt when it came to Palestine.

I am sure that the meeting between Syria and Egypt will again make the Palestine question the issue of all the Arabs, not only the Palestinians. And this is the correct position in which our question should remain.

[Al-Hakim] They [not further identified] are currently talking about the need to convene an international peace conference. Do you think that this conference will be convened? What are the conditions according to which such a conference might be convened?

[Al-Fahum] We support the convening of an international Middle East peace conference; this support has continued to be announced since the holding of the PNC's 1976 session. This support has been reiterated ever since the holding of that session. We do not have any conditions for the convening of this conference other than those pertaining to our attendance as a major party to the conflict with the participation of all concerned parties and under the auspices of the UN Security Council and the five permanent members of that council. We are for the immediate and undelayed holding of an international conference. However, Israel is the party that rejects such a conference. Besides, the United States also rejects the convening of such a conference, as it seeks to resolve the conflict through the pursuit of a step-by-step approach, whereas we seek a comprehensive solution.

[Al-Hakim] If we supposed that ‘Arafat would visit Israel, do you think that such an event might resolve the conflict?

[Al-Fahum] Such an event would neither resolve the conflict nor change anything. Al-Sadat did it when he visited the Knesset and delivered a speech there. As a matter of fact, the speech delivered by al-Sadat at the Knesset was a very good one, as he made no concessions on any Arab rights in that speech. Shamir was the speaker for the Knesset at the time. Shamir then responded to al-Sadat's speech showing further intransigence and a stronger hold on the occupied Arab territories. Such a visit by ‘Arafat, if contemplated, would be a big calamity. I pray to God that he would not make it.

[Al-Hakim] Some are talking about a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation to the aspired-for international conference. Do you agree with this?

[Al-Fahum] When the international conference is convened, I prefer to attend it within a unified Arab delegation, as the issue is an inter-Arab one and not one that concerns only the Palestinians. King Husayn rejected many partial solutions offered to him despite the numerous pressures exerted on him. He rejected all partial solutions.

[Al-Hakim] How do you envisage the representation of the Palestinians in the single Arab delegation? Will it comprise PLO members or Palestinians from the occupied territories?

[Al-Fahum] The problem here is that the PLO is an organization for all Palestinians. Every Palestinian is a natural member of the PLO without having to be a full-time employee. Most Egyptians are not state employees. Does this mean that they are non-Egyptians? We do not differentiate between Palestinians residing in the occupied territories and those residing outside these territories. What satisfies the Palestinians inside the occupied territories satisfies us, and what satisfies the Palestinians outside the occupied territories satisfies the Palestinians inside these territories.

[Al-Hakim] Do you accept Edward Sa'id, who is a U.S. passport bearer, as a representative of the Palestinians?

[Al-Fahum] Edward Sa'id has been a PNC member since 1974. He remains a Palestinian, even if he carries a U.S. passport. He gave a press interview 2 weeks ago calling for stopping the dialogue with the United States because it is useless.
DFLP Leader Interviewed on Elections, Bilateral Relations
44040526 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 12 Jul 89 p 12

[Interview with DFLP leader Nayif Hawatimah, by Fathi al-Barqawi: "Casablanca Summit Resolutions Must Be Implemented, Translated From Words Into Deeds"; Tunis, date not given; first six paragraphs are AL-BAYAN introduction]

[Excerpt] Palestinian activity is nowadays passing through its most important phase in the last 10 years.

After the Palestinian dream of unifying the factions of the revolution was realized in 1987, the 19th session of the National Council followed. The resolutions that emanated from it made Palestinian political activity an initiative at the front of the international stage in New York, Geneva, Cairo, Tunis, Moscow, Paris, and other capitals.

Recent days—and perhaps days to come—have witnessed and are witnessing a Palestinian gathering of no less importance. Palestinian action finds a quick echo in Tel Aviv, before other capitals, and the split that Israel is showing in its domestic statements is the greatest indication of this.

A few days ago there were meetings of the Palestinian groups in Tunis. In less than 3 weeks, another meeting will be held of the largest of these organizations, Fatah. This will be the fifth general conference since the founding of this revolutionary movement that has changed the balance of Middle Eastern politics.

Nayif Hawatimah, general secretary of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DFLP], was a principal participant in the meeting of leaders. Because of the prominent role he plays, we can always expect something new and important from him.

In our meeting with him today, Hawatimah discusses a series of topics related to the Palestinian issue. He talks about elections inside [Palestine] and about Palestinian-Arab relations, especially relations with Syria, now that the latter has released 300 Palestinian prisoners. He also speaks about contacts with the United States and about the five-member Arab committee of countries involved in the international conference, as well as about other subjects.

Most Important Subjects Raised

The interview with Hawatimah went as follows:

[AL-BAYAN] What were the most important subjects raised at the recent meeting of Palestinian leaders?

[Hawatimah] The main subjects on the agenda at the recent meetings of Palestinian leaders were the American-Palestinian dialogue, the Shamir plan, in which elections form the main element, Palestinian-Arab relations in light of the Casablanca summit resolutions, particularly the five-nation Arab meeting proposed between Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, normalization of Palestinian-Syrian relations, the situation in Lebanon, problems of the Palestinian camps, the intifadah in the occupied territories, and the need to develop it so as to enable it to increase and stand firm in the face of the Zionist repression machine that is now intensifying in an unrelenting Israeli attempt to break the intifadah’s strength.

When the Palestinian leaders discussed the first issue, they noted that the intifadah, now entering its 20th month, has stood firm against the entire Israeli war machine. At the same time, we noted that the Zionist occupation forces have begun new steps to expand and diversify their repression on the basis of banishment, collective punishments, razing houses, and an economic blockade.

In this context, Yitzhak Rabin, the enemy minister of defense, has asked that the repressive Israeli steps be legislated into law by the Knesset, so as to remove any burden from the Fascist army of occupation before public opinion inside Israel, before the Palestinian people, and in the world. The entire responsibility will be moved onto the Israeli government with all its members, and the lights will thereby be kept away from the immediate mechanism of repression. This will have grave consequences. It will push the entire government of the Zionist enemy to unite behind the occupation army in intensified and expanded operations of oppression.

We also noted recent transfers and the appointment of General Yitzhak Mordecai as governor of the occupied Palestinian West Bank. He is known for the bloody violence he practiced in the Gaza Strip in past months—siege operations, starvation, razing houses, collective punishments, and much bloodshed, plus special measures involving magnetic identity cards and insure surveillance of every Palestinian worker who can work inside the Zionist entity.

All these measures clearly indicate that the government of Israel, benefiting from American coverage of the Shamir plan and the elections proposal, is gaining more and more time. This is leading it to the illusory hope of suppressing the intifadah and returning the Palestinian and Middle East situation to the stage of stasis and stagnation that prevailed before the outbreak of the intifadah.

In this context, we in the Palestinian leadership studied a large number of political, organizational, and material steps to deal with these developments on the ground, so that the people of the intifadah can stand resolute and overcome the new Zionist means of repression in which all members of the Israeli government are being asked to participate with new legislation from the Knesset.

We hope that the measures approved by the Palestinian leaders will find their way to speedy implementation, particularly improving the situation of the intifadah’s
united national leadership and the popular national strike committees, so that they form organized, solid mechanisms that will not weaken in the face of the enemy’s intensive attack. We also hope for the implementation of financial arrangements to enable our people in the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem to solve the economic problems that are becoming more serious daily due to the steadfastness of 20 months—the period of the intifadah.

**From Words to Deeds**

In this context, many responsibilities fall upon the Arab states. They must implement the Casablanca summit resolutions and move them from words to deeds—especially the formation of the broad Arab committee under the chairmanship of King Hassan II. This committee is to go to all the Western European countries and the capitals of the permanent members of the Security Council in order to improve the international situation relative to the intifadah and the Palestinian people’s right of return and self-determination. This committee has not yet been formed, even though international conditions are completely favorable, given the failure of the persistent efforts to sell the Shamir plan for elections. The recent response of the European summit in Madrid was decisive. American pressure totally failed to push Western Europe to take up the Israeli government’s plan and divert the pressure in the direction of the PLO and the Arab states.

The leaders of the Arab states must carry out the financial obligations approved at the recent summit, so that it becomes possible to deal with the economic and social difficulties impeding the path of the intifadah. Our people in the occupied territories will thus be able to develop their struggle and render it more effective, so as to defeat the new wave of repression, overcome all the other difficulties, and continue organizing the people in the framework of the united leadership and the other united student, worker, women’s, and professional councils.

**Palestinian Leadership and Dialogue With America**

The Palestinian leadership gave lengthy consideration, particularly at a bilateral meeting between Fatah and the DFLP, to the issue of the Palestinian-American dialogue. There was agreement on the need to have done with this game. Because of American and Israeli tactics, it has gone on too long. It has aimed at flooding the Middle East and the international arena with the elections proposal, rather than rallying efforts to hold the international conference and begin a serious search for a comprehensive, balanced solution that guarantees the Palestinian people’s rights, Arab rights, and security and peace for all nations of the Middle East.

We noted how the plan to hold elections has failed internationally, as represented by the decision of the European summit, the Socialist International, and the position of the Soviet Union and China. Faced with this international situation, it is difficult for the United States to continue trying to sell the Shamir plan. Shamir himself has announced before the Israeli cabinet that his plan is not practical; rather, it is a publicity plan. It aims at countering the Palestinian political initiative and the international climate moving toward holding an effective international conference and also aims at gaining time because of the intifadah.

Thus we must say to America, “Enough delay, selling, and dodging!” All the American-Israeli efforts to sell the plan have failed at the international level and at the level of the Arab summit.

We must say this so that we can invite the American side to a serious, in-depth dialogue about the essential issues—issues that will really lead to preparations for holding the international conference to seek a comprehensive, just, and balanced solution.

Although America and Israel have since last March been diverting the settlement process with the aim of dispersing efforts and giving Israel a new opportunity to strike at the intifadah, we now have in our hand all the effective weapons necessary to finish off the elections plan and reopen the door to the Palestinian initiative, the resolutions of the Casablanca summit, the resolutions of the European summit, and the position of the Soviet Union, so as to move the process of settlement in the Middle East region in the right direction.

We gave lengthy consideration to the need to mobilize Arab solidarity to implement the Casablanca resolutions, which form a sound basis for normalizing Arab-Arab and Palestinian-Arab relations. In this regard, more than at any previous time, we found that conditions are right for intensifying the effort to hold the five-nation Arab meeting, so as to block Washington and Tel Aviv from maneuvering on the basis of antagonisms between the front of five progressive forces. Conditions are right for unifying the joint effort in the struggle, so as to support the intifadah and render Arab solidarity effective.

In the struggle on the international level, [we discussed] speeding preparations for the international conference. Outside of this conference, there is no solution. Meanwhile, the plans of Washington and Tel Aviv are still based on bilateral, separate solutions, like the formula of the Shultz plan.

All that has emerged in the three rounds of dialogue between the PLO and the United States is the search for a bilateral, separate solution, promotion of the Shamir plan, and holding elections under the shadow of the occupation.

The five-nation Arab meeting can play a large role. Nothing now exists to impede it. In this context, there was clear agreement among Palestinian leaders, particularly Fatah and the DFLP, on the need to encourage the Algerian effort to mediate between the PLO and Syria in order to speed resumption of the dialogue between the
two on the basis of the summit resolutions, thereby opening the way to holding the five-nation Arab meeting.

**Conditions in Lebanon, Problem of the Camps**

We considered conditions in Lebanon and the problems of the Palestinian camps in this Arab country. We noted that the remissness of PLO organizations in rebuilding the camps must be remedied quickly. The necessary funds must be guaranteed for the Refugee Relief Agency (UNRWA), so that it can undertake the rebuilding of the camps with the residents. Sabra and Shatila camps, whose residents have paid their blood in defense of the revolution and the PLO, deserve every gift, so that they can be rebuilt as quickly as possible before the coming winter. We also considered how to correct and develop the relation between the camps and their surroundings, so as to ensure a correct relation between camp residents and all the Lebanese national forces. The camps will thus be able to assume their role in protecting themselves and in contributing against the Israeli enemy, who is occupying South Lebanon and Palestine.

[AL-BAYAN] While what you have said is clear, the issues you have raised require further clarifications. You said that the Palestinian-American contacts must be brought to a conclusion. What is the next step? Does that mean cancelling the contacts or stopping them?

[Hawatimah] To be exact, I said "having done with the American-Israeli game based on pressure and selling the Shamir plan and the plan for elections under the shadow of occupation." In clear language, this means correcting the course of the dialogue, on the basis of a nearly all-inclusive international will, a collective Arab will, and a Palestinian will embodied in the resolutions of the 19th session of the National Council and in the political initiative based on these resolutions.

The Palestinian-American dialogue must continue, not stop. After 15 years of prohibition imposed by successive American administrations on dialogue with the PLO, this wall collapsed under pressure of the National Council resolutions and the wide international response. This created a political transformation in the international climate and, at the same time, a stifling isolation of American Middle East policy, as embodied in the notorious U.N. resolution in which 154 countries agreed on the need to open the gates of New York for the president of the state of Palestine to participate in the activities of the U.N. General Assembly. The United States was forced to retreat and open the doors to dialogue with the PLO.

However, this by itself is not enough. America still insists that dialogue does not mean recognition of the PLO or of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, independence, and application of the U.N. resolutions, particularly Resolution 194, concerning the right of the refugees who were uprooted from their country, Palestine. From all this, it becomes clear that the American side in the dialogue pushed the elections plan from the very first round. Then it began to promote the Shamir plan, after it took shape during the Israeli prime minister's visit to Washington last February. In this way, the American administration thrust the dialogue into the vortex of elections, self-rule, and separate solutions, with the goal of promoting a return to the Camp David solutions. America, on the other hand, would be able to take advantage of separateness, and Israel, on the other hand, would be given a broader opportunity to strike at the intifadah. Now, after long months of dialogue, it has become clear that there is no military solution that will suppress the intifadah and that the enemy must seek a political solution. This is what enemy generals and some political leaders are stating. It has become clear that Israeli efforts to sell elections have reached a dead end. This has led to a fixing of American pressure on the PLO through the rounds of joint dialogue or through the American channels that America moves or works with. All this has led to a dead end.

Therefore, as I said, we discussed the need to correct the course of the Palestinian-American dialogue. Instead of a dialogue that turns in a closed circle, it must become a dialogue that returns to the main direction of seeking a comprehensive solution in the context of an international conference.

In plain and clear terms, we can say that after long months of American attempts to sell the elections plan, the time has come to have done with the game and move to serious discussion and dealing with essential issues.

[AL-BAYAN] Did ‘Arafat meet with Pelletreau? When do you expect the fourth official meeting to take place between the two sides, bearing in mind that Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) has revealed that he met the American ambassador to Tunis, Robert Pelletreau, twice? Published reports say that Palestinian Chairman Yaser ‘Arafat met with the same American official. Is this correct?

[Hawatimah] A short while ago, we were in a meeting of the leaders of the Palestinian groups. I can definitely say that no meeting has taken place between Brother ‘Arafat and the American ambassador. However, Brother Abu Iyad personally informed us about the two meetings that took place with him. He himself explained what took place at them. They were within the same bounds as the activity of the third round of dialogue. Pelletreau was thinking in terms of the elections plan and self-rule and heard the same answers that had heard from the Palestinian delegation.

The dialogue must be moved a step in the right direction. There must be a clear and direct discussion with the American side at the next meeting about the need to be done with the Shamir plan and move seriously to preparations for the work of the international conference. In principle, we have agreed on the need for this step, particularly now that the Palestinian side has come to possess a cohesive Arab and international position.
When will the fourth round take place? There is no definite indication, but I expect it to be in the second half of August.

[AL-BAYAN] The official spokesman for the American State Department revealed that Ambassador Pelletreau met with two Palestinian figures other than Salah Khalaf, but that they asked that their names not be revealed.

[Hawatimah] It was certainly not 'Arafat. The names were ordinary and not worth publishing.

[AL-BAYAN] Formation of the five-nation committee of the five Arab states involved in the international conference is an important subject. Is some party obstructing the holding of its meeting?

[Hawatimah] In Casablanca, the Jordanian foreign minister, Marwan al-Qasim, expressed reservations about the meeting. He said that it was too early to take this step, while the other four parties agreed.

In a recent meeting between PLO Executive Committee member Mahmoud 'Abbas (Abu Mazin) and Minister al-Qasim in 'Amman, the Jordanian side announced that the reservation no longer existed and that it was ready to discuss holding this meeting.

This first of all. Also, for the meeting to take place quickly, dialogue must be resumed between the PLO and Syria on normalizing relations as they have been normalized between the PLO and all the other Arab states. In this way, the obstacles will be removed from the path of this expected meeting.

In this light, discussion proceeded on the basis that since Jordan has withdrawn its reservation, the PLO should begin a series of contacts with the involved Arab parties and with Algeria, so that the latter intensifies its mediation for the resumption of dialogue between the PLO and Syria. This will serve to create a suitable atmosphere for holding the five-nation meeting as soon as possible.

[AL-BAYAN] Although it has been 5 weeks since the al-Asad-'Arafat meeting in Casablanca, we have not noticed any new development in Palestinian-Syrian relations. A few days ago, Syrian Vice President 'Abdel-Halim Khaddam stated that there was no room for independent Palestinian decisionmaking.

[Hawatimah] On political issues, the common denominator between the PLO and each Arab country is the Casablanca summit resolutions. No one can turn his back on having signed these resolutions. Everyone has learned that there is a high price to pay for attempts to draw away from Arab common denominators. We have learned that the abandonment of the 1974 Rabat resolutions cost our people and the Arab states 15 years of suffering and continual Arab-Arab disagreements that made America and Israeli happy. It led to wasting the positive results of the October war. It led to al-Sadat's position, the ensuing separation of Egypt, the Camp David agreements, the confusion of the entire map of the East, the destruction of Arab solidarity, and being pulled into the Iraq-Iran war, whose fires consumed tremendous Arab and international forces, instead of directing all efforts toward Palestine. In this way, 15 years were wasted. Finally, each Arab state learned from bitter personal experience that it could not proceed on its own or decide policy for the total situation in the Middle East. Therefore, with the resolutions of the Algiers summit, and because of the intifadah and the earthquake it caused in the Arab situation, all the Arab states returned to working under the banner of Arab solidarity.

The Casablanca summit resolutions, coming 15 years after the Rabat summit, have come to reassert that this bitter intervening period need not have happened had it not been for the factors of backwardness or insufficient vision on the part of this or that group. Therefore, all the Arab states reaffirmed what they had decided 15 years ago—that the formula for Arab-Arab and Arab-Palestinian relations must be based on common denominators.

We therefore say that the Casablanca summit resolutions have laid a political foundation shared by all the Arab states. This is also the case between each Arab state and Palestine, since Casablanca approved the Palestinian draft resolution.

Second, I have learned from sources in Fatah that Syria has released approximately 300 Palestinian prisoners. Consequently, this action obliges us to look for whatever will guarantee the success of Algeria's mediation, which has gone a long way forward, and which ensured the meetings that took place in Casablanca. The important thing now is to encourage contacts to ensure resumption of the dialogue through Algerian participation and based on the desire of the Palestinian and Syrian sides.

Suitable Way Out

[AL-BAYAN] Palestinian Chairman Yasir 'Arafat is said to be going to visit the Syrian capital, Damascus, to recite prayers for the soul of the martyr Khalil al-Wazir (Abu-Jihad) at the Feast of Sacrifice. Observers see this as a reasonable way out of the difficulty regarding a third meeting between al-Asad and 'Arafat.

[Hawatimah] All possibilities are open; it depends on Brother Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat]. Many information media have publicly mentioned this way out of the difficulty. The important thing is the agreement both sides have given to Algeria to continue its mediation. The dialogue between the PLO, with all its groups, and Syria should be based on the Casablanca resolutions, which form a common, jointly approved political foundation, and on whatever further the process of guaranteeing the three-party meeting as soon as possible. In order that the process may be resumed with joint effort, no one should hang back. Thus we shall have done with the Shamir plan and the elections proposal, which are a tactical maneuver in the bloody Israeli actions to suppress the Palestinian people, and thus we shall resume
the collective effort to prepare for the international conference. [passage omitted]

Red Crescent Supports Palestinian Uprising
44000601 Muscat TIMES OF OMAN
in English 6 Jul 89 p 17

[Text] Qatar Red Crescent Society has donated more than $2.3mn to support the Palestinian uprising in the occupied Arab lands.

Mr. Hasan al-Suwaydi, the society's executive director said that the amount, $2,318,998, was remitted over a period of 10 months ending April 15, through the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East], and Palestinian Red Crescent societies.

Mr. al-Suwaydi said $548,998 was paid through the PLO and $700,000 to UNRWA for its relief activities in Arab occupied lands.

Some 21 societies in the occupied West Bank got $420,000, a Cairo based Palestinian Red Crescent Society, $150,000 for a Gaza relief project, and al-Khalil Palestinian Red Crescent Society $50,000 for a children's hospital.

Some $200,000 was given to the International Committee of the Red Cross to buy beds, medicines, and other relief articles, while $50,000 went to Nablus Women's Hospital and another $50,000 for a Gaza hospital.

The Cairo-based Palestinian Hospital also got a grant of $50,000 for the rehabilitation of children handicapped in the intifada and a donation of $100,000 went to Junain Zaka at Committee to help 981 families on Eid al-Fitr.

Mr. al-Suwaydi said QRCS would continue to raise funds to support the intifada and would welcome donations. "We are ready to do whatever we can whenever we get a call," he added.

Jordanian Regime's Stability Said Top PLO Aim
JN2408093689 Manama WAKH in Arabic
0835 GM 24 Aug 89

[Text] Kuwait, 24 Aug (WAKH)—Fatah Central Committee member Khalid al-Hasan has praised the outcome of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat's visit to Jordan and Jordan's position on the Palestinian question. He stressed that maintaining Jordan and its regime is a PLO strategic aim.

In a statement published today by the Kuwaiti AL-ANBA' newspaper, al-Hasan expressed the belief that relations between Jordan and Palestine "must be strategic as dictated by geography and demography."

He said the crises that the bilateral relations had witnessed every now and then in the past were of a temporary nature.

He stressed the need for creating an organic relationship between Palestine and Jordan "similar to one's relationship with oneself, not with someone else." This is especially important because the Zionist enemy is persistently acting toward converting the east bank of the Jordan river into an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, al-Hasan added.

"Maintaining Jordan and its regime is a top PLO strategy," he stressed.

He added: Harm to Jordan affects the Palestine question as well; Jordan's relationship with Palestine is inseparable.

EGYPT

Government Reports on Progress of Land Reclamation
45040410a London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 7 Jul 89 p 35

[Text] An important report to the specialized national councils headed by Dr. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim asked that a comprehensive scheme be drawn up of the land reclamation operations which have been implemented in Egypt. It asked that a determination be made of what has been planted and of the causes of a decline in productivity in some of them, that to be a basis for an integrated plan to reclaim and cultivate these lands.

The report also asked that a comprehensive and precise survey be made of Egyptian lands, on the basis of which a map would be made that would indicate reclaimable areas, the water sources that they need, and the appropriate crops for each region. It also asked that the laws and legislation pertaining to land reclamation be combined into a single law so as to eliminate the negative impact of the multiplicity of laws enacted on it, and the multiplicity of agencies independently administering the lands.

The report stresses the need to establish a national authority on state lands that would include the agencies currently responsible for land reclamation, and it alone would have power over all lands and the application of the unified law to it. It also called for establishing monetary and executive facilitations that are bound to encourage the private sector and Arab and foreign capital to invest in land reclamation within the scope of projects that would take the form of corporations.
Vice Chairman of General Authority for Investment Discusses Corporation Law
45040425 London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 21 Jul 89 p 45

[Article by Mahmud Salim in Cairo: "Deputy Chairman of Egyptian Investment Authority: New Law Eliminates Procedural Problems and Encourages the Formation of Stock Companies"]

[Text] Cairo is witnessing an important development in the area of financial investment. A new investment law is issued after long debate in the People's Assembly and by the specialized committees of the Nationalist Party and after discussions among ministers of the economic group and lengthy consultations with businessmen and federations of chambers of commerce and industry.

The law will be a major step towards attracting Arab and foreign investment to Egypt.

The new law and other issues of concern to Egyptian, Arab, and foreign investors, were discussed in an AL-HAWADITH interview with Dr. Muhyi al-Din al-Gharib, deputy chairman of the General Authority for Investment and the official responsible for investment in Egypt.

AL-HAWADITH asked him about the law and the new advantages it offers investors and about new developments in the field of investment. The resultant dialogue follows:

[AL-HAWADITH] What's new about the new investment law?
[Al-Gharib] In a few words, the new law is a major leap towards enticing investors—Egyptian, Arab or foreign—to invest their funds in Egypt. It corrects some problems dealing with procedures, exemptions, and indebtedness of existing projects as well as problems dealing with free zones.

[AL-HAWADITH] Let's discuss each problem in detail. How does the new law tackle the problem of lengthy procedures [red tape] that plague investors of all nationalities?
[AL-GHARIB] The law offers a final solution to this problem. According to its provisions, the investment authority's role is not limited to approval of new projects. It now has responsibility for obtaining from competent authorities, in behalf of entrepreneurs and investors, the permits required under laws and regulations governing project development, management, and operation.

The authority, on behalf of competent agencies, will handle the allotment of sites and the attendant contracts. Those agencies are committed in return to providing the authority with all available land surveys, data, and regulations governing project sites. Investors will therefore face fewer procedures when setting up projects.

Furthermore, the authority will be the agency responsible for approving the imports needed for investment projects and for establishing the dates when projects should begin production or commence operation.

[AL-HAWADITH] How about the problem of stumbling projects. Does the new law offer them solutions?
[AL-GHARIB] The law has devised an important solution for those projects already in existence. It advocates encouraging the infusion of capital in projects that stumble because of funding fundamentals. The law went as far as to grant expanded projects, approved by the authority's board, a five-year tax holiday beginning on the first of the year following the date when these expansions begin operation or commence production. This tax exemption is valid for three years from the date capital is infused under this law to correct the funding flaws of existing projects.

[AL-HAWADITH] Entrepreneurs are haunted by the problem of foreign currency indebtedness. What can you say in this regard?
[AL-GHARIB] The law has dealt with this problem and devised a solution based on encouraging the fulfillment of such debts in Egyptian pounds. Egyptian currency used to fulfill foreign currency obligations will be treated as invested capital if used to establish or expand a project.

[AL-HAWADITH] Doesn't there still remain the problem of determining the starting dates of tax holidays granted to projects?
[AL-GHARIB] That problem was also addressed by the new law. It stipulates that the first year of the holiday comprises the period from the date when operations or production begin to the end of the following fiscal year. In any case, only the authority will determine the date when production or operations begin.

[AL-HAWADITH] Does the new law address any other previously unstimulated issues?
[AL-GHARIB] The law allows existing projects, as well as corporations created under its provisions, the opportunity to take part in other projects outside the jurisdiction of the investment law. The new law stipulates that projects in the form of stock [holding?] companies may invest some funds in ancillary projects outside the scope of the investment law. However, such funds invested in ancillary projects will not enjoy the tax exemptions granted similar projects under the investment law.

[AL-HAWADITH] How about free zone projects?
[AL-GHARIB] The new law dealt with the problems of tax holidays for free zone projects. It stipulates that projects organized along free zones, and the profits they distribute, are not subject to tax laws and levies in Egypt. Funds invested in those projects are not subject to the profits tax. Such projects, however, are subject to an annual fee of one percent of the value of goods entering
or leaving the free zone to the account of the project. Transit goods are exempt from this fee. Projects whose main activity does not involve the entry or exit of goods are also subject to an annual fee of one percent of total project revenues.

[AL-HAWADITH] What are the national priorities of the new law?

[AL-GHARIB] As far as the national priorities of the Egyptian economy are concerned, the new investment law offers many advantages and exemptions. For instance, the law "stormed" the problem of housing in Egypt by encouraging rental housing projects. It stipulates that middle-income and economy housing projects fully allotted for rental purposes are to be exempt from all taxes and fees for a period of 15 years. This tax holiday may, in the public interest, be extended for an additional five years by a decree of the council of ministers. Profits distributed by these projects similarly enjoy a tax holiday of the same duration.

[AL-HAWADITH] The new law is said to encourage the formation of stock companies. True?

[AL-GHARIB] True. The law encourages projects in the form of stock companies whose shares are offered for public subscription to encourage participation by small savers. The new law has exempted distributed profits from general income taxes to the extent of 10 percent of the original capital share value of the investment after the original tax holiday has lapsed. The exemption will be 20 percent of the par value of the capital share of projects created under this law as stock companies offering for public subscription at least 40 percent of capitalization.

[AL-HAWADITH] How about land reclamation and new cities?

[AL-GHARIB] An important stipulation of the new law offers Arab and foreign investors opportunities for farm and real estate investment, land reclamation, and the cultivation of arid and desert acreage thus relieving the state of burdens it would otherwise have to assume. The law stipulates that company activities in that area would be in the form of long-term leases of no more than 50 years, renewable for another 50 years at the option of the council of ministers. Ownership, however, is possible for projects in the form of stock companies.

[AL-HAWADITH] How about new cities?

[AL-GHARIB] To encourage the creation of new cities and new industrial zones, the new law offers 10-year tax holidays for projects in land reclamation and reconstruction as well as in new cities, new industrial zones, and new urban complexes. This tax holiday could be extended by an additional five years if so approved by the council of ministers. A 10-year tax holiday is also stipulated for projects operating in remote areas or within new industrial zones and new urban complexes. The new law extends to the Egyptian investor all incentives available to his Arab and foreign counterparts under the investment law.

[AL-HAWADITH] How about after the return of Egypt to the Arab League.. is it ready to receive Arab investors?

[AL-GHARIB] I anticipate that investing in Egypt will be highly popular among Arab investors after the Rabat summit. Some 100 investment projects are ready and waiting to be carried out by Arab investors.

Union Leader's Comments Provide Case Study of Factory Strike
45040433A Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 25 Jul 89 p 3

[Article by Rabi' Shahin: “Strike Day in Iron and Steel Company Increases Production 50 Percent”]

[Text] A disaster almost occurred on the eve of the Feast of Immolation. On that day, the workers of the Iron and Steel Company in Hulwan announced a strike in their own way, so that they were able to increase production 50 percent over the daily average. At the same time, they were able to deter the police from storming the factories or arresting the workers' leaders. They forced the deputy chairman of the board of directors to negotiate with them and grant their demands, after the chairman of the board had double-crossed them. The latter had broken his promises and had refused to implement previously issued resolutions increasing incentives. He had called upon the minister of industry to help stop the elected representatives on the board of directors from working and prevent them from entering the factory.

The newspapers have published brief reports of this strike. AL-SHA'B turned to Muhammad Mustafa Ibrahim, a worker-elected member of the board of directors. Everyone we asked said that he had played a memorable role in keeping the course of the strike and events under control, thus sparing Egypt the great losses that would have occurred had the furnaces stopped or had the gas depots exploded, as might have happened—God forbid!—had the police tried to storm the factories.

Muhammad Mustafa Ibrahim said, "Since December 1988, we have been demanding that the rate for incentives should be raised and that the system for their payment should be reviewed, especially since they no longer fit the productivity of workers quantitatively or qualitatively. We repeatedly tried to submit the matter to the incentives committee, along with other problems, but we became aware of a completely negative attitude. Sometimes board meetings were postponed; sometimes they were cancelled to kill the demands." He added, "Things began to get hot at the 30 May session. The four elected members of the board announced that they would withdraw in protest and would refer the matter to the Organization for the Mining Industries Sector and the minister of industry."
On 14 June, after the chairman of the board of directors returned from abroad, he promised to study the demands that the elected members had raised and that had been discussed at the previous session. A session of the incentives committee was held under his chairmanship on 24 June. It decided to increase worker incentives by 25 percent, if the goals of the plan were realized—i.e., 870,000 tons (the break-even point), along with another 10 percent increase, so as to reach 125 percent, instead of 90 percent. The board of directors met after the meeting of the incentives committee and actually approved what the latter had arrived at, following a request to that effect by Muhammad Mustafa Ibrahim. The decision became final, to be implemented from 1 June. Payment was to start with the August salary, and the minutes of the meeting and the resolutions were to be approved during the following session.

Who Leaked the Minutes in Falsified Form?

Muhammad Mustafa added, “We were surprised afterwards when the trade union committee distributed minutes of the session to all workers in automobiles. The minutes did not include the decision to raise incentives. The meaning is that the minutes were falsified and that a crime was committed in leaking them in violation of the law. The members are determined to ask that there be an investigation of the union committee concerning how these minutes were distributed and falsified. The matter raises broad questions.

“Distribution of the minutes provoked a strong reaction by workers, after they became certain that incentives would not be raised. It was imperative for the elected members of the board to meet with its chairman to correct the matter.

“On 11 July, 2 days before events exploded, Diya Tantawi, chairman of the board of directors, dodged and made excuses: the minutes might be corrected and the decision about incentives added at the next session. It was a treacherous blow.”

Connivance by the Minister

The next day, 12 July, as Muhammad Mustafa said, “The chairman of the board of directors informed me that we had to go to the ministry, ‘Abd-al-Rahim Hawidi and myself. Unexpectedly, when we met with a security official, he took out a resolution from the minister, Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Wahhab, removing us, suspending our participation in the board of directors for 6 months, and investigating us. Afterwards, the dimensions of the plot were revealed. Many parties had participated in it to make us appear to the workers as having let them down. The plot was set for the eve of the feast, so that the holiday vacation would follow it.

“Events wrestled with each other. It was necessary for the elected board members to convey the picture and the facts about it to the workers’ general association. That was done by addressing them orally at the gate of the company and explaining the entire situation. That took place on Tuesday, 13 July.

“The company’s security administration behaved with noticeable cattiness toward us the morning of that day. We learned of an intensive raid by forces from the Bureau of Investigation for National Security, headed by officers Rashad Bayram, Ashraf Mashurah, Mus’id al-Kawmi, and others. They assaulted, struck, and verbally abused elected board members Haridi and Mustafa. This savage episode left its impression in stirring up the workers who were present. Groups of them began pouring out to take refuge in the area of the new transformers. At the same time, shots by investigation bureau officers were flying through the air.

“Suddenly, the affair developed. Hundreds of officers and men from the riot police and the Investigation Bureau, led by the director of security for Cairo and the assistant minister of interior, were seen rushing to encircle company headquarters. They tried to rush in, do battle, and arrest the workers. The situation became more heated. Almost 4,000 people had gathered.

“They immediately gathered around the gas meter, which has a capacity of 30,000 cubic meters of toxic carbon dioxide gas. They threatened to open fire and release the gas on the police, if they dared to break in. It should be mentioned in this regard that the workers had announced their demands in a peaceful, limited demonstration inside company headquarters.

“At the same time, they had been able to catch the deputy chairman of the board of directors, Hasan ‘Abd-al-Latif. He expressed his agreement to their demands and to negotiations to approve them. He was moved to the transformer area. Out of concern for the company, work, and the workers, we asked the police to move back and withdraw. We threatened unsavory consequences.” He added, “To give the lie to any allegations of interrupting production, the elected members decided to close the entrances of the company, remain at work, and urge workers to increase production as a challenge to circumstances and events. Indeed, the rate that day went up fifty percent, in a way that never occurred before or since, even on holiday eves, since the establishment of the company.

“Undeterred, a force of police tried to break in. When they saw that the workers were serious in carrying out their threats and in opposing them, the security forces became afraid and retreated, after Hasan ‘Abd-al-Latif asked them not to intervene, inasmuch as it was an internal matter between the workers and the administration.”

Muhammad Mustafa added, “An important fact must be emphasized. As the events and the scenario developed into this bad situation, the workers feared that the members of the council would be arrested. They took the brave and unprecedented position of deciding on a complete strike from work in all sectors and departments
of the company, if any of their colleagues was arrested or interfered with. They insisted that the minister of industry's decision to suspend and remove board members Haridi and Mustafa be withdrawn and cancelled.

"A written commitment was indeed received from the deputy chairman of the board of directors to discuss sending the minister a note to this effect. The director of Cairo security promised not to interfere with or harass any of the workers. After intensive telephone contacts—it was late in the night of the feast—the chairman of the board of directors agreed to make a copy of the board's resolution of 24 June and distribute it as a circular to the workers, thus agreeing to all their demands. Peace returned to the company at 5 in the morning of the feast, and God saved Egypt from certain disaster."

A salute and some questions remain. The workers went beyond their monetary demands. They resolutely closed ranks behind their leaders to defend them and warned about interfering with them. That was not all; every day I noticed their concern to go up and ask about colleagues Muhammad Mustafa and Haridi in order to set their minds at rest about them. As for the questions—and I found no one to answer them: Who bears the responsibility for this anarchy? What if a disaster, God forbid, had happened?

**Imams, Officials Discuss Threats to Islam**

45040446 Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 19 Jul 89 pp 1, 3, 4

[Article by Ahmad Sulayman and Mahmud al-Shadhili: "Shaykh al-Ghazali Warns of International Conspiracy To Christianize Sudan, Asks Government To Return Money of Depositors in Investment Companies"]

[Excerpts] The great Islamic preacher, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, warned of the existence of an international conspiracy led by the Great Powers in the East and West against the Afghan holy war. Shaykh al-Ghazali said that these Great Powers are fighting against the establishment of the Islamic state that the Mujahedim want in Afghanistan after having defeated the Soviet Union and forced it to withdraw its forces from their Muslim country.

Shaykh al-Ghazali added, "It is impossible for the Great Powers to accept the establishment of a major Islamic state. They have therefore deprived the Mujahedim of offensive and air cover weapons in order to prove to the world that the Mujahedim have been defeated."

In his Feast of Immolation sermon before over 150,000 worshipers in the Mahmud Mosque in al-Muhandisin, Shaykh al-Ghazali indicated that the atheist, John Garang, had the audacity to say he would never allow the application of Islamic Shari'ah in the Sudan. He explained that the aim of the conspiracy against the Sudan, the key to Africa, is its Christianization.

Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali also called on officials to look with compassion on the thousands of citizens who deposited their money in investment companies, citizens with whom they lived happily for many years.

He asked the government to return the money speedily to depositors, carrying out what it had promised, and assuring the people that their money would not be lost.

**Feast Day Sermons Raise Heated Islamic Issues**

Last Thursday, millions worshiped at Feast of Immolation services at open-air sites prepared by the Ministry of Awqaf in all governorates. Feast day preachers dealt with a number of important subjects of discussion in the Islamic and Arab field. High on the list were the Afghan and Palestinian holy war and recent events in the Muslim Sudan. Preachers also dealt with Muslim unity, the application of Shari'ah, and other Islamic issues. AL-NUR's correspondents spread through the governorates to report on the feast day sermons.

**In Mahmud Mosque**

At Mahmud Mosque in al-Muhandisin, more than 150,000 Muslims gathered at an open-air site and listen to the sermon that the Islamic preacher, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, customarily gives on every feast. [passage omitted]

Shaykh al-Ghazali referred to the communist, John Garang, who has said of the Sudan, "We will never allow the application of Islamic Shari'ah and Arabism in it."

Shaykh al-Ghazali marveled that Arabs and Muslims could hear such talk with their hands tied and their faces downcast. He asked what had come over them.

Making a comparison about events in Palestine, Shaykh al-Ghazali said that he is pleased with the slain, but not pleased with the murderer. The world, on the other hand, accuses the owner of the house of being a terrorist.

Then he dealt with events in Namibia, saying, "Despite its small size, elections in that country were supervised by the United Nations. Palestine and the Arabs, however, are beneath that!"

He referred to the Afghan holy war and how the conspiracy against it has become obvious. He stated that it was impossible for the Great Powers to accept the establishment of a major Islamic state in the world. The plan was for Islam to become a secondary religion by the end of the current century; Christianity would then fill every gap.

Shaykh al-Ghazali stated that some in the Arab nation were obedient subjects and followers of the Christian and the communist blocs. He said that we must reject such dependency, with God's word to us before us: "Obey not him whose heart We have made neglectful of Our remembrance so that he follows his own lust, and his affair has become all excess," (Koran 18:28).

Al-Ghazali compared the Arab nation now to a chicken coop. Its owner takes one bird out at random and
slauters it, until the turn comes for the others. The others stand and wait their turn. That is the end of neglectfulness of God and failure to unite ranks in strength and faith. [passage omitted]

He said that it was impossible for us to make God’s word the uppermost, while our hands are the lowest, which happens when we need bread, weapons, clothing, and medicine from our enemy. What are we making on this earth?

He indicated that the demoralization of the Islamic nation and Islamic society throughout the Islamic world had been plotted, so that there would be no mission to which they belonged.

He stated that when the people are in sound health, a sound government would be a natural byproduct of a sound people.

He said that it was necessary to fight legislative imperialism by changing a mode of operation that no one is satisfied with.

He pointed out that Oxford University had hosted the scoundrel Salman Rushdie. Furthermore, the British foreign minister had gathered all of NATO and had contacted the president of the Soviet Union to protect this scoundrel who exalts himself above Muhammad—may God bless him and grant him peace. Truth has its inconveniences and liabilities, which must be faced.

He called on officials to look with compassion on the thousands of people who deposited their money in investment companies, citizens with whom they have lived happily for many years. Until these incidents took place, ordinary Egyptians were depositing nearly 1 billion pounds a year in these companies. We want officials to return the money to the depositors, carry out what they promised, and assure the people that their money will not be lost.

He ended the sermon, saying, “It is a sin for Muslims to be joyful, while other Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, and various parts of the world are being massacred and experiencing every kind of torment.”

He said that festival celebrations in the Islamic world should be cancelled. Celebration should take place for the victory of God and the victory of His nation.

In Old Cairo

In the open-air space facing the Mosque of ‘Amr Ibn-al-‘As in Old Cairo, Dr ‘Abd-al-Sabur Shahin, delivered the sermon of the feast. In it, he said that Islamic nationalism means that all Muslims in the various countries of the world should unite ranks.

He indicated that the Western countries and those who hate Islam want to divide all the Muslim countries by various ways and means—for example, unloosening the phrase, “Arab nationalism.” This was a Zionist-Western plot. Its intention was to break up the unity of all Muslims and ignore the scope of the unity of the Islamic ranks. He added that we must speak in terms of “Islamic nationalism,” which extends from Tangier to Jakarta, rather than Arab nationalism. [passage omitted]

Dr ‘Abd-al-Sabur Shahin called on all Muslims throughout the world to stand beside Palestine and support the Palestinian people, who are suffering at the hands of Zionism. They should support the Palestinian intifadah morally and financially. They should also back the Afghan people, helping them financially and physically, until they obtain recognition for the government of the Mujahedin.

He stated that we have no way out of our difficulties except reverence for God and application of His Islamic Shari‘ah, which commands justice, freedom, and equality.

He begged the Interior Ministry for a speedy release of the Islamic prisoners who have been deprived of the joy of the feast. He mentioned specifically Dr ‘Umar ‘Abd-al-Rahman.

In al-Manyal

Dr ‘Abd-al-Rashid Saqr, the imam and preacher of Salah-al-Din Mosque, delivered the Feast of Immolation sermon. In it he said, “The Islamic nation now needs a man to impel it again to glory and train it to march toward self-esteem—a man by whom God revives the nation.”

He asked, “What is it with Muslims? What has happened to them? How do they accept this degrading poverty, contemptible decline, and deep darkness, when they have in their hands the light of the Koran, which reveals the way to them?” He stated that it was necessary to return to the Koran and read it with reflection and faith.

Dr ‘Abd-al-Rashid explained that even if power now is in the hands of unjust tyrants, the scales will inevitably be set right some day, and power will return again to clean hands, that they may act justly after there has been injustice, rise up after being humiliated, and progress after being undeveloped—God willing!

In al-Qalyubiyah

In al-Tukh district in al-Qalyubiyah Governorate, Hajj ‘Izz-al-‘Arab Fu‘ad, a member of the People’s Assembly (Alliance), delivered an open-air sermon. He said in it that the Muslim nation is being targeted by East and West. Although the Jews have been supported by the Great Powers with money and weapons, they have not settled down in security, peace, and tranquility. This was because in the eyes of God, repose is predicated upon conditions: “Those who believe, and have not confounded their belief with evil doing—to them belongs security; they are rightly guided,” (Koran 6:83).

He indicated that the Prophet—may God bless him and grant him peace—had assured us of the end of the Jews in his saying: “The Last Hour will not come until the
Muslims and the Jews fight. Muslim will kill Jew, until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees. Then the stones and trees will cry out and say, 'O believer! O servant of God! Here is a Jew behind me; come and kill him.'"

Haji 'Izz-al-'Arab Fu'ad called for the Islamic nation to gather around one man, who would be a human extension of the Prophet—may God bless him and grant him peace—in the world of men, and who would walk on the path of the Messenger of God. [passage omitted]

In Mit Kinanah
In Mit Kinanah in Qalyubiyah, Shaykh 'Awad al-Najjar, imam and preacher of al-Jabal Mosque, said that the wisdom behind the feasts in Islam was to stress the principle of reward from God, may He be praised and exalted. The feasts come as a lesser prize after the performance of the duties of fasting and pilgrimage; but the greatest reward will be on the Day of Resurrection. [passage omitted]

In Jirja
In the district of Jirja, Sawhaj Governorate, Shaykh Husayn al-Suyuti, district director of preaching and guidance, delivered the feast sermon at Jirja Youth Center. In it, he asked Muslims to worship God, to whom belong might and majesty, sincerely.

He explained that the Muslim who holds this faith does not accept injustice or submit to tyrants. [passage omitted]

Bloody Feast in Samusta
In Samusta district, Bani Suwayf Governorate, riot police from the governorate stormed the peaceful town.

As members of Islamic groups were preparing the place designated for the feast day service, rifle shots and plastic bullets were fired without previous warning. Tear-gas bombs were thrown. Some members of the Islamic groups were hit, and the residents of the town woke up choking from the tear gas.

Ten persons were afterwards arrested: Mahmud Sayyid Ahmad, Fathi Sayyid Ahmad, Ramdan 'Abbas, Harun 'Ali Mursi, Jamal Faruq, Rab'i Mayhub, Farid 'Abd-al-Hamid, and Hamdi Shalash, as well as Sa'd Sha'ban and Hasanayn Lutfi, who were severely wounded in the face.

Fathi Sabir, one of the members of the Islamic groups in the district, said, "The police bombardment of the town continued for 5 hours without interruption, forcing us to flee and hide in the fields."

'Abd-al-Qadir Muhammad Hasan added, "Not satisfied with flooding the site prepared for the service, firing shots, and terrorizing the people, the police burned the carpets of the mosque and seized the equipment used to move the carpets and furniture into the open. They also seized the money and watches that fell from us as we fled from the continuous bombardment."

A resident of the town, who awoke choking from the tear gas, said, "The members of the family were overcome with fear and terror. The area outside the house turned into a hell of fires. My youngest baby daughter was choking badly. We were unable to revive her with cologne. She came to only after a long time."

In Armant
In Armant, Qina Governorate, riot police vehicles went to the place designated for feast day open-air worship. They flooded the square with water and prevented worshipers from praying in the open. Afterwards, members of Islamic groups were pursued.

The riot police were able to arrest three individuals. One of them was badly wounded and was taken to the hospital. The doctor documented these wounds in his report; so the National Security Investigation Bureau arrested him and forced him to alter the report. The prosecutor's office decided to release the doctor and the three arrested individuals, but the Investigation Bureau decided after midnight to imprison the arrested individuals and release the doctor.

In Abu-Kabir
In the town of Abu-Kabir, Sharqiyah, the Muslim Brotherhood took control of the Ministry of Awqaf's site for worship in the public square. Dr Hasan al-Husayn, a member of the People's Assembly (Muslim Brotherhood), spoke before the service. He announced that the preacher of the feast would be Professor Muhammad Saqr (Muslim Brotherhood) and invited him to come forward to serve as imam for the service. Professor Saqr then delivered the feast-day sermon. Afterwards, angry words were exchanged between Shaykh Sulayman al-Najjar, the Ministry of Awqaf preacher, and Professor Muhammad Saqr, the Muslim Brotherhood preacher. Men from the Investigation Bureau were watching the situation from nearby, but did not intervene.

One should mention that the Muslim Brotherhood in Abu-Kabir usually holds its service on the acre of land in front of the sports club. However, the security police had flooded it with water, using fire hoses. They had done the same thing at prayers on the Feast of Breaking the Fast.

In a related development, Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Shams, head of the Investigation Bureau in Abu-Kabir, chased the car that was announcing that the service of the Salafiyyah group would be held in the group's usual prayer site, behind the Mosque of Abu-Basha, the group's stronghold. The driver of the car was able to escape. The head of the Investigation Bureau took custody of the car and the loudspeaker.

The group held its feast day service at its usual place. The sermon was delivered by Ahmad Ghunaym, a leader of the group in Abu-Kabir.
In Luxor

Riot police attacked worshipers as they were praying the prayers of the feast outdoors on the grounds of the Muslim Youth Club. At the beginning of the service, worshipers were surprised by large numbers of riot police shouting and moving towards them. The worshipers became frightened and rushed in different directions. The riot police followed them, shooting at them, or beating them with sticks. Ten people fell wounded. One worshiper, a member of an Islamic group, was hit by a bullet in the head. Fifteen members were arrested.

More than 300 people had gone to worship in the open air. Amidst the screams of women and children, even passers-by did not escape the flood. A number of them received bad bruises.

The riot police fanned out in the streets of Luxor, arrested members of Islamic groups, and announced that their open-air places of worship were being placed under guard.

Agricultural Land Statistics Provided

[Article by Majidah Hasanayn]

Statistics gathered by the public survey authority within the framework of the national plan to determine agricultural lands disclosed that the total land area was 7,194,000 feddans, according to what was agreed upon by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation and the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources.

That was stated by Engineer 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Ali, chairman of the authority. He added that the second stage is to carry out a detailed compilation of all data on old lands and those recently brought under cultivation, and all the areas from which parts have been removed for homes, the new cities, and public facilities.

The chairman of the authority explained that the compilation will also include administrative reporting from villages, centers, and desert lands in the governorates of north and south Sinai, the Red Sea areas, al-Wadi al-Jadid, and Marsa Matruh. For the first time, it will be undertaken on a national scale with well-documented and authoritative maps. The authority has decided to put together a compilation every year or every other year based upon available resources.

Citizens, Officials, Bakers React to Bakery Slowdown

[Article by Samir al-Tantawi: "By Command of the Ministry of Supply, 'Eat Dinner Early, Egyptians, or Else!'"

"We have accepted hardship, but hardship doesn't accept us." Such was the cry of pain, despair, and complaint voiced by Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Alim, an accountant in a private office, commenting on the phenomenon of bakeries closing and stopping bread production after 7 pm every day. Throughout their history, they used to operate 24 hours straight.

Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Alim added, "A loaf of bread used to cost 2 piasters. I used to return from work at 9:10 and could get it. Of course, I had to stand in a long line, but finally I would return home with a loaf of bread.

"After they raised its price to 5 piasters, things continued the same. More than 3 weeks ago, however, I was taken by surprise. When I went to buy the bread I needed, at about 8 pm, the bakery had stopped working and had no bread. They told me that they were stopping work after 6 pm. They showed me a big piece of paper hanging on the outside wall of the bakery, saying: 'By decision of the minister of supply, a loaf of bread sells for 5 piasters. Operating hours from 5 am to 6 pm.'"

"On that day," Ahmad continued, "I was forced to buy two bags of top-quality bread. Each bag had only five loaves in it, but cost 45 piasters, despite the fact that one bag isn't enough to feed a baby. The bread in the bag was the kind that is made for us to swear on, not to eat. The two bags were hardly enough for our dinner. We were forced to buy as many more for breakfast. In other words, I spent 180 piasters. Formerly, I used to buy five or six loaves of ordinary bread for supper and breakfast, since the job situation of my wife and me gives us no opportunity to eat lunch at home."

Disaster

Mrs Nawal Mahmoud, a secretary in a private-sector company, broke into the conversation. She has two children. "Imagine, when we have to pay about 2.5 pounds every day just for bread. How can we live? Where can we buy things to go with the bread? Does the government think we have unlimited resources, when we're poor employees? We stay at work from morning to evening, so that we can live decently. They said, 'A loaf costs 5 piasters.' OK, we said; somehow the debts will get paid. But we can't find ordinary bread at all after 7 pm. It's a disaster. I bet you the owners of the bakeries that make top-quality bread for high-class people are behind the whole thing. They don't care whether bread costs a pound or 2 piasters.

"Ever since the bakeries started closing early, we've been forced to buy the expensive bread. We're racking our brains. Did the household budget need logarithms to finish the month, so that they are doing this to us?"

We're Being Tormented by Devils

Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Qawi, a worker in a public-sector factory, cried out, "Since the day the bakeries began operating only until 7 pm, we've been tormented by devils. Our lives have become hell. Even though my wife is a housewife, she can't leave my kids alone and go out to buy bread. I used to buy bread at night, after returning..."
from work at 10 pm. We would keep it to hold us for the rest of the next day, until I bought some more on the following day. Now that this business has taken place, my wife takes the children with her and goes out to buy bread in the crush of the lines. My middle son, Muhammad, 5 years old, was almost trampled to death by the people crowding in line. So now I either get up at the crack of dawn to buy bread in time, before I go to work, or else I have to buy top-quality bread, which costs me more than 3 pounds in a single day. Therefore, the salary runs out on the 1st or 2nd of the month, and I have to go begging and borrow to finish the month.”

Ibrahim ‘Abd-al-Qawi ended his tale of woes, saying, “Honestly, I don’t know what the government wants from us. If it wants us to go hungry, we really are going hungry, and we can no longer feed our kids. If it wants us to stop working and go looking for bread, we’re ready.”

In a tone of pain and dejection, he added, “Certainly, it can’t want us to let our children be trampled to death by people in the bread lines. Frankly, I don’t know anything. I want you to tell me: What does the government want?”

Government Has Set Hours for Us

The fact is that this new phenomenon that is taking over the ordinary bakeries, particularly those that have undergone some improvement and have become semi-mechanized, has led to thousands of families being deprived of ordinary bread, particularly if circumstances force them to stay at work as late as 8 or 9 pm in order to earn their living.

The phenomenon has loaded these families with new burdens. As a result, they may become unable to provide the other necessities of food and drink.

But how do the bakery owners explain this new and dangerous state of affairs that has spread through all the semi-mechanized bakeries located throughout Greater Cairo—at the pyramids, al-Jizah, al-Ma’adi, Dar al-Salam, Hulwan, Bulaq, al-Talibiyah, Shubra, and other rich and poor Cairo neighborhoods?

AL-SHA’B met with “Uncle” ‘Ali Ibrahim, the owner of a bakery that operates on this schedule in the Ta’awun neighborhood near the pyramids. I asked him, “Did you set these hours, or did the government?”

He said, “We can’t set hours. The government sets for us the hours when we operate and when we don’t. For all of our lives, we used to operate 24 hours. But after the bakery became semi-mechanized and increased in productivity, the Ministry of Supply set the schedule for us.”

To confirm that he was not violating the law, the man pointed to a paper hanging on the wall. It said just what he had said. He continued: “The government issues us an allotment of 20 sacks of flour every day. The bakery has a capacity of over 1 sack every ½ hour. In other words, in 10 hours we finish the assigned allotment. If you reckon the period from 5 am to 7 pm, we operate more than 14 hours. In other words, we work 4 hours over the amount of flour the government gives us.”

The owner of another bakery in al-Ma’adi said, “We are ready to work 24 hours, but the government should give us the flour to work with. These bakeries use electricity and other things. It all costs money. It’s wrong for the government to make us keep working 24 hours on an allotment we can finish in 10. Also, these bakeries need a rest. That doesn’t mean that we don’t want to work. Like I said, give us flour, and we’ll work.”

Ministry of Supply, and a Surprise

Because the phenomenon is strange and its economic effects on the family budget are disastrous, and because it is happening for the first time in Egypt, I went to officials in the Ministry of Supply to get reliable information from them about this matter.

When I explained the problem to Mr Hasan Ahmad, undersecretary of supply, he was astonished at first. He asked me, “Have you seen it yourself?”

I said to him, “I have seen it myself and have talked with bakery owners. They stated that a decision to this effect was issued by the minister of supply.”

The man denied the existence of such a decision. “Certainly,” he said, “the bakery owners are doing this on their own.”

To further confirm that such a decision had never been issued, he picked up the receiver of the in-house telephone and called Mr Latif Iskandar, undersecretary for distribution, who assured him that such a decision had absolutely never been issued.

The man asked me for the name of the bakery that was doing this. I gave it to him. Then he signed the paper on which I had written the name of the bakery, indicating that there would have to be stricter surveillance of these bakeries. Those who were applying these hours would be apprehended, and legal measures taken against them.

I left the man’s office certain that such an irregular situation would be corrected and that matters would return to normal again. Citizens forced to remain at work until late would find bread when they returned home.

But there was a surprise when I returned 2 days later to the same bakery. I found that the first paper, the one that said, “By decision of the minister of supply, a loaf of bread sells for 5 piasters—operating hours from 5 am to 7 pm,” (it had not had a seal on it) had been removed from its place. Another paper had been put up instead. It confirmed the previous hours. On it was the approval of the supply department to which this bakery belonged, and it was sealed with the seal of the Ministry of Supply and the emblem of the republic!
Well then! If high officials in the Ministry of Supply deny the existence of such hours, and if the departments of supply are the ones that have decided on these hours, the Ministry of Supply ought to review these strange hours and tighten its control over its departments of supply. The officials in them are acting from the dictates of their personal whims. Otherwise, the wrath of the people is coming!

If the overwhelming majority of the people have reluctantly agreed to the increase of the price of a loaf of bread from 2 piasters to 5 piasters, in the hope that it would improve, which happened for only a limited time, after which it became worse than it had been before the price increase, the majority of people certainly will not agree to these arbitrary new hours, which can be given bad explanations and interpretations. The simplest of these explanations is connivance with the bakery owners.

IRAQ

Highway Construction Projects Completed

44000619 Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER
in English 11 Jul 89 p 2

[Article by Yousef M. Amin: “Sections of Expressway No. 1 in Use, Says Official”]

[Excerpt] Baghdad, July 10—A number of sections of the Expressway No. 1 linking al-Nasiriyah with Safwan and al-Basrah, Shumali (Babylon province) with al-Fallujah and Tawilah (al-Anbar province) with the Jordanian and Syrian borders are now in use, said Director General of the Roads and Bridges Department, with Mr Adnan Ahmed Madhlim.

He said that other sections of the Expressway are currently under construction.

These are the sections extending from Shumali to Diwaniyah and from al-Fallujah to Tawilah and other routes linking some provinces with the capital he said adding, it is hoped that all of these sections will be completed in the first half of 1990.

Other parts of the Expressway linking Diwaniyah with al-Nasiriyah at a length of 145 kilometres and its exits and branches leading to Simawah and al-Nasiriyah were awarded for implementation by national companies, he said.

The Director General elaborated that the Expressway No. 1 which starts from the Kuwaiti border in the south to the Jordanian and Syrian borders in the west is one of the most important motorways in the world.

The new route which covers a length of 1200 kilometres at a cost of about 1,200 million Iraqi dinars will make Iraq one of 50 world countries which have similar expressway according to the International Road Federation. Iraq is also regarded as one of 15 countries which have an expressway of a length exceeding 1000 kilometres.

Mr Madhlim said work in the Expressway started in late 1970s. It was divided into ten sections starting from Baghdad southwards, at an overall length of 570 kms. These are Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. The sections starting from Baghdad westward to the Jordanian and Syrian borders are Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, at a total length of 600 kilometres.

There are many branches of the Expressway leading to main cities like Baghdad, which is linked with the Expressway by Baghdad-Abu Ghurayb expressway at a length of 23 kms. There will be other linking branches joining the Expressway with the cities of Ramadi, al-Hillah, Diwaniyah, al-Nasiriyah and Simawah. Thirty-four crossings of two or three levels will also be constructed to join the Expressway with the current highways and several flyovers to cross railway lines.

The Expressway is of 6 lanes 3 in each direction, except for sections 12 and 13. The total width covered with asphalt of each direction is 15.5 metres if the expressway is of six lanes. It is 11.25 metres if the road has four lanes. The Expressway also has a 2.5 metre lane for emergencies.

The Expressway is provided with necessary traffic signposts and fences which separate the two directions. It is also protected by BRC fences to prevent animals from crossing it.

Mr Madhlim added that there are service ways at a length of 1,300 kilometres parallel to the expressway which was designed according to the most up-to-date designs to contribute in making Iraq a significant linking area between the Gulf and the Mediterranean regions. It will also help boosting relations among the countries in the region and reduce pressure on other highways. [passages omitted]

ISRAEL

‘Source’ Claims No Objection to Joint Funds in Territories

7A2208142789 Jerusalem AL-QUDS
in Arabic 21 Aug 89 p 1

[Text] A high-ranking source in the Israeli security apparatus said yesterday evening that Israel does not object to the introduction of joint Jordanian-Palestinian-U.S. funds to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This source was commenting on the visit by PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to Amman.
Reduction in Arab Sector Aid to Territories

TA2508080889 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0405 GMT 25 Aug 89

[Report by Yo'el Dar]

[Text] Government elements in charge of the Israeli Arab sector point out that the abatement in the activities of that public in behalf of the uprising is no coincidence. The organizers have learned from experience that no Arab town or village beyond the Green Line is suffering from food shortages. The reason is that the Israel Defense Forces ensures fresh supplies of bread, milk, fruit, and vegetables to villages where prolonged curfews are imposed.

The circle of volunteers and donors for the territories has not expanded in recent months. On the contrary, in quite a few cases the organizers realized that they could not fill bread trucks with promises given at gatherings.

The controversies between those who head the fund-raising campaigns have not helped either. The radical religious movements used to transfer the donations to Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] in Gaza, which in turn transferred the aid to West Bank townships and villages related to their movement. HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality], on the other hand, preferred to hand their contributions over to the Palestinian Communist Party activists and to bodies affiliated with it.

Leaflets calling for contributions, which are occasionally distributed in the Arab settlements in the Galilee and Triangle, have not created greater harmony between the organizers, who belong to different parties and whose goals are not alike. Attempts to unite the aid activities under one umbrella have so far ended in failure. Only the medical follow-up committee continues to collect medical supplies and distribute them in Nabulus and East Jerusalem hospitals. This body is sponsored by the Committee of Arab Local Councils.

It should be remembered that uprising leaders in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip are interested in continued assistance from Israeli Arabs, although the reason is not a shortage of food or medicines, but rather a desire to recruit them for their struggle.

Rabin's Office Releases Data on Effects of Jibril Deal

TA21008074389 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 21 Aug 89

[Text] Eight of the men released in the deal with Ahmad Jibril are currently imprisoned in Israeli jails for security-related crimes. Thirty-four of the 600 men who returned to their homes in the territories have been deported, 6 have emigrated of their own free will, and a total of about 200 have been arrested for security-related crimes and for taking part in riots. Our correspondent points out that this data was released by Minister Rabin's office at the request of Knesset Member Hanan Porat. The latter has been cautioning against a prisoner exchange deal in view of the bitter experience of the deal made with Jibril.

Maximum Administrative Detention Extended to One Year

TA11008080889 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 11 Aug 89

[Text] The maximum period of administrative detention in the territories has been extended from 6 months to 1 year. Our army affairs correspondent Roni Dani'el reports that the commanders of the Southern and Central Commands signed orders permitting residents of the territories to be placed under administrative detention for up to 1 year, as opposed to the present limit of 6 months.

It was also decided that anybody detained for longer than 6 months has the right to appeal to a judge at least once every 6 months. The order was changed due to security requirements and the current situation in the territories. It was done in accordance with the defense minister's directives, and with the agreement of the justice minister.

Detainment of Tourist Provokes Strong Danish Press Reaction

Attorney Complains of Mistreatment

44230165 Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew 16 Jul 89 p 9

[Text] "This is not the first time that the police and General Security pulled a fast one on me," Attorney Andre Rosenthal of Jerusalem, who represents Danish tourist Ulla Lingsby, 25, fulminated on Friday when it became known that the session on her deportation was held at Petah Tiqwa magistrates' court without his knowledge. He is preparing to complain to the police minister and to the Lawyers' Office about police behavior in the course of the affair.

The session on Lingsby's appeal of her arrest was due to be held on Friday at Haifa Regional Court. The previous evening a senior Haifa police officer called Attorney Rosenthal and, according to him said: "She will be released tomorrow, don't come to court." At the same time, the officer refused to give any additional details. Since the information did not come from an authorized court source, the next morning Rosenthal did go to court. According to him, Judge Dan Bein, who was scheduled to deal with the case, was also amazed that he had been informed of Lingsby's release only that very morning. Denmark's Honorary Consul to Israel Arye Meulal also appeared in court. He told the judge that he had just received a call from the police saying that the tourist had been released.
Attorney Rosenthal was furious that the session was held in his client's absence: "Detainment appeals may be judged in the suspect's absence, but from a legal viewpoint it is unfair not to allow her to have her say," he said. According to him, General Security investigators appearing before the judge took with them the deportation document without leaving a copy for him. He claimed that he learned of the deportation only at noon, some 3 hours after she had been put on a plane for Denmark.

Lingsby, 25, who is 2 months pregnant, spent her detainment in a solitary cell in the women's wing of Qishon prison in the Haifa area. Twice she asked for a medical examination, and her condition was found satisfactory. She was allowed no visitors. Upon arriving at the prison her name was listed on the detainees' board, but since she was under the authority of the security service, the dates of her arrival and departure were not noted. When she was taken away to be deported, the prison authorities learned of it hours later, at cell count.

The information released stated that Lingsby had clearly and of her own will admitted to all the accusation counts against her. Among other things, she was charged with gathering intelligence information on Denmark's Rabbi Melchior who was in Israel, at the request of her boyfriend Jihad Mashlawi, a Fatah activist in Copenhagen, after the PLO office in Copenhagen decided to kill the rabbi.

Her claim that she was not allowed to call the Danish Embassy was refuted after it became clear that at the time of her arrest the police invited her to call the Danish Embassy or anyone else, and she chose to call a friend who was staying at the same hotel. The Israeli police immediately informed the embassy of the arrest. She was released because she had not had time to cause any damage.

On Thursday night the tourist was transferred to a security cell at Petah Tiqwa police station in order to be brought before a judge the following morning. After her release she was secretly taken to Ben-Gurion airport and was put on the 1020 flight to Copenhagen.

Wave of Anti-Israeli Sentiment
44230165 Tel Aviv HADASHOT
in Hebrew 13 Jul 89 p 5

[Text] The Danish tourist who was arrested on Sunday, 3 days after arriving in Israel, on suspicion of serious criminal activity appealed to an Israeli court through her lawyer. The appeal will be judged in the next few days. The tourist lives with a PLO activist in Denmark. Security sources speculated that she may be deported from Israel even before the appeal comes to court. Her lawyer, Andre Rosenthal of Jerusalem, who was hired by the Danish embassy, is convinced that the tourist will remain in detention at some northern prison at least until the appeal comes to court.

The lawyer asked the court to allow the detainee to appear before it. It should be noted that the court has a right to judge the case in her absence. In the meantime, the security services continue to debate whether to bring her to trial or to deport her. Her attorney said that he continued to be in direct daily telephone contact with the prison and, although he was not allowed to visit her, all her needs were being met.

An ugly wave of anti-Israeli articles, unprecedented in Denmark's history, flooded that country's press ever since news of the tourist's arrest became public. Two popular evening newspapers, POLITIKEN and BERLINGSKETIDENDE, compet for the most sensational vilification of Israel. In its editorial, POLITIKEN inquired whether Mosad [Central Institute for Intelligence] had asked Danish counterintelligence, PET, to help follow the moves of Palestinians in Denmark. The newspaper assumed that the tourist was arrested at the airport in Israel in the wake of prior information. Next to the article the paper carried a malicious cartoon showing a Goliath-sized Israeli soldier crushing under his boot a blond girl carrying a suitcase. The soldier has a gorilla-like face and is armed to the teeth; he is wearing a visored cap with a Star of David; his open mouth bares sharp teeth, and his boot is raised to crush the innocent girl who had fallen into the "Mosad" net.

The newspaper also carried an article by a university jurist, Professor A. Kraropp, who claimed that "Israeli sentences customary for security violations are worse than those applied in Nazi Germany under Hitler."

Under the title "Don't Go to Israel," a young Danish tourist wrote that while in Cyprus she decided to sail to Israel for a 3-day visit to Jerusalem. In the port of Haifa she was detained for questioning for hours and all her belongings were searched. She added that because of that humiliating treatment she gave up on the visit and returned to Cyprus. Her advice to Danish tourists: Don't go to Israel.

Danish newspapers claimed that Israeli sources had hinted that the tourist will be deported even if she is found guilty, so as not to impede bilateral relations.

As for intelligence cooperation between the two countries, Danish journalists investigated and found that Israel has 15 diplomats at its embassy in Denmark, which is more than the West German embassy has there. The newspapers hinted that several bearers of diplomatic passports use them as a cover for their real activities.

The Israeli embassy in Copenhagen is under heavy media pressure. Answering local journalists, the Israeli ambassador to Denmark said that the solitary detention in which the tourist was kept was no different from trial procedures in Denmark.
In Israel, journalists entreated the magistrates' court in Haifa to lift the embargo on publishing the security affair that had been circulated abroad. The court left it up to the police to reply.

Gaby Baron, chairman of the Professional Committee of the National Journalists' Association of Israel, yesterday rejected a demand by the Danish Journalists' Association to the Israeli government to lift the censorship black-out of the affair. Baron said that in this case the matter concerned the security of Israel and its people of all religions, and the security of all citizens, including Danes.

**SLA Issues New Traffic Instructions in Security Zone**

_Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1330 GMT 13 Aug 89_

[Text] The South Lebanese Army [SLA] commander this afternoon declared a series of new traffic instructions valid in south Lebanon's security zone. Our correspondent in the north Menahem Horowitz reports that every Lebanese vehicle will be registered in one of the SLA's headquarters; will receive a registration number; and the vehicle owner will have to carry the car license at all times. This requirement was issued as a result of the car bomb explosion and is meant to prevent similar attacks in the future.

**Army Mental Health Officer Discusses Those Exempt From IDF Service**

_44230159 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Jul 89 p 9_

[Article by Gabi Weissman, chief mental health officer in the reserves: "Those Who Do Not Serve in the IDF"]

[Text] Who benefits and who loses from the induction of marginal youths into the IDF [Israel Defense Forces]? This subject resurfaces every few years, but the problem is not resolved. In Israeli society, a deep social significance is attached to service in the IDF. It is one of the components that determine the social status of the individual, and it contributes frequently to the advancement of the individual on the social ladder. Consequently, there is great sensitivity regarding those who do not serve in the IDF.

The stain on the nonreligious rejects sometimes constitutes a barrier to social and economic integration and the denial of equal opportunities to a population numbering some 30,000 isolated youths.

The feeling of discrimination arises very sharply every year, and this may be the reason that those who deal with disadvantaged youth found that the most effective solution for them is induction into the IDF.

Marginal youths are isolated youths, and they come mainly from the poorer neighborhoods. The identifying characteristics are: difficulty of integration into the official frameworks of school, vocational studies, or work places, and the situation is characterized by emotional and social neglect, difficulty in accepting authority, and lack of perseverance. The individual's behavior displays prominently violence, delinquency, discipline problems, and refusal to accept a framework.

In contrast to the youth's characteristics, the military framework is stiff and impersonal. The transition to the military framework from the civilian framework is sharp, total, and involves crises. Every soldier is required to make the greatest effort to accept discipline and difficult and institutionalized conditions of life. Punishments are imposed on all those who do not fulfill military regulations. In contrast, in the civilian framework, the youth is not subjected to stiff discipline and dictated, compulsory tasks. The educational approach is more personal and adapted to the personal level of the youth.

While in the civilian framework the youth may choose his acquaintances and his position, in the army everything is imposed on the individual. These are only a few of the factors that intensify the dropping out of youths from the military framework, and the youth's feeling of personal failure increases, along with that of the young IDF officers who are toiling for the absorption of marginal youths.

The civilian frameworks that handle problematic youths are by their nature intended for the purposes of education, treatment, and rehabilitation, and they are supported by defined professionals such as social workers, probation officers, psychologists, psychiatrists, and educators.

In 1963, on the instructions of the Prime Minister's Office, the NAHAL [Fighting Pioneer Youth] absorbed two companies of marginal youths. The unplanned attempt at absorption produced negative results. More than 60 percent of the youths dropped out within a few months. In 1974 there was another nonselective attempt to induct marginal youths, and the consequences were not long in coming.

The consequences were: the theft of hundreds of weapons, homosexual acts, drug use, burgeoning absences without leave. These factors led the chief of staff, Mordekhay Gur, to a new conclusion: that the IDF was paying a high price for the induction of marginal youths. He admitted that the IDF had failed partially in this educational operation, and it was decided to take a more selective approach to induction.

The induction of "Raful's youths" broadened the framework, and the MAKAM [expansion unknown] was established. There is today no clear picture of what is going on in the MAKAM, but it appears that an intensive educational effort is being undertaken. A young and optimistic staff, which was not prepared professionally for this task, is handling them.
Lip Service

There is neither research nor a clear conception or conclusions about the nature of the results. This may be the lip service that the IDF is paying to political factors that gave the IDF this psycho-social task.

The Ministries of Education and Welfare have repeated for tens of years their attempts to rehabilitate marginal youth in the IDF. In these ministries, despite their professional experts, their resources, and their professional experience, they expect military personnel whose profession and role is to defend the state and its security to solve the problems of marginal youths.

Today, the Ministry of Welfare and Youth Aliyah are dismantling the institutions and boarding schools (by the way, institutions for religious youths who will not be inducted are not being dismantled), and as a result, about 5,000 youths, who are potential marginal youths on the eve of their induction, are being sent home.

A study by Professor Rosenfeld of Hebrew University indicates the rising accomplishments of boarding school children from the poorest strata, in comparison with their peers who grow up with their families in the poor neighborhoods.

A study by Dr. Yisra’el Katz (the former minister of welfare) indicates that the state today invests more in the elderly than in youth.

A small number of marginal youths may be absorbed and benefit from their induction into the IDF. Therefore, there is a basis for the limited induction of youths who meet the accepted borderline criteria for induction into the IDF.

It appears that both in the past and today, most of the marginal youths drop out and fail in their efforts to be absorbed into the IDF. Therefore, selective and methodical induction is necessary, with consistent professional follow-up. In order not to exempt the Ministries of Welfare and Education from their responsibility and obligation to handle marginal youths, ministerial responsibility should be placed on those ministries for everything connected with marginal youths. These ministries must act to create pre-military frameworks that prepare youths for induction. In principle, the goal of the IDF is to defend the security of the state, and it is not obligated to rehabilitate marginal youths. It also does not benefit from the induction of these youths.

Levinger Discusses Politics, Arabs

44230166 Tel Aviv HA’ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Jul 89 p 2

[HA’ARETZ Interview with Moshe Levinger by Dan Shilon; date and place not given]

[Text] [HA’ARETZ] Rabbi Moshe Levinger, do you make a distinction between blood and blood?

[Levinger] “I never have and I do not make any distinction.”

[HA’ARETZ] How can a person who claims that he makes no blood distinction say about himself—as you have done on another occasion—that he has a right to kill Arabs?

[Levinger] “This is one of the base adages voiced by my opponents and even by people close to my circle, such as Yo’el Ben-Nun. They took things out of context.”

[HA’ARETZ] But you yourself said at the opening of your trial that you regretted not having killed the Arab shopkeeper in Hebron. Was that not a clear and unequivocal statement?

[Levinger] “What I said concerned that specific incident, when I was attacked three times in one day. But there had also been stoning attacks. The youth yelled. The rabble wanted to hurt me, so I said what I said only in connection with those attacks. My position toward Arabs is well known. Certain people, like Yo’el Ben-Nun, who later tried to say that I condone the spilling of Arab blood, did so out of malice. That was a very serious thing. It was an attempt to make themselves look good by disgracing me.”

[HA’ARETZ] Did you or did you not use the word “right” regarding killing Arabs?

[Levinger] “I certainly did, but it was along the lines of ‘Anyone preparing to kill you, kill him first.’ The rabble standing there wanted me and three of my children and my granddaughter dead. As far as that rabble was concerned, it would indeed have been a commandment.”

[HA’ARETZ] You described the court that sentenced you as “Ishmael’s court.”

[Levinger] “I did not say that about the court. I was talking about the prosecutor. Indeed, I think that the prosecution tends to be harder on Jews than on Arabs.”

[HA’ARETZ] So much so that it deserves to be called “Ishmael’s prosecution?”

[Levinger] “If that is the reality—and I can prove that they make special efforts to put Jews in a bad light at any cost—then the prosecution’s methods should be examined.”

[HA’ARETZ] You once described the members of the Jewish underground as “doers of charitable works.” Now that they themselves have expressed regret about their actions, do you still think of them in those terms?

[Levinger] “I did not describe them as ‘doers of charitable works.” I said that their action against mayors resulted in 1 and ½ years of peace in Judaea and Samaria. Even the chief of staff at the time, Refa’el Eytan, as well as the commanding officer of Judaea and
Samaria, concurred. That action did very much to deter Arabs, so I said that the calm they managed to achieve was an act of charity.

[Levinger] “I don’t think that your newspaper can serve as a forum for a police investigation on this subject. I am not an investigator myself, and I don’t know anything about it. Our clear stand is that past actions should not be repeated.”

[HA’ARETZ] That was not the only action of the Jewish underground.

[Levinger] “I referred only to two of their actions without addressing the question of whether they were permissible or not. I was talking only about the outcome.”

[HA’ARETZ] Why do you outlaw Jews like Yosi Sarid, whom you called an “informer?”

[Levinger] “I want to thank you for giving me an opportunity to talk about the Israeli left. The left is nothing but a small minority, because the large majority of the Alignment today is close to Likud positions.”

[HA’ARETZ] Are you aware that such a remark, coming from you, even if it concerns outcomes only, may encourage attacks on innocent people?

[Levinger] “I do not want to discuss the issue of who is innocent now. However, after the Temple Mount action, I and other members of my camp came to the conclusion that we must no longer permit such actions, because we feared that they may lead to undesirable actions. I have sometimes been approached with ideas for various underground-type activities, but I opposed them on the grounds that we must stand by our own conclusion that irresponsible actions may ensue. I remained faithful to our decisions.”

[HA’ARETZ] But what happened prior to your internal decision to cease underground actions? Did you support and encourage a Jewish underground until then?

[Levinger] “I do not want to discuss the past now. I told the police everything I wanted to say on the matter.”

[HA’ARETZ] Not exactly. You did not cooperate with the police investigation.

[Levinger] “The entire investigation is in the police records. I don’t think that this is the place to rehash it.”

[HA’ARETZ] This is still a question of public interest, and the police claim that you refused to cooperate with the investigation. Why?

[Levinger] “I don’t think that the Israeli press and this interview should serve instead of police investigation. I fully and actively participated in our decision to stop underground activities. The underground’s actions had deteriorated dangerously. I am in full agreement with our decisions.”

[HA’ARETZ] Today are there no signs of establishment of a new Jewish underground?

[Levinger] “There is no hint of any such thing. Having said that, it does not mean that some Re’uven or Shim’on may not stage some action. Such things can happen when you’re dealing with 70,000 people, but Gush Emunim as an umbrella organization firmly opposes any underground activity, and not only formally.”

[HA’ARETZ] Who are the Sicaris, who threaten Jews in particular?

[Levinger] “I don’t think that your newspaper can serve as a forum for a police investigation on this subject. I am not an investigator myself, and I don’t know anything about it. Our clear stand is that past actions should not be repeated.”

[HA’ARETZ] Why do you outlaw Jews like Yosi Sarid, whom you called an “informer?”

[Levinger] “I want to thank you for giving me an opportunity to talk about the Israeli left. The left is nothing but a small minority, because the large majority of the Alignment today is close to Likud positions.”

[HA’ARETZ] The Israeli left is certainly no smaller than Gush Emunim and the settlers.

[Levinger] “Surveys show that 60 to 70 percent support Greater Israel and the settlers. That is a fact.”

[HA’ARETZ] I can cite different figures and percentages, but let us return to outlawing Yosi Sarid and his left-wing colleagues, be they even as small and few as you claim.

[Levinger] “In Israel there are two kinds of leftists: those who care about and search for truth—those who sincerely consider the question of where things are going in Judea and Samaria—and those who support the intifadah [uprising] and who do not recoil from any means to ensure that tomorrow we withdraw from Judea and Samaria.”

[HA’ARETZ] Yosi Sarid belongs to the latter?

[Levinger] “Not only Yosi Sarid—I wish it were only him. All CRM [Citizens Rights Movement] members are like that.”

[HA’ARETZ] Yosi Sarid and CRM members condemned and continue to condemn the intifadah.

[Levinger] “That is one of the dishonest things they do. They say that they condemn it, but they actually support the intifadah.”

[HA’ARETZ] Why not accept their condemnation at face value? In the same manner one could say about you that you do not mean what you say about the Jewish underground: publicly you condemn their actions, while still encouraging and supporting them.

[Levinger] “All the actions of CRM members show them supporting the intifadah. When they say that the intifadah can be understood and that it constitutes a just struggle, they in fact encourage it. They also interfere with military efforts to end it. They stubbornly fight any attempt to deport Arabs and undermine the defense minister’s capability to take steps to end the intifadah.”

[HA’ARETZ] Aren’t they just struggling to preserve law and order?

[Levinger] “The public doesn’t buy that. The public says and knows that they act to preclude steps apt to end the
intifadah, and that is why the public strongly hates Yosi Sarid and his comrades. Their condemnation of the intifadah is not sincere. Also, note that when they do voice condemnation, they make it bilateral, applying it to both Arab and Jewish intifadah."

[HA'ARETZ] That is why you want Yosi Sarid's blood?

[Levinger] "I don't want his blood, God forbid, but he himself doesn't see how much the people mistrust him and his comrades."

[HA'ARETZ] You definitely urged and called for Yosi Sarid's physical elimination.

[Levinger] "I did not call for that. I am and will remain firmly opposed to that. I only voiced the collective feeling of public mistrust of those people. I am saying these things even though they don't sound nice. That is my opinion of CRM and that is also my opinion of Avraham Burg. Those are the people behind riots and behind the intifadah."

[HA'ARETZ] This week those people were armed by the Knesset with personal weapons to defend themselves from you and your colleagues.

[Levinger] "They don't need to defend themselves against me and my friends. We oppose any underground action."

[HA'ARETZ] But as a result of what you said here, someone may try to attack them. Would you regret it if it happened?

[Levinger] "You cannot build a sound and solid building on shaky foundations."

[HA'ARETZ] You are not answering my question.

[Levinger] "My actions are responsible; on the other hand, I do not try to whitewash or hide the truth."

[HA'ARETZ] You are still evading the question. Would you be sorry if Yosi Sarid were attacked?

[Levinger] "Everyone knows that I act carefully and responsibly."

[HA'ARETZ] Will you just as carefully and responsibly give your blessing to attack on Sarid?

[Levinger] "I deplore attacking any Jew. And I deplore every attack on Arabs more than Yosi Sarid does."

[HA'ARETZ] Could you sit at the same table with Yosi Sarid and his colleagues, listen to them, and try to see their arguments?

[Levinger] "Until a few years ago I did sit down to talk to Yosi Sarid. I also shook his hand. I changed my opinion when he wrote a venomous article against the binding [aqa]da affair. I said to him: 'That's it.' I went into his office and said: 'After reading your article I can no longer shake hands with you.'"

[HA'ARETZ] In so doing did you not in fact plant the first seed of Jewish internecine war?

[Levinger] "I am positive that today there is no threat of internecine war. Love of Israel and of our one nation is deeply rooted amid Gush Emunim and does not permit the development of anything even resembling internecine war. On the other hand, I don't know what may happen in the future if anyone tries to expel Jews from their homes. To the best of my knowledge, both Likud and large numbers of Alignment do not intend to do that. Although there are dangerous tendencies to change the political situation in Judaea and Samaria, they will not bring about violence among brothers."

[HA'ARETZ] Those dangerous tendencies, as you call them, may in the end bring about the return of the territories in exchange for peace, as Menahem Begin did in Sinai. What will happen then?

[Levinger] "I don't see things happening that way. The Arabs want us to return to the June 4th borders, divide Jerusalem, and establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. The gap between Shamir's plan and PLO's wishes is very wide, despite the danger the plan presents of progress toward realizing PLO's wishes. Ariel Sharon is afraid of that, and he is right."

[HA'ARETZ] In fact, why should we not return territories in exchange for real peace? And please, don't talk to me about "our historical rights."

[Levinger] "Our holding all of Greater Israel was always based on the Jewish nation's strong desire to return to its country and to build it up, and on the fact that 'the Glory of Ishmael will not fail,' as David Ben-Gurion put it. In other words, we have a profound security need to stand up to Arab opposition. That is why we went from the partition lines to the 1949 lines, and from the 1949 lines to the 6 June 1967 lines. We were forced to do so for security considerations."

[HA'ARETZ] What if Ishmael sincerely wants peace, would you still not be prepared to make territorial concessions?

[Levinger] "The intifadah proves that the Arabs have no such desire. People who take up stones and knives will not be reconciled."

[HA'ARETZ] There are people, even in your own camp, who do not agree with you and who are prepared for concessions. Your teacher and rabbi, Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Hakohen Kook at the time sounded very pragmatic when he said that "one must find the golden mean between common sense and Torah judgment."

[Levinger] "Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook was indeed my teacher and rabbi, and he was our spiritual leader. He was our guiding light. On several occasions I indeed heard him make remarks such as the one you cited. He used to say that 'It doesn't hurt to have a brain.' He taught us to act wisely. In the beginning he indeed
opposed what seemed to him to be mere demonstrations, but when he realized that it was a real mass movement, he changed his mind and supported it. I hope that we now are acting wisely and within the limits of good taste. Even when we do demonstrate, we try to take a wise and responsible attitude.”

[HA’ARETZ] Nevertheless, you’re not all made of one piece. For example, Rabbi Yitzhak Schildt of Ma’ale Adumim recently wrote in NEQUDA: “The settlers must show understanding and accept the fact that settlements may have to be moved for security reasons.” Do you view him as a traitor and a heretic?

[Levinger] “More than 90 percent of Gush Emunim’s collective leadership do not accept such ideas. The rest are very few and even they have been losing ground lately. On the other hand, there is an internal debate among us concerning methods of dealing with security issues. This debate has been going on for years. But even on this matter disagreements are diminishing.”

[HA’ARETZ] Do you recognize and respect Rabbi Me’ir Kahane, and do you agree with his views?

[Levinger] “Our approach has always been to make the people love the Land of Israel. Rabbi Kahane tried to follow his own truth, but in the process he cut himself off from the people and thus failed.”

[HA’ARETZ] Did you make mistakes at any point?

[Levinger] “Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Kook was displeased that I stopped my clerical work and teaching. I thought that as a public figure I should be involved in current events and watch out for public interests. That may, however, have been a mistake.”

[HA’ARETZ] But in the area of public activities, have you no regrets or are you not sorry about anything you did?

[Levinger] “I sometimes make sharp remarks, but I am not sorry about that, because things have to be said.”

[HA’ARETZ] Do you have a sense of humor?

[Levinger] “I don’t think that I am difficult to talk to or to socialize with. We keep open house on the Sabbath, and visitors are not met by an angry man who never smiles. Had that been the case no one would ever come to our home.”

[HA’ARETZ] Then why do you try to appear as an ascetic and as one carrying all the weight of the world on his shoulders? That impression is given, for example, by your behavior and your shabby clothes.

[Levinger] “Some people do make that mistake about me, even within our camp. I am no different from anyone else. I meet many different people, including wealthy people. I meet with them in various settings, here and abroad. The image that is attributed to me is not correct.”

[HA’ARETZ] Have I just been talking to a man who is about to be charged with murder or manslaughter by an Israeli court?

[Levinger] “I have already had two trials that caused a sensation. It was prophesized that I would spend many years in jail, but I was acquitted. I do not doubt that this time, too, I will be acquitted, God willing.”

[HA’ARETZ] Do you see yourself as a messiah?

[Levinger] “I deal with more prosaic, simple issues concerning the entire nation.”

[HA’ARETZ] Do you have messianic qualities?

[Levinger] “I won’t talk about my qualities or about what I may perhaps be capable of doing. The word messianism connotes something evil divorced from real life.”

[HA’ARETZ] Thank you.

General Ehud Baraq Profiled

44230164 Tel Aviv HADASHOT Weekend Supplement in Hebrew 21 Jul 89 pp 4, 8-9

[Article by Na’omi Levitsky: “The Teflon General”]

[Excerpts] The sound of bullets cannot be heard, but even now, Assistant Chief of Staff General Ehud Baraq is waging one of the toughest battles of his career. The war for the post of the next chief of staff of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has been thrown into high gear, and in the IDF betting booths, Baraq is considered the leading candidate. To maintain such a comfortable balance of power, from his point of view Baraq is convinced he must keep the assistant’s throne. That in itself is not an easy task. The chief of staff, Dan Shamron, is constantly being attacked from all sides and is still impatiently awaiting the confirmation of his fourth term. He is well aware that his assistant, who is more capable and more popular than he, is breathing down his neck. It has been more than 2 years now that Baraq has served as assistant chief of staff. He would not be opposed to going off on some refreshing sabbatical, away from the intifadah [uprising], to the United States for example. But without explicit assurances in writing that he will be the next chief of staff, he will not be found going anywhere. From Baraq’s point of view, the issue is closed, but not from the chief of staff’s viewpoint. And now everyone is gathering for the next round of fighting for the position of assistant, a battle that is nothing more than a stage in the war for the legacy. Baraq has prior experience with this kind of war. Three years ago, Chief of Staff Moshe Levi and several senior generals waged a difficult struggle against the leading candidate, Dan Shamron, a struggle in which the rules of fairness were not always followed. It was then that the idea was brought up within the political system to bypass the senior generals and appoint Baraq.

The idea appealed to the young general who was moving up quickly, and he, too, entered the game. While Levi
and his friends were running all over the political map attacking and slandering Shomron, Baraq waged a different kind of battle, more quiet and sophisticated, one that ruffled no one. Even then, he managed to carry with him politicians of all kinds and types who supported him with zeal and joined the struggle on his behalf; Dan Meridor, Ehud Umat and Moshe Gitsen on the one side, Yosi Sharir and Yosi Baniel on the other—all worked for him in unison. Rabin, who abhors upheavals by his nature, preferred to appoint Shomron, a senior general. But Baraq, who at the time threatened to resign if he was not chosen, received the pleading delegations that made their pilgrimages to him and was persuaded to stay on. And, what is more important, like Shomron before him, he, too, managed to get a nonbinding promise of sorts that come the next round everything would be all right. Since then, not only has he successfully escaped the uncomplimentary stigma of a loser, but he has sprinkled with star dust. Politicians, senior functionaries, public idols, and journalists seek his company, and he, being the good boy that he is, usually complies. Since the ritual worship of generals following the 6-Day War, no army man has received such exhibitions of admiration. At a time when army officers are exposed to savage criticism, leaving through Baraq's file of newspaper clippings reveals articles, sometimes a bit sticky, on his achievements and virtues. It would be difficult to find therein a word of criticism.

He wears the suit of the resident genius that was well tailored for him, and there are those who believe that he will bring the IDF the glory that Shomron promised but did not deliver. Time will tell. Baraq is like his name, a man who shines, a man with original thoughts. He reads books and possesses a rare ability of expression. Even the goddess of luck is on his side. Napoleon, who liked generals with good luck, would have found him to be a general after his own heart. He managed to leave the Intelligence Branch, a potential graveyard for generals, unscathed and in one piece only 4 days before the diversion of the Libyan plane that was supposed to be transporting senior functionaries from Syria. The fiasco was never associated with him. He left the central command only a few months before the fire there. He even managed to shake himself loose from the intifadah. His relationship with the chief of staff is especially complex and delicate. On a professional level they share a common language; some even say their relationship is harmonious. Both of them support a small and aggressive army, both believe in precision weapons. They work on most issues in full coordination. They hold two regularly scheduled meetings a week. One is a personal meeting without a fixed agenda, the other is a working meeting with an agenda established in advance. If the test of an assistant is measured by the number of recommendations he manages to receive from the chief of staff, then Baraq would score 100.

However, beneath the surface, at a different level almost hidden from view another set of relationships exists between the chief of staff and his assistant, and there things are pretty bad. Shomron, who is absorbing the brunt of the criticism, occasionally throws a glance over his shoulder and there he finds Baraq—smiling, free, and happy. As assistant chief of staff, Baraq deals with issues related to the intifadah on a regular basis, appropriating forces, weapons, the number of days of reserve duty. And yet he manages—as if he were coated with teflon—to shake loose from any hint of a link to the issue. Units like Shimshon and Dudevan are the fruits of his creation, rubber and plastic bullets and scatter bombs fall within the realm of his responsibility. Yet he comes out of all this as pure as the driven snow and smelling like a rose. Shomron bears the heat of the intifadah—as Jesus bore the cross—alone. When it comes to the intifadah, Baraq is left in the shadows, but on all other issues Shomron has found him to be dominant and strong. As in the American advertisement for Merrill Lynch, when Baraq speaks, everyone listens. [as published] This is the fertile ground from which the seeds of paranoia grow. Baraq walks a thin line, more carefully than ever. Now he need only cross the finish line. Therefore, perhaps for the first time in his life, he asked that this article not be published.

It is also the first time in recent years that Baraq is really working hard, like a marathon runner who increases his speed during the final kilometer, using his last bit of strength. When he was commander of a troop in the north, the command general at the time, Avigdor Ben-Gal, complained that Baraq was often absent from the troop. When he commanded a troop in Sinai, his subordinates complained that he spent a great deal of time enjoying himself in Tel Aviv, in wealthy circles. Despite the fact that the troop performed the largest and most complex exercise in the history of the IDF, his subordinates were not happy. At the time Baraq sent an in depth letter to the chief of staff and the minister of defense, in which he explained why they should make him a general. In January 1982 he in fact received the rank and was appointed head of the planning branch. He held the post for only 1 year and 3 months and did not leave a significant mark there. On the eve of the war in Lebanon, he asked to be appointed to a senior post in the field forces. Ari'el Sharon supported him, but the chief of staff, Raphael Eytan, hurried Ben-Gal back from the United States for the post. Ben-Gal later related that he made changes in plans that had been signed by Baraq because the plans called for opening a territory that was too narrow and would not have supported the forces or met their potential needs. Baraq was appointed Ben-Gal's assistant, and he was insulted. He was a bit angry and therefore not really involved in the issues. Together with a few of his friends from reconnaissance, he worked on a plan for commando operations that was never carried out. Ben-Gal claimed he had no assistant, Baraq claimed he felt superfluous and apparently both of them were right. Baraq even shook loose the residue of the war in Lebanon effortlessly. Even the fact that in the famous battle over Sultan Ya'aqov Baraq was in effect the active commander for several hours (Ben-Gal) was called to a conference with the chief of staff did not make a
difference. The teflon effect worked that time, too, and he was never identified with that mishap. Later Baraq said that all the planning there had been faulty, but in a long and detailed investigation on the part played by his forces in the major complex battles, Baraq was silent and spoke neither for nor against.

One of the officers at the time gave Baraq the nickname “jumping flare mine” meaning: it makes a lot of noise, it makes a lot of light, but it leaves no mark. As head of the Intelligence Branch, he got the reputation of one who does not work very hard. Even as general of the central command, he had exaggerated ease in the field. He had what he always has: understanding, intellect, and strategy. He worked in complete harmony with Ephraim Sena, then head of the civil administration. With whom else could he use the word “reciprocal” and be understood. There are those who say that his soft hand delayed the outbreak of the intifadah by a few months, that it is not a coincidence that the problem did not erupt during his reign. But at that time, his head was already involved in politics. He requested the government ministers’ chambers and ran around to parties and cocktails. Although his command was the leader in the IDF exercises, 30 officers sent a letter to the minister of defense complaining that they had no command general, that Baraq was not to be seen there. Baraq replied that they should stop bothering him and that it was the results that counted.

After the resignation of Amram Mitzna, Baraq was again offered the central command. He was not willing to touch it with a 10-foot pole. His political idiosyncrasies, in the meantime, reached an unprecedented level. All the generals deal in politics in one way or another, but if the others deal in one way, Baraq deals in the other. Even at this he surpasses them all.

The journalist Hana Kayam in the Tel Aviv weekly THE CITY exposed the fact that Baitin, who was at the time without any official post and one of Peres’ team of 100 days, regularly consulted with Baraq, then head of the Intelligence Branch, on his working papers. Baraq knows all of the ministers’ aides and maintains branch contacts. He can be found at a Purim party thrown by Mivra Avraham, at a Bar Mitzvah hosted by Roni Milo or Yosi Sharid, joining a celebration with David Levi or a wedding with Ya’aqov Nirmodi. He also joins in their sorrow. He went, for example, to comfort David Levi, and, not too long ago, when Sharon’s mother died, they were looking for Baraq and found that he had gone to console the bereaved. He has become a regular at the Olympia restaurant; at a birthday party at his home he hosted Beno Tzadik, ’Ido Disenchik, Yo’el Markus, Dan Shomron, Yitzhak Rabin, and Eytan Haber. Haber, communications advisor to the defense minister, conducts public relations for Baraq, has already crowned him the next chief of staff, and often, half in jest, calls Baraq the current chief of staff. As he left the party, the chief of staff quipped that when he was a general he used to invite the subordinates and colleagues to his home, not his superiors.

Boredom was for other people and life was full of surprises. It was also here that Baraq met his wife Nava, originally from Tiberias and an intelligence soldier. They have three daughters. In the mid-1960’s he mustered out,

Baraq loves being “in.” He wears the most fashionable sunglasses, writes with a Mont-Blanc fountain pen, wears a Rolex watch and sometimes smokes Havana cigars. He is a fascinating conversationalist, educated, with a sense of humor. He has tact, and when he wants he knows how to make friends with people. He will ask a politician what in his opinion will happen, thereby making him feel important; he will embrace a military analyst and ask him for an indication; “Tell me, Mr. Analyst, how am I doing?” An admiring journalist who asks Baraq about his relationship with Shomron will also win an embrace plus an expression of respect for his job. There, before the row of photographs of assistant chiefs of staff, Baraq will ask with a suggestive smile: “Tell me, which assistant chief of staff had such good relations with his boss?”

When and if he becomes chief of staff he will have a supportive press. He is a pleasant kind of manipulator. Sometimes he is so deliberate that he makes plans to plan. If he wants to buy an egg he will not just go to the grocery store. He will ask for something that is white on the outside yellow on the inside and wet. Usually he will get an egg but sometimes he will get a chick.

Baraq (Brogue), a kibbutznik from Shomer Hasharon in the Hafar Valley, was born in 1942. Small, lean, with a baby face, he excelled at mathematics and picking locks. With a group of boys, wild as he was, he broke into storehouses in the area and took whatever came to hand. He did not finish high school. In the 12th grade he stayed away from school and only later completed his baccalaureate exam externally. Today he has an undergraduate degree in mathematics and physics and a masters degree in systems analysis. In 1959 he enlisted in the army. He wanted to be a pilot, but wound up in the armored corps. Avraham Arnan, who at the time was building an elite reconnaissance unit, rescued him from there. Arnan’s headhunter was Sammy Nahmias and Baraq’s name rolled into his hands.

Baraq was quickly assimilated into the new unit, and within a short time his friends had given him the nickname Napoleon. It was clear to them that this boy would go far. “Not just because he was brilliant,” says Nahmias, “but he knew how to make the right decisions quickly in the field. It seems to me that at the time he had the highest IQ in the IDF and I, already a first lieutenant, while he was only a young soldier, was consulting with him and he would always come up with some idea that we had not thought of. He was that kind of kibbutznik, a bit of a troublemaker. His laundry was always lying under his bed, and he was always taking socks and shirts from all of us. But as scattered as he was, he knew how to be practical. This kibbutznik knew how to save money and even then, he knew how to invest it.” The problem was that Baraq lacked spontaneity. “He was very methodical, perhaps too methodical, deliberate, and very, very careful.” [passage omitted]
finished an undergraduate degree and worked for a time at the Weitzman Institute. But this quiet life was not for him. He returned to the army, this time for real. Anyone who wants a career in the IDF knows that the way to go is through the armored corps. Baraq, planning every detail to the end as is his nature, took a division commanders course and toward the end of the war of attrition he commanded a tank division at the canal. He returned to reconnaissance as lieutenant commander of a unit and later became commander. His name was associated with the mission that surrounded the Beirut airport and freed the hostages from the Sabena plane, and countless other missions. It was then that his spark of genius was discovered. For several more years he was involved in secret missions, and he planned the most complex and sophisticated among them. Foreign sources say that he planned the attack on Abu-Jihad's life.

His bravery is worth noting. Baraq is the officer with the most decorations in the IDF. He even received a special decoration for the management of the reconnaissance division when he was commander. The Yom Kippur War caught him at Stanford University in California. He returned to Israel, gathered around him a battalion of tanks and arrived at the front at exactly the same time as Yitzhak Mordekhay's battalion got stuck in the Sinai in battles that were almost lost. Baraq was asked to rescue the battalion from the inferno. Sometimes, when members of the armored corps say that Baraq is a butterball who fought under special circumstances and lacks real war experience, his supporters will bring up this battle as an example. “It was a very tough battle,” Baraq once recounted, “an exemplary battle from the point of view of the quality of the people, but there is some doubt as to whether it was at all necessary.”

Moshe Dayan was also impressed with Baraq. “Tell me,” he said to troop commander Avraham Eden. “What is wrong with that boy? He seems too good to be true. He is probably pulling the wool over our eyes.” Baraq participated in the planning of the Entebbe operation as head of the operations division of the general staff. When a problem arose with the plans for the landing, Baraq suggested parachuting fighters into Lake Victoria. Then they found out that the lake had crocodiles and they quickly reverted to the original plan. He also wanted to command the operation and almost did. At the last minute, General Yequti’el Adam had him replaced and sent Baraq instead to close up the perimeter in Kenya. There, in a dark blue suit and fashionable tie he met the fighting forces only to hear that Yonatan Natanyahu, who commanded the operation in his stead, had been killed.

At the unveiling of Natanyahu’s headstone, Baraq eulogized him as if he were giving his own eulogy. “Let us not talk about him. Rather, let us contemplate a handful of reflections from the side of the road where he fell. When you see how randomly—even if it is not without symbolism—death chose our Yoni, when you stand from time to time facing another dead body in a long line of graves where the best of your friends lie, you cannot help but wonder about the meaning of the last judgement. I believe that life is not mainly the passage of hours and days from the birth of a man to his death, but the content with which he filled those days and hours. There is the man who is blessed with long life but from this point of view, hardly lived at all. And there is the man who lived a short but full life, a man who learned and loved, fought and taught fighters, contemplated the deepest problems of our existence and nonetheless remained sensitive and open, to a smile, a walk, a flower, a poem. If there is consolation in a life that was cut short at the age of 30, that is the consolation...” Hayim Guri, who did not know Baraq, heard the eulogy and said: That young man will be prime minister one day.

People may say that at every stop Baraq is already looking toward the next one, hurrying to arrive there, that he has no patience for details, nor with people—an sworn elitist who quickly grasps the principle of every role and later loses interest. A senior officer, one of his friends, explains it this way: “He does not lose interest in the issue, but with the pest who tries to spoonfeed him, with the fool who tries to explain to him that which he has already known for a long time.” For years he has been the target of criticism by senior members of the armored corps, in the context of the almost traditional struggle between the armored corps and the para-troopers. It does not help that now he is proclaiming that he is actually a native of the armored corps (one who enlisted in the corps), while senior corps members see him as a paratrooper. They say that he promotes his men from the reconnaissance at the expense of their men, and in this there is more than just a hint of truth. Of all people, Gen Israel Tal, the father of the armored corps, has come to his defense. “Ehud,” he says, “is a real tankist. Because he has gone through all the courses and preparations, he was a company commander and commander of a tank battalion; it is absurd to say that he is anything else.” [passage omitted]

In private conversations Baraq talks a great deal about what he calls an officer's hardships as distinct from his talents. Recently he was asked why he did not appoint Brigadier General Hertzl Bodinger to head the Manpower Branch, when Bodinger is more talented and brilliant than Ron Goren. Baraq replied with a few sentences about the place for real talent in the IDF. “Such people,” he said, “are more difficult to control. The system is not accustomed to that kind of internal independence.” He was speaking of Bodinger, but perhaps really about himself. Gen Tal once showed Baraq a passage from a book by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “August 1914”—“There is no end to the torment of an officer who is extraordinary by virtue of his talents. The army enthusiastically submits to talent when it already holds the reins of authority, but as long as his hands are drawn toward this wand, there is no end to the woes that he must endure.” Baraq liked that passage, but his colleagues are not clear as to which torments he was thinking about. “Everything,” they say, “came so easily to him.”
When they tell him he is still in the commando and that commanding large-scale operations is another story, he quietly replies: Where would you prefer your sons to be, with me or with my opponents? When I was a battalion commander in the armored corps, the veteran commanders were already saying: Ehud is good for analyzing the situation in India or China, but doing manual labor with the rank and file is not for him. And when Sharon came for a visit and wanted to see an exercise, whom did they choose to conduct it if not the expert on India and China. Amir Drori insulted Barak when he said that Barak was born with a silver spoon in his mouth, that he never gets dirty, that he was not experienced in combat. “I have done it all,” replies Barak, “but under warmer conditions and in an environment that required operational quality and precision.” He is familiar with all the criticism levelled against him verbally, and he has answers for everything. They say he never had the patience to stick with a position and now he has no end of patience to remain assistant chief of staff. They say he does not have patience to deal with details, that he is only interested in grander things. Life, he says, is not a balance sheet, it is not computer printouts. People do not change. It is frightening how much they do not change. In any event, there are those who develop and those who stagnate, but their character remains the same. In the sandbox at nursery school, you can already tell who will be a good officer.

In the campaign for chief of staff, Barak is making a real effort not to ruffle anyone. He has managed to tell each person what he wants to hear. A few months ago, he delivered a speech to a group of journalists. Three army correspondents sat in front with a list of the parties in the consensus. Barak said the yeshiva students made excellent fighters; the correspondents placed a check next to the National Religious Party. Barak said that the preventive force of the IDF soldiers was compelling and that the appearance of an IDF soldier shouldeering his weapon was enough to prevent a planned enemy activity; the correspondents placed a check next to the Likud. On and on, he ran through all the parties, but it was really frustrating when he only barely dealt with the phenomenon of objectors in the IDF. This would have been an opportunity to say a word on the fighting ethic, about the humanist world view. But Barak was cautious. He knows how to walk in between the raindrops. Unlike the judges of the Giv’ati soldiers, Barak was not anguished at the sight of the paratroopers’ lack of restraint in Qalendia. Without emotion, Barak explained to his listeners in the pressroom that if you are supposed to go through the door and you do not succeed, then you go through the window, and if in the process a television falls, then it falls. The important thing is for everything to be legal.

But sometimes, for all his caution, Barak does not see the forest. He tries so hard to be on good terms with everyone that sometimes he trips over his own feet. Shamir is not pleased with his antics and Arens keeps a certain distance from Barak. His former commander, Me’ir Amit, says that he has tremendous latent potential but he is still waiting for it to be concretized. And Yosi Sharid says: “If his spinal cord worked like his head, Barak would be a perfect man.”

[Box, p 9] A Small Debt

For Defense Minister Moshe Arens, there is a small “open account” with Ehud Barak. One incident has to do with the Lavi controversy, for which Arens has “accounts” with everyone. Barak sat for a long time on the fence and avoided taking a clear stand in public. When he spoke with politicians, he was careful to point out the pros and cons. Only at the very end did he get off the fence and join the objectors; he even convinced Minister Yitzhak Peretz of SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] to vote against the project.

The second incident dates back to the war in Lebanon. When the question of withdrawing the IDF from Lebanon came up Barak was head of the Intelligence Branch. He submitted to Arens an intelligence report supporting total withdrawal to the international line, without a security strip. The plan was based on an agreement with Amal’s Shi’ites. The northern command and former Chief of Staff Moshe Levi supported, with certain nuances, withdrawal to a security strip. An argument ensued and Barak informed them that a Christian security strip would not hold up, that the Lebanese army would soon fall and the IDF would likely find itself back in Lebanon. Arens said if the choice was total withdrawal he would sooner not withdraw at all, and so the IDF remained there until Yitzhak Rabin took over the defense ministry.

Al-Turayfi Denies Threats, Will No Longer Meet With Shamir

TA2108074889 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 21 Aug 89

[Text] Attorney Jamil al-Turayfi from Ramallah, one of the Palestinian figures who conferred with the prime minister, says he will no longer meet with Mr Shamir if the latter invites him. If Mr Shamir wants to discuss politics he should approach the PLO, al-Turayfi said.

According to him, he fears no one and his life is not in danger. Our correspondent Moti Amir points out that al-Turayfi is thus seeking to deny rumors that he left the country over 2 weeks ago, 1 day before a scheduled meeting with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, because unidentified persons had threatened him after his meeting with Mr Shamir.

Attorney al-Turayfi returned to Ramallah yesterday after visiting Jordan and Egypt on what he claims was family and not political business.
IDF Operates Five Medical Clinics on Lebanese Border

TA1608174589 Jerusalem Domestic Service
in English 1700 GMT 16 Aug 89

[Excerpts] IDF [Israel Defense Forces] Surgeon General, Brigadier General Yehuda Danon, says the IDF is operating five medical clinics on Israel's border with Lebanon. This is only a part of the medical aid Israel is extending to the population of south Lebanon. Le'a Zinder reports:

Tens of thousands of refugees are fleeing war-battered Beirut every day and streaming into southern Lebanon, swelling its population threefold in the past 4 months. Many of the refugees are sick or wounded. These people are being treated at two hospitals: at Marj 'Uyun and Bint Jubayl.

At the Marj 'Uyun hospital, the IDF some years ago rebuilt the facility, added a new pavilion for obstetrics, gynecology, pediatrics, dentistry, and emergency care. The hospital now has 20 Lebanese doctors and 50 nurses.

In the past 3 years, the IDF has also rebuilt, reactivated, and equipped the hospital at Bint Jubayl. And, says the surgeon general of the IDF, Brig Gen Yehuda Danon, Israeli involvement continues. [passage omitted]

The IDF now operates five medical clinics on Israel's border with Lebanon, from Rosh Haniqra up to Metulla. Brig Gen Danon says Israel's medical aid is limited to south Lebanon by government policy, but is bringing enormous humanitarian relief to the Lebanese people.

Favorable Trade Balance With Romania Reported

TA1608090089 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Aug 89 p 4

[Report by the economic affairs correspondent]

[Excerpt] For the first time in 5 years the Israel-Romania balance of trade has tipped in Israel's favor. In the first 7 months of the year exports to Romania totalled $14.5 million, while imports stood at $12.5 million.

The change in the trend of the two countries' trade was caused by Romania's increased purchases of phosphates for their chemical industry. This year Romania placed orders for 150,000 tons of phosphates worth $9 million—a 50-percent increase compared to last year. According to phosphates industry sources, that quantity is still not final and may still increase. Romania also purchased 2,500 tons of cotton this year at a cost of $3.5 million.

Exports to Romania this year also included, in addition to the above-mentioned items, orange concentrates and other goods. Imports from Romania include cars (the import of the Romanian-made Delta will be renewed this year, after a break of 1 year), tractors, metal and wooden trimmings, furniture, chemical goods, and bathroom appliances. [passage omitted]

Soviet Jewish Exit Requests Rise 'More Than Sixfold' in 1989

TA2308183289 Jerusalem Domestic Service
in English 1700 GMT 23 Aug 89

[Text] The number of exit requests reaching Israel from Soviet Jewish families has risen more than sixfold in the first 8 months of the year, compared to the same period last year. Throughout 1988 requests were received from some 7,500 families. So far this year applications have been made by more than 55,000 families representing some 200,000 people.

KUWAIT

Figures Indicate Improvement in Economy

44040535 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT
in Arabic 9 Aug 89 p 8

[Dispatch from Kuwait by 'Abd-al-Karim Kazim: "Kuwaiti Economic Indicators Show Growth at Between 6 and 28 Percent"]

[Text] Kuwaiti economic indicators during the past couple of years show improved performance with rates of growth that vary from one sector to another. In the sector of bank financing of Kuwaiti exports, Kuwaiti banks had growth of 14.3 percent in 1988. In the construction sector, the number of issued licenses rose by 28 percent. Commercial bank credit facilities for the construction and real estate sectors grew at the rate of 6.3 percent. Ministry of Commerce and Industry projections forecast continued positive influences on the country's economic conditions in the coming year now that the debt settlement program is almost completed and the Iraq-Iran war has come to a stop.

It is to be pointed out that the softening of world oil prices in 1988 has greatly delayed the fruits of improved general economic performance in Kuwait, according to a report by the Kuwaiti ministry of commerce and industry which was made available to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT.

The report reviewed major domestic and international economic developments and indicated that the volume of Kuwaiti bank financing of Kuwaiti imports rose by 14.3 percent in 1988 compared with only 2.3 percent in 1987.

In the building and construction sector, 8,469 licenses were issued in the first 10 months of 1988 compared with 6,617 licenses in the first ten months of 1987, or an increase of 28 percent. Domestic commercial bank credit facilities to the construction and real estate sectors rose by 6.3 percent from 1,623.2 million dinars in 1987 to 1,726.1 dinars in 1988.
The ministry reviewed state budget estimates of general revenues and expenditures as follows:

GENERAL REVENUES: The 1988/89 budget forecast general revenues at 2,054 million dinars for an increase of 3.8 percent from 1987/88 budget estimates and a decrease of about 8.8 percent from actual revenues for the year. Oil revenues for 1988/89 were estimated at about 1,788.5 million dinars. This is an increase of about 3.9 percent from 1987/88 budget estimates and a decrease of 10.2 percent from final figures for 1987/88.

Non-oil income was estimated at 265.5 million dinars or an increase of 4.8 from the 1987/88 budget.

GENERAL EXPENDITURES: aggregate general expenditures were estimated in the 1988/89 budget at about 3,194.8 million dinars compared with 3,158.0 million dinars in the 1987/88 budget. Two main factors account for the relatively steady path of general expenditure estimates in recent years—the policy of rationalizing general expenditures and reduced general revenues as a result of unfavorable oil market conditions. Estimates of aggregate general expenditures rose by only 1.2 percent in 1988/89. The path of general expenditures reflects two fundamental issues—increased salary allotments to cover mandatory raises as well as the costs of hiring new graduates, and containment of unnecessary spending.

The Deficit

The 1988/89 budget deficit is estimated at around 1,346.2 million dinars. The Kuwaiti state budget first showed a deficit early in the current decade because of lower general revenues without corresponding cuts in spending.

The growth of the gross domestic product, according to generated activity, reflects the performance of the various sectors of the national economy. The latest figures released by the ministry of planning show that the domestic product grew in 1987 by 13 percent from 1986 compared to a negative rate of growth of about 17.4 percent in 1985. This is attributed to improvement in both oil sector segments—crude production and refining. The former increased by about 12.2 percent over 1986 and the latter increased by more than 69 percent.

Monetary and Credit Developments

The volume of credit facilities increased in 1988 to 4,697 million dinars from 4,626 million dinars a year earlier. Credit grew for real estate, personal loans, farm loans, and construction but decreased for financial services and for industry. The commercial sector maintained almost the same level of credit. The exchange value of the dinar was relatively stable last year at about 278.94 fils to the U.S. dollar. On the exchanges, the volume of securities in circulation and the number of transactions retreated along with monetary value. Stock prices advanced for 19 companies and retreated for 38 others.

Cost of Living and Price Trends

The Kuwaiti cost of living index in 1988 was 1.5 percent higher than a year earlier, reflecting a steadiness that characterized general price trends in domestic markets in recent years.

Foreign trade and Economic Relations

The most recent figures released by the Central Bank of Kuwait put the value of exports in 1987 at 2,330 million dinars, compared with 2,104.3 million dinars in 1986. This increase of 19.7 percent is attributed to an increase in the value of oil exports from one year to the next. Aggregate imports declined in value from 1,673.3 million dinars in 1986 to 1,476 million dinars in 1987. This decline of 11.8 percent is attributed to the relative economic recession that has persisted since late in 1982.

Trade With Gulf Cooperation Council States

Kuwaiti trade with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] has developed from 1987 to 1988. [as published] Trade figures reveal that Kuwaiti exports and re-exports to GCC states declined by about 0.3 percent from 73.1 million dinars in 1987 to 69.2 million dinars in 1988, maintaining their same trend since 1983.

On the other hand, Kuwaiti imports from the GCC states rose by 0.5 percent from 122 million dinars in 1987 to 189.1 million dinars in 1988, further widening the trade deficit with the GCC. Saudi Arabia was Kuwait's largest GCC trading partner in both imports and exports, followed by the Emirates which accounted for about 86 percent of Kuwaiti exports to and for more than 82 percent of Kuwaiti imports from the GCC in 1988. Noteworthy is that Kuwaiti imports from the GCC have increased. Increased exports and imports among GCC states are attributed to steps taken by some of those states to construct and expand commercial ports equipped with advanced facilities for shipping and unloading. They are also attributed to the growth of several industries in some of the GCC states.

According to certificates of origin, the value of exported Kuwaiti products increased by 16.6 percent from 40.9 million dinars in 1987 to about 47.7 million dinars in 1988. Of that amount, exports to GCC states accounted for 39.9 million dinars compared with 38.2 million dinars in 1987, or an increase of 4.4 percent. Major Kuwaiti exports included automobile chassis, mineral pipes, and dyes.
LEBANON

Shams-al-Din Answers Questions About Tripartite Report
44040533 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 21 Jul 89 p 17

[Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, deputy chairman of Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council in Lebanon, by 'Ala' al-Da'iq: "No Quick Solution to Crisis, 'Troika' To Produce a Way Out Within 6 Months"; date and place not given]

[Text] The deputy chairman of the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council in Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, thinks that the Arab tripartite committee charged with solving the Lebanese crisis will not achieve a quick solution to the crisis, as some believe, but will produce a way out of the crisis in the 6-month period it has set for itself. This is because the crisis has increased in complexity and severity after the entry of new factors and elements, rendering its treatment more difficult and complicated.

In an interview with AL-WATAN, Shaykh Shams-al-Din expressed his belief that the decisions of the summit will find their way to implementation in the form in which they were issued, despite the obstacles that stand in the way of implementation. These obstacles were anticipated. In the end, they will not influence the process of finding the way out, and the committee will succeed in its task.

Shaykh Shams-al-Din pointed to the existence of people who will be harmed by a solution to the crisis and who will make every effort to obstruct the summit resolution and make the high-level committee fail. But whatever they try to do, the difficulties they make will not be able to withstand the real popular will of the Lebanese to emerge from the crisis. Nor will they be able to withstand the unified Arab resolve and the international attitude.

The text of the interview follows.

[AL-WATAN] Do you have hope that the decisions of the Casablanca summit will find their way to implementation, given existing realities on the Lebanese scene and the conflicting positions of affected parties?

[Shams-al-Din] We are confident that the decisions of the Casablanca summit will find their way to implementation in one form or another. We think it likely that they will find their way to implementation in the form in which they were issued. Naturally, we are talking about the decisions related to the Lebanese issue, not about the other decisions. As for the obstacles that have confronted the efforts begun by the summit committee, they are obstacles that were expected. They were not a surprise. Yes, people's impatience leads them to believe that this committee will bring about a quick and complete solution. The committee will not bring about a quick solution; it will produce a way out of the crisis in the 6-month period it has set for itself. Setting this time period is not futile. Between 23 September and 14 March, new elements and factors entered the Lebanese problem, rendering it more complex and severe. Treating it has become more difficult and complicated. Naturally, this requires a longer time.

Similarity

[AL-WATAN] Some people point out that actions are now taking place that resemble what happened during the period of presidential elections last September. For example, parliamentary deputies are being prevented from crossing between the two districts [of Beirut]. Will these actions have an influence on implementation of the summit decisions?

[Shams-al-Din] These are the difficulties that we said were anticipated. Certainly, there are people who are harmed by the finding of a way out of the crisis and by its being set on the path to solution. These anticipated difficulties will not prevent the committee from finding a way out. The committee will succeed in its task.

[AL-WATAN] On what do you base your optimism about the committee's succeeding in its task?

[Shams-al-Din] I am not being optimistic. We read the reality. The objective reality regionally and internationally leads to this belief. As I said and repeat, there is a way out—not a solution—a way out that comes at a later time, not with the speed that public opinion anticipates or hopes for.

[AL-WATAN] How does the American position influence implementation of the summit decisions on Lebanon, especially since this position seems to be wavering and unstable?

[Shams-al-Din] We do not believe there has been any change in positions on the international level. As for some statements made on certain occasions, we do not believe that they represent the basic position of the American administration.

[AL-WATAN] Some parties that hold security cards in their hands are trying to play these cards to exert pressure for their own benefit. Will they be able to continue playing these cards to block implementation of the summit decisions?

Attempt at Obstruction

[Shams-al-Din] As I said, there are people who will be hurt. They will make every effort to obstruct the summit resolution and make the high-level committee fail. Or else they dream of altering the resolution. The most recent unfortunate expression of this attitude was represented by what happened to some members of parliament. This difficulty serves an Israeli attitude and a regional attitude that has emerged in the Lebanese crisis—the use of a certain Arab-Arab conflict in the Lebanese crisis itself. It serves certain chauvinist or personal attitudes on the part of certain Christian leaders. I do not say on the part of Christians or on the
part of Maronites, but certain leaders who have chauvinistic ideas or personal ambitions.

These difficulties will not be able to withstand a real popular will among the Lebanese to emerge from the crisis. Nor will they be able to withstand the Arab resolution embodied in the summit, the high-level committee that has been formed, and the international attitude.

Minimum

[AL-WATAN] Is the minimal Arab solidarity that has been achieved around the summit resolutions on Lebanon enough to implement the resolutions?

[Shams-al-Din] Perhaps it is not as much as was sought, but it is definitely a positive turning point in the general Arab position in the interest of Lebanon.

[AL-WATAN] How have the meetings held by Prime Minister Husayn al-Husayni and Patriarch Nasrallah Sufayr influenced the process of implementing the resolutions of the Arab summit?

[Shams-al-Din] We know that Prime Minister al-Husayni is one of those most affected by the crisis in Lebanon and by efforts being made to resolve it and that Patriarch Sufayr is spiritual leader of the Maronite community.

We attach importance to these discussions between Patriarch Sufayr and the Vatican. As we have often repeated, we hope that things will be seen realistically and in depth. We hope that no one misjudges the real situation. We are waiting for the results.

[AL-WATAN] What is your opinion about the opposition that some people express to the summit resolutions on settling the question of [presidential] powers before presidential elections?

[Shams-al-Din] The Arab summit and the international community realized that the practical and correct way to emerge from the Lebanese crisis is to establish the principle of reform. Unless this principle is established, there will never be a way out of the crisis. The summit resolution translated this Arab and international conviction.

The opposition that some people express to beginning with the subject of reform is an attempt to jump over this resolution and to portray the problem as if it were a limited security problem—that is, if we were to close our eyes to the attempt to falsify the nature of the problem and make it appear to be a Lebanese-Syrian problem. This is what we have called falsification of the nature of the problem. I believe that the international community and the Arab summit clearly and correctly perceived the essence of the problem and thus began with the question of reform. That is the way things will take place.

[AL-WATAN] Will Israel's intervention through intensified attacks against Lebanon during initial attempts to implement the summit resolutions influence the course of the Arab committee's action?

[Shams-al-Din] The methods Israel has been using recently—we see that it has been strongly intensifying its attacks in the last 2 weeks—are quite understandable. They are to block the path of the committee's efforts and make it seem that Israel is suffering from a security problem. Israel wants to achieve two goals: diverting attention from the intifadah in Palestine, and creating confusion on the Lebanese scene by repeated attacks. We cannot judge the extent to which these attacks have influenced ongoing Arab and international efforts. We guess that they will have no real influence on these efforts.

[AL-WATAN] Is there a united position in the Islamic and nationalist field on the subject of implementing the summit resolutions. Is the point of view the same?

[Shams-al-Din] As far as I know, the position that was formulated at the end of last year and the beginning of this year and that was transmitted to the six-member committee is the position that still exists from the Islamic and nationalist point of view. There has been no change in it.

[AL-WATAN] Can we reassure everyone that the military events of the last 3 months will not recur?

[Shams-al-Din] Until the tripartite committee completes its work, I cannot reassure anyone. An element of caution must remain. This will not mean that the committee will not succeed; however, until it completes its work, some incidents may occur.

MOROCCO

Government Permits More Political Openness

45040439 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
17 Jul 89 p 12

[Article by Abu-Bakr al-Sharif: “Tolerance Started with Religion, Extended to Politics, Economics; Moroccan ‘Perestroika’ To Deal with Concord”]

[Text] The most important political parties on the political scene in Morocco, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces Party, the Istiqlal Party, the Constitutional Party, and the National Rally of Independents, have determined their positions on the substance of the outcome of a series of democratic practices. These positions were determined by the time the first three political parties had held and completed their national conferences and by the time the latter party had completed the basic steps for convening its conference. The National Rally of Independents thus provided indicators about its general strategy. The most important political parties on the political scene in Morocco outlined their views on the general shape of future trends.
While it may be true that 14 political parties are involved in Morocco’s political scene and that most of these parties have found their way to parliament, the importance of the aforementioned most important parties in no way overshadows the other parties. The importance of these parties rather relies on the Istiqlal Party’s unique position as the founder of the partisan movement in Morocco. The Istiqlal Party, which was founded by Allal el-Fasi, remains one of the country’s most important parties. Its prominence is not significantly limited by whether the party is the ruling party or the opposition party.

By the same token, the Socialist Union Party, which split from the Istiqlal Party a long time ago under the leadership of Mehdi Ben Barka, continues to maintain its influence on political decisions made in Morocco on all levels and at all times.

Quasi-Governmental Classification

The National Rally of Independents is led by Mr Ahmed Osman, the current speaker of parliament. Mr Osman is related by marriage to the Moroccan monarch. The Constitutional party, which presently has the majority in parliament, is led by Mr Maati Bouaibid, former prime minister. The two parties can be classified as quasi-governmental, whether both are in government, as is the case now, or whether one of them serves in the cabinet while the other remains in the ranks of the opposition. This situation is one which is required by the game of democracy as it is played in Morocco. It is a situation which actually happened to the National Rally of Independents in the early eighties. That situation resulted in the creation of the Constitutional Party which then became the majority party.

Going back to the aforementioned conferences, it may be said that these conferences provided a moment for reflection and for thinking out loud. Furthermore, they revealed details about the aforementioned parties’ programs and the extent to which these programs reflect and correspond with the objective facts and the strategic choices of those in decision making positions.

A “Pregnant” Period

Moreover, talking about what transpired at these conferences is part and parcel of the political circumstances which Morocco is currently experiencing. More than one observer considered these circumstances to be the progenitors of a plan that would bring about a change which can create what may be considered reorganization. The significance of the effects of this reorganization will be no less than that of the effects of perestroika, which is breaking up ideological rigidity, making it possible for those in power to deal with the objective facts, or “affecting” the detente between the superpowers and making its geographical scope equal to its moral scope.

That is why the aforementioned conferences were preceded by predictions and ideas, all of which foresaw the likelihood of a storm of radical change. Radical change is being predicted because, on the one hand, these conferences coincided with the approach of the end of the eighties and the impending birth of a decisive decade which will take us into the year 2000, an era about which there are many hopes and fears. On the other hand, these conferences coincided with the twilight of the current stage for the legislative institution in Morocco.

Strategically, the Moroccan monarch sounded the wake-up alarm in the face of what has been called “the world peace offensive.” It is not that the king wants to oppose that offensive, but that he wants to lay the groundwork for dealing with it. The king sounding the alarm when he addressed the “France and Africa” conference which was held several months ago in Casablanca. He also sounded the alarm in his opening speech at the emergency Arab Summit Conference which was held in Casablanca last May. His tone then echoed the highlights of that speech as he appealed to friends and fellow Arabs to think about how energies and resources can be mobilized and utilized to support the countries which are seeking growth. Providing such support would mean that these energies and resources would not become “false witnesses against the nineties decade.” This is especially important as we approach the year 2000. Keeping in mind the mobilization of those energies and resources, this means that world balance is essential. This statement may be construed as one that talks about one thing while referring to something else.

Political Tolerance

In tactical matters the Moroccan government, whose cabinet is chaired by the Moroccan monarch, offered much to relieve political parties of the traditional consequences of competing and vying with each other to offer ordinary service programs for citizens and to take credit for such programs. Political tolerance became the new term in the political jargon of the democracy game in Morocco. It is now being practiced in Morocco along with religious tolerance, which is deep seated in Moroccan practice. Accordingly, prison doors were opened in 1987, 1988, and 1989, and large numbers of political fighters from many political parties were pardoned.

In his first exclusive interview with the French magazine, VOGUE, Mr Driss Basri, Morocco’s minister of the interior and information, said that Morocco’s celebration of the Moroccan monarch’s birthday on 11 July 1989 was a Moroccan occasion to celebrate tolerance in every sense of the word: tolerance in domestic policy, in the kingdom’s relations of solidarity with the outside world, and tolerance inside the country. Tolerance inside the country was practiced by giving people freedom of speech and the freedom to travel and to assemble.

Mr Basri added, “This tolerance also manifests itself in the economy, which will continue to rely on having
confidence and hope in the private sector. This economic liberalization will make possible the adoption of a strategy that is open to national as well as foreign private parties."

A Change in Practices

The link between instructions from the Moroccan monarch and the statements made by the minister of the interior and information, neither of whom makes capricious statements, made all observers and political analysts predict what has already been referred to as a change in the practices of the conferences of national political parties. This means the political parties will plan for the future by taking these directions and statements and turning them into a point of departure.

The discussions which took place within these parties were actually a typical indicator of the change that was taking place in political life. One of the most important manifestations of this change may have been represented in the scrupulous monitoring of economic and social developments. Another may be the emergence of a generation of young people who expressed their ambitions and their aspirations to assume leadership positions. And yet, none of the aforementioned endeavors was realized at the level which observers and monitors had expected. Young leaders remained in their place in the second tier [of leadership].

The Wish and the Means

These young leaders added, "The will to change requires a balance between the wish to change and the means for affecting such a change. Both must be compatible with the facts of the age. Because the latter remains the more powerful factor, the will to change deliberately steals away from the traditional seats of power in search of a platform [from which it can be heard]. Those who are making a case for change do not need to brag and boast about a bygone past, but they rather need to demonstrate an ability to lead the present and confront the future which is extremely complicated and involved."

Whatever the case, this summer, which is a hot summer, is one with which the political scene has responded to a large extent. It remains likely that numerous ideological formulas will be fused together this summer and that 11 parties will be created. All of these parties have planned to hold their conferences this year. If, as a number of observers and political analysts think, what the important political parties have to offer will prove to be unfavorable to the others, the phenomenon of a majority party in parliament is likely to emerge, but it will emerge outside the traditional framework for such a game. And here it is worth referring to the cultural societies in the various regional capitals which are led by dynamic individuals who appear to be intent on comprehending the general strategy as well as the characteristics of that strategy. They are looking forward to pitching in and taking part in formulating that strategy in the real world.

Planning Minister Discusses Trade Balance

45040438 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 17 Jul 89 pp 31-32

[Article by Abu-Bakr al-Sadiq al-Sharif: "Morocco's Minister of Planning: 'Economic Discipline Achieves Its Goals; Tourism Reduces Deficit in Balance of Trade'"

[Text] Economic policies in Morocco have been subjected to a strict economic plan which has been called here "a plan of action." Its aim is to deliver the country gradually from the economic austerity policy which the country has been following since 1983 to counter the effects of the drought and desertification disasters which have been plaguing the Moroccan economy for years, not to mention the cracks in Morocco's economic ceiling which were created by these disasters. In addition, Europe imposed protective pressures against Moroccan products before and after the Iberian Peninsula was admitted into the European Common Market.

Rachidi Ghazouani, deputy prime minister, and minister charged with the task of economic planning, presented to Morocco's parliament recently a checklist of what 1 year of the government's commitment to the aforementioned plan of action has accomplished. He affirmed at the outset that the development of Morocco's production during the past year provided cause for much optimism. In fixed prices production rose at an average of 10 percent. The fact that the drought is receding helped the country increase production and gave it a good agricultural season. This was virtually assured by the fact that the cultivated terrain was expanded and performance was improved. All that had a positive effect on the level of productivity.

Rate of Inflation Slows Down

The minister mentioned that prices had been relatively stable. In 1988 the average increase in the cost of living index was no more than 2.3 percent. This stability has been attributed to an ample supply of produce, to the controlled growth of the money supply, and to a decline in the prices of imported goods. As a result of the development of production, on the one hand, and such a decline in the inflation rate, on the other, the rate of change in family consumption was satisfactory. Consumption of families rose by over five percent.

With regard to fiscal budgets, Ghazouani made it clear that signs that the tight economy was beginning to ease culminated the efforts that were being made to correct imbalances. The foreign balance improved significantly, and that improvement was accomplished with the help of a good agricultural season and the easing of a few basic hindrances such as the exchange rate for the dollar, the interest rate, and oil prices. In addition, demand for phosphates grew, and, thanks to the measures which were taken to allow Morocco to benefit from competition, nationally manufactured products were able to compete.
Deficit in Trade Balance Declines

"In this climate," adds the minister, "and for the third time since 1976, the deficit in the trade balance fell more than 20 percent. Thus, the cost of more imports was being covered by export revenues, and that ratio changed from 66.3 percent in 1987 to 76 percent in 1988."

Mr Ghaouani said that as an extension of this development, the budget's performance improved each year. The balance for ongoing operations showed a surplus of 110 million dirhams compared to a deficit in 1987, and that does not take into consideration scheduling the interest payments on the foreign debts. Revenues from tourism, which rose by 11.5 percent, contributed to this improvement. At the same time and in contrast with previous years, remittances from Moroccan workers working abroad declined by 18 percent.

Reserves Are Strengthened

Ghaouani made it clear that despite the difficulties which accompanied balancing the capital budget, due to the importance of meeting our foreign debt obligations, rescheduling part of this debt enabled us to strengthen our hard currency national reserves by about 1.655 billion dirhams. This amount equals what is spent on imports in 3 months.

With regard to the general budget, the minister indicated that revenues rose at a high rate. Despite this increase, ordinary revenues represented no more than 22.6 percent of the total GNP [gross national product]. Ordinary expenses also rose, even though at a lower rate. As a result of an increase in operating costs, ordinary expenses rose by 17.1 percent.

The minister indicated that as a result of the discrepancy in the change occurring in revenues and expenditures, treasury operations showed a positive balance of approximately 3.8 million dirhams, compared to 778 million dirhams in 1987 [as published] before the payments were rescheduled.

It is worth noting that the improvement which is taking place with regard to balancing the budget did not occur at the expense of investment spending, which rose from 9.665 billion dirhams in 1987 to 11.682 billion dirhams in 1988.

Balancing Volume and Value

Ghaouani made it clear that the other sectors of production underwent significant growth. In the fishing sector, a sector which plays a significant role in helping the country become self-sufficient in food, investments rose by 75 percent. The fishing sector also helps improve the performance of the budget, and it provides employment opportunities. The fishing fleet grew by 152 vessels, and while the volume of production rose by 12 percent, the value of production rose by 27 percent, compared to 1987. The value of fish exports also rose by 15 percent.

The Tourism Sector

With regard to tourism, the minister mentioned that 1,978,420 tourists visited Morocco last year: a 26.3 percent increase. During that year an additional 5,189 beds were added to house tourists, and that made it possible to provide 2,306 new employment opportunities directly. Hard currency revenues from tourism rose by 11.5 percent.

Developing Manual Industries

Minister Ghaouani mentioned there was a seven percent increase in exports of products from Morocco's traditional industries.

Ghaouani noted that in the education and vocational training sectors there were 2,102,600 students in elementary education and 1,279,500 students in secondary education in the 1987-1988 academic year. The number of university students rose by 10 percent, and 1,420 additional classrooms were built. The capacity for vocational training rose by 4.7 percent, and the number of students in that sector amounted to 74,200 students. That is a six percent increase.

The Postal Services Sector

The minister explained that completed investments in the postal services sector in 1988 amounted to 945 million dirhams: an 80 percent increase. These investments made it possible to meet the increase in the number of applications for telephone service: 29,989 applications, compared with 22,681 applications in 1987. This is a 32 percent increase. The number of subscribers rose from 266,187 to 286,493 subscribers.

The Potable Water Sector

With regard to the basic equipment for that sector, the minister affirmed that a policy of building dams was being pursued in keeping with the guidelines of the plan of action. In addition to continuing construction on the Ait Ayub Dam and diverting the waters of the Mitmitah Dam, work is underway to build the Aoulouz Dam in Taroudant and the seven dams that will be built after it. By the time these dams are completed, their total water storage capacity will be approximately 10 billion cubic meters. Costs incurred by the Water Engineering Department for the equipment to complete its program for 1977 amounted to approximately 524 million dirhams.

The Transportation Sector

Rachidi Ghaouani affirmed that numerous projects were completed in the roads and railroads sectors. Last year the National Bureau for Railroads invested 350.5 million dirhams to put in a second line between Rabat and Kenitra, to start implementing a project to tie Muhammad the Fifth Airport to the national system, and to acquire 13 passenger cars and 312 box cars manufactured in Morocco. The office was able to transport 11.5 million passengers and 33.1 million tons of phosphates.
The minister said, "Shipping activities carried out by the National Transportation Office improved by 6.36 percent. In 1988 the office transported 14.7 million tons of goods, compared to 13.8 million tons in 1987."

Ghazouani made it clear that as far as port facilities were concerned, the previous year was one during which the oil terminal at Mohammedia Port was expanded; a new port was built in Agadir; and equipment was provided for Tan-Tan Port. A total of approximately 36.6 million tons of goods passed through Morocco's seaports.

The Irrigation and Electricity Sector

The minister indicated that as far as looking and exploring for water was concerned, 580 wells have been completed. He said the total depths of these wells, which have been drilled in various parts of the kingdom, amounted to 70,000 meters. He also said that work was to begin on drilling 600 new wells whose depths will amount to 76,000 meters.

With regard to rural electrification, Ghazouani indicated that the first part of the national rural electrification program, involving 286 villages in 21 provinces, was completed. Afterwards, studies pertaining to the second part of the program were completed last year. The second part of the program involves 600 rural centers and the electrification of 9 villages in 6 provinces. This year expenditures amounted to 19.6 million dirhams.

The Agriculture and Forests Sector

The minister mentioned that projects in the agricultural sector emphasized plant and animal production as well as forestry. Projects which were introduced into El Hajez and Tissa Village are about to be completed, and 7,500 hectares have been distributed to 618 beneficiaries. Several forestation projects have been completed, and one of the most important of these projects was that of planting trees in approximately 30,000 hectares. This was part of the national tree planting program. Other projects are those which were introduced into Kus and Mamoura. With regard to the work that was done on major water equipment for agriculture, this included the annexation of 14,000 hectares and the completion of an irrigation and drainage system for 18,000 hectares.

The Anti-Pollution Sector

Ghazouani called to mind the government's policy on protecting the environment when he talked about the efforts that were being made in that regard. The government's policy may be summarized by saying that it is a rational and a balanced use of natural resources. The government is fighting all forms of pollution which could destroy the natural environment and affect the population's health. The government is trying to improve living conditions for citizens living in human, urban, and rural settlements by preserving the ancient fabric of these communities and preserving their architectural and cultural heritage. It is also trying to pump new life into recreational areas and parks.

Ghazouani said that Morocco and West Germany were working together to set up a national laboratory where pollution will be monitored and studied.

The minister concluded his statement by saying that positive results were realized in the first year of the economic and social development plan. He said that the average growth rate in Morocco was considered one of the highest in the world. It was the highest average growth rate for Morocco on record for over 20 years.

The minister also said that 1989, the second year of the plan, will become an extremely important year because it will enhance efforts which continue to be made to decentralize [the economy] and to reform the country's economic institutions.

Local Councils Experiment With Democracy

45040420 London AL-HAWADITH
in Arabic 14 Jul 89 pp 32-33

(Article by Tewfik Joselette: "Elected Councils Evolve Into Local Governments")

[Text] The democratic experience, horizons for its development and enrichment, is the topic of the hour in Morocco. There is much talk about this subject now that the term of the elected town and provincial councils have come to an end and the Moroccan political parties are holding their conferences to examine their political, economic and social programs in preparation for the next stage of the democratic process and for the decentralization experiment Morocco has been experiencing ever since the 1977 town, provincial and legislative council elections.

Amid these climates which were laden with anticipation and optimism, the 4th Local Communities Symposium, held in Casablanca from 27 to 29 June under the motto "Trust", came to an end. It was attended by 1,600 participants, including 200 foreign delegates. The participants represented elected bodies, Moroccan political parties and labor unions. This was in addition to eminent intellectuals, politicians, university professors, Arab and foreign delegations and journalists from all over the world.

The symposium's opening session, chaired by Mohamed Jalal Es-Said, first vice-president of Parliament, was marked by a speech delivered by interior minister Driss Basri who stressed that the 4th symposium, which coincided with the end of the local councils' mandate, was aimed at assessing work accomplished through teamwork and at charting the course of the future. He pointed out that preparation and organization were, for the first time, marked by the actual and direct participation of elected representatives. He also talked about the advantages of the teamwork system, emphasizing that the decentralization policy will not be complete unless accompanied by an effective decentralization movement.
able to attain a measure of independence for the communities and to help firm up their qualitative and quantitative development through steady growth.

The Moroccan minister's speech was followed by speeches by Arab and foreign delegates and political and partisan bodies. The Independence Party speech was delivered by Executive Committee member Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Awad who focused on highlighting ways to deepen the democratic process, emphasizing the need to engage in sound political practice; to broaden political participation; to reexamine the concept of trusteeship; to implement decentralization and broaden the local communities' powers; to provide the necessary human and material resources; and to allow elected local bodies to play a prudent role in safeguarding and fostering religious and moral values. The Independence Party representative looked at the 4th symposium as a momentous opportunity for his party to express its opinion on topics brought up for discussion and to engage in a constructive dialogue about the results of the democratic process and the steps that must be taken to deepen it and lend it the necessary credibility. He urged that the broad masses be given the chance to engage in democratic activities and to lower the voting age to 18 years.

As for the Moroccan Communist party—the party of progress and socialism—its secretary general Mr 'Ali Ba'thah, delivered a speech in which he reminded the audience that the Moroccan experience in democracy is young and capable of evolution and needs to benefit from the experiences of other nations, those that have a centuries-long tradition practice in particular, such as Switzerland, France and Great Britain. He added that the elected bodies can only be viewed from the wide and true angle of democracy, namely guaranteeing the economic, political and social rights of the people. He thought the word "trust", picked as the symposium's motto, was a perfect reflection of the reforms the Moroccan people are after and need for the sound management of local communities. Trust, in its sense of responsibility and duties entrusted to the elected representatives, ought to be embodied in the election statutes, in the guarantees for impartial and honest elections and in the prerequisites for their political independence.

After listening to guests' speeches, the first international local communities exposition, highlighting the endeavors these communities have made in the various development sectors, was inaugurated, after which conference listened to speeches by the chairmen of the preparatory committees who have presented an overview of the work of the 13 committees commissioned to study and prepare working papers on the following subjects: the establishments, organization and management of local councils, development of collective jurisdictions, local finances, public services, local public utilities, construction and model experience of the city of Casablanca, revival of the local economy, special development of provincial communities, national revival, the civil state and information and communications.

The second day was marked by a meeting of the specialized committees that came out with draft proposals which were examined by the plenary session prior to ratification. On the third and last day, the conference moved to the presidential palace in Casablanca where the Moroccan monarch chaired the final session and made a speech that revolved around the "trust" motto which he gave to the 4th Local Communities Symposium, saying: "I tried to find in foreign dictionaries a word that can convey the meaning of trust and can capture its philosophy, spirit, aims and objectives, but I could not find one that gives the word trust its three imports: trust, in our Arab language, means responsibility, as God said in His Holy Book: "We did indeed offer the Trust to the Heavens and the Earth and the Mountains but they refused to undertake it" [Koran: 33/72]. The second import is commitment: "God doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due" [Koran: 4/58]. The third meaning is conduct and morality, as stated in the Prophetic Tradition: "If trust is lifted, expect the Hour of Judgment."

The Moroccan monarch's speech was analytical and instructive to the elected bodies, for he urged them to proceed on the path of responsibility which is fraught with danger and to adhere to democracy, expressing his deep faith in it. He viewed democracy as entrusting local communities with managing their own affairs and securing their future. At the conclusion of the Moroccan monarch's speech, the curtain came down on this symposium which was marked by the active participation of Moroccan political parties, out of their desire to strengthen the structures of the democratic process, and contributions by Arab delegations from Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

On the sidelines of the symposium, the secretary general of the Popular Movement Party, Mahmoud Ershan, told AL-HAWADITH: "The political parties participated in the symposium via their elected representatives and the symposium's credibility manifested itself in the preparations these representatives themselves made. The symposium had a high level of dialogue and debate and, with regard to content, we believe that the recommendations it put forth are ideal and original and will advance democracy and decentralization in Morocco. As for the symposium's slogan chosen by King Hassan II, it has multi-faceted connotations: responsibility, trust, loyalty, faithfulness and sincerity.

The democratic experience in Morocco has derived from its participation and interest in running citizen affairs. Furthermore, decentralization is gradually filling an important position in the economic field. The 1976 charter vested local bodies with broad powers in construction, in cultural, economic and social activities and in taxation. And, in an effort to strengthen the council chief's role (be it town or provincial council), the bill granted the council chief broad jurisdictions qualifying him to be the number-one official vested with powers to implement resolutions made by the decision-making
body, to expend its money and to manage its affairs. It must be conceded that this process has not been completed yet because certain elected bodies have failed to exercise their full powers and to shoulder their responsibilities due to a dearth in human and material resources as well as conflicting relations among local powers. These cases, however, are but an exception to the general rule that has underscored the local councils' total awareness of the gravity of the powers vested in them and are making serious efforts to strengthen them and to provide the necessary means to exercise them in a better way.

Moreover, there is a serious tendency toward anchoring the local government structures. This kind of reform will help the elected local agencies to rid themselves of subjugation and to turn to the state's central interests, with all the pressures and harshness that this entails, with a view to establishing firmly local independence.

Great hopes are pinned on the local councils to evolve into local governments dealing with rural and urban problems, be it in basic reforms, including road construction; residential building construction; potable water, lighting and transportation; school construction; establishment of cultural centers; combatting vice, such as the spread of alcoholic beverages, drugs and prostitution; finding effective solutions to the unemployment phenomenon; and protecting cities against pollution.

Furthermore, eligible citizen participation in these councils via free and honest elections will certainly bolster the democratic process in Morocco and guarantee the elected bodies their legitimacy, enabling them to shoulder their responsibilities as democratic institutions whose job is to reform urban and rural areas, to contain their problems and to promote their political, economic, cultural, social and civilizational development. Therefore, the recommendations submitted by the special committees growing out of the symposium must be implemented forthwith. They include:

- Terrioral districting process, as dictated by demographic, economic and social changes in the country. Districting must be regulated by objective criteria based on fairness and justice.

Broadening political participation by giving young people a chance to participate in public life. Within this scope, the voting age must be lowered to 18 and the candidacy age to 21.

Implementation of the decentralization concept which is based on the distribution of some of the state's local administrative powers to the elected councils so that they may manage their constituents' affairs with initiative and efficiency. Hence, it is necessary to expand the councils' powers to keep up with development.

Provide necessary material and human resources. In other words, expand the elected councils' own resources, bolster central government support for them and finance economic and social community projects.

Transportation Sector Suffers From New Taxes

45040431a Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 18 Jul 89 p 3

[Text] Whenever there is a religious holiday when some people have to join their families in regions outside of Casablanca so as to celebrate the occasion with them, the pressure intensifies on the two road stations in Najdiyah and "Karaj 'Alal," which have become incapable of absorbing the increasing travel activity, especially on such occasions. That opens the door to some who would use the occasion to exploit the hardships and problems of the people. This issue has made it more imperative than ever before to create large, modern stations suitable to the volume of transportation activity experienced by the road network that links the economic capital to other regions of Morocco. Continuing to depend on the two road stations in Najdiyah and "Karaj 'Alal" means helping to deepen the existing crisis and multiplying the problems of travelers who might be forced to postpone their trips several times before being able to get a ticket.

Casablanca has seen increasing demographic development for years, and the responsible departments ought to have kept up with the needs of the population in the various areas of life, foremost of which is the transportation sector, which represents the hub of industrial, social, and economic activities. Without it, the dynamics of the city cannot be assured, nor its commercial and industrial flow, or the productivity expected of it as the economic capital of Morocco with a leading role in the field of development. What needs attention in this respect is work on the structure of laws enacted for the public transportation sector aimed at encouraging investment in it, and creating incentive exemptions. That in addition to reviewing the taxes that were legislated at the start of 1989, because these new taxes and fees, according to those concerned, have become an obstacle confronting those working in the sector, who have expressed their unhappiness on more than one occasion with the decree applying an axle tax to vehicles, and with subsequent taxes announced afterwards by local authorities in the city. We are afraid that this grievance will be reflected on the sector, and create new problems that will be difficult to solve at a time when the city needs to work on a solution to existing problems, and not on complicating them.

A position must be taken on the public transportation sector linking the city and the rest of the regions of Morocco that would review it, provide what is needed for its development, and improve travel conditions for travelers. This will not come about in any case unless a popular policy based on the public good is pursued in this vital sector, one whose basic aim is to improve the installations connected with the road stations, and reduce the gratuities involved in getting spare parts as well as the increase in prices. But for the state to try to add new taxes to an important sector tied to the lives of the rest of the citizens, means that it plans to deepen the existing gap and drive investors away from involvement in the sector. All indications confirm that the state cannot meet its needs with its present capabilities.
SUDAN

Omdurman Officials Prepare for Annual Flood
45040449 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 17 Jul 89 p 4

[Article: "Protective Embankment To Maintain Safety of Omdurman: a 25 Kilometer Embankment Made of 200,000 Tons of Dirt Stretches from Mt Turiyah South to Wadi Sayyidna North"]

[Text] We are now on the verge of the fall season whose earliest indicators tell us to expect heavy rains. The water level of the Nile is expected to rise significantly, and flooding and torrential rains may occur. The force and vigor of these floods and torrential rains and the damage they caused may not be less than the damage of last year's disaster. In anticipation of that, the commission for the national capital, working with its agencies and authorized councils, started implementing an urgent two-part plan to provide assistance throughout the capital. The first part of that plan had to do with opening drainage canals for rain water and strengthening embankments and bridges. The second had to do with the health of the environment.

Preparations are underway in the Sudanese city of Omdurman to secure the area against any anticipated dangers, especially since Omdurman was flooded last year when flood and rain waters that were 6,000 meters deep [as published] covered the entire city. Furthermore, approximately 40 schools and 8 mosques were destroyed. Besides, people lost their lives in that flood, and the losses we do not know about are greater.

Three and a half million people live in Omdurman. They are served by 15 urban and rural councils and a market. Of course, these figures do not include people who come to the city from everywhere.

By mid-month next July Omdurman will have been secured against disasters. A protective 25 kilometer embankment has been built to protect the area from Jabal Turiyah south to Wadi Sayyidna north. To protect the land from the fury of the water which is expected, 200,000 tons of dirt were used to build this embankment.

This optimistic piece of information became an introduction to an interview with Mr 'Ali Jarqandi, deputy administrative director for Omdurman and one of Sudan's most competent administrators. Mr Jarqandi, who graduated from Khartoum University in 1974 with a Master's degree in management, has been employed, since his graduation, as an administrative officer. He worked for various councils in the capital and in the provinces. During that time he gained a tremendous amount of experience, and that helped him acquire a unique art, which we will call, if we may, "the art of dealing with disasters."

Furthermore, he is one of the best intellectuals in Sudan. He is a discriminating reader and the author of research papers and studies on numerous Sudanese issues, particularly tribal disputes in the contact areas. Mr Jarqandi authored studies that have to do with tribal coexistence between Arabs and the Dinka in the area of Bahr al-'Arab. AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 17 Jul 89 p 4

met with Mr Jarqandi in his office at the Omdurman Council. The conversation touched upon the efforts that were being made by the area's councils to confront this year's fall season, and the health of the environment. The conversation also touched upon the authorities and powers of Khartoum's councils, civil service, bread, local government and other such subjects. Because the conversation flowed smoothly and coherently and because it was very informative, we did not feel that we had taken up more time than we should have with Mr Jarqandi, a man who starts his day at six o'clock in the morning and continues working until five o'clock in the evening on the embankment which, according to him, will protect Omdurman from dangers and from the disasters of rainfall and torrential rains.

Omdurman Is Secure

How has Omdurman been secured? Mr Jarqandi said that to date, 60 percent of the embankment which is protecting the city has been built. By the 15th of next July, work on that project will have been completed. This includes the main drainage canal which distributes the water to two secondary drainage canals.

The deputy administrative director says that the effort to confront the disasters and the rainfall which are expected started by dividing the work which had to be done and setting up committees. One committee was to oversee the level of the area; one committee was for the aforementioned protective embankment; one committee for the main and secondary drainage canals; one committee for elevating the wharf of the Nile; and, finally, a committee for bridges and secondary conduits (programs). Operations were started at all locations on 13 May, and special emphasis was placed on building the protective embankment.

Mr Jarqandi says, "The embankment is being built to hold and keep the water and then to let it drain in the area west of Omdurman, from Jabal Turiyah south to Wadi Sayyidna Valley in the north. This is a hilly area. Water flows directly from that area toward the Nile in New Omdurman and al-Thawrah.

"Another purpose behind building the embankment is that of letting the water drain again through two main drainage canals: Khawr Abu-'Anjah or Khawr Tunbak and Wadi Sayyidna. Approximately 12.5 million pounds were earmarked for building the protective embankment. But except for the costs of operating machinery, work on the embankment so far has been done through..."
local effort.” Mr Jarqandi expects that local effort to continue until the embankment is completed.

A committee chaired by Jarqandi himself is overseeing construction of the embankment. Members of that committee include engineers and technicians, and its secretary is an administrative officer from Libya. Three bulldozers are being used from 6 a.m. to 5 p.m. to elevate the embankment. These bulldozers were borrowed from the Department for Unplanned Housing. Drivers and workers receive incentives from the councils which assume responsibility for transporting them after work hours to the areas where they live.

Vandalism Is Prohibited

We are responsible for our own safety. It is not wise to curse the sky when a disaster occurs: a disaster which is, of course, of our own making.

It was the citizens themselves who started vandalizing this 25 kilometer protective embankment. They may have vandalized it without being aware of its importance in preserving their lives and their property. Mr Jarqandi warned against the consequences of vandalizing the embankment, particularly since some people started moving dirt from the embankment at night to build their unplanned houses which will inevitably be covered by the flood waters should the embankment collapse.

The solution lies in having a local order issued to deter such activities and to put those who vandalize the embankment on trial. It is the function of the media to make citizens understand the importance of the embankment and to make them aware of the consequences of vandalizing it.

The 25 kilometer protective embankment for Omdurman has to be traversed by concrete bridges for those traveling from and to north Sudan (Dunqulah) and west Sudan (al-Abyad).

According to Mr Jarqandi, “The fact that cement is scarce represents an obstacle to the construction of these bridges. Cement is not available, and one has to buy it from the black market. All the cement which was acquired by the agencies overseeing the embankment amounted to 30 tons, and that amount had been designated originally for internal bridges.

“The agencies overseeing construction of the embankment managed to overcome another problem somewhat. To put it briefly, the area of the embankment had been designated and divided for agricultural projects in which no investments had yet been made. An agreement was reached with the owners of that land to protect Omdurman.”

Omdurman in Danger

The conversation with Mr Jarqandi, deputy administrative director for Omdurman, continued. We talked about newcomers and about services.

The man sat up straight to explain the problem and said, “The main problem which is facing Omdurman at the present time and which started in 1983 has to do with newcomers to the city. Newcomers to the city are now twice as many as Omdurman’s original residents.

“While the city’s population doubled, services and service facilities remained the same. Newcomers to Omdurman shared with area residents the space that was originally designated for local citizens, and they also shared with them the few services that were available in those areas.

“Complicated security, health and social problems surfaced. People migrated to Omdurman in groups, each of which brought along its own customs, traditions, and practices, and these were definitely not compatible with the local residents’ beliefs and customs. As a result, there was daily friction, and conflicts and disputes could even develop from such friction. We ask God to protect everyone. But should we wait for a disaster to occur?”

Mr Jarqandi says otherwise. The man has suggestions which could help solve the crisis. The problem of unplanned housing must be dealt with by developing centralized construction policies that would be carried out by the Department for Unplanned Housing. In Jarqandi’s opinion the most important of these remedies may be summarized as follows:

• The capacity at the sites
• The establishment of new sections in a city
• Sending the newcomers to peace cities

These remedies will work for housing provided they are met by services that are compatible with the number of newcomers to the new cities.

The deputy administrative director of Omdurman says that the density of the newcomers is much greater than the volume of services which are available. “Therefore, the Construction Planning Department, in cooperation with local authorities, must build new city sections where these large, growing numbers of people can be housed.”

It is ironical that local authorities are surprised to see new city sections crop up, but these city sections have no services. How can newcomers be forced to live in new areas which receive no water, no electricity, and no medical services? This is a disaster, and something must be done to correct it before any step is taken to build on any new residential site.

Conflicting Specializations

The easy flowing conversation with Mr Jarqandi touched upon powers and spheres of authority. What did he say about that?

He said, “We in the councils work in accordance with specific spheres of authority which are regulated by law. These same spheres of authority can be found in the commission’s areas of jurisdiction. For example, area
councils have jurisdiction over supplies. At one time jurisdiction over supplies was taken away from the area councils and given to the national capital. That had a negative effect on citizens who experienced hardships to reach officials. Citizens had to double their efforts just to look for what they were entitled to every day. Any citizen, who, let’s assume, lived in Sururab or Abu Dulayq, had to go to the commission to get approval for a bag of sugar to deal with a death [in the family]. Now,” continued Mr Jarqandi, “the commissioner decided that supervision over supplies and bakeries was to be restored to the councils even though supply authorities in the national capital are still strongly resisting that.”

Mr Jarqandi thinks that supervision over supplies will not be rectified unless that supervision is restored to area councils. Then, supply authorities would have to provide the supplies and provide general supervision.

Local Government and the Missing Law

That is why it is necessary and essential that the local government law and the national capital law be implemented. Mr Jarqandi affirms that implementing this law is important for the councils because he thinks that popular involvement (in oversight and legislative activities) has been missing since the uprising. Thus, the burden was placed on the administrative officers, and the councils were being asked to deal with some aspects of the law.

Mr Jarqandi goes on to say, “We are a neutral, administrative organization. We have no relationship to any party. We are executive officers, and we go about doing our work purely on that basis.”

No to Politicization

The deputy administrative director for Omdurman admitted that political intervention in the civil service had occurred in the past, but he said, “We managed to call attention to that, and we instructed all the administrative officers in the capital and in the provinces to adhere fully to neutrality and to stay away from overt political affiliations. We told them to serve people and to remain unbiased when serving all people. We asked them to serve people with an unbiased, operational frame of mind.”

This Is Our Book

We said that charges had been made against administrative officers who were being accused of failing to do their duty in confronting the disasters which were brought on by torrential rains and rainfall. Mr Jarqandi denied that and added, “All the reports which we received from all areas and all the reports we get as we handle daily events and visit sites in the field indicate that all the administrative officers were always in the forefront, playing a prominent and an unequivocal role in confronting those disasters. They tackled the complexities and problems involved in distributing relief supplies, and they did distribute those supplies.”

Regarding preparations for this year Mr Jarqandi says, “Things will be quite different because precautions were taken early. So far, drainage canals have been opened so that rain water can flow off, and the necessary plan has been devised to protect the health of the environment.”

Conclusion

“A popular effort is the last thing left for these toiling people. It is better for us not to wait for others. Let us begin, and let anyone who wishes to catch up with us do so afterwards. We hope that God will protect Omdurman with the efforts of its authorities and its citizens, and we hope that Khartoum and other areas will take steps to ensure their own survival.”

Editorial Rejects ‘Importing Government Theory’

45040450 Khartoum AL-QUWWAT AL-MUSALLAH in Arabic 10 Jul 89 p 7

[Article by Engineer, Dr ‘Abd-al-Aziz Sayyid Ahmad: “For the Homeland”]

[Text] The task of building a homeland is not an easy one. Nor is it an item in a plan. The task of building a homeland is carried out on the basis of theories about government and the state. That is why one of our most important duties is to come up with a philosophy by means of which the foundations of a state can be laid and an effort can be made to build the homeland. The homeland is history, society, and values. The homeland is the land, the geography and the economy. This and the other aspect of the homeland are two parts of an equation whose relationship is one that indicates organic unity. A theory of government or a philosophy of the state is not something that is written down. It is neither a document that is ready for application, nor an experience to be copied. It is rather an organism that grows as experiences accumulate and as experience and education are gained, even through trial and error. We have no choice about that. The only thing we have to do is think. We have to think clearly and hard, and we must devise the premises which will become the vehicles by means of which the homeland can become what we want it to become.

It is easy to import a car factory and a group of experts to turn Sudan into a car manufacturing country, but it is impossible to import a theory of government or a philosophy for building a state. I think that anyone who thinks that a theory of liberal democracy is the ideal solution for our society is nothing but pompous. I think it is pompous to make statements that are quoted at random from English textbooks, and I think that the few Sudanese politicians and intellectuals who are only marginally involved in politics and who repeat such statements are pompous. To say that the mistakes of democracy can be corrected only by more democracy shows nothing but sham pedantry. Such statements are made for the benefit of junior journalists and young people seeking freedom in the sense of chaos. This is a freedom
that is associated with an inflated ego which exists in a vacuum. How can such a democracy be possible in a country like Sudan where a person’s wishes can be falsified by a piece of bread, a few pounds of sugar, and a loyalty oath sworn on the Koran?

Thus, looking for a new formula which can grasp our national, political experiences, those national experiences which are vital and positive, has become a pressing necessity. We have to look for this new formula without hard feelings or fear. Such a formula must have incisive knowledge of the characteristics of the Sudanese individual, that individual who may be seen in all parts of Sudan, but not that stereotype of a Sudanese citizen who is depicted in files and books of jurisprudence which are imported from overseas. Thus, the law would become nothing but a mechanism by means of which the Sudanese individual’s original customs and practices can be shaped and regulated. The law would not become something that is imposed on the Sudanese individual by a naïve higher power. It would not be something taken out of textbooks or produced by the vainglorious rhetorical and intellectual displays of professors.

We can give an example of what, in our opinion, would be the proper elements of such a new formula. It is a formula that involves an alliance between the armed forces and the forces of production, as represented by professional associations and trade unions. The armed forces is an institution that is a true melting pot. It is a visible manifestation of nationalism and one of its formidable tools. Held together by the regime’s power and the will for unity, the armed forces were pulled into national political action when colonialism penetrated the homeland. I do not need to repeat the long history of that struggle against colonialism because it is known to every person who is interested. The armed forces gained many experiences throughout that struggle, and these experiences qualified them to confront the major national functions and duties of protection and defense at any time and at any place. The armed forces paid a high price for all that, and thousands lost their lives protecting and defending the country. The institution of the armed forces has always taken positions that were purely nationalistic. Any other position would be impossible for the armed forces, which is not a tribal, partisan, or sectarian institution. The institution of the armed forces does not have a religious or a political ideological tendency that it prefers. It is, therefore, fully qualified to become a key and an important player in determining the kind of government that will lay down the foundations of a state for Sudan.

The forces of production which are represented by the institutions of production, and these include professional associations, trade unions, and other organizations, are also clean, national organizations by every standard or in every sense. These institutions of production were founded in the process of an arduous and lengthy struggle against colonialism in all its forms and shapes. This was a struggle which involved fighting corruption and partisan, sectarian, and tribal conspiracies. Throughout this struggle these institutions of production maintained their independence, their values, and their performance methods. They performed national functions selflessly, and they too paid a high price in blood, sweat, and tremendous sacrifices. They are no longer a mere movement making halfhearted, indistinct demands which have nothing to do with the country. Although some parties wanted the institutions of production to become such a movement, their radiant history turned them into one of the country’s impregnable strongholds which cannot be overlooked. However, Sudan’s institutions of production can become involved in the alliance. Who among us does not remember how the parties surrendered when the trade unions declared themselves on the side of the well known armed forces memorandum? Since then, that memorandum has become a philosophical cornerstone and the shining centerpiece of the theory of government and of building a state in Sudan.

Thus, an alliance at this stage is one form of those premises we are talking about. This alliance does not represent the complete and definitive theory for the Sudanese state, but it is one of the premises for it. In our opinion, this alliance will work with other premises, and the foundations for building a state and a homeland will be laid down as we accumulate experiences and gain experience. We will lay down the foundations for building a state and a homeland as society becomes stable and develops and as positive developments occur as a result of that. But none of this will happen unless we have a real and solid solution for Sudan’s primary question: the question of the south and the ongoing war there. We will not be able to do anything unless we find a formula for peace. Peace is the key to our future. There is nothing more to add to that. Rallying around peace or moving away from it could not only endanger Sudan’s unity, but it could also expose all of Sudan to destruction. And who among us is willing to bear such a burden?

SYRIA

Black Bread Market Thriving

Shortage Creates New Phenomena

44040529 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Jul 89 p 7

[Editorial: “Bread, Relationship Between Producer, Seller and Citizen and Between Us and Responsible Authorities”]

[Text] Again, we devote a page to bread. We do not find this repetitive for several reasons. First, there is an existing problem connected with the essential food commodity, and nobody disagrees with us that it is essential. Second, there is a new side of the issue through which we will discuss this problem, namely the investigation conducted by colleague Bashshar [al-Hajali] on bread sellers
in the black market or the children who sell bread in front of bakeries at severalfold the price set for it.

We will not, of course, deal here with the methods used or with the profits made by these sellers. Bashshar’s report will deal with this in detail. But we will make some observations that dictate themselves through the report and through the reality of the bread production and distribution methods in our country.

The first observation concerns the price at which a bread bag is sold in the black market. We have already said that this price amounts at times to severalfold the set price. The difference in price is merely for saving the time the citizen is forced to spend in front of a bakery window if he does not resort to the child vendors. This observation indicates that we are constantly losing appreciation for the money paid in return for getting a commodity or a service, especially since time is life and is not of such great importance as to exchange it for money, particularly if we keep in mind that a large number of those who buy bread at black market prices are not old or disabled people who cannot wait long in front of bakeries but are mostly young men who would rather pay a high price than wait.

So that the above may not be misunderstood, it is not intended to justify the long queues in front of the bread sale outlets but to condemn a general social behavior which always sees the solution in paying more money.

The second observation concerns the money the child bread vendors make—a sum which may amount to 400 Syrian pounds daily. This sum equals a half week’s pay of a doctorate holder and a week’s pay of an ordinary worker. Over a year, this sum is tens of times more than what is earned by the worker who produces the bread and stands behind the oven or behind the scales for long hours of exhausting work.

Do we think, after all this, that we can convince a child at the beginning of his life of the importance of productive work or of schooling? Can we ultimately encourage society as a whole to embark on productive work when the child in this society can see how much gain parasitic work can yield?

The third observation concerns the bakeries themselves without whose assistance the black market trade could not flourish. We ask here: If long queues are what motivate the citizen to purchase bread from the black market and if, as already noted and as the investigative report points out, the interest of those who supervise the bakeries dictates that this queuing continue—to put it more clearly, if it is against their interest to eliminate this queuing—then how can we not expect these supervisors to contribute to the perpetuation of this condition, either by hording bread in their bakeries and refraining from selling it to the citizens on the pretext that it is allocated for hospitals or institutions or by damaging quantities of the bread, especially if the bakery is controlled by the public sector, so that this bread may be then sold as fodder and so that the demand for the remaining bread may rise sharply?

The fourth observation concerns the “black market” name we have given vendors outside the bakeries. It is a unique market because it is located only a few meters away from the “white market.” Those operating in the black market do not find it at all difficult to offer their wares in broad daylight, right in the middle of the road and before everybody’s eyes. Yet, there are those who assert that there is no bread black market!

The fifth observation concerns cooperation between the authorities in charge of fighting legal violations and other abnormal conditions. If not missing, then this cooperation does not rise to the desired level. If it were not for this, would tens of vendors be able to squat on the sidewalks in front of bakeries and sell their bread without fearing anybody?

If it were not for this certainty that they would not be pursued, would not a single patrol of the Reserve Bakeries Committee be able to apprehend a large number of vendors with a single swoop?

The sixth observation concerns the cooperation of the authorities in charge with us, i.e. with the press. While some of these authorities compete to provide us with hard figures on their accomplishments and with creative statements about their work, we find that they take a negative stance when we follow up on an issue as important as this issue. At such times, the issue becomes an issue which concerns them alone and which the press has nothing to do with.

We should note here that we have repeatedly pointed out in this paper the phenomenon of the bread sold at high prices in front of bakeries and that we have seen no effective step to combat this phenomenon. We have not even received an explanation, a justification or a clarification in response to what we have published. When such vendors are apprehended and our editor asks about the steps that will be taken in the future to combat this phenomenon, the response is negative.

We will, under all circumstances, proceed in the direction we, as the development section of a newspaper concerned fundamentally with the domestic structure, have chosen. As we said at the outset, this is not the first time we have tackled the bread issue, and it will not be the last time because the importance of the issue needs no affirmation and because the citizen’s main food staple merits such attention. The issue merits even much greater attention because we are eager not to see the effort made to provide the citizen with quality bread wasted, the money paid for the purpose squandered or the effort of years, the sweat of hundreds and the billions of pounds turned into several hundred or several thousand pounds bagged by a greedy exploiter or a little broker and, finally, because we believe that it is extremely important to make every effort possible to prevent the transformation of our children into brokers who hold money sacred and who view learning and productive work with disrespect.
Measures To Stem Child Vendor Phenomenon
44040529 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
19 Jul 89 p 7

[Article by Bashshar al-Hajali: "Bread-Exploitation Phenomenon Again; Vendors Expose New Methods of Acquiring Commodity; Measures Taken Against Child Vendors Are One Step But They Are Not Enough; Approach Should Be Comprehensive"]

[Text] We are going to talk one more time about bread bags sold in front of bakeries at several fold their [set] prices. Again we refer to what we have already said in this regard, pointing out that most of those engaged in this activity are children. To make it brief, we will be content to point out that the authorities concerned have begun tackling this phenomenon by dispatching their patrols where child vendors are found to prevent them with all means from exploiting bread. However, we pose this question: Will the new measures solve the problem finally or have new methods surfaced, making it difficult to achieve a final solution?

Numerous questions and interesting information, and the answer is offered in this report. Last week, a government vehicle belonging to the Reserve Bakeries Committee arrived at the newspaper premises carrying children of varying ages who had been apprehended selling bread bags illegally and at several fold the [set] prices, thus subjecting the citizen to some sort of exploitation.

We did in fact stand our ground with these child vendors during which we made clear the "panorama" of the bread bags. I say "panorama" because the matter evokes both tears and laughter.

It is not easy for a person to be a bread vendor unless he meets certain conditions on which he often agrees with the owner of a "bread stand" or with bakery workers. If one asks about a bread vendor's daily income, one will find that it is much more than one expects. What we hope is that the reader will not find in this an invitation to become a bread vendor but will realize what sort of exploitation may occur if the situation continues much longer, especially since the price charged for a bread bag ranges from 15 to 35 Syrian pounds, i.e. fourfold or fivefold the official price.

With "Child" Vendors

The vendors brought by the Reserve Bakeries Committee's patrols are not the end of the road and this does not mean that we have wiped out the phenomenon finally. It is a step, and a lot more is needed, even though it is right to say that it is a commendable endeavor. Child or minor vendors are still found in lines in front of the major bakeries. The truth is that not only minors engage in this activity. There are also numbers of men and women who do it. These are still beyond reach and in them lies the crux of the problem. It is as the proverb says, "the crooked line [begins with the lead steer.]"

What is important is that we convey to you what has been said by the "child" vendors, as we have called them, led by 'Ayn A., a 17-year-old youth. I understood from this youth that he had been working at al-Maslakh [Slaughterhouse] 13 Bakery, that he comes from a broken family, that his parents are separated and that he is the only supporter of the 8 other family members. He said: It is not easy for one to become a bread vendor. Everything has its price. In addition to standing the entire day and part of the night in front of the bakery, there are other conditions that have to be met. If a stand owner does not know you, you cannot get a single bread bag, not to mention all this number of bags. When we asked him about these conditions, he said:

A vendor has to be known to the stand owner and has to pay him the well-known [kickback]. I am one of 50 vendors who divide themselves among al-Maslakh 13, 14 and 15 [bakeries]. We pay the distributor [8] Syrian pounds for every bag. We pay him 40 pounds and he gives us 5 bags. We sell them and go back [for more]. As to how the distributor gets the [kickback] money, the youth said: We are careful not to arouse the suspicions of those queuing for bread. So as not to embarrass the distributor, we offer him a soft drink and, according to prior arrangement, we put the money in the bottle, inside a sandwich or in a cigarette box. At times we ask the distributor loudly to sell us bread for one pound but when we get to him, we pay only the full sum. It has been going on like this for 2 months. For every bag we get through the [official] window, we get many bags through the back door, thanks to Abu-al-'Ays. It seems that this Abu-al-'Ays owns a distribution stand at one of the aforementioned bakeries. There are also Abu-Istayf, Abu-Hamid, Abu-al-Khall and others. This is so far as the transactions of the child or "minor vendors" are concerned. As for the men, they have their own method, and so do the women. Each exploits the other. The men even bring their food and drink as of the early hours of the night, and God knows what lies behind this activity. Child B.'Ayn said: I have been engaged in this activity for 2 days only. I have worked in front of Ibn al-Amid Bakery. Depending on the customer's condition and on how much of a hurry he is in, I have been selling the bag for 15-25 pounds. Thus, I made 400 pounds in 4 or 5 hours. This is big income for a man, not to mention a child. When we asked him about his family's attitude, he said that his father is not aware of his activity and he was very fearful that we would tell him. His mother has prohibited him from doing it but 400 pounds without capital or effort are not bad.

R. Kh., a 15-year old who works as a weight checker at a bakery, shed light on the methods with which both minors and grownups exploit bread. I do not wish to recount here all that he said. What is important is that he asserted that bread-sell sellers [distributors] deal with
both grownups and minors and use their own agents while shouting at the citizens to queue in line when these sellers observe no queue. This is an attempt on their part to throw dust in the eyes.

Y. A., a 14-year old, said: Need pushed me to engage in this activity. My family has 12 members and my father is a laborer. I have to help him. When I found it easy, I began to sell bread bags.

Some of those brought by the patrol swore that they have never sold bread. Their appearance did not indicate that they have.

What is important in the matter is that if the vendors realized that this would be the result, that the patrols would stop them from engaging in this activity and that they would end up with “heads shaven,” would be cited for supply violation and would be placed in a reformatory, the conditions would change greatly, provided that both minor and grownup vendors are brought to account.

It Is Not Thus That Camels Are Brought to Water

After hearing the children's statements, we headed for the Damascus Supply Directorate, our next stopping point. We had hoped for cooperation and [a positive] response, especially since the issue had been initiated by an agency of the Ministry of Supply which wanted to familiarize us with its steps in this regard. But very regrettably, we encountered a different picture. The assistant supply director made us feel that we were a very heavy burden to him, as if he did not wish to discuss the issue. He even stated openly that he is above everything and that he is the man with the final decision. He had the vendors and he had the right to act as he wished, either keeping or releasing them. When we insisted that the procedures be observed, especially since there was an attempted violation, he raged with anger, saying: “You have done your duty and your task is ended.” We are not citing this incident to point out specifics but rather to point out the need for cooperation and coordination among all. One hand cannot clap. If anything, we complement each other's work. We do not mean a specific director or a specific phenomenon and we are not about to recall the role of the media and the press. We are doing it as a sort of family censure and we will be content to say: It is not thus that camels are taken to water, Mr Assistant Director.

Deterrent Measures, But...

To complete [our investigation of] the issue, we interviewed Muhammad Zuhayr Tinawi, the Reserve Bakeries Committee chairman, who said:

Practically, we are a producer and distributor of bread. It is not our task to deal with what occurs outside the bakeries. But out of our eagerness to deliver bread to all citizens in the easiest way and in a healthy and clean manner, we find that the spread of the phenomenon of bread vending in front of the bakeries undermines the delivery of this commodity on the one hand and diminishes the quality of the bread on the other because spreading bread on sidewalks exposes it to insects and dirt. This is in addition to the inflated prices. All these are among the reasons that urge us to deal with this phenomenon at any price because ultimately everything is reflected on us as reserve bakeries. This method of distribution and of delivering the commodity to the citizen definitely harms the bread commodity.

This is why we have formed a committee, let us say a patrol, to watch the movement at the bakeries and the distribution outlets and to apprehend those who exploit this commodity and turn them over to the Supply Directorate so that they may be punished.

The truth is that we have not felt a response from the other authorities to curtail this phenomenon even though higher instructions have been issued in this regard. Citing an example, Tinawi said that the police commander has, thankfully, instructed the police stations close to the bakeries to dispatch their patrols. But the stations' response has been: “We have sent patrols, have not found any trace of the phenomenon and have not found any vendors.” However, in my capacity as the Reserve Bakeries Committee chairman, formed committees to observe the sale of bread at the outlets, to confiscate any bread sold outside these officially accredited outlets and to turn over child vendors to the Supply Directorate, as I have already said. These committees launched their activities at the beginning of last June and we have been able to accomplish acceptable results in curtailing this phenomenon. But we have also realized that the vendors are not children exclusively. There are women and oldmen also. If we had the powers, we would take harsher steps toward the women in particular.

Tinawi added: We agree with you on the danger of the proliferation of such a phenomenon. What we are doing will not end the problem. We should also point out that this kind of vending is an important factor contributing to the visible long queues. But the problem must be tackled. Let the treatment begin by dispatching joint patrols for various periods of time and by giving these patrols the needed powers. This phenomenon will then certainly decline.

So What Have We Done?

This question dictates itself. The phenomenon is not as simple as some people imagine. In addition to being a direct offense, it raises bigger questions: Why is this happening and how did we reach this condition? Have we lost the means to tackle it successfully? Certainly not. The solution must start by underlining the crux and roots of the problem. If the vendors did not find those who help them and supply them with the commodity, they would not be able to do what they are doing. Even if they did, what would happen if the citizen refrained from buying from them? Where would they find a market to dispose of their wares, especially since the manner in which they offer their wares is not flawless? Putting hot
bread on the dusty and dirty ground, mixing high-quality bread with other varieties, cheating in the bread weight—aren't all these elements reason enough for us to steer away from this bread?

Some may say that the long queues, the shortness of time and the commodity shortage are all fundamental reasons that cannot be overlooked. To these people we say: Yes, but the approach should be comprehensive and cannot be divided. Now all that remains is to ask the Bakeries Committee chairman: What have you done in this regard?

Tinawi responded: We have tried to limit the sale of bread bags to no more than 3 bags per person and we have issued this directive to all our bakeries, holding them accountable. If it is proven that this directive, which is directive No 30 of 25 June, is violated, then the contraveners will refer to the courts on the charge of selling the commodity (illegally). There are no exceptions in this directive.

In a related development, if it is proven that a connection exists between a salesman or a sales supervisor and the vendor, then we dismiss the individual concerned, regardless of who he is, and we ban his employment finally, at least in any of the bakeries under our control. We have made a number of decisions in this regard, the latest of which was directive No 23 of 30 May 1989 which dismissed 4 workers from their jobs and banned their employment under the power of accountability.

Another point noted by the Reserve Bakeries Committee chairman is the new system of distributing the commodity to the official institutions and agencies. Agreement has been reached with the public authorities to nominate accredited distributors, each to supply bread to his district. The minister of supply has also instructed that the commodity be supplied through 122 new centers, distributed as follows:

Thirty three fruit and vegetable centers, 27 centers divided among meat establishments and 50 centers for the Public Retail Trade Company, in addition to expanding the distribution network. It should be noted that the allocations are certainly enough but that there is a flaw in distribution. The recent measures will contribute to alleviating the burden.

Concluding, Tinawi said: I am responsible and I will bear all the consequences. But all sides must help to curtail this phenomenon. The brother citizens' cooperation is the most important thing.

We, in turn, reaffirm what the Reserve Bakeries Committee chairman has said about the need for a cure so that the measures may not continue to be just a show of muscle. It is not enough to say that we have done. Followup is essential. The responsibility is one [shared] responsibility. It must also be emphasized that the issue is not as simple as some people think.

Slow Production and Maldistribution Cause Chaos
44040529 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Jul 89 p 7

[Article by Sa'd al-Qasim: "Bread: Insufficient Production or Maldistribution"]

[Text] We don't believe that anybody sleeps with no bread in his home or that anybody cannot get the bread he needs. What does this mean? It means that the bread supplied is enough for the domestic consumption needs. Then why the long queues in front of bakeries or of bread booths and why is a bread sold in the black market at severalfold its actual price?

The above observation is not the only thing that indicates that there is enough bread. This is also indicated by the total flour volume allocated annually for bread production. If we add to this volume the flour consumed in the form of varied pasties, we find that there is no justification for the long queues we see in front of bakeries throughout the hours of the day and into a late hour of the night, thus stretching one day into the next. However, the queuing is there.

The answer to the previous question dictates posing another question, perhaps even more than one question. Are all quantities of flour allocated for bread production consumed for the purpose for which they are allocated? Is all the bread produced consumed as [human] food?

Do we, as individuals, consume all the bread we bring to our homes? Finally, can the long chain of bread sale outlets supply bread to all the citizens and end the queues within the framework of the system currently employing?

The above questions are some of the questions that have to be asked before an attempt is made to offer an answer to the abovementioned fundamental question asking about the reasons for the queues.

Before anything else, a quick picture must be presented on our country's actual bread production which is turned out fundamentally by the public sector, either directly or indirectly. The private bakeries, mainly in Damascus, make a very small contribution in this regard. The public sector produces bread in its automatic bakeries which are spread throughout the country and whose production is distributed through sales booths. Moreover, these bakeries supply bread to a number of official institutions and agencies.

In addition to the automatic bakeries, we have the state-owned reserve bakeries which the government utilizes through contracts with supervisors. These bakeries sell their production to the citizen directly. They also supply some [official] circles with the bread they need.

Thus, the bread sale outlets are divided between the automatic and reserve bakeries and the sale booths.
Generally, their total number is reasonable when compared with the number 10 years or more ago.

Again, we find ourselves faced with the same question, phrased differently:

If the volume of bread produced is enough to meet the domestic consumption needs and if the number of sale outlets is reasonable, then why the queues?

We may find the answer to this question in two small observations:

The first observation concerns the extremely slow production process which we notice in many of the reserve bakeries in particular, even though these bakeries have a number of production lines. This slowness prolongs the queues, especially since these bakeries sell their bread to the citizens directly, i.e. as soon as it is baked and before it cools down. We rarely find ready-to-sell packaged bread, as was the case in the past and as it should be at present.

This observation permits us to say that some of those who utilize the bakeries do, in fact, have an interest in the continued presence of the queues and in selling bread in this manner, either by selling bread when it is hot and benefiting from the weight difference or, as made evident in colleague Bashshar’s report, by sharing the profits the black market vendors make by selling the bread at several times its price.

The other observation concerns the bread-selling booths which remain without a single bread bag for long hours of the day while awaiting delivery from the bakeries. Meanwhile, the citizens gather to wait for the bread. When it is delivered, the queuing, as well as the shoving and the chaos, is at its worst.

The two above observations call for seeking a more advanced system to deliver bread to the citizens and to take advantage of the distribution capacity actually available. Should we think of requiring each bakery to supply a quantity of bread not just to the circles and booths assigned to it but also to fruit and vegetable shops, to the Public Retail Trade Company and to every possible consumption outlet while keeping an eye on the needs of these outlets? Why don’t the authorities in charge supply bread to groceries and to fruit and vegetable shops so that they may sell it to the citizen in return for a set profit or fee?

Why don’t the government bakeries try to sell bread to organization workers by establishing with the administrative authorities of these organizations a relationship that enables the workers to get the bread they need without having to wait in front of bakeries for a long time?

These are just simple suggestions on how to develop the bread distribution system, considering that we agree from the outset that the problem is in distribution, not in production.

But aren’t there problems in production?

The fact is that it is difficult to deny this. The figures we have repeatedly published in this page [section] confirm that waste does occur during the production process and that large quantities of bread are damaged and end up being used as cattle fodder, at best.

With all the bread destroyed, we cannot say that the bread sold is of high quality because the reality says otherwise.

Poorly produced bread leads ultimately to one consequence, namely more wasted bread and a higher demand for bread. This is another reason for the queues—a reason the significance of which cannot be slighted.

Previously, the queues were attributed to the use of bread as livestock fodder at a time when fodder was scarce.

They were also attributed to smuggling flour from bakeries and selling it in the black market to be used for pastries and confectioneries.

The solutions offered by the authorities concerned took two directions: First, increase the price of bread to prevent its use as fodder.

Second, stiffen the watch on the bakeries to prevent flour smuggling.

Fodder became available at a later time and livestock breeders stopped using bread as a fodder substitute. Higher-priced bread was produced and the citizens continued to consume the same volume they had been consuming before.

We don’t know precisely what steps were taken to prevent flour smuggling from the bakeries. However, we don’t believe that the smuggled quantities could lead to such a sharp crisis because the quantities which the pastry and confectionery markets can consume are somewhat limited.

However, the citizen is still compelled to wait for a long time to get bread.

Does the problem exist because the public sector is the producer, as some circles like to say in interpreting the causes of the crisis, or does it exist because the private sector has not been given the chance to make the profits it wishes to make?

We will answer neither question but will be content to say that the public sector undertook to produce and supply bread when it became evident that the private sector is incapable of performing this task and when it became obvious that the few [private] bakeries scattered in quarters here and there are incapable of meeting the growing consumption needs for this essential commodity.
When the public sector undertook this serious task, appropriations unprecedented in any country with economic conditions and circumstances similar to ours were made. Yet, we have not reached the phase when we can supply every citizen with high-quality bread without saddling him with the burden of having to wait and shove because we have not yet exploited what we have built—and it is vast—the way it should be exploited.

UNIVERSAL ARAB EMIRATES

Taxation Agreement Signed With France
44000617 Dubayy GULF NEWS
in English 20 Jul 89 p 11

[Text] Abu Dhabi—UAE [United Arab Emirates] and France yesterday entered into an agreement dispensing with the system of double taxation, that envisages among other things incentives for investments in the two countries for mutual economic benefit.

The agreement was signed at the ministry of finance by Ahmed Al Tayer, UAE Minister of State for Finance and French Ambassador Hubert Colin de Verdiere and marks the fruitification of protracted discussions on streamlining taxation laws.

The agreement will alleviate considerably the burden of taxation on personal income, company profits and inherited capital with reciprocal benefits.

It also entails in certain cases the residents in any of the two countries to the country of residence instead of the other for categories of income (dividends) or capital gains.

In his address Ahmed Al Tayer said this was the first agreement of its kind signed between UAE and France and that the ministry of finance and industry was deliberating for quite some time to contact countries which had active trade and economic relations with the UAE in order to enter into negotiations for formulating similar pacts to prevent double taxation.

The aim was to encourage investments in the private and the public sectors between the countries to boost bilateral trade, he said and pointed out that the UAE did not impose taxes on foreign investments here.

Such pacts coming into vogue will accord privileges to UAE investors in the matter of obtaining the same conditions for investments in other countries, he stated.

The agreement will pave way for streamlining the economic legislations between UAE and the countries concerned in respect of taxation and its salutary effects will extend to cover interests of individual and private companies as also government companies and firms.

"It will accord compatible characteristics and privileges regarding revenues accrued on investments," he stated.

One of the salient features relates to taxes on profits from shares for UAE nationals, the tax for shares less than 30 percent of the total value, that attracted a 35 percent levy earlier has now been done away with.

In cases of share ownership exceeding 35 percent, the tax component has been slashed from 35 percent to 5 percent.

The remuneration of residents through employment will not come under taxation except in the country of residence.

This is subject to not exceeding prescribed period of stay of days in the country under reference.

Residents living in UAE who own houses for private use in France are exempt from property tax that is calculated on the basis of rental value.

Salaries and wages paid by the government or local bodies will not be subject to tax except in the country of residence.

Also money payable to students and trainees will not be subject to taxation, provided the source of money was outside the country.

The economic relations between UAE and France has been developing remarkably and between 1983 and'85, the trade balance was in favour of UAE. However it witnessed a drop in'86.

France imports from UAE accounted for $535 million in'85, which dropped to $149 million the next year while UAE imports from France stood at $343 million in 1986.

The trade balance swung in favour of France for three years from 1986.

UAE was considered the fourth major trading partner for Western Europe with imports from Europe aggregating to $2.71 billion, while exports were in the order of $1.44 billion.

The agreement expected to facilitate investments between France and UAE.

The investment figure in France by UAE entrepreneurs and traders was estimated at between six and eight billion dirhams.

It was also announced on the occasion that UAE and France will soon initiate negotiations for another convention, to deal with the issue of reciprocal protection of investments, which when concluded was likely to accord further filip to trade between the countries.

Economic, Technical Agreement To Be Signed with Soviet Union
44040520p Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 18 Jul 89 p 2

[Text] His Excellency Sayf al-Jarwan, the minister of economy and trade, will undertake an official visit to the
Soviet Union this September in response to an invitation from the Soviet minister of foreign economic relations.

During the visit of his excellency, Minister al-Jarwan, to Moscow, an agreement for economic, trade, and technical cooperation between the two countries will be signed in final form.

A delegation from the Ministry of Trade and Economy headed by Deputy Minister ‘Abd-al-Ru’uf al-Mubarak concluded a visit to the Soviet Union that lasted several days during which previous discussions in Abu Dhabi concerning the articles of the aforementioned agreement were drawn up. Muhammad Jasim al-Muzki, acting deputy minister of trade and economy, said that a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding prevailed over the meetings between the two sides and that they will conclude their talks on the agreement, in particular, and economic cooperation, in general, during the upcoming visit of the minister of economy to the Soviet Union this September.
BANGLADESH

Parliament Told of Bangladeshis in Indian Jails
46001553 Dhaka THE NEW NATION
in English 23 Jun 89 pp 1, 8

[Article: “114 Bangladeshis in West Bengal Jails”]

[Text] Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud yesterday said 114 Bangladeshis nationals, including 12 women, were detained in different jails in West Bengal (India) till February 28, this year, reports BSS.

Replying to Mr Ataur Rahman (Cop-Serajganj) the Foreign Minister told the Jatiya Sangsad that till now no complete and detailed report had been received from the Indian government relating to the Bangladeshis detained in different prisons of India. But, on behalf of the West Bengal government it was informed that 114 Bangladeshis nationals, including 12 women had been detained in the West Bengal jails till February 28, 1989.

The Minister, however, said the official efforts at diplomatic level were continuing to collect a detailed report on the genuine Bangladeshis citizens detained in different jails all over India.

Referring to the Foreign Minister’s reply to the house last February 23 the opposition member, Mr. Ataur Rahman had wanted to know, if the government had received the detailed account from the Indian government of the Bangladeshis detained in India.

Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud, in reply to the Jatiya Party member from Magura, Mr. Natai Roy Chowdhury, had told the House on February 23 that no reply was received from the Indian government when the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi wrote to the Indian Foreign Ministry on September 13, 1988 for detailed information about Bangladeshis detained in the Indian jails. Bangladesh was officially told on August 31 last year that 736 Bangladeshis were in Indian jails.

INDIA

Revised Estimates Show Reduced Budget Deficit
46001583 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 6 Jul 89 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, July 5 (PTI)—The budget deficit of the Central government for 1988-89, which was placed at Rs 7,940 crores in the revised estimates, has been drastically reduced to Rs 5,800 crores.

At this level, the deficit is Rs 1,684 crores less than the original estimates of Rs 7,484 crores for the year and is even less than the actual for 1987-88, which stood at Rs 5,817 crores.

This was stated at the consultative committee of members of Parliament attached to the ministry of finance which met here today under the chairmanship of the finance minister, Mr S.B. Chavan.

The consultative committee was informed that the revenue collection from indirect taxes was by and large keeping pace with the target.

The meeting considered the recommendations made by the study group of the committee on indirect taxes. Suggestions on it were also made at the meeting held on May 4.

Participating in it, members stressed the need to have a tax structure which should avoid high cost economy. It was pointed out that the imports should be kept to the minimum restricting them to only essential items and that customs duty should not be looked upon as a source of revenue. They said customs duty on essential imports should be kept at a low level.

The finance minister agreed that the need for mobilising revenue could not be overlooked.

The finance minister shared the members concern on the need to reduce revenue deficit and to curb non-plan expenditure.

Mr Chavan said while he was not too happy with the present position relating to the balance of payments, the situation was very much under control. He stressed the need for discipline to avoid unnecessary imports.

He said the customs and central excise department was being strengthened so that it was fully geared to meet the challenges in the years to come.

Members said that there was a necessity to study the long term implications of the tax policy. Some of the members drew the minister’s attention to CA and AG’s report on MODVAT [Modified Value Added Tax] and requested that the irregularities pointed out in the report should be examined in the ministry.

Papers Give Details on Government Changes
Cabinet, Other Ministers
46001584 Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Jul 89 p 9

[Text] New Delhi, July 4—The following is the list of the members of the Union Council of Ministers after the reshuffle today.

Ministers of State


Barring Mr. Namgyal, all those upgraded today are from the Hindi belt—two are from Bihar and one each is from Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh.

Apart from the five promotees, five others are involved in the changes of portfolios. Mr. Giridhar Gomango, number two to the late Bir Bahadur Singh in the Communications Ministry, has been given independent charge. After Singh’s death, Mr. Gandhi temporarily took over the Communications portfolio. Mr. M.M. Jacob, Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs, will additionally hold independent charge of Water Resources. Mr. B. Shankaranand, who looked after the Ministry, has been left with Law and Justice. Mr. Saroj Khaparde, Minister of State for Health, has been moved to the Textiles Ministry headed by Mr. Ram Niwas Mirdha. He gave up Health which he got as an additional charge after Mr. Motilal Vora was sent to Madhya Pradesh as Chief Minister.

Defence Production for Baitha: Mr. Baitha, till now a Junior Minister in the Food and Civil Supplies, will be the new Minister of State for Defence Production. He fills the vacancy caused by the appointment of Mr. Chintamani Panigrahi as Governor of Manipur. Mr. Mahabir Prasad, Deputy Minister of Railways, is now the Minister of State for Mines and Mr. Namgyal is the Minister of State for Chemicals and Petrochemicals besides Parliamentary Affairs (till now he was Deputy Minister here and in Surface Transport). Mr. Malaviya will continue to be associated with Labour and Parliamentary Affairs in his upgraded capacity. Mrs. Oraon will be Minister of State for Environment and Forests.

Mr. Rafiq Alam, Minister of State, has been moved from Textiles to Health and Mrs. Krishna Sahi from Water Resources to Culture in the Ministry of Human Resource Development.

Promotions to Secretary Rank

46001584 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 11 Jul 89 p 6

[Text] Close on the heels of the Cabinet reshuffle, the Government in a major shift of senior officials on Monday, promoted nearly half a dozen additional secretaries to secretary rank.
Mr. R. Vasudevan, additional secretary in the Prime Minister's office [PMO], was promoted as special secretary in PMO, while Mr. Suresh Mathur, member secretary in the National Commission on Rural Labour, was brought in place of Mr. Badal Roy, who retired as labour secretary recently.

Finance Commission member secretary Mahesh Prasad has been appointed secretary in Environment and Forests Ministry while secretary in the Department of Food and Civil Supplies Miss Meera Seth will hold the same post in Health and Family Welfare.

In yet another significant appointment, Mr. P.B. Krishnaswamy was appointed secretary in the Planning Commission to succeed Mr. J.S. Bajjal.

Mr. M.M.S. Srivastava, additional secretary in the Department of Food will be special secretary in the Planning Commission.

Mr. Ashwath Narain, additional secretary in the Defence Ministry has been appointed as member secretary in the National Commission in Rural Labour.

Mr. K.P. Geethakrishnan, who was secretary in the Ministry of Environment and Forests has been shifted to the Department of Expenditure under the Finance Ministry as secretary.

Mr. S.P. Shukla, who was special secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, has been appointed secretary in the Department of Women and Child Development.

Mr. P.K. Lahiri has been promoted as secretary in the Department of Mines. He was additional secretary in the same department.

Mr. K.V.R. Nair, who was additional secretary in the Ministry of Finance, will be member secretary in the Finance Commission.

Mr. N. Raghunathan has been promoted as secretary in the Department of Civil Supplies.

Mr. A.V. Ganesan has been appointed secretary in the Ministry of Commerce to act as the chief negotiator for the Uruguay round. He was earlier additional secretary in the Department of Industrial Development.

The withdrawal would be in India's own interest, and in the interest of friendly relations the future between India and Sri Lanka, the party noted.

The resolution was circulated to newsmen at a briefing on the meeting by the party general secretary, Mr. C. Rajeswar Rao, and the deputy general secretary, Mr. Indrajit Gupta.

The resolution said that after two years of the India-Sri Lanka agreement, the Lankan President, Mr Premadasa, had unilaterally demanded that the IPKF should quit by July 29, or remain confined to its barracks, and has even made this an issue for boycotting the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] meeting. Simultaneously, the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] and the JVP [?] were indulging in a virulent anti-India campaign. In such a situation, the position of the IPKF in Sri Lanka had become "untenable," the resolution stated.

It said it was true that the Tamil groups, other than LTTE, feared for their security once the IPKF departed, but the responsibility for the protection of their lives and property cannot indefinitely be borne by the IPKF, the party observed.

While expressing concern for the safety of Tamils in Sri Lanka, the CPI said the responsibility should fall squarely on the shoulders of the President, Mr Premadasa.

The CPI called on Sri Lanka and India to avoid a confrontation, and said the Sri Lankan President and the Indian Prime Minister should desist from stipulating pre-conditions.

It called on them to negotiate an agreement which would enable the IPKF to withdraw with dignity and with due respect.

On China, the party said it had taken note of the "recent serious and tragic events there following the massive students' movement for democracy and against corruption."

The present world conditions, the party noted, far-reaching economic reforms, if not accompanied by political reforms in the direction of greater democracy, by themselves, cannot satisfy the people's aspiration.

Answering questions, Mr. Gupta said Chinese reforms in opening up the economy were much more far-reaching than the Soviet Union, but these were not matched by political reforms.

This may have been a factor contributing to the crisis, he observed, saying any analysis required greater study.

Asked if he thought that the developments in China were "counterrevolutionary," as the communist party of China as well as the CPM here thought, Mr. Gupta said, "It was difficult to say as the situation was unprecedented and complicated."
Nevertheless, the resolution says that the statement of the central committee of communist party of China on the recent events had to be noted.

**Stand on Other Indian Parties**

*46001585 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 6 Jul 89 p 7*

[Text] New Delhi, July 5—The CPI [Communist Party of India] proposes to give a “fitting” reply to the “aggressive communal stance” of the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] on the eve of the coming Lok Sabha election, senior party sources said yesterday after a meeting of the party’s central executive committee which ended three days ago.

Briefing newsmen on the deliberations of the CEC [Chief Election Commissioner], the party general secretary, Mr C. Rajeswar Rao, said, “The RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh]-Vishwa Hindu Parishad [VHP]-BJP combine is playing with fire.”

Asked if the current positions of the CPI and the BJP might not lead to “physical attacks” before the election, Mr Rao said his party was not afraid of “such things.”

Sitting beside him, Mr Indrajit Gupta, the CPI deputy general secretary, noted that much would also depend on how the government proposed to tackle the situation created by the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid dispute.

Party sources said the CPI was proposing to contest approximately 50 seats in the Lok Sabha election, whether or not an adjustment was reached with the Janata Dal. They underlined, however, that the agenda of the coming few months would be topped not by considerations of seats, but by campaigns to challenge the rising “communalism” of the BJP and its associates.

In this connection, discussions in the CEC is believed to have centred on the fact that the Janata Dal, a factor in the current politics, had not conducted any campaign so far to counter the Hindu card being played by the BJP.

This, the sources said, had been conveyed to all the top Janata Dal leaders with whom the CPI had lately been in touch. These include Mr V.P. Singh himself, Mr Devi Lal, and Mr Biju Patnaik.

In a resolution, the CEC appealed to the Janata Dal to “give up” its present electoral strategy, and instead strive to build a left and secular democratic alternative “based on a progressive programme.” This alone could defeat the Congress, it added.

The resolution also noted with concern that the Janata Dal had been conducting negotiations with the BJP for an “umbrella agreement” in regard to allocation of seats.

Another resolution recorded that the communal situation had become “extremely critical” with the decision of the “VHP-RSS-BJP combine” to pull down the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and build a Ram temple in its place.

This, the CEC noted, was a “sinister” attempt to divide Hindus and Muslims and create a “permanent cleavage” between them.

It said the BJP had once again exposed itself as the “most vicious communal divisive force which is prepared to sacrifice the sacred cause of national integration to gain petty partisan political gains.”

In the face of these developments, the CPI said the government was displaying an attitude of “utter complacency.” So far even a meeting of the national integration council had not been called to find a way out of the temple-mosque impasse.

The party appealed to all concerned to accept the verdict of the court in settling the dispute. The resolution underlined that the CPI was opposed to the demolition of any temple, mosque, gurdwara, church, or religious shrine.

Mr Rao told newsmen that his party was proposing to hold demonstrations on August 15 in all towns of UP [Uttar Pradesh] on the Ram Janmabhoomi issue. On November 8, Jathas from all corners of the country were proposed to be brought to Ayodhya by the CPI.
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