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USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No 7, July 1983

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U.S. ACCUSED OF TRYING TO UNDERMINE MILITARY BALANCE

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 3-6

[Article by V. V. Zhurkin: "Who Is Undermining Stability"]

[Text] Harvard University Professor Roger Fisher, a prominent American expert on law who is famous for his original ideas about world politics, proposed his own method of preventing nuclear war. As we know, the U.S. President is always accompanied by an officer carrying a black briefcase in which the code for the order to use nuclear weapons is stored. Fisher suggested that this code be enclosed in a capsule and that the capsule be implanted within the body of a volunteer, next to his heart. Before ordering a nuclear attack, the President would first have to kill the volunteer.*

When he suggested this to people he knew in the Pentagon, Fisher writes in his book "The Final Epidemic: Physicians and Scientists on Nuclear War," they replied: "My God, what a horrible idea! The need to kill someone first could alter the President's decision. He might not push the button."**

Although Fisher's suggestion with its connotations of "black humor" is extreme, it clearly points up the moral aspects of the first use of nuclear weapons. The morality and ethics of nuclear strategy have been questioned more pointedly in our day in the pastoral message of the American Roman Catholic bishops and by the growing U.S. movement for a nuclear freeze.

In an attempt to evade questions about the real roots of the arms race launched by Washington and the real reasons for all of its new doctrines and concepts of nuclear attack, the Reagan Administration has been spreading propagandistic rumors since the first days of its existence. These include the imaginary "window of vulnerability," through which Soviet missiles will momentarily rain down on the United States, and the equally fanciful "threat" posed to Western Europe by Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons. The theme of strategic stability has recently become a recurring refrain in this recital. The implication is that this stability is being undermined by the Soviet Union on both the global and the regional, or European, levels.


** Ibid., p 235.
There is no question that the issue of strategic stability, which has always played an important role, is now particularly pertinent. The maintenance of the existing military and strategic balance is one of the most important ways of keeping the peace on our planet. This balance rests on the approximate parity of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, the equality of the two sides' medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe and the approximate balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact strength in conventional forces and arms.

As for strategic forces, the USSR has around 2,500 carriers of these weapons (1,398 ICBM launchers, 950 SLEM launchers and more than 150 heavy bombers), while the United States has around 2,300 (1,053 ICBM launchers, over 600 SLEM launchers and more than 570 heavy bombers). As for the number of nuclear warheads delivered by these strategic vehicles, the USSR has around 7,000 and the United States has 10,000.

The correlation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe between three NATO members—the United States, Great Britain and France—on one side and the USSR on the other (the rest of the Warsaw Pact countries do not have nuclear weapons) is also distinguished by almost complete equality. Both sides have approximately a thousand carriers. The numbers of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces are also relatively equal (with a slight overbalance in NATO’s favor), and the two cases in which data on the number of airborne and ground forces in Central Europe were exchanged indicated that the situation is similar in this field (around a million people on each side).

Under these conditions, how can Washington speak of destabilization "in favor of the USSR"? This is done with the aid of a simple maneuver: Information about the one weapon system in which the USSR is slightly stronger is isolated from all the data on the balance of Soviet and U.S. forces and is used as the basis for the accumulation of allegations about "Soviet superiority."

In Europe this system is the Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missile. Everything else is blithely ignored: the hundreds of American medium-range aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the missiles and planes of U.S. allies—Great Britain and France—and so forth.

Strategic stability is just as simply reduced to the imaginary "vulnerability" of American ICBM's, while Soviet land-based ICBM's are declared the "main destabilizing factor," particularly the SS-18 heavy ICBM's. Once again, other elements of the strategic balance are left out of the calculations, although it is the group or combination of these elements (and not isolated, arbitrarily chosen elements) that represents the material basis of strategic equality.

On this false foundation, U.S. ruling circles made their preparations for an unprecedented round of the arms race, which will cost the American taxpayers more than 1.8 trillion dollars over a period of 5 years and is supposed to disrupt the existing military-strategic balance, guarantee the military superiority of the United States over the USSR and destabilize the strategic situation in the world.

The Reagan Administration is pursuing this policy in two directions at once. The first is the intensive buildup of American military power, particularly
nuclear strength. The second is an attempt to decimate the Soviet defensive arsenal during the course of negotiations by putting forth proposals aimed at the unilateral restriction of Soviet nuclear potential.

This year will be a milestone in the grand-scale upgrading of U.S. nuclear forces, which is intended to secure their potential for a first, "pre-emptive" strike against the other side. Several extremely dangerous steps will be taken in 1983 to secure the ability of the United States to start and fight a nuclear war.

The most irrational of these steps will be the projected deployment of new medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe in December 1983. These missiles, which can destroy targets deep within the territory of the Soviet Union, are designed to serve as a direct supplement to the strategic nuclear arsenal and to tip the present regional and global balance in the West's favor. When the deployment of these missiles has been completed (108 Pershing II missiles by 1985 and 464 cruise missiles by 1988), the number of Western medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe will be augmented 1.5-fold and the number of carriers of strategic U.S. nuclear weapons will increase by 25 percent. The flight time of "Eurostrategic" missiles to targets in the Soviet Union will be reduced sharply (to 5 or 6 minutes): This will be only one-fifth or one-sixth as long as the flight time of strategic missiles launched from U.S. territory.

In 1983 President Reagan made his final decision on the deployment of 100 new MX ICBM's, beginning in 1986, in silos previously used for the Minuteman 3 missiles of the previous generation. The President's decision reiterated the recommendations of the commission headed by General B. Scowcroft, which immediately put an end to the many years of discussions by Washington politicians about the "vulnerability" of American land-based ICBM's by suggesting that the MX missiles be located in the same silos that had always been called "vulnerable."

Where is the logic in this? The answer is obvious: If the United States plans to launch the MX missiles first, the particular silos in which they are located are of no consequence. By choosing to deploy the new MX missiles, the most effective of all missiles ever included in the U.S. arsenal, in the old Minuteman silos, the Reagan Administration essentially acknowledged that these are weapons for a first strike against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, all of the parameters of the new missiles, particularly their heightened accuracy, greater force and higher number of warheads (10, as compared to 3 on the Minuteman 3 missiles), are classic features of a strategic system for a "pre-emptive" strike against the strategic forces of the other side--virtually a textbook example of this.

Furthermore, the MX will not be developed by itself. It will interact with Minuteman missiles, whose destructive properties are being understated in every way possible by U.S. officials. But after all, the re-equipping of 300 Minuteman 3 missiles with the new, more powerful and accurate MK-12A warheads will be completed in 1983. Official documents submitted to the Congress in 1983 by the Reagan Administration frankly acknowledged that this warhead "was designed for use against a broad range of targets, but recent plans have
concentrated more and more on its use against the growing number of hardened Soviet targets."

At the end of last year, U.S. heavy bombers began to be equipped with strategic cruise missiles—another first-strike system. The first thousand air-based cruise missiles will be deployed in the coming year. The development of the underwater component of U.S. strategic forces—the Trident ballistic missile submarines with properties approximating the parameters of land-based ICBM's—has also been stepped up. In numerical terms, all of these efforts should more than double the number of warheads on U.S. carriers of strategic weapons.

Finally, the "crowning touch" to all of these exercises to build up first-strike potential is the program announced by President Reagan on 23 March 1983 for the creation of a broad-scale antimissile system in outer space. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov stressed, "the adventurism and danger of this undertaking stem from the fact that all of these plans are based on the expectation of impunity, on the assumption that a first nuclear strike can be made and a retaliatory strike can be averted. The temptation to push the button is not far from this."

Although the creation of impenetrable antimissile defense is impossible and retaliation is inevitable for the aggressor, the danger of Washington's advancement to the crucial point would increase considerably, particularly in a critical situation.

The Reagan Administration's "arms control" policy has been accompanied by militaristic preparations since the first days of its existence. The dominant theme of this policy has been the naive expectation of unilateral advantages and the hope of destabilizing the strategic situation with the aid of arms limitation and reduction talks.

The proposals put forth by the United States between fall 1981 and summer 1983 have been cut from the same simple pattern. They are supposed to radically reduce the weapon systems in which the Soviet Union is stronger, leave the ones in which the United States is stronger untouched, and open up all the channels through which the United States intends to make new breakthroughs in the arms race in its search for the mirage of military superiority over the USSR.

Obviously, any U.S. and NATO attempts to destabilize the military-strategic balance will be countered by the Soviet Union. In a statement issued on 28 May 1983, for example, the Soviet Government issued a firm warning: If the agreement on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, excluding the possibility of the deployment of new American missiles here, is broken and if this should pose an additional threat to the security of the USSR and its allies, the Soviet Union will take timely and effective retaliatory steps in this area, and these will affect the United States as well as Europe. A fitting response will also be found for U.S. actions in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons, whether these concern the MX missile, cruise missiles or anything else of this kind. In spite of all this, the Soviet Union has invariably stressed its preference for another way of raising the overall level of military
strategic stability. This way is the radical reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe with strict adherence to the principle of equality and equivalent security.

At the talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, the USSR proposed a 25-percent reduction in the original ceiling specified in the SALT II treaty—that is, from 2,400 Soviet and U.S. strategic weapon carriers to 1,800. The number of nuclear charges on these carriers would be reduced considerably to equal negotiated levels. This would strengthen the parity of Soviet and U.S. strategic forces, and on a much lower level. This can only promote strategic stability.

At the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, the USSR proposed that they be reduced in such a way that it would have no more medium-range missiles and warheads than England and France. The number of medium-range aircraft on both sides—NATO and the USSR—would also be reduced to equal levels. This decision would strengthen stability in Europe. Furthermore, the USSR expressed its willingness to take the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe to the extreme—to free the continent of all nuclear weapons, both medium-range and tactical.

There is no discrepancy between the struggle to strengthen strategic stability and the moral aspects of nuclear disarmament in the Soviet approach. This unity of words and actions is most clearly reflected in the Soviet Union's unilateral pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This pledge is a moral and political challenge to the United States and NATO.

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W. EUROPEANS FEEL THREAT FROM U.S. ARMS PROGRAMS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 7-19

[Article by V. F. Petrovskiy: "Political Realism and Europe"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Political realism is a dictate of the times, an imperative of the present day. The future development of the international situation will be decided to a considerable extent this year: Either peace and detente will be consolidated or events will progress toward the point of nuclear catastrophe. This will depend primarily on whether new American nuclear missiles are deployed in Europe and whether the massive buildup of U.S. military strength, according to a program with a projected cost of a trillion and a half dollars, will begin to be carried out; in other words, either the American administration's irrational, adventuristic ambitions for military superiority will be put in action or common sense will prevail.

The question of political realism in connection with Europe is all the more pertinent because it is precisely in Europe that the category of realism was first transferred from the sphere of philosophy, literature and art to the sphere of politics, including foreign policy.

It is particularly important to adhere to the logic of political realism today: It is important not to waste time, not to allow Europe to become entangled in a new round of the nuclear missile race and not to allow the international situation to the reach the point at which events are no longer controllable.

It is not difficult to see, however, that an actual disregard for the objective conditions of today's world, coercion, authoritarian behavior, imperial ambitions and a reliance on force, especially military strength, are often passed off as realism in the West.

Obviously, this has nothing in common with genuine realism. The only realistic policy in the nuclear age is one envisaging the resolution of problems through negotiation, and not by force of arms; it must be a balanced policy, free of transitory and emotional considerations. It is now impossible to successfully pursue a foreign policy line without taking the interests and
capabilities of one's own state and of other states into account. A balance of interests is the basis on which political decisions on international problems must rest.

In connection with this, it is extremely important to search through the entire range of interests of different states to find coinciding or parallel interests and then to use these points of convergence in the coordination of other vectors, which might vary considerably in different states, particularly in the case of states belonging to different socioeconomic systems.

Realism in politics begins with a sober assessment of the situation. It presupposes the choice of a principal guideline for the adoption of specific measures and means to an end.

According to the logic of political realism, an assessment of the European situation points up the common vector of interests of the members of any political camp. This is the interest in averting nuclear catastrophe, which is threatening the entire world, especially the European continent, with incalculable disaster.

A sober assessment of the source of this threat is also important. It does not lie in the "Soviet menace" or the mythical "military superiority" of the Soviet Union, as Western propaganda alleges, but in the arms race and tension created by aggressive imperialist circles. These processes are generated by the attempts of the United States and the entire NATO bloc to secure a position of strength by achieving superiority in arms.

The arms race is not something that propels itself with fatal inevitability, but something that progresses according to the "action-reaction" principle. Ample proof of this can be found in a list of just the major milestones in this race. The creation of the atomic bomb: in 1945 in the United States and in 1949 in the USSR; the creation of the thermonuclear bomb: in 1952 in the United States and in 1953 in the USSR; the first nuclear submarine appeared in the United States in the middle of the 1950's and in the USSR at the end of the same decade; MIRV'd missiles appeared in the United States at the end of the 1960's and in the USSR in the middle of the 1970's. The United States is now preparing for the deployment of the new MX strategic missile system, which will force the Soviet Union to create a similar system; the plans to deploy hundreds of new missiles in Western Europe will force the USSR to make the appropriate response.

When we discuss the source of the danger of war, it is obvious that the peace program for the 1980's, announced by the 26th CPSU Congress, and the related plans for peaceful construction in the economic, social and other areas up to 1990 are quite far removed from the American "arms upgrading" program and the plans to increase the military spending of the NATO countries up to the end of the 20th century.

Apologists for the arms race "rationalize" it with the concept of the "balance of terror," which is ascribed the magical ability to deter any potential aggressor. In reality, the concept not only presupposes a continuing threat
of war but also stimulates the arms race, particularly in the case of nuclear weapons. After all, it is based on a militaristic postulate formulated by the ancient Roman military historian and writer Vegetius: "If you want peace, prepare for war."

The overseas advocates of the "balance of terror" are not contented with just the attempts to force Europe to live in fear on mountains of nuclear and conventional explosives. They have gone even further by making it the most probable "theater of war" where nuclear strikes would be exchanged without anyone pushing the buttons to launch strategic weapons.

Official Washington spokesmen are now discussing the possibility of "limited," "protracted" and other varieties of nuclear war. They are trying to calm people's fears by calling nuclear war acceptable. Only a person who deliberately closes his eyes to the realities of our era can fail to see that the nuclear flames, no matter how or where they start, will inevitably go out of control and will grow into a worldwide conflagration.

This is probably more obvious in Europe than anywhere else. A reality of the second half of the 20th century—that military force can no longer be used as an instrument of policy in relations between states with differing social structures—is particularly apparent on this continent, with its tragic experience of two world wars and extremely high population density and concentration of cities, material goods and cultural monuments. The unsuitability of military methods in the resolution of problems in today's world has also been illustrated clearly by events outside of Europe, such as the failure of the dirty U.S. war against the people of Indochina. In Europe, however, starting a war would be completely outside the bounds of common sense and expediency and would essentially be tantamount to suicide.

There is a close connection between military-political aims and the escalation of the arms race and its negative consequences. In accordance with the plans for "limited nuclear war," American military strategists are striving to move nuclear missiles to advanced frontiers in Western Europe. The plan to deploy new medium-range missiles there would stimulate the adventurism of the overseas nuclear maniacs by convincing them of the possibility of actually starting a war only in the European "theater," taking advantage of the fact that the nuclear warheads of missiles in Western Europe will take only one-fifth or one-sixth of the delivery time of missiles launched from the United States.

This approach is permeated with the desire for military superiority, which is just as dangerous as it is unrealistic. The concept of military superiority belongs on the particular pages of European history when victory in wars was calculated either by the number of combat elephants, as in the battle of Cannae, or the number of cannons, as in the battle of Waterloo. Under present conditions, military superiority is unattainable. The Soviet Union and its allies will not allow this to happen and will be able, just as they have been in the past, to make the appropriate convincing response to any challenge from the other side. As a result, military equilibrium will be restored, but on an even higher level of arms and military confrontation.
The result of a new round of the arms race will not be the consolidation of security but, on the contrary, the further augmentation of the threat to peace. Enough weapons have already been accumulated to destroy all life in Europe and the rest of the world several times over. The concentration of military strength in Europe alone is several times in excess of the combined power of European weapons from the time of the Roman legions to World War II. Under these conditions, it would be dangerous and insane to expect to win the arms race or to win a nuclear war.

The addition of new weapons to the nuclear equation in Europe will complicate its resolution, will undermine the stability of the military-strategic situation even more and will increase tension on the continent and in the rest of the world. A new round of the arms race would mean that nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction would become even more complex. This would considerably increase the difficulty of drafting international agreements on their limitation and reduction.

It is completely obvious that the haphazard growth of military arsenals is against the interests of peaceful cooperation and will keep the European countries from pooling their efforts to solve such global problems as the development of power engineering, the protection of the environment, the constructive use of the world ocean, the eradication of the most dangerous diseases and so forth. Militarism is a threat to the security, happiness and, last but not least, the very future of Europe.

In contrast to the machinations of the militaristic demons, genuine political realism offers the actual possibility of stopping the dangerous developments of the present day, rerouting them in a healthy direction, strengthening mutual trust, attaining the entire sequence of objectives in the limitation and reduction of weapon arsenals, particularly in the case of nuclear arms, and consistently lowering the level of military confrontation. The only requirement is the political will of states to unite their efforts in the consistent pursuit of the policy of detente, peace and disarmament.

Europe has the necessary prerequisites for the correct choice of genuine realism. All of the European states have experienced the advantages of detente. There are no states here whose interests would not be served by the preservation and multiplication of its results.

It is true that European detente did not put an end to all of the conflicts between states of different systems, but it certainly was not, as H. Kissinger alleged, only a "limited compromise" or an attempt to survive in a world where nuclear stormclouds are gathering. The processes resulting from detente are in line with the European states' deep and vital interests in security and cooperation.

It is quite indicative that even now, despite the icy winds and belligerent challenges coming from the camp of the opponents of detente, the material basis for peaceful cooperation, which was laid by the all-Europe conference in Helsinki, is still being developed. Political contacts between governments have become broader and more meaningful. Economic, scientific, technical and cultural contacts have increased and are acquiring new features.
The main thing, however, is the approximate balance of military strength between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It was and is the cornerstone of the entire edifice of detente erected in Europe.

In Europe this balance, which places specific quantitative and qualitative limits on military strength, extends to medium-range nuclear weapons and to conventional arms and armed forces. In the case of medium-range nuclear weapons (1,000 kilometers or more, but less than intercontinental), the balance of Soviet and NATO strength has remained approximately the same for several years—around 1,000 units on each side. Specifically, the NATO countries have 986 carriers of nuclear weapons of this range, including over 720 American land- and sea-based airplanes. Besides this, 64 ballistic missiles and 55 bombers constitute the English potential, and 98 missiles and 46 bombers constitute the French. The Soviet Union has 975 weapons of this kind. The medium-range weapons in NATO's possession can simultaneously launch 1.5 times as many nuclear charges as the USSR's weapons.¹

As for conventional weapons and general-purpose armed forces, there are 94 divisions from the NATO countries (counting Spain) in Europe, as compared to 78 divisions from the Warsaw Pact countries. Furthermore, a full American division consists of 16,000-19,000 men, and the West German division consists of more than 20,000, while the army divisions of the Warsaw Pact countries have a maximum of 11,000 soldiers.² In general, the correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces in Europe is 1.27:1 (2.123 million and 1.669 million personnel respectively).

It is significant that there is also an approximate balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries in Central Europe. The second exchange of official numerical data at the Vienna talks (on 1 January 1980) corroborated the approximate balance in this region in the total number of NATO and Warsaw Pact airborne and ground troops (991,000 and 979,000 personnel respectively, including 792,500 and 796,700 ground troops and 198,500 and 182,300 airborne troops).

The existence of this parity has been acknowledged more than once by experts and statesmen from the United States and other NATO countries. They have acknowledged it, but it has been an increasingly exasperated acknowledgement in recent years. On 5 June 1981, for example, A. Haig, who was then the U.S. secretary of state, said: "Approximate parity in strategic nuclear forces still exists" between the United States and the USSR. American spokesmen later began to allege that the balance had been tipped in favor of the Soviet Union or would be tipped in its favor (since the absurdity of the allegation that this could have happened in a year or a year and a half was already quite obvious). The purpose of this lie is self-evident: the attainment of military superiority under the cover of conversation about the need to "restore the balance."

Of course, it is not an easy matter to accept new realities. But this is the main feature of political realism. The supporters of this current of political thought in the West—prominent bourgeois politicians and diplomats—have
repeatedly pointed out the fact that intelligent political leadership consists in the ability to accept new ideas and discard old ones. One of the idols of contemporary Western diplomacy, Bismarck, often remarked that the most dangerous thing for a diplomat was to give in to illusions. Another authority, Gladstone, taught that the main thing in politics is the ability "to determine one's obligations in line with circumstances and as they arise."

Even now, authoritative members of the ruling class in the West are advising the adjustment of the militaristic policy of Washington and NATO with a view to present realities. The bases of this policy, according to M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. McNamara and J. Smith, who occupied high positions in various American administrations, "were originally laid when U.S. superiority in nuclear weapons was overwhelming, but this superiority ceased to exist long ago and cannot be restored."

Realism demands the acknowledgement of these facts as a prerequisite for efforts to reduce the danger of war and to limit and then disarm military arsenals. Europe now has tremendous intellectual potential, capable of finding answers to the most difficult and complicated problems. Its role in the resolution of the most important global problems—the preservation of life and civilization on our planet—must be commensurate with its historically determined place in the world.

It is significant that the bases of the realistic approach were already negotiated by states during the period of detente and were recorded in the final act of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe and in the bilateral documents of the USSR and the United States and of the socialist and capitalist countries of Europe.

The final document of the first special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament, which was adopted unanimously by the members of this organization, says that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear armaments, "is now more likely to endanger than to protect the future of nations. For this reason, the time has come to put an end to this, to prohibit the use of force in international relations and to seek security through disarmament."

Roads leading in this direction are already being paved in Europe.

The most important are the SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS ON THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, the latest round of which began on 17 May 1983. The positive outcome of these talks could break the vicious circle in which the actions of one side are counteracted by the other. In this case, realism means that BOTH SIDES must work toward a lower level of nuclear confrontation and must participate in reductions.

What did the United States bring to these talks? The main element of the so-called "zero option" with which it began the talks, and on which theme it is still playing variations, is the suggestion to eliminate only one type of medium-range nuclear weapon—the land-based missile—and only on the part of one nuclear power in Europe—the Soviet Union. The American administration has refused to reduce its own medium-range nuclear weapons deployed on the
European continent and has objected to the inclusion of English and French weapons in the total. At the same time, it has tried to reduce Soviet weapons not only in the European part of the USSR but also in all other Soviet regions, as a result of which the number of Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe would be cut by more than half while the number of NATO weapons would not be reduced by even a single unit. In fact, this number could even rise. The regional and global balance of power, which is now distinguished by approximate parity, would be undermined dramatically, and the situation in Europe and the rest of the world would be less stable.

The so-called "intermediate" solution now proposed by the United States has not changed the essence of the American approach. It has the same purpose as the "zero option"—to change the balance of nuclear forces in Europe in NATO's favor. Neither the English and French nuclear weapons nor the American nuclear air carriers are included in the "zero" or "intermediate" options, but they both demand the eradication of medium-range Soviet missiles even in the Asian part of the USSR, although this has nothing to do with Europe.

It is clear that the aim of the U.S. approach is not a lower level of nuclear confrontation in Europe, but the attainment of unilateral military advantages. It is also clear that this approach has nothing in common with political realism. It does not attest to a sober U.S. assessment of the world situation or of U.S. capabilities and the capabilities of the other side. How can it demand that the Soviet Union agree to unilateral disarmament and ignore the more than 720 American planes capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which constitute U.S. forward-basing strength in Europe, and the more than 260 English and French nuclear missiles and aircraft aimed at targets on Soviet territory and the territory of other socialist countries?

All of this suggests that Washington would like to break the agreement and call the talks a failure so that it can deploy its missiles in Europe. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the NATO countries have invariably confirmed their intention, under U.S. pressure, to begin the emplacement of these weapons at the end of 1983 if an agreement has not been reached at the talks prior to that time. This approach, which is tantamount to setting an artificial deadline for the talks, could mean that the talks will be delayed so that the absence of an agreement can be used as an excuse for the actual deployment of American missiles. In short, the United States does not want to give up its attempts to undermine the approximate balance of forces in the European zone and to gain a decisive advantage for NATO either through the unilateral disarmament of the USSR or through the dramatic augmentation of its own, already considerable nuclear strength in Europe.

The Soviet Union is prepared to go quite far. As we know, the USSR has proposed the eradication of all types of nuclear weapons in Europe, both medium-range and tactical. This would be the real zero option.

If the other side is not ready for this kind of radical solution, the USSR has proposed the mutual reduction of medium-range weapons to less than a third of the previous number. In particular, it is willing to keep only as many missiles in Europe as England and France have there—that is, the USSR and the
NATO countries would still have 162 missiles each. This means that the Soviet Union would reduce the number of its medium-range missiles by hundreds, including dozens of its most modern missiles, called the SS-20 in the West. This solution would be fair to both sides—the Warsaw Pact and NATO—and would set the lowest possible equal levels under present conditions. Furthermore, if the number of English and French missiles should be reduced in the future, the USSR would reduce the quantity of its missiles by the same number. In addition to this, the Soviet side proposed the reduction of Soviet and NATO planes carrying nuclear weapons to equal levels. This would mean that each side would retain 138 medium-range planes, and this number could be reduced on a mutual basis in the future.

The Soviet Union went even further. It announced its willingness to negotiate the equality of nuclear potential in Europe both in terms of carriers and in terms of warheads, but certainly with the inclusion of English and French weapons. This would maintain the approximate balance between the USSR and NATO in carriers of medium-range nuclear weapons—that is, missiles and aircraft—as well as in the number of warheads on them, and this would be a balance on a much lower level than at present.

It is obvious that the Soviet proposals are more realistic and are aimed at an honest and fair agreement. They hold out the promise of a real solution to the problem of limiting nuclear weapons in Europe and can "completely guarantee," as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov said in his replies to West Germany's SPIEGEL magazine, "real equality and truly equal strength." They can only be interpreted differently by those who believe that there is something more important than the preservation of peace and life on earth.

The United States, however, has continued to publicize the Reagan Administration's so-called "zero" and "intermediate" options, which are actually designed to undermine the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. Both of them are devoid of a realistic basis and are dictated by the desire to accomplish the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Europe in one way or another.

Washington has tried to conceal its unconstructive position behind a propaganda screen. On the one hand, people there declare that the talks are being conducted in a serious and businesslike manner. On the other, they immediately contradict themselves by alleging that progress is being impeded by the insidiousness of the Soviet Union. They are also spreading the rumor that the Soviet Union will give in eventually, when the time comes to act on the NATO decision. The purpose of this tactic is obvious: It is supposed to quell antimissile demonstrations in Western Europe and simultaneously test the strength of the USSR's nerves by means of an exercise in blackmail.

Another important road to security is represented by the VIENNA TALKS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMS IN CENTRAL EUROPE—a region which has been the detonator of the two world wars that took the lives of 65 million people. The actual lack of progress in these talks is an understandable cause for alarm. The NATO countries are obviously trying to delay them and to use them as screens to conceal the buildup of their own military potential, including their strength in Central Europe. After rejecting the proposal put forth
by the socialist countries in 1974 on a moratorium on the number of armed forces and arms during the negotiation period, the United States sent 35,000 more troops to this region; the Soviet Union, on the other hand, unilaterally withdrew 20,000 of its servicemen, 1,000 tanks and other military equipment from the territory of the GDR.

The NATO countries' attempts to extend reductions only to specific components of armed forces are also aimed at the acquisition of unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the legitimate interests of the socialist community countries. It is no coincidence that the United States and its allies have refused to reduce or even to limit airborne forces. They are planning for an unprecedented buildup of military preparations and have therefore refused to consider the reduction of arms and combat equipment, in spite of the agreements reached during preparatory consultations. The Western side is insisting on an extremely awkward and cumbersome package of so-called "concomitant measures," including completely unjustifiable measures of control, and has demanded that some of them extend far beyond the boundaries of Central Europe. This is also inconsistent with the negotiated object of the talks. This is an obviously unrealistic position.

The realism of the position taken by the USSR and other socialist countries at the Vienna talks consists primarily in the fact that all of the proposals put forth by the Warsaw Pact states during the discussions in the Austrian capital are based on strict consideration for the security of both sides and are consistent with the agreements reached on the object of the talks during preparatory consultations (January–June 1973). In accordance with the principle of reciprocity, the socialist countries have insisted that the process of reduction must include both airborne and ground troops and both the number of armed forces and the number of arms of all states having troops in Central Europe. This approach could effectively lower the level of military confrontation in the center of the European continent.

Taking a completely serious and responsible approach to the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe and to a lower level of military confrontation in this region, the socialist states have not limited themselves to the simple acknowledgement of the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Vienna. Their top leaders put forth a group of new proposals and considerations in the Prague political declaration of 5 January 1983, including proposals pertaining directly to the talks in Vienna.

In line with these initiatives and in the hope of ending the impasse at the talks, on 17 February of this year the socialist countries proposed a totally realistic, simple and practical way of reaching an agreement in Vienna, namely the negotiation of the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact troops in Central Europe to equivalent collective levels of 900,000 people on each side, regardless of differences in the number of troops they have at present. Each side would independently determine the best ways of reducing its collective armed forces to the necessary ceilings. It is significant that no side would have more than 900,000 people in its armed forces in Central Europe, including no more than 700,000 ground troops.
The purpose of this new socialist proposal is to overcome, without injuring the security of either side, the so-called "numerical barrier" erected by the West—that is, the unproductive and futile arguments about which side has more or less soldiers—and thereby to make the necessary reductions possible. The socialist countries firmly believe that all of the necessary prerequisites exist so that an agreement can be reached at the Vienna talks quite soon—within a year.

So that the level of military confrontation in the center of Europe can begin to be lowered without any further postponements or delays, the socialist countries have proposed that the first practical step toward the reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe be taken by the Soviet Union and the United States as a mutual example, outside the bounds of a treaty.

The USSR is willing to withdraw another 20,000 of its ground troops, in addition to the 20,000 Soviet servicemen recalled earlier from the territory of the GDR on a unilateral basis, from Central Europe within the next year on the condition that the United States withdraw 13,000 people from its ground forces from the region within the same period.

The socialist countries proposed the negotiation of mutually acceptable and appropriate measures to verify this specific move and larger reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces.

The socialist countries proposed that the reduction of Soviet and American troops as a mutual example be followed by a freeze on the armed forces and armament levels of all direct participants in the talks, which would remain in effect throughout the negotiation period.

The socialist proposals do not put anyone in an unequal position. They will have the same meaning for both sides. They provide a real opportunity to achieve concrete positive results by abandoning all types of arguments. All that is required is the political will of the sides.

Another way of curbing the arms race in Europe would be THE CONTINUATION OF THE PROCESS BEGUN IN HELSINKI. It is with good reason that the military aspects of European security, primarily the organization of a conference on confidence-building measures and on security and disarmament in Europe, are the central topic of discussion at the current Madrid meeting of the states party to the all-Europe conference. In line with the wishes of many West European countries, the Soviet Union agreed that future confidence-building measures would be substantial in the military sense, would be politically binding and would be accompanied by appropriate forms of verification corresponding to their content.

The Soviet side also took an important constructive step in the determination of the zone of application of these measures. It announced its willingness to extend the measures to the entire European part of the USSR, but only on the condition that the zone also be extended by the Western states, since otherwise—and this is precisely what the United States wants—the balance of forces and interests in Europe would be destroyed. Since NATO's military preparations do not begin at the continental edges of Europe, the confidence-building
measures should extend to the maritime regions and air space adjacent to Europe. Of course, this applies only to the part of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to Europe and does not include the territory of the United States and Canada. The boundaries of these maritime regions and air space can be clarified at the conference. This also reflects the realism of the Soviet approach, since it would obviously be difficult to determine the precise boundaries at the Madrid meeting.

Therefore, the basis of a solution—and, what is more, a realistic basis, consistent with the interests of all parties to the conference on security and cooperation in Europe—exists. All that is needed is for the West to give up its unrealistic attempts to tip the balance of power in its own favor and to gain unilateral advantages at the expense of the Soviet Union.

In addition to requiring progress at current talks, the realistic approach to European affairs demands dialogue on other pertinent questions of military detente and arms limitation in Europe.

Now that international tension has reached a dangerous level as a result of constant steps to escalate the arms race, THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY PROPOSED BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ON THE MUTUAL NON-USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WARSAW PACT AND NATO COUNTRIES would be of great significance in the establishment of a healthier atmosphere and the restoration of the shaken faith in peace. If an agreement could be reached to exclude the possibility of an armed confrontation between these groups of states, an essentially new and immeasurably better atmosphere would be created to stop the current dangerous course of events, give the process of detente new momentum and thereby attain all successive objectives in the limitation and reduction of arms, particularly nuclear weapons.

In essence, the parties to this treaty would be obligated not to initiate the use of nuclear or conventional weapons against one another and, consequently, not to initiate the use of military force in general against one another. This completely refutes the "counterargument" that the Soviet Union supposedly intends to use conventional weapons for an attack on Western Europe. It is on the strength of this argument that the United States and its nuclear NATO allies are refusing to follow the USSR's example in pledging not to use nuclear weapons first.

An important feature of the treaty proposed by the socialist countries is that it envisages not only international legal obligations on the non-use of military strength, but also several other extremely significant obligations to consolidate peace and reinforce trust and mutual understanding. For example, the treaty is supposed to contain a pledge by both sides to negotiate, in a spirit of goodwill, effective measures to curb the arms race, limit and reduce weapons and accomplish disarmament. This underscores the organic connection between the moral and political aspects of security and practical steps toward disarmament, thereby heightening its effectiveness. The treaty could be drafted and signed by members of both alliances and by all other interested European states, and it could later be signed by any world state wishing to do so.
In the struggle for peace in Europe, the socialist countries are not setting priorities and are not claiming a monopoly on the truth. The main thing is to avoid standing still, to advance in all important directions and to conduct parallel and simultaneous talks on various problems. Success in one area will promote advancement in other directions. This is the principled approach of the socialist states to European and world affairs.

As we know, at the end of 1982 the SWEDISH GOVERNMENT approached the USSR, the other Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO states WITH THE PROPOSAL THAT A ZONE FREE OF "BATTLEFIELD NUCLEAR WEAPONS," APPROXIMATELY 300 KILOMETERS IN WIDTH, BE CREATED IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE SEPARATING THE WARSAW PACT STATES FROM THE NATO COUNTRIES. The Soviet Union has already made its reply and, as in all cases of proposals aimed at the actual curtailment of the arms race and reinforcement of security, the reply was affirmative.

Furthermore, considering the technical and tactical characteristics of the nuclear weapons in question, the capabilities of tactical aviation, which is one of the main components of the battlefield weapon arsenal, and the increasing range of tactical missiles, the Soviet Union proposed the width of the zone be 500-600 kilometers instead of 300. This would make the zone truly effective and would aid in the considerable reduction of the nuclear threat. It would help to alleviate the tense atmosphere of nuclear confrontation, which has taken shape in Europe, particularly in its central region, and is being compounded by the actions of NATO countries. With a view to these considerations, the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate the geographic dimensions of the zone and other matters, including the verification of the fulfillment of obligations with regard to this zone.

THE SOVIET UNION SUPPORTS PROPOSALS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN OTHER PARTS OF EUROPE, as it regards their creation as an important sphere of the struggle to consolidate peace and security in Europe and as one way of freeing the entire continent of nuclear weapons—both tactical and medium-range.

In particular, this kind of zone could be created in Northern Europe. Finland proposed this long ago, and the Soviet Union has repeatedly declared its positive attitude toward this specific proposal. The USSR is willing to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North European countries included in the nuclear-free zone—that is, the countries refusing to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or to allow their emplacement within their territory. This guarantee could be secured either by means of a multilateral agreement with Soviet participation or by means of bilateral agreements with all of the countries in the zone. The Soviet Union will not make this pledge conditional upon a positive attitude toward the zone on the part of other nuclear powers, although the creation of this zone would obviously be of much greater value to its participants if the NATO nuclear powers could also make this pledge.

It is also significant that the USSR does not exclude the possibility of discussing some other measures, and substantial ones, in Soviet territory adjacent to the nuclear-free zone in Northern Europe.
A nuclear-free zone could also be created on the opposite, southern flank of the European continent—in the Balkans. Its creation has already been suggested by several countries in this region, and the Soviet Union supports this proposal because it believes that this would consolidate security in this zone and in Europe as a whole.

The Mediterranean region could become a zone of peace and cooperation if an agreement could be reached on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from the Mediterranean Sea and on the refusal to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the Mediterranean non-nuclear countries.

Another direction in which steps must be taken is the STRUGGLE TO FREE EUROPE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. This objective, which is important in itself, is particularly pertinent now that the Pentagon is drafting plans (and already carrying them out) for the creation of new, so-called binary chemical weapons, intended for deployment in Europe. In the Prague political declaration, the Warsaw Pact countries express their willingness to join other interested states in the investigation of all possible ways and means of banning chemical weapons on the continent and beginning the necessary negotiations.

The Soviet Union favors the negotiation of all these matters. The main thing is to move on to practical action. This will be possible only if all European states unite their efforts in pursuit of the policy of detente, peace and disarmament.

The peaceful initiatives of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community are evidence of their determination to do everything possible to strengthen security in Europe, ensure the positive development of intergovernmental relations on the continent and improve the atmosphere throughout the world.

Within the context of this realistic approach, however, it is also obvious that progress in the improvement of the European situation cannot be expected if only one side is striving for this, if it is the only one to put forth initiatives and proposals while the other side refuses to consider them. Positive results cannot be expected in the absence of reciprocity.

Unfortunately, recently we have frequently encountered precisely this situation. Examples are not difficult to find. The talks on medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe have already been discussed. The Vienna talks are another example. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have met their Western partners more than halfway in these talks, but no reciprocal movement has been seen on the other side. Furthermore, on some matters the position of the Western side is even more negative now than it was several years ago. This means that even if there is some movement on the West's part, it is a movement away from agreement instead of toward it. The situation in Madrid is another example. Here the United States and its most zealous apprentices cannot even find the time to discuss the new Soviet initiatives. There is no question that this kind of approach cannot produce positive results.

When the Soviet Union speaks of the realistic nature of its foreign policy initiatives, it means that they are in our interest but they also take the
position of the other side into account. Furthermore, the USSR is willing to consider the ideas of other states, as it did when it supported the Swedish Government's recent proposal.

One of the main requirements of political realism consists in moving ahead and striving for practical results in negotiations instead of simply maintaining and expanding forums for dialogue. In the Soviet Union's opinion, the purpose of talks with the United States and other Western countries, Yu. V. Andropov remarked, particularly talks on ways of curbing the arms race, does not consist in an official record of disagreements. The USSR views these talks as a way of uniting the efforts of various states for the sake of results benefiting all sides.

The geographic fact that the sun sets in the West, which is reflected in the very name "Europe" (from the Phoenician word "ereb" or "irib," meaning sunset), has given many thinkers, particularly philosophers of the pessimistic school, a basis for allegories to substantiate the inevitable approach of "darkness"—wars, fascism and even the death of European civilization as such. But after all, this natural phenomenon could be viewed in a different way, and in line with the same allegories. In the soft and mild rays of the setting sun, the European cultural experience accumulated over centuries is seen in sharp detail, and the centuries-old wisdom, common sense and humanism of the most progressive European minds, associating the future of Europe with peace and prosperity, are illuminated. And if we must turn to historical imagery, would it not be better to remember that the ancient Greeks gave the name Europa to their goddess of the age-old human occupation of farming. But before this vitally necessary work can be performed in peace, lethal weapons must be removed from the European fields and swords must be reforged into ploughshares.

The tendency to make references only to sad past experience, connected with the fact that the main international conflicts of the 20th century, both world wars, began here, signifies a refusal to see something else: that it was precisely this experience that made the European people aware of the disastrous consequences of war.

The Soviet Union does not approve of pessimism and resignation and believes that Europe can and should fight for a better future. The main thing now is to take immediate measures to strengthen peace and detente. This is essential and it is dictated by the realistic approach to problems in Europe and in international life in general. During the period of detente Europe set an example in the development of relations of peace and cooperation between states, and under present conditions it can and must set an example of political realism in the interest of peace and in the interest of present and future generations.

FOOTNOTES

2. We can also cite data on several important indicators of weapons.

TACTICAL AVIATION AND HELICOPTERS: Despite the slightly higher number of combat planes in the Warsaw Pact countries, NATO has the advantage in the combat capabilities of aviation support and in the number of helicopters.

The correlation of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in this area is the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat planes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombing payload with a delivery range of 185 kilometers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1</td>
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TANKS: Before Spain entered NATO, the Warsaw Pact states had a slight advantage in tanks. After Spain entered NATO, however, this slight advantage ceased to exist. The U.S. and NATO leaders include only the tanks under the jurisdiction of the bloc's united armed forces command in Europe among their own. In this way, they considerably underestimate the number of tanks they possess (supposedly less than 12,000 in all). In fact, the forces of the NATO countries (including Spain) have more than 17,000 tanks. Besides this, around 1,500 American tanks and 6,500 tanks belonging to West European NATO countries are stored in Europe. Consequently, in terms of the total number of tanks (25,000) the NATO countries are not surpassed by the Warsaw Pact countries, and in terms of the number of antitank weapons the NATO states hold the advantage.


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ESCALATION OF U.S. INTERFERENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 20-30

[Article by A. V. Kuz'mishchev]

[Text] The Sandinist people's revolution in Nicaragua, which ended in victory on 19 July 1979 and put an end to the Somoza regime that had served Washington so faithfully for more than 40 years, evoked something like shock in U.S. official circles. For 20 years all of their efforts had been aimed at the isolation and destruction of socialist Cuba. But the new upsurge of revolution in Central America proved quite conclusively that the revolution in Nicaragua and the Cuban revolution were not isolated events, but stages of a growing revolutionary struggle in the countries of this region. The collapse of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua marked the beginning of a chain reaction of crises in the puppet and oligarchic regimes in the subregion, which had been loyal to the United States and had helped American imperialism secure its hegemony here for decades.

The flames of civil war engulfed El Salvador in the first months of 1980, and the patriots of this country have been waging a selfless, heroic struggle for more than 3 years against the pro-American puppet regime and all those who are aiding it—both directly and indirectly. The broad popular masses in Guatemala have been actively involved in the struggle against the brutal rule of the successive dictatorships of the last three decades. In Honduras the growth of the antimilitarist, antigovernmental and anti-imperialist movement led to a situation in which the military elite had to give up direct rule of the country and turn the government over to centrist bourgeois politicians. In Costa Rica the increasing influence of united leftist forces forced the local oligarchy to put nationalist-reformists behind the wheel of state in order to make an attempt at reinforcing the capitalist order here with the aid of social demagogy.

The attempts of the ideologists and theorists of the U.S. ruling class to find the reasons why Washington policy is at an impasse have led to the publication of special studies. The authors of two of them, published in 1980, determined to also decide what American policy in Central America in the 1980's should be. It is particularly significant that the authors of both studies are members of the intellectual elite of the American establishment, which generally provides the personnel for the "think tanks" that make U.S. foreign policy. A
comparison of their views reveals the ideological baggage of recommendations lying at the basis of Washington's current policy line in relations with Central America.

The first (in order of publication) of these documents is officially called "A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties," but it is better known as the "Santa Fe Document." Its authors, a group of conservative professors and several retired generals who once held prominent positions in the Pentagon, belong to the Committee of Santa Fe, which is something like a political club close to the Republican Party leadership. The official name of the document alone reflects the authors' pretensions to a global approach to U.S. foreign policy issues. It contains many statements about Western Europe and Japan, including the opinion that the alliance with them constitutes the "basis of U.S. power"; in the Western Hemisphere they assign Canada the role of a faithful ally, blindly following in the wake of Washington policy; in their discussions of the Latin American countries, the "Santa Feans" advocate the "revival of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine" and stronger military cooperation within the framework of the "Rio Pact." But the "Santa Fe Document" assigns a special role to policy toward the Central American states, calling them the "strategically vulnerable underbelly" of the United States.

The tone of the study is set in the foreword, the author of which, President R. Doxey of the Council for Inter-American Security, writes: "The part of the Western Hemisphere lying south of our border could be called the American Balkans, by analogy with the explosive region of southern Europe that became the detonator of World War I." According to the "Santa Fe Document," Central America "has fallen into the clutches of the Soviet bear"; the "Marxist conquest of Nicaragua" and "Soviet expansion" have turned the Caribbean Sea into a "Marxist-Leninist lake." On the basis of this premise, the authors of the document conclude that America must once again assume the role of a cementing, incontestable force in the Western Hemisphere and sound the call for a struggle for "liberty" and "national interests." They also suggest the appropriate methods—"decisive action like the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965." In general, the Latin Americans deserve punishment, the authors state, particularly Nicaragua and Cuba, and primarily Cuba, where the economic blockade should be supplemented with overt punitive measures. Besides this, the report recommends the resolute support of the United States' "faithful allies" in El Salvador and Guatemala (that is, the puppet dictatorships in these countries). The Carter Administration, according to the "tough guys" from the Committee of Santa Fe, was incapable of implementing their recommendations; the struggle against the "red menace" required a "militant president," under whose leadership America could win "World War III" and so forth.

In May 1980, when the "Santa Fe Document" was published, it might have been interpreted as spiteful attacks on the Carter Administration by a group of conservatives inclined to "look for reds under their beds." At that time their connection with Ronald Reagan, who had not won the Republican Party nomination for the presidency yet, did not attract any attention. The fact that Reagan's emissaries toured the Central American capitals to contact the leaders of regimes loyal to Washington and to give them generous promises of increased aid on behalf of their boss if he should be able to settle in the White House, was not publicized at that time either. Reagan himself received visitors from El Salvador, Guatemala and other countries of the subregion at that time and assured them of his support.
The "Santa Fe Document" is read and interpreted in a completely different way today, now that its recommendations have become the basis of the Republican administration's policy in Central America, and now that the escalation of U.S. interference in the affairs of the countries of this region is posing a real threat to their peace and security.

The possibility of an election victory by Ronald Reagan was one of the main reasons for the publication of a second document, entitled "A Unique View of El Salvador and Central America." The study was prepared by a State Department task force on El Salvador and Central America and was submitted to the Carter Administration on 6 November 1980—that is, when it became obvious that the White House would have a new master. Under these conditions, the report could serve as a program of action for the administration of the defeated Democrats for only the 60 days of the transition period—just until Ronald Reagan's inauguration. Following the administration's instructions, the authors gave the report the form of an analysis of the personal views of officials from the U.S. State Department, National Security Council, Defense Department, CIA and several other agencies. These influential members of the Washington establishment decided to use this kind of official channel to express their personal misgivings and dissatisfaction with the futile involvement in a conflict reminiscent of the U.S. war in Southeast Asia. The opinions set forth in the document contradicted the policy pursued by its authors in their capacity as U.S. government officials, and this duality affected the content of the document.

The report stated that American policy toward El Salvador was at an impasse and that the United States was bound hand and foot by its support of a weak and unpopular regime in a position of international isolation; a similar situation had taken shape in relations with Guatemala; American contacts with the reactionary military clique in Honduras, to which the United States has assigned the role of subregional policeman, were in acute conflict with the nationwide democratic, antimilitarist and antioligarchic movement in this country; Washington was not taking the broad international support for Sandinist Nicaragua into account. The authors also noted that Mexico and some other Latin American countries did not agree with all or part of Washington's actions in the Caribbean basin; they pointed out the inevitability of conflicts over this issue between the government and the American people if the United States should embark on direct intervention in Central America.

The authors of this document felt that the situation could be corrected by the peaceful resolution of the Salvadoran crisis. This primarily signified recognition of the Democratic Revolutionary Front and the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation, which have been fighting against the pro-American regime and are a representative political force. They advocated the rejection of "confrontation"—that is, of interventionist plans—and advised non-participation in the talks between the Salvadoran Government and the patriots, as Washington had been discredited too much by its support of reactionary forces in this country. In this way, according to the authors, the United States could effectively promote the establishment of a "pluralist democratic regime" in the country and thereby keep circles loyal to Washington active in Salvadoran politics. Although they were blinded enough by their anticommunism to call for the "restriction of Soviet and Cuban expansion" in Central America
and painted a "frightening picture" of the waves of "internationalist brigades," acting on orders from the Kremlin, rolling "across the isthmus from Colombia to the Mexican border," their point of view essentially represented a realistic alternative to the shameless expansionism of the "Committee of Santa Fe." President J. Carter, however, did not agree to any changes in the then growing U.S. interference in El Salvador.

Soviet researchers have correctly noted that this "inconsistency" corroborates Lenin's well-known thesis that the bourgeoisie "develops two systems of government and two methods of struggle for its own interests and in defense of its own supremacy. These two methods are used either alternately or in various combinations. The first is the method of violence, the method of refusing to make any kind of concessions to the labor movement, the method of supporting all old and outdated institutions and the method of the intransigent rejection of reforms... The second method is the method of 'liberalism,' of steps in the direction of broader political rights, in the direction of reforms and concessions and so forth."4

The United States' relations with its southern neighbors clearly illustrate the depth and accuracy of V. I. Lenin's analysis. The events of the two past decades provide ample proof of this. The liberal reformism of the "New Frontier" policy certainly did not keep President J. Kennedy from sanctioning the intervention against Cuba that ended in such a disgraceful failure in the Bay of Pigs. The invasion of the Dominican Republic under President L. Johnson completely buried the myth, engendered for the gullible by the "Alliance for Progress," that the United States had abandoned the "big stick" policy. President R. Nixon offered the Latin Americans an "equal partnership" within the framework of the "New Dialogue" but simultaneously sanctioned the operation dreamed up by H. Kissinger for the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. J. Carter waged a "campaign for human rights," during the course of which halfhearted criticism of terrorist regimes evolved into support for the bloody dictatorship in El Salvador and the active U.S. interference in the civil war in this country began.

The Reagan Administration has been even more frank in declaring its expansionist plans for all of Latin America. Central America is the main target of American imperialism. The United States is willing and able to take virtually any steps to prevent the victory of revolutionary forces in El Salvador and Guatemala, to isolate Nicaragua in the subregion and in the Western Hemisphere in general, if not in the entire world, to undermine the position of the Sandinistas within the country and, finally, to stop the spread of socialist Cuba's influence in Central America.

For this purpose, the Reagan Administration, as noted previously, took the path recommended by the "Santa Feans," although it also undertook some diplomatic maneuvers to renovate the facade of the regimes in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador and to make them resemble "representative bourgeois democracy" as much as possible. Washington needed this as the propaganda foundation for its own interventionist plans: It is easier to give military and political assistance to bloody dictatorships disguised as "democracies" than to discredited juntas whose evil deeds are known to the entire world.
The beginning of this operation dates back to Carter's time, to 1980, when centrist politicians loyal to the United States took the wheel of state in Honduras as a result of Washington's efforts to quell the popular antimilitarist movement in the country. The top army leaders moved into the background, where they were able to recover from the wounds inflicted by the laboring public. The militarists did retain, however, the right of autonomy in relations with the United States. Taking advantage of this, Washington began to turn the Honduran army into its own policeman in the subregion.

These attempts to "democratize" the dictatorships were much more vigorous in 1982: Presidential elections were held in Guatemala at the beginning of March and elections for the Salvadoran "constituent assembly" were held at the end of that month. The Washington-inspired game of democracy was stopped, however. The new president of Guatemala was unable to take office because the falsification of ballots was so flagrant; a hastily organized military coup changed the results of the scandalous election campaign. In El Salvador the elections were essentially army operations to herd the population into the polling booths and they were accompanied by the same brand of counterfeit ballots. As a result, the government was taken over by rabid "ultras" whose misanthropic plans Washington is incapable of disguising.

As usual, the U.S. political actions were backed up by the appropriate dollar injections. In fiscal year 1981 alone, the Salvadoran rulers were offered 185 million dollars; military and economic aid to the rulers of Guatemala was resumed (11.8 million dollars) and Honduras was allocated 50 million dollars (more than in the last 20 years). As always, Washington publicized its "concern" for the needs of these countries, implying that its sops would somehow improve the state of their economy. This was exactly how President Ronald Reagan acted when he put forth the so-called "Caribbean initiative" in OAS headquarters in February 1982.

In essence, this "initiative" can be described in the following manner: The United States is willing to develop trade relations with the countries of the subregion, promote the investment of American capital there and offer these countries economic "aid," but certainly not for unselfish reasons. In particular, the countries would be expected to participate in the anticommunist "crusade" for which the current Republican administration has been appealing since the first days of its existence.

In July Ronald Reagan repeated these proposals at a breakfast attended by representatives of the U.S. business community. At that time a lobbyist group of businessmen was formed—a "coalition in support of the Caribbean initiative" with the aim of promoting economic aid to the countries of this zone. The fact that the coalition was headed by D. Rockefeller and F. Borman (once an American astronaut and now the president of Eastern Airlines, one of the largest American airlines) indicates whose interests the coalition represents.

What was the result of Reagan's "initiative" for the people of Central America?

First of all, the CIA's covert subversive operations against Nicaragua were activated. At the end of 1981 the CIA allocated 20 million dollars for the
training of a counterrevolutionary attack force, operating against the Sandinist government from the territory of Honduras. Around 4,500 of Somoza's former agents, criminals and counterrevolutionary refugees from Nicaragua are now on the payroll of various American special services. The 700 kilometers of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border have become a frontline, which the Sandinist army has had to defend against constant invasions by reactionary gangs acting with the obvious connivance of the Honduran authorities and with the blessings of the United States. The American embassy in Honduras has turned into something like a headquarters for the coordination of U.S. covert and overt operations in Central America. Washington has also exerted constant pressure on Costa Rica to force this country to follow Honduras' example. American military advisers have been sent back to Guatemala and are active in El Salvador.

The victory of the revolution in Nicaragua dealt a fatal blow to the so-called Central American Defense Council (CONDECA), which had performed the functions of a "stronghold" of American imperialism in the subregion. Washington quickly put together a new military-political bloc, which was joined in 1982 by Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador, and later by Guatemala. It was given a name fully in line with the hypocritical policy of the White House—the Central American Democratic Community (CADC). According to Washington's plans, the CADC was supposed to straighten out Nicaragua and stop the growth of the revolutionary movement in the countries of the isthmus.

The creation of aggressive military blocs is a favorite tactic of Ronald Reagan's "Santa Fean" associates. This is also attested to by the recent appearance in the Caribbean of another of this policy's offspring—a "regional security force" made up of the armed forces of the East Caribbean countries. Great Britain took an active part in the creation of this military organization along with the United States. In light of Washington's recent support of the English Conservative government's policy at the time of the crisis over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, this case of American-British cooperation shows how little imperialism cares about the interests of the countries the United States is trying to unite in some kind of "community of the Western Hemisphere" and whose interests it pretends to defend.

The "regional security force" is supposed to serve as a barrier to isolate socialist Cuba in the region of the Greater and Lesser Antilles, and as a striking force. It is expected to put an end to the genuine:people's government established on the island of Grenada in 1979 by the New Jewel Movement and to prevent the spread of revolutionary ideas to other Caribbean islands. The strategic support of the two military-political blocs is provided by this Latin American version of the "rapid deployment force" and is covered by the Caribbean operational unit created in 1979 and converted into a regional command in December 1981 (with its headquarters in Key West, Florida).

In December 1982 Ronald Reagan toured several Latin American countries. He visited Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras. In view of the present state of affairs, the itinerary had to include Central America. Reagan encountered the first difficulties of this tour even before he entered the subregion. In the Colombian capital of Bogota, he ran into something close to an affront from the new president of this country, Betancur. The head of the Colombian state frankly told the President that the resolution of problems
in Central America would demand peaceful methods, and not groundless attempts to blame Cuba and Nicaragua for everything.\(^7\)

A more loyal reception awaited Ronald Reagan in Costa Rica and Honduras, where he also met with the leaders of the Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes. Here the master of the White House generously "forgave the sins" of Guatemala's dictator Montt and El Salvador's "Provisional" President Magana by calling them "democrats to the core." The President of the United States promised them, as well as Honduran President Cordova, political support and military assistance. He was unable, however, to gain wholehearted support for his own anti-Nicaraguan policy from the Costa Ricans.\(^8\) It is indicative that Washington's first major action in the subregion following the President's visit to Central America was a set of joint American-Honduran maneuvers, conducted for provocative purposes near the Nicaraguan border at the beginning of 1983.

But the Reagan Administration's political adventures were thwarted by unexpected obstacles. All of the successive attempts to take reprisals against Nicaragua failed. In fact, the Sandinist government is winning increasing support both within the country and in the international arena. One indicator of this was witnessed at the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly, when the Latin American states nominated Nicaragua as their regional temporary member of the Security Council.

The course of the struggle in El Salvador has been just as discouraging for the "Santa Feans" entrenched in Washington. The patriots of this long-suffering country still hold the strategic initiative in the civil war, despite the military, economic and political aid its reactionary rulers have received from the United States.

The growing intensity of class struggle in Honduras is frustrating the local military establishment's attempts at active interference in the internal affairs of neighboring states in the capacity of a subregional policeman—a role Washington wanted it to play. In Guatemala public dissatisfaction has evolved into partisan warfare against the terrorist military junta. Under these conditions, although the national reformist leaders of Costa Rica allowed their country to be drawn into the CADC, they are in no hurry to become involved in Washington's anti-Nicaraguan adventures. As for the CADC itself, as soon as it made its appearance it was being compared to "a shaky tripod with only two sound legs."\(^9\) At that time it consisted of Honduras, Costa Rica and El Salvador, which was the broken leg of the defective tripod. Its stability was not improved when Guatemala joined the community a little while later.

All of this testifies that the method of violence, to which the Republican administration decided to resort in order to strengthen its own position in Central America, did not produce the results anticipated in Washington. This was the reason for the semblance of calm on the border in 1982 and 1983, which turned out to be a cover for preparations for a new, even more aggressive wave of escalated interference in Central American affairs. At this time, it might even have seemed that the ideas of the "Santa Fe Document" were no longer completely satisfactory to the White House. For example, Assistant U.S.
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs T. Enders repeatedly mentioned the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Salvadoran crisis in his statements, referring to possible negotiations between the authorities in San Salvador and members of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, representing patriotic forces in the country. The same types of statements were made by members of the puppet Salvadoran regime—"Provisional" President Magana and his then "strong man," General Garcia, Salvadoran minister of defense (who was dismissed from this office in April of this year for the defeats suffered by the government troops he headed).

The events of spring 1983 proved, however, that Washington had resolved to resume its anticommunist hysterics and its tough line in the subregion. In March 1983 President Reagan requested Congress twice to approve additional allocations in the amount of 110 million dollars in the current year and 86 million in the next year, fiscal year 1984, for military aid to El Salvador, and it was announced that more American military "advisers" would be sent to El Salvador.

American strategists cannot understand the real reasons for the intensification of the chronic crisis in the system of imperialist oppression and do not realize that these are internal in nature, stemming from the maintenance of conservative governmental structures and outdated forms of economic management and semifeudal oppression in Central America. They regard the revolutionary demonstrations of the popular masses in these countries as the result of the intrigues of "world communism," directed by "the hand of the Kremlin." They advise their clienteles to fight against the "red menace." But in today's world the puppet regimes are usually unable to contain the pressure of revolutionary war.

The success of socialist construction in Cuba and the victory of the people in Nicaragua are serving as tangible points of reference in the struggle of the laboring masses of Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.

This is evoking increasing animosity in imperialist circles in the Western world's strongest nation.

It was this spirit that permeated the recently published report of the planning group of the U.S. National Security Council on American policy in Central America and Cuba up to the end of fiscal year 1984. The contents of this document, compiled more than a year ago, are particularly interesting because they provide a basis for the comparison of White House words and actions.

The authors of the report stated that clear tendencies toward a stronger position for Sandinist Nicaragua and increased influence for Cuba were apparent in the Central American subregion. In connection with this, the planning group recommended more intense covert subversive actions against these countries and advised that these actions be camouflaged with a broad propaganda campaign in order to win Latin American and West European support for Washington's policy in Central America. As the document stressed, however, the United States could attain its goals only if the regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala, which depend on military, political and economic assistance from Washington, could gain a stronger position.
According to the authors, the attainment of U.S. policy goals in Central America up to the end of fiscal year 1984 will require almost a billion dollars a year in allocations to prop up the Salvadoran and Guatemalan regimes, to heighten the military potential of the Honduran Army—the United States' policeman in the subregion—and to make the CADC more effective and finance subversive activity against Nicaragua and Cuba.

The contents of the NSC report accord completely with the ideas set forth in the "Santa Fe Document." What is more, they have been reflected in the actions of the Republican administration during the year since its publication.

The "dramatic" statements by White House leaders that El Salvador would soon fall "into communist hands" marked the beginning of the latest round of escalated American interference in subregional affairs. This was the essence of statements made by the abovementioned T. Enders, Secretary of State G. Shultz and General Nutting, commander of the U.S. Southern Command. These statements "reinforced" J. Kirkpatrick's announcement, made after her trip to El Salvador in March, that the pro-American regime would not last long without immediate military assistance.12

A noisy campaign was launched to promote the extension of additional military credit to the Salvadoran rulers. It was accompanied by a large-scale invasion of Nicaragua by Somozist bandits, trained with U.S. aid. The two actions were interconnected and revealed the aggressive essence of Yankee policy in Central America, which was intensifying the crisis in this part of the Western Hemisphere.

While passions flared up in Washington over the weakness of the puppet government and the uncertainty of congressional approval of additional U.S. credit to El Salvador, the counterrevolutionary invasion by the army trained by the CIA on the territory of Honduras was being kindled. These CIA actions were contrary to the December 1982 resolution of the American Congress, prohibiting the financing of any activity aimed at undermining the Sandinist government in Nicaragua or at escalating the Honduran—Nicaraguan conflict. But this did not embarrass President Reagan and his associates, who had actually directed the actions of the invading forces through something like a headquarters known as a "special coordinating committee," the members of which include representatives of the CIA and the U.S. Southern Command. In Honduras the actions of the committee are overseen by the American ambassador to this country, J. Negroponte.

At the same time, the White House undertook a diplomatic assault on Mexico for its support of Nicaragua and progressive forces in El Salvador. But when U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz visited Mexico in the middle of April, he was unable to convince the Mexicans to give up the realistic policy they are pursuing in conjunction with Venezuela, Colombia and Panama with regard to events in Central America. The Mexican Government announced that it would continue adhering to the position of the "Contadora group," created at the beginning of this year at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama on the Panamanian island of Contadora.

During this meeting, representatives from these four countries expressed their worries about the escalation of U.S. interference in the affairs of Central
America, where a seat of international tension had come into being and could grow into an armed conflict. The "Contadora group" condemned U.S. interventionist plans, supported the right of the Central American people to independent development and social progress and advocated the settlement of all disputes between states of the subregion by means of negotiation.13

This was the aim of the group's proposal that a meeting of the foreign ministers of all five Central American states be held in the Honduran capital, Tegucigalpa, in April of this year, with representatives from Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama in attendance. The meeting was unproductive because the Salvadoran and Guatemalan dictatorships and the governments of Honduras and Costa Rica, incited by Washington, remained deaf to the peaceful proposals of Nicaragua and the Contadora states.

It must be said that all of the political propaganda spread by the American administration in connection with the crisis it had incited on the Central American isthmus did not deceive anyone, not even the American legislators. This was particularly apparent during the April debates in the U.S. Congress when the allocation of 60 million additional dollars to the Salvadoran regime in military aid in the current fiscal year was being considered. The Democratic majority in the House of Representatives took a skeptical view of the Republican administration's adventures in Central America, calling them a new 1980’s version of the anti-Cuban action in the Bay of Pigs that ended in such a disgraceful failure in 1961.14

To attain its goal, the White House inundated the congressmen with all sorts of guarantees, reaffirming its noble intention to found a "democracy" in El Salvador on American money. Ronald Reagan even appointed a special emissary, R. Stone, to oversee the establishment of "democracy" in El Salvador under the present puppet dictatorship. The criteria by which Stone will be guided in his activity can already be judged because he has already spent a long time in Washington representing a lobbyist group working in the interests of the successive dictatorial regimes in Guatemala.

But the main argument in favor of additional military aid to the regime in El Salvador was Reagan's speech about U.S. policy in Central America at a joint session of the House of Representatives and Senate. By tradition, presidents speak at joint sessions of the Congress only in extreme situations, when they must discuss problems pertaining to U.S. security. Only in this way, by artificially creating a turmoil over the imaginary "communist terrorist aggression" in the subregion, was Ronald Reagan able to save the plans of his administration from total failure.

The additional U.S. aid to the Salvadoran rulers was approved, although in an amount cut to 30 million dollars. This reaffirmed the duality of the political outlook of the American bourgeois establishment's so-called liberal wing, to which many Democratic congressmen belong. Class solidarity caused them to make an obviously halfhearted decision against their own common sense, which told them that the escalation of U.S. intervention in Central America would lead to a repetition of the Bay of Pigs incident. As a result, almost immediately after Reagan's address in the Congress, Somozist gangs supported by
regular Honduran army units began another broad-scale invasion of Nicaragua on 30 April. It is true that a select House committee on intelligence approved a resolution on 3 May which prohibited the CIA from aiding armed formations trying to overthrow the Sandinist government. This is far from the first resolution of its kind, however, and is not so much a restriction of White House activity as it is a confirmation of its participation in the intervention against Nicaragua.

More than half a century ago Augusto Cesar Sandino, the national hero of Nicaragua, warned that Yankee imperialism, the Latin American people's most evil enemy, wanted to put an end to their national dignity and liberty. The hegemonist content of the White House's present Central American policy proves that nothing has changed in the last 50 years. The Reagan Administration is again trying to justify its interventionist line with the need for struggle for the "values of Western civilization" against the expansion of "communist atheists." But these general statements quite often precede more specific and revealing explanations that the United States' "fourth border" supposedly runs through the territory of the independent states of Central America. Consequently, the struggle of the people of this subregion for their rights, in Washington's opinion, undermines U.S. security.

This thoroughly false thesis was exposed at the recent international conference in the Nicaraguan capital of Managua on "The Peace and Sovereignty of the People of Central America and the Caribbean." Conference speakers, supporters of peace from Latin America, Asia, Africa and Europe, stressed that poverty and underdevelopment, and not the "hand of the Kremlin," are the reason for the revolutionary struggle by the popular masses of the subregion. When Carlos Nunez Tellez, chairman of the Nicaraguan State Council and member of the FMLN national leadership, addressed the peace forum in Managua, he said that the United States must realize the senselessness of the war it is financing in Central America.

History is proving once again that American imperialism did not benefit from the hard lessons it learned in Cuba, Vietnam and Iran. People in Washington do not want to understand what happened in Nicaragua and what is now happening throughout Central America. All of this will inevitably make the situation in the region more explosive, and this is certainly not in the national interest of the United States.

FOOTNOTES


3. See, for example, E. S. Dabagyan, "The Cooperation of the Latin American Socialist Countries," LATINSKAYA AMERIKA, 1979, No 5; V. N. Lukin, "Washington Takes Aim Against Latin America," ibid., 1982, No 3;


7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 4 December 1982.

8. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 3, pp 66–70.


12. TIME, 4 April 1983, pp 34–35.


14. TIME, 4 April 1983, p 35.

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AMERICAN NEOCOLONIALISM: THE MONOPOLIES AND THE 'TRANSFER' OF TECHNOLOGY

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 31-42

[Article by R. I. Zimenkov]

[Text] The seventh conference of the heads of state and government of the nonaligned countries (New Delhi, March 1983), the sixth session of UNCTAD—the UN Conference on Trade and Development (Belgrade, June 1983) and several other recent forums and events have once again directed the attention of the international community and all people of the world to the developing countries' struggle to consolidate their political independence and economic self-sufficiency and their fight for a new international economic order. Questions connected with the technology trade between the developed capitalist powers, particularly the United States, and the developing countries are acquiring an increasingly important place in this struggle.

The profound progressive changes in many young states, their struggle against oppression and exploitation by American and world imperialism and the actual discrediting of imperialist ideology and practices in the former colonies and semicolonies have all motivated the United States to continue using its old, traditional methods of the economic subjugation of the emerging nations (the export of capital, "aid," trade and others) and also to find and make extensive use of new ways and means of keeping these countries in a dependent position in the world capitalist economy. It is within this context that we should examine the energetic U.S. attempts to make use of technological superiority and of scientific and technical achievements in the exploitation of these countries by American capital, especially the transnational corporations. It is not surprising that this policy is called "technological neocolonialism." Its chief purpose is the formation and maintenance of a system of economic relations between imperialist and developing states in the commercial transfer of equipment and technology to the latter which will secure their technological dependence in the strategic interests of present-day neocolonialism. Therefore, this phenomenon is essentially part of the total strategy of neocolonialism in its present form. The continuous technological revolution is making "technological neocolonialism" an increasingly important way of attaining Western economic and political goals in the developing countries.

To this end, the West is making energetic use of the huge scientific and technical gap separating imperialism from its economic periphery. The U.S. share
of the total research and development expenditures of all capitalist countries is now around 49 percent, for example, while the combined share of the Asian, African and Latin American countries is less than 4 percent. In 1981, U.S. R & D expenditures totaled 69.1 billion dollars, or 2.37 percent of the GNP, while the expenditures of the developing countries were just slightly over 2.8 billion dollars, or 0.3 percent of their combined GNP.3 There is also a sizeable gap between supplies of scientific personnel and engineers. At the beginning of the 1980’s there were 604 scientists and engineers engaged in R & D for each 100,000 inhabitants in the United States, while the figure for the developing countries was only 10.

These countries are striving to overcome their technological and economic underdevelopment, particularly through the acquisition and incorporation of foreign scientific and technical achievements. American imperialism is trying to take advantage of this in order to bind the newly liberated countries more closely to its own technological potential and to the U.S. economy. It is placing increasing emphasis on broad-scale technological expansion in these countries with the use of transnational corporations—the biggest suppliers of modern technology in the West and the chief partners of the developing states in the trade in patents, licenses, trademarks, equipment and consulting services. Around half of all of the international capitalist trade in technology now consists in transactions between transnational corporations and their branches in the developing countries. Furthermore, it is American companies that dominate the field, accounting for around 66 percent of all revenues from the export of technology from developed capitalist states to the liberated countries.4 The role of these corporations in commercial technology transfers has grown even more important in recent years, particularly now that the Reagan Administration is encouraging private capital in every way possible and is trying to stimulate private investments in developing countries and activity by American monopolies abroad.

Of course, the effects of this corporate activity have been varied. On the one hand, by conducting research and development projects, organizing the production of science-intensive goods and transmitting technology to several countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the transnational corporations are helping to raise the level of their technical and economic development. On the other hand, this progress "is accompanied, just as all other types of capitalist progress, by the 'progress' of contradictions—that is, by their exacerbation and spread."5 The "transfer" of technology and its use in the developing countries are conducted in the corporations' own interest and are aimed at the accumulation of superprofits. They are binding these countries to the U.S. economy by creating a new type of technological dependence and by controlling the establishment and development of their national economies. It is no secret that the transnational corporations are striving to channel this development in capitalist directions.

The technological expansion of American transnational corporations in the developing countries is supported by the government. The direct forms of its economic support are negligible, but the arsenal of indirect forms is extremely diversified: broader activity by the government Overseas Private Investment Corporation, promoting the flow of direct investments to the developing
countries (and this is one of the channels of technology transfer); the 1975 federal program for trade and development, intended specifically to increase exports of science-intensive products to the young states; the use of programs of economic, scientific and technical "aid" to foreign states as a means of stimulating exports of machines and equipment; several measures to involve small and medium-sized U.S. businesses in the expansion of export operations and technology transfers; the political and diplomatic support of transnational corporate activity in the developing countries, etc.

This article will examine new developments in the transfer of technology to the developing countries by American transnational corporations, the machinery and basic forms of this transmission and its socioeconomic effects on these countries. In view of the fact that the general aspects of the transfer of technology to these countries by Western states have been analyzed in Soviet literature,6 the author has concentrated on the distinctive features of the technological expansion by U.S. monopolies in the young national states in recent years.

Basic Forms, Channels and Machinery

The inferior status of the developing countries in the capitalist technology market, their insufficient knowledge about its alternative sources and their traditional economic ties with the imperialist powers limit the group of potential suppliers of technology and considerably restrict the ability of the young states to deal on more advantageous terms. These factors allow American monopolies to dictate the prices of technology and earn superprofits. The inequality and discrimination that are characteristic of technology exchange between developed capitalist and developing countries and the restrictive terms on which scientific and technical achievements are to be transmitted and used are clearly apparent in the very machinery of technology transfer.7

It is conducted primarily on a commercial basis through two main channels: through the intraorganizational channel to overseas branches of U.S. corporations, and through the interorganizational channel on the basis of licenses, cooperative systems, management contracts and other long-term agreements with foreign firms and jointly controlled companies.

In the first case the U.S. corporation supplies its branches in the developing countries with new technology and with extensive rights to the use of licenses and trademarks, the export of products to third countries and the expenditure of funds on experimental work. As a rule, the branches are given the necessary assistance in the management and organization of production locally for the quicker and more efficient use of innovations created by the head company. But this group of rights does not extend to the public sector or the national companies of the young states. As a result, the American branches make up something like a technological enclave in the host country and exacerbate contradictions and disparities here by stifling local competition, contributing to the growth of unemployment, drawing local enterprises into the transnational corporate orbit, disrupting the economic plans of young states, etc. The "transfer" of technology through intraorganizational channels makes up the greatest (relative) portion of technology trade between the United States and the developing countries.
In the second case (interorganizational shipments), technology is sold to companies in developing countries during later stages of the "life cycle" of the product or technological process—that is, when there is a drop in the market demand for types of technology that are already being used and are no longer new.

Furthermore, whereas the TNC's provide their branches with a continuous supply of innovations, interorganizational shipments are always isolated events. Besides this, the attainment of more advanced technology, or its "second generation," must be negotiated with the corporations, which do not always agree to this condition because they fear competition from the partner. Finally, when TNC's transfer technology to companies not under their control, they raise prices and make extensive use of all possible restrictions, particularly the limitation or prohibition of the licensee's export operations, in order to integrate partners in the corporation's own global sales network. Consequently, although national enterprises do receive technology directly through interorganizational channels and can make use of it in their own interest, the specific terms of the transfer reduce its final impact.

American TNC's usually transfer technology either directly, in its "pure" form, or in conjunction with machines, equipment, instruments and other physical elements. As a rule, however, the forms and methods of technology transfer are not mutually exclusive and are most often combined in various ways.

The main form of "combination" commercial technology transfers consists in exports of machines, equipment and other types of industrial products. American exports of machines and equipment to the developing countries are increasing rapidly, primarily due to the industrialization efforts of many of these countries. Between 1970 and 1981 these exports more than quadrupled—reaching 19.4 billion dollars. At the end of the 1970's these countries accounted for 38 percent of all exports of machines and equipment from the United States and 60 percent of the U.S. positive balance of trade in science-intensive products.

Of course, these countries derive certain benefits from the purchase of equipment as a means of obtaining new technology. For example, they do not have to acquire technical knowledge which does not meet the requirements of their national economy.

Nevertheless, the transfer of technology through foreign trade channels has several negative implications for the developing countries. In general, the TNC's have no interest in the efficient use of technology transferred in this manner: Their prices do not depend directly on the results of the use of this technology in production. The client must bear all of the risk and expenditures connected with the incorporation of new equipment. Furthermore, even if the transaction imposes no restrictions on the importer of equipment patented by an American firm, the patent actually means that the seller can dictate his own terms for the future use of the equipment to the buyer. The degree of seller control depends on the buyer's ability to acquire equipment from other sources.

The domination of the world capitalist market by American and other monopolies means that enterprises in the developing countries are dependent on them for
purchases of other elements of technology and credit for the purchase of equipment and, in some cases, must pay artificially inflated prices. Finally, Washington's attempts to use various trade restrictions, sanctions and embargos in its own political interest have a negative effect on technology transfers, and this kind of behavior in trade with the developing countries is becoming a common feature of the current U.S. administration.

The export of engineering services occupies a position midway between the "pure" and "combination" forms of technology transfer. These are various engineering and consulting services which are a commercial item and are used by the client to optimize capital investments connected with a technical project—the construction of a new facility or the modernization of an existing one. The transaction can involve either the entire set of services connected with project planning and construction or one or several elements of the set. The buyer of these services is generally also granted the right to use patented inventions, technological processes and expertise. On the other hand, licensed technological processes can dictate the purchase of engineering services.

American engineering companies generally fall into one of two categories—engineering consultant firms and construction engineering firms. The first make up the largest group and are contracted for services without any subsequent deliveries of equipment or performance of construction operations. These firms have been most active in Latin America and the Middle East. At the beginning of the 1980's, for example, around 100 such firms were operating in the Middle East, mainly in connection with the stepped-up development of the petroleum refining and petrochemical industries here.

As for construction engineering firms, these fairly powerful branches of American TNC's usually perform all of the services connected with the planning of industrial and other facilities and with the actual construction work, the delivery, installation and adjustment of equipment and the start-up of facilities—in other words, they provide the "final product" or a facility "ready for operation." They are also able to offer their clients long-term financing. These firms have a sizeable operational volume in the developing countries (around 60 percent of all their foreign orders). Between 1975 and 1980, the foreign orders of the 400 largest construction engineering firms in the United States increased 2.9-fold and amounted to 34 billion dollars. One of them, the Loomis company, began the planning and construction of eight petroleum refineries at a cost of over 860 million dollars in the young states in 1980, while the Bechtel company signed contracts with Saudi Arabia for the construction of several large industrial complexes at a cost of 35 billion dollars just between 1976 and 1981.

The export of engineering services makes it easier for U.S. corporations to penetrate the developing countries and export more machines and equipment to their markets. Besides this, the export of engineering services binds the economies of the developing countries more closely to American technical specifications and standards and to the U.S. economy. Finally, inflationary processes in the United States have brought about a dramatic rise in the cost of the construction of various facilities in the developing countries by American firms. Furthermore, these countries are subject to huge overpayments.
because American corporations deliberately jack up the prices of projects. This is being practiced on such a broad scale that several countries have had to take special measures to guard against the rising costs of industrial construction projects by Western companies. For example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain have agreed to exchange information about the project pricing practices of American and other Western firms. Dishonest firms will be "blacklisted" and will not be allowed to participate in development projects.

The export of management and organization methods, which has recently become an important form of economic relations between U.S. firms and the developing states, is the main type of transfer of technology and production experience in "pure" form. This is connected with the increasingly important role of management and organization in securing the effectiveness of modern production.

The export of management and organization methods by American firms generally takes the form of management contracts, consulting services and assistance in the creation of managerial training systems. The practice of concluding management contracts between American corporations and industrial or other local companies in which the corporations have no ownership rights is growing more popular. This is the transfer of managerial expertise in "pure" form, it is "enterprise without capital," it is trade in knowledge and experience. A firm taking on management functions in another company receive regular payments for these services. This new form of business is connected with the greater role of management in the era of technological revolution, with restrictions on the import of capital in many developing countries and with the possibility that the property of American monopolies might be nationalized. As the HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW commented, "direct investments through traditional channels do not accord with the realities of the changing balance of power and...the danger of political risk dictates a transfer from quick profits to the less profitable but more stable service contract."

Management contracts give the contracted firm profits from management operations and income from the sale of the equipment it recommends for the enterprise, as well as additional opportunities to penetrate new markets, access to various sources of raw materials, etc. Furthermore, the contracted firm which manages an enterprise in which it does not have ownership rights effectively escapes the risk connected with investments but can control enterprise operations. This practice is particularly widespread in the petroleum and mining industries in the developing countries, especially in Venezuela, Mexico, Panama and a number of states in the Middle East.12

Consulting services in organization and administration play a special role in the export of management from the United States. Consulting firms draw up plans on a commercial basis and help companies in the developing countries incorporate new management methods. In contrast to the management contracts, which are generally connected with the establishment of enterprises, technical services and consultations in the sphere of administration presuppose the functioning of an existing enterprise. Besides this, the local company manages its enterprise independently. These agreements, which are called "franchises," are widely used in retail trade, public catering, the hotel industry, airport services, vehicle rental, etc. For example, Trans World
Airlines, a large American air transport company, has offered its administrative services to several airlines in the developing countries and has thereby gained an opportunity to penetrate their air transport markets and earn huge profits. Franchising allows American TNC's to avoid the expenditures and risk that generally accompany investments abroad, to earn large profits and to control a large portion of this part of the service sphere in several young states.

Participation in the organization of management training systems is another way in which administrative expertise is exported from the United States to the developing countries. This usually takes the form of the transmission of knowledge and experience to specialists who come to the United States. Many American universities and colleges admit and train foreigners for this purpose. One of the underlying motives here is that the American TNC's are interested in employing administrative personnel from the developing countries who have acquired the necessary skills and education to work in corporate branches in the young states. Besides this, by training specialists from the young states, the United States is striving to create an internal social basis of support in these countries, which can be used to promote American influence and bourgeois ideology and policy.

To heighten the impact of the training of managerial personnel from these countries and to adapt the system to local conditions, American corporations, universities and charitable foundations aid the developing states in the organization of special managerial training centers for instruction in the latest administrative methods. These centers include, for example, the School of Business Administration in Sao Paolo (Brazil), the Higher School of Business in Lima (Peru), the Institute of Higher Learning in Administration (Venezuela), the business administration departments of the universities of Malyasia and Singapore and the School of Business Administration of the University of Lagos (Nigeria). American firms and specialists participating in the creation and operation of these centers derive a high income from this work. This also gives them a unique opportunity to learn the distinctive features of the economy of each country.

American corporations transferring management experience to the developing countries also derive considerable financial advantages. It is indicative that licenses, expertise and patents account for only one-fourth of the payments of branches of U.S. companies for the services of their parent firms; the rest are payments for the latest managerial methods and other similar services. In 1981, for example, the payments of branches in these countries to their parent firms in the United States totaled 1.331 billion dollars (including 357 million for licenses), while payments for the latest management methods and other services of this type totaled 973 million dollars.13

Finally, another way of transmitting technology in its "pure" form is the licensing agreement of the American corporation. In international practice, these agreements can encompass several types of rights and services. American corporations, however, try to sell rights to the use of patents, expertise and so forth separately. Only in rare cases, when circumstances are colored by the gradual development of the scientific and technical potential of young
states or by competition from other Western firms, do American TNC's offer a local company a "package" of various rights and services in license agreements, similar to the practice of American corporations in the developed capitalist states. License agreements generally contain many stipulations which transcend the bounds of normal business practice and restrict the interests of developing countries: "conditional purchase" (the sale of technology is conditional upon client orders for materials, equipment and spare parts from a firm specified by the seller of the technology); a partial or total ban on exports of products manufactured on the basis of the license; restrictions on the import of goods that might compete with the products of the company selling the technology; the appointment of Americans representing the licensing firm to managerial positions.

Overseas licensing by American corporations is also stimulated by other factors. The sale of licenses is sometimes preferable to direct capital investments. Some of these factors are the chance to sell unused technology and to penetrate largely inaccessible sales markets, the shortage of the available investment capital and skilled manpower required for the organization of branches in the developing countries, and the political risks of investments in some young states.

At the beginning of the 1980's all of the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America accounted for only around 20 percent of all U.S. overseas license agreements. The sectorial structure of these agreements reflects the desire of American monopolies to penetrate the most rapidly developing sphere of the economy of these countries—the processing industry (accounting for more than 70 percent of all agreements), particularly machine building, electrical engineering, instrument making and the chemical industry—that is, precisely the modern industries in which TNC control can ensure the future economic development of this group of countries in the interests of the corporations.

Therefore, in their relations with developing countries the American TNC's use various means and methods for the "transfer" of scientific, technical, production and managerial knowledge and experience. No matter what specific forms it might take, however, the policy of the American TNC's is aimed at the maximization of profits from the exploitation of foreign labor, which is cheaper than U.S. labor, with the aid of modern equipment, at increasing their own exports of manufactured goods and at taking over the markets of the developing countries—in short, at the further intensification of foreign economic expansion.

Consequences

American exports of technology to the developing countries have not brought about any significant rise in the level of their scientific and technical development and have not led to their attainment of economic independence. On the contrary, in the multistructured economy of these countries they have contributed to the creation of enclaves of modern industrial production with only a weak connection to the national economy. Finally, they have created a new form of dependence—a technological form that supplements and reinforces economic dependence.
In this area, the negative effects of American TNC's on the economies of the Asian, African and Latin American countries are reflected, above all, in the limitation of their possibilities for scientific and technical development through restrictive monopolistic practices; secondly, in the deformed technical structure of their economies; thirdly, in their industrial specialization in accordance with the interests of monopoly capital.

The restrictive monopoly practices in the sphere of technology transfer have already been researched in scientific literature. We will simply note in brief that they include the restriction of the licensee's production and exports, the obligation of the licensee to purchase spare parts and related equipment only from the licensor, the restriction of further research and of the employment of specialists not recommended by the exporter of the technology, the limitation of the adaptation of technology to local conditions, the obligation of the importer to acquire unnecessary additional goods and services, the restriction of the use of technology after the expiration of the contract, etc.

The abuses of monopoly power are cogently attested to just by the restrictive business practices with regard to the TNC's rights of ownership to patents and trademarks in the developing countries. The TNC's make extensive use of trademarks to jack up the prices of products marketed under the label of a U.S. industrial or commercial firm. According to a special study, for example, in the Philippines the prices of medications with TNC labels are jacked up by more than 2,000 percent in comparison to the prices of equivalent medicines from local enterprises. Besides this, the TNC's abuse ownership rights to trademarks in order to divide markets in developing countries among themselves and maintain a wide range of prices in these markets in order to increase their profits. In Colombia, for example, branches of American pharmaceutical TNC's sold tetracycline at prices approximately 10 times as high as world prices and their prices for ampicillin were 2.4 times as high; the prices of electronic audio components for television sets were 2.6 times as high and the prices of semiconductors were 11 times as high. A paper-making machine costing 800,000 dollars was sold in this country for 1.2 million. Similar cases were discovered in India, Mexico, Costa Rica and the Philippines.

Furthermore, the technology transferred to developing countries within the framework of TNC production complexes generally performs only a few production operations (usually the initial or final stage). This means that the functioning of production facilities here is deliberately made wholly dependent on the headquarters of American corporations. In this way, they effectively insure themselves against the consequences of nationalization, since enterprises with an incomplete production cycle remain dependent on American capital and technology for a long time even after nationalization. This practice erects serious obstacles impeding the formation of efficient national economic complexes in the developing countries and perpetuates their activity on the periphery of world capitalist industry.

Finally, the technology transfer operations of American TNC's have a negative effect on the industrial specialization of the developing countries. Under present conditions, the West, particularly the United States, is no longer
capable of maintaining the system of neocolonial exploitation based on the limited agrarian and raw material specialization of these countries. One of imperialism's most important means of dominating them is its monopoly in science and technology. The mounting struggle of the developing countries for economic independence, however, has forced the United States and other developed capitalist countries to modify the system of international capitalist division of labor. Now the TNC's are not only transferring obsolete and worn equipment and technology to the developing countries but are also moving production requiring high energy, labor and material expenditures to these countries, as well as production processes which are no longer an avenue of scientific and technical progress and are inclined to become a burden on the developed capitalist economies (for example, enterprises with a negative ecological impact). By doing this, monopoly capital is pursuing quite specific and selfish goals.\(^{15}\)

The establishment of scientific schools and fields dependent on the United States is also having a negative effect on the scientific and technical potential of these countries because they are used to "filter out" the best ideas and scientific energy of the young states. The United States is using the following channels to establish this kind of dependence: the financing of research centers in the developing countries (with the terms depending on the political loyalty to the host countries to their American creditors and on the investment climate for TNC's); a personnel policy in which central staffs (primarily on the lowest levels) are made up of national specialists trained in the United States; the popularization of research theories and methods having no connection with the national requirements of developing countries; the staffing of the advanced scientific infrastructure primarily with American researchers and specialists with professional ties to TNC's.

When prominent English economist P. Streeten analyzed this system, which has been termed "academic imperialism" in the West, he concluded that the ability of the economically underdeveloped countries to generate new ideas and conduct research on their own was being undermined by the actions of foreign specialists and that Western research practice in the developing states was intended to justify a neocolonial system of exploitation.\(^{16}\) The system resulted in the rapid limitation of the functions of many specialized research services of TNC branches engaged in the adaptation of production processes to local conditions or raw material and product quality control.

In 1981 the income derived by American corporations directly from the transfer of scientific and technical knowledge to the developing countries exceeded 1.5 billion dollars.

The table shows that most of this income (87 percent in 1981) came from U.S. branches in the developing countries and only an insignificant portion (13 percent) came from foreign companies not controlled by TNC's. Obviously, increasing payments have a negative effect on the finances and economy of developing countries. The intraorganizational mechanism of technology transfer allows American TNC's to earn huge additional profits by evading the payment of taxes on part of their income: The price of the technology acquired by a particular country is often deliberately understated in branch accounts, while the real price of technology transferred to branches is recorded in the accounts of TNC
headquarters, which cannot be audited by tax agencies in the developing countries. This results in huge losses for the developing countries, putting an additional strain on their already strained, often negative payment balances and reducing their budget revenues.

Structure of U.S. Corporate Income from Sale of Technology to Developing Countries, millions of dollars

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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>1,522</td>
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<tr>
<td>From branches and affiliates</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>1,331</td>
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<tr>
<td>From independent foreign firms</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>191</td>
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The direct income of American corporations from the transfer of technology to this group of countries is supplemented by payments for equipment "attached" to the technology by suppliers and sold at deliberately inflated prices. The total income of American corporations in this area was estimated at 25.2 billion dollars in 1981, or around 15 percent of all the capital invested by young states in fixed assets.17

Besides this, it should be borne in mind that American corporations usually underestimate their income from technology transfers, particularly with the aid of loopholes in the mechanism of accounts with branches and affiliates not under the control of the developing states. All of this also allows the TNC's to conceal the scales of their actual exploitation of the young states with the aid of technology transfers. Furthermore, their concealed income is sometimes much greater than their direct revenues. The attempts of governments in several of these countries to block the channels for the illegal transfer of finances have not had any perceptible effect as yet.

The newly liberated countries have an urgent need for patents, technical documents and production and managerial expertise and cannot refuse to import technology. This is why the struggle between these countries and the United States in this sphere revolves around the conditions of technology transfers, particularly the TNC "code of behavior" in this field.

According to the decisions of the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly (August 1980) and the Fifth UNCTAD Session (Manila, 1979), this code is supposed to contain provisions securing fair standards of technology transfer and excluding the possibility of inequality and restrictive business practices by monopolies in international transactions and in the exchange of technology between TNC's and their branches in the developing countries.

Although Washington has verbally acknowledged the right to choose technology for import and to adapt it and has agreed to cooperate with several regional centers in the transfer of technology, it has insisted that the main channel
of this transmission be the investment of TNC capital in the economies of the developing states. What is more, the United States believes that the code should be optional and should not extend to the operations of TNC branches in developing countries. Besides this, it is taking every opportunity to minimize the list of restrictive business practices that the code is supposed to declare unlawful.18 As a result of the obstructionist U.S. position, the drafting of this code has not been completed. And while the debates go on, the losses of the developing countries and the profits of American corporations are growing.

The technological revolution could provide the young independent states with great opportunities for the modernization and development of their economies and could help them overcome their underdevelopment and eradicate hunger, disease, poverty and illiteracy. All of this is being impeded, however, by imperialism's selfish policy and by the dependence of the majority of developing countries on it. The opportunities created by the technological revolution are not being utilized in full. The huge monopolies of the United States and other developed capitalist countries have concentrated most of the scientific and technical potential of the capitalist world in their own hands and are using it for their own expansionist economic and political purposes.

Whereas this policy of "technological neocolonialism" did not encounter active resistance in the Asian, African and Latin American countries just 10-15 years ago, now it is exacerbating conflicts between these countries and the West. Many of these countries realize the true purpose of neocolonial strategy and are defending their own national interests by opposing "technological neocolonialism." The growing movement for nonalignment, which is anti-imperialist in nature, and scientific and technical cooperation among the young independent states are of great significance in their economic liberation and the consolidation of their political independence. The further expansion of cooperation by the developing countries with the USSR and other socialist states will promote this process. The experience of recent years attests to the highly effective nature of relations based on equality and mutual benefit.

FOOTNOTES


2. For more about this strategy, see, for example, M. Ya. Volkov, "American Neocolonialism in Its Present Form," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 12.


6. See the article by E. Obminskiy in MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA, 1975, No 9.
7. In contemporary world usage the term "technology" takes in licenses, patents, technical documents, models of new machines, trademarks, production and technical expertise, consulting and managerial services and the professional training of personnel for foreign states.


15. For more about the consequences of technology transfer, see V. Shitov, "Liberated Countries and New Technology," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1981, No 8.


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'PROJECT DEMOCRACY,' ITS GOALS AND MOTIVES

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 55-61

[Article by I. Ye. Malashenko]

[Text] A foreign policy propaganda program, reflecting the development of the Reagan Administration's ideological views during its 2 years in power, has been submitted to the U.S. Congress—"Project Democracy."

As soon as the Republicans entered the White House, the new leaders tried to reorder the priorities of the Democratic policy of "defending human rights." This policy had evoked a negative response from rightwing conservatives, who saw it as a threat to the "friendly" dictatorships that sometimes became the targets of "human rights defense" criticism.

At first Washington tried to substitute a propaganda initiative of its own for Carter's policy of "human rights defense." It launched a propaganda campaign about the Soviet Union's alleged "involvement" in "international terrorism," and this became something like the new administration's calling card. In fact, the "struggle against international terrorism" served as only one aspect of a broad-scale campaign against the mythical "Soviet threat," a campaign which turned into the main element of the Republican administration's foreign political and ideological offensive.

The Reagan Administration obviously did not, however, consider the fact that some criticism of the dictatorships was supported by liberal circles in the United States and abroad. After encountering widespread opposition to its efforts to scrap the "human rights defense" policy, the White House tried to adapt the latter to its own ideological aims with the aid of the distinction made by U.S. Secretary of State A. Haig in spring 1981 between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes. The then secretary of state used the first term to define the socialist states and the term "authoritarian" to define anti-communist dictatorships, which supposedly had the potential to become "more democratic." Haig openly advised that the practices of "authoritarian" regimes not be criticized and that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries be made the exclusive target of this "criticism."

Washington's attempt to rebuild the "human rights defense" policy on the basis of the abovementioned distinction between states with differing social orders
failed. As a result, the administration had to modify its goals to some degree and to employ a new tactic in the area of human rights policy.

The new ideological initiative was announced by Ronald Reagan in his speech in the British Parliament on 8 June 1982, at which time he called upon the West European allies to join the "crusade for freedom and democracy." He declared that the United States had begun work on a specific project as the American contribution to this "global campaign." He was referring to "Project Democracy."

The programs included in "Project Democracy," which was submitted to the Congress on 23 February 1983, differ widely in terms of scope and nature and are united only by their anticommunist purpose. In all, the project has five interrelated aims.

The first is to teach foreign politicians the "theory and practice of democracy." In other words, it is an attempt to implant the basic principles of the American political system in the political elite of other countries, especially the developing states. This is the purpose, for example, of the program for the organization of symposiums on "the nature of democratic societies" for military leaders, who traditionally occupy civilian positions in the developing countries (the cost of this program is 1.7 million dollars). It is assumed that the military rulers of Honduras or Guatemala would have no trouble giving their dictatorial regimes a democratic appearance after undergoing this kind of training.

The second is an attempt to popularize the American system with the aid of purposeful influence on the educational system in foreign countries—by organizing centers of American area studies, improving education in the English language, setting up scholarships, etc. Young people will be the main target of Washington's propaganda: It is for these young people that courses in democracy will be taught in foreign universities (at a cost of 932,000 dollars), English language instruction will be improved in the African countries at a cost of 1.8 million dollars, and American studies centers will be organized in other countries (10.6 million dollars).

The third aim of the project is "to strengthen the main democratic institutions" in foreign countries. In other words, this will essentially mean the support and direct financing of trade unions, political parties and mass media acting in Washington's interests.

Fourthly, Washington hopes to popularize the American way of life "by means of conferences, meetings, the distribution of books and magazines, special programs in universities and other institutes and the mass media." The publication of a new magazine, COMMUNICATIONS IMPACT, in English, French and Spanish editions to promote "free communication" (850,000 dollars), the distribution of books abroad at below cost to popularize "American political institutions" (5.4 million), the expansion of AFL-CIO propaganda programs (4.8 million) and other measures will serve this purpose.

Fifthly, the "development of contacts between American citizens and organizations and their foreign counterparts" has been planned to create international
support for the principles lying at the basis of the project. The program for
the exchange of labor union experience (3 million dollars), exchange visits by
American and foreign church dignitaries (450,000) and others fall into this
category.

Just as in the past, these measures will provide American special services with
a broad field of action for the infiltration of sociopolitical organizations
and movements.

The administration's official spokesmen are not concealing the fact that the
new project includes programs carried out earlier in the form of covert CIA
operations, particularly operations calculated to destabilize governments
objectionable to Washington. A special organization is to continue employing
these methods to cultivate what is loosely called democracy in Central and
South America (3.2 million dollars). The allocation of 8.5 million dollars
for the assistance of "democratic trade unions in key regions and countries"
through AFL-CIO channels has been planned.

As Secretary of State G. Shultz announced, "most of the programs are intended
for Latin America, Africa and Asia." This is certainly no coincidence; it
reflects the American leadership's worries about the extreme unpopularity of
the United States and its policy in the developing countries and the growing
dissuasion with "American democracy" in all countries.

The actual purpose of the programs intended for the developing countries is
clearly indicated by the actions that have already been taken in this area.
As NATION correspondent H. Hitchens wrote, "even before the start of 'Project
Democracy,' the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) was giving money to some people
who are obviously at odds with this concept." In fiscal year 1982/83, for
example, the so-called Committee for Central America was allocated over 162,000
dollars to pay for visits to the United States by official representatives
("press liaisons") of repressive Latin American regimes. The American taxpayer
financed trips to Washington by a representative of the Pinochet regime, an
emissary from the Haitian dictatorship and another dozen "democrats" of this
type. The Center for Free Enterprise Education and Research received almost
60,000 dollars to hold a seminar for 25 Guatemalans.

Washington spokesmen have taken every opportunity to stress that only negligi-
ble portions of these programs will concern Western Europe and that, in the
words of Assistant Secretary of State L. Eagleburger, they will consist in
long-range attempt to reveal "the common values of Americans and West
Europeans." What does this really mean? Although the sums earmarked for
propaganda in the West European countries are far smaller than the allocations
intended for developing countries, they are expected to play an important role
in undermining the West European antiwar movement. It has long been one of the
primary goals of U.S. foreign policy propaganda to discredit and split this
movement.

For example, 192,000 dollars will be allocated to the "independent" Center for
the Study of Ethics and Social Policy, headed by E. Lefevre. The money is
supposed to be used to popularize the Reagan Administration's position on
nuclear weapons in Europe and to misinform the West European public.
Eagleburger admitted that "Project Democracy" will be used in conjunction with the "Daley Program," drawn up by the State Department to counteract the movement against the deployment of new American missiles in Western Europe. He declared that American foreign policy propaganda is directly related to military policy and to "questions of U.S. defense capabilities" and should be wholly at the service of this policy. Therefore, the "search for common values" is obviously interpreted as a struggle against events and processes on the West European continent that are contrary to Washington's aims.

The measures included in "Project Democracy" testify that this program is aimed both directly and indirectly against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Europe. Although G. Shultz admitted the "limited ability" of the United States to influence the socialist states, he reaffirmed the invariable goal of American propaganda—"to bring discussions of political, economic and social concepts and events to the attention of the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" with the slant required by Washington.

Project allocations envisaged directly for anti-Soviet and antischolar propaganda include, above all, half a million dollars intended for more vigorous activity by anti-Soviet emigres within the United States and a large part of the funds turned over to the AFL-CIO. In particular, the "aid to democratic trade unions" on the part of the AFL-CIO will include the support of underground counterrevolutionary "Solidarity" members in Poland. It is no secret that the AFL-CIO leadership has repeatedly declared its intention to continue aiding antischolar elements in Poland in every way possible. Part of the allocations for other programs will also serve this purpose.

The definite evolution of the Reagan Administration's aims in the "ideological offensive" sphere, reflected in "Project Democracy," is striking. Although the project is distinguished by its consistently anticomunist purpose, it envisages much less financing for overt, undisguised attempts to undermine the socialist order. The lion's share of the funds requested from the Congress will be used to strengthen and develop political institutions acceptable to the United States in the developing countries.

All of this testifies that the Reagan Administration has armed itself with some premises of the Carter Administration's line in relations with the developing countries. The Carter Administration also tried to stimulate "constructive change" in these countries in the American interest, sometimes with the aid of the so-called policy of "human rights defense." This line was reflected when G. Shultz addressed the Congress, saying that "the support of democracy is an important part of our policy on human rights." Director C. Wick of the USIA made similar statements when he solicited the Congress for funds for "Project Democracy."

Why did the Reagan Administration decide to associate its "campaign for democracy" with the slogan of "human rights defense" when it encountered the need to modify the aims of its "ideological offensive"? After all, this slogan is identified wholly with the Carter Administration and was attacked more than once in the past by rightwing conservatives within the United States. Apparently, in the view of the Carter Administration and of the current Washington
leadership, the slogan of "human rights defense" has an "important advantage": According to Washington officials, it is capable of evoking broader support than any other ideological instrument.

It is indicative that Carter's campaign "in defense of human rights" was originally supported by liberals and conservatives. But whereas the liberals supported this program because they regarded it as a sign of liberalism and an alternative to the amoral and unprincipled foreign policy of aiding discredited dictatorships, the conservatives saw it primarily as a means of strengthening the ideology of anticommunism.

This feature of the Carter campaign was the reason for its ineffectiveness, even within the context of the "alignment" of internal political forces, because liberals and conservatives had different hopes for it. Understandably, the campaign began to be criticized from various standpoints.

The Reagan Administration's desire to link "Project Democracy" with the slogan of "human rights defense" testifies to an attempt to reinforce the particular part of Carter's ideological platform that conforms to the conservative aims of the present Washington leadership and to simultaneously reduce the criticism of the administration's one-sided ideological policy. It is for this purpose that the policy of "human rights defense" is being revived in a new form. The slogan has remained unchanged, and this must appeal at least to some of its liberal supporters, but the definite changes in the content of the policy are even more important to them.

As for rightwing conservatives in the United States, they should be pleased with the openly anticommunist purpose of the programs making up "Project Democracy." Some American observers have drawn a direct connection between the announcement of this project and Ronald Reagan's attempts to "pacify" the conservative critics on the extreme right who constantly demand the "adjustment" of American foreign policy in the direction of more pronounced anti-Sovietism and anticommunism.

The attempt to create extensive domestic political support for "Project Democracy" is also attested to by the persistence with which administration spokesmen have stressed, on the one hand, its "bipartisan character" and, on the other, its "mixed" nature as a project involving private organizations as well as federal agencies. Although most of the programs in the project were drawn up by the USIA, the State Department and the Agency for International Development, representatives of the Republican and Democratic party national committees and of the bipartisan American Political Fund and congressmen from both parties took part in planning the project.

The Reagan Administration is making energetic efforts to broaden the framework of "Project Democracy" in order to maximize the base of its "campaign for democracy" and, if possible, to disguise its true purpose. During the initial stages of planning, however, only conservative "think tanks," like the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation and the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, were working on the project. These organizations have long advised the maximum intensification of the ideological struggle on the global level and the much more vigorous use of American foreign policy propaganda.
A comprehensive program for the reconstruction of U.S. ideological concepts was put forth around a year and a half ago, for example, by American Enterprise Institute researcher G. Lenczowski, who was appointed the National Security Council's acting adviser on Soviet and East European affairs in February 1983. He was appointed to the NSC staff after the departure of R. Pipes, who summed up the administration's approach to the Soviet Union in a statement offering the USSR a choice between the "rejection of the communist system" or World War III. This is how the NSC staff acquired this "more respectable," 32-year-old conservative, although his views are amazingly similar to those of his predecessor.

G. Lenczowski, who sees some kind of "ideological threat" as the "chief danger" to the Soviet Union, has recommended an emphasis on the "global struggle of ideas." For this purpose, he advises the use of "all non-military weapons: international radio broadcasts, American libraries abroad, international contacts in education, culture and tourism, the distribution of books, brochures, films and television programs, the augmentation of the number of foreign news correspondents and the employment of more foreigners (journalists, for example) in American news agencies abroad, and the more active use of international forums like the United Nations for an ideological offensive."

At the beginning of June, Reagan decided to appoint as his adviser on Soviet affairs J. Matlock, who had worked in the U.S. embassy in Moscow for 7 years (most recently as a temporary charge d'affaires) and was then the ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

The NSC is now expected to play a special role in the coordination of American foreign policy propaganda efforts and it will now have direct jurisdiction over the entire propaganda machine. In January 1983 Presidential Directive 77 provided for the creation of a new committee, a so-called special planning group (SPG) to take charge of all forms of American "public diplomacy" (the term used to define foreign policy propaganda). The chairman of the group is the President's assistant for national security affairs and the other members are the secretary of state, secretary of defense, USIA director, AID director and the President's assistant for communications.

The SPG has jurisdiction over four interdepartmental committees responsible for overseeing various spheres of "public diplomacy": the International Information Committee, under the supervision of the USIA; the Committee on International Policy, in which the key role is played by the State Department; the Committee on International Broadcasting, controlled directly by the NSC; the Committee for Public Relations, co-chaired by the President's deputy assistant for national security affairs and his assistant for communications.

The work on "Project Democracy" will be overseen by the Committee on International Policy, to which Assistant Secretary of State L. Eagleburger has been appointed as chairman. The work on the project will be a kind of touchstone for the new organization of foreign policy propaganda. It was with good reason that Secretary of State C. Shultz declared that the "struggle for democracy" would be a "fundamental aspect" of American foreign policy over the long range, and L. Eagleburger said that the administration expects the work on the project to be completed within the next 20 years.
The technical aspects of these plans have been made the responsibility of the USIA, which has considerable experience in the organization of anti-Soviet and anticommunist campaigns. The funds needed for the attainment of the administration's ambitious aims will be deposited in the USIA budget. The amounts will be substantial: The administration plans to spend 20 million dollars on the project just during the current fiscal year, and 65 million more next year. And this, as Washington officials have pointed out, is only the beginning.

The USIA will then distribute these funds to other agencies and organizations, including the State Department, the Agency for International Development and others. In this way, a single fund will be created for the financing of all project programs; according to reports in the American press, this system was borrowed from West Germany, which has a central fund for the financing of all West German political parties.

The future of "Project Democracy" will depend largely, however, on the Congress, which must authorize the necessary allocations. The administration's new initiative has not aroused any great enthusiasm on Capitol Hill. Secretary of State G. Shultz was "cross-examined" by Democratic congressmen who wished to know how the United States planned to "promote democracy" in countries ruled by dictatorial regimes friendly to the United States.

Far from all of the legislators heeded Shultz' call to "fearlessly bear this torch." Congressman J. Pritchard said: "The more we learn about this matter, the more it worries me." "Judging by all indications, this is simply a multi-million dollar propaganda campaign," Congressman P. Kostmayer agreed. Disturbed by the legislators' reaction, the organizers of the project hypocritically denied its propagandistic nature. Director C. Wick of the USIA told the Congress that "Project Democracy" was "not at all intended to be a 'propaganda campaign'"; he accused the press of fostering "mistaken ideas."

This tactic, however, is hardly likely to mislead anyone. The administration's propaganda activity has already encountered public resistance more than once, and has sometimes even been opposed by the legislators.

For this reason, the possible scales on which the Reagan Administration will be able to launch "Project Democracy" are still unknown.

There is no question, however, that Washington's attempts to organize a "global ideological offensive" according to "updated" anticommunist recipes will not win the Reagan Administration any victories in its struggle against forces for social progress. "I do not think that this program will give us anything but trouble," Congress P. Kostmayer acknowledged, for example, during the debates on "Project Democracy." Washington's new propaganda initiative, which is based on a refusal to take the realities of today's world into account, can result only in a waste of the American taxpayer's money and the further decline of Washington's prestige in the eyes of the world public.
PENTAGON EFFORTS TO ATTAIN MILITARY SUPERIORITY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 61-68

[Article by V. A. Mazing and S. K. Oznobishchev]

[Text] The first half of 1983 was marked by the dramatic intensification of the anti-Soviet militarist campaign in the United States, which was headed by the President himself. The head of the Pentagon and other members of the U.S. political and military leadership have taken a more than active part in this campaign.

The campaign is supposed to validate, as Yu. V. Andropov said in his replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent on 27 March 1983, the United States' hegemonistic ambitions to become the dominant military power in the world. To this end, the administration has resorted to inexcusable distortions of Soviet policy and the most unscrupulous tricks.

In March the Pentagon published a new "research work"—"Soviet Military Strength, 1983," with a foreword by C. Weinberger. The authors of this "research" are primarily trying to convince the reader of the "need" for a comprehensive U.S. rearmament program in response to the "rapidly growing Soviet military threat." The first version of this "research," which was published in 1981, was subjected to quite serious criticism, even by Western experts, for the tendentious presentation of material and the tendency to ignore comparative data on the most important categories of weapons possessed by the USSR and United States and by the Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

The new Pentagon publication contains several tables which, according to its authors, are an "objective reflection" of the balance of armed forces and weapons between the sides today. But the numerical data presented in this "research," just as in other publications of this type, suffer from a biased approach and do not take into account all of the factors determining the actual state of affairs. The authors of this latest "research" provide a tendentious description of the organization of the Soviet armed forces, juggle the facts about the balance of forces and use fraudulent methods to assess the military expenditures of the sides. When they describe the "frightening Soviet military preparations" with the aid of color illustrations and all types of tables and diagrams, the authors compare only the most convenient indicators of
Soviet and U.S. armed forces and distort the total picture of the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons and troops. Numerical assessments of troops and weapons deliberately ignore the fact that the USSR is opposed by all NATO countries, and not just the United States.

The authors try to depict the existing military-strategic parity between the USSR and United States as some kind of Western "lag" on the global and regional levels. The measures taken by the Soviet Union since fall 1981 (when the first Pentagon "research work" on this subject was published) to strengthen its defense capabilities are depicted as the latest round "in the continuous arms race the Soviet Union has been escalating for 21 years." In their discussion of Soviet military construction, the authors confuse cause and effect and try to conceal the fact that the arms race is rooted in American soil and that virtually all new rounds of this race have been initiated by the United States.

The Pentagon study deliberately says nothing about the steps and measures the Soviet Union took during this year and a half to curb the arms race, reduce military confrontation and facilitate the conclusion of agreements during ongoing talks. The basic premises of Soviet military doctrine and foreign policy are presented in a distorted light.

This unfair, to say the least, Pentagon publication was analyzed in detail in the Soviet press. Its publication, as Senator E. Kennedy pointed out, "coincided with the vote on the military budget and the discussion of the nuclear freeze resolution." He called the study "a classic example of scare-mongering."

It could more accurately have been called a set of deliberate misinterpretations and lies, which also fill the annual report of the U.S. secretary of defense on the military budget for fiscal year 1984 and military programs for fiscal years 1984-88. On the very first pages of this report, the Pentagon chief puts forth the thesis that runs all through the report: "The Soviet Union poses the greatest military threat to the United States and its interests and will continue to pose this threat in the near future." This "threat" is seen literally on all levels and in all areas of military confrontation.

For example, assessing the situation with regard to strategic arms, Weinberger writes that "the Soviet Union's achievement of a certain degree of invulnerability for its ICBM's has made it impossible for the United States to deliver an effective strike against Soviet ground-based nuclear weapons." The program for the production and deployment of new ICBM's should, in the opinion of the Pentagon chief, change this "unfavorable" situation, and he requests additional allocations of 3.768 billion dollars for the development and creation of MX missiles (allocations for this purpose were 1.911 billion in fiscal year 1982 and 2.519 billion in 1983). Research projects to study methods of basing American ICBM's in underground silos will also be continued in fiscal year 1984.

The development of the naval component of the U.S. strategic "triad" presupposes the completion of several programs to heighten the "survivability" of the American nuclear submarine fleet. The program for the construction of new Trident submarines is being stepped up. The first ship of this series, the
"Ohio," was on "combat duty" in the Pacific Ocean last October. At the beginning of 1983 a second ship of this type, the "Michigan," was also turned over to the U.S. Navy. The Trident submarines have more launchers than the Poseidon ships (24 instead of 16) and will carry more advanced Trident II SLBM's (D-5). Now that the Pentagon has decided to build 10 Trident ships, it is requesting appropriations for an 11th ship this year. Requests for fiscal year 1984 also include allocations for the purchase of equipment for Trident II SLBM's for the 9th Trident ship (the decision on its construction was made in fiscal year 1981), which will be the first ship of a new series equipped with D-5 missiles, the production of which is to begin this year so that they can be deployed before 1990. The budget for fiscal year 1984 also envisages allocations for the purchase of the last 43 Trident I missiles. The general plans for the purchase of Trident I missiles were reduced by 60 missiles, and this also reflects the Pentagon's intention to step up the development of submarines equipped with Trident II missiles.

The program for the deployment of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads on submarines and surface ships of the U.S. Navy holds a special place among Pentagon plans. A battleship of the new series, the "New Jersey," has already been equipped with Tomahawk antisubmarine missiles. Since these missiles still do not meet the requirements of "combat readiness," the equipping of submarines with missiles of this type and missiles intended for the destruction of targets on land has been postponed for around a year.

The first cruise missiles have already been installed on strategic bombers. By the end of fiscal year 1984, 90 B-52G planes will be equipped with them. The re-equipping of the strategic B-52H bombers with cruise missiles is scheduled for 1985.

Pentagon military programs for fiscal years 1984-88 envisage the modernization and improvement of all components of U.S. strategic forces. The Reagan Administration has adopted the previously rejected program for the B-1 bomber. According to Pentagon plans, the American Air Force will start receiving models of the new plane carrying cruise missiles, the B-1B, in 1985. The original plan called for the construction of 100 B-1B planes, and the program, with an estimated cost of 20.5 billion dollars, should be completed in 1988. The work on a fundamentally new Stealth strategic bomber will be continued. According to Pentagon plans, it will be capable of evading air defense systems and delivering surprise nuclear strikes deep within enemy territory. The new bombers should become part of U.S. strategic aviation by the beginning of the 1990's.

Plans also call for what will essentially be the complete renovation of fighter aviation when outdated planes are replaced with new F-15 fighter-interceptors and F-16 fighter-bombers. According to the American command, this will not only heighten capabilities in combat against airborne enemy targets but will also increase the striking power of the American Air Force. The first of five projected air wings consisting entirely of F-15 planes was formed in fiscal year 1982.

Special attention is being given to the development of a command, communication and reconnaissance system. C. Weinberger calls this system "an integral element
of the American strategy of deterrence." It is supposed to provide U.S. military and political leaders with a continuous supply of air and space data on the global scale in peacetime and in the event of a crisis. Intensive work is being conducted to improve the radar detection and air warning network, and the construction of new command centers and communication lines has begun.3

The United States has not given up its plans to create an effective, technically improved ABM system. Although the secretary of defense is quick to assure critics of this program that it is not contrary to the articles and provisions of the Soviet-American ABM treaty of 1972, this is not true. According to Pentagon calculations, the ABM system being created in the United States should be able to intercept targets in space and in dense atmospheric strata. The latest weapon systems will be used for this purpose, including the multiple warheads that are prohibited by the ABM treaty and are completely inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the international treaty of 1967 on the principles of activities by states in the exploration and use of outer space, which was signed by around 100 governments, including the United States. What is more, as Yu. V. Andropov said in his replies to DER SPIEGEL magazine, the adventurism and danger of Washington's declared plans to develop broad-scale and highly effective antimissile defense consist in the expectation of impunity, the assumption that a first nuclear strike can be delivered as protection against retaliation. The temptation to push the button—that is, to put the world on the verge of the nuclear abyss—is only a short step away.

In the area of so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons, or theater nuclear weapons, the buildup of American nuclear forces in Western Europe will be the main objective of the next 5 years. Specifically, this means work on the program to carry out the December (1979) NATO decision on the deployment of new medium-range American nuclear missiles and the expansion of arsenals of nuclear artillery, tactical missiles, bombs and naval systems on the European continent. Weinberger's report says that the Pentagon has already placed orders for the Pershing II medium-range missiles in triple the amount designated for deployment in Western Europe. It is no secret that the plan for the "modernization" of NATO nuclear forces envisages the deployment of 108 Pershing II missiles and 464 GLCM's4 with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers.

The United States has deployed 155mm and 203mm artillery weapons and Lance operational-tactical missiles within the European theater. In the next 5 years the United States plans to improve the capabilities of this category of weapons. The production of W70-3 neutron warheads for Lance missiles and W79 warheads for 203mm howitzers is to be completed. Although these warheads are now stored on American territory (this is underscored in Weinberger's report), the absolute majority of experts admit that they are intended for use outside the United States, primarily in Europe. Washington's plans and actions to build up American nuclear weapons in the European theater of combat are supposed to tip the continental balance of power in its favor and to lay a material and technical foundation for "limited nuclear war" in a region located thousands of kilometers away from American territory.

This is also the purpose of the planned redeployment of three American brigades (a total of around 15,000 servicemen) in direct proximity to the borders of the
GDR and CSSR. An agreement on the technical and "administrative" aspects of the plan was concluded at American-West German talks in March 1982, but a consensus was not reached on the financing of this program, which has an estimated cost of 1 billion dollars. The talks will be continued this year and Bonn will be pressured to assume part of the cost of transferring American troops to eastern regions of the FRG.

The United States is also taking part in the program for the enlargement of the NATO infrastructure. Its share of the cost is 27 percent (300 million dollars in the draft for fiscal year 1984); what is more, 35-40 percent of the annual allocations will be used for the maintenance and support of U.S. armed forces under NATO jurisdiction. These projects include the maintenance of airfields, naval bases and missiles sites and the construction and protection of ammunition and fuel depots. Washington wants countries where American troops are stationed to participate more in their material and technical support. The Pentagon has reported that definite agreements have been reached with the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Great Britain. According to the Pentagon chief, the American-West German agreement signed last year is particularly significant: The FRG Government agreed to create reserve peacetime units (around 93,000 people), which will be responsible for the organizational support of American units stationed in West Germany or transferred from overseas in the event of a crisis or war.

One of the problems connected with the presence of American troops in Western Europe is the question of finances. When the budget for fiscal year 1983 was being discussed, some congressmen, without questioning the "need" for the American military presence in Western Europe, suggested that the recall of some U.S. subunits from Europe to the American continent might be economical.

As C. Weinberger reported, the Pentagon analyzed this matter in detail and considered several alternative plans for the possible recall of certain quantities of American troops from Western Europe. The general consensus was that it would cost more in 1984-88 to station these troops on American territory and keep them in readiness for rapid transfer to the European continent in the event of an "emergency" than to continue financing their presence on U.S. bases in Europe. "This analysis," the Pentagon chief categorically stated, "should put an end to all of the speculation that we could maintain the necessary level of security or fulfill our NATO obligations at a lower cost by withdrawing our advance forces from Europe. On the contrary, from the financial standpoint, forward basing is the best way of fulfilling our commitments in the maintenance of collective security."

The Pentagon is extending "forward basing" to many zones other than Western Europe, now declared to be "spheres of U.S. vital interests." "As a country with commitments and interests throughout the world, the United States must maintain a strong system of forward defense," Weinberger declared. This means the deployment of American ground and naval forces in Japan, South Korea and a multitude of U.S. military bases abroad and the presence of carrier task forces and amphibious troops in the West Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The number of American troops abroad exceeded 543,000 last year.
The Pentagon is working at full speed on the program for the development of air and naval transport forces. The aim is to considerably heighten the possibility of the rapid transfer of additional contingents of U.S. armed forces by air or by sea to "hot spots" in the world. For example, the construction of 13 new amphibious ships for the simultaneous conduct of two large-scale landing operations in different parts of the world has been planned for fiscal years 1984-88. Allocations have been requested for the production of 50 additional C-5 transport planes and 44 KC-10 transport tanker aircraft. Research projects will be continued in fiscal year 1984 to develop a new model of the wide-body C-17 cargo plane, capable of takeoffs and landings on virtually any airfield.

The advance stockpiling of weapons, ammunition and materiel for U.S. combat subunits transferred from overseas is being conducted in various parts of the world that represent, according to the American command, "future theaters of war." For example, weapons for three Army divisions and ammunition for maintenance subunits on active duty on the American continent were deployed in Western Europe in the 1960's. The storage of equipment and ammunition for a fourth division is now being completed, and weapons for the fifth and sixth U.S. Army divisions are to be stockpiled in Belgium and the Netherlands in fiscal year 1985. Ammunition and auxiliary equipment depots for the American Air Force are being set up in Western Europe, Southwest Asia and South Korea, depots for Marine brigades are being set up in Norway, etc.

The United States has been able to gain the consent of a group of developing states to the use of their local airfields and ports, military facilities and installations, navigation stations and radar equipment by American troops, particularly the "rapid deployment force." Almost a billion dollars has been allocated for the enlargement and modernization of U.S. strong points and military bases in Egypt, Oman, Kenya, Somalia, the Azores and the island of Diego Garcia.

The U.S. efforts to intensify its global expansionism by raising the level of its military presence abroad, building new overseas bases and military installations and remodeling existing ones and carrying out programs to heighten the mobilization capabilities of American armed forces are consistent with the plans of the U.S. military-political leadership to establish its dominion over other countries and regions and to create bridgeheads for the start of military conflicts thousands of kilometers away from American territory and in direct proximity to the boundaries of the Soviet Union. The quantity and duration of military conflicts have been made dependent on the "ability to restore peace on terms acceptable to the United States." The U.S. Armed Forces "must be able to win a conflict in one or several theaters of war" and "be prepared for protracted combat," Weinberger said. In essence, the report set forth the concept of "protracted nuclear war," the basic premises of which were listed in the "defense directives for fiscal years 1984-88."

When American strategists speak of "protracted" war, they mean any armed conflict lasting longer than a single exchange of nuclear strikes. They proceed from the false and extremely dangerous assumption that this kind of conflict can be fought and won. The absurdity of this line of reasoning is obvious,
and not only to the political and military opponents of the United States. "I see no possibility of fighting a limited or protracted nuclear war," wrote General D. Jones, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example. "I feel that it would be extremely difficult to prevent the escalation of any exchange of nuclear strikes between the United States and the Soviet Union."

More and more U.S. politicians and public spokesmen, several members of the administration and many congressmen are realizing that increased military spending, broader military preparations and the design and development of new types and systems of weapons cannot solve the domestic economic and social problems of the United States or strengthen its security and defense capability.

Excessive armament expenditures are undermining the American economy and are responsible for the unprecedented growth of the federal budget deficit, which experts predict could exceed 280 billion dollars by the end of 1988. The continued militarization of the American economy, according to Council on Economic Priorities staffers R. Degrass and W. Rayjen, could lead to a situation in which military expenditures will absorb more than 75 percent of the budget by 1986. The additional funds for military purposes will be taken from other federal budget accounts. Western economists have estimated that the program of broader military preparations will cost each American family 20,000 dollars a year in 3 years.

The opponents of excessive military spending include Director D. Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget, former Secretaries of Defense R. McNamara, M. Laird, J. Schlesinger and H. Brown, former Secretary of State C. Vance, Retired Admiral E. Zumwalt and several senators and congressmen. The vote in the House of Representatives in March, when the Democratic Party's "alternative" federal budget for fiscal year 1984—envisaging cuts in the military expenditures planned by the White House—was approved by the majority of congressmen, testifies that opposition to the Republican administration's military policy is present in the nation's highest legislative body.

"The Pentagon has launched a campaign," said Rear Admiral (Ret) G. La Rocque, director of the Washington Center for Defense Information, "for the purpose of frightening the public and obtaining appropriations for weapons we do not need."

Therefore, the facts testify that the U.S. administration is stubbornly carrying out plans for military preparations, the augmentation of military programs and the creation of new types of weapons. This unrestrained race for arms is supposed to make the United States the world's dominant military power. But all efforts to attain military superiority over the USSR are futile. The Soviet Union will never allow this to happen; it will never face any threat unarmed. The present state of military-strategic parity "is a reliable guarantee of peace," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov stressed in his replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent on 27 March 1983, "and we will do everything within our power to maintain it."

FOOTNOTES
2. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 12, pp 65-68—Editor's note.


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AMERICANS' CRITICISM OF REAGAN POLICY IN AFRICA SURVEYED

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 79-83

[Article by V. A. Martynov: "Reagan's African Policy: Criticism of the 'New' Approach"]

[Text] The change in the Reagan Administration's political tactics in relations with the countries of black Africa and the reordering of priorities in its approach to urgent problems pertaining to Africa in general have aroused the attention of American experts on African affairs. The authors of recently published works have tried to determine the purpose of Washington's so-called "new African policy" and its possible effect on U.S. national interests—which are perceived differently by different groups of authors.

The apologists for the current administration's foreign policy activity feel that the approach is new primarily because it rejects the regionalist view of African problems that was characteristic of the Carter Administration and took the form of the assignment of higher priority to Africa in general and the more diversified development of contacts with the independent states of Tropical Africa. The Republicans subjected this approach to considerable revision.

Many American researchers have commented on the anti-Soviet aims of the Reagan Administration's African policy, calling it the focal point of all African policy. These aims stem from the globalist concepts that have traditionally impressed the Republican Party, with a superimposed subjective factor in the form of the extremely reactionary views and pathological anticommunism of the current President and the political forces behind him.

In an article entitled "On Safari Again," part of a series of articles in ORBIS magazine on Africa, H. Kitchen, a well-known expert on African affairs, wrote that "the Reagan Administration is more likely than its predecessor to categorically link aid to Africa with U.S. national interests," and the "calculation of U.S. national interests in Africa puts more emphasis on anti-Sovietism than on the idea of helping Africa lay the foundations for economic and political independence."

The specific features of the Reagan Administration's economic policy in Africa have also been interpreted in recent works by American authors as a sign of
the Republican administration's general tendency to regard the African continent primarily as an arena of struggle against the USSR. The volume of American capital investments and trade with the African countries is relatively small, but their role in the overall structure of U.S.-African ties transcends the bounds of purely numerical indicators. This is particularly true of American "aid" to the African countries, which is offered directly and through international financial organizations.

Analyzing the economic aspects of U.S. policy in Africa, Carol Lancaster, who succeeded Assistant Secretary of State C. Crocker as the director of the African studies program at Georgetown University, defined its main elements in her article "U.S. Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa": an emphasis on activity by the private sector to the detriment of government programs, reflected in changes in proportional budget allocations for so-called development aid and, consequently, in larger allocations for the financing of African imports; the concentration of American "aid" in such American strongholds on the continent as Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Zaire and Liberia and a corresponding reduction in aid to states which are categorized as "politically unstable" or whose political aims are objectionable to the current administration, such as Mali, Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Togo and Tanzania; the continued financing of such programs as the Sahel development fund, also with an underlying political motive—the hope of neutralizing Libyan influence in this region.²

There is no question that relations with South Africa are a key aspect of Washington's general African strategy. The interest of American ruling circles in supporting the Pretoria regime as a bastion of capitalism and anticommunism on the continent and in the use of this regime for the further consolidation of American economic positions is understandably in conflict with the more general U.S. interest in heightening America's prestige in Africa and is inhibiting the spread of the American influence on the continent.

S. Solarz, the former chairman and current member of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, who has always spoken out vehemently against apartheid and against American contacts with South Africa, declared in an ORBIS article that "the Reagan Administration's approach to the strategic, economic and political problems the United States is encountering in Africa suffers from more than just a shortage of the necessary diplomatic concern. The chief weakness of this approach is a South African policy that is contrary to the interests and the ideals of the United States."

Solarz also sees other defects in Washington's general strategy in Africa, including, for example, the as yet unsuccessful attempts to repeal the "Clark Amendment," which would allow the United States to openly support UNITA in Angola, the reduced allocations for the development of cultural exchange and the emphasis on activity by the private sector in the sphere of economic relations. However, Solarz says in summation, "no matter what kind of other defects African policy (the policy of the Reagan Administration—V. M.) might have, it is precisely the moral and strategic bankruptcy of the American approach to the Republic of South Africa that could have the most negative long-range effects on our country."³
Washington's general policy line in relations with South Africa is colored by a complicated intermixture of political, ideological, military, strategic and economic considerations, some of which cause American ruling circles to strive to consolidate U.S. positions in South Africa while others inhibit this kind of convergence. The most traditional arguments, used most frequently to substantiate the need for stronger ties with the Pretoria regime, include the alleged "vitaly important" dependence of the United States on South African strategic raw materials.

Despite the popularity of this argument, it has never been completely indisputable, even for official representatives of U.S. ruling circles, and has been criticized regularly in the works of American experts on African affairs. Its latest resurrection by the Republican administration was also accompanied by the appearance of several articles criticizing the attempts to use it to justify cooperation with South Africa, primarily for the reason that this argument interferes with the accurate assessment of the United States' actual long-range economic and strategic interests in this region. One of these was M. Shafer's FOREIGN POLICY article, "Mineral Myths."

Shafer's basic premise is that "the specter of a resource war, which is being employed more and more by the Reagan Administration, has been severely exaggerated.... Most of the commotion over this issue stems from beliefs that are either based on false information or are the product of ideological pressure. Many of the officials in the Reagan Administration have raised the question of strategic minerals...in order to justify the policy of confrontation with the Soviets.... Haig's approach (this refers to the former secretary of state's remark about the coming "era of resource wars"—V. M.) could pose a real threat to U.S. security in the area of mineral supplies and could undermine other, more fundamental U.S. foreign policy interests in Africa and the rest of the world." In a detailed analysis of the argument about the "vital importance" of supplies of African, particularly South African, raw materials to the United States, M. Shafer refutes the statistics that are usually used for this purpose and suggests alternative moves in the sphere of economic and foreign policy that could minimize the elements of this dependence. He stresses that "the United States could reduce imports of strategic minerals considerably without any threat whatsoever to national security" because the kind of "critical dependence that would dictate unequivocal imperatives of convergence with South Africa does not exist, just as the specter of a Soviet threat that would turn southern Africa into an arena of conflict between East and West does not exist."4

Regardless of the official economic and strategic motives of U.S. policy in Africa, particularly in southern Africa, the main element is related to political ideology, specifically the desire to prevent what American political scientists call the "radicalization" and "destabilization" of the situation in this part of the continent—that is, the growth of the liberation movement in South Africa and Namibia.

In connection with this, two problems have recently become the central matters of concern for American observers: the U.S. attitude toward the system of apartheid in South Africa and the granting of independence to Namibia. Both of these issues will have the most direct effect on relations between Washington and Pretoria.
South Africa's racist policy put it in an odious position long ago. The officially legalized system and practice of apartheid have made open cooperation with the white minority regime in South Africa politically disadvantageous for any U.S. administration. All U.S. administrations of the two past decades have verbally condemned the practice of racial discrimination and segregation in South Africa; the Carter Administration was particularly active, hypocritically proclaiming the slogan of "human rights defense" throughout the world. Under the influence of international and domestic political factors, American ruling circles had to exert some pressure, although it was usually only rhetorical, on the racist regime in Pretoria in the second half of the 1970's to convince it to modernize and modify the socioeconomic and political structure of South Africa to some degree and to conceal the particular features of apartheid that were most unacceptable to the world public and the American population. The ultimate purpose was to prevent racial upheavals in the region, counteract the increasing influence of the Soviet Union and secure the ability of the United States to pursue its own interests here without suffering any political injuries.

The Reagan Administration chose to attain these goals with the policy of so-called "constructive influence," which was planned in detail by the abovementioned C. Crocker when he was still a professor at Georgetown University. It was precisely this doctrine that provided the grounds for describing the African policy of the Reagan Administration as a new approach to the problems of the region and of the entire continent.

According to J. Seiler, however, "a closer look at its declared principles and its actual behavior reveals much more continuity than change. The main element of this policy is still an overriding concern about a potential challenge to U.S. regional interests.... Just as in 1976, the economic and military domination of the region by South Africa is being publicly acknowledged in order to gain Pretoria's consent to the transition plan for Namibia. At the same time, the limits of U.S. influence in the region and on the RSA are being underscored. Finally, a relatively new principle is being considered: the criticism of racism in South Africa must be balanced by an understanding of the difficulties connected with the establishment of stable democratic institutions in the multiracial society of the RSA and by public approval of measurable progress."5

The practice of exerting "constructive influence" on the Pretoria regime in order to gain its consent to at least the apparent reform of apartheid has not only failed to produce the anticipated results but has actually caused its domestic policy to grow more rigid. The more active relations and contacts with South Africa, which were conceived as an integral element of the doctrine and a means of exerting pressure on Pretoria, were interpreted by the RSA ruling elite as carte blanche for stronger repression within the country and more pronounced aggression against neighboring "frontline" states.

Some aspects of the new U.S. approach to problems in southern Africa began to be criticized within a year after the Republicans took charge. In "Silence Is Not Golden," an article in the spring 1982 issue of FOREIGN POLICY, J. Dugard acknowledged that "the Reagan Administration was unable to stimulate reforms
in South Africa. On the contrary, there are clear signs that the South African Government is returning to the old type of racial policy.... What is more, quiet diplomacy probably promoted the return to more extreme forms of racial domination." "The quiet diplomacy of the Reagan Administration," Dugard says in summation, "is broadly interpreted as the maintenance of the status quo."6

From the first days of its existence, the Reagan Administration refused to make even symbolic gestures against apartheid. The limited means of exerting pressure on the racist regime and the inexpediency of excessive pressure, stipulated in the doctrine of "constructive influence" as a precaution against the rejection of the very idea of reform, neither appealed, nor appeared convincing, to the Africans and a sizeable segment of U.S. political circles. Given this situation, the administration's experts on African affairs suggested a specific tactical maneuver. Whereas the original purpose of the doctrine worked out by C. Crocker before 1981 was to exert at least some pressure on Pretoria with regard to the system of apartheid (preferably with the aid of the "carrot" rather than the "stick"), the current administration accomplished a rapid change of tactics and made the Namibian question the focal point of all African policy.

Stronger relations with South Africa began to be interpreted less as a means of accomplishing the liberalization of the Pretoria government's domestic policy than as a necessary condition for a "positive response" from South Africa to the question of granting independence to Namibia. As a result, the Namibian question became an integral element of the line of "constructive influence" because the settlement of affairs in Namibia through negotiation could serve as the sole reason for convergence with Pretoria. Without the United States' ostentatious participation in the settlement of the Namibian question, its policy toward South Africa would lose its "constructive" appearance and would represent only a political liability.7

The resulting duality and hypocrisy of American diplomacy in the settlement of Namibian affairs have been a matter of concern even to American politicians who believe that the United States should, in its own interest, take a tougher stand on Pretoria's policy and its behavior in the region. For example, J. Whitaker, one of the editors of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, suggested in a NEW YORK TIMES article on "The Pretoria War" that "if we do not firmly announce our clear and precise opposition to South Africa's destabilization campaign, we might find our diplomatic efforts undermined by mounting African suspicion and hostility." Whitaker feels that the United States should avoid undesirable consequences "primarily by convincing South Africa that its destabilization operations (this is what he calls the racists' aggressive raids on neighboring Angola--V. M.) are contrary to U.S. and RSA interests" and "by reinforcing its arguments with definite unofficial warnings of potential repressive measures. If the raids continue, Washington must condemn them immediately and publicly and encourage the European allies to continue satisfying the frontline states' requests for military assistance in warding off South African aggression. Finally, Washington should demonstrate its own concern for the stability of South Africa's neighbors by aiding in their economic development."8
Another means of pressuring Pretoria was suggested by R. McNamara, who once served as U.S. secretary of defense and later became the president of the IBRD, in a speech in Johannesburg at the end of last year. He frankly warned the South African audience that, "in the absence of genuine change, by 1990 the situation in South Africa could be as great a threat to peace as the situation in the Middle East is today." McNamara advised the Western governments to stockpile chromium, manganese, vanadium and platinum and draw up "emergency plans" in case South Africa should stop exporting these minerals. This would show South Africa that the "mineral weapon" does not work. The "McNamara Plan" was supported by NEW YORK TIMES correspondent F. Lewis, who saw it as "a warning South Africa cannot ignore."9

According to the statement made by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs C. Crocker at the January 1983 conference of the Afro-American Institute in Harar, however, the Reagan Administration does not intend to change its African policy. He responded to the criticism of Washington's "linkage" concept with the cynical remark that "we have never asked any African government to declare its support for the linkage doctrine. It makes no difference to us whether it is approved or disapproved."

This conference, which was attended by around 200 prominent African and U.S. politicians and statesmen, became, according to the WASHINGTON POST, a "forum for the discussion of the Reagan Administration's policy of 'constructive influence' on southern Africa under white rule." Zimbabwe's Prime Minister R. Mugabe called the "linkage" policy "blackmail"; President Sam Nujoma of SWAPO described it as "cynical, disgraceful and inhumane, because it gives South Africa an excuse to remain in Namibia." H. Wolpe, the Democratic congressman from Michigan who is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and who attended the conference, acknowledged that "the African leaders are much more disillusioned with U.S. policy and regard it with greater cynicism than a year ago.... No one trusts us because of the actions we have taken in support of South Africa, which has received a clear message from us that it can do whatever it wants in this region without fear of reproach from the United States."

Wolpe's description of the essence of the "new" U.S. approach to Africa and the implications of the policy based on this approach seems quite apt.

FOOTNOTES


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IMEMO MONOGRAPH ON CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PROBLEMS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 104-114


[Text] A collective monograph, "Soyedinennyje Shtaty Ameriki," written by a group of authors from the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences under the supervision of A. V. Anikin, O. N. Bykov and A. I. Shapiro, was published at the end of 1982. It is part of the series "Present-Day Monopoly Capitalism." It is an examination of the United States' major problems of the 1970's and early 1980's and the latest developments in the economic, social and political life of this country. Many of the authors have been studying U.S. economics and politics for more than three decades and are recognized experts on American affairs, and this has contributed a great deal to the highly skilled investigation of the majority of these problems. Ten years separate this work from the previous institute monograph on the same subject, and the two books combined can give readers an overview of developments in the United States during most of the postwar period.

The 1970's and early 1980's were a turning point in the development of American capitalism. During this relatively short period of time there were three malfunctions of the U.S. economy (1969-1970, 1973-1975, 1980-1982), accompanied by the ruin of considerable productive resources and a rise in unemployment unprecedented in the postwar period. The fundamental conclusions drawn by the CPSU and other fraternal parties with regard to the severe crisis of the system of state-monopoly economic regulation were wholly corroborated. Massive structural disparities in the development of the American economy became evident during this period. The rate of economic growth slowed down dramatically. This was accompanied by the decline of the basic indicators of the effectiveness of capitalist economic management—the dynamics of labor productivity, return on capital and profit margins. The serious effects of the U.S. tendency to lag behind two other centers of imperialist rivalry, Western Europe and Japan, on the international economic and political positions of American capital became fully evident.
The turn of the decade also interests researchers of contemporary U.S. history and economics because it was precisely in these years that two fundamental changes took place in the policy of the dominant class. One was in the sphere of domestic policy and was connected with the attempt to limit the government's economic role and to return, at least verbally, to absolutely unrestricted "free enterprise." The second was in the sphere of foreign policy and represented a sharp turnabout from detente to a policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Both of these changes were dictated by the dominant class's desire to strengthen its own position and regain America's "rightful" place in the world.

All of this gives the study of the contemporary stage of U.S. development great scientific value and political pertinence. The significance of this collective monograph, however, is not confined to the pertinence of its topic and the broad historical approach to its investigation. The work is of value primarily because it represents a comprehensive study of the main processes, problems and contradictions in the United States' economic, sociopolitical and international political development in the 1970's and early 1980's in comparison to the preceding period. This reaffirms the value of the interdisciplinary approach in the analysis of social processes and the importance of examining the cause and effect relationship of events—in short, the importance of complying with one of the basic requirements of historical materialism.

The authors examine U.S. productive forces and production relations, the monopoly structure of the economy, state-monopoly economic regulation, current trends in cyclical development, the inflationary process, foreign economic ties, the social structure of society, the status of various classes and strata, public opinion and domestic and foreign policy issues.

As a result of their research, the authors were able, it seems to us, to make a definite contribution to the comprehension of new events in the capitalist world and their effect on the United States, particularly the distinctive features of the current stage of the general crisis of capitalism, the increasingly important role of the military-industrial complex, the activities of transnational corporations and several others.

One of the indisputable scientific achievements of the team of authors warrants special consideration. This is their detailed analysis of the deep-seated causes of the reversal in the basic trends of U.S. economic development in the 1970's, which separated the preceding quarter-century of relatively rapid economic growth from the current period of much slower development and marked the beginning of the considerable deterioration of all of the main conditions for the reproduction of social capital. This analysis lays a solid foundation for short- and medium-range forecasts of the economic and sociopolitical development of American capitalism—a field in which, as recent years have clearly shown, non-Marxist economic science has been completely helpless, despite all of the success in mathematical modeling and the incredible speed with which computers of the third and fourth generations operate.

Special mention must be made of the massive amounts of statistical analysis conducted under the supervision of B. M. Bolotin, which not only corroborates
hypotheses but is also of value in itself. All of this helped the authors write a valuable book, guaranteed to appeal to even the most demanding reader.

Of course, this does not mean that all sections and chapters of the monograph are of equal value and that all of the statements made by the authors are sufficiently valid and indisputable. This kind of book probably does not even exist. The deficiencies of this monograph include, in particular, the inadequate analysis of such topics as financial capital and the financial oligarchy, the chronic underloading of fixed capital and the role of the annual conferences of the "big seven," led by the United States, for the planning of economic and political strategy in the capitalist world. The scientific value of any study, however, is measured not by what it lacks, but primarily by what it adds to the knowledge we have gained from earlier works and by the progress it represents in a particular field of knowledge. From this standpoint, this rich and meaningful work deserves a high evaluation: It contains thorough discussions of the U.S. economy, social structure, class struggle and domestic and foreign policy, provides a better understanding of the reversals and intricacies of the Washington administration's strategy and gives researchers ample food for thought by inviting them to consider new questions. We feel that the following are some of the most intriguing of these questions.

To what degree can the assumption of power by the Republican Party conservative wing, headed by Ronald Reagan, be regarded as the beginning of a "new era" in the history of American capitalism? Can "Reaganomics" solve the problems in the American economy, which could not be solved by the system of state-monopoly regulation based on neo-Keynesian recipes, over the medium or long range? Will the tendency to lag behind other centers of imperialist rivalry cause America to lose its leading position in the capitalist world by the end of this century or the beginning of the next?

We will try to answer these questions with the aid of the analysis conducted by the authors of this book and research currently being conducted in the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

I

When the Republican Party, headed by Ronald Reagan, won a victory in the 1980 presidential election, many observers in the United States and abroad pointed out the depth, long duration and stability of this political reversal. This conclusion was promoted to a considerable extent by the Republicans themselves, members of Congress, administration spokesmen and their supporters in the mass media. Just over 2 years later, the situation changed perceptibly. The number of persons pointing out the temporary, superficial nature of this reversal is rising by the day and even by the hour. Is this a coincidence?

In retrospect, we can see that the results of the 1980 election proved that there was and is no solid basis for Republican statements about the extensive mandate they allegedly received from the majority of the American public. Presidents in the United States are usually elected not by a majority, but by a minority—from one-fourth to one-third of all voters. Ronald Reagan is no exception to this rule. Table 1 shows that he was elected by 26.6 percent of the voters.
Table 1

Postwar Presidential Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Registered voters, millions</th>
<th>Number of persons who voted, millions</th>
<th>% of voters who voted</th>
<th>% of votes won by President</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>57.8</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>107.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>114.1</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>120.7</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>140.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>150.2</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>162.6</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The victory of the Republican Party, which had been the opposition party for most of the 20th century, was due to a specific set of circumstances. The most important was the profound disillusionment of various strata of American society—from the grand bourgeoisie to the working class—with the liberal-reformist economic and social policy usually associated with Democratic administrations.

The realization of the deadlock of state-monopoly economic regulation, the administration's inability to prevent the onset of increasingly frequent and severe economic crises, the futility of the struggle against inflation and unemployment and the deterioration of American capitalism's international economic and political positions began to be interpreted by broad segments of the American population (not without the aid of press organs controlled by big capital) as a result of excessive government interference in economic affairs and the artificial restriction of private capitalist initiative.

A significant rise in taxes and the unequal distribution of the tax burden among various population strata played an important role in the mounting dissatisfaction with government economic policy. The so-called "middle strata," to which more than half of all American families belong, had to bear most of this burden. At the same time, they received much less from the government in the form of various social benefits. They derived another advantage: The redistribution of national income in favor of the underprivileged allowed the authorities to alleviate social tension and keep class contradictions from growing into open conflicts or at least moderate them considerably. Nevertheless, many middle-income Americans felt that they were being robbed. This laid the foundation for the "taxpayers' revolt" and for a variety of anti-government feelings, including hostility toward "big government" in general.
The erosion of the traditional values of Americanism, the crisis of faith in the main institutions of the American society and the doubts about the validity of key postulates of the American way of life provided fertile ground for the growth of conservative, traditionalist feelings, which had always been promoted by the Republican Party, especially its right wing and all of the different rightwing-extremist organizations that had traditionally rallied round it (the Ku Klux Klan, the American Legion, the American Nazi Party), as well as the organizations of the "New Right," including rightwing religious groups (the Moral Majority, the Christian Voice, the Christian Roundtable and several others).

Another contributing factor was the series of serious failures of American foreign policy, which the ideologists of American conservatism described as "national humiliations" and the direct result of the policy of detente and unjustifiable concessions to Moscow.

The inconsistency of the Carter Administration's domestic and foreign policy, the incompetence and inexperience of many of Carter's advisers and cabinet members and the President's own indecisiveness also played a role, motivating part of the "silent majority" to take the side of the Republican Party and guaranteeing its victory.

All of this provided grounds for the absolutely correct conclusion that the U.S. political axis moved to the right at the beginning of the 1980's. But was this such a pronounced shift? Did it include the broad masses? Would it last long? The events of the past 2 years proved that this conclusion is apparently even less valid now than it appeared to be just recently.

The alternative proposed by the Republican Party in the form of "simple solutions to complex problems" led to the deterioration, and not the improvement, of domestic and foreign economic conditions. It is not surprising that Reagan's presidential prestige (despite his personal popularity) had fallen lower than any other postwar president's at the beginning of his third year in office, as Table 2 shows. It is true that public opinion in America is quite changeable and that this opinion could easily be replaced by a more favorable opinion of the President. The wave of conservatism which engulfed the U.S. political stage at the turn of the decade, has certainly not receded. But Reaganism as a current of political ideology, as a rightwing radical variety of conservatism issuing the order "Backward, march!" and disregarding the political realities of today's world, is obviously losing its appeal. Many American political analysts are comparing Reaganism to "a mountain giving birth to a mouse" and are calling it a "flash in the pan," although it was just recently being described as nothing other than a promising current of American social awareness.

Therefore, we are less likely to wonder whether Reagan's move to the White House marked the beginning of a long era of Republican government than to consider whether Reaganism will leave the political stage even before the next election or will remain there for some time after the election if the incumbent feels able to win the nomination and be re-elected for another term. The answer to this question will depend largely on the Democratic Party's ability
to learn a lesson from its political defeat in 1980 and to offer an appealing alternative to Reaganism in domestic and foreign policy. The events of the next few months will decide the matter.

Table 2

Approval of Presidential Performance After 2 Years in Office, %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidents</th>
<th>Percentage of Public Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. Reagan</td>
<td>41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Carter</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Ford</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Nixon</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Johnson</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Kennedy</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Eisenhower</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Truman</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only 37.8 percent in March 1983.


II

The failure of Reagan's economic policy, called "Reaganomics," is so obvious that it cannot be denied even by the most zealous supporters of this policy. Instead of experiencing quicker growth, the U.S. economy was stricken at the beginning of the 1980's by the most lengthy economic crisis of the last 50 years. In place of increased employment, the army of unemployed individuals now numbers 12 million (more than 10 percent of the entire labor force); this is the highest level of unemployment since pre-war days. The largest budget deficit in U.S. history--around 200 billion dollars--is expected in the current fiscal year instead of the promised balanced federal budget by 1984. Instead of reducing government expenditures, the administration has constantly increased them, and military spending has increased at a particularly rapid rate--10-13 percent a year.

Of course, it would be wrong to blame all U.S. economic difficulties on the economic policy of the Republican Party. But it would be equally wrong to deny that its policy has aggravated the illnesses of the national economy, particularly the unproductive use of manpower and the sad state of government finances. The usurious interest rates on bank credit, stemming from the unprecedented budget deficit, have made emergence from the crisis more difficult in the United States and everywhere else in the capitalist world. This is still one of the major causes of the extraordinarily feeble recovery of the world capitalist economy.

The supporters of "Reaganomics" allege that there has not been enough time to eliminate the deep-seated defects and disparities resulting from the inept
and excessive interference of Democratic administrations in economic affairs. This argument deserves some consideration: There are no magic spells for the resolution of economic problems with a single wave of a magic wand, particularly in the case of a country with a GNP close to 3 trillion dollars. It takes time, and a great deal of time, to bring about changes in an economy of this size. We should recall, however, that the people who are now advising against hasty conclusions are the same people who were just recently encouraging these kinds of expectations and beliefs with their own offhanded remarks.9

But let us return to the specific question. Will "Reaganomics" be able to bring about any real improvement of U.S. economic conditions over the medium or long range if it is pursued for a fairly long period of time? This does not mean the mere recovery of the economy, which will take place sooner or later, but the improvement of conditions—that is, the elimination of such unhealthy and already chronic symptoms as mass unemployment, inflation, excessively low rates of economic growth and government financial disorder. Economic improvement also presupposes long-awaited structural changes in the economy, the elimination of the most serious national economic disparities, the accelerated renovation of fixed productive capital, the augmentation of labor productivity and the return on capital and, at the very least, the prevention of a further decline in the American people's standard of living.

The Reagan Administration is still asserting that the pursuit of its policy in accordance with its four-point program (reductions in taxes, federal spending and government regulation and an increase in the total amount of money in circulation) and another massive weapons buildup are the best way of solving the nation's problems. An objective analysis proves, however, that "Reaganomics" is unable to solve these problems or even to hasten their resolution. In the first place, the administration has been unable to pursue this policy and, in the second, results have been absolutely unsatisfactory even when it has been able to carry out its plans.

The grand facade of "Reaganomics" and its unsubstantiated promises, postulates and symbols of faith fell apart like a house of cards as soon as it came into contact with reality.

The President and his advisers asserted so many times that the main purpose of "Reaganomics" was the reduction of taxes. In a burst of sincerity, Director D. Stockman of the Office of Management and Budget even let it slip that all of the rhetoric of "supply-side economics" was invented simply to justify a radical tax cut benefiting mainly the owners of large fortunes.10 And then what happened? Less than a year after the famous tax reform of 1981, the President pushed a bill through Congress for the collection of almost 100 billion dollars in new taxes in the next 3 years. In the beginning of 1983, he proposed additional "unplanned" taxes for the collection of around 240 billion dollars within 3 years, although these were not to be instituted until after 1985 and only if other measures should prove inadequate.11 Does this radical reversal not constitute an admission that one of the basic postulates of Reaganism turned out in practice to be absolutely utopian?

The crux of the matter is not even that the present scope of government economic activity is such that a smaller financial base could have serious
implications in production as well as the monetary sphere. The main consideration is that, no matter what kind of tax benefits and advantages are offered to private capital, it will take more than increased savings and government pleas to bring about the actual investment of capital. There must also be the assurance that new capital investments will produce sufficiently high profits. Apparently, the executives of American corporations still do not have this assurance.

The second premise of "Reaganomics"--reduced government spending--turned out to be just as impracticable. During the years of Reagan's presidency, federal government expenditures have risen by an average of 4.35 percent a year (in constant 1972 prices) and the total rise over 2 years was 8.9 percent, 12 primarily as a result of the growth of the most unproductive type of expenditure--expenditures on military aims--with simultaneous cuts in social programs. The administration got so carried away that it did not even notice the comic aspect of the situation in which the chief executive quite seriously demanded that the constitution be amended to require the balancing of government income and expenditures at the same time that the federal budget deficit began to be measured in a 12-digit figure. 13

It is too early to judge the results of the loud campaign to promote the third premise of "Reaganomics"--"deregulation." According to its supporters, this is supposed to free private initiative from the "smothering embraces" of government regulation. A special commission chaired by Vice-President G. Bush is trying to minimize the swollen code of laws regulating the economic activity of private capital. Regardless of the possible short-term advantages of this kind of legislative review, they certainly will not be comparable to the colossal and irreversible damage U.S. national production potential might incur as a result of the repeal of restrictions concerning environmental pollution, labor safety or consumer rights protection.

As for the fourth premise of "Reaganomics"--the use of a restrictive monetary policy to combat inflation--considering the resulting drop in demand, cuts in production and rise in unemployment, it is absolutely clear that, from the standpoint of social stability, this cannot be the basis of a long-term strategy.

What about the fact that the rate of inflation has dropped to less than half of its previous level--from 10.2 to 4.6 percent a year? 14 The possibility that the inflationary rise in prices could be slowed down by an economic crisis was known of long ago, before Reagan and long before the appearance of the notorious "supply-side economics." 15 Even when Eisenhower was President, BUSINESS WEEK, the magazine of the business community, remarked that this was like stopping a nosebleed by fastening a noose around the neck.

The bankruptcy of the Reagan Administration's economic policy stems precisely from its promise to put an end to inflation without resorting to this old and painful remedy. What it actually did, however, was to put the economy in a financial noose and thereby intensify the months-long critical production slump and deliberately bring about an unprecedented rise in unemployment. Obviously, this is not that great an achievement. But the main thing is that inflation, despite the administration's allegations, is far from a thing of
the past. The highest (in real terms) interest rates of the 20th century—an average of 7-8 percent per annum—are the best indicator of the actual "reasonable expectations" of Wall Street bankers. In an attempt to insure themselves against possible losses, they are trying to use these high rates to compensate for the anticipated resumption of the inflationary rise of prices during the recovery phase.

Little remains, with the exception of bombastic rhetoric, of Reaganism's fundamental aim of reducing "big government" and its economic role. The more than 2 years of activity by the Reagan Administration have proved that there was nothing to this claim. The government has played a greater role, and not a smaller one, in economic affairs during these years, both in relative terms, judging by the proportion accounted for by the budget in the GNP, and in absolute terms, judging by the total size of the federal budget. Even its official role appears to have been augmented if we compare the current administration's feverish legislative activity to the activity of the previous administration and, in fact, if we compare the activity of the executive branch to that of the two other branches of the U.S. political system—legislative and judicial.

One form of state-monopoly capitalism which provides ample proof of this is government orders for military goods and services and, in general, everything connected with the activity of the military-industrial complex. In this area, the Reagan Administration has set another undisputed record by burdening the nation with military expenditures of almost 2 trillion dollars in 1981-1985. American agriculture is being regulated and subsidized as much as before, if not more. The administration has intervened much more energetically than before in foreign economic relations by encouraging trade expansion, exports of American capital and the activities of U.S. transnational corporations abroad and by simultaneously regulating imports in their interest with the aid of tariff and non-tariff protectionism. The Reagan Administration's shameless interference in relations between labor and capital provides more evidence of its reluctance to give up any of the authority that reinforces the supremacy of the monopolistic bourgeoisie.

In general, could we even conceive of capitalism in the United States or any other industrially developed capitalist country today without the redistribution of national income, a change in the accumulation-consumption ratio and the protection of the interests of the country's "own" companies against encroachment by foreign firms or its own working class? The current administration's announced return to virtually unrestricted "free enterprise" was more a reflection of capitalist nostalgia for the "good old days" than an actual policy objective. From this vantage point, whether we examine "Reaganomics" or "Thatcherism" and whether we examine them over the short, medium or long range, we can discuss all of the basic theoretical premises that represent some kind of aberration, a step out of line or even a step backward in comparison to the mainstream of contemporary capitalist economic strategy, but all of this is actually nothing other than an attempt to purge the existing system of state-monopoly regulation of several extremes and excesses and turn over part of its functions to local government. The main thing is that "Reaganomics" uses essentially the same methods as the usual Keynesian remedies, but more crudely, more primitively and less effectively.
In connection with this, we should recall that, at the beginning of 1982, when a large U.S. publishing firm asked Harvard University Professor Emeritus J. Galbraith to define "Reaganomics" for the new edition of a dictionary, he replied: "Don't worry about it. By the time the new edition comes out, no one will care." If the venerable professor was wrong, it was only because he did not realize how many Americans will be unable to forget it after they have personally experienced its negative effects.

III

Processes in the world capitalist economy have slowly but surely reduced the relative strength of U.S. economic positions since the middle of the 20th century. This tendency, which is hardly discernible in some areas but clearly pronounced in others, reflects a characteristic feature of the imperialist stage of capitalism—less uniformity in the political and economic development of separate states. V. I. Lenin first described this tendency just before World War I and it has now become more distinct under the influence of the technological revolution—a factor contributing to the rapid equalization of development levels in the main capitalist countries.

Table 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Production</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct overseas investments*</td>
<td></td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>59.1**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold currency reserves</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentage of capital exported by main exporting countries (United States, Japan, FRG, France, Great Britain, Italy, Canada and the Netherlands).

** 1975.


As Table 3 indicates, the U.S. share of world production, international trade and the export of capital has decreased perceptibly in the last three decades and is still shrinking. The same can be said of the U.S. share of world gold reserves, scientific and technical innovations and the export of licenses. This is occurring at a time when the internationalization of production, the
development of specialization and cooperation and the intensification of international division of labor have increased the economic interdependence of many countries and the U.S. economy has grown much more attached to the world market. In the area of energy resources, for example, the proportion accounted for by foreign sources in the U.S. supply ranges from one-fourth to one-half of all national consumption. Although U.S. participation in international economic processes is still growing in absolute terms, it has displayed a steady decrease in relative terms. All of this naturally alarms the ruling circles of a country which has always regarded economic strength as the basis of its claims to world hegemony.

The tendency toward a relative lag between the United States and other centers of imperialist rivalry is the result of many socioeconomic processes inside and outside the country. Now that American economic growth rates are dropping, Japan, the FRG and some other industrially developed states, not to mention newly industrialized developing countries, have continued to develop much more quickly than the United States during the upward movements of the economic spiral. The dynamics of labor productivity in the most highly developed capitalist countries are not in the U.S. favor either, and this is another cause for alarm in business and government circles, as the reduced competitive potential of American goods in the world and domestic markets is connected with the decreasing productivity of labor.

Changes in the balance of forces among leading centers of rivalry in the capitalist world are tangible and indisputable. When the current position of the United States in the world capitalist economy is being assessed, however, the following three facts must be borne in mind.

First of all, the definite reduction of the U.S. economic role after World War II was natural and understandable because this role was disproportionately great as a result of the devastation of other countries by the war. The reduction of U.S. participation in world capitalist economics was just as inevitable as the increased participation by other countries as their economies recovered and developed.

Secondly, despite its relative lag, the United States has colossal financial and economic strength, is far superior to its partners in the main branches of economic activity and, what is particularly important, is still the leader in many advanced fields of scientific and technical progress—the development of computers of all types, particularly super and high-speed equipment, the development of specialized software, bioengineering, laser technology, space exploration, the exploitation of world ocean resources and several others.

Thirdly, U.S. national statistics do not include the overseas products of TNC's, which are playing, along with the International companies of other capitalist countries, an increasingly important role in the world capitalist economy. Overseas enterprises controlled by American capital now have a sales volume 4.5 times as great as all American exports. Obviously, a total assessment of U.S. economic potential must also include the gigantic overseas industrial empires with their headquarters in the United States.
Nevertheless, the relative U.S. economic lag is an actual trend in world development in our time. Is this only a short-range tendency, stemming from temporary factors, or a fairly lengthy and stable one, engendered by long-term factors? Is it reversible or irreversible? Will the United States lose its leading position in the capitalist world in terms of basic per capita economic indicators by the end of this century or the beginning of the next? The research into this matter in economic science and the general state of world economic forecasting cannot provide a sufficiently reliable answer. The book by the group of authors from IMEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences, does not answer this question either. There is no doubt, however, that the gap between the per capita GNP indicators of the Land of the Rising Sun and the present leader of the capitalist world will continue to decrease and could even be virtually erased by the year 2000. This seemed absolutely improbable just 15 years ago.

We will make a stab at answering these questions by expressing the following general opinions.

Although the increasing internationalization of production and exchange, the development of the TNC as a specific form of this internationalization in the capitalist segment of the world economy and the general intensification of world economic ties are contributing to the rapid development of the technological revolution in breadth, the use of scientific and technical innovations as an accelerator of economic growth will depend less on total national expenditures of real resources than on their effective use, the state of management and organization on the macroeconomic and corporate levels, national production ethics and labor discipline. The differences in the rates of technological progress in the United States and Japan provide graphic proof of this.

The possibility that the U.S. rate of economic growth will be somewhat higher than that of its competitors in the next few years cannot be excluded. This will depend on many factors, primarily on the U.S. ability to overcome a number of serious national economic disparities that came into being in recent decades: between consumption and accumulation, between the production and non-production spheres and between military and civilian production. Much of what was written in the 1960's and 1970's about the stimulating role of consumption in comparison to accumulation, the service sphere in comparison to physical production and the military sector of the economy in comparison to the civilian sector has not been corroborated. The negative effects of their excessive development, however, have become completely obvious. This is why the restoration or, more precisely, the establishment of more reasonable national economic proportions would seem to be an important condition of accelerated economic growth in the United States. The question of whether U.S. state-monopoly capitalism will be able to fulfill this condition is another matter.

The economic crisis of 1980-1982 put an old problem in a harsh new light: What was to be done with the few fundamental branches of industrial production that were unable to compete? Would it be possible to confine development only to leading science-intensive branches of industry and the service sphere, in which the United States has a tremendous advantage in terms of relative outlays? After all, this was precisely the prospect drawn just recently by the authors
of popular theories of the postindustrial society. In any case, the time has come to decide what should be done about the unprecedented structural unemployment and about the huge quantities of manpower with no productive employment. The theory of "reindustrialization," proposed at the end of the 1970's, probably will not solve a single one of these problems. It appears that they require serious additional discussion, without which any attempt to speed up economic development would be the same as building a bridge without deciding in advance whether it should go across the river or run its entire length.

One of the most important reasons for the relative U.S. lag in the postwar period was the incautious expenditure of resources on military aims. While the United States' chief rivals and competitors—the FRC and Japan—were prevented by well-known international circumstances from spending more than the stipulated maximum for this purpose, the United States squandered truly astronomical sums. The total amount of actual and projected military expenditures in 1946-1985 (6.8 trillion dollars) is fully comparable to the entire reproduced national wealth of this country (8 trillion).

The prospect of change in the capitalist balance of power will apparently depend on processes in the United States and outside the country—in the industrially developed capitalist states, the developing countries and the socialist community—and, what is equally important, on relations between the two opposing social systems, on their peaceful competition or confrontation. This is why an investigation of the dynamics of these processes requires a comprehensive analysis of the problems of capitalism's uneven development and the U.S. position in the capitalist world.

These are some of the thoughts we had when we read "Soyedinennyye Shtaty Ameriki." Although the discussion ends at the beginning of the 1980's, it can be of great help in predicting the development of American capitalism in the less than two remaining decades of the 20th century. The creative approach of this team of authors should encourage other researchers to ask new questions and try to answer them.

FOOTNOTES


3. An indicative remark was made by famous correspondent and Johns Hopkins University researcher F. Jalil: "Of course, the Reagan myth consisted in the fact that the antideluvian method of tabulating electoral college votes somehow turned Reagan's slight majority into a 'landslide victory'; that the number of congressional seats won by the Republicans presaged a political revolution of Rooseveltian dimensions; that the future wave of conservatism would lift the Republicans so high that they would control both houses of Congress this year.... Since myths are artificial by their very nature and do not survive contact with reality, this myth was shattered in November" (of 1982—G. S.)--THE GUARDIAN WEEKLY, 26 December 1982.


9. When A. Laffer, one of the creators of "supply-side economics," was asked how long it would take for "Reaganomics" to start working, he replied: "How long would it take you to pick up a hundred dollar bill?"


11. FORTUNE, 21 February 1983, p 68.


13. Commenting on the administration's hypocritical appeal for a balanced budget in the future while it is responsible for unprecedented deficits in the present, London's FINANCIAL TIMES printed a report from Washington, "The Know-Nothing U.S. Congress," which said: "The U.S. Senate, which has been courted assiduously by President Ronald Reagan, committed an insane act last week, which might ultimately make the American system of government the laughing stock of the civilized world. On Wednesday, by a vote of 69 to 31, the Senate approved a proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution making a balanced federal budget mandatory. All responsible commentators were unanimous in asking only one question: 'Will this amendment be a joke or a catastrophe if it makes its way through all of the stages of ratification?'" (FINANCIAL TIMES, 9 August 1982).


15. This theory was discussed in V. M. Shamberg's article, "The Economic Theories of the Republican Administration" (SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 5).

16. For more about this, see "The Economic Strategy of the Republican Administration" ("In the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences"), SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, Nos 9, 10.

18. In 1973-1980, for example, the average annual rate of increase in labor productivity per worker in the United States was 0.2 percent, whereas it was 10 times as high--2.2 percent--in other industrially developed countries belonging to the OECD ("Economic Report of the President," Wash., February 1983, p 53).


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SWISS BOOK ON UNINTENTIONAL NUCLEAR WAR RISK REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 Jun 83) pp 115-117


[Text] The continuous buildup of U.S. nuclear weapons, accompanied by more and more irresponsible statements by members of the American administration about the possibility and even the "acceptability" of nuclear conflict, are escalating international tension and heightening the danger of a nuclear catastrophe. The mounting worries evoked in Western scientific circles by this turn of events are attested to by the subject of this review, a book by Swiss researchers D. Frei and C. Catrina, published by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. This institute, as its director, L. Botha, mentions in the foreword, was created by a decision of the UN General Assembly in 1980 to conduct disarmament research in connection with the preparations for the second special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament and to give representatives of interested countries, especially the developing states, easier access to available information, studies and research projects in this field.

It is the purpose of this book, according to the researchers, to reveal the factors capable of leading to unintentional nuclear war and the possible ways of minimizing this risk. The authors used many (over 500) American, West European and Soviet documents in their research. Their analysis is also based on information gathered during consultations with researchers from government organizations and academic institutes, including researchers in Washington and Moscow.

The authors conclude that "the best long-term solution to the problem of unintentional nuclear war is universal and total disarmament, as well as the creation of the kind of...international order that presupposes the existence of an effective system of measures to settle disputes on the global level" (p XXI). Before this final goal can be reached, however, attention must be focused on measures that might seem unimportant but are directly related to the prevention of nuclear conflict (p XXIV).

The Swiss researchers note that the possibility of accidental nuclear war alarms the public and even the leaders of many countries. People are
particularly disturbed, the authors write, by the "dramatic prospect of a strategic deterrence system out of control, which could turn into a nightmare for the entire world" (p IX).

It has recently become a fairly popular notion, D. Frei and C. Catrina point out, that what they term "Judgment Day" could be provoked by insane colonels issuing unauthorized orders for a nuclear attack, clumsy servicemen who push the wrong button, flocks of birds reflected on radar screens and taken for enemy missiles, etc. The spread of such ideas, however, does not actually mean, the authors stress, that this danger has become more probable or more realistic. Obviously, the danger of accidents involving nuclear weapons should not be underestimated, but it would be wrong to concentrate just on this possibility (pp 1-3), particularly since this could present the problem in a false light and overshadow more serious factors of risk. Effective double-check security systems will minimize the possibility of a war breaking out as a result of errors by military personnel or technical malfunctions, while international crises pose the actual danger of nuclear catastrophe. "It is quite possible that an acute international crisis could be the catalyst for a nuclear war that would come as a complete surprise to the sides involved" (p IX).

The authors want to make the public aware of the fact that nuclear war is more likely to break out as "the result of misperception"--or, in other words, a miscalculation or incorrect conclusion by people empowered to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons. The authors' list of risk factors of this type includes the wrong idea about the enemy; irresponsible behavior under stress; the transmission of incorrect information; the escalation of hostility by means of the "mirror image" mechanism; faulty decision-making due to the mental state of political leaders under stress; the failure to carry out excessively complex orders correctly; confusion stemming from organizational flaws and the inflexibility of standard administrative procedures. These are the actual risk factors, the authors state, which could lead to fatal decisions. "Some researchers have drawn an analogy with 1914, which is still a frightening example of the cumulative effect of errors of this kind at a time of acute crisis. Situations of this type could now involve nuclear states in a crisis and are therefore quite likely to mark the beginning of a nuclear catastrophe" (p X).

Although the authors mention the international crisis as a possible detonator of "accidental" nuclear war, they point out the fact that the assumption that any international crisis could give rise to this kind of war is a gross oversimplification of the matter. Risk factors are not self-engendered in a situation of crisis; they come into being only when the international strategic situation acquires a definite "tendency toward destabilization." Strategic instability combined with international crisis can create the kind of explosive situation that touches off a nuclear war (p 152).

What does strategic instability mean in this case? The authors feel that it is a set of circumstances in which the states observing the international crisis feel an urgent need to make decisions about the use of nuclear weapons. The "urgency" of these decisions, in turn, stems from the vulnerability of their
strategic weapons and command, control and communication systems, which heightens their fear of a possible sudden "disarming" strike by the other side. "The elementary fear," the authors stress, "that the enemy will strike first gives each side a motive to climb at least one rung higher than the adversary on the ladder of nuclear escalation" (p XI). If the strategic forces and/or the command channels responsible for the threat of retaliation can be destroyed suddenly by the enemy, this threat can be nullified by a "pre-emptive strike" against these targets. In American military terminology, this means a strike to forestall a preventive enemy attack.

Strategic stability, on the other hand, means, the authors state, that the overall balance of forces is such that any attempt to resolve the conflict with the aid of nuclear weapons will involve an obviously unacceptable risk. This, the authors note, is related to the concept of "mutually assured destruction" (p 76). Some scientists have been quite persistent in their proposals that the term "strategic stability" be replaced with the term "crisis stability," denoting the kind of alignment of strategic forces that would allow each side involved in an international crisis to not deliver an immediate strike without suffering any substantial damages. Conversely, crisis instability would give rise to the "pre-emptive strategy" that would give the side delivering the first nuclear strike the advantage.

Western researchers have correctly pointed out the fact that the risk of "unintentional" nuclear war is heightened considerably by the escalation of militarism in world politics, the continuous buildup of weapons and their qualitative improvement. In connection with this, they are particularly concerned about the latest weapon systems the United States plans to deploy (the MX, Pershing II, Trident and others), which are capable of destabilizing the overall strategic situation (p 40). Frei and Catrina justly criticize the American concept of "deterrence," with which, as we know, the United States is concealing its aggressive military preparations.

The authors are correct in their conclusion that nuclear proliferation and the related increase in the number of nuclear powers could lead to local nuclear conflicts and that these, considering the interdependence existing in today's world, could escalate and evolve into a nuclear world war (p 175). They criticize the concept of "limited" nuclear war and admit that this kind of war could be a "mistake," with all of the ensuing consequences (p 70).

Agreements to reduce the risk of "unintentional" nuclear war are the subject of one chapter of the book. These agreements, the authors state, envisage certain measures to keep accidental or unauthorized nuclear strikes from resulting in war.

The authors conclude that the risk of "unintentional" nuclear war is much greater than people think. The number of risk factors is quite high, and their interaction makes them stronger and compounds the danger. In connection with this, they stress that the entire matter requires an extremely serious approach (p 219).

One of the book's indisputable merits is that its authors do not confine themselves to a mere list of "risk factors" but also list specific, practical ways
of averting the present danger (pp 224-225). Taking a generally pacifist stand, they advise that all possible measures be taken to minimize the risk of nuclear confrontation and that regional efforts at nuclear disarmament, involving all interested nuclear powers, be given more attention. They place particular emphasis on the need for states to refuse to use offensive nuclear weapons first. This, we must point out, has already been done by the Soviet Union on a unilateral basis. The authors attach great importance to the system of mutual Soviet-U.S. consultations; the continuation of efforts to improve confidence-building measures; the establishment, maintenance and improvement of systems of direct communication between the governments of nuclear powers to exclude the possibility of the "misinterpretation" of the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons (pp 223-229).

Of course, some stereotypical patterns of bourgeois thinking and recommendations that are inconsistent with the realities of the present state of international relations are present in this work. Nevertheless, we must admit that most of the statements made by the authors are consistent with a sensible approach to contemporary world issues.

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CSO: 1803/12
KENNETH ADELMAN, DIRECTOR OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 17 June 83) pp 123-124

[Article by S. M. Samuylov]

[Text] In the middle of April, after a solid 3 months of severe pressure from the White House, the U.S. Senate approved the nomination of K. Adelman to the top position in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) by a majority (57:42).

Kenneth Adelman was born in Chicago in June 1946. His father was an attorney. In 1967 he graduated from Grinnell College in Grinnell (Iowa) and then worked in the congressional liaison office of the Department of Commerce. He continued his studies at Georgetown University in Washington and was awarded a master's degree in 1969.

The American mass media ascribe the successful beginning of his political career to the patronage of D. Rumsfeld, a prominent figure in the Republican Party under whose supervision Adelman worked in the Office of Economic Opportunity in 1970-1972 (in the Nixon Administration). He then pursued a doctorate at Georgetown University, where his academic counselor was J. Kirkpatrick, now the permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations. In 1975, after making several research-related trips to Zaire, Adelman defended a dissertation on the developing African countries. He is the author of "African Realities." In 1976 and 1977, when D. Rumsfeld was the Ford Administration's secretary of defense, Adelman worked in the Defense Department as Rumsfeld's assistant.

From 1977 to June 1981 Adelman was engaged in research. He was a senior research associate (specializing in strategic analysis) at the Center for Strategic Studies (in the Washington suburb of Arlington) of the Stanford International Research Institute. The institute is a private research organization working on contracts with the federal government, private business and foreign clients. Adelman was also a member of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was on the executive council of the Committee on the Present Danger, an organization uniting opponents of international detente.

Adelman has written a number of articles for such periodicals as FOREIGN POLICY, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NEW REPUBLIC, CURRENT HISTORY, THE WASHINGTON POST

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and others. These articles deal with the ideological penetration of socialist countries, the effectiveness of CIA analytical intelligence in the assessment of Soviet nuclear potential, U.S. relations with African countries and so forth.

After Ronald Reagan was elected president, Adelman was a member of the group responsible for taking over the affairs of the Carter Administration. After this, he returned to his institute.

In June 1981 J. Kirkpatrick asked Adelman to work in the United Nations. He was appointed her deputy with ambassadorial status. Kirkpatrick limited Adelman's sphere of activity to the work of the Disarmament Commission.

After E. Rostow resigned as director of the ACDA in January 1983, Adelman was appointed as his replacement (on 13 January).

Adelman's frankly unconstructive stand on arms control motivated several senators to reject his nomination. The following facts were established during hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee when Adelman's appointment was being considered:

He advocates the negotiation of nuclear arms limitation with the USSR "from a position of strength" and the rapid buildup and modernization of American military potential and takes a skeptical view of earlier agreements with the USSR in this area;

In spring 1981 he declared in a NEW YORK DAILY NEWS interview that he regarded these talks as a fiction and would conduct them only "for political reasons" in order to gain public support, just as, in his opinion, the Reagan Administration is doing;

He feels that the SALT II treaty "is essentially unsuitable for arms control";

The freeze on Soviet and U.S. nuclear arsenals, in his opinion, would be "impractical" and would not lead to the reduction of nuclear weapons.

It was learned during the hearings that Adelman had been sent a memo after his appointment by E. Rowny, the head of the American delegation at the Geneva talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. In this memo, Rowny suggested, in particular, that Adelman dismiss several agency staffers who, in his opinion, had been too eager to reach an agreement with the USSR in the talks. During the hearings, however, Adelman said that he did not plan any "ideological purges" for the ACDA.

The Pentagon, the "New Right" and their representatives in the Congress, particularly Senator J. Helms, were pleased by Adelman's appointment. Individuals with more moderate views saw the administration's choice as an indication of its intention to continue its actual refusal to conclude arms limitation agreements with the USSR.

On 24 February 1983 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected Adelman's appointment by a vote of 9 to 8 and recommended that the Senate do the same.
The committee's statement on the matter said that Adelman "lacked the necessary qualifications to head the agency" and that "it appears that his interest in arms control is more general than specific; his familiarity with the entire range of arms control issues is limited; his knowledge of the 20-year history of the negotiations is superficial and he approaches these issues from a political standpoint" (this refers to party considerations—Editor).

As a result of the persistence of the President and his staff and their pressure on the senators, however, the Senate eventually approved the appointment.

One of the main reasons for the administration's stubborn support of Adelman was apparently the hope of minimizing all friction in the foreign policy establishment. Although E. Rostow, the former director of the ACDA, was a "hawk" in his general views, he tended to take independent action and did not coordinate his activity sufficiently with other foreign policy agencies. For this reason, one of the members of the administration had this to say about Adelman's appointment: "Adelman can do three things Rostow could not. He can get along with the Defense Department, the State Department and the White House."

Many political correspondents of the American mass media have predicted that Adelman will not play the key role in policymaking in the sphere of arms control. Adelman himself has said that he will be the "private adviser of the decision makers."

Nevertheless, Adelman's appointment, in view of his political reputation and his support by the extreme Right inside and outside the administration, indicates that the administration right wing is growing stronger.

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[Text] March

1, 3, 8, 10, 22, 24, 29—Plenary sessions of the delegations at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe were held.

5--PRAVDA printed an editorial on "Washington-Style Equality," describing the American side's unrealistic approach to the limitation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

9—The publication of the second edition of a propaganda brochure, "Soviet Military Strength," was announced in the United States. This brochure, with a foreword by Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger, tries to "prove" that the USSR is striving for military superiority in all areas and is preparing for protracted nuclear war with the expectation of winning this war, while the United States is supposedly fighting for peace and therefore "must put an end to its military inferiority to the USSR" by increasing military spending.

President Ronald Reagan addressed the 41st annual congress of the National Association of Evangelists in Orlando (Florida) with a provocative speech, reaffirming the current American administration's ability to think only in terms of confrontation and rabid anticommunism.

By a vote of 27 to 9, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved a resolution calling for a U.S.-Soviet agreement on a verifiable mutual freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons.

11—A conference on "American-Soviet Relations, Dialogue Between Peoples" was held on Capitol Hill. It was convened at the suggestion of several American legislators and a public organization, the Fund for New Priorities in America. Conference speakers called for the curtailment of the arms race and the creation of a healthy international climate and advised trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

15—A large group of senators and congressmen, public and religious figures and academics spoke in support of the nuclear freeze resolution at a press conference in Washington.
16--A session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to aid in the implementation of the aims and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of 26 May 1972, and the agreement concluded by both sides on 30 September 1971 to reduce the danger of nuclear war, began in Geneva.

17--After debates, the House of Representatives postponed the vote on the draft resolution calling for a mutual, verifiable freeze on U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.


22--A press conference was held in the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at which time First Deputy Procurator General of the USSR N. A. Bazhenov told Soviet and foreign newsmen the facts about the harboring of Nazi war criminals in the United States.

23--President Reagan made a long speech about U.S. foreign policy. In essence, he said that the United States must arm itself to the hilt and become the dominant power in the world. The President's speech contained inexcusable distortions of Soviet policy.

27--General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov's replies to the questions of a PRAVDA correspondent, including an assessment of Reagan's speech of 23 March, were published. "The present U.S. administration is continuing to travel an extremely dangerous road. Questions of war and peace cannot be dealt with so casually.... Washington's actions pose a threat to the entire world. Today," Yu. V. Andropov said in conclusion, "all efforts must have a single purpose--the prevention of nuclear catastrophe. We definitely advise the United States to take this road."

31--The U.S. President made a speech, containing the proposal of a so-called "interim agreement" on medium-range nuclear weapons.

A plenary session of the Soviet and U.S. delegations was held, ending the current round of START. The resumption of the talks was scheduled for 8 June 1983.

April

2--Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, held a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists, during which he explained logically why President Reagan's "interim option" is unacceptable to the Soviet side.

9--Speaking at the American University (Washington), Senator E. Kennedy censured the White House's overt attempts to revive the "cold war" and President Reagan's malignant attacks on the Soviet Union. Arguing the need for a realistic approach to relations with the Soviet Union, he stressed the absolute futility of the attempts to attain military superiority.
10—The message of Soviet scholars to all scholars of the world on the Reagan Administration's declared plans for the development of antimissile weapons was published.

13—PRAVDA printed an editorial—"Who Is Threatening Whom?"—on the actual state of affairs at the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

25—General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov's replies to DER SPIEGEL magazine (FRG) were published.

27—Credentials were awarded to new foreign members of the USSR Academy of Sciences in a ceremony in the Soviet embassy in Washington. They were awarded to members of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, University of Illinois Professor John Barden (physics), University of California Professor Emil Smith (biochemistry) and Colorado State University Professor Gilbert White (geography). The credentials were awarded by Soviet Ambassador to the United States A. P. Dobrynin.

29—The Soviet press published a telegram addressed to General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov from a group of renowned American scientists and public figures, appealing for the prohibition of space weapons, and Yu. V. Andropov's reply. It is precisely the Soviet Union "that initiated and participated in all existing international agreements aimed at the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind," he stressed in his reply. "I can assure you that the Soviet Union will continue to make a maximum effort to counteract the sinister plans to extend the arms race to outer space."

May

3—General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov spoke at a luncheon in the Kremlin honoring a party and governmental delegation from the GDR. "We must reach an agreement on the equality of nuclear potential in Europe in terms of carriers and warheads, and naturally with consideration for English and French weapons," Yu. V. Andropov said. "Anyone who refuses our proposal will take on a grave responsibility to the people of Europe and the entire world, as each lost week and lost day in the conclusion of an agreement heighten the danger of nuclear war."

3—The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a statement to the U.S. embassy in the Soviet Union, describing the American official statements about the "threat" posed to Iran by the Soviet Union as an absurd lie.

A group of influential senators and members of the House of Representatives sent President Reagan a letter expressing the increasing worries in Congress about the dangerous nature of U.S. nuclear strategy.

A group of Americans visiting the USSR on the initiative of an American organization called the Committee for Dialogue Between American and Soviet Citizens held a press conference in Moscow. In a joint statement, the members
of the group declared that victory is impossible in a nuclear war, advised the quickest possible attainment of practical results in START and pointed out the importance of broader dialogue between the two countries.

4--The House of Representatives approved a resolution calling for a "mutual, verifiable" freeze on all types of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons and the conclusion of a nuclear arms reduction agreement.

8--The Democratic senator from Michigan, C. Levin, accused the U.S. President of juggling the facts in his assessment of U.S. and Soviet military potential, particularly with regard to nuclear strength.

10--A TASS statement on the situation in Lebanon was published. "Israel and the United States," it said, "are flagrantly violating Lebanon's sovereignty and its legal right to safeguard its own security."

11--The technological assessment office of the American Congress reported that Washington's embargo and restrictions on trade and economic relations with the USSR had not had the negative effects on the Soviet economy anticipated by the White House, but had, to the contrary, rebounded against the United States.

13--Prominent American scientists, specializing in space research, issued an appeal to the Reagan Administration for the immediate commencement of talks with the Soviet Union on the prohibition of the emplacement and use of any weapon in space.

17--The Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe resumed in Geneva.

18--The House Appropriations Committee approved the program for the production and deployment of 100 strategic MX missiles, which had previously been approved by the committee's counterpart in the Senate.

19, 24--Plenary sessions of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe were held.

26-31--Representatives of the Soviet and American public met in Minneapolis (Minnesota). The meeting was organized jointly by the Washington Institute for Policy Studies and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the USSR-USA Society and the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

28--A Soviet government statement was published. It said, in particular: "The U.S. administration has taken an unconstructive, obstructionist line in all talks directly or indirectly connected with the curtailment of the arms race. This applies to U.S. behavior at the talks in Geneva, Vienna and Madrid and in other international forums." The Soviet Union declared that "it is not too late to stop the dangerous escalation of tension."

29--The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois made a decision reaffirming the absolute illegality of the actions of the American authorities who have kept the Polovchak family from seeing their son Vladimir for 3 years.
30--The U.S. State Department refused to issue visas to a delegation from the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Sea and River Fleet Workers, invited to the United States on a return visit by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters of the East Coast of America.

31--Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman at his request.

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