USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1805

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES
Nos. 11 and 12, June 1983

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USSR REPORT
MILITARY AFFAIRS
No. 1805

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES
Nos. 11 and 12, June 1983
Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language semi-monthly journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No. 11, June 1983, (signed to press 19 May 1983) and No. 12, June 1983 (signed to press 3 June 1983)

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NAVY DAY MATERIALS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 83 (signed to press 19 May 83) pp 37-41

[Article: "The Fatherland's Ocean Shield"]

[Text] Navy Day was instituted in 1939 by a decree of the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars] and the Central Committee of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)]. In accordance with it, on the last Sunday of July the motherland will traditionally, for the 44th time already, honor seamen, veterans of the fleet, and all those who are augmenting naval glory and forging the defensive might of the socialist fatherland by tireless labor.

The armed defenders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are living with the same thoughts and aspirations as the people. Just as all Soviet people, they fervently and unanimously support the wise policy of the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee and, like sons, are proud of the achievements of the country of developed socialism and are solicitously preserving and adding to the glorious revolutionary and combat traditions. In a common formation with the men of the other services of the Soviet Armed Forces, the naval personnel are overflowing with the resolve to accomplish their duty with dignity and honor in the future, too—to defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people reliably and to be in constant readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff for any aggressor.

As is known, our fleet has a truly heroic genealogy. The many brilliant victories of the Russian fleet at sea over foreign aggressors and enslavers are not fading in the people's memory. Special pride is caused by the achievements of that legendary cohort of seamen who stood in the front ranks of the struggle for the just proletarian cause in the prerevolutionary years under the influence of bolshevik ideas. In October 1917, on the call of the party of Lenin, thousands and thousands of Baltic Fleet sailors, shoulder to shoulder with the revolutionary workers and soldiers, ensured the victory of the armed uprising in Petrograd, marking the start of the era of socialism with the historic round from the cruiser "Aurora." The decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 29 January (11 February) 1918 on the creation of the new, socialist Workers' and Peasants' Red Navy, marked the beginning of the glorious history of the Soviet state's Navy.

The Red Navymen operated selflessly against the forces of internal counterrevolution and foreign intervention on the Baltic, Caspian, Black, Azov, and White Seas.
River and lake flotillas were created for the active support of the Red Army on all fronts in the course of the Civil War. Their seamen executed bold raids in enemy rear areas, landed amphibious forces, supported ground force units by the fire of ships and coast artillery, and transported army combat subunits across water obstacles. It is sufficient to recall that in covering the cradle of the revolution from the sea, the members of the Baltic Fleet operated actively against the British squadron in the Gulf of Finland and the seamen of the Volga Flotilla fought for the liberation of Kazan, Syzran, Samara, and other cities of the Volga. The fighters of the Northern Dvina, Astrakhan-Caspian, Dnepr, and Azov Flotillas coordinated with the land units just as closely. At that time, more than 75,000 seaman fought on the land fronts alone. Shock detachments, armored-train crews, and artillery and rifle units which accomplished the most important assignments of the command were formed from them in coastal areas of combat operations as well as in those most distant from the sea.

After the victorious conclusion of the Civil War the party of communists, considering the military danger originating from hostile imperialist states, adopted measures to raise the defensive capability of the first socialist state in the world. In March 1921, on the recommendation of V. I. Lenin the 10th Congress of the RKP(b) approved an expanded program for the restoration and development of the Navy of the Country of Soviets. On the instructions of the party’s Central Committee, more than 1,200 naval seamen were returned to the fleet—communists who worked in civilian institutions or who had gone to the land front during the conduct of combat operations. In the next year, the patronage of the Lenin Komsomol was established over the Navy. The Komsomol sent thousands of its representatives to ships, shipyards, and military educational institutions.

During the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars the Soviet people, under the leadership of the Communist Party, successfully accomplished tremendous work on the strengthening of our sea borders. Already by 1928, the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets had been restored and were a well organized combat force. The Caspian and Amur flotillas and detachments of warships on the Dnepr and Western Dvina were successfully restored. On the decision of the party and the government, naval forces were created in the Far East as was the Northern Flotilla, which later became respectively the Pacific and Northern Fleets. The technical reconstruction of old ships and the construction of new ones were successfully accomplished. Suffice it to say that by 1941 about 1,000 combat units were counted afloat including 3 battleships, 7 cruisers, 59 destroyers and leaders, and 218 submarines. The ships of various classes as well as naval aviation and coast artillery were controlled by highly qualified personnel, thanks to which our fleet, in coordination with the other services of the Armed Forces, acquired the actual capability properly to defend the country against fascist aggression.

The seamen met the surprise enemy attack in an organized manner and subsequently launched decisive combat operations. They reliably ensured the strategic stability of the maritime flanks of a tremendous front, effectively assisted in the crushing defeat of the German-fascist groupings with weapons from the sea and the landing of assault forces, and conducted independent operations successfully. Altogether, during the years of combat operations more than 1,300 enemy combat ships and auxiliary vessels and 1,400 transports were destroyed. Naval aviation executed about 400,000 combat sorties. In August 1941 the Baltic aviators launched the first bombing strikes against the fascist capital—Berlin.
Pages which tell of the selfless operations of the seamen in the defense of hero cities, the Khanko Peninsula, the Soviet Arctic, and the North Caucasus and about their heroism and valor in offensive combat operations are inscribed in gold letters in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War.

The seamen of the Volga, Pinsk, Chudskoye, Azov, Ladoga, Onega, White Sea, and Caspian Military Flotillas made a significant contribution to the smashing of the enemy. The combat path of the Dnepr Flotilla, whose personnel greeted Victory Day in prostrate Berlin, ran through the water routes of many European countries. The seamen of the Danube Flotilla displayed themselves heroically in the liberation of the peoples of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Austria from the fascist yoke.

Right up to the complete defeat of fascist Germany our Pacific Fleet served as a reliable barrier against the aggressive aspirations of the Japanese militarists and, at the same time, tirelessly trained personnel for the active fleets and fronts. In August–September 1945, the Pacific and Amur seamen contributed their bit to the defeat of the militarist Kwangtung Army. For special distinction in combat operations, 51 of them were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

This lofty honor was awarded during the years of the Great Patriotic War to about 600 men in the Navy and 7 of them—B. F. Safonov, A. O. Shabalin, V. M. Leonov, V. I. Rakov, N. G. Stepanyan, A. Ye. Mazureenko, and N. V. Chelnokov—twice. The following figures tell about mass heroism: 350,000 frontline seamen were awarded orders and medals for distinction; 78 ships, units, and forces joined the Guards. All our fleets became Red Banner fleets.

The postwar decades which have passed changed the political map of the world radically. The world socialist system was formed and strengthened. The national-liberation movement of the peoples achieved great successes. And the positions of imperialism proved to be thoroughly undermined.

However, historical experience teaches that with a loss of positions the aggressiveness of imperialism not only is not reduced but is intensified even more. The events of the postwar years confirm with all obviousness the permanent urgency of V. I. Lenin's warning concerning the necessity "to be ready for the fact that with the slightest change in the situation the imperialist plunderers will again make for us" ("Polsnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 42, p 136).

Virtually immediately after the conclusion of World War II, the reactionary circles of the imperialist states, the leading position among which was occupied by the United States, began to prepare for new "crusades" against the USSR. Under the cover of slogans about the necessity to eliminate the "communist threat" and myths about a "Soviet military threat," they began to regroup their forces and whip up the international situation; they initiated nuclear blackmail, deployed a broad network of military bases around the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and created aggressive blocs.

Under these conditions the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government were forced to implement measures to ensure the country's security. One of these measures was the creation of a qualitatively new, ocean-going, nuclear-missile fleet
which meets all the requirements of contemporary war. Great spatial scale of operations, the ability to deploy its forces covertly and rapidly and inflict crushing strikes on enemy objectives at sea and on land, and the constant high combat readiness of units and forces became its characteristic properties.

The Soviet ocean-going fleet concentrates within itself the latest achievements of those fields of science and technology whose development now determines scientific and technical progress. It received contemporary electronic and automation equipment for the control of weapons and combat equipment and reliable means for communication and navigation in any area of the world ocean.

The main weapons of the Soviet seamen are various types of missiles. The primary means for the accomplishment of the fleet's most important missions are nuclear submarines. Great possibilities for building up the fleet's combat might were opened up by missile-carrying and antisubmarine [ASW] naval aviation. Our mighty surface ships which have everything necessary for the accomplishment of long, autonomous voyages are standing their watch today in defending the fatherland from aggression from maritime directions on all ocean latitudes. The capabilities of the naval infantry, which has first-class combat equipment and contemporary weapons, have grown immeasurably.

The fleet's organizational structure, basing system, and material-technical support received further development.

Responding to the concern of the party and the people, and having a deep realization of their responsibility, the Soviet seamen are carrying the baton of naval glory and valor with honor. They have proven many times that they are equal to any missions, which is convincingly shown by the unparalleled cruises of Soviet nuclear submarines beneath the ancient ice to the North Pole and other regions of the world ocean, the first group round-the-world voyage in the world by our submarines, and the many, many other manifestations of high combat and naval ability, courage, and other moral-psychological qualities of the seamen, especially on long ocean voyages when separated from their bases. For however well the fleet may be equipped technically, the main factor of its might was, is, and remains people who are standing tireless watch at the nuclear reactors, skillfully controlling the electronic stations and instruments, and masterfully commanding formidable missiles. Without them the ships do not leave their moorages, the submarines do not descend to the depths of the sea and depart on cruises, and naval aviation does not rise into the sky.

Youths arrive on the ships and in the units of the fleet to serve who are better and better trained morally, general-educationally, technically, and physically with each passing year. The overwhelming majority of them have a secondary general and secondary technical education, and many—one or another production qualification which predetermines the comparatively rapid mastery, by the newcomers, of the combat equipment and weapons entrusted to them and the entire volume of necessary military knowledge. Simultaneously, thanks to the purposeful indoctrinational influence directly in the fleet combat collectives, the young seamen acquire the lofty moral-combat qualities which are necessary for the attainment of victory in contemporary war. By the way, their formation is also furthered by the nature of service at sea. The water elements, as is known, continuously required of people courage and valor, persistence and patience, high professional skill, close coordination, and discipline.
Experienced commanders and political officers train and indoctrinate the naval youth. The military councils, political directorates, and staffs and political organs of forces and units display constant concern that the daily vital activity of the personnel of ships and units is directed by people who are politically mature, competent, with initiative, and possessing organizational abilities and a sense of the new as required by the Central Committee of the CPSU.

A noteworthy feature of today's fleet is the high level of general-educational, ideological, and professional-military training of its command and political personnel. The admirals, generals, and officers who are in leadership posts, as a rule, are people with an academic education who possess profound, comprehensive knowledge and great practical experience in the organization of the effective combat and political training of the personnel. Their ideological conviction and scientific Marxist-Leninist world outlook determine an active life's position which is manifested primarily in the tireless struggle for the high combat readiness of the ships and subunits.

The reliable assistants of the officers in the training and indoctrination of the subordinates are the warrant officers [michman and praporshchik] among whom are many genuine masters of combat qualifications who have gone through the great school of sea and ocean cruises. They serve as examples for the petty officers and seamen in the accomplishment of their military duty.

Today, the routine training days of the fleet are long ocean cruises. It is namely there, under the conditions of severe long voyages that naval art is comprehended, skill in the mastery of weapons and equipment is improved, the fighting man's character is tempered, and the ability to wage a struggle with a strong, well-equipped enemy is acquired. There, in the ocean training sectors, they get to know the true value of the highest state of discipline and organization, military cohesion, and collectivism, and coordination and teamwork of the various fleet forces and effective methods and procedures for the accomplishment of various tactical and firing missions and the use of weapons and equipment are worked out with consideration of all capabilities which are structurally placed in them.

The training of the seamen was crowned with high grades in the last year. They were all seized by the enthusiasm of the socialist competition for a worthy greeting of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation. The combat crews of the nuclear submarine, where the commander is Captain 1st Rank V. Zhuravlev, and of the Guards missile cruiser, "Varyag," which most distinguished themselves then were awarded the Pennant of the USSR Minister of Defense for courage and military valor.

"Raise vigilance, reliably ensure the motherland's security!"—this is the motto of the current training year's competition. The honor to be its initiator in the fleet was awarded to the crew of the nuclear missile submarine commanded by Captain 1st Rank A. Samokhvalov. On the ship, a stubborn struggle is under way for the punctual accomplishment of all obligations which were assumed earlier. Now, more than 60 percent of the personnel are experts of combat and political training and 9 out of every 10 men are rated specialists.

The results of the winter training period and the summer training which has begun show that maintaining their alignment on the right guides of the competition, the seamen of other submarines and surface ships, aviators, and naval infantrymen are
confidently taking the planned positions. The movement for excellent ship and leading force and for the detection of targets at maximum ranges and their destruction with the first missile launch and first gunnery and torpedo salvo is acquiring ever greater scope and heat. It has become a good tradition that the petty officers and seamen are struggling to be awarded the title of 2d-class specialist in the first year of service, and 1st-class specialist in the second year. Many of them are mastering a specialty at the level of master of military affairs and achieving the right to be called successors of the best specialist of the war years. The increased socio-political activity of the personnel and the striving of the seamen to augment the glorious naval traditions with successes in combat and political training find their expression in all this.

During a stay in the Red Banner Northern Fleet member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov noted the good training of the crew of the nuclear cruiser "Kirov." He called on the men to learn to fight in the contemporary manner and to struggle decisively against indulgences and simplification in combat training. It is in this way that, evaluating the results of their daily military labor self-critically, many ship and coastal combat collectives of the fleet are persistently achieving an advance toward new positions in combat readiness. For example, there are many glorious deeds to the credit of the crew of the missile cruiser "Groznyy," the Guards large antisubmarine warfare [ASW] ship "Krasnyy Krym," and the submarine "Ulyanovskiy Komsmolets" which has retained the title of excellent for many years. The personnel of the ASW cruiser "Minsk," the large ASW ship "Admiral Isakov," and the escort ships "Razitel'nuy" and "Bezukorizenny" are successfully accomplishing the missions of long voyages.

The vessels of the hydrographic service of the Navy, "Admiral Vladimirkii" and "Faddey Bellingsgauzen," recently returned from a Soviet round-the-world Antarctic expedition. They accomplished a vast program of studies, passing over the courses of the great Russian navigators F. F. Bellingsgauzen and M. P. Lazarev who, commanding the sloops "Vostok" and "Mirnyy," discovered the Antarctic in 1820.

The augmenting of glorious traditions is served by the valiant achievements of many other men of the fleet, too. Among them are hundreds of seamen, petty officers, warrant officers [michman], and officers of ships and subunits who have been awarded orders and medals. And such officers as A. Gusev, L. Kuverskiy, V. Kozlov, V. Lushin, D. Novikov, and others who especially distinguished themselves in the accomplishment of training combat missions have been awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. The ranks of the leaders are multiplying. Dressing on them, all the seamen are moving toward new positions of combat improvement with a confident step, which is predetermined to a great extent by the effective party-political work of fleet commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. At present it is directed toward the indoctrination of the seamen in a spirit of profound communist conviction, toward seeing that under conditions of international tension the vigilance and combat readiness of the ships, units, and forces of the Navy are raised even higher, and toward mobilizing the personnel for the successful practical realization of the decisions of the 26th Party Congress, the May and November (1982) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the instructions of the party's Central Committee on defense questions.
An important sector for political-indoctrinal work in the fleet is the struggle for the further strengthening of military discipline, the role of which has grown immeasurably today. Everything is being done so that each man realizes profoundly with his mind and heart: the stronger discipline and organization, the firmer is prescribed order and the higher the combat readiness.

The party organizations step forth as the political nucleus of the fleet collectives. They operate in the very thick of the masses of servicemen and, with all their work, actively further the realization of party policy in the area of strengthening the country's defense and ensure unremitting influence on all aspects of the life and combat and political training of the men. The example of the communists is a moral reference point for all personnel in the accomplishment of their duty to the party and the people.

The Komsomol organizations of ships and units are making a ponderable contribution to the indoctrination of the young seamen in the spirit of loyalty to revolutionary and combat traditions. Their important role in the vital activity of the fleet's combat collectives is manifested in the fervent participation of Komsomol members in all patriotic achievements and, first of all, in initiative and creativity with the punctual accomplishment of socialist obligations. And it is proper that the majority of the Komsomols in the fleet are experts of combat and political training and highly rated specialists.

The personnel of the Navy are accomplishing their patriotic duty in the defense of the socialist fatherland with honor in a single formation with the men of the other services of the Armed Forces. Their ties with the fraternal navies and armies of the Warsaw Pact countries are constantly developing. The experience of their combat and political training is being enriched and filled with new content. In the course of strained joint exercises the coordination of ships is worked out, combat skill is improved, and the friendship and brotherhood-in-arms of the men who are defending peace and socialism is strengthening.

The Soviet naval flag on the expanses of the world ocean is a symbol of the international ties, good will, friendship, and collaboration of peoples. Being on official friendship and business visits in many ports of foreign countries on all continents, the Soviet seamen represent our people and the socialist motherland there in a worthy manner and step forth as active propagandists of the Soviet way of life.

The ties of the fleet personnel with local party, Soviet, trade union, and Komsomol organizations are strong and varied. From year to year the contacts of the Pacific Fleet seamen with the Komsomols of the Far East and of the North Sea seamen with the Komsomols of Moscow and the Urals are becoming closer, and the patronage of the youth of the Ukraine over the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet and, in the Baltic region and in Belorussia—over the twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, is growing stronger.

The seamen are collaborating closely with the personnel of the shipbuilding and defense industries and the workers in the plants. Their friendship with the sailors of the merchant fleet and the fishing and scientific research fleets is traditional and the most fixed attention to the DOSAAF organizations is unfailing. In these organizations thousands of youths become accustomed to naval affairs and the stern
romance of naval service which affects their service formation directly in the fleet combat formations in the most beneficial way.

Just as in former years, the seamen are greeting their holiday with new achievements in combat training. Their striving to use all available possibilities for purposes of combat improvement is dictated by the complex international situation which, through the fault of aggressive imperialist circles, has now been brought to especially dangerous limits. This also pertains to the military-strategic situation on the world ocean. It is characterized by the more and more massed presence in various regions of the seas and oceans of U.S. naval forces which have been sent there to threaten the countries of the socialist commonwealth as well as for the accomplishment of gendarme functions and to exert pressure on governments which are objectionable to the Washington administration. The new U.S. naval strategy presumes the concentration of a significant nuclear missile potential on the ocean theater of military operations.

The Soviet Union has always stepped forth actively and consistently as an opponent of militarization of the ocean expanses and put forth for its limitation specific constructive initiatives including expressing a readiness to negotiate a mutual limitation on the actions of naval forces.

In a political declaration adopted in January 1983, the member states of the Warsaw Pact expressed themselves in favor of the start of talks on limiting naval activity, on limiting and reducing naval armaments, and on the extension of confidence measures to the water areas of seas and oceans. They also expressed themselves in favor of the removal from the Mediterranean Sea of ships carrying nuclear weapons and for the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean, and they introduced other truly peaceful and mutually advantageous proposals.

However, the United States and its partners in the NATO bloc do not display a responsive peaceful disposition and, as the facts show, are not abandoning intentions to disrupt the balance of forces which has developed. But they will not succeed in this. "All attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR are in vain," declared the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yu. V. Andropov, in answers to a PRAVDA correspondent. "The Soviet Union will never permit this, it will never be defenseless when facing any threat."

Our Armed Forces are an important means for suppressing the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, restraining its military adventures, and for decisive opposition to threats to the security of peoples. Unanimously supporting the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government the seamen, just as all Soviet servicemen, constantly remember the party's order to be in high combat readiness and are doing everything for the ocean shield of the fatherland to become even more reliable.

PARTY SECRETARY WORK BOGGED DOWN IN PETTY DETAILS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 83 (signed to press 19 May 83) pp 47-50

[Article by Capt N. Ismailov, secretary of regimental party committee: "To Rise Above Petty Details"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Obviously, I will not err if I say that for us, the secretaries, a serious hindrance in work is the fact that a considerable portion of the time is spent on the solution of so-called petty details. Overcoming such petty work remains one of the acute problems. I come to this opinion when I hear statements of party activists concerning daily concerns which overcome them and read the responses of comrades to the article by Major B. Konovalov ["How Is the Work Going, Secretary?"] And really, I myself have often been convinced in practice that petty details do not provide the opportunity to concentrate attention on the main thing and shield one from perspective. I have reflected on this many times and here is what I think now: how can one rise above petty details and can they be avoided altogether?

The following case is recalled. A communist came to the party committee. He informs it: the schedule for repair work on the kitchen farm is being disrupted. Can the party committee interfere and adopt any measures?

I began to investigate. I spoke with officer M. Petrov who was to check the course of this work. He referred to the fact that motor transport is not allocated and he has nothing on which to deliver construction materials and tools. Then—a talk with an officer of the regimental motor service. "There are not enough vehicles," he complains, "a part of them are being serviced...." I had the occasion to talk with other comrades, too. It took much labor to ascertain the true reasons for the disruption of the schedule of work on the kitchen farm and to establish who is guilty. And the matter was that one did not give the alarm, another displayed passivity, and a third thought—this is not my concern, he says.... In short, some chain was formed. A chain of irresponsibility.

Of course, by common efforts, as they say, we made headway. Time and the efforts of many people were required for this. But as a result, the repair work on the kitchen farm was completed on time.
And here is one more example. Private A. Glybin turned to me. He said that his wife was sick. In this connection, he appealed to the subunit commander with a request—to apply for the granting of a short leave. But it so happened that bogged down in petty matters he forgot about the soldier's request. And so he came to the party committee.

It was necessary to investigate again. Private Glybin was granted a short leave. But here they forgot to take him off rations and to issue him leave money. Again delay, again an investigation.

I have presented only two examples. But how many similar cases occur in our practice! Sometimes you lose a day before you "settle" a question caused by someone's lack of administrative abilities or someone's inattention. Your own affairs which are prescribed for you by the plan and by other urgent concerns prove to be put aside. True, later you hear how people speak—the problem, they say, has been solved, the party committee helped. But you don't experience any special satisfaction from this. Is it really a matter where the secretary and, at times, also other members of the party committee are converted, if one can say it in this way, into pushers who are forced to assume others' duties?

Of course, each day life brings forth problems, large and small. You don't shut yourself off from them by some barrier. And is it really necessary to shut oneself off? It is believed that one should approach the solution of these problems differently. Here I agree completely with Major B. Konovalov and with other participants in the conversation being conducted on the pages of the journal who stressed that the party committee and the party bureau should employ methods of activity which are characteristic of them. Take the case which I have already discussed. The schedule for repair work on the kitchen farm had been disrupted. Of course, I and the members of the party committee were bound to delve into the situation. However, first of all we had to demand that the comrades responsible for this sector be properly engaged in their work. But in no way should we substitute for those responsible. For it is namely such substitution which bogs one down in petty details. It is also dangerous in that it impedes and paralyzes the work of many. I will refer to one more example.

The party activists of a unit planned to conduct a measure in the school under its patronage which is connected with the military-patriotic indoctrination of the schoolchildren. Everything was ready and each one had a specific assignment. Senior Lieutenant V. Moiseyenko also had an assignment. He was to prepare a demonstration lesson.

Some time passes and suddenly it turns out that Moiseyenko is not ready for the lesson. What was the matter? The officer immediately found excuses: he says that they did not issue him the necessary visual aids.

What remained to be done? Putting off all matters, as they say, he went through channels. He distracted people and disrupted their plans. For it was necessary to solve the problem without delay. And all because of the negligence and irresponsibility of one person.
Of course, we try not to ignore such cases and we hold responsible communists who have a listless attitude toward the assigned matter. We listen to reports of party members and candidates about their accomplishment of the CPSU Regulation. More experienced communists conduct talks with young comrades about party duty, responsibility, activity, and devotion to principle. Questions connected with raising the organizational role of party members and candidates and the development of their initiative are discussed at party meetings and sessions of the party committee. All this, of course, provides its fruits. People have a deeper realization of their responsibility to the collective, strive to work creatively and make a ponderable contribution to the training-indoctrinational process, and participate actively in the unit's social life. Evidence of this—the regiment occupies leading positions in socialist competition and is accomplishing the assigned tasks successfully. And so the results of the winter training period show that the level of our men's combat skill has risen noticeably.

But nevertheless, it seems to me that at times the return from our labor could be much higher. Often, as it is said, we ourselves complicate life for ourselves by our disorganization and confusion in work and by the fact that we do not try to overcome getting bogged down in petty details and see tomorrow's tasks. They especially suffer from this in the lower party elements.

Not so long ago, at a session of the party committee we discussed the results of the winter training and the tasks of the subunit party organizations in raising the organizer role of the communists. The comrades who spoke noted that the party organizations of battalions and companies still evaluate the personal contribution of party members and candidate members in the struggle to strengthen military discipline with insufficient exactingness. Mentioned in particular was the party organization where officer Yu. Podaryashchyi is a member of the CPSU. Here some communists do not serve as an example of execution, discipline, or a high level of organization in work. However, the party organization does not display demandingness. For example, when the secretary was asked why a recent case did not receive the proper evaluation, (due to the carelessness and lack of administrative ability of the officer-communist a lesson was spoiled in essence), the answer followed: "But we thought that the party committee would take up this question...."

You see, the comrades hope that the party committee would look into any case. Why, the party committee will look into what happened. But really, is it not clear that in the subunit party organizations they should be aware of why a communist deviated from the requirements of the CPSU Regulation and punish him if he is guilty of this? For it is namely in the company and battalion that a person is seemingly in the public eye and a demanding word from his fellow-servicemen has great significance in the indoctrination of people and in the creation of a principled atmosphere in the collective.

At the session of the party committee of which I am speaking, the decision was adopted to discuss at the forthcoming seminar of secretaries of company party organizations the question, "The indoctrination of communists in a spirit of lofty mutual demandingness is an important task of the party organization." In addition, the members of the party committee conducted talks with the secretaries of company party organizations on the Lenin work style and rendered them practical assistance on the spot, in so doing devoting special attention to the comrades who were elected secretaries for the first time.
My own experience also suggests something else: we are not always able to distinguish the main element in work and snatch first at one matter and then at another, and as a result we unwillingly find ourselves prisoners of petty details. Take the following fact.

One of the battalions prepared for exercises. During this period, an important role in their preparation should have been played by the repairmen—subordinates of Senior Lieutenant V. Okorkov. I will not explain in detail what tasks faced them; I will only say that their actions also predetermined the battalion's success to a great extent. At this time, officers from higher headquarters were working in the unit. They determined that there are gaps in the organization of the training and service of support subunit personnel, in particular, of the repairmen. Some shortcomings were eliminated at once while it was required to eliminate others in the immediate future.

The results of the inspection also became known in the unit headquarters. It would seem that the situation itself would have suggested to the party activists: assemble, learn why there are complaints about the training of the specialists of the support subunits and who of the communists are guilty here, and hold them strictly responsible. Moreover, preparations for exercises are under way in one of the battalions, the quality of which also depends on the level of ability of the support subunit men....

But time passed, the party bureau was occupied with current problems such as, for example, the drawing up of materials for visual agitation, and here the main problem remained outside the field of view. Not one of the members of the party bureau even visited Senior Lieutenant V. Okorkov's subunit, was interested in how the situation developed here and what difficulties are present, and did not help the officer (by the way, the only communist in the subunit) in organizing the training-indoctrinal process. As a result, the repairmen spoiled the exercises and the battalion did not succeed in accomplishing the missions assigned on the exercise in a quality manner.

It was necessary to adopt the required measures. The case became the subject of a thorough talk both at a session of the party committee and at a seminar of party organization secretaries. It also helped us, the members of the party committee, to see our omissions in work more clearly. Obviously, we do not always teach our activists objectively to determine that link in a chain which, as V. I. Lenin noted, should be grasped with all strength in order to hold the entire chain. We say to people: the basic problems of combat training and the men's service should be in the foreground. But then, how to pose these problems, formulate them at party meetings, render specific assistance, let us say, in the organization and conduct of the same party meeting, and then again help to check the accomplishment of what has been planned—we, unfortunately, do not have enough persistence and patience, if you will. It is not enough to say—struggle against being bogged down in petty details and rise above it. It is also necessary to show how to do it.

Being bogged down by petty details has many aspects. In analyzing the work of the secretaries of subunit party organizations and listening to complaints about a shortage of time, I see that some of them are trying to "lock" everything on themselves. A meeting is prepared—one secretary is perturbed by this. It is planned
to listen to a communist's report—again all preparation lies on the secretary. A meeting with veterans of the war and labor is planned—but again it is primarily the secretary who "spins." I once learned from one comrade why he does not involve the activists in the work and does not rely on them. "You know, people have many concerns about service. Moreover, if I undertake a matter myself, I will certainly do it...."

It is believed that such an answer cannot excuse a party leader or justify his position of "being everywhere." The secretary who substitutes for other communists hardly becomes a genuine organizer of collective work. For he is deprived of the possibility for the deep interpretation of his activity and for constantly comparing it with general party requirements. Even one who is not a newcomer in party work can lose a sense of perspective with time if he only counts on his own strength and experience. It is appropriate to recall the words of V. I. Lenin: "The leader—communist should prove his right to leadership by FINDING, and only by finding MANY, more and more assistants for himself...by the fact that he IS ABLE to help THEM to work, to promote THEM, and to show and consider THEIR experience."

How often we say: it is necessary to work creatively, to search, and to use new ways and possibilities for the best formulation of a matter. But we work, it turns out, as formerly, in the old way, obeying the will of circumstances, flowing with the current of daily concerns. We should decisively get rid of such a style.

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ELIMINATING FORMALISM IN MILITARY POLITICAL TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 11, Jun 83 (signed to press 19 May 83) pp 56-61

[Article by Lt Gen S. Smirnov, chief of Political Department, Airborne Troops: "To Seek a Creative Approach"]

[Text] A visit to the troop unit in which Guards Major N. Shchelkunov serves always leaves a pleasant impression. The order on the territory of the cantonment, in the combat vehicle pool, and in the residential areas pleases the eye. But nevertheless, something else is the main thing. And namely—the attitude of people, their inner mobilization and readiness to work with the complete straining of strength and energy. The paratroopers are persistently improving their soldierly skill, clearly accomplishing all training-combat missions, and performing service in an exemplary manner. Evidence of this—the results of the socialist competition for the winter training period. The regiment confirmed the title of excellent. Here the ranks of experts of combat and political training, rated specialists, and rated sportsmen have been increased and instances of violations of military discipline have been overcome in the majority of the subunits.

The creative labor of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations is embodied in the collective's successes. And militant, purposeful ideological work, its deep content, aggressiveness, and close tie with the life and specific tasks of the personnel became some of the important components of what has been attained. At the center of attention of the party organization and all propagandists and agitators of the unit are questions of the profound study and accomplishment, by the servicemen, of the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, patriotic and international indoctrination, and well-reasoned and intelligible propagandizing of the historic advantages of real socialism. The attention of the students is directed toward the important, impressive successes of our party and people and toward affirmation of lofty moral principles.

I should like to stress especially that in the lectures, reports, and talks in the course of the Marxist-Leninist training of officers, the political training of the warrant officers [praporshchik], and political lessons with the noncommissioned officers and other ranks the propagandists strive to expose convincingly the anti-popular essence of imperialism, first of all American, and its reactionary, aggressive policy.
Being in the Guards regiment, each time I try to visit political lessons and, if time permits, to visit a Lenin lecture, thematic soiree, a morning class, and other measures. One day, I found myself in the role of student at a lecture by Lieutenant Colonel V. Masanovets. The lecture concerned the decree of the CPSU Central Commit-tee devoted to the 80th anniversary of the Second Congress, RSDRP [Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party]. The lecturer stressed the Communist Party's great concern for strengthening the country's defensive capability and for its Armed Forces. He told warmly and convincingly about the regiment's communists and the leading people of the subunits. In conclusion, he dwelled in detail on the tasks facing each man in today's difficult international situation and pointed to the reserves for the further improvement of the combat readiness and military skill of the paratroopers. Nor were the urgent problems of raising the military discipline and vigilance of the servicemen ignored.

I transmitted Masanovets's talk only briefly. It remained in the minds of the students not only because the talk concerned an important problem and was linked with the men's specific missions. It is believed that the quality of the lectures was determined by the officer's ability to aim the students toward a class evaluation of life's phenomena and to help them to understand profoundly the social significance of soldierly labor from the position of the historic experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the missions which it poses for the Armed Forces at the contemporary stage.

Many such examples of a thoughtful, purposeful approach of the regiment's propagandists to ideological influence on the personnel can be presented. We see the main task in enriching our propaganda and agitation ideologically, making it more timely, and strengthening its tie with life and with the tasks being accomplished by the paratroopers. And be it a lecture or talk, report or seminar, discussion of a motion picture or thematic soiree—it is important that it does not simply carry additional information to the students and comments on events and phenomena already known, but also provides food for thought and helps to realize one's place and role in raising combat readiness and strengthening discipline, organization, and order.

But the tasks which the paratroopers must accomplish are difficult and important. They are an airborne assault on unfamiliar terrain at any time of the day and in any weather, emerging in the "enemy" rear area, and swift, multikilometer marches immediately after a parachute drop. Of course, not only is excellent military ability required for this, but also excellent moral training and psychological tempering. In order to generate these qualities in people, it is necessary to approach their indoctrination in a nonstereotyped manner and creatively, conforming to the situation.

Here an operational news sheet is before me. "Guardsman—paratrooper!" it says in it. "You are now flying over the place where, in June 1941, the 214th Airborne Brigade under the command of Colonel A. Levashov, stood in the path of the fascists who were rushing toward Minsk. In heavy, bloody battles the paratroopers displayed selflessly bravery, a will for victory, and mass heroism. Be worthy of their exploit!" This operational news sheet was produced by Guards Major V. Vyrodov who was appointed party organizer for the time of the flight to the drop zone. It was read by all those who were in the military transport aircraft. It was also read by Guards Junior Sergeant A. Fedotov. I do not want to draw a direct connection between the content of the operational news sheet and the man's actions in the
subsequent difficult situation, but he proceeded exactly in the way that the heir to the glory of the frontline fighters should.

Fedotov was to jump immediately behind the combat vehicle. The aircraft rocked strongly during the dropping of the BMD [airborne combat vehicle]. The junior sergeant did not hold on, fell, and injured his leg. However, the desire to accomplish the assigned mission was so great that Fedotov did not move back in front of the open hatch; he only shouted to the paratrooper who was behind him: "Help me," and he jumped from the aircraft. In the course of these exercises, he and his fellow servicemen operated energetically, with vim. And the propagandist word inspired them to soldierly labor. After the landing, Guards Captain A. Bespalov briefly assembled the paratroopers. "My father, Lieutenant Bespalov, fought on the ground where we are to operate," he said. "The artillery platoon which he commanded struck down the fascist scum with accurate fire. We are learning to fight so that no one will dare to encroach upon our peaceful cities and villages and on our happy life so that in case of necessity we will be able to give a worthy rebuff to the aggressor."

The effectiveness and quality of ideological influence depend on a great many factors. The special features of the present stage of social development and the improvement of our Armed Forces are reflected more and more completely in lecture propaganda, in oral agitation, and in the system of political training. As a rule, the propagandists consider the intensifying ideological offensive of the class enemy. But we have no grounds to delude ourselves with successes. We should not, and we do not have the right to, permit interruptions in the ideological indoctrination of the men or to have a formal attitude toward this matter.

Each oral presentation is called upon to attract the audience with the logic of its arguments and depth of analysis of the problems being examined, and to carry an emotional charge. In this connection, I should like to recall what Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin said about the mastery of the oral presentation. He advised propagandists and agitators to structure their speech in such a way that it touches the souls of the listeners and stirs them up. For this, one should speak in his own language rather than in ready formulas. "And do you know what it means to speak with a ready phrase?" he asked. "It means that your thought does not work, but only the tongue works. You will make no impression on people with a ready phrase. You will not make it because they know it even without you. You are afraid that if you speak in your own way it will not be as pretty. You are mistaken. It will sound even better and its clarity will be greater."

One day, one of the propagandists gave a lecture on the subject, "The Soviet Armed Forces—the reliable guardian of the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people and bulwark of peace and socialism." He presented it rather clearly, turned to the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and to party documents, formulated conclusions laconically, and presented examples from the combat training of the personnel. It would appear that all was well. But the lecturer talked with his listeners in a language which was too trite and "scientific." Every word or term unknown to the men was one for which they had to glance in a philosophy dictionary in time. The men simply could not keep up with the propagandist and follow his thought. When, after the lecture, a worker from the political department who attended it pointed this out to the leader of the group for political lessons, he heard in reply that, he said, the audience was prepared as a whole and the majority of the men
have a secondary and secondary special education. Therefore, he said they are required to know the terms.

Of course, the education and the amount of information possessed by today's soldiers and sergeants have grown noticeably. But nevertheless, the coolness of indifference blew on propaganda work from such views. It should not be forgotten that people who are still quite young and have not grown wise with life have assembled before the lecturer. They are just at the age when a figurative, emotionally colored word or comparison is best perceived.

Unfortunately, we still do not always consider this. How important it is to shift the center of gravity in political Indoctrinational work to quality criteria has not been completely understood in all units. In some places, as formerly reliance is placed on excessively voluminous plans for work with people without reinforcing what has been planned organizationally.

Here, for example, is the unit where Captain A. Yatskevich serves. Here, it was planned to give more than 20 lectures during the winter period of training. A bit too much, of course, but even this is not the main point. The preparation of the lectures lay on a narrow circle of propagandists. Captain Yatskevich undertook to work up several lectures in a short time. Two or three more members of the agitation-propaganda group found themselves in a similar situation. At the same time, other comrades did not receive any assignments. The unit propagandist saw no harm in this. He says, there are enough old texts of lectures, let them be used. Is it necessary to say that with such an attitude toward the matter dogmatism is implanted in propaganda and its low quality is predetermined?

Formalism has many faces. We frequently strive to attach to one or another ideological measure or lesson in the political training system purely external "smoothness" and see that everything is, and this is the main thing, measured and accurate. And what the return is from the lecture, talk, or seminar and how they enrich the attendees, we sometimes forget about this. With a clear conscience we place the next "tick mark"—the measure took place. But in my opinion, it is better not to conduct it at all than to do it for the sake of form, in the name of a mark in the plan alone.

...One day I visited a seminar in the group for Marxist-Leninist training which is directed by Major Yu. Polyakov. I listened to the presentation of one comrade, another, and a third, and I suddenly caught myself thinking that I had already read such expressions, phrases, and formulations somewhere. Most likely, in newspaper publications dealing with the subject of the seminar. Of course, familiarity with newspaper periodicals is a good thing, you may retort here. But when a dryish retelling, and even a simple reading of a newspaper article, replace knowledge of primary sources and other important materials, this automatically suggests the thought that the student came to the seminar with no materials and with a formal attitude toward the matter.

And what about the group leader, officer Polyakov? As was learned, such a course of the lesson did not trouble him in the least. Rather the contrary: he was satisfied that outwardly the seminar proceeds actively, without the slightest pauses and hitches, and that each one present knows clearly where and when he should "join in."
But here, in the eyes of the students sitting around me, a poorly concealed boredom was held back and it was felt that the people are merely sitting out the prescribed hours.

The most resolute struggle should be waged against such an attitude toward the matter of the ideological tempering of military personnel. And this task should be accomplished first and foremost by party organizations. Unfortunately, the party committee of the unit in which Major Polyaakov serves was virtually uninterested in the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers during the year. Although they also spoke of the importance of this sector of the regiment's ideological life formally, at party meetings, and of the necessity to devote daily attention to it.

Yes, formalism has many faces. But one thing is always seen in its essence—indifference toward a living matter and the striving to cover by form one's indifference toward how a person lives. If only everything were smooth in accordance with papers.

Ideological work will not accept stereotype and trite dryness. Life confirms that its effectiveness depends primarily on the propagandist himself and the level of his training. This is why political organs and party organizations try to devote the most fixed attention to work with propaganda personnel and ideological activists. On the recommendation of the troop political department, theoretical and scientific-practical conferences and methodological seminars are conducted regularly in the large units. Individual consultations for unofficial propagandists and agitators and surveys of political and military literature have been put into practice.

Reference-information centers and methodological offices have been supplemented with literature on the oratorical art of the propagandists of the Lenin school, speech style, and the lecturer's contact with the audience. Now the party collectives have a more exacting approach toward monitoring the rise in the quality of ideological work at all its stages. In the organization of lecture propaganda, we see that the prepared lectures are first discussed in agitation-propaganda groups and agitprop collectives. In the course of such a discussion, one can obtain an impression of how the propagandist worked on the material, how deeply he mastered and accustomed himself to the subject, and what he takes to the rostrum, and he can be cautioned against possible errors. In many units, they have begun to be systematically interested in the comments of the audience concerning the lectures and talks and to generalize the students' opinions and draw practical conclusions from them.

The fruits of such an approach and such a style of activity can be seen, in particular, in the Guards Chernigovskaya Red Banner Airborne Division. In its units there is a well-thought-out approach to the selection of propagandists and the indoctrination of the ideological activists and they are well trained. The party collectives keep the quality and effectiveness of ideological measures in their field of view. To a great extent, thanks to this they succeeded in improving the planning of ideological-political and military indoctrination. Measures for "tick marks" are now mentioned less and less in plans. The propagandists calculate their forces more thoughtfully and are striving to create conditions in order to increase the return from each measure and the degree of its influence on the minds and hearts of people. Here they began to think more about the depth of the content of lectures, talks, and soirees and about their emotional aspect. The paratroopers were reminded of the so-called thematic ten-day periods—"Invincible and legendary," "In the harmonious family of the peoples," "City-soldier, city-worker," and others. They are
organized and conducted jointly with the CPSU city committee and local party and Komsomol organizations. The purpose of the 10-day campaign is to disclose, using specific examples from the life of labor and troop collectives and the fates of people, the greatness of the deeds and accomplishments of the Soviet people, their grandiose successes accomplished under the leadership of the Leninist party, and the noble mission of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Each 10-day campaign is opened by a celebration by one of the city's streets. Beautifully decorated and decked out like a cordial hostess, the street greets the guests—veterans of the war and labor, leaders and innovators of production, and servicemen—with inviting marches. Then a meeting begins. Those who speak at it tell about the city's yesterday and today and about the qualities of its representatives who defended their native land during the war years. The program for the 10-day thematic campaign includes military-patriotic readings. Readings on the subjects, "We are Soviet people," "The hero next to us," and "A reliable defense for the peaceful labor of the Soviet people" left a trace in the consciousness of the people. Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Ivanovich Bizyayev and veterans of the war and labor S. Davtyan and Ye. Nechayev participated in them. The starts of participants in the trip to places of revolutionary, labor, and combat glory of the Soviet people take place with emotion. Young pathfinders seem to touch the moral sources of our victories and achievements with their hearts and mature spiritually. And this is extremely important for the boys and girls whose moral make-up is still in the stage of formation.

Our propagandists are also concerned about instilling a good artistic taste in the men and teaching them to evaluate the works of literature and art from the correct, party point of view. A certain experience in this has been accumulated in the unit where officer Yu. Vorob'ev serves. Here, oral journals "What it means to be cultured" and "The culture of free time," debates "They quarrel about tastes" and "Learn to understand music," and the discussion of the documentary films "Meeting with Giaconda," "Exhibition of the Dresden Gallery," and the "State Hermitage" are conducted regularly. Art experts, music critics, writers, artists of the theater and films, and members of agitation and propaganda groups which specialize in problems of aesthetic and moral indoctrination who are invited to meetings with the men answer the students' questions.

These measures leave no one indifferent. After them, excited talks about art do not die down for a long time and the ranks of library readers and participants in amateur arts are enlarged. More admirers of classical music and Soviet art of songs and worshipers of true masters of word and brush have appeared among the men recently. The spiritual world of the servicemen is becoming richer and this has a beneficial influence on their attitude toward their obligations and their duty to the motherland.

The ideological content and theoretical and methodological level of propagandist work depend to a great extent on the attention to it on the part of the party organizations. Practice shows that a systematic analysis of the activity of communists on specific ideological sectors and the generalization and introduction of leading experience are the most important conditions for the attainment of success. An exacting attitude toward the organization and content of political-indoctrinal work has become the main feature in the work style of many party collectives.
of the airborne troops. In the party organizations where Major P. Rassokhin and Captains A. Bobrakov and A. Lopukha are the secretaries as well as in many others, these questions are constantly discussed at meetings and sessions of committees and bureaus. The communists hold strictly accountable those who keep aloof from participation in ideological work, lock themselves within the framework of their service duties, and meet with people seldom and unwillingly. And this, in the end, helps to attain good results in the indoctrination of the men and has a beneficial influence on the general level of combat and political training and the status of military discipline.

Unfortunately, it is not like this everywhere. In individual party organizations questions of raising the effectiveness of ideological work are not properly studied and leading experience is poorly generalized and introduced. At times, a principled and acute evaluation is not given to instances of the low quality of lectures which have been given and other propaganda measures. The criticism of communists is not always heard and activity is not always manifested in political-indoctrinational work.

Not so long ago, in the Political Department we discussed problems in the improvement of the analysis of ideological activity in the large units and units of the airborne troops. The criteria for its quality and effectiveness, the nature of the information reaching us from the units and large units, and the working methods of the officers of the political organs with the troops were not disregarded. Our conclusions and recommendations were reported to those who participated in the next assembly of ideological personnel of the airborne troops. In accordance with the requirements of the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, we are trying to direct all communists toward more active participation in the indoctrinational process and to make leading experience in propaganda activity common property.

In order to realize the party's instructions on improving ideological and political-indoctrinational work, it is important to see that each propagandist seeks a creative approach to the solution of the problems facing him and gives all his knowledge and experience and all the ardor of his soul to the assigned matter. It is the primary duty of each one who participates in the noble cause of the ideological indoctrination of the motherland's defenders to rid our propaganda of formalism and conventionalism and, by passionate word, to inspire the paratroopers to selfless soldierly labor.


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ARMY SPORTSMEN MUST DEMONSTRATE HIGHER CHARACTER STANDARDS

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[Article by Lt Col I. Bogovik, chief of Political Department, Central Sports Club of the Army: "The Honor of an Army Sportsman"]

[Text] A little more than a year remains to the day when the blue Olympic flame blazes up, symbolizing peace on Earth, the friendship of all nations and peoples, and the mighty all-triumphant strength of youth. The last celebration of world sport took place in the first socialist country. The capital of our country--Moscow--was its symbol and banner. Despite the ban of their governments, representatives of many capitalist countries and young sportsmen to whom the ideals of peace and the ideals of an honest sports struggle were closer than the intrigues of western politicians surrounding sports travelled to Moscow then. And they did not regret this. The Moscow Olympiad was a glorious success and made a significant contribution to the development of the world Olympic movement.

The honor of the Soviet sports banner was entrusted for protection to the strongest of our athletes, those whose names we even now pronounce with admiration. Also among them are many army sportsmen, representatives of the Central Sports Club of the Army which marked its 60th anniversary quite recently.

It is not for naught that the TsSKA [Central Sports Club of the Army] is called the forge of champions. As members of combined teams of the country, our athletes took part in eight summer and seven winter Olympiads and in many international tournaments and they won about 1,500 medals, including 370 Olympic medals. The club trained hundreds of champions and record-holders of Europe, the world, and the Olympic games. And today the sportsmen of the TsSKA are demonstrating high skill, selflessness, and a will for victory in competitions.

The members of the collective who attained the highest results have been awarded orders and medals. We have created the Avenue of Sports Glory for the club's 60th anniversary. Busts of the wearers of the Order of Lenin have been placed on pedestals: V. Bobrov, A. Bogdanov, Yu. Vlasov, A. Vorob'yev, Ye. Grishin, V. Kapitonov, A. Karpov, V. Krivopuskov, V. Kuzin, V. Kuts, B. Mikhaylov, I. Rodnina, A. Roshchin, Yu. Sedykh, and V. Tret'yak--sportsmen who brought fame to our Soviet sports flag.

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Not so long ago high state awards were given to a new group of army sportsmen and coaches. They are V. Tikhonov, Yu. Moiseyev, V. Kuz'kin, A. Volchenkov, and S. Gimayev—on the hockey team, A. Zavyalov, V. Tarakanov, and S. Savel'yev—on the ski team, and others.

But it is not without reason that the wonderful slogan, "The Olympiad is not only for Olympic athletes!" came into being in our units and on the ships. Soviet sport is strong because of its mass nature and the broad scale of the physical culture movement. And this slogan is being embodied especially brilliantly in our Armed Forces where all conditions have been created for the comprehensive physical development of the men and the growth of their sports results. Army sportsmen who show high results are invited to sports clubs of districts and fleets and to the Central Sports Club of the Army. Here, for example, the talented boxer Senior Lieutenant V. Rybakov was invited to the TsSKA from the Far East Military District. One of the best skaters in the country, A. Malikov, previously served as a gunner in the Kantemirova Tank Division. A pass from the troops to major army sport was received by champions of the USSR, Europe, and the world Majors Yu. Yumashev, V. Kaplan, and many other servicemen who proudly bore and are bearing the honor of the army sportsman.

The honor of the army sportsman... This concept is capacious and lofty. And it is not made up of records and sports achievements alone. In speaking of the honor of the army sportsman, we have in mind first of all his lofty communist ideological content, flaming patriotism, party, Komsomol, and moral qualities, fighting-man nature, and will for victory.

On one of the meetings with the youth, the Olympic champion, honored master of sport and now coach of the TsSKA, Galina Prozumenshchikova, pronounced these words:

"I had many difficult duels in the blue lanes of the pools. At times, when meters remained to the finish line, it seemed to me that there was no more strength to fight for victory. At such instants one thing rose before my eyes: I saw the flag-pole and the red calico cloth which was slowly rising upward on it—the flag of our motherland. And do you know, fatigue disappeared, I flew toward the finish line as if on wings, I won...."

Dozens, no, hundreds of army sportsmen who have written many a glorious page in the history of Soviet sport would go along with these emotional words which come from the very heart. The scarlet banner with the hammer and sickle, the solemn melody of our anthem—these are not only the dearest reward for the victor. Being far from his motherland, the Soviet person sees our entire immense country in this symbolism. And at times, our sportsmen accomplish the impossible, what will rightly be called an exploit, in the name of the fatherland, in the name of its glory. An exploit in the name of the motherland.

The competitions of the 5th Summer Games of the friendly armies which took place in the Hungarian People's Republic will remain in the memory forever. More exactly, it was one of the competitions in the 20-kilometer sports walk. Half the distance had been covered. Our sportsman, Lieutenant V. Sapon, is leading. One of the competitors, in trying to "catch" the leader, accidently stuck the army man in the heel with a spike. The blood on the foot was visible even on the platforms. A
physician ran up to Sapon and offered to help him. But to stop means to lose. Our athlete did not quit the race and finished first. And the price at which this victory was gained was clear to everyone. Spectators, sportsmen, and even the judges stood and applauded this courageous person.

Army judo wrestlers Oleg Stepanov and Avel' Kazachenkov have also demonstrated their fighting nature many times. And not only on the wrestling mat. There was a case where, risking their lives, they protected people against unrestrained hooligans. And here is why I remembered this. The price which our youth puts on such features of character as courage, the will to victory, and mutual assistance is well known. Demonstrating genuine qualities of fighting men, the army sportsmen are exerting a tremendous influence on all sports-lovers. And especially, on the youth.

The famous captain of the army ice team and combined team of the country, now senior coach of the Leningrad SKA [Sports Club of the Army], Boris Mikhaylov, once received a letter from the parents of a boy who was seriously ill. They asked Boris Petrovich to write their son several encouraging words to support him at the difficult moments of his life. "Of course, I could not fail to write him," recalls Boris Mikhaylov, "and when, being agitated, I looked for those uniquely needed words which would mobilize the little boy's will for the struggle against sickness, I thought that this is very similar to a situation in our most difficult duels with an experienced and strong competitor. But if there we could also lose in general, here the stake was a human life. This instance of people appealing to me with a matter so important for them then showed clearly, in addition to everything else, the moral responsibility which we, army sportsmen, bear."

The overwhelming majority of the army men—and among them of course our "Red Stars," as fans of the TsSKA's are called, realize the measure of their moral responsibility for participating in sports competitions and for actions in life. The moral summits, just as sports summits, are not achieved in passing. The path to them, of course, does not require special drills, but painstaking, daily work, the work of the sportsman himself, is simply necessary first of all as is that of the public and the party and Komsomol organizations. This cannot be forgotten either because the main goal of the development of all our sport is its mass nature and the practical direction of pursuits in physical culture and sport. The decree of the CPSU Central Committee, "On a further rise in mass physical culture and sport," directs us namely toward this. The summits toward which the aspirations of all our army sportsmen and servicemen who are engaged in physical culture and sport will be directed also depend to a great extent on the moral qualities which our best sportsmen possess.

During my years of service I became convinced: if a man is physically tempered and able to withstand the considerable loads which arise in the course of combat training, he is equal to any tasks. And if the entire squad, platoon, or company is on friendly terms with sport? There are also reserves in raising the effectiveness of combat training in this. But how can we see that sport becomes a requirement of each serviceman and that a person in a military uniform does not conceive of his life and service without systematic physical exercises and drills? And exactly right here much can be done by our army champions and athletes whose names brought and are bringing fame to all Soviet sport.
I recall that when I was a political officer with the troops, sportsmen from the TsSKA often travelled out to us to meet with the men. Their talks and demonstration presentations were long remembered by the young servicemen. And if a distinguished sportsman again visits lessons on physical training and shows how to accomplish better one or another exercise!...

Even then I understood that our army service is impossible without sport. We need sports to understand the depths of soldierly skill. But in addition to everything else, sports in the army makes genuine men out of lads who have only just put on the soldier's uniform.

I remember that Private V. Yermolov arrived in our platoon. The soldier was diligent and conscientious. But things did not get on well for him and he lagged behind his comrades. The reason for his failures was disclosed at once—poor physical training.

And suddenly I learned almost by chance that the soldier had been called up to the army by mistake. After a serious operation he was not quite healthy and could not serve in the army. Of course, I immediately wanted to apply to the command for his early release to the reserves. But first I decided to talk with the subordinate to find out from him what had happened.

The talk began and I saw that Yermolov had tears in his eyes. He, it turns out, had concealed his illness in the military commissariat. For him, service in the army was not only a duty to the motherland, but also a matter of family honor. His father and grandfather had died in the war.

To put it briefly, the command permitted Yermolov to continue his service. And the military medics worked out a special system of physical training for him. He became one of the best specialists in our battery and a first-class sportsman. Prior to release to the reserve, he appeared before the men of the regiment and said that military service and sports taught him and forged the army character with which he will firmly go through life.

The army character.... How many times people rendered its due to it and how much was spoken and written about it. With what delight we observe the courageous skirmishes of the sportsmen with the stars in sports shirts, be it on a hockey rink or basketball court, on a wrestling mat or in a ring.

And nevertheless, literally on the following day after arriving in the TsSKA I saw in quite a different light what stands behind the customary phrase, "Great sport—great labor." I dropped in at the dressing room to see the hockey players in order to become acquainted with them. They rested after a drill, having removed their ice padding. The first thing to strike the eyes were the scars and bruises. But the hockey players seemingly did not notice them and smiled as they extended their hands in becoming acquainted.

On this first meeting, I understood with all obviousness that great sport is the lot of the strong and the courageous. You come to a drill of figure skaters, gymnasts, or basketball players.... Drop in at any sports section—you understand that even a triply talented person who, however, does not possess a strong will does nothing in great sport. He cannot attain high sports results and will not bring glory to Soviet sport.
Yes, sports achievements cause admiration and joy and demonstrate man's unlimited possibilities. But, it is believed, nevertheless, this is not the essence of the records shown by our sportsmen. The fans organize fervent, cordial meetings for the sportsmen on their native soil not only due to magnificent results. The talks by Soviet, including army, sportsmen who have been brought up in the spirit of communist morality vividly propagandize the achievements of the socialist system, cause respect and lively interest in our country among foreign sports lovers, and disclose the best features of the Soviet man's character.

It is universally recognized that many Canadian residents became keenly interested in the Country of Soviets and its people after the brilliant performances there by the Soviet hockey players and our combined team, the backbone of which were representatives of the army club. Suffering the bitterness of the defeat of their hockey "stars," the Canadians at the same time also looked differently at our country, which sent such an ice detachment, and at the Soviet people. Our sports heroes who, in the eyes of foreign spectators, personify the entire great Soviet people, also become an example for imitation in a society which lives according to laws which differ radically from our, socialist, laws. Thus, the museum of hockey glory in the Canadian city of Kingston decided to open a permanent exhibit in the international hockey department devoted to the outstanding Soviet hockey player and alumnus of the TsSKA, Valeriy Kharlamov. Our famous goalie, Vladislav Tret'yak, enjoys great popularity among the Canadians. We were accustomed to seeing him on the ice rink where he guards the hockey net and takes, it would seem, impossible pucks. But, perhaps, not everyone knows how after one of the sessions of the International Olympic Committee, of which Tret'yak is a member, he defended the interests of the Soviet country and our socialist ideals at a press conference. Let us say directly, the trickiest, most intricate questions were asked of him by representatives of the Western mass media and propaganda means. The methods which were introduced by some of those who were present at that press conference far surpassed the dirty methods of some Canadian hockey professionals in their dirtiness. But even in this situation Vladislav Tret'yak, party secretary of the TsSKA team, preserved his imperturbability, beat off all attacks of the shouters with the confidence of a person convinced of his rightness, and gave well-reasoned, truthful, and convincing answers to all questions. And his presentation was then concluded to the ardent applause of the hall.

For the lofty civic qualities which our army sportsmen display under any conditions, numerous admirers respect and appreciate them. The sports achievements of the army men and such features of their character as courage, a will to victory, a sense of collectivism, mutual assistance, and patriotism exert a great indoctrinational influence on sports lovers and enrich the spiritual life of society. And the majority of the sportsmen understand the moral responsibility which lays on their shoulders. In this, they are greatly helped by political officers and party and Komsomol activists. But one is able to bring up a sportsman in whom the best qualities of the Soviet man would be inherent by no means at once. Unfortunately, we still have people who have not justified the high honor of being called an army sportsman. I name only the famous sportsmen and honored masters of sport Valeriy Limasov and Vasiliy Solomin who, until recently, were members of the country's combined teams and the TsSKA for boxing. Having achieved certain results in the ring and having come to believe in their irreplaceability, these boxers set forth on the path of the systematic violation of the sports regimen and began to use alcohol. And this,
naturally, led to where their sports results dropped sharply. It is natural that Limasov and Solomin were disqualified and dropped from the combined teams.

Something similar also occurred with the promising boxers N. Burlachko and V. Martel' who chose the road of violating military discipline. They were also forced to leave the team.

In reflecting on the reasons which led to such sad consequences, one cannot fail to see that a fair share of the guilt lies with party and Komsomol organizations of the TsSKA boxing team. Individual coaches and communists of the team did not serve as examples and did not exert the necessary indoctrinational influence on their wards. It was necessary to work on the indoctrination of the indoctrinators. We adopted strict measures of influence, and there is the hope that the state of affairs on the team will change substantially.

The political department of the TsSKA and the party organizations are striving to intensify conditions in instilling the best civic and moral qualities in the sportsmen and coaches. Along with the intensification of individual indoctrinational work, we pay special attention to raising the effectiveness of all measures being conducted—meetings of the party, trade union, and Komsomol activists of the TsSKA, seminars and assemblies with activists, and the study of the moral situation in our collectives.

The main thing in the work of the political department is concern for strengthening the party nucleus on the teams and raising the combat vitality of the party organizations.

But the indoctrination of the sportsmen is effective only when it is conducted in an integrated manner when, I would say, the moral growth of the sportsman is under the fixed attention and influence of the coaches, party and Komsomol activists, and political officers.

Many famous sportmen and worthy representatives of our club owe their civic development to their coach. He concentrates within himself everything that is better and everything that is advanced which is provided by contemporary science and the experience of indoctrinational work.

Our club is living the country's life and the life of its Armed Forces. The political department and the party and Komsomol organizations of the majority of the club's sports teams are trying to maintain a continuous tie with the collectives of workers as well as with the men of the units and ships and with the pupils of the military educational institutions.

The ice team of the TsSKA has been maintaining contacts with the officer candidates of the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for many years. Our soccer players receive many letters from the soldiers and officers of the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division. In which regard, the meetings and talks of the sportsmen and the fans do not always have a festive nature. Recently, the workers of one of the plants, at a regular meeting with the collective of soccer players of the TsSKA, informed the sportsmen of their successes in labor and expressed their dissatisfaction with the play of the army team.
The soldier's honor, the serviceman's duty.... These are words with the highest sounding. The majority of the army sportsmen carry the honor of Soviet sport in a worthy manner. It is a firm principle for them: if you win only personal fame in sports, don't expect success in life. The famous hammer thrower, army man Yuriy Sedykh, once said at one of the team meetings: "The strength of each of us relies on the strength of the collective and, in the end, on the strength of our army and our multinational country. Lose this support—and you lose everything."

Correctly noted. It expresses in the best way possible the very essence of the army sportsman's nature. Meanwhile, we can still see that not all our champions and record-holders are passing the check with glory, that check which also tells most clearly of all about qualities inherent in a person as a personality, and the personality of the country of developed socialism which imposes increased moral and ethical requirements on people. And the party and Komsomol organizations which have not been able to achieve the greatest effectiveness from their indoctrinational efforts bear responsibility for the "failures" of the sportsmen which still occur and who have achieved certain successes on the difficult sports path. And here is what else should be considered. When one or another sportsman violates various ethical and moral principles, he suffers not only personal losses. The losses of a moral order are much more ponderable, those which in no way contribute to a rise in the authority of the sports title.

The nature of the fighting man, the nature of the citizen of his great motherland and the lofty sports achievements—in my opinion these are inseparable concepts. Therefore, the indoctrination of the sportsmen and their ideological tempering—this is the main task facing the political department of TsSKA and its personnel. And this task is fully within the power of our army club.

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PENTAGON-CONTROLLED MEDIA ANALYZED

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[Text] The intensification of international tension and the increased danger of a new world war which are caused by the adventurist policy of imperialist circles and, first of all, of the United States, are forcing the bourgeois ideologists and propagandists to resort to the most refined demagogy, hypocrisy, falsification, and deceit to conceal from the peoples the truth concerning the actual source of the threat to peace. An entire system of ideological myths which obscure the true meaning of imperialism's intentions and which are called upon to blunt the vigilance of the peoples is being worked out. A giant propaganda machine has been created for this which uses all modern means of ideological influence.

An integral and component part of American imperialism's propaganda machine is the Pentagon's mass media. They are widely used by the most reactionary circles of the United States to mold public opinion in America itself as well as beyond its borders. "Having created the biggest information system in the world," writes the American scientist Herbert Schiller, "the Pentagon has been transformed into a highly organized machine for manipulating consciousness." Schiller cites the following data: the radio and television system of the U.S. Armed Forces (the biggest radio-television network concentrated in single hands) has 204 radio and 80 television ground-based stations as well as 56 radio and 11 television stations installed on warships.

The staff of the U.S. Department of Defense contains more than 3,000 specialists: theoreticians-propagandists, psychologists, sociologists, and linguists who are engaged with questions of raising the effectiveness of the ideological influence of the Department of Defense's mass media. Having available hundreds of billions of dollars of budgetary appropriations, the American military authorities have the capability to spend huge sums annually on domestic and foreign propaganda.

Along with the broad use of radio and television for ideological influence on the servicemen as well as on the civilian population, the Pentagon devotes the most fixed attention to the press. In the United States, more than 1,850 military periodicals are published including 366 journals and 1,038 newspapers. The single circulation of publications of this type at the end of the 1970's reached 12 million copies.
The special role of the military press in the mass media system of the U.S. Department of Defense is explained, in particular, by the very specific character of the printed word. For newspapers and journals, in contrast with radio and television, serve as a factor for long-term ideological influence. They can be transferred to one another by servicemen and be in libraries and clubs. Thus, almost each edition of the journal SOLDIERS contains the call to turn over a copy which has been read to other servicemen. And the Pacific edition of the newspaper STARS AND STRIPES (whose circulation is 250,000) is read, according to the editors' estimates, by up to 1 million people.

A typical feature of the U.S. military press is its complete ideological standardization. It is attained by centralized control over the information flow, by strict regulation of published materials, and various instructions and censorship on the part of commanders and other officials.

The main role in directing the activity of the military press is played by the armed forces press service. It is directly subordinate to the information directorate which handles questions of the ideological processing of the American servicemen. Prepared in the appropriate spirit, materials are sent out to all the services of the Armed Forces and are reprinted by the military newspapers mandatorily. In the headquarters of formations [ob'yedneniye] and large units, responsibility for the output, dissemination, and political direction of the press is borne by the department "of public affairs," and in brigades, separate battalions, and air and naval bases—by "public information officers" who are called upon to defend the interests of the ruling classes.

Back during the time of World War II American military propagandists came to the conclusion that the "internal resistance and apathy" of the soldiers as regards the "official orientation" was explained to a great extent by the "suspicion that they are being subjected to propagandizing influence." The theoreticians of bourgeois propaganda believe that caution and mistrust of the "official line" are manifested in the soldiers to a no lesser degree even now. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of the newspapers and journals for servicemen have the status of "unofficial" publications which allegedly are not connected with the Department of Defense or with other official institutions. This is communicated on the first page of such publications. A considerable portion of such printed production is published by civilian publishers in the interests of one or another unit or large unit, which is also called upon to conceal their dependence on the Pentagon's propaganda lines.

In fact, commanders at all echelons are required to accomplish the strictest censorship of all publications. A special instruction requires that the commander examine the printed output to determine "whether the material on demonstrations by the supporters of peace and on anti-war movements and other civil disorders...will harm the discipline and morale of the servicemen subordinate to them," and the right is granted to forbid the dissemination of publications which, in the opinion of the commander, "will contradict the best interests" of the large unit (unit or subunit). To give the appearance "of independence and being above party" of the military publications, the instruction forbids the publication in them of news, cartoons, and editorials devoted to pre-election campaigns and candidates and to the results of public opinion polls on these questions. Similar considerations also explain the absence of commercial advertisements in the majority of military newspapers and journals which are typical of the American press.

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Of course, the obstinately proclaimed "independence: and "being above party" serve only as a smoke screen which is called upon to conceal the unalterable fact that the military press zealously defends the interests of the monopolies and steps forth as mouthpiece of the bosses of the U.S. military-industrial complex. The degree of "freedom" of expression of various opinions on the pages of the American military press and its "independence" of the ruling circles can be judged if only from the directive of the Headquarters, Department of the Army, which determines the goals and tasks of the so-called "commander's information" program and the role of the press organs of the Armed Forces in its realization. In the directive, it says that "under no circumstances can it be permitted that materials for the program or discussion take the form of attacks on American principles and governmental system or defend ideologies or forms of governments which are hostile or contradict the interests of the United States."

The Pentagon's propaganda service succeeded in achieving a great differentiation of military publications, which provides the opportunity to exert ideological influence on various categories of servicemen. This is confirmed first of all by the existence of a so-called "mass press" intended for soldiers and a "quality press"—publications for officers, generals, and highly placed bureaucrats of the Defense Department.

The basic and biggest newspapers which belong to the "mass press" are the daily STARS AND STRIPES and the weekly ARMY TIMES, (Ground Forces), AIR FORCE TIMES (Air Force), and NAVY TIMES (Navy) and journals of this type—the monthlies SOLDIERS, AIRMAN, and ALL HANDS. The "mass press" also includes the "field press," that is, the newspapers of armies, corps, separate brigades and battalions, military bases, garrisons, and ships which, as a rule, come out weekly. Their single circulation is almost 1,500,000 copies.

The journals ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, COMMAND, OFFICER, and MILITARY REVIEW, which are published not only in English but also in foreign languages and are sent out to more than 80 states are intended first of all for command personnel. Organs of the press also exist for the various services of the Armed Forces, combat arms, and services. Journals intended for officers publish articles of an analytical and problem nature which are called upon to further the improvement of their professional knowledge and also to serve them as a guide for the conduct of propaganda measures among the soldiers.

The propagandists across the ocean cannot fail to consider the fact that a considerable portion of the soldiers in the U.S. Armed Forces is made up of negroes. The newspaper BLACK TIMES is published for them. And for Americans of Puerto Rican and Mexican origin in the large units and units where the percentage of colored servicemen is high, special appendices to local newspapers are published in Spanish. The basic propaganda direction of such publications is to smooth out in at least some measure the acute racial and national disagreements which exist in the country and in the U.S. Armed Forces.

The readership of military newspapers and journals is rather broad. In addition to representatives of the U.S. Armed Forces it includes various categories of civilians, members of the National Guard, reservists, veterans, members of servicemen's families, the local population of countries where American military installations are stationed, and servicemen of other states which receive the Pentagon's printed products.
In the work, "Successes and Difficulties of Soviet Power," V. I. Lenin wrote: "In the 18th Century one of the Prussian monarchs said the wise sentence: 'If our soldiers had understood why we are fighting, it would not have been necessary to fight one war'"("Polnoye sobranie sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 38, p 50). This contradiction which is inherent in the bourgeois armies is also manifested in full measure now, which forces the imperialists to excel in the ideological shaping of their subordinates. Therefore, the main task of the U.S. military press, as well as that of the other imperialist states, is the introduction of a distorted picture of the world in the consciousness of the men and officers, and the spread of myths, false theses, and stereotypes in order to instill in them a faith in the alleged advantages of capitalism over socialism which are present and admiration of bourgeois "values" and "ideals." The military propagandists are trying to distort the essence of unjust, aggressive wars which the imperialists are waging and to instill in the servicemen a hatred for the USSR, other socialist countries, and for all revolutionary and progressive forces.

Malicious anticommunism and anti-Sovietism, impudent slandering of the socialist system, and falsification of the policy and goals of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism permeate the overwhelming majority of the propaganda materials being published by the U.S. military press. Using anti-communist and anti-Soviet concoctions, bourgeois ideologists are trying to justify the existence of aggressive imperialist blocs and the unrestrained growth in expenditures for armaments and also to distract the attention of the servicemen from acute internal problems: crisis shocks in the economy, intensification of the exploitation of the workers, mass unemployment, inflation, the violence of racism, crime, and so forth.

In trying to mold a distorted picture of the world in the servicemen, the Pentagon uses in the press any lie, falsifications, trickery, and insinuation to instill a faith in the "special predestination" of America as the defender of the ideals of "freedom" and "democracy" which allegedly is called upon by history itself to save the peoples of the world from "communist expansion." This so-called "positive propaganda" has the goal of breathing new life in the "values" of bourgeois society which are losing their attractiveness. It was especially intensified in the American Armed Forces in recent years in connection with the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the founding of the United States, which coincided with the 200th anniversary of the formation of the American army. The basic tasks of this propaganda campaign, which is continuing even now, were put forth by a special directive: the rebirth of the "ideals of the American revolution," a study of the traditions, and "inspiring a profound sense of pride for the contemporary army and its achievements." For these purposes, the "continuity" of the traditions of the United States Army is constantly stressed on the pages of the American military publications.

The unrestrained praising of the "American way of life" and the freedom of private enterprise which allegedly serves as the main reason for the "wealth" and "military might" of the United States is marching in step with frantic anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. At their basis lies a collection of propaganda myths and stereotypes which are called upon to present in a false light the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR and of all socialist countries and to discredit and distort the peace initiatives of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact member nations.
In trying to justify the new turn in the arms race and preparations for a new world war, the American military press is whipping up anti-Soviet hysteria, not disdaining the coarsest fabrications and frank lying. Thus, the journal ARMY tries to convince its military reader that our country allegedly is not interested in genuine detente and that Moscow is "striving to build up tension."

Resorting to various reexaminations, unfair tricks, and other devices the military press of the United States has the goal of creating in the reader the impression that seemingly the USSR destroyed the strategic balance in its favor. But you see, during the entire postwar period the creation and deployment of the Soviet types and systems of armaments, first of all in the strategic area, invariably served as a response to the development of such systems by the United States. "All the time, the matter was such that in the buildup of armaments we only followed the Americans, and not the reverse," stresses Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in answers for the journal SPIEGEL. "In which regard, in catching up with the United States we always proposed stopping this race and proposed freezing the level of armaments on both sides and moving on to their reduction. Unfortunately, we did not obtain the agreement of the American side to this." But the Pentagon press keeps silent about all this in every possible way and often even distorts it.

In trying to turn the facts upside down, the military propagandists across the ocean assert that the USSR is striving for "military superiority" over the United States in order to win a nuclear war. Constantly modernizing the myth about a "Soviet threat," the military journals have successively frightened the readers for two decades with the "lagging" of the United States in bombers, in missiles, in missile defense weapons, in expenditures for military purposes and, in recent years, with "lagging" in the area of civil defense and in the production of chemical weapons and small arms. It is noteworthy that the chronology of these "laggings" shows on which programs the military-industrial worked specifically in recent decades. This can be judged from the propaganda support which it required to obtain the necessary appropriations and to mold the corresponding public opinion.

Now the propaganda ballyhoo in the Pentagon publications is directed first of all toward covering the program for the attainment of superiority over the USSR which has been put forth by the administration of R. Reagan. As is known, the United States is planning to deploy the new MX intercontinental missiles, hypocritically called the "Peacekeeper," but in fact a first-strike weapon. It is also planning to take into the inventory a new airplane for strategic aviation, the latest systems of nuclear submarines, and other armament. Washington's plans to emplace 572 American medium range missiles in Western Europe and the decision on the mass production of neutron weapons are a serious threat to peace.

The pages of the military newspapers and journals constantly quote statements by leaders of the U.S. administration who are called upon to justify its aggressive course. Thus, Defense Secretary C. Weinberger asserts that the "dense pack" method for basing the MX missiles announced by President R. Reagan does not contradict Soviet-American understandings. Pentagon publications persistently propagandize the notorious "zero" and "intermediate" options which in fact signify nothing but the unilateral disarming of the Soviet Union.
Introducing in the consciousness of the readers the wild idea of some messianic role for the United States which allegedly is called on to save the countries of the "free world" from a mythical "Soviet threat," the military press is striving to convince the servicemen that they have a right to use any means for this, including nuclear and neutron weapons. Moreover, the newspaper STARS AND STRIPES asserts that "the use of neutron weapons is moral." Mercenary scribblers impress in every possible way the thought that this barbarous means for the destruction of people is "a return to the civilized conduct of combat operations ... in the nuclear age."

In directing the consciousness of the personnel toward war, the Pentagon press constantly noises about that the coming war is inevitable. Here the enemy is always named specifically: the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Warsaw Pact. The military newspapers and journals publish a tremendous number of articles with an analysis of various "scenarios" for the possible repelling of a "Soviet attack." Specific missions for the combat arms and services are defined. In which regard, all this is served to the reader as if war is just about to begin. And, of course, the same "perfidious Russians" will begin it.

The associates of the Pentagon press organs have become skilled hands in preparing publications on the apparent "threat of the Soviets" to the United States and various regions of the planet. Here, not a word is said about U.S. expansion in many regions of the world or that hundreds of American military bases are located in the immediate proximity of the Soviet border and are directed at our country.

In the journals published by the Pentagon, from issue to issue series of selections are published on the Soviet Armed Forces where in distorted form they take up the principles of military organizational development in our country, the mutual relations between the men and officers, and the role of political officers, and the contribution of the USSR to the defeat of fascism in the years of World War II is consciously understated. In numerous articles devoted to the biggest battles, the military propagandists resort to a radical overestimation of the nature and results of the war, falsify historical truth, and try not only to whitewash, but also to glorify the Hitlerite warriors. Moreover, calls are sounded to study the "experience" of the Hitlerite army since its struggle with the Soviet troops, as the journal ARMY blasphemously asserts, is the "closest analog of the direct accomplishment of the missions which the NATO countries will encounter in case of an attack (?) by the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries."

It is reasonable to ask the question: wasn't this "experience" mastered and put into operation by Lieutenant Calley and his assistants who, in March 1968, brutally destroyed about 500 residents of the Vietnamese village of Song My? And you see, there were many such butchers as Calley in the American army during the United States' dirty war in Vietnam! This was recalled by the residents of the planet's peace-loving forces in March of this year in connection with the 15th anniversary of the Song My tragedy.

By the way, it should be noted that the Pentagon allots a special role to the military press in the propaganda campaign on rehabilitating the moral prestige of the U.S. Armed Forces which was greatly undermined by their participation in the war in Vietnam which was unpopular among many Americans. During the last three-
four years military propagandists changed from cautious attempts to cause at least sympathy for veterans of the Vietnam War to the open praising of their "exploits." President Reagan's decorating of the forgotten "heroes" of the Vietnam "era" and banquets in their honor are widely publicized on the pages of military newspapers and journals and the idea of erecting a memorial to the "GI's" who marauded in Vietnam and found their ignominious end on the land of that country was defended and widely propagated. In the end, in the journal ARMY it was agreed that not the war itself, but "the attitude toward the Vietnam veterans on the part of the majority of the Americans will forever remain America's national shame." And so, it turns out that not the war, and not aggression, but condemnation of the aggressors is the shame and crime!

In striving to raise the morale, discipline, and combat readiness in the Army, Air Force, and Navy, the military press devotes great attention to the strengthening of "regimental comradeship" and propagandizing of the history and traditions of individual units as well as the services of the Armed Forces. As is known, in American society they try to inculcate the striving for rivalry and the cult of "leadership" as early as in the juvenile age. Heating this up in every possible way, the military press describes in bright colors the special services and the special place allegedly occupied in the Armed Forces by the Navy, the Air Force and, of course, by the so-called "elite" troops—the Marines, and airborne and special-forces units and subunits.

However, the American army is an army of mercenaries. The main incentive for the service zeal of the soldiers, seamen, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers is money. And the military propagandists not only do not conceal, but even constantly use this incentive, understanding well that in the hierarchy of the values and ideals of the bourgeois society the "golden calf" occupies the most honored place. Therefore, it is not by chance that up to 50 percent of the first-page publications of the newspapers ARMY TIMES, AIR FORCE TIMES, and NAVY TIMES, that is the most popular military publications, are devoted to questions of the payment of money and various advantages and privileges granted to the servicemen. In one of the issues of the journal MAGAZINE, the monthly supplement to these newspapers, all articles were completely devoted to these questions. The author of the article which was simply entitled "Money" stresses that "perhaps there is no subject more discussed by servicemen and the members of their families than their pay." And this is understandable. For the Pentagon brings up soldiers who are ready for everything for money; to kill anywhere and at any time in the interests of the notorious military-industrial complex which determines the extremely aggressive nature of Washington's military policy.

Implanting brutality and sadism, the military press encourages the most vile instincts of its readers. "War," it says in one of the editions of the Pentagon publication MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, "is hunting season for people." The newspaper OVERSEAS WEEKLY which is published for American soldiers and claims doubtful popularity specializes namely in the sensational presentation of materials about murders and gang fights, sexual perversion, and rapes. Such materials are not a rarity in other Pentagon publications, either.

Unquestionably, the constant mass influence of the military press on the consciousness of American servicemen jointly with other means of the mass media
does not pass without a trace. It furthers the shaping of the soldier masses and leads to the so-called "brain washing" in conformance with the main concept of the ideological processing of the personnel of the U.S. Armed Forces which, in the opinion of the progressive American journalist Peter Barnes, is rather simple...and encompasses three basic directions: anticommunism, respect for authority, and implicit submissiveness."

Hence, it is not by chance that in recent months, after the announcement by the President of the United States of a "crusade" against communism, the Pentagon's propaganda apparatus which has a far-flung system of publications was moved up to the forward detachment of the entire anti-Soviet, anticommunist array. For military publications are intended not only for the ideological processing of soldiers and officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, but also for the corresponding influence on the minds of the civilian population in the United States as well as abroad.

Therefore, it is necessary to consider the consequences and results of the ideological shaping of the American servicemen. Poisoned by the venom of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism and the delirious chauvinistic idea of the superiority of the "American way of life" and the "right" of Washington to dictate its will to other peoples, the U.S. Armed Forces are a large threat for all mankind, for they are ready to rush into the abyss of dangerous military adventures into which they may be pushed by the sinister alliance of the militarists and the monopolies. Under these conditions, as has been repeatedly stressed in the documents of the CPSU and the Soviet government and in orders of the Soviet Minister of Defense, the men of our Armed Forces require constant political vigilance, strong ideological tempering, soldierly skill, and high military readiness. The Soviet men, standing guard over the achievements of socialism, should be on the alert so that no adventures of the imperialists catch us unawares.

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PARTY ROLE IN WEAPONS AND MILITARY-EQUIPMENT TRAINING

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[Article by Lt Gen V. Arapov, member of Military Council and chief of Political Directorate, Red Banner Central Asian Military District: "Excellent Mastery of Weapons and Equipment"]

[Text] The Communist Party, invariably guided by the Lenin instruction that in war "the winner is the one who has the greatest equipment, organization, discipline, and the best machines" is constantly concerned about the further strengthening of the country's defensive might and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. In a speech at the November (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee the General Secretary of our party's Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, stressed: "The Politburo considered and considers it mandatory, especially in the present-day international situation, to give everything necessary to the Armed Forces."

The men feel this fatherly concern of the party daily. The troops of our district, just as all defenders of the motherland, are equipped with contemporary first class weapons and combat equipment. They contain great combat capabilities which the personnel consider their duty to master completely. In the course of summer combat training ever greater scope and efficiency are acquired by the struggle of all categories of servicemen for the profound mastery of weapons and combat equipment and a rise in rated qualifications, and first of all of the officers, warrant officers [praporshchik], and leading specialists.

"An important element of combat readiness," the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, points out, "is the skillful mastery of weapons and combat equipment. In recent years new armaments have been reaching the troops and the fleets, and they must be thoroughly studied, their combat properties and capabilities must be confidently known, and the troops should learn to employ them with maximum effect in various types of battle, in the offense as well as in the defense."

In satisfying these requirements, the district's military council, commanders, political organs, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations of units are using the entire variety of forms and means for working with people to mobilize them for intensified training, improvement in the quality of the men's technical
training is being attained, and the personnel are being attracted to the patriotic movement under the slogan, "For new equipment— a higher level of its mastery!"

The tasks of command and political personnel in intensifying organizational and indoctrinational work which assists in the profound study of organizational weapons and equipment are discussed regularly at the district military council. Thus, when summing up the results of the winter training period the military council directed commanders and political officers toward the further improvement of the organization of combat and technical training and tactical exercises where the men master primarily weapons and equipment and become proficient in the procedures for their efficient use. Using the experience of the leading units, it was shown that lessons on the study and practical employment of equipment take place with the greatest value where the following principle is strictly observed: to teach the troops what is necessary in war, and the responsibility of officer personnel for the effectiveness of technical training is in fact ensured.

Recently, more concern has been displayed in the district for the methodological training of command and engineer personnel who organize lessons with the personnel on the study of equipment and weapons. At training-methods assemblies for various categories of officer personnel, main attention is devoted to equipping their participants with the ability to conduct lessons and drills with knowledge of the matter. Not one assembly takes place without acquainting commanders and political officers with leading experience in the mastery of equipment and weapons and a demonstration of the most effective methods for their combat employment, operation, and upkeep. Training is combined with the intensification of the checking, by senior commanders, of the personal training of the officers and the raising of demandingness toward them for the quality of instruction of subordinates. All this contributes to the attainment of good results in the mastery of equipment.

In work among the troops, the officers of the political directorate jointly with the generals and officers of the other directorates, departments, and services assist commanders and political officers of units in raising the quality of the training process. In analyzing the course of the lessons in technical training and the activity of party and Komsomol organizations which is directed toward ensuring the leading role of the communists and Komsomol members in the mastery of weapons and equipment, they in essence disclose shortcomings and achieve their elimination.

The listening to the reports of chiefs of political organs and their deputies and other political officers concerning the effectiveness of party-political influence on the process of the mastery and skillful operation of equipment is practiced in the political directorate. Each such talk is preceded by a study of matters locally. For example, political directorate officers V. Petrov, G. Bal'chus, and others, having studied how party influence on the personnel's mastery of combat equipment and weapons is accomplished in the unit where communist N. Soloshenko serves, disclosed a number of omissions in the activity of the party bureau. In particular, it did not display proper persistence in ensuring that the communists serve as examples in combat training and raising rating qualifications and in the improvement of military-technical propaganda. The report of this unit's political officer was heard in the political directorate,
shortcomings in the party organization's activity were pointed out to him, and recommendation and advice on how to correct the matter were given.

The district political directorate and staff devote constant attention to the study and generalization of leading experience in combat training and the practice of party political work on the mastery of equipment and weapons. Everything better and most effective from the procedure of training and indoctrination is made available to the officers of the units in the form of subject surveys and is discussed at assemblies and seminars with various categories of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol activists. In certain measure, this furthers the strengthening of a responsible attitude toward the accomplishment of a task of great importance.

There are many troop collectives in the district where the struggle for the profound mastery of combat equipment is conducted objectively and with results. This is the situation, for example, in the leading units where communists officers A. Vasil'ev and V. Viskov serve. Here commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations clearly define the basic directions in organizational and political-indoctrinal work which contributes to a rise in the technical ability of the personnel. One of them is the molding, in the men, of an understanding of the acute necessity to master to perfection weapons and equipment, especially in the contemporary strained situation. Commanders and political officers, propagandists and agitators explain to them the instructions of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party concerning the significance of a high level of technical training. By means of various forms and methods of conviction, the consciousness is instilled in people that excellent knowledge and skillful operation of the combat equipment and solicitous care of it are the patriotic duty of each soldier, sergeant, warrant officer, and officer and a necessary condition for high combat readiness.

Political lessons are skillfully used to develop in the personnel the striving to study weapons and equipment quickly and in a quality manner. Propagandists disclose the role of man and equipment in contemporary battle and cultivate in the servicemen responsibility for the mastery and competent employment of equipment. On seminars, leaders of political lessons groups receive advice on how, in the study of one or another subject, to conduct a talk on the superiority of our combat equipment and to instill in the men a love for it and the desire to master it at the level of the subunit's best specialists.

For this purpose, political information sessions, radio broadcasts, means of visual agitation in Lenin rooms, on the territory of military cantonments, and in combat vehicle motor pools, and the indoctrinal opportunities of the traditional holidays of the services and combat arms of the Armed Forces and unit anniversaries are used successfully here. On days when they are marked, representatives of the various combat arms meet in the troop collectives and they demonstrate their ability and skill to one another in competitions and contests. All this is of value and provokes in the soldiers and sergeants the striving to become experts in combat equipment.

Naturally, party-political work on mobilizing the men for the excellent mastery of equipment cannot be reduced to explanation and conviction alone. The broader
and more varied the forms of this work, the greater its influence on the personnel. In this plane, I would like to express the thought: however interesting, let us say, a lecture or a talk may be, if these measures are not backed up by the demonstration of the combat capabilities of equipment and weapons their instructional return will be low. Therefore, we support and propagate in every possible way the experience of commanders and political officers of units and subunits who are molding in the men faith in our weapons and equipment and are disclosing combat work procedures, attracting the most experienced officers and best specialists for this. Their word is authoritative and valuable in that it teaches how to attain successes in the mastery of professional skill.

In the interests of the profound mastery and competent operation of armament and combat equipment commanders, political organs, and party organizations are striving to make more complete use of the opportunities of socialist competition. Here, great significance is attached to seeing that specific goals are clearly defined in obligations: a reduction in the times to study equipment, its accident-free operation, improvement of combat skill, and raising rating qualifications.

The practice of organizing socialist competition, for example, in the Vyborg Order of Kutuzov Motorized Rifle Regiment confirms that success is ensured in the case where the personnel are directed toward the attainment of specific indices in the mastery of equipment and when a daily struggle is waged for the complete accomplishment of the obligations assumed by each serviceman. In the competition of the motorized riflemen there is a clear definiteness as to who gave his word to become a second- or first-class specialist or master of combat qualification or to master an allied specialty in what time, what combat standards will be exceeded and by how much, and which training-combat missions will be accomplished at his battle station only with a grade of "excellent."

Favorable experience in such work has been accumulated in the battalion where Captain A. Mekhovich is the deputy commander for political affairs. In the subunit, the matter is organized in such a way that at the end of the training day each serviceman knows what results he attained in training, what grade he received for studying the equipment, and what time he demonstrated in accomplishing the standards. All this is reflected visually in Lenin rooms, which permits comparing results and disclosing the leaders and the laggards. In the battalion, diverse forms of moral stimulation are used which contribute to the development of the personnel's activity in the mastery of equipment. The best specialists are awarded championship ribbons and pennants and their successes are related in bulletins and letters of thanks to the men's birthplace. Evenings honoring the soldiers and sergeants who have attained the greatest successes in studying weapons and combat equipment are conducted regularly.

The party organizations of the majority of units and subunits are making their contribution to the struggle for the effectiveness of the personnel's technical training. Typical of the work style of many of them are irreconcilability toward shortcomings and indulgences in training and holding answerable on the basis of principle those officers-communists who let the important matter drift and evaluate the results of combat training unobjectively. Here is proof of this.
On one of the check lessons which the unit commander conducted, the operators of the sections headed by Captain A. Dudarev and Senior Lieutenant A. Gribskiy unexpectedly demonstrated poor training. Meanwhile, in summing up results for preceding months both collectives were named among the leaders. In the logs where the training of the operators is evaluated, it could be seen that namely the specialists of these sections had the greatest number of trackings of provisional targets. This means that drills were conducted intensively. Then what was the matter?

The unit commander disclosed the reason why the sections had surrendered the positions attained earlier. In the pursuit of quantitative indices in the training of the operators, officers Dudarev and Gribskiy had lowered their attention to working out tasks in a difficult tactical situation. And as a result—under conditions of heavy jamming Junior Sergeant B. Zhanabekov and Private A. Volkov who, prior to this case, were considered to be the best specialists in target tracking, were unable to demonstrate a high result. The unit commander made the section commanders answerable for simplifications in training. A principled, impartial conversation with these communists also took place at a session of the party bureau in the party manner. They both drew the correct conclusions.

There is also much that is instructive in the work practice of the party organization of the excellent Red Banner Guards fighter regiment which was commanded until recently by Hero of the Soviet Union V. Kot who has received a promotion in service. Here questions of the exemplary behavior of communists in the mastery of combat equipment and weapons are discussed objectively and in a businesslike manner at party meetings and sessions of the party committee. In implementing the recommendations of the 6th Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations, the party activists keep in sight the professional growth of the servicemen, analyze what personal contribution is made by each CPSU member and candidate member to the mastery of combat equipment, and hear reports and communications from the communists. The party organization is doing much to propagandize the experience of rated specialists and to raise their prestige and authority in the eyes of their fellow-servicemen.

The purposeful activity of the commander, political officers, and party organization is providing its fruits. The aviators of the regiment have firm skills in the accomplishment of training—combat missions in mountain—desert terrain and difficult weather conditions, at night, and at the lowest altitudes. Here 100 percent of the pilots are rated specialists and four pilot-snipers have been trained.

The role of the communists' personal example is high in the development of the competition for the high-quality mastery of new equipment and armament. The majority of them constantly remember this and show their fellow servicemen how one should study military affairs in a genuine manner, accomplish personal obligations, and struggle for common successes and the high combat readiness of the unit and subunit. For each point of individual obligations may become an example which calls them forward and may also prove to be a hollow sound which sows scepticism in plans. So that this does not occur, the party organizations of many collectives are imposing increased demands on communists, seeing that each of them backs up his word with deed. In this regard praise is merited by
the party committee of the Vyborg Order of Kutuzov Regiment which has already been mentioned. On its initiative, party meetings took place in the companies with the agenda, "On the responsibility of the communists for the complete and quality realization of the slogan 'For new equipment— a higher level of its mastery!'". The reports which were given by the regiment's leading personnel contained an analysis of the communists' specific contribution to the mastery of equipment and raising rating qualifications, and communists V. Dergunov, V. Medvedev, and others were criticized for the low status of technical training in individual subunits and falling short of the target in servicing the equipment. After a while, the party committee heard reports from these CPSU members concerning the elimination of the shortcomings which had been noted at the meetings.

It is valuable that the party committee not only achieves the exemplary work and responsibility of the communists in mastering weapons and equipment itself and in the accomplishment of obligations and the organization of training, but it also helps to create an exacting atmosphere in the party organizations of the subunits. In them, the question is posed as follows: a communist means an expert in military affairs, a specialist with an increased rating, and a master of combat qualification.

Considering that the effectiveness of party political work with the personnel on the studying of equipment depends greatly on the level of training of its organizers, the political organs have begun to display greater concern for raising the professional and military-technical knowledge of unit and subunit political officers, officers, and warrant officers. The conduct of lessons with political officers on the study of new equipment and preparations for tests for ratings have been put into practice. Thus, in the collective of surface-to-air missilemen where Major V. Kashin serves, 100 percent of the political officers as well as of the party members and candidate members are rated specialists. Among the officer personnel 67 percent are specialists with an increased rating. There are also masters of combat qualifications here.

In raising the quality of the personnel's military-technical training, it is difficult to overestimate the role of the training material base. Understanding this, commanders, political organs, staffs, and party organizations of units and subunits are displaying concern for its constant improvement so that it effectively reflects all changes in equipment and corresponds to the instructions and rules for its operation. Monthly campaigns and overtime days for improvement of the training-material base, inspection-competitions for the best training classrooms, training and drilling ranges, and simulators, and so forth are conducted everywhere. The inquisitive thought of rationalizers and inventors and the technical creativity of the personnel are widely used in this work.

The matter is well organized, let us say, in the troop collective where officer A. Puchkov is the political officer. Here, they have become accustomed to the practice of the public defense of rationalizer suggestions, of which more than 40 have already been introduced. Among the most active rationalizers are communists Major P. Ivanov, Senior Lieutenant A. Tishchenko, Warrant Officer V. Plokhoy, Private First Class Yu. Rostun, and others. Specially prepared displays, technical bulletins, and wall newspapers are devoted to the achievements of the innovators and their most valuable suggestions.
Unfortunately, the training-material base is still not used in full measure everywhere for the more effective mastery of combat equipment and weapons by the men. At times, instances are encountered where there are both a modern training base and experienced methodologists in the unit but the men's knowledge grows slowly. This happens because some leaders have a formal attitude toward technical training and the party organizations, in turn, do not display the proper devotion to principle and tolerate shortcomings.

In the mobilization of the men for the successful mastery of combat equipment and weapons, an important role belongs to the Komsomol organizations. Commanders, political officers, and party organizations are doing much to develop in the Komsomols the striving to study equipment and weapons quickly and with quality. Recently, the influence of the Komsomol organizations on the course of the men's combat training and their mastery of equipment has intensified. The Komsomol organizations have begun to ensure more persistently the personal example of the Komsomol members in the mastery of military specialties and to develop activity and initiative in training. This is typical, for example, for the work of the Komsomol organizations of the motorized rifle regiment in which Lieutenant A. Miroyubov serves. Here, questions of ensuring the example of the Komsomols in the mastery of combat equipment are examined at meetings and sessions of the Komsomol committee and bureau. The reports of Komsomols on how they are increasing their technical knowledge and accomplishing their obligations are discussed regularly. On the initiative of the activists, the soldiers and sergeants joined in the struggle to raise their ratings and master allied specialties. Broad propagation among the men was received by the patriotic undertakings "Destroy the target with the first round and at maximum range," "At night according to daytime standards," and "Komsomol concern for the training-material base." Komsomol activists are taking part in the ritual of the ceremonial awarding of weapons and equipment to the young soldiers, propagandize the experience of the masters of military affairs, and organize comradely mutual assistance in the mastery of military specialties.

The attainment of successes in the study and mastery of equipment and weapons in the district's leading units is furthered greatly by military-technical propaganda. Members of the agitprop groups and agitprop collectives take a most active part in it. They instill in the soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers, and officers daily and persistently a thirst for knowledge and a love for combat equipment and weapons. Military-technical conferences and technical conversations, competitions for the title of best specialist, technical "battles," and the discussion of articles and papers received wide propagation in the units.

Favorable experience in military-technical propaganda has been accumulated, for example, in the unit where Major A. Petrenko is one of the party bureau members. Here, technical study groups have been created and are working productively in each subunit. In the motorized rifle battalions they are directed by the deputy commanders for technical affairs, and in the companies of the tank battalion—by the senior technicians. In the unit, technical conferences proceeded in an interesting manner on the subjects: "Special features in the operation of combat equipment in connection with the onset of seasonal weather changes on the republic's territory," "A thrifty attitude toward equipment and weapons—the guarantee of combat readiness," and others. Thorough preparation preceded all
of them. Skilled craftsmen prepared expressive displays, mockups, tables, and diagrams. Participants in the conferences viewed training films and became familiar with the leading procedures in servicing motor vehicle equipment. The commander of the large unit, senior inspector of the district's Military Automobile Inspection Service, and chairman of the military tribunal appeared before them.

Officers' Houses and soldiers' clubs do not remain aloof from propagandizing military-technical knowledge, either. Universities of military-technical knowledge and technical style as well as technical lecture bureaus are operating successfully with many of them. For example, the Officers' House where Major Yu. Petrov is the chief is doing much to increase the military-technical knowledge of the men.

From what has been said, it by no means follows that all questions and problems in the servicemen's quality study of combat equipment and weapons have been solved in the district. Unfortunately, as yet not all opportunities are being used in party-political work for mobilizing the personnel to accomplish this important task.

Let us take at least the introduction of leading experience. Here success depends on the purposeful work of commanders, staffs, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. However, it is not conducted effectively everywhere. Let us say, in the Nth unit there are many servicemen who have achieved noticeable successes in the mastery of equipment and weapons. Among them are Captain K. Zikrinov, Lieutenant A. Yeremin, Junior Sergeant A. Kippar, and others. But few know about these people and about their leading training methods. The publication of bulletins and photo- and radio newspapers devoted to the best specialists and their talks to their fellow servicemen is not practiced here.

The matter of training rated specialists is not in bad shape in the majority of the units and subunits. However, even in this case stricter monitoring and more knowledge of the matter are required of communists-leaders and party organizations. I had the occasion to talk with unit commanders who found it difficult to say what officer received a rated qualification and when. This means that the opportunity to influence their further professional growth is missed in the collective. Many officers have a third-class rating. Yes, this is also an indicator of combat qualification, but only of a primary one. And if they know in the unit that the third-class rating was obtained while still in school or immediately after its completion, neither the commander nor the party organization can put up with such marking time.

In a number of places, as formerly, party influence on the quality of command training and the content of indoctrinal work on vehicle-maintenance days leaves much to be desired. The materials for visual agitation on the territory of some military posts and in combat-vehicle motor pools do not have sufficient expressiveness and actuality.
The district's military council and political directorate and unit commanders, staffs, political organs, and party organizations are adopting measures to overcome these shortcomings and others and to raise the level of party-political work on mobilizing the personnel for the deep study of weapons and equipment and a further rise in the combat readiness of units and large units.

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COMMANDER OF ASW CRAFT DESCRIBES TRAINING PROBLEMS

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[Article by Capt 2d Rank P. Khomenko, commander of large ASW ship "Admiral Yumashev": "Combat Coordination is Forged in the Ocean"]

[Text] After returning from an ocean voyage, the ship's crew was to fire on a high-speed, highly maneuverable aerial target. The training battle was expected to be tense and fluid and requiring the genuine combat coordination of actions and the good training of each seaman. Poor weather conditions complicated the work. Also causing concern was the fact that some of the personnel had been released to the reserve. And you see, these were the best trained and most experienced specialists.

But nevertheless, we withstood the test successfully. At all battle stations and command posts seamen, petty officers, warrant officers [michman], and officers operated clearly and smoothly, like a single, well-adjusted mechanism. And it automatically occurred to me: the seamen did not work in a strained manner in vain on exercises and drills during the long cruise. The efforts of commanders and political officers and of the party and Komsomol activists were not wasted. The combat coordination of the crew increased noticeably. But the path to this was not easy.

The coordination of the crew is the most important component element of a ship's combat readiness. These two concepts are closely interconnected. The higher the coordination of the personnel's actions, the more rapidly will the ship be able to enter the battle, employ its weapons against the enemy, or avoid his strike and repel an attack. The significance of the time factor is growing immeasurably in contemporary battle. At times, seconds decide a duel's outcome. And just high combat coordination helps to win the seconds necessary for victory.

Combat coordination is a multidimensional and broad concept. It is both the ability of all crew members to accomplish their functional duties, orders, and instructions quickly, clearly, and in a coordinated manner in any situation, even the most difficult one, and the high combat and sea training of each man. The core of the collective's solidarity consists of the ideological conviction and political maturity of the seamen, their profound understanding of their duty to the motherland, and loyalty to the military oath. The coordination of the
subunits and the crew as a whole begins, figuratively speaking, with the co-
ordination of the seamen's hearts, the unity of their thoughts, aspirations, and interests, and with spiritual kinship.

We are constantly occupied with instilling in the men ideological, moral-
political, and combat unity and a sense of personal responsibility for the
ship's high combat readiness. But this work was conducted especially fruitfully
on a long ocean cruise. Here the situation itself brings people closer togeth-
er. The entire crew is constantly assembled and all are occupied with a common
matter—the accomplishment of difficult training—combat missions and ensuring
the ship's combat capability and survivability as well as the safety of the
voyage. Watch at sea, exercises, lessons and drills which tightly filled each
day, severe storms, and frequent meetings with NATO ships and aircraft which
devoted excessive "attention" to us required self-collection and coordination.
The seamen had a more acute feeling of their mutual tie and dependence and their
responsibility for personal and collective constant readiness for battle.

On the ship combined training and political-indoctrinal measures were con-
ducted which assisted in the solidarity and coordination of the crew. I was ren-
dered great assistance in this important matter by the deputy commander for
political affairs, Captain 3d Rank M. Kosarev, the executive officer, Captain
3d Rank N. Melakh (both have recently been transferred to a new place of service),
and the party organization. The weekly and daily training plans and plans for
party-political work were closely linked and coordinated. Officers-communists
were constantly among the seamen, knew for certain their attitudes and the
situation in the collective, gave lectures and reports, and conducted Lenin
readings and talks.

We tried to create a special mood among the people and to develop in them a
sense of naval friendship, high demandingness toward themselves and their com-
rades, and faith in the dependability of one another. A traditional meeting
took place prior to the very departure of the ship on a long voyage. The pre-
sentations of the seamen were brief but convincing and specific. They expressed
a readiness to perform their duty honorably and overcome all difficulties. The
meeting inspired the men and created patriotic and emotional enthusiasm.

The responsibility of the communists for the moral atmosphere in the collective
and its combat mood were constantly discussed at party meetings and when listen-
ing to the reports and communications of CPSU members and candidate members at
the party bureau concerning their accomplishment of their party and service
duty. This feeling was also intensified by a very real situation. The seamen
saw the maneuvering of the American aircraft carriers "Nimitz" and "Eisenhower"
and other warships, not in photographs placed in journals and newspapers, but in
reality, in the immediate proximity. With consideration of this "neighborliness," com-
munists actively conducted work on instilling hatred for imperialism and expos-
ing its aggressive intrigues. Members of the agitprop group with the party
bureau, officers A. Pronin, N. Melakh, and M. Kosarev, gave the personnel lec-
tures on the reasons for the aggravation of the contemporary military-political
situation. Their subjects speak for themselves: "The Atlantic Ocean in NATO's
plans," "The North Atlantic bloc—a threat to peace and the security of peoples," and
"Indefatigable vigilance and constant combat readiness—the law of a long
voyage." The presentations of the communists, well-reasoned and linked with
specific tasks, left a trace in the men's consciousness.
Great indoctrinational significance was had by the regular production of radio newspapers and photo leaflets which exposed imperialism. They enjoyed great interest among the seamen. This was explained, first of all, by the timeliness of the subject and, second, by the convincingness of the facts. Usually, a photograph of the NATO ship was glued to the leaflet, and alongside were presented its tactical and technical data and a short "statement of service" of the evil deeds, brigandage, and aggression in which it participated. Radio broadcasts exposed the gendarme functions of the U.S. 6th Fleet. This raised the men's sense of responsibility, rallied the personnel, and furthered the public suppression of the slightest manifestation of carelessness.

The ship's command and the communists constantly explained to the seamen that a crew is a single combat family and that we are accomplishing one common mission: we are standing guard over the achievements of the Great October. For on the ship all is closely interconnected and the weapons here are crew-served. The success, let us say, of a rocket attack depends not only on a tactically competent decision by the commander and the skill of the rocket men, but also on the correct actions of the specialists of the engineer department who ensure the movement and maneuvering of the ship and the control department where, figuratively speaking, the ears, eyes, and nerves of the ship are located. A malfunction at one battle station as a result of the carelessness of even one seaman may threaten failure in the accomplishment of the mission by the entire crew. I will present such an example.

At the start of the cruise a signalman, Senior Seaman L. Min'kov, receiving a radiogram displayed carelessness and a lack of self-control in work. As a result, an error crept into the instruction of the senior commander which the seaman had received. All the same, we executed the order correctly but, you see, it could have ended otherwise. The entire crew could have erred due to the error of one.

Of course, the instance of the blunting of vigilance was thoroughly analyzed. Not only was the signalman held strictly accountable for his poor standing of watch, but also his chiefs. Broad publicity was given to what had occurred. This case served as a lesson for all personnel and convincingly showed again how high is the responsibility which lies on each crew member and with what accuracy and clarity one must accomplish his duties. Senior Seaman Min'kov also understood and realized his guilt profoundly. On watch he was invariably self-collected, attentive, and concentrated, and he received only good and excellent grades.

It should be said that the assignment of grades was told beforehand by the detailed summing up of results after the regular changing of watches. All errors, miscalculations, and inaccuracies were recorded and brought to the attention of the personnel and measures were adopted accordingly so that this would not be repeated in the future.

The struggle against carelessness and irresponsibility was waged by the joint efforts of commanders, political officers, and the party organization. Together we noticed and disseminated everything valuable and useful in training and made it the property of the crew. The indoctrinational work conducted from
day to day united and rallied the collective and furthered the creation of a healthy moral atmosphere, devotion to principle, and mutual demandingness in it. I believe I will not exaggerate if I say that the ship's party organization made a large contribution to the accomplishment of this task. The communists served as an example everywhere and in everything, disclosed shortcomings boldly, and helped commanders to eliminate them.

Problems of maintaining the ship's high combat readiness, unconditional accomplishment of the plan for combat and political training, and accident-free sailing were at the center of attention of the party men. To mobilize the seamen for conscientious labor the communists organized speeches to the personnel by the best specialists and participants in previous voyages. Captain-Lieutenant Ya. Khokhlov and Warrant Officers [michman] V. Kirichenko, I. Chekh, and A. Pekhterev told their fellow-servicemen in free and easy talks about the special features of ocean cruises and about possible difficulties and ways to overcome them, gave valuable advice, and answered questions of interest to the young men. Unquestionably, the seamen extracted value for themselves from the speeches of communists—department commanders Captain 2d Rank A. Kashafutdinov and Captain 3d Rank V. Tarasov—about the experience of operating weapons and equipment in the accomplishment of training-combat missions on a long voyage.

Good results were brought by the well thought out assignment of the party activists and communists among the combat shifts. By personal example, CPSU members and candidate members carried their fellow-servicemen along to the quality accomplishment of the missions assigned to the ship, rendered assistance to comrades who had departed on a long cruise for the first time, and participated actively in political-indoctrinational work. It should be said that the deputy commander of the ship for political affairs and the secretary of the party bureau approached the ensuring of party influence on all aspects of the men's life creatively. The assignment of the communists also changed with a change in conditions. Thus, in the course of the voyage the necessity arose to strengthen the first shift of the sea detail in the forward engine and boiler room. A young communist and first-class specialist, Chief Petty Officer V. Poselkin, was transferred to it. This had a favorable effect on the state of affairs in the detail. The seamen's responsibility and coordination in their actions were increased.

Complex and difficult tasks had to be accomplished during the entire voyage. Our ship participated in an ASW [antisubmarine warfare] exercise as part of a hunter-killer group. In the course of the first searches, shortcomings were discovered in the work of the personnel of the control department. For example, in the radio division led by Captain-Lieutenant S. Malyshov the special training of the men and the coordination of their actions left much to be desired.

The party bureau made a large contribution to work directed toward eliminating shortcomings. On its instruction, Captain 3d Rank N. Melakh analyzed the activity of the communists in the control department. It was learned that the party organization of the department and the party group of the radio division devoted little attention to raising the quality of the sonarmen's special training and to competition for accomplishing and exceeding the standards. As a result, the seamen and petty officers committed a number of errors on the exercise which entailed a reduction of the grade for the entire crew.
We gave a principled evaluation to these omissions at a session of the party bureau. Communists V. Tarasov, I. Kotov, Ye. Gubanov, and others made specific suggestions on improving the ASW training of the personnel of the control department. The party bureau pointed out to the commander of the sonar group, communist V. Volynin, the necessity to work better on training his subordinates and to employ the most effective training methods. At the same time, the officer was given assistance. Additional lessons and drills with the sonarmen, the exchange of experience, and competitions for the title of best specialist were organized. The ship's political officer conducted talks with party and Komsomol activists and told about the special features of party-political work on various stages of the ASW exercise.

The measures which we adopted did not pass without leaving a trace. On subsequent exercises, despite unfavorable weather conditions the crew coped successfully with its assigned missions. Sonarmen Warrant Officer V. Chubaruk and Petty Officer 1st Class V. Lobanov operated skillfully and smoothly.

Practice shows convincingly that an important role in the crew's combat coordination is played by each man's ability to service weapons and technical equipment competently. We are speaking about the personnel's level of special training. Therefore, even prior to the cruise we oriented the commanders of departments, divisions, and groups toward making more active the work on training rated specialists.

It was conducted fruitfully and purposefully in the rocket-gunnery department. Here the requirements imposed on rated specialists were brought to the attention of all personnel ahead of time and the selection of candidates for raising combat qualifications was strictly approached. Main reliance was placed on ensuring the quality and effectiveness of planned lessons and drills in specialty and additional work was conducted with the laggards. Substantial value was brought by consultations where the men learned the problems which hampered them and made up deficiencies. The course and quality of preparations for examinations for ratings were considered in summing up the results of socialist competition and determining the winners among the subunits and were reflected in the wall newspaper and operational news sheets. All this affected the results. Despite the increased requirements, many seamen raised their ratings on the cruise.

Unfortunately, this is not the situation everywhere. In the control department, for example, proper significance was not attached to the training of rated specialists. Thus, the communications division and the radio division did not consider the men's state of discipline and their attitude toward service obligations. Individual seamen who were not distinguished by irreproachable conduct found themselves among those included among candidates for raising ratings.

The ship's command and party bureau pointed out to the officers of the control department their errors and the necessity for a stricter attitude toward the evaluation of the men's discipline and training.

Combat coordination is also needed in the seamen's daily activity. However, it acquires its greatest significance in the period of the ship’s cruise and the accomplishment of training-combat missions at sea. Here clear and close interaction and coordination in the work between sections and battle stations and
departments are doubly and triply necessary. Each separate link can be excellently trained, but if there is no coordination of actions between them a strong overall chain will not be obtained. The following case is recalled.

A mission for the accomplishment of gunnery firing at a naval target was suddenly assigned to the crew. The personnel of the rocket-gunnery department and the control department joined in the work without delay. Readiness reports soon arrived from the commanders. The men of both subunits operated skillfully and dexterously. But when the order arrived to receive target indication, the gunners were late. It turned out that, through the fault of a young seaman, the radar antenna was not matched with all target indication links.

The specialists of the two departments worked skillfully and competently individually, but their combined efforts did not lead to a high result because the proper interaction between the men of these subunits had not been worked out. The department commanders drew their own lessons from this case. Subsequently, they devoted much more attention to working out the coordination of the battle stations.

The party organizations of both subunits also drew conclusions. They began the more frequent organization of meetings of radar operators, gunners, and rocket men and the conduct of a joint search for ways to unite the collectives. As a result, we accomplished all firings with good and excellent grades, including those which were accomplished in accordance with surprise special situations. The subordinates of Captain 2d Rank A. Kashafutdinov demonstrated high training. The gunners of the battery led by communist Captain-Lieutenant A. Zhdanov fired only excellently. Nor did his rival in the socialist competition—the commander of the surface-to-air missile division, Captain-Lieutenant Ye. Gubanov, who was declared the best missileman in the force—lag behind him. By the way, both officers accomplished the obligations assumed for the cruise—to become masters of combat qualifications.

The combat effectiveness and coordination of the crew depends to no small degree on how well the study of second and allied specialties is organized in the departments. Even in peacetime, at times the necessity arises to replace one or another specialist. And in actual battle, where considerable personnel losses are possible, this problem acquires special urgency.

Interchangeability is not only the possibility of replacing a comrade who has been put out of action, but is very important by itself, anyway. Knowledge of second specialties and allied areas permits the seaman to become better oriented in the situation, organize clearer coordination between combat sections and stations under normal conditions, and master the ability to conduct damage control operations more effectively.

Thanks to the broad explanation of all this to the personnel by the communists, many seamen, petty officers, and warrant officers assumed obligations to study allied or second specialties. The cruise offered excellent opportunities for independent work. The materiel is in operation almost all the time, which permits getting to know the procedures for its servicing and operation more rapidly and deeply.
Ponderable successes were achieved by personnel of the control department and engineer department. For example, complete interchangeability was worked out in a crew of the ship's radar picket. The seamen significantly exceeded the established standards. The same success was achieved by the plotters of the close and distant situation and by other men.

It has become a rule on the ship: each officer will take for the cruise the obligation to master duties one step higher than the post occupied. Many accomplished it on the long cruise. Thus division commander Captain-Lieutenant Ye. Gubanov mastered the duties of commander of the fire control department. The engineer of BCH [department]-2 [gunnery department] was ready to replace the commander of the surface-to-air missile division at any moment. Engineer-Captain-Lieutenant L. Soldatkin performed the duties of commander of the engineer department. This practice brings tangible value: it furthers the professional growth of the officers and raises the combat effectiveness of the ship and the coordination of the crew.

The party and Komsomol organizations popularized such zeal in service in every possible way. Special radio broadcasts were devoted to those who mastered second and allied specialties and had learned to accomplish duties a step higher than the occupied post and, when necessary, successfully replaced a fellow serviceman. The great significance which such interchangeability has for the ship's combat readiness was convincingly disclosed in them.

The communists and Komsomol activists also gave broad publicity to each case of comradely assistance by experienced seamen in the acquisition of combat and sea training to the young men who departed on an ocean cruise for the first time. The fact is that on a long cruise the uniformity of the situation tires people and has an unfavorable influence on their minds. Indifference or extreme nervousness appear in some of them. Therefore, questions of strengthening friendship and comradeship require special attention. And it is very important when a sensitive, sympathetic attitude toward a comrade receives public recognition and any manifestations of irritability, hot temper, or indifference are condemned by all. Along with commanders and political officers, communists and Komsomols were concerned daily about the maintenance of such a moral climate in the collective.

We try to consolidate and develop everything that has been attained on a long cruise. For life does not stand still. The personnel were often replaced, including officers. Those who newly arrived to replace them are yet to be established in the combat collective. The next, more difficult missions also require a higher level of skill and the combat coordination of the crew.

Relying on the experience which has been accumulated and considering shortcomings which have occurred, we use each sea cruise to improve combat training and for the moral-political and psychological tempering of the men and the further improvement of the ship's combat readiness.

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EFFECT OF LEADERSHIP ON UNIT DISCIPLINE

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[Article by Col A. Rogach: "The Collective Is Strong with Discipline"]

[Text] The unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel G. Voronov has had no coarse violations of military discipline for five years. In the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR it occupied one of the leading places in the Red Banner Kiev Military District for basic indices and now confidently retains the leadership. The struggle to reach new positions of combat readiness on the basis of the high level of organization of the personnel and the strict observance of prescribed order has been initiated in all its subunits.

It is difficult to give an unambiguous answer to the question of what furthered most of all the rise in the level of discipline in the unit during the five-year period, of course. It can only be stated that the changes which occurred are the consequence of the more effective and coordinated efforts of the organizers of the training process and indoctrinational work. On their credit side is an entire complex of measures which were implemented systematically and consistently from that moment, which is memorable for the unit's veterans, when Lieutenant Colonel G. Voronov made a report at an enlarged session of the party committee exactly a month after assuming his duties. Even up to now, what was heard then from the rostrum is remembered by many veterans--it proved to be so essential and, it can be said, determining for all the subsequent practical activity of those who were present.

The discussion first concerned ways to ensure a more resultant training process and the reasons which were holding up advancement. And thanks to a thorough analysis of the state of affairs, such reasons were disclosed in literally all subunits. In one of them, let us say, all was not well in the special training of the men, in another the time allotted for the independent study of the personnel was not used in a sufficiently well thought out and efficient manner, and in a third the monitoring of the strict accomplishment of the daily agenda by all servicemen was weak. Formerly, negative facts of this type were only stated. But in his statement, Voronov considered it necessary to stress attention to the reasons for the existing omissions and neglect. It was stated
directly: they consist of the inadequate organization of the leaders themselves and their passivity or inability to direct the energy of subordinates to the required channel and create in the collective intolerance toward any manifestations of indiscipline. It was namely a different, more thorough and combined approach to the strengthening of military discipline which, in the opinion of the commander, was that important link which, being grasped could stretch the entire chain. Not to rush into gaps on an emergency basis but to operate along the entire front consistently and persistently--this is what the officer recalled then, especially stressing the thought that it is not an easy task to raise organization to the proper level. It requires maximum smartness of appearance, self-collection, and initiative, first of all of those who, in accordance with their service duty and their position in the military collective, are called upon to set the tone in strictly following the laws of army life.

The commander's statement also contained the call to some of the regiment's chiefs of services who really grieve for their sector of work but, alas, are not sufficiently involved in the indoctrination of people and consider this to be the concern of commanders and chiefs alone. "The interests of the matter require a radical review of practice of this type," it was stressed in this connection in the decision which was adopted which obliged the communists to conduct individual work with all categories of servicemen constantly and persistently, bearing in mind that without this it is impossible to ensure the proper level of organization and order in the personnel's vital activity.

Next followed specific assignments, who must undertake what. Since then, the style for the training and indoctrination of the men which is being introduced persistently by the unit commander with the active support of the party committee has become the accustomed standard of daily service activity for chiefs of any rank and a determining condition for raising the discipline of all servicemen.

We should especially tell about the concentration of the attention of the leaders who are responsible for strengthening prescribed order on work directly in the subunits. Taking an active part in it, the communists of the staff did and are doing much for each man's profound understanding of the exceptional role of the strictest discipline in the accomplishment of tasks in combat and political training and ensuring proper combat readiness. And it is proper that the struggle for prescribed order here is reinforced with the clear organization of the training process and the entire tenor of the personnel's life. Especially instructive in this regard is the following feature. Formerly, because of various "objective circumstances" individual lessons in training classrooms and in the field, it happened, were conducted with insufficient quality or with a delay, which was actually explained by the omissions and errors of certain officials. As was noted by Lieutenant Colonel Voronov, facts of this type were the consequence of a dangerous "disease"--the division of the regulations' requirements into primary and secondary, less obligatory. "Minor" deviations from various provisions of guidance documents also led to disruptions in the training rhythm.

Thanks to measures which were adopted, instances of this type are now excluded. The clear accomplishment of the training schedule is ensured in all subunits. Any adjustment of them is permitted only with the permission of the unit commander, in which regard if this should happen the gap in the training of the men is filled immediately. The quality of conduct of each additional lesson is taken under the special control of the senior commanders.
Here, the poor preparation of any commander for the conduct of lessons is considered an emergency. Both the party organization and the officer public react immediately in the proper manner to each such case. In confirmation of the unit commander's requirements they remind the careless one: be ready the day before for what has been planned for today; otherwise, in making up what has been omitted you will sit until late at night and will not leave the unit area until the senior commander is convinced that you, the leader, are ready for the lessons and can conduct them at the proper level.

The strict monitoring of the instruction of individual crews and each specialist soldier has been established in the unit. The increased demandingness in this matter is dictated by the specific nature of the service of the personnel who are servicing communications equipment.

"Under conditions where many of our specialists attend lessons at their work sites in accordance with operational special situations," explains the chief of staff, Major V. Shumilin, "the question of the organization of lessons with consideration of circumstances dictated by life arises with all acuteness. Success in this matter is predetermined by the initiative of the leader of the training --to see that people are occupied under any conditions. It is pleasant to state that the professional skill of the signalmen is ensured first of all through the most efficient use of each hour and each minute of training time. It cannot be otherwise. In our work if a person did not drill for a day and did not become familiar with various technical literature in time, it means that he lagged."

The clearly organized service of the troops also contributes to ensuring a high degree of organization and order. Each day, a certain portion of the unit’s personnel go on detail to perform interior and guard duties and combat alert duty. How high the responsibility and straining of the men who are accomplishing such tasks is known: the slightest error by any of them is fraught with consequences which may have an adverse effect on the status of the combat readiness of the subunit and the unit as a whole. In order to eliminate any troubles and failures here, especially clear monitoring of the specialists' work on the part of the senior commanders and, simultaneously, the purposeful, daily, and effective party influence on each serviceman are necessary. And the path to this is in the correct placement of communists on the important sectors for the personnel's accomplishment of training-combat missions. This was declared at one of the recent sessions of the party committee after hearing the report of the chief of staff who analyzed comprehensively the status of the guard and interior duties and the role of the communists in their improvement. The decision adopted on this question is also being realized. In accordance with it, the communists are now conducting work more purposefully before the men go on duty or on guard. The equipment of all posts has been brought into conformity with the requirements of the regulations and the rest areas of the men who are on detail have been designed with good aesthetic taste. In accordance with the evaluation of the authoritative commission which checked the maintenance of the guard room and posts in the course of a district inspection-competition, the unit was adjudged one of the best and was awarded the Certificate of Honor of the district's military council.

A large group of signalmen has incentives for the performance of guard duty itself. The striving to be their equal is inherent in all personnel. The question
arises: well, are there no shortcomings here? Unfortunately, they are present: individual soldiers permit negligence of various types when performing interior detail. But you see, how to react to them is important. Thus, recently inspectors noticed that in the daytime some sentries converse with one another, which leads to a reduction in vigilance. In this connection the commander and the party activists immediately sounded the alarm and adopted urgent measures to intensify a sense of responsibility in the men performing duty. Collective and individual talks took place in all small units on the subject of vigilance. The leading soldiers, whose call for maximum self-collection and circumspection at the posts played a special mobilizing role, shared experiences in the performance of guard duty. The same inspectors now note the proper concentration of all sentries at any time of the day.

As is known, many-years' experience of troop service is concentrated in the general military regulations. Everything is regulated and set forth in them clearly, precisely, and specifically, including concerning the role of non-commissioned officers in the struggle for strict observance of the standards of military life. Their complete and precise accomplishment of their service duties is a necessary condition for ensuring firm prescribed order.

Now, in the majority of the unit's subunits the warrant officers [praporshchik] and sergeants in fact are the constant assistants of the officers. Such is the result of the unit command's concern for the consolidation of their authority, instilling firm skills of working with people, and the ability to utilize rights which have been granted in regard to their subordinates. Senior commanders display strict demandingness toward noncommissioned officers in combination with a respectful attitude toward them. They consult with them, listen to their opinions, and rely on them in ensuring internal order in the subunits.

Nevertheless, sometimes dark spots are also seen against this glowing background. Up to now, for example, far from all warrant officers and sergeants are successfully accomplishing their duties, which is expressed in their insufficient demandingness toward themselves and their subordinates and various distortions in disciplinary practice. Thus, comparatively recently, the absolutely illegal reliance of individual leaders on so-called "responsible officers" in maintaining order in service and residential premises of the military cantonment was condemned at a service conference of subunit commanders. They were charged with accomplishing the actual duties of sergeants or persons of the daily detail which, by itself, was a violation of the provisions of the regulations. The critique of this case had the goal of reminding the participants in the conference: firm prescribed order is attained and reliably ensured where each official accomplishes his duties strictly.

And here is an incident which pertains to the last session of the commission which examined the service activity of the unit's warrant officers. The comrades who were invited to the session were made acquainted with the conclusions of the commission in which the degree of discipline of the servicemen was considered as a determining indicator. Just such a posing of the problem pursued a completely specific goal—not only to give an instructive lesson to those who, for various reasons, do not always coordinate their actions with the provisions of the regulations, but also so that others draw the proper conclusions. It was
namely in connection with this that the participants in the session were to
decide—to prolong or not prolong the period of service of Warrant Officers I.
Ushkalov and V. Volkov who, counting on the reputation of highly qualified
specialists which had been confirmed for them, became conceited, thinking them-
selves all-knowing and infallible, and stopped listening to the advice and de-
sires of fellow servicemen. They both gave their word to reform radically, and
the commission considered it possible to grant them a test period.

Excessive self-confidence and conceit also let down one more well-trained
specialist—soldier I. Shishman. In the course of a Lenin examination the
Komsomols, noting these undesirable features in their fellow serviceman, voted
against his recommendation in a friendly manner. The soldier did not expect
such unanimity, naively assuming that high erudition in questions of special
training justifies his passivity on lessons. The lesson given by the Komsomols
forced the soldier to review his behavior radically which, of course, also had
the corresponding public response. Thus, collective opinion played its disci-
plining role in this case, in connection with which we cannot fail to blend in
the thought that the unit command and party committee are relying on raising its
role in every possible way, especially in the matter of struggling against
phenomena of a negative order. It is not without purpose that the regimental
commander, his political deputy, the chief of staff, and other officers appeal
to public opinion, one can say, on each alarm signal. And they receive reliable
support especially in those cases when the talk concerns digressions from the
good traditions which have already formed in the collective. Here is a typical
illustration of this.

In one of the subunits the attention of Major Bartsev was attracted, it would
seem, by an inoffensive fact: a young soldier, A. Soltyk, had sewn the under-
collar for a senior fellow serviceman, V. Davydov. What did this mean? Com-
radely concern? As was learned, the reason was different. Davydov abused his
influence on the newcomer, which also stimulated the officer to discuss the
alarming incident with party and Komsomol leaders of the subunit. All activists
were also directed in the corresponding manner. The most authoritative of them,
such as Sergeants F. Negrov and V. Berestin, appeared before their fellow ser-
vicemen with talks about military friendship and comradeship, illustrating the
best manifestations of these qualities by examples from the history of their
unit. In the light of the facts which they cited, V. Davydov's act not only de-
famed Davydov himself, but also all the men of the subunit. Many soldiers who
took part in the talk came to just such a conclusion. As a result, the culprit
had to give his assurance that, in the future, he would not permit himself to
do anything like this but, on the contrary, would begin to assist in the con-
solidation of healthy mutual relations in the collective in every possible way.

Officer Bartsev and the activists also drew the proper conclusions for them-
sew. They considered it necessary to visit the area of this subunit more
often and to adopt measures to ensure more interesting leisure time for the men.
At the same time, corrections were introduced in the program of the sergeants'
lecture bureau which had been organized in the unit. They envisaged talks by
experienced propagandists about the atmosphere of the military collective, the
moral–ethical standards of conduct of servicemen in the unit and outside the
cantonment, and so forth. According to the estimate of the noncommissioned
officers themselves, lessons which have already taken place on these subjects
were a good help in improving their work with subordinates.
Public influence in this unit can be characterized as all-embracing with full justification. In particular, it also stimulates the service activity of the subunit officers, especially of the recent graduates of military-educational institutions.

For example, in the unit they note the rapid command development of Senior Lieutenant V. Lebedev. He served out his active duty time in the regiment, then became a warrant officer, and after completing the school he was assigned here to the post of subunit commander. A comparatively short time passed, and they began to speak of the collective which he heads as the leader in all training indices.

"I explain the success which has been achieved," Lebedev himself stated in regard to this, "to a great extent by the very energetic participation of an entire series of more experienced officer-fellow servicemen in my daily concerns. It is namely with their help that already soon after assuming my post I succeeded in using virtually all levers for effective disciplinary influence on my subordinates. The high degree of organization and punctual execution of the personnel were the guarantee of the successful accomplishment of other tasks facing the subunit."

The service biography of Lebedev's contemporary—Senior Lieutenant V. Khomenko—developed differently. By the way, the start of his service was also reassuring: Performing the duties of platoon leader, the young officer displayed noticeable zeal and was in good repute. Then, in accordance with the evaluation of the senior commander, Khomenko reduced his activity noticeably and received several admonitions for insufficient demandingness toward himself and his subordinates, which also caused alarm among the officers. All were interested, first of all: what was the reason for the changes which had occurred? As was learned, it was rooted in the change in Khomenko's former attitude toward service and his reluctance to work with the complete output of his strength and abilities, with which the practical assistance of his comrades could only aggravate the young officer's passivity. The situation required following a different path—come what may, to stimulate in the lieutenant his former responsibility and purposefulness which, in the end, was attained. Realizing his error, Khomenko took hold of himself and set about filling the gaps in his work with redoubled energy. At this stage, the officer publicly sees its task in the practical assistance of the platoon leader in all spheres of his daily service activity.

In the interests of strengthening military discipline, the unit command attaches great significance to questions of organizing the lives of the personnel.

Together with Lieutenant Colonel G. Voronov, I move from one room to another. We hear: "Here is our new mess hall," "Here is a reequipped bath," "And here is a barber shop and shoe repair shop...." We are convinced: A genuine combine for the domestic services is now at the service of the men on the territory of the military cantonment. The warehouses are in excellent condition. The supplying of the personnel with all types of allowances has been set up in full conformity with the normative documents which, by itself, is an indoctrinating and disciplining factor. Receiving everything prescribed by the standard in good

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time the people impose increased demandingness on themselves. This is also evidenced by the attitude of the servicemen toward their uniform (smartness and neatness in wearing and maintaining the uniform is inherent in the majority of the soldiers), by order in the barracks, and by the organization of public services and amenities of the cantonment as a whole.

Concern for cultural and interesting free time also has a direct bearing on the strengthening of military discipline. Sports competitions, contests for best specialist, meetings with frontline fighters and leaders of production, scientists, and writers, and cultural trips to museums and theaters found permanent registration in this military collective. In direct contact with one another, the soldiers enthusiastically spend their free time on athletic fields or in the club and library of their cantonment; they rest on leave in the city just as collectively and with value for themselves. The representatives of the garrison commandant's office, as a rule, have no complaints about them. These and other similar facts were discussed recently at a seminar which took place on the exchange of experience in the struggle for the strict accomplishment of the regulations' requirements by all servicemen without exception. What was stated from the rostrum was also confirmation of the fact that the call of the signalmen which was put up in the cantonment, "Serve according to the regulation—win honor and glory," is also becoming the standard for daily life which has been firmly mastered by the majority of the personnel.

It must be noted in conclusion that the article did not illuminate all forms and methods in the work of commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations in the further strengthening of military discipline. In particular, this goal is also served by thoroughly planned mass measures including lectures, reports, and talks organized by the agitprop group. These and other components of purposeful party-political work and administrative activity which are working to ensure prescribed order and organization and, this means, high combat readiness, have been put into action and are providing tangible results. Confirmation of this are the indices in combat and political training attained by the personnel of the leading unit.

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DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM IN THE ARMED FORCES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 83 (signed to press 3 Jun 83) pp 48-52

[Article by Col V. Zotov, candidate of historical sciences: "A Guiding Principle for the Party's Organizational Structure"]

[Excerpt] The experience of the Communist Party's activity confirms convincingly the firmness of the principle of democratic centralism and its significance in the life of the CPSU. It reflects the objective processes of the development of the party and society as a whole. "The tested principle for the organization of the entire life of the socialist society," notes Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "is democratic centralism, which permits the successful combination of the masses' free creativity with the advantages of a single system of scientific leadership, planning, and control." The CPSU devotes unceasing attention to seeing that it is put into practice in a practical manner in state and public organizations. The party is also constantly concerned that democratic centralism comprises the basis of the activity of political organs and party organizations of the Armed Forces. The combat vitality of the party organizations and the degree of their influence on all aspects of the life of the military collectives depend to a decisive degree on how firmly they implement the principle of democratic centralism.

The principle of democratic centralism is consistently realized in the work of CPSU organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces. The entire internal life of the Armed Forces party organs is structured in accordance with general party laws. The strict observance of the Lenin standards of party life and the principles of party leadership is also mandatory for them. However, it should be kept in mind that implementation of the principle of democratic centralism in the activity of the Armed Forces party organizations has several special features which are caused by the specific nature of party organizational development in the Armed Forces. How are they expressed?

Party-political work in the Armed Forces is directed by the party organs. The centralism in their activity is manifested in the fact that they create the primary party organizations and direct all their ideological-indoctrinal and organizational work. Broad democracy is also characteristic of the activity of political organs. Political organs conduct party conferences and meetings of the party activists at which various problems in the realization of party
influence on all aspects of the life and activity of the troops and naval forces are solved collectively. The political organs inform the communists on how the decisions of party conferences and meetings of the party activists are accomplished and they attract party members and candidate members to the social life of the troop collectives.

Democracy in the activity of the Armed Forces party organizations is also ensured by the electivity of the party organs. As a result of elections, the leading party organs are replenished with fresh forces. Each year, the composition of the party group organizers and secretaries of company party organizations and of those equal to them is renewed by more than half. Many communists participate in the work of party election organs. The political organs and party organizations maintain constant close contacts with local party committees and exchange experiences in ideological-political and organizational activity.

The CPSU Regulation grants to each party member the right to discuss freely questions of policy and the practical activity of the party, to elect and be elected to party organs, to make suggestions, and to express openly and defend their opinions prior to the adoption of a decision by an organization. The party regulation also secures for the communist the right to criticize. Here, at party meetings Armed Forces communists have the right to criticize any party member and candidate member regardless of the post occupied. However, criticism of orders and instructions of commanders and chiefs is not permitted. This restriction contains a special feature of criticism in Armed Forces party organizations which properly follows from the necessity to observe the principle of unity of command. The orders of commanders and chiefs have the force of law. They are subject to implicit and precise execution.

A young comrade, obviously, already had the opportunity to be convinced that in our party the Lenin requirement is the law: after the adoption of a decision by a competent party organ or party organization, all communists act as one person. "Having adopted a decision," it is noted in the accountability report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 26th Party Congress, "it is necessary to achieve its absolute accomplishment in the established time." It is namely this approach which ensures the consistent realization of the principle of democratic centralism. In this connection, it is appropriate to recall that the unconditional accomplishment of the decisions of meetings and sessions of party committees (party bureaus) also depends greatly on the activity, initiative, and persistence of young communists and on how they accomplish party assignments.

The party teaches us the accomplishment of decisions in good time and completely. It should be made the rule, it was pointed out at the November (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that each new decision on the very same question be adopted only when past decisions have been accomplished or some new circumstances arose.

The Lenin principle of democratic centralism is a subject of furious attacks on the part of bourgeois ideologists and revisionists of all colors. Along with distortion of general questions of the theory of Marxism-Leninism, they demand rejection of the Lenin principles of party organizational development.
Our ideological enemies are attacking from various directions. Some of them openly reject the principle of democratic centralism, declaring it either obsolete or unacceptable altogether. Other ideologists of the bourgeoisie come forth against democratic centralism under the guise of its "improvement." Democracy and centralism, they assert, are "incompatible"; it is necessary to separate democracy from centralism and reject centralism.

It is not difficult to understand to what such "advice" is directed. The denial of centralism in fact means the rejection of discipline in the party which inevitably leads to the undermining of unity and solidarity and, in the end—to the party's decay and ruin.

In completing today's talk, I should like to note the following. Only that development of party life leads to the maturity of intraparty relations and raising the combat vitality of the party organizations, the basis of which is formed by both democracy and strict discipline. Intraparty democracy is alive and effective to the extent that party discipline and the mandatory nature of the decisions of higher party organs for the lower ones exist. No democratically adopted decision can be implemented if centralism is ignored.

Our party has a reliable basis for work—the Lenin principle of democratic centralism which organically combines within itself democracy and centralism. One of the basic conditions for the successful activity of party organizations of the Armed Forces in the accomplishment of missions which face them consists of the strict, steadfast observance of all its norms by communists.

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SOCIALIST COMPETITION AMONG SOVIET-BULGARIAN UNITS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 12, Jun 83 (signed to press 3 Jun 83) pp 81-85

[Article by Maj N. Andreyev: "In the Interests of High Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Located in the south of Europe, in the Balkans, is a country which is linked by close bonds—economic, political, cultural, and also military—with our state. It is the People's Republic of Bulgaria—the country of the fraternal Bulgarian people. Its army occupies a worthy place in the combat commonwealth of the allied armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states. The organizational development and training of the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) is being conducted at the contemporary stage under the sign of the decisions of the 12th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the course which it has worked out to continue the building of a developed socialist society.

The sharp intensification of imperialism's aggressiveness, its course directed toward the derangement of socialist creation in the PRB [People's Republic of Bulgaria] and confrontation with the socialist world as a whole, and the increase in the real military danger force the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and the entire Bulgarian people to devote constant attention to strengthening the country's defensive might and raising the combat readiness and combat capability of the BPA. As is known, a slanderous campaign has now been initiated in the West against socialist Bulgaria within the framework of a notorious "crusade" against socialism. Imperialist special services, and first of all the special services of the United States, as well as subversive centers of anticommmunist propaganda have initiated an unbridled anti-Bulgarian campaign, trying to prove the imaginary participation of Sofia in "international terrorism." Direct provocations against Bulgarian citizens are being organized under this pretext which is false through and through and a campaign of incitement has been intensified against the PRB in the bourgeois mass media. All this, of course, cannot fail to be considered by commanders and political officers of the BPA when organizing combat and political training in the units and subunits. Speaking in May, 1983, before the participants in the Second Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Party Organizations the member of the Politburo of the BCP Central Committee and Minister of the People's Defense of the PRB, Army General D. Dzhurov, noted that the present situation in the world poses exceptionally important tasks for commanders, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations of the People's Army. They include the conduct of constant work
on explaining to the personnel the difficult international problems and raising
the vigilance and combat readiness of the men in every possible way.

The soldierly labor of the Bulgarian servicemen received a high evaluation at
the 12th Party Congress. "Thanks to the concerns and attention of the party
and the persistent labor of the fighting men and commanders," Comrade T.
Zhivkov, General Secretary of the BCP Central Committee and Chairman of the
State Council of the PRB, noted at the congress, "the BPA has been transformed
into contemporary armed forces and its men are distinguished by skill in the
mastery of weapons and indestructible morale. Service in the armed forces has
become an excellent school for the ideological-political, moral, and physical
tempering of the younger generation and for the upbringing of valiant patriot-
internationalists, vigilant defenders of the motherland, and selfless builders
of socialism. The Bulgarian servicemen, in a single combat formation with the
men of the invincible Soviet Army and the armies of the other Warsaw Pact member
states, are steadfastly standing guard over their native boundaries, socialist
achievements, and the people's peaceful labor."

In the BPA, socialist competition is a mighty means for the development of the
men's creative initiative and the improvement of combat training. Commanders,
political officers, staffs, and army organizations of the BCP and the Dmitrov
Communist Youth League (DKSM) are guided by the Lenin principles for the organi-
zation of socialist competition. It should be noted that the Lenin provisions
on publicity and comparability of results, the possibility for the practical
repetition of leading experience, moral and material incentives, and others play
a decisive role in the development of competition among the Bulgarian workers
as well as among the personnel of the BPA.

In February 1982 the Central Committee of the BCP, the Council of Ministers of
the PRB, the Central Council of Bulgarian Trade Unions, the National Council of
the Fatherland Front, and the Komsomol Central Committee adopted a decree on
national socialist competition in Bulgaria in the course of the 8th Five-Year
Plan. The competition, it was noted in the document, is the living creativity
of the masses and a mighty motive force in our society.

The men of the BPA—our class brothers and comrades in arms—also understand well
the role of competition. In response to the party's decisions, they stepped
forth with a number of valuable patriotic initiatives which received the support
of the PRB's Ministry of National Defense and the Main Political Directorate of
the BPA. According to the report of the Bulgarian military journal ARMÉYSKI
KOMUNIST (the organ of the BPA Main Political Directorate), questions of socialist
competition in the army were examined at a session of the bureau of the Main
Political Directorate. The course and results of the competition, the reasons
for the success of a number of units and ships, and some unresolved problems in
this area were analyzed. A new directive reached the troops on socialist com-
petition, the provisions and requirements of which were deeply studied by the
officer personnel. For this purpose, check lessons were conducted with all
officers; seminars were conducted with political officers and secretaries of
party and Komsomol organizations. A common day of political studies was also
an effective form for studying the directive on the competition.
The Chief of the BPA Main Political Directorate, Colonel General K. Kosev, writing on the pages of the journal ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST, called socialist competition a powerful lever in the hands of commanders for the attainment of the personnel's high level of activity. He supported soldierly rivalry on lessons in combat and political training and the creation of a situation in the units and on ships so that competition accompanies each serviceman, worker, and employee of the BPA.

Questions of socialist competition occupy a prominent place at army-wide forums of communists and Komsomols. For example, the basic tasks facing the party organizations of BPA units and subunits at the contemporary stage were discussed at the Second Army-Wide Conference of Secretaries of Party Organizations. In the period of preparation for the conference, primary significance was acquired by the generalization, by party organizations and all men who are members of the BGP, of the experience accumulated in ensuring high combat readiness and effectiveness of the training process, in strengthening military discipline, and in the dissemination of everything favorable which has been attained in the subunits and units and on the ships. A special role is allotted to the initiators and winners of the competition.

It should be noted that in its content, forms, and tasks competition in the Bulgarian People's Army and the Soviet Armed Forces has much in common. This is explained by the deep historic ties and the enduring processes in the furthest drawing together of Bulgaria with the USSR and of the BPA with the Soviet Armed Forces in all areas. At one time, Georgiy Dimitrov stressed: "Our army should be just like the Soviet Army. We should have common missions, a common organization, common armament, and a common military science. We should have a complete understanding and common language in all questions." Today, the Bulgarian servicemen are sacredly executing this order.

There are many units in the People's Army which are right guides of socialist competition. For example, in the last training year the unit where officers Vezev, Khristov, and Mikhaylov serve occupied the highest rung of the pedestal of honor in the BPA, winning in the army-wide competition. This competition took place under the slogan, "For the struggle for accomplishment of the decisions of the 12th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, for a worthy greeting for the 100th anniversary of the birth of Georgiy Dimitrov and the 38th anniversary of the socialist revolution in Bulgaria." And the main thing—participation in the competition stimulated the men to further improvement of combat training.

In the fall of 1982, the unit took part in a joint exercise of staffs, troops, and naval forces of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states on the territory of Bulgaria under the code name "Shield-82." Together with the men of the Soviet Armed Forces and the other fraternal armies, the personnel of this unit worked out on the exercise problems of the combat coordination and close cooperation of staffs, combat arms, and units. The situation was difficult. Almost inaccessible mountains, wide water obstacles, and difficult weather conditions hindered the actions of the men. Despite all difficulties, the unit personnel demonstrated high professional skill and the ability to employ contemporary weapons and combat equipment effectively on the battlefield. All assigned training-combat missions as well as socialist obligations assumed for the period of the exercises were accomplished successfully.

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Stepping forth as the initiator of socialist competition in the BPA at the start of the current training year, the men of this unit are now confidently storming new heights of soldierly skill. As the organizer and leader of the competition, the unit commander relies on the party-political apparatus and the staff in his activity. The position of winner and initiator of the competition on an army-wide scale imposes many obligations. It is an honorable and difficult matter to be an example for the others. Commanders and political officers as well as party and Komsomol activists, in considering this important feature of their position and in planning for the winter training period, correctly determined that in the end the overall success depends on people's attitude toward the matter and their conscientiousness, activity, and interest in the accomplishment of the difficult missions of combat and political training. Soldiers, sergeants, and officers were offered the opportunity to determine independently the lines for the improvement of combat and political qualities, and a broad expanse for the personal initiative of the men has opened up.

Of course, great ideological and organizational work was conducted. Here, efforts were directed toward seeing that each man has the clear and profound knowledge of his duties and tasks, both daily and current as well as long-range, for the training period. They spoke of socialist obligations not only at meetings. Their accomplishment was checked on each lesson. Such an approach permitted getting rid of formalism in the organization of competition and making competition an indispensable law of lessons and drills.

The obligations which were assumed in the unit envisioned a reduction in the times for bringing the subunits to combat readiness, the efficient use of training time, and the acquisition and raising of a proficiency rating. A worthy place in the obligations was also occupied by questions of raising the political and cultural level of the men, their observance of honor and dignity, impeccable behavior, an exemplary external appearance, military bearing, and their accomplishment of the standards of communist morality.

The commander and staff devote special attention to the competence of the communists-leaders, their methodological and professional preparedness, and their practical ability to organize competition. In the unit, wide use is made of combined lessons with a trip to the field for the entire day. In a situation as close as possible to one of combat the subunits work out exercises on weapons training, driving combat vehicles, and defense against weapons of mass production. Questions of the theory of combined-arms combat are also studied here. Training is conducted against a specific tactical background in such a way that a new subject logically continues and develops one which has just been studied and so that movement goes from the simple to the difficult.

Specialists of the staff and of the various services play a large role in the organization of the competition of the men of the leading unit. All data on the basis of which summary documents on the course of the competition can be prepared and publicity, clarity, and comparability of results can be ensured flow to them from the subunits. But it is not only a matter of diagrams, summary sheets, and tables which are prepared by the staff. The main thing is that with the assistance of the staff officers and chiefs of services competition became an integral part of combat training, is closely tied with the tasks of maintaining constant combat readiness and, to a large degree, furthers a rise in the quality of combat and political training.
The communists and all officers of the unit which is the initiator of competition in the BPA are applying considerable effort to raise the effectiveness of the men's combat training. Here is one example which, at first glance, seems quite simple. Officer Tabandzhov strives to intensify each drill and to fill each minute of the schedule with strained training. On lessons on motor vehicle training which he directs, there was the opportunity to train only six soldiers simultaneously—in accordance with the number of available training vehicles. Here is how it was: six men were occupied, and the remainder awaited their turn. Communist Tabandzhov did not put up with such wastefulness of valuable training time. He created additional training sites for the shifts which were not occupied where the soldiers and sergeants study the combat materiel, drill in the assembly and disassembly of weapons, and analyze the accomplishment of driving exercises. The matter, as can be seen, is not difficult but it provides great value—they arrived at this conclusion in the unit staff.

The summing up of results is considered to be an important moment in the conduct of the competition in the unit. Here its timeliness, objectivity, and instructiveness are attained. Publicity and operativeness are attained, in particular, by the fact that immediately after the accomplishment of an exercise on the range or tank driving ground the winners are declared directly at the combat vehicles, as they say, while the scent is hot. Their achievements are soon also learned in other subunits. At the present stage of combat training the men who are the initiators of the competition are filled with the resolve to accomplish lofty obligations, again win in soldierly competition, and consolidate their position at the highest stage of soldierly glory.

Rivalry is the soul of competition in the BPA. Using the experience of the Soviet Armed Forces, Bulgarian commanders and political officers are striving to organize it in such a way that the competing collectives and servicemen can compare their indices regularly, disclose reserves and put them into operation, and use the achievements of the best and leading experience.

The military press plays an important role in ensuring the rivalry and instructiveness of the competition and operativeness in the introduction of the best training procedures and methods. Materials are published regularly on the pages of the newspaper NARODNA ARMIYA and the journals ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST, ARMEYSKA MLADEZH, SERZHANT, and others about the competition in units and on ships for the high-quality working out of training tasks and standards and for the title of best in a combat specialty and best crew, section, and subunit.

For example, the newspaper NARODNA ARMIYA periodically places articles on the best servicemen under the heading "Dressing on the Leaders" and acquaints the readers with their achievements in soldierly labor. Here is a short story about two leading officers of the Bulgarian Navy, commanders of excellent ships in their class, Senior Lieutenants P. Manushev and P. Dereliyev.

For the fourth time, the crew under the command of officer P. Manushev is attaining the title of excellent ship and winner in the socialist competition. The seamen's indices are impressive: on the ship 80 percent of the departments, 81 percent of the battle stations, and 74 percent of the personnel became excellent,
and 88 percent of the men became rated specialists. For 10 years already, the ship has been standing combat watch at sea and during this time was awarded the title of ship of exemplary maintenance six times. On recent checks, the ship demonstrated excellent results in the execution of a maneuver, sweeping, and other special missions, receiving a good grade only for gunfire. Great credit in the record indices belongs to the commander.

Senior Lieutenant P. Dereliyev is known in the Bulgarian fleet for his creative attitude toward the organization of competition on the ship. He is distinguished by persistence in the accomplishment of the assigned goal, thoughtfulness in work, and the ability to direct the efforts of the collective toward the main thing. Commanding the ship, he exerted influence on the activity of the party group and the Komsomol organization with knowledge of the matter and constantly relied on them in work, and he studied deeply the moral and professional qualities of each person.

The commander did everything to create a healthy moral climate on the ship. And the cohesive, healthy collective is able to accomplish difficult training-combat missions and the fire of competition is not extinguished in it. The efforts of P. Dereliyev, the communists, Komsomols, and the entire collective were repaid a hundred-fold: the ship was awarded the title of excellent and declared the winner in the socialist competition in the fleet. Officer P. Dereliyev himself was awarded a medal and received a promotion in service. But he also values highly another reward for his military labor—the good memory of him on the ship which he commanded.

The BPA has numerous means for the moral and material stimulation of the victors in the competition. Specific measures for encouraging the leaders were determined by the directive mentioned earlier on questions of socialist competition. These are—declaration of a unit to be the best in the BPA or a subunit—the winner in a service of the Armed Forces, large unit, or unit; awarding pennants and cups to the leading subunits, crews, or sections; the awarding of orders and medals, and much more. In the course of the competition commanders, political officers, and army organizations of the BCP and the Komsomol instill in the personnel a sense of pride in the successes of their subunit, troop unit, ship, or large unit. They achieve high operativeness in the application of measures of encouragement to those who have distinguished themselves and in spreading their experience. And this is understandable: the men are not indifferent to timely public recognition of their experience and personal contribution to the success of the collective.

The decoration of the men who have demonstrated the best results in firing from a tank with the "Expert" ribbon is practiced in the tank company commanded by Senior Lieutenant Ignatiyev. The ribbon is awarded on the range when summing up the results of accomplishment of exercises. And tables, diagrams, and brief explanations devoted to their experience and soldierly achievements are placed on the displays of the experts in the Dimitrov Room alongside the photographs of the competition leaders.

The photographing of the winners at the unfurled unit Battle Standard exerts a great emotional influence on the competitors. Also in vogue among the organizers
of the competition are a simple word of praise and oral thanks in front of a formation. A note in the wall newspaper or news bulletin, a broadcast over the local radio network—these are also forms for popularizing experience and encouraging the experts. Collective visits to theaters and the cinema and trips to places of revolutionary, combat, and labor glory of the Bulgarian people and memorials to Bulgarian-Soviet friendship and combat collaboration are organized for the leading subunits.

Member of the Politburo of the BCP Central Committee and Minister of Defense of the PRB, Army General Dzhurov, stressed in one of his speeches: "In our time combat readiness should be high not by an indicated time, and not at the end of the training year, but constantly, at any moment. This means that it is necessary to ensure that degree of the personnel's political consciousness, that organization and order in the performance of combat service, that condition of weapons and combat equipment, and that quality of field, sea, and air training of the troops and naval forces which would provide the capability to enter the battle in an organized manner and smash the aggressor at any minute, day and night."

Thus, the main goal of socialist competition in the Bulgarian People's Army in light of these requirements consists of intensifying the soldierly labor of the men and ensuring that level of combat readiness of the Armed Forces which meets the requirements of the contemporary military-political situation in the world and permits the Bulgarian servicemen, jointly with the men of the other armies of the Warsaw Pact member countries, to reliably ensure the defense of socialism's achievements.

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