NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

VIETNAM
TAP CHI CONG SAN
No. 6, June 1984

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the monthly theoretical and political journal of the Vietnam Communist Party published in Hanoi.

CONTENTS

Strengthening the Control of the Implementation of Party Resolutions and Directives (pp 1-5)
(Editors) ............................................................................. 1

Address by Truong Chinh at the Ceremony Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of the Victory of Dien Bien Phu (pp 6-16)
(Truong Chinh; this item previously appeared in FBIS Asia and Pacific DAILY REPORT, 9 May 84 pp K6-K16)

The Latest Crimes of the Chinese Reactionaries (pp 17-18, 24)
(Unattributed article) .......................................................... 7

Accelerating Scientific and Technological Progress Within the National Economy (pp 19-24)
(Dang Huu) ........................................................................ 10

A New Step Forward in Drafting the Laws of Our State (pp 25-31)
(Phan Hien) ....................................................................... 17

The Ho Chi Minh Trail, a Strategic Exploit (pp 32-37, 70)
(Viet Phuong) ................................................................. 26

Materials: Nguyen Ai Quoc's Participation in the 5th Congress of the Communist International (1924) (pp 38-40)
(The Tap) ....................................................................... 34

Studies: The Laws of the Socialist Revolution and Socialist Construction—the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture (pp 41-47)
(Quyet Tien) ..................................................................... 38

- a -

[III - ASIA - 107]
Exchange of Opinions on Building the Districts and Strengthening the District Level: Building the District and Strengthening the District Level in An Nhon (pp 48-54) (Truong An) ........................................... 46

Developing from an Agricultural District into a District that Has a Comprehensive Agricultural-Forestry-Fishing-Industrial Economic Structure (pp 54-60) (Hoang Cong Cham) .................................................. 54

Thai Thuy Tries To Develop the Economic Potentials of a Coastal District (pp 60-64) (Cao Si Kiem) ............................................................................. 62

The Revolution and the Literature of an Age, of Each Writer (pp 65-70) (Le Xuan Vu) .................................................................................. 68

Le Quy Don, a Vietnamese Scholar of the 18th Century (pp 71-73, 81) (Nguyen Tai Thu) .................................................................................. 74

The 60th Anniversary of the Publication of the Soviet Journal 'KOMMUNIST' (p 74) (Unattributed article) .......................................................... 79

The Immediate Forerunner of 'BOLSHEVIK'--'KOMMUNIST' (pp 75-81) (Unattributed article) ................................................................. 81

The Essence of the Present Situation in Southeast Asia (pp 82-88) (Pham Binh) ......................................................................................... 88
STRENGTHENING THE CONTROL OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARTY RESOLUTIONS AND DIRECTIVES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 1-5

[Editorial]

[Text] Control work is one of the main functions of the party organization. The experience of our party as well as the fraternal parties has shown: the adoption of a correct line and policy by the party is the first factor of decisive significance in the victory of the revolution, but to turn this line and policy into reality, to insure that the revolution wins victory, the next matter of decisive importance is for the party to attach very much importance to organizing the implementation and controlling the implementation of this line and policy in a regular and close manner.

Lenin taught that once a line or policy has been adopted and targets and guidelines have been approved, the task of organizing implementation must be given foremost priority and the focus of leadership must shift "from drafting decrees and orders to selecting persons and controlling implementation."(1) Lenin also stated: "Controlling personnel and controlling the actual performance of work—the key to all work, to our entire policy at this time lies therein, still lies therein and only therein."(2)

Only by performing control work can the leader assess how the resolutions and directives of the party are actually being implemented; determine which factors and experiences are positive and must be developed upon; determine shortcomings, weaknesses and incorrect tendencies that must be rectified; determine which problems must be resolved; and insure correct compliance with the resolutions and directives of the party. Only by performing control work can the various party committees echelons correctly evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the movement, see the strongpoints and weaknesses of leadership and management agencies, correctly evaluate the qualities and capabilities of cadres and party members and, on this basis, adopt positive plans and measures for improving the leadership skill and fighting strength of the organizations of the party, improving the quality of party members and building solid and strong party organizations. When the party is in power, control work, together with increasing the effectiveness of party leadership, also makes an important contribution to the establishment of the system "the party leads, the people exercise collective ownership and the state manages."
Because the control work of the party is of such importance, our party has always attached importance to and strengthened its control work throughout the course of leading the revolution. The Report on Party Building at the 5th National Congress pointed out: "Control work is one of the main leadership functions of the party, is an important part of the entire effort to build the party, especially when the party is in power... Leadership without control is the same as no leadership at all."(3)

In the recent past, the control work performed by the various party committee echelons has been further strengthened, thereby helping to stimulate the performance of political tasks and maintain party discipline. Control work has helped to bring about new changes in the style of leadership of the party committee echelons. Many of them have attached importance to controlling the implementation of decisions, becoming deeply involved in central tasks and economic management and making better use of the forces of the committees and sectors in control work and in observing the process of implementation, thereby making the leadership and guidance they provide more effective and achieving higher results.

Control work has also made positive contributions in developing the exemplary-vanguard role played by party members in the implementation of party resolutions and directives, strengthening internal unity, promptly stopping and dealing with disciplinary infractions by cadres and party members and encouraging efforts to build solid and strong party organizations, thereby helping to promote mass agitation and strengthening the ties between the party and the masses while taking the initial steps in establishing the system "the party leads, the people exercise collective ownership and the state manages."

However, besides these positive changes, the control work of the party has not, generally speaking, been promoted; in particular, the control of the implementation of party resolutions and directives has not been well organized, has not become established procedure, has not been put on a regular basis. More than a few party committee echelons simply stop at issuing decisions, stop at looking into and handling incidents and matters that have occurred or places "that have problems" but do not deeply involve themselves in organizing implementation, in controlling implementation. The leadership and control role of the party organization is not being appropriately emphasized. The committees of the party committee and the control agencies of the state have yet to establish good coordination for the purpose of assisting the party committee in effectively guiding control work. In some localities and basic units, there is not full compliance with some of the positions and policies of the party and state. Many mistakes by cadres, party members and lower level organizations of the party are not being corrected or criticized. The practices of submitting inaccurate reports, inflating achievements and strongpoints and concealing mistakes and shortcomings still occur at more than a few places. The collective ownership role of the masses is not being respected. Due to the failure to perform control work, the failure to maintain close contact with installations and keep abreast of what is happening, some leaders are unable to assess the situation, unable to make effective, timely decisions in their work of guiding implementation.

Of foremost importance in strengthening and increasing the effectiveness of control work is the need for the various party committee echelons to gain a
full and deep understanding of party control work. The Political Report at the 5th National Congress defined the two main elements of party control work as: "Controlling the implementation of the lines and policies of the party on all levels and within all sectors" and "controlling the maintenance of the revolutionary qualities and the activities of the cadres, party members and personnel within the state apparatus."(4)

Controlling the implementation of the lines and policies of the party is a vital part of leadership, is a key aspect of organizing implementation.

Controlling the maintenance of revolutionary qualities and the activities of cadres and party members and controlling those party members who violate party statutes, violate party discipline and state law and betray the character of the party member are very important in maintaining the discipline of the party.

The two elements of control work mentioned above are closely interrelated; they support and stimulate each other's development and increase the effectiveness of control work. The primary significance of control work from the perspective of the two elements mentioned above is to insure continuity between the issuing of decisions and their implementation, insure that implementation is effectively organized, insure that the lines and policies of the party become reality and maintain the party's strict discipline. This continuity between these two elements makes control work "one of the primary leadership functions of the party" and "one of the important parts of everything involved in building the party," as mentioned above. It is necessary to have a full understanding of this viewpoint of the party and not give it light attention or ignore anything that it entails.

Along with developing a deeper understanding and a higher spirit of responsibility, we must also know how to perform control work in accordance with established duties and work regulations. The Report on Party Building at the 5th National Congress pointed out: "The control of general matters regarding compliance with the lines, policies and resolutions of the party for the purpose of supervising and correcting mistakes in compliance must be exercised by the party committee and its committees in accordance with their official duties and within the scope of their authority.

Control work involving party members who have violated party statutes, that is, violated the principles of party organization and life, violated the discipline of the party, violated state law or betrayed the character of a party member and control work involving disciplinary action within the party, control work involving party finances and so forth must be performed by the Central Control Committee and the various levels tasked with implementation in accordance with the provisions set forth in the Party Statutes."(5)

The Party Secretariat directive on strengthening the control of the implementation of party resolutions and directives also states: "Controlling the organization of the implementation of party resolutions and directives is part of the responsibility and authority of the party committee echelons, is the task of every party member."
In order to perform this task, the members of the various party committee echelons must, on the one hand, personally perform control work; on the other hand, they must utilize and establish close coordination among the committees of the party committee and the related sectors and gain their participation in control work under the unified, centralized guidance of the party committee.

The work involved in controlling the implementation of party resolutions and directives must take the form of specific regulations on each party committee echelon and at each basic party organization and must be raised to the level of a science: leadership backed by control work, control work conducted on the basis of effective programs and plans.

Each time a party resolution or directive is issued, the party committee must give it careful study; propose a plan for implementing it; assign party organizations, cadres and party members the task of fully implementing it while guiding them in this effort; assign party members to agitate and lead the masses in meeting the requirements and targets that have been established and, on this basis, control implementation.

On the other hand, on the basis of resolutions issued by the upper level, the resolutions of the party organization congress and its own resolutions, the party committee must adopt a control program, make the most critical issues within the locality the center of this program, determine which problems and which units control work must focus upon and assign clearly defined responsibilities to each committee, sector and mass organization for regularly supervising and controlling implementation on all levels, especially on the basic level. The control program must be considered an important, routine part of the work program of the party committee standing committees. The secretary and the standing committee members of the party committee bear the main responsibility for guiding the control of implementation. The various committees of the party must assist the party committee in guiding the various sectors and the lower levels as required by their function. The control committees on the various echelons play a very important role in assisting the party committee in controlling implementation.

Even when the control program and plan have been adopted, the organization and management of their implementation must still be directly carried out by the party committee because only the party committee has the ability and authority needed to guide and coordinate the different committees and sectors, discover problems and resolve them in a correct and timely fashion.

It is necessary to criticize and correct such erroneous concepts as "controlling implementation only serves to further complicate the situation and generate more work," "without control work, everything goes smoothly" and "it is still possible to build a solid and strong party organization without performing control work." It is precisely because of these erroneous concepts that some party committees have given light attention to control work, which has led to them providing lax leadership or, in essence, no leadership at all. And these erroneous concepts are the main reason why many correct policies of the party and state have not been fully implemented, why many mistakes have been corrected slowly and why many jobs are performed slowly.
The basic party organization is the place that directly organizes the implementation of party resolutions and directives; therefore, full importance must be attached to controlling implementation on the basic level. The successful control of implementation on the basic level assists the basic level party organization in effectively implementing resolutions and directives. Each party member and basic party organization must truly play an exemplary-vanguard role and consciously and fully implement party resolutions and directives. This is the principle of party consciousness as it applies to each party member and each organization of the party.

The party committees and state management agencies of the districts, precincts, federations of enterprises and corporations must closely guide the control work performed by basic units and organize the control of implementation in all subordinate basic party organizations within agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, distribution-circulation, the services, administration, the units of the armed forces and so forth. The party committee on the upper level must provide the party chapter committees and party committees on the basic level with instructions in how to formulate their control programs and plans.

The party committees on the basic level must organize their cadres and party members in an effort to gain a thorough understanding of the spirit of the resolutions and directives of the party and the work policies of the party organization, which must take the form of a specific program of action for each person; at the same time, they must adopt a control plan and supervise the activities of each party chapter, each party cell and each party member in implementation. Only by doing this well can the groundwork be laid for helping cadres and party members in the struggle they wage, in improving and controlling themselves and participate in overall control work, which also lays the groundwork for the party organization to control the work and qualities of cadres and party members. On the other hand, the party organization must teach the broad masses and gain their active participation in controlling the implementation of the positions and policies of the party and state.

To increase the effectiveness of control work, in addition to the matters mentioned above, we must also properly employ the various forms of inspections: routine inspections, periodic inspections, special inspections and unscheduled inspections. Routine inspection and supervision are the main forms of control work. Within the basic party organizations, special importance must be attached to routine inspections and supervision and this work must be performed well. On the district and precinct levels, inspections mainly take the form of periodic inspections and special inspections; unscheduled inspections are conducted when an unusual problem arises. The subject of the inspection, the persons being inspected and the form of inspection being employed determine which forces should be assigned to and utilized in the inspection. Regardless of which form is used, inspections must be conducted in a serious, cautious and thorough manner, reach clear, precise conclusions and result in the proposal of thorough corrective measures.

Today, besides the organizational system of the party, there are also the organizational systems of the state, the mass organizations, the people's
armed forces and so forth. The various party committee echelons must consider it important to control the implementation of the lines and policies of the party and state not only within the organizational system of the party, but also within these other organizational systems in keeping with the requirement that "every job be closely inspected, every sector strengthen its control work." (6) At the same time, it is necessary to closely coordinate the control work of the party with the inspection work of the state and the control work of a mass nature performed by the people's inspection forces.

Controlling the implementation of party resolutions and directives is difficult and complex work. To some party committees, especially on the basic level, this is brand new work in which they do not have much experience. Therefore, the various party committee echelons must provide close guidance; on the other hand, they must attach importance to conducting preliminary and final reviews and gaining and disseminating experience. Attention must be given to guarding against inspections that are conducted in a hasty, slipshod manner and inspections that are inspections in name only, do not reach clear conclusions and do not resolve any problems, which adversely affect the overall movement, the confidence of cadres, party members and the masses.

In the present situation, controlling the implementation of party resolutions and directives is a pressing requirement. By performing this work well, our various party committee echelons, cadres and party members will make practical contributions to bringing about new revolutionary changes and insuring that the positions and policies of the party and state are scrupulously implemented and lead to new victories for the cause of building socialism and defending the fatherland.

FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., 1976, Volume 45, p 19.


4. Ibid., Volume I, p 169.

5. Ibid., Volume III, p 123.

6. Ibid., Volume III, p 123.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
THE LATEST CRIMES OF THE CHINESE REACTIONARIES

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 17-18, 24

[Unattributed article]

[Text] The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists have again ordered their forces to wage an artillery war against Vietnam and conduct armed incursions into Vietnamese territory, committing countless crimes against our compatriots in the process.

Since early April, 1984, not 1 day has passed without Chinese forces firing upon and committing crimes along the entire border from Quang Ninh to Lai Chau. They have fired some 30,000 artillery shells and mortars of all sizes, H12 rockets and numerous salvos of infantry fire at practically every border district within the six northern provinces of Vietnam.

In Quang Ninh, since 1200 hours on 2 April 1984, Chinese artillery forces have savagely fired more than 5,000 artillery shells and mortars at many hills and population centers, at the town of Mong Cai, at hospitals, schools, roads and dams; at the same time, they have sent troops to infiltrate Hai Ninh District. Chinese forces have killed a number of civilians, including one teacher and three students, and destroyed many houses and fields. The Hai Hoa State Farm was torn up and destroyed by Chinese artillery.

In Lang Son, the enemy began their artillery assault at 0900 hours on 2 April 1984. Chinese forces have fired more than 10,000 artillery shells, mortars and H12 rockets into all five border districts. They have even fired on compatriots of ours who were tending to ancestral graves during the Thanh Minh Tet, killing a number of them and destroying many civilian houses, rice paddies and tobacco fields. In an even more serious incident that lasted from 2100 hours on 5 April to the morning of 6 April, 1984, they fired thousands of artillery shells into the villages of Quoc Khanh and Tri Phuong and then sent two infantry battalions to attack Hill 820 and Hill 636, which lie deep within Quoc Khanh Village in Trang Dinh District. The armed forces and people of the locality, displaying high vigilance and maintaining high combat readiness, promptly inflicted well deserved punishment upon the enemy and defeated, at the very outset, the plan of the Chinese reactionaries to encroach upon and occupy Vietnamese territory.
In Cao Bang, since 1100 hours on 2 April 1984, the enemy has fired upon all eight border districts. They have fired upon the town of Soc Giang and the town of Ha Quang, which lie nearly 10 kilometers from the border, killing a number of civilians, including one elderly person and two children less than 17 years of age, setting 20 civilian homes on fire, killing many buffalo and cattle and destroying many rice paddies, subsidiary food crops and industrial crops.

In Ha Tuyen, since 0930 hours on 2 April 1984, Chinese forces have fired artillery, mortars and many H12 rockets into the seven border districts, as deep as more than 10 kilometers from the border at some places. The losses inflicted by Chinese forces in Ha Tuyen Province have been very large: more than 40 persons have been killed or wounded; buildings, warehouses, grain, agricultural supplies and hydroelectric power stations worth more than 2.3 million dong have been destroyed; and hundreds of hectares of forests, rice, subsidiary food crops and tea terraces have been torn up and cannot be harvested. The reactionaries have sent many intelligence agents and commandoes into Dong Van, Meo Vac and Yen Minh Districts to conduct intelligence operations and stage ambushes to carry out assassination plots. On 18 April 1984, after firing more than 1,000 artillery shells, two Chinese infantry companies attacked Hill 1250; they met with stiff resistance from the armed forces and people of the locality and were forced to flee back to China. In an especially serious incident that took place on 28 and 29 April, 1984, the Chinese reactionaries mobilized three regiments of the 40th Division, the 14th Military Corps of the Kunming Military Region to attack and occupy Hills 1509, 772 and 233 in Vi Xuyen District. This was a serious escalation of the war by the Chinese authorities, one that violated Vietnam's territorial sovereignty and destroyed the security of the Vietnamese living in border areas. Our armed forces and people promptly retaliated against the aggressors, fought tenaciously, defended each bit of soil, killed many enemy troops and captured prisoners.

In Hoang Lien Son, together with firing on Hill 1383 and the northern portion of the town of Muong Khuong, the Chinese reactionaries have intensified the infiltration by intelligence agents to spy, stage ambushes and implant mines on trails and terraces. On 1, 3, 8, 9, 16 and 17 April 1984, they infiltrated Bat Xat and Muong Khuong Districts and opened fire on compatriots of ours as they were working, killing or wounding 10 persons.

In Lai Chau, Chinese forces have conducted artillery attacks on Phong Tho and Sin Ho Districts, destroying many sections of valuable timber forest, setting 10 civilian houses on fire and killing or wounding four persons.

The acts of war committed by the Chinese reactionaries by shelling and encroaching upon Vietnamese territory are extremely barbarous, malicious, serious and clear. The targets of their shelling are population centers, schools, fields, agricultural product and supply storehouses, hydroelectric power stations, main roads and even places to which people have been evacuated to avoid the shelling. They have frequently shelled many very densely populated areas: the towns of Mong Cai and Ban Chat, Hills 820 and 636, the town of Soc Giang, the Thanh Thuy intersection, the area around Bac Mountain in Bach Dich Village, Yen Minh District in Ha Tuyen Province (two shells per
square meter). Their shelling has been intense and repeated at some times, sporadic at others and has come both during the day and at night, thereby creating a state of constant tension along the entire border, their futile purpose being to make our compatriots feel that it is not safe for them to go about their normal routines of earning a living and attending school. This is proof that the hostile policy being pursued by the Chinese reactionaries toward Vietnam has never changed and has, in fact, become even more pernicious and intransigent. By their very nature, these actions have bared the cruel and aggressive face of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists. The attacks on civilians, the acts of economic sabotage and, in particular, the attacks on and occupation of Hills 820, 636, 1250, 1509, 772 and 233 by the Chinese reactionaries in violation of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Vietnam have been met with retaliation by our armed forces and people since the day they first began. Many artillery positions and ammunition depots used by China solely to commit crimes against our people have been attacked as retaliation by our armed forces; many intelligence agents who infiltrated the territory of Vietnam have been killed or captured. Our armed forces and people on the border have fought well and skillfully, won resounding victories and will deal even more painful retaliatory blows if Chinese forces recklessly violate the sacred sovereignty of the fatherland.

The Chinese reactionaries, regardless of how loudly they try to distort the situation, regardless of how cunning and deceptive their psychological warfare arguments might be, cannot conceal or gloss over their barbarous crimes. There is a proverb that states "A small hand cannot hide one's face." The Chinese reactionaries themselves are exposing their face to the world. Progressive mankind is denouncing and condemning the crimes of the Chinese reactionaries against Vietnam. From Nicaragua, Cuba, Latin America, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of eastern Europe, from Libya and the democratic nations on the African continent to India, Laos, Kampuchea and even Indonesia, from the communist parties to the international humanitarian and peace organizations voices are being raised to sternly denounce the Chinese reactionaries and express sympathy and support for the just cause of Vietnam.

We condemn and denounce the crimes of the Chinese reactionaries before public opinion at home and abroad. We demand that the Beijing authorities cease their hostile policy toward Vietnam. We desire peace and it is always our policy to live in peace and friendship with neighboring countries but we are also determined not to permit any power to violate the independence, freedom and territorial sovereignty for which we shed so much blood to achieve.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
ACCELERATING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS WITHIN THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 19-24

[Article by Professor Dang Huu]

[Text] "Rapidly and widely applying scientific achievements and technological advances in production and everyday life"(1) is "one of the foremost factors in raising productivity and quality, achieving greater savings, realizing higher returns and stimulating the process of expanded reproduction."(2) It is one of the important measures in meeting the four economic and social goals set by the 5th Congress of the Party.

Prior to the 5th Party Congress, the Political Bureau resolution on the science and technology policy stated: "The more difficult our economic circumstances are and the lower the level of technological development within production is, the more we must attach importance to investing in scientific and technical activities." The resolution defined the basic objectives of our country's science and technology policy as bringing about the strong development of science and technology, establishing a progressive system of science and technology and applying scientific and technological achievements for the purposes of raising labor productivity and creating much wealth for society in a manner that yields high economic and social returns.

In keeping with the spirit of the resolution of the 5th Party Congress, the Council of Ministers' resolution on scientific and technical work, issued on 17 May 1983 decided a series of important management measures designed to achieve our socio-economic, scientific and technical goals.

Improving management along lines that stimulate scientific and technological advances in production and daily life and create the conditions for development in depth, this is the trend of our times, is the general direction that has been taken by the socialist countries in combining the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution with the superior nature of the socialist system, thereby bringing about revolutionary changes in production forces, which lays the base for strengthening and improving socialist production relations.
Our party and state have long concerned themselves with building and developing our scientific and technical potentials. Today, we have more than 160 scientific research facilities and more than 80 colleges and academies. Our corps of scientific and technical cadres is large in size, is well balanced in terms of the occupations it represents and possesses both specialized skills and good political qualities. This corps consists of nearly 300,000 cadres who have a college or academy level education, more than 4,000 persons who hold M.S. or Ph.D. degrees and more than 600,000 cadres who have a vocational middle school education. This corps, which is making its presence felt in all fields of the national economy, has undertaken practically all aspects of technology for which we once had to rely upon foreign countries for assistance; quickly become the masters of the technical projects turned over by foreign countries; gained some experience in planning, designing and constructing many important projects; and taken over the work of providing college level training for practically all specialized fields while actively participating in post graduate training in many different fields of science and technology. In some fields, such as public health, education and so forth, specialists of ours in foreign countries have become known for their specialized skills and spirit of service. Scientific projects by many Vietnamese scholars have won international acclaim. Compared to the population, the number of scientific and technical cadres, in general, as well as the number of cadres engaged in research work, in particular, are far higher than in many other developing countries.

During the past several years, in keeping with the guidelines and resolutions of the party regarding science and technology, the scientific and technical cadres of the entire country have increasingly oriented their efforts toward achieving economic and social goals and supporting production and everyday life, having achieved significant results in the process. Many successful projects within the system of key scientific and technological advancement programs of the state together with many achievements previously recorded in scientific and technical research have permitted us to reach conclusions concerning and apply many technological advances that have yielded marked economic returns; make noteworthy contributions to the development of production, especially the production of grain and food products and production within a number of industrial, capital construction and other sectors; save raw materials, building materials and energy, increase the sources of export goods and replace many products that once had to be imported.

Scientific and technological advances have become one of the factors contributing to grain output increasing at the average annual rate of 1 million tons and industrial output increasing at the annual rate of 11 percent over the past several years. The economic returns from the application of technological advances within production are estimated to be in the billions of dong.

However, the impact of science and technology upon the national economy has not been strong, returns are still low and potentials have not been appropriately developed. Many scientific achievements and technological advances that are of high value and yield high economic returns have not been widely applied. The number of advances and achievements that has been
applied is still small and the rate of application is slow. Many technological measures which would have the effect of raising productivity, quality and efficiency within production and lie within the grasp of our scientific and technical cadres have not been applied. Labor productivity has not significantly increased; the return from 1 dong invested in fixed assets is declining; the consumption of materials per unit of product is increasing; product quality is unstable; and the quality of many important products, including even some export goods, has also been declining. Significant advances have not been made in terms of the returns from scientific and technical activities within the national economy. Science and technology have yet to truly penetrate to production and everyday life.

There are many causes of this situation, causes that lie in awareness, in economic organization and management, in the organization and management of science and so forth, but most importantly in the lack of a well coordinated system that closely links science to production and shortens the science-technology-production-marketing cycle. We do not have a full complement of suitable regulations and policies regarding scientific-technical cadres and production management cadres that encourage and provide incentive for them to take positive steps to resolve scientific and technical problems and organize the application of technological advances in production. In terms of organization, we have yet to establish the forms of organization and the mechanisms needed to closely link science to production. Within many production sectors, the organizational structure actually impedes the application of technological advances and advanced industrial guidelines.

The present economic management system does not cause producers to truly concern themselves with quality and efficiency. The formulation of plans and the evaluation of the completion of plans are not truly based on advanced economic-technical quotas and appropriate attention is not given to norms on quality and efficiency or to material consumption ceilings. As a result, production has little need for science. We have yet to establish a system that maintains a close link between producers and consumers and producers do not understand the specific needs of consumers.

The various economic levers have not created the conditions needed to stimulate technological advances and have not stimulated a need for technological improvement, for improved industrial processes, for improved products. There are many aspects of the price policy, of the regulations on the various funds, the regulations on wages, bonuses and so forth that do not have the effect of encouraging higher labor productivity, lower production costs or an increase in the level of technology on which production and products are based. We have not taken steps to provide material and financial support to enterprises that apply new technologies or begin producing new products and resolve their temporary difficulties. Because of many difficulties that have not been satisfactorily resolved, some enterprises have refused to apply new technology in their production even though it would have meant major returns for the national economy. We also lack specialized organizations to support the application of new technologies in production and everyday life. In addition, the social attitudes and work habits of small-scale, decentralized production, conservatism, the practice of doing as one
sees fit and so forth have also affected the application of scientific and technological advances.

Facts have shown that among the various reasons impeding the application of scientific and technological advances, those that pertain to management are of very important significance. The resolution of the Political Bureau on the science and technology policy pointed out: "Recent shortcomings in economic management, social management and the management of science and technology have impeded the application of scientific and technological advances in production and everyday life and restricted the development of science and technology." At many enterprises, although leadership cadres are well qualified and very enthusiastic, they are at a loss over how to apply technological advances in production because their efforts are thwarted by many current management regulations. It can be said that the slowness with which we have eliminated subsidization in economic management is an important reason why scientific and technological potentials have been developed slowly.

On the basis of the viewpoint that scientific and technological advances are not goals in and of themselves but essential needs of production and daily life, our party and state have defined the role of the production and business management agencies in organizing the application of scientific and technological advances in production as: the scientific and technical advances plan must be considered an integral part of the economic and social development plan; therefore, among the management measures that are taken to achieve economic and social development, foremost attention must be given to utilizing advances in science and technology as a tool competently supporting the establishment and fulfillment of targets regarding production and the standard of living.

Wherever the various management levels concern themselves with guiding the application of scientific and technological advances, production develops. The experience of the various sectors and localities also permits us to conclude that among the guidelines for the improvement of the management of production and business, attention must be given to management mechanisms that stimulate scientific and technological advances because these advances are indispensable prerequisites in raising labor productivity, producing high quality products and raising the efficiency of production. These guidelines must not only be fully reflected in the management of science and technology, more importantly, they must even be reflected in the management of production and business.

The primary measures that must be taken to stimulate the application of scientific achievements and technological advances in production while gradually establishing a well coordinated system stimulating this application are:

The science and science management agencies must establish specific research tasks for each stage based on socio-economic needs and tasks both in the immediate future and over the long range. Every project must have a clearly defined objective and give full consideration to the conditions necessary for application. A trial must be conducted on the semi-production scale so that
scientific analysis can be carried out and a conclusion can be reached concerning the feasibility of applying the advance in production. Before being applied, every technological advance must be subjected to test production on the necessary scale, must be evaluated from an economic and technical standpoint and economic and technical conclusions concerning it must be reached. To be incorporated in a plan, there must be economic-technical documentation that clearly states which material and technical conditions are necessary during application and the specific economic returns from each proposed application. Bypassing this step will cause difficulties to those who are actually applying the advance and could cause a loss of state budget funds. Increasing the investments made in material bases for science agencies to conduct good trials on the necessary scale also creates the conditions for them to conduct trials at production installations.

As for production management agencies, formulating and evaluating the completion of plans on the basis of advanced economic-technical norms must be considered an obligatory task. We must quickly put an end to the practice of lowering the economic-technical norms within production and business plans. The evaluation of the completion of plans must be based on both types of norms: quantitative norms and qualitative norms; the failure to fulfill qualitative norms must also be viewed as having failed to complete the plan.

The scientific and technological advances plan must be considered an integral part of the national economic plan and must be balanced with the financial and material conditions needed for it to be implemented. The evaluation and approval of the completion of the scientific and technological advances plan must be carried out at the same time as the evaluation and approval of the completion of the production plan: the failure to complete the scientific and technological advances plan must be viewed as having failed to complete the production plan. The conditions needed for the implementation of the plans for scientific and technological advances that will truly have an impact in production must be prepared when these advances are still being researched, with importance attached to organizing test production. The results of test production lead to conclusions concerning economic-technical norms and insure that application is consistent with specific production conditions and yields the highest possible economic returns.

The main guideline for improving the various economic levers is to create factors that stimulate improvements to products and technological change. Those factors within all levers involving finances, prices, profits, wages, bonuses and so forth that impede technological change must be quickly eliminated.

One situation to which attention must be given is that in the initial stage of their application, many technological advances might not yield economic returns, might prevent the enterprise from completing a number of norms within its production plan, might require supplemental capital and so forth. Such cases require a capital assistance policy, price support regulations for new technology and so forth. In an initial step toward resolving this problem, the Council of Ministers' resolution permits the use of production development funds for the purpose of applying technological advances; at the same time, it
permits the establishment of a central fund by each ministry to encourage the development of science and technology.

Of the various economic levers described above, those that stimulate technological change from within production play an important role. These are the levers that involve prices, profits and the distribution of profits on the basis of the principle of distribution in accordance with labor to those who create and apply technological advances within production. The largest difficulty here is the distribution of profits between science and production. Because, the past labor contained within the product of science is non-materialized. Consequently, if research costs are compared with production costs, they sometimes are not sufficiently persuasive to cause finance agencies to acknowledge a fair distribution of profits between the scientific researcher and the producer. Concerning this point, Karl Marx taught: "The product of mental—scientific—labor is always undervalued."(3) F. Engels also said: "The first 50 years of the existence of one achievement such as the steam engine of James Watt was enough to pay back to the world all the expenditure on science that mankind had incurred since antiquity."(4)

The instructions by the founders of scientific communism are the red thread that runs throughout the management principles of socialism and insure the constant development of labor productivity.

While improving the planning mechanism and the various economic levers, researching organizational measures is also a matter to which importance must be attached. It is necessary to establish centers that expedite the application of technological advances in production and establish various scientific-production federations, considering them to be organizational bridges that enable the rapid movement of scientific and technological achievements from the field of research to production. To help establish the basic principles that govern the improvement of management and the stimulation of scientific and technological advances within the national economy, the functional agencies of the state must research and establish a well coordinated management system which insures that each management measure plays a role in stimulating scientific and technological advances within each production and business activity. This is confirmation of the fact that scientific and technological advances are not goals in and of themselves, but are needs of production itself, of socio-economic development.

Improving our management with a view toward the objective of applying scientific and technological advances is a matter of practical as well as theoretical importance. Because, scientific and technical activities cannot achieve results if they are only conducted through movements. It is the impact of management measures that causes the need to arise in production for scientific and technological advances that will increase the efficiency of production. Another important consideration is that such management measures eliminate the administrative style of guidance regarding science, a style of guidance which, to some extent, has impeded the display of initiative in creative activity.

One matter deserving of attention regarding the guidelines for perfecting a code of regulations that stimulates scientific and technological advances is
that these regulations must not be restricted to the scope of the management of research and development; rather, of greater importance and significance is that they bring about fundamental changes in the management of production and business, with economic efficiency becoming the goal of production. This goal is the moving force behind scientific and technological advances. This moving force is stronger than the impact of any single measure that might be taken, be it in the field of scientific research or the field of production and business.

Given the correct application of economic and social laws and the various laws that govern the formation of the creative motivation of the laborer, management measures must play the role of a premise that re-establishes the natural, close relationship between science and production. This is consistent with the dialectical oneness that exists in the relationship between science and production: although science has its own internal laws, science does not develop for its own sake, rather, science develops mainly to satisfy the need to understand and transform nature and society.

**FOOTNOTES**


2. Ibid., p 119.


4. Ibid., Volume 1, p 555.
A NEW STEP FORWARD IN DRAFTING THE LAWS OF OUR STATE

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 25–31

[Article by Phan Hien]

[Text] In keeping with the 1981-1985 five year legislation plan, the Council of Ministers presented to the National Assembly the draft of the Code of Criminal Law consisting of two parts: a general section and a section on crimes. The National Assembly gave preliminary approval to the general section of the code during its June, 1983 session and will examine the section of the code that deals with crimes in an upcoming session, after which the entire code will be officially adopted.

The adoption of the Code of Criminal Law, the first code of law of our state, will mark a new step forward in the legislative work of the state and play a major role in implementing the resolutions of the 4th and 5th Congresses of the Party as they relate to strengthening the socialist system of law.

I. The Promulgation of the Code of Criminal Law Meets a Pressing Requirement of State Management in the New Stage of the Revolution

Within the socialist system, the underlying causes of crime—the exploitation of man by man and the impoverization of the laborer—are abolished. However, crime continues to exist to some extent because of many different reasons and conditions (factors which do not cause crime but do encourage crime): the final show of resistance by the toppled exploiting classes; the acts of sabotage by the imperialists and other international reactionary powers; the influences of bourgeois and other non-proletarian ideas, which remain strong in the consciousness of man; shortcomings in one aspect or another of the management of the country; the failure of the system of law to keep pace with socio-economic development at some times and places; shortcomings in crime prevention and the effort to fight crime... According to Marxism-Leninism, the view that all crimes and other violations of the law can be completely eradicated during the initial stage of communism is a common, reactionary view. Because, it leads to denying the role played by the state and the law in this stage. Facts have shown that, although greatly reduced, crime continues to occur in the developed socialist countries.
In our country, crime has increased and changed in a complex manner in recent years. This situation is due to many different causes and conditions.

To begin with, there are the schemes and activities being carried out by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and the other reactionary powers in their wide-ranging war of sabotage, in their very dangerous and clever methods of attacking and undermining the Vietnamese revolution.

We are in the initial stage of the period of transition. During this stage and throughout the entire period of transition, the struggle between socialism and capitalism is a tough, complicated and fierce struggle. Although the bourgeoisie have been and continue to be transformed, they still have forces at their disposal, forces that have been augmented by factors of spontaneity arising from within small-scale production, which is still widespread. The thinking, attitudes and habits of the exploiting classes and the old society have not been swept away, especially the social ills and poisons of the reactionary culture that were left behind by neo-colonialism and which the imperialists and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists are still looking for every way to sow in our country.

Our party has adopted a correct general line and economic line and established a correct economic structure. The 4th Plenum of the Party Central Committee observed: "Since the 5th National Congress of the Party, our country has undergone positive changes, recorded new advances and moved ever steadily forward." However, the overall socio-economic situation is still characterized by very many difficulties, some of which are very acute. The 3rd and 4th Plenums of the Party Central Committee pointed out the existence of such shortcomings as: the slowness with which management policies and regulations have been revised and amended and the lack of coordination in this area; the failure to take urgent steps to reorganize production; the slowness with which agricultural transformation has been carried out in Nam Bo; the light attention given to the transformation of industry and commerce and to market management; the relaxation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in many areas; the lack of strict laws and discipline; the lack of vigilance and many weaknesses in the face of sabotage by the enemy and our failure to promptly deal with enemy sabotage, especially economic; the failure of ideological and organizational work to keep pace with the requirements of tasks; the failure to uphold the right of collective ownership of the laboring people...

Being vigilant against and promptly dealing with the schemes and acts of sabotage of the enemy, winning victory over the bourgeoisie and making every effort to correct the weaknesses in every aspect of state management will guarantee victory for the cause of building socialism and the cause of defending the socialist fatherland. Also on this basis, we can gradually curb and eliminate the causes and conditions underlying crime and other illegal behavior.

In waging the tough, complicated, decisive and long struggle mentioned above, the party and state must employ a broad range of well coordinated political, military, economic, administrative, ideological and organizational measures;
one or another of these measures is emphasized depending upon the time, the place and the issue at hand. Among these measures, criminal prosecution is indispensable and plays its own important role.

In the various periods since the victory of the August Revolution, the state has promulgated many documents regarding criminal law. These documents had an impact by helping to maintain political security, maintain social order and safety and strengthen state discipline, thereby helping to insure the successful performance of the tasks of the revolution. However, they were only documents that regulated one or a few particular areas, consequently, they lacked coordination, lacked unity and many crimes were not regulated. The greatest drawback was that the criminal affairs policy of the party and state, which lays the political and legal foundation for preventing and effectively struggling against crime, was not a full, comprehensive policy.

In view of the shortcomings described above, current criminal law is not truly an effective weapon used by the dictatorship of the proletariat to protect the leadership of the party, uphold the right of collective ownership of the laboring people, insure effective state management and stimulate the constant advance by the revolution.

Following the promulgation of the new Constitution and the new laws on the organization of the state apparatus, the promulgation of the Code of Criminal Law that embodies the requirements involved in the performance of the two strategic tasks of the period of transition, especially in the initial stage of this period, and the requirements involved in simultaneously carrying out the three revolutions, building the new system, establishing the new economy and culture and molding the new, socialist man, satisfies a pressing demand. The Code of Criminal Law regulates each matter regarding crime and punishment in a unified, systematic manner and within one document. In view of the facts that it is based on the objective laws of development of our society, reflects the attitudes, aspirations and fine traditions of the nation, incorporates the broad experiences gained over the past several decades in preventing and fighting crime and selectively incorporates the experiences of the fraternal socialist countries, the Code of Criminal Law must, by definition, reflect high revolutionary militancy and be both creative and scientific in nature.

II. The Code of Criminal Law Codifies the Criminal Affairs Policy of Our Party and State in the New Stage of the Revolution

Within the socialist state, in general, and our state, in particular, crime prevention and the fight against crime can and must take the form of an organized and planned struggle. Waging this struggle is not only the task of a number of specialized agencies, it is also the task of all other state agencies, of all social organizations, of all the people. It can only be effectively carried out on the basis of certain foundations and principles and by means of appropriate methods and measures. Within each stage of the revolution, the party and state adopt a suitable criminal affairs policy. The Code of Criminal Law codifies every aspect of the criminal affairs policy of the party and state in the present stage of the revolution, which is something that has never been done before in our drafting of criminal law. This policy reflects the spirit of taking the initiative in preventing crime and fighting
crime in a determined, thorough manner; maintaining the strictness required in the present situation while being lenient when appropriate; and punishing crimes but not overlooking the educational aspect emanating from our firm confidence in the ability of our system to change and transform man.

Above everything else, the Code of Criminal Law reflects the viewpoint of our party and state concerning crime. On the basis of this viewpoint, the code defines "crime as those actions dangerous to society expressed within this Code of Law and consciously or unconsciously performed by persons capable of bearing criminal responsibility..." This is the first time that the concept of crime—a political-legal concept—has been defined within a state document.

Of the many factors mentioned above that constitute crime, danger to society is the basic standard. It is a standard of a distinct class character; it defines whose class interests must be protected and for the sake of whose interests a certain kind of behavior is considered dangerous. Within the exploiting states, crimes are actions that disrupt the social order established by the exploiting classes; progressive, revolutionary actions are considered crimes. Within our state at this time, crimes are actions that violate the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the fatherland; violate the socialist state system; violate the socialist economic system and socialist ownership; violate the life, health, property, freedom, honor, dignity and other fundamental rights of the citizen; or violate the other fields of socialist legal order.

Danger to society is also an historical category. Within a state, the danger posed by certain actions emerges, disappears or changes in degree depending upon political, economic and social conditions. Therefore, criminal behavior cannot be regulated and laws cannot be applied in a manner divorced from political, economic and social circumstances. According to Marx, "The law can never be higher than the economic system or the cultural development that corresponds to the economic system."(1)

Another point deserving of attention is that in order to be considered a crime, an action must be defined as such within the Code of Criminal Law. This means that the principle of similarity no longer applies. This is something new in the drafting of criminal law by our state. In a few cases that arose in the past, in order to punish crimes that had not been specifically defined, it was necessary to apply laws on crimes that were similar in nature to the unregulated crime.

Today, we have established an entire code consisting of roughly 300 articles of law that define more than 200 crimes. Summarizing the experiences gained in our many years of struggle against crime and forecasting changes in the crime situation in the years ahead can provide us with a realistic basis for insuring that we overlook no crimes, especially serious ones. In the future, if new crimes emerge as a result of changes in the situation, the code will be promptly amended.

The Code of Criminal Law reflects the view of the party and state concerning punishment. Marx pointed out that "punishment is nothing more than a means by which society defends itself against actions that violate the very premises of
its existence, regardless of what these premises are."

(2) Punishment for crimes is a long-standing practice in other countries and nations, a practice that transcends the different ages of history. Within the different social systems, punishment has differed in substance and form, especially in purpose. Under the feudal state, whose punishment was clearly vengeful and terroristic in nature, we saw such extremely barbaric and cruel forms of punishment as poking out the criminal's eyes, dismembering the criminal, cutting away one piece of flesh at a time until the criminal died, the execution of the criminal together with his family and so forth. Despite the boastful claims made by the bourgeoisie to the contrary, the vengeful and terroristic nature of punishment continued under the bourgeois system. Vietnamese revolutionaries knew the extremely harsh and inhuman conditions of the prisons of the French colonialists of bygone years and the prisons of the Americans and the puppets of recent years better than anyone else.

Under our system, the purposes and essence of punishment are based on the Marxist science of sociology and the concept of the dialectical relationship between mandatory punishment and education. Punishment is never vengeful; criminals must accept their punishment but we avoid inflicting physical pain and, instead of stripping them of their dignity, we actually create the conditions for them to regain their dignity, some of which they lost by committing a crime.

Marx advanced the thinking that the most basic guideline in fighting crime is prevention: "The learned legislator always does everything possible to prevent crime, not to subsequently punish the criminal." (3) In May, 1951, the esteemed President Ho Chi Minh told the students of the advanced justice cadre training class: the purpose of conducting good criminal trials is to ultimately not have to conduct any trials. The prevention of crime demands that the socialist state take the initiative in applying well coordinated political, economic, social, educational, cultural, legal and organizational measures. Among legal measures, prompt punishment for crimes committed is a crime prevention measure, a crime prevention guideline. Therefore, within the socialist state, punishment still has the purpose of preventing crime, preventing specific crimes and preventing crime as a whole.

As regards criminals, punishment is designed to teach and transform them into productive members of society who obey the law and the other rules of social life and prevent them from committing new crimes. With the exception of capital punishment, which is a special form of punishment applied to persons who commit especially serious crimes and must be completely removed from society, all punishment has this function.

As regards other persons, punishment has the effect of deterring and restraining unstable persons who intend to commit crimes; punishment helps to raise the consciousness of the people regarding the law and encourages everyone to actively participate in preventing and fighting crime.

Crimes differ in nature and degree. Persons who commit crime have different motives and objectives, employ different methods and cause different consequences; the attitude that each person has after committing a crime is not the same attitude they had when the crime was being committed.
Prosecution must be well deserved and suited to each set of circumstances in order to be highly effective. It is on the concepts of the party and state regarding crime and punishment that the prosecution policy is based.

a) Counter-revolutionary crimes (which, in the Code of Criminal Law, are called especially dangerous crimes against national security) are crimes against the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the fatherland and threaten the very existence of the socialist system, of our state. These have always been and will always be considered the most serious of all crimes and must, generally speaking, be the crimes that bring the most severe punishment.

In addition to counter-revolutionary crimes, the following crimes are types that require truly harsh punishment:

—Crimes against socialist ownership, such as robbery, burglary, theft, embezzlement, fraud and destruction of state property or property of the collective. These crimes must be very harshly punished because they are crimes against the base of the socialist economy, against the foundation and the source of strength of the socialist system, against the sources of the comfort and happiness of the people.

—The resolution of the 4th Plenum of the Party Central Committee pointed out: "At present, circulation and distribution are a front on which we are encountering many of our most pressing and acute problems, are the site of many difficulties and negative phenomena and are the place at which the struggle between socialism and capitalism, between ourselves and the enemy is most intense." We must attach importance to economic crimes, with severe punishment being handed down for the crimes of speculation, smuggling, the manufacture or sale of fake goods, the theft of stamps and coupons and making or circulating fake stamps, coupons or papers for use in distribution.

—Our system considers man to be the most precious asset. The crimes of murder, rape and kidnapping are among those types that must be very severely punished. The same applies to the crime of robbery against the citizen.

b) As regards the punishment of criminals, the Code of Criminal Law clearly distinguishes between cases requiring severe punishment and cases in which leniency can be practiced.

Within each type of crime, organized crimes, that is, crimes committed by many persons among whom there is close collaboration, are always the most dangerous. Therefore, persons who commit organized crimes must be severely punished and, among these persons, their masterminds, leaders and commanders, that is, those who play the most important role, must be punished more severely than the rest.

Persons who stubbornly resist, hoodlums, gangsters, repeat offenders and those who reject education and transformation and fall into a life of crime must, of course, also be severely punished.
In the present situation, to help strengthen the right of collective ownership of the laboring people, increase the fighting strength and improve the leadership of the party and increase the management effectiveness of the state, we must resolutely, promptly and fairly prosecute cadres and personnel who lose their good qualities and become deviant, steal socialist property, accept bribes, engage in smuggling or exploitation, conspire with bourgeoisie and dishonest merchants to make themselves wealthy by illegal means and intimidate the masses. Among these persons, those who abuse their position and authority to commit crime must be severely punished.

Those persons who truly repent, who voluntarily confess, who denounce their accomplices, perform a good deed to atone for their crime or voluntarily make amends or pay damages can be shown leniency. Leniency is punishment that is less severe than normal. In a number of special cases, leniency can encompass immunity from punishment or immunity from criminal responsibility. The policy of leniency reflects socialist humanitarianism and confidence in the good that lies within the criminal and encourages the criminal to lead a better life. When correctly applied, the policy of leniency has an immediate and positive effect in solving criminal cases.

The criminal affairs policy of the party and state encourages and creates the conditions for persons convicted of crimes to work and become law-abiding citizens. The Code of Criminal Law defines conditions under which those persons who prove that they have honestly reformed themselves can have their sentences reduced or even be granted an early release. Persons who have been sentenced to life in prison can also have their sentence reduced. A person who has served his sentence can, after he has been tested for a period of time, depending upon the severity of his sentence and provided that he earns an honest living, obeys policies and the law and does not commit new crimes, have his sentence removed from the record. A person whose sentence is removed from the record is considered to have never had a criminal record.

The criminal affairs policy of the party and state also gives attention to minors (persons less than 18 years of age) who commit crime. Minors, in addition to being psychologically and physiologically unstable, have limited knowledge, lack experience in life and are unable to correctly evaluate things. In our protection, care and education of children, although we have recorded achievements very deserving of pride, there are still many shortcomings; in particular, education in all three environments, the family, the school and society, does not truly comply with the line on socialist education. In many cases of violations of the law by persons who are less than 18 years of age, the family, the school and society are partly responsible. Minors who commit crime cannot be prosecuted in the same manner as adults. The party and state have a separate policy regarding them. The criminal affairs policy regarding minors is a part of the overall criminal affairs policy; on the other hand, it also reflects the policy of the party and state on protecting, caring for and educating persons who have not yet come of age.

Codified for the first time in the Code of Criminal Law, the main features of the policy on minors who commit crime are as follows:
Children less than 14 years of age are not held criminally responsible for their actions, even if they commit a serious crime. In the case of these children, social measures are applied, such as turning them over to a family or mass organization to vouch for them or sending them to reform school.

Minors above the age of 14 are held criminally responsible for their actions depending upon the seriousness of their crime and their age group.

In the criminal prosecution of minors, education and reform are the main objectives. Consequently, it is necessary to make widespread use of such measures as mandatory probation and sending minors to reform schools. The family and society play an important role and have a large responsibility in the implementation of these measures.

Prison sentences are only given to minors who commit serious crimes and only in cases in which it is truly necessary to separate the minor from society for a certain period of time. These prison sentences are less severe than those given to persons who are of age.

Minors may not be given life in prison or the death penalty. They are not incarcerated with adult prisoners.

Conditions have also been established whereby minors can have their sentences reduced, can have their sentence removed from the record and so forth.

Enforcing the Code of Criminal Law is the task of the state and all society. Therefore, not only the agencies of dictatorship, but all agencies of the state, all social organizations and each citizen as well must know and understand the criminal affairs policy and, on this basis, actively participate in preventing and fighting crime.

Instead of waiting until the Code of Criminal Law is officially adopted and promulgated, we must immediately begin to widely disseminate and publicize the criminal affairs policy while making a greater effort to publicize the law, in general, and criminal law, in particular, and raise the consciousness of cadres and the people regarding socialist law.

Each agency and social organization has the responsibility to teach, supervise and inspect the persons who are under its management to insure that they comply with and protect the law; each must take determined, timely steps to reduce and eliminate the causes and conditions that lead to crime and other violations of the law within their agency or organization.

Each citizen must fully comply with policies and the law and exercise his right of socialist collective ownership by supervising the agencies of the state, social organizations and other citizens to insure their compliance with policies and the law.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., 1957, Volume 8, p 531.

3. Ibid., 1955, Volume 1, p 131.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, A STRATEGIC EXPLOIT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 32-37, 70

[Article by Viet Phuong]

[Text] Twenty-five years ago, the vital lifeline of the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the trail that was celebrated in brilliant feats of arms, was born. As it stretched down the length of the country and reflected the rising requirements of the resistance against the United States for national salvation and our international obligation, this remarkable trail was called by many different names through the years and months of its existence (Line 559, "Uncle's" Line, the Truong Son Road, the Strategic Reinforcement Line and so forth) but was ultimately called by a very Vietnamese, very heroic name: the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Western military experts, books and newspapers discussed this road at considerable length. And, perhaps to enhance the mystical quality surrounding it, they called it the Ho Chi Minh "Trail"! And, according to them, the Ho Chi Minh Trail became, in the dense jungles, the eighth wonder of the world; the Ho Chi Minh Trail was not only a resupply route, it was the symbol of the Vietnam war as well. The CIA considered it to be its most important strategic target. The French journalist Valgiet observed that the Americans considered their agony to have originated mainly in this inviolable "trail."

Placing the trail in its proper perspective in the resistance against the United States for national salvation, in the nation's tradition of struggle and in the future of the country, Le Duan said during a 1973 visit to the Truong Son Road: "It is the road of the will to win, of a brave heart, of an heroic spirit. It is the road that links South and North, that reunifies the country, is the road to the prosperous future of our fatherland...and is the road uniting the peoples of the three countries of Indochina."(1)

Two years after the Geneva Accords were signed, the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys not only refused to negotiate and hold general elections, they also intensified their activities against the Indochinese revolution and established an anti-communist defense line linking South Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to Thailand. They frantically launched a series of bloody campaigns of terror, made every effort to provoke the psychology of war and prepared for aggression against the North. Our people were no longer able to achieve the
reunification of the country through peaceful struggle within the legal framework of the Geneva Accords, rather, as Resolution 15 of the Party Central Committee (January, 1959) confirmed, "the basic course of development of the Vietnamese revolution in the South has become the course of violent force." This revolution, which was consistent with the aspirations of the broad masses, led to mass uprisings that razed enemy posts and destroyed whole sections of the enemy's network of control in the villages and hamlets. The people seized control, built up the people's armed forces and brought the revolution in the South from a posture of maintaining and preserving forces to a posture of widespread and continuous attacks.

This situation demanded that the great rear area in the North meet the highest needs ever encountered in the war of liberation in the South. The "Unity" road that was still being used to move cadres, documents and a number of necessary supplies was no longer suitable. Only a strategic communications-transportation route could quickly meet the increasingly large needs of the southern battlefield. In keeping with a Political Bureau resolution, Line 559 (the first name of the trail) was quickly established. It fulfilled the mission of reinforcing the southern battlefield and the battlefield in the two friendly countries of Laos and Kampuchea.

As our party confirmed, this was the most basic, the primary route used to reinforce the South, reinforce our friends. It was of extremely important immediate and long-range strategic significance. Its mission was diverse and grew in scope in the course of development of the war, from fighting the enemy and expanding the liberated area in the Truong Son Mountains into a strategic base area, into the base of support of our battlefields and those of our friends; organizing transport operations to provide strategic support to the battlefields of southern Indochina; providing for strategic, campaign and combat mobility by the various branches and building bases among the masses and the guerrilla war movement to organizing rear service and technical support of the various forces operating on the road itself, receiving and providing medical treatment to wounded and ill soldiers sent from the various battlefields for transfer to the rear area and so forth. Metaphorically speaking, the Truong Son Road was the "bridge" connecting the great rear area in the socialist North to the great frontlines in the South and the battlefields in our two friendly, neighboring countries. The Truong Son troops were an army that had both a strategic rear service mission and the mission of conducting combat operations to expand and strengthen their strategic area of operation in southern Indochina in order to provide the large, heavy rear service support needed by the battlefields in the South and the two neighboring countries. During the early years, because our road construction capabilities were very limited, we relied primarily upon rudimentary forms of transportation combined with mechanized transportation wherever possible. During our operations, we maintained absolute secrecy and did our very best to avoid contact with the enemy in order to insure that the pressing requirements of the revolutionary movement and uprisings were met, contribute to the victory over the "special war" of the Americans and puppets and support the needs of the Lao revolution while building bases and fighting the enemy in order to expand and strengthen the liberated areas.
Even during those early years, the Americans and their lackeys "sensed" that this "trail" would be the prime factor in their possible defeat. The U.S. president quickly ordered plan 34a, the plan for overt military operations against the North, to be put into effect and pressured the Royal Government of Laos into allowing the U.S. Air Force to attack at will and interdict our operations on the western side of the Truong Son range.

However, although the enemy truly waged a fierce, unrelenting "war of interdiction," our armed forces and people continued crossing the Truong Son Mountain Range to provide strategic support and reinforcement. At the end of the final dry season during the first period (1959-1964), the volume of transportation increased 3-fold, thereby increasing the total number of tons per kilometer 40-fold compared to previous years. These achievements produced a new, realistic capability: mechanized transportation could be employed as the main mode of transportation along the Truong Son Mountain Range.

Between 1965 and 1968, many changes favorable to us occurred on the battlefield in the South. The obligation of the great rear area in the North during this period was to provide the South with the highest possible level of support. Providing strategic communications and transportation became the central, pressing task of our entire party, people and army. The communications-transportation network in the North was restored, developed and actively defended. All transport forces and means of transportation of the state, the army and the people were mobilized to take goods to the Truong Son troops for delivery to the various battlefields.

During this period, using primarily mechanized transportation combined with some rudimentary transportation, we were unable to maintain our old style of operation and, instead, found it necessary to flexibly apply the guideline "attacking-defending-avoid." We had to fight the enemy in order to move forward, open roads in order to advance, build networks of detour routes when necessary, all with a view toward defeating the enemy's war of interdiction, excellently completing our large support mission and making competent contributions to the victory over Johnson's "limited war."

In order to carry out this large task and put this mode of operation into effect, the Truong Son troops quickly opened additional main roads into the rear areas of each battlefield. With their troop strength, equipment and weapons having increased by more than 2-fold compared to the previous period and having been equipped with more than 1,000 new trucks, they conducted strong, widespread operations on the western line.

"Sensing" this buildup, the enemy conducted 11,578 air attacks during the 1965 dry season and increased the rate of attacks 5 to 8 times during subsequent dry season. In 1968, the concentration of U.S. air power during the Johnson era reached a peak in 160,264 sorties and the widespread use of electronic weapons. All types of CBU bombs, magnetic field bombs, pressure activated bombs, demolition bombs and delayed action bombs mixed with tens of millions of leaf bombs, dragon tooth bombs, pocket bombs and so forth were "dropped" along roads to create a dense "anti-infiltration" network consisting of hundreds of areas in which various types of bombs and mines had been combined to set "firepower traps." The enemy also dropped on jungle areas tens of
thousands of "noise detectors" that sent signals to reconnaissance aircraft that were in the skies 24 hours a day!

To effectively combat the enemy's frenzied attempts at interdiction, the Truong Son troops displayed revolutionary-offensive thinking in every aspect of their work and combat and creatively applied the principle of establishing coordination among the various branches in the fight against the enemy's interdiction; established a thorough and direct style of command; mobilized the entire line to fight the enemy; invested manpower in opening many detour routes; widely practiced the "art of camouflage" to deceive the enemy; intensified the building of fortifications to protect personnel and equipment; accelerated the movement to establish bases and wage a local people's war; and hunted down all commandoes in order to maintain security along communication lines.

Through these effective organizational measures, we were able to combine our forces and defeat the destructive might of the U.S. pirates. The Ho Chi Minh Trail competently supported the general offensive conducted by the armed forces and people of the South during the Mau Than Tet in 1968. That general offensive defeated the "limited war" of the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, it signalled the ineffectiveness of the enemy's war of interdiction and forced them to admit: "We can only succeed in slowing them down, in forcing them to pay a high price but we definitely cannot interdict them."(2)

After the U.S. pirates were forced to "de-escalate" the war of destruction against the North and change their war strategy in the South, our party decided that the North had to provide the South with an even higher level of support so that we could realize our determination to defeat the U.S. imperialists' "Vietnamization of the war." The various general departments and services and Military Region 4 concentrated their efforts on creating the best conditions possible for the Truong Son troops to successfully carry out their central, urgent strategic mission during that period. The Rear Service General Department studied ways to send supplies deeper into the South in order to reduce the difficulties being encountered by the Truong Son troops. The general departments and the General Staff made preparations to strengthen the forces, equipment and weapons of the Truong Son troops so that they were fully capable of defeating both the air force and infantry units of the enemy and maintaining safety and uninterrupted operations along the transport line. The Air Defense-Air Force and Military Region 4 sent well trained, seasoned units to protect terminals and stood ready to send units to support the troops on the western side of the Truong Son mountains.

At the start of the 1969 dry season, just as we had predicted, the United States concentrated their Air Force units operating over the North in attacks on the Ho Chi Minh "Trail." In 4 years (1969-1973), they flew 483,980 tactical aircraft sorties and 25,842 B-52 sorties, with special attention to 23 key interdiction targets, against which they directed force sufficient to destroy every living thing. The Seng Phan Valley in southern Laos was the target of 2,708 sorties and the area from the Ta Le River in southern Laos to Cha La slope, also in southern Laos, was the target of some 5,700 sorties. Nam Cong in lower Laos was continuously attacked for 3 months. At those places, not one thing green remained, not one bird could be seen and even the
ant colonies disappeared. However, at the end of 1970, U.S. military experts were shocked to find that the statistics on the "infiltrated supplies" reaching the battlefields of South Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos "had reached urgently alarming proportions."

The U.S. president decided to launch operation Lam Son 719 using combined forces on both the eastern and western sides of the Truong Son Mountains to attack and occupy the Vietnam-Laos border region (from Khe Sanh to Pha Lan) in order to cut the strategic resupply lines of the battlefields in southern Indochina. However, as a result of having prepared the conditions needed for combat, our main force military corps launched a strong counter-attack that wiped out the best trained units of the Saigon puppet army, which were supported by U.S. firepower, and totally defeated the enemy's operation Lam Son 719.

During that period, the U.S. pirates made use of scores of scientific and technological advances and improved their electronic equipment, making the AC-130 an aircraft that specialized in locating and attacking vehicles at night and combining it with "phantoms" in search and destroy missions against communications targets and with sabotage by spies and commandoes. U.S. experts and commanders hoped by this clever maneuver to pose more obstacles than ever to our transport operations along the "trail." However, in the spirit of laying down their lives for the country, the Truong Son engineer units, having worked throughout the 6 month rainy season to make the necessary preparations, completed five main roads and three networks of "concealed" roads running along the mountain range to enable large-scale transport operations during the day coordinated with "exposed" roads to enable small-scale transport operations at night. We increased the use of mechanized transportation along the river to Stung Treng in Kampuchea and established a liquid fuel pipeline extending into southeast Saravane in lower Laos. These were achievements of decisive significance in the efficiency of our support operations. As regards the organization of their forces, the Truong Son troops were organized into five regional divisions so that they could coordinate in combat and work with our friends to build local armed forces (45,000 guerrillas) to defend the road network.

During the period from 1969 to 1973, we recorded results of strategic significance: we rendered the most modern technological efforts of electronic warfare ineffective; compared to the previous period, we transported two receiving units, more than four times as many supplies and raised the total tons/kilometer index 184 times; we completely defeated the strategic operation conducted by the Americans and puppets to interdict our supply lines, continuously attacked the enemy along the entire line, shot down 1,689 aircraft of all types, liberated many large areas, from Pha Lan-Saravane-Attopeu to the junction of the borders of the three countries of Indochina and killed more than 10,300 enemy troops. Our Truong Son troops had successfully established a military communications-transportation battlefield deployment in which troops and firepower could effectively fight the enemy, defeated the war of interdiction waged by the U.S. imperialists along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, established a strong foothold behind the enemy and turned the trail into the immediate rear area of the various battlefields.
Following the signing of the Paris Agreement, the comparison of forces between ourselves and the enemy on the Indochina battlefield underwent major changes, changes that were clearly in our favor. The thinking of our party at that time was that, regardless of the situation, the path to the victory of the revolution in the South continued to be the path of violent force and that we had to maintain an offensive strategy.

The tasks of the Truong Son forces during that period were to very urgently open a network of roads on the eastern side of the Truong Son range so that we could move up on the enemy; improve the network of roads on the western side of the Truong Son range; organize divisions under the direct command of Headquarters in which there was combat coordination among the various branches; combining the forces of the three different modes of mechanized transport; successfully meeting the requirements of the "strategic preparations" stage and being ready to seize historic opportunity.

At that time, we enjoyed an unprecedented advantage in the Truong Son region: there was no fighting at all in two-thirds of the region and only light fighting in the remaining one-third. Therefore, the firepower of the entire Truong Son line could be concentrated to overwhelm enemy forces within small areas of operation and the other branches could devote their efforts to supporting the new strategy of the Party Central Committee.

As a result of making "complete, early and well coordinated preparations immediately adjacent to the battlefield," when the historic opportunity arose and the strategic general offensive and mass uprisings began, the entire Truong Son line was ready and promptly put nearly 10,000 vehicles of all types to work to meet the demands of each task: transporting the forces of the military corps in their blitzkrieg against the enemy; transporting nearly 20,000 tons of vital weapons and equipment to the areas behind troop lines; quickly transporting the Truong Son engineer regiments as the attacking formations of our armed forces advanced in order to disarm mines, open roads and build bridges; transporting the Truong Son anti-aircraft regiments and divisions and the Truong Son infantry regiments and divisions from the western to the eastern flank to participate in the battles in the Central Highlands, Zone 5 and Nam Bo; moving the mechanized technical support regiments, the carrier wave signal regiments, the petroleum product support regiments and so forth ahead to keep pace with the forward attacking elements on many fronts in order to competently support the campaign and the major battles being fought and quickly win victory in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign.

In the years and months of very difficult work and fierce fighting during the resistance against the United States for national salvation, the Truong Son troops and other support forces recorded very large and glorious achievements: they constructed a strategic network of nearly 20,000 kilometers of different types of roads extending from western Quang Binh to Loc Ninh; fought 112,135 battles against the U.S. Air Force, downing more than 2,500 aircraft; won victory over 1,263 land-grabbing operations and enemy commandoe and spy operations; transported 454,750,000 tons/kilometer of supplies of all types; and sent more than 2 million persons down the trail. Although the enemy tried by every ingenious and malicious method conceivable to cut the trail, our armed forces and people, in the spirit of being ready to lay down their lives
for the country, gave the trail increasingly strong, indestructible vitality. The main artery of the resistance against the United States for national salvation continued to provide unceasing support, keeping the sacred cause of liberating the South alive until the day total victory was won.

This was the feat of arms of hundreds of thousands of cadres, soldiers, shock youths and frontline corvee laborers who sacrificed their lives, who fought tenaciously, worked creatively and successfully established a "strategic rear service battlefield deployment" in a region that occupies an especially important position on the Indochina peninsula.

This feat of arms was the result of the wise and effective guidance provided by our party during the war, was a reflection of the rear service organizational skills of our armed forces and people in the decisive test of strength against the ringleader of imperialism, whose forces and equipment were many times more powerful than ours. This feat of arms also reflected the tremendous contributions made by the ethnic minorities that live along the imposing Truong Son Mountain Range, the strength of the close solidarity among the peoples of the three countries of Indochina and the decisive role played by the socialist North as the rear area of the war to liberate the South.

Employing imagery, the journalist Jacques Despuque wrote the following about the feat of arms that was the Ho Chi Minh Trail: "Hannibal and his roads across the Alps, Napoleon and his road for heavy artillery through St. Bernard pass become relics of the distant past when mention is made of the Ho Chi Minh 'Trail.'"(3) And, the French journalist Valgiet observed: "The entire Ho Chi Minh 'Trail' that we talk about today is the result of centuries of struggle against oppression; therefore, this trail possesses strong vitality because it symbolizes the fighting strength of an entire nation... Therefore, it must also be realized that, without it, the war might have already been brought to a conclusion."(4)

Today, even though our country has been reunified and our people are building and defending the socialist fatherland, the Ho Chi Minh Trail remains a strategic foothold for organizing attacks against the enemy and firmly defending the country; at the same time, it is making increasingly large contributions to developing economic potentials and building the Truong Son range into areas of economic prosperity, developed communications and a strong, solid national defense network.

In keeping with party resolutions, units of our army, including the Truong Son troops, quickly moved into the remote, wilderness areas of the western region of our country. And, following nearly 8 years of hard work, these forces have firmly established themselves in key areas within this strategic region. In the not too distant future, through the strengths of the army of shock troops on the front of building this strategic region and through the positive contributions made by the various minorities, our country will have millions of hectares of cleared land and hundreds of state farms and villages in the highlands, all linked together with a well developed, convenient network of roads. Then, the strategic foothold that is the Ho Chi Minh Trail will be made even more solid and the strategic role played by the Truong Son mountains
and jungles, by that strip of land that is the ridgepole of the house of the fatherland in this new stage, will have an even greater impact.

FOOTNOTES


7809
CSO: 4210/23
MATERIALS: NGUYEN AI QUOC'S PARTICIPATION IN THE 5TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL (1924)

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 38-40

[Article by The Tap]

[Text] This year, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Nguyen Ai Quoc's participation in the 5th Congress of the Communist International, we are presenting a number of materials concerning his delegate status and the words spoken by him at the congress.

As regards his delegate status, questions such as the following have frequently been raised: was Nguyen Ai Quoc an official delegate within the delegation of the Communist Party of France or was he a consultative delegate and, if so, why?

To clarify this matter, we present the following three documents:

1. A letter written by Nguyen Ai Quoc in French and dated 13 June 1924:

"To: Comrade Petrov,
Chairman, the Far Eastern Bureau,
Dear Comrade,

Yesterday, the French delegation sent a letter to the Delegate Credentials Committee requesting that a card be issued to me.

I received a card to participate in the enlarge conference of the executive committee.

This morning, Comrade Grossman told me that I must send you the details in writing, that you will forward them to the Delegate Credentials Committee and that Comrade Grossman, the committee and you will come to an agreement that will result in a delegate card being issued to me.

The particulars of my case are:

1. Because I arrived here many months before the congress, my party could not issue a delegate card to me.

34
2. The Communist International requested my party to send delegates from the colonies to the congress; knowing that I was already in Moscow, my party thought it unnecessary to include me in the delegation coming from Paris.

3. My comrades within the French delegation cannot issue a delegate card to me because they would be out of order. However, with the consent of those cadres and the consent of the Delegate Credentials Committee, you can issue a card to me.

Communist greetings"(1)

2. Comrade Petrov's reply, which was written in Russian on the letter from Nguyen Ai Quoc:

"To Comrade Grossman for consideration during the upcoming debate of the Delegate Credentials Committee: if the French delegation presents a written request to the effect that they want to accept Nguyen Ai Quoc into their delegation, I suggest that he be issued credentials as a consultative delegate."(2)

3. The written request by the secretary of the French delegation:

"Moscow, 17 June 1924,

It is hereby requested that a consultative delegate card be issued to Nguyen Ai Quoc of the Far Eastern Bureau.

This comrade works in the movement in Indochina, a French colony.

Secretary of the French delegation,

(Signed)"(3)

On the basis of the above documents, we can confirm that Nguyen Ai Quoc was a consultative delegate at the 5th Congress of the Communist International. The reasons why he served as a consultative delegate are clear and Nguyen Ai Quoc was very happy to have been accepted as a consultative delegate to the 5th Congress of the Communist International.

As regards the words spoken by Nguyen Ai Quoc at the 5th Congress of the Communist International:

The "Collected Works of Ho Chi Minh," Volume I (1920-1925) contain words spoken by him on two different occasions under the title "Participation in the Debate of the National and Colonial Questions at the 5th International Congress of the Communist International." To provide readers with research material, we hereby present the following two additional documents (not found in the "Collected Works of Ho Chi Minh"):

1. "The eighth session, 22 June 1924:

...Nguyen Ai Quoc (Indochina): my purpose in speaking here is to direct the attention of the delegates to the colonies, on which the destiny of the world
proletariat depends, to a large degree. They are the places that supply food and soldiers to the large imperialist countries; if we want to defeat these countries, we must begin by taking away their colonies. I agree with Comrade Trein that we must wait until the flood tide of revolution surges in France. However, I do not endorse the thinking regarding the danger posed by fascism. The French bourgeoisie has no need for fascism. It relies upon its armed forces in the colonies; according to official statistics, the French army consists of 458,000 French soldiers and 206,000 colonial soldiers. However, in actuality, the percentage of colonial soldiers is much higher because they serve in the military for a longer period of time.

We must give more attention to the colonies. This is the foremost task of the French party and the British party" (INTERNATIONAL BULLETIN Journal, Number 41, 4 July 1924).

2. "I come here to direct the attention of the Communist International to the fact that the colonies exist and proclaim that the revolution has the task of resolving the issue of the future of the colonies; at the same time, I am here to bring to your attention the dangers faced by the colonies. Apparently, you have yet to fully accept the thinking that the destiny of the international proletariat, especially the proletarian within those countries that send forces to invade and occupy colonies, is closely linked to the destiny of the oppressed classes in the colonies. Even if the situation were calm, I would avail myself of the opportunity and, if necessary, create every possible opportunity to awaken you to the colonial question...

Comrades, forgive my boldness, but I must say that as I listen to the contributions to the debate by those of you from mother countries, I get the impression that you are trying to kill the snake by hitting it on the tail, not the head. You all know that the venom and vitality of imperialism are concentrated in the colonies, not the mother country. It is the colonies that supply raw materials to the factories and soldiers to the armies of imperialism. It is the colonies that are the foundation of counter-revolutionary forces. And, when you talk about revolution, you give light attention to the colonial question.

Why, in all matters of revolution, have you not reorganized your tactics and forces? Why do you organize forces and organize propaganda but give no attention to the forces and propaganda of the opposition that you want to struggle against and topple? Why do you ignore the colonies at a time when the capitalists are using the colonies to defend themselves and oppose you...

While debating capabilities and methods for completing the revolution, while preparing combat plans, the British and French comrades and the comrades of the other parties have completely overlooked this important strategic point. So, this is why I must earnestly appeal to you to 'pay attention'" (shorthand notes of the 5th Congress of the Communist International, pages 210-211, from the French version printed in Le Marxisme et l'Asie((Chu nghia Mac va chau A [Marxism and Asia])),1853-1964 by H. C D'Encause and S. Schram, Armand Colin Publishing House, Paris, 1965, pp 273-274).

The above speeches by Nguyen Ai Quoc, although short, reflected his viewpoints and thinking concerning the national liberation revolution in the colonies.
The national and colonial question was one of the important questions on the agenda of the 5th Congress of the Communist International. There was intense debate of this question during a number of sessions of the congress...

We must collect all the speeches by Nguyen Ai Quoc at that congress and try to find original versions in order to compare copies against them and discover sentences or passages that are missing or differ in some way from current versions for one reason or another in order to help achieve better results in the work of collecting and verifying documents and materials of his.

On the basis of the materials that have been collected so far and are beginning to be studied, we see that his speeches reflected a determined spirit to struggle to defend and put into effect Lenin's arguments concerning the national and colonial questions; that he honestly and frankly criticized a number of fraternal parties of that time for not concerning themselves with or conducting any activities in support of the revolutionary movement in the colonies; and that he pointed out that the revolution in the colonies must be raised to a level of equal importance with the proletarian revolution in the imperialist countries and that the revolution in the colonies must display initiative and not depend or rely upon the proletarian revolution in the "mother country." He also concerned himself with the issue of the peasants in the colonies, primarily the peasants of Indochina, and suggested that the Communist International help reorganize peasants, supply them with leadership cadres and guide them in the direction of revolution and liberation.

The speeches by Nguyen Ai Quoc at this congress are of major theoretical and practical value and help to enrich Marxism-Leninism with regard to the national and colonial questions.

FOOTNOTES

1. The archives of the Institute of Party History at the Institute of Marxism and Leninism.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
STUDIES: THE LAWS OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION--THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 41-47

[Article by Quyet Tien]

[Text] After the working class and laboring people seized political power, the gradual transformation of agriculture in accordance with the principles of socialism becomes an objective necessity. At the same time, it is one of the most complex and difficult tasks in the course of the socialist revolution and socialist construction.

As we know, in every country in which the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established, the victorious proletariat found itself facing an old agriculture consisting of the following two types of economies: the capitalist business economy and the small-scale, private production economy of peasants. Both of these economies are, by their very nature, in contradiction with the trend of development of socialism because both are based on private ownership of the means of production. Therefore, this old agriculture must, of course, be transformed in accordance with the principles of socialism.

We also know that the nationalization of cropland or the distribution of cropland to peasants do not immediately lead to the formation of new production relations within agriculture. Therefore, the proletarian state must take additional measures to bring agriculture to the path of socialism.

Within the state sector, this task is carried out by establishing large, highly mechanized enterprises on nationalized cropland. These are the state farms in the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. These farms provide solid foundations for thorough reforms in the countryside and are models of all of the party's work regarding socialist agriculture.

More complicated is the work of bringing the mass of small-scale private farmers to the path of large-scale socialist production within agriculture. This, too, is a very difficult task because the decentralized nature of the private economy of farmers, the inherent spontaneous nature of its development and its technological backwardness together with its low labor productivity, its low product output and the private ownership psychology of farmers are
inconsistent with the requirements involved in the development of the new society. Therefore, this economy must be transformed in accordance with the principles of socialism.

Concerning the characteristics of small-scale, private agriculture, Marx once said: "Because of its nature, small-scale cropland ownership does not permit the development of the social production capacity of labor, the establishment of various social forms of labor, the concentration of social capital, large-scale livestock production or the progressive application of science in agriculture."(1) Marx also said that small-scale, private production "cannot achieve the rich nature or the development of a system of reproduction or its material and spiritual conditions but neither can small-scale, private production achieve the conditions of a rational system of farming."(2)

With these as its characteristics, this small-scale agriculture reveals itself to be powerless to develop production forces and, as a result, is not suited to the requirements of building and developing large-scale, socialist production.

From a different perspective, small-scale, private production, as Lenin said, carries within itself the seeds of capitalist spontaneity. Due to the impact of the law of value, this agriculture is constantly divided and changing; while a small percentage of farmers, as a result of the advantages afforded them by their means of production, liquid capital, labor and even their "tricks of the trade," is becoming richer with each passing day, the majority of farmers are becoming poorer and an increasing number is going bankrupt. This situation occurs on a regular basis and inevitably gives rise to exploiter-exploited relations. And, this is obviously in contradiction with the nature of socialism.

Thus, from the standpoint of both economics and politics, small-scale, private agriculture becomes an increasing obstacle to the establishment and development of large-scale, socialist industry as well as the complete liberation of the laboring farmer and the strengthening of the alliance of workers and farmers, which is the primary political base of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system. Socialism cannot be built with one foot resting on a system of large-scale, socialist industry while the other foot is resting upon a backward, small farmer economy. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot become firmly established if it does not completely liberate the farmer from small-scale agriculture with its backward technology and low labor productivity or if it fails through this liberation to strengthen the alliance of workers and farmers, which constitutes the main force of the socialist revolution.

Only by transforming small-scale, private agriculture in accordance with the principles of socialism can we develop the production forces within agriculture on the basis of applying new technological advances and expanding the division of labor so that agriculture develops in every respect, initiates intensive cultivation and specialized farming, achieves highly centralized and specialized production, achieves high labor productivity and high crop yields, produces a large output and meets, more fully with each passing day, the needs of the country and the people for grain and food products, for agricultural
raw materials for industry, for agricultural products for exportation, thereby laying an ever more solid base for the building and development of large-scale, socialist industry.

Only by transforming small-scale, private agriculture in accordance with the principles of socialism can we put an end to the division among farmers, eliminate capitalist spontaneity within agriculture and abolish one of the most important causes of the emergence and re-emergence of capitalist exploitation.

Only by transforming small-scale, private agriculture in accordance with the principles of socialism can we completely liberate laboring farmers from the threat of bankruptcy and poverty and make their lives increasingly happy and civilized. On this basis, we can strengthen the alliance of workers and farmers, strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, strengthen the socialist system. With its feet firmly planted in large-scale, socialist industry and cooperativized agriculture with increasingly modern technology, the socialist system becomes a very solid system. And with the alliance of workers and farmers as its solid base, the dictatorship of the proletariat is solidified and strengthened.

Thus, transforming small-scale, private agriculture in accordance with the principles of socialism is clearly a very important law of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. It is also a very large task that the victorious proletariat must successfully carry out if it wants to complete its glorious historic mission.

Concerning the inevitability as well as the principles and methods involved in the transformation of small-scale, private agriculture, Engels once said that "it is not in the interest of socialism to maintain that system (that is, private ownership--Q.T.), but to allow it to disappear; because, wherever private ownership exists and to the extent that it exists, public ownership cannot be established."(3) Engels also said: the desire of small farmers to preserve private ownership only prolongs their "more dead than alive" existence! Engels defined the task of the communist regarding small farmers as follows: "Once we have seized political power, we will not have the option of considering the use of violent force to take from the small farmer his right of ownership (whether violent force is employed or not, compensation must be paid) as we must do with landowners. Our task as far as small farmers are concerned is to direct their private production and private ownership down the path of cooperation, not through force, but by example, by having society help them achieve this."(4) Confident that this correct solution would be accepted by farmers, Engels wrote: "When we give farmers the ability to utilize the methods of large-scale businesses, not for the sake of the capitalists' interests, but their own common interests, will it not then be obvious to them that this is in their interest, that this is their only course of salvation?"(5)

Inheriting and developing upon these thoughts of the founders of scientific communism, Lenin charted the course of agricultural cooperativization in detail, that is, the course of building socialism in the countryside. Lenin's cooperativization plan was based on cooperativization under circumstances in
which the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist state controlled the primary means of production, which constitute the universal form of cooperativization, the form most easily understood by farmers that is used to attract farmers to socialist construction.

As Lenin observed, the main advantage of the cooperative system lies in the fact that it is a policy that combines private interests with state control and supervision of these interests; it is a policy that subordinates private interests to the interests of the whole. Without this, it is impossible to lead laboring farmers down the path of socialist construction. Concerning the extremely important significance of cooperativization, Lenin once wrote: "The power of the state over all primary means of production, political power in the hands of the proletariat, the alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and very small peasants, the proletariat's winning the right to lead the peasantry, etc.—is this not all that is necessary to build a complete socialist society out of cooperatives, out of cooperatives alone, which we formerly ridiculed as huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right to treat as such now under the new economic policy?"(6)

Lenin defined the primary principles of socialist cooperativization as: voluntary association, gradual cooperativization, party leadership and assistance provided by the dictatorship of the proletariat state.

The principle of voluntary association is one of the most important. This principle is based in the fact that the party of the working class considers laboring farmers to be the strategic allies of the working class and, as such, they are not the targets of appropriation by means of violent force and even the use of orders to force action by them is prohibited. Only persuasion in the form of ideological education and, in particular, in the form of real examples of the superior nature of a specific way of working can attract the large numbers of laboring farmers to agricultural cooperativization. To do otherwise is detrimental to the agricultural cooperativization movement, to the effort to strengthen the alliance of workers and farmers, which is the base of the dictatorship of the proletariat and constitutes the main force of the socialist revolution.

The principle of gradual progression is an important principle in organizing and guiding the agricultural cooperativization movement. This principle has its basis in the following: the level of socialist awareness of laboring farmers can only be raised gradually; the true level of socialization of agricultural production can only be raised gradually; and the management qualifications of cooperative cadres can only be raised gradually on the basis of gaining practical experience. Because he adhered to this principle, Lenin maintained that we must first carry out cooperativization within each field of trade (by organizing credit cooperatives, marketing cooperatives and so forth) and then gradually shift to the field of production, within which there are many different degrees of cooperativization, ranging from cooperativization of labor to cooperativization of cropland and the other important means of production.

The principle of leadership by the party of the working class and assistance from the dictatorship of the proletariat state is the principle of decisive
significance in the success or failure of the agricultural cooperativization movement.

Without the leadership, education and organization provided by the party, farmers do not join the cooperativization movement in a truly voluntary manner and this movement cannot steadily advance to final victory, to the true socialization of agricultural production on the basis of increasingly advanced technology. It must be understood that persuasive measures and concern for the material interests of the farmer are the basis of everything involved in encouraging farmers to join cooperatives in order to socialize agricultural production. Lenin frequently stressed that the cooperativized economy must be based on strict economic accounting and scrupulous adherence to the principle of wages based on the quantity and quality of labor. This task cannot be carried out without struggling against the forces and habits of the old society, without leadership by the party.

Together with party leadership, organizational, technical and financial assistance by the dictatorship of the proletariat state to cooperatives is a necessary prerequisite to the reorganizing of farmers and to consolidating the gains of the cooperativization movement. Lenin once wrote: "A social system emerges only if it has the financial backing of a specific class. At present (that is, with the dictatorship of the proletariat having been established—Q.T.), the social system to which we must give more than ordinary assistance is the cooperative system."(7)

Thus, the gradual socialist transformation of agriculture, which primarily involves the cooperativization of production carried out by farmers, is a general law of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. However, the particular characteristics of this process have differed from one country to another.

In Russia, they began to organize new forms of socialist agriculture immediately after the victory of the October Socialist Revolution. Later, the work of developing the lowest forms of cooperation in the countryside was carried out.

During the early years, cooperative and work exchange organizations were the main form of the cooperative movement within production. Within these organizations, labor was socialized, cropland usually continued to be privately owned and production tools and draft animals were centralized to some degree. Prior to 1929, this was the universal form of organization in the countryside.

Once, agricultural communes were established in the Soviet Union, which centralized all means of production, both basic means of production and minor means of production. However, this form of production cooperation did not become widely developed. The agricultural communes only existed during the early years of the Soviet government, after which they broke up and were reorganized as agricultural artels, that is, collective farms.

Within the collective farms, everything is socialized: the use of land, labor, draft livestock, agricultural machines and implements and the main
production buildings and economic projects. The collective farmer only retains his house, a household garden and some livestock and poultry. Because it represents the fullest and most successful combination of the social interests of all laboring people and the particular interests of collective farmers, collective farms developed widely and became the best form of organization for building socialism in the countryside.

Together with the widespread development of the collectivization movement, tractor stations were established. These are state-operated enterprises that provide the collective farms with agricultural technical support. However, the role of the tractor stations does not stop there. They are also a new form of production alliance between the cities and the countryside, between state industry and the collective farms.

Thus, by 1940, the Soviet Union had completed the collectivization of agriculture and finished the building of large-scale, socialist agriculture on the basis of industrialization within the cities. This led to the complete abolition of the class of wealthy farmers, the last exploiting class in the Soviet Union, and the elimination of the long-standing opposition between the cities and the countryside.

In the other socialist countries, the characteristics of the agricultural cooperativization movement have been different than in the Soviet Union. The main reason for this has been the fact that, in the vast majority of the socialist countries, cropland has not been entirely nationalized as in the Soviet Union, but given to farmers to hold as private property. This has made the cooperativization movement somewhat more complex. However, this solution was necessary because the total nationalization of cropland would not have been supported by farmers, who struggled for centuries against landowners to gain ownership of their cropland.

As a result, some socialist countries at first established low level cooperatives. Within these cooperatives, cropland was considered to represent shares contributed by members to the cooperative but continued to be the private property of farmers. Farmers received income not only on the basis of the quantity and quality of the labor contributed by them to the collective economy, but also on the basis of how much cropland they contributed to the cooperative. In the next stage, the stage of high level cooperatives, income from cropland was discontinued and income from the cooperative was based solely on distribution in accordance with labor.

Within the world socialist system, due to the results of the socialist transformation of agriculture, the socialist sector today accounts for more than 90 percent of total agricultural land.

In our country, following the course of cooperativization charted by Lenin, adhering to the primary principles on cooperativization advanced by him and applying the experiences of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, our party, after seizing state power, quickly began leading farmers down the path of agricultural cooperativization. On the basis of our country's specific situation, our party decided to carry out agricultural cooperativization before mechanizing agriculture. It adopted the policy of
combining cooperativization with the building of water conservancy projects. We widely organized consumer cooperatives and marketing cooperatives even during the early years of the period of transition in the socialist North; at the same time, we organized different forms of cooperative production, forms that ranged from a low to a high level of development: work rotation teams, low level cooperatives and high level cooperatives. The cooperativization movement in the North during the early years was basically carried out in accordance with Lenin's principles on cooperativization; at the same time, these principles were given more concrete meaning in the organizing and management of cooperatives by our adoption of the principles: voluntary association, mutual benefit and democratic management. Together with setting up cooperatives, our party quickly established state farms on the basis of nationalizing the plantations of the imperialists, the compradore bourgeoisie and large landowners. The increasing development of the cooperativization movement played a large role in consolidating the socialist North and enabled it to become the most decisive factor in the victory of the resistance against the United States for national salvation.

Ever since our entire country began advancing toward socialism, our party has attached importance to encouraging, teaching and organizing the farmers of the South in various forms of agricultural cooperativization: credit cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, production teams, production collectives and cooperatives. Through the leadership of the party and assistance provided by the dictatorship of the proletariat state, the cooperativization movement in the South has taken initial strides forward. Relying upon the experiences of the North in past years, our party has pointed out that the best course for gradually advancing agriculture in the South to large-scale, socialist production is: closely coordinating transformation and construction and carrying out cooperativization in conjunction with building water conservancy projects and carrying out mechanization; attaching importance to both establishing cooperatives and establishing state farms; closely linking the establishment of cooperatives with the building of the districts; coordinating agricultural transformation with the transformation of private industry and commerce within the cities...

Within cooperativization, our party emphasizes the need to comply with Lenin's principles of cooperativization. It has also attached very much importance to uniting all laboring farmers within cooperativization. These are good experiences that we must give our attention to developing upon in order to steadily advance our country's agricultural cooperativization movement to final victory.

Another point that must be mentioned is that the cooperativization movement in our country was, for many years, carried out on the basis of distributing cropland to laboring farmers. This was necessary in order to build enthusiasm among laboring farmers for production and gain their voluntary participation in the cooperativization movement. However, the situation has changed since then. Whereas cropland was gradually socialized in the North in the past through agricultural cooperativization, in the South today, we are able to socialize cropland by stipulating that land is under national ownership. Our country's new Constitution clearly states: all land in our country is under national ownership. This is possible because each bit of soil of our
fatherland has been soaked with the blood and sweat of many generations of Vietnamese; therefore, it is the common property of the people of the entire country. We must put an end to the confusion regarding land ownership resulting from purchases, sales, leases, disputes, illegal occupation and so forth, which do not facilitate the unified management of land by the state; land use must be planned so that land is not only developed in a rational and economic manner, but is also improved, nourished and protected. Thus, stipulating that land is under national ownership is consistent with the interests of all society as well as the basic and long-range interests of each citizen. However, to insure that farmers engage in production with peace of mind, the Constitution states: "Those collectives and individuals who are now using land may continue to use it and enjoy the fruits of their labors in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." This is a new characteristic of the agricultural cooperativization movement in our country.

We believe that by correctly applying the law of carrying out the socialist transformation of agriculture in a gradual manner and promptly learning from its experiences in order to develop upon strongpoints and correct weaknesses, our party will surely lead the agricultural cooperativization movement throughout our country to new and larger victories.

FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p 274.


4. Ibid., p 708.

5. Ibid., p 710.


7. Ibid., p 666.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS ON BUILDING THE DISTRICTS AND STRENGTHENING THE DISTRICT LEVEL: BUILDING THE DISTRICT AND STRENGTHENING THE DISTRICT LEVEL IN AN NHON

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 48-54

[Article by Truong An, secretary of the An Nhon District Party Committee]

[Text] I. Developing the District Agro-Industrial Economy

Our district has two main production sectors, agriculture and small industry and the handicraft trades. To reorganize production and develop it in accordance with an agro-industrial economic structure, we had to first give thought to planning. In the beginning, because we were not aware of all that is involved in overall planning and sector planning, we simply established the production guidelines of the district as consisting of agriculture and small industry and the handicraft trades.

Within agriculture, grain (primarily rice) and annual industry crops (such as peanuts, soybeans and sugarcane) are the main crops; hogs and cattle are the main species of livestock raised. Within small industry and the handicraft trades, the district primarily produces consumer goods, export goods, building materials and small production tools while processing agricultural products for human consumption and feed for livestock. Although neither comprehensive nor complete, these guidelines did play a major role in the formulation of the economic-technical plans of agricultural production installations as well as small industry and handicraft installations. In 1977, on the basis of the task assigned by the province and the potentials and strengths of the district itself, An Nhon drew up a rough outline of the district's overall planning. Today, this overall planning is still in the process of being amended and improved and has yet to be officially approved by the province; however, this planning does clearly reflect the district's economic structure as an agro-industrial economy coordinated with forestry and has served to guide the planning of the various sectors within the district.

Within agriculture, crop production mainly involves the production of grain, primarily wet rice, supplemented by cassava and corn (there are 16,000 hectares of rice, which account for 75 percent of the amount of land under cultivation during the year). Export crops include soybeans, peanuts, sugarcane, castor oil, cashews and pimentos. Livestock production primarily
consists of hog production (from 71,000 to 75,000 hogs) and cattle production (16,000 to 22,000 head) supplemented by ducks and fresh water pisciculture. The total value of the district's agricultural output will increase from 20.338 million dong in 1981 to 36.85 million dong in 1985.

In small industry and the handicraft trades, four large production clusters closely associated with the four economic-technical clusters within the district have been established. Production centers around machine manufacture and repair; the processing of agricultural products and food products for human consumption and feed for livestock; the production of building materials; textile production; the contract production of handicraft art products for exportation; the production of essential consumer goods and so forth. The value of the total output of these sectors will increase from 14.6 million dong in 1981 to 30 million dong in 1985. In forestry, more than 4,500 hectares of forests have been planned along lines that coordinate forestry with agriculture and industry, thereby creating a supply of raw materials for the processing industry and for exportation. In addition, full use is being made of idle land at various places to raise medicinal crops and other crops that provide raw materials.

In recent years, on the basis of the overall planning of the district, sector production planning, the planning of specialized farming areas, the planning of cooperatives and so forth have been carried out and implemented and have yielded a number of initial results. In agriculture, we have established two main production zones that are closely linked to the four economic-technical clusters. The first zone consists of 10 villages with approximately 5,669 hectares (4,171 hectares of which are cropland) and a population of 104,558, 32,123 of whom are laborers. Within this zone, our key rice growing area, rice is raised in rotation cultivation with peanuts or soybeans. At present, there are 500 hectares under the cultivation of peanuts and 450 hectares of soybeans. Soon, we will expand soybean production to 1,500 hectares, peanut production to 1,000 hectares and plant mulberry trees and organize sericulture within this zone to support the district's textile installations. The main species of livestock raised in this zone are hogs, ducks in flocks and draft buffalo and cattle. The primary products and commodities produced by this zone are rice, soybeans, peanuts and pork. The second zone consists of four villages with 3,439 hectares of farmland and a population of 49,869, 15,198 of whom are laborers. This zone, which is devoted mainly to the production of grain, consists of 2,298 hectares of rice, 200 hectares of cassava and 1,000 hectares planted with sugarcane. Some land has been allocated for the planting of cashew and mulberry trees. The main species of livestock raised in this zone are cattle, hogs and freshwater fish (the Mot Mountain reservoir). The main products and commodities produced by this zone are sugar, beef, pork and oil bearing plants.

In industry, we planned and gradually established four large production clusters that are closely associated with the four economic-technical clusters and the two electric power networks within the district. The first cluster, which is located in the town of Binh Dinh, consists of installations engaged in the manufacture and repair of machinery, the extraction of molasses to make white sugar, ice production, the processing of agricultural products, the processing of livestock feed, paper production, the production of bicycle
parts and the production of handicraft art products for exportation and the production of molasses for civilian use. The second cluster, which is located in the town of Dap Da-Go Gang, consists of the blacksmith, textile, machine manufacture and repair, glassware, writing chalk, plastic goods, exported handicraft art product, soap and conical hat sectors. The third cluster, which is located in the town of Canh Hang, consists of the machine repair, blacksmith, livestock feed processing and a number of consumer goods sectors. The fourth cluster, which lies along National Highway Number 19, consists of the forestry product processing sectors of the central, provincial and district levels, the building materials sector, the rice milling sector, the machine repair sector, the livestock feed processing sector and the industrial sugar sector. Together with the large-scale production clusters, the agricultural cooperatives have organized handicraft trades in the countryside, thereby creating a small industry and handicraft production network extending from the district to the installations.

We have also constructed two electric power networks, the first of which receives power from Quy Nhon and the second of which receives hydroelectric power from the Mot Mountain Reservoir, which primarily support agricultural and industrial production.

On the basis of the broad outline of production guidelines based on the initial overall planning and sector planning described above, we have carried out economic, cultural and social transformation and development within the district. We began by transforming the old production relations and establishing the new production relations within the various sectors and trades. Within transformation, we have combined transformation with construction, placing primary emphasis upon construction; we have consolidated our gains wherever transformation has been carried out. On the agricultural production front, despite encountering numerous difficulties in the struggle between socialism and capitalism, very acute difficulties in some cases, through the determination of the entire party organization and the close guidance provided by the district party committee, 27 agricultural cooperatives were established within the district during the 4 years from 1978 to 1981, thereby bringing 89 percent of farm families into cooperatives and collectivizing 92 percent of the means of production. Deserving of attention is the fact that we guided the agricultural cooperatives in quickly making payment to farmers for their means of production. Chiefly as a result of this, obstacles have not been encountered in the distribution of draft power.

Along with establishing the new production relations within agriculture, we quickly abolished private, capitalist commerce, established a socialist commerce network, established four state-operated installations and 10 cooperatives in small industry and the handicraft trades and carried out the transformation and reorganization of the communications-transportation and public health sectors within the district. Wherever we have established the new production relations, we have strengthened the organization and reorganized production forces. The reorganization of production forces within the district and at installations has been designed to closely link agriculture with industry, small industry and the handicraft trades, closely link production to distribution and circulation and establish ties among the various segments of the economy.
On the basis of our overall planning and sector planning, we established the scale and structure of production and defined the production task of each installation. The agricultural cooperatives have improved their fields in a manner closely linked to building roads and water conservancy projects and have allocated their crops and livestock in accordance with the zoning and planning of the district, thereby gradually establishing specialized farming areas. We carried out the redistribution of labor among the various sectors and within each sector on a district-wide basis. We shifted nearly 3,000 agricultural laborers and small merchants to small industry and handicraft production. Within agriculture, a portion of the labor force has been shifted to collective livestock production and the different trade sectors.

During the past several years, we have, by educating the masses, mobilizing the masses and adopting specific policies, gained the voluntary participation of the masses in the movement to go build new economic zones. We have sent nearly 1,500 families consisting of more than 6,000 persons to build new economic zones within and outside the province. The reorganizing and reassignment of production forces, although not yet perfect, has resulted in the gradual establishment of three of the four economic-technical clusters (Binh Dinh, Dap Da and along National Highway 19). These economic-technical clusters are initial expressions of a close link between agriculture and industry, between production and distribution-circulation. We have taken steps to guide the establishment of economic ties within the collective economy, between the collective economy and the state-operated economy and between the collective economy and the private economy through the contract ordering of goods or joint businesses. In addition to the state-operated economy and the collective economy, we have also given attention to the household economy. In the recent past, although we have not truly given them appropriate attention every cooperative has organized or guided the development of a number of subsidiary sectors and trades in order to make full use of idle labor and increase the income of cooperative members.

Several years ago, although the agricultural, small industry and handicraft production of our district were increasing, they were not increasing at a high average annual rate. This was because the production installations within the district were constrained by an unsuitable management system. In recent years, our district has gradually improved the economic management system. We began by improving the way that plans are formulated and improving the organization and guidance of the implementation of plans. Our district has quickly applied scientific and technological achievements in production. We have attached very much importance to training and efficiently utilizing scientific and technical cadres. Practically all key cadres and professional cadres on the district level and at installations have attended economic management schools or specialized professional schools. Deserving of attention is that during the past several years, under the guidelines "the state and the people working together," "the people performing the work and the state providing assistance" and "the people performing the work and the state providing the guidance," we have gradually established a network of material-technical bases within the district. In the area of water conservancy, we built the Mot Mountain Reservoir, which has a capacity of 90 million cubic meters of water; constructed or repaired dozens of concrete dams and dozens of dirt dams; and completely constructed and put into use four
electric pump stations. Every agricultural cooperative has dug new canals and ditches or dredged existing ones. As a result, we have established an irrigation and drainage network that is rather efficiently combined with transportation and national defense needs within the district.

Within the district are more than 160 water pumps of various types, which provide effective irrigation for 100 percent of the land under the cultivation of winter-spring crops and from 70 to 80 percent of the land irrigated during the year. In addition, there is a hog breeding farm, a hog artificial insemination farm, a crop production and veterinary station, a technical supply station, a disease prevention hygiene station, a tractor unit... On the basic level, all 27 agricultural cooperatives have constructed granaries, drying yards, seed soaking tanks and relatively permanent collective livestock farms. Many cooperatives have established joint businesses that process livestock feed. Many cooperatives have improved or are improving their fields in a manner coordinated with communications and water conservancy needs. Every cooperative has provided its laborers with a full supply of hand implements and is gradually equipping with improved implements (rice threshing machines, improved carts) and a number of motorized plows, thereby gradually achieving mechanization within a few important elements of production.

On the basis of the transformation of the old production relations and the establishment of the new production relations, the reorganization of production, the strengthening of material-technical bases and the redistribution of labor have had a positive impact upon the development of production. Grain output increased from 36,164 tons in 1977 to 50,050 tons in 1982. The amount of grain per capita increased from 320 kilograms in 1977 to 360 kilograms in 1982. As regards industrial crops, we produced 561 tons of soybeans, 369 tons of peanuts, 8,732 tons of sugarcane and 506 liters of peppermint oil in 1982. The district had 33,620 hogs, 17,000 head of cattle and 981 buffalo in 1982. Our district meets and exceeds its norms on the mobilization of grain, meat and industrial crop products every year.

In small industry and the handicraft trades, we have established or restored 51 production installations within the district. Of these installations, four are state-operated, nine are cooperatives and the remainder are cooperative teams and a number of business units within agricultural cooperatives. The output value of small industry and the handicraft trades increased from 2.59 million dong in 1977 to 19 million dong in 1982 (computed at fixed prices). The majority of the small industry and handicraft products produced over and above those needed to fulfill contracts with the state are used to serve the needs of the locality or sold outside the district; this figure accounts for roughly 40 percent of total output. With agriculture representing 54 percent and small industry and the handicraft trades representing 46 percent of total output, we have begun to establish a clearly defined agro-industrial economic structure within our district.

II. Organizing Distribution-Circulation Within the District

Our district closely linked the transformation of industry and commerce to the reorganization of distribution and circulation at the very outset. In 1976, we quickly established a socialist commerce network consisting of state stores
and village marketing cooperatives. We gradually established a level III general corporation with 14 state stores and a district marketing cooperative management committee in charge of 23 stores and 14 village and town marketing cooperatives. The state stores as well as the marketing cooperatives are distributed throughout the district and closely linked to the four economic-technical clusters; together with the agricultural cooperatives and the credit cooperatives, they form the three legs of the commerce network at each installation. Ever since we began establishing agricultural cooperatives and small industry and handicraft cooperatives, we have made a conscious effort to closely link the state-operated commerce network and marketing cooperatives to the agricultural cooperatives and the small industry and handicraft cooperatives in order to establish production and distribution-circulation as a closed cycle.

In each production season and each planning year, the socialist commerce organizations have kept abreast of the plan norms and the production investment requirements of agricultural, small industry and handicraft cooperatives and established the material conditions needed to support production and the daily lives of laborers. These organizations sign contracts with the agricultural cooperatives and the small industry and handicraft cooperatives to procure their products, thus putting them under state control, which includes procuring the goods obtained by marketing cooperatives in their business operations. As a result, the state controls the flow of goods, the market is stable and favorable conditions exist for the development of production. In recent years, the commerce sector has procured an average of 18.3 million dong in goods each year and sold goods worth 22.5 million dong each year; each citizen is sold goods worth an average of 150 dong each year.

III. Molding the New Man and Building the New Countryside

Since liberation day, our district has given special attention to molding the new man. We have attached importance to cultivating within each person patriotism, love of socialism, the habit of living and working in accordance with the Constitution and law, the habit of working in a disciplined, technical and highly productive manner and the spirit of collective ownership. All cultural and educational activities have focused on molding the new man. In the field of culture and education, we quickly constructed a number of material bases, such as halls of culture, meeting halls, museums, tradition halls, reading rooms and so forth of the district and each installation. We have constructed sufficient schools and classrooms and provided sufficient teaching and learning aids to enable one of every three persons to attend school and eliminate the need for three school sessions per day.

In public health, in addition to building the public health network and a number of material bases to safeguard the health of the people, we have attached importance to guiding the "five complete jobs" movement of the sector, with special attention to the construction of the three basic sanitation projects and planned parenthood. Because ours is a small, densely populated district that has no more land to clear, in order to stabilize and gradually improve the standard of living of the district's people, we must, in addition to accelerating the development of production, also send persons to
build new economic zones and practice planned parenthood. By means of propaganda, education and specific policies, we have enlightened the masses and gained their voluntary participation in planned parenthood. Within our district, 6 percent of women wear the intra-uterine loop and the rate of population growth has declined from 3.4 percent in 1976 to 1.8 percent in 1982.

IV. Building the District into a Fortress Maintaining the People’s Security and Defending the Fatherland

Together with carrying out economic and cultural development, we have made every effort to develop the district into a fortress in the defense of the fatherland. We have paid special attention to building and strengthening our mobile militia forces, self-defense militia and the people's security network at each installation. At present, each village has one mobile militia company and each agricultural cooperative has one militia platoon. At the agencies and enterprises are two battalions and three directly subordinate companies. The district itself has one reserve battalion. Since 1979, under the guideline of coordinating the economy with the national defense system and while improving the canal and ditch network, building roads, constructing stations and farms, building the communications network and so forth, we have given our attention to supporting national defense needs. We have planned and gradually established defense lines and rear bases as well as production installations that serve the needs of the regular armed forces stationed here. We annually set aside 1 percent of the grain output of cooperatives as a reserve for national defense needs. We have maintained a continuous movement to protect the security of the fatherland and have all the people participate in national defense work in order to raise the level of awareness of cadres and the people and heighten their revolutionary vigilance. At the same time, we have formulated plan norms on the military draft for each year and each of the next several years. In each of the past several years, our district has exceeded its norms on the induction of youths, meeting both quantitative and qualitative requirements.

V. Building a Solid and Strong Party

In our district, the process of socialist transformation and socialist construction has been closely linked to the process of building the party. Our district party committee, which has firmly upheld the principles of democratic centralism, collective leadership and personal responsibility, has achieved a high degree of unity and consensus within the party committee as well as the party organization. To insure that we are fully capable of providing the necessary leadership and guidance, we have given very much attention to cadre work and party member work.

In order to establish a solid and strong apparatus, the district party committee, on the basis of research conducted by it, reorganized and reassigned cadres in a manner suited to the requirements of each organization; in particular, additional competent cadres who possess good personal qualities have been assigned to the various leadership agencies and economic agencies. The district party committee has given its attention to putting control work on a regular basis. It has especially concerned itself with putting party
activities on a regular basis and assigning party members to lead the masses. Besides deploying and assigning cadres to meet present work requirements, we have carried out cadre planning for the district and basic levels. Each year, on the basis of this planning, we boldly send a large number of cadres, especially young cadres who show prospects, to study culture, politics, economic management and special fields or professions at schools of the central level and province. On the other hand, we have arranged for cadres to study on the job or attend cultural, political or specialized schools on the district level and have helped them gain experience through their daily work in order to improve their qualifications. On this basis, we have boldly promoted competent cadres who possess good personal qualities to important positions under the guideline "young and old working side by side."

Today, the executive committee of the district party organization, the district people's committee and the various sectors and circles around the district, especially the economic sectors and key agencies on the basic level, have been strengthened by assigning to them young cadres and even scientific-technical cadres who possess good political and management qualifications. Of the 995 party members in the cities and towns within our district, 882 are working in agriculture, 304 of whom are management cadres or specialized cadres at the 27 agricultural cooperatives; 80 party members are on cooperative management boards, 105 are on subcommittees and 92 serve as unit chiefs or assistant chiefs. The corps of party members is increasing in size and its quality is improving with each passing day; practically every party member is working hard to complete the task assigned to him.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
DEVELOPING FROM AN AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT INTO A DISTRICT THAT HAS A COMPREHENSIVE AGRICULTURAL–FORESTRY–FISHING–INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 54–60

[Article by Hoang Cong Cham, deputy secretary of the Tuy Hoa District Party Committee]

[Text] Tuy Hoa is a lowland district and one of the key rice growing districts of Phu Khanh Province. Following liberation, Tuy Hoa 1 District and Tuy Hoa 2 District were merged to form Tuy Hoa District. In mid-1977, Tuy Hoa District was merged with Tuy Hoa City to form an administrative unit directly subordinate to the province. In late 1978, it was divided back into two administrative units, Tuy Hoa District and Tuy Hoa City (as they existed before the merger). In 1982, the six northern villages of the district were merged with Tuy Hoa City.

At present, the district measures 104,468 hectares, 21,703 hectares of which are agricultural land. The district consists of 17 villages and the town of Phu Lam, which is the district seat. The district has a population of 171,235, 90.38 percent of which works in agriculture. The district has 610 square meters of farmland per capita. It has 50,942 hectares of forests, 12,360 hectares of which are rich forests and 14,100 hectares of which are average forests. The district's timber reserves exceed 7 million cubic meters. The district has more than 30 kilometers of coastline. Each year, from 1,500 to 2,000 tons of marine products can be harvested in the ocean waters of Tuy Hoa. The district has many industrial, small industry and handicraft sectors and trades. At present, its main sectors are the processing of agricultural, forestry and marine products, the production of machines for agriculture and, in particular, the production of building materials.

Immediately after liberation, the Tuy Hoa District party organization asserted that in order to develop the economy within our district, we had to move forward on the basis of our arable land and labor and consider agriculture to be the front of foremost importance. With this, the district party committee began to focus its efforts on providing the guidance and assembling the forces needed to develop agricultural production; at the same time, it proposed and put into effect a series of important, well coordinated measures designed to
move agriculture forward. First, the water conservancy problem was tackled. The district already had the Dong Cam farmland water conservancy project, which provided irrigation water for about 9,500 to 10,000 hectares each year. After liberation, we constructed the Nam Binh Electric Pump Station in Hoa Xuan Village, which provides irrigation water for 1,400 hectares, and built several other electric pump stations and a number of spillways, thereby increasing the amount of area under the cultivation of rice that is irrigated from 10,000 hectares in 1975 to 13,000 hectares in 1983. Water conservancy has been coordinated with communications. We have stepped up the construction and improvement of district roads while strongly developing the network of rural roads. Since we completed the establishment of agricultural cooperatives throughout the district (March, 1979), we have built 580 kilometers of field roads supporting production. We have continued to expand the amount of area under cultivation in two basic ways: restoring fields to production and clearing all cropland that had become overgrown; we have cleared 4,223 hectares at first installations and 1,305 hectares at second installations. We have gradually applied scientific and technological advances in agriculture, with efforts focused upon seed, fertilizer, crop protection, the improvement of fields and the planting of crops on schedule and with appropriate attention given to intensive cultivation, especially the intensive cultivation of rice. We have done a good job of redistributing some of the population and labor to areas that have arable land but little or no labor. For jobs requiring a large amount of labor, such as the construction of water conservancy projects, the building of roads, the clearing of land and so forth, labor from throughout the district has been mobilized. We have attached importance to accelerating production while making every effort to build material-technical bases supporting agriculture. Having started with nothing, the agricultural cooperatives of the district now have 173,200 square meters of drying yards (164,000 square meters constructed of bricks and 2,900 square meters constructed of concrete or cement), 144 granaries with a total capacity of 17,505 tons, a number of stations and farms, etc.

During the past several years, the important victories on the agricultural production front in Tuy Hoa District have come in the production of grain. Grain output per capita in paddy equivalent has risen with each passing year: 1975: only 336.9 kilograms (334.5 kilograms of which were in the form of paddy); 1982: 464 kilograms (455 kilograms of which were paddy); and 1983: 513 kilograms. Today, we are fully meeting the grain needs of the people, the cadres and personnel of the state and the armed forces within the district. At the same time, we have been fulfilling an ever higher grain obligation to the state each year. In 1976, we mobilized 17,398 tons for the state; in 1982 (minus the six northern villages that had been merged with Tuy Hoa City), we mobilized 20,739 tons of grain in paddy equivalent, primarily in the form of paddy; in addition, we have also produced some reserve grain and commodity grain for trade with other places.

Livestock production has also developed quite well, with the hog herd increasing at an annual rate of 11.5 percent and the cattle herd at an annual rate of 7 percent.
By fully resolving the grain problem, we have quickly stabilized and gradually improved the standard of living of the people. The socialist production relations within agriculture have been strengthened, thereby laying a solid foundation for stepping up production, developing the economy within the district and advancing from an agricultural district to a district that has an agricultural-forestry-fishing-industrial economic structure.

As regard forestry, the district annually harvests from 1,000 to 1,500 cubic meters of timber and 15,000 to 20,000 steres of firewood. If we include the timber harvesting site of the province and the other harvesting forces, roughly 10,000 cubic meters of wood are harvested each year in Tuy Hoa. The potentials for planting whole forests on barren hills, especially along the sandy coastline, and the potential for the planting of trees by the people are very large. Since liberation day, the district has planted more 1,000 hectares of whole forests and the people have planted more than 3.6 million trees.

As regards fishing, Tuy Hoa District has encountered many difficulties during the past several years in reorganizing production, socialist transformation has been carried out slowly and the supply of materials and fuel has decreased with each passing year; however, the output of ocean fish and the other types of marine products has still ranged from 1,500 to 2,500 tons per year and the district procures from 200 to 300 tons of fresh marine products each year.

At the time of liberation, the district had virtually nothing by way of industry, small industry or handicraft trades. During the past several years, we have restored this sector, primarily by building a number of new state-operated industrial installations such as the district machine station, the state-operated ice enterprise, installations processing hand-milled sugar, marine products and grain and a number of collective production installations. Today, the district has one forestry product harvesting and processing enterprise and 33 cooperatives and 3 cooperative teams in small industry and the handicraft trades. Many agricultural cooperatives have established installations that produce and repair farm implements, machine sections that operate and repair small tractors and the standard machines powered by internal combustion engines and installations producing building materials. The industrial, small industry and handicraft production installations produce such primary products as hand tools, household furniture, bicycle rims, bicycle tires, bricks, tiles, lime, split stone and so forth and process marine products, grain and lumber. The building materials sector, especially the production of bricks and tiles, has developed very rapidly, thereby creating favorable conditions for capital construction in support of agriculture and meeting the majority of the need for the construction of cultural projects, educational projects and housing for the people. The output value of the industrial sector has exceeded the plan and increased each year: in 1980, it exceeded the plan by 41 percent, a 1.4-fold increase compared to 1979; in 1981, it exceeded the plan by 30 percent, a 25 percent increase compared to 1980; and, in 1982, it equalled 8.6 million dong (at fixed prices) and exceeded the plan by more than 30 percent.

In the building of the material and technical bases of socialism, the district has restored the entire Dong Cam farmland water conservancy network; built
three new spillways, one of which, the An San spillway in Hoa Thinh Village, irrigates 500 hectares; and built seven electric pump stations, one of which, the Nam Binh Pump Station in Hoa Xuan, irrigates 1,400 hectares. We have constructed one tractor station with 14 large tractors; one veterinary station; one crop protection station; and one state-operated mechanized transport unit consisting of 7 trucks with a capacity of 126 tons. We have established 2 transport cooperatives consisting of 119 horse-drawn carts with a capacity of 60 tons, 774 cattle-drawn carts and 4,213 improved carts of various types supporting agricultural production. The road network has been repaired and expanded, from the district roads to the village and field roads, and now extends for a total of 891.5 kilometers, 98.6 kilometers of which are district roads and 212.2 kilometers of which are village roads. The district has one hospital (100 beds), 12 village public health stations, 12 cultural centers with meeting halls and outdoor theaters, 610 reading rooms (444 of which are newly constructed), four level III schools (three of which are newly constructed) and 74 child care centers.

In the years ahead, in order to build a solid and strong district on the basis of coordinating agriculture and industry at the very outset and at each installation and develop an agricultural-forestry-fishing-industrial economic structure within the district, we will focus our efforts on the following several areas:

1. We will concentrate on developing agriculture in every respect. Every effort will be made to increase the amount of area under cultivation and accelerate the rise in crop yields, with importance attached to increasing the yield of rice in high yield growing areas; at the same time, efforts will be made to achieve greater uniformity of rice yield within the district. We will raise the district's average yield to 10 tons and raise the average yields of many agricultural cooperatives to 15 tons per hectare per year. We will fully meet the grain needs of the people, fulfill grain obligations to the state, rapidly increase the output of agricultural commodities and exported agricultural products and establish many sources of raw materials for industry, small industry and the handicraft trades in order to develop the production of consumer and export goods. At the same time, appropriate attention will be given to developing livestock production, especially collective and household cattle and hog production. We will try to balance livestock production with crop production.

2. We will strongly develop industry, small industry and the handicraft trades to support agriculture and produce consumer and export goods. We will concentrate our efforts on the building of the economic-technical clusters while doing our best to develop small and medium-scale hydroelectric power stations. We will accelerate the development of state-operated industry, with attention to developing small industry and the handicraft trades within the collective sector. At the same time, positive steps will be taken to develop the trades within the agricultural cooperatives and among cooperative member families. We will establish economic ties with neighboring districts and increase our exports in order to create sources of raw materials, supplies and technical equipment for production. We will begin by strongly developing the processing of grain, food products, livestock feed, marine products and forestry products, the machine repair sector and the production of common
tools and a number of improved tools. Every available source of raw materials within the district will be used in production. We will promote the harvesting of marine and aquatic products and expand fishing operations, primarily ocean fishing. We will develop the cultivation of aquatic products and make full use of existing ponds and lakes for this purpose.

3. With regard to forestry, we will intensify the harvesting of wood and other forestry products, such as Bipterocarpus alatus, rattan, gum, latania leaves and pharmaceuticals; at the same time, attention will be given to planting and restoring forests, protecting the forests, especially headwater forests, and stopping the destruction and indiscriminate harvesting of the forests. Between 1983 and 1985, we will harvest 10,000 cubic meters of timber and 15,000 to 20,000 steres of firewood and plant 500 hectares of whole forests and 4 million individual trees, thereby covering barren hills and coastal sand dunes.

4. We will bring about strong changes in export and import activities. Exporting goods will become established as a strategic task of special importance in developing the economy and supporting everyday life. We will encourage the various strata of the people and all production installations to do everything possible to produce many export goods from agricultural products, forestry products and marine products and within small industry and the handicraft trades. Development will mainly be based on such short-term crops as sugarcane, tobacco, the various types of beans, sesame, castor oil, pimento and garlic. At the same time, full attention will be given to such perennial industrial crops as coconuts and pepper, especially cashews. We will correctly implement the principle of the state's exclusive rights in foreign trade; the principle of the exclusive management of foreign trade and foreign currency by the central level; and the principle that districts that have export goods must acquire their imports in accordance with the plan established between the province and district and the production installations and in accordance with the export-import regulations established by the state.

5. On the distribution-circulation front, every effort will be made to achieve the following targets: controlling the flow of products, especially such strategic products as grain, pork and exported marine and agricultural products. We will expand the use of two-way economic contracts so that each sector and each production installation clearly recognizes that the key to successful distribution and circulation is control of goods and money by the state. We will expand production at state-operated enterprises and cooperatives, emphasize discipline and responsibility in the delivery of products to the state and properly manage those products that are produced under contracts with the installation receiving raw materials from the state and the state receiving the finished products that are produced.

Both state-operated commerce and the marketing cooperatives will be strengthened so that they are able to supply rationed goods to recipients. At the same time, they will supply essential goods to the people and eventually become the masters of the market. A determined struggle will be waged against speculation and smuggling, market management will be strengthened and the market will be tightly managed at its source, on the basic level.
We will endeavor to control the flow of money and properly manage investments in economic development and capital construction, especially investments in small industry, handicraft and fishing cooperatives. Financial, monetary and credit activities will be promoted. Every effort will be made to establish credit cooperatives and insure that their activities yield economic returns. We will intensify the collection of the various types of taxes and insure that the local budget plan is fulfilled. The savings movement will be promoted. Compliance with the various rules and regulations on the management of cash receipts and expenditures will be closely checked.

In the years ahead, on the basis of the economic targets outlined above, we will concentrate on implementing a number of primary measures designed to develop agriculture, forestry, fishing and industry within the district in a manner that yields economic returns.

We will improve our overall planning and the zoning of agricultural production along lines that divide the district into three large-scale, specialized farming zones:

a) The rice zone, which lies in the center of the district and includes the land between the southern bank of the Ban Thach River and the edge of the mountains (the Ca Pass line of mountains). There, we will promote intensive cultivation to achieve high rice yields and expand the amount of area under cultivation, upgrading some one crop rice fields to two crop rice fields and some two crop rice fields to three rice crop fields or two rice crops and one bean crop fields. Within this zone, priority will be given to providing supplies and technology to the rice growing area that lies to the south of the Ban Thach River, with foremost attention to the construction of water conservancy projects.

b) The sandy coastal zone will be developed into an economic zone raising such perennial industrial crops as cashews, coconuts, beefwood, eucalyptus and so forth, with some land being allocated for the planting of such export crops as castor oil plants, pimento, garlic and pharmaceutical crops.

c) The economic zone in the western portion of the district will continue to be expanded and be strongly developed into a zone specializing in the production of subsidiary crops and such annual industrial crops as tobacco, sugarcane, beans, citronella, sesame and castor oil.

In conjunction with increasing the amount of area under cultivation, we will carry out the redistribution of labor at each installation and within the district and coordinate the economy with the national defense system by focusing our efforts on building second installations of agricultural cooperatives and opening land to cultivation in the western portion of the district in order to develop the production of industrial crops, export crops and cattle in herds; at the same time, the amount of area under cultivation in the coastal zone will also be increased. We will boldly shift a portion of the population and labor to new land areas, including the zone in the western portion of the district and the coastal zone. A new division of labor will be established within agriculture, industry, small industry, the handicraft
trades, forestry, fishing and so forth in order to balance the labor force and develop the strengths of the district.

We will promote the application of scientific-technological advances in agricultural production, with efforts focused first on water conservancy. In the immediate future, we will upgrade the Dong Cam farmland water conservancy system, the An San dam canal and ditch network in Hoa Thinh and the Nam Binh Electric Pump Station in Hoa Xuan. We will initiate the construction of small and medium-scale water conservancy projects and conduct the research needed to build a number of water conservancy projects in the rice growing zone south of the Ban Thach River (in addition to the Dong Cam dam system). We will study and quickly build water conservancy projects in the economic zone in the western portion of the district and the sandy, coastal economic zone in order to promptly support the development of production. Water conservancy will be closely combined with road construction and we will strongly develop the construction of field roads to support production.

We will widely apply scientific-technological advances in the fields of crop hybridization, fertilizer, crop protection, veterinary services, livestock production and so forth.

Material-technical bases will be constructed to support crop and livestock production. Efforts will first be concentrated on building the network of stations and farms, building livestock feed processing plants and building drying yards and granaries at places where they are still lacking.

Small and medium-scale hydroelectric power projects will be constructed to increase the sources of electricity for production. We consider providing electricity for production, especially for industry and small industry, to be the measure of foremost importance on which efforts must be concentrated. Positive steps will be taken to mobilize investment capital to develop hydroelectric power projects under the guideline "the state and the people working together"; the labor needed to support the construction of hydroelectric power projects will be mobilized.

We will carry out the construction of economic-technical and cultural clusters within the district by production zone. The district plans to establish six clusters; during the years from 1983 to 1985, an effort is being made to establish three inter-connected clusters by zones that are capable of supplying electricity in order to promptly support the development of production and support everyday life.

Every effort will be made to solidify and improve the socialist production relations within industry and intensify the socialist transformation of private industry and commerce. We will strengthen the agricultural cooperatives, constantly increase the number of above average and excellent cooperatives, constantly decrease the number of weak cooperatives and eventually reach the point where there are no weak cooperatives within the district. We will raise the uniformity of cooperatives and establish production guidelines based on planning and plans, guidelines that advance agriculture one step closer to large-scale socialist production. We will develop the trade sector at cooperatives and rapidly increase the output of
goods. We will continue to strongly develop material-technical bases and economic and cultural installations so that the face of the countryside changes with each passing day. We will continue to plan for and train management cadres, specialized cadres and technical cadres to strengthen the management apparatus of cooperatives so that they are fully capable of managing and regulating production.

We will completely remove the bourgeoisie from commerce. We will reorganize small merchants and shift a portion of them to production and the services. We will strengthen small industry and handicraft cooperatives and develop them in the correct direction; strengthen the management apparatus of cooperatives so that it is capable of supporting the development of production; and strengthen the socialist production relations within the collective sector while continuing to transform the private sector. In the fishing industry, we will mount an educational and agitational effort among fishermen to have them collectivize the fishing industry in one of two different forms of organization: marine product cooperatives and marine product teams. The transformation of the fishing industry will be carried out gradually along with developing production and supporting the daily lives of fishermen.

The various party committee echelons, the district and village people's committees and the various economic sectors have adopted plans for maintaining a constant, organized effort to discover new factors and advanced model units emerging within the different production sectors and promptly summarizing and widely publicizing the good experiences and innovations of units and individuals for application in production, for application in the management of production.

We will display the spirit of self-reliance and do our best to develop every potential that lies in the arable land, labor and production skills of the district in order to step up production and develop the economy in every respect.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
THAI THUY TRIES TO DEVELOP THE ECONOMIC POTENTIALS OF A COASTAL DISTRICT

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 60-64

[Article by Cao Si Kiem, secretary of the Thai Thuy District Party Committee]

[Text] Thai Thuy is a coastal district of Thai Binh Province. In view of its natural characteristics, labor force, production conditions and material-technical bases, Thai Thuy belongs to the type of district that has an agro-industrial-fishing economic structure and is a district with rather large economic potentials. Thai Thuy has 24,000 hectares of land (one-sixth the land of the province), 13,000 hectares of which can be planted with rice (one-fifth the rice fields of the province); 1,200 hectares of which can be used to raise rushes; 400 hectares of which can be used to raise mulberries and peanuts; 6,000 hectares of which can be used to raise winter crops; and 210 hectares of which can be used to produce salt. With its 27 kilometers of coastline, Thai Thuy has favorable conditions for harvesting shrimp, ocean fish and other marine products and developing the ocean transport sector. This does not include the 2,000 hectares of coastal dunes and river bars and the 1,400 hectares of land in gardens that can be incorporated within the planning for the planting of mangroves, rattan, mulberries and so forth and the thousands of hectares that can be used to cultivate freshwater fish.

As regards labor, Thai Thuy, which is the most densely populated district within the province (235,000 persons), has a large labor force (nearly 93,000 persons) skilled in many sectors and trades, including traditional trades (such as ocean fishing, salt production, the making of rush mats and so forth), many of whom have many years experience and highly developed skills. At present, the district has 52 agricultural cooperatives with 70,000 laborers, 11 handicraft cooperatives with more than 10,000 laborers, 9 ocean fishing cooperatives with 1,800 laborers, 3 salt production cooperatives with 1,500 laborers and a number of ocean transport units with 1,000 laborers.

As regards material-technical bases, through many years of hard work, Thai Thuy has gradually built a relatively complete water conservancy network; equipped itself with 2,800 tons of fishing vessels and 2,500 tons of ocean and river transport vessels, more than 50 percent of which are motorized; constructed a self-contained power network supporting production at each cooperative; and established a network of crop protection, veterinary, rice
seed, duckweed seed and a number of other stations and farms. On the average, each cooperative has more than 300,000 dong in fixed assets (computed at fixed prices).

Our district has more than 9,000 party members in 47 village party organizations and 50 agency, enterprise, station or farm party organizations and party chapters; the corps of scientific and technical cadres is quite large and includes nearly 400 engineers and doctors.

In the process of moving forward to build a prosperous and strong district, we have made significant efforts and achieved exciting results in the development of the locality's economic potentials. By 1980, production had taken rather large strides forward in our district and contributions to the state and the standard of living of the people of the district were increasing with each passing year. However, we ourselves recognized that compared to the requirements involved in building and defending the fatherland and compared to the rich and large economic potentials of the locality, the efforts made by our district still fell short. The untapped potentials of our arable land, rivers and ocean waters (both in breadth and depth), were still many. Much land was lying fallow and crop yields remained below the average yield of the province. The fish catch, salt output, mulberry output and so forth were unstable. There was still much surplus labor. In the six coastal villages, thousands of persons were unemployed, the handicraft trades were developing slowly and some production sectors were declining.

Under the light of the directives and resolutions of the party and state, especially Political Bureau directive 33 "On Building the Districts and Strengthening the District Level" and the resolution of the Standing Committee of the Thai Binh Provincial Party Committee "On the Work of Thai Thuy District," the 7th Congress of the District Party Organization (October, 1982) harshly reviewed the shortcomings in the work of the party organization, pointed out the reasons for them and charted a course for correcting these shortcomings in order to continue to lead the people in the strong development of the locality's economic potentials. In the past, the strengths of Thai Thuy District could not be fully developed because of the poor condition of the district's soil and its unfavorable climate; as much as 90 percent of the district's soil was acidic, saline soil, one-third of which was heavily polluted by salt, and 60 percent of its soil was heavy loam; meanwhile, the farmland water conservancy network had not been completed, the district was far from water sources and at the end of the electricity network and there was a serious shortage of supplies, petroleum products, machine spare parts and fertilizer. On the other hand, as for ourselves, we had not become the master of our arable land, natural resources and labor and were not fully aware of the strengths and economic potentials of a coastal district; moreover, we were still lacking in creative thinking and management skill. Specifically, we did not have a full understanding of the arable land, the rivers and ocean waters, the labor and production skills of the district so that we could chart a suitable course to follow. Our organization and management system were not well coordinated nor were they highly effective. The organizational apparatus had not been strengthened, there was a lack of internal unity and consensus, a lack of strict discipline and mass movements could not be launched.
After studying and re-assessing every aspect of the locality's situation and analyzing the strengths of a coastal district, our district party committee changed the direction of the development of the district and, on this basis, carried out general planning and adopted socio-economic development plans for the next several years and the long range. Our guidelines are to focus our efforts on developing a full-scale agriculture and rapidly increasing the output of grain, food products and agricultural products by thoroughly developing the potentials that lie in our labor, arable land and existing material-technical bases and making effective use of each source of capital of the state, the collective and the people; taking positive steps to develop the ocean economy, mainly through the harvesting of shrimp and ocean fish, the cultivation of rushes, salt production and ocean transport; increasing the production of handicraft products, agricultural products and food products for exportation, such as rush rugs, jute rugs, woven rattan and bambooware, peanuts, garlic, lotus seed, essential oils, pimento, shrimp, duck down, etc.

To implement these guidelines, we have adopted a policy of coordinating the teaching of ideology, economic-technical measures, organizational-management measures and the building of the apparatus. On the one hand, the district party committee has conducted numerous campaigns within the party organization and among the people to study and discuss the district's development in order to show everyone the economic strengths and potentials of the locality; reviewed and analyzed the production situation and the work performed by the district; and pointed out the responsibilities of the various party organizations, government agencies, economic and social management apparatus and the mass organizations as well as the responsibility of each individual in the development of the district. On the other hand, we have attached special importance to introducing scientific and technological advances in production, implementing the new management system and making positive use of the various economic levers within all production and business sectors.

As regards agricultural production, our policy is to thoroughly implement all measures involved in intensive cultivation: water conservancy, fertilizer, seed and soil improvement. With soil and field conditions such as those of Thai Thuy District, water conservancy must be considered the measure of foremost importance. In 1983, we mobilized the masses to excavate and spread 682,000 cubic meters of dirt and stone and build 400,000 cubic meters of sea dikes and 14 water conservancy projects costing 8.2 million dong. The improvement of soil has been achieved by irrigating and draining fields, reducing the level of subsurface water and leaching fields of acidity and salinity many times during each production season; at the same time, various types of organic fertilizers that neutralize acidity and salinity have been actively used. In 1983, all of the district's farmland was leached to remove acidity and salinity twice during the spring season and three times during the 10th month season and fertilized with 5,000 tons of inorganic fertilizer, an average of 240 kilograms per hectare, which included 1,000 tons of phosphate fertilizer; duckweed was spread on more than 60 percent of the district farmland. Together with the construction of water conservancy projects and soil improvement measures, we have given our attention to selecting and introducing in cultivation crop varieties that are suited to each class of soil, are resistant to pests and diseases and produce high yields. Whereas Thai Thuy once raised as many as 25 different varieties of rice during the 5th
month-spring season and 18 different varieties during the 10th month season, during the spring season of 1983, the district raised only 5 different varieties of rice, primarily Nong Nghiep 8 (on 64 percent of its land under the cultivation of rice). The "golden bead" variety of rice is widely raised in the areas of acidic, saline soil. The Moc Tuyen and Bao Thai varieties of rice are the main 10th month varieties. During the winter season, we have gradually reduced the amount of area under the cultivation of sweet potatoes and planted more crops of high economic value, such as garlic, soybeans, tobacco, green beans and western potatoes.

In the process of applying scientific and technical measures, we have given our attention to training cadres, party members and the people and gradually increasing their knowledge of science and technology, especially the application of technical measures within each specific production job. For example, we have held practical and advanced training classes for the secretaries of village party committees, village chairmen, cooperative directors and the heads of production units in the techniques of processing seed, pest and disease prevention and control measures and so forth. Each cooperative has provided practical training to its members.

During the past few years, chiefly as a result of actively applying technical measures while strengthening our management and thoroughly implementing product contracts with groups of laborers and individual laborers, marked advances have been made in agricultural production in Thai Thuy. In 1983, despite a prolonged spell of cold weather, drought, typhoons, major flooding and continuous pests and diseases, Thai Thuy still recorded a district-wide average rice yield of 56.87 quintals per hectare. (The Thuy Van and Thuy Thanh Cooperatives recorded average yields in excess of 80 quintals per hectare for the first time ever.) Total grain output was 71,915 tons; split rushes: 5,452 tons; silkworm cocoons: 80.3 tons; and tobacco: 327 tons.

As regards industry and the handicraft trades, together with accelerating production and strengthening those cooperatives that specialize in the production of handicraft products (rush mats, rattan and bambooware, jute rugs and so forth), we have attached importance to developing the handicraft trades within agriculture in order to provide jobs for subsidiary labor and surplus labor while producing many export goods and increasing the district's income. In particular, we have given our attention to establishing a more rational division of labor, utilizing labor in an effective manner, developing local sources of raw materials and developing the traditional trades along with introducing new trades within the locality in order to produce a wide variety of new products. In 1983, Thai Thuy produced 16.2 million dong in handicraft products, 9.1 million dong of which was generated by the handicraft trades within the agricultural cooperatives, an increase of 2 million dong compared to 1982. Several cooperatives, such as the Thanh Xuan and Minh Thang Cooperatives, completed their plans 1 to 2 months early. Today, the trade sector has been established in 43 of the district's 47 villages. Every cooperative has a few trades and the trades themselves account for 28 percent of the total output value of the cooperatives.

As regards developing the ocean economy, we consider the harvesting of shrimp and ocean fish to be an important measure in bringing prosperity to the
district. Gaining experience from past years, we have reorganized the various forces involved in the harvesting of marine products and begun making good use of all three forces, state-operated, collective and private forces; have developed many sectors and trades and begun using many different types of fishing equipment on each boat, at each cooperative and throughout the district; begun harvesting and fishing both in shore and at sea and on the surface as well as the bottom; restored traditional fishing methods in coordination with obtaining additional modern equipment, improving fishing techniques, consolidating cooperatives on a suitable scale, reorganizing the contingent of core cadres, implementing the new management system and attaching importance to contract work, to managing and procuring products; and coordinated fishing with cultivation. As a result, in 1983, despite the difficulties caused by typhoons and major flooding, which washed away 12 kilometers of sea dike, broke through the dike around the Thuy Hai salt fields and sunk and heavily damaged hundreds of tons of boats and ships, Thai Thuy still caught 3,560 tons of ocean fish (180 percent of its plan and 160 percent of its fish catch in 1982) and raised, for the first time ever, brackish water shrimp on 124 hectares. Eight of the nine ocean fishing cooperatives have exceeded their plan quotas and begun to operate at a profit. The Quyet Thang Cooperative completed its fishing plan 4 months early and the Thuy Tien Cooperative completed its plan 2 months early. Together with fishing, changes for the better are also occurring in salt production and the processing of fish sauce. In 1983, Thai Thuy produced 7,245 tons of salt (125 percent of its plan and 120 percent of its salt output in 1982), its highest salt output ever.

As a result of the development of production, especially the development of the harvesting of shrimp and ocean fish and the expansion of the trades, the district's exports have constantly increased. The district raised the value of its exports to 52 million dong in 1983, a 12 million dong increase compared to 1982. Its main exports are rush mats, shelled peanuts, essential oils, sea shrimp, duck down, rattan, bamboo, etc. Deserving of attention is that last year, for the first time ever, our district exported 19.5 tons of sea shrimp, 7 tons more than planned. Much progress has also been made in the contribution of grain and food products to the state. In 1983, our district delivered to the state 23,100 tons of grain (nearly twice as much as in 1982) and 1,560 tons of pork, live weight (28 percent more than in 1982). The standard of living of the people of the district is gradually being improved. Within agriculture, grain income per capita is 345 kilograms of paddy per year; within industry, average income is 5,000 to 6,000 dong per year; within fishing, average income is 25,000 to 30,000 dong per year. We raised the total savings of the district to 43 million dong in 1983, 6 million dong more than planned and 10 million dong higher than in 1982, for an average of 183 dong per person. As a result, Thai Thuy is the unit with the second largest savings in the country. Cultural, educational, public health and physical culture-sport activities are also changing and developing along wholesome lines.

We have been able to achieve the results described above because we began by making ourselves the masters of the labor, arable land and production conditions within the district and, on this basis, establishing correct production guidelines, gradually perfecting the planning and plans for the
development of the district and adopting positive, effective measures. Our guidance of implementation has been selective and well focused. We have encouraged the masses to overcome their difficulties and have tapped their initiative and creativity. The policy on product contracts has been correctly implemented. And, we have gradually improved our work methods and procedures under the guidelines of maintaining close contact with installations, working under programs and plans and working in a disciplined manner, with fair awards and penalties.

However, our district party committee recognizes that the results that have been achieved are only initial results and represent but small steps in the development of a district that has large economic potentials but must resolve many difficulties. There is a lack of uniform development among the areas and cooperatives of the district and crop yields are not high. Some 25 percent of the district’s rice fields still produce yields of less than 5 tons per hectare. Only 50 percent of collective livestock production plans are completed. The rate of population growth is still high (1.9 percent) and many laborers are still unemployed. There are still some weak and deficient cooperatives and organizational work and management have not truly been put on a regular basis.

In order to continue to make strong and steady progress down the path of developing the economy in every respect, achieving high productivity and developing the economic potentials of the locality more effectively, our district party committee has established guidelines and specific targets for the period between now and 1990, beginning with 1985. During 1984, we are determined to produce a total output worth 450 million dong, which will include 320 million dong in agricultural output, 80 million dong in industry and handicraft output and 60 million dong in exports through the production of 64,000 tons of paddy, 4,000 tons of ocean fish, 8,000 tons of salt, 20,000 laying ducks, 2.6 million eggs, 40,000 meat ducks, 10 tons of duck down and 6,000 tons of rushes. To do this, we must continue to apply scientific and technological advances in production and business, thoroughly implement the new management system, take positive steps to solidify and strengthen the party and government organizations and improve work regulations and methods.

It is our hope that with the assistance of the province and the central level, with the experiences that have been gained, Thai Thuy can complete its plan and norms and advance the district to new stages of development.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
THE REVOLUTION AND THE LITERATURE OF AN AGE, OF EACH WRITER

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 65-70

(Book Review(>) by Le Xuan Vu)

[Text] The new literature of Vietnam was born more than one-half century ago. Its development has been continuous: even under the feudal-colonial system, although a banned literature, it was still the main school of Vietnamese literature; in the flames of the two wars of resistance against France and the United States that lasted for 30 years (beginning after the August Revolution), it became the complete and official literature of the North and then of the entire country. In this era of the entire country's independence, of reunification, of working to build socialism and defend the fatherland, it has reached increasingly high pinnacles. A literature possessed of such vitality is not easily achieved. Correctly evaluating its tremendous achievements in past stages, summarizing its broad experience and determining the laws of its development are very necessary in order for us to gain additional pride and march steadily into the new stage. "The Writers of Vietnam (1945-1975)" by Phan Cu De and Ha Minh Duc is an effort in this direction.

"The Writers of Vietnam (1945-1975)" is planned to be printed in four volumes consisting of general essays and a portrait of each writer.

Volumes 1 and 2 of the collection, which have already been published, consist of five general essays (on prose; poetry; plays; literary theory, criticism and research; and President Ho Chi Minh, the person who laid the foundation for and created the essence of the modern literature of Vietnam) and 29 portraits of representative writers (beginning with President Ho Chi Minh) who emerged primarily during the period preceding the August Revolution and during the resistance against France. Here, there is no correlation in time between the essay portion and the biographies because the biographies of the authors must be presented in a relatively complete fashion and cannot be limited to the 30 years between 1945 and 1975. The order in which the authors are presented, which is primarily based on the order in which they came upon the literary scene, is also only of relative significance and will, because of many reasons, including some that have to do with publishing itself, have to be revised and supplemented when the entire collection is completed and

68
published. Here, several shortcomings are also evident as is a variation in writing skill from one article to the next.

Generally speaking, although "The Writers of Vietnam (1945–1975)" Volume 1 and Volume 2 has not been completed, it does represent a serious and rather detailed research project. The respect shown for every achievement of literature, for the unique style and contributions of each writer is entirely proper because literature is a delicate and complex field, because "among writers, no two are alike," because every person who contributes a part of himself to the common cause is deserving of praise.

"The Writers of Vietnam (1945–1975)" sets for itself the primary task of introducing a number of representative writers of a specific period of literature. We cannot expect to find within this collection of books a complete, general survey of a stage of literary history or the history of each literary genre. The essays on these genre presented in Volume 1 of the collection serve only as an introduction, or, more correctly stated, as a foundation. We would have preferred these essays to be more evocative and precise in content and more consistent in their method of presentation; however, each of these essays does outline the stages of development of each genre of literature from 1945 to 1975 through a presentation of literary works and their authors; does reflect an effort to analyze the works of writers whose biographies are not presented in the biographical section; and does make an initial attempt to draw from reality the laws that govern literary life. Together with the essay entitled "President Ho Chi Minh, the Person Who Laid the Foundation and Created the Essence of Revolutionary Literature," which the authors respectfully place before the essay section and the biographies of representative writers, these essays provide a general understanding of the robust and rich development of the new literature in this important stage and, on this basis, confirm our legitimate pride in the new literature of Vietnam.

The years from 1945 to 1975 were 30 years of bitter war in Vietnam. Yet, during those 30 years, the new literature of Vietnam, exhibiting the vigor of its springtime, grew continuously in a balanced and comprehensive manner and became a socialist literature of a profound national character. During those 30 years, each and every vital issue pertaining to a new literature, from its aesthetic ideals to the subjects of its descriptive efforts and whom it serves, from the contents to the methods of writing, style of expression and so forth, was, for all intents and purposes, clearly defined not only in conceptual terms, but also in terms of literary creativity, literary theory and literary criticism. Works of value were produced in every literary genre. The short stories written during those years were unequalled. The novel matured quickly in both content and form in an effort to be worthy of the nation's heroic undertaking. Memoirs proliferated and assumed a clearly defined position within literary life. Poems of all types became more numerous as the revolution advanced, achieving their greatest brilliance in both the South and the North during the resistance against the United States for national salvation. Theatrical literature also recorded many noteworthy achievements. The works written in the fields of literary theory, criticism and research were too numerous to enumerate, despite the fact that not many of the critical articles and essays that appeared in the press have been reproduced in book form because we have not yet had an opportunity to do so.
However, of greater importance is the fact that all of this work in the fields of literary theory, criticism and research insured the victory of the line on revolutionary literature and art. This is not to mention the literature of cinematography, children's literature or ethnic minority literature. The corps of writers grew with each passing day and encompassed many different generations; although each member of this corps had his or her own style, all were linked together in a common cause, in a common effort to achieve the goal of devoting their intellect and talent to serving the laboring people for the sake of the fatherland and socialism and with a willing acceptance of party leadership.

We must affirm all of these tremendous achievements in a more vigorous and persuasive manner, these achievements that established the character and the dominant position of the new, socialist literature throughout our country, these achievements that helped to bring glory to our nation.

Our ancestors of ancient times used to say: a mountain is sometimes famous not for its height but its spirits; water is sometimes made magical not by its depth, but by its breadth. Our new literature "is worthy of standing in the front ranks of the anti-imperialist literature and art of our times"(1) primarily because it reflects that which is noble, that which is unsurpassed in the revolutionary reality of our country and is imbued with patriotism and love of socialism, with national pride, with confidence in man, with communist humanitarianism. The stature of a literature is ultimately determined by what it gives to life, by how it meets the needs of the times, the needs of the trend of development of history. How many literatures have achieved the status of our new literature during the stage from 1945 to 1975, a literature that had a profound impact upon the thinking and feelings of our people, a literature that contributed to our nation's great victory, a literature that helped bring to a glorious conclusion the period of the national democratic revolution, which enabled our reunited country to begin the advance toward socialism? The strongpoints of "The Writers of Vietnam (1945-1975)" are that it presents the achievements of literature during those 30 years of war and confirms that our new literature radiates ideals and realism, possesses a tremendous power to transform, has steadily developed in accordance with the correct and consistent line of the party and is a well-established vanguard literature. These strongpoints stand out even more if we recall that Volume 1 of this collection was published in 1979, at which time there was a certain hesitation to confirm the existence of the socialist realist literature of Vietnam.

The main portion of "The Writers of Vietnam (1945-1975)" is devoted to the portraits of the writers.

In Volume 1 and Volume 2, we meet, if not all, practically all of the representative authors belonging to the generations of writers that emerged during the period preceding the August Revolution and during the war of resistance against the French colonialists. Following President Ho Chi Minh are the writers: Truong Chinh, To Huu, Dang Thai Mai, Tu Mo, Huy Can, Hoai Thanh, Nguyen Huy Tuong, Xuan Dieu, Nhu Phong, Che Lan Vien, To Hoai, Nguyen Dinh Thi, Nguyen Cong Hoan, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Hong, Xuan Thuy, Nam Cao, Luu Trong Lu, Nguyen Tuan, Te Hanh, Bui Hien, Anh Tho, Hong Chuong, Xuan Truong,
Hoang Trung Thong, Nong Quoc Chan, Nguyen Van Bong and Nguyen Khai. The backgrounds of the writers of the new literature of Vietnam presented here are truly diverse: some were or are leaders of the revolution; some were or are high ranking leaders of the party and state; some came to literature through the revolution; and some came to the revolution through literature. To some of these persons, political activities were their main interest. Others specialized in literary activities and participated in the revolution primarily on the literary front. Some persons achieved fame before the August Revolution and some persons' literary talents did not emerge until the years of the war of resistance. Although each person's style differed, everyone followed in the footsteps of President Ho Chi Minh and stood beneath the banner of the party.

Reflecting this simultaneous diversity and unity, the portraits of the writers provide a concrete and profoundly vivid understanding of the growth, the stature and the vitality of the new literature of Vietnam that matured within the new power of the revolution, within the flames of the arduous and heroic war fought for national independence and socialism.

The portrait of each author presents the unique characteristics and the main contributions of each person. However, the placement of these portraits within one book, such as "The Writers of Vietnam (1945–975)," creates interesting and surprising cause and effect relationships that arise from general or universal comparisons made from the many different perspectives of the reader.

For example, through these portraits, our pride is deepened in the solid abilities and large achievements of literary theory, criticism and research based on the Marxist viewpoint in Vietnam. We are frequently unsatisfied with the work currently being performed in the fields of literary theory, criticism and research. This is because of developing needs and because we want to immediately answer all the questions raised by life. However, when we review the sum of this work through the contributions made by each author as well as the impact of this work upon each writer as described in the writer's own experiences and feelings, we suddenly and clearly see that the Marxist theory of literature is truly the essence of the new literature of Vietnam. It stands as a beacon of light emanating from Ho Chi Minh, the person who gave national literature a new direction, a new content, a new style of artistic creation, from the documents of the party regarding culture, literature and art, from the instructions of Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, from Truong Chinh—the Marxist literary theorist—from To Huu—the guide, the person behind each specific stage of development in artistic creativity and so forth, a light that illuminates the entirety of the new literature of Vietnam. Not only have literary theorists, critics and researchers, such as Dang Thai Mai, Hoai Thanh, Nhu Phong, Hong Chuong, Xuan Truong and so forth, written on theory and engaged in criticism and research, but many writers have also written criticism, conducted research and participated in the formation of Vietnamese literary theory by keeping notes on their creative experiences just as many theorists, critics and researchers have composed poems or written novels. Although we have yet to conduct major projects on the theory of the literature of Vietnam, there have been new and valuable developments regarding many important matters, such as the party consciousness of literature, the popular
nature of literature and so forth, that represent the correct and creative application of the viewpoints of Marxism-Leninism concerning literature and art to the specific circumstances of Vietnam. Vietnamese Marxist literary theory has matured, has won victory in all literary struggles, often very sharp struggles, against bourgeois, petty bourgeois, colonial and feudal viewpoints and thinking, against the influences of "leftist" and rightist opportunism within the international communist movement, thereby insuring the steady advance by the new literature of Vietnam.

Through this collection of portraits of writers, one also sees the different course of development taken by each generation of writers during the stage from 1945 to 1975.

The development of the revolutionary writers who emerged prior to 1945, such as Truong Chinh, Le Duc Tho, Xuan Thuy and so forth, virtually followed a straight path.

The development of those writers who emerged immediately after the August Revolution and during the early years of the resistance against France, such as Nguyen Dinh Thi, Hoang Trung Thong, Nong Quoc Chan, Nguyen Van Bong, Nguyen Khai and so forth, was highly specialized, vigorous and robust.

Among those writers who are often referred to as "pre-war" writers, development was closely linked to their abandoning their old world view and creative method and taking the side of the revolution, as a result of which they, too also experienced very clear and rich growth. But not every writer improved or gained popularity from one stage to the next because the public also changed. Every writer, especially every poet, has one period that represents the springtime of his career, has an early period of profundity, freshness and passion. Every writer has but one prime. Every writer has but one life. Nam Cao, who wanted to "live life and then write about it," sacrificed his life very early, when the revolution was only 6 years old, just as his talents showed so much promise following his "The Pair of Eyes," "In the Forest," and so forth. Succeeding Ngo Tat To as the voice of critical realism prior to the August Revolution in 1945 was Nguyen Cong Hoan; although influenced by the party, he fell into pessimism, changed direction, faded from the scene and, even though he experienced the August Revolution, it was not until 10 years later that he returned to literature. There are other such cases that can be cited. Generally speaking, however, in the literature of the "pre-war" writers, their most brilliant work and largest contributions to life still occurred after the August Revolution, occurred after they began supporting the literature and art line of the party.

Huy Can was "often very melancholy before it" but become light hearted after the revolution, became a "flower in full bloom, a poem in the sunlight." Xuan Dieu was a poet who was admired by the youth of the "New Poetry" era because she possessed "the intense love of the soul of a romantic poet" but always felt as though she were a "deer caught out in the daylight," always felt the indifference, the exhaustion, the loneliness of the "prostitute"; yet, what is there as precious as Xuan Dieu's poetry, as Xuan Dieu's criticism on poetry, writings on the theory of poetry, translations of poetry, as Xuan Dieu speaking on poetry after the revolution? Che Lan Vien, whose initial
patriotism strayed from its moorings into metaphysical and mystical thinking, subsequently returned to the people following the revolution "like grass returning in the spring, like a returning swallow," bringing with himself a diverse style of poetry rich in intellect. After the revolution, the poems of Luu Trong Lu reflected a more intense feeling and devotion and radiated the truth of the new life. The poems of Anh Tho were like the "pure white smile of the newly opened pineapple flower," thus putting behind the poet the dark melancholy and the lack of direction that afflicted him in his early years. The steel-like quality of the satirical, derisive pen of Tu Mo became even sharper. Te Hanh expanded and developed his poetic talent. Bui Hien readily acclimated himself to the new life and began to view life with greater warmth, insight and trust. Nguyen Tuan made an effort to atone for his "crime" of obstinate, arrogant and provocative individualism in the old society through his work "The Da River" and his essays on the fight against the United States, which reflected the unique style of socialist realist prose. Both Nguyen Huy Tuong and To Hoai confirmed their literary calling and talent after the revolution. Nguyen Hong redisplayed all the strength of his early days in the novel "The Sea Port," etc.

All of these writers genuinely supported the revolution, pursued a definite direction in their thinking concerning art and displayed their literary character and talent in the revolution. Although the degree of their success varied, all were representative writers whose works marked an important stage of the new literature of Vietnam, a literature that has won the praise of the Vietnamese public. Looking to literature for the sake of fulfilling their noble ideal of transforming life or seeing in and expressing through the remarkable vitality of literature the meaning of life, such were the writers of the new literature of Vietnam during the stage from 1945 to 1975.

The new literature of Vietnam is a great literature. The Vietnamese revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam founded and forged by President Ho Chi Minh has awakened, given direction to, developed and brought to maturity every literary talent. By leaving us with these two clear and bright impressions, "The Writers of Vietnam (1945-1975)," Volume 1 and Volume 2, has made a valuable contribution.

FOOTNOTES


LE QUY DON, A VIETNAMESE SCHOLAR OF THE 18TH CENTURY

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 71-73, 81

[Article by Nguyen Tai Thu commemorating the 200th anniversary of the death of Le Quy Don]

[Text] Le Quy Don (1726-1784) was a major 18th century scholar of our country. He was born in Dien Ha Village in Dien Ha District, which is now Phu Hieu Hamlet in Doc Lap Village in Hung Ha District, Thai Binh Province, and died in his mother's village, Nguyen Xa Village in Duy Tien District, Ha Nam Ninh Province. At 18 years of age, having enjoyed early reknown as a child prodigy, he was first candidate in the 2nd degree examination, placed first in both the 2nd degree and palace examinations and went on to serve as an official, rising to the post of assistant cabinet chief(*) during the Le-Trinh era. In his life, he sought to bring prosperity to the people and strength to the country by means of political reforms and was a prolific reader and writer of books. But, how could he, as a Confucian scholar and a high ranking Mandarin loyal to the Trinh family, initiate the necessary progressive political reforms; however, he truly learned the majority of the knowledge that an 18th century Vietnamese could learn and left to subsequent generations a huge and priceless storehouse of knowledge that will forever serve to bring glory to Vietnamese scholarship.

It can be said that Le Quy Don was the scholar who wrote the most books in the 18th century as well as in the history of Vietnamese feudalism. His knowledge was broad and deep. He was a bright example of the desire to learn and of tireless mental labor. He said: "Only by possessing broad knowledge can one build his career" (Thu kinh dien nghia). To write "Van dai loai ngu," he read more than 600 books. He criticized those who used the excuse of being too busy to not study or conduct research, criticized them as the "lowest order of scholar." He demanded that man be the master of his time: "The intelligent man is busy everyday but still has leisure time" (preface to Nghe an thi tap by Bui Huy Bich). Tran Danh Lam, a contemporary of his, observed: "Le Que Duong...there is not one book that he has not read, not one matter that he has not thought through to its conclusion" (preface to Van dai loai ngu).

The works of Le Quy Don include several dozen collections of books and hundreds of different individual pieces encompassing many different genre.
As regards his work in the field of historical science, the "History of Dai Viet" or "The History of the Le Dynasty," was written when he was 23 years of age. His "History of China" consists of diplomatic correspondence written during the period he served as ambassador to the House of Qing. His "Phu bien tap luc" is a careful record of the social situation within China during and before the 18th century. "The le thuong" within the book "Kien van tieu luc" dealt with the organization of society and social activities during the Ly, Tran and Le Dynasties. These works provide us with accurate, specific knowledge and much material that still retains its full original value. For example, in "Phu bien tap luc" there are notes on the Spratly and Paracel Islands stating the legal right of Vietnam to sovereignty over these two archipelagoes; "Kien van tieu luc" contains a detailed description of the clever and brazen methods that the Chinese feudalists handed down from one generation to the next and employed to encroach upon and occupy land along our country's border, such as drawing maps to suit themselves, gradually moving border markers into Vietnamese soil, giving Chinese names to places they planned to occupy and using their position as a large country to force us to express "gratitude" to them for their acts of illegal occupation. One short passage reads: "This governor (the governor of Kaihua District, Yunnan Province) told the tutor of Prince Van Chi (a person from our country): an investigation of the map shows that our territory extends from Kaihua District southward to the Do River, not for only a distance of 240 miles, but beyond that point, up to and including the Ninh Bien River" and said that the Ninh Bien River itself, that is, the Do Chu River, was, according to the map (their map) territory of theirs! This trick of encroaching upon and occupying land belonging to others is one that we have seen the Chinese expansionists pull time and time again and one they continue to pull today.

The projects in historical studies conducted by Le Quy Don, which reflect a serious attitude and a cautious, diligent approach based on a full supply of information, served as a model for those who followed him, as Phan Huy Chu observed in "Lich trieu hien chuong loai chi."

The philosophy and socio-political thinking of Le Quy Don were expressed in the works: "Quan thu khao bien," "Thanh mo hien pham," "Thu kinh dien nghia," the chapter entitled "Ly khi" in the book "Van dai loai ngu," the book Cham canh" in "Kien van tieu luc," etc. In these works, Le Quy Don showed the relationship between reason and sentiment, between virtue and talent, between knowledge and practice and between the individual and the masses down through history; he raised the matters of a policy for governing the country, the development of a system of law and so forth. In these fields, although he suffered under certain limitations, he did embody materialist factors and express positive views. For example, concerning the role of the people, he said: "What the emperor and all high officials wear and eat each day come from the people"; "the people are the country's foundation and this foundation must be solid if the country is to last..." Although he did so from the stand of the feudal ruling class, Le Quy Don did realize the people's strength: "When the people are content, life is merry; when they are not, they laugh at death and, when they laugh at death, rebellion is imminent"(Thu kinh dien nghia). His thinking on virtue and talent was profound and rational; for example, he saw "virtue" not in trivial tokens, but in will power, in one's attitude toward work; "virtue" does not stop at words, but must be expressed
in deeds; "virtue" must lead to "talent" and "talent" must be developed on the basis of "virtue" (Quan thu khao bien). His thoughts on developing the system of law were also of value in the management of society.

In literature, Le Quy Don's contributions encompassed the collecting of historical materials, research, editing and writing. In addition to "great talents, poetry and prose" in "Phu bien tap luc," "selected poetry and prose" in "Kien van tieu luc," "the craft of writing" in "Dai Viet thong su" and "literature and art" in "Van dai loai ngu," his largest project in the collection of poetry and prose was "Toan Viet thi luc," which consisted of six books containing 897 selected poems by 73 poets in our country from the time of Ly Dynasty to the reign of Le Tuong Duc (1509-1516). Along with Phan Phu Tien's "Viet am thi tap" and Hoang Duc Luong's "Trich diem thi tap," Le Quy Don's "Toan Viet thi luc" helped to collect and preserve priceless poems within the storehouse of national culture. As regards his writing, Le Quy Don wrote "Que duong thi tap" and "Tieu tuong bach vinh." His poems were abundantly lyrical, natural and honest. Phan Huy Chu observed: "He was a man of great learning whose every writing became literature." Clarity is the essence of his poems. His prose is as natural as the heavens, flows effortlessly, is as broad as the vast seas and touches every subject, thus giving him a truly illustrious style" (Lich trieu hien chuong loai chi).

In the fields of ethnic studies, sociology, linguistics, agricultural science and other fields, Le Quy Don also made tremendous contributions, contributions too numerous to describe here.

The above achievements reflect only a small portion of the contributions he made; however, they are sufficient to show the magnitude of his character and intellect. His contemporary Bui Huy Bich wrote in "Eulogy to Le Quy Don": "In the past few hundred years, there has only been one person like him in our country."

Le Quy Don became a great scholar and made numerous valuable contributions to the country's culture largely because he possessed a spirit and sense of responsibility to the nation and felt concern for the people.

Despite the limitations imposed on him by his class and times, Le Quy Don was always thinking about the nation, about the country. In 1759, the Imperial Court sent a mission to the House of Qing. Although he was still too young to join it, he saw the trip as an opportunity to learn more about others and himself and learn things of benefit to the country. Thus, he petitioned the emperor "to be allowed to go along to examine government affairs in China, to learn about the people and geography there"("History of China"). He wrote "Van dai loai ngu" to systematize the knowledge of contemporary mankind but he referred to the realities of Vietnam whenever he had a chance. He knew and recorded 210 varieties of rice in Vietnam; he studied thoroughly the animal life in the forests and ocean waters of Vietnam; he offered accurate advice on the techniques of rotation cultivation; and he clearly described the land, customs and habits of the people of the various localities. In "Phu bien tap luc," not only the history but also the mountains and rivers, the market, the officials, the customs and rules, the persons of talent and the products of the two areas of Thuan and Quang were described with brilliant clarity. It
must be stated that Le Quy Don had a very deep understanding of the realities of Vietnam. It was because of this that he became an outspoken scholar.

Struggling for a correct understanding of our nation's position, he opposed the hegemonist attitude of the Chinese feudalists and demanded that they not call our ambassador the "migrant Mandarin" and not use the word "migrants" to describe the people of Dai Viet. He opposed the distortion of our culture in the history books written by the Chinese. He considered the assertion made by Cao Hung Trung in his book "An nam chi" that our country did not begin to pursue learning until a Chinese person, Kaisi came to participate in the government of Giao Chi to be "nonsense," "traitorous" and "abhorrent" (kien van tieu luc).

To raise the nation's self-respect and pride in itself in order to dispel the national feeling of inferiority and the worship of things foreign, of China among some Vietnamese, he compared the civilization, talents and products of ours to those of China. Concerning civilization, he said: "Our country's Ly and Tran Dynasties existed at about the same time as the Zong and Yuan Dynasties in China and the quality of our talent and character of our literature were in no way inferior to those of China" (Kien van tieu luc). As regards skills, he cited numerous cases in which China had to learn from us, such as China's House of Zong learning how to organize an army from Vietnam's House of Ly and the House of Ming learning how to make firearms from the Vietnamese Ho Nguyen Truong. He also pointed out that Nguyen An, a Vietnamese of integrity and talent, was the person credited with designing and building the Beijing moat during the Ming Dynasty (Kien van tieu luc). As regards products, he said that our country produced many valuable products, such as sandalwood, cinnamon and incense, that were admired by China. These claims by Le Quy Don were true, were based on fact, not fabricated on the basis of national jealousy. He praised at great length the heroes of the nation, the great talents of the country both in the North and the South. He was fond of quoting national prose and poetry to "present work performed with skill and experience through a robust and fresh style of writing that helps to enhance national prestige" (Kien van tieu luc). He was deeply pained to see so many vestiges of national culture being lost. He detailed, in prose filled with indignation, the Chinese expansionists' occupation of land belonging to us at Thu Long, etc.

The age in which Le Quy Don lived was an age in which the antagonism between the ruling feudal class and the various strata of the people became a sharp antagonism, was the intense age of peasant uprisings, the age of the panic and impotence of the Le and Trinh rulers. A patriotic intellectual, Le Quy Don did not feel resentment toward the times nor indifference toward life; to the contrary, he felt a responsibility to help make the people prosperous and the country strong.

Le Quy Don widely travelled about our country as it existed then, from the northwest and northeast to Thanh Nghe and Thuan Quang. Wherever he went, he conducted investigations and research and took notes as a student of ethnic studies and sociology. This fact and this practice of his had the reciprocal effect of enriching his knowledge and raising his spirit of responsibility to the country, the nation, the people.
Le Quy Don appeared before the public as two persons: scholar and patriot. As a scholar, he performed glorious deeds for the nation; as a patriot, he served the nation well. In both of these roles he inspired many subsequent generations and has even had a good impact upon today's generations, who are implementing the party's slogan of revolutionary action: "Everything for the socialist fatherland, for the happiness of the people."

FOOTNOTES

* A post similar to the present day post of vice chairman of the Council of Ministers.

7809
CSO: 4210/23
THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE PUBLICATION OF THE SOVIET JOURNAL 'KOMMUNIST'

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6 Jun 84 p 74

[Unattributed article]

[Text] On 23 April 1984, in Moscow, a formal ceremony was held to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the publication of the Soviet journal KOMMUNIST. In attendance were M. Gorbatchov, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and many other leaders of the Soviet party and state. Also in attendance were delegations representing the theoretical journals and communist and worker parties of the countries of Bulgaria, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Mongolia, Korea, Laos and Vietnam. The delegation representing Vietnam's TAP CHI CONG SAN was headed by Editor-in-Chief Hong Chuong.

To mark the occasion, the editorial board of Vietnam's TAP CHI CONG SAN sent the following letter to the editorial board of the Soviet journal KOMMUNIST:

Dear Comrades,

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the publication of KOMMUNIST, the theoretical and political organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, we send you our warmest greetings.

During the past 60 years, the Soviet journal KOMMUNIST has always brandished the banner of Marxism-Leninism, relentlessly struggled against bourgeois thinking and opportunism of all kinds and made large contributions to the cause of building and defending the first socialist country in the world while strongly inspiring the communist and worker movement and the national liberation movement. Through the tremendous contributions made in the ideological struggle to protect and develop the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet journal KOMMUNIST has proven itself worthy of being the leader on the theoretical front of the international communist and worker movement.

Ever since it was first published, Vietnam's TAP CHI CONG SAN has always received valuable inspiration and assistance from the Soviet journal KOMMUNIST. The cooperation between our two editorial boards has developed
with each passing day and yielded fine results. On this occasion, we extend to you our deep thanks.

We wish you good health and many larger achievements in your work.

With communist greetings,

Hanoi, 20 April 1984
On behalf of the editorial board of TAP CHI CONG SAN

Editor-in-Chief
Hong Chuong

7809
CSO: 4210/23
THE IMMEDIATE FORERUNNER OF 'BOLSHEVIK'—'KOMMUNIST'

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 75–81

[Unattributed article(*)]

[Text] In the history of the growth and development of Bolshevism, it can be said that the press of the party played a special role. The newspaper ISKRA (1900–1903), which, according to V.I. Lenin, created the Bolshevik Party, Vperyod (December, 1904–May, 1905), Proletary (May–October 1905, August, 1906–November, 1909), Novaya Zhizn (October–December, 1905), Volna, Vperyod and Ekho (spring and summer, 1906), Pravda (1912–1914) and Sotsial–Demokrat (1908–1917)—all of these newspapers, despite very difficult circumstances, insured the victory of Leninist guidelines within the Russian worker movement and will forever be recorded in the annals of the class struggle of the Russian proletariat and the whole of the international proletariat as harbingers of a new age—the age of mankind's liberation from the oppression of capital. To us, the names of these newspapers are the names of seasoned militants who struggled against dictatorship, against exploitation, the names of tireless propagandists for revolutionary Marxism, the names of political organizers of workers, as though they were important stages in the life and activity of the founder of our party and the soviet state. The theoretical journals of the party published under the personal leadership of Lenin—Zarya, Mysl, Prosveshcheniye and Dnevnik Sotsial–Demokrata—occupy a worthy position beside the daily newspapers, the central organs of the Bolsheviks. It was in these journals that the classical works of Lenin were printed, such as "The Agrarian Platform of the Russian Social–Democratic Party," "Concerning the Statistics on Strikes in Russia," "The Three Sources and the Three Components of Marxism," "Critical Remarks on the National Question," "The Right of Nations to Self–Determination," "Concerning the Slogan 'Disarmament'" and many other works.

As we commemorate the 60th anniversary of the publication of the first issue of Bolshevik (April, 1924), I would like to direct attention to a relatively unknown chapter in the history of the press of our party—Lenin's founding in 1915 of the theoretical journal of Bolsheviks called Kommunist. Its brief (only one double issue) and tragic history was a highlight of the party's struggle against social–chauvinism and opportunism in Russia and in the international arena to unite all internationalist revolutionary forces.

81
In August, 1914, World War I broke out. While baring the aggressive and cruel nature of imperialism, it also caused the collapse of the 2nd International through the traitorous activities of the rightist, opportunist leadership dominated by the social-democratic parties. The leaders of the 2nd International raised the slogan of defending their capitalist motherland. And, it was only the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, who adopted a thoroughly internationalist stand at the very outset of the war. While in Switzerland, Lenin formulated the tactics to be applied in the revolutionary struggle under the new conditions that now existed.

In early 1915, it became clear that the hope of the main imperialist groups for a quick victory could not be realized. Both sides suffered unprecedented losses in the fighting and the war brought increased suffering and misery to the laboring masses. The wave of chauvinism instigated by the bourgeoisie spread to a large number of workers and began to weaken them. The influence of the rightist, opportunistic leaders among the masses swiftly declined in all European countries. Meanwhile, the influence of the Bolsheviks was strengthened at home and abroad. Now, to maintain their ideological dominance and block the developing worker movement, the international capitalists placed their hopes mainly on the Centrist faction led by K. Kautsky in Germany and L.D. Trotsky in Russia. While hiding behind words of fake internationalism and verbally denouncing the war, the Centrists did everything possible to draw the masses away from revolutionary activities, defend the betrayal by the social-chauvinists and impede the effort to unite leftist forces on a worldwide scale.

Against this background, in the spring of 1915, Lenin proposed the establishment of a new theoretical organ of Bolsheviks. Its task, according to Lenin, was to "unite each and every person against social-chauvinism and Kautskyism."(1)

The new journal had to be published under the leadership of Lenin by the editorial board of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT Newspaper, the central organ of the party.

The name KOMMUNIST was not a name that Lenin selected at random. On 5 December 1914, in an article entitled "A German Voice on the War," while exposing the betrayal by Kautsky, Plekhanov and others, Lenin wrote: "Indeed, if such 'social-democrats' wish to be in the majority and to harm the official 'International' (= an alliance for international justification of national chauvinism), then is it not better to give up the name of 'social-democrats,' which has been besmirched and degraded by them, and return to the old Marxist name of Communists?"(2)

However, the time for actually raising this matter was not at hand: only an all-Russia congress or conference of delegates of the party could change the party's name, but such a congress or conference could not have been convened then. It was not until early 1917, in the final draft of the "Letters from Afar," the fifth letter, and later, in "The April Thesis," that Lenin raised this issue, placing it within a more realistic environment. Prior to then, as party historians have observed, Lenin popularized the term "communist" and, in this way, prepared opinion within the party for the need for a change in the party's name.(3) Of course, in this effort, the new journal of the party had
to play an important role (if not the main role). A letter from the editorial board of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT to M.N. Pokrovsky inviting him to write an article for the new journal read in part: "We (and a group of comrades who recently arrived from Russia) have begun to publish a theoretical journal (overseas) called KOMMUNIST (through this name, we seek to emphasize our close association with the original philosophy of Marx and Engels as opposed to the deceitful, ordinary Marxism of Plekhanov and Kautsky)."(4)

Deserving of attention is the fact that the headline of the editorial in the first issue was the definition of a communist taken from the "Communist Manifesto" of K. Marx and F. Engels. Within the editorial itself, the terms "revolutionary communism of Marx," the "communist doctrine" of Marx and Engels as opposed to "Marxism," patriotism-socialism and national independence-freedom stood out like guidelines.

Preparations for the publication of KOMMUNIST were made in late April, 1915.5 Prior to then, even before the publication of issue number 1, in order to focus attention upon the upcoming publication of the journal and unite around it all genuine internationalist revolutionaries, a decision was made to make public the political stand of the editorial board. To achieve this end, an editorial entitled "Editorial Note" was printed separately, dated 20 May and sent to clandestine addresses in Russia, to exile centers, to leftist socialists in the European countries and to all prospective authors as an "announcement of KOMMUNIST. The journal's editorial will not be a lengthy editorial. It will be what, in the historical research materials of the party, is sometimes called the 'preface.'"(6) However, in letters amongst themselves, the members of the editorial board called this document the "steering article." It is obvious that the article "Editorial Note" was written with the very close participation of Lenin.(7)

The editorial began with an evaluation of the stage of monopoly in the development of capitalism. Although it was published 1 year before Lenin wrote "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," the editorial "Editorial Note" painted a full picture of this stage of capitalism. In essence, the article, although not as polished or complete as Lenin's classical work, presented three of the five features of imperialism: "Large-scale agglomeration in production, alliances among capitalist monopolies" and close ties between the banks and industry, which lead to the dominance of financial capital and a few "large" powers dividing the world amongst themselves and waging bloody struggle against one another to secure the most lucrative profits.

Also deserving of attention was the evaluation of imperialism as the final stage in the development of capitalism, the conclusion concerning this creating the objective prerequisites for the socialist revolution and the definition of the new age as the age of social upheavals, mass economic and political strikes, revolutions and military conflicts, as the age that faces the international working class (with the "irresistible and inevitable need to struggle for political power, topple the rule of the bourgeoisie and carry out the socialist revolution." Then, the editorial assessed, in the Leninist spirit, the situation within the social-democratic movement in Russia and western Europe and the role played by the betrayal by the Centrists—an
assessment that was developed upon by Lenin in the pages of KOMMUNIST in an article entitled "The Collapse of the 2nd International." While defining the task of the new publication of the party, the editorial emphasized: "It is hoped that our journal will help...explain the truths of the communist doctrine of Marx and provide for a better understanding of the tasks of the proletariat in the upcoming age of revolutionary struggle..."

Citing the need to unite all internationalist forces, the editorial board of KOMMUNIST appealed in the editorial for every genuine internationalist, regardless of faction or tendency, to "struggle for the fundamentals of the revolutionary communism of Marx." However, this view in no way meant abandoning stands based in principle. Lenin vehemently opposed the suggestion to invite Trotsky to cooperate with the journal. However, contrary to his wishes, this invitation was still extended and Trotsky used this as an opportunity to fiercely attack the Bolsheviks, accusing them and their yet to be published journal KOMMUNIST, of factionalism.(8) Thereafter, Lenin frequently stressed the need to select authors "very carefully."(9) Generally speaking, although there were some negative features about it, the widespread attraction of new authors on the basis of the internationalist stand proved to be correct. For example, Kollontai was invited to participate in the journal, as a result of which she adopted the Bolshevik stand in its entirety. Of even greater significance was the contacts made with many foreign social-democrats, including many persons who subsequently became comrades-in-arms of Lenin when he became the head of the Zimmerwald Left.

Existing letters between Lenin and the members of the editorial board show how close was the attention paid by Lenin to the editing of material and how deeply he delved into every matter, even ones that seemed trivial at first glance. In his letters, Lenin expressed his thoughts on how to improve the contents of the journal, the contents of articles.(10) In addition to editing articles, Lenin also wrote editorial notes to a number of articles.(11) He wrote to the members of the editorial board: "It needs facts. Its need to be comprehensive. It would be better if issue number 1 were fuller."(12)

Krupskaya recalls that the publication of KOMMUNIST was accompanied by...more than a small amount of discussion, worry and vexation.(13) In late July, Lenin became increasingly concerned over the delay in publishing KOMMUNIST resulting from the mistakes made by a number of the journal's cadres. He reacted sharply to this delay, thereby giving an indication of just how important Vladimir Ilyich considered the timely publication of the journal to be.(14)

At first, plans called for the publication of the first issue of KOMMUNIST in August, 1915 and issue number 2 in September. In a letter, Krupskaya wrote: "The first issue of KOMMUNIST became so large that it was decided to divide it into two issues and publish them one after the other." Later, it was decided to combine both issues in a double issue (number 1-2). Finally, the urgent preparations for issue number 1 were completed by Lenin. In September, he happily telegraphed V.A. Karpinsky: KOMMUNIST Number 1-2 has been published. It is a fact.(15)
Of the articles printed in the journal, most deserving of attention were the three by Lenin: "The Collapse of the 2nd International," "The Voice of an Honest French Socialist" and "Imperialism and Socialism in Italy." Also printed were the article "Imperialism and the Tasks of the Proletariat" by A. Pannekoek, a Dutch social-democrat; the article "Chaos in Great Britain" by T. Rothstein; the article "Why Was the German Proletariat Silent During the July Days?" by A. Kollontai; the article "War and the Finance System of Russia" by M. Bronski and other articles. In the appendix, under the heading "Forgotten Words" were printed the most important anti-war documents of the time—"The Manifesto of the Basle International Socialist Congress" and "The Resolution of the Chemnitz Party Organization of the German Social-Democratic Party" adopted in 1912.

The Bolsheviks and their sympathizers in the different countries of the world were awaiting the publication of the journal. Soon, copies of KOMMUNIST Journal began arriving in Russia by clandestine routes. Reports of having received the journal came in from everywhere. Along with these reports and new requests for the journal, the editorial board also received the first impressions concerning the impact of KOMMUNIST. A report by Shlyapnikov, the representative of the Russian Department of the Central Committee, to Lenin on his trip to Petrograd stated that KOMMUNIST had made a strong impression. It was "hailed" just like "ZARYA was."

Leftist internationalists overseas also had high praise for the stand taken by KOMMUNIST. Leftwing German social-democrats wholeheartedly hailed KOMMUNIST as a fraternal "organ" "of revolutionary internationalists."(16)

Readers eagerly awaited new issues of KOMMUNIST but none were published. The cause was disagreements within the editorial board. G.L. Pyatakov and E. V. Bosh, who were on the editorial board and paid for the journal's publication, opposed the policy of the central organ's editorial board, even during the process of preparing for the initial double issue, and tried to impose their terms upon Lenin. After the journal was published, these disagreements grew. Bukharin, who had also joined the editorial board, sided with G.L. Pyatakov and Bosh. These three maintained an incorrect stand concerning many issues of principle in the platform and tactics of the party, concerning the right of nations to self-determination, concerning the role of democratic demands and a minimum general platform and other issues. They made every effort to use the journal to serve their factional ends. Within the editorial board, votes were split down the middle: on the one side were the three members of the SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT editorial board and, on the other side was the trio of Bukharin, Pyatakov and Bosh. In addition, having paid for the publication of the journal, Pyatakov and Bosh sought commercial gains.

Because of the actions of this group against the party and at the suggestion of Lenin, the editorial board of SOTSIAL-DEMOKRAT declared that it could no longer continue to publish the journal. In a letter to Armand on 30 October 1916, in which he explained the reasons for terminating the publication of KOMMUNIST, Lenin wrote: "The political task of our party was clear: we could not tie our hands by equality in the editorial board with N.I. (that is, with Bukharin—BBT)+ Yuri (Pyatakov—BBT)+ E.P (Bosh—BBT) (...KOMMUNIST was a good thing so long as there was no separate program of the trio who composed one—
half the editorial board). To grant equality to a group consisting of
Bukharin + Yuir + and E.B. would be idiocy and the ruin of all the work...And if they had allowed themselves to descend to group stupidity with
Bukharin, then we had to break with them, more precisely with KOMMUNIST. And
that was done."(17) The Central Department in Russia, after hearing the
report on the disagreements within the KOMMUNIST editorial board, declared its
complete unity with the editorial board of the central organ SOTSIAL—DEMOKRAT
and expressed its desire that "all publications of the Central Committee be
edited under strict guidelines that are totally consistent with the line of
the Central Committee that has been in effect since the start of the war."

That fact that Lenin proposed that the publication of the journal cease did
not, of course, prevent him from highly evaluating the contents of what was
the first and the only double issue of KOMMUNIST or having a high evaluation
of the role played by this journal in the history of our party. It is not
surprising that, immediately after the February revolution, in a letter to
J.S. Hanocki dated 30 March 1917, Lenin wrote: "I must at all costs demand
the republication in Petrograd—under the title "From the History of
the Last Years of Czarism" of SOTSIAL—DEMOKRAT, of KOMMUNIST."(18) It seems
that certain measures had been taken to republish KOMMUNIST. In the central
archives of the Institute of Marx—Lenin of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union there is still one copy of KOMMUNIST (in
pamphlet form) that bears the words "for republication in Russia." However,
this could not be done. The articles by Lenin that were printed in KOMMUNIST
were reprinted in Petrograd in the anthology "Against the Flow."

On 8 (21) August 1917, the Central Committee of the Russian (b) Social—
Democratic Workers Party debated the establishment of a theoretical journal of
the party. Two names were proposed—Prosveshchenie or Kommunist.(19) However,
such a journal could not be established at that time. The study of
theoretical issues was carried out on the pages of the Leninist newspaper
PRAVDA. The SPUTNIK KOMMUNISTA Journal, the organ of the Moscow Municipal
Party Committee, was published in Moscow during the first years following the
revolution.

In November, 1923, while Lenin was still alive, a resolution was issued
founding BOLSHEVIK Journal. One year after the birth of the journal, the 14th
Plenum of the Russian (b) Communist Party, in a resolution "On Party
Building," observed that "the thinking of establishing a militant leading
organ of the party (BOLSHEVIK Journal) to supplement PRAVDA, Newspaper was
entirely proper and the party must make every effort to further strengthen
BOLSHEVIK as a solid leading organ of Leninism."

FOOTNOTES

* An article by the editorial board of KOMMUNIST (Soviet Union).


2. Ibid., Volume 26, p 95.


8. NASH GOLOS, 4 June 1915.


10. Ibid., pp 76-77, 79, 84, 86, 87-88, 90, 92-93.


12. Ibid., p 93.


15. Ibid., p 143.

16. LICHTSTRAHLEN, No 1, 3, October 1915, p 15.


18. Ibid., Volume 49, p 421.


7809
CSO: 4210/23
THE ESSENCE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Hanoi TAP CHI CONG SAN in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 84 pp 82-88

[Article by Pham Binh]

[Text] During the past 40 years and more, Southeast Asia has been the only region in the world that has not been at peace. Continuous wars and crises have occurred in this region, including one war in which more bombs and shells were used than in all of World War II.

Putting an end to this situation and turning Southeast Asia into a region of peace, stability and cooperation are the foremost concerns of many countries in the region and the world. However, there are disagreements over how this should be done. The largest disagreements exist among the countries of Southeast Asia, especially between the ASEAN group of countries and the countries of Indochina, and concern the causes of the present situation in Kampuchea and the threats to Southeast Asia. To understand the causes and the essence of the Kampuchean situation, it must be examined against the background of all of the issues of Southeast Asia. And, to gain a full understanding of the issues of Southeast Asia, present day Southeast Asia must be examined against the background of its 2,000 year history, especially the 40 years since World War II. At the same time, one must also examine all the developments that have taken place during the past 5 years within this region.

Chinese expansionism and hegemony constitute the oldest and most persistent threat in the history of mankind. It has been a continuous threat to the countries of Southeast Asia for 2,000 years. China imposed its hegemony on all countries of Southeast Asia in the 1st century B.C. and still considers Southeast Asia to be its sphere of influence. The threat by China to this region was only interrupted for about 100 years during the 19th century when China itself was turned into a colony by the western imperialist countries. The American, French, British, Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese colonialists also occupied and took turns ruling the countries of Southeast Asia. During World War II, Japan replaced the western imperialists as ruler of Southeast Asia. Following the defeat of the Japanese fascists, the western colonialist countries reinvaded the countries of Southeast Asia and began to oppose the national liberation movement within this region. Taking advantage of the defeat and the weakened position of the western imperialists, the United
States jumped into Southeast Asia and waged in Vietnam the most bloody war of aggression in history. Compared to the threat posed by Chinese expansionism and hegemony during the past several thousand years, the western colonialist and imperialist powers ruled the countries of Southeast Asia for a shorter period of time. Following their defeat, all imperialist countries were forced to withdraw from this region and look for other ways to re-establish themselves here. In contrast to these powers, China and Japan lie immediately next to the countries of Southeast Asia. These two powers have not abandoned their expansionist and hegemonist designs on this region and will not do so in the future.

History has proven that the expansionist and hegemonist powers, the colonialist and imperialist powers always focus their efforts on suppressing the peoples of those nations that possess the strongest spirit of patriotism so that they can easily control all Southeast Asia. During the past 2,000 years, China has focused its efforts on invading and intervening against Vietnam, Burma, and Indonesia and considered Vietnam to be its main target of subjugation. China ruled Vietnam for more than 1,000 years and invaded Vietnam 10 times in the next 1,000 years. During the past 2,000 years, not one country in Southeast Asia has been ruled or invaded by China as many times as Vietnam has. After World War II, the three countries of Indochina and Indonesia became the first countries in the world to use violent revolutionary force to win their independence. As a result, the western colonialists and imperialists returned to the region in a vain attempt to impose their domination upon these countries once again. Following on the heels of the western powers and in conjunction with infiltrating and committing sabotage against all countries of Southeast Asia, Great Han chauvinism directed the thrust of its efforts against the three countries of Indochina and Indonesia. With the victory of the three countries of Indochina and Indonesia, the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia developed strongly and forced the imperialist countries to grant independence to other countries in Southeast Asia.

The colonialist and imperialist countries of the West had hoped to defeat the independence movement of Vietnam and the other countries of Indochina in order to crush the national liberation movement in Southeast Asia. However, they would encounter many difficulties in combating a liberation movement with such strength and broad influence without enlisting the aid of a number of countries within the region.

They especially exploited the expansionist designs of Thailand against its neighbors, mainly Laos and Kampuchea, in order to draw Thailand into their policy of aggression and use territory of Thailand to conduct activities against its neighboring countries. In its history, Thailand has invaded all neighboring countries in continental Southeast Asia and ruled Laos, Kampuchea and Malaysia. At the same time, Thailand has always collaborated with foreign countries to achieve expansionism and hegemony over neighboring countries. The Chinese feudalists collaborated with Thai feudalists in attacks on Burma and Vietnam in the 18th century. Thailand collaborated with Great Britain in an attack on Burma at the start of the 19th century. In the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, Thailand recognized the rule of French colonialism over Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam in exchange for France's recognition of Thailand's
annexation of a portion of Kampuchea and Laos. In World War II, Thailand was the only Asian ally of Japan in the war against the United States, Great Britain and France in the Pacific and in Japan's war of aggression in Southeast Asia. As reward for its service, Japan gave Thailand some territory belonging to Laos, Kampuchea, Malaysia and Burma.

In 1954, following the defeat of France in Indochina, Thailand and the Philippines collaborated with the United States, Great Britain, France and Pakistan in establishing the SEATO military bloc to counter the three countries of Indochina. The headquarters of SEATO is in Bangkok and the general secretary of this bloc is Thai. In the war of aggression against the three countries of Indochina, the United States used military bases on Thai soil; sent the Thai army into Laos to fight the people of Laos and into South Vietnam to fight the Vietnamese; and used Thailand to oppose the neutrality of Kampuchea.

Since 1979, Thailand has been collaborating with China to oppose the three countries of Indochina. The history of the seven centuries of Thailand's existence has been the history of Thailand collaborating with countries outside Southeast Asia to oppose all neighboring countries on continental Southeast Asia, has been the history of Thai expansionism and hegemony. Thailand is the country in Southeast Asia that has the most historical problems with its neighbors.

In 1945, Vietnam and Indonesia won their independence, thus marking the beginning of the end of the 2,000 years during which the countries of Indochina have been dependent upon and ruled by foreign countries. The victory of the three countries of Indochina in the resistance against the United States, the most powerful of the imperialist countries, was a milestone marking the extraordinary growth of the forces of independence and peace and ushered in peaceful coexistence among the countries of Southeast Asia. This trend was recognized by General de Gaulle years ago when he proposed the neutralization of Southeast Asia in 1966. And, it was also on the basis of the new balance of power in Southeast Asia, that, in 1971, the ASEAN countries proposed the establishment of a region of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia. Since 1973, many ASEAN countries have established diplomatic relations with Laos and Vietnam. After the United States was forced to withdraw from Vietnam and continental Southeast Asia, China began to use the Pol Pot clique as the main tool for opposing the three countries of Indochina and intensified its policy of hegemony and expansion in Southeast Asia.

The victory of the three countries of Indochina in 1979 was the most serious defeat ever to the expansionism and hegemony of China in Indochina and Southeast Asia. That victory solidified the trend toward peace and independence as well as the trend toward peaceful coexistence in Southeast Asia.

A review of the situation in Southeast Asia from an historical, overall perspective shows that this situation has been characterized by five distinctive features:
All threats to the independence of the countries of Southeast Asia and all attempts to undermine peace and stability within this region have come from colonialist, imperialist, militarist and hegemonist powers outside the region. There are historical problems existing among the countries of Southeast Asia, such as those between Thailand and the countries of Indochina, Thailand and Burma, Thailand and Malaysia, the problems regarding the South China Sea, the disagreements concerning the Kampuchea issue, the East Timor issue and so forth. However, all of these disagreements are very small in comparison to the contradictions that exist between the countries of Southeast Asia and the imperialist, colonialist, militarist and hegemonist powers outside the region.

The three countries of Indochina have been the primary victims of aggression, intervention and domination by outside powers. No other country in the world has been ruled by foreign countries for thousands of years as Vietnam was. No other country has endured so many long wars of aggression or endured bombing and shelling as heavy as Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea did.

The aggression and intervention by foreign colonialist, imperialist and expansionist powers against the countries of Indochina and the undermining of peace and stability in Southeast Asia would not have been possible without the support and the permission to use the territory of a number of countries, especially Thailand.

The imperialist and expansionist powers have always pursued a policy of "divide and rule," a policy of setting one country of Southeast Asia against another, especially between the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina.

The forces of independence and peace in Southeast Asia have developed constantly since World War II and became strong enough to defeat the longest, bloodiest wars of aggression ever waged as well as every political, economic and military effort of the three largest imperialist powers (the United States, Great Britain and France) and the largest expansionist and hegemonist power (China).

During the past 5 years, the so called Kampuchea issue has arisen in Southeast Asia. At first, many persons were confused. However, the facts of the past 5 years have revealed what actually lies at the heart of this issue.

To conceal their expansionist and hegemonist intentions toward Southeast Asia, the Beijing authorities have falsely accused Vietnam of invading Kampuchea, of being the "small hegemonist" lackey of the "master hegemonist," the Soviet Union, of practicing expansionism within the region and threatening the security of the ASEAN countries. They are doing precisely what the imperialist countries used to do. When France invaded Vietnam, it said that its purpose was to prevent communist aggression within this region and prevent Vietnam from becoming a lackey of the Soviet Union and China. The United States fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident and said that the purpose of the war in Vietnam was to prevent communist aggression and prevent Vietnam from becoming a lackey of the Soviet Union and China.
The truth of the matter is that for more than 30 years, especially after the defeat of the United States in 1975, China looked for ways to conquer Vietnam and Laos and use them as implements of its strategy. However, Beijing was defeated. Therefore, they have sought every way to control Kampuchea in order to divide the three countries of Indochina and use it as a springboard for Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia. Between 1975 and 1978, with the instigation and encouragement of China, the Pol Pot clique conducted continuous acts of provocation and aggression against the territory of Vietnam, massacred Vietnamese and rejected every proposal by Vietnam for a negotiated peace. In late 1977, they severed diplomatic relations with Vietnam, massed 19 of their 23 battalions along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border and launched a war along the entire border in December, 1978, intending to occupy a large portion of the territory of Vietnam and directly threaten Ho Chi Minh City.

In early 1978, in coordination with the Pol Pot clique's activities against Vietnam, China instigated the "Chinese refugees" incident in Vietnam, cut its aid to us, withdrew its specialists, concentrated a large number of forces along the Sino-Viet border and began conducting acts of armed provocation.

In the face of this situation, the Vietnamese side steadfastly sought to resolve the problem through peaceful negotiation. On 5 February 1978, following a series of proposals for peaceful negotiations, Vietnam advanced a three-point proposal for a peaceful solution to the conflict between the two countries; at the same time, through the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade in July, 1978, we sought reconciliation between Vietnam and Kampuchea.

Every peaceful effort by the Vietnamese side failed to produce results. In November, 1978, the U.S. government raised the issue of troop concentrations along the Kampuchea-Vietnam border in the UN Security Council; the Pol Pot clique emphatically rejected Security Council debate of this issue. Meanwhile, the military forces of Pol Pot and China had formed a pincer and were seriously threatening the security of Vietnam.

In January, 1979, exercising its legitimate right to defend itself, just as the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain had exercised their right to defend themselves against German fascism in World War II, in response to the appeal by the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation and in order to save the people of Kampuchea from genocide, Vietnam sent volunteer forces to help the people of Kampuchea topple the genocidal regime, end China's control over Kampuchea, defeat China's plan to invade Vietnam from two directions and eliminate a factor of instability within this region.

Together with falsely accusing Vietnam of having invaded Kampuchea, China held the hope that Vietnam would be resisted by the people of Kampuchea and become bogged down there just as the United States had become bogged down and defeated in Vietnam. Exactly the opposite occurred. The Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea have been welcomed and respected by the people of Kampuchea because they saved them from genocide and they want Vietnamese forces to remain in Kampuchea as long as necessary to prevent the return of the Pol Pot clique.
This is the third time that Vietnam has sent forces to Kampuchea to join the people of Kampuchea in fighting the common enemy, in winning and defending the independence of each country. On the two previous occasions, Vietnam withdrew all its volunteer forces after France was forced to end its war and the United States was forced to cease its aggression. This time, Vietnam will also withdraw all its volunteer forces after China ceases to pose a threat, stops using territory of Thailand in acts against the three countries of Indochina and stops using Pol Pot against the people of Kampuchea. While awaiting complete withdrawal, Vietnam has unilaterally withdrawn some of its forces twice in 2 years and, together with the People's Republic of Kampuchea, examined the possibility of withdrawing some forces each year. The withdrawal of some of its forces proves that Vietnam cannot immediately withdraw all its forces and allow China to send the Pol Pot lackeys back into Kampuchea; it also proves that Vietnam is not bogged down and unable to withdraw its forces. This action is an indication of the strength of the resurrection of the people of Kampuchea. It also shows that Vietnam respects the independence and sovereignty of Kampuchea.

Having falsely accused Vietnam of invading Kampuchea, Beijing hoped that the establishment of the "three faction coalition government" in Kampuchea headed by Sihanouk would reverse the situation there. However, this Pol Pot clique in disguise is reviled and opposed by the Kampuchea people. Following the birth of the so called coalition government, the realities of the past 2 years have proven Sihanouk's admission that he would commit political suicide by forming a coalition with Pol Pot. In view of the fact that this so called coalition government consists of all those persons who have been cast aside by the realities of life in Kampuchea over the past decade and more, how can it hope to survive? These three factions have set about eliminating one another and only come together like so many marionettes when the UN General Assembly convenes.

The people of the three countries of Indochina fully realize that the people of Kampuchea suffered the greatest tragedy in history, the campaign of genocide, because China used the Pol Pot clique to divide the three countries of Indochina. That period was the most difficult ever experienced by the three countries of Indochina. At the same time, through the unity and mutual assistance of the countries of Indochina, the people of Kampuchea were saved from genocide and the peoples of the three countries of Indochina surmounted the greatest difficulties ever faced. This is the historical significance of the solidarity among the peoples of the three countries of Indochina. Although China is always falsely accusing Vietnam of planning to establish a so called "Indochina union," everyone knows that the strength of the solidarity of the three countries of Indochina is based on respect for the independence and sovereignty of each country.

During the past 5 years, Beijing has constantly said that the Kampuchean issue is an issue between Vietnam and the ASEAN countries and has used the Kampuchean issue to set the ASEAN countries against the countries of Indochina. However, when the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina express a desire to hold negotiations, China voices its opposition. Meanwhile, China has demanded negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning the Kampuchea issue and considers the resolution of the Kampuchea issue to be
the most important of the three prerequisites to improved relations with the Soviet Union. In the five-point proposal made public on 1 March 1983, China also considered Kampuchea to be the main issue standing in the way of improved relations with Vietnam, with ASEAN playing no role at all.

Thus, as indicated by its actions, China considers Kampuchea to be an issue between China and the Soviet Union, an issue between China and the countries of Indochina. On the other hand, in Sino-Soviet negotiations as well as in China's five-point proposal, Beijing never mentions the role of the ASEAN countries in the Kampuchea issue. During the past 5 years, as everyone knows, the Kampuchea and Afghanistan situations have been the two main elements of the collaboration between China and the United States against the Soviet Union. Clearly, China is using the Kampuchea issue to make gains in its relations with the United States. This is the maneuver of pushing someone else into a "fight" so that they do the "negotiating," a maneuver that China has often employed in the past.

The realities of the past 5 years have clearly shown the "Kampuchea issue" for what it is: it is not the issue of Vietnam invading Kampuchea, it is not the problems that exist between the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina and it is not the cause of instability in Southeast Asia. The so called Kampuchea issue, the disagreements between the two groups of countries in Southeast Asia and the fact that the situation in this region is characterized by a lack of peace and stability have but one cause. It is Beijing's desire to start trouble in Southeast Asia to enable it to carry out its policy of expansionism and hegemony in the region. It is also China's desire to use the crisis in Southeast Asia as an instrument supporting its strategy of collaborating with the United States against the Soviet Union and the world revolution in order to achieve the "four modernizations" with a view toward quickly becoming a superpower and realizing its ambition to become the ruler of the world.

Deserving of attention is the fact that the ASEAN countries frequently say that they will not allow China to control Kampuchea as it did in the past and will not allow the Pol Pot clique to return to power and the fact that they are concerned with the security interests of Vietnam. However, the ASEAN countries demand that Vietnam unilaterally withdraw its forces at a time when China is free to intimidate Vietnam and threaten its security, free to use territory of Thailand to oppose and sabotage the three countries of Indochina and Pol Pot is free to oppose the people of Kampuchea at will. The ASEAN countries have proposed that forces of the six ASEAN countries and Vietnam be sent in to occupy Kampuchea in place of Vietnamese volunteer forces. However, everyone knows that the six ASEAN countries support the so called coalition government in its opposition against the government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. The presence of forces of the six ASEAN countries in Kampuchea would help them find ways to destroy the People's Government of Kampuchea. The people of Kampuchea would surely strenuously oppose this. In such a situation, Vietnam would certainly support the People's Government of Kampuchea. Thus, the ASEAN solution would turn the "Kampuchea issue," an issue between China and the countries of Indochina, into a military conflict between the ASEAN countries and the countries of Indochina. The hostile stand that the majority of the ASEAN countries have taken toward the three countries
of Indochina during the past 40 years reinforces the need to view the above mentioned solution proposed by the ASEAN countries with a great deal of skepticism.

Clearly, every solution to the problems of Southeast Asia must take into consideration the characteristics of this region and the realities of the situation over the past 5 years. All solutions that arise from misconceptions and incorrect arguments lead to a dead end.

In view of the characteristics and the realities of the situation in Southeast Asia, a fundamental, comprehensive and lasting solution to the problems of this region must lead to an end to aggression and intervention from the outside and the withdrawal of all forces and military bases from Southeast Asia; respect for the independence and sovereignty of the three countries of Indochina and the other countries in Southeast Asia; an end to the practice on the part of some countries in the region, especially Thailand, of allowing their territory to be used by foreign countries against third countries in Southeast Asia; an end, in the immediate future, of Thailand's collaboration with Beijing and its allowing the Pol Pot clique and other reactionary powers of Kampuchea to hide within Thailand and create instability in Kampuchea, in particular, and Southeast Asia, in general; and the countries of Southeast Asia opposing the attempts to divide them by foreign countries, living together in peace, resolving their disagreements through peaceful negotiations and working together to turn Southeast Asia into a region of peace, stability and cooperation.

The development of the situation over the past 40 years in Indochina has made it fully possible for the countries of the region to endeavor to achieve these noble goals. However, until a complete solution such as the one described above is achieved, the countries of Southeast Asia must intensify their dialogue, seek partial solutions that can be implemented and, on this basis, create favorable conditions for arriving at a complete solution in Southeast Asia, thereby preventing the imperialist and expansionist powers from exploiting the disagreements among the countries of Southeast Asia and causing the situation to deteriorate, which could lead to an uncontrollable explosion.

In the face of the danger posed by China's collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and Japan in the remaining years of the 20th century, the countries of Southeast Asia must soon make peace and begin cooperating with one another in order to build their respective countries.

The issues of strategic importance described above will pose challenges to the countries of Southeast Asia and demand that the countries of the region resolve their current problems within Southeast Asia in a high spirit of responsibility for the sake of the interests of each country and for the sake of a Southeast Asia of peace, stability and prosperity.

7809
CSO: 4210/23

END