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WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2219

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FOREIGN MINISTER HALLGRIMSSON GIVES VIEWS ON EUROMISSILES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 8 Sep 83 p 25

[Text] Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrímsson who is presently attending a conference on European security matters in Madrid recently returned from a conference with Scandinavian foreign ministers in Stockholm and, in an interview with MORGUNBLADID yesterday, made the following statements:

"In connection with disarmament we discussed the necessity for some accomplishment leading from the superpowers' Geneva conference on the limitation of middle-range missiles in Europe. We also discussed generally limitation of nuclear weapons, including the proposal of certain areas of Scandinavia being kept totally free of such armaments without, however, any definite recommendations being offered. Anyway, it was soon apparent that, besides Iceland, Denmark and Norway consider any such recommendations not only unnecessary but even harmful with possible negative effects on the superpowers' negotiations for limiting nuclear armaments and missile stock-piling in Europe.

"We are of the opinion that the immediate concern should not be with an area already free of nuclear armaments, i.e., the Nordic countries, all of which have declared that their territories are without such stores. Such declarations need to be made by other such nations, after which participation by nations possessing nuclear weapons could be sought.

"We naturally discussed relations between East and West, particularly in the light of developments following the recent Soviet attack on the South Korean passenger airplane, and all agreed that such an occurrence was totally reprehensible and must not ever be repeated."

As to the present Madrid conference, Geir stated that the attack on the South Korean airplane had been a major subject for discussion and deplored by most nations except those behind the Iron Curtain who had excused the Soviet Union and termed discussions of the matter a hate campaign. Geir said that today Gromyko, the USSR foreign minister, had stated in speech that the United States had been using the passenger airplane for spying on military sensitive areas, the airplane had been in the service of the United States committing a criminal act, adding that the plane had refused to land at a Soviet airport, did heed warnings, and tried to escape, so that Soviet personnel were forced to cut short the flight. Geir further stated the Gromyko, in his speech, made clear that no one could violate Soviet airspace or enter any Soviet-controlled areas without risking similar fate.
Geir said he would deliver a speech at the conference today, Thursday. Yesterday morning, Wednesday, U.S. foreign minister Schultz hosted a breakfast meeting of NATO representatives, after which the ministers attended a special meeting prior to the official opening of the conference, where Schultz gave a report on the airplane incident which, Geir stated, was being viewed as a very serious matter.

The conference will continue today and tomorrow morning, concluding at noon on Friday.

9981
CSO: 3626/55
ETA-M ALTERS OPERATIONAL MODE IN FACE OF RECENT EVENTS

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 8 Sep p 9

[Article by Juan Pedro Quinonero, correspondent]

[Text] The ETA-m [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group-military] is starting an "operational reform" inside French territory so as to "make an energetic response" to the new political and paramilitary situation in France and in Spain. This reform is going to be undertaken in response to various events which have taken place during the month of August, so that they can "adapt themselves" to the new situation.

Paris--The ETA-m is undergoing an "operational reform" on French soil, so as to "make an energetic response" to the new political and paramilitary situation in France and Spain.

This tactical reform does not mean there will be a change in its functional structure, but rather a political and functional reform of the groups who carry out its activities in France and Spain, who, according to the same sources, are trying to "adapt themselves" in a more functional way" to the new situation.

This operational reform is being carried out in response to certain basic events:

The total clandestinity now forced on the top leaders of the ETA-m in French territory; the floods and disasters in the Spanish Basque Country; the escalation of the French-Basque "Iparretarrak" terrorist movement, and the political consequences of the "flag war."

Response

By this operational reform the ETA-m is attempting to respond and adapt itself to that network of "new relationships." The leaders of the ETA-m have followed and politically analyzed the emotional impact caused by the cooperation between Madrid and Bilbao during the disastrous events in the Spanish Basque Country. And the first attacks carried out are an initial response toward any attempt at "political recovery."
The new political cooperation between France and Spain some months ago forced many ETA-m leaders who had fled to France to go into complete hiding; while events like this summer's "flag war" made necessary a close and very "dynamic" relationship between the political leadership and the armed branch of the organization. From this there arises the need to "reform" certain operational channels in the organization.

The operations of "Iparretarrak" [the ones from the north] during the past month of August also coincided with a parallel escalation of anti-nuclear terrorism in France, which was intimately linked to the "ETA geography" in France. ETA-m believes that many of the "irresponsible" actions of Iparretarrak are historically dangerous. Today the ETA-m appears to be yielding to accomplished facts, and has decided to seek a "political advantage," whenever possible, from certain actions which frequently are out of its direct control.

Alternatives

The new operational reform of the ETA-m will seek to achieve "greater flexibility" with the "greatest energy necessary." In operational terms, the ETA-m considers it necessary to be able to have a "broad" range of objectives, which can be chosen by the leadership at any time as it plays its cards using different alternatives as "military" actions which "answer to" a very ambiguous political situation.

In particular, the floods and disasters of the past month of August constitute a "political-ecological" event with a strong emotional impact, which the ETA-m does not want to "abandon" to simple "sentimental" analysis.

"Autonomy" and "flexibility" are two of the main parts of the operational reform: the relative difficulty of movement within French territory has made advisable the relative "autonomy of action" granted to the members in Spanish territory. The theory of the fish in the water of Mao Zedong's military writings perfectly fits -- the ETA believes -- a political situation where the emotional impact of the floods and the "flag war" permits more direct and brutal activism in situations which are in a constant state of flux.

The top leadership of the ETA-m still reserves for itself definitive leadership in major actions; counting on the tactical support of its members in Spanish territory, indirect support in conflicts which are beyond its control, but in which it can exercise a considerable specific influence by merely issuing "slogans". The ETA-m leadership will decide at any time which actions and attacks can "expand the struggle on one or another front."

The prime objectives of this operational reform are quite wide in scope: "to launch a response against the political recovery resulting from the floods;" to increase the clandestine communication routes in France and Spain; to intensify the "psychological battle"; to create the necessary contacts with "Iparretarrak" and the antinuclear movement in the south of France, which could allow them to exercise a certain "political control" over their actions at all times.

8131
CSO: 3548/498
ETA-M PLACES EXPLOSIVES AT NAVARRA UNIVERSITY

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 8 Sep 83 p 9

[Text] Pamplona—An explosive device made of one kilo of goma-2 was deacti-
vated early yesterday morning by the EDEX section of the National Police in
the Theology School of the University of Navarra.

At about 10:30 in the evening a telephone call was received at the abertzale
[patriotic] newspaper EGIN, in which the presence of the explosive in that
school was reported.

Three explosive devices were thrown at the University or Navarra Saturday
night and Sunday morning. This was attributed to the ETA-[Basque Fatherland
and Liberty Group] military, according to reports published in that news-
paper.

Saturday night two devices exploded outside the Goimendi residence hall, and
one in the Theology School. No significant damage took place.

According to police sources, the device which was deactivated could have
been thrown there early Sunday morning. It did not explode because its
fuse malfunctioned.

8131
CSO: 3548/498
GUERRA, GOVERNORS STUDY PUBLIC SECURITY MEASURES

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 17 Sep 83 p 11

[Excerpt] Madrid--Alfonso Guerra, vice president of the government, yesterday delivered the closing address at the meeting of civil governors to study the plan for public security. The meeting took place this Thursday and Friday in the Traffic Office in Madrid. The closing session was held behind closed doors. On his arrival at the meeting, Alfonso Guerra declared to the press that:"the security plan is aimed at reducing not only ordinary crime, but also the criminal attacks of the terrorists."

"The plan will not change the laws regarding the authority of the civil governors or the responsibilities of the different police forces," Guerra added. "There are various security boards which deal with cooperation between the responsible officials of the state and those of the autonomous communities." The vice president added that "it is essential to guarantee authority 'per se', which is not detrimental, but necessary, and also the rights of the citizens, since both factors go to make up security and liberty." "In a democratic system the risks which freedom entails must be guaranteed by better organization of security."

The vice president of the government told the civil governors that he was going to confirm the statements which Felipe Gonzalez had made to them that morning at the Moncloa, concerning the need to enforce the law firmly, but always with respect for the dialogue with every sector of society. "In carrying out this task they will always have the support of the socialist government," he added. After the conclusion of the meeting a press conference was held, presided over by the head of state security, Rafael Vera, the director general of the Civil Guard, Aramburu Topete, the director general of civil protection, Antonio Figueruelo, and the civil governor of Madrid, Jose Maria Rodriguez Colorado. Rafael Vera declared that the feeling of insecurity which the citizens have does not conform to reality, because more emphasis is put on criminal actions than on police successes, which unconsciously produces insecurity. In order to combat this psychosis a campaign to educate the citizens so that they will cooperate more with the police is what is needed.
The director of state security denied that friction exists between the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior because of the releases from prison resulting from the reform of the Criminal Prosecution Law and the Penal Code. He added that unemployment, and especially drugs, are the most common causes of crime, and he announced the creation of a single anti-drug command which will coordinate all the actions of the security forces on this subject by means of a decree which the office of state security is drawing up.
ELECTRICITY, GAS PRICES TO BE INDEXED TO CONSUMPTION

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 25 Aug 83 pp 28-29

[Article by Eric Walther: "Price of Energy: the Unique Formula?"]

[Text] Set all energy prices with the help of an indexing formula which would satisfy producers and consumers at the same time? After petroleum products (in effect) and natural gas (planned), it is electricity's turn. But the minister of finance is already clearly announcing his desire to maintain control of public rates...

It is not a question of losing control of public rates of electricity. Such is, in substance, the reaction of Jacques Delors' entourage to the possible setting up of an automatic indexing formula for consumer electricity prices, starting at the beginning of next year.

At the moment when the battle on the inflation front is entering its crucial phase, the public powers are not visibly hoping to expose themselves to too great a risk of having inflation skyrocket. Unfavorable outlook, then, but one which would not exclude a section dealing with rates in the blueprint agreement which the French Electric Company (EdF) government are expected to sign on their return. One can even think that some evaluation guidelines taken into account in the formula already worked out will be retained as the basis for negotiations for price adjustments, but without ever imposing on them a rigid, definitive character.

The beginning of regular indexing of his sales prices is enticing to the producer! Even if some modifications have been brought about, oilmen are not complaining too much anyway about the system which has been set up for their products. The formula, in a preliminary version appearing in an addendum to EdF's blueprint contract bill (which itself must be approved by an administrative council on 6 September) preserves the undertaking of an excessive deficit in case of a noticeable rise in rates. The whole of cost-price items is covered. The introduction of elements which avoid EdF's control, like the market gros domestic product, the change in electricity consumption and also the monetary environment, complete the setting up of this formula. The recourse to parameters which
evaluate the parities between the franc and the dollar, and the international rates of remuneration of capital loans give cause for surprise at first. However, it can be justified if one remembers that EdF still burns fuel oil in its power plants and must reimburse a debt of more than 150 billion francs partially drawn up in dollars.

Expected to work every four months unless vetoed by the public authorities, this formula proposal comes several weeks after the "green light" given by Jean Auroux, secretary of state for energy, to a policy of increased penetration of electricity, particularly in industry.

On this occasion, it was asked of the public establishment to define a rare structure adapted to this objective, one aspect of which could recover the setting up of long-term contracts with manufacturers, permitting them to take on new investments on a clear basis. No doubt these initiatives will be the object of debate, no matter what happens. Moreover, they will retain a solution which, for EdF, consists of automously braking down the coming increases among the different categories of users, which would constitute an essential contribution to conducting a much sharper commercial policy.

Electricity: 5 Percent Increase in September?

If this formula is put on the shelf in its current version as a really "independent" and operational calculating tool, it is probable that its informal use can simplify relations between the state and EdF, a step forward which obviously would make everyone happy.

So nothing is definite yet. The outcome of the negotiations will once again depend on a harmonious balance among the three points of the index triangle of prices, trade policy and health of the establishment. On this last point, the former minister of energy, Edmond Hervé, was engaged in reestablishing the EdF's deficit (7.9 billion francs in 1982) from here to the end of 1984, a proposal taken up again moreover in the blueprint contract bill. It seems that this is a problem for which solutions will be found in increased sales, notably in exports, rather than in increased prices...

However, one read in the report from the "long term energy" group, sent to the government last July: "The rate policy should best reflect the real costs of energy (...) and the prices of each type of energy should become adjusted fully and without delay on cost prices." It is true that the authors stated further "that the producers can have an interest financially in selling under their cost price (long-term marginal costs) in order to reduce their surplus capacity...".

For now, the price of electricity will go up in September. A five percent hike is being discussed. But, without a formula, it is still difficult to confirm...
Natural Gas Too [in box]

The indexing formula bill on the price of natural gas dates back far beyond the bill concerning electricity. Its imminent application has even been announced several times since the beginning of the year. Integrated into the blueprint contract bill that the French Gas Company (GdF) sent to the government last 13 July, it seems that it has little chance of being totally adopted under current conditions, although its existence does not respond to the same imperatives as those of its electrical counterpart.

In fact, the outside constraint for EDF (2.5 billion in losses in 1982) is of quite a different order. Since more than three-quarters of the firm's supplies are now being bought abroad, the current price of the dollar constitutes a very real handicap. One can thus imagine that there again, along the initial parameters of the formula (price of natural gas and certain concurrent energies, monetary parities), there are some that will be retained at the outset of negotiations. A certain number of items which could be brought to the public's attention, mainly in the matter of cost of supplies, would clarify the debates when the time comes to adjust rates.

Setting Energy Prices: The Current Situation [in box]

Petroleum Products: A monthly indexing formula for the prices of all products except heavy-grade fuel oil has been in effect since May 1982. Its effects have been limited during the price-freeze period. Then, applied normally, it led to three successive price reductions in the first trimester of 1983 and to increases since. Its statutes foresee a regular revision of the weight of the parameters (which was done in July and translated into a limitation of the increases). Outside of the non-deductible value added box except for heavy-grade fuel oil, the fiscal and parafiscal levies were spread out in March 1983 between 12.8 percent for domestic fuel oil and 48.8 percent for regular gasoline.

Natural Gas and Electricity: Their prices are adjusted by ministerial order after consulting with the price committee (on an average of twice a year since 1981). The TVA, which is non-deductible, is applied for domestic uses. A supplementary levy of 12 percent on average is applied to low-tension electricity and 4 percent on high tension. Natural gas is better off, with just 0.5 percent (domestic use) and 0.8 percent (industrial and commercial use).

Coal: The sale prices of the French Coal Board are set once a year, in January for industrial uses and in April for home fireplaces. There is no levy other than the TVA for domestic use. Imported coal is not subject to any rule and is not subject to any other particular tax.
TEK PROPOSES POWER PURCHASE FROM PRIVATE SECTOR

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 18 Aug 83 p 4

[Article on economic page edited by Cahit Duzel: "TEK Proposal to Private Sector"]

[Text] Ankara (HURRIYET)—Kamil Toktas, general director of the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise [TEK], told industrialists: "You build the power plants and sell us the electricity." Noting the attempt to remove TEK from monopoly status, Toktas said it was necessary for factories to undertake to produce their own electricity and that 10 factories could easily get together and build an electric power plant. When the factories produced more electricity than they needed, they could sell it, he said. The TEK general director said two firms had applied to produce electricity, and their status would be studied.

General Director Kamil Toktas pointed out that the state was mobilizing all available resources for energy investments, but this was inadequate. "Much more investment is needed. Electric power plants are a profitable business, but our problem is the lack of resources to build them," he said. Stressing that hydroelectricity was a very profitable investment, Toktas added, "Water, sun and wind are free. The profit is in the production of electricity." He said:

"We're not saying we shouldn't haul passengers. We're just saying to the private sector, 'You buy a bus and start hauling passengers, too.'

"Ten factory owners or individuals could get together and build a power plant. We will buy all you produce. We could carry the electricity needed for their factories in the TEK electrical grid. If they produce too much, we are ready to buy what is left over from that, too. We would sign a 30-year contract to buy the electricity they produce."

Toktas denied claims that cement production is down owing to an electricity shortage. "We had a 20-percent cut-back for 7 months from 1 June to 31 December. The extent of the impact would also be in this vicinity," said TEK General Director Tektas, adding:
"If there had been no drought, Turkey's electricity production this year would have been around 30 billion kilowatt hours. The cut-back in industry was 1 billion kilowatt hours. That is, we are continuing to produce 29 billion kilowatt hours. We are straining our thermal power plants to do this. If more thermal power plants had been built in Turkey, we would not have been affected this much by the drought." Toktas also said that, for a very low fee, they could give cement producers the ashes from lignite power plants which are used in cement production. Thousands of tons of these ashes, which make up 20 percent of cement, are expelled every day, said Toktas, adding, "We are willing to sell them at far below the present cost to all who want them."

Kamil Toktas said the electricity rationing had gone as hoped and that the public had adjusted to it very well.

8349
CSO: 3554/411
UGT TO BASE NEGOTIATION WITH GOVERNMENT ON ANE

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 17 Sep 83 p 38

[Article by Rodolfo Serrano]

[Text] The UGT [General Union of Workers] will defend its negotiation with the government of the medium-term economic program with an attempt to establish a new union model in which wage demands do not have the importance they have had up to now. Its point of reference will be the National Employment Agreement (ANE), which will be used as an argument to offset resistance by the CCOO [Workers Commissions] to the medium-term economic program. While the socialist central organization has confidence in agreements with the government, complemented with others with the business organizations, CCOO--agreeing, although for different reasons, with the employers' organization--believes that the government itself has made agreement impossible because of the small margin for maneuvering it has left the group's representatives.

The terms of the medium-term economic program delivered last week to the unions and the employers' organization, particularly those regarding the wage increase, have set excessively rigid limits on negotiation, according to both groups. For the CCOO, or at least for a substantial sector of it, negotiation under these conditions is impossible. Julian Ariza himself called the meeting of the CCOO with government representatives deceptive and reiterated his pessimism with regard to the prospects for agreement.

However, some sectors of the Workers Commissions have expressed the opinion that the central organization cannot risk remaining outside of a negotiating process to which the company representatives are committed, and they recall the punishment suffered by the union after its refusal to sign the AMI [Framework Collective Bargaining Agreement], not to mention the support and consolidation achieved after signing the ANE. All parties agree, in addition, that the agreements coming up now will not be a new ANE, although its frame of reference is binding. While the ANE was a closed negotiation process whose development came later, the new negotiations will be--and this
was stressed by the economy minister, Miguel Boyer—continuous and stretched out for some time.

New Union Model

For the UGT, which hastens to defend the suitability of the negotiations at all costs, these negotiations have characteristics which are different—better—from those of ANE. The wage control required to comply with the medium-term economic program did not meet with too much surprise in the socialist union organization. In fact, it fits in perfectly with what the group upheld in its last congress. The UGT is bent on establishing a new model of union action which reduces the importance of pure wage demands in favor of greater attention to the unemployed, a better economic situation for the country, more competitiveness in our products in which the goal would be an improvement in overall wage income in spite of the sacrifice this might mean on an individual level.

The UGT’s argument for defending the negotiation will use the ANE as a point of reference. The National Employment Agreement involved greater wage sacrifices than those now being asked: a wage zone was fixed at 9 percent to 11 percent, with a revision clause whose ceiling was 2 points under the inflation rate, which in 1982 was 14 percent. Also, with regard to compensation, these did not surpass what will be established in the foreseeable future. The increase in pensions was agreed on under the ANE at a rate under that of inflation, while the increases foreseen for the next year will be greater than the expected IPC (Consumer Price Index).

The UGT’s intention seems to be centered around forcing the CCOO to explain why it signed the ANE, which overall, and in the UGT’s judgment, offered greater guarantees. For the CCOO, the ANE was a three-pronged agreement, in which the playing field was defined from the beginning, while the economic program does not offer any possibility for a concrete agreement and will be fragmented by collateral agreements. The CCOO, according to some of its leaders, would negotiate on a three-party basis, and will resist a bilateral negotiation in which the CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations) has the wage sacrifice all wrapped up.

8735
CSO: 3548/504
PCA HEAD INTERPRETS LAND REFORM MARCH IN ANDALUSIA

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 9-15 Sep 83 p 11

[Article by PCA Secretary General Felipe Alcaraz]

[Text] The march of the workers through Andalusia is an event of great importance. This is a seriously organized march, with a goal which attracts more Andalusians every day: Total Agrarian Reform (RAI).

The Rural Federation of Workers Commissions of Andalusia has had a happy beginning, which the PC [Communist Party] leadership warmly salutes, calling upon the efforts and solidarity of the entire party to assist the march for agrarian reform.

A happy beginning, but a difficult one. It is not a pleasure walk. The route will cover over 1,000 kilometers in more than 40 days and pass through 60 Andalusian villages. It is, then, a form of struggle involving a great sacrifice. With humorous enthusiasm the CCOO [Workers Commissions] Rural Federation has called it "a union athletic effort." A march which without a doubt will receive massive welcome in cities and villages and which will not only be made up of workers, although they will be in the majority. And it is precisely here that one of the goals of the march is rooted: to open the meaning and the need of the RAI to participation by industrial workers, peasants, intellectuals, to the "homo urbanita"--in short, to all the Andalusian people, because the RAI is a condition for the possible recovery of Andalusia. Meanwhile, the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] is secretly preparing its Law for Agrarian Reform in Andalusia. No one knows yet its possible content, although according to Escuredo himself, it will be surprising in its leftist scope. However, at the present time the disagreement between the governing party and the central union organization (UGT [General Union of Workers]) is obvious. Escuredo visited the EEC headquarters not long ago, and now he has gone to Israel. There are those who have remarked that in both cases he went north to seek agrarian measures to implement in Andalusia, as well as for other critical reasons (it is not proper to start a political romance with Israel in the face of its diplomatic recognition).

However, in both cases, as they are saying around here, Escuredo is more confused than a fish out of water. Or at worst he is attempting "changes" in Andalusian agriculture in the shadow of multinational interests.
At the end of July Escuredo offered the PCA [Andalusian Communist Party] an agreement on agrarian reform, among other things. There has been no meeting about this yet. Indeed, we might point out to Escuredo that at present the only party with a clear, viable program, involving real change, for agrarian reform is the Communist Party.

At the same time, we must tell Escuredo not to lose sight of the march and that it would be unjust and erroneous to look down his nose at the struggles and the choices of the Andalusian agricultural workers.
TEXT OF TFSC 'SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN STRATEGY'

Nicosia K.T.F.D. RESMI GAZETE in Turkish 29 Jun 83 pp 101-112

[Text] Section I
Turkish Federated State of Cyprus Council of Ministers Decisions
Decision Number: C(K-1) 522-83
1984-88 Second 5-Year Development Plan Strategy
(Bill No: 394/83)
(TFSC-PM)

The Council of Ministers has approved for publication in the RESMI GAZETE the 1984-88 Second Five-Year Development Plan Strategy annexed hereto as amended.

11 June 1983

Second Five-Year Development Plan Strategy

I. Introduction

The basic goal for the duration of the Second Five-Year Plan (SFYP) is: to take advantage of the potential of our economy within the framework of fundamental elements guaranteed by our Constitution to put our economy on a firm foundation at a high rate of development, regulating investment, production, consumption and savings within general economic balance.

The principal targets of the SFYP for achieving this goal include: to proceed with organization and revisions to raise productivity in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry; to provide for industry to operate at full capacity and for the establishment of effective inter-industrial cooperation; in particular, to support the local production of raw materials and, in tourism, to seek opportunities for private-sector input and the use of foreign resources as required for the best utilization of the existing tourist infrastructure; to increase the public economic enterprises' responsibility for generating resources; to ensure that all strata of society share appropriately in this development; in the social area, to increase the per capita national income as a result of this planned economic progress and, therefore, raise the standard of living of the citizens; to eliminate imbalances in income distribution as to labor and professional groups; to
revise educational programs as required to eliminate the manpower shortage existing in certain areas; to ensure a rational personnel distribution by shifting excess personnel in certain areas to areas where personnel are needed; to coordinate the educational system and programs with productive activities and the labor market; to exercise care in the future training of personnel so as to comply with the needs of economic and social development; to take measures to discourage youth problems and encourage the physical and mental health of the citizens; to provide nationwide health services; in particular, to upgrade medical treatment and rehabilitative health services to a superior level; to place great importance upon protection of environmental health; to reduce unemployment to a minimum through the creation of employment opportunities; to promote the spread of cooperatives and make them more effective through regulations to generate resources; to resolve once and for all the housing problem; to make public administration more effective and productive and ensure cooperation and coordination between central administration, local administrations and other public institutions.

II. Basic Policies and Goals

1. The economy will be set on a sound structure to be developed so as to create additional areas of employment and increase production and foreign sales, and provision will be made for all strata of society to benefit equally from this progress.

1.1. Stabilization measures will be developed and applied so as to minimize possible negative factors arising from monetary operations in the monitoring and control of money volume by means of the Central Bank.

1.2. By means of a Development Bank to be established, savings will be directed into investments to provide for development of the economy, generating resources for private and public investment appropriate to the plan and programs and for other financing needs, and developing in this way the impact on and contribution to development of the banking system.

1.3 Investments will be managed within an integrated whole to ensure maximum benefit from scarce resources in such a way as to increase employment, production and sales abroad.

1.4. An interest policy will be implemented at a level to encourage a public tendency to save and appropriate to the needs of the economy while ensuring economic stability and confidence in the country.

1.5. A balanced consumption policy will be pursued, the fight against inflation will continue and price stability and a price-wage balance will be achieved so as to improve the welfare of the low income groups.

1.6. Public income and investments will be increased and budget deficits will be decreased through a balanced spending policy.

1.7. The State Economic Enterprises (SEE), through eliminating their legal, administrative, capital and financing problems, will be developed as
enterprises operating at full capacity, opening up new areas of production and employment and generating new resources for the economy.

1.8. Implementation of the Resettlement Land Distribution and Equal Property Law will be largely completed during this period, restoring the interrelationship of man-soil-property, and new economic and social legislation will be passed during this period.

2. In all initiatives for the development and firm foundations of economic, social and cultural relations with world nations, the coordination and cooperation in all areas with our Motherland will continue.

2.1. In foreign economic relations, the fundamental principle will be reduction of the current accounts deficit, not in the sense of cutting off the flows of goods, services and capital, but rather in the balanced development of the quantity and quality of these flows according to the needs of the economy.

2.2. Foreign resources will be an element of particular advantage for investments, and qualities will be sought in the use of foreign resources that will allow local products to become competitive on foreign markets.

3. Marketing will be more effectively regulated for the benefit of society and the producer.

3.1. On the domestic market, price and quality control will be the issue, and economic and legal measures will be adopted to prevent hoarding, smuggling and black marketeering. In the purchase of products for the domestic market, cooperatives and the SEE's will be used in getting products to the consumer more cheaply and maintaining price balance, and the development of these institutions will be supported by the state.

3.2. As regards the foreign market, the state and related institutions will be deeply involved in market research, red tape will be eliminated and measures will be developed to prevent destructive competition among public enterprises, cooperatives and the private sector, balancing the impact of these sectors on foreign trade. In this connection, sales abroad will be facilitated and incentive legislation will be passed.

4. Care will be taken in the implementation of the necessary administrative measures and incentives for the best possible development during this period of tourism, which is an important element in the balance of foreign payments and is of great significance for our economy.

4.1. Close cooperation will be established between public and private businesses active in tourism and, in increasing incentives for tourism, legal and administrative regulations will be adopted for taking maximum advantage of foreign resources.

4.2. Efforts will be made to establish direct communications with Europe and the Middle East, standards will be developed for air and sea travel
transportation services, both air and ferry services to foreign nations will be developed and improved and personnel will be trained in the provision of tourist-oriented services.

5. Industry will be developed so as to meet production raw material requirements from local resources insofar as possible, and industries which improve employment and produce import substitution goods and export-oriented industries will be supported.

5.1. Industrial incentive laws will be passed to encourage industrial investment, existing industry will be protected against internal and external factors, but price and quality will be the benchmarks in this regard.

5.2. Export-oriented public and private businesses engaged in exploration for or use of local raw materials in industry and which wish to undertake investments with a high added value or employment contribution will be encouraged, and cooperatives for the establishment of agriculture-based industry will be supported. Incentives will be developed through administrative and legal measures to provide for utilization of foreign resources in the development of industry, especially the establishment of mineral processing industry.

5.3. In developing the incentives needed to enable local industrial products to compete on foreign markets, the necessary measures will be taken to prevent the creation of new idle capacity and to activate existing latent capacity.

5.4. Small industry will be developed through organization and credit qualification under the cooperative system.

6. In agriculture, the principal goal is to increase per unit productivity through balancing the means of production and the labor force and developing agricultural production methods, to guide production according to domestic and foreign market demand and to provide for the grower to derive the greatest benefit from his labor.

6.1. As to water resources, subterranean and surface water resources will be improved within the framework of a master plan. To ensure maximum benefit from our water resources, incentives and legal measures will be offered to encourage widespread use of modern, efficient irrigation methods, and research will be done on the potential for solar energy and utilization of sea water.

6.2. Agricultural resources will be developed bearing in mind production goals, and an agricultural research center will be established to determine the factors to increase production qualitatively and quantitatively and to determine scientific principles by which to direct production patterns.

6.3 Cultivation and packaging of export-oriented agricultural products will be based on foreign market demands, firm measures will be taken on marketing,
input, price and payment problems, in particular the prompt remuneration for product and the negative effects on exports of the transportation factor will be reduced to the extent possible.

6.4. In domestic marketing of agricultural products, cooperatives will be utilized as an element of balance for the protection of both producer and consumer.

6.5. The development of animal breeds, good care and feeding and scientific studies to improve birth rates per head will be intensified.

6.5.1. In addition to genetic development, stress will be placed on elements to reduce costs and, by encouraging the cultivation of fodder crops, the use of hay and forage will be balanced with mixed feed to reduce the costs of animal products.

6.5.2. A meat combine will be established to ensure that meat reaches the public under hygienic conditions, to stabilize meat prices, to eliminate economic losses that may arise from the over feeding of animals, to guarantee high prices for exports and to capitalize on byproduct possibilities to improve foreign exchange earnings.

6.5.3. Obstacles to the export of animal products will be removed, with particular attention to development of milk and milk-product exports.

6.5.4. Milk producers will be organized in a cooperative system to improve efficiency, and the necessary measures will be taken for the collection of all milk produced.

6.6. Our forests and wooded areas will be developed within the framework of the forestry management plan. National parks and recreation sites will also be protected and extended.

6.7 The necessary technical and credit resources will be provided the fisheries sector to enable optimum benefit from marine products, and an updated marine products law will be passed.

7. Economic activities will be largely stepped up, with steady development of the infrastructure which will form the basis for realization of our autonomy.

7.1. Drinking water and irrigation projects will receive priority to give Famagusta and Nicosia independent drinking water systems and, towards rational utilization of surface and subterranean water potential as regards irrigation matters, canal, dam, pond and well studies will be effectuated.

7.2. The necessary studies for our region's independence as to electricity will be concluded.
7.3 Construction of a harbor at Kyrenia will be completed during the SPYP period to provide intercourse with foreign nations and, in particular, as a great contribution to the development of tourism.

7.4. Construction of an airport in addition to Ercan will also reach completion during this period.

7.5 In updating mass communications, radio and television broadcasting will be modernized, and the development of telecommunications services will be undertaken in such a way as to avoid creating bottlenecks in other sectors.

7.6. While the maintenance and rational development of the existing highway network will retain primary importance, efforts will also be made with the assistance and cooperation of our Motherland to resolve the now inadequate air and sea communication between our State and Turkey and the rest of the world.

8. For the purpose of providing adequate and equal basic health services to all inhabited areas as a team effort with the contribution and participation of society coordinated by the relevant sectors:

8.1. Basic Health Service Will be provided on a regional basis at rural and urban health centers.

8.2. The number of existing health centers will be increased and services will be improved.

8.3. A health clinic will be opened and kept operating in each village.

8.4. Basic Health Services will cover such matters as education in the prevention and control of existing health problems, provision of adequate clean water, adequate balanced nutrition and diet, mother-child health and maternity services, combatting infectious diseases and immunization services, providing treatment and the necessary medications for general and particular disorders and emergency treatment.

8.5. The broad scope of the Basic Health Services including both preventive and medical care will comprise the first tier of the national health system, and these services will be supported by the second and third tiers consisting of hospitals that provide surgical services.

8.6. The Basic Health Services will be conducted through the contribution and participation of society and coordination of the sectors involved in matters that fall within their scope.

8.7. Particular attention will be paid in the Basic Health Services to the special needs of susceptible and high-risk groups (such as women, children and workers).

8.8. Basic Health Services will be extended to the most remote areas, and doctors, nurses and maternity-care and other health personnel will be provided in adequate numbers on the basis of population.
8.9. Incentives will be offered to make the jobs of these health personnel working under difficult and frustrating conditions more attractive to ensure their sincere devotion to service.

8.10. Refresher courses and training programs will be arranged for all health and other related personnel to enable Basic Health Services to be offered consistent with adequate and modern technology.

8.11. Adequate and continuous logistic support will be provided the Basic Health Services.

9. In order to provide treatment and rehabilitative health services at a superior level:

9.1. Treatment facilities providing diagnostic, care, treatment and rehabilitation services for the ill and injured will be modernized and upgraded scientifically.

9.2. To improve therapeutic services provided in the hospitals, hospitals will be reorganized to provide second-tier therapeutic services.

9.3. Ways and means, personnel and medication needs will be met to the extent that modern technology allows and will be made available to the public equally in the best, most efficient manner possible.

9.4. Despite the small size of our community, it is a community subject to the constraints of island living and, bearing in mind the difficulty of transporting patients in emergency situations by sea or surface, efforts will be made to train specialists and make these services available in all areas except those highly technical ones requiring large medical teams, such as open heart surgery and kidney transplants.

9.5. There will be an effective oversight mechanism of health services in the public and private sectors.

10. To promulgate education nationwide, preserving and developing the intrinsic values of our country, to ensure equal opportunity and ability to benefit from education and to correlate education with the requirements for rapid and sound development:

10.1. Scholarships, credit and boarding school facilities will continue to be made available to needy and academically accomplished students, and the balanced location of educational institutions across the country will be undertaken to provide equal educational opportunity and access.

10.2. National education will strive to evoke the national culture grounded in national unity and nationalism along the lines of Ataturkist Principles and will develop and inculcate modern civilization, social peace and solidarity, moral strength, democratic concepts, libertarian thought, tolerance, intellectual curiosity and social morality and thought.
10.3. Education will be revised to give the individual the ability to know, interpret and contribute to his environment. Opportunities to learn by doing through experience will be increased.

10.4. Vocational-technical education intended to train a technical element at the intermediate level will be revised, and priority will be given this type of education.

10.5. General courses will be taught in the first year at the intermediate level, and students who elect a particular field at first will be offered the opportunity to change fields or schools depending on their skills and aptitudes.

10.6. The institutions of higher learning in our country will be restructured to allow multi-purpose programs to be offered and may be used for satellite education if necessary.

10.7. On-the-job training and apprenticeship training will be organized and promulgated under state auspices in conjunction with standard education.

10.8. Constant and effective in-service education will be established in each sector and at all stages of public administration.

10.9. Satellite education will be expanded to provide opportunities for vocational training to adults and those unable to benefit sufficiently from standard education.

11. For the development of our culture, an extension of national Turkish culture, the support of activities in the arts and the guarantee of the individual's right to benefit from culture and the arts:

11.1. Cultural services will be under state guidance.

11.2. National culture will be promulgated through activities in the arts.

11.3. Ancient treasures, historical artifacts and underground archeological remains will be closely guarded and the necessary attention given to museum-related undertakings.

11.4. The necessary importance will be given press and publications as significant mass media in the promulgation of our national culture. Care will be taken to protect copyrights.

11.5. Physical education and amateur sports will be supported in an organized, extensive and scientific manner nationwide beginning with the schools. Public sports will be particularly encouraged.

11.6. Care will be taken to have young people involved in the social, cultural, scientific and sports-related aspects of national problems to enable
them to take on the burdens of government in the future. In doing this, educational, nutritional, health, employment and labor problems will be taken up as parts of a whole.

12. To improve income levels and standards of living of workers:

12.1. The Labor Law, Strike Law and similar laws envisaged by our Constitution will be passed, and current labor-related laws will be revised and updated.

12.2. Wage policies will be devised to form the basis for determining income levels for workers and introducing a dynamic, inflation-indexed income review system. The necessary administrative and legal arrangements for their enforcement will be made.

13. To eliminate imbalances and differences among workers in both working and living conditions and distribution of social security benefits:

13.1. The functions of the agencies formed to provide social security will be reviewed as a whole, and the development of a uniform system will be undertaken.

14. To introduce sound solutions to employment, unemployment and related problems:

14.1. A constantly updated data collection system will be developed for employment- and unemployment-related statistics.

14.2. In the search for a way to resolve unemployment, emphasis will be placed on efforts to increase production-oriented rather than socially-oriented employment opportunities.

15. To ensure the equal and balanced access of all citizens to the social security benefits provided by the state:

15.1. A uniform system will be developed in the social security services available to workers.

15.2. Organizations will be developed to provide social security services to the non-working population, and the necessary technical, administrative and financial resources will be allocated to allow them to operate efficiently.

15.3. Certain imbalances arise from the present heavy obligation of the State in one Social Insurance system covering employers and the self-employed alike. For this reason, the premium contributed by the State will consist of either a premium set above the minimum limit for earnings or State contribution of a specific percentage of constant salaries guaranteed by the Social Insurance agencies.
15.4. Because the Social Insurance Law has gone into effect and long-term benefits have begun to apply, causing duplication between the Reserve Fund and Severance Pay which is now in effect, this practice will undergo the necessary legal revision for conversion into an old-age pension for workers.

16. To promote cooperativism during the development period and heighten its effectiveness and productivity:

16.1. The new Cooperatives Law will be passed to ensure development of cooperatives appropriate to current conditions.

16.2. Cooperatives will be encouraged and supported in their efforts to form superior organizations (unions and union confederations), and the necessary revisions will be made in the superior organizations to generate resources for the cooperatives.

16.3. The Cooperative Affairs Office will be upgraded to develop and disseminate the educational and managerial services of the cooperatives on behalf of the public.

16.4. Production-oriented investment initiatives by the cooperatives will be encouraged, and technical and credit support will be made available.

16.5. Guidance will be offered to cooperatives involved in or capable of export-oriented production to resolve credit and marketing problems.

17. Urban and national planning will be given a legal framework, and to eliminate the housing shortage which has become a serious problem in the large cities—Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia and Guzelyurt in particular—as well as in smaller population centers:

17.1. Economic, social and cultural programs will be incorporated in national projects, and projects intended for specific areas for realization of such investments with minimum utilization of resources will be reviewed as a whole with an eye to consistency in functional correlation and land use. This approach will also be used by the relevant ministries in drawing up sectoral physical and master plans.

17.2. In urban physical planning, great importance will be ascribed to such matters as the ecology, environmental health, preservation of historical and natural wealth, business-residential ratios, and social and cultural standards of living.

17.3. Priority will be given to resolving the housing problem of low income groups.

17.4. The technologies necessary to enable the building of cheap public housing will be developed, and incentives will be offered for the construction of public housing.

17.5. Utilization of local materials and technology in housing construction will be stressed.
17.6. The credit policy related to public housing construction will be reviewed, and the State will play an active role in both the financing and construction stages.

17.7. To prevent land speculation in urban expansion zones and price-gouging related to expropriation, vacant lands will be converted into lots and offered for sale to the public in addition to State-owned lots.

17.8. Lots will be assigned by the State to restricted-income citizens, infrastructure requirements will be met and, for those wishing to build their own homes, specific standards will be set and they will be provided the resources needed to build according to the standards.

18. To improve the efficiency and productivity of public administration:

18.1. Duties, powers and responsibilities will be clearly defined.

18.2. Public employees will receive in-service training.

18.3. Public employees will be given the necessary powers parallel with their responsibilities.

18.4. A hierarchy of authority will be established to regulate disrupted relationships.

18.5. Raising administrative and fiscal oversight to the desired level will be undertaken.

18.6. Functioning of the disciplinary mechanism will be improved.

19. To ensure labor peace, halt legal wrangling, ensure rational personnel distribution among the enterprises and prevent waste of scarce State resources:

19.1. Laws to regulate strikes, collective bargaining and labor-management relations will be given priority passage to ensure labor peace.

19.2. The numerous, conflicting laws will be reviewed and made uniform to bring a halt to legal wrangling.

19.3. A rational distribution of public employees among the enterprises will be effected.

19.4. Provision of the same services by different organizations will be halted, thus allowing no opportunity for spreading scarce resources too thin.

20. To eliminate the pronounced salary and wage imbalance in public administration:

20.1. Salaries and wages will be revised and updated and, in an attempt to apply a realistic wage and salary system, a cost-of-living increase will be
added to base pensions and wages to prevent a negative, long-term impact of
the rising cost of living on fixed incomes.

20.2. A uniform collective agreement will be used to end the salary and
wage wars brought about by collective agreements.

20.3. No opportunity will be allowed for a retired public employee to draw
more than one State retirement pension, thus preventing a relative imbalance
in comparison with other employees in social security benefits.

III. Statistical Goals [figures as published]

21. The growth goal adopted in the SFYP is 6.5 percent. An annual average
rise of 6.5 percent in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 42,916.4 million
Turkish liras [TL] at 1983 prices to 58,799.3 million TL by the final year
of the plan period is projected. Generation of a 260,234.0 million lira
volume during the SFYP period is targeted, along with an average annual rise
of 5 percent in per capita GDP from the estimated 276,000 liras in 1983 to
352,000 liras at the conclusion of the plan period.

22. The foreign deficit, expected to be 11,500.0 million TL in 1983, will
be reduced in a balanced way during the plan period, the target being a
reduction to 4,480.2 million TL at the end of the plan period. A total
foreign deficit of 39,735.6 million TL will be generated during the plan
period, and this will be covered to a large extent by foreign aid and
borrowing.

23. Total resources will rise during the plan period from 54,416.4 million TL
at 1983 prices to 63,279.5 million TL in the final year of the plan period,
with total resources generated by the economy during the plan period to be
299,969.6 million TL. Of these resources, 15.7 percent for investments
with a total 5-year investment of 46,946.1 million TL is projected. Planning
calls for 57.5 percent of the investment to be made by the State and 42.5
percent, by the Private Sector.

24. Consumption targets for the plan period are an average annual increase
of 3.4 percent in general consumption, 3 percent in public consumption and
3.5 percent in private consumption. Thus per capita consumption will rise
by 1.9 percent annually from 294,000 TL to 323,000 TL in 1983 liras.

25. A rise in domestic savings, estimated at 2,821.1 million TL in 1983,
to 4,764.8 million TL in the final year of the plan period for a total
savings volume of 7,209.9 million TL in the plan period is projected.

26. Public revenues will rise an average of 12 percent annually during the
plan period and, since the rate of increase of public consumption will be kept
at 3 percent, the public financing requirement of 11,565.1 million TL in
1983 will decline to 8,980.0 million TL in the final year of the plan period,
representing an average annual decline of 4.9 percent. Thus, 39,735.0 million
TL of the financing requirement of 52,898.1 million TL to be generated during
the 5 years will be covered by foreign aid and loans.

28
27. Of spendable income generated by the private sector, approximately 85.6 percent will go to consumption, 8.7 percent to investment and 5.7 percent to savings (Appended Tables I and II [not published].)

28. Targets for sectoral development in achieving an average annual economic growth rate of 6.5 percent are shown below.

Projected Annual Growth by Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Annual Increase %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Construction Industry</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trade, Tourism</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transportation, Communications</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Financial Institutions</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Housing Revenues</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Independent Professions, Services</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Public Services</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Growth 6.5

29. Sectoral shares of the marginal GDP of 14,882.9 million TL to be reached in the final year of the plan period are:

Sectoral Shares of Marginal GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Construction Industry</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trade, Tourism</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transportation, Communications</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Financial Institutions</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Housing Revenues</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Independent Professions, Services</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Public Services</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Total] 100.0

30. Shares of the sectors in GDP by 1988 will show the following distribution:

Projected 1988 Sectoral Shares of GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Construction Industry</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Trade, Tourism 20.4 23.3
5. Transportation, Communications 8.8 8.9
6. Financial Institutions 3.2 3.3
7. Housing Revenues 4.0 3.7
8. Independent Professions, Services 3.7 3.1
9. Public Services 20.1 16.3

[Total] 100 100

The agricultural sector will retain its percentage, while the industry and trade and tourism shares will rise. On the other hand, owing to envisaged improvements in public services, this sector's share will decline (Appended Table III [not published]).

31. To achieve the stated goals, the fixed capital investment of 43,042.6 million TL projected for the plan period at 1983 prices will be distributed by sector as shown below:

**Distribution of Planned Investment by Sector**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Million TL</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agriculture</td>
<td>6,976.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Industry</td>
<td>19,774.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Construction Industry</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Trade, Tourism</td>
<td>2,627.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transportation, Communications</td>
<td>7,573.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Financial Institutions</td>
<td>397.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Housing</td>
<td>3,384.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Independent Professions, Services</td>
<td>413.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Public Services</td>
<td>1,820.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Total] 43,042.6 100

32. To realize the projected investment level, the average savings rate in the plan period must be 17.6 percent; in other words, 30 percent of marginal income must go into savings. To achieve this level of savings, measures to prevent needless and conspicuous consumption will be accompanied by savings incentives.

33. The total export goal is an average increase of at least 15.3 percent annually, with the shares of both agriculture-based industry and other industrial products in combined commodity exports rising. Also, with the projected 15-percent annual development in commodity exports rising. Also, with the projected 15-percent annual development in commodity exports and the push to be made in tourism and transportation, exports of services will rise an average of at least 15.8 percent annually, and thus current account earnings will develop positively also.

34. Total imports are targeted to rise an average 5.6 percent annually from 26,200.0 million TL to 34,480.2 million TL by 1988. The share of intermediate
goods in imports will rise parallel to the projected increase in production, while the share of consumer goods will decline (Appended Tables IV, V [not published]).

35. Directing exports to third countries in general and imports to the motherland will be undertaken during the SFYP period, and, depending on the improvement in the status of foreign exchange reserves, progress will be made in purchases abroad from free importation towards importation based on foreign exchange.

36. The population will grow on average around 1.2 percent annually, rising from 157,984 to 167,256 during the SFYP period.

37. The labor force supply will rise at a rate approximately equal to population growth. Employment opportunities needed to parallel this will be supplied.

38. To enable Basic Health Services to be provided effectively nationwide, the number of health centers will be raised from 10 to 16, and the number of midwife-nurses at the health centers will be increased to allow 1 midwife-nurse (visiting nurse) per 2,000-2,500 population. Also, personnel will be increased to allow 1 general-practice doctor and 1 medical nurse per 5,000-3,500 [as published] population in the area served by each health center.

39. The number of nurses and orderlies employed in Medical Treatment Establishments (hospitals) will be raised from 261 to 358 and the number of midwives, from 19 to 36 in the next plan period.

40. The number of doctors in general practice will be raised during the SFYP period from 26 to 44 to allow one doctor for each 5,000-3,500 [as published] persons; the number of dentists will be raised from 13 to 30 to allow one dentist per 5,500 persons and the number of pharmacists will be raised from 15 to 30 to allow one pharmacist per 5,500 persons.

41. The number of beds in health-care institutions will be raised from 754 to 836 to allow 5 beds per 1,000 population.

42. During the SFYP period, 1,000 units of public housing will be built.

43. The rate of school attendance will be 50 percent for Pre-School Education, 100 percent for levels one and two of Basic Education, 80 percent for Intermediate Education and around 25 percent-30 percent for Higher Education.

44. Vocational and Technical Education will continue to impact at 50 percent.

IV. Conclusion:

It is believed that the goals stated above will be successfully achieved and that, through objective solutions to economic and social problems, society will achieve peace and prosperity.

State Planning Organization
11 June 1983
8349
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CONSERVATIVES GAIN FROM SCHLUTER'S PERSONAL POPULARITY

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 13 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Kleberg]

[Text] Denmark has never had such a popular government in the entire postwar period as now. When the four non-socialist parties, the so-called four-leaf clover, formed a minority government under the leadership of the Conservative Poul Schluter just a year ago, it was not predicted to have a long duration.

But the Danish prime minister, whom Olof Palme visited last week in order to resolve--and apparently with some success--snags in Danish-Swedish cooperation, has made himself and his government popular deep within the Social Democratic electorate. The Schluter government has not acquired its popularity by fighting the budget deficit by following the Swedish example of first increasing it greatly. On the contrary, it is the government's vigorous saving program which has had an impact.

The four-leaf clover government, rather than cautiously advancing as a minority government on a compromise course, chose from the beginning to go on the offensive. The government needs, in addition to its own votes from the two larger parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals and the two smaller ones, the Center Democrats and the Christian People's Party, support from both the social-liberal Radical Liberals, who have traditionally played a balancing roll in Danish politics, and Glistrup's extremist Progressive Party. To unite them required pragmatic, unglamorous policies.

The good-natured coordinator Poul Schluter has shown himself to be admirably suited for this roll. He has not only surprisingly held the four-party government together but also brought into line supporting parties on the right and left. The Progressive Party has moreover, become a little more politically respectable, particularly since Glistrup has now lost his hold.

When it was suitable, Schluter also made up with the Social Democrats. Most notable was the agreement to tax pension funds and insurance companies. When Anker Jorgensen's Social Democratic government proposed such a tax, the non-socialist parties opposed it, and it had to resign. Only a few months later the four-leaf clover government approved such a tax so that the budgetary deficit would be lower than that in the previous Social Democratic budget.
The same pragmatism marks also this year's budget proposal which has just been presented. In it new restraints are proposed to "save" 10 billion. But only 4 billion are savings. Six are tax and fee increases, for example, higher charges for health insurance and for unemployment insurance as well as differentiated fees for health care (high income recipients, about every fifth Dane, will have to pay the entire cost of a doctor's call and part of the cost of being hospitalized). The Social Democrats can be expected to support some of these tax increases, while the tax cutters in the Progressive Party kick in vain.

The Conservatives, which is the only party with an actual advance in public opinion support, dreamed for a while about cooperation with the Social Democrats, between industry and the trade union movement. The Social Democrats did not dare and partly did not want to respond to these invitations. The Conservatives want to tighten things up in order to help industry as the motor of the economy. Ideological expositions on increasing the private sector and the undoing of the public sector is left to the now neo-liberal Liberal Party, which holds the important economic posts in the government.

Schluter's personal charm and display of leadership with the government's energy from the very beginning has given non-socialist cooperation a new spurt in Denmark. But above all the government can point to the results achieved: real wages are rising slightly for the first time in a long time, inflation has been cut in half (now 5 percent), interest has sunk from 23 to 13 percent, industrial production is increasing somewhat, exports very much, and the deficit in the balance of payments can be reduced one-half in 1984 despite heavy interest payments.

Unemployment and cuts in social expenditures are the government's weak points. Unemployment could have also increased with a socialist government, and budget restrictions were necessary. There is an obvious risk, however, that the policies benefit the fully employed on the sunny side of life. The young, the families with children, those unemployed for a long time and the recipients of social help are hit more than is reasonable.

But even so that four-leaf clover government has not become a real fighting, anti-social government. It appears to have a chance of leading Denmark out of the economic paralysis in which the country had lived for too long. At the moment it is affecting the socially weak and for the first time made the Progressive Party respectable. But Denmark had sunk down so far that it is perhaps the only way to some kind of prompt improvement.
SPD'S VOGEL DEFENDS LEADERSHIP, ACTS OF OPPOSITION

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Sep 83 pp 34-47

/Interview with Hans-Jochen Vogel, SPD fraction chairman, by SPIEGEL editors Klaus Wirtgen and Dirk Koch/

SPIEGEL: Herr Vogel, at the start of the parliamentary fall session, the SPD mounted unusually vehement attacks on the government. You called for the resignation of CSU Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann and FDP Justice Minister Hans Engelhard, consequent upon the death of Altun, a Turkish seeker of political asylum. Did you yourself feel uneasy for not having earlier reacted with sufficient asperity to Zimmermann's plans for tightening alien legislation and the law on demonstrations?

Vogel: I did not. The decisive aspect was the Federal Interior Minister's remark (subscribed to in effect by the Federal Justice Minister), according to which cooperation with the police of a country that tortures prisoners and is subject to a complaint about serious violations of human rights—lodged by several West European countries with the Human Rights Commission in Strasbourg—is more important than the protection of a human being from persecution, possible torture or even death. This event justifies the call for dismissal, even though we should not lightly use such a tool.

SPIEGEL: Do you think it was really clever to include FDP politician Engelhard also? Would it not have been far more difficult for some Liberals (we are thinking of Gerhart Baum or Burkhard Hirsch) to have to vote for Zimmermann in a roll call?

Vogel: We are concerned with the matter in hand, not with tactical considerations as to who might possibly vote one way or the other. The Federal Justice Minister is deeply involved in the responsibility with regard to the basic accusation I have just formulated. Moreover, we have learned that in the Geissler case too...

SPIEGEL: ...You mean the remarks by the CDU general secretary to the effect that pacifism made Auschwitz possible...

Vogel: ...despite lively criticism and strong emotions among liberal FDP members, the eventual vote proceeded along government and opposition party lines.

SPIEGEL: When Helmut Kohl was still the leader of the opposition, some members of his party accused him of wanting to gain power by way of a sleeping car. Now you
are leader of the opposition and subject to similar criticism from your comrades. Friedhelm Farthmann, North Rhine -Westphalian minister of labor, claimed that the SPD should be far more aggressive in opposition. Do you intend to listen to him?

Vogel: We took on the role of opposition 6 months ago. We adopted the structure required for this duty. Even in the early months we developed alternatives, checked on the government, clearly and severely criticized it. That is all an opposition can do within 6 months of a defeat.

It is one of the rules of the game that a government going in for summer theatricals as ours did in recent weeks, is bound to get more publicity than an opposition that goes about its work with remarkable unity. I have no complaints.

SPIEGEL: Is it not one of your duties to go in for theatricals in competition with the government, or do you feel more like a chancellor in waiting?

Vogel: We discharge our duties but admittedly not in the style of the Franz Josef Strauss of Sonthofen, in other words not by helping matters to get even worse merely so that we should have a better chance. We feel ourselves responsible to our voters and the people. And as for going in for theatricals? How do you surpass a summer stock of this kind—with part of the coalition demanding the resignation of the most prominent member of the other section of the coalition, with Franz Josef Strauss suddenly doing something he bitterly opposed for 13 years and up until last May, while theater director Kohl keeps his mouth shut all the while? I believe any attempt of ours along these lines would sound artificial, and a competition of this kind would not benefit us.

SPIEGEL: Many Social Democrats miss the presentation of your own beliefs.

Vogel: I do not see that at all. In the debate on the government statement we offered a clear counter opinion. We gave direction to the defense of peace. In the fields of economics, social and financial policies we note growing willingness for people to listen to our conceptions. At the time of the election this was still overlaid by the belief that the Union would bring about recovery. People now recognize that many of the promises offered then were empty and hollow, basically nothing but air.

SPIEGEL: You say that you did not notice any criticism. Farthmann publicly stated his opinion. Helmut Schmidt explained his own reticence by saying he did not want to steal the show from Hans-Jochen Vogel in the Bundestag. Do you need his consideration?

Vogel: Farthmann is obviously impressed by the summer theatricals. As for Helmut Schmidt: What do you mean by consideration? According to his wishes, roles and duties in the fraction were reorganized and new appointments made when we went into opposition. Everything since has arisen from this distribution of duties. He uses his own experiences to contribute to the political discussion on many occasions; he also talks to the media. I have never felt this to be either disturbing nor an attitude contradicting the decisions we all arrived at together after the election. On the contrary! Nor do I feel that I would have to ask anyone for special consideration.
SPIEGEL: Would you like him to more frequently speak in the Bundestag and assume a more distinctive attitude toward important topics?

Vogel: I believe in this situation there are approved precedents for a man who, after a long and very successful tenure of government, leaves behind this function—not only in our country but also in similar democracies. And I have the impression that Helmut Schmidt conforms to these precedents. That is perfectly in order.

SPIEGEL: You mean his habit of remaining silent?

Vogel: I mean when he does or does not choose to speak.

SPIEGEL: Do you agree with us that possibly comrades all over the country are feeling some disappointment with Hans-Jochen Vogel because he is who he is: You do not care to violently attack the government but prefer instead often to use the words "responsibility" or "responsible behavior."

Vogel: Your opinion is evidently based on very intensive consultations with comrades and certainly on hundreds and thousands of interviews with Social Democrats...

SPIEGEL: More, Herr Vogel,

Vogel: ...hundreds of thousands of interviews. I only agree insofar as all those who importuned, invited and finally nominated me knew exactly with whom they were dealing. Quite particularly everybody knew that nothing is further from my mind than to represent myself as other than I really am.

SPIEGEL: It seems that your right-wing comrades in the so-called "Seeheimer Circle" whose leader you were before Hans Apel, have another recollection of their Jochen Vogel. Or how do you explain this group's criticism of your allegedly unduly considerate line of integration vis-à-vis the Greens?

Vogel: Our discussion, conducted in an amicable manner, must be interpreted against the background of the new duties assigned me. The fact that I, as the chairman of the fraction, am responsible for the entire fraction, evidently affects the discussion. Incidentally, I encountered a great deal of understanding and agreement with my line in regard of the defense of peace.

SPIEGEL: Maybe you personally are saddled with the unease many feel vis-à-vis your party: Unease about the rather ambiguous attitude to basic issues such as unemployment and missiles. There are many insistent yes, buts.

Vogel: I have attentively regarded the general image you have presented. Mine is a completely different impression, that of a definite feeling of relief that, after the defeat of 6 March, this party did not fall into a state of self-flagellation, mutual recriminations and the inability to function but actually demonstrated far greater unity than in the years before (I am compelled to claim this). I almost feel that you must have had some trouble finding a critic you considered quotable.

SPIEGEL: Still, there are Helmut Schmidt and Friedhelm Farthmann. And the former head of government thinks that consolidation and integration are not enough; he
calls for more leadership and political goals from the chancellor's opposite number instead of undue consideration for the wings and groups in the party.

Vogel: Where and when did he say so? Besides: With a view to the next election, what is to be placed in the foreground now but consolidation, a gathering of forces, an end to disputes that were to some extent embittering and hurtful? That also is the task for the leader. There is certainly no lack of political impulses either. Furthermore, the voters did, after all, give us 38 percent for the next 4 years.

SPIEGEL: Two weeks from now an important election looms in Hesse.

Vogel: Things do not look bad at all there.

SPIEGEL: Still, if you were to listen to Schmidt, give a stronger lead and set goals, the political echo would be greater, the attention of the media attracted.

Vogel: As a rule the government makes the news. That was no different in our time. And when, on top of this, the government quarrels more in the first year of its administration than the social liberal government in its 12th or 13th year, this represents a factor affecting the attention of the media. Besides: Do explain to me what you consider "political handicaps."

SPIEGEL: Let us take the missile issue. Here the SPD speaks with many tongues. Schmidt backs the NATO dual track resolution. Mildly reproved by the SPD presidium, Oskar Lafontaine advocates withdrawal from military integration in NATO. Willy Brandt wishes for an extension of the Geneva negotiations on medium range weapons.

Vogel: You are objecting to something that, in my interpretation of democracy, deserves praise rather than criticism: In the matter of this issue we are doing after the election exactly what we told the voters in our election program. We strive for a settlement in Geneva, that would reduce the Soviet force so radically as to make emplacement on our side superfluous. We also said: We will come to a decision once the result of the Geneva negotiations is to hand, at the end of the stage of negotiations now proceeding. The remarks you cite are in no way opposed to this.

SPIEGEL: Is Lafontaine's demand in compliance with the party resolutions?

Vogel: I make an exception in this case. Lafontain's remark on NATO in his SPIEGEL book is outside this framework. The presidium explicitly stated that his is not the party's opinion. This is the only instance where I admit that a member of the executive champions an interpretation deviating from our resolutions.

SPIEGEL: Are you and the party presidium favoring the Greek proposal (backed by Willy Brandt) for extending the Geneva negotiations?

Vogel: We must see to it that a result is achieved in the beginning round of negotiations; I said so before. Should there be an indication at the end of this stage of the negotiations, that such a result might fail to be achieved solely due to a lack of time, an extension would certainly not be a sensational but rather a sensible event. No conflict here.
SPIEGEL: This is not a matter of constructing conflicts, it is a matter of the representation of SPD policies tending to bewilder the public.

Vogel: How bewilder? All public opinion polls show...

SPIEGEL: ...that the SPD has still not advanced beyond 40 percent.

Vogel: I do not intend to dispute that fact. Still, it is not at all a poor result for us to be around 40 percent only 6 months after the election. Such a situation could not be taken for granted. All public opinion polls demonstrate that a large majority of the public generally agree with our attitude to the missile issue and sympathize with it.

SPIEGEL: The SPD postponed its special party congress (to decide about its attitude to arms modernization) from early November to 18-19 November. Will the party delay once more if no result or intermediate settlement has emerged from Geneva by that time?

Vogel: The party executive has the power to so determine the exact date of the party congress as appears appropriate with regard to the course of the Geneva negotiations.

SPIEGEL: In your capacity as the opposition party, what do you in fact wish to achieve by the party congress?

Vogel: There are two possibilities. Either there is a settlement in Geneva—and I still do not exclude this possibility—in that case we must deal with this result. Or there is no settlement, and then we will have to say yes or no.

SPIEGEL: Are you personally in favor of postponing the party congress if necessary?

Vogel: Within the framework of the party executive's powers I am.

SPIEGEL: By feeling the lack of a clearer opposition policy, we are obviously making greater demands on you than you do yourself. You are satisfied with a consolidation of the SPD below the 40 percent mark; we imputed to you quite concrete claims to power.

Vogel: Whatever made you think that I am satisfied with 40 percent? And our political claims are perfectly concrete and clear. Especially on the issue of the defense of peace.

SPIEGEL: We must beg to differ. You are once more avoiding a clear decision—it may be too late in November. By that time the rockets might be in place, and the SPD will then only be able either to give its blessing or withdraw from politics.

Vogel: It has always been the goal of social democrat politics to prevent another arms race. According to the criteria of our election program, a negative response is quite possible if negotiations do not end in a settlement. Did you fail to notice that some sections are actually saying "no" in the preparation of the decision to be made by the special party congress? What is ambiguous about that?
SPIEGEL: Have you for your part failed to notice that the peace movement has arisen in part because the SPD remained ambiguous and contradictory in this area?

Vogel: There are many reasons for the emergence of this movement. If Helmut Schmidt had failed to take the initiative at the time, the situation would surely be no better than now. Indeed, we would have a situation in which this race would progress without any hindrance at all.

SPIEGEL: Why do you not simply conduct politics in a manner that cannot be misunderstood by so many people?

Vogel: What in fact is it that is misunderstood? That disputes arise here and there whether emphases are to be stronger in this or that direction is something I do not find upsetting at all. More and more people are suddenly realizing that we have here no arms race of the old kind but one that may end with the destruction of mankind. Our policy for the defense of peace is in entire agreement with this change in consciousness. We have achieved negotiations; we have helped to get the Soviet Union to submit reasonable proposals; we are now urging a progressive proposal by the United States. We are advocating that the French and English systems be taken into account and, for that purpose, INF and Start negotiations linked. What is supposed to be ambiguous about that?

SPIEGEL: The opposition is also mute on the issue of unemployment; at least it does not challenge the government. Though your federal secretary Peter Glotz talks of a "hot autumn": in economic policy, though soon there will be 3 million unemployed --no alternatives have been introduced by your party.

Vogel: What do you mean by saying we are mute on unemployment? Dealing with it is a focal point of our policy. We criticize the government for not doing anything and talking only about the economy's self-healing processes. Because it says that it would be sufficient to cut down the social state and redistribute burdens from the top to the bottom of the ladder.

We oppose our alternatives to this false policy. They are: Cuts in working hours at all three levels, that is working life, working week, working years; purposeful job creation and nurturing of mass purchasing power--in other words not just cuts bound to immediately affect demand.

Furthermore we have submitted ideas for coping with the steel shipyard and coal crises.

SPIEGEL: The Schmidt Government clashed with the SPD rank and file because Finance Ministers Hans Mattheoefer and Manfred Lahnstein refused to accept even higher budget deficits in the struggle against unemployment. Why, last week, did the SPD in opposition make the government's work easier by again rejecting larger deficits in the fight against unemployment?

Vogel: The opposition declared that it did not consider the sum total of the deficit to have an absolute limit nor did it mention a taboo. However, when weighing the various aspects, we consider reasonable and necessary a course of consolidation
that respects the dictates of social justice, carefully deals with mass pur-
chasing power. The discussion did not consider a restriction to or a fixed settle-
ment of a specific amount.

SPIEGEL: Hans Apel, spokesman on finances, explicitly stated last week that he
would not even dream of greater net borrowing.

Vogel: Concerned here is not a qualitative decision, in other words the doubling
or trebling of net borrowing. Such a thought would be quite inappropriate, and no
Social Democrat in fact advocates it.

SPIEGEL: No such dimensions were mentioned...

Vogel: ... We are concerned with the question whether another billion or so might
be needed for sensible programs and measures in addition to the coverage proposals
we have offered, and which anyway amount to more than 7 billion. Such reflections
are not out of place, and we reserve the right to make a decision once the budget
discussions in committee have been concluded.

SPIEGEL: Do your opinions differ from Hans Apel's?

Vogel: No, we are in agreement.

SPIEGEL: It appears to us that Franz Josef Strauss has been rather more generous.
He said lately that he was not bothered by 500 million more debts—when he wished
to make prevail his and the Bavarian Land government's concepts of maternity bene-
fits.

Vogel: That is roughly the dimension I mentioned in my above reply.

SPIEGEL: How do you explain the fact that your concepts (that do not differ sub-
stantially from the measures the SPD pushed when holding government responsibility)
do not find the approval of the workers who persist in voting for the Union parties?

Vogel: At the time of the last election the Union succeeded in getting people to
believe that it would manage, in concert with business; to believe that they who
voted for the Union were voting for recovery. In this kind of public mood there is
not much readiness to accept the message of him who says: Even if there is a re-
covery, unemployment will not disappear; we need to change structures.

SPIEGEL: What conclusions are you drawing from all this?

Vogel: The conclusion that we should stay with our conceptions. Already the pub-
lic mood is changing. Disillusion has set in. People recognize that the recovery
predictions and apprenticeship guarantees are proving hollow. The public are learn-
ing that traditional recipes and a policy that leaves everything to chance cannot
achieve anything.

SPIEGEL: Is it possible that the persuasive force of arguments may also depend on
the people who propose them?

Vogel: To be sure,
SPIEGEL: You are not an economist, and the SPD does not have an outstanding mind (such as Karl Schiller or even Schmidt used to be) who is generally acknowledged as particularly competent.

Vogel: Neither of the two began as an "outstanding mind." They acquired one in the course of their work. Moreover, Hans Apel, the financial spokesman of the fraction, has made a name for himself as Helmut Schmidt's finance minister, and Wolfgang Roth already takes most effective charge of economics. Others in the fraction and the party are also busy in this field.

SPIEGEL: The lack of bite in the opposition may be due to the fact that one of the most important allies of social democracy—the labor union movement—is also finding it difficult to take up position against this government. Mass unemployment and a weak economy are not suited for a display of muscle by the labor movement.

Vogel: Evidently the trade unions are being challenged more in the current economic situation than at a time of full employment. But I am not aware that the trade unions are falling in their duties. Their championship of shorter working hours, their struggle against social cuts, for peace and the maintenance of liberalism leaves nothing to be desired in terms of resolution.

SPIEGEL: Though the labor unions no longer carry their former weight as partners in the alliance...

Vogel: ...that is your opinion, not mine!

SPIEGEL: ...and, according to general observations, count fewer confirmed Social Democrats among their members, leading unionists nevertheless demand to exert decisive influence whenever social democratic principles are involved, for example in social policies or the question whether the peace movement is your "ally" or "partner in an alliance." Do you feel this pressure to be inconvenient or fruitful?

Vogel: Why should social democrats who hold responsible positions in the labor unions be barred from collaborating in the process of opinionmaking?

SPIEGEL: What are your feelings when, for example, your faction colleague and chairman of the IG [industrial labor union] Chemicals Hermann Rappe flatly states that, both as a trade unionist and SPD member, he does not need the peace movement, that he considers the SPD and the labor unions sufficient guarantees for a peace policy?

Vogel: If he said so, I am bound to respect his remarks as reflecting his opinion. After all, the real crux of the matter is this: Whether the SPD's and the trade unions' peace policy is made more difficult or ultimately promoted by the peace movement. And this question is now being answered generally in the meaning of my definition of "difficult partners."

SPIEGEL: In contrast to his party chairman, Hermann Rappe calls on the SPD to be exclusively concerned with regaining votes from the CDU. According to him nothing is to be gained from Green-votes or "attitudes on the left margin, however admirable." Do you see the issues differently?
Vogel:  I do not share the opinion that our losses were mainly to the CDU. Losses in other directions were at least as great, and the total may have been greater. I am concerned with advocating the concept that does justice to the challenges of our time. Therefore we must publicize this concept.

Here I see no insuperable conflict between our efforts to obtain the approval of the workers for it and our efforts to obtain the approval of those who have arrived at their political convictions from a rather more intellectual and critical dispute with social conditions. After all, the SPD arose from protests against earlier social conditions, as an alliance of intellectuals and workers.

SPIEGEL: But the protest now sounds very subdued. The Kohl government cannot be said to tremble when opposition leader Vogel roars like a lion....

Vogel: ...what a wonderfully appropriate image: When a Vogel (play on words--Vogel in German means bird--translator's note) roars like a lion.

SPIEGEL: Is it true, then? Do you not want to stop the Union? After all, in opposition the CDU/CSU was quite pleased for the SPD to settle relations with the neighbors in the East.

Vogel: You think the Union merely pretended when, at the time, it went so far as to demand a no-confidence vote against our Eastern policy? Is Strauss supposed even at that time to have been a secret champion of détente?

SPIEGEL: Possibly. Therefore our question whether the Social Democrats may not keep so quiet because, in the deepest recesses of their minds, they would prefer to have the other party carry out the unpleasant tasks: Cuts in social welfare, missile emplacement, the hopeless struggle against unemployment.

Vogel: I have just defended the Union against the imputation of having merely pretended to oppose our Eastern policy. All the more emphatically do I object to the allegation that we are thinking along the lines you attribute to us. Moreover, what actually do you expect from us in the Bundestag? Are we to smash the benches every time, or appear as a Greek chorus? Do you consider politics a competition to see who can yell the loudest? I am concerned with arguments, and insofar I cannot complain of any lack of attention in the Bundestag.

SPIEGEL: Maybe you tend to agree with the chancellor's opinion that an opposition is ultimately unable to return to government by programs or alternatives and can only prosper by the wear and tear on the government in power?

Vogel: Both! Wear and tear are taking quite a toll on it already. Mutual recriminations, calls for resignations and constant quarrels even in the first 6 months. We were not like this even in our 12th year.

SPIEGEL: On the eve of the Hesse provincial assembly election, on 25 September, could it happen that the Liberals do not return to the assembly while the Greens succeed in doing so? Would not this suggest that, ultimately, a grand coalition may emerge?
Vogel: Let me point to Holger Boerner's remarks and to the resolutions of the Hesse Land party. I have nothing to add. I will not entertain coalition speculations.

SPIEGEL: Do you mean to say that SPD and CDU or SPD and CSU or SPD and CDU/CSU could not, in principle, establish grand coalitions?

Vogel: For me that is not a matter of principle but one of political propriety and credibility.

SPIEGEL: Do you rather consider the opposite development possible—that, maybe, first in one Land, later in the federation, the small parties go under, and we are moving toward a two-party system?

Vogel: I do.

SPIEGEL: Herr Vogel, let us thank you for this interview.

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POLICEMAN DISGUISED AS DEMONSTRATOR CAUSES STIR

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 12 Sep 83 pp 114-116

An agent throwing rocks—disclosures about the course of the Krefeld riots confirm dubious practices by the BfV [Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution]

Traveling to West Germany by car with three fellow campaigners, Peter Troeber had a full agenda. He was in the forefront of the violent demonstrators who showered rocks during the reception of U.S. Vice President George Bush in Krefeld on 25 June last.

The subsequent police report: "At 10.27 hours, violent interlopers attacked the police officers with rocks, bags of paint, and fire crackers. At the same time around 50-60 helmeted aggressors attacked the forces barring their way with iron pipes, cudgels, spades and other weapons. They all acted with the greatest brutality."

Injuries were inflicted on both sides and, when Troeber was hit on the head by a police baton, a surprising event occurred. Demonstrators and policemen nearby were astounded to hear the injured man say: "Never mind me, I am from the Senate."

The demonstrators were just about able to grab Troeber's shield and note the mysterious fellow combatant's identity, before police lifted the rock thrower and took him to the collection point for all those who had been arrested. A little later the Krefeld police learned whom they had in custody: A Berlin BfV agent, alarmed at the absence of a report, called Krefeld and asked: "Are you holding a man by the name of Troeber?" Troeber was released and, shortly thereafter, on the way back to Berlin, reported to his superiors, disputed all allegations and disappeared again.

The BfV people thought that this (slight) trouble had been settled. However, the matter surfaced again, 2 months later, on Friday of the week before last: Troeber (at least that is the name shown in his personal papers) was arrested upon entering the FRG at the German-Netherlands border point Aachen-Vetschau. The semi-official understanding had been unable to halt the public prosecutors' preliminary inquiries with regard to armed resistance and aggravated breach of the peace.

The man now standing revealed as a BfV informer is doing more than disgrace Berlin's BfV alone.
The Federal Government, above all CSU Interior Minister Zimmermann, had used the Krefeld rock throwing incident to justify its advocacy of more severe penalties for demonstrators. Now, though, the police have ascertained that it was precisely a BfV agent from CDU/CSU ruled Berlin, who attracted attention by his "acts of violence" and by "throwing rocks" at the police (the wording of the arrest warrant).

This was not the first time that informers of German security agencies—commissioned or not to do so—pretended to be activists. In the late 1960's, also in Berlin, BfV informer Peter Urbach made the headlines: According to witnesses he was supposed to infiltrate and report on the APO [extraparliamentary opposition] and commune members but went so far as to distribute arson materials and passed on a weapon.

On several occasions, informers on the right margin escaped the reins of their BfV handlers. In Lower Saxony, informer Hans-Dieter Lepzien assisted the establishment of a terrorist association as a co-founder and was sentenced to 2 1/2 years jail. In Hamburg BfV informer Michael Fruechauf was even involved in a right-wing death squad murder.

Berlin's Interior Senator Heinrich Lummer (CDU) considers "undesirable and inadmissible" for a BfV informer to turn agent provocateur. Evidently he considers it even more undesirable for one to be discovered. In any case Lummer's officials did their utmost to promptly deal with the looming scandal.

Hardly had Troebor once again identified himself to the Aachen arresting officers as an authorized special agent ("I am a member of the Interior Senator's staff"), when Senat Counselor Hartwig, deputy head of the Berlin Land Office for the Protection of the Constitution, and an aide went off to Aachen. His lengthy talk with his Berlin employers encouraged the detainee: The protectors of the constitution promised their servant an early release and handed him DM500 for travel expenses.

Haste appeared most desirable. Even in late August the Berlin BfV office had asked its Duesseldorf counterpart how the Northwest Rhineland judicial authorities would react in case Troebor was arrested. The reply was not promising: The Duesseldorf people refused to definitely spare him from being held pending inquiries.

The Berliners then went off on another tack. Klaus Mueller, head of the Berlin political prosecutor's office, called the competent Krefeld prosecutor and asked him for an unusual favor—to allow proceedings to be transferred to Berlin.

Such commitment to the alleged violent criminal served only to make the Duesseldorf people more obstinate. In the night from Friday to Saturday of the week before last, the interior ministry instructed the police to handle the case as a normal arrest and to hold the Berlin spy in Krefeld jail for the time being.

The "wanderer" action (the name senior Berlin officials gave Troebor's operation in Krefeld) had now definitely turned into a political scandal.

The case spotlights practices and problems of BfV offices regarding the direction and choice of informers. In Interior Senator Lummer's words, their origins usually relate to the "scene." Last week the Christian Democrat revealed that "sometimes
some people begin to waver, and we may then find an opportune moment for asking them whether they might be willing to help us."

Lummer's staff classified Peter Troeber as very wavering indeed—"psychologically unstable" and "susceptible to stress." Nevertheless they did not consider their man unable to handle an outside operation such as Krefeld. They gave him another informer as a sidekick.

Troeber is alleged some time ago to have told his superior, that he wanted to leave the government service. On the other hand, the Krefeld police watched him running amuk to an extent that, as a Berlin politician joked, he should even now benefit from the revision of the breach of the peace article planned by Bonn's law and order champions—exemption for all those who run with a violent mob for professional reasons.

Meanwhile Berlin militants are making every conceivable effort to reconstruct the career and personality of the traitor. They recognized in him the "Piwi" who, in 1981, 4 weeks before the beginning of the "Fuwat" festival, suddenly emerged in Berlin, attended various house squatting incidents and was rarely absent when rocks were thrown.

His erstwhile companions remember him as comradely but, at the same time, an outsider. They noticed that he suffered from depression and self-pity. Once, they reported, he cut his wrist. Attempts to feel to a dream world alternated with aggressive resolution ("he was terribly militant").

Gym shoe combatants claim to have seen their friend "Piwi"/Troeber in the forefront of several Berlin riots that followed the clearing out of squatters as well as at the Haig demonstration in September 1981. A senior fellow combatant claims that "by rights he should have a tennis elbow" for having thrown so many rocks. Other street fighters report that, faced with a human chain of police on the Winterfeldt Platz, "Piwi" had called out: "Kill them!"

The BfV informer was last sighted in mid-August, at a Central America demonstration in Berlin. Friends recall that he "complained bitterly of being suspect as a spy ever since Krefeld and asked what he might do about it."

The BfV intended Peter Troeber to inform on the hard core of squatters, wherever the officials considered it to be hardest. Prison groups and RAF sympathizers were also within his field of observation. In 1981 the unemployed Troeber joined the squatters in a Kreuzberg building. The police described this house as a "refuge for criminals" and raided it "even if just a banana skin was thrown from the window" (comment by one resident).

It is virtually impossible to check on BfV informers in such exposed situations. Often the employer is reduced to hoping for the best. A senior official at the Berlin BfV office said: "We do realize that they are bound to commit crimes, but these must remain within bounds."

A BfV informer, teetering on the edge of illegality, risks his skin all alone. If he commits crimes for reasons of self-defense or camouflage, even his special service relationship does not necessarily save him from subsequent public prosecution.

Berlin BfV officials cite an acknowledgment by bureau chief Franz Natusch: "Ultimately the informer is always expendable."
PCF's HERZOG ON NEW FALL SEASON PLANS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Paris REVOLUTION in French 2 Sep 83 pp 6-8

Interview with Philippe Herzog, member of PCF Politburo and economist, by Dorothee Vion; date and place not specified

Text Question The rentree is here. Employment is a central concern. In industry and even part of the service sector, jobs have decreased nationally, and planned dismissals are growing. Yvon Gattaz, moreover, calls for heads of enterprise to have the right to discharge quickly and freely. What can be done?

Answer M Gattaz does not quite realize we are no longer under Giscard, in a time when employers could dismiss employees and close factories by confronting workers with a fait accompli. The will of the French people is clear: to revive industry and reduce unemployment. That of the government is the same. The CNPF/National Council of French Employers/ cannot lay down the law. Workers' proposals must be heard and discussed, and solutions for maintaining and increasing employment must be sought. Peugeot's management was unable to carry out its planned dismissals.

That is an initial success for democracy. A serious debate is possible. It is admitted that the PSA group's management was not without serious faults in terms of competitiveness and sound use of the group's assets.

Yes, employers are pushing the offensive to eliminate jobs and enterprises, and to reduce social gains. But they can be forced to give ground. By relying on the national will and the government's objectives, and by making use of the rights available to them and the reforms instituted by the majority, workers can influence management's choices and act for recovery of the national economy.

In that sense, we can consider the rentree from a constructive viewpoint.

Question A number of positive signs should be noted. This summer INSEE National Institute of Economic Statistics and Research published indicators tending that way. Are things taking care of themselves?
A balanced interpretation of those signs is needed. There are positive elements. The stabilization of unemployment is due to two years of effort, and contrasts with all that is happening in other capitalist countries. Moreover, a revival effort was possible together with a slowing of price rises.

We must, however, see the fundamental problems still to be solved. In view of the risks of worsening unemployment, which are evident from the current dismissals, everything points to the need for a new mechanism to favor employment. The government is working on it. Training of youth, and other social measures, will make further progress. But more will be needed. It is imperative to start on a viable revival of French growth, and especially of its industry. This is not yet achieved, for industrial production is at the same level as a year ago, and if mass consumption drops, so will production.

As regards the balance of payments, it is clear there has been a reduction of the trade deficit, and that should be pursued. But two observations should be made: first, there is still a deficit; and the foreign debt must be paid—and with interest. To that I add the net capital exodus which has continued in the last period—with Pechiney, for example. Moreover, we must be able to reduce and even eliminate the payments deficit, and do so not in a context of zero growth but in one of positive growth. That is the aim of the Left. But for the moment, improvement in the trade balance is particularly linked to the decrease in imports caused by the halt in growth.

The present respite on the external front must then be greatly consolidated. The recovery of our industry and the reconquest of our domestic market, together with reduction of the capital exodus, are decisive factors without which that respite would not be lasting.

As for prices, we must be able to mount an even stronger attack against what are called the "structural causes of inflation" so we can slow down price rises in a context of renewed growth.

While the dollar bobs up and down but remains high, which makes for a number of difficulties, such as forcing us to pay more for imports?

There is recovery in the United States, though not yet a return to the pre-recession level. With the approach of the elections, Reagan is giving his economy a certain boost through tax cuts. But that revival is precarious. Already, financial appetites are growing, with an upsurge in Wall St., and prices threaten a new rise.

Everything shows that American capital and management will further intensify the economic war. American industrial competition is growing. We see, for example, Ford's return to Europe in strength. The effort to consolidate the dollar's privileges continues. Capital is attracted to the United States by very high interest rates. Multinational banks and the IMF impose
recessive policies on Third World countries. For them, recession is starting. The aggressive policy of the United States and the domination of finance capital create economic and financial problems for every country in the world.

Question: But still, is there not a recovery, and if so, what consequences can it have for France?

Answer: I have said there is recovery in the United States, but with much financial parasitism. It is precarious also because of the problems it creates abroad, and which will boomerang on the United States. In West Germany and Britain recovery is in no way assured, and unemployment rose in July, as in most European countries except France.

So France must not rely on international recovery, for even if it is confirmed, the economic war rules out any thought of coupling our car to a train pulled by the United States!

If France does not succeed at home in creating the conditions for an in-depth recovery of its industry and for lasting growth, then we will find ourselves in a difficult situation in the next few years, whatever conditions may be abroad.

But it so happens we have considerable assets in France with which to initiate that growth by reducing the burden of financial capital. I add that on the international level the struggle to reduce domination by the dollar and to combat unemployment can be intensified. So there are real prospects. The new policy to achieve them must make further advances, and action by the workers must develop.

Question: In France the debate on growth continues. Edmond Haire, for example, takes his stand for zero growth, and has just declared to LE MONDE that "Socialism is not a growth rate but a way of life." And Michel Dran-court ironically says, in LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, that the Communists want production for its own sake. So then, yes or no, is growth needed or not?

Answer: Unless we create more wealth we cannot achieve the social goals of the Left. Unless our economy grows we will become a society of unemployed or insecure workers, in which living standards and welfare protection will deteriorate. Growth is of first importance.

The French middle class is practicing a policy of national abandonment. It is "Long live financial profit!" at the cost of industrial and cultural regression. When the Left came to power in 1981 France was in recession. Today, by using the considerable economic and financial powers available to them, the capitalist bourgeoisie and the Right continue to strike blows against the national assets.

So I am surprised that people who call themselves Leftists see a conflict between the idea of a better quality of life and the need for growth.
Everything indicates that continued zero growth would mean rising unemployment, social regression, and deterioration in quality of life. So there are better things to do than stand idle. To call Communists laggards on growth is an old hoax. Actually, we want a new growth. Production, yes, but also services to attract youth by offering them useful tasks: modernization of factories, products, and production processes, and of housing; preservation of forests; improvement of the transportation system. All that contributes to improving the quality of life. Production should be such as to help us develop independently. Unless we reconquer the domestic market, all attempts at growth will result in trade deficits. Products and services are needed, and even joint ventures with Third World countries and other peoples, to cooperate in development tasks.

New growth also because of new productivity. It is often mistakenly thought that modernization means reduced employment. Obviously, less work will be needed to attain a given useful result. But if the new wealth created is not squandered in profit taking and financial investments, then training, research, and new activities can be developed. Thus productive employment can grow. Work can be more interesting and shorter, which contributes to an improved quality of life. All that constitutes the challenge facing the new majority.

Question: What must be done to assure viable growth in France?

Answer: Growth cannot be decreed. It is at stake in management. In enterprises, banks, taxation, and public finance, we must manage more effectively. We adopt the idea of strictness, a strictness in furthering new objectives which respond to the concerns of the great majority of French people. If France is not yet well embarked on the path of this new growth, that is because the French middle class prefers to invest capital and obtain large financial profits rather than develop the productive apparatus. It is because in the nationalized industrial and banking sectors the old management criteria are still operative, and we see public corporations which make no effort to pursue national growth objectives. Cooperation between French firms, for example, is all too rare. In the automobile industry, cooperation between Peugeot and Renault is a dead letter, whereas cooperative relations are developing between Renault and Volkswagen and between Peugeot and Fiat. There is reluctance to develop cooperation with small and medium enterprises or to discuss problems in the regional context.

What can management do to be more effective in terms of employment? First, it can do much more for worker training. There will be no successful modernization without a massive upgrading of qualifications. Better a worker in training than one made idle. I point out, moreover, that employers often deceive workers and the public authorities by pretending that dismissals are related to technological progress. Most often, dismissals are quite simply linked to corporate breakups. The case of Talbot is typical.
With better training, with the exercise of new rights, we can reduce breakdowns, improve product quality, and make better use of equipment. New investments can be effective only if they are preceded by training and not associated with the breakup of still useful and effective facilities.

The heart of the problem, then, is to develop competitive products. But the old way of seeking competitiveness does not work. That is defeat. New paths are needed. These products must aim at development and reconquest of the domestic market, not only to make French growth possible, but also to have the means for a stronger presence in foreign markets.

I add that defense of purchasing power is crucial for French industrial recovery. Employers say "there is no money." That is not true. Capital continues to flow to the United States. Financial provisions are important. Banks continue to balk at financing development of French industry, while not hesitating to borrow costly funds in Eurodollars to help employers carry out redeployment operations. This summer we saw an effort by the BNP to canvass for funds to be invested in Panama. Meanwhile, credit is lacking to develop French production. And then, private estates like that of the Peugeot family levy on enterprises, but put no money into the productive apparatus. Finally, public funds are too often squandered, although the government has made efforts to subject their expenditure to criteria which would have a positive effect on employment. In all these fields appropriate action is called for.

Question Since you are in the government, how would you intervene?

Answer We are a force within the majority which seeks to contribute usefully to attainment of the Left's objectives. Contribution and emulation are our modes of action. For advances to be made there must certainly be continuation of a governmental policy of social progress and growth dealing effectively with problems which arise. We had occasion in the past, for example at the time of the Delors plan, to make suggestions for further increasing that effectiveness. We shall do so again, always in a constructive way. For example, a debate on industrial policy is planned for the rentree. We shall present our point of view. Such an expression, on the national scale, of determination to bring about industrial recovery, also serves to support gains by the workers.

For our role is also to aid workers in their defense of social and economic gains, so that they may take their rights in hand, and so make themselves the harvesters of reform. There is a great deal to be done in this field, and that is the way we shall move ahead. The fundamental stake of the rentree is the progressive development of a democratic way of life in enterprises, in banks, in the regions. Let those who have ideas present them; let there be discussion, and let us find the best paths. It is a majority choice. It is a question of building a "new mixed economy." The old-fashioned mixed economy—a combination of statism and employer monopoly—does not work. Much has been done in two years. We must now make use of
the support which has been created. In the public and nationalized sector, which has a primary role to play, the state has defined new missions. They must be carried out concretely in practice.

[Question] Why is that not moving faster?

[Answer] First, time was needed; then, old concepts of management are obstacles; and finally, there is at times a certain opposition to majority objectives. All that can evolve in the right direction if the workers intervene.

The importance of efforts to develop contracts must be emphasized. That is a method of dialogue and negotiation poles apart from the fait accompli. Contracts on public sector regional plans, and contracts between regions and enterprises, are so many possibilities for democratic practice. Jack Ralite proposes an employment-production-training contract which has the particular advantage of furthering cooperation between enterprises. As regards credit, acceptance of progressive objectives and contracts must also be attained. Banking reforms plan for regional credit conferences, and that is important.

Of course, there is the whole field of rights under the Auroux plan. Joint production committees offer the best possibilities as agents of information, and have greater means of action than before. Joint economic commissions can be created. And then there are other reforms in process, for example that intended for enterprises in difficulty, with rights to preventive measures and better possibilities to permit their continued activity. When I see all that, I say to myself that we have the means to go forward. The Right fears democracy. It cries out in alarm against Communism. That is shabby, though true to its form.

France has a card to play to set off a new growth. Let us play it.

6145
CSO: 3519628
WILLOCH GOVERNMENT LIKELY TO MAKE CHANGES AFTER VOTE DEFEAT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGLADET in Swedish 14 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] It is said that history never repeats itself. Nevertheless, a first analysis shows many common features between Tage Erlander's earth-shaking defeat in the municipal elections in 1966 and the reverse of the Conservatives in the Norwegian local elections on Monday. A low voter participation—the lowest in any election since World War II—indicates that many Conservative sympathizers stayed home, a result of "disappointment with expectations" as Sven Aspling wanted to explain the Social Democratic defeat in 1966. As a protest against their expectations not being fulfilled, people stayed home on election day.

This explanation as to why it went the way it did does not naturally minimize the indisputable advance which Gro Harlem Brundlandt's Labor Party made. The outcome of the municipal election will be an incentive for the opposition Social Democrats in the parliamentary election of 1985.

There are, however, special aspects of the Norwegian local elections on Monday. The Labor Party was not the only winner. The Progressive Party won just as much as the more naive of the two rightist parties in Norway, the Conservatives, lost, 3.7 percent. Despite the Labor Party's advance with 3.3 percent to just under 40 percent, the conservative parties together held their positions. The gains of the Social Democrats were won to a significant degree at the expense of the two smaller government parties, the Center Party and the Christian People's Party.

One should remember that the Progressive Party is far from being the same party it was during the time of its founder, the politician of discontent Anders Lange. Under the leadership of Carl I. Hagen the party stands out as a more truly conservative party than the Conservatives—and with the expressed ambitions of keeping the larger party on the narrow path and at the same time the party swears that it will never bring down a conservative government.

Hagen's appeal to young people has been strong, and the Progressive Party, as number three party in Oslo, is drawing a new picture of the political geography of the Norwegian capital. It is possible that the gains of the Progressive Party in many cities will prevent the majority being changed and that non-socialist rule will continue.
It would be most serious if the Conservatives minimized their defeat, which is greater than their gain in the parliamentary election of 1981. The party can claim it has suffered harm from the stringent policies which the Kare Willoch government has been forced to follow to put the Norwegian economy on a sound basis. Unemployment has risen to 4 percent. The austere policies contrast sharply with the high expectations which the Norwegians with the oil finds in the North Sea as a background had imagined. In this manner, "disappointment with expectations" hit very hard.

In addition, the Willoch government has the mantel of administration over itself. To govern in a time of crisis—something which the Swedish Social Democrats have had to learn—is not to create new things but to keep house with limited resources. It is also possible that the strong party apparatus of the Conservatives after being worked hard to win government power has become a little rusty. There are indeed reasons for self-examination.

As is known, the parliament cannot be dissolved. The municipal elections will have other consequences. After the defeat the government will find it harder to pursue its policies, particularly if the two small parties try to get the dominant Conservatives to lessen the inevitable screws of austerity. The defeat of the three government parties must lead to Prime Minister Willoch's seeing that the government's external activity is given a stronger emphasis than before. Changes in personnel may be necessary.

The Conservatives and Kare Willoch can take consolation from the fact that the low participation in the election—67 percent—indicates that there is a far from paltry reserve of voters, who public opinion polls indicate would still be ready to support the party in a parliamentary election. Since assuming governmental power, the Conservatives have remained stable at something over 30 percent in almost all public opinion polls.

But obviously it is necessary that the Conservatives regain their power of appeal and ability to mobilize in the 2 years which remain until the parliamentary election in 1985.

Paradoxically Kare Willoch can find consolation and inspiration in Tage Erlander: after the earthquake of 1966 came the triumph of 1968.

6893
CSO: 3650/295
SOCIALISTS SEEK PARTY UNITY AT FIFTH CONGRESS

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 Aug 83 p 13

[Commentary by Jose Castelo]

[Text] The Socialist Party Congress could achieve a surprise reunification between the majority and the "Ex-Secretariat." Other important factors, however, are also involved.

The 5th Congress of the Socialist Party (PS) is just a month away (30 Sep - 2 Oct), but contrary to what one would normally expect, almost nothing has been defined, at least insofar as eventual lists to be presented to the National Committee are concerned.

The central point at issue is the position of the so-called Ex-Secretariat, which was invited by Mario Soares to be part of the majority list. Some members of this group are to meet this weekend in the Algarve to draw up a document to serve as a basis for negotiations in future meetings with the Socialist leader, precisely to lay down the conditions under which they will agree to such a unity list. Of course, no conclusions can be drawn from bargaining talks that have not yet even begun, but the Ex-Secretariat certainly faces obvious difficulties and finds itself divided. Vitor Constancio, in a statement to EXPRESSO relating to the speeches at the dinner honoring Salgado Zenha, said, "I really fear that this path could well lead to the formal breakup of the so-called Ex-Secretariat minority, culminating in an evolution that seems to have escaped observers but which has been going on for about a year."

Indeed, as far as we could ascertain, the division is much greater than many commentators have noted, consisting of two distinct groups: those who seek an understanding with Mario Soares and realize that the PS needs to overcome internal divergences and take on a new image of a united and strengthened party, and the hard-line holdouts, who voice their severe disagreement with the majority at every available opportunity.

For the first group, whose most effective spokesman is Vitor Constancia, is in fact open to agreement, although at least some of its members preferred not to break the internal solidarity that existed in the Ex-Secretariat in
earlier times. Thus the first hypothesis would be an overall understanding between the majority and the Ex-Secretariat. Even if this solution is not impossible, it is still very dubious, since Salgado Zenha and Antonio Amaut, among others, seem little disposed to yield unless at a price that Mario Soares would not accept. The Socialist leader, now prime minister, favors the return, but without forgetting what has passed.

An alternative solution would be agreement between the Ex-Secretariat's "moderates" and the majority, without letting such an understanding imply a split in the minority. Or in other words, the hard-liners could hold out in their "opposition" without blocking others from reaching an agreement.

Any of these situations can be worked out ahead of time, and as strange as they may seem, they are far short of the drastic attitude assumed by Vitor Constancia in the above-mentioned document, when he affirmed: "From now on I shall be guided essentially by options of a political character, and I shall therefore seek to work together with those with whom I am in agreement politically."

Apart from any justifications for such a statement, it obviously means that he has left himself an eventual out to break with the Ex-Secretariat, if he has sufficient reason.

If this is the context in which the Ex-Secretariat operates, it is no less true that the whole situation is still very confused. It is even possible that instead of a formal separation, a reunification could take place if Mario Soares were to impose conditions that would be considered unacceptable, even by the moderates.

Among the ranks of the majority there will undoubtedly be some who want very tough conditions, if only to cut down on the number of candidates for certain jobs, so that they stand a better chance at one. However, it would be just as true to say that few in the majority could have any such thoughts in mind, since the government has already been formed. On top of that, we have never known Mario Soares and those closest to him to be afraid of other slates being moved up. In fact, it was he who "allowed" the rise to national political prominence of persons, namely of the Ex-Secretariat, who would otherwise still be unknown. And when one comes down to it, what is there to fear for the only man who in fact controls the PS?

Thus, without forgetting the support that he received in the critical phase of his leadership during the last congress, and in terms of pure logic, Mario Soares will be much more interested in smoothing out existing differences and winning over the moderates of the Ex-Secretariat in a policy of even-handedness, than in keeping up the "war," creating unacceptable conditions and thus alienating prominent party members.
Whatever the outcome of this situation, there will have to be concessions if agreement is to be possible, and the first on the part of the Ex-Secretariat will be the sector realignment law, a subject on which the government is already committed and cannot turn back.

But with or without a unity slate, and whatever the agreements that might be established, some points of discord will still carry forward, two of which are obviously Ramalho Eanes and Salgado Zenha. No matter what understandings are drawn up, Soares will not yield to a policy of understanding with Eanes, which is supported by some members of the Ex-Secretariat, at least by its hard-liners. Nor will he forget what happened between him and Salgado Zenha.

Thus if this is to be the congress of reunification, at least relative, it will also be two other things no less important, of which there can be no doubt: it will be the congress of affirmation of leadership and the meeting that will initiate its eventual replacement.

Affirmation of Leadership

Socialist leader Soares attained a political position last year that would have been almost unthinkable for many at the time of the first AD government. Because of a combination of circumstances and when some were ready to bet that his days in power had ended, he came out on top at the last congress, defeated the minority, put the PS back in as the majority party, and came back to take over the power at Sao Bento Palace. And even more, he leaves for the 5th Congress with more than 80 percent of the votes, so that he can claim to be the big winner. In fact, he is the only one in the PS who can say that with absolute certainty. Soares does not conceal his attitude and is betting on his election as President of the Republic, a post that seems to be clearly within his reach, as some are saying, including officials of the PSD. Well now, the Socialist leader will certainly want to grasp his opportunity at the congress, of course indirectly, to make his power felt and to prepare the psychological conditions that will lead the party militants to support him without hesitancy or question for the position of President of the Republic.

The political orientation motion presented by Mario Soares to the congress leaves no room whatever for doubt in the matter. He states: "Through force of circumstances the party has to start getting used to getting along more without its current secretary-general... Besides, the problem is going to become even more acute when the PS has to designate a candidate of its own for the presidential elections."

And this assertion of leadership is not really something that the top leader of the PS might appear to want to make as a purely personal affirmation. Quite the contrary, he knows that one of the vectors where a candidate supported by Gen Ramalho Eanes can find support is precisely in the very space of the Socialist Party, which is fluid and even hybrid in this field. Thus it is better to convince him right now than to let the wind blow whither it listeth, as the expression goes.
A congress to prepare a candidacy is naturally a congress to start the process of nominating a new secretary-general. Postponing decisions does not mean forgetting them, and notwithstanding the determination not to tamper for now with the by-laws, as had been foreseen, the undeniable fact is that if Mario Soares becomes President of the Republic, someone else will have to become secretary-general of the PS.

Also under this heading, the socialist leader has no doubts and in his motion to the congress states that a change in the by-laws has been considered that would create a chairman, elected by the congress, and 3 or 4 vice-chairmen. And he adds something curious in that connection: "My proposal is that in this part the by-laws not be changed, leaving things as they are, without prejudice for trying on an experimental basis a more extensive division of tasks and responsibilities at the level of the political committee and not just the standing committee." This statement, coming from the one who in effect can pick his successor, if he should be elected President of the Republic, indicates something clear and precise: let the best play his cards.

It is extremely early to be speaking of names, even though some candidates are prepared and ready. Much will depend on the successes of the present government and especially its ability to keep out of the presidential jockeying, thus creating secure conditions for a division between the jobs of prime minister and secretary-general. But the right cards are necessary. If the good sailor prepares on land, the politician, new or old, who aspires to leadership of the PS naturally begins his preparation phase ahead of time. We shall certainly be seeing only a relative postponement of decisions in which each one from now on will play his trumps with an eye on the near future.

Basically, we thus have a congress where the interests are multiple, from an inside viewpoint, and where each one will legitimately play the cards available to him. But the most important element, in spite of everything, is still missing from this brief analysis: the coming political evolution.

Mario Soares is prime minister of a government that, at least in this phase, will be unpopular for the steps that it must take, both because of the agreement with the IMF, as well as all the other well-known reasons that stem from the economic crisis. To be prime minister at a time like this is obviously difficult, since no matter how much concern the government tires to show, those who are against it will always win, in comparative terms. For many Portuguese, the financial squeeze is already becoming unbearable, and although that fact is not likely to get much publicity at the 5th Congress, it will very soon make itself felt by most of the socialist militants. In fact, they will face just as hard a personal situation as do their working comrades, making it increasingly difficult for them to come up with answers that are sufficiently convincing.
If it is obvious that the future of all PS leaders, especially those in
government, depends on their ability to solve the country's economic
difficulties, it is no less true that, beyond everything already discussed,
the 5th Congress will only produce its results if it succeeds in creating
favorable conditions for each militant to be a confident spokesman for
the attitudes and positions of the Government, given effective training
and information.

12430
CSO: 3542/210
EANIST AMBIGUITY SEVERELY CRITICIZED

Lisbon 0 DIA in Portuguese 22 Aug 83 p 13

[Commentary by Sa Freitas]

[Excerpts] For some analysts there is an umbilical cord between Eanes and "Eanism" called Presidency-of-the-Republic, which produces between the two entities a system of gaps revealing a national imbalance reminiscent of 24 April.

This somewhat unfavorable interpretation of the President of the Republic and of the democratic country in which we profess to live would be dissolved very easily and immediately if the concept of "Eanism" were defined with clarify and if His Excellency were to respond without clever evasions to the direct question, "Is Eanism Eanist?" Faced with the aloof silence from Belem, we shall venture out own analysis of "Eanism."

Eanism is only the promise of a promise, the shadow of a cloud, the auditorium for an empty stage. It is defined as strategy for seizing power that is based on ambiguity, vacuity, equivocation, and that is nourished by ineffectiveness, agony, and failure. Nobody knows the kind of state that "Eanism" promises or the kind of society that it will model. Nobody knows whether things would be better there for Catholics or for Masons, for Left or Right, tradesmen or farmers, workers or bosses, NATO or Warsaw Pact, public schools or private schools, doctors without patients or patients without doctors, "queens" or sailors. And all this ambiguity is defensible by anyone who defends it, thanks to the evident bankruptcy of the democratic alternative that the parties have come to tolerate.

Faced with the downfall of the parties or the "Eanist" intangibility, the Portuguese people feel that the choice is between the Devil and Satan. Neither the ambiguity nor the ineffectiveness serves them well, even when the one is called upon to justify the other. Neither of the two helps lower the prices of beef or milk. But both have lowered the level of the national treasury and of public morale. Neither of the two is able to make a paycheck last one day longer or youth to acquire wisdom one day sooner. The Portuguese people, because of the ineffectiveness of democratic governments, are beginning to know what hunger is and they demand more than
ambiguity to fill their bellies. They are tired of being mugged and robbed on the streets at all hours, and they are no longer satisfied with the promise that, from another galaxy, within some millennium, the "Eanist" regime will arrive to assure peace and order.

For "Eanism" is like a fireman who, having helped set the fire, through ineptitude or malice, promises to put it out without having the necessary means to do so: no water, no axe, no uniform. Even if there were a uniform, there is nobody in it who might be identified. Lumping the parties, from the CDS to the PC, into the same bag as "Eanism," it is easy to see that the same purpose is served by setting the fire as by claiming that there is a fireman around who can put it out. Meanwhile, the Portuguese people are on fire—in revolt before a fraud, where they can't even take a chance on defeat, because failure is fatal.

With all due respect, which we shall never lack, for His Excellency the President of the Republic, whether he calls himself Eanes or Ramalho, we confess to not having the slightest respect for that strategy of taking power called "Eanism," which Eanes has never admitted that he approves or rejects. These are not times for vague promises nor failures. They are times for action: firm, clear, and courageous. Our people have to know what they want and where they are going. The situation will not be solved by any discussion on the part of "Eanists" about the way to change the constitution (whether through an illegal referendum or by 4-5 Deputies), or by a new government with the same old parties. Neither such governments, nor these "Eanists," nor phantasmagoric "Eanist" governments can redeem Portugal.

The well-being of the Portuguese, which is generally said to consist of the sufficiency of the family budgets, tranquility in the streets, the honesty of the daily conduct of the citizens, the purity and joy of our quiet and humble way of life, are beyond incompetences and dark clouds. This is a time when we must all be soldiers for our country, welded to our country, to the sunlight of our country. And not to the foreign countries, the ones that pay for the incompetence and the cloud, the better to devour what is left of the booty.

We are summoned to the ranks by the silence of the generals. It is time to pass out the loot at the door of the collection house. The symbols and the arms are to be delivered. Meanwhile, we shall be checked beforehand to see that we have received all our vaccinations. The two most important ones are given with the same needle. It is an intramuscular injection with a large needle, for both anti-"Eanist" and anti-"party politics." It helps us to resist the virus of cowardice and desertion when the social and economic fever strikes. The doctor who administers it is called public opinion, and if all the readers of this newspaper, among which must doubtless be counted the President of the Republic, want to think of me as a kind of nurse's aide, I take my leave here with profound gratitude.

12430
CS0: 3542/210
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED ALLOCATION OF U.S. AZORES BASE PAYMENTS

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 26 Aug 83 p 15

[Text] Azorean interests may be adversely affected in the negotiations to revise the Portuguese-American Agreement for the use of the Lajes base, according to the 21 August issue of ACOREANO ORIENTAL.

That newspaper, which is believed to reflect the opinions of the Azores government, stated in an editorial that it found it strange to learn the "it is the intention of the Government of the Republic to divert a portion of the funds due from the United States for the use of military facilities in the Azores to a special fund, on a priority basis, apparently to help the former Portuguese colonies of Africa."

The ACOREANO ORIENTAL refers to disagreements between the mainland and Azores governments about the revision of the Lajes Accord and considers that the development effort of the islands requires the concentration of "all potential regional assets, including the geostrategic position of the Azores, which generates benefits that should properly be applied in the region."

These conflicts between the central and Azores Governments come up every time the Portuguese-American Agreement is negotiated. The current agreement expired in February, and negotiations have dragged on since then against the will of the regional government.

The reports in the ACOREANO ORIENTAL appear on the eve of the reopening of the negotiations, which are to get under way in Lisbon in early September.

12430
CSO: 3542/210
REVIVAL OF MARXIST THEMES IN PSOE ANALYZED

Madrid DIARIO 16 in Spanish 12 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Justino Sinova]

[Text] Some recent anti-Marxist statements by Miguel Boyer are about to revive the controversy that has been buried in the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] since Felipe Gonzalez' return to the post of secretary general in 1979 following his dramatic resignation. This time Marxism did not reach first base. The government is too busy resolving urgent everyday problems and no longer has any time for pragmatism. There are those, however, who are probably ready, reader with every passing day, to raise the issue of Marxism in the PSOE again head on and it seems that they are getting ready for that.

When Felipe Gonzalez was on his way to address the first election rally of his life, in Seville during the campaign of the republic's first general elections, he confessed something to me that was so simple yet so difficult at that time, as it is now: "I am a social democrat." We were flying from Madrid, his only collaborator then was Helga Soto and he was accompanied by Carmen Romero and Alfonso Guerra. Nervous about his imminent debut, the then not so well-known secretary general of the PSOE made some reflections on the socialist situation in Europe and concluded saying that he was what Western European socialists call a "social democrat."

The debate over Marxism in the PSOE was still a long way off, although it had begun to appear. A few months before Felipe had publicly declared himself to be a Marxist and practically all of the PSOE executives had in one way or another practiced Marxism. It was said that Alfonso Guerra had already read all the books on Marxist theory when they were a novelty to the other comrades. And the position paper issued by the 27th party congress, in which now Minister Joaquin Almunia, for example, had participated, abundantly exuded Marxism.

The process of historic acceleration our country is going through was manifested at that congress too. It was only 4 years ago that Felipe Gonzalez resigned from the party secretariat, basically because of the controversy over Marxism, yet it seems like it was a century ago. It was only 4 years ago that the PSOE was an avowed Marxist party, yet it now seems like ancient history.
All well and good. When last Monday Minister Miguel Boyer/ [in italics] renounced Marxism on television ("the Marxist economy has always seemed antiquated to me"), a few PSOE organizations were stirred up over it, but only a few, not the whole PSOE. Only a few prominent radicals reacted to Boyer's rationalist acknowledgment, which is in keeping with the times, and everything boiled down to that.

Obviously, the controversy as to "Marxism: yes or no" is today an antiquated issue limited to the domain of intellectualism or political philosophy.

Practical politics is less and less concerned with whether Marxism should or should not govern the programs a pragmatic approach demands, whether there are "Marxist solutions" or not. With every passing day it is getting to be more certain that Marx has died as far as the politicians in power are concerned. Marx is dead for Felipe Gonzalez and for the PSOE government. And he never existed for some Spanish socialists.

The old game of guessing to what degree the PSOE exudes Marxism, how many ministers are Marxists, is less and less exciting. After all, it does not make any difference whether Javier Solana is a Marxist or whether Alfonso Guerra and Fernando Moran are Marxists. Political exigency, the imperative necessity of resolving more and more problems every day, of living in contact with the world forces politicians to look for efficacy and reject dogmatism. It serves little or no purpose, for example, to be Marxists if in the end we have to be a part of NATO because we cannot do otherwise, seconding the decisions of history's biggest anti-Marxists.

It is only logical and explainable that the debate is now but an attempt at one. Who would be interested in it? Merely raising the issue frightens the government and the immense majority of the nation does not care about it. A few people are concerned over it simply because it may divert the course of affairs from its true path. The debate over Marxism, which was on the point of breaking the PSOE in 1979 when Felipe Gonzalez felt himself harassed by Marxist bureaucrats, could also now break the government, the PSOE and the country. Time wasted is time wasted and there is nothing to gain from ceasing to look forward.

Only a small clique in the PSOE is interested in reviving the issue. And a movement can nowadays be detected behind the scenes of the so-called critical faction. There is a professor worn by oblivion, voluntarily retired from active politics, who may now feel tempted to return to it. About him the critics are forming a sentimental gathering. Every morning, when he takes the train to get to his classroom, always with a tie, always with a briefcase, always with a hat, he, who fills his exile with academic lectures and the radiance that adorns nostalgia, is probably thinking of the chances of returning.

The plan for this return operation may already be outlined. But it would be unfortunate if that return were conducted with the banner of Marxism raised on high.

11,466
CSO: 3548/507
AP'S FRAGA STRESSES UNITY THEME IN WAKE OF BASQUE FLOOD

Madrid YA in Spanish 11 Sep 83 p 7

[Article: "Fraga in Bilbao: 'Now Is the Time to Open Lemoniz'"

[Excerpt] The chairman of the AP noted that he too would have left the job of coordination during the floods to Garaicoechea.

"There is now a historic occasion for taking advantage of hardships and turning them into benefits. I don't want to get myself involved in anything that may imply division, not even at a time when there are so many reasons for speaking of that. All of Spain and the Basque Country within it in in a process of being impoverished which is in part due to the general situation and in part to our economic management, as well as to a specific situation which has here had an effect on the key factor, confidence. This is now being aggravated by the floods. May this catastrophe, as in the sieges Bilbao has suffered, be the beginning of a process of recovery," said opposition leader Manuel Fraga Iribarne in the course of a press conference held yesterday during his visit to the Basque Country, our correspondent in Bilbao, Luis Maria Landaluce, reports.

The chairman of the Popular Alliance (AP), who on Friday visited the areas affected by the floods in Burgos and Cantabria, met yesterday with representatives of the following business organizations: the General Confederation of Viscayan Businessmen headed by Luis Olarra, the Viscayan Business Center and the CONFEBAIZ [Basque Confederation], as well as the Cantabrian Business Confederation. For a little more than an hour they discussed the serious problems involving industry, commerce and the services as a result of the catastrophe. Afterwards, he went to the old center of town accompanied by the president of the Businessmen's Association, Jose Luis Guijarro. And after that he held a meeting with the directors of the coalition attended by People's Democratic Party secretary general Julen Guimon, Marcelino Oreja and Florencio Arostegui, among others.

After the press conference he went to San Sebastian, on the way visiting the industrial areas of Vizcaya most affected by the floods: Echebarri, Basauri, Galdacano and Duranquesado. At San Sebastian he held more meetings and, after his conversation with the president of the Basque Government, Carlos
Garaioechea, he returned to the Vizcayan capital. He will conclude his stay in the Basque Country with the visit he is to make today of the areas hit by the floods in the province of Alava.

Manuel Fraga stressed the fact that he was greatly impressed by the magnitude of the catastrophe, announcing that the coalition would organize "follow-up commissions at national, provincial or local levels to familiarize itself with the problems that will be cropping up and determine how to resolve those problems."

Asked about the message he was bringing the president of the Basque Government, he tersely stated that "I will put myself at his disposal, as is natural. It couldn't be any other way," praising the national government's approach of delegating all the functions of coordination of civil protection measures and aid for the flood victims to the Basque Government and specifically its president: "That seems right to me and I would have done the same thing," the AP leader said.

"ETA Doesn't Understand This Historic Hour"

In answer to a question as to whether the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] would change its attitude in view of the national government, the Armed Forces and the national security agencies and forces' response to the plight of the flood victims, Fraga replied that he would prefer not to discuss topics that are divisive. "But having said that, it's obvious that the fact that some factions, like the ETA, don't understand the importance of this historic hour is much to be feared. The full responsibility falls on them, inasmuch as they are incapable of comprehending or correcting their attitude. I don't want to find an excuse for this with even a single word. But, if they were to assume the same responsibility that is expected of all of us, this would be the time to do something about it, and that includes opening the Lemoniz plant. I say so loud and clear, This is the moment to do more and better, and to correct our attitude, we first of all."

With regard to the hostile atmosphere displayed in Zarauz by certain political factions and nationalist citizens with reference to Manuel Fraga's visit to the president of the Basque Government's summer residence, the chairman of the AP replied: "They are quite free to behave like that and I to realize that it is they who are mistaken, while I am sure of it. As always, there are those who take advantage of every moment to divide and sow discord among people. I have not come to take anything away with me; if I can, I will contribute something. But I stress the fact that there are those who place their personal or factional quarrels above the interests of the Basque Country or Spain."

11,466
GSO: 3548/507
MUMCU EYES DEMAGOGUERY IN VOTE RECEIPT CLAIMS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 18 Aug 83 pp 1, 9

[Article by Ugur Mumcu in the column "Observation": "How Many Million Votes"]

[Text] Political party spokesmen announce from time to time "how many million" votes they are going to get. We just wonder—as would appear from such announcements as: "We have 9 million votes"—Have the parties discovered some electronic device we do not know about to predict the votes they will get?

No such device has been invented, of course. The party spokesmen are reaching into a hat and pulling out inflated figures. What is in the hat is the votes received by the pre-12 September parties. Each of the new parties feels it has the support of the voting constituency of one of these parties, and taking that number of votes out of the hat and adding a few million to it, say: "That's how many votes we'll get, eh?" The numbers announced by the different parties far exceed the number of voters. What else can we say:

—Lord, have mercy...

Look around; is there as much interest in politics as there used to be? We do not much think there is a great deal of interest in the new parties. The pre-12 September events have scared people off, and they are disgusted. It will be a long time before this apathy turns into hot and heavy involvement. If the figures for future votes are based on election results of the past, it is the worst possible approach. Even Mom and Pop in their corner store know they cannot figure their apples and pears together.

So where are these figures coming from when they say, "We'll get 9 million votes"?

They come from the delusion and self-deception of the demagoguery of biased propaganda. They lack credibility because they are not grounded in facts and figures.
In the West, you know, they have organizations that take public polls. Pre-election polls taken by these organizations in England and America have closely approximated the final results. We do not see many organizations here that do this kind of research using scientific methods. There is no such research available to the political parties that we know of. The party spokesman, reminiscent of Recep being admonished not to exaggerate in the well-known expression, comes to the auctioneer's podium:

--We'll take 9 million votes...

In our rough assessments, we are finding apathy towards the new parties. Of course, it would be wrong to take this as verified data. True, but we have another yardstick. Newspaper circulation usually picks up noticeably during election periods. Look now, there has been no recent increase in readership worth noting. This may be viewed as a measure of apathy.

Certainly the degeneration of parliament and the terrorism experienced prior to 12 September would account for a significant share of this apathy. It is enhanced today by the homogeneity of the new parties. The two major trends which, ever since the Committee of Union and Progress, have found organized outlets under various names—that is, two political views, one conservative and the other, progressive—have not become the flesh and bone of the present political parties. This, too, accounts for a part of the apathy.

But the party spokesmen are undaunted:

--We'll take 9 million votes...

From where? How? Why? By what rationale? These questions have not been researched. What need is there for research?

The civilian politician needs time, at the very least, to regain respect. Until the civilian politician has regained the respect and confidence of the general public, democracy will lack the opportunity to take root and grow. A lot of water has passed under a lot of bridges. Is it so easy to discount this water, or these bridges?

We do not know what basis the party spokesmen have when they say they will get 9 million votes, 10 million votes. But if a little poll were taken, it would be found that people are a lot more interested in watching "Dallas" on Sunday nights than in current politics and parties.

We have no scientific poll, but we are positive that "Dallas" has at least 9 million viewers.

Oh, well; that's life!
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR PARTY ELECTIONEERING ACTIVITIES

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 18 Aug 83 pp 1, 9

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau)---As the race for advance organization by the MDP [Nationalist Democracy Party], ANAP [Motherland Party], DYP [Right Way Party] and SODEP [Social Democratic Party] draws to a close, the primary race for national deputy in the MDP and ANAP begins. Of the primary applicants to the MDP, 26 percent want to represent Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. Applications for the national deputy primary in the Motherland Party have been extended.

The MDP, ANAP, DYP and SODEP have begun forming provincial organizations in all provinces. All of these organizations, however, have not been registered. The MDP has taken the lead in district organizations with 445 districts, and SODEP is in second place with 396. According to these figures, which change rapidly as the parties constantly announce the formation of new organizations, ANAP has officially established 340 district organizations and the DYP, 283. The Populist Party [HP] holds fifth place as to both provincial and district organizations. The HP has officially reported 40 provincial and 154 district organizations and is awaiting certification in 18 more provinces.

Primary

The MDP has 840 candidates for the national deputy primary and has collected 63 million liras in the special fees paid by primary candidates. MDP candidates include 87 from Ankara, which will elect 22 national deputies; 106 from Istanbul, which will elect 36, and 26 from Izmir, which will elect 16. It has reported 621 primary candidates for national deputy from other provinces.

"Preliminary evaluation" of MDP applicants for national deputy candidacy will continue today. Candidates applying to the party are being evaluated by a council composed of party general chairman Turgut Sunalp, vice chairmen Ahmet Ihsan Kirimli and Sabri Keskin, general secretary Dogan Kasaroglu and the provincial chairman and two members of the provincial board of the province in which each candidate will run. The chairman and two board members are asked for an evaluation of the candidates applying from that province and
also complete a questionnaire of 19 questions prepared by political scientists and psychologists. An individual form for each candidate is completed.

The evaluations made by this council and the forms they fill out will be discussed at a meeting of the Council of Founders on 28 August.

Populist Party

Populist Party Deputy General Secretary Kemal Aydar said that the number of applicants to their party for the national deputy primary was growing rapidly and had exceeded 100 by yesterday. Aydar said he thought there might be even more.

Application Period Extended

Motherland Party headquarters were aswarm yesterday, as it was the last day of the announced period for primary application. Despite the large number of applicants, their names were not announced. ANAP Deputy General Chairman Sivgin announced that the application period had been extended owing to the crush of applicants.

Kartay: SODEP Must Enter Elections for Sound Democracy

Ankara (CUMHURİYET Bureau)—SODEP General Chairman Cezmi Kartay said the failure of his party to participate in the elections would serve the purposes of those who do not desire the country's transition to a sound democracy.

In an interview by reporters who asked what he thought about the possibility that SODEP might not participate in the elections, SODEP General Chairman Cezmi Kartay replied:

"Such a possibility is the last hope of those who do not desire fulfillment of all the resolutions and announcements promising Turkey democracy. It is the wishful thinking of those who do not desire a transition to democracy, of the reactionaries, separatists and all extremist elements and those with post-6 November ambitions. The failure of SODEP to participate in the elections will only serve their purposes and their purposes alone."

DYP Chairman: We Have No Doubt that Our Party Will Be Allowed to Serve

Ankara (CUMHURİYET Bureau)—Right Way Party General Chairman Dr Yıldırım Avcı said, "We believe we have the confidence and support of more than 10 million Turkish voters." Asserting that they aspire to winning the elections with this belief, Avcı said that they "have no doubt that the path to service will be opened" for their party.

Describing his trip to Gaziantep, Adana and Mersin, Dr Avcı asserted that "the Right Way Party is not a superficial political organization," and said:
"I returned to Ankara with heightened resolution and fervor after 4 days of contacts and discussions with members of the provincial and district organizations and citizens in Gaziantep, Adana and Mersin.

"The Right Way Party is not an artificial party, but a genuine, authentic party rising from the grassroots of the nation, which can provide the answer to its aspirations, opinions and philosophy. This was confirmed once again by the extraordinary response we received to our party on my tour.

"We aspire to office with our belief in what everyone without exception will see at the conclusion of the elections, in which we have the confidence and support of more than 10 million Turkish voters, and we have no doubt that the path to service will be opened for our party."

8349
CSO: 3554/408
FORCES COMMANDER LJUNG REPEATS REQUEST FOR ADDED FUNDS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Sep 83 p 6

[Text] The defense forces must receive an additional one and a half billion kronor per year up to 1989 if last year's defense resolution is to be fulfilled. Forces Commander Lennart Ljung said this in his budget proposal for 1984/85, which was presented to the government Thursday.

In two weeks, the forces commander will present his program for the next five years, and then it will be seen how serious the forces commander considers the situation to be. A sizeable increase is necessary as early as in the coming budget year, he says.

In general, the forces commander accepts the suggestions from the force commanders. This means that the naval commander will get approval of the proposal to station units on the west coast and begin repeated exercises.

The Air Force's problem is very great. But the commander will have his measures approved -- reduced flying training and increased purchase of materiel.

A possible elimination of several fighter divisions will not be dealt with before the long-range program is presented in two weeks.

All in all, the forces commander is asking for 18.9 billion kronor for the next budget year. This presupposes that the promised money for protection against submarines, 250 million, will be paid out this year.

The proposal is based on a dollar exchange of 7.42, which was the rate in February. Today, the exchange rate is closer to 7.90, which makes the situation worse.

Another assumption has been the promised price compensation with the defense price index.

9124
C80: 3650/299
WORSENING WORLD SECURITY INCREASES DEMANDS ON ARMED FORCES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Sep 83 p 2

[Editorial: "The Armed Forces"]

[Text] There is more reason now than there has been for a long time to discuss the problems of the Armed Forces in responsible terms.

Steadily increasing demands are being placed on the ability of the Armed Forces to meet the requirements imposed on them by the people through Parliament, but at the same time, the economic resources they need for that purpose are being increasingly cut back. Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg was certainly not guilty of understatement when he said during a speech in Linkoping on Tuesday that "the Armed Forces are in a very awkward cash situation."

On a couple of occasions, the OB [supreme commander of the Armed Forces]--firm in his facts but moderate in tone--has emphasized the discrepancy between the objective laid down by Parliament and the funds made available. Gen Lennart Ljung also emphasized in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET how completely our situation has changed due to the number of submarine intrusions, which apparently are still continuing. In back of it all lies the Soviet Union's view of Sweden as a nation: the Baltic Sea is viewed as a "mare nostrum" giving the USSR the right to use the territorial waters of a small neutral country as it pleases.

Meanwhile, on the NATO side, discussions are underway concerning the growing importance of the Norwegian Sea and the moving forward of defensive positions. Resistance is to begin on the border between Norway and the Soviet Union, not in the so-called GIUK gap between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Positions which are defensive in themselves, and which we cannot influence, can in a given situation become powder kegs just as explosive as offensive units.

In such a situation, we obviously cannot manage our defense in just any way. Either Parliament assumes its economic responsibility or it says that the defense of neutrality is impossible.

To put it in a nutshell, this serious situation was brought about by Social Democratic retrenchments in terms of the 1982 defense decision, devaluation, inflation, and the high dollar rate. In combination, all those things have resulted in a shortfall of between 3 and 5 billion kronor in terms of the 1982
5-year decision, and this is exceptionally serious precisely because, in an activity with such sizable fixed assets, the money "on the top" makes a significant contribution to effectiveness.

The heads of the military services spoke their piece in the budget requests for next year that they submitted on Wednesday. The overall summary will be presented when the OB goes to the government a month from now with his budget plan.

Naturally, it is hard to find any new ways to take money away from the military services. Recourse is being had to the old tried-and-true combination of cutbacks, certain improvements, postponed materiel procurement, and delayed construction, among other things.

For the OB, it is a matter of getting an overall grip on the thing. As has been said so often on this page, SVENSKA DAGBLADET regards it as a given starting point that when Parliament says A, it must also say B—that is, it must see to it that there is substance behind the objective. Dialogue with government and Parliament based on such a starting point also provides a reasonable distribution of responsibility. Do the politicians want to weaken the defense of neutrality at a time of increasing international tension and a growing shift of attention toward our part of the world? If so, it should be stated in plain language that that is what it is prepared to do.

Nothing would be more natural than to restore the purchasing power provided for in the 1982 defense decision. It is reasonable that even the Armed Forces should take advantage of cost-cutting possibilities in a tough economic climate, but it seems that there is no branch of the state administration in which the rationalization requirement has been taken farther than it has in the Armed Forces. It is human nature that everyone in the state administration should be interested primarily in protecting his own sector and letting other areas bear the cost of economizing zeal. All the same, the starting point must be that defense costs are not seen as being in opposition to any other area of government activity and that the defense of external and internal freedom is an area of such proportions that it cannot be measured by the same standard as other activities.

In actual fact, the government is facing a decision that will determine the credibility of our policy regarding security and neutrality. Peace and stability have characterized our part of the world because of the establishment of a system—the so-called Nordic balance—in which a combination of separate security policy solutions functions well. Any alteration of that system—any move of the checkers on the board—is a threat to stability.

But the changes do not depend on us alone: they can also be produced by the powers in the world around us.

The submarine intrusions are a typical example. True, it has been claimed in leading government circles that the intrusions have in no way altered our security policy situation. Naturally, that argument is completely untenable and even fatal from the standpoint of security policy, since it practically invites more such actions.
It would be tantamount to not providing the Armed Forces with the wherewithal now to fulfill their purpose. It would be a signal to the world around us that we have not really understood what has happened and is happening in our own waters and in our immediate vicinity. The credibility not only of our security policy but also of our foreign policy would receive a fatal blow.

11798
CSO: 3650/286
STATE-OWNED ARMS PLANT MAY HAVE TO REDUCE WORK FORCE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Aug 83 p 9

[Article by Rune B. Axelsson]

[Text] Vaxjo, Monday--Because of a sudden and drastic reduction in orders from the air force, the National Industries Corporation (FFV) is preparing to lay off 800 employees in the near future. That is almost 10 percent of the workforce. Hardest hit is FFV Electronics, which has plants in Arboga, Linkoping, and Vaxjo, but Ostersund and Stockholm will also be affected.

The other company unit threatened with layoffs is FFV Maintenance.

This development is not reflected in the seminannual report that was just published. On the contrary, that report trumpets a continued improvement in results for the FFV Group. During the first half of this year, the company's profits were up by about 30 million kronor for a total of about 52 billion. In particular, the report draws attention to very good developments within the now-threatened electronics sector, which includes Telub in Vaxjo among others.

The board of directors has not even had time to approve the report, but a number of the FFV's units have already received the shock announcement that several activities are seriously threatened.

Of the approximately 1,250 people working for FFV Electronics, 300 are facing layoffs, including 150 in Vaxjo, 110 in Arboga, and 25 in Stockholm.

Goran Stenudd, manager of Telub in Vaxjo, says: "The air force is the biggest customer here. We work mainly with services in this firm. This means that the customer's lead time is not the same as it is in the case of other orders."

"We view the situation more or less as though someone were pulling the stopper out of the bathtub before we had a chance to make arrangements for refilling it from another direction. We feel that we can make up for the loss in the long run, but it takes time to do that."

There is considerable bitterness in the firm, partly because those involved feel that they are working in a dynamic sector of industry and partly because
they feel that they have built up exceptional competence to meet the future successfully. The problem is that they do not seem to have the time they need.

He continued: "We won't give up without a fight, however."

Goran Stenudd said: "It is always awkward when the customer no longer has money to spend." He was referring to the defense appropriations and their effect on air force investments.

"As we see it, the air force was forced to choose between continued new procurement and continued high operational levels. They were forced to choose the latter."

The chairman of the Salaried Employees Union at Telub is John Wetterberg. He says:

"We had our suspicions that this might happen. We had indications of it before the vacation period. But we were really surprised by the extent of the layoffs being prepared for by the firm."

He is backed up by his colleague Lars Erik Ahrle, who holds the same union position in Stockholm.

It is mainly salaried personnel who are affected when layoffs are planned. The entire firm is based on highly qualified technicians and a service function that is built around them.

11798
CS0: 3650/286
ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON FINANCIAL PROBLEMS OF ARMS MAKER

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 31 Aug 83 p 10

[Article by Sture Ryman]

[Text] Malmslatt, Tuesday--"The decision to eliminate 800 jobs at the FFV (National Industries Corporation) is neither a matter of 'playing to the gallery' nor a threat to the politicians so that they will appropriate more money to defense, particularly the air force.

"The company has a very troublesome cash problem that I knew nothing about a week ago," said Minister of Defense Anders Thunborg when he visited the FFV in Malmslatt on Tuesday.

Not until last week did the minister of defense get the figures from the air force, which is short 3 billion kronor for the coming 5-year period if the years from 1983 to 1988 are compared to the period from 1984 to 1989.

The FFV's workers and salaried employees are going to be hard hit because modification of the Draken airplanes will not be carried out to the extent initially planned. A couple of air squadrons at Tullinge may be shut down. The danger naturally exists that the FFV's competence in production and maintenance will be lost. But, said Thunborg, we cannot have a defense force for the sole purpose of maintaining old aircraft.

Anders Thunborg also defended the decision on the JAS aircraft. There will never be any financial problems, he said.

"Look at the Viggen--Europe's finest aircraft. And despite all the predictions when it was being built that there would be financial problems in the future, we stayed within the limits. I want to say the same about the JAS. We will be able to handle it, and everyone except the Communists feels that we must have a new aircraft system.

"The devaluation has played a major role, and so has the dollar to some extent. We ourselves are bearing 80 percent of the total production cost, but we will buy only 15 or 20 percent of that production. As far as the JAS is concerned, we will also get equivalent orders from others, chiefly the United States, so in this case we will lose neither jobs nor money," said Anders Thunborg.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

NIGERIA BUYING HOWITZERS FROM BOFORS IN FIRST SWEDISH DEAL

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 Aug 83 p 8

[Article by Erik Liden]

[Text] Nigeria is becoming a new customer of Sweden's defense industry. With the government's permission, Bofors has succeeded in selling the howitzer 77 artillery piece for about 200 million kronor, and more orders may follow.

The Swedish Armed Forces—chiefly the army—have been involved for several years in regular exchanges with Nigeria, which Prime Minister Olof Palme regards as a hopeful democracy in Africa. Despite disturbances and violence in the streets of Lagos, the capital—where even Swedish diplomats carry weapons—the war materials inspector and the government do not feel that civil war or other obstacles to arms exports exist.

When the Nigerian Army's commander in chief visited Sweden last spring, it was clear that his army wanted the howitzer 77, and now the contract is to be drawn up. Several Swedish officers and technicians will settle in Nigeria to help with training and service during the introduction of this modern piece, which has limited independent movement and a maximum firing range of 25 kilometers.

India has long been greatly interested in the howitzer 77, and a giant order is now ready for final negotiation this fall. Earlier information points to a purchase of artillery pieces and ammunition worth nearly 5 billion kronor for India's 1,200,000-man army.

An order from India is vital to Bofors because without it, there will be more layoffs in addition to the 600 laid off in 1982. In this context, the order from Nigeria is a drop in the bucket.

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ARMY CHIEF SKOLD DISCUSSES STRATEGIC SITUATION, FORCES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Aug 83 p 26

[Report on interview with Army Chief of Staff Lt Gen Nils Skold by Kerstin Vinterhed; date and place not specified]

[Text] Totally improbable!

That is how Lt Gen Nils Skold, army chief of staff, sizes up the risk of a nuclear war in Europe between the big powers.

Both big powers know what catastrophe such a war would mean. They also know how enormously great the risk is that such a war would immediately spread to their own countries, says Nils Skold. "But it is true that we military are also alarmed by the arms race," he says. "It would be a matter of incredible luck if the big powers could deescalate the balance of terror--but that is not possible without compromises."

By "compromises" in this context, he means the deployment of fewer nuclear missiles in Europe than are now being planned, and he is sharply critical of the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association's determined opposition to such a compromise.

He says: "Those demanding unilateral disarmament in the West are working against their own purposes. They are immediately suspected of being tools of the Soviet Union." He rejects the idea that for purely technical reasons, a conventional war would necessarily turn into a nuclear war within an hour.

Nils Skold says: "Somebody like Angstrom"--a reference to Lasse Angstrom, who is active in the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association--"refuses to learn from reality. We have had hundreds of wars since World War II, and not one of them has developed into a nuclear war."
Warnings

On the subject of Alva Myrdal's warnings that Europe would be used as a battlefield by the big powers, he is a little more cautious.

"She is a national saint, of course, and one cannot tackle people like that. And also, of course, she is so old."

He does not want to attack her too sharply—he has done that before and been criticized for it—but he considers her fears unrealistic.

"Here in Scandinavia, we are in a quiet corner of the world," says Skold. "Both big powers keep a low profile in this region. We have very few troops or other activities in preparation for war in our area."

DAGENS NYHETER: How does that fit in with the submarine intrusions? They have been described as "preparations for war."

Skold: There are only two possible explanations. Either those intrusions are war preparations in the sense that those behind them want to know more and be better prepared in the event of war, or there are political reasons behind them. The Russians think that our mouths are too big. They want to demonstrate their strength and put us in our place.

DAGENS NYHETER: Are our mouths too big?

Skold: Yes, we have an opinion on almost everything that happens in the world.

DAGENS NYHETER: How do you view Palme's statement that Sweden will bomb and destroy the next submarine that is discovered if it does not surface? Is it not terribly risky to say such things?

Skold: Palme must make it clear, of course, that we absolutely intend to defend ourselves. Our entire neutrality policy is based on that.

DAGENS NYHETER: But what will the Russians do if we actually sink one of their submarines with perhaps 20 men on board?

Slight Hysteria

Skold: I admit that there is a hairline difference between genuine defense and what may do more harm than good in cases like this. It may be better not to go at it too hard. There has been some slight hysteria in this matter of submarines, and in several cases, there has been very little to support the reports that are made.

DAGENS NYHETER: Are there not also American submarines in our territorial waters?
Skold: As far as I know, the Americans do not have submarines of that type, and neither do they have any reason to undertake such operations. The FRG has the boats, but it has no reason, either.

DAGENS NYHETER: Is war a rational activity that one can predict and protect oneself against through strategic calculations?

Skold: I don't deny that madmen may come to power and that they may do anything. But that danger must not prevent us from trying to protect ourselves against probable rational war.

As far as Sweden is concerned, that means being used as a base by one or the other of the big power blocs in the event of an international conflict. It is to prevent such a use of Swedish territory that we must have a strong defense—and there is broad agreement on that point both inside and outside Parliament. Eighty percent of the Swedes want to defend the country and democracy and to do so with the help of a conscript army.

DAGENS NYHETER: Regardless of the price we have to pay?

Skold: Any other "price" would be higher.

DAGENS NYHETER: Even if we have an effective border defense with the best technical equipment?

Skold says that the talk about defense of the periphery is unrealistic precisely because of technological developments. Our frontier is so long that it would be impossible to keep the war outside the country's borders.

The only thing that is really effective, he says, is "depth defense" based on general conscription. He has said that before, and he is standing by it.

[Skold] Defense in which the entire population takes part cannot be cracked. That is shown by the experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan, even though they were much more poorly equipped than we at the start.

DAGENS NYHETER: Will it be possible to maintain a high level of Swedish defense in these times of retrenchment? Can the army hold its own against the other military services?

Skold: The army was to have cost about 7 billion kronor per year under the latest defense decision (1982). But since then, there have been further calls for cutbacks. In addition to a reduction of 200 million kronor per year in terms of what was provided earlier, we must cut back by another 50 million. Devaluation and the higher value-added tax are making everything even more difficult. The army must reduce its personnel by 900 men between now and 1987—we hope to be able to do so through natural attrition. If that is not possible, we will be forced to let people go. The other branches of the Armed
Forces are having to proceed in the same way—we are not being singled out for mistreatment.

DAGENS NYHETER: What is the situation with our weapons—are they really Swedish?

Skold: At least 75 percent of our weapons are Swedish. Our RB70 surface-to-air missile is now being used in all the brigades. We have new artillery and fast new tracked vehicles. We are holding up well internationally.

Weapons Exports

DAGENS NYHETER: Is it really right to export weapons to other countries?

Skold: Here we have a strange double standard. We produce our own war materiel so as to be independent of the big powers. Then when other, less-developed countries want to achieve the same independence by importing from us instead of from the United States or the Soviet Union, we criticize them. The criticism of weapons exports misses the point, and I don't understand it.

DAGENS NYHETER: So there is nothing wrong with our weapons. How about the soldiers and their training?

Skold: We rely on group dynamics and try to use it. Training is based on the idea that a soldier should learn to cooperate in solving a problem. There has never been blind discipline in the Swedish Armed Forces. Instead, the rule has been to treat the troops well.

Our experience is that most of the boys develop tremendously and mature during their military service. Most of them are favorable, and that is a challenge to us to do a good job. I feel that we have a tremendously constructive task: we are working to defend the peace and freedom we have.

DAGENS NYHETER: Is it not destructive to wage war?

Skold: War is always terrible, but it is giving up that is destructive. Most of those who oppose our defense forces start with the premise that war is coming. We begin a step ahead of that. The task is to deter the attacker.

DAGENS NYHETER: Can you point to any shortcomings in our defenses?

Skold: We must develop our ABC protection, including, among other things, our protection against chemical warfare, and also our ability to operate at night.

DAGENS NYHETER: When it comes to nuclear weapons, the civilian population is not effectively protected, either—there are no gas masks for children under 3 years of age, for example.

Skold: Civil defense is not my affair, of course, but there is no reason to try to poison the entire Swedish population. As for the talk about all the
girls who are going to die if they join the army—-a statement that constantly recurs in the debate—-we can manage without girls.

It is true that modern society is vulnerable, but we also have much larger reserves now than before. We can last quite a while with them. If the intention is to use Sweden as a base, terrorism serves no purpose.

DAGENS NYHETER: What do you think of women's role in the Armed Forces?

Skold: Women help to broaden recruitment and improve quality. The first batch of 40 girls began its voluntary military service in June. After that, they will go on to officer training. They will be assigned to combat units just like their male colleagues—-there are no exceptions. We have no difficulty getting people into the Armed Forces. The Home Guard is larger than ever, and many girls and boys want to be officers.

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MERCHANDISE FLEET DANGEROUSLY LOW IN SHIPS FOR WAR NEEDS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 28 Aug 83 p 32

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] The size of the Swedish merchant fleet must not be allowed to decline any further, otherwise Sweden will not be able to handle its own sea transportation needs in an emergency situation.

So says the Maritime Administration's Defense Office, which plans for sea transportation in wartime. The emergency fleet is short at least 20 small vessels for miscellaneous cargo--ranging from 2,000 to 4,000 deadweight tons.

Tomas Book, head of division in the Maritime Administration's Defense Office, told DAGENS NYHETER: "We have already reached the threshold of pain. If Sweden's merchant fleet drops by another 1 million tons, Sweden will quite simply not be able to handle its own sea transportation in an emergency situation."

In a new informational document addressed to various defense authorities, the Maritime Administration draws attention to the problems with sea transportation that Sweden will face in an emergency situation.

Ships Called Home

The Swedish merchant fleet's chief task during the threat of war or in wartime will be to carry most of the goods making up our foreign trade. Coastal shipping along Sweden's long coastline and in canals and on lakes must be guaranteed. Ships are also needed to help the defense forces with the transportation of such things as fuel and cement inside the country.

Between 50 and 55 million tons of merchandise arrive in Sweden every year by sea--and 15 percent of those imports are carried in Swedish bottoms.

In the case of exports, 35 million tons are carried by sea, 30 percent of it in Swedish bottoms.

In an emergency situation--or "twilight situation," as the Maritime Administration calls it--the peacetime transportation pattern will gradually change. Every nation will call its ships home to help in that country's own transportation work.
Swedish coastal shipping is completely dominated at present by foreign vessels—West German, Polish, and Soviet, for example. As a result of low profitability, smaller Swedish vessels are totally lacking.

Cut in Half

To retain its credibility as a neutral country, Sweden must be able in an emergency situation to use its own tonnage and not be dependent on another power's vessels for handling imports, as one example.

In round figures, the size of Sweden's merchant fleet has been cut in half since 1976, partly as a result of reregistering ships under flags of convenience.

The Maritime Administration has calculated the number of vessels—by type and size—with drafts greater or less than 7 meters that would be available in an emergency situation. In all, they add up to about 1.5 million deadweight tons.

They include tankers: 54 (19); bulk carriers: 1 (3); other dry cargo carriers: 87 (46); and passenger ferries: 13 (8). The first figure refers to vessels with a draft of less than 7 meters.

The second figure (in parentheses) is the number of vessels with a draft of over 7 meters. A maximum draft of 7 meters means that the vessel can pass through the Sound and Falsterbo Canal and through civilian emergency routes and those inside the skerries.

Twenty Needed

The Maritime Administration estimates that because of their geographical distribution, barely 50 percent of Swedish vessels are immediately available.

An immediate addition of at least 20 medium-sized vessels is needed.

Tomas Book says: "The fact that there is only one bulk carrier with a draft of less than 7 meters is deplorable."

Bulk carriers are designed to carry loose cargoes of grain, ore, coal, and so on.

In an emergency situation, bulk carriers would be needed, for example, to carry sugar from unprotected silos in Skane to protected harbors on Lakes Malaren and Vanern.

Small Swedish coastal vessels are needed. At present, large quantities of goods are unloaded in big Swedish ports on the west coast, chiefly Goteborg—ocean shipping in the Baltic Sea is not profitable—and the merchandise is then further distributed in smaller tonnages, for which Swedish vessels are totally lacking.

The government's bill on maritime shipping policy a couple of years ago proposed certain measures to support coastal shipping, including a special fund for small vessels.

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"But we did not notice any improvement," says Tomas Book of the Maritime Administration.

He does not believe that Sweden would build new ships simply to have them ready in case of an emergency.

"In that case, on the other hand, there must be vigorous support measures by the government to stimulate Swedish coastal shipping," he says, and he compares Sweden's situation with that in Denmark.

A few years ago, Sweden's merchant fleet was twice as big as Denmark's, but today, in 1983, the situation is the reverse—Denmark's merchant fleet is now twice as big as Sweden's.

The Danish Government reached agreement with the shipowners and crews on a solution that called for reregistering the ships under flags of convenience on condition that those ships be manned by Danes.

The Danish shipowners made money from that solution and invested it in new ships which now sail under the Danish flag.
LIBERAL PARTY STUDY: ALSO POLITICAL MOTIVES FOR SUB INTRUSIONS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Dick Ljungberg]

[Text] It is difficult to agree with the Submarine Commission that there were only military motives behind the many Soviet submarine intrusions. It would be more reasonable to assume that the intrusions are also political signals directly to Sweden, the U.S., and NATO. This is the opinion of a committee in the Liberal Party.

The group presented its report Thursday, the day before the commander in chief reports on the continued submarine intrusions after Harsfjorden.

The group consists of peace researcher Kjell Goldman, Hakan Holmberg, Ph.D., former Riksdag member Hans Lindblad, and Commander Gunnar Widh.

The party's vice-chairman, Birgit Friggebo, said at a press conference that the "purpose of the committee was to analyse more closely than the Submarine Commission the motive behind the intrusions. The criminal and illegal actions of the Soviets are a threat against the Nordic balance and the Swedish policy of neutrality."

The conclusion of the Submarine Commission was that the intrusions "represent preparatory phases in a military operational plan." This conclusion was criticized here in the debate as much too limited.

"The longer the intrusions continue, in spite of the sharp Swedish protests, the more likely it is that the motives are more long-range than what the Commission said," Hans Lindblad said.

The Soviet actions may be to show that they consider the Baltic Sea, including the archipelagos, as the area for Soviet operations, even in peace time. It can also be to show such superiority and such pressure that the North will be marked as a Soviet sphere of interest and that the small countries should take this into consideration in their policy, the report says.
Soviet Demonstration

The submarine intrusions indicate that the Warsaw Pact is considering military operations in Sweden in case of war. This creates the necessity of demonstrating that Sweden, or at any rate its archipelago, belongs to the Soviet sphere of interest.

The submarine intrusions therefore take on a political purpose, and the message is directed first of all to the U.S. and to NATO. Therefore Sweden is in danger of being drawn into great power politics. The submarine intrusions are therefore the most serious test of our security and defense policy since WWII.

The intrusions are therefore unacceptable and must be stopped, in the opinion of the Liberal Party. The committee feels that from a military point of view the 250 million kronar appropriated for this purpose is enough for now. The new regulations to chase submarines out of Swedish inner waters that have been in effect the last six months are also sufficient for now.

Even Outer Waters

"But if this should prove not to be enough, the regulations can be expanded to include even outer waters," the group said.

In case of extreme necessity, one can consider using the depth charges the military has for wartime. But all other means must be exhausted. And these weapons cannot be used during an intrusion without the sending of clear signals to the enemy that we are prepared to use depth charges if the intrusions do not stop."

"The intrusions have put Sweden in a political dilemma," Kjell Goldman said. "It is in our interest to react sharply against the intrusions, but we also want to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union."

Question for the UN

"We must make it clear to the Soviets that further intrusions will impair our relations with them just when we want to increase economic and cultural connections.

"Individual actions will naturally not change our policy of security and neutrality," the group said. "Continued intrusions should be taken up in the UN and in other international fora."

"But introducing the intrusions in the UN Security Council requires very clear proof that the submarines are Soviet," Hans Lindblad said. "If we only have indications, there would be the risk that only the NATO countries would be on our side, and this would only hurt the policy of neutrality. On the other hand, the intrusions have already been taken up in the General Assembly."
LIBERAL STUDY URGES STRONG DEFENSE BUT FAILS TO ASK FUNDS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 16 Sep 83 p 2

A necessary but difficult test of Sweden's defense policy is pending. The security policy situation has obviously changed. If we are to maintain strength and credibility in our freedom from alliance and our goal of neutrality in war, we must strengthen our defense forces. This strengthening must take place at the same time that government expenditures are generally being reduced.

Just to carry out last year's defense resolution we must increase the defense budget by one and a half billion per year, according to the commander in chief's proposal that was delivered to the government Thursday. This gives an idea of the extent of the policy change necessary for us to raise the level of our ambition in relation to the present defense resolution.

The problem this policy change is making for the political parties is illustrated very clearly by the report on defense and security policy that a committee in the Liberal Party has made. The committee, in which among others Hans Lindblad and Kjell Goldman worked, presents a rather sharp picture of how the security policy situation is changing. They say that the submarine intrusions are the "most serious test of our security and defense policy since WWII."

The conclusions do not completely agree with the background picture, however. The Liberal Party cannot yet draw the unavoidable conclusion that the defense force must be given increased funds. To give 250 million extra for protection against submarines during the rest of the defense budget period does not mean that the defense forces are strengthened. It simply means that the decline of the defense forces that is coming about as a result of other factors -- and which the Liberal Party has partially contributed to -- is somewhat less.

The inconsistency between the description of the security policy situation and the defense policy conclusions in the report of the Liberal Party illustrates the importance of the defense policy being properly reviewed. In other words, some form of general inspection of defense policy is needed. Now there is a rather fortunate mixture of general savings measures, changed rate for the dollar, and the effect of the added value tax increase that determines the development of defense.
A review of the latest defense resolution on the background of what has happened this year is needed as a basis for the decision on increased funds for defense. But this review and the following resolution is also necessary to show the Soviet Union that we intend to defend our territory. Continued disarmament would naturally be an answer to the Soviets on the submarine intrusions. But from Sweden's point of view, it would be the wrong answer.
PEACE RESEARCHER AGRELL PONDER USSR VIEWS OF SUB INTRUSIONS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Sep 83 p 2

[Op Ed Article by Wilhelm Agrell: "Unstable Neutrality"]

[Text] By its actions in the submarine crisis, the Soviet Union has shown that it does not attach much importance to Sweden's territorial integrity, and that it considers the Swedish defense forces to be hostile and under the influence of its main opponent, according to peace researcher Wilhelm Agrell.

In the Swedish protest note that was delivered to the Soviet Union after the Submarine Protection Commission presented its report 26 April, it was stated, among other things, that the Swedish government expected the Soviet Navy to receive orders that the intrusions would stop. In its report, the commission interpreted Soviet motives for the intrusions to be preparations for operational plans, something that could be done because the risks were considered to be slight. Sweden should therefore, in the opinion of the commission, have good opportunities for changing the balance with the new regulations of 1 July and with the introduction of new equipment for detecting and fighting submarines.

At any rate, it does not seem that the Soviet's Baltic fleet has received the order the Swedish government wanted it to receive; violations of Swedish territorial waters continue, and the submarine commission's conclusions on the reasons for the intrusions and the consequences for security policy must therefore be rejected in several important points. And three basic questions are still unanswered:

- Why did these intrusions take place?
- What are they leading to?
- What security policy inferences can be made from them?

Historians who try to investigate a political or a military decision process after the fact often find that it is impossible to discern a single explanation.
The decision appears instead to be the result of a series of causes, the intrigue of those in power with and against each other, and the situation at hand. It is reasonable to see the decision behind the submarine intrusions from this point of view, and the conclusion would be then that the possibilities of explaining the intrusions would be greatly limited as long as we know nothing about how the Soviet decision was made, to the extent that there was a decision.

Many of the explanations that have been brought forth during the past year in the debate can be discarded because the intrusions continued. No intelligence activity and no operational preparations are carried out in this way. Nor is it likely that the intrusions can be viewed as a method of influencing Swedish foreign policy. The Swedish government's attitude, for example, on the question of a nuclear-free zone in the North has hardly developed in a negative way from the point of view of the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, there is the importance of the affair with U 137, which may have been the triggering event. It was after this that the character of the intrusions changed. It is possible that the Soviet Union, and above all, the Soviet Navy, reacted very strongly to the Swedish actions during the incident, actions that from their point of view can be interpreted as provocative and improper from a small country. The intrusions in 1982 can therefore be seen as a form of equalization with the aim of making clear the strength relationships and of humiliating the Swedish defense forces.

Such a purpose, however, would have been achieved in connection with the Harssjard incident. But here it is possible that the report of the Submarine Commission and the Swedish protest note may have been interpreted by the Soviets to mean that Sweden had not understood the lesson. They can even interpret the whole thing as Sweden's joining up with the imperialistic powers in what the Soviet Union considers to be a constant propaganda war against it. If this interpretation of the Soviet viewpoint is correct, it would have been very surprising if the intrusions had stopped.

But there is another aspect that has come into the picture and that can be of decisive influence. After the incident with U 137, Swedish efforts for protection against submarines during peacetime were increased. This took the form of, among other things, new decisions and new materiel for chasing submarines. The running aground of the Soviet submarine can therefore be said to have been the beginning of a struggle for control over the Swedish territorial waters, a tug-of-war that for Sweden means territorial integrity and confidence in its ability to maintain it, and for the Soviet Union the prestige of a superpower not to give up positions one has gained.

If the intrusions are seen as part of such a tug-of-war and not as part of, for example, operational preparations, which could be carried out by different methods, the question of profits and risks can be seen in another light.

On this background, it is not probable that the intrusions will stop just because the Swedish submarine defense is gradually strengthened; the only
thing one can expect is that the intrusions will take on another character. It is possible that the Soviet military is so locked into this strategy that it will continue with it no matter how great the risks become. It is also possible that they are opposing the political leadership and underestimating or more likely hiding the risks of an accident. This type of event is common in large and closed bureaucratic systems.

No matter what motives the Soviet Union had or has, the intrusions may easily bring about a change in the Swedish policy of neutrality. The neutrality policy has been based up to now on the assumption that Sweden's neutrality is of value to both great power blocks, and that in case of conflict they have a basic interest in respecting Swedish neutrality. By its actions in the submarine crisis, the Soviet Union has shown that it does not attach much importance to Sweden's territorial integrity, and that it considers the Swedish defense forces to be hostile and under the influence of its main opponent.

The Soviet actions therefore work against the assumptions of the interests of the superpowers on which Swedish security policy has been built up to now. The submarine crisis may have pointed to breaks in confidence in neutrality that were already in existence earlier, and this falling confidence may in turn be an important factor behind the submarine crisis. The critical question then becomes to what extent it is realistic to count on Sweden's neutrality being respected by both parties in a conflict, and that the country will be left out of a future world war. The submarine intrusions can therefore be seen as a symptom of a much greater problem.

This conclusion is anything but cheerful. For there is no way Sweden can quickly restore faith in and respect for the policy of neutrality to the extent this faith and respect were found earlier. At the same time, there is no logical alternative to the neutrality policy. The only possibility is a long and difficult process of building up both respect and trust, above all in relations towards the east. Otherwise the whole basis of the postwar neutrality policy becomes shaky.

This does not mean that the Swedish position on the submarine intrusions should be changed; here the Swedish government has in practice no choice when it is a matter of defending the rights of a small nation. But it is very necessary in the continued development of the crisis to constantly remember the long-range goal, which is a condition under which the policy of neutrality will be able to function.
EFFORTS TO PREVENT OIL SLICKS IN NORTH SEA

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 19 Sep 83 p 63-68

[Text] Bonn has launched a search on the high seas for oil spillers, using crime detection methods and a special aircraft. Interior Minister Zimmermann wants to reduce the flow of muck from the rivers into the North Sea, to restrict the dumping of salts and acids. Transportation Minister Dollinger demands that ships be prohibited from pumping oil off into the ocean. But for the time being the filth keeps coming—legally.

Pieter Hulsebos, 36, the navigator of the Dutch "Maritime Patrol" aircraft, did not have any trouble interpreting the somewhat longish, pointy dark spot which turned up in the rippled grey of the radar screen in his observation monitor—"een smeerboel," in other words, a filthy mess.

The ripples were the echoes which the sensitive side-view radar of the patrol craft was picking up over a width of approximately 60 kilometers from the waves of the slightly agitated southern North Sea. But where it became dark on the radar screen, there were no longer any wave echoes—the sea beneath was smooth over a longer stretch; an unmistakeable indication that a ship was pulling an oil slick behind itself there.

To remain undetected as long as possible, the twin-engine Cessna approached its target initially from out of the sun. Using his manually operated camera, the navigator initially made color photos of the piecegoods freighter which was sailing southwest and its clearly visible filth trail. But before the aircraft made its second pass over the ship and the slick, Hulsebos switched the observations of the UV and IR sensors, which were integrated into the system, to his own monitor:

The UV sensor measures the differing light performance of clean and oil-covered water and thus—in a naturally limited near range—supplies more precise information on oil pollution than can be obtained from the long-range radar.

The IR sensor scans the differing heat radiation from water and oil; from the more or less strong discoloration on the monitor, the expert can draw conclusions as to the thickness of an oil layer.
During the last approach, for ship identification, the aircraft went down to an altitude of 100 feet, almost at the height of the freighter's mast. She was Polish, with home port at Gdingen [Gdynja]—and that was easy to read off on the stern, the forecastle, and the bridge.

Navigator Hulsebos, an officer of the Dutch Water and Shipping Authority "Rijkswaterstaat" had assembled abundant evidence: The colored air photos, the Polaroid photos from the monitor during various operational phases, and above all a data tape recording the entire event with all positions, courses, and times during the reconnaissance flight, retrievable individually, and replayable on videotape for use as evidence during any investigation.

Since the beginning of the year, Rijkswaterstaat has been using its location system off the coast of Holland to look for oil slicks and those responsible for them. Although "we naturally cannot catch everybody," the number of oil pollutors since then, as Hulsebos estimated, "dropped by 50 percent by virtue of our presence alone."

The Bavarian Werner Dollinger is putting his money on the "deterrent effect" of the flying Dutchmen and their system which was developed in Sweden. For 300 hours per year and at an hourly price of DM2,000, the BMV (Federal Transportation Ministry) recently borrowed the Cessna plus crew for inspection flights over the German part of the continental shelf of the North Sea.

Now, 36,000 square kilometers in the North Sea, are under surveillance, covering the Bay of Helgoland together with a so-called duck-bill extending all the way to Doggerbank (see diagram). Where German environmental penalty law has been in force since 1980, Bonn is also obligated to prosecute environmental regulation violators according to international agreements.

"The risk of discovering outlawed oil dumping," the DHI (German Hydrographic Institute) warned international shipping most recently in a "Message for Seafarers," is now "no longer calculable" there.

For years, there was no risk at all. Christian shipping made its very special contribution to the creeping poison death of the North Sea as a result of the dumping of thin acids, oil slicks from drilling platforms, and the sewers from half of Central Europe: The oil waste, which merchant vessels annually dump overboard off the coast of Central Europe has been estimated at 25,000 tons—as much as if one medium-sized tanker were to run empty year after year.

The filth for the most part flows into the southern North Sea, the water body with the worldwide highest freighter frequency. The risk of an economic disaster is further increased by the immediate proximity of the mudflat coast which is threatened with collapse as a result of ocean pollution, tourism, as well as dam and industrial construction projects (DER SPIEGEL, 10, 1983).

Last week, Bonn was concerned with the emergency situation in the North. On Tuesday, the countries bordering on the North Sea signed an agreement in the Foreign Ministry which extends the already existing cooperation for oil disasters to accidents involving other noxious substances. On Wednesday, SPD [Social
Democratic Party of Germany] politician and interior minister Friedrich Zimmermann demanded immediate measures to save the North Sea; on Thursday, the Lower House in an environmental debate also discussed ocean pollution.

The SPD above all demanded boundary values for long-lived toxic substances, the rapid expansion of large-scale settling plants, a rapid end to the dumping of toxic substances into the North Sea and the establishment of a nature preserve in the mudflat waters from Denmark to Holland.

In 1984, the interior minister at an international North Sea Protection Conference in Bremen wants to urge that the flow of filth from rivers and the dumping of noxious substances be reduced: "We cannot wait until irreparable damage has been done." Federal Transportation Minister Dollinger demands that ships in the future may no longer be allowed to dump oil into the North Sea.

But dumping at sea is popular because it saves berthing fees and waste removal costs: Before they take a new load on board, tanker captains plow oily ballast water and tank washing residues under, often almost without any visible traces. When they mix "Oil Spillage Remover" in, which emulsifies the oil, there is at most only a thin film left behind.

But even if the captains wanted it otherwise—ashore they would not be able to get rid of their oil water everywhere. Many European ports still do not have any ship garbage disposal facility, a no-fee waste removal setup, such as they are customary in many United States ports. So, engineers at sea keep pumping the bilges, those deepest points in the ship's hull where all of the lubrication muck from engine operation flows together.

There is much one can tell from the oil trails, among other things, that petroleum has become more expensive also for the seafarers. Ship operators increasingly take on cheaper heavy oil as fuel for the ship's diesel engines and that oil must be separated before use. Solid oil parts, which can clog nozzles, are filtered out, are stored temporarily in sludge tanks, and are discharged, diluted with water, when they overflow.

Thousands of dead North Sea birds—which made the nation's TV audience and Bonn politicians aware of the trouble in the ocean last winter—according to analyses by the DHI had fallen victim to oil which for the most part came from the sludge tanks of freighters.

Accidental discoveries of oil polluters by Armed Forces pilots, patrols from Water Safety, Customs, and Federal Border Guard as a rule did not lead to anything. "Because of difficulty in obtaining evidence" (DHI), law suits aimed at fines for violations of the international "Oilpol" Agreement or investigations according to Paragraph 324 of the Criminal Code ("Contamination of a Water Body") mostly ended with their discontinuation. The chief engineer of a freighter, who recently was fined DM 15,000, is a noteworthy exception here.

Arguments by captains to the effect that they were sailing through the filth of a ship ahead of them frequently could not be refuted and the same is true
of statements by sailors who claimed having run into fields of algae which from a distance indeed might easily be considered as oil slicks. DHI chemist Gerhard Dahlmann thinks that "even with the excuse that the ship's cook had lost the content of a frying pan overboard" a captain would have had a good chance of getting away without trouble.

But sailor yarns will no longer cut any ice. The recent thorough air reconnaisance is only one—albeit the decisive—"link in a chain" (BMV) for the identification of environmental polluters afloat. Target location is followed by:

Taking an oil sample from the sea at the scene by ships flying the West German official flag or by harbor pilot and Federal Border Guard helicopters which are launched from a "central message center" in Cuxhaven, the moment the "Maritime Patrol" has picked up a ship with an oil slick in its side-view radar;

A second sample—taking on board the suspected vessel at the port of destination and a comparison of both samples for "final evidence against the violator" (DHI).

Something that sounds like an excerpt from a crime detection guideline actually reveals parallels to police work. Just as every individual leaves his own unmistakable finger print behind, so does no ship oil trail resemble that of any other in terms of its chemical composition.

After the analysis of the first sample taken from the sea, DHI chemist Dahlmann can already "tell a Water Police officer where he must then take the possibly matching second sample on board"—whether in the charging tanks, in the sludge tank, or in the bilge.

Additional analyses, with the help of so-called gas-chromatography mass-spectrometry, then provide information as to the identity of the samples: Depending on whether a tanker, as its last cargo, for example, carried crude oil from the Near East, from a North Sea field, or from African drillings in his tanks, his tank-washing water, which was pumped overboard, contains components that specifically point to the origin of the oil.

But the bilge filth from a ship again can be unmistakably identified by the different intensity in the leaks dripping from the lubricating oil and fuel lines of the ship engine but also solvents oozing out during repairs.

Until a short time ago, Federal Interior Minister Zimmermann wanted to send a gigantic armada out to sea against the mudlarks from all nations. After many, many maritime birds had died and just in time for the Schleswig-Holstein state Diet elections in March, the Interior Ministry announced that its own little army, the Federal Border Guard, would be equipped for oil watch in the Bay of Helgoland with four and later perhaps even eight floating helicopter carriers—each of them costing at least DM200 million.

But these election promises came to naught primarily due to a shortage of money—and good riddance, too. That Zimmermann's fleet policy was just so much
"hogwash"—as his fellow countryman Dollinger maintained—was documented by a paper that has been gathering dust in the Transportation Ministry ever since the social-liberal era.

Floating units—a body of experts judged at that time—do not have the wide horizon necessary for fast, large-area oil reconnaissance missions. Helicopters on the other hand because of their vibrations are supposed to be unsuitable for "air surveillance not depending on visual observation"—in other words, the images coming from the sensitive radar, UV and IR sensors supposedly would turn out to be somewhat squiggly.

The currently established system’s independence of direct visual observation is of course not unlimited either. In contrast to, perhaps, the UV sensor, which needs a minimum of daylight, the side-view radar does still work in total darkness and heavy fog. But when there is no wind, on top of that, and when there is nothing to stir the sea, things become pitch-dark in the reconnaissance aircraft likewise: Because no state-of-the-art echoes can be received then, it is no longer possible to make out the oil slicks.

The Dutch have sometimes had some negative experiences also in the night-time identification of polluting vessels—and those are the Dutch who are supposed to fly for Germany until the FRG has its own properly equipped aircraft presumably in 1984. At night or in fog, they must ask oil spillers for the name of their ship on USW channel 16. In "about three out of ten" cases—according to navigator Hulsebos—the captains keep the ship’s name to themselves.

But even if the threat potential from highly sensitive sensors and clever methods for marine tracking should take hold—oil muck will continue to flow from tankers and freighter bilges, even legally, into the seriously sick North Sea.

The new "International Agreements on the Prevention of Ocean Pollution by Ships" (Marpol), which is to become international law early in October, 10 years after it was passed, still allows tankers to leave 60 liters of oil per mile under them 50 nautical miles off the coast.

And if the broth has been sufficiently diluted, captains and engineers of other ships can have the oil stuff pumped out of the engineroom and into the sea also outside a 12-mile limit.