Near East & South Asia

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CONTENTS

8 SEPTEMBER 1988

NEAR EAST

REGIONAL

Polisario Fighters Reportedly 'Relocate' to Mauritania [London AL-MAJALLAH 27 Jul 88] .................. 1
Nigerian Swindling Operates in Gulf [Kuwait AL-QABAS 21 Jul 88] ........................................... 1
Libyans Contribute to Tourism Increase in Tunisia ................................................................. 1
Tourism Statistics [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE 3 Aug 88] .................................................... 1
Libyan Visitors [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE 3 Aug 88] ....................................................... 1
Israel Seeks New Petroleum Agreement With Egypt [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL 20 Aug 88] ............. 1
'Diplomatic Sources' Report Site Offers for Palestinian Government [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL 20 Aug 88] .................. 2

EGYPT

Columnist Views Warming Soviet-Israeli Relations ............................................................... 2
Sudanese Flooding Seen Inadequate To Fill Lake Nasser ....................................................... 4
Liberal Party Nominates Marsa As AL-AHRAR Chief Editor .............................................. 4
Disagreements Begin Over National Democratic Party Local Nominees ............................. 4
Journalist Reportedly Fired After Uncovering 'Espionage Operation' [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL 28 Aug 88] ................. 4
Shukri Supports New Party, Opposes 'Young Egypt' Name .................................................. 5
State Security Attempts To Kidnap al-Rayyan President ..................................................... 5

ISRAEL

Factory Established in Lebanon ......................................................................................... 5
Finance Minister Nismi Profiled ............................................................................................ 5
Beni Begin Discusses Political Views .................................................................................. 8
HA'ARETZ Interviews Koor General Secretary Ga'on ....................................................... 12
Intifadah Activities Spread to Tel Aviv ............................................................................. 14
New Arab Democratic Party May Figure in Coalition Building ........................................ 15
Schiff Analyzes PLO's View of Likud ................................................................................ 17
General Discusses Strategic Balance With Syria ............................................................... 19
Former Gush Emunim Leader Interviewed on Tensions With Arabs ............................... 19
Writer Examines Changing Security Concerns Towards Lebanon ...................................... 25

LIBYA

Recommendations Aim at Promoting Fishing Industry ...................................................... 30

MOROCCO

Fund-Raising Campaign for King Hassan II Mosque Underway ........................................ 31

SOUTH ASIA

BANGLADESH

Report on Meeting of Joint Panel With Iraq ........................................................................ 32
Papers Report on Visit of Pakistan Commerce Minister .................................................... 32
Remarks to Press Agency ....................................................................................................... 32
23 Jul Press Conference .......................................................................................................... 33
Editorial Welcomes, Questions Repatriation Deal .............................................................. 34
INDIA

External Affairs Minister Asserts Pakistan Has Bomb .................................................. 37
Opposition Leader Challenges V.P. Singh To Clarify Policies .................................... 38

IRAN

Official Denies Reported Purchase of American Helicopters .......................................... 39
Completion of IRI-Japan Petrochemical Complex To Begin Again [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] . 39
Trade Value With Turkey Reaches 118 Billion Dollars [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] .......... 40
IRI's UN Representative Interviewed by Israeli Paper [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] .......... 40
Musavi-Ardebili: We Will Not Allow Monarchy To Revive [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] ... 42
Shi'a Leader's Death Provokes Strong Reaction [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] ............... 42
Industriai Countries Compete for Postwar Reconstruction [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] ... 43
Khark Island Repair Estimated 1.5 Billion Dollars [London KEYHAN 11 Aug 88] .......... 44
Non-Oil Exports Drop 22 Percent [London KEYHAN 11 August 88] ............................. 44
Mujahedin-e KhalqReportedly Capture Military Equipment [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH 3 Jul 88] ... 45
Libyans Contribute to Tourism Increase in Tunisia

Tourism Statistics
45000178 Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Aug 88 p II

[Text] The number of tourist entries during the first semester of 1988 has risen to 1,372,042 from 836,878, in other words, an increase of 63.9 percent. This significant increase is due to the considerable wealth of the North African clientele and to that of Libyans in particular.

Libyan Visitors
45000178 Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Aug 88 p II


Israel Seeks New Petroleum Agreement With Egypt
45000172 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 20 Aug 88 p 8

[Text] Israel has officially requested that Egypt renew the petroleum agreement signed between the two countries that will expire this October.

Israel invited Egyptian Petroleum Minister 'Abd-al-Hadi Qandil to visit Israel and hold talks to increase the amount of this agreement to 4.5 million tons, incremented annually, at reduced prices.

Israeli Energy Minister Moshe Shahal conveyed to Muhammad Basyuni, Egyptian ambassador in Tel Aviv, Israel's desire to import natural gas from Egypt in amounts fluctuating between $50 million and $70 million, as well as its desire to discuss the possibility of extending a gas pipeline from Alexandria to Ashdod and setting up a solar energy project in Eilat and Cairo costing $80 million. The Israeli minister noted that West Germany is prepared to finance 50 percent of the project and that Israel could persuade the U.S. to pay the rest of the project's cost.

American Jewish billionaire Armand Hammer has announced his readiness to adopt the gas pipeline project between Egypt and Israel to link the eastern Delta to Be'er Sheva' via a line through North Sinai to provide an energy alternative in Israel at reduced prices.
'Diplomatic Sources' Report Site Offers for Palestinian Government
45000171 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic
20 Aug 88 p 6

[Text] Informed Arab diplomatic sources have mentioned that three Arab countries, among them Egypt, had suggested to certain Palestinian officials that their capitals be the official headquarters of the temporary Palestinian government, at a time when the Palestine National Council is making a final decision on the formation of this government in its next session. The sources explained that several Palestinian officials are "enthusiastic" about forming this government in exile and consider Cairo to be the "preferred headquarters" of this government. Other Palestinian officials prefer Tunis to be the headquarters, but the subject has not yet been submitted for discussion between the Tunisians and Palestinians.

EGYPT

Columnist Views Warming Soviet-Israeli Relations
45040218a Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic
30 Jul 88 pp 1, 8

[Article by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "Historic Visit"]

[Excerpts] Despite the openness the current Soviet regime adopts vis-a-vis all countries, especially the United States, this regime has not yet succeeded in applying this policy to a small country, namely Israel. The Soviets are extremely eager to engulf their relations with Israel in a thick wrap of secrecy, suspicion and lies! There are ongoing Soviet-Israeli contacts but the Soviet Government does all it can to conceal these contacts or to minimize their significance and usefulness. It is easy for us to understand this Soviet position. Official diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv have been severed for the past 21 consecutive years, i.e. since the war Israel launched against Egypt, Syria and Jordan on 5 June 1967.

The relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv have been severed from that time to the present day. To tell the truth, all the leaders who ruled the Soviet Union in the past 20 years let no occasion go by without denouncing the Israelis' brutality, their failure to withdraw from the occupied Arab territories and their refusal to restore the Palestinian people's rights. This positive stance on the superpower's part was warmly welcomed by the Soviets' friends and allies among us, as if mere denunciation with words succeeded in scaring Israel or in diminishing its brutality and its disavowal of all human principles in dealing with the Palestinian people in the occupied territories. On the contrary, Israel took advantage of the Soviets' severance of their relations with it by declaring its rejection of any role the Soviet Union could play in stirring the peace process in the Middle East on the pretext that the Soviet Union is not a neutral country

vis-a-vis this issue, as evidenced by the constant Soviet denunciation of Israel's policy and Soviet refusal to restore diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. It is evident that the United States showed, as usual, understanding of whatever issued from Israel, especially Israel's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. It is no secret that Israel's wish to restore relations with Moscow has been supported by the United States. This support was one of the most significant keys to the two superpowers' dialogue which has led to the firm understanding that has now developed in U.S.-Soviet relations.

It is certain that a change has occurred in the Soviet policy toward Israel and we do not find it unlikely that a Soviet agreement in principle has been given to restoring relations with Israel. The only obstacle facing Moscow's restoration of relations is embodied in the proper timing to declare this restoration. It is obvious that Israel is not putting great emphasis on restoring relations quickly. What is important is that Israel has gotten some of what it wanted from the Soviet Union. It has gotten Soviet agreement to facilitate the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel even though this emigration had been suspended for years and years.

From the Israeli Government's viewpoint, the propaganda books promising Soviet Jews the heavenly blessings enjoyed by whoever manages to emigrate to the promised land are no longer fit for the "brainwashing" process now that it has become apparent to this government that Soviet Jews have lost trust in this propaganda and in its false and misleading books and pamphlets! To achieve this "brainwashing," the Israelis found that the only solution is direct contact with the Soviet Jews. But the difficult problem facing such contact was the Moscow-Tel Aviv relations that were still severed and the Soviet Government's determination to postpone restoration of the relations indefinitely.

A compromise had to be reached to permit the Israelis to achieve their goal of direct contact with Soviet Jews and of resuming contacts and exchange of views with the Soviet Union without causing the Soviet Government embarrassment in the Arab world, in case this government restores diplomatic relations with Israel before a solution is found to the Middle East issue. The Israelis have in fact succeeded in attaining this compromise. It is not unlikely, if not certain, that this success has been achieved with U.S. support and pressure which went unnoticed by many amidst the major clamor that has accompanied this new understanding in the U.S.-Soviet relations!

More than a year ago, the world was surprised with news of the arrival of a Soviet mission comprised of many Soviet officials on the first visit to Tel Aviv since the relations were severed in June 1967. Israel hailed this visit with all its domestic and foreign media whereas the Soviet Union tried to minimize the visit's significance, stressing that the Soviet delegation was a mere consular mission which was visiting Israel to discuss the means to
safeguard the Russian Church's property in Israel. The Soviet Union also stressed that the mission was not empowered to examine or discuss any other issue with the Israeli Government. The Soviet Government's assertions did not forget to imply that that delegation would not stay a single day after it is reassured of its church's property in Israel!

What is important is that the Soviet mission is still in Israel to this very day and that it uses for its headquarters the Finnish Embassy in Tel Aviv which has taken care of the Soviet interests since the relations were severed. The Soviet mission receives Israeli officials there to discuss with them how to safeguard the church property, of course!

Despite its success in convincing the Soviet Government to extend the stay of its consular delegation in Israel for the second consecutive year, the Israeli Government was not content with this success which it considered a deficient success that could be made complete only by sending, as a reciprocal act, an Israeli consular delegation to stay in Moscow.

This success was actually made complete last week.

The Israeli delegation could have arrived in Moscow and stayed there for a long time without anybody in the world learning anything about the visit if it weren't for the fact that Israel does not share the Soviet Government’s keenness on secrecy and its desire to conceal any contacts with the Israelis. As usual, the Israeli Government rushed to announce the composition of the Israeli delegation, which consists of five prominent officials, and the date of its departure for the Soviet Union. The Israeli and western world press reported the details of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's meeting with the delegation members. Within the journalists' earshot, Shamir promised the delegation members at the conclusion of the meeting that their visit to the Soviet Union will be a “historic visit.”

The Soviet Union was at a loss! Two days ago, it was compelled to issue a statement stressing that the Israeli consular mission is visiting Moscow for reasons connected with Israel's property in the Soviet Union and for talks with the Netherlands Embassy in Moscow which has been taking care of the Israeli interests since the relations were severed and has been issuing entry visas to Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel!

The Israeli Government has paid no attention to the Soviet Government's statement because it, Israel, knows better than others what its delegation will do in Moscow. The Israeli delegation left its country for the Hague, the Netherlands capital, to get an entry visa to the Soviet Union and a two-month residence permit—a permit renewable again and again.

To start, Israel owns no property in the Soviet Union in order that it may be said that the reason for the visit is reassurance over Israel's property there. All that Israel has in Moscow is its embassy building whose annual rent the Israeli Government has been keen to pay from the time the two countries' relations were severed in 1967 to the present day, according to the French LE MONDE edition of last Wednesday!

One can imagine the purpose of the Israeli delegation's visit to be the following:

—Hold direct contacts with Soviet Jews, beginning with a plenary meeting which took place in a synagogue in the center of Moscow on the morning following the Israeli delegation's arrival. The Israeli delegation has personal instructions from Shamir to do its utmost to convince the largest possible number of Soviet Jews of Israel's need to have them emigrate to Israel itself and to denounce any Jew who refuses to emigrate to the "promised land" and prefers to go to the United States, Britain or even one of East Europe's countries.

—Make every effort possible to persuade the Soviet officials—in the two sides' undeclared meetings—to increase the number of Soviet Jews permitted to emigrate and given an exit visa to Israel. It is true that the Soviet Government has greatly increased the number of exit visas it grants Jews, estimated at 2,000 visas monthly, but this figure does not satisfy the Soviet Government's dreams, especially since it has become evident to it that the overwhelming majority of those given the visas prefer to go to any country other than Israel.

No time limit has been set for the Israeli delegation's stay in Moscow. It is likely that the Soviet Government will agree to renew the delegation members' residence permit once every two months, following the pattern adopted with the Soviet delegation which has been residing in Israel for the second consecutive year. The winning card held by the visiting delegation is, so the Israelis believe, the world's desire to hold the international conference to solve the Middle East issue. There is unanimous agreement on the need for Soviet participation in such a conference. But Israel continues to reject Soviet participation in any solution as long as the Soviet Government insists on the continued severance of relations with Israel. The Arab countries, with their eagerness to have this conference see the light and their eagerness for Soviet participation in the conference activities, will not obstruct restoration of the relations between Moscow and Tel Aviv. This card, which the visiting delegation believes it can play to improve the Israeli-Soviet relations, is based on the belief that the Soviets under Gorbachev are different from the Soviets before him. The Soviet delegation which has been in Israel for more than one full year is not the only delegation that has been visiting Israel from time to time. Many are the Soviet art troupes that have presented their shows in Israel. Groups
of Soviet tourists have been trooping to Israel under great financial incentives. LE MONDE has asserted that more than 2,000 Soviet tourists are visiting Israel these days.

We should expect a lot as a result of the Israeli delegation’s visit to the Soviet capital. It is my opinion that we should watch this visit step by step so that we may not be surprised with the unexpected.

08494

Sudanese Flooding Seen Inadequate To Fill Lake Nasser
45000174 Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic
13 Aug 88 p 9

[Text] Engineer ‘Isam Radi, minister of public works and water resources, has announced that the rains that fell on Khartoum have had no effect on the Nile level and that the flood picture will not become clear until the end of September.

The minister added that the rains that fell on Ethiopia and whose average amounts had recently increased reach Egypt via the Blue Nile and ‘Atbahar Rivers. These are the rains that cause the flooding of the Nile and affect its rise or fall.

The minister said: “No matter how high the flood rises, and even if the flood exceeds that of 1975, which reached 120 billion cubic meters, the level of the lake will not exceed 168 meters at the most this year. The lake will not be filled to its 1987 level until after two or three more floods in the next 2-3 years”.

In addition, the minister says that the rains that fell on Khartoum and northern Sudan, and the flooding of the al-Jash River, will not raise the water level in the High Dam’s lake. This is because the al-Qash River does not feed into the Nile or any of its tributaries. The Khartoum rains and others will become swamps and ponds swallowed up by the land or will dry up in the sun, and will not reach the channel of the Nile except for the merest trickle, which does not register on the dam’s gauges. It is worth mentioning that the rains that fall on Sudan during this period [of the year] do not [normally] exceed 138 millimeters, while they reached 210 millimeters at one time during the last few days. A communiqué issued by Khartoum explained that the Nile rose about 24 centimeters—higher than the most severe floods that struck Khartoum in 1946.

Engineer Khalil ‘Umar, a Ministry of Public Works agent for water supply, added that the Nile began to rise on 22 July, reaching 150.68 meters, and will gradually continue to rise, God willing, several centimeters daily. It began to rise at 2 cm/day, then rose at 5, 10, and 15 cm/day until it reached 32 cm/day on 12 August 1988.

Liberal Party Nominates Marsa As AL-AHRAR Chief Editor
45000180 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 8 Aug 88 p 7

[Text] “The-al-Usbu’ al-Siyasi” column has learned that negotiations took place recently between certain leaders of the Liberal Party and prominent journalist ‘Abd-al-Wahhab Marsa concerning taking over the responsibilities of editor-in-chief for the AL-AHRAR newspaper. The latest negotiations came immediately after the crisis that exploded when Wahid Ghazi, the current editor-in-chief, took a position against the investment companies that was incompatible with the party’s policies and guidelines supporting the position of the investment companies.

The Liberal Party had recently submitted to the Supreme Press Council a request for permission to issue a daily newspaper called AL-JUMHUR AL-MASRI [The Egyptian Public] and nominated ‘Abd-al-Wahhab Marsa, a journalist for AL-AKHRAR newspaper, as its editor-in-chief. Official sources in the Liberal Party confirmed that this nomination was the first step in preparing to give the responsibility for AL-AHRAR to ‘Abd-al-Wahhab Marsa, considering the impracticality of issuing a daily newspaper in such a short time.

Disagreements Begin Over National Democratic Party Local Nominees
45000181 Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 8 Aug 88 p 7

[Text] Serious disagreement has broken out among the members of the [National Democratic] Party [DNP] in Jirja due to competition for nominations for the elections and the NDP’s success in nominations for party seats. Six individuals are competing for three seats in the Sawhaj Governorate’s local assembly. Among them are two physicians, a Ph.D. from al-Azhar University, a public tax auditor (a member of the old assembly), and a party youth secretary. The youth secretary threatened that, if the party did not nominate him in the memorandum list that it sent to the party secretary in Sawhaj, he would split from the party and reveal its true nature in Sawhaj. The party had refused to nominate the youth secretary in previous elections, and the controversy intensified among the party members when one party member, who works in the local unit of Jirja District, announced his own nomination.

Journalist Reportedly Fired After Uncovering ‘Espionage Operation’
45000176 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 28 Aug 88 p 11

[Text] The dismissal of well-known Egyptian journalist Muhammad Ghazalan, of the English-language EGYPTIAN GAZETTE, revealed that the true reason for the journalist’s dismissal was his discovery of an espionage operation for the Israeli enemy carried out by certain male and female foreign journalists.
Muhammad Ghazalan organized a sit-in in the Federation of Egyptian Journalists' building, protesting the decision to bar him from working. He was supported in his sit-in by a large number of Egyptian journalists.

Shukri Supports New Party, Opposes 'Young Egypt' Name

45000170 Cairo ALSHA'B in Arabic 9 Aug 88 p 1

[Text] Last Sunday the committee on political party affairs listened to statements by Ibrahim Shukri about the announcement of a project to establish a new political party bearing the name "Young Egypt."

Shukri had already sent a letter to the chairman of the committee containing his opposition to the name the party's founders had chosen, based on the fact that "Young Egypt" is the historical and intellectual basis of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP). The party president was on hand to meet Dr. 'Ali Lutfi, chairman of the committee on party affairs; members of the committee; the minister of justice; and the minister of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs.

Shukri said that he had learned from Dr. 'Ali Lutfi that he had not discussed the submitted requests, and that there would be a meeting of the committee next week.

Shukri explained to the committee members that "our reservations regarding the naming of the new party do not constitute opposition to its personalities or programs, but are rather our legal and political reservations, since the SLP is the natural extension of the Young Egypt movement, and since this is established not only in the minds of the masses and other popular fronts (both domestic and foreign), but is also established in official, legal, and constitutional documents."

Shukri indicated that the adoption of the name "Young Egypt" by some will result in grave disadvantages to the SLP, because the famous or symbolic name is considered to be one of the party's main issues and special characteristics, and the prominent personalities in "Young Egypt" that continued to work in the Socialist Party and then in the SLP are still presiding over the leadership of the SLP.

State Security Attempts To Kidnap al-Rayyan President

45000167 Cairo ALSHA'B in Arabic 9 Aug 88 p 1

[Report by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Quddus]

[Text] The legal counselor for the al-Rayyan Company submitted a complaint to the Duqqi police department accusing Maj Gen Zakri Badr, the interior minister, of planning the kidnapping of the president of the al-Rayyan Company, after he and his assistant were fired upon, although the shots missed them.

The complaint, registered as number 17 this year, said that Ahmad Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Fattah, president of the al-Rayyan Company, was on his way to Alexandria to sign some contracts to build a residential village in al-'Ajami, owned by the company.

At the head of the Desert Road, in front of the Ramada Hotel, four cars belonging to State Security Investigations blocked his car, at which point 15 officers and 7 detectives got out and forcibly pulled the company president out of his car. When his assistant tried to intervene, one of the officers fired four rounds but did not hit anyone. Then the attacking force began kidnaping [the president of] al-Rayyan, and set off toward an unknown location. The location turned out to be the State Security Investigations branch in Duqqi. Muftada Mansur, legal counselor for the company, hurried to the police department, where he submitted a complaint about the incident that included the numbers of the attacking cars: 136600 and 205127. The other two cars were without numbers.

ISRAEL

Factory Established in Lebanon

TA3008100588 Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 29 Aug 88

[Excerpt] HADASHOT p. 3: Ido Tal reports that the Rosenberg family, from Haifa, has established a sewing workshop in the security zone in southern Lebanon. The workshop is located on the Lebanese side of the border, near the Good Fence, and employs some 50 workers from southern Lebanon. It is the first factory in Lebanon financed by Israelis.

Finance Minister Nisim Profiled

44230050A Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Jul 88 p 2B

[Article by Yosef Harif: "The Tough Guardian of the Treasury"]

[Text] For weeks now a delegation of workers of the Bet Shemesh engines plant has been protesting in front of Finance Minister Moshe Nisim's house. They are demanding that their laid-off colleagues be paid compensations on a par with those awarded to the Lavi project.

In the beginning, on his way to his office, the minister used to stop by the delegation, greet them, try to explain to them the situation of the economy, and attempt to make them understand that they will never receive compensations like the workers laid off the Lavi project.

One day he stopped talking to them. He would pass by the protesting delegation, dismiss them with a "Good Morning," and get into his car. The reason: colleagues of the delegation members had broken into the Finance Ministry, smashed glass doors, and turned over desks.
Nisim: “My sole intention is to demonstrate that violence does not pay and that what they cannot achieve peacefully they will certainly not achieve by violence or by prolonged strikes designed to exploit public difficulties.”

Nisim also received word from representatives of the Labor Party who do not agree with the “successful band” (as they are called) that is managing the Histadrut and is responsible for the deterioration of the Kupat Holim [Sick Fund], the collapse of old enterprises, and the debacle at Koor.

Recently, Labor Party representatives contacted the Histadrut leaders and asked them to levy a small payment (2 shekels) on each visit to a doctor and double that for hospitalization. These payments were not going to be required from everyone, only from those who could afford it.

In exchange, the Histadrut would have received an equal amount from the treasury. In other words, the treasury was prepared to match each shekel collected from its members. In this way the Kupat Holim could have obtained up to 150 million shekel. However, in the name of “equal medical care,” the secretary general of the Histadrut, Yisra’el Qeysar, turned down the proposal.

Nisim later learned that the Histadrut had an additional reason: if the Kupat Holim situation becomes even worse, it was said, we can lay the blame on the treasury, and the fund members’ protests will force it to change its policy.

Nisim knows that some of the Labor leaders identify with him on the Kupat Holim issue more than they do with Qeysar and the Histadrut. Nisim also knows that at one meeting of a small Labor forum, some said that “The finance minister is right.” Others, however, observed: “But we cannot say that publicly, because it will help him and the Likud in the elections.”

Nisim: “The fact is that this is the first time in the history of the state that on the eve of elections we do not pour out money to buy votes. My job is to preserve the integrity of the economy and its stability, and I will not do anything that will spoil what we have accomplished at the expense of great sacrifices on the part of the workers. I am convinced that the public is at times wiser than the Histadrut leadership. All they can say, when it comes to the Kupat Holim budget for example, is, ‘Give, give!’”

Not only the deputy finance minister, Alignment’s ‘Adi Amora’, agreed with the minister. Even the Alignment faction spokesman in the Knesset Finance Committee, Hayim Ramon, who is viewed as a fanatic upholder of the Labor Party’s values, does not spare the Histadrut leadership. Ramon was among the first to lecture—in the Finance Committee, too—on the need to adopt a proposal to levy a small payment for each visit to a Kupat Holim doctor.

He ridiculed the fact that Qeysar was hiding behind the principle of “equal medical care.” Ramon also was in favor of that principle, but when it comes to emergency signals it is not enough to wave a “principle” about. One must work to rescue this tremendous enterprise, the pride of the Labor movement, the Kupat Holim.

“What happened to common sense?” Hayim Ramon cried out. Qeysar himself agreed to a 30 percent salary erosion within the framework of the government’s economic program for the sake of rescuing the economy. The issue may appear to contradict the principle, but for the sake of the economy he agreed, and justly so, to deviate from the principle as a temporary measure.

So why stick to a principle in connection with the Kupat Holim, when efforts must be made to save it? Are two shekels indeed a violation of the “equal medical care” principle? “I regret to have to say,” Ramon said, “that this is an anachronistic approach, and those who suffer as a result are precisely those for whom they allegedly refuse to violate the principle.”

Nisim, who won popularity as finance minister, has for a while began to appear as excessively tough. His adversary, Health Minister Shoshana Arbeli-Almozino, also marveled how he could be so “cruel” to patients.

This week, when a big outcry was heard from the patients of all the hospitals on partial strike, the finance minister was once again suspected of being hard hearted. Even those who support him and his policies began to muse aloud: “Is he perhaps exaggerating somewhat?”

When fear seized the public this week upon hearing the news of the ambulance services strike and upon seeing the terrible pictures shown again on television, the finance minister was asked: “How can you deal with this?”

Nisim: “I am sorry and I empathize with the suffering patients, but there is only one thing I can promise the public, namely that it will soon become apparent what we (the treasury) contributed to public health and to medical services. Let us assume that I give ‘allowances’ to the Kupat Holim and the hospitals. What will be the end result? The same situation will recur in very short order.”

Nisim expresses himself with restraint when forced to talk about Histadrut leaders. He does not want to anger or provoke, lest the person in question oppose him in the future not because it is logical to do so, but because his ego was hurt.

He is careful about what he says even about the health minister, although he secretly believes that she is guided by the Histadrut and the Kupat Holim. When this week he was told that Knesset Member Ehud Olmert had described the health minister as the “Kupat Holim’s
clerk," Nisim said: "I do not want to comment on the health minister's personality. The public knows her well, and there is no need for me to air my views on the subject."

But when it is not a question of personality, but of method, the minister does not spare his rod: "There is no doubt that we must save the health care system from collapse. There is almost general agreement already that this awful situation is the outcome of an obsolete approach. This approach was nothing but a wasteful, inefficient system. If anyone thinks that they can use this situation against the finance minister and his party in the elections, good luck to him. I do not think in terms of elections."

There are signs (this week a private company filmed a protest demonstration by workers of the Histadrut's Alliance tire plant) that in the coming elections the Likud will present the failure of the Histadrut economy and the Kupat Holim like the TAQMAM-Blass affair and the collapse of the purchasing organizations of the Moshav Movement.

[Question] Is it because of your close acquaintance with all those customers, who in the end come around to the treasury, that you think that this is indeed good election stuff?

[Answer] I am the finance minister and as such I must be concerned with all the sectors of the economy. In this connection I can only express my regret that several of the Labor leaders, especially of the Histadrut, have recently been mouthing 'mass-appeal slogans,' perhaps because they think that it will help them in the elections.

[Question] Ministers, too?

[Answer] Yes, ministers, too. I will name no names. However, I remember sitting on a commission of ministers in charge of economic affairs which dealt with the matter of the Bet Shemesh engines plant, and we came to a certain agreement. When we brought it before the workers' representatives, they said they would give their answer "within 24 hours." The next day they came and said they were not accepting the "treasury plan."

[Question] What happened?

[Answer] It turned out that they met with a certain minister from the Labor Party, or perhaps with more than one, from whom they got the "impression" that if they reply in the negative, there is a chance that the treasury's decision will be changed. But nothing changed and nothing will change. We have demonstrated that pressure, strikes, and even violence will not make us give in to demands that may hurt the economy.

They may strike, but in the end they will realize that we will not give one-fourth of of a shekel more than we were prepared to give before the strike. Examples? The nurses' strike, the engineers' strike, the academics' strike, the broadcasting workers' strike, the public workers' strike, and so forth.

All of a sudden, Tel Aviv City Hall awarded increments to sanitation workers against the recommendation and without the permission of the treasury. We did not let it go. It came to court and the sentence upheld our position. The same thing occurred with the hospitals' administrative personnel when the director general of the Health Ministry took the liberty of awarding increments in a manner that the court, after deliberating the matter at our request, condemned and described as "conspiracy against the state."

This week Nisim was asked: [Question] It is said that not only the Histadrut leaders, but also Dov Lautman, chairman of the Industrialists' Association, has begun a campaign against you. Do you believe in the existence of such a pact? [Answer] There is indeed a view—I did not say it—that they are doing things not without a purpose at this particular time. What I can say is that the industrialists are requesting development projects. However, if we adopt that method we will find ourselves letting inflation back in through the front door, and the outcome will be a complete collapse of stability.

There is indeed a certain slow-down in several sectors, because of a considerable drop in consumption in Judaea and Samaria—clothing, for example. However, this slow-down is not connected, in the opinion of the treasury, to the exchange rate policy. The proof is that exports increased this year (in the first 5 months, compared to last year) and imports dropped, so that the trade deficit decreased anyway.

Nisim's reactions are usually moderate, but he is in control of the smallest detail and he does not leave anything to chance. No one who deals in his name with the Histadrut or with any other official body will do anything without the minister's approval.

Does Shim'on Peres, who was one of the architects of the economic plan 3 years ago, still takes an interest in what is happening?

Treasury people say that in the two years that Nisim has been minister no one has had access to his realm. Everything that happens may be claimed to his credit or his debit, but it is "all Nisim."

Nisim knows that Labor Chairman Shim'on Peres is in favor of radical reforms in the health services. But he also knows that Peres is not doing anything to help implement them because of pressures from Qeysar.
Today no one comes to the treasury to ask for aid without presenting a plan for “increasing efficiency and profitability.” Verbal declarations of intent are not sufficient; one must have detailed written plans. Aid is extended only if the plan, after being carefully studied by the treasury, justifies it.

From this viewpoint there is no doubt that the Labor Party is correct in describing Moshe Nism as a “problem.” He is not prepared to bow, not to the Histadrut, and not to the industrialists.

Beni Begin: Discusses Political Views
44230046a Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Jul 88 p 3B

[Interview with Dr Binyamin-Ze'ev Begin by Dov Goldstein; date and place not specified]

[Text] Dr Binyamin-Ze'ev Begin’s answers gradually increased in length, after being tightly pared at the start. He weighs his words carefully and his speech is exceedingly economical. He thinks a lot, says little.

Later he opened up and the barriers dissipated. Toward the last part of the interview, his words became freer and began tumbling out like a waterfall.

That did not happen because our souls clicked, or because suspicions were allayed, or even because the atmosphere warmed up. It happened because the nature of the questions changed.

I had divided my talk with Begin the younger into three separate and distinct parts.

I called the first part “You and Your Father.” It was punctuated by long silences. The answers were short and stripped even of hints, which were deleted with obvious premeditation (the reader can find that part of the interview elsewhere, but will not feel satisfied).

I called the second part “You and the Herut.” We talked about “princes” on short political runways, about privileges, and about the need of a young man on the threshold of his political career to prove that he deserves to bear the name Begin.

I called the third part “The Blue Period.” This is an expression that Beni Begin coined a few months ago in counterpoint to David Grossman’s “Yellow Period,” referring to the coalition government, the Labor Party and its processes, peace and war, the Intifadah (“Why do we not refer to these events as riots?” he asked). At this point his language lost its reservations: it shifted order and organization and revealed its inspiration from the traditional studios of the Herut party, and expressions from the father’s house became identifiable.

On Tuesday morning, 24 hours before the second stage of elections for the Herut center, in his modest home in Jerusalem, Dr Beni Begin agreed, with conviction and self-confidence, that “anything may happen in the elections.” He also knew that his path to the “panel” was paved and that from that viewpoint, nothing could happen.

Flooded by ceaseless telephone calls, domestic and international, from advice givers and advice seekers, from people who wanted to hear a good word from him that might help them on “judgment day,” and from correspondents of the biggest and most important newspapers in the world who wanted to interview him, Beni Begin answered each one courteously and patiently. And if he had to decline a request, he took the time to explain why. His tone is a rare blend of determination and softness.

He is an interesting man who not even the name “Begin” will stop from rising up the political ladder...

First, “You and the Herut.”

[Question] Are you bothered by the claim that your name contributes to greatly facilitating your political path to the Knesset, as well as to the top leadership of Herut, or are you indifferent to it?

[Answer] It is not a question of indifference. Naturally, within and outside the Herut people treat me differently than they do other members. There are whole chapters that deal with me as a result, and because of my family connections. Other members do not have to answer for such a connection.

Other members are not asked in every interview or talk if they consulted their father before deciding to embark on a political career, and what the father said. Whether he agreed, or encouraged, or urged them on. And what they would have done if the father, based on his experience, had discouraged them from such a career or had, God forbid, specifically forbidden them from following that path.

But does it bother me or cause me sleeplessness? No, it does not bother me. I treat it the way anyone should treat a fact. Period. I have trouble comparing the fate of a man who happens to be Menahem Begin’s son to that of a man who is not, because I never was anyone else’s son...

[Question] From this viewpoint, was the name Begin merely a catalyst, an encouraging, promising, and helpful factor, or was it also a deterrent, because of the fear that others might claim that you are capitalizing on assets that you did not personally earn?

[Answer] No... we can put it like this: it is my name. I did not select it. I was not asked for permission. I have strong ties to Herut members. I have now chosen a political career. I compete for the right to represent my party in the Knesset. So far, everything is clear and the facts are obvious.
It does give me a feeling of responsibility and obligation. Especially in the past 2-3 years, after I appeared before the media, expressed views and positions, and was invited to appear before party gatherings—the dialogue between the public and myself created a network of expectations among some of the members. These expectations increased in the past months, and I assume that they will further increase when I am elected to the Knesset.

But the question that interests me is not whether I fulfill these expectations because of my name, but whether I have anything to contribute to the Knesset and to Israel's political life. I came to the conclusion that I do. That is what I feel. That is why I chose this career, and from this viewpoint I hope that I will not disappoint either the party members or myself.

[Question] Do you not feel some need to dispel any possible assumption that you were elected because of your father?

[Answer] No. Not in the least. In 1988 a situation and a man came together, facing each other, interlocked with each other. And this man is told by good friends that he has the ability to make a certain contribution. The feeling that you have the ability to make a contribution creates an obligation. You must put it to the acid test of politics. In the past 25 years I worked in geology. If I may say so, I was successful in my profession and I enjoyed both a very interesting job and the appreciation of colleagues.

On the other hand, I have not yet demonstrated that I can make a contribution to politics. It is only an assumption, or a hope, or an expectation that I have something to contribute. This, and nothing else, gives me a feeling of obligation. It is a science that requires study, and I will be a conscientious student. But I do not have to prove anything to anyone, or to prove that the name Begin makes me better and more deserving than others.

I decided to do it and I will. It is my duty. Not despite the name, nor because of it. Because of the need to do it. However, if anyone pins his hopes on me because my name is Begin, and if, God forbid, he suffers a disappointment because his expectation is not fulfilled, then I want to tell him this:

It makes no sense to me that anyone should expect me to make a contribution to Israel's political, governmental, and social life equal to that of my father. Why should that be? People like him are born once in a century. The expectation that I should be like him is not serious, and I am convinced that it does not exist at all.

[Question] We are talking about a very large party, the majority of whose voters are salaried employees and workers, and many of whose supporters are poor and needy. In view of that, does it not set your teeth on edge to hear the nickname "princes" applied to Dan Meridor, Ehud Olmert, Uzi Landau, and yourself?

[Answer] Right, this has become a part of the landscape... The princely status is not in reference to the economic gap, as you made it appear in your question. Not that I am complaining. God forbid. Not in the least. I am not poor. But I am not at all sure that other princes in the world live like me. In point of fact, now that I mention it, I remember that I have never met a real prince...

But look here, what is a prince? All my life I have traveled by bus. It's a beautiful experience, it's fun. I could serve as Eged's public relations man, on a volunteer basis, of course. I get on an air-conditioned bus in Jerusalem, have a good nap, or read, or talk to other passengers, and 2 hours later I am in Haifa—I feel like a king, not just a prince.

On the way, here in Jerusalem or on the roads, I sometimes see friends choking in their cars, stuck in traffic, while I ride my bus on its special lane, and I think to myself: who needs special treatment to ride on the bus? Why do they suffer? We have a 12 year old Peugeot. My wife uses it; she needs it for her work as a social worker.

So this is certainly not what is meant by "prince". Perhaps the fact that princes have a shorter way to go up in politics. In the Herut no one is impressed by the nickname. The members judge each person by his value. If the intention in using this nickname is to describe a group of young people far removed from the rest of the mortals, superior and estranged, then it does not fit the group of people to whom it is applied.

[Question] Knowing perfectly well that you do not do anything to imitate your father, does the fact that your appearance, speech, and tone of voice are amazingly like your father's bother you at times?

[Answer] No, I am not aware of anything like that. I was never aware of it until friends and acquaintances called my attention to it. It is like recording your voice, then listening to the recording. You do not recognize your voice, but others do so without difficulty. It is difficult for a person to see himself.

When friends came and told me, I answered the way you phrased your question: I do not do anything to imitate my father. It must be a matter of genes. Should I deny the resemblance? What can I do? I have so many problems with the name Begin, I do not mind another one.

[Question] A politician who declares that he does not aspire for the prime minister's seat arouses mistrust. One who declares that he does may invite ridicule. Where do you stand?
[Answer] It is not necessary to declare anything. I could easily attack your basic premise in order to disprove its generality. Must everyone make a declaration? Is there no other way? For example, the late Pinhas Sapiro, who was in all opinions an experienced and important politician, said that if "he is forced to serve as prime minister, he will jump from the third floor." He ran from it like from the devil, without thereby arousing mistrust.

Where do I stand on the premiership? I have not yet been elected to the Knesset... And if I am elected, look how many other steps one must first go through: chairman of the coalition leadership and deputy minister, then minister, then senior minister. Premiership... If I can be of use as a Knesset member I will view that as an excellent achievement.

[Question] With your permission, let us go on to the "Blue period." In Israel's present situation, if after the elections Likud can form a government with its partners without the Alignment, would you prefer that possibility, or would you rather have a national coalition government with the Alignment, despite the past negative experience?

[Answer] I would definitely prefer a national unity government to any other. I agree with the view of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. We will need to create a situation in which the Alignment cannot ignore the coalition agreement or work against it, as was the case with this government. But given the political conditions that Israel will face, a broad government with the participation of Likud and the Alignment is a must.

It is not obligatory that the government's lack of action should stem precisely from the paralysis to which the national unity government is doomed. Israel had one government completely dominated by the Alignment—that was on the eve of the 6-Day War—which was incapable of deciding on breaking through the Egyptian siege because the votes were split 11 to 11. Consequently, even a narrow government without any major partner can become paralyzed.

Moreover, the term paralysis is a matter of individual perspective. If an international conference constitutes a serious setback and a great threat to Israel, then preempting it is not paralysis, but a great success for the prime minister and his colleagues.

And one must not forget the unity government's contribution to improving the economic situation.

[Question] Other than the example of the government's paralysis on the eve of the 6-Day War, what do you think of the assumption that a government composed of partners among which there is broad agreement can be more successful than a government split by a chasm?

[Answer] Of course it can. But if we try to assess the extent of the chasm we see that there is none. It is only an artificial perception not supported by reality. All right. What are the real issues? Territorial compromise—nonsense. There is no chance of that. The Arabs do not want a territorial compromise and do not accept it.

There is a good deal of agreement between the Alignment and Likud, while the disagreements are not topical and can be postponed. There is not a chance in the world to achieve peace with Husayn on the basis of territorial compromise. About what can you compromise with Husayn? Why do we need this senseless artificial dispute? We must decide what is desirable for us in the present situation: to forge a broad national basis, or to fight over chickens that have not been hatched?

Let us assume that I am wrong. Let us assume that there is one chance in a million that Husayn will agree to a territorial compromise according to the Alignment formula, without withdrawal from Jerusalem and other areas in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—can he then hold on to the territories that Israel would vacate? He will be forced by big riots in his country and in the territories and by the other Arab countries to immediately accept a Palestinian state. And so we hand over the territories of Greater Israel to the PLO through an intermediary.

Some people in the Alignment claim that autonomy is dangerous because it constitutes an opening for a Palestinian state. This claim deserves serious consideration. But to claim that a Palestinian state will not be established if we hand over the territories to Husayn, because he is opposed to it and will preempt it, is nothing if not utterly absurd!

That is an illusory solution, and whoever recommends it must know that it does not stand a chance. Consequently, there is no chasm, except in appearance. In reality there are common goals, and it is possible and necessary; in fact we must work together to preclude the dangers.

[Question] What are the areas of agreement on which the Alignment and the Likud can work together, other than precluding dangers?

[Answer] That is it. That is the "blue period" I mentioned. The Alignment and the Likud must wield the boldface portion of the Declaration of Independence as the foundation on which the entire declaration rests: A Jewish state, established in Eretz Yisra'el, on the basis of our natural and historical right. This is the primary premise and the cornerstone of the entire structure. This is the matrix into which we must pour the practical substance. It is our right. It does not need or depend on the Arabs' agreement. They never did agree and, in my opinion, never will agree.
The foundation for a broad national consensus is support for the Camp David agreements. They were passed in the Knesset with a very large majority, with the support of the Alignment, and were included in the basic policies of the present government. The tendency of some of us to distance ourselves from the agreements weakens our position and brings about serious attempts by foreign factors to renege on the agreements and on their responsibility for implementing them.

The Shultz document reduces the agreements to the level of an unrealistic plan. According to his plan, the Camp David agreements cannot be realized. The Camp David agreements are only 10 years old, but those who want to disclaim them say that they are outdated. However, the same people invoke Israel’s obligation to withdraw from the occupied territories as defined in Resolution 242, which is 21 years old!

For example, Eugene Rostow, a senior adviser to President Johnson who had a hand in the formulation of Resolution 242, published a paper in which he stated that the moment that Israel withdrew from all of Sinai—more than 90 percent of the area occupied in the 6-Day War—it would have completely fulfilled its obligations under Resolution 242 and consequently, there were three possibilities open to it in negotiations with Jordan: to withdraw from all of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza; to withdraw from some of the territories; or not to withdraw from any territory.

[Question] The Camp David agreements, which you view as the basis for national consensus (and the prime minister-whips anyone who tries to disclaim them), clearly state: “Israel recognizes the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.” The agreements, including this paragraph, bear the signature of Prime Minister Menahem Begin. What are, in your opinion, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians?

[Answer] They include all the civil rights that a citizen needs in order to lead a normal life. The right to establish another Arab state in addition to the 21 that already exist is not among those rights. Very simple.

According to the admission and definition of the Arabs themselves, there is one Arab nation from the ocean to the Persian Gulf. This nation has enjoyed the most energetic national expression through the establishment of 21 states (whose great contribution to humanity is still not evident...). There is no logical or moral reason that this nation should have 22 states instead of 21.

[Question] Do you believe that there will ever be peace in the Middle East on the basis of the Likud’s philosophy of “not one inch”? Is that serious?

[Answer] No. One must frankly admit that there is no chance for peace in the Middle East, now or in the near future. There is no chance that the Arabs will accept us within the present borders. On the other hand there is no chance that they will agree to any other solution, other than the map that they have been openly outlining in the past 6 months, which means “One Palestine,” over the entire area, without exception—Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa, everything.

Zionism aspired for peace with the Arabs. However, it did not make it a condition for the establishment of Israel. Likud’s plan is difficult, demanding, and devoid of illusions, but it is the only realistic plan: we must defend ourselves with all our might, without concessions and compromises.

[Question] Jabotinsky’s “steel wall”?

[Answer] Yes. The steel wall. There is no better way.

[Question] And all the talk about the extinction of the Intifadah...

[Answer] Please, the riots, the riots...

[Question] OK, the riots... They expressed unfulfilled aspirations. Is there a military solution to that in your opinion?

[Answer] It has been proven that there is a military solution at least as far as their intensity goes. The condition for ending the riots is that they should put out of their minds the expectation that they serve their interests or can cause us to withdraw from our positions. They must become convinced that this way does not lead anywhere.

When people say that the riots have no military solution, they mean to say that they have a political solution. In reality there is no such solution. But the claim that a political solution existed is one of the strongest incentives for the continuation of the riots. This claim feeds the illusions of the rioters, that if they persist, Israel—under U.S. pressure—will get tired and will surrender.

[Question] Unfortunately, Israel no longer attracts new immigrants. Soviet Jews opt out in Vienna, and forcing them to come to Israel as a first station will not solve the problem. What can be done to make Israel once again attractive to the Diaspora Jews?

[Answer] This is a complex question, and so is the answer to it. But there is one thing I want to tell you: many Israelis, here and overseas, are among the first to give the country a bad name. They speak ill of it. Who is going to buy a product whose owner takes pleasure in pointing out its faults? What grounds do we have to hope that Jews in the Diaspora, hearing what we have to say about Israel, will want to come here??

There is a vicious circle here: people go overseas and drag Israel in the mud. Then they return and state triumphantly: “Well, we told you no one would come to a country like this!”

That is the tragedy.

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HA’ARETZ Interviews Koor General Secretary Ga’on

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[Interview with Koor General Secretary Beni Ga’on by
Nehemyah Strassler and Yonatan Sherman; date and
place not specified]

[Text] “We were forced to sell 50 percent of our holding
in Tambour in order to close out the month; only after
the economic system is working will we be able to
improve salary conditions; Histadrut plants must favor
the principle of mutual assistance between plants that
have prospects for recovery, but I will not sell off
property in order to pay 400 percent compensation.”

Despite all the early expectations, Koor this week man-
aged to shake up the economic community in Israel after
it submitted the worst balance sheet of any corporation
in the entire 40-year history of the existence of the State
of Israel. A net loss of 389 million shekels in one year, a
pre-tax operating loss of 436 million shekels, a trouble-
some erosion of its own currency reserves—those are the
statistics which really shook Yisrael Qeyasar, who did not
know how bad the situation was.

Koor in good years is considered the flagship of the labor
movement, the diamond in the crown. Today it is part of
the bleak picture of the rest of the shaky labor organiza-
tions: Hasne, Solel Bone and Qupat-Holim.

Beni Ga’on, 52, has served just six weeks as General
Manager of Koor. He is very close to Yisrael Qeyasar, the
Secretary of the Histadrut. He served as general manager
of the Co-op from 1982 until May of this year. Before
that, from 1975 until 1982 he was manager of Koor
Intertrade Europe. He began his Histadrut career as
manager of Tadiran Marketing and Services, which, in
his day, was the marketing arm of Tadiran.

Rumors about Qeyasar’s decision to appoint Ga’on as
successor to Yishaiyahu Gavish began circulating two
years ago, after Ga’on’s activity in the Histadrut elec-
tions, in which he served as Qeyasar’s main supporter. At
the time Gavish refused to accept Ga’on as head of the
Mazon group in place of Binyamin Givli and as deputy
to the general manager. Qeyasar told Ga’on: “He doesn’t
want you as his deputy, so you will replace him as general
manager.”

He Got the News in His Car

[Question] Were you surprised when Qeyasar offered you
the job about three months ago?

[Answer] In fact, Qeyasar wasn’t the one who offered me
the job, but rather Dani Rozilko. Dani contacted me in
my car while I was on a tour of stores, told me about
Gavish’s resignation and offered me the job. The next
day I met with Qeyasar and accepted. No. I was not
surprised. Actually I was not working behind Gavish’s
back, but there was talk in the Histadrut about his being
replaced and Qeyasar had agreed to offer me the job. In
fact agreements in the Histadrut are very fluid, and they
don’t always work out. In this case what eventually came
to pass was the result of previous events.

[Question] There wasn’t much love in your relationship
with Gavish.

[Answer] Relations between us were proper. I spoke with
him three to four times over the last two years about the
possibility of my replacing him and I explained to him
that I was not pressuring him. It was no secret that I was
a candidate for the job, and the talks took place because
of his threats to resign. It is true that I am not a friend of
Gavish’s or a member of his coterie, but I think that he
did a lot in Koor. A great deal of the work for efficiency
and recovery that we are accomplishing today in Koor
was done by him in the second half of 1987. You might
say that this activity should have started a year sooner.

[Question] If so, do you feel that Gavish is responsible
for the failure?

[Answer] If you are on the inside and there is a failure,
it’s yours. Gavish is responsible in that if he saw where
Koor was going and couldn’t control it, he should have
resigned. I won’t accept responsibility for decisions that
I can’t control. For example, if someone were to tell me
tomorrow to open the Alliance plant and pour money
into it, then I would be acting against my responsibility
as a manager. My responsibility requires that we first
advance the economy of Koor, and only if we have
surplus on our investments can we permit ourselves the
luxury of ideology.

Unprecedented Backing

[Question] You mean that if you feel you can’t imple-
ment your decisions, you will resign?

[Answer] If I feel that someone is interfering with me for
non-economic reasons, and I don’t believe in it, then I
will draw the appropriate conclusions. But today I enjoy
backing like no Histadrut manager has ever had. It is a
natural outcome of the situation. Neither the Histadrut
nor the State of Israel can allow Koor to fall.

[Question] If your program to show a profit in 1990 does
not pan out, will you resign?

[Answer] If the program doesn’t work, then Koor will go
and I will go with it.

[Question] Doesn’t Amnon Gafni, the Chairman of the
Board of Directors when Koor racked up such a big loss,
bear some responsibility?

[Answer] No comment.
[Question] How close to a collapse is Koor today?

Gaon: As long as the banking system does not gouge our credit line, we will stay in business. Today the banks are not giving us additional credit, but we can live with what we have. The problem is mainly the foreign banks. We don’t have any problems with the banks in Israel.

We owe the world banking system about $320 million, and there are IOUs issued in the U.S. totalling $105 million. Meanwhile, no one has reduced the credit that he has advanced us. Shim’on (deputy director and head of the finance branch—Y.S.) and I have made enormous efforts to calm the banking system, and at this stage we have gotten very positive reactions. At the moment we don’t have a serious cash flow problem, despite a debt to banks here and abroad totalling $1.2 billion.

In addition, we had to sell 50 percent of our holdings in Tambour (25 percent of the company stock) in order to close out the month.

The Gap Between the Dollar and the Index

[Question] When you came on board, did you know the size of the loss? At first they were talking about a much smaller loss, $100 million. Afterwards about a $180 million loss. Suddenly it grew to a $252 million loss.

[Answer] When I went to the U.S. in May, I got data from the system here that spoke of a loss of between $130-150 million. Since then two things happened: the gap in translating Tadiran’s fiscal expenses from a dollar balance to an index balance added a huge sum to the loss, as did the differences in calculating the Soltam inventory, as well as additional adjustments that the accountants insisted upon.

[Question] Maybe that was an attempt to clear the slate, so that from here on things can only get better?

[Answer] I wasn’t involved in preparing the balance sheet, and even if I had wanted to increase the loss I wouldn’t have been able to. We just got to a very difficult situation because of the ratio of capital to obligations (increasing the loss would have brought Koor close to a situation in which it would have had to redeem its IOUs in the U.S.).

[Question] As soon as you got to Koor, the rumors started about heads having to roll. Was that necessary?

[Answer] Before I took the job, Koor’s central management numbered 16 people. From that nucleus only five have remained. All the rest either resigned, left, or were fired. The only person I brought into management was Savino’am Avivi, because I wanted someone who, if you put a wall up in front of him, would simply move it aside.

Those who left management were ‘Ami Aviv, Shevah Ofir, Ya’aqov Beyruti, Avraham Gil’or, Shalom Hochman, Issar Heimann, Yitzhaq Haziza, Hertzeli Kaspi, Yosef Levi, Shlomo Furman, Shlomo Peleg, and Ze’ekaryah Qiqayon. Everyone of them left or resigned for one reason or another. Aviv, Ofir, Kaspi, Levi, Peleg, and Qiqayon resigned from Koor. Gil’or, Hochman, Haziza, Beyruti and Furman changed jobs. Those changes were required by the change in Koor.

Revolution in Tadiran [Ga’on] Of Gavish’s original management, only Uri Bar-Ratzon, David Golomb, Guryon Meltzer, Yig’al Ne’eman, and Dan Shinbal remained.

I was pleasantly surprised by Shim’on Ravid, who is also new in Koor. He and I work together hand in glove.

I knew Guri Meltzer back when he was chief engineer for Tadiran, and he is the kind of person I need—an engineer who thinks systematically with an engineer’s rigor. Overall I have put together a staff of 3-4 people that I can work with and whom I can entrust with authority, since I can’t do everything by myself.

[Question] Will Yig’al Ne’eman remain general manager of Tadiran? There are rumors of friction between you.

[Answer] Today Yig’al Ne’eman is general manager of Tadiran. If there is to be a revolution in Tadiran, it will be at the hands of the present management. Meanwhile I have changed the makeup of the company’s board of directors, which decided on the establishment of committees that will determine Tadiran’s future direction.

(Our private guess: Ne’eman will also go).

[Question] Are you still serving as Chairman of the Board of the Co-op? Isn’t that a conflict of interest?

[Answer] I will remain in that job for a limited time only. The only reason is that I want to work in the area of Mazon, to coordinate activities with the Kibbutz industry and Tnuva. But I only serve as Chairman of the Board; I am not involved in operational decisions. There is no conflict of interest in that.

[Question] When you were in the Co-op, you resisted putting out balance sheets. Isn’t it dangerous for there to be no public scrutiny?

[Answer] I didn’t put out balance sheets because I didn’t get them up to date. By law, I don’t have to do that. I will support the publication of balance sheets the day that Yosi Rozen (general manager of the Co-op) gets an audited balance sheet 3-4 months after the end of the year.

[Question] What worries you?
My main worry is that I have to pass on the message of the conclusions about Koor's situation to all layers of the Koor system. To explain to them that it is not business as usual. To explain to them that the idea of a workers' company is great, but it cannot be applied until the economic system works. Only then can you improve the workers' salary conditions. You can't live on overdrafts.

The labor system plants must favor the principle of mutual assistance between plants that have prospects for recovery, but in no case will I sell property in order to pay 400 percent compensation.

How do you like the job?

It's a job with a lot of power, but I haven't enjoyed it for one minute. I am very pressed. I can't work now in an organized fashion the way I like to, with a half year work plan and regular data. I work 18 hours a day, from 6 in the morning until midnight, and I have to make decisions on very short notice. I only hope that I don't make the wrong decisions.

Are you optimistic?

Of course. We are moving toward balanced management. Every unit will have to prove itself, and I think it will succeed. If I didn't believe it was possible to resurrect Koor, I wouldn't have come here.

The frightened sanitation workers abandoned their work immediately. They remembered the fate of the "collaborators" who had been found hanging, their bodies riddled with handgun bullets, on suspicion of cooperating with the Israeli authorities.

A few minutes later arrived the workers' boss, Yosef Algali, a Jewish entrepreneur from Tel Aviv.

In the beginning the four refused to tell him the reason for their odd "strike." He pressed them for an explanation and they finally told him about the visit of the three men from Gaza.

Algali immediately organized a search of the area. Not far from the Hypershug, at the bus stop, he spotted three men who fitted the workers' description. The argument between the three and the entrepreneur soon developed into a brawl, and the three were arrested.

Has the Intifadah spread to Tel Aviv?

In the past month alone, the Tel Aviv area police recorded 32 cases described as criminal cases with a nationalistic background.

The media has made almost no mention of them. The main reason for that is that the cases in question were insignificant in comparison to the intensity of the events in the territories. An additional reason is that none of the incidents in the Tel Aviv area caused any serious injuries, except for one girl soldier who was hit by a stone while riding on the train, and for people injured in fights between Arabs and Jews.

However, almost every single day Arabs from the territories are brought before the detention judge on duty in Tel Aviv on suspicion of hurling stones, flying the PLO flag, and other nationalistic manifestations.

Simultaneously with the uprising in the territories, terrorist organizations have intensified their activities within the Green Line. The first signs of this were threats against Arabs working in Tel Aviv. Restaurant workers in the area of Yirmiyahu Street were warned not to go to work. And indeed, in the wake of the threats there was a sharp drop in the number of restaurant workers who made it to work in Tel Aviv. Later, Arab workers at the Tel Aviv wholesale market also received threats. Posters were put up throughout the market ordering them to stop working there.

On 12 June of this year, close to 10:00 pm, four incendiary bombs were dropped from the roof of the Dizengoff Center, one of which went off. No one was hurt. According to the testimonies received by the police, a young man and a young woman were involved. Reportedly, the girl, who wore a long kufiyah around her neck, was the one who tossed the bombs.
Since that incident in the heart of Tel Aviv, there has been an increase in the number of nationally motivated cases recorded in the area. A few days after that, a girl soldier was injured while the train she was riding passed by the Exhibition Grounds. The guests at a wedding party held on Hamasger Street were injured by stones hurled by Arabs working at a neighboring auto workshop. Reviling signs appear on walls, and the PLO flag is displayed every day in Tel Aviv and the surroundings.

A few days after the incendiary bombs incident at Dizengoff Center, Tel Aviv Police Commander Yig'al Markus told MA'ARIV: "I do not believe that there is an organization behind these actions which issues precise orders." In his view, the incidents were locally and individually initiated.

Currently the Intifadah in Tel Aviv is merely a nuisance. That is to say, most of the incidents—except for the incendiary bombs and concealed explosive charges—involved writing on walls, setting fire to thorn fields, displaying flags, and throwing stones. Most of the suspects arrested in these incidents were residents of the territories working in Israel. However, the number of those who are aware that they stand to be caught and are still willing to risk their livelihood is growing. Their audacity increases, as do the difficulties faced by the police in handling this phenomenon.

New Arab Democratic Party May Figure in Coalition Building
44230068c Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
2 Aug 88 p 15

[Article by Dani Rabinovitz]

[Text] After its founding convention in Nazareth some ten days ago, the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) of 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah officially joined—for the first time—parties competing for the votes of Arabs in elections for the Knesset. The debut of this party sharpens an interesting question concerning the electoral struggle for the 14 mandates which are "equated" with the Israeli Arabs: Is the hegemony of the list of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (HADASH) (a coalition of organizations centered around the RAKAH Party) coming to an end in this election campaign? If so, who will get RAKAH's votes? If not, when will the upset occur?

The traditional support of the Arab public for HADASH is fed by several factors. In the fifties, HADASH became the first party to offer Israeli Arabs an alternative compatible with the spirit of Palestinian nationalism. In this capacity, it attracted, and still attracts the Arab protest vote, of those who refuse to vote for the various Zionist parties. The communist ideology of HADASH for this purpose, is a benign remnant, which most of the party's supporters are willing to tolerate quietly.

It is clear that the significant support given to HADASH—by an average of approximately 30 percent of Arab voters—does not reflect support for the classical Moscow version of communist ideology. Only a few percent in Israel's Arab sector adhere to pure ideological communism as is presently the case in most western countries.

The second source of power of HADASH is its well-oiled administrative apparatus, which is able preserve its local support here in Israel by means of extensive connections in Eastern Europe. Consequently, HADASH has had the means to send young people abroad for advanced study in areas such as medicine, engineering, electronics, and dentistry at the expense of the party, and with its blessing. In exchange, the party appoints such students to positions in one of the organizations subordinate to the party, or in an organization which is supported by the party with the help of funds which usually come from abroad. These means create indebtedness on the part of support recipients and their families, whose degree of indebtedness ranges from authentic gratitude to a formal obligation to continue to work in the party and support it.

A portion of those going to study in Eastern Europe are party activists before they leave. Others are "long-term investments." In any case, this beneficence should be viewed as something which goes beyond an election bribe. Here also, as with the expression of Arab nationalist sentiments, HADASH is succeeding in doing what no one else can do; it offers a way out, a chance to progress in the direction of personal, professional, and social fulfillment independent of the Israeli establishment. For a young Arab from an average family, such an opportunity is much more significant than a mere material gift in the manner of a business campaign or a promotional give-away.

HADASH'S Time Is Limited

Over the course of many years, RAKAH's control of local councils and Arab municipalities has naturally created a third source of power. Positions in public service, respect at the local level, the ability to be integrated into a nation-wide system of national protest (in the form of the Committee of Arab Local Authorities for example) are alluring seductions in the Arab sector just as they are in the Jewish sector. Voting patterns, which in many cases still correspond to clan and kinship patterns, facilitate the task of recruiting and steering votes. As more time passes, more people are added—directly or indirectly—to the circle of those benefitting from the hegemony of HADASH. More people have something to lose from an upset.
The entrance of Darawishah into the race, four years after the appearance of the Progressive List for Peace, bears witness to a growing number of average Arabs who believe that HADASH's time is limited. An Arab psychologist from northern Israel told me: "They are old, dogmatic, decayed. Despite his charisma, Tawfiq Ziyad is no longer able to convince any intelligent man." In a population in which the number of university graduates is growing at an unprecedented rate, such a statement is significant.

Darawishah brings with him to the race, first and foremost, his personal integrity, and the esteem which he enjoys in the Arab sector. In his different capacities as a teacher, a school principal in his village, Ikisal, which is next to 'Afula, and as a supervisor in the Arab educational system, he has acquired a reputation for being a fair man with values, who is pragmatic but good-hearted. An owner of a taxi station in Nazareth told me: "That is what I like about him, he works with a good heart. He does not want power at any price. Rather, he wants to help people. He has good intentions and faithfulness, and that is more important to him than power."

**Labor Alignment Background**

On the other hand, the political record of Darawishah poses an obstacle for him. Someone told me: "It will take him another several years to overcome his connection to the Labor Alignment." His Labor Alignment background is perhaps his major shortcoming in the eyes of the public, which is of the opinion that Rabin is just as bad as Shamir and Sharon, and worse than Arens or Levi. His rivals for the Arab vote quickly identified this prominent stain which the pleasantly-mannered Darawishah is attempting to patch over; they hastened to saturate the Arab political scene with the rumor that Darawishah's withdrawal from the Labor Alignment is nothing but an election tactic through which he would receive the votes of Arabs fed up with the Labor Alignment, but would be then absorbed—along with his mandates—by his former party the day after the elections, as if nothing had happened. "First he must prove himself five times, and afterwards, he will perhaps gain serious support," my conversation partner added.

Darawishah is aware of his problem. In his opening address at his party's convention, he did not refer positively or negatively to HADASH, the Progressive List for Peace, the Citizens' Rights Movement, or MAPAM. Instead, he chose to criticize the Labor Alignment in a code which was well understood by his listeners: "The period in which the Arab sector served as a reserve of votes at the disposal of the Labor Alignment has ended." Those present in the auditorium greeted the declaration with vocal encouragement.

Nonetheless, it is clear that if indeed there is an historical upset following the coming elections, and the Labor Alignment approves its first coalition with an Arab party, Darawishah would be the favored candidate. He is known to the prominent figures of the Labor Alignment, who esteem him despite, and perhaps on account of, his bold drive to participate in the Palestine National Council meeting in Amman, and his withdraw from the Labor Alignment as a result of events in the territories at the beginning of 1988. For the pragmatists in the Arab sector, the chance to see an Arab minister in the government for the first time since the establishment of the state is perhaps an incentive to vote for the Arab Democratic Party. For those who see participation in the elections first and foremost as an opportunity to protest against Rabin and his security policy in the territories, the idea is considerably less attractive.

It comes as no surprise that the political platforms of HADASH, the Progressive List for Peace, and the Arab Democratic Party are similar. All three are calling for withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel, and under the leadership of the PLO. All three state that the next phase in their struggle will center on gaining full civil equality for Israeli Arabs, who will of course continue to live in the state. It was interesting to see Darawishah express these opinions—including acceptance of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and as the moving force in the Palestinian state that would be established in the territories—in the presence of the president of the state, who sat in the place of honor on the stage at the convention. Ten years ago, one would have found it difficult to dare to even think of making such statements in the presence of a low-level representative of the Jewish establishment. Today however, such statements are made openly in the presence of the president. Arab leaders, who in the past appealed to representatives of the establishment, now appeal first and foremost to the voting public.

The democratic game of hunting for votes is becoming more widespread on the Arab political scene. The appearance of Darawishah as a third "Arab" party (the first to use the designation "Arab" in its name) doubtlessly adds to the political maturity of the Arab sector in Israel.

**The Arab-American Vote**

The expressions used by Darawishah regarding the present situation in the territories, and their future, were unequivocal: "The legitimate national struggle of our people;" "enough of the strong arm;" "enough of conquest and brutality;" and other similar key phrases. The enthusiastic applause given to these expressions by the 400 delegates (in addition to a similar number of guests) present in the auditorium was a good indication of the topics currently occupying the consciousness of the Arab public.

The question currently on the agenda pertains to national honor. This question is more important than the problem of budgets for local authorities, more important than the question of suitable representation for
Arabs in governmental institutions, and more important than the issue of civil rights equality. The time will come for these issues after a solution has been found to the problem of the territories.

The absence of a significant Muslim religious hue in the opening speech at Darawishah's party convention indicates that Darawishah has conceded the fight for the extremist Muslim religious vote. The statements of 'Abdallah Nimr Darwish, the prominent Islamist, who recommended to his followers that they vote for the Progressive List for Peace, indicate to Darawishah that, in this area, he has more to lose—i.e. the support of segments of the population who are exceedingly sensitive about the growth of extremist Islamic forces—than win.

This trend is also marked by the prominence of a Christian, Jurays Khuri, at the convention proceedings, and his possible candidacy as the number two person on the Knesset list (the list will be determined by a coordinating sub-committee in several weeks). A party with a fundamentalist Islamic component could not allow itself the luxury of a Christian candidate in its top ranks, especially given the fact that Khuri's wife, Amal, a lawyer, is a candidate to chair the party's control board.

Nevertheless, Darawishah is presently satisfied with the passive involvement of “soft” Muslims, including a number of imams—mosque clergy whose salaries are paid by the Ministry of Religious Affairs (as is the case with rabbis)—most of whom are moderate in their opinions. 'Adil Zaydan, the Imam of Jish, who is the chairman of the National Imams Committee, even sat at the place of honor on the stage at the opening of the convention. It seems that Darawishah has stopped ardently wooing the Muslim Brothers; however, he attended the Islamic art festival in Kafir Kana a week after his party's convention.

An interesting new development in the founding committee which could indicate future directions of the party, and affect its world view, was the speech delivered at the convention by an Arab-American, David Sa'd, who is one of the founders of the “National American Organization,” which was established in 1972. According to Sa'd, his organization represents three million U.S. citizens, and gives the Arab Democratic Party financial support, and moral and political support on Capitol Hill.

The fact that an Arab-American organization with clear ideological links to the Democratic Party in the United States volunteered to participate indirectly in the Israeli political game is interesting in itself. Its decision to support Darawishah is also significant: HADASH is on its last legs, as expected, and it is likely that the mixed Arab-Jewish character of the Progressive List for Peace tipped the balance in favor of Darawishah. In any case, there is no doubt that the Arab Democratic Party will profit in several ways from its coalition with U.S. Arabs.

Currently, 'Abd-al-Wahhab Darawishah is not the leader of his people. He knows how to raise his voice in the appropriate places, and make speeches with dramatic color. Aside from his feelings for the political, historical issues which currently concern his people, and his courage in placing his weight and prestige on the line regarding these issues, Darawishah’s admission ticket is that he is not loathe to act to bring about change and improvement with regard to other spheres, including the more mundane issues which preoccupy Arabs in Israel. Inasmuch as the question of leadership of Israeli Arabs— with premeditation and by agreement—stands in the shadow of the question of leadership of the entire Palestinian people, it is likely that Darawishah can only profit from the fact that he does not come to the field with the declared abilities of [only] a claimant to the local crown.

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Schiff Analyzes PLO's View of Likud
44230068b Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jul 88 p 1B

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] It is increasingly possible to hear Palestinian personalities stating that they want to see a victory by the Likud and the right-wing in the coming elections for the Knesset in Israel. I almost began with the words, “very surprisingly.” However, it is evident that there is well-ordered doctrine behind this idea. The PLO has its own logic regarding this matter, and it is appropriate to trace it. This idea was not born recently following as a result of the uprising. I have had the opportunity to hear similar statements from several Palestinian personalities prior to the uprising, however the uprising apparently strengthened this hope.

We—particularly members of the Likud Party—do not really hear much about the central idea of the PLO, which holds that peace needs to be made with the right, and with those who are considered more extremist. The list of Palestinian arguments as to why the PLO would want to see a Likud victory in the elections can be arranged according to a different set of priorities.

What are they saying?

—In their estimation, a Likud victory in the elections would sharply polarize Israeli society. Internal dissension would grow, and schisms would be created in Israeli society, which would be difficult for the Jews to overcome. The last phase of the war in Lebanon, and the Israeli response to it are constantly mentioned as examples of this. In order to form a government, the Likud would have to form a coalition with the extreme right, which would stipulate difficult conditions, which would in turn lead to extreme measures, such as imposing Israeli law in the territories, or establishing settlements in every locale at the expense of other
things. These steps would cause heated internal clashes, weaken Israel from within, and undermine to an even greater degree what Israelis refer to as the national consensus. This would clearly benefit the PLO, because the weakening of Israel would either bring about greater willingness on the part of more Israelis to negotiate with the PLO, or it would undermine Israel's ability to resist.

—Following the ascension to power of the Likud and the extremist right, and the implementation of measures which such a coalition would be compelled to take, Israel would find itself increasingly isolated internationally, especially in Europe; its status in the United States would also deteriorate. For example, the matching of Shamir with Dukakis could not be expected to produce a love story. Palestinian personalities are convinced that in such a situation, there will be more voices in the U.S. calling for recognition of the PLO, and the establishment of formal contacts and negotiations with it. If such voices are being heard now, at the end of the Reagan-Shultz administration, it is certain that this tendency would be strengthened in the next U.S. administration if the Likud and the extreme right are ruling in Israel.

—The ascension of the Likud to power will put an end to the flirting which has been going on for years between Shim'on Peres and Labor Alignment leaders on the one hand, and King Hussein on the other. The PLO does not like this flirting. The severance of the "special relations" between Israel and Jordan will put an end to Hussein's attempts to represent the Palestinians, or to play a central role in representing the Palestinians at the expense of the PLO. The task of severing relations with Jordan can only be carried out by the Likud.

This very thought occupied the minds of the PLO members who had secret discussions with a former Herut coordinator, Moshe 'Amirav. The details of these discussions have not yet been publicized in their entirety.

Likud members, who were involved in the 'Amirav-Nusaybah-Faysal Husayni discussions, referred to them with less seriousness, but there is no doubt that the Palestinians viewed these contacts as a significant step which might bring them important tactical advantages, and as a sound maneuver by which to outflank and neutralize Jordan. It should be remembered that these contacts occurred approximately in the same period in which Foreign Minister Shim'on Peres held discussions with King Hussein, at the conclusion of which the London Document of 10 April 1987 was born. It is not out of the question that the PLO got wind of the tightening of contacts between Peres and Hussein. Accordingly, the PLO viewed its own contacts with 'Amirav—who claimed that he was reporting on his discussions to the office of Prime Minister Shamir—as a signal to Hussein that the PLO is capable of holding its own contacts with the Israelis, even with the rightist camp.

Jordan became very concerned when the discussions between 'Amirav and Faysal Husayni were disclosed, including the arrangement of a meeting in Geneva in which Yasir 'Arafat was supposed to have joined the discussions. Jordan did not understand the meaning of these Israeli contacts with representatives of the PLO, which paralleled contacts between Israel and Jordan. It especially did not understand the Likud's involvement in them. The government of Jordan sent envoys to uncover all the details of contacts between the Likud and the PLO, and to determine whether or not a connection was being developed at the expense of Jordan.

—The Palestinians are also talking a great deal about the fact that if the Likud reaches a political agreement with the PLO, such an agreement would not be accepted because of opposition by Israel's leftist opposition, which would go the way of the Likud, as happened in the peace agreement with Egypt. However, it appears that the Palestinian viewpoint differs from that usually presented in Israel. The Palestinians repeatedly state that they find no significant difference between the Likud and the Labor Alignment with regard to negotiations with representatives of the PLO. Both the Likud and the Labor Alignment appear to them in the same negative light.

They perceive the Labor Alignment as the Likud in different attire. The Labor Alignment might speak a bit differently, but it actually behaves in the same way as the Likud. The Labor Alignment is even more dangerous as far as they are concerned, because its soft style and talk weigh more heavily on the PLO in the international sphere.

Thus, it seems wiser to them to jump over the hedge that the Labor Alignment is establishing, and engage in direct discussions with the Likud. If this succeeds—great, it would be an added bonus. If the attempt fails, they will nevertheless gain from the Likud's ascension to power on the basis of the same arguments mentioned above.

The main error of the PLO in this matter stems from its reliance on the possibility that the Likud would be prepared to negotiate with them on the future of Judaea and Samaria, just as it negotiated with al-Sadat over the Sinai. For if the PLO were prepared to recognize Israel and stop terrorism, there would no longer be a PLO; likewise if the Likud were prepared to negotiate with the PLO on the future of the West Bank, there would no longer be a Likud. Nevertheless, we might be completely surprised one day by the emergence of a new leader in the Likud, who would be ready to enter peace negotiations with the PLO. This would vindicate those who maintain that the defeat of the Labor Alignment—in its present composition—is irrevocable because it did not succeed in advancing peace with new ideas.
General Discusses Strategic Balance With Syria

Interview with Brig Gen (Res) Aharon Levrin, editor of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' "Middle East Military Balance," Israel TV's "New Evening" program, 31 August 1988; interviewer: Gideon Reich Lash.

[Question] The latest issue of your report, covering 1987-1988, was released today. What information does it contain about changes in the Syrian army and their implications for Israel?

[Answer] Actually, what happened within the Syrian Army during the period we reviewed and analyzed is that the compulsory army was reduced, units were transferred to reserve duty status, and a fair number of tanks were placed in storage. On the other hand, there was actually, compensation for this: a group of recruits had its induction date moved up, Syria's air force grew through the addition of MIG-29 planes, and its reserve duty network grew a fair amount, so matters were somehow offset. No drastic changes occurred from the standpoint of strategic parity, on which, as you know, the Syrians are relying a great deal.

[Question] We do not need to fear a surprise attack by the Syrian Army, for example?

[Answer] That's exactly what I want to say. Nevertheless, I believe that the risk of war has decreased slightly, because it is inconceivable that someone who plans to start a war in the very near future would take such drastic steps. When I say that the risk of war with Syria has diminished, I should of course add that Syria will not be so quick to start a war alone: Its complex relations with the Soviet union are problematic, and the USSR will certainly not encourage Syria to go in this direction in the foreseeable future. But we also stress that even if the chances of an initiated war, planned in advance, have declined, this does not mean that some kind of belligerent flare-up between us and Syria cannot occur, since there are many points of friction between us. For example, I will mention what could have happened as a result of the hang-glider incident in Israel's north, in November 1978.

[Question] If something like that were to happen, is there anything to be learned from an analysis of the use of missiles in the Gulf war, which your report also deals with?

[Answer] Absolutely. We analyzed the risks to the Israeli rear, with regard to surface-to-surface missiles and chemical weapons. Of course, the serious and relatively prolonged precedent in the Gulf war serves as an instructive experience. It should be emphasized, however, that the two arenas are different, and what applies to Israel from the standpoint of its reprisal and deterrent power is not the same as what applies to Iran. But without a doubt I belong to that school of thought in Israel which views matters with slightly greater gravity. I believe that the Persian Gulf precedent can certainly make its way to us, even though perhaps more in the sphere of surface-to-surface missiles and less in the realm of chemical weapons.

[Question] The IAF cannot prevent such incidents?

[Answer] The IAF is a deterrent weapon and an offensive weapon. If we are lucky, and have good intelligence provided on time—in 'real time'—then it is conceivable that the IAF would be able to carry out great projects, but it would be a bit much to count on it and believe that it will solve all our problems.

[Question] Given the information in the report, the balance of forces between us and our neighbors, do you sleep well at night?

[Answer] I do not sleep well, certainly not given what is in the report. I believe that the qualitative gap has been reduced to our disadvantage. We had a fairly large qualitative advantage. I also believe that the Gulf war has to arouse serious thoughts concerning what can be expected to happen to us. Not in the short term, perhaps, but in the longer term. But these two issues must certainly serve as food for thought and for organizing.

Former Gush Emunim Leader Interviewed on Tensions With Arabs

Interview with Rabbi Menahem Fruman, rabbi of Teq'a Settlement: "Since Neither Party Can Give Up Jerusalem, This Country Cannot Be Partitioned or Divided; Everyone Who Throws a Molotov Cocktail Must Be Shot; We Need a Religious Man or Leader To Continue What Mubarak 'Awad or al-Sadat Started;" date and place of interview not specified.

[Text] Whenever leaders of the Gush Emunim Movement and "settlers' leaders" become the subject of discussion, the name that always comes up is that of Rabbi Moshe Levinger or Beni Katzover, who became well-known for advocating the destruction of the village of Bayta. And yet, other names, like that of Rabbi Menahem Fruman, remain almost unknown to Palestinians. Fruman, one of the founders of Gush Emunim, holds different views, which Palestinian leaders should know about. If a real change in Israel's right wing should come about, the opinions which are expressed by Rabbi Fruman might provide an indication of such a change.

Rabbi Fruman is the rabbi for the Teq'a settlement. He was born in Kfar Hasidim near Haifa 43 years ago. In addition to regular religious courses at Yeshiva Religious Institute, he studied Jewish philosophy and general
philosophy. He served as rabbi for the settlement of Migdal 'Oz in Gush Ezyon. Nine years ago he took the position of rabbi for the settlement of Teq'o'a. He is the father of eight children.

The man we were interviewing was a student at Merkaz Harav Religious Institute, during those years when Gush Emunim was still in the embryonic stage. That is, he was a student between the 1967 June War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. He does not hide the fact that he grew up when the Jewish settlement movement was still in its infancy. He studied with Gush Emunim leaders, Hanan Porat and Moshe Levinger, who are his close friends.

Rabbi Fruman says that the real Gush Emunim Movement is made up of 15 persons who studied the Torah together at the Merkaz Harav Center Institute. Nothing he can do can change this fact.

He was a member of Gush Emunim's Secretariat, but he left the movement in anger after the existence of a secret, Jewish, terrorist organization was revealed. With the support of everyone in Teq'o'a Settlement he devoted himself to publicizing a declaration in which he condemned that organization and signs of sympathy with it from some settlers. It was the first and perhaps the only statement issued by settlers condemning that secret organization. Even today Rabbi Fruman refuses to join those who are calling for a pardon for members of that organization. "I announced I was withdrawing my membership from Gush Emunim, but no one took my announcement seriously because anyone who was born with Gush Emunim stays with this movement."

Because it is true to its mission to inform Palestinian readers and convey to them what is on the minds of all existing tendencies on the other side, AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI thought it was its duty to interview Rabbi Fruman as someone who represents one opinion coming out of the settlements.

[Question] It is no secret to you that, to say the least, Palestinians do not think about settlers in positive terms because the Jewish terrorist organization was born in their midst. And there was the question of the village of Bayta. It is now known that settlers killed a young Palestinian man from the village of al-Shuyukh in Hebron. What is your attitude about these matters?

[Answer] As far as I know the way settlers are divided in their own communities is no different from the way the vast Israeli society is divided. Settlers are different people with different points of view, and almost the same psychological attitudes toward Arab society which one finds in Israeli society in general can be found in their midst. Everything I am telling you is uttered with a full sense of responsibility, according to what I know. The spirit of the uprising was kindled when people were told, "Settlers are coming to the village to attack you." People then went out to defend themselves. But such matters have no basis in fact, and that statement was a lie and a falsehood. I live among the settlers, and I don't know to what extent Palestinian readers will accept the veracity and candor of what I'm telling you. However, I do speak quite candidly when I say that in principle, this public does not hate the Arabs. And yet, there are some indications that such hatred does exist among settlers just as it does exist in Israeli society on the whole.

Speaking as one who witnessed the birth of the settlement, I can say that the settlement of Judaea and Samaria was not an action against Arabs. In no way was it a step taken in opposition to the Arabs. No one intended to persecute the Arabs, humiliate them or rub their noses in the dirt. No one wanted to make it impossible for them to hold their heads up again.

Those who carried the banner of settling those areas and marched ahead of thousands to settle in the West Bank had nothing to do with such feelings or motives. They felt that Jews had to live on every spot in Israel. It is possible that along with such feelings there was some hatred for the Arabs or indifference to them. I mean they may have felt as though Arabs did not exist at all, or they may have had no desire whatsoever to get close to them. The common denominator that brought these people together was the need to settle Judaea and Samaria. But any feeling about a role which the Arabs were playing here had nothing to do with it. It was not the prevailing opinion to harass the Arabs and arouse their anger. It was nothing like that at all.

I was not the only one who felt that way. I had friends who shared those feelings. We considered the Arab residents in Judaea and Samaria as a possible bridge for peace between Jews and Arabs. The current political reality and ideas which at this time are unprecedented may make what I am telling you sound like something out of the realm of fantasy. Nevertheless, we wanted the settlers to understand most of the Arabs' feelings, and we wanted them to represent the Arabs in front of the Jewish public. It is difficult for me to make that clear, but I am not just expressing my personal opinion here. I can produce others, who were among the first settlers, and they will confirm what I am saying: they were not motivated by hatred for the Arabs, although I do not deny that there were those who were. Those settlers did not believe the Zionist statement which states that "Jews who are a people without a country came to a country without a people." Quite frankly, they did not ignore the fact that there are Arabs in this country.

The Gush Emunim Movement is very much like "a delayed Zionist Movement." (Rabbi Fruman then chuckled and added this.) Devout people are usually one or half a generation behind people who are secular. In the early days of Zionism there was also some nostalgic feeling for Arab society. I am not saying this for sensationalism. When I was a child, we thought of our forefathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, as Arabs. When we played the parts of our nation's fathers, we used to dress up as Arabs. Members of Hashomer (a group which
guarded the first agricultural villages which the Zionists established) used to wear Arab clothing, and they tried to speak Arabic. I understand the nostalgic feelings which Jewish people feel for the land of Israel. It is similar to the nostalgic yearning for a simple life whose roots, for the Zionists, were established by Arabs who lived on their land. That was what the Zionist Movement was like when it got started. That was also what the Gush Emunim Movement was like in its early days: very much like a copy of the Zionist Movement in its infancy.

[Question] These statements are not compatible with the points of view which are known to be held in the settlements. The settlers have been at the forefront of those calling for a stronger iron fist approach against the Arabs. We heard no strong condemnation of the terrorist Jewish organization, nor did we hear the settlers condemn the call to destroy the village of Bayta or other similar things.

[Answer] Assumptions are made about the settlers, and it has been my experience that it is difficult to wipe out those assumptions. When our father Abraham destroyed the idols in his father's house, he was, by today's standards, being courageous. He destroyed assumptions, and that was not an easy thing to do.

It is certain that there are individuals in our midst whose political points of view are quite different from mine, but I think—and I say this with a full sense of responsibility—that when I sit among my people, I do not feel that opposition to Arabs in general is greater among the settlers than it is in Israeli society.

In that regard I hold Israeli society to blame. But opposition to the Arabs is not greater in the settlements in particular. The difference is simple. (He says that with dismay.) An Israeli who lives in Tel Aviv meets an Arab who washes dishes in a restaurant where the Israeli goes to eat. His situation is different from that of an Israeli who lives among the Arabs. Accordingly, the way he deals with the Arab is also different. He might hate the Arabs very much, but he does not have an opportunity to confront them, to strike them, or to express his hatred for them. However, those who live in our midst and who hate the Arabs have many opportunities to prove this hatred in words and deeds.

Assumptions are based not only on facts, but also on the forms in which these facts and ideas are presented in the media. The media focus in particular on settlers who hate Arabs even though their counterparts can be found in Israeli society. Accordingly, other phenomena and other points of view which are different do not get aired.

[Question] And yet we have not heard enough condemnation of the Jewish terrorist organization, nor have we heard true reservations expressed against the appeal to destroy Bayta.

[Answer] These voices have been drowned out. There are people who settled in Judaea and Samaria because they wanted to create a relationship [with their surroundings] or a way of life that was gentler and less rigid. There is an association between Fascism and people who live in the city. That association is evident in Hitler's life and in how he felt when he was in Vienna, which is like New York (the city where Meir Kahane grew up and lived). Hitler felt he was worthless as a human being, and then he tried to create for himself a strong and powerful personality. This is what Meir Kahane's supporters are doing, but these people are not pious and unswerving in their faith. Quite the contrary, their piety is shallow. Their Judaism is only skin deep, and because it is, they try to cling to non-substantive matters and display a rigid attitude. According to our school of thought, such non-substantive matters are a force for evil. The settlement in Judaea and Samaria tried to overcome that phenomenon because the settlers wanted to go back to a life whose roots are real, a life in which man would have no need for external things to protect the deepest feelings in his heart. It is on that basis that I declare this openly: I am not the Arabs' enemy.

I remember that during a demonstration which was organized by the Gush Emunim Movement in a beautiful setting, a friend of mine told me, "The scenes were beautiful until we saw that sign which said, 'A city will be built here.'" I then asked myself, what am I doing here? They are destroying a beautiful setting. They will uproot trees and destroy flowers to build a city here.

Does settling the land mean uprooting trees and pulling out flowers? It would make no sense on that basis for someone to come to a country with the idea of expelling and uprooting its citizens, making them miserable and persecuting them. Such an idea, and I am not the only one who believes that, is incompatible with the goal I was seeking when I came to Judaea and Samaria.

[Question] But that actually happened, didn't it?

[Answer] (The rabbi sighed.) It always happens. If we look at Zionism in general, we will find that it created a refugee problem. Do you want to say that the settlement in the areas created injustices against the Arabs here and there?

[Question] When you say "here and there," that means the severity of the injustice is being minimized.

[Answer] We are now dealing with the principal problem in the issue. We are dealing with what happens when things are done and then do not appear the way you want. When that happens, we have to go back where we started from, and we have to try to do as much as possible to alleviate the injustice. We must go back to the goal we were seeking when we came.
When we consider why the settlers came, we find that they did not come to infringe upon the Arabs. I am not saying that there weren’t any in their midst who did not want to do that, but I can only speak for myself. So, speaking only for myself, I say that is not why we came. Rather, the opposite is true.

I think I owe it to myself to tell you that a few people encounter problems with the Arab public. Then they take a position that is different from their previous position. We must go back to the main position. One must not forget the reason why he came here. I think this is the problem of Zionism in general, as I see it. We must always remember why Jews came to this country. We must be careful about the dynamics of a situation in which a person who sets out on a certain course, succumbs to pressure from actual problems, forgets why he took that course, and adopts a rigid position. This is like the story of a man who built a tomb for his wife, decorated it, and planted a garden around it. Then, he eventually forgot about the love he felt for his wife, which was how the whole thing got started.

[Question] In light of the lessons which have become available so far, how do you see the future?

[Answer] First of all, we must know the facts, and we must accept them as they are. We must know that everything is not up to us. It is up to the Creator Who decides how Arabs and Jews will live in this country. In order to do something, we must know that everything is not up to us.

It is the Almighty Creator who makes the world go around. Man can only write a few footnotes on the margins of history. Above all else we must know that Arabs and Jews live in this country. In light of this fact, Jews must know that they cannot throw the Arabs out into the desert. And the Arabs too must realize that they cannot throw us into the sea. If the realization of Zionist hopes is accompanied by the expulsion of Arabs from this country, or if the realization of the Arabs’ hopes is accompanied by throwing Jews into the sea, that would be a blatant injustice and a horrible and terrible thing. This is the first fact which must be accepted. As far as I am concerned, this is a religious acknowledgement. It is a religious point of view.

Everyone must also know that this country cannot be partitioned or divided. Whether we want to accept this or not, this remains an unalterable fact. From my point of view this country is indivisible. Who can give up Jerusalem, anyway? Suitable circumstances for partitioning the country are not available here because the country is indivisible. If one of the plans can be realized and the country is partitioned into one Arab bloc and one Jewish bloc, the two blocks will always be clashing with each other because each party will feel that something was taken away from it.

The religious approach stipulates that one must see the facts and study them. There might be a positive side to them and not necessarily a negative side.

Why partition the country? The need to partition the country is attributable to a point of view that is groundless, and I see no reason for it.

Let’s ask ourselves, what is Zionism? My goal is to live a good and peaceful life in this country. I do not think that achieving this goal requires that there be no Arabs here. Just as the trees and flowers which are here do not keep me from feeling that I am living in my home, the presence of Arabs does not keep me from having that feeling. I used to travel in Arab buses then, and I repeatedly took that bus which was attacked by a LOW missile in Jerusalem. It was fated, however, which determined that I was not to be on that bus on the day of that incident.

I used to take that bus to go from Jerusalem to Teqoa when I was a teacher at the ‘Ateret Kohanim Institute of Religion. I like to sit with the Arab public, that public which is part of the Arab community which I wish will [one day] become part of mine.

[Question] You talk a lot about “the Arab public” and about “human beings,” but you do not mention “the Palestinian people” or “the Arab people.”

[Answer] Most certainly. I think that for many people the usual formula is that we do not want to infringe upon the Arabs’ rights. We do not want to infringe upon their rights as individuals, but we do not want to recognize them as a people. Many express the opinion that Arabs are entitled to all their rights as individuals, but not as a nation. It would be pointless for them to stay [here] as a nation. Let them go to Egypt, Iraq, or any other Arab country.

That opinion is unacceptable to me because every human being is above all a civilized creature. Civilization is a strong and constructive social element. Accordingly, the previous alienation oppresses Arabs, and that is why there is no way I will approve of it. As a Jew, I cannot live an ethnic Jewish life in France, and the same principle applies to the Arabs.

I believe that Arabs must be given the ability to live an ethnic Arab life. This is a matter of culture. If they don’t have that ability, they will lose their culture, which is the means by which man reaches his social circle, be it Arab in general or Palestinian. It is my belief that Jews have a problem in the way they see this matter. Jews see everything from a historical perspective. There are those who say that one cannot think of the Palestinian people as having had their own history in the same way that the Chinese or Jews did. But there are clear signs that a nation is being born right in front of us and that it has all the characteristics of self-awareness. And that makes the Palestinians different from other Arabs. I feel that as the
years go by, it will not be easy for Palestinians to blend in Iraq or Kuwait. They will continue to feel that they are Israelis, and I think that the positive implications of that outnumber the negative. The problem lies in how they identify themselves. That is their problem. If they want to identify themselves as Palestinians, they have a right to do that.

In the past there was a rivalry between two kinds of kibbutzes in Israel: the association of kibbutzes and the unified kibbutz. At the present time the rivals' children are living together. They do not understand why their fathers were rivals. It is not unlikely that 100 years from now my grandchildren and your grandchildren will sit together and they will not understand what Jews and Palestinians had been fighting about. From history's viewpoint that could be one outcome, and it may become clear 100 years from now that there is a nation of Palestinians. Those who say there are no Palestinian people have a political interest in making such a statement to those who lack the historical depth to understand the subject and who cannot see 4,000 years of Palestinian history which is clearly different from Arab history. That is why they say what they say. But they forget that the Jewish people too have a history that goes back 4,000 years. The Jewish people were born at some point, and they did have a beginning. It is possible that what we are witnessing is quite clearly the birth of a nation. I think that the positive implications of that are greater than the negative.

[Question] If you oppose partitioning the country, where will it be possible for the Palestinian people to realize their hopes as a nation?

[Answer] What do you mean, "where?" Right here in this country without a doubt.

[Question] Where?

[Answer] Herein lies the main point I want to clarify. It is a point that is very difficult to clarify. I usually speak to a small number of people in the Jewish public and a small number of people in the Arab public, but let me affirm that everything starts with a small group of people. Islam and Judaism too have a tradition of affirming the fact that each started with a small group of people. Each religious message then spread until it became a social phenomenon. Islam is a dramatic example of that. Judaism too affirms that Abraham is the only man who fathered the religion. He was also the moving force behind the single tribe and the single family which turned into a nation.

What does the term, the children of Israel, mean? It means the children of one family, the family of Jacob. It is true that I speak to a small number of people; that doesn't mean anything. The Gush Emunim Movement began with a few people. The fact that I talk with a few people doesn't mean that what I say is wasted. What I am trying to make clear is that our challenge is generally humanitarian: we can call it progress. Our challenge is to find out how we can overcome violence and inflexibility in mankind. It is then, in particular, that we will have a new model for coexistence. Self determination may not always be expressed in political terms—people, through the army or other such methods—but it may be expressed in culture: in a civilized partnership between those people who create a civilization.

In that respect, there is something in the notion that a Palestinian nation is taking shape here because culture is not something that just exists. When Zionism was brought here, a cultural renewal, in both the secular and the religious sense, was expected. The Palestinians are, above all else, a group of people who want to create a new shared life. They want to make the free choice to create a new culture. One individual cannot do that alone. He needs a group with whom he could feel, in a normal way, that he is in his own home, in a place where he wants to develop his own culture. If this is my understanding of the national question, then I find no difficulty in wanting to get rid of the military framework. On the contrary, it would be easy. In this respect, if the Palestinian question did not exist, I would have had to create it. There may be some exaggeration here, but something that makes sense becomes evident. Two nations living in the same country have to have a solution. That is something I would want for myself without having anything to do with the Palestinian question.

Nationhood is not achieved by the rigid aspects of government, such as the army and other institutions like it. That is not what defines a group of people as a nation.

It is on that basis that I see no difficulty in the prospect of having two nations live here. Quite the contrary, let them live side by side as equals because we are all equal in the Creator's eyes. Every nation can have its own national institutions; every nation can develop its own civilization and arrive at its own cultural frameworks. I talked previously about the inspiration which Jews wanted to get from the Arab farmer. They can get that inspiration in such a setting.

Two ethnic cultures do not have to oppose and reject each other. There has to be a revolution in consciousness. At the present time the vast majority of Jews and Arabs do not define the situation in those ethnic terms. They do not see the situation in terms of a shared or sturdy culture which could produce a common culture. But I am interested in such a revolution even if there were no dispute with the Arabs. I am interested in it for my own sake. From a religious standpoint the facts of life are forcing me to seek such a solution. No other solution will succeed. I would like to make one observation in this regard. I would like to say that the circumstances here are ideal. If Divine Providence wanted me to be next to the Germans, for example, that situation would have been less comfortable. We must bear in mind that there is a linguistic as well as a religious affinity between the
two cultures. Islam does not present any religious problem for Judaism. Quite the contrary. Christianity, however, wavers toward Judaism. It is the consensus, however, that Islam is one way to worship the Creator.

I remember that many years before the problems became political in nature, Rabbi Moriyah, the rabbi of old Jerusalem, used to say, “The Torah forbids the destruction of a mosque just as it forbids the destruction of a synagogue.”

According to Jewish law the Holy Book forbids the performance of “any action in a synagogue which must be performed in an idolatrous place of worship.” That is the source of the interdiction against the destruction of a temple where the Creator is worshiped. That interdiction covers synagogues as well as mosques. There is a certain close relationship between these two cultures. Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda was the founder of Gush Emunim, and all the members of that movement are more like his disciples. The Gush Emunim Movement consisted of about 20 students in a religious institute. They were the students of Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda Cook who was always very cautious in dealing with the Arabs to avoid giving the dispute with them a metaphysical nature—[that is,] an “imperceptible” nature.

It has also been customary to magnify reality and attribute general and far-reaching proportions to any dispute. Rabbi Cook observed caution to prevent this conflict from turning into a war of principles such as that which was launched by the Jews against Greece and Rome. Instead, he defined that conflict in terms of a dispute between neighbors. To him it was nothing more than that. He tried to say there was no war of principles between the settled population and the cities. With the help of Almighty God a solution to this conflict will be found in the near future.

[Question] The prevailing impression is that the Gush Emunim Movement does not accept your points of view. Do you and a few of your friends intend to fight for your principles within this movement?

[Answer] I don’t think that what you are saying is true. These have been my points of view over the years.

[Question] Do you intend to publicize these points of view and to convey them to a larger number of people?

[Answer] That is why I go to Judaea and Samaria. It is because of these ideas.

[Question] But the settlers are considered an obstacle to peace, not a contributing factor to it.

[Answer] The settlers are considered, and rightly so, an obstacle to partitioning the country. Those who believe that the Jewish-Arab dispute can be settled by establishing a Jewish state alongside an Arab state—and I already said that I do not believe in such a solution—are talking about an Arab state that has no Jews. This is what happened in the town of Yamit in Sinai, in keeping with the Camp David Accords. The residents of that town were thrown out of the town. They were not given the right to choose to live under an Egyptian government if they wanted to do that.

At the present time, however, I cannot come up with a political solution because such a solution depends upon many things. First of all, it has to be acceptable to both parties. I am talking about a unilateral solution here: we must first see if that solution is acceptable to the other party. On that basis we must talk to that party to find out what are its sensitive issues and its wishes.

[Question] When you say the other party, do you mean the PLO?

[Answer] I mean Palestinian people in general: the Palestinian people and any leaders they choose. They can choose their leaders just as Jewish people can choose different kinds of leaders. There are leaders whose ideas are closer to mine, and there are leaders who see everything in terms of a “government” an army and force. In several months we will see what the Jewish people will decide, and then we will see what the Palestinian people will decide. The leaders they will choose will determine the nature of the talks between the two parties.

Are you also asking me about the PLO?

The PLO is not the only partner I would turn to for such talks. Its vision and what I understand about its charter and its concept for achieving the hopes of Palestinians is not suitable for me. I hope that there will be a few people in the PLO who would be willing to realize Palestinian nationalism in an ideal, civilized manner which appeals to me. As long as the PLO represents the Palestinians’ national leadership, matters will get worse from my point of view. The question is this: what will be the outcome?

The Arabs are facing a major problem. I speak respectfully to the organic tribal cadre which is settled on the land. I see it as the model which Jewish society should try to emulate. To me, that also includes the religious aspect.

A friend of mine used to say that he wanted to get to that stage in which he could bless food the way an Arab does. I think that the tribal makeup of Arab society can become a source of inspiration to Jewish society too. It could show Jewish society the appearance it ought to assume. But there is a problem here which perplexes Marxists too. Would it be possible to bypass the stages of development? In Russia Marxists had struggled with the question of whether or not farmers could switch to a socialist society and endure the revolution without going through a period of capitalism.
As far as the Israeli public is concerned, it is clear to many that deliverance will not come with statehood—by decree or popular [declaration]. It is clear to many that a political framework will not help an individual or a nation achieve its innermost hopes. Can a Palestinian individual forget about a state and accept such an idea directly? This is the principal problem that exists and lies in front of us at the present time. It is my hope that this will happen. If it does not, and if Palestinians cannot express their Palestinian character, they will concentrate on pelting Israeli soldiers with stones, and that, of course, is an expression of national sympathy or greater devotion to the cause which will manifest itself in a willingness to throw Molotov cocktails. As long as that remains the trend, wars will continue and so will bloodshed, violence, and counterviolence.

These are the rules of the game. There is no point in doing anything when they throw a Molotov cocktail on a bus that is carrying my children. We must fire back at anyone who throws a Molotov cocktail.

It is said that there is an Islamic tradition which started during the Crusades. Muslims and Christians would perform religious rituals during a break in the fighting, and they would then resume fighting. That meant that Muslims and Christians ignored their personal feelings and did what they were supposed to do. If Arab society does not try to tear down such traditions and if it remains stuck in such a naive state, bloodshed and hatred will ensue, and the opportunity to reach a settlement will become remote. I believe that Israeli society too might become that naive. I think there is hope, but what can I tell you? It is up to the Almighty Creator. If you ask me, I would say that at the present time this is less likely to happen. In this regard I think that ethnicity has a powerful appeal for people. The best evidence of that is the horrible killing which is going on between Iran and Iraq. Consider what is happening in Lebanon: there are battles between Hizballah and Amal, and both of them are Muslims and Shi'ites. But that does not stop them from killing each other. And why are they killing each other? They think what they are doing affirms their ethnicity, and that reinforces our hope.

[Question] How will you affirm your point of view in Gush Emunim?

[Answer] That is a religious question. Religion teaches us to find positive points in the facts. And it is a fact that at the present time religious leaders are not state leaders. Although that may distress a few clergymen, several positive points may be found in that fact. These lie in the possibility of developing an ideal situation.

If one has to deal with practical problems right away, he may become worn out during the process we spoke of, and he may forget why he came in the first place. Clerics and intellectuals can sit with their students and contribute to the revolution of consciousness, which is a must. Although religious leaders do not enjoy the same prestige that political leaders do, I do not think that religious have no influence. They have a major influence. To me, political leaders are more like mouthpieces for spiritual points of view which are prevalent among the people. There isn't much difference between a political leader and one individual in the public. He understands matters in terms of the public at large. Accordingly, education could have a tremendous impact.

Let me conclude by saying that everything is according to the Creator's will. The Creator does work in mysterious ways, and His will will be done.

It is my point of view that the success of Zionism is due to the fact that it was the less violent of the two national movements. The Arabs turned down the 1947 Partition Decision. The country was then occupied for the first time. In 1967 Husayn refused to remain silent and sit quietly on the sidelines, so Judaea and Samaria were occupied. This is a lesson that we must learn in our time.

Every stone that is thrown in Judaea and Samaria strengthens the power of the ultra right wing in Israel. Every stone strengthens the Likud and those settlers whose opinions I do not share. The one important fact which we must notice here is that it was Anwar al-Sadat who broke the Likud's inflexibility. If a new al-Sadat were to come along, he too may open the hearts of Gush Emunim. The Creator is capable of making such changes, and peace will be achieved if it is His wish.

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Writer Examines Changing Security Concerns Towards Lebanon
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[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] Since the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon three years ago in the wake of the fiasco in the 1982 War, a number of substantive changes have occurred in Israel's security posture vis-a-vis that country. These changes began to develop back in the days of Moshe Arens, the Likud man who took Sharon's place in the defense ministry, but they expanded and became firmly entrenched when Yitzhak Rabin took over the defense portfolio and brought about the withdrawal program. The changes in Israel's approach since then can be seen in several areas:

The first is in Israeli involvement in the north, or more precisely, in what takes place in Beirut. Since the latter half of the seventies, Israel's military involvement in Beirut and the northern half of Lebanon has increased. That brought about Israel's direct involvement in the internal government power struggle. Things came to a head with Israel's military alliance with the Phalange and the invasion of Lebanon, one of the goals of which was the coronation of Bashir al-Jumayyil as Lebanon's president. That insane hubris is now over, though one cannot
say that what happens in Beirut is of no interest to Israel. Clearly events there can affect our security, but that is no reason to go to war. Israel no longer crowns "Lebanese princes." She has stopped mixing into the internal wars in Beirut, even when the Palestinians return to Lebanon or the Hizbullah increases its strength.

Another qualitative difference of strategic significance is Israel's attitude toward the Syrian presence and its function in Lebanon. Arie'el Sharon would in no way permit that presence and even saw it as an excuse for war. Today things are totally different. Israel has not gone as far as the U.S. and even Britain, whose diplomatic ties to Syria are still cut, but who look favorably on the role that Damascus plays in Beirut. Israel recognizes that the Syrians have vital interests in Lebanon and is prepared to live with them—and not just out of weakness, so long as they do not directly endanger her. When the Syrians first sent their army into Lebanon in 1976 (when Rabin was Prime Minister), a number of "red lines" were established for containing the Syrian army and its activity in Lebanon. Those lines have become somewhat blurred since then, but it is clear that al-Asad, with his sharp sense of the strategic, knows how far he can go with direct military activity in southern Lebanon. When three Syrian soldiers were wounded in May by Israeli artillery fire at the time of the IDF action against Hizbullah in Maydun, the Syrians well understood that they had no basis for complaint.

Israel's attitude toward the Syrian presence in Lebanon is also seen in its position vis-a-vis the large Shi'ite movement, Amal. Israel understands that Amal, which controls most of the settlements in south Lebanon, needs Syrian military backing. This is the third difference in Israel's security approach. There is friction between Israel and Amal, but Israel feels that the Shi'ite role, including that of Amal, will increase. Stability in Lebanon cannot be achieved without consultation or unspoken agreement with Amal. What is misleading is that Amal is not a unified body, and each group in the organization has its own interests. Israel has no reason to thank Amal, and its "red line" for this organization is that whenever Amal attacks her, Israel will strike back.

The fourth difference is seen in Israel's attitude toward the security zone and the South Lebanon Army [SLA]. The mission here is to secure the northern settlements and only that. This has meant that the IDF pullback is not total. Israel is today financing a rather large Lebanese militia, but the goal is to reduce IDF involvement as much as possible and to rely on the SLA instead. The level of the Israeli military presence will depend on the scope of attacks from the other side.

The prospects for achieving this goal will be considered in a moment. The push to create a stable situation on both sides of the border and to arrive at an understanding with the Shi'ite community also dictate the IDF's retaliatory steps in south Lebanon, especially when the civilian population is involved.

Apart from the changes in Israel's approach to Lebanon, we should consider the qualitative changes that have occurred in that country since the 1982 War. One of the most striking is the weakening of the Christian community. The Lebanon War, one of the purposes of which was to strengthen the Christians and allow them to dominate other groups, in fact brought about their retreat. It is this weakness that has caused certain factions in the Christian community, who yesterday joined with us in common cause against the PLO, to be prepared today to assist in the return of PLO fighters to Lebanon.

Another change, since 1985, is the metamorphosis of Hizbullah into a leading element in Lebanon and the military activity of its militia against Israel. The war furthered this process so that today one can no longer ignore the existence of this radical group. The Syrians must also deal with them, as we saw recently in the siege of the southern quarters of Beirut during the Syrian army's entry there. This militant religious-political movement is no negotiating partner for Israel and cooperates with the programs of Palestinian organizations to attack Israel from south Lebanon.

This change has brought about another significant change in its wake, also very dangerous for Israel: an Iranian military presence, in the person of the Revolutionary Guard, in Lebanon. Just how deep this involvement is evidenced by the proposal that the force entering south Beirut be a mixed force composed of Iranian units alongside the Syrian ones. The proposal was rejected by Damascus, but the latter cannot prevent Iranian military involvement through teachers and advisors, weapons and courses, in the al-Biq'a as well as in south Lebanon. The number of Revolutionary Guard fighters is estimated today at about 1,000. The Iranian goals in Lebanon do not jibe with those of the Shi'ite community—Amal, for example.

Lebanon is the one place where the Iranian revolution succeeded in exporting its ideas. That success is continuing mainly because of the large sums of money, about one hundred million dollars thus far, that Tehran has invested in shattered Lebanon. The goal is the establishment of an Islamic Republic that would also cast its eyes on Jerusalem.

There is also no ignoring the continued return of the Palestinians to Lebanon. Their success can be seen in the fact that they have again established a military base for themselves in the Sidon area. For the moment nothing tangible has come of it because the Palestinians still find themselves in a bloody internal struggle, and they also have to defend their holdings from Amal.

But it is not only the PLO that is prepared to forge new alliances. Along with the other changes mentioned, some extremely strange coalitions have been formed, and Israel's name crops up among them. These are not official coalitions but rather unspoken understandings.
on the basis of identical interests in a certain area: for example, an unspoken agreement between Israel, Amal, and Syria that the increasing strength of Hizballah and the Palestinians in Lebanon could endanger all of them; or the unspoken local agreement on the existence of Christian Jezzine. The Christians (including the Lebanese Army), the Druze, and Israel agree that a vital role is played by Jezzine, lying between the Shi’ite al-Biq’a and South Lebanon, the Druze Shuf Mountains and the Druze concentration on the slopes of Mount Meron and the Christian north and south. Israeli policy toward Jezzine is fuzzy: clearly she wants it to continue to exist under the protection of General Lahad, but she herself does not want to have to go back there.

Has the Security Zone Justified Itself?

After the decision was made by the government in January 1985 to withdraw from Lebanon, there was a lively debate about whether it would not be worthwhile, given our disappointment with the Phalange, to undertake a new policy in south Lebanon as well: to withdraw to the border and leave the territory under Shi’ite control (in fact, under Amal), and completely forget about establishing a Christian militia.

Those who favored that approach, who were in the minority from the beginning, argued that over time the SLA was likely to crumble, which drag the IDF back into Lebanon. Instead of defending the Galilee, we would find ourselves defending the SLA. This idea was rejected because it was felt to entail more risks, especially against the backdrop of political criticism of those who supported the war and opposed withdrawal. It was quite clear that a failure of the new concept of the security zone and the SLA would likely bring Israel back to Sharon’s security ideas about Lebanon.

The other approach was not without risks either, including being drawn back continuously into the Lebanese quagmire. From the beginning it recognized that there was no decisive solution to the problems of security on the northern border. To try it would be to enter a grey area, a great unknown. A year later the same questions persisted. When Hizballah began its organized military attacks on the outposts of the SLA, apparently with the advice of Iranian experts, there was the fear that Lahad’s army would not hold its own. Many of its soldiers were killed and its positions overrun for more than a few hours. The SLA was not prepared for these sorts of actions. The need to move around regular axes in the security zone exposed it to attacks by an enemy that was partially underground. When Israel began building a line of outposts for the SLA, the impression was created that we were repeating the mistake that we made along the Suez Canal and reestablishing a kind of Bar Lev line that might be even more vulnerable.

A Christian Army

The SLA did not crumble. It held on, although it is obvious that it could not have done so by itself. Without military assistance from the IDF, without Israel’s financial and logistic assistance, the SLA would have little prospect of holding out for very long. It is completely dependent on Israel.

In the past the SLA suffered a decline in its ranks, including many defections and desertions. Today its numbers seem to be increasing. Its strength has increased to about 2,600 men, and it seems that there would be no problem drafting more if it should choose to do so and if there were money to do so (mainly because of the economic situation in Lebanon). There has been an improvement in its position; its military capability, relative to that of other militias in Lebanon, has improved. Most of the credit for this change goes to a military man with a good operational feel, Brig General David Agmon. Agmon introduced important changes in military training for the SLA.

Boot camp was increased from four weeks to 12. Special effort was devoted to the training and preparation of commanders in various courses, including armor and adjutancy. SLA soldiers go through courses in nursing, communications, and sabotage. They have a squadron commander’s course, and others go through an officer’s course.

The structure of the SLA has also changed. The area is divided into two territorial brigade commands, one in Marj ‘Uyun for the eastern sector, the other in Bint Jubayl for the wide sector. There are three battalions under each brigade. Of the 2,600 men in the SLA, about half are fighters, or, more precisely, in field units. Each battalion has three companies. Each platoon has a tank crew, a mortar crew, and professionals such as communications or sabotage specialists.

In addition to the six infantry battalions, there is an artillery battalion and an intelligence unit known as the “defense system,” which has been very successful in preventive intelligence. (The proof of that success is the relatively small number of attacks within the security zone). Their weapons are also better. They have more night vision devices. Instead of the old Sherman tanks, you can now see Russian T-55’s.

One old problem remains, that the SLA is mostly Christian, even though it defends an area mostly populated by Shi’ites. Of the seven battalion commanders, one is a Druze, another is a Shi’ite, the rest are Christian. Today there is one battalion, most of whose members are Druze, and another which is mostly Shi’ite, and in three of the Christian battalions, there is one Shi’ite company. Shi’ites can also be found among the people in armor, but in general this problem has yet to be solved. Lahad’s independent force in Jezzine is entirely Christian. This force includes SLA people, Sham’un supporters, and Phalangists from the north, all of them under Lahad’s command.
Changes in the SLA

Under General Lahad and Brig General Agmon, the SLA has taken on more of the character of a military organization. This can be seen, among other things, in the ratio of casualties between the SLA and Hizballah. While in 1985 and 1986 it was 2:1 in favor of Hizballah, it has gone to 5:1, and in some cases even 7:1, against Hizballah in 1987. This is one of the reasons for the loss of military momentum by Hizballah, which has suffered heavy losses and which, thus far, has not been able to move the SLA or capture its string of positions. This will weigh heavily on them so long as they remain in confrontation with Amal in South Lebanon, with no direct military assistance from the soldiers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard.

Has the security zone, including the system left behind on the border, proven itself? The past three years would seem to give a positive response. That does not mean that the price was cheap or that an impenetrable barrier has been created or that the shellings from Lebanon have stopped completely. The price has been paid by IDF soldiers and even more by the soldiers of the SLA. The number of IDF soldiers killed in various actions in the security zone and in the terrorist penetration with the glider is 36. Another 64 were wounded and two were kidnapped (not taking into account the captured navigator). As to the casualties among the SLA, there are different figures. The unit coordinating activities in Lebanon says more than 120 were killed over three years, while IDF intelligence says 64 dead.

Good Internal Security

The positive response is the result of the fact that our northern settlers conduct their daily lives in relative quiet. Over the three years since the withdrawal, no Israeli citizen in the north has been killed by terrorist activity or by cross-border shellings. In those three years there have been about 60 firings of Katyushas into Israeli territory, but because they were fired from a greater distance, which makes ranging difficult, it is hard to hit the target.

The bottling up of terrorist activity is now accomplished much further forward, deep in the security zone along its northern border and not along Israel’s northern border, which the northern settlements sometimes straddle. That is, the security zone was meant to serve as a kind of breaker system for Israeli settlements. Those gangs that have gotten to the system’s fence (there have been 10 such incidents in 1988) have been repelled. The same was true in the case of the glider penetration.

Internal security within the security zone, within which about 200,000 people live, is also relatively better than in the past, especially when compared to other areas in Lebanon, especially in Beirut. Movement within the zone is relatively free, while on the highway from Tyre to Beirut, for example, there are about 30 roadblocks, at many of which you have to pay. Instead of 329 incidents of rocket and mortar fire into the zone in 1985, there were 140 such incidents in 1987. Thus far in 1988 there have been 85 such incidents.

The Price

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attempts at penetrating the fence</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5/15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encounters in the zone</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katyusha fire into Israeli territory</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katyusha and mortar fire into the zone</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF dead</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF wounded</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLA dead</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) In 1986 two IDF soldiers were kidnapped by Hizballah

(2) There is a higher estimate of SLA dead in the office of its activities coordinator in Lebanon.

Source: IDF spokesman

Economic Anarchy

It would be a mistake to think that the problems in the security strip are limited to security questions. The establishment of the security strip from a military point of view reawakened the basic economic questions. Maintaining the SLA and the civil administration in the security zone costs Israel 35.5 million shekels at 1987 prices. This budget is divided between the Treasury Ministry (5.5 million shekels) and the Defense Ministry. It now turns out that it is not enough:

The security zone has a strong lobby in Israel, including defense circles who claim that Israel has no choice but to infuse additional funds into the area. They argue that if you want to maintain an army of mercenaries in a deteriorating country, you cannot ignore the deterioration of the civilian infrastructure in the area that the mercenaries come from, and which they are defending.

However in Lebanon there is also economic anarchy. The country’s framework is collapsing. The economic system is like that of the Middle Ages. There is a local economy based on the activities of rich families with ties abroad. Investment in Lebanese infrastructure stopped years ago. Some of those systems, like electricity and water supply, still work, but there is no proper maintenance, no development, and what still exists is slowly deteriorating along with the services. The same is true of salaries. Where the salary of a teacher in the security zone (which he received from the Lebanese government) was 80 dollars a few years back, it is today worth about
30 dollars. Many teachers say that they will stop working. In that case, the refuge of the children will be the Shi’ite schools of the clerics close to Hizballah who are financed by Iran.

Financial Aid to Political Friends

The Arab states and Iran will send in money from time to time when they are looking for political objectives. Now this lobby is calling for Israel to join the process, to invest in and assist the civilian sector, as well. The argument is that we want the security zone to be in a better economic and not just defensive posture than the other areas. In such a situation the population, including those living north of the zone, will have an interest in preserving its existence. They claim that Israel’s involvement in the future will be more economic than military and that the number of IDF soldiers will be reduced as time goes by. This is the opinion of the civil administration in the zone. It has garnered support from the office of Uri Lubrani, the coordinator of activities in Lebanon, and has had other consequences. The Chief of Staff sent Brig Gen Efraim Sneh to do a special study on the civil economy, and it has been reported that he also supports the expansion of economic aid.

The proposal is not to not make do with increasing the number of workers from the security zone in Israel (who number about 1,150 today, most of them in industry and services, with some in agriculture and even fewer in construction), but to invest more in the crumbling infrastructure of the area. For example, to invest in ruined highways and water sources, including drilling; to improve the electric system and, as much as possible, cut off dependence on the electric station in Sidon. The proposal also includes improving teachers’ salaries, setting up a university branch and looking for sources of employment via industrial development in the south so that high school graduates will not rush to leave the security zone. Likewise, it has been proposed to expand the hospitals in Bint Jubayl and set up local clinics for family practice. There is even talk of establishing a police department, in addition to the SLA, based on the Lebanese gendarmerie, to deal with public order and normal criminal matters.

That is a lot, but the people in the civil administration in the security zone argue that they need half a million dollars a month. Meanwhile they have allowed General Lahad more “play” with the funds at his disposal. He can, for example, decide on certain purchases within Lebanon, since some goods are cheaper there (for example, diesel fuel, which is 0.54 shekels in Israel as compared to 0.30 shekels in Lebanon—in dollars; or concrete, which is 108.55 shekels in Israel, but can be had for 79.45 shekels in Lebanon).

UNIFIL Forces

The future of the security zone cannot be discussed without considering the UNIFIL forces. They remind us day and night that the system of relationships on the northern border is not confined to what goes on between us and the Lebanese or between us and the Syrians or, lately, also the Iranians. UN institutions are also involved, along with all the countries that contribute forces to UNIFIL. This system of relationships was influenced in the past by regular confrontations between the SLA and UNIFIL units.

The impression is that over the past year, there has been a moderation of these incidents, whether because discipline has improved within the ranks of the SLA or because it has gained self-confidence. But surprises can always be expected in this area. The basic problem is due to the fact that the UN, as well as countries contributing soldiers to the international force, are tireless in their demand to implement the UNIFIL mandate as spelled out by the Security Council; namely, that Israel complete its withdrawal from Lebanon and UNIFIL deploy its forces all along the Lebanese-Israeli border. In the present situation, there is no prospect that Israel will accede to that. Proposals to transfer responsibility to Amal are not possible politically, but it seems to me that, in any case, it is impossible today in the situation where Amal is not sure of itself against Hizballah, the Palestinians and the Iranians. In the past two attempts were made to transfer certain territory in the security zone to UNIFIL. In the first instance the attempt failed because a short time afterward there was firing into Israel from near the Huqan borderpost, has thus far succeeded. The SLA evacuated a distant position. UNIFIL took over a part of the position and in the other part prevented the entry of Hizballah and Amal. It was a boon for the Shi’ite villages nearby. But that does not mean that Israel is ready to expand the experiment to other places in the zone.

Some security elements claim that UNIFIL is superfluous, and that if it were to leave, the security situation would not worsen. This opinion is not accepted elsewhere. The international force occasionally stops gangs on their way to Israel, but once it relieves them of their weapons (which is not always the case), it lets them go, and they just try again.

After the French left UNIFIL, because of pressure from Hizballah and the fear of involvement with the kidnappers of the hostages, the idea has gained ground in Israel that even if UNIFIL has increased the stability of south Lebanon, that by no means implies that it can be relied upon for security along the length of Israel’s border. It is too much of a risk when dealing with a country like Lebanon. Meanwhile a new problem is developing between UNIFIL and a portion of the Shi’ite population in the south.

It seems that around the UNIFIL staff, where about 2,000 people are concentrated, a business and entertainment center has sprung up that bothers the local population. Entertainment houses and even a casino have opened up. Prostitutes have come in from the Philippines and Scandinavia, and there are lots of good times.
Don't Become Complacent

The picture that you get from the three years that have gone by since the Israeli withdrawal is of a security zone that is entirely stabilized, and that things will always be that way. But we must not allow ourselves to be blinded by this relative success. Just as all of Lebanon is characterized by instability, there are plenty of unstable factors in the security zone, too. Many forces in Lebanon oppose the existence of the security zone, and they might ignore into a struggle in the future that would be supported by Syria, as well. That does not mean a collapse of the zone, but it would immediately force the IDF to increase its presence in south Lebanon. Even a larger Iranian military involvement would likely bring about such a situation.

As long as the present situation continues in which there is no political responsibility in Lebanon, Israel cannot rely on the UN to play the same positive role that it plays, for example, on the Golan Heights, or that the multinational force plays in the Sinai. There both sides are interested in peace. It might be possible to achieve unwritten agreements with Amal in the area, despite the fact that it has ties to Syria and has demonstrated military weakness in the al-Biq'a and South Beirut. It has nevertheless had success in the south, in no small measure to the fact that Israel stands on Hizballah's flank and is willing to attack it from the rear, as she did in the latest forays. But the feeling in Israel is that we cannot afford to experiment. For example, to tell the SLA to take off for a few months until we can see if the arrangements with Amal pan out. Who among us would claim that after such a failure the SLA could be resurrected?

Therefore a new tune is being heard in defense circles today. No more aid to the SLA until the situation in Lebanon stabilizes, but the present situation in the security zone is irreversible. This approach means that Israel will stay in South Lebanon forever, or at least a new Lebanon arises. Until then one careless senior Israeli commander or one insensitive Minister of Defense would be enough for the situation to deteriorate to the point where we were felt to be a conquering force. Thus the situation has been created where the SLA and the security zone are indeed dependent on Israel, but Israel is no less a captive of the SLA.

09794

LIBYA

Recommendations Aim at Promoting Fishing Industry

45040204 Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 9 Jun 88 p 3

[Text] The General Popular Committee for Marine Wealth has wound up its second meeting held in the last two days. This meeting studied ways to implement basic popular conferences' resolutions pertaining to marine wealth and the realization of the highest growth rates in this vital field.

The committee also discussed several topics of concern to this sector, including the provision of refrigerated means of transportation, subsidies to marine wealth projects and corporations, preparations for the sardine and tuna processing season, dredger maintenance, and the provision of spare parts.

During its second meeting, the committee adopted several recommendations and resolutions aimed at developing and bolstering this sector and raising performance levels to realize expectations of how best to exploit marine wealth resources by centralizing trained and qualified elements in the marine wealth field. Exploitation is to be done through establishing a marine biology research center to conduct studies and necessary surveys of the Libyan Arab shores, using all available capabilities to support this center, underscoring the need to take advantage of the Jamahiriya's participation in international organization in preparing the necessary studies and surveys to determine fish supplies and polluted areas and speeding up the drafting of laws and bylaws regulating the marine wealth sector.

The committee also underscored the need to produce the necessary dredger maintenance funds as fast as possible; to provide technical expertise to run the Zuwarah sea fishing port; to forbid any side whatsoever from issuing fishing licenses to foreign ships in territorial waters; to review all previous licenses and amend them in accordance with the terms and precepts set by the General Popular Committee for Marine Wealth; to seek to put all fish and tuna factories in operation at maximum capacity and to supply them with spare parts, maintenance, and a two-shift system instead of one extended shift; to require companies to pay up loans acquired from banks and national companies via the General Popular Committee for Marine Wealth; to concentrate on the cultivation of salt water fish; to furnish all the requirements of the fish farm projects; to market fresh water fish production; to hasten the construction of refrigeration facilities to increase storage capacity; to set new fish prices that take into account fishing equipment costs and the real work fishermen put in to ensure equity.

In addition, the committee underscored the need for fishing cooperatives to participate in production and to coordinate with municipal vocational training committees in drawing up a program for the sea fishing sector; setting up training centers in littoral municipalities, requiring sea fishing companies to participate in training programs as well as tending to health conditions in factories—concentrating on female workers' problems as much as possible—and forming health oversight committees in all factories.

The committee's resolutions and recommendations included the establishment of three major sea fishing companies—one in the eastern region, one in the central region and one in the western region—as well as a fish processing company, a maintenance company, and a fish farm project.
The committee also discussed in its second meeting the scientific project for the Tripoli municipality work plan and decided to expedite coordination with the Tripoli municipality popular committee regarding implementation of the plan approved for the Shi'ab sea fishing port, to approve the internal organization project for the marine wealth secretariat, to subsidize and promote sea fishing, and to ask the General Popular Committee to exempt fishing equipment from customs duties.

Moreover, the committee's meeting came out with several recommendations and resolutions pertaining to sea fishing subsidy, the provision of fishing gear, and solving all problems facing fisheries and fishermen. The committee also studied several proposals and reports submitted by sea fishing and production managers.

The committee will hold its third meeting in the next few days.

12502

MOROCCO

Fund-Raising Campaign for King Hassan II Mosque Underway
45000173 Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French 27 Jul 88 p 3

[Excerpts] His majesty the king, may God glorify him, has officially opened the national fund raising campaign for construction of the Great Mosque of Hassan II in Casablanca in his name and the names of their royal highnesses the princes and princesses on Wednesday, 20 July, 1988.

This campaign, which is taking place in an atmosphere of voluntary service, enthusiasm and popular spirit, effectively reaches all of the prefectures and provinces of the kingdom, where close to 6,500 pledge offices are distributed by economic region as follows:

The central economic region with a population of 6,616,343 has 1,548 offices, equal to 4,274 residents per office; the southern economic region with a population of 2,686,348 has 1,001 offices, equal to 2,622 residents per office; the northwest region with a population of 4,791,259 has 912 offices, equal to 5,255 residents per office; the north central office with a population of 2,796,900 has 719 offices, equal to 3,889 residents per office; the Tensift region with a population of 3,424,861 has 1,580 offices, equal to 2,173 residents per office; the south central region with a population of 1,763,799 has 342 offices, equal to 5,159 residents per office; the eastern region with a population of 1,721,024 has 394 offices, equal to 4,364 residents per office; for a total of 23,810,535 residents and 6,497 offices, which is equal to 3,665 residents per office.

The total number of contributors as of 24 July 1988 was 894,172, and the total amount of the pledges was 164,722,947 dirhams distributed by prefecture or province. It may be noted that the central economic region, excluding Casablanca, has registered the greatest participation, the provinces of Settat, Beni-Mellal, El Jadida, Khouribga and Azilal occupying first, second, third, fourth and sixth place respectively. During the start-up period of the campaign, which was characterized by the gradual setting up of structures and preparations for the Feast of 'Id al-Adha, a median contribution of 4 billion centimes was achieved. According to circles close to the contribution offices, the participation of citizens will increase during the coming days, particularly in large towns which are mobilizing little by little.
BANGLADESH

Report on Meeting of Joint Panel With Iraq
46001679 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Jul 88 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Dhaka Baghdad Accord To Expand Bilateral Ties"]

[Text] The second meeting of the Bangladesh-Iraq joint economic commission concluded in Dhaka on Thursday with both the sides agreeing to expand the existing bilateral economic and trade relations between the two countries, official sources said, reports BSS.

The two-day meeting held in "a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding" took a number of decisions for "further manpower and technical cooperation between the two countries, the sources said.

An agreement was also initialed at the end of the meeting which was signed by the visiting Iraqi Minister for planning, Dr. Samal Majeed Faraj, and the Labour and Manpower Minister, Mr. Sirajul Hossain Khan, on behalf of their respective sides.

An official Press release issued at the end of the talks said; the meeting also reviewed the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first meeting of joint commission held in Baghdad in 1983.

It was agreed in the meeting that in view of the cordial relation between Iraq and Bangladesh, any renewal of the manpower protocol of 1984 was not essential, and that the employment condition and terms of the Bangladeshi workers recruited under that protocol would continue to be governed by the provisions of the protocol and the banking agreement made under that protocol.

The Iraqi delegation held out the assurance of taking necessary steps to resolve various problems of Bangladeshi workers in Iraq and also for providing facilities to Bangladeshi recruiting agents to visit Iraq.

The joint commission was of the view that there were considerable scope and prospect for further expansion and diversification of trade between the two countries, specially in non-traditional items.

Both sides on the commission exchange lists of exportable goods of their respective countries. The list of exportables from Bangladesh comprised 24 items including copper wire, transformer, safety razor blade, diesel engine, ceiling fans, insulator, shrimps and prawn, paper and paper products, jute carpet, pharmaceuticals, hard particle board, readymade garments, leather and leather goods, tobacco, handicrafts, sanitary wares, safety matches and some other items.

Nine exportables from Iraq include TSP fertilizer, sulphur, cement, dates, syrup, dry batteries, blankets, electric transformers, electric metres, the Press release said.

Both sides agreed to strengthen cultural cooperation and exchange cultural troops between the two countries.

The Iraqi side also took note of certain problems of Bangladesh Biman and of some Bangladeshi construction companies, and assured that these will be looked into.

It was agreed that the third meeting of Iraq-Bangladesh Joint Commission will be held in Baghdad in 1989. The date would be fixed through diplomatic channel.

Dr. Faraj extended an invitation to Bangladesh Labour and Manpower Minister Sirajul Hossain Khan to visit Iraq. The invitation was accepted.

/12223

Papers Report on Visit of Pakistan Commerce Minister

Remarks to Press Agency
46001678 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Jul 88 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Pindi Ready To Provide Anything Dhaka Needs"]

[Text] Pakistan's Federal Minister for Commerce, Finance, Planning and Development, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq, arrived in Dhaka on Thursday on a week-long visit to Bangladesh at the head of a ten-member delegation.

He was received by the Information Minister Mr. Mahbubur Rahman, at the Zia International Airport.

Talking to BSS, Dr. Haq said that Pakistan was keen to expand existing bilateral economic and trade cooperation with Bangladesh.

He said he had come here at the directive of President Ziaul Huq and was carrying some concrete proposals for widening economic cooperation between the two countries.

The Pakistani Minister said that his government was ready to extend long-term soft credit to Bangladesh for procuring light engineering goods, sugar plants power plants, tractors and agricultural machineries from Pakistan.

In exchange, Dr. Huq said, Pakistan would increase its quantum of imports of tea, jute and jute goods, "Pakistan will attach top-most priority to Bangladesh in meeting her import requirements", he said adding, by now Bangladesh has emerged as an industrialised country.
Dr. Haq expressed the hope that the official talks with Bangladesh authorities would be very fruitful and the outcome would be a milestone in the economic cooperation between the two countries.

The economic and trade cooperation between Pakistan and Bangladesh could serve as an example to other countries in the context of South-South cooperation, he said.

In this connection, the Pakistani Minister said that he had proposed holding a conference of the finance and planning ministers of the SAARC countries before the next summit for evolving a preferential trade arrangement among the countries of the South Asian region.

When asked about the Pakistani proposal for extending a credit of 50 million U.S. dollars to Bangladesh, he said the issue would come up during the official talks and added Pakistan’s proposal in this regard would go beyond Bangladesh’s expectations. “Pakistan was ready to provide anything Bangladesh needed”, he added.

Replying to a question on stranded Pakistanis, Dr. Haq said Pakistan was keen to resolve the issue amicably and peacefully. “We have received very enthusiastic response from the probably donors for funding the trust formed in this regard”, he said adding, the fund would be available within the next year and enable us to start the repatriation operation.

Dr. Haq said stranded Pakistanis would be settled in a natural way and they would be provided with homes and jobs.

Information Minister Mahbubur Rahman and Pakistan Ambassador in Dhaka were present during the briefing.

Dr. Haq hinted at the prospect of a long term agreement on buying jute tea and newsprint from Bangladesh and supplying raw cotton from Pakistan.

Supply of thirty thousand tons of sugar and one lakh tons of cement from Pakistan was also being negotiated, he added.

He said during official talks both sides explored areas of preferential trade. Pakistan offered to Bangladesh trade on Taka account. Pakistan had not extended the facility of trade in local currency to any other country, Dr Haq added.

He also hinted at the prospect of a joint committee of chambers of commerce and industry of the two countries. Private sector traders from both sides are keen on it and we shall, god willing, be setting up the committee, he said.

He described the official talks as significant and constructive for expansion of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Import, Export

Dr. Haq told a correspondent that Bangladesh imports from Pakistan during the ten months ending April last stood at 69 million U.S. dollars and export to Pakistan at 43 million dollars.

Bangladesh officials later said Pakistan was enjoying favourable position in cash trade but, taking STA into account, Bangladesh was having trade surplus with Pakistan.

Asked about the prospect of joint venture Dr Haq said it was for the private sector to identify areas and scope. Personally I do not like joint venture in public sector for, the public sector is notoriously inefficient...many of those are now ailing.

He said jute industry in Pakistan was not operating efficiently and “we are to arrest its growth and rely on more supply from Bangladesh.”
Dr Haq told a correspondent that division of pre-liberation assets and liabilities did not come up during the talks. "The amount of goodwill we have are our assets", he said.

Non-locals

Dr Haq replied in the negative when asked if the issue of repatriation of stranded Pakistanis came up during the talks. But, he said, "We are extremely keen on resolving the long standing problem. It is our moral obligation, not a legal compulsion. They deserve home, normal life and job".

An estimated two lakh fifty thousand non-locals opted for Pakistan at the time of independence. They have been living in about sixty different camps and been awaiting repatriation.

Dr Haq said a trust fund had been established for raising five hundred crore rupees necessary for the repatriation. Pakistan contributed 25 crore rupees and Rabitatu-e-Alam-al-Islam, five crore rupees. "The repatriation will start as soon as we mobilise half of the money required for it".

On strengthening bilateral relations he said "despite divide pulses of our two nations beat together. We equally share your distress and happiness".

Dr Haq was talking to newsmen in a homely and cordial atmosphere. But he suddenly turned stiff when a correspondent asked if Pakistan would compensate for Bangladesh bearing the burden of stranded Pakistanis for so many years. "My fried, we have hosted thirty lakh Muslim refugees from Afghanistan for eight years. The only bill we presented them is love and affection. We hope you will take it in that spirit".

/12223

Editorial Welcomes, Questions Repatriation Deal 46001676 Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 12 Jul 88 p 5

[Article: "The Repatriation Deal"]

[Text] The agreement between the Pakistan government and Saudi-based Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islam on the issue of the repatriation of 250,000 Bihar Muslim from Bangladesh to Pakistan was a long time in coming. But the fact remains that at last it has arrived; and for the first time in seventeen years, the Biharis, otherwise known as stranded Pakistanis, can look forward to being repatriated to the country they opted for following the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent nation. Yet, as one waits for the Pakistan-Rabita accord to take practical shape, one cannot help asking as to why the deal had to be struck after such a long period of time. When 380,000 Urdu-speaking Muslims, coming to what was then the eastern wing of Pakistan following the subcontinental partition of 1947, decided to adopt Pakistan as their country after December 16, 1971, the natural thing would have been to accept them as full-fledged Pakistanis. Of course, about 120,000 Bihari were resettled in Pakistan under an accord reached in 1973, but the majority have suffered, and for no fault of their own.

Perhaps it would be too early to feel euphoric about the latest agreement on repatriation. And why? For one thing, Pakistanis finance minister Mahbubul Haq has gone on record as saying, after the signing of the deal with Rabita, that the repatriation of the stranded Pakistanis will begin as soon as sufficient funds are collected. For another, there is still the issue of the modalities that are to be adopted in ensuring the success of the repatriation scheme. Such thoughts are enough to carry to one the impression that the overall process of repatriation involves, very importantly, the time factor. As for the financial aspect of the matter, about U.S. $280,000,000 are required. It is quite a staggering figure, but the silver lining in the clouds is the belief that Muslim states and individuals will contribute to the total, in the financial sense of the term. All said and done, the repatriation and rehabilitation of the stranded Pakistanis should be over in about two to three years' time. When the job is finally accomplished, it will be two decades after the Bihari Muslim first decided upon adopting Pakistan as their own land. Yet the thought that these hapless people will finally have made it is comforting enough, for the simple reason that they were not forgotten.

The setting up of a trust by Pakistan and Rabita is indeed a welcome step because it purports to deal with an issue that has eluded solution for a long time. In the seventeen years that have gone by, the Bangladesh government has been forced, despite its limited means, to care for the stranded Pakistanis. Other countries and relief organisations have come in too with assistance. For the stranded people themselves, life has been sheer agony all these years—and they have projected their suffering through such extreme means as hunger strikes. Certainly the constraints of the Pakistani authorities regarding the resettlement of a large number of people are to be appreciated. But the point that must be understood is that when people voluntarily wish to journey to a country they call their own, it is the responsibility, moral as well as political, of that country to fulfill their aspirations. The hope, now, is that the Pakistan-Rabita agreement will pave the way to a better future for the Pakistanis now stranded in Bangladesh.

/12223

Press Reports on Dissidence in Opposition Party 46001677 Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 16 Jul 88 p 1

[Article: "Obaid Holds Separate Meet of BNP Leaders"]

[Text] The inner party situation of BNP took a new turn yesterday when a separate meeting of party central and
district level leaders was held in the city at the call of K.M. Obaidur Rahman and Barrister Abul Hasnat.

A press release issued after the meeting claimed Obaidur Rahman as secretary general of BNP and Jamaluddin Ahmed as a vice-chairman who presided over the meeting.

The press release signed by Jamaluddin Ahmed said the meeting reviewed the situation arising out of the dissolution of the party standing and executive committees.

According to the press release, 225 central and district level leaders were present at the meeting. The press release, however, did not mention the venue of the meeting.

The meeting urged Begum Khaleda Zia to call a party council meeting within the shortest possible time by announcing a date by July 31 and immediately dissolve the new standing and executive committees of BNP. The meeting also called for democratization of the BNP constitution and pursue democratic norms in running the party.

According to the press release, the meeting described the dissolution of BNP standing and executive committees by party chairman as “surprising” and “undemocratic”—which has caused adverse reaction among party leaders and workers. The dissolution of the committees has also damaged party image and caused despair among the people.

The party chairman’s sudden action has diverted the attention of the people from the anti-Government movement of BNP and the Government was allowed a sigh of relief though temporarily, the press release said.

It said the decision of dissolution of the two committees by Begum Zia violated the principles set for running the party by late President Ziaur Rahman who had founded BNP.

The meeting, according to the press release, referred to the last standing committee meeting where out of eleven members nine supported holding of council meeting and democratization of the party.

It said a small circle of inactive politicians surrounding Begum Zia for their self-interest influenced her to dissolve the two central committees and later they were shown as majority in the new committees.

It was said the BNP constitution allows not more than 140 members on the national executive committee of the party, but this provision has been violated by forming the new committee with 182 members.

Secretary General’s Statement
46001677 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 17 Jul 88 p 1

[Article: “All Is Not Well Inside BNP”]

[Text] The possibility of a rapprochement between the rebel group and the BNP leadership seems to be remote with the issuance of a strongly worded statement by BNP Secretary-General Abdus Salam Talukdar on Saturday. He termed the meeting of the rebel group presided over by Jamaluddin Ahmed and convened by Obaidur Rahman as unconstitutional and part of a conspiracy to weaken BNP.

In a statement to the Press on Saturday Salam Talukdar said that in the past the Government conspired to weaken the party by alluring many people to lucrative and elevated positions. The meeting held on Friday was a part of that conspiracy, he alleged. He said BNP was relentlessly fighting for establishment of democracy under the leadership of Begum Khaleda Zia. He asserted that the party workers, leaders and supporters would spoil recurrence of such moves to weaken the party.

But Our Varsity Correspondent reported that when the former BNP Secretary-General K.M. Obaidur Rahman came to Dhaka University campus he was greeted by a large number of students belonging to JCD, BNP student front on Saturday.

Political observers are keenly watching the development in BNP and any split in the party would weaken the democratic movement and the nationalist forces.

Replies to Begum Zia’s Charges
46001677 Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 23 Jul 88 pp 1, 8

[Article: “Obaid, 4 Others Reply but Hasnat Ignores Deadline”]

[Text] K.M. Obaidur Rahman Former Secretary General of BNP, has denied the charges brought against him by party chief Begum Khaleda Zia and urged her to withdraw the show cause notice served on him.

In his reply to the show cause notice yesterday Mr Rahman said “the allegations against me are ambiguous and vague. There is no room for conspiracy in my politics.”

Reiterating his earlier demand for dissolution of the new part committees, convening of national council session and democratization of the party Mr Rahman said ‘I hope you (Begum Zia), will accept the demands for in greater interest of the party and withdraw the show cause notice on me.’
The BNP Chairman on Thursday served notice on six front-ranking leaders of the party to explain within 24 hours as to why action would not be taken against them for violating party discipline.

Almost identical replies were sent yesterday to the Party Chairman by Messrs K.M. Obaidur Rahman, Jamaluddin Ahmed, Abul Kashem Ataudin Khan and Ahmed Nazir, copy of which were released to the press.

Barrister Abul Hasnat, a former Major of Dhaka city, however, did not respond within the 24-hour deadline.

BNP sources said immediately after receiving replies from the five leaders the party central committee went into an unscheduled meeting last night to examine the replies. The meeting at the party central office continued till late in the night. Its decision about the dissident leaders is expected to be available today.

Referring to the July 15 meeting of party leaders Mr Obaidur Rahman said it was within the knowledge of Begum Zia.

You (Begum Zia) will certainly remember that a similar meeting was held at your residence which demanded of the then party chief Justice Abdus Sattar to convene the council session and the proceedings of the meeting was released to the press. Our meeting on July 15 was essentially in line with the party constitution, and for the greater interest of the party, it was not a formal meeting but an informal one for the sake of the party, Mr Rahman said in his reply.

Giving details of his activities as the BNP Secretary General since March 1987 and in the past he said he had suffered imprisonment and harassment for advancing the movement against autocratic rule.

Ahmed Kamal

Mr Ahmed Kamal, brother of late President Ziaur Rahman has pleaded with the BNP Chairman to withdraw show cause notices against some party leaders and to resolve the crisis within the party through discussion.

In a statement to the press yesterday he thought the crisis could be averted with practising democracy with BNP and expressed the problem would be resolved through democratic way of discussion.

Zakaria

Zakaria Choudhury, a former Minister in a statement has urged all concerned in BNP to maintain party unity at all costs in the greater interests of the organisation and the people.

He said, the process of split in the party has frustrated the people.
She trained her gun point blank at the Government. "By a slip or by design I am not sure, the Government has publicly termed BNP as its enemy and another opposition party as its opponent," Begum Zia said and added "the Government has devoted itself to destroy the party spinning conspiracies and striking blows one after another to obliterate it."

She added that the attempts had failed to destroy the BNP. Now, what they failed to achieve from outside, they would try to do it from inside. The BNP had remained intact. It would not be fractured if one or two people deserts the ranks, Begum Khaleda Zia remarked.

Hinting at new personalities joining the party the BNP chairman said that a number of patriotic people from outside the organisation had expressed their desire to join the efforts to safeguard the party.

Begum Khaleda Zia said whatever actions she had taken including making of Obaidur Rahman as the secretary general of the party were in the interests of the party.

"You have spilled blood but we failed to reach our goal because of conspiracies by different alliances and parties otherwise the government would have crumbled in December last," she said and without referring to anyone asked whether everyone had done their jobs during the March 3 polls. It matters little who leaves the party or joins. Some had said they were the real leaders of the city. But those of you who had graduated from long terms in jail were the real leaders of the party."

Turning on the national issues BNP chairman urged all to defend the national independence and sovereignty, which, she said, is facing a grave threat. "They are constructing barrages to turn the country into a desert and building towers, trenches at the border. What all this indicates", she posed a question.

Begum Khaleza Zia, however, accused the government of not facing all these threats squarely saying that there was no one to protest as the country lacks a nationalist government. We did not take up arms for our independence to live as surrogates, she remarked.

Referring to what she said closure of search for oil at Panchagarh and violations of air space there Begum Khaleza Zia alleged that the government was not informing the people about the situation.

/12223

INDIA

External Affairs Minister Asserts Pakistan Has Bomb.
4624021 Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi 6 Aug 88 p 47

[Text] K.K.Tiwari became Minister of External Affairs during the last round of cabinet changes. What effect would it have upon the region if Pakistan has the bomb? And how would the Indian government look upon this? A discussion with Tiwari.

[Question] After Pakistan has made a nuclear bomb, what influence will this have on the Indo-Pak relationship?

[Answer] Our policy regarding neighboring countries is absolutely clear. If there is peace and stability in our neighboring countries, then there will be here also because their people's linguistic and ethnic similarities to those of India are very great. If there are problems in Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Bangladesh, they fall in India's lap as thousands of people come as refugees. In some countries, however, such a mentality is being created that failing to settle their own domestic quarrels, they blame India. Pakistan is doing just this. They keep bringing India's name up in many matters. We have tried to improve our relations with Pakistan. We want to strengthen our relationship with SAARC. Yet up to now Pakistan has assumed a negative attitude. Pakistan is accepting help from superpowers outside the region and is a toy in their hands. They take full advantage of this. They are extending their mutual quarrel in the Simla Agreement, there was scope for the solving of every type of differences of opinion. Pakistan, however, instead of improving the mutual relationship, made every issue international and took the help of non-regional powers.

[Question] What has India done to improve relations?

[Answer] Our Prime Minister proposed to Pakistan that we adopt a mutual peace, friendship, and co-operation treaty in order to remove all kinds of doubts. Under the treaty, one of the stipulations would have been that we refrain from attacking each others nuclear centers. In order to expand mutual relations between the citizens of the two countries, writers, poets, journalists, and parliamentary members would have been sent to each others countries. But Pakistan's attitude was very negative regarding these matters. They did not accept the proposal. Pakistan is under the influence of a big superpower.

[Question] Under which superpower's influence?

[Answer] Everyone knows this superpower's name. Pak is its puppet and is operating as its front line state. Pak is co-operating in all its interests. It has agreed to the building of military bases there. This brings instability to the region.

[Question] Is there any proof that Pakistan has a nuclear bomb?

[Answer] Everyone knows that Pakistan has a nuclear bomb. American intelligence also released this news and their administration has confirmed it. Pakistan in its own defense said that they haven't conducted a nuclear explosion, and that therefore the question of whether or not they have the bomb doesn't arise. The truth is that it is no longer necessary to explode in constructing a bomb. Effects can be ascertained by testing in the laboratory.
Israel has never exploded a nuclear bomb, but they have at least 100. Thus it can be seen that there is no necessity of testing. The father of the Pakistani bomb, A.Q. Khan, himself said that testing is not necessary in order to make the bomb. Those who have the formula can make it. Pakistan’s President Zia Ul Haq said the same thing in an interview with Time magazine. Pakistan also says the nuclear energy they have is for peaceful purposes. The power plants in the country use natural uranium and there is no necessity for enriched uranium. My question is: Why then is Pakistan making 90% enriched uranium? It is clear that it is for making a nuclear bomb. According to the information I have, Pakistan has several bombs

[Question] America is an opponent of nuclear proliferation. Why can’t they say something to Pakistan?

[Answer] This is a funny thing. America is immorally giving nuclear weapons to Pakistan. Due to this, risks to the security of the region have been created. America’s law is that they cannot give economic help to nuclear countries, yet they are immorally giving $4.2 billion of military help to Pakistan. They are constantly violating the Symington and Solarz amendments. America is such a country that it could have stopped Pakistan from making nuclear weapons, but did not. Now Pakistan is also obtaining nuclear weapon blueprints from China. These also will be used only against India. There is no necessity for use of the lethal F-16 airplanes and Harpoon missiles in Afghanistan. Yet these also have been sent. The picture is becoming quite clear.

[Question] What is India doing in response to Pakistan’s making nuclear bombs and their heavy military preparedness?

[Answer] We are ready to deal with any type of attack and won’t be lacking in any way. A security imbalance has been created in the region by Pakistan having made the bomb. Now India is compelled to review its own nuclear weapons policy and see whether or not it needs to make the bomb.

[Question] But if Pakistan suddenly attacks, can we make a bomb that fast?

[Answer] Pakistan will not be so crazy as to suddenly start a fight and also use the bomb.

Opposition Leader Challenges V.P. Singh To Clarify Policies
46240022 Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi
30 July 88 pp 33-35

[Excerpts of Interview of Chandra Shekar by Anurag Chaturvedi]

[Text] [Question] In some areas, there has been sharp reaction to the statement you made in Puna after the Allahabad elections by-elections. What did you say in Puna? Why did the opposition’s crisis suddenly increase after the elections?

[Answer] Only those who feel or sense a crisis can give this answer. I don’t see signs of a crisis in the opposition. Congress was defeated in the by-elections. This is indicative of a hopeful future for the opposition. You made reference to the statement in Puna. For the last few months, I have been trying to at least speak to people through the medium of newspapers. The press had invited me there. I was asked if I thought that as a result of the by-elections, the opposition had become strong. I replied that of course it had become strong. In winning the elections, the opposition had increased its strength while Congress’s had weakened. This is an auspicious sign for the opposition. There was another question in Puna as to whether this was especially important. We replied that it was especially important because Congress had made it a question of their prestige. A third question was whether this had brought strength to the unity. My answer was that the unity will not get stronger as a result of the elections, but instead due to current political circumstances. Today’s political circumstances are such that the opposition must be united. In every circumstance, win or lose, the opposition must be united. In Puna I of course had said that I don’t think the Allahabad by-elections were such an important occurrence for opposition unity. A fourth question was asked there concerning what I had to say regarding V.P. Singh’s policies. I said that he has opposed corruption and that this is very good. He was in the administration, he knows it well, and he has exposed it. This has brought the true nature of the administration before the public and we all co-operated in this. Again I was asked what I had to say regarding his policies. My reply was that he has not clarified his policies and has not made his opinion clear on the remaining questions. One journalist brought up the question of whether I knew the basic differences between the policies of Rajiv Gandhi and V.P. Singh. I replied that I couldn’t exactly say. As long as V.P. Singh doesn’t state his policies, it will remain difficult for me to say whether or not there are differences between he and Gandhi. If some people have a bitter reaction to this, then only they can make a psychological analysis of why that is.

[Question] But in Puna, you also said that V.P. Singh could not be an alternative, that it was necessary to find a substitute for him.

[Answer] No, I said that when there is talk of putting an individual forth as an alternative, that is not a real option. Individuals can be substituted for. Only policies can be an alternative. Even now I believe that if we have to look for an alternative to Congress, nothing will come from changing individuals. There has to be a change in policies.

[Question] The selection of the future Prime Minister has become the main concern and election topic of the opposition. What is your reaction to this type of talk?

[Answer] I don’t have any reaction. Ask those who are choosing the future Prime Minister. I am not entitled to choose the future Prime Minister, I have never been a
candidate, nor am I now. Up to now I haven't gotten near to this power. Yet some people are possessed with my ghost which rides upon their heads [they continue to fear me]. I feel sorry for these people and have sympathy toward them. Yet if some individuals understand themselves to be able to make or break the Prime Minister, let them have this pride. I am not in the competition for getting this type of pride and I'm also not in the race to be made Prime Minister.

[Question] Is it true that you secretly yearn to be made Prime Minister and that this very desire is creating obstacles for the other opposition leaders?

[Answer] Even if the individual who has no support, who has no power, had a yearning to be made Prime Minister, how could he create obstacles in the paths of others? Those who say this (laughs) don't acknowledge my importance in today's politics. Unimportant individual's yearnings can't create hindrances. I want to assure these people so that they don't get nervous on my account.

[Question] In your view, what will the political scene be like in 1990?

[Answer] There is a lot of debate over this. For the last 1 ½ years we have been hearing that the elections are about to be held. Many pre-eminent people and analysts have said this but my position has been that Rajiv Gandhi will not hold elections. When he does there will be an eclipse of his power and thus the elections could be postponed. Today also we all look upon the present situation from the viewpoint of electoral politics. A situation may arise in which the politics of tomorrow become the politics of resistance, politics of struggle, and a raising of voices against corruption and vice. All the effort going on now has no relation to the politics of resistance. In the politics of tomorrow, a clear perspective will be necessary. Dedication to an ideal will be necessary. To take society in a certain direction, awareness is required. People can sit in their houses and pull strings in politics. The chessboard may be laid out nicely but sometimes wrong moves are made. It is possible that before 1990 some people sitting in power will make the wrong moves as a result of which all of today's explanations and assumptions may prove to be mistaken. We could suddenly find ourselves in a situation that we are not mentally prepared for. Because of this, I have said again and again that where it is necessary to prepare for electoral politics, it is also necessary to prepare for the politics of struggle. Yet no one listened to me. It is well known that when there are politics of resistance, there are few people left.

Generally, people are going in different directions. There is another possibility; that of increasing enthusiasm for the opposition. The current Prime Minister has become so entangled in his misdeeds that it is possible that outside powers or journalists could release such information as to make it difficult for him to remain in the Prime Minister position. This possibility cannot be ignored. Even in this situation, the opposition may fall into difficulties. Assume that today's Congress Party freed themselves from this Prime Minister and made someone else Prime Minister. Thus the current aim of the opposition, namely, the goal of attacking, will be eliminated. For this reason the question of policies is also important. Yet it is also possible that if the Prime Minister is removed, another Prime Minister like him may be created. He, for only a few days also as the public will wait and see how he does. If the question of policies is not brought up, this type of possibility may be created.

**IRAN**

Official Denies Reported Purchase of American Helicopters
46400177 Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 19 Jul 88 p 3

[Text] Tehran—Central News Unit—An informed official in the defense ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in an interview with the Central News Unit, denied that Iran purchased military helicopters from America. He emphasized that the spreading of these kinds of rumors by the western press is done in order to avoid condemnation for the downing of the Iranian passenger plane by the American battleship in the waters of the Persian Gulf. This informed official, while rejecting the news of an arms deal between Iran and America via Spain, added that the defense ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran, relying on the talents of its own specialists, has developed a successful helicopter building program, and has successfully flown its first product.

Completion of IRI-Japan Petrochemical Complex To Begin Again
46400171c London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 4

[Text] The Japanese firm Mitsui—which is responsible for carrying out the joint project to build the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Complex in Bandar Shapur—announced that it is prepared to hold talks on completing this project with officials from the Ministry of Petroleum and the Iran Petrochemical Company. The news of the readiness of the Mitsui industrial group's willingness to resume construction activities on the Bandar Shapur Petrochemical Project came out after it was announced in the Japanese press that the Islamic Republic had accepted UN Resolution 598 and that there would likely be peace between this nation and Iraq.

Early last week an official of the Japanese Ministry of International Commerce and Industries announced that his country does not intend to renounce forever the continuation of work to complete construction on the giant Iran-Japan Petrochemical Complex. This official told the Japanese press that the Japanese government has not yet made a decision concerning the payment of export insurance claims to the Mitsui company.
Recently the Mitsui company asked the Japan Ministry of International Commerce for damages amounting to $3.4 billion because of the major losses it sustained because of the suspension of the Bandar Shapur Petrochemical Complex construction project.

In early 1987 the Mitsui company announced that it intended to withdraw from participation in the building and completion of the complex because of the constant attacks by Iraqi aircraft on the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Complex's installations under construction and also because the project was not economical.

Construction on the Bandar Shapur Petrochemical Complex, which began in early 1973, was stopped in the first years after the war between the Islamic Republic and Iraq began. The news of the interruption in this huge complex's construction was announced when more than 85 percent of the construction had been completed.

Trade Value With Turkey Reaches 118 Billion Dollars
46400170b London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 4

[Text] In addition to quantities of crude oil, the Islamic Republic will also export other goods and substances to Turkey this year valued at $60 billion. Non-petroleum goods that can be exported to Turkey include limited amounts of light industrial products, mineral materials and raw ore products, construction materials and some agricultural products. The value of the agricultural products that can be exported to Turkey in the current year is estimated to be about $15 million, the value of the industrial products about $10 million, and the value of the construction materials about $20 million.

On the basis of Article Six of the Economic and Commercial Cooperation Protocol between the Islamic Republic and Turkey, the text of which was recently approved in the Turkish parliament, in the current year Iran and Turkey will exchange a total of $1.8 billion in goods. The major part of Iran's exports to Turkey is crude oil, and in exchange Turkey will export to Iran quantities of industrial goods, agricultural products and foodstuffs.

Recently, in connection with the level of Turkey's crude oil imports, this nation's government statistics institute announced that in the first five months of the current year Turkey bought about 8.84 million tons of crude oil from various nations. This institute said that the value of the crude oil bought by Turkey in this period was about $100 million.

In its report, the Turkish government statistics institute announced that in the first five months of the current year this nation increased its crude oil imports by about 14 percent over the same period the previous year.

Elsewhere in its statistical report, this institute noted that in the period under discussion Turkey bought about 63 percent of all the oil it needs from Iraq. The quantity and value of the crude oil bought from Iraq in the first five months of the current year were 5.8 million tons and $694 million respectively. Turkey's crude oil imports from the Islamic Republic in the first five months of the current year were announced as 2.21 million tons valued at about $303 million.

IRI's UN Representative Interviewed by Israeli Paper
46400169b London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 3

[Text] In its Thursday evening program, RADIO ISRAEL gave a report on the interview with the Islamic Republic's representative in New York, Mohammad Ja'far Mahallati, by the Israeli newspaper YEDI'OT AHRONOT. However, the media of the Islamic Republic made absolutely no reference to this subject.

This is the first time that an official of the Islamic Republic—apart from his public image and true role—has spoken openly with an Israeli. This Israeli newsman asked Mahallati whether or not the establishment of a cease fire could change the Islamic government's hostile position towards Jerusalem. He answered: No, there is no such possibility, and the Islamic Republic's position towards Israel will remain firm. He added that the Islamic government has been steadfast on this matter since the beginning of the revolution and there is no reason to change now. He told the Israeli correspondent that he could not understand what relationship a cease fire could have to Israel. Mahallati was asked a question about the measures taken by Jordan on the West Bank of the Jordan River. He answered that the Islamic Republic supports any step that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. This comment by Mahallati was exactly the opposite of what ISLAMIC REPUBLIC RADIO said when it sharply attacked Jordan for doing this.

During this interview Mahallati refrained from making threats about Israel, the liberation of Jerusalem and the like. For this reason the reporter from the Israeli newspaper AHRONOT complimented Mahallati and called him a very polite man.

Mahallati, who does not have sufficient experience in diplomacy and cannot play a role in political affairs in in the solution of intricate matters, especially in the current sensitive state of affairs, at least refrains from the harsh and antagonistic ways of the Islamic Republic's former UN representative, Seyyed Raja'i Khorasani, who has now been elected as a Majlis deputy. In any case, the previous representative was also universal in the art of diplomacy.
Khomenyi Personally Praises Airborne Ground Forces

464000168b London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 2

[Text] The bravery and achievements of the gendarmerie units in the Mehran area, the units and airborne troops at the northwestern fronts and the patriotic popular, national and tribal forces at both fronts have been so great in stopping the Iraqi advances and driving their forces from Iranian soil in recent battles that the Islamic Republic's leaders—including Khomeini himself—have been compelled to praise them.

General Abol-Hasan Khorraram Rud, commander of the Ilam Gendarmerie Regiment—which was made up of worthy and brave Hamadan Gendarmerie officers—was able in recent battles with Iraq to help popular and patriotic forces stop the Iraqi invasion and drive them back. Unfortunately, however, he was martyred at the war front. At the northern front as well the brave and patriotic paratroopers, in more than 300 war missions, were able to play the most effective role in stopping the advance of Iraqi and Mujahedin forces. The role of the airborne forces was so distinguished that Khomeini himself wrote a note encouraging the commanders and paratroopers of Kermanshah and praising their bravery. Khomeini's hand-written note was delivered to the airborne troops the next day.

This is the first time that Khomeini has given a note to encourage army forces. Political observers have interpreted the open praise by the regime's leaders for the armed forces of the revolutionary guards as an indication of an increased role for the army, not the role of the revolutionary guards.

9310

Musavi-Ardebili: Hang Mujahedin-e Khalq Without Trial

464000172b London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 1

[Text] After the execution of seven Mujahedin in Kermanshah and one Mojahed in Ilam, the officials of the Islamic Republic showed in an angry reaction that they will deal very harshly with members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization in the future.

In the resolution of a demonstration march declaring renewed allegiance to Khomeini, officials of the Islamic Republic were asked to adopt harsher methods against the Mujahedin-e Khalq. In this week's Friday prayer sermon in Tehran, Musavi-Ardebili, the chief of the Supreme Judicial Council—which is considered the Islamic Republic's highest judicial office—said he will conform to the standards of justice, said that the people want the government to put aside administrative formalities in punishing the Mojahedin and execute them.

Musavi-Ardebili, who compared the legal trial of a criminal, even if he collaborates with foreigners and cases of treason, with administrative formalities, did not say what the view of the Islamic Republic's judicial authorities, who must necessarily carry out their responsibilities separately and independently from the government, would be in this regard.

However much the people of Iran have vigorously rejected the Mojahedin-e Khalq, he has made an undesirable effect on the people with such a clear remark about destroying them without a trial. An Iranian who heard Rafsanjani's remarks about how the Mojahedin in West Shah Abad were caught and killed on Tehran television told KEYHAN that after seeing the face of Rafsanjani, who said these things savagely, he understood the man's bloodthirsty nature. In Baghdad, a spokesman for the Mujahedin-e Khalq called upon the people of the world to pressure the Islamic Republic in order to prevent executions without trial.

Last week 'Ali Shamkhani, Rafsanjani's intelligence and security aide on the commander-in-chief's staff, announced new details of the Mujahedin-e Khalq programs in the attacks in the western part of the country.

He claimed that the Mojahedin-e Khalq, with 7,000 people in 30 organized regiments and with strong support from Iraqi armor and air power, planned to reach Tehran and overthrow the regime in a five-stage military campaign. He said that for these operations the Mojahedin have available 120 tanks, 488 personnel carriers, 90 70-millimeter mortars, 40 121-millimeter cannons, 150 40-mm-mortars, 30 106-millimeter cannons and 1,000 trucks and vehicles, all of which were destroyed by Iranian forces.

Shamkhani did not say how only 7,000 persons made use of all this war equipment, including 1,000 trucks and vehicles!

At the same time, while denying this, a Mojahedin-e Khalq spokesman in Baghdad claimed that there are more than 7,000 Mojahedin. He did not give a specific number.

At the same time, an intelligence official in the western part of the country claimed that a Mojahedin commander told the Iraqis during a battle that since their advance had been arrested by the resistance of the tribes and airborne operations, it would be necessary, in order to neutralize the airborne forces, to bomb the Kermanshah airbase with chemicals. This intelligence official claimed that ten minutes later Iraqi aircraft bombarded the area with chemicals.

At the same time, a military official in the western part of the country announced that after the defeat of the Mojahedin-e Khalq forces, a sharp disagreement arose between the Mojahedin and the Ba'athists leading to such a dispute that many Mojahedin plan to take refuge in...
Iran or go to Western countries. The same official claimed that a Mojahedin operational commander surrendered with his people to the Islamic Republic's forces. He gave no further explanation of this matter.

9310

Musavi-Ardebili: We Will Not Allow Monarchy To Revive
46400172a London KEYHAN in Persian
11 Aug 88 pp 1-2

[Text] The people's psychological struggle with the preacher regime on the occasion of the anniversary of the Constitutional Revolution was so intense that on Friday 14 Mordad [5 July] Musavi-Ardebili sharply attacked the Constitutional Revolution and those advocating constitutional monarchy during his Friday prayer sermons. He said: Those who lament the passing of the constitutional monarchy must know that we will not allow the monarchy to revive in Iran. In an interview, Minister of the Interior Mohtashemi said: The regime's most important opposition group is the Mojahedin, and we have not been able to destroy them.

Mohtashemi said: Now that the regime has accepted Resolution 598, there is no reason to weaken the revolution by doing this and leaving the way open for a return to the old way of living.

Musavi-Ardebili also said in the Friday prayer sermons: If the Iran-Iraq war ends, the people must not expect a return to the economic prosperity prior to the revolution, because an end to the war is no reason for an end to the revolution.

Musavi-Ardebili claimed that the revolution is continuing on its way. The war was just a diversion. Now that the war has ended the revolution will continue on its main path once again, and there is no place for opportunism or hope for an upper-level life!

Another method for the people's psychological struggle was that they not only condemned the Mojahedin for their cooperation with the enemy, but they said openly that the Mojahedin are preachers that wear hats instead of turbans.

The people also reminded the preachers in power that the revolutionary guards have not defeated the Mojahedin, but the we defeated them ourselves. Accounts of the flight of the revolutionary guards in the face of the Mojahedin at Karand and Shah Abad spread everywhere by word of mouth.

Even Musavi-Ardebili admitted with regard to this that the revolutionary guards at Shah Abad "or, in the words of the Islamic Republic, Islam Abad," wanted to turn back "meaning retreat" but one of the commanders laid down in front of a tank and said "If you turn back you will have to ride over my body."

In the people's psychological war against the regime, everywhere they attributed the defeat of the Mojahedin to the nationalist and monarchist forces, and they said that contrary to the regime's claims, they are not only staunch opponents of a Mojahedin regime, but the nationalist and patriotic feelings of the people are expressed in the form of the constitutional monarchy.

Radio and television became vigorously active, and prepared and put on so-called special recreational programming in which it derided the history and achievements of the constitutional monarchy, but their program was also defeated in this instance, because the people, despite their eagerness for news of the cease fire, openly boycotted radio and television, so that most of the radios were turned off in the lower-class cafes and public places, and even the Hezbollahis did not have the nerve to turn on the radios.

9310

Shi'a Leader's Death Provokes Strong Reaction
46400168a London KEYHAN in Persian
11 Aug 88 pp 1-2

[Text] Yesterday 'Alameh 'Aref Hoseyn ol-Hoseyni, the 42 year-old leader of the Shi'ites of Pakistan, was killed by terrorists. The Pakistani government is terrified of the consequences of this murder, fearing that with one week remaining before the month of Moharram [14 August - 12 September] it could cause a severe reaction from the Shi'ites of that country. He was also chief of the paramilitary branch of the political-religious party of the Fiqh-e Ja'fariyyeh movement, supporters of the Islamic Republic. However, as he was going to a mosque in the Peshawar area to lead the morning prayer, he was struck by a bullet. There were no witnesses in the vicinity of the incident, but a number of students who lived in a nearby building saw someone fleeing just as the sound of the shooting was heard. When the shot was heard 'Aref Hoseyn's guards were praying in a mosque in the same area. When they went to the victim's bedside, they saw that he had died from the bullet wound to his chest. They took one of the guards, who was so severely affected that he had tried to commit suicide with a pistol and badly wounded himself, to the hospital. A short time later the Pakistani government designated a commission for quick investigation of this incident, then Zia ol-Haq, the president of Pakistan, made a sudden appearance on Islamabad television and called upon the people to remain calm. However, he called this murder a plot by the enemies of Pakistan and Islam who seek to disrupt the solidarity of the people of that country.

The immediate reaction of the Shi'ites of Pakistan was to consider America or the government of Pakistan itself as the agent of the murder. Nesim Ahl, Pakistani minister of the interior, told correspondents in an interview that a foreign enemy was involved in this act. Indications are that because of this there will be demonstrations by the Shi'ites of Pakistan during the month of Moharram.
The Islamic Republic gave the strongest reaction to this assassination, and devoted most of its radio and propaganda programming for Saturday and Sunday evening to the glorification of Seyyed ‘Aref hoseyn ol-Hoseyni and his close and deep relationship with Khomeyini and the Islamic Republic. It considered America and Saudi Arabia responsible for this murder. The Islamic Republic, which looked upon this assassination as cutting off one of the avenues of hope for establishing an Islamic movement in the neighbor nations, immediately sent a delegation to Pakistan headed by Ayatollah Jannati. Ayatollah Jannati prayed over ‘Aref Hoseyn ol-Hoseyni’s body, and all the leaders of the Islamic Republic sent messages of congratulations and condolence to the slain man’s family.

‘Alameh ‘Aref Hoseyn ol-Hoseyni was an unequivocal supporter of Khomeyni and an advocate of Islamic government in Pakistan. He had vigorously attacked Saudi Arabia over the recent events concerning the pilgrimage to Mecca and called for the management of the cities of Medina and Mecca by an Islamic council. The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY has claimed that even now a number of ‘Aref Hoseyn ol-Hoseyni’s followers in Saudi Arabia are in prison for the crime of demonstrating during the pilgrimage season this year.

9310

Industrial Countries Compete for Postwar Reconstruction
46400171a London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 4

[Text] With the end of the war between the Islamic Republic and Iraq and the return of peace and stability to the region, the European industrial nations hope to do most of the reconstruction and development work as well as the work of repairing the ruin caused by eight years of battle. Last week, after the announcement of the Islamic Republic’s agreement to accept the articles of UN Resolution 598, commercial officials and government representatives from many European nations, including Greece, Turkey, Italy, Sweden and France, as well as Canada, New Zealand, Australia and Japan secretly or openly went to Tehran and attempted, in meetings with the Islamic Republic’s economic officials, to interest them in expanding commercial relations and making use of their nations’ industrial and consultative services.

Early last week, in addition to the announcement of the signing of a new commercial treaty between Italy and the Islamic Republic and the the expected expansion of commercial and industrial exchanges between Rome and Tehran, the European media printed news on the possibility of expanded commercial relations between France, England and several other European nations and Tehran.

Recently a European petroleum publication published news concerning secret talks between French petroleum officials and the Islamic Republic for the signing of commercial treaties and the exchange of petroleum for goods. According to the publication PETRO-STRATEGY the trip to Paris by the Islamic Republic’s commercial delegation—which took place early last week after the news of renewed political relations between Tehran and Paris—led to agreements in principle between the two countries concerning the possibility of Iran bartering oil in exchange for French goods. Apparently the Islamic Republic and France agreed during the talks that significant quantities of food produced in France would be exchanged for Iran’s crude oil. The value of food to be exported to Iran was given as $250 million, and the value of crude oil to be provided to French companies by the Islamic Republic was given as about $500 million.

Experts on Middle East trade believe that after the improvement of commercial and political relations between the Islamic Republic and England and the sending of this nation’s political representative to Tehran, there will be major efforts made to expand commercial ties between London and Tehran. According to information from reliable commercial sources in Tehran, the representatives of many English firms are now seeking, by establishing direct contacts with the Islamic Republic’s government organizations, especially the National Iranian Oil Company and the affiliated institutions, the Ministry of Industries and other government institutions, to obtain a major share of Iran’s development projects after the return of peace to this country.

Among the nations who have had the best luck in expanding commercial and industrial ties with Tehran can be mentioned Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the northern European countries Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Many economic observers view the Islamic Republic’s recent decision to renew political relations with Canada and to reopen its embassy in the capital of New Zealand as indications of an imminent expansion of economic and commercial exchanges.

As efforts by the Western industrial nations to expand commercial relations with Tehran continue, some of the Eastern bloc nations, not to be left behind their competitors, have also begun commercial and economic talks with the Islamic Republic.

Among the Eastern European nations, Romania has been the most successful in expanding its economic and industrial cooperation with Tehran. According to the Tehran press, recently, at the conclusion of the sixth economic meeting between the two nations in Bucharest, the Islamic Republic and Romania signed an economic protocol. The estimated value of the commercial exchanges expected in this agreement is about $1.2 billion dollars. The text of this protocol states that Rumania will buy $560 million in crude oil from Iran.
Reports received from Tehran state that on the eve of the Tehran Commercial Exposition, the Islamic Republic's commercial officials are making arrangements so that this exposition will be as extensive as possible. Economic observers believe that if the UN cease fire is implemented and if the return of peace to the area is likely, at the next Tehran Commercial Exposition a great many of the world's industrial nations—who seek to sell as many as possible of their goods and services to the Islamic Republic—will have an extensive presence.

9310

Khark Island Repair Estimated 1.5 Billion Dollars
46400171b London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 4

[Text] As soon as the cease fire is established at the war fronts with Iraq and the crisis in the Persian Gulf is ended, the Islamic Republic intends to repair Iran's crude oil export installations on Khark Island. Among post-war reconstruction projects in the Islamic Republic, special priority will be given to projects to put into operation several refineries damaged by Iraqi air attacks, repair oil wells and pump houses in various parts of the country, the repair and completion of oil installations on Laran, Sirri, and Lark islands, and finally the completion of petrochemical industrial installations in several parts of the country.

Quoting informed sources, the REUTERS NEWS AGENCY reported that the cost of repairing the oil terminal on Khark Island is estimated at about $1.5 billion. Continuing its report, this news agency writes: Iran's capacity to refine oil at its domestic refineries has dropped from 1.32 million barrels in the late 70s to less than 400,000 barrels in recent months. In addition to destroying the Abadan oil refinery, Iraqi aircraft have in the last few years done great damage to oil refineries in other parts of the country including Kermanshah, Tehran, Esfahan, Tabriz and Shiraz.

9310

Daily Blackouts of 6-7 Hours Reported in Tehran
46400168c London KEYHAN in Persian 11 Aug 88 p 11

[Text] The heat in Tehran during the second and third weeks of the month of Tir [25 June - 8 July] is unprecedented in the last 20 years.

The heat on most days during those two weeks was unbearable, and life was very difficult for Tehran residents, with a power blackout of several hours and the inoperability of home refrigerators and air conditioners.

On 13 and 22 Tir [28 June, 7 July] Tehran's temperature rose to 40 degrees centigrade. This temperature was equalled only on 13 Tir 1347 [28 June 1968].

Travelers who came to London last week from Tehran described daily life in Tehran in the months of Tir and Mordad [23 July - 22 August] as very difficult. A young woman told KEYHAN of London: Although I have been in London several days, I still worry when I am about to go out of the house about how I will be able to tolerate the sticky heat in my thick Islamic veil!

This woman also said: It is harmful when the power goes out in the homes. On the one hand there is the danger of food spoiling, and on the other hand, because the air conditioners do not work, it is so hot that one cannot breathe. Worst of all, no ice water is available.

Travelers said that the Tehranis are without power at least six or seven hours a day.

9310

Non-Oil Exports Drop 22 Percent
46400170a London KEYHAN in Persian 11 August 88 p 4

[Text] The value of the Islamic Republic's non-petroleum exports in the first three months of the current year, Farvardin, Ordibehesht and Khordad [21 March - 21 June] reached about $171 million, and in comparison with the value of the exports in the first three months of 1366 [21 March - 21 June 1987] this represents a decrease of about 22 percent.

The Public Relations Office of Iran Customs reports that during the three months mentioned the Islamic Republic shipped 258,000 tons of non-petroleum goods to the world's markets, thereby bringing in 12,084 million rials in foreign exchange into its treasury. In its report, Iran Customs notes that about 72 percent of the exported items in the first three months of the current year consisted of hand-woven carpets, pistachios and pistachio meats, various hides, copper, caviar and several types of traditional goods.

Statistics published by Iran Customs show that at the top of the list of the Islamic Republic's non-petroleum exports for the period discussed were various hand-woven wool carpets, weighing 1,611 tons and valued at 4,249 million rials. During this period the Islamic Republic exported 6,440 tons of fresh fruits and produce valued at 447 million rials and 18,057 tons of dried fruits valued at 2,841 million rials to buyer countries.

Concerning the Islamic Republic's non-petroleum exports last Khordad [22 May - 21 June], Iran Customs announced that a total of 122,000 tons of non-petroleum goods and substances valued at 6.22 billion rials were exported to other countries. Among these goods, hand-woven wool carpets weighing 748 tons and valued at 21.9 billion rials represented an increase of 133 percent by weight and 67 percent by value over the same period the previous year.

9310
Bazargan Again Protests Arrests of Associates
464000169a London KEYHAN in Persian
11 Aug 88 p 11

[Text] Last 10 Khordad [31 May], agents of the revolutionary komitehs used the open letter from Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the Society for the Defense of Freedom and Government by the Iranian Nation to Ayatollah Khomeyni as a pretext and arrested six of that society's prominent members, 'Ali Ardalan, Engineer Mohammad Tavasolli Hojjati, Hoseyn Shah Hoseyni, Hashem Sabaghian, Takavkol Amir Ebrahim and Nezam ol-Din Movahhed without any legal cause. Now, more than two months since that date, there is no word of them. Initially, Engineer Bazargan, who was waiting, protested on the society's behalf to those in power on 19 Khordad [9 June], to no effect.

Before the above persons were arrested, government agents completely took over the society's office. They took down the society's sign and carried away all its files, furniture and equipment. Bazargan's protests to recover those things were likewise to no avail. Several days later the society sent a letter to Ayatollah Montazeri, the heir apparent to the leadership, Seyyed 'Ali Khamenehi, president of the republic, and the the Supreme Judicial Council, protesting anew the occupation and plundering of the society's office and the arrest of the six members mentioned, especially since some of those arrested are old and sick and their families, knowing nothing of their circumstances, are deeply worried. At the same time, the Islamic Society of Engineers sent a letter to the Supreme Judicial Council protesting especially the arrest of two of its members (Engineer Hashem Sabaghian and Engineer Mohammad Tavasolli), and calling for their release.

In a public statement, the revolutionary prosecutor portrayed the arrested persons as nationalist heretics with aims parallel to those of world imperialism who were issuing propaganda in the interest of Iraq and insulting the families of martyrs. In a radio program, the regime's deputy minister of intelligence also called them disrupters of unity in the martyr-nurturing nation, followers of Americanized Islam and Iraqi spies. In a detailed letter from this society to Ayatollah Montazeri, he was asked: If people like this are beaten, imprisoned and overthrown in this way, then what refuge remains for the protection of the gains of the revolution and the Islamic Republic? If the Islamic government cannot tolerate such people, how can it claim to have freedom? Unfortunately the revolutionary prosecutor has adopted recourse that is not found in the law.

In its complaint to the Supreme Judicial Council, the society used a slogan to the effect that the revolutionary prosecutor's statement is a political statement, not a judicial statement, and since all the accusations that have been made against the society are political, according to Principle 168 of the Constitution those arrested must be tried in the courts in the presence of an impartial jury. Therefore, their prosecution is within the jurisdiction of the public prosecutor, not the revolutionary prosecutor.

The Society for the Defense of Freedom and Government by the Iranian Nation, in its second letter of complaint, protested to Seyyed 'Ali Khamenehi: We have always relied upon the law, and unlike some of those affiliated with the government who are pursuing their own ends, we have no other recourse. And also: Is the procurement of judicial rights only for those who support and defend the government, while others may be put down and imprisoned by any means available?

9310

Mujahedin-e Khalq Reportedly Capture Military Equipment
Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 3 Jul 88 p 2

[Text] Paris—INA—The Iranian Opposition organization, Mujahedin-e Khalq, announced that the National Liberation Army (NLA) captured huge quantities of weapons including tanks, artillery, and other military equipment worth approximately 2 billion dollars in the attack which it launched against the city of Mehran on 18 June.

The statement, which the organization released yesterday, indicated that 45 tanks, 38 troop carriers, 30 pieces of field artillery, 3,4 thousand pieces of weaponry, and other military equipment were captured.

It said that eight thousand Iranian soldiers were killed or wounded during the attack on Mehran and more than 1.5 thousand were taken prisoner.

The statement indicated that the tanks that were captured in the Mehran operation form almost one sixth of the total sum of Iranian tanks.

The statement mentioned that the amazing amount of military equipment that was captured serves as evidence of the complete destruction of two divisions of troops consisting of Khomeyni's guard and the army as well as reinforcements from other battalions that were sent to the area.

It added that the booty also consisted of instruments, machinery, and heavy equipment which included tractors, bulldozers, fuel tanks, electric generators, 53 Jeeps, 30 buses, 23 trucks, 14 ambulances, 20 motorcycles, 370 telescopes, as well as communications and duplication equipment. It also consisted of light weapons which included hundreds of handguns and light rifles.
It mentioned that the National Liberation Army launched a heroic attack on the 19th of last month against the city of Mehran which resulted in its liberation and the liberation of the heights surrounding it after fierce fighting.

Also, an official from the Iranian organization, Mujahedin-e Khalq, described the Khomeyni regime as a collection of gangs, like packs of wolves, that are afflicted by division and obvious collapse on the international level.

In an article published yesterday in Lebanon's AL-MAHIRAH magazine in which he spoke with 'Imad Musa, the magazine's special correspondent in Bagdad, the official said that Khomeyni no longer has cards to play after the battles of Faw and Shalamcheh which stripped him of the power to manoeuvre, escalated the crisis within his regime, and shook its political and economic structure. All that remains of the Khomeyni regime is a state of total bankruptcy.

He emphasized that the Mujahedin-e Khalq are going for the heart of the Khomeyni regime and striving to put an end to the dark period in which the Iranian people have lived under its oppression.
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