Near East & South Asia

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NEAR EAST

REGIONAL

Arabs Discuss Response to Israeli Nuclear Threat [London AL-HAWADITH 17 Jun 88] .......... 1
Challenges of Arms Sales, Production Policies [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL 16 Jul 88] ................. 3

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO Representative Says Abu-Sharif's Statements 'Not New' [Kuwait AL-WATAN 30 Jun 88] ... 5
Deportees Discuss Organizational Structure of Uprising [Kuwait AL-WATAN 30 Jul 88] .......... 6

EGYPT

Wafd Official Discusses Camp David, Potential Opposition Front
[Kuwait AL-QABAS 25 Jun 88] ..................................................... 11
African Bank for Development Funds New Power Station .............................................. 16
Israeli Examines Censorship of Palestinian Affairs ....................................................... 16
Two Oil Beds Explored Near Gulf of Suez ......................................................................... 17
New Port Opens in Rashid ................................................................................................. 18
Four Factories Open in Sadat City ..................................................................................... 18
Al-Fayyum To Use Waterfalls To Generate Electricity ..................................................... 18
Food Industries Show Production Increase ..................................................................... 19
Experts Discuss Potential Water Problems, Solutions [London AL-HAWADITH 17 Jun 88] ... 19

IRAQ

New Law Issued To Encourage Arab Investors [Dubayy GULF NEWS 12 Jul 88] ............. 20

KUWAIT

Committee Established To Reappraise Foreign Investments ............................................ 21
Naval Exercises 'With Live Ammunition' Announced ......................................................... 21

LIBYA

Diplomats in Malaysia Spearhead Asia-Pacific 'Offensive'
[Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN 11-12 Jun 88] ................................................................. 22

MOROCCO

Interview With Majority Leader Maati Bouabid [London AL-TADAMUN 11 Jun 88] .......... 23

SUDAN

Government Takes Measures To Halt Economic Depression
[Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL 25 Jun 88] ................................................................. 25
New Budget Reportedly Faces Widespread Opposition [London AL-DUSTUR 4 Jul 88] .... 26

SYRIA

Phosphates Exported to USSR ......................................................................................... 27
Construction Begins on $125 Million Dam Project ......................................................... 27
Production of Wheat, Barley Increases .............................................................................. 28
Report From Provinces on Increase in Grain ...................................................................... 28
Logistical Problems in Record Harvest Reviewed, Discussed ........................................... 29
Al-Hasakah Peasant Federation Meeting ................................................................................. 29
Al-Raqqa Harvest Detailed ...................................................................................................... 33

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Iranian Trade With Dubayy at ‘Standstill’ .................................................................................. 37
GULF NEWS Reports Oil, Gas Reserves Increased ‘Dramatically’ ........................................... 37
Editorial Discusses Cabinet Endorsement of Quota Rejection ............................................... 38

SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN

Cooperation Protocol Signed With Tajek SSR ........................................................................ 39
Education Ministry Receives Free Soviet Aid ........................................................................... 39
Transportation Protocol Signed ............................................................................................... 39
Gas Supply To Be Augmented From USSR .......................................................................... 39
Servicemen Participate in Rebuilding Projects ......................................................................... 40
Extremist Infighting Leaves 16 Dead ...................................................................................... 40
Badakhshan Lands Cultivated ................................................................................................. 40
Kunduz Lands Cultivated Mechanically .................................................................................. 40
Construction, Repair of Schools Under Way .......................................................................... 40

INDIA

Report on Minister’s Talks With EEC in Brussels ..................................................................... 41
Writer Reviews Worsening Relations With Pakistan ................................................................. 41
Janata Said To Withdraw Support From Baliapal Agitation ...................................................... 42
V. P. Singh Tells Aims, Policy to Newsmen ............................................................................ 42
Analyst on Importance of Foreign Minister Appointment ....................................................... 44
Bharatiya Janata Asks New Probe Into Bofors ....................................................................... 44
CPI Leader Claims Left Gaining Strength in Punjab ................................................................. 45

IRAN

Delegation Requests Food From France in Exchange for Crude Oil ....................................... 46
REGIONAL

Arabs Discuss Response to Israeli Nuclear Threat
44040260 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
17 Jun 88 pp 29-30

[Text] President Husni Mubarak, while announcing his
country’s support for Saudi Arabia’s obtaining the new
Chinese CSS-2 East Wind missiles, paused to criticize
the threats coming from certain leaders of the Zionist
enemy, and to say: “What do the Israelis want? We know
that there is nuclear activity in Israel, and also that there
are nuclear bombs.” With that, the Egyptian president
has brought up the subject of a new stage in the equation
of Israeli nuclear activity—the existence of which had
previously been in doubt. This new stage poses a severe
challenge not only to Cairo, but to all Arab capitals as
well, in their efforts to meet the Israeli threat.

It seems that the issue was not a surprise to anyone.
Egyptian intelligence had been the first agency to con-
firm during the late fifties that the Dimona textile
factory was a nuclear reactor. Moreover, all observers
have confirmed that Israel was in fact prepared to use its
nuclear bombs if the situation became critical in the 1973
war, when it came closer than ever before to being
destroyed; to a certain extent, there had been an actual
threat prior to 1967. On the other hand, an Egyptian
expert on chemical warfare, who wished to remain
anonymous, disclosed that during the 1973 war Egypt
had been prepared to meet this possibility by “training
the joint services to carry out protective measures
against weapons of total destruction, including various
incendiary materials which Israel had used in its previ-
ous campaigns. The goal was for the forces to reach
a high level of competence in carrying out protective
measures against these weapons.” The proliferation of
information saying that Israel possessed nuclear weap-
ons and that it was prepared to use them if its national
borders were threatened, was a motivating factor for
protective measures, especially since protection compels
an enemy to reconsider its plans and sometimes forces it
refrain from using those weapons. The protective me-
asures were not limited to separate training; rather it
extended to joint training. There were problems. For
example, how could realism be achieved in training? It
would be necessary to depict semi-realistic situations,
and provide simulation that would depict what is sup-
posed to happen. In fact, the simulation of an atomic
explosion has been accomplished using gas substitutes
composed of harmless substances. Practical training was
not limited to members of the armed forces; instead, it
was extended to civilian production centers and posi-
tions. In addition, units were formed for searching out
radiation and chemical and biological elements, as well
as units for cleansing individuals, weapons, equipment,
the ground, and clothing.

A senior officer of the Egyptian armed forces, speaking
to AL-HAWADITH on the issue of Israel’s possession
of nuclear bombs, said: “There are a number of indications
which confirm that they have not carried out a nuclear
explosion, just as we have not observed one. They have
said publicly that they have not introduced nuclear
weapons into the region. But they might resort to using
a nuclear bomb if the traditional solution of using con-
ventional weapons, with which they have achieved their
goals in all previous confrontations, were to fail. There is
another question: against which targets would Israel use
it? Would the targets be civilian or military? If the targets
are to be military, Israel does not have the power to
destroy them completely. It is enough to say that 20
nuclear bombs could wipe out 40 battalions, and let us
remember that the Iranian Karbala’i assaults against Iraq
resulted in the loss of about 20 entire battalions. Let us
learn from the Iran-Iraq war, and from its consequences
and course of events, that strength of numbers, a feature
of Iran, does not determine the battle.”

The military commander added: “If Israel were to use
nuclear bombs against civilian targets, would it be pro-
tected from the effects of nuclear radiation, since it is
influenced by southeast and southwest winds? Moreover,
Israel is a state no more than 40 kilometers across,
and the fact is that the radiation from Chernobyl reached
several European states. Thus, Israel would not resort to
using these bombs unless it felt that it was threatened
with annihilation. In spite of that, indications are that
Israel’s capabilities so far would not enable it to use more
than 14-20 nuclear bombs.”

The Egyptian defense minister, Field Marshal ‘Abd-al-
Halim Abu-Ghazalah, recently spoke on this issue. He
said: “Precise studies based on estimations of the capac-
ity of the nuclear reactors and on the precise determina-
tion of the amount of uranium which could be in Israel’s
possession, including the uranium that it has been able
to smuggle from the United States, show it likely that Israel
could now have between 20 to 25 nuclear bombs of the
standard kind, that is, a 20 kiloton bomb. Twenty
kilotons means that the bomb’s explosion is equivalent
to 20,000 tons of explosive material, or equal to the
Nagasaki and Hiroshima bombs.”

It seems that the debate is still ongoing as to whether
Israel does in fact have the bomb, in light of the plan
which aims at what strategists call “deterrence through
uncertainty.” In regard to nuclear tests by Israel, Dr
Nafi’ al-Hasan, a Palestinian expert in this field, said:
“Israel has in fact tested its nuclear weapons, once in
1979 off the coast of South Africa, and perhaps once
again underground in the Negev desert, with a medium
explosive force.” He said: “Israel has technical problems
in the area of the actual application and use of nuclear
carriers and projectiles, and therefore Israeli experts are
trying to overcome these technical difficulties, as well as
political obstacles. With the help of a modern computer
system, which was bought from America, Israeli experts
have been able to master the problem of determining the
probable force of the explosion, estimate how effective it
would be under Middle Eastern circumstances, and
develop types and sizes that would suit the scenarios of
the next war. Israel has succeeded in obtaining from America 200 detoners of the Kraton type used in the manufacture of nuclear bombs. It seems that there is no longer much doubt about the matter, in light of the information that Mordekhai Vanunu disclosed and the documents which he presented, with 60 pictures of the Makhon II plant, where the nuclear bombs are manufactured. Scientists from Britain and the United States have examined them, and Theodore Taylor, who worked with Oppenheimer on the production of the first atomic bomb, in commenting on Vanunu's information, said: "No one should doubt that for at least 10 years, Israel has been more advanced than previously known reports and assessments have indicated."

Amin Huwaydi put an end to the debate over whether Israel has the nuclear bomb, setting forth four possibilities, namely:

1. That Israel does in fact have several nuclear warheads and systems for launching them. This is the most likely possibility.

2. That Israel has manufactured the parts for several nuclear warheads, and has kept them unassembled in storage to be reassembled in a short period of time ranging from weeks to days, depending on the need. This is the second most likely possibility.

3. That Israel has acquired the technical know-how to manufacture the bomb, but that it stopped at this point to avoid international complications and high costs. Its know-how is such that it could manufacture several nuclear warheads if the situation called for it, especially since it is one that has control over initiating a crisis. This is the third most likely possibility.

4. That Israel does not have the technical know-how to manufacture the bomb, and that consequently it does not have nuclear warheads at all. This is the fourth most likely possibility.

Amin Huwaydi, an expert in this field, added: "There is a golden rule in strategic actions which says that if we do not have certain information, the possibility remains and must be taken into account. So catching us by surprise these days would be difficult."

A group of experts with whom AL-HAWADITH met outlined two directions to be taken to confront the nuclear superiority on which Israel will continue to hold a monopoly for decades to come.

First: increased research on the possibility of the Arabs using chemical and biological weapons, since these weapons are among the basic deterrents against Israel, especially since, as Amin Huwaydi said, their manufacture is less sophisticated, they are easier to produce, and their manufacture requires less effort and is more easily done than that of nuclear weapons.

The benefit of this, as Amin Huwaydi said, comes from the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Arab side, 30 to 1 in favor of the Arabs, and 10 to 1 in favor of the confrontation states. This means that if Israel were able to kill 3000 Arabs, the Arabs could achieve exactly the same result if it could kill 100 Israelis, or 300 in the case of the confrontation states. This means that a minimal effort would be needed to have a deterrent effect, because what would be needed in that case would be to cause limited human casualties in the enemy's ranks.

Amin Huwaydi cited some of the statistics that came out in the report of the secretary general of the United Nations on the dangers to Israel of a nuclear war. The United Nations report states that if a field of operations were in a defensive posture, with four divisions supported by 100 airplanes distributed among 10 bases, such a field could be penetrated by a force of 12 divisions and several hundred airplanes. Another way to penetrate this field would be to use dozens of bombs with a force of 1-10 kilotons against the land forces, in addition to 10-20-100 kiloton bombs against the air forces. This would cause overall military and civilian casualties of more than 200,000 killed and injured. Applying those statistics to Israel, a sufficient deterrent would be for us to have the capability to inflict casualties of no more than 6,000 for civilians, and 1,100 with respect to the military, which could be accomplished with air raids and medium range missiles.

AL-HAWADITH can confirm from information that it obtained that chemical and biological weapons have reached an advanced stage of production in a number of Arab states, which fully realize that they are threatened by nuclear weapons, and that Israel will hold the monopoly in nuclear weapons for some time to come.

The second possibility for confronting Israel is to develop and furnish Arab deterrent weapons which, as Maj Gen Hisam al-Din Suwaylam says, would depend on long and medium-range surface to surface missiles. He added: "It can be assumed that Israel would hesitate to launch a broad campaign to destroy the Arab economic and urban structure, as long as there is an Arab deterrent based essentially on long range surface to surface missiles capable of inflicting substantial harm on Israel itself, in spite of the fact that Israel's capabilities in this field are superior to Arab capabilities. In spite of the rationality of this assumption, it is important from the Arab point of view not to depend solely on deterrence based on surface to surface missiles, for many reasons:

- The possibility that Israel might concentrate specially and with all available means on striking the bases of these missiles in a first strike, or in the first hours of any future wide-scale war.

- The possibility that Israel might be prepared, in the final analysis, to bear the losses that could be inflicted on it by the use of these missiles, so that it could enjoy freedom
of action in carrying out its plan to cause major damage to the Arab structure, whether by using conventional, non-conventional, or nuclear weapons. In any case, we can be sure that Israel pays special attention to the need to counter Arab long-range delivery systems which, they claim, have been furnished with chemical warheads. This would give them further incentive to strike deep with the intention of neutralizing the supposed threat, either directly, or through protective measures aimed at reducing the effectiveness of such weapons in the event they did in fact reach Israeli territory.

It is well known that if non-conventional deterrence were available to the Arab states, it would have many advantages. Medium range missiles could easily reach the heart of Israel, but they do not require intensive training, airports, airplanes, or a huge army of technicians to service the aircraft. They can achieve an element of surprise because of their tremendous speed, and cannot be intercepted with interception systems. They can be used in all air situations, and carry huge amounts of explosive materials over long distances. They are capable of changing course as did air to ground missiles, and they do not need an air projectile to be used, for they set out for their targets oblivious to hostile air activity, and they are also flexible and can be moved from one base to the next, and can be kept always in full readiness.

Because everyone understands the need to confront Israel's superiority in the nuclear field, we see that some Arab states are concentrating all their attention on getting medium range missiles. Some of these states are Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Some reports have recently stated that the Saudi missile deal has a value of 1.8 billion pounds sterling. It has caused the Israelis severe anxiety, especially since the CSS-2 or East Wind missiles have a range of 1700 miles and cover Israel in its entirety, even though China and Saudi Arabia have announced that the missiles do not carry nuclear warheads. In fact, Saudi Arabia recently signed the nuclear non-proliferation agreement. However, the Israelis fully understand that these missiles are a kind of non-conventional deterrence. The same can be said of the Iraqi al-Husayn and al-'Abbas missiles, which, despite Iraqi denials, are rumored to be Iraqi developments of the Soviet SCUD-B and SS-2 missiles. Iraqi officials say that the range of the SCUD-B missile is 280 km, whereas the range of the al-Husayn missiles is 650 km. Iraq is using these missiles to strike Iranian cities. Also, tests of the al-'Abbas missile have been successful. It has a range of 900 km, such that, in the final analysis, it covers Israel as well as Tehran and all other Iranian cities.

A question remains over what Syria and Egypt have in their stockpile, since they could be the two states most concerned about Israeli nuclear activity and military capabilities. Maj Gen Tal'at Muslim, of the Center for Political and Strategic Studies, says that Syria has obtained missiles known as "Furush 7," and SCUD-B, and SS-21 missiles, but mere serious and important than that is its attempt to strike a huge deal said to be for 500 SS-23 missiles. Even though that is not certain, if Syria were to get this kind of missile, as Maj Gen Tal'at Muslim says, it would acquire the means to achieve conventional static deterrence, or non-conventional if they were fitted with radiative, chemical, or biological warheads. Since it would be difficult for Israel to be sure of intercepting or destroying that many missiles, they would threaten Israeli cities and settlements.

It is well known that Syria is concentrating all its efforts on producing chemical-biological substances on a broad scale in two assembly places for chemical weapons that are operating at full capacity. It is known that the SS-21 missile can destroy air bases in Israel as well as other military bases. In any future war, these missiles would leave 5,000 dead and a large number of wounded.

That leaves Egypt, and as Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah said recently: "Egypt has begun to manufacture successfully the large SAM-2 missile. However, production costs are high, and funds are in short supply according to an article published in The FINANCIAL TIMES which said that Egypt is manufacturing a surface to surface missile. The truth is that Egypt originally had the Russian SAM-2 missile, and had successfully engineered it to reverse its anti-aircraft capabilities. We have launched a number of missiles, which have been 00 percent [as published] successful."

In the final analysis, Israel in its determination to hold a monopoly on nuclear weapons in the region has opened the door wide to missiles that have come to fill the Middle East, such as the Saudi, Iraqi, Syrian, and Egyptian missiles systems. These missiles have made the idea of secure borders, or fixed defenses completely obsolete.

12547

Challenges of Arms Sales, Production Policies
45040198 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 16 Jul 88 p 27

[Excerpts] An agreement to sell Kuwait some Egyptian sophisticated weapons was signed recently. Preparations are now underway in Cairo to set up an exhibition of Egyptian military products under the slogan "Made in Egypt". The inclination is to have this exhibition held in one of the Gulf states with the aim of directly acquainting the Gulf governments of Egypt's ability to build and produce sophisticated types of weapons and modern defense systems. The initiative for which the Egyptian officials are currently preparing is the result of a host of
earlier political and military developments. Foremost of these is the continuing Iran-Iraq war, the Egyptian military factories' supply of a substantial part of Iraq's military needs, the resumption of relations between Cairo and most of the Arab countries, and the recent talk about revival of Arab participation—especially Gulf participation—in the work of the Arab Organization for Industrialization [AOI], particularly with a view to raising adequate funds in order to develop the AOI's products and improve their quality. In the meantime there is talk about a greater Egyptian role to be played in the Arab political and military map in the light of rapid developments in the Gulf.

Egyptian officials believe that the Egyptian arms industry, which continued production despite the absence of Arab participation for a long time and has been able to meet a substantial part of the Egyptian army's needs during the process of restructuring it and equipping it, is capable of securing much of the Arab countries' needs for sophisticated arms because of two basic factors at least: The first is the similarity of Arab geography and, therefore, the Egyptian arms manufacturer's familiarity with the terrain on which these weapons might be used. This is a very important factor considering the great dissimilarity between the geography of the Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries, and that of the exporting countries which are mostly American and west European.

The second factor is the nonexistence of conditions which the arms-exporting countries generally impose on the export of sophisticated arms with the aim of restricting the scope and direction of their use. These are primarily political conditions relating to international strategies and to the network of interconnected relations and interests between these countries and the international balance which the major powers, so far the primary source of all types of arms, especially high technology arms, are seeking to establish. Arab arms deals with western countries and particularly with the United States often encountered a series of difficult conditions which many times led to cancellation of the entire deal and to searching for new sources to meet their needs. The nonexistence of conditions could be one of the most significant elements that would be an incentive for many Arab and African countries to turn toward Egyptian products which would be available at such competitive prices that it would be impossible for the advanced countries to match, given the fact that the cost of skilled labor in Egypt is low compared with other countries. This is in addition to the facilitations that would be granted to the importing countries.

So far the optimism Cairo is showing with regard to its factories' ability to produce high quality sophisticated weapons at competitive prices with no political strings attached gives rise to great hopes for the creation of an Egyptian industry capable of meeting Egypt's needs first and the Arab and African countries' needs second. It is also hoped that this would to a large extent put an end to the system of conditions which the arms-exporting countries usually apply. Yet this optimism once again raises the fundamental question about the extent of Egypt's ability, given its economic and technological base, to break the advanced countries' monopoly on arms production and export. It also once again raises the question about the developing countries' ability to build a highly advanced and sophisticated technology in a world dominated by an absolute trend toward highly complex technological systems.

If Brazil has pursued the method of selecting the weapons it can produce and which it can develop in the future, Israel pursued the method of using the open channels to the west European industry, and South Korea relied on bilateral agreements with the United States and some west European countries, Egypt, the state that is aspiring to play a more significant role in arms production, began its experiment in the fifties in a somewhat different manner. It was nearer to the method which some of the advanced European countries adopted, especially Belgium, Holland, Norway, and Denmark, in producing the U.S. F-16 fighter plane and the method which China is adopting in producing some European types. Cairo, through the Higher Authority for Military Industrialization, selected some weapons systems that partially meet its needs for weapons, such as fighter planes, military helicopters, missiles, tanks, jeeps, and field guns. It concluded contracts with the producing countries, foremost of which was France (the Mirage), Britain, and the United States (Abrams tanks) to build factories for themselves in Egypt with the aim of benefiting from Egyptian technical and scientific assets, such as engineers and technicians. The Egyptian method called for importing parts and assembling them in Egypt after training Egyptian crews in the exporting countries. Thus production first began with assembling then producing parts and later producing the entire weapon. In fact, Egypt, despite the economic conditions that have exhausted it, the political situation that developed following President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Israel, and the estrangement with the Arab countries, has been able to develop this method through benefiting from western products and from the availability of local technical expertise. This is in addition to the growing necessary industrial base. It is true that the systems Egypt has chosen are not first class in quality nor are they so on the technological level, but they will certainly be sufficient to meet a great part of the Egyptian army's needs as well as the needs of most of the Arab and African armies for various weapons, foremost of which are land weapons, missiles, light armor, and high power ammunition. The second stage, if Cairo succeeds in working out a more effective formula for the reactivation of the Military Industry Organization [MIO] on a broad Arab and particularly Gulf, base would enable entering the field of manufacturing more sophisticated weapons such as tanks, radars, and missiles which is still monopolized by a handful of countries, primarily the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.
Officials of the Higher Authority for Military Industrialization in Egypt are optimistic about the future, although their optimism is sometimes dampened by the reality of the economic and political situation. Yet they believe that their products have passed the acceptance test in most of the markets they have successfully entered. The coming stage portends better results for several reasons, foremost of which is the potential availability of long-term investments in the light of the strong possibility of the countries which co-founded the Authority resuming their participation in it, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. Such investments, which are vitally necessary for proceeding in accordance with a long-term plan, were unavailable to the Authority in the past.

The second reason lies in the open-door policy which Cairo is pursuing towards most of the Arab and African states and the fact that no strings are attached to arms sales to these countries. The Brazilian experiment has proved a great success in this regard. This is in addition to the relative success of the Korean and European experiments.

It is true that the need for sophisticated weapons will continue to depend on the advanced countries, but the countries that are proceeding on the path of advancement have but to boost their capabilities. The litmus test in the Egyptian experiment is the extent of the Egyptians' ability to benefit from the experiments of the advanced countries in order to build an advanced industrial and technological base which they can use as a launching pad.

13305

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

PLO Representative Says Abu-Sharif's Statements
"Not New"
44040300 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 30 Jun 88 p 16

[Interview with PLO Representative in Great Britain Faysal 'Uwaydah by Amin al-Siba'i in London]

[Text] Faysal 'Uwaydah, a representative of the PLO in Great Britain, spoke with AL-WATAN about the expulsion from Great Britain of a Palestinian press advisor, "Abu-Khalid," and the attempt to discredit the reputation of the PLO by falsely accusing it, and obliterating indications pointing to the responsibility of Israeli intelligence for the assassination incidents experienced by Great Britain in the recent past, of which the most outstanding is the assassination of the distinguished artist, Naji al-Ali.

'Uwaydah also spoke of relations within the PLO and the real meaning of the political position contained in the article by Yasir Arafat's advisor for information affairs, Bassam Abu-Sharif, and the political and media controversy surrounding it.

At the beginning of the interview, 'Uwaydah responded to a question concerning the degree to which relations between the PLO office and Great Britain were affected following the case of Isma'il Sawan, and the expulsion of Zaki Abu-al-Hawa, an employee in the PLO's London office. He stated that "there is no doubt that the PLO and the expulsion of an employee of the PLO office are not connected to what happened. Many questions and explanations have followed. The absence of such a connection is absolutely clear. All that happened was that an Israeli spy accused one of the members of the PLO office of concealing a weapon, etc. The statements of this spy were seriously considered by official, British circles even though the obvious, basic objective of this spy was to attempt to defame the reputation of the PLO office in London.

"It is clear that I am not defending Mustafa 'Abd-al-Rahman, nor am I accusing him. He is innocent until the accusation is proven. However, the British government hastened to accuse him on the basis of statements made by an Israeli spy. We requested that the British government investigate the facts, and exchange views with us through an open dialogue. We asked to interrogate Mustafa 'Abd-al-Rahman concerning the accusation leveled against him, anywhere deemed appropriate by the British government for a candid and secure interrogation. That is our way to uncover the truth and eliminate the accusation made by those attempting to harm the reputation of the PLO. We stated that we will merely observe what transpires in this interrogation, and will not interfere in it. We welcome the attendance of any neutral person at these interrogation sessions. Based on the results of the investigation, appropriate measures will be taken against, or in favor of Mustafa. If we had taken the initiative, and handed Mustafa over to British authorities on the basis of a fabricated accusation originating with a spy, we would have allowed a conviction to sweep him away without a fair trial. We reject this. The wheels of justice must not be impeded, and we are pursuing justice.

0"We are certain that Mustafa 'Abd-al-Rahman became involved in this operation because his name was forced into the matter, even though he had no connection with it."

[Question] What was Mustafa doing in Britain before the accusation was made against him? What was his position?

[Answer] The British police knew that Mustafa came to Britain assigned as my bodyguard. He coordinated his assignment with the British guard, and they knew him well. When he left London, we sent a letter to the British interior ministry, informing them that Mustafa's assignment had ended, and that he had been transferred elsewhere.
The problem between us and Britain is that officials here listened to the statements of a witness who is hostile toward us, and they made their decision against us on the basis of this spy's statement. I say against us, because we believe that the basic accusation in this case should be levelled against the Mosad. The Mosad is involved in all cases and incidents in Britain, such as the operation to kidnap Vanunu, the attempt to kidnap a former Nigerian minister, the Mosad operation to forge British visas, and many, many, similar operations undertaken by the Mosad in Britain daily. It seems that Britain does not wish to issue a judgement which condemns Israel without condemning us. It has hastened to equate us with Israel and issued its judgment against us when we had no role in what happened.

[Question] So relations between you and Britain were affected by what happened?

[Answer] Relations have doubtlessly been affected. We are trying, however, not to escalate the disagreement, and to prevent this fabrication and those behind it from succeeding in harming our relations with Britain. We are asking them to merely comprehend the fact of the Mosad's involvement in the case, and to confirm that the PLO has no connection to what happened.

[Question] Have you held meetings to explain the situation to political and party leaders in Britain?

[Answer] The truth is that we discussed this subject with a number of Labor and Conservative party members in parliament. We explained the facts to a number of officials in the foreign ministry in more than one meeting with them, and it was emphasized to them that the expulsion of Zaki Abu-al-Hawa, "Abu-Khalid," from Britain was an act or decision which insulted us.

[Question] Why do they want you to decrease your activities specifically at this time? Is there any justification for this?

[Answer] More than one party has informed me that I must be cautious, because the activities of the PLO's office in London have become more normalized and extensive than expected. As a matter of fact, we have made a great effort not only in London, but also in all of Britain, and have been able to obtain the support and backing of many communities. We have been very active with regard to the House of Commons, the press, and television. This effort has aroused anxiety on the part of Israel, which attempted to create circumstances that would compel us to lessen our activities in Britain.

[Question] What is your opinion on the controversy caused in America by the statement of Bassam Abu-Sharif?

[Answer] Bassam Abu-Sharif did not say anything new. His statement did not differ from statements issued by the Palestine National Council, although he framed it in a clearer language. The Americans are more concerned with clear language than with the content of the statement. This is part of an American campaign which is attempting to portray the U.S. as having secured a new PLO position, thereby justifying American initiatives in the region. I read what Bassam Abu-Sharif wrote a number of times, and I did not find anything new in it except for a clearer formulation. It is unfortunate that we, as Palestinians and Arabs, attack something before we read it, and ponder its meaning.

[Question] Is the sympathy toward the uprising on the part of several British officials, such as Minister David Miller, merely a passing emotion, or does it express a general British policy?

[Answer] Before David Miller went to the occupied territories, there had been British activity aimed at moving closer to the Palestinian viewpoint. Progress has been achieved in this area despite the desire of British officials not to diverge from American policy.

David Miller went to the Middle East and the occupied territories in search of facts regarding positions on the peace process, and was shocked there by the violence of the Israeli oppression of the Palestinian people and its uprising. He found that Israel, with its unacceptable actions, is not helping to attain any peace. He was not authorized to make any statement or commitment which would be liable to Israeli criticism. Rather, his statements resulted from what he saw there, and he discovered that his mission had ended with the existence of the uprising and its circumstances. Britain's official policy is to pursue an Israeli withdrawal within a Jordanian-Israeli solution. Miller's mission was to reconcile Israeli and Jordanian viewpoints. When he found that the Palestinian struggle against Israel was larger than the dangers which he was ignoring, what happened to his mission happened. To this day, he still believes in the position which he announced in the occupied territories.

13286

Deportees Discuss Organizational Structure of Uprising
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[Interview with Husam Khidr, Fatah leader from Nablus, Bashir al-Khayri, PFLP official from al-Birah, and "Fathi" and "Sha'ban," two unnamed Fatah and PFLP leaders, by Bahi-al-Din Hasan: Cairo, date not given; Word in italics as published]

[Text] The organizational apparatus of the uprising is one of its most important achievements. How and when was it possible to build such an organization? Indeed, does such an organization exist? How was it able to realize such success for the uprising? We discussed this broad question at length with two well-known figures from the Palestinian leadership deported by Israel after the outbreak of the uprising.
Husam Khidr was charged with being a West Bank leader of Fatah and of its mass organization in Nablus. He has been arrested 23 times in his 26 years of life. His family is from Jaffa in the part of Palestine illegally seized in 1948. He lives in the Balatah camp in Nablus, where he graduated from al-Najah University, department of political science and management.

Bashir al-Khayri, 46 years old, spent 16 years—more than one-third of his life—in occupation prisons on the charge of being a central official in the PFLP, following the longest trial—3 years—in the history of the occupation. He is a lawyer, a 1964 graduate of Cairo University. He was born in al-Ramlah of 1948 Palestine and was living in al-Birah on the occupied West Bank before his recent expulsion.

Two other parties, whose real names we cannot mention, participated in the discussion. They are leaders in Fatah and the PFLP. We shall refer to the first as “Fathi,” the second as “Sha’ban.”

Leadership of a Unique Kind

[Question] How was the leadership of the uprising born?

[Answer by “Fathi”] The 3-year war of the camps in Lebanon had deep repercussions in the occupied territory. A widespread belief developed that it was necessary to stop betting on any party, that all efforts had to be united and focused on the principle of self-reliance, and that this attitude had to be imposed on all Palestinian organizations in the territory. They therefore began coordinating their activity, which put pressure on overseas leaders of these organizations to unite their forces in the framework of the PLO and overcome their disagreements. This finally bore fruit in last year’s Algiers unity council. Thus one can say that the unified leadership inside the territory was born of the war of the camps.

[Answer by “Sha’ban,” describing the history of the origin of the unified leadership] It was born 1 and ½ years before the uprising. It was merely a committee for field coordination between the Palestinian groups in the territory, for preparation for mass battles, and for consultation at important moments. It enjoyed no definite powers. It was known as the Coordinating Body and was referred to in the files of the groups as HT [Arabic, Hayat al-Tansiq].

[Question] From whom is the unified leadership formed? How does it make its decisions—unanimously, or by majority?

[Answer] The unified leadership is formed of four representatives—from Fatah, the PFLP, the DFLP, and the Communist Party. They make decisions unanimously.

[Question] You say “representatives.” Do you mean the leaders of the four groups in the occupied territory?

[Answer] No, I mean what I say. The groups are represented in the unified leadership by representatives, not by the leaders. This is to maintain continuance of the leadership role of these leaders, on the one hand, and the secrecy of the composition of the unified leadership, on the other hand. These representatives enjoy full authorization to make decisions, and there is always someone in reserve ready to replace anyone who is arrested. This is the job of every group separately.

[Question] How are relations between the internal leadership and the PLO central leadership abroad coordinated?

[Answer] The unified leadership in the territories enjoys complete independence to make its own decisions, especially since the nature of its job consists of leading the everyday struggle. It is not entrusted with the making of major political decision. That is the job of the central leadership abroad. In the territories, the unified leadership has demonstrated its capacity to develop forms of concrete struggle based on an estimate of the concrete situation it experiences immediately every moment of every day.

The internal leadership now is a genuine leadership formed by the natural development of the struggle of the Palestinian people. This struggle has passed beyond the “leadership of notables” stage. The struggle has become the only touchstone. It is the only criterion now for the rise of any figure or new militant leadership.

Today’s leaders have risen from a varied social milieu. I mean the leaders and important figures of all the organizations, including Fatah. A profound transformation has included everyone. The camp leader today is a son of the camp; the village leaders are its most eminent militant sons. Almost everyone has graduated from the prisons of the occupation—the best leadership preparation school!

Prison Graduates

[Question] How can you give me concrete examples?

[Answer] We have succeeded in turning the prisons into cadre schools for militants—from teaching the illiterate to read, all the way to specialized lectures on economics, political science, and methods of struggle. All this takes place according to a definite and adhered-to time frame. I would like to point out here that most of the teaching materials in prison are by Egyptian writers. Many people who were not involved in the struggle, but were arrested at random by the occupation authorities, have left prison as practicing militants. Prison is not just a training school; it is also a field of struggle full of challenges, dilemmas, and difficult situations that test people’s firmness and their readiness to struggle.
For example: Within our ranks there is now a militant who entered prison illiterate, unable to read and write. Now he gives specialized lectures in economics in cadre schools. We had a lower-level member who entered prison, and before finishing his sentence, became a member of the front's central committee.

[Interviewer] He mentioned his name to me. "Fathi" gives another example he knows from close at hand—the militant Khalil 'Ashur, who entered prison at age 21. He had not finished primary school. During his 13 years in prison on a charge of participating in armed operations against the occupation, he continued his education until he finished high school. When he left prison, he enrolled in al-Najah University in Nablus, continued the struggle through public mass channels, and became president of the university's student union. Finally, the authorities expelled him last year.

[Question] What do your militants read in the occupation prisons, Brother "Fathi"?

[Answer] Mostly Egyptian books—as far as they are available, of course. I would mention, "This Open-Door Policy," by Dr Fu'ad Mursi, "The Development of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement," by Shahdi 'Atiyah, "and another book whose name I do not remember now by Mahmud Amin al-'Alim.

[Question] Don't they read Egyptian literature?

[Answer] Of course, especially by Yusuf Idris, and others. The most notable Egyptian novel the militants are circulating from one prison to another is "It Is Happening in Egypt Now," by the Egyptian writer Yusuf al-Qa'id.

[Question] Are books allowed to circulate between the prisons?

[Answer] Of course not. Imprisoned militants copy political books and good novels by hand and exchange them secretly between prisons in special ways. The goal is to spread the benefit from them to their brothers in other prisons where these books are not available.

Roving Masked Men

[Question] To return to the unified leadership: How does a limited leadership of four persons move such large crowds of the Palestinian people. Is there a pyramid organizational structure that interprets the leadership's directives?

[Answer by "Fathi"] In reality, there are two organizations whose activities are complementary—or let us say two teams or two levels of activity. One is action-oriented—for moving the masses and field activity in the street. The second we call planning-oriented, but in reality its role is to provide for the increasing social and humanitarian needs arising from long-term daily clashes with the enemy. These require living supplies and medical equipment. It is responsible for organizing at all levels for the stage of total civil disobedience, for discovering deficiencies and gaps, and for estimating precisely what is needed for this important stage, based on real field work, not from inside closed rooms. It is responsible for drawing lessons from the gradual progress we have made to date toward this stage.

[Question] How are these two teams formed—spontaneously and without plan, or does one take into consideration the principles that governed formation of the unified leadership, with its representation of the four main groups?

[Answer] Naturally, the principal organizations are represented in both teams.

[Answer by "Fathi," giving a detailed picture of the action-oriented organization] It has come to be known in Palestinian poetry as "the moving masked men." They number about 4,000 youths who hide their faces with the traditional Palestinian kaflieh. They are from the action-oriented leaders who led the Palestinian [political] scene in the period before the uprising. Their job is to direct mass activity from the public square—from the street, not from secret meeting rooms. They do not work in a single district, but go about in groups from city to city and from camp to camp by back roads. None of them has a permanent, known place of residence. All are wanted for arrest. When confrontation with occupation soldiers flares up, the public rushes forward to cover their withdrawal.

[Question] What is the nature of the authority granted to them? What are the limits of their authority in directing field work?

[Answer] They enjoy absolute freedom within the framework of the general directives of the uprising leadership. On the one hand, they follow up implementation of their instructions, so that the required mass actions—demonstrations and clashes—go forth in the best possible way. On the other hand, they issue local directives—each group in its area—for demonstrating on a certain day at a certain time. Or they agree on definite tactics to be followed in a certain place during a local general demonstration. Or they issue the instructions required by events when previously unexpected surprises occur, such as an attack by settlers on a particular village, etc.

[Question] Give us an example of some kinds of tactics.

[Answer] There are ambushes, for example. These are usually carried out at midnight demonstrations, when it is pitch black, and the occupation soldiers are exhausted. They are surprised with an unexpected demonstration by people they assumed were sleeping off the fatigue of the day's demonstrations and clashes.
When the soldiers begin chasing the demonstration, the people withdraw, leaving a five-man ambush behind. The soldiers rush to take them and arrest them, but they are surprised at the right moment by stones rained upon them from every direction at a prearranged time and agreed-upon signal.

Another job of the “roving masked men” is to spread expertise from district to district and from camp to camp. This includes spreading these tactics and every original innovation, no matter how small, that people arrive at for confronting the occupation soldiers and obstructing or paralyzing their movement. For example, ball-bearing projectiles are used against military automobiles that have begun to install wire windows to protect against the stones. There are ways of using nails to deflate the tires of military automobiles, immobilize them, and then burn them. There are dozens of little tricks that do not require big sacrifices, but when used on a broad scale can immobilize groups of soldiers or prevent them from advancing.

Another of their jobs is rapidly to spread knowledge of the new methods arrived at by the occupation army to overcome the methods and tools we originate to combat it, so that our losses can always be as small as possible.

[Question] You said that the action-oriented organization is composed of several thousand young people. Doesn’t it include girls?

[Answer] Naturally, there are a large number of girls in this team. Palestinian women have played and are playing a decisive role in the course of our struggle and in the current uprising in particular to a degree no less than men.

The uprising has brought down the model of the hero from a “superman” to the level of the ordinary man in the street. There is no longer any big difference between the commander, the rock-thrower, the person who contacts the news agency to report information, and the old lady—the old woman who carries written instructions from place to place. For the revolution to have penetrated so deeply is one of the most important achievements of the uprising.

[Question] But this is not enough for understanding the level of response and obedience by ordinary Palestinians to the directives of the uprising leadership, despite the enormous sacrifices suffered every day in martyrs, wounded, and prisoners, the interruption of all means of livelihood, and confrontation with an army whose strength everyone knows and where there is not the least sign of any amount of yielding to the demands of the Palestinian people.

How was it possible to reach such a degree of coordination and commitment in light of these hard realities? We are not talking about a regular Palestinian army moving by direct military order—not even about organized groups of commandos—but about a people being crushed by occupation every day.

[Answer by Husam Khidr] We must not forget that during the past 20 years the Palestinian people never ceased struggling. This struggle raised the level of militant experience and reflected itself on the framework and organization of the Palestinian political scene. Thus, the Palestinian people have an organizational and political framework wherever they are—university students, workers, even school children have their own sessions in which they discuss politics every day. This is what in the end has contributed to developing a spirit of struggle and politicizing the people. It has made everyone organized in some way or another.

Almost all Palestinian groups now have their mass organizations inside the territories, in addition to their secret military organizations. For example, Fatah’s mass organization inside the territories is known as the “Youth Committees.” The PFLP’s mass organization is known as the “Committees for Volunteer Work,” and so forth.

[Question] You said “known”—do the occupation authorities know this?

[Answer] Yes, but the mass organizations do not officially announce their link with a particular group. Nevertheless, the occupation authorities occasionally interrogate certain militants on charges of belonging to the Youth [Committees], and so forth.

“Ninja” Gang

Our custom is to choosing for our streets and alleys names that deeply fix in our people’s memory the features of their homeland that was unlawfully seized in 1948, the names of our martyrs, or names that indicate important events in the course of our struggle. Among these events was the battle of Maghdushah—the PLO’s success in taking it was an important turning point in the war of the camps, so that one can even say that it finally reached victory at Maghdushah. In addition, there are alleys named after Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Haifa, Baysan, and Dayr Yasin. Our camp is sometimes called Tall al-Za’tar Camp.

[Question] Why this alley in particular? Because for years the soldiers of the occupation have not been able to arrest a single youth from it; and the women of the alley are no less strong than the men. They attack the soldiers and prevent them from taking away the people they want to arrest. In this alley now we have women who are symbols of national resistance. Any one of them is capable of grabbing an armed soldier, throwing him down, and beating him with a shoe.
Maghdushah Alley also has an enormous reputation with the occupation authorities. An Israeli intelligence official swore publicly as a challenge that he would turn the inhabitants of Maghdushah Alley into hirelings some day.

In general, the Balatah camp has a special notoriety. Since 1985, the police have not been able to enter it. This has forced the Knesset to issue a decree putting the army itself in charge of security in it, thus acknowledging openly that they cannot control it.

**Israeli Radio Calls the Attack Group in the Camp “the Ninja Gang.”**

**[Question]** What is the Ninja Gang?

**[Answer]** It is an attack group of 200 specially trained young men armed with sticks and knives. They operate as a deterrent force against hirelings and burn the houses of those who will not refrain after being warned to leave the camp in 24 hours. Israeli intelligence has not been able to reach any of them yet.

After the uprising, General 'Amiram (Mitsna'), commander of West Bank occupation forces, stated that he would not allow continued control of Balatah camp by young people. It was an open acknowledgment that there was a patriotic authority controlling the camp.

Wedding parties among Palestinians have become a kind of political activity. At every wedding you will find Palestinian flags. Some of the wedding songs will be nationalistic songs. The police therefore frequently forbid wedding parties.

**Birth of the National Front**

**[Question]** I directed the same large question to Bashir: How can one explain the depth of the Palestinian people's response to the directives of the unified leadership and their abiding by them to an extent very close to obedience?

**[Answer]** In content, slogans, and human material, the uprising is the PLO's uprising. The PLO actively leads it and is responsible for leadership within the unified leadership, which for a long time now has been concentrating on completely organized activity in every place, down to the camp, the street, and the alley.

Every group within the PLO has its own secret and mass organizations inside the territory. All work with a high degree of coordination. The popular committees now responsible for organizing the course of the uprising have their roots in the mass organizations of the various groups.

**[Question]** When did formation of the mass organizations of the Palestinian groups inside the territories begin?

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**NEAR EAST**

**[Answer]** Fourteen years ago, in 1974.

During this period, one can talk about the emergence of two important connected phenomena:

1. The success of these organizational frameworks in various student, worker, and women's milieus in carrying out their social, technical, economic, and struggle-related requirements.

2. Increased readiness on the part of people in the territories to defer to a national leadership authority.

**[Question]** One can see clearly and certainly that the mass organizations of the principal PLO groups played the decisive role in political and organizational preparation for the uprising and in its continuance. Isn't it logical now for these mass organizations to amalgamate, since they are carrying out more or less the same jobs?

**[Answer by “Sha’ban”]** The mass organizations have in fact united in the framework of the uprising. The question that now arises is their official unification.

In brief, this means announcement of the birth of the internal national front.

**[Question]** One question concerns the place of the Islamic tendency in the context of the uprising.

**[Answer by “Fathi”]** Disagreements with this tendency were eliminated only in the middle of last year. Accordingly, it was given representation in PLO organizations, up to the Central Council, during last year's national unity council.

However, dialogue with them began a long time before that and demanded great effort. After discussions with them in the territories faltered and danger of an armed confrontation with them increased, we began to look for their overseas leaders. We were able to meet them in an Arab country and to convince them, after arduous discussion, that the current stage is one of confrontation with the occupation, requiring the focusing of all efforts toward the goal of liberation. After this stage, our disagreements can be settled in a democratic framework.

**[Answer by Husam Khidr, commenting on foreign media highlighting of the role of the Islamic tendency]** This tendency's principal role is in Gaza. It has recently begun to be prominent because it has come to complement the national movement. Were it to present itself as an alternative to it, as it previously did, it would leave no mark.

(Husam states that Balatah camp witnessed bloody battles with the Muslim Brotherhood, but they stopped several months before the uprising, after the Muslim Brotherhood stopped using violence.)
Despite his sympathy with the Egypt's Revolution organization, Dr Nu'man stated his rejection of assassination because of his legal background. He said, “As a professor of law, I cannot state that I welcome the idea of assassination. However, Egyptian society has reacted by supporting and welcoming the activity of Egypt’s Revolution—at least it has not condemned this activity.”

He also said, “If I announced my acceptance of the idea of assassinating an American or Israeli foreigner, I would also have to accept the idea of assassinating an Egyptian diplomat walking the streets of Tel Aviv or New York.”

The Wafd Party assistant secretary general added that the crimes committed recently by Zionist gangs against the Palestinian uprising repeat the methods of Egypt's Revolution. It was heaven's justice to respond to them in kind.

He said the announcement of the Egypt's Revolution case was badly timed and revealed a sharp contradiction between the behavior of the Egyptian government and that of the provocative Zionist gangs.

Dr Nu'man disapproved of the attempt by certain people to introduce the name of Jamal ‘Abd-al-Nasir into the case. He said, “I reject the introduction of the late President ‘Abd-al-Nasir’s name into any current cases for the purpose of insulting him in one way or another.”

He stated that ‘Abd-al-Nasir, “notwithstanding our difference and disagreement with him, was a patriot who carried out his role in Egyptian life.”

The Wafd Party [assistant] secretary general announced that he welcomed the legitimization of any political tendency existing among the mass of the people, including the Nasiris.

He said, “We harbor no real hostility to the Nasiris. The problem between us is purely formal. There is common ground that allows political links to exist between us.”

In his conversation, Dr Jum‘ah dealt with the subject of a unified front of opposition parties to enter coming local council elections. He expressed his hope that opposition groups would overcome their disagreements and unite in one front. But he went on to say that he could not speak definitely about what would happen in the future. He stated that the purpose of a united opposition front would not be to defy the government, but to persuade it to take the democratic road.

Dr Nu'man defended the Wafd against various charges that have been aimed at it, especially that it is attempting to settle accounts with the July Revolution. He said the July Revolution was a reality. It was a response to a painful Egyptian reality at the end of the monarchy. It
had its positive aspects. It was a reality in Egyptian political life that no one could ignore or denigrate unless he wanted to become like an ostrich with its head in the sand.

The following is the text of the interview:

[Question] Dr Nu'man, as professor of law, what does the Supreme Constitutional Court's decision striking down recognition and approval of the Camp David agreements as a precondition for announcing the establishment of a political party represent to you?

[Answer] This decision deserves respect. It confirms an uncontested constitutional principle—namely, that any group of citizens can form a party and that approval or recognition of a particular treaty may not be a legal precondition for establishing that party. Treaties are like contracts: you can disagree about them, you can interpret them, and you can oppose them. They may also be abrogated or terminate. They may lose their authority with the passage of time. They may lose their practical importance and value with the passage of time and changes of events. Therefore, the existence of political parties cannot be linked to a treaty or agreement. If we look at the other side, we find that Israel by its deeds has torn up the agreement, beside the fact that members of the Israeli Knesset tore up the agreement in al-Sadat's very face. It is unthinkable for us to limit Egyptians' freedom and force them to honor or recognize this treaty.

Decision Removes Obstacle to Political Parties

[Question] I take it that this is the view of the professor of law. What is the view of the assistant secretary general of the opposition Wafd Party?

[Answer] It represents an important step in Egyptian political life because it removes an important obstacle to the formation of political parties. I think matters in Egypt will be set right and extremism and domestic terrorism be overcome only with a large degree of freedom and democracy. That will take place only by allowing freedom to form political parties, so that the existing parties will be forced to reform themselves and to know that there is strong competition to draw and attract citizens to new programs. The condition of the old political parties, including the Wafid, will improve only if the opportunity is given to establish new parties and if you force them to move quickly among the masses of the people.

Government Committee Imposes Its Will and Control

[Question] Then can we say that the Wafid Party assistant secretary general thinks the constitutional court's decision will open the door for political forces opposing Camp David to organize into legitimate parties that enter official party life in Egypt?

[Answer] It only removed one obstacle, and many obstacles exist to the formation of parties. The most important one is that approval of the establishment of a party is assigned to a government committee all of whose members are from the government party, the NDP. This obstacle is formal, but very important. Even if one appeals the decision of this committee, the matter is not submitted to the administrative court, but to a specially formed judicial body most of whose members are government-selected political figures. Thus, from the formal point of view, the way is blocked. There are also many objective obstacles. For example, the program of the new party must differ from that of existing parties. This is a subjective authority that allows the bodies that examine the application to control and impose their will.

Political Turning Point Emanating From a Judge's Conscience

[Question] Doesn't Dr Nu'man Jum'ah think that the constitutional court's verdict, beside its judicial or political value, also represents a legal codification and legitimate expression of the Egyptian people's rejection of attempts to push normalization with the Zionist enemy?

[Answer] That is certainly the case. The constitutional court's decision represents a political turning point emanating from the conscience of a judge who in the end expresses the feeling and conscience of society. The meaning of the decision is that society's conscience and ingrained spirit reject normalization with Zionist gangs that daily attack things sacred to Arabs and Islam.

I Do Not Approve of Individual Terrorism

[Question] The constitutional court's decision overturning Camp David was preceded by another announcement of the overturning of this treaty by a different method. I mean the announcement made explosively by the bullets of Egypt's Revolution. In your opinion, what does this organization represent?

[Answer] First, I do not approve of individual terrorism or assassination—the assassination of civilians. Any foreigner, whether Israeli, American, Arab, or Egyptian—a man who lives and walks peacefully in the street, not fighting or carrying a gun may not be suddenly killed. I reject and condemn murder as a political activity. But I believe society reacted to the actions of the Egypt's Revolution 20 by supporting and welcoming them—at least not by condemning this activity. A critical point is that if you allow the killing of an Israeli or American civilian walking the streets of Cairo, you must accept that other side's assassination or killing of an Egyptian diplomat walking the streets of Tel Aviv, Washington, or New York. I think I must reject the method of assassination.
Egyptians Felt Satisfaction

[Question] Doesn't everything that has been published and broadcast about the activities of Egypt's Revolution indicate that they were aimed only at Mosad and CIA elements that are penetrating everything in Egypt, and that none of the operations of Egypt's Revolution was aimed at any ordinary civilian?

[Answer] I cannot dispute that you feel honored. I have said to you that all Egyptians felt inward satisfaction and did not condemn the actions of Egypt's Revolution. But as a professor of law working in the field of law, I cannot state that I welcome or encourage these crimes. At the same time, I am pleased by the uprising or revolution of the Palestinian people. But killing civilians—because of my legal background—I cannot accept it.

Uprising Requires Our Material Support

[Question] No one approves of the principle of assassination per se. But don't you think the actions of Egypt's Revolution served the cause of the entire Arab people, especially the Palestinian people as its uprising escalates despite the hateful machine of Israeli repression?

[Answer] The Palestinian uprising requires that we at least support it with money. The uprising means that an entire people, the Palestinians, can find no sustenance, since the uprising means strike, not working, not earning a living. They are citizens who now require material and food support and supplies. That is our job. If the man who was killed was a Mosad man, had killed Egyptians or Palestinians, or had played an evil role in the Arab-Israeli struggle, that may be a cause for satisfaction on the part of Egyptians. But I personally know no details about the victims who were killed by Egypt's Revolution.

I Do Not Approve the Principle of Acting as Agent of the People

[Question] To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement that Egypt's Revolution is a group of patriotic young Egyptians who announced that they were agents of the entire Egyptian people and who carried out particular acts they thought served the movement of the masses of the people?

[Answer] Perhaps I differ with you. I cannot agree that any particular group has a mandate to represent the Egyptian people. The idea of acting as agent is an old one. It was used in 1919. At that time it was clear. It is dangerous to consider any political organization to be the agent of the entire people, and I cannot agree with you about it.

Egypt's Revolution Expressed Rejection of Normalization

[Question] I do not mean an official mandate. Nevertheless, the Egyptians who were members of this organization translated the people's rejection of the Camp David agreements into practical reality.

[Answer] I that case, I can agree with you that the members of Egypt's Revolution expressed in a practical way the Egyptian people's rejection of normalization of an Israeli embassy on Egyptian soil, and of the Zionist entity in general. I sympathize with the fact that the Egyptian people have not condemned them. At the same time, I cannot proclaim that I welcome the idea of assassination. I cannot do that because of my legal background.

'Abd-al-Nasir: A Patriot Who Carried Out His Role

[Question] I know I am talking to a man, to a law professor, and at the same time to the Waf'd Party assistant secretary general. My question is the following: Apart from the events and details of a case still under justice, doesn't Dr Nu'man think some people are attempting somehow to introduce 'Abd-al-Nasir into the Egypt's Revolution case in order to settle accounts with him?

[Answer] I am not inclined to introduce the name of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir into any current cases. Current cases involve the present generation that is alive. The task of its members is to face the problems of today and tomorrow. 'Abd-al-Nasir is not here now; he should not be brought into any conflict, nor should his name be used to slander him in any way. President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was president of the Egyptian Arab Republic for a long time. He had his own characteristics, positive and negative. If we want to evaluate his thought, we must do so objectively, so that he receives credit as a patriot who carried out his role in Egyptian life, despite our difference and disagreement with him. I am against slandering him and introducing his name into our current everyday problems, because 'Abd-al-Nasir is not going to awake from his grave to face them. So I reject any slandering of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir or introducing him into such matters.

Introduction of the Case Poorly Timed

[Question] There are people shouting, "First look into what the Zionists do with their men who kill us every day and are not brought to trial; then try the members of Egypt's Revolution." They mean that Israel intentionally does not try those who bury Palestinians alive, while we are now demanding the heads of Egypt's Revolution members who translated the feelings of patriotic Egyptians into action against members of the Mosad and the CIA.
[Answer] Indeed, the timing for bringing the Egypt's Revolution case into court was poor, because there was a sharp contradiction between the behavior of the Egyptian government and that of the Israeli government. As for the behavior of the Israeli government, it is not a government and not a people—just gangs. Their behavior is provocative and justifies any actions, including killing. They are committing these crimes in a more loathsome way than Egypt's Revolution or than what the Egyptian revolution and the PLO have done. I agree with you that meeting the Zionist gangs in kind and in the same way may perhaps be a legitimate and unavoidable defense and that they deserve such treatment. But the problem is that killing a human being walking the street under the state's protection is an action to which it is difficult for us to give our unqualified support. However, Israel's behavior in assassinations, kidnapping innocent people and burying them alive, liquidating the men of the Palestinian revolution (Abu Jihad was the most recent)—these things really justify the behavior of Egypt's Revolution. The truth is that it is heaven's justice to reply to them in kind.

[Question] In legal language, can we call these circumstances mitigating?

[Answer] Certainly. This was a political crime surrounded by circumstances calling for a lightened sentence. I therefore do not believe the court considering the case will impose a severe sentence on any of these brothers.

We Welcome the Nasirists Because They Are an Existing Tendency

[Question] To return to the decision of the Constitutional Court again—this decision in effect opens the door for the Nasirist tendency to surface in official political life. What does the official presence of this tendency mean to the Wafid Party?

[Answer] The Wafid Party welcomes the legalization or legitimization of any existing political tendency, because this is the beginning of political calm and stability. If a group having political ideas and bound together by intellectual bonds exists, and you prevent it from surfacing, its only choice is to work underground. As a general rule, I say that one should welcome the legalization and legitimization of any political grouping. The Nasirists are an existing reality, irrespective of their size, influence, or presence on the Egyptian political scene, which is a problem we cannot go into. The test will come when they enter elections. The Nasirist tendency is a political reality in the Egyptian scene. It must be recognized and given the opportunity to be active and cooperate with everyone to improve conditions in Egypt by solving the country's problem. The Wafid Party may very possibly cooperate with the Nasirist tendency, just as it cooperates with Marxists or with any political group, as long as there is common ground. Certainly there is common ground: We all dream of improving wealth in Egypt and establishing a democratic life allowing freedom of opinion, freedom to form parties, freedom of thought, freedom of belief, and reforms of the constitution and electoral laws. All these things represent common ground about which no one differs. We in the Wafid Party harbor no real hostility toward the Nasirists. From time to time there is blunt discussion, but that is merely a verbal problem and a formality. If everyone communicates and engages in discussion, they will find that there is common ground permitting political links to exist between them.

United Opposition Front Including All Political Forces

[Question] Then according to what he has announced, does the Wafid Party secretary general agree on making the Nasirist tendency—if it organizes officially into an official political party—part of a united opposition front?

[Answer] Definitely. The united opposition front will include all political forces in Egypt, as long as they accept the principle of legitimacy and respect for others. This means that if political forces or a political tendency appears that does not believe in democracy and a plurality of parties and that wants to come to power and realize its goals by force, there will never be any agreement between us and it. It would want to kill political life, while we want it to flourish. But if there are political forces that believe in peaceful democratic political activity, there is nothing preventing us from sitting down together in dialogue, solidarity, and cooperation.

I Hope Opposition Groups Will Overcome Their Differences

[Question] While we are talking about the opposition front—there are general elections slated for this September, elections for local councils. Rumor has it that the opposition parties will enter them with a united list against the NDP. Do you expect that the opposition parties will this time successfully transcend their differences and unite in a single list for these elections?

[Answer] I cannot speak definitely about what will take place in the future, but at least I am hopeful that the opposition groups will be able to overcome their differences and work together successfully. Such common activity will never be an attack on the government or against the regime of President Husni Mubarak. It is an experiment involving the groups coming together in an attempt at collective action. If they succeed, it could lay the groundwork for a meeting with the government for dialogue or for organizing activity between us. The purpose of uniting the opposition is not to defy the government, but to persuade it to take the democratic road. Through cooperation and a front, we may be able to force the government to yield to the will of the people for constitutional and electoral law reforms and getting rid of infamous laws, so that we can live a normal political life.
We Will Try To Remain in a United Front

[Question] Some people are afraid that in the coming elections the Wafd Party will do what it did in the last People's Assembly elections—retreat from a united front. What do you say to people who have such fears?

[Answer] I tell them that the Wafd Party has made a decision at the highest level to enter the elections in a united front with the opposition parties. In the 1978 People's Assembly elections, the party's highest level rejected a united list.

[Question] That means you guarantee the Wafd will remain in the front during the election campaign?

[Answer] We will try to remain, unless it is impossible because of behavior by some of the fronts, groups, or political forces that is incompatible with collective action. As long as everyone works as one team and believes in collective action, the Wafd will raise no obstacles from its side.

[Question] In your capacity as professor of law—let us agree first that any constitutional organization must abide by the text of the law that regulates it, even if it disagrees with it, until it is amended or repealed. Do you agree with that in advance?

[Answer] Yes, I certainly do.

Wafd Violation of Provisions of the Political Parties Law

[Question] Then in light of our agreement, don't you think the Wafd Party violated provisions of the Political Parties Law that regulate the party's formation?

[Answer] The provisions to which you are referring, which prescribe entry into local elections with a party list, are unconstitutional. If they were submitted to the Constitutional Court, it would decide their unconstitutionality. But there is no time to bring thousands of cases to invalidate bad provisions that violate justice and the constitution. Legal fictions not for fraudulent purposes are legitimate and allowed in legal life. If there is an inflexible provision in the law, instead of clashing head-on with it, one can try to apply it in such a way that the person subject to it does not collide with it. What the political parties are now doing is a legal fiction for the purpose of confronting a bad law and bad behavior in tailoring laws so that they pave the way for the government to falsify or manipulate elections. If the opposition can evade these evil provisions, I don't think that deserves condemnation from the legal point of view.

Furthermore, the lists will be presented in the name of each party separately, not in the name of more than one party in a single list. Each party will have the field to itself in a number of districts. Within each district, there will be nothing to prevent cooperation, especially since the candidates in local elections are not party leaders. Thus there will not be the problem of having one party's leaders enter the list of another party.

Absence of Democracy in the Wafd

[Question] To limit our discussion to the Wafd and its violation of the provisions of the Political Parties Law—there are those who say that the party has violated the provisions of the act, thus requiring its dissolution under the law.

[Answer] How so, even by way of example?

[Question] For example, while the Political Parties Law explicitly requires an element of internal democracy in each party, the Wafd party has not abided by this, as indicated by its not having convened its general assembly, the highest authority in the party structure, for a long time.

[Answer] As you know, some legal provisions are mandatory; others are supplementary or advisory. There is no stipulation in the law mandating holding a meeting of the general assembly at a particular time. Rather, there was a promise on the part of the party leadership to hold the general assembly at a time in the past. We could not hold it at that time until we completed our organizations in the governorates. We are in the midst of completing these organizations. The Wafd General Assembly in its new form is composed of the governorate party leaders, members of the supreme presidium, the party's legislative body, and the specialized committees. All these organizations need to be completed in order for the general assembly to be completed. There has been no intentional wrongdoing, no evasion of a particular stipulation, no lapse of democracy. On the contrary, we are making rapid progress toward election of all party leaders.

[Question] Allow me a brief explanation: I am not saying there is an explicit provision in the Political Parties Law obliging the party to hold a general assembly at a particular time. What I mean is that by not holding the general assembly the party has openly violated the internal democracy that the law explicitly mandates. The fact that the highest party authority has not met may represent a violation of this democracy.

[Answer] The meeting of the general assembly will in no way change us. The members of the assembly are the Wafd leaders whom we see and meet every day. Whenever I make party visits to the Wafd general committees in the governorates, I am eager to meet the party leaders in the governorates and have discussions with them. Nothing is making us afraid of holding a general assembly, for we are constantly meeting and holding discussions with our members. The problem is that the Wafd moved from one stage to another when its extraordinary general assembly was held. As a result, the party general assembly came to be composed of the party leaders, and
not of every Wafd member who has paid membership dues. The leadership roles have not yet been filled out, since they have to be elected in the rest of the provinces. We shall finish this shortly, and the party general assembly will soon be held. Afterwards, it will hold a regular annual meeting. So it is really a physical obstacle, not a political one.

July Revolution a Response to a Painful Egyptian Reality

[Question] My last charge against the Wafd is that its daily behavior represents a clear violation of provisions of the law.

[Answer] For example?

[Question] The Wafd constantly attacks the 23 July Revolution in a vengeful and angry spirit, while the law stipulates approval of the 1952 revolution.

[Answer] I do not agree with you that the Wafd makes spiteful criticisms of the 23 July 1952 Revolution. There may be an article by some person or other attacking and criticizing the revolution, but the Wafd's general policy is not based on holding a grudge against the July Revolution, criticizing it, or depreciating it. The July Revolution is a reality. The July Revolution was a response to a painful Egyptian reality at the end of the monarchy. The July Revolution had its positive aspects and is a reality in Egyptian political life. No one can ignore it or depreciate its importance, unless he would become like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand. The truth, however, is that the Wafd disagrees with the actions of certain periods of the July Revolution government. That is the party's right and the right of every citizen in Egypt. To mention, for example, the intelligence state led by Salah Nasir—if you were to read with me the public prosecutor's investigations for the year 1968 during the life of late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, there are events mentioned there that bring sweat to one's brow. Salah Nasir and some of his aides in the intelligence bureau used to assault women, commit unnatural sexual practices, and kidnap wives from their husbands. When we criticize such behavior, we are not condemning the July Revolution. We are not criticizing the July Revolution when we criticize burying people in the sand alive. We are not demolishing the July Revolution; we are criticizing its behavior. When we criticize the fact that we were unprepared for the 1967 war before announcing the closing of the Strait of 'Aqabah, we are criticizing the action of the government, but not denigrating the revolution. In any case, I do not see any attack by the Wafd on the July Revolution now. We have to acknowledge that the July Revolution is a reality that has imposed itself—a reality with its positive aspects, despite the fact that I am not a lover of the July Revolution or of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. I say that feeling is one thing and accepting reality another. I respect President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir as a political leader who definitely had his positive aspects and as a patriotic leader. I disagree with him over dictatorship, repression, torture, and not implementing democracy. President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir had all the keys of authority in this country. He could have given Egypt a democratic government for it to enjoy, and he could have built up the individual and society, so that we would have been in a different situation now.

African Bank for Development Funds New Power Station

45000127b Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 21 Jun 88 p 2

[Text] "Egypt has agreed with the African Bank for Development to finance a scheme to build a power station in West Cairo in order to meet the needs of new factories and the expansion of the residential area," said an official source at the Ministry of Internal Cooperation.

He added that the African Bank for Development has allocated about 450 million dollars to finance Egypt's economic development.

He explained that Egypt is seeking soft loans from the African Bank for Development in order to finance power generation projects following the refusal of the World Bank to provide the requested finance for these projects.

/9274

Israeli Examines Censorship of Palestinian Affairs

44230017 Tel Aviv YEDIOT AHARONOT in Hebrew 5 May 88 p 29

[Article by Smadar Pri, Cairo; "In Cairo, They Censor the Events in the Territories;" Passage in boldface as published]

[Text] The Intifadah is served up to Egypt on a complex platter: Up-to-date reporting almost without photographs; the incident in Beyta, the murder of Abu-Jihad, the rage in the territories—all these were treated with sharp scissors before reaching the small screen; love of Israel is not what stands behind this goal.

An Israeli visiting Cairo these days finds himself totally surprised: Someone decided that television viewers must be spared the daily dose of the Intifadah. The result: The newscasters on the three state television channels present, each evening, an updated summary of the events in the territories. There is a report. There is no story. And the main thing is that there are no photographs.
Only newspaper readers know the details regarding specific events. The incident in Betfa, for example, or the CBS film of IDF soldiers mistreating Arabs, which elicited worldwide fury, were not shown on the small screen in Egypt. On the Egyptian street, thank God, no one knows these stories.

But this does not mean that a sudden sympathy for Israel has been born in Cairo. The opposite is true. All of the sympathy in Cairo is for the rebels. Donations are collected, shipments of food and medication are dispatched. Lawyers and theater and movie stars hold identity gatherings. Israel is depicted everywhere as a cruel Goliath, who mistreats the powerless Palestinian David.

A caricature in an Egyptian newspaper: Prime Minister Shamir, in the fifth month of pregnancy (the five months of the Intifada), complains to a doctor: “Doctor, because of my swollen belly, I have no feeling, I have lost my heart...”

A political term is being thrown around which characterizes Israeli-Egyptian relations. Dr Butrus Gali, minister of state, who coined the phrase “cold peace” in the wake of the Lebanese War, has determined that the era of “formal peace” has arrived. “And this is a lesser peace than the ‘cold peace,’” he cautions.

In contrast to him, Mubarak speaks enthusiastically of the peace. “The only war that will occupy us,” determines the president, “is the war of development to improve the living conditions in Egypt.” Peace appears throughout the speech, but, intentionally, it has no address. Peace with whom?

Egypt, it is permitted to estimate, will hold its nose and swallow any bitterness toward Israel until the Ta’ba episode is over. Egypt, which exhibits a demonstrable indifference toward us today, will not permit Israel to use any excuses to avoid the obligations for a document of arbitration over Ta’ba. Peace, sighed one of my friends in Cairo, will be well hidden under the carpet until after the episode. And what will be afterward? “We’ll see.” The tone of his “We’ll see” does not bode well.

Also, the murder of Abu-Jihad, which is still very much in the public eye, was treated, on the small screen, with sharp scissors. Only one filmed report was seen in Cairo regarding the white villa in the suburbs of Tunisia. The interview with Um-Jihad, for example, which was broadcast throughout the world, as well as in Israel, was not shown in Cairo. “If we had brought the testimony of the widow regarding the murder carried out before the children, it would not have been possible to stop the millions of people who would have assaulted Israelis in Cairo,” they explain to me.

It was enough to see the sea of security personnel, in uniform and plain clothes, who were scattered through the Ma’a’diy neighborhood just a few hours before the Independence Day celebration at the house of the Israeli ambassador, in order to establish a setting appropriate for now: In the Egyptian street, and, mainly among the intelligentsia, a great anger and unprecedented bitterness prevails toward the “gangsters” from Israel. Official elements did not hesitate to say to me, “We are fed up with you. We have no further interest in appealing to the public opinion in Israel. Your hysterical joy, in the wake of the elimination of Abu-Jihad, made you forget the simple truth: You will have to pay the price...”

The new evaluation in Cairo is, in the wake of the Intifada, that if there is any sense in speaking with someone from Israel, it is preferable to speak with Yitzhak Shamir, not with Shim’on Peres. Shamir, toward whom President Mubarak did not attempt to conceal his dislike, has received added height here in recent weeks. In surprising candidness, people are saying: “With Shamir, to our great sorrow, we know exactly what he does not want. Peres, to our great disappointment, is capable only of promising...”

All in all, they tell me in Cairo, there is no significant difference between Shamir and Peres. The election platform of the Labor Alignment, on the subject of peace, irritates Egypt. And that of the Likud is all too clear to them.

A story going around by word of mouth reveals an unknown angle in the Abu-Jihad incident. According to the story, on the eve of the operation in Tunisia, security forces knocked on the door of Attorney Fa’iz Abu-Rahma from Gaza and arrested him. A few hours later, he was released. Tahsien Basir, adviser to the Egyptian foreign minister, says that Abu-Rahma, the cousin of Abu-Jihad, was arrested to serve as a hostage in the event that an unanticipated hitch occurred in Tunisia.

Morning in Cairo, with its unmasked bitterness, complaints about Israel, and the demonstrable indifference, is impossible without the latest joke, which is now circulating on the streets of Cairo: After his death, Abu-Jihad went up to heaven and knocked on the gates of the Garden of Eden. It quickly became clear that his name did not appear on the lists. His only choice was to go to Hell’s gates. But his name did not appear there, either. After some confusion, the angel Gabriel appeared and announced: “What’s the problem? Here, too, we have refugee camps...”

13438

Two Oil Beds Explored Near Gulf of Suez
45000127c Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English
21 Jun 88 p 2

[Text] Two new petrolierous beds have been explored at the biggest petroleum field in the Gulf of Suez. These oil-bearing beds produce 7,200 bpd out of the total
production of Morgan field, which amounts to 160,000 bpd. The Morgan field is 20 years old while bids for extracting crude at further depths started only 5 years ago, said the Director General of Exploration at the Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company, Mr Sawqi Abdin. The first producing petroliferous bed is Abu Rudays, at a depth of 9,000 feet, which produces 6,000 bpd, whereas the second one is a-Hajar al-Thawbi which produces 1,250 bpd, added Mr Abdin. A development programme is currently being worked out to determine the size of the petroleum reservoir, which also includes drilling 4 new wells within a year, said Mr Abdin, indicating that the Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Mr Abdal-Hadi Qandil, called for starting the development of the giant petroleum fields of the Gulf of Suez company, which produce 60 per cent of Egyptian petroleum, such as Morgan, July, Ramadan and October.

New Port Opens in Rashid
45000127a Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English
20 Jun 88 p 2

[Text] New Port. “The petroleum port at al-Ma’diyah, near Rashid, will expand its activities to receive cargo vessels, in addition to its usual activity of manufacturing the platforms used in deep water oil fields,” declared an official source at the Ministry of Petroleum. He pointed out that it has been agreed with the authorities concerned that the port will receive ships coming from the Federal Republic of Germany carrying the equipment needed for the new aluminium nitrate plant at the fertilizer factory in Abu Qir, in order to save time and money.

Four Factories Open in Sadat City
45000127d Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English
21 Jun 88 p 2

[Text] Mr Hassaballah al-Kafrawi, the Minister of Construction, Housing and New Communities accompanied by Mr Mahir Abazah, the Minister of Electricity and Energy, and Mr Muhammad Abd-al-Wahhab, the Minister of Industry, visited Sadat City and opened various new factories.

The Ministers opened a factory for electrical fuses with a capital of L.E. 2 million and which manufactures 2.5 million devices to be used with currents of 10 to 100 amps. They also opened the first factory in the Middle East for the manufacture of plugs using natural mineral materials. It cost L.E. 37 million and can manufacture 850 million plugs annually.

Furthermore, the ministers opened a new butter factory whose annual production capacity is estimated at around 4,500 tons. They also visited a factory for electrical industries which produce 13 million electrical switches of different kinds.

Mr al-Kafrawi said that Sadat City has, at present, 38 factories that are in production and providing about 3,860 jobs, adding that another 140 factories will be built soon.

He added that 15,000 housing units at Sadat City are currently being built, noting that work has finished on 2,500 units, while the rest will be finished within three years.

Following the opening of the plants of the Egyptian Arab Company for electric fuses in Sadat City, the Energy Minister, Mr Mahir Abazah, stated that the production of the new facilities is in line with the specifications of the Westinghouse international corporation and under its licence.

Furthermore, Minister Abazah urged that high-voltage automatic fuses should be produced on a larger scale, indicating that the opened plants are equipped to manufacture the electrical fuses necessary for flats and small-size factories and workshops.

Al-Fayyum To Use Waterfalls To Generate Electricity
45000136 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 14 Jul 88 p 9

[Report by Mahir Najib]

[Text] Al-Fayyum—Al-Fayyum Governorate has decided to exploit its geography, which is distinguished by the abundance of waterfalls, to fulfill its electricity needs. The governorate has included three large projects for generating electricity from waterfalls in its current 5-year plan. The first project includes building a station on the al-Lahun aqueducts with a capacity of 6 million kilowatts and costing 12.78 million Egyptian pounds [L.E.]

The second project is the renovation of a power plant on the al-'Azab waterfall costing L.E. 6 million and with a capacity of 4.1 million kilowatts providing 350 tons of diesel oil annually.

The third and final project is the establishment of a power plant in Bahr Wahabi on the Hajz al-Sikkat al-Hadid aqueduct with a capacity of 2.3 million kilowatts and costing L.E. 4.2 million.
The governorate is also conducting more than one study on building three other stations on several waterfalls in the areas of Markaz Tamiyah, the Wadi al-Rayyan tunnel, and the al-Wahhab station. This was stated by Governor Dr 'Abd-al-Rahim Shihatah.

Food Industries Show Production Increase
45000138 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Jul 88 p 9

[Text] The Food Industries Authority has finished preparing a report on its companies' production results during the fiscal year which ended on 30 June. Adil al-Shahawi, head of the Authority, will present the report to Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab, minister of industry.

Al-Shahawi stated that production companies in the food industries peaked their production at approximately 4 billion Egyptian pounds [L.E.], an increase of L.E. 353 million and 9 percent compared to the previous year—3 percent more than what had been planned.

He said that export figures had reached L.E. 26 million, an increase of 45 percent from last year.

He singled out several companies, among them the Egyptian Sugar and Distilling Company, as it had produced sugar valued at L.E. 560 million. The extracted oils companies and Egypt Oils led the oils companies in achieving their goals.

He also said that one cigarette company had produced L.E. 1.6 billion. AL-AKHBAR learned today that all food companies had made a profit this year except one: Egypt Dairy and Food Products.

Experts Discuss Potential Water Problems, Solutions
45040164 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 17 Jun 88 p 44

[Article by Usamah 'Ajaj in Cairo]

[Text] Egyptian television viewers have voiced their displeasure with the weather forecast that is broadcast every evening. This is because those responsible for it still insist on reporting weather conditions in all the world areas, in eastern and western Europe, in America, and in the Arab countries, but give not the least attention to specific areas which have become priorities to all the Egyptians, and particularly to the Nile basin countries where everybody is raising supplications to heaven to grant rain. The Egyptians wish to follow the rainfall or potential rainfall on the Ethiopian plateau, particularly since the "specter of drought" is noticeably approaching Egypt, despite the reassuring statements which say that this year Egypt will not face a drinking water problem and that agriculture, tourism, and industry will not be affected by a water shortage problem. The most recent statement to this effect was the one which the minister of works and water resources, Eng 'Isam Radi, made before the People's Assembly, which held a special session in order to discuss the likely crisis.

Apparently, western reports which speak about water—rather than oil—becoming the dominant factor in the coming era now speak about the next wars in the region being wars over water resources. A senior Egyptian military commander speaking at a closed symposium stated that the only reason that would convince the Egyptian army to fight outside the Egyptian borders would be any threats to the Nile river sources. It appears that such words were not haphazard, particularly since Egypt is the mouth of the Nile, and gets its water from outside its borders. Former Egyptian minister of irrigation, Eng Ibrahim Zaki Qanawati, told AL-HAWADITH that "the Nile waters come from the White Nile and its tributaries in southern Sudan, of which 20 to 30 percent reach Egypt throughout the year, although the water volume differs from one month to another. This is estimated at an average of 10 to 25 billion cubic meters, the greatest part of which reaches Egypt via the Blue Nile and 'Atbara in Ethiopia. This water represents 70 to 80 percent of all the waters that reach Aswan and which totals about 65.5 billion cubic meters". [figures as published]

Certainly maintaining good relations with Ethiopia and Sudan has become an important part of preserving Egypt's national security. This explains Egypt's continuing efforts to seek a reconciliation between the two sides [Sudan and Ethiopia] and to eliminate all problems between them. It means ending these problems that affect water availability and is one of the major objectives of the policy of the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources. As Minister 'Isam Radi told AL-HAWADITH, "It also means halting water losses and obtaining a share from the upper Nile projects, among which are the projects of the equatorial plateau, such as the Jonglei Canal, the Bahr al-Ghazal project, and the Ethiopian plateau projects in Mashar and Lake Tana. These external projects would ensure for Egypt 10 billion cubic meters if the Albert Dam project, the second stage of the Jonglei Canal, and the improvement of the White Nile's channel are carried out. One of the reasons for Egypt's desire to solve the problem of the southern Sudan is completion of the work on the Jonglei Canal, from which Egypt will receive 2 billion cubic meters of water in the first stage. A meeting of the joint technical body for Nile waters between Egypt and the Sudan will be convened this month in Cairo in order to discuss and study the possibilities of the situation with regard to the Nile river waters during the next water year, which begins in August. This is in addition to studying work reports on water studies projects of the equatorial lakes in order to develop their resources in the interest of the countries participating in these studies. These are Egypt, the Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

Explaining the situation to AL-HAWADITH, the minister of public works and water resources said that the
High Dam data indicates that we have a total of 90 billion cubic meters of water which we will continue to use until we reach the danger point, something which we are now trying to avoid. Since the year 1984-85 the ministry has taken several conservation measures, including not giving any more water to the electricity sector. It is known that if the water level drops below 165 meters it affects power generation. This has already happened, and the High Dam turbines will stop completely if the water level drops below 147 meters. The minister stressed the need for alternative power stations because one day the level is going to reach this point. Had it not been for the measures the ministry has taken, the level would have reached 145 meters. These measures included stopping water wastage into the sea, which has saved 8 billion cubic meters. Moreover, the land tracts that need to be developed under the 5-year plan and which total 750,000 feddans will be irrigated with water from the agricultural drainage system in order to avoid excessive use of the Nile waters.

Official figures, according to the minister of works and water resources, have proved that the ministry's forecasts with regard to water level potentials proved to be correct. The forecast for last March put the level at 155.87 meters while the actual level was 155.95 meters. In April the forecast was 154.87 meters and the actual level was 155.30. The forecast for May is 151.26 meters, for June 151.26 meters, and at the end of July 150.04 meters. Engineer 'Isam Radi affirms that if the flood next year is high, in the range of 100 billion cubic meters, the highest level in front of the dam will be 173 meters which by the end of July 1989 will drop to 165 meters. But if the low yield period continues (70 billion cubic meters) then 3 billion cubic meters would be drawn from the High Dam lake. The potential maximum level in this case will be 154 meters and minimum level 148 meters, which is just above the level at which power generation at the High Dam would stop.

The situation with regard to Egypt's water requirements up to the middle of next year could be reassuring, but nobody denies the fact that Egypt's electric power production will be adversely affected. As Minister of Electric Power and Energy Mahir Abazah said, the implication of the water level reaching 150 meters—as the Ministry of Works and Water Resources said—would be to reduce the capacity of electric power production from 1,750 megawatts to 1,000 megawatts only. The 3-meter drop in the water level last year cost 200 million pounds, being the cost of fuel used [in generating electricity] in order to make up for energy shortage. A further 3-meter drop in the level this year would mean a rise in costs to 400 million pounds. There is a possibility that the water level at the Dam will reach 147 meters, in which case all the turbines will stop and Egypt will lose a source which supplies it with 28 percent of its electric power. According to forecasts, this shortage will last 9 months—that is, until next March, when new thermal power stations will begin operating in order to produce 1,600 megawatts. Engineer Mahir Abazah said that this shortage will be made up for by exploiting the reserves of the present thermal stations by operating them at maximum capacity. There is a contingency plan on how to deal with a drop of the water level to below 147 meters before next March, although such a possibility is remote. If such a thing should happen it will be in July 1989, which would be after 13 new thermal power stations have been completed. These will be commissioned successively beginning March 1989 and will supply us with 1,600 megawatts. Other power generating units will continue to come on line up to 1993, giving us a total output of 5,600 megawatts.

AL-HAWADITH has learned that in light of the coming energy crisis in Egypt, two principal ideas are under consideration with the aim of contributing to solving the crisis:

First, reopening the study on the al-Qattarah depression project despite the fact that, as Engineer Mahir Abazah told AL-HAWADITH, this faces two problems: First, the cost of implementing it would reach $6 billion while it will produce only 300 megawatts, which means that it is extremely expensive. The second problem is the project's effects on the subterranean water in the Nile Valley and on earthquakes, since there will be a big lake pressing on the lands of northern Egypt while there will be another big pressure in the south at the Dam lake. Studies on these problems have not yet reached a conclusion.

Second, there is a new thinking with regard to the decision to build nuclear reactors, which have been postponed since the incident of the Soviet Chernobyl reactor. Had Egypt made the political decision in 1980 to build four nuclear power stations as was scheduled, it would not have faced this crisis because by now these stations would have been operating, and each one of these units would have been producing the equivalent of all the High Dam power output.

13305

IRAQ

New Law Issued To Encourage Arab Investors
44000182 Dubayy GULF NEWS in English 12 Jul 88 p 11

[Text] Baghdad (DPA)—Iraq has issued a new law aimed at encouraging Arab companies and nationals to invest in its economy.

The law, published in the official IRAQI GAZETTE, offers Arabs income tax exemptions on profits which do not exceed 20 per cent of invested capital in the first five years of profit-making and 10 per cent of capital in the next five years.
There is no ceiling on repatriation of profits, and the law provides for exemptions from taxes on raw materials and machinery for as long as the project remains in operation.

It allows investors to lease or purchase land and real estate from the government or private citizens, with such purchases exempt from real estate taxes for a period of 10 years.

A project must have a minimum capital of one million dinars (about $3.3 million) to qualify.

Iraqi companies and nationals are allowed equity shares in such projects at a maximum percentage of 49 per cent of capital.

The law did not set a maximum percentage for foreign participation or say whether wholly Arab-owned companies were permissible.

The law stipulates that the products and services of investment companies will not be subject to official pricing.

The employers of such companies will be allowed to repatriate in hard currency a percentage of their income which was not immediately specified.

Investors should approach competent ministries with proposed projects and authorities are required to reply within three months, with the investor's licence to be revoked if he does not start work on the project within one year.

The law assures investors against nationalisation and confiscation and provides for "a fair compensation" in the case of expropriation for public benefit.

Gulf-based businessmen said they were awaiting the executive regulations of the law to get further details on such potentially thorny issues as exchange rates and guarantees against unavoidable governmental red tape.

The first company set up under the provision of the new law was a joint venture for manufacturing electrical washers.

The IRAQI GAZETTE said the capital will be determined by the partners, identified as the Arab company for industrial investments and the Iraqi company for household appliances.

The Iraqi government has made it known that it would especially welcome investments in the automotive industries but has yet to promulgate laws governing non-Arab investments.

The present law specifically forbids Arab partners to sell their equity shares to non-Arabs.

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**KUWAIT**

**Committee Established To Reappraise Foreign Investments**
44000173b Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
21 Jun 88 p 13

[Text] Kuwait has set up a special panel to reappraise the performance of the public agency that controls the investment of more than $85 billion accumulated by this oil-rich country over the past 15 years, according to a local daily.

The investment policies of the Public Investment Authority have come under fire from local economists, especially the recent acquisition of a 22 per cent stake in British Petroleum.

The paper, quoting unidentified sources, said the three-member panel was formed at the instructions of the Minister of Finance, Jassem Al Khuraifi.

It said the panel had already arrived in London, site of the authority's key subsidiary, the Kuwait Investment Office. The office oversees Kuwait's investments in Britain and other major European financial centres.

The committee comprises Khalid Abu Al Saud, HH the Amir's investment advisor, Mohammed Al Adasani, a former speaker of the National Assembly, the parliamentary body dissolved since July 1986, a Yaqoub Al Humaidhi, a prominent economist.

"The step is intended to upgrade the performance of various bodies of the authority," one of the sources was quoted as saying. He added that the committee would report back to the government before Aug 10.

It was not immediately known whether the BP purchase, currently under consideration by a British anti-monopolies commission, prompted the review.

Kuwait has widespread investments in real estate, government bonds and publicly held companies. At least $85 billion in oil revenue is believed invested in the Western industrialised nations, especially the United States, Britain, West Germany, France and Spain.

/9274

**Naval Exercises 'With Live Ammunition' Announced**
44000173a Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English
13 Jul 88 p 1

[Text] The Kuwaiti Navy will stage exercises with live ammunition off Kuwaiti islands in the northern Gulf from July 16-20, the Defence Ministry announced yesterday.
It warned private fishing and pleasure boats to stay clear of an area northwest of Kubbar and Umm Al Maradim Islands. The islands lie on either side of the main approach channel to Kuwait's main oil port of Mina Al Ahmadi.

More than a dozen mines widely blamed on Iran were laid in the channel last year to disrupt shipping.

/9274

LIBYA

Diplomats in Malaysia Spearhead Asia-Pacific ‘Offensive’ 45000119 Sydney THE AUSTRALIAN in English 11-12 Jun 88 p 13

[Article by Bruce Loudon: "Al-Qadhdhafi’s Malaysian Outpost"]

[Text] Libyan diplomats based in Kuala Lumpur are spearheading an offensive by Libya’s Colonel al-Qadhdhafi in the Asia-Pacific region.

They are coordinating action across a broad front stretching from Tahiti, Vanuatu and New Caledonia, through to militant Islamic groups in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia itself.

European diplomats here say the Malaysian authorities "do not have the political will" to curb the Libyan activities.

“They are just not interested,” one diplomat said.

There is some suspicion that the Libyan People’s Bureau in Kuala Lumpur provides assistance for Libyan support groups in Australia.

The Malaysian capital has emerged as the preeminent Libyan bridgehead in the Asia-Pacific since the closure by the Hawke Government of the Peoples’ Bureau in Canberra and the failure to establish a permanent mission in Port Vila, Vanuatu.

Training

The role played by the Libyans in Kuala Lumpur was brought into sharp focus in April when Tahitian political militants were found making their way there to get funding and onward tickets for travel to Libya.

After the alarm was sounded by Australia and Singapore, the Tahitians were turned back and sent home.

But diplomats closely monitoring the situation say travellers from South Pacific island States as well as other countries in the Asia-Pacific region arrive regularly in Kuala Lumpur and are immediately taken under the wing of the Libyan People’s Bureau.

“Many people come,” one diplomat said. “They arrive here ostensibly for visits to Malaysia, but in fact, on many occasions, they are provided with different travel documents and different identities by the Libyans.

“With these, they travel on to Libya for training, or any other purpose. Then they return to Malaysia, revert to their old travel documents, and go home.

“In that way, no one knows they have been to Libya.”

The implication is that there may be, for example, many more South Pacific islanders travelling to Libya than is realised by the governments of those nations.

Nominally, the Libyan People’s Bureau here is a small mission with only four accredited diplomats and is housed in a villa in one of the better residential sectors.

It is believed, however, there are many more Libyans operating in the Malaysian capital, outside of the bureau, mostly as “students”.

According to one diplomat, one regular caller at the bureau is Mr Yann-Celene Uregei, the Kanak leader who is regarded as Colonel al-Qadhdhafi’s main man in the South Pacific.

“Very often he comes here for just a couple of days, then he goes off,” the diplomat said.

The belief among such diplomats is that Libyans in Kuala Lumpur arrange whatever support is requested by sympathetic bodies in the Asia-Pacific region, although there is no evidence of arms shipments through Malaysia.

One recipient of Libyan arms shipments is the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.

In Indonesia, the Libyans are, it seems, providing assistance to the fundamentalist Darul Islam movement based in Aceh, Sumatra, which has long been a thorn in the side of the Suharto Government.

The growth of Islamic fundamentalism is one of the major fears of that Government.

Through Kuala Lumpur, it is said, the Libyans are also channelling funds to the Malay irredentist movement in southern Thailand, while in Malaysia itself Libyan involvement in Islamic movements is extensive.

The Malaysian Islamic Missionary Association is one repository of Libyan aid and its headquarters were built with a loan from Tripoli.
Malaysia's Education Minister, Mr Anwar Ibrahim, one of the country's most ambitious politicians, is said to have visited Libya, and the youth wing of the ruling UMNO party is also said to have particularly close contacts with Libya.

There is, in Malaysia, little sympathy or support for Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's rabid brand of fundamentalism. Most Malays are simply too happy-go-lucky and fond of the good life.

But that, in the view of diplomats in Kuala Lumpur, in no way diminishes the importance Colonel al-Qadhdhafi attaches to his outpost in the Malaysian capital.

"The People's Bureau here coordinates Libyan activities throughout the whole region. It is extremely important for Colonel al-Qadhdhafi," a diplomat said.

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MOROCCO

Interview With Majority Leader Maati Bouabid
45040189 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic
11 Jun 88 pp 29-31

[Article by Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq al-Sharif]

[Text] When King Hassan II of Morocco inaugurated the spring session of the Chamber of Representatives a few weeks ago (on 4-8 Apr 88, to be exact) he confirmed conclusions reached by Al-TADAMUN a few months earlier that Morocco's main political concern is primarily economic and that the way to handle it is to so expand political liberalism as to also encompass the economic sector.

In fact, that step had been expected since the fall session last October, giving rise to considerable discussion, which revealed the state's intent to release to the private sector some 700 public productivity centers.

The king, while expressing thoughts on the matter, hinted that he would pursue all relevant opinions and discussions of the issue. As a matter of fact, there are several reasons to believe that one of the main reasons behind the inaugural address was to respond to these discussions and create more opportunity for digesting the idea.

It was the first time that the king used a written statement to address the representatives; his speeches to them were traditionally extemporaneous. This departure from the norm is in keeping with the nature of the decision, but it also indicates that the Moroccan ruler considers this experiment to be of historic dimension. He makes prepared speeches only on the anniversary of his accession to the throne, when he reviews the experiences of the previous year and outlines the horizons of the one to follow.

According to the Moroccan monarch, the reason for the changeover to the private sector is to strengthen the economic fabric and create a balance among the various segments of society. Changing some institutions from the public sector to the private sector requires bolstering economic decentralization and opening the Moroccan economy as wide as possible to the world economy.

Hassan II focused on two points in his speech to the Chamber of Representatives. First: that the policy directed at privatizing some public institutions should not be subject to theoretical logic or circumstantial considerations. It must keep in mind such political and social factors as creating job opportunities as well as stimulating the Moroccan economy and expediting its development.

Second: that the changeover must not be allowed to turn into an opportunity for capitalist concentration or for the rich to amass new monopolies.

The king called upon the legislature to begin by compiling a list of public institutions that can be privatized. Legislation would then define procedures to restructure these institutions in order to obtain a fair price for the state.

Support for these economic measures was expressed by government coalition parties even prior to the king's address but the parliamentary opposition—the Istiqlal Party and the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces]—approached the matter from two different angles. The Istiqlal Party exhibited great flexibility in accepting the measures. Party organ AL-ALAM explained in an editorial that a positive discussion of these measures requires that "we be pragmatic", and that the Istiqlal Party can not ignore the private sector's tendency to tie the economy to individual interests and to make huge profits at the expense of the national economy. However, some institutions should remain as part of the government. Opportunities should be made available at these institutions for economically enlightened youth to apply their stimulating youthful activity to developing and saving these sectors and saving them.

The Istiqlal Party advocated that forthcoming legislation include a bill for administrative reform that would streamline procedures for new projects, reduce banking regulations, and lower interest rates.

On the other hand, Mr Abderrahim Bouabid, secretary-general of the USFP, took advantage of his party's first regional convention in Mohammedia-Zenata on the day following the king's address to the Chamber of Representatives. Capitalizing on the industrial nature of the town, the coalition opposition leader denounced supporters of liberalism and called upon them to studiously roll up their sleeves and take risk in the same manner as venture capitalists in the West and elsewhere. He emphasized that gains achieved through determination to build
independence on a solid foundation should be the starting point in the various sectors, and that the fruit of the people’s efforts and sacrifices should be made available to all the people.

For sure, opposition parties in Morocco have held their breath and kept their eyes on the Constitutional Union Party, party of the ruling majority, since last October when the king of Morocco articulated the necessity for radical economic measures to privatize some 700 public sector institutions.

Holding one’s breath may have political justification in a democratic framework that inhibits freedom of expression. However, the reason for keeping an eye on the Constitutional Union Party is that it has, since its formation, been an advocate of expanding political liberalism to include the economic sector. This inclination by the majority party caused a great deal of debate that subsided only when King Hassan II announced last 8 Apr that implementation of the changeover would proceed.

Al-TADAMUN had a lengthy interview with Mr. Maati Bouabid, leader of the ruling majority, and posed to him the following disturbing questions:

[Question] Expanding political liberalism to include the economic sector is one objective of your party that found support in recent decisions. Are you sure that the private sector is capable of operating the public enterprises that will be sold to it?

[Answer] It is true that, since the creation of our party, we have been calling for bolstering political liberalism by stimulating the private sector. We were sure that the day would come when all public sector enterprises became private. Our dedication to this goal is based on deep insight into our situation and the realities of the world around us. We are convinced that countries of the Third World will invariably get in trouble unless they travel the road to liberalism, economically and politically. It is a fact that all African nations that did not espouse liberalism are now suffering economic crises. This is also true of other Third World countries. We are certain, therefore, that total liberalism is inevitable in view of the current condition of the world economic crisis.

[Question] We inquire about the private sector’s capability because some say that you are jumping ahead and skipping several stages.

[Answer] What we are calling for has been frequently described as “stylish” but it is exactly the opposite. We are not seeking a duplicate of British liberalism or American liberalism. We are calling for liberalism that would give us some breathing space compared to Third World countries, and that would put our economic liberation in proper proportion to our political democracy. That is the only way to liberate the individual and hone his productivity.

[Question] Your goal then is liberalism with a Moroccan accent?

[Answer] I would say we are calling for genuine liberalism, which in the old days confronted the so-called practices of feudal lords. Here we are fighting a variation of this feudalism represented in public enterprises that control more than 60 percent of the national economy and choke it with bureaucracy and antiquated procedures. It is also represented by a public administration that interferes in everything.

[Question] Many have expressed several concerns over the success of this experiment, including fear that it might make the rich richer and the poor poorer.

[Answer] Morocco will undergo a very exacting experiment. It is everyone’s right to oppose it and be optimistic or pessimistic. There is no doubt that unless we take all precautions for the success of this upcoming experiment, we too would fear falling victim to the unexpected or unimaginable. This is why our party recently held a symposium that focused on two issues—why the public sector should be privatized, and how to accomplish the changeover. The answer was summarized in a statement the king made in parliament and evoked applause from the representatives. He said: “We don’t want this operation to bring gain to a specific group, and we don’t want it in the hands of monopolists. We call for clear-cut procedures and fair laws. We call for equal opportunity for those who think and believe that they can operate the enterprises to be privatized. If the procedures are unfair, we will be the first to say they can’t be because they would negate the liberalism we are seeking.”

[Question] The king’s directives included an equal opportunity program. Does your party have a plan to achieve this goal and guarantee its success?

[Answer] Actually, the king gave his charge to parliament. We naturally have our own ideas about the two previously mentioned issues. We do not call for the privatization of all public sector enterprises because political or economic strategies might dictate that some remain under state control, provided they are rationed, cured of bureaucracy, and their administrative and operational mentalities changed. There are certain public enterprises that should be sold right away and there are others that should perhaps be discarded by Morocco altogether. Furthermore, there is a public sector concerned with economic affairs, and it should be discussed further. In short, the king has directed us to designate which sectors should be turned over to the public sector in preparation for discussion of these sectors’ budgets and the blueprint for the changeover. We are also to designate the institutions that will remain state-controlled. We in the Constitutional Union will make a positive contribution prompted by this historic responsibility.
[Question] At a recent seminar in Mohammadia, economists said that the deterioration of certain public sector institutions calls more for reforming them than for selling them. What do you think?

[Answer] Our thoughts on this are clear. You can’t ask a wolf to live with sheep and co-exist. By the same token, you can’t ask the administration and those on its payroll to espouse the necessity for privatizing the public sector. I believe that the debate to which you refer included private sector people and engineers with ties to the state. Naturally, the administration is interested only in the status quo. We, on the other hand, are telling these administrators that their mentality and the way they are running public enterprises will lead us into harm. We are liberals who seek political and economic freedom for this country and who must pursue liberal directions. The public sector, in my opinion, is one of the reasons for prissiness, bureaucracy, and obstructing the advancement and liberalization of the citizenry. We have been listening for thirty years to the call for reforming the administration and for changing its mentality and this is the end result. The problem must be excised with a sharp sword.

[Question] One of the reservations expressed is that every decade since independence has seen the privatization of a segment of the public sector. In the sixties, administrative and financial centers and the estates of foreign settlers were changed over. This was followed in the seventies by foreign capital centers in production, commerce, and banking, and in the eighties by public sector privatization procedures. How do you view this tempo of economic change and the reasons for it? Is it possible to prevent repetition of Moroccanization negative factors?

[Answer] I believe that Moroccanization is one thing and the privatization of public enterprises is another. What do these three [as published] issues have in common? I believe it is the development of Morocco. Morocco was occupied and is now independent.

Naturally, land in an independent country should not remain in the hands of foreign settlers, and hence it was regained as you mentioned. Then there was Moroccanization in the sense that Moroccans had to take part in their national economy which was controlled by foreigners. We have now reached a third stage even beyond Moroccanization. The latter never did accomplish its goals because its fundamental course was ambiguous, and the issue was set upon and plundered by a group of monopolists. We have criticized Moroccanization over and over again, and I personally criticized it as well.

Regaining the land is therefore one step and Moroccanization, despite its shortcomings, was another. Now, it must be reformed in the sense that the king’s idea was great, the foundation was important, but the implementation suffered deviation. I believe we have now reached the stage where we would ideologically and politically like Morocco to reveal its true character. Morocco still appears to be neither socialist nor liberalist, and has an administration that interferes in everything.

When you talk to an official, he speaks of state controls more than of liberating the citizen or expanding democracy. This is why we call for deepening liberalism as espoused by King Hassan II, by the private sector, and by all citizens. But there are those who oppose it, and they are entitled to do so. It is an experiment considered to be the third stage in our developmental liberation. We must succeed in implementing this stage, because failure would mean good-bye to liberalism in Morocco.

[Question] Our last question concerns whispers about creating free zones in Morocco, possibly in the Tangier area. How true are these speculations and how does the majority party view this kind of activity?

[Answer] The creation of free zones is a technical and economic issue, of course. Talk of this goes back to the sixties. We keep hearing since then that Tangier and other northern regions will become free zones. We also heard that other regions, such as Tan, will also become free, but I still do not think that the government has given the matter serious study.

Be that as it may. There was no thought of such zones when I was premier five years ago. It would be all right to entertain this idea because free zones offer advantages. We used to have a free city in Tangier but we focused on its shortcomings and ignored the advantages it provided. Some of us were later sorry that we did not keep it free. Now, if thorough studies were undertaken, a decision on the matter would be an enlightened one.

12945

SUDAN

Government Takes Measures To Halt Economic Depression
45040187A Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic
25 Jun 88 p 8

[Text] An announcement of economic decisions aimed at allowing greater opportunity for private sector participation in the country’s economic activity and at decreasing public expenditures coincided with the arrival of an IMF delegation in Khartoum.

Sudanese Finance Minister 'Umar Nur al-Da'im announced these decisions before the Constituent Assembly. The most prominent of them was the sale of some unprofitable public-sector companies to the private sector. These included the White Nile and Blue Nile agricultural companies. In addition, part of the capital of four commercial banks belonging to the state will be sold in the form of shares.
Minister al-Da'ir, at the same time presented another series of steps to support his plan to halt the current economic collapse. He confirmed that military service will last for the period currently in effect—2 years. This is to prevent an influx of manpower into the market at a time when unemployment is increasing. The retirement age will be lowered from 60 to 55 years to open job opportunities for young people. Wage increases will be carefully monitored. Any exceeding of the budget will be completely forbidden. In addition, prices of some luxury goods will be increased, while prices of some basic commodities such as rice, coffee, tea, and lentils will be lowered. Besides these steps, Education Minister Shaykh Mahjub Ja'far announced the repeal of free secondary and higher education.

Nur al-Da'ir summed up the economic situation in the Sudan as "dark," but said that the difficulties could be overcome. Specifically, the expected balance of payments deficit is estimated at about $832 million, in addition to $1.497 billion in import costs. At the same time, debt principal and interest will reach $1.225 billion.

12937

New Budget Reportedly Faces Widespread Opposition
430401878B London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic
4 Jul 88 pp 4-5

[Text] Professor Muhammad Shaykhun, member of the political committee of the Sudanese Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, said in a press statement that the Ba'ath Party thinks the new budget the finance and planning minister announced a few days ago represents complete yielding to the conditions of the IMF and World Bank. In particular, the budget makes most of the conditions contained in the agreement made by the previous coalition government on 1 October of last year.

It is clear from the basic tendencies of the budget that the three-party coalition government has begun its economic policies from where the policies of the overthrown May regime left off, particularly its measures of February 1985. The central goal of the pillars of the three-party coalition is to develop the parasitical capitalist business classes at the cost of impoverishing millions of ordinary people.

He added that this was embodied in the government's ridding itself of public-sector, bank, and oil seed enterprises, for the benefit of a limited class of society. It was embodied in the floating of prices, in lifting support from flour and sugar, and in increasing education and health fees. Professor Shaykhun said in his statement that this tendency could not be separated from the tendency of the al-Sadig/al-Turabi alliance to limit general freedoms, impose a civilian dictatorship in the name of national concord, and traffic with Islam and its benign Shar'iah.

At the close of his statement, he called on all forces of the uprising, including its centers within the Ummah and Democratic Unionist parties and among representatives of the Constituent Assembly, to resist and defeat the budget by democratic means in loyalty to the martyrs of the uprising and in order to defend its goals and slogans.

In a related development, after the minister of finance and economic planning delivered the budget statement before the Constituent Assembly, the government of national concord was surprised by a broad campaign of criticism of the expected effect of this budget. The surprise was that most of the criticism came from a large group of government deputies, not to mention criticisms from the opposition. Although the budget passed, dissatisfaction on the part of government deputies was evident. More than 70 government deputies intentionally stayed away from the budget vote to express their rejection.

Most of the criticisms came from representatives of the least developed regions in the west, south, and east. They objected to the small amount of money earmarked for development of these regions, particularly for roads, water, electricity, and security. The most important of these criticisms was that the government had failed to implement its constantly repeated slogans of just distribution of available resources. The campaign of criticism was not limited to members of parliament; the unions also rejected the government's intention to sell public-sector enterprises to the private sector. These enterprises include public-sector banks, major agricultural projects, and commercial enterprises.

As is well-known, the budget announcement coincided with the arrival of a high-level delegation representing the IMF. Private sources confirm that this delegation had followed the steps of preparing the budget so that it would agree with the ideas of the fund and with the government's attempt to obtain a certificate of qualification enabling it to overcome a previous IMF decision affirming that the Sudan was not qualified to deal with it and thus to benefit from available loan opportunities. The same sources told AL-DUSTUR that agreement between the two sides was "less than a bowshot away," since the new budget has complied with most of the IMF's conditions. These include pricing policies, the floating of commodity prices, control of the volume of money, and abandonment of the public sector. All that remains before publication of the agreement in its final form is Sudanese acceptance of the condition of devaluing the Sudanese pound against the American dollar. Had all the measures contained in the budget not been confronted with a broad campaign of criticism, so that the government considered the atmosphere unsuited to acceptance of a decision like the devaluation of the pound, the matter would have been settled with a devaluation at the Khartoum meetings concluded last week with the IMF delegation.
It should be mentioned that the minister of finance stated last week that the government's differences with the IMF mission were minor. The minister of information and official spokesman announced that the IMF mission was convinced that the Sudanese government had implemented most of the reforms to which it committed itself in 1987. The mission had read the fourfold rescue program and the proposed budget and had presented some suggestions about the program and the new budget. He added that the negotiations had succeeded in clarifying the two viewpoints and in narrowing the differences, so that only a few small disagreements remained. Since the mission had less authority and flexibility, it was thought best to end the negotiations at this point and make preparations for a second round of negotiations at a subsequent date.

In any case, now that the budget has been approved, it appears that the Sudanese government will be confronted in the coming period by a broad wave of demands and strikes by labor, farmer, and employee unions and federations due to the heavy burdens the new budget will impose on the cost of living and because of its tendency to reexamine public-sector enterprises and the conditions of workers in them. The farmers of al-Jazirah began a general strike last Monday, and more than five large unions are threatening to strike.

12937

**SYRIA**

**Phosphates Exported to USSR**

44040279a Damascus AL-BATH in Arabic

13 Jun 88 p 5

[Article by Hasan Hamshu]

[Text] Syrian phosphates are the white gold which bodes ever well for us, since it is supposed to be the economic opening through which world importers will extend their hands, bearing hard currency to pour onto the scales of Syrian exports. The latest figures on production and exporting of Syrian phosphates shown us by the General Company for Phosphates and Mines reveal some of these good omens. As of 31 May of this year, the amount of phosphates produced was 881,000 tons, an increase of 12 percent over phosphate production during the same period in 1987, when that amount was 787,000 tons. As for the country's exporting of phosphates abroad, that increased by 17 percent over 1987. It had been 592,000 tons, and jumped to 695,000 tons this current year.

Perhaps optimism regarding this increase, whether in production or export, arises from the fact that the marketing process faces great difficulties which restrict export operations, since transport is carried out with extreme difficulty. Moreover, the increase in the level of Syrian phosphates exports is considered to be an important indication in light of the existence of world competition headed by the United States, Morocco, and Jordan. In this respect the international publication on phosphates affair (FARITKUN) says that Syria maintained its strength in phosphates exporting during the latter months of 1987, and by the end of the year had recorded 1.6 million tons, an increase of 23 percent over the previous year, and that the exchange of goods still forms a large part of sales with Western Europe, which comprised 10 percent of Syrian phosphates exports in 1985. As for 1987, sales with Western Europe rose to 40 percent of exports, at a time when the European market was shrinking. Sales to East Europe also increased; 89,000 tons were sold to the Soviet Union, and sales to East Germany and Yugoslavia increased. In addition, the General Company for Phosphates and Mines (Gecopham) has continued to ship and sell phosphates to China.

The publication concluded: "It is difficult to predict how Gecopham will be able to continue to increase its exports." Perhaps the answer to that question will be found in the company's determination to overcome difficulties in order to achieve larger sales figures that will surprise the expectations of the specialized world publications.

12547

**Construction Begins on $125 Million Dam Project**

44040279d Damascus AL-BATH in Arabic

23 Jun 88 p 5

[Article by Ahmad al-'Ali]

[Text] The General Company for Irrigation and Drinking Water is currently implementing the Salhab packed earth dam project, which is an important economic project in the plan to develop the 'Tar al-'Ala' and al-'Asharinah plains of al-Ghab. Also overseeing implementation operations is the al-Ghab development branch connected with the Orontes river basin irrigation directorate.

This vital plan, which will be completed by the end of 1989, aims to capture the waters of floods and springs that flow down the Salhab and Abu-Qubays valleys, and to prevent flooding on the al-Ghab plain. Stored waters will be used for agricultural purposes and to recharge underground water in the region. In addition, fish will be raised in the lake that will form behind the dam on an area of about 336 hectares, which in turn will help to moderate the weather. Eng Husayn 'Alash, director of the al-Ghab development branch, told the AL-BATH delegation that the estimated cost of the project has reached 125 million. He added that the company for hydraulic studies is now preparing a technical study of the irrigation and drainage network of this dam.
It should be mentioned that the storage capacity of the Salhab Dam will reach approximately 37 million cubic meters. It will have an height of 27 meters, and a length of 1125 meters at the main floodgate, and 625 meters around the secondary floodgate at the eastern end.

AL-BA'TH has learned that public sector construction companies are currently working to build model villages along the sides of the al-Ghab plain and along the mountain foothills, east and west, where work to build 10 planned villages will continue. The Shathah model village has been completed, and work is continuing on the project to build nine villages in Tar al'Ala'and al-'Asharinaq. The goal of these planned service projects is to settle people in the region and to stop the encroachment of people and cement piles over fertile agricultural lands.

The completion and operation of the Salhab Dam a year from now will change the circumstances of the people and the land of the southern al-Ghab plain greatly. In particular, it will turn acres of reclaimed land into arable land, and the agricultural plan will be intensified by more than 150 percent; we realize that 27,000 dunums were flooded during the last rainy season, but the dam will protect them from flooding. Finally let us say: We have an appointment with destiny in October 1989, when there will be a reunion between land and water, once in the Euphrates basin projects, and again in the Orontes River basin and in other places around the country. Perhaps this is the most important thing which our nation will gain from these giant accomplishments which support our economy and strengthen our position.

12547

Production of Wheat, Barley Increases
44040279b Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic
22 Jun 88 p 5

[Article by Jihad al-Ahmar]

[Text] Damascus—When more than 20 days had passed since the beginning of the barley harvest, and five days since the comprehensive operation of the wheat harvest had begun, AL-BA'TH decided to ask concerned parties about how well the practical results of the harvest concurred with expectations that had been publicized shortly before it began, how things have been so far, and what they all indicate, especially since wheat is the principal crop in our country, giving us our bread without which we cannot do at all, while barley is the principle substance in animal feed. Thus the most important issue in our national economy is for us to succeed in preserving what our land has abundantly produced in this year of good rain and weather.

The first stop on our new tour was at the Ministry of Agriculture. An official source there reported to us as follows:

As of 20 June 1988, 908,614 tons of barley had been sold, while 1,366,994 hectares of barley had been harvested. The official source mentioned that our anticipated barley yield had been around 825,000 tons for the 87-88 season, which was the amount planned for. Because of the steps taken by the government to supply production requirements, and the dovetailing of efforts by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform and all other concerned agencies, it is expected that the yield will reach almost 1.8 million tons.

Wheat

As of 20 June 1988, 141,584 tons had been sold, and 251,192 hectares of wheat had been harvested. The source added that due to the efforts made to provide everything needed for grain production—especially harvesters and spare parts—and due to the efforts of those working in the ministry and other concerned parties, the yield figures for wheat would exceed previously announced expectations.

Thus, yields of wheat and barley are expected to exceed those of the scheduled plan, which stipulated a yield of 2.9 million tons, such that our yield of these two types of grain will reach a figure of over 3.5 million tons.

All problems and difficulties facing the season this year have been dealt with, allowing the timely introduction of harvesters and spare parts. In addition, all trucks were pressed into service to transport the grain, the problem of supplying sacks was dealt with, grain was purchased from our brethren the farmers in bulk or in sacks, many centers were opened, etc.

In replying to AL-BA'TH's question about the lessons learned from the current season and the steps that will be taken for the next season, the official source in the Ministry of Agriculture explained, "Supplying what is needed for production early is considered one of the most important points that will be dealt with during the next growing season."

12547

Report From Provinces on Increase in Grain
44040279c Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic
22 Jun 88 p 5

[Text] What about the latest news of the harvest and sales in our provinces?

Our correspondent in al-Hasakah wrote: "Operations of harvesting, buying, and selling of grains in al-Hasakah Province are proceeding well and normally without problems worth mentioning, except for the shortage of harvesters in some districts, especially the northern districts of the province. Meanwhile, now that farm roads and trucks have been provided, they are now doing their job."
Sources in the Directorate of Agriculture of al-Hasakah report that harvest operations are currently concentrated on wheat fields in the northern districts, and that 10 percent of them have been harvested, whereas 75 percent of the barley fields have been harvested. As for the quantities of grain sold to the purchase centers belonging to the branch establishment for the selling and processing of grain in the province, as of 20 Jun 1988 they were up to 91,610 tons of wheat, 357,586 tons of barley, and 8,524 tons of lentils. The number of harvesters in operation this season is 700, out of the 1200 that the province needs.

Concerning all the measures taken by the province during the season, the governor of al-Hasakah, Comrade Ahmad Mustafa Muru, made a statement to AL-BA'TH's correspondent in which he confirmed that the winter season this year was exceptionally good and that it excelled over previous seasons because of a number of factors. Most important of these were natural conditions and the large amounts of rainfall that covered all the districts and subdistricts of the province, as well as the great efforts made by the state to provide what is needed for labor and production at the right time. He added that the agricultural council in al-Hasakah pursued this matter at the start of the growing season, when it was estimated what the province would need for production, such as spare parts, tires, fuel, mineral oils, and so on. Marketing committees were formed, and 23 centers for grain purchase were opened. Comrade Governor mentioned that harvesting and selling operations were proceeding normally, after all the needed facilities had been offered to our brethren farmers and producers.

Al-Suwayda'

From al-Suwayda', AL-BA'TH's correspondent Riyad Na'im wrote: "The grain office has begun to receive the wheat crop from the farmers from the producing districts. The first deliveries were from around al-Suwayda' and (Rasas). The office is continuing to sell burlap sacks to the farmers and the farming cooperative associations. The harvesting of various field crops by hand is continuing, thus as of 21 June 2,800 hectares of wheat had been harvested, 13,900 hectares of barley, 1,840 hectares of lentils, and 2,416 hectares of chickpeas. Five harvesters were used for the mechanical harvest around al-Thal'lah, Jubayb, ('Ara), (al-Fariyah), and (Shunayrah). But the harvest operations still need more harvesters, and the appropriate parties are working to introduce a number of them into the province and employ them in the fields as quickly as possible. On the same subject, city, town, and village councils have set aside many areas for the study of field crops."

Halab

The seasonal and permanent purchasing committees of the branch of the General Company for Grain Selling and Processing in Halab have so far sold 210,246 tons of barley, 8,940 tons of wheat, 3,303 tons of lentils. Dar'a

As of yesterday, the permanent and seasonal grain purchasing centers in Dar'a had sold 316 tons and 850 kg of white and red lentils, and 11 tons and 770 kg of chickpeas. The farming committees and the branch marketing committees are pursuing their harvesting and selling activities.

Hims

As of two days ago, 17,893 tons of barley and 3,758 tons of wheat had been sold in Hims.

Al-Raqqah

Approximately 252,000 tons of barley and 14,000 tons of wheat have been sold in the province so far.

Idlib

The barley harvest in Idlib is about over. So far 50,633 tons have been sold, an increase of more than 20,000 tons over what had been planned for.

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Logistical Problems in Record Harvest Reviewed, Discussed

Al-Hasakah Peasant Federation Meeting
44040298a Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic
26 Jun 88 p 5

[Text] Last week the central council of the General Federation of Peasants met in the Governorate of al-Hasakah in the presence of Comrade Ahmad Qublan, member of the party's regional command and chairman of the Regional Peasants' Office, Comrade Mustafa al-'Ayid, member of the party central committee and chairman of the General Federation of Peasants, Messrs Muhammad Ghabash, the minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, and 'Abd-al-Rahman Madani, the minister of irrigation, and a number of party and government officials.

Mr Muhammad Mustafa Muru, the governor of al-Hasakah, began his talk by welcoming the visitors to the prolific territory of the al-Jazirah and praised the great achievements that have been realized for the agriculture sector and the peasant sector in general and for the Governorate of al-Hasakah in particular in the past years.

The comrade president of the General Federation of Peasants then talked and referred to the great acts of self-sacrifice which have characterized the peasants. He said:

"The executive office of the General Federation of Peasants decided to hold its current central council session in the Governorate of al-Hasakah in order to
honor it, in view of the economic importance it possesses in our country, especially since it is distinguished this year by abundant grain production, totalling 2 million tons of various kinds."

Comrade Qublan requested that those who had come together talk about their various problems and issues with utmost frankness and objectivity and that the statements presented measure up to the responsibility cast upon the shoulder of the peasants, who represent one of the basic pillars in our domestic economy.

The brother peasants actually were concerned at their meetings to bring this about, and the discussions occurred in a manner which poured salt on wounds, revealed the points of imbalance and shortcomings in some places and underlined the points of development and progress in others. The former cases were dealt with in suitable ways, and conversely emphasis was made on the latter cases in order to implant them in the organization's life in a general manner.

Discussion of Harvest and Marketing Issues

The most important and emphasized subject in the overwhelming majority of the discussions and views presented by our brother peasants and officials in the bodies concerned with the agricultural question was the harvest season and the issues of marketing in the various grain-producing provinces, especially those in the northeast, specifically al-Hasakah and al-Raqqa.

Mr Shibli Nasr, member of the General Federation's executive committee and chairman of the marketing bureau, talked about grain marketing activities in general and said "Through field tours in the governorate, the presence of a number of obstacles facing marketing operations was apparent. There is for example a large number of rough roads which are not open to travel in the desired manner, obstructing the processes of getting the grain to the marketing centers via these roads and routes, especially since the tremendous amount of rain which fell this year has made matters worse by increasing the rough quality of these roads."

"It was also apparent that the time set aside for carrying out the barley harvesting activities was less than the actual time. It was expected that the harvest would be completed 15 June, but we were surprised to find that we needed a longer time because of the lack of availability of a sufficient number of reapers and a lack of readiness with some of the reapers available. One should bear in mind that the Agricultural Mechanization [Organization] reapers do not work at their total productive capacity."

The chairman of the marketing bureau went on, "It appears that there are some governorates which are in flush condition as far as the availability of burlap bags goes. Conversely, there are governorates which are experiencing a stifling shortage of bags, such as al-Raqqa Governorate, where the entities concerned have started looking for ways of storing grain in flowing, 'loose' form, in spite of the risks and harm to the crop this method entails." He asked about the bases in accordance with which the quantities of sacks were distributed among the governorates.

He pointed to the presence of a number of siphons which have been shut down and are not working. Moreover, the external transport activities which take place by means of freight cars are few and do not meet the purpose, since they are not in keeping with the volume of the quantities marketed and stored in the silos.

Al-Hasakah Governorate

The deputy chief of the Federation of Peasants executive office in al-Hasakah Governorate talked about the importance of the al-Jazirah area as far as the domestic economy goes, pointing out that it provides 40 to 50 percent of the wheat the country produces. He said, "Ours is one of the governorates to which our country attaches great hopes, in view of its agricultural nature distinguished by the farming of both winter and summer strategic crops, since its production of grain this year has been estimated at about 1 million tons of wheat, 700,000 tons of barley and 80,000 tons of lentils. The bodies concerned in the governorate have adopted a number of measures to guarantee the success of the activities of marketing these quantities, far removed from the problems and difficulties which might appear from time to time. However, in spite of that, we observe the presence of some problems, one of the most conspicuous of which is the lack of availability of production accessories, such as reapers, tractors, tires, vehicles and so on, on schedule and in the right quantities. There are a number of producers who are now storing part of their production out in the open in man-made pits because there is not an adequate number of silos and small elevators in the governorate's subdistricts. In addition, the agricultural roads are considered among the most important auxiliary factors encouraging farming, but our governorate is lacking in the necessary agricultural roads for transporting the various crops from the fields to the marketing centers."

The deputy chairman of the peasants' federation in the governorate then talked about some other difficulties obstructing the development of agricultural activity in the governorate in general, including, for example, the great delay which is occurring in the execution of the Great al-Khabur Basin irrigation project, which it is hoped will irrigate 150,000 hectares of land lying within the Governorates of al-Hasakah and Dayr al-Zawr, as well as the failure to proceed with the execution of the Tigris Basin irrigation project, which is of no less importance than the al-Khabur project.

To that should be added the failure to put the cattle pen and poultry lot which the government has established in the governorate into operation although work on the two of them ended a long time ago.
The Governorate of Dayr al-Zawr

As regards Mr Ahmad al-Hamad, the chairman of the Dayr al-Zawr peasant federation, he pointed out that the marketing plan in the governorate for this year stipulates the purchase of 40,000 tons of wheat and 30,000 tons of barley, but predictions state that these figures will be exceeded, especially in the case of the barley crop, since it is expected that 80,000 tons will be marketed. The quantities marketed so far came to about 40,000 tons of barley and 300,000 tons of wheat. The sales of sacks have come to 650,000 new Red Pen sacks and 80,000 sacks which can be used. The quantity in storage comes to 88,403 new sacks and 3,538 which are usable.

He said, "The purchase of loose barley will stop because of the storage of 15,000 tons in the silos—bearing in mind that silo capacity is 18,000 tons—if the barley stored in the silos by the railway organization, according to the agreement made with it at the meeting held under the chairmanship of the assistant minister of supply on 31 May 1986 to ship barley at a rate of 3,000 tons a week, is not shipped. In addition, the governorate is suffering from the shortage of sacks and reapers, since a number of reapers have started to go off for work in the al-Hasakah Governorate fields and the agricultural mechanization branch reapers are not working at their full capacity. A number of them have ceased operating because of breakdowns."

The vice chairman of the governorate’s peasant federation and Comrade Khalid Hayyu, chairman of the branch peasants’ office, then talked about some other issues, among them:

The prevention of a number of peasants of Dayr al-Zawr Governorate from working their lands present in al-Hasakah.

The breakdown in new motors the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform has provided to some societies present in the governorate and the high costs of using them.

Al-Raqqah Governorate

The difficulties and obstructions in grain marketing activities have become more complex and greater in scope in the Governorate of al-Raqqah. Mr ‘Ali al-Ibrahim, chairman of the federation of peasants in the governorate, has pointed out "The marketing plan for this year in al-Raqqah stipulates the purchase of 500,000 tons of barley and 150,000 tons of wheat. In spite of the many measures which have been taken to reduce all the obstacles in the way of marketing, there are some basic problems which have continued to remain." He went on, "For example, the governorate is suffering from a stifling shortage of burlap bags. 4.7 million bags have been distributed to the peasants so far, and actual need comes to 8.5 million, that is, approximately double that. This statement could apply to reapers, since 400 reapers are working in harvesting the crop in the governorate’s fields and this figure has begun declining day by day because the reapers have gone off to work in some other governorates, such as al-Hasakah, while demand for reapers in the Governorate of al-Raqqah has started to intensify. This has created a great problem for us and the producers have paid a high price for it through the high harvesting wages. The price of harvesting an unirrigated dunum has come to 90 pounds and sometimes 100 pounds. To that one should add the control by drivers and handlers and their exploitation of the peasants in a vile way through the imposition of the wages and prices they want. The peasant pays, in humiliation, or his production is left unmarketed. A single handler receives 8 to 9 pounds for a single sack, while the official rate is much less than that. That is, the peasant ultimately gets only 50 percent of his production, and sometimes less.

"This is on the one hand. On the other, the delay in harvesting and marketing operations has caused us another problem, which is our peasants’ inability to carry out the intensified agricultural plan for the corn crop, which must be farmed directly after the grain harvest, within schedule."

Mr Ibrahim added, "With respect to the trucks, in order to solve the transportation shortage, the central bodies concerned have taken a number of measures, among them setting a number of Army and public company vehicles aside for the Governorates of al-Raqqah and al-Hasakah. Seventy Army vehicles have reached al-Hasakah, and the great majority of the other vehicles have not arrived yet. We highly appreciate these measures, but we consider that they are not to be viewed as a radical solution to the problem, because the vehicles which have arrived have been characterized by their small load capacity and high fuel consumption. Therefore, we are demanding the creation of other solutions besides the immediate ones for this and other existing problems. The transportation problem has inflicted another problem on us, that of storage. The silos which are present are in the process of filling up, if they have not actually done so, because of the imbalance between the volume of the quantities transported from the silos out of the governorate and the volumes entering them."

The Other Governorates

Just as the grain-producing governorates are suffering in a major way from problems, so have the other governorates to some extent seemed free of them. Indeed, they have a surplus in some marketing accessories, which shows that some other governorates are suffering from the presence of a severe shortage in these, for instance sacks, reapers and vehicles.

Hikmat Khattab, the chairman of the Idlib peasant federation, said "Our governorate is not suffering from any shortage as far as the harvest or marketing goes.
Indeed, to the contrary, Idlib is considered a reaper-exporting governorate." He stated that this year's marketing plan is to purchase 45,000 tons of barley and 3,500 tons of wheat.

Khalid Salamah, chairman of the Hamah peasant federation, said, "The grain plan has been carried out in full in accordance with the figures approved by the ministry and the higher agricultural council. Seven grain marketing centers which are to be taken over have been opened, and estimates of wheat production come to 236,000 tons, barley 165,000 tons, and lentils 11,000 tons.

"As to the marketing plan, that includes the purchase of 125,000 tons of wheat, 40,000 tons of barley, and 4,000 tons of lentils. Three hundred reapers are harvesting the crop and 350 trucks from the Office of Regions and nine vehicles from the organizations are transporting it, in addition to tractors, since the distances are close to the centers of production and the grain centers. Also, 1.1 million sacks have been distributed to peasants. About half a million sacks are left over from the quantity handed over to the governorate."

Muhammad Mansur Khawalidah, the chairman of the Dar'a peasant federation, said, "The area farmed with wheat in the governorate comes to 60,000 hectares and the anticipated production from it is 71,000 tons. Of this, 3,000 tons are required for marketing. As far as barley goes, the area farmed is 29,000 hectares. It is expected that they will yield 25,000 tons in production. As to barley, it is expected that production will be 6,000 tons, of which 500 tons are required for marketing. The state of the crops is good and all the marketing accessories are available. The governorate needs 70 reapers to begin preliminary harvesting operations as of 20 June, for a period of a whole month."

Muhammad Husayn Fahd, chairman of the Hums peasant federation, said, "The marketing plan in the governorate stipulates the purchase of 8,000 tons of barley and 10,000 tons of wheat. It is expected that the purchase figures in the case of barley will come to 25,000 tons and in the case of wheat to 20,000 tons."

The chairman of the Aleppo peasant federation pointed out "the marketing and harvesting operations are proceeding at good rates. Three and a half million burlap bags have been distributed to peasants for the purpose of marketing their production."

A number of common denominators appeared in the discussions of most of the people who talked about the issues of harvesting and marketing. These issues include the lack of availability of an adequate number of reapers, burlap bags and vehicles, in addition to the exercise of exploitation of producers by handlers, drivers and harvesters, the failure of the agricultural mechanization branch reapers to perform at their full productive capacity and the lack of availability of tires and spare parts.

What Have the Entities Concerned Said?

After the peasants reviewed the problems and difficulties obstructing the course of harvesting and marketing operations in their governorates, an opportunity was given to the general managers of the organizations and companies concerned to reply to the discussions which took place.

The general manager of the General Agricultural Mechanization Organization stated "The organization has 90 reapers distributed among its branches in the governorates in accordance with specific percentages. Many obstacles manifested themselves to the organization in the course of the optimum operation of these reapers in particular and the rest of the machinery in general. These obstacles include the lack of availability of drivers because of the low wages and salaries in the organization and their high level in the public sector, in addition to the lack of availability of the necessary spare parts and tires. These factors have led to the failure to operate these reapers at their maximum productive capacity. However, through cooperation with some other bodies and by directive of the minister of agriculture, the drivers' wages have been increased, some other problems have been solved and the reapers have been put in operation at a rate of two work shifts a day, with the period of about 10 hours per shift. Thus the reapers have worked close to 20 hours. If this time is met, it is enough for operating in the optimum manner."

He added, "We must not forget that the reapers present in the Agricultural Mechanization Organization, as is the case with the other reapers and other machines that exist, break down and cease operating. We are sparing no effort to prevent these breakdowns and so that the breakdowns which do occur will be repaired at the maximum possible speed within the resources available. What has happened in the Dayr al-Zawr branch does not amount to more than the breakdown of just two reapers of a total of 18. We have repaired the breakdowns and now all the reapers are working well."

The general manager of the Agricultural Mechanization Department promised that maximum efforts would be exerted on behalf of the optimum use of the machinery and reapers working during the season.

Mr. Muhammad Bartawi, director general of the General Grain Trade and Processing Organization, talked about the reasons which led to the emergence of a stifling shortage in burlap bags in some governorates, saying, "That can be attributed to the delay in the arrival of the final installment of bags for which contract had been made with Bangladesh.

"They come to about 60 million bags and they now are on their way to the country and will immediately be distributed to the needy governorates."
He pointed out that they would restudy the bases for distributing sacks to the governorates and distributing the surplus to the needy governorates.

Mr Muhammad Mustafa Miru, the governor of al-Hasakah, talked about the measures which have been taken in the governorate to eliminate the obstacles obstructing harvesting and marketing operations and pointed out that 13 workshops had performed maintenance and repair on all the agricultural roads present in the governorates. All roads are at present easy to travel and there is no problem in this regard. In the governorate there are 8 million burlap bags distributed to the peasants in accordance with principles. One should bear in mind that actual estimated need comes to 14 million sacks.

He stated that there are some areas, although they are small, which have been subjected to much damage because of the floods and heavy rains and requested that means be found for compensating the peasants who own these areas and helping them overcome the ordeal which has befallen them.

Comrade Ahmad Qublan, the chairman of the regional peasants' office, then spoke and demanded “the exertion of further efforts for the sake of increasing the figures of purchases planned within the marketing operations, especially since there are some governorates in which the possibility exists for increasing the figures on purchases to double what has been planned.” He asserted the need for optimum use of all the accessories available to us and stated that the most proper solution to the problem of the handlers' exceeding the official tariff was application of the harvesting and marketing processes by the flowing, "loose" method.

After that, the minister of agriculture and the assistant minister of supply replied to requests for information and questions which had been raised, within their areas of activity.

The Gripping Conclusion

After the discussion on harvesting and marketing had ended, the door to the discussion on other issues was opened. These were many, and no less in importance than the issues of the grain season. However, in brief, we can point out that they focused on the lack of availability of agricultural pesticides in adequate form and the General Seed Reproduction Organization's distribution of poor-quality sweet potato seeds for this season. Then a discussion was held on the reports presented by the executive board of the General Federation of Peasants.

The council concluded its activities the following day, with all the members of the council making a field trip to some grain marketing centers, oil fields and the associated gas production plant in al-Rumaylan. It was indeed a splendid, enjoyable tour and the conclusion was gripping.
Yusuf Mansur, al-Raqqa manager of agriculture:

He pointed out “The area planted with the unirrigated barley crop was 532,000 hectares and the production estimates on the basis of the harvest data are expected to come to more than 660,000 tons of barley and close to 250,000 tons of wheat, while 550,000 tons of barley and more than 150,000 tons of wheat are to be marketed.” As to the corn harvesting and marketing accessories, the manager of agriculture said, “The crop harvesting and marketing requirements were estimated more than a month before the harvest in the course of more than one agricultural meeting attended by the comrade branch secretary, and the governorate’s need for burlap bags was estimated at no less than 8 million bags at the beginning. It later became clear that the governorate needed 10 million bags, in addition to no less than 460 reapers and 400 trucks. In view of the shortage of bags and the volume of production, we have set out a number of bases for their distribution:

“The producer’s agricultural ownership deed.

“The allocation of 15 sacks per hectare of unirrigated land and from 30 to 35 of irrigated land.

“The breakdown of the distribution of sacks in two installments. If the farmer’s output is less than 2,000 sacks, they will be given to him in one installment, and if it is more than 2,000, he will be given half the amount and the second installment will be after delivery of the first. In this manner, many of the problems of our brother peasants and producers have been solved.”

What crop marketing accessories have been provided before commencement of the crop harvest?

Burlap bags, 3.4 million, which later came to 2 million bags.

Trucks, about 80.

Reapers, about 265, including public sector reapers.

TISHRIN posed a question to the comrade secretary of the party branch: How have you overcome these problems?

Comrade Secretary Hunaydi replied to this question, saying:

“Just as the land has been prolific, our brother farmers and producers have been self-sacrificing. There has been a lofty feeling on the part of all of the importance of the crop in increasing our national income. Everyone realizes the importance of this crop to total production, with the resources available. We asked our brother peasants and producers to market part of their crop by the loose method, and they responded. We asked the brother producers to store their crops in loading areas, and what we wanted was done. We have witnessed in actual conditions how some brother producers erected ground warehouses in a rectangular form, with four walls, with concrete poured on the ground, and how they filled them with the crop, until it was marketed, by the loose or conveyed method. These things to some extent contributed to the low demand for bags. As to the shortage of reapers, it is well known that the harvest starts in al-Raqqa Governorate no less than 15 days before the adjacent governorates. In fact, large numbers of reapers which worked in the governorate for a period of no less than 15 days came from al-Hasakah, Aleppo and Idlib. This helped solve part of the problem we had been suffering from. As to the trucks, the higher party and government command are to be thanked; they contributed in a major, effective way to solving a large part of our problem. Large numbers of organization and public sector company trucks were sent to our governorate for shipping and marketing this crop. Full thanks go to our Armed Forces, which responded and sent us many vehicles to take part in this great domestic and national duty.”

[Question] What is the area that has been harvested so far? What is the irrigated area of the grain branch in al-Raqqa?

[Answer] The area which was harvested up to 17 June came to about 386,000 hectares out of a total farmed area of 532,000 hectares of unirrigated barley, that is, a completion rate of 75 percent. As to unirrigated wheat, 37,000 hectares of that have been harvested out of a total farmed area of 64,000 hectares, and the total that has been marketed by the grain branch has come to 225,000 tons of barley and 10,000 tons of wheat. Let us once again resume raising what the people responsible for marketing and harvesting this crop and what remains of it are suffering from.

Kasir Sallum, manager of the grain branch in al-Raqqa:

During his conversation, he referred to the problem of the shortage of sacks and the correspondence which has taken place between the branch and the Ministry of Supply since April on the possibility of supplying the governorate with sacks, and the governorate’s need for packs.

[He also pointed out] how the ministry informed him that it had made a contract to import packs and they had not arrived as of this date, and the ministry, after insistence by the party and government bodies in the governorate, belatedly helped in the provision of 2 million packs from the branches of the country’s governorates, which helped solve a part of this problem.

Concerning the problems obstructing work in the branch, he said:

“I have many problems, the most important of which are:

“The shortage in personnel working in the branch, in particular warehousemen.
"The shortage of service vehicles required for purchase centers.

"The great shortage in bags.

"The suspension of shipments to the interior because of the shortage of trucks.

"The unsuitability of part of the roads existing in the governorate for the shipping process.

"The shortage in the number of weighing scales in the governorate, since the governorate at the lowest estimate needs six weighing scales, while what we have are four.

"The absence of warehouses for storage.

"In addition to these problems, there are many things which have been eliminated with the aid of the comrades in the party command."

As to the second subject which was discussed at length, vehicles and breakdowns:

Hamid al-Muz'ii al-Imam, manager of the Office of Regions, said:

"At present we have 200 trucks. At the beginning of the season the problem was the shortage of trucks present in the governorate, since the governorate has only 80 vehicles. At the beginning of the month of April, during the branch agricultural council meeting, we estimated the governorate's need at 300 vehicles, and, with the efforts of the comrades, the secretary, and members of the branch command, public sector vehicles in the governorate were set aside for the Office of Regions to take part in transportation of the crop. They were not enough. Then we received 90 government vehicles from public sector companies and organizations by directive of the higher party and government commands, in addition to 80 military vehicles. We now need more than 100 vehicles so that we will be able to market the crop in the optimum way." He pointed out that the daily shipping rate was about 10,000 tons.

Ramadan al-Kassar, chairman of the ground transport workers' union:

He pointed to the need to provide 100 other vehicles in addition to those present in the governorate, and asserted the need to increase speed in unloading in the open air centers to enable the trucks to increase their number of shipments per day.

With respect to the handlers' shops and their inadequate number, and problems and disputes between handlers and producers, he said, "The problem we are suffering from is a problem in the contract for unloading handlers, since things have been reflected in the producer's paying more than the official tariff for handlers.

"The shortage of vehicles and handlers' shops at the beginning led to a black market, and that was reflected on the producers. At the beginning of the season there were only seven handlers' shops. Now, however, the number of handlers' shops has come to more than 45. This number has to a large extent reduced the existing shortage, as well as protecting the producer."

As to Comrade Mahmud al-'Awwad, the vice chairman of the peasants' federation in the governorate, he said,

"The producer's responsibility ends when the vehicle becomes filled with sacks. What happens is that the vehicle continues to be part of the producer's responsibility until it is unloaded. This forces the producer to pay large sums to handlers. One should bear in mind that handlers' wages are restricted to an official tariff which the grain board pays, which is 5 Syrian pounds per ton unloaded, that is, 2.1 Syrian pounds per sack.

"This has resulted in the handlers' refraining from unloading and a halt in marketing. Therefore it is necessary to amend the contract between the grain board and the foodstuff workers' union, as in al-Hasakah, and such an amendment is the jurisdiction of the higher bodies.

"The problems of the peasant societies:

"The al-Safafah society: the society's need for sacks is estimated at 40,000. Only 6,000 sacks have been received, and they have been used a number of times, being filled and emptied. The second problem is that vehicles are very scarce. We must have 20,000 sacks ready for marketing and there are no vehicles for loading them." The society head said, "The society went to the Office of the Regions a number of times, ad we did not receive a vehicle. We must wait a period of no less than 10 days." He returned to the problem of sacks and said, "A number of days ago we bought 14,000 sacks from the black market in the city of Aleppo at a price of 42 Syrian pounds per sack in order to solve our problem. As far as reapers go, at the beginning of the season, in our area specifically, the charge was 15 percent, but now the charge has doubled. The great problem facing us now is we have an area of 4,000 dunums planted with irrigated wheat and it has not been harvested because of what was mentioned. One should bear in mind that this area is planned to be cultivated with the intensified corn crop whose planting has begun this season."

"Abd-al-Qadir al-'Ali, chairman of the Kish society:

"We have submitted documents to obtain 23,000 sacks, and have received only 10,000. Therefore, we obtained agreement for 3,000 sacks, and 50 percent of the wheats-barley crop has not been harvested because of the shortage of reapers and the lack of availability of sacks
and trucks. We now have 13,000 sacks which we have not been able to market.

"We requested 20 vehicles from the Office of Regions to market the crop, and so far we have obtained only three trucks."

'Ali 'Abd-al-'Ali, member of the executive committee in the peasant federation of the governorate:

He said, "At the beginning of the season, by directive of the political command in the governorate and the peasant organization, the small areas were harvested by hand so that execution of the intensified corn crop plan would be started on schedule. In fact, an area of 20 percent in the governorate as a whole has been completed. The problem arising from that:

"The rise in the charge for harvesting a single sack, which has come to 40 Syrian pounds per sack.

"The tractors present were sent to thresh the crop and transport the grain.

"This shortage in tractors has led to an inability to till the land prepared for execution of the plan, which has suspended the manual harvest, out of fear of what was mentioned. At present we require mechanical harvesting, and there are no reapers.

"Grain silos. The problem:

"In al-Raqqa there is a single silo with a theoretical capacity to store 50,000 tons of wheat, and actual capacity of about 45,000 tons, and from 41,000 to 42,000 tons of barley. The silo up to 17 June has received 72,000 tons of wheat and barley, 50,000 tons of which were loose and the rest conveyed. In addition to this silo, there is a small elevator in the Tall Abyad area with a capacity of 4,000 tons. This season so far just 9,000 tons have been received, of which 4,000 tons were loose and the rest conveyed. This small elevator was established to serve small producers at the production sites. At present the grain elevator has almost been shut down, because of the absence of vehicles to unload grain and transport it to the interior. In addition the problem of the silo will arise if there is a deficiency and a time delay, and that will be reflected on the producers this season. What is needed is a complete fleet of trucks to solve the problems of the silo and the small elevator."

[Question] What about the processes of harvesting and marketing the winter crop in the government installations and farms?

Nuri al-Najawi, manager of the al-Asad installation:

He mentioned that this year's plan is to farm 7,000 hectares with wheat and barley. Up to 17 June 1988, 6,700 hectares were harvested, so that the installation's barley production came to about 11,000 tons, which are currently present in the production sites. It is expected that production will come to 200,000 tons of unirrigated wheat. The manager of the installation summarized his problems as the difficulty of shipping production from the production sites to purchase centers because of the shortage of trucks.

As to Dr. Marwan Hanini, manager of the pilot project:

He stated "The project plan was to cultivate 5,000 hectares of unirrigated barley, which have been harvested in full, in addition to the farming of 6,200 hectares of irrigated wheat. Close to 2,000 hectares have been harvested and work is continuing on the rest. The problems which are obstructing our work are just the shortage of handlers to carry the grain production, since there are at present more than 35,000 sacks which have not been transported. With respect to the reapers, they are available in a good form in the project and the organization."

Following this rapid review of the problems of the harvesting and marketing of the winter crop, we heard the view of the farmers in the governorate:

Sha'ban al-Hammud pointed out: "The political and government command in the governorate has contributed greatly and effectively in providing our requirements, in spite of the limited resources which everyone in the governorate knows. From the beginning, when the problem of the shortage of sacks became clear, we were oriented to the need to market the crop in loose form and we were supplied with siphons (spiral belts). However, the problem was not solved in a radical manner, and great areas remained unharvested. The delay in harvesting to this time has led to a loss in quantities of production in addition to a twofold increase in the charges of harvesting a hectare. This farmer called for the need to work for the sake of increasing the harvests and providing all the necessary requirements for marketing this crop, which we have waited for a long time.

Ahmad al-Salal, from the village of al-Mansurah, said, "So far 40,000 hectares have been harvested in the al-Mansurah subdistrict out of a total of 140,000 hectares." He pointed out that the delay in the harvest led to a drop in revenue because the harvesters at present have been operating in an untechnical manner, in view of the increase in demand for them.

Following this concentrated review of the current status of crop harvesting and marketing operations and the problems of the people carrying them out, extensive time exists which one can benefit from to contain the existing problem. This, as the people working in crop marketing have pointed out, requires:

The provision of no less than 100 large trucks to ship the harvest from the production sites to the purchase and marketing centers.
The need to provide a loose shipping capacity ranging from 2,000 to 3,000 tons a day, in addition to what is shipped by train for the sake of the continuity of operation in the silo, in terms of the continuity of receipts and dispatches.

A review in rapid form of the contract concluded by the grain organization and the foodstuffs union, as in al-Hasakah, in order to protect the producer from paying any sum which is in excess of the handlers' tariff.

The effort to direct harvesters from other governorates which have completed harvesting activities to al-Raqqah Governorate.

Supporting the grain branch with the necessary technical personnel in the form of warehousemen and grain exports in order that the branch will be able to perform its role without obstacles.

The need to provide no less than 2 million sacks very rapidly to meet the needs of brother peasants and producers.

Here, while we are in the course of discussing the harvest and marketing, we might mention that:

It is necessary to increase the number of reapers in the governorate in the coming years and provide all the harvesting accessories for the various crops in the governorate.

In addition it is necessary to build permanent purchase centers equipped with all the necessary requirements for crop harvesting and marketing operations.

Expansion in the construction of silos and small elevators in this prolific governorate.

A final word. The great efforts made by all officials in the governorate, in spite of the modest resources, to preserve every grain of wheat contributing to the support of our nation's economy in this good season have been blessed. The efforts made in the governorate for the initiatives undertaken to excavate ditches in loading ramps at depths of more than 2 meters for the sake of selling the crop to them in loose form, so that the silo would not halt receiving or dispatching, have also been blessed.

11887

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Iranian Trade With Dubayy at 'Standstill'
44000180 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English
6 Jul 88 p 1

[Text] Iran's trade with Dubayy has come to a standstill and its currency, the rial, has taken a sharp plunge in the unofficial market following the escalation of tension in the Gulf.

No dhows sailed from the various Iranian ports for Dubayy yesterday for the second day running following the shooting down of the Iranian Airbus A-300 by the American navy on Sunday. There were no dhow sailings from Dubayy, too, as the skippers preferred to stay clear of the Gulf waters.

The Iranian rial lost further ground in the unofficial trading deals and as against an exchange rate of 1,350 rials to the U.S. dollar in the parallel market four days ago, yesterday's rate was 1,417 rials to the dollar. Iran's official exchange rate is 67 rials to the dollar, but because of the war a large-scale erosion of its currency has occurred leading to rampant unofficial trading activity, according to local businessmen. The growing gap between the official and unofficial exchange rates is posing a severe burden on Iran's exports, said a trader.

The three-day mourning in Iran had led to a stoppage of all bookings of cargo from Iranian ports, traders said. The regular dhow sailings from Bandar 'Abbas, Bushehr, Bandar Chah Bahar, Bandar Lengeh and Bandar Khamir have been transshipping a wide-variety of Iranian cargo such as carpets, pistachio, sultanas, fresh vegetables and fruits, cummin seeds, dates, coriander, building materials, saffron and caviar. These goods are being routed to Europe, Japan and the Far East, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, besides the Gulf and Middle Eastern markets.

Although Dubayy has traditionally been an entrepot, serving the market needs of Iran and other regional countries, the movement of goods to Iran has been rather slow for some time because of various constraints, the major one being an acute shortage of foreign exchange with the Iranian government.

Almost 80 per cent of Iranian exports are being done by the various cooperatives, who have been bringing in goods and meeting the import requirements in barter deals. The most sought-after items are tyres, motor spares, air-conditioners, fans, rice and other foodstuffs and other electrical and home appliances.

/08309

GULF NEWS Reports Oil, Gas Reserves Increased 'Dramatically'
44000178 Dubayy GULF NEWS in English
26 Jun 88 p 11

[Article by Arun Solomon]

[Excerpt] The proven oil and gas reserves of the UAE have increased dramatically according to the just released BP Statistical Review of World Energy 1988.
Abu Dhabi's proven oil reserves have risen from 31 billion barrels at the end of 1986 to 92.2 billion barrels at the end of 1987. Natural gas proved reserves of Abu Dhabi have risen from 90 trillion cubic feet at the end of 1986 to 183.5 trillion cubic feet at the end of 1987.

At the current rate of production Abu Dhabi's reserves of both oil and gas will last for more than 100 years.

Dubayy's proven oil reserves have risen from 1.4 billion barrels at the end of 1986 to 4.0 billion barrels at the end of 1987. Natural gas reserves of Dubayy rose from 4.4 trillion cubic feet in 1986 to 6.0 trillion cubic feet at the end of last year.

The UAE's two major producers have added significantly to the proved reserves of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council member states. The GCC's total proved oil reserves at the end of last year according to the BP Review were 362.3 billion barrels.

/08309

Editorial Discusses Cabinet Endorsement of Quota Rejection
44000179 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English
29 Jun 88 p 4

[Text] The federal cabinet has just endorsed the position outlined by Minister Mani' Sa'id al-'Utabah about the OPEC-assigned oil production quota for the UAE. When OPEC's bi-annual meeting decided in mid-June to roll over the group's production and price levels for the rest of the year, Dr al-'Utabah had made it plain that the output ceiling of 948,000 bpd set for the UAE was not acceptable, and that the country's "fair and official quota is 1.5 million bpd." By declaring on Monday that it stands by this assertion, the cabinet has let it be known how strongly it feels about the need for a revision of quotas among OPEC partners. The country has gone along with the other major producers to restrict production in order to spur prices and stabilise the international oil market. It has sacrificed vital revenues, and it met its commitment to OPEC even when reported violations of the consensus by some tended to throw the whole arrangement overboard. The government feels that it is justified in saying that the UAE should have a pragmatic quota compatible with the country's oil production capacity and reserves. Dr al-'Utabah has said that the UAE's reserves exceed 220 billion barrels and, accordingly, "our production of 1.5 million bpd could continue for hundreds of years." In fact, if one goes by the barometer of reserves, then the UAE output quota should be the second biggest within OPEC after Saudi Arabia's. Thus, adherence to even 1.5 million bpd involves a continued sacrifice on the part of the UAE, which is bound by its pledge to defend the $18 price. This is precisely why Dr al-'Utabah stressed the other day that "we do not seek an increase in our share, but only our rights."

The controversy is not new, and it has nothing to do with OPEC's inherent strength as an organisation. But it does underscore the necessity for frequent deliberations to sort out ticklish questions which arise from time to time. Apart from the difference of opinion over the allocation and interpretation of quotas, a row is also assuming serious proportions on the definition of crude oil for the purpose of output limits. Kuwait is apparently insisting that the term should include condensates but Venezuela, a leading producer of the disputed hydrocarbon liquids, is said to be arguing with equal force that they are excluded from it. A coherent response to a reciprocal exports cut offer made by non-OPEC producers also remains to be worked out.

All these issues are part of a problem that concerns perhaps the most important sector of the international economy. But, by the same token, any disagreements over them exert a deep influence on market forces, and hence on prices. They should, therefore, be tackled on a priority basis, and if an extraordinary meeting of OPEC ministers is deemed necessary for this, then it should be held without delay. At least, the Gulf oil producers should quickly adopt a joint approach.

/08309
Transportation Protocol Signed
46000183b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 10 Jul 88 p 2

[Text] A protocol on cooperation was signed on Thursday in Kabul between motorized transport department of the executive committee of Moscow city and Millie Bus transport enterprise of the Ministry of Transport of the Republic of Afghanistan.

According to the protocol, the sides will cooperate in designing of technical projects shops of the enterprise in Kabul city and supply of equipment as well as carry out primary studies about the enterprise.

The protocol was signed by Mohammad Hakim, Kabul Mayor, and the deputy-head of the motorized transport department of the executive committee of Moscow.

07310

Gas Supply To Be Augmented From USSR
46000184a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 8 Jul 88 p 4

[Text] The station for filling liquid petroleum gas was set up in Kabul in 1985 at a cost of 205 million Af's under a contract with the Soviet Union and commissioned in late 1986, said Eng Gul Mohammad, head of the station talking to your correspondent. He added that this made it possible to meet the need of Kabul citizens for cooking gas to some extent.

“We import gas mainly from the USSR and supply to the people through our outlets in the capital and provinces after filling special cylinders. Our unit also owns 30 tankers for transporting gas to Kabul.

To provide more facilities, another station for filling gas will be completed late this year in Hairatan city at a cost of 3.6 million dollars. This unit will have a capacity of filling 200 tons of gas and would meet the needs of citizens of Hairatan and Balkh as also Kabul city,” he said.

Last year the department of liquid gas supplied 700 tons of gas to the public and it has plans to raise the quantity to 1000 tons. So far 500 tons of gas have been transported to Kabul.

“We have a plant to establish another filling station in Kabul also. Our unit supplies one kg of gas for 40 Af's which is the price determined a commission of Commerce Ministry. Our 10 outlets are functioning in Kabul, one in Hairatan and one in Balkh,” he added.
Servicemen Participate in Rebuilding Projects

46000184b Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 7 Jul 88 p 4

[Text] Mazar-i-Sharif, July 5 (BIA)—To welcome the 69th independence day of the country and the army day of the Republic of Afghanistan, the personnel of the armed forces took part in the rehabilitation of water supply schemes drilling of a tube well and repairing of water pumps of the holy shrine of Ali (the fourth caliph of Islam) and saved Afs 120,000 for the state.

Also through voluntary work, the power substation supplying power to over 150 families was repaired in the fourth precinct of Mazar-i-Sharif city.

07310

Extremist Infighting Leaves 16 Dead

46000182a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 6 Jul 88 p 1

[Text] Sixteen extremists belonging to the Abdullah and Gulab gangs were killed, and five seriously wounded in interline fighting among the various bands in Dawlatabad district of Balkh province recently. Also, there was an exchange of fire between the Gulbuddin and Rabani gangs in Nijrab district of Kapisa province in which four extremists were killed and four injured. In still another clash, three extremists (including Ibrahim known as Sar Safid) were killed in Khanabad district of Kunduz province.

07310

Badakhshan Lands Cultivated

46000179c Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 28 Jun 88 p 4

[Text] Faizabad, 21 June, (BIA)—Over 72,400 hectares have been cultivated with wheat, barley, paddy, maize and vegetable in the spring campaign of the current year in Badakhshan province.

A spokesman of the agriculture and land reforms department of the province said that during this period chemical fertilizers, improved wheat seeds and pesticides valued at 1.495 million Afs, 1.2 million Afs and 531,000 Afs respectively were distributed to the peasants and cattle breeders of the province.

/12232

Kunduz Lands Cultivated Mechanically

46000184c Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 7 Jul 88 p 4

[Text] Over 2700 jeribs of land (five jeribs equal one hectare) were cultivated using agricultural machinery in Kunduz province during the last three months.

Also machinery was used for harvesting 550 jeribs and levelling 50 jeribs during the same period. The Kunduz mechanized agricultural station earned 769,000 Afs for 31,000 hrs of work carried out.

The station has 40 tractors and six combines. (BIA).

07310

Construction, Repair of Schools Under Way

46000179a Kabul THE KABUL TIMES in English 24 Jun 88 p 2

[Article by Nahid: “Rapid Construction, Repairing of Schools”]

[Text] “The construction unit of the Ministry of Education, by achieving 12,000 cum construction worth 75 million Afs during the last 3 months, has implemented its 3-month plan 100 percent,” said Eng Mohammad Marouf, president of the unit to KT correspondent.

The construction of 14 projects, including two 24 classroom schools in Kabul, the 24 room building of Pedagogical Institute, one kindergarten housing 250 children and rehabilitation of 150 schools is under way.

“The projects, which will be completed and commissioned during the current Afghan year, are Khushal Khan school, Khair Khana girls’ school Pul-i-Khumri kindergartens, and basic repairing of Shir Shah and Habibia high schools. Twenty other schools will also be repaired by the unit in Kabul city.

Over 270 million Afs have been allocated for construction, and expansion and repairing of schools in Kabul city,” he said. Eng Marouf added that as many as 648 projects have been built by the unit since its establishment. The total amount spent on these projects is 413 million Afs, met from the state budget.

The Construction Unit of the Ministry of Education stood first in work emulation drive launched among construction units last year and was awarded by Honorary Banner of the Kabul city party committee.

By building 77850 cum construction valued at 246,748 million Afs, the unit overfulfilled its plan last year.

Eng Marouf went on to say that the unit has also built two, eight class room schools in Onaba and Rukha villages of Panjshir district, two schools in Maidan Shar and Pul-e-Alam of Logan province this year.

There are 400 employees on its payroll. Of them 106 are productive workers, 58 engineers and 135 administrative employees.

/12232
INdIA

Report on Minister's Talks With EEC in Brussels
46001609 Madras THE HINDU in English 3 Jul 88 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, July 2—India and EEC have agreed to set up an EEC-India Energy Management Centre to strengthen cooperation in the field of energy management, according to a decision reached at a meeting held recently in Brussels between the visiting Indian Union Minister of State for Industry, Mr M. Arunachalam, and the EEC Commissioner, Mr Claude Cheysson.

During the discussion, it was also agreed that the proposed Technological Information Centre would be structured to further India's objective of ensuring access to data relating to modern industrial technology available in Europe and elsewhere for dissemination to public and private sector enterprises in the country.

Software workshop: According to an official release here today the meeting noted with satisfaction the preparations by the Commission for the proposed Software Workshop in Europe to introduce Indian software companies to European users.

Industrial standards: It was agreed that the next meeting of the Indo-EEC working group on industrial cooperation would be called by October 1988. In the area of industrial standards and quality assurance, the main thrust of the programme will be to place Indian experts for training at the Community and Member-States level and to depute European experts to India to assist in drawing up and implementing Indian standards. The cooperation in industrial standards was of long range significance in the context of the rapid industrialisation in India and the movement of the European Community towards a single unified market in 1992.

/9274

Writer Reviews Worsening Relations With Pakistan
46001606 Bombay THE TIME OF INDIA in English
I Jul 88 p 18

[Article by V. T. Joshi]

[Text] Islamabad, June 30. Indo-Pakistan relations, rarely on the upswing, seem to be showing a distinct tendency to nosedive.

Apart from President Zia-ul-Haq's remarks at an international conference squarely blaming India for all the ills in South Asia, the latest irritants include reports of alleged Indo-Israeli collusion to attack Pakistan's nuclear facilities.

These reports have periodically emanated invariably from the western media and have been picked up by the Pakistani press in what Indian diplomatic sources believe to be an emerging pattern of a new propaganda offensive against India.

Press reports about alleged Indo-Israeli collusion, despite emphatic denials by India, are a source of concern to the average Pakistani after the harrowing experience of the explosions in the American arms dump in Rawalpindi in April.

Suspicion Rampant

Although India had nothing to do with the blasts, on that fateful day every Pakistani instinctively assumed that it was an Indian attack, till it was officially clarified that it was an accidental fire that caused the catastrophe.

Against this backdrop, an Indian embassy press release issued at a news conference here on Monday drew pointed attention to the statement of the official spokesman of the government of India, made in Delhi last week, emphatically refuting the allegation of Indo-Israeli collusion and calling it "baseless, motivated and mischievous."

The Indian embassy press note referred to a news item broadcast by Radio Pakistan and simultaneously carried by several newspapers in this regard.

It also listed five different items and editorials on various topics in prominent sections of the English and Urdu press in the last few months to illustrate "a systematic and continuous process of disinformation and propaganda against India."

The Pakistani press representatives took umbrage. They argued that the Indian radio and press coverage and comments on Pakistani affairs were no less unfortunate.

The Indian ambassador, Mr S. K. Singh, stated that he would heartily support any move by his counterpart in Delhi, Dr Humayun Khan, to correct Indian press perceptions, if necessary, so that good neighbourly relations could be established between the two countries.

After a candid exchange of views, marked by some warmth, the Indian ambassador affirmed that he stood by every word of his press release.

A question posed by a young Pakistani correspondent in this regard was: "Are nuclear weapons safe in Indian hands but not so safe in Pakistani hands?"

Mr Singh replied that India was firmly committed to disarmament, and was not contemplating production of nuclear arms despite its demonstrated capacity to do so.
At the same time, even the international scientific community felt concerned at Pakistan’s nuclear programme because of its uranium enrichment far beyond its energy needs or capacity.

/9274

Janata Said To Withdraw Support From Baliajal Agitation
46001603 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
30 Jun 88 p 7

[Article by S. P. Nanda]

[Text] Bhubaneswar: The three-year-old resistance movement against the location of the missile test range at Baliajal suffered a setback following the recent shift in stand by the Janata party leader, Mr Biju Patnaik, over the issue. Mr Biju Patnaik’s statement that the government may go ahead with the project if it could convince the Baliajal people about the justifiability of locating it in the agriculturally prosperous area is being seen by observers as a step to extricate his party from the movement. The Janata party, which had hitherto spearheaded the agitation, is apparently unwilling to go as far as the people of Baliajal are prepared to in order to stall the setting up of the test range.

Though the people of Baliajal have carried the burden of the agitation against the test range throughout the past three years, they have, no doubt, looked towards the Janata party leaders for support and help in creating an awareness outside the state about the issue. Any vacillation on the part of Janata leaders is sure to come as a jolt and weaken the resolve of these villagers, observers foresee. Mr Riju Patnaik has already turned a blind eye to a rally by the Congress(I) at Baliajal last month in support of the project.

The Orissa chief minister, Mr J. B. Patnaik’s recent statement that he was helping Janata leaders explain to the agitationists the suitability of Baliajal as an ideal location for the test range has also raised further doubts about Mr Biju Patnaik’s sincerity towards the movement. The chief minister’s statement is believed to provide an insight into the talks he held with Mr Biju Patnaik before the first ever formal government-Opposition meeting on the test range, held at Balasore last month. The meeting took place at the initiative of Mr Biju Patnaik. Arouses further suspicions regarding his intentions for calling the meeting, the Janata leader refused to divulge the proceedings of the talks only reiterating Mr J. B. Patnaik’s cryptic remark that they were held in a “cordial atmosphere” and that another meeting should take place soon.

Mr Biju Patnaik’s statement about the interim test range (ITR) at Chandipur, also on the Balasore coast, has further highlighted the fact that the Opposition was divided over this issue. The Janata leader apparently acquiesced to the ITR (where new missiles like ‘Agni’ are to be test-fired) and stated that the setting up of this facility would preclude the need for a test range at Baliajal. This is in sharp contrast to the stand of other opposition parties, particularly the CPI, which have launched an agitation against the establishment of the ITR site.

/9274

V. P. Singh Tells Aims, Policy to Newsmen
46001607 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
2 Jul 88 p 9

[Text] Bombay, July 1—At an informal get-together arranged by Mr Ayub Syed, editor of the CURRENT weekly here with some members of the press on Thursday, the Jan Morcha leader, Mr V. P. Singh, laid down guidelines for a change in the system. A change of individuals alone would not solve our problem. Messiahs would not be of any help. The fight had to be against the system.

The first step, he said, had to be taken in the field of election reforms. “So far, we have no law on parties. The whole system is running without defining what a political party is.” No obligations were placed on political parties.

Then the question of funding of politics had to be looked into. If the party was the vehicle of politics, it had to be democratized. There should be a statutory law for regular elections in all the parties and there should be public audit of all party accounts.

Decentralisation of economic and political power was essential. His experience, he explained, was that the problem of corruption could not be solved by sitting in a ministry. “You have to evolve a mechanism for decentralisation not only from Delhi to state but from state to districts and from district to the lowest level.” Even electoral reform could not curb corruption until this grassroots interaction took place.

Another important thing was the right of information. “The people have the right to know what’s happening in the country and, except for some areas like defence, they should be given the information.”

Mr Singh said these were just his stray thoughts. He intended to work on it and present a paper to his friends and colleagues. He and other opposition leaders planned to come together to work, write papers and then spell out their policies and programme. That would be the political task for 1988-89.

The Jan Morcha leader felt that within the next two months the opposition would be able to come to a consensus—to have a united action on a common platform. And thereafter a mass movement would be launched.
Mr Singh was asked how opposition unity could be brought about in view of Mr Chandra Shekhar’s recent statement not accepting his leadership.

“I don’t think he has been saying anything disturbing. I am not the opposition. There are other men and there are parties. We in the opposition believe in moving away from concentrating on individuals to issue-based programmes. Besides, Mr Chandra Shekhar was only serving a note of caution. The Allahabad victory cannot solve the country’s problems.

Q: But he said that between Rajiv Gandhi and V. P. Singh there is not much difference.

V.P.: I will speak to him when I meet him in Delhi. He is my personal friend. These matters will get sorted out.

Q: What is your approach to business houses and industrialists? As finance minister, you refuse to meet them.

V.P.: That is another myth about me. I had my open houses where they could come without even an appointment. And they were not only heard, attended to, but each memorandum was computerised and within a timeframe of a month a decision was taken.

Besides, I regularly attended meetings and seminars I was invited to, whether by small-scale or multi-based industries. I had meetings of financial institutions and any of the pending cases or individual cases also were asked in the presence of officers for disposal. Anyone who wanted to see me was welcome.

They were asked to submit memorandums so that I could read and discuss the matter with my officers and know their case by the time they came to see me. But some people wanted to see me alone, without submitting their memorandum. I was holding a public office. Why did they want to whisper in my ears? They had infiltrated the finance ministry and were getting their work done. That is why they spread rumours about me.

Q: As future prime, would your attitude remain the same towards the business houses?

V.P.: I think I would be disastrous as prime minister and that should end the debate.

Q: But what is the alternative?

V.P.: The alternative will come when the times arises.

On the Allahabad elections, he explained that he was a consensus opposition candidate and all opposition parties which wanted to fight the Congress supported him, whether it was the Muslim League, the Muslim Majlis or the Barbari Action Committee, on the one hand, and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, on the other. They all came together to support the opposition candidate so as to defeat the Congress. He said he had not got 80 per cent of the votes and 100 per cent Muslim vote. In fact, he added that even large numbers of Congress workers supported him, many even openly.

At the beginning of the campaign, the Congress had photographs of four people on the posters—Rajiv Gandhi, Sunil Shastri, V. B. Singh and Lal Bahadur Shastri. After a few days, Rajiv Gandhi and V. B. Singh vanished from the posters. Only Sunil Shastri and Lal Bahadur remained.

So a candidate who had been given the ticket Rajiv Gandhi himself knew what his prospects would be if his posters carried the photograph of Rajiv Gandhi.

“You can judge the level of Rajiv’s credibility in his own party. Sunil realised he could no longer pull voters by using Rajiv’s name. So his photograph was removed from the posters.”

When asked why he had to keep Mr Arif Mohammed away from the election campaign in Allahabad, Mr Singh said that it was a lapse on his part and he had accepted it publicly.

Q: Is Rajiv the villain of the piece or the system?

V.P.: The system, obviously. And Rajiv is a part of that system and is continuing it.

Q: But do you think he was a good man when he started?

V.P.: Yes, in 1984 I thought I had a better leader than even Mrs Indira Gandhi. Even the people felt like that.

Q: So he was the victim of the system?

V.P.: Why does one have to be the victim of the system? One can get out of it. I got out of it.

Q: At what point of time did you begin to get disillusioned?

V.P.: It started in the finance ministry. First the submarine deal came up.

Q: And also the raids on big business houses?

V.P.: That was also one point. There was the HBJ pipeline too. And so it went on building up.

/9274
Analyst on Importance of Foreign Minister Appointment
46001610 Madras THE HINDU in English 8 Jul 88 p 2

[Article by K. K Katyal]

[Text] New Delhi, July 2 — It may be premature to talk about the chances of upgrading the dialogue between India and China to the ministerial level, but the way has been cleared with the appointment of Mr P. V. Narasimha Rao as Minister for External Affairs.

There were vague suggestions for such a contact when Mr N. D. Tiwari looked after the Ministry. On one of his visits to North Korea, he made use of a brief stopover in Beijing for an informal exchange of views (at a time when his opposite number happened to be out of China), but there was no formal meeting.

Last year, the idea of a visit to China by the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, was revived—he accepted it in principle at the time of the 1987 round of official-level talks when the leader of the Chinese delegation renewed his Government's invitation.

There has been no concrete follow-up since, but it was understood that such a visit—whenever it takes place—will be preceded by intensive preparatory work—by officials as well as Ministers. This was another context in which a Ministerial meeting was considered possible.

With the Prime Minister holding charge of External Affairs, most of the work, other than that involving policy decisions, was conducted first, by the two Ministers of State, Mr Natwar Singh and Mr Eduardo Faleiro, and then by the former. Inherent in this arrangement was a ticklish protocol problem—how to go about in situations where business is to be conducted at the level of Foreign Ministers?

The Prime Minister obviously could not be involved in discussions with Foreign Ministers of other countries and they, in turn, would have liked to deal with persons of equal ranking—which the Ministers of State were not. This hitch did loom—even though vaguely—whenever Ministerial-level contacts were thought of.

Deputing a Senior Minister

But at no stage the idea of a meeting between the Ministers of India and China had to be shot down, because of the absence of a Foreign Minister (during the period when the Prime Minister headed the External Affairs Ministry). Perhaps, the protocol difficulty could have been got over by the Prime Minister deputing a senior Minister—Mr Narasimha Rao or Mr Tiwari—as his representative if the move to upgrade the level of contacts had materialised.

The appointment of a Foreign Minister obviates the need for informal arrangements. In the allocation of work finalised after the changes in the External Affairs Ministry, Mr Narasimha Rao will look after relations with the neighbours which, it is expressly stated, include China and Afghanistan.

Allocation of Work

As the head of the Ministry, Mr Narasimha Rao will be responsible for coordination and supervision, will take care of policy issues, of relations with the superpowers, the UK, Japan and West Germany, other important subjects like the UN, disarmament, nonaligned movement, SAARC and the Commonwealth, the AFRICA Fund, the Indian Council of Cultural Relations and administration of the IFs ("A" category), their service conditions and cadres.

The division of work between the two Ministers of State, Mr Natwar Singh and Mr K. K. Tewary, is on the old lines (between the former and Mr Faleiro in the past), Mr Natwar Singh’s charge includes relations with neighbours, including China and Afghanistan, UN, disarmament, NAM, SAARC and Commonwealth—through the Minister—Eastern Europe, Western Europe, including the EEC, multilateral economic relations, External Publicity, Policy Planning and the Division concerned with international conferences.

Mr Tewary will look after administration and establishment, the Africa Division, South America and the Caribbean region, East Asia, except China and Japan, West Asia, the Gulf, North African consular affairs, passports, visas and the Legal and Treaties Division.

Bharatiya Janata Asks New Probe Into Bofors
46001608 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 2 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Ranjit Roy]

[Text] Jamshedpur, July 1 — The national executive of the BJP has demanded the setting up a new joint parliamentary committee with a chairman from the ranks of the Opposition to probe the political connections of the Swiss bank account beneficiaries exposed by the recent disclosures in THE HINDU.

Addressing a press conference after its meeting here today, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee said the BJP had started talks with the leaders of all the Opposition parties to force the Prime Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, to order a fresh “impartial probe into the scandal.” He said the Opposition leaders would jointly meet the President, Mr R. Venkataraman, before the next session of Parliament to apprise him about the probe demand.
Asked whether the Left parties would join the deputation, Mr Vajpayee said corruption had no left or right leanings. "The CPI and the CPI(M) are with us on the Bofors issue," he said.

Meeting Begins Late

The BJP national executive could only discuss the Bofors issue today as the meeting began about three hours late due to the late arrival of the train in which the prominent leaders of the party were travelling.

The national executive will discuss the political situation in the country after the recent by-elections, the Punjab situation and the alleged delay in taking up the crop and cattle insurance programme by the Union government during the next two days.

The other demands made by the BJP on Bofors are public prosecution against Mr Win Chadha and the Hindujas, a formal request to the government of Sweden through the Indian ambassador in Stockholm to reopen the entire inquiry and a request to the federal government of Switzerland for the full facts behind these bank accounts. Mr Vajpayee claimed that the Swiss banks divulged accounts of their clients if a criminal case against them was on and a request was made by the government concerned.

Rajiv Flayed

The BJP accused Mr Gandhi of misleading the country about the "greatest arms scandal in the country since Independence." In a resolution it questioned why the Prime Minister had stated that no Indians had received payments from Bofors.

Making a scathing attack on the joint parliamentary committee and its probe report on the Bofors deal, the BJP said, "The JPC was a captive body mouthing tutored versions of the Rajiv Gandhi government." It demanded the re-examination of principal witnesses like Mr Martin Ardbo, the key man in the deal, the Swedish prosecutor, Mr Ringberg, and the then Indian ambassador in Sweden, Mr Bhupatrai Oza. The BJP also called for an examination of the minutes of the meeting held in Stockholm between April 20 and 22 in which Bofors first made an admission of payments.

Advani’s Appeal to Opp.

The president of the party, Mr L. K. Advani, appealed to all major Opposition parties to act together "to oust the Congress(I) from power." He was addressing the members of the party’s national executive on the eve of its three deliberations.

He said Mr V. P. Singh’s victory in Allahabad had showed that the “people are disillusioned with the Congress(I). They wish to see a change of government at New Delhi” he said.

Commenting on the CPI(M)’s reluctance to work with the BJP he said, “Its influence is irrelevant outside West Bengal, Tripura and Kerala. In the greater portion of the country, its support or opposition to any candidate does not affect the outcome of elections even a wee bit.”

/9274

CPI Leader Claims Left Gaining Strength in Punjab

46001605 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 1 Jul 88 p 5

[Article by Soutik Biswas]

[Text] Calcutta, June 30: The CPI central executive member, Mr Satpal Dang, feels that the Leftist parties will “emerge stronger” in Punjab because of the initiatives taken by them to defuse tensions and avoid a Hindu-Sikh divide.

Talking to this correspondent this morning in his heavily-guarded room in the state government guest house in south Calcutta, Mr Dang said the people in Punjab were aware that the Communists were “making sacrifices and taking the initiative” in the troubled state. “The result is the strengthening of the Left in Punjab. We have not lost in the state.”

After Operation Black Thunder, CPI cadres had toured the rural areas of Punjab, including terrorist strongholds, and held 33 meetings. The biggest meeting, he said, was held in Chowk Mehta, which was Bhindranwale’s stronghold and housed his headquarters, the Damdami Taksal. The party had already covered 500 out of the 1,200 villages in the state and a large number of public meetings were also held in Amritsar.

City an example of the Left making inroads into terrorist strongholds, Dr Dang said at a public meeting held by his party outside the Amritsar Medical College, some extremists came out of the college, “listened to our speeches and threatened us.” The CPI cadres “immediately took out their arms and the extremists fled saying they would come back armed. They never did.” The CPI leader also attached importance to the CPI-CPI(M) joint convention in Jalandhar which was a success.

Mr Dang felt the Centre had failed to cash in on the “very good gains” of Operation Black Thunder. “The government admitted that only 20 per cent of the terrorists were caught in the operation. And it also knew that the Golden Temple was not the only shelter of the terrorists.” The Centre should have immediately started a similar operation in the marshy Mand area, a terrorist stronghold, he said.

Mr Dang said no action was taken in Mand because it was the operational headquarters of a section of terrorists headed by Avtar Singh Bratma, who had pledged loyalty to Bhai Jasbir Singh Rodhe and the government
was trying to mediate with the terrorists through him. The Brahma group is taken advantage of the government's softness towards it to smuggle in more arms from Pakistan. This has been revealed by top security officers in Amritsar on the basis of the interrogation of hardcore terrorists," the CPI leader said.

Mr Dang said the Centre had "become party to the dirty games" of Akali factions. The recent ordinance by the Centre asking the managing committees of religious places not to allow politics in places of worship was being questioned today as the Centre had pinned its hopes on Mr Rode when the SGPC, at the best of Mr Prakash Singh Badal and Mr G. S. Tohra, changed the high priest. "This had made the people doubt the government's intentions of not mixing religion with politics."

The gains of Operation Black Thunder, Mr Dang feels, will be neutralised if the government did not give up its policy to trying to "make a deal" with a section of terrorists. He said there should be also a concerted operation to flush out terrorists from the Mand area. The CPI leader also demanded the immediate release of the "innocent" Jodhpur detenus, prosecution of the people involved in the anti-Sikh riots and an early decision on the Sarkaria Commission report to give more powers to Punjab and other states. "But there should be no special status for Punjab. This will result in theocracy."

Mr Dang said the government should hold bilateral talks with all the parties to evolve a broad consensus on the territorial disputes between Punjab and Haryana. "The terrorists are trying hard to bring about Hindu-Sikh riots. They have not succeeded till now. During Black Thunder they were exposed as purely antisocial elements," he added.

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IRAN

Delegation Requests Food From France in Exchange for Crude Oil
45000135 Cairo AL-AKBAR in Arabic 20 Jul 88 p 3

["Letter From Paris" column by William Wisaj]

[Text] It seems that Iran's poor economic condition was one of the chief factors behind the surprise decision taken by the Tehran government to accept the cease-fire. AL-AKBAR has learned that the Iranian delegation that visited Paris at the beginning of July sought to purchase French foodstuffs valued at 3 billion francs, provided that Iran pay for it in crude oil. During its stay in Paris, the delegation held unofficial discussions with a number of officials in French oil companies and some ministries. The Iranian delegation presented a request to the French authorities to raise the embargo it had adopted last August following the severing of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Informed sources told AL-AKBAR that recent developments in the Iranian position and the Tehran government's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598, which calls for an immediate cease-fire between the two warring countries in the Gulf, will encourage Paris to adopt positive decisions toward the Iranian request, especially after the restoration of diplomatic relations.

France announced its pleasure with the Iranian decision to accept the cease-fire. An official spokesman for the Foreign Ministry announced in a statement it issued that France welcomes with pleasure Iran's decision to accept Security Council Resolution 598 officially.

The statement added that "France is prepared to continue its efforts toward the full and complete application of Resolution 598."
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