APPLICATION OF ASPECTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE: TOOLS FOR ENGAGING THE CURRENT AND FUTURE THREAT TRENDS OF THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 1999

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Application of Aspects of Unconventional Warfare: Tools for Engaging the Current and Future Threat Trends of the Post-Cold War Environment

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This study investigates the aspects and nature of unconventional warfare operations from pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War environments. The case studies examined are: unconventional warfare operations in the Philippines (World War II), unconventional warfare operations with the Contra Rebels, and unconventional operations during Operation Uphold Democracy. Critical factors are identified for each operation. By analyzing the critical aspects of case studies spanning a full range of periods and operational environments, parallels and trends are established. The threat trends expected in the post-Cold War environment are established and parallel aspects of conventional warfare are evaluated against them. The post-Cold War environment promises to be one of ambiguity and asymmetry, with Special Forces soldiers working through and with indigenous forces. To be successful in this environment, Special Forces soldiers must be technically and tactically proficient, with an emphasis on indirect skills. Indirect skills enable SF soldiers to be flexible and adaptive to fluid changes in the operational and political environment. Primarily, the human element must be amplified. By focusing on cross-cultural communications, linguistics, interpersonal, human intelligence, and training skills, SF training will produce competent and versatile unconventional warriors capable of meeting the diverse threats expected in the post-Cold War environment.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
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The biggest debt of gratitude is owed to my family. Candy, Christina, Chloe, and Hunter, thank you so much for your support in allowing me to finish this thesis. See, we did survive the best year of my life!
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Direct Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECLGA</td>
<td>East Central Luzon Guerrilla Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEIB</td>
<td>Basic Infantry Training School (translation from Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAHD</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAPH</td>
<td>Front for the Advancement of Progress of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSLN</td>
<td>Sandinista National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>GOH</td>
<td>Government of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>Human Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
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<td>IPM</td>
<td>International Police Monitors</td>
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<td>IPSF</td>
<td>Interim Public Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>LGAF</td>
<td>Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces</td>
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<td>LLC</td>
<td>Low Level Contacts</td>
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<td>LLS</td>
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<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi National Force</td>
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<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
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<td>South West Pacific Area</td>
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<td>United States Army Forces Far East</td>
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<td>USAFIP, N.L.</td>
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<td>UW</td>
<td>Unconventional Warfare</td>
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change . . . This reality means that USSOCOM must embrace and institutionalize the process of change in a disciplined manner that allows us to move closer to our vision. During this journey, only our core values are permanent and non-negotiable. Everything else — our organization, force structure, platforms, equipment, and missions — must continuously evolve to meet the needs of the nation and seize the opportunities brought about by change . . . To be relevant in the future, we must continue our transformation, while maintaining the readiness required to shape and respond to the world today. We need to anticipate trends and future scenarios, conditioning ourselves to not be surprised by surprise and the rapidity of change and the dynamics that follow. As new threats arise, we must decide which of our current capabilities to retain or modify, which new ones to develop, and which old ones to discard. (General Peter J. Schoomaker 1998, 10).

Background

General Schoomaker made this statement in the article “Special Operational Forces: the Way Ahead.” He clearly describes the need for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to be forward looking and forward thinking in order to remain a relevant force. In the Army Special Force’s (SF) attempt to remain a relevant force during a time of shrinking resources, primary missions and collateral activities must all be evaluated on a regular basis. The SF must step back with an objective eye and closely examine all it is currently doing and that which it may be doing in the future.

Before looking into the future, it is helpful to look at the past. By studying the past, the evolution of SF can be seen and an understanding of the current mission focus may be gained. The one mission that has historically defined the essence of SF is unconventional warfare (UW). Field Manual (FM) 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, refers to Joint Publication 1-02 to define UW as, “a broad spectrum

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of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery (UAR)."

Historically, UW has been the capstone mission for SF. Units, such as Detachment 101 and the Jedburghs are the forefathers of today’s SF. These units were born of the necessity for a force capable of conducting UW operations. After World War II, the world found itself engaged in the Cold War. During the Cold War, the national command authority of the United States again recognized the need to have units capable of conducting UW operations. The 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFG) was organized in 1952 to fill this specific need. The 10th SFG was the first of the special forces groups that are recognized today as U.S. Army Special Forces. Since the inception of the Special Forces Group, UW has been the mission that defines SF.

During the Cold War, UW operations conducted by SF were a tool the U.S. could use to help in the struggle to control the spread of communism around the world. In the third world, UW was an effective tool to indirectly support democracy and counter the spread of communism. This indirect approach was important because it allowed the U.S. to achieve its national military strategic goals without having to directly confront the Soviet Union, possibly causing a third World War. In the event of war with the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, the 10th SFG planned to employ fifty
operational detachment-alphas (ODAs) to conduct UW operations behind the Iron Curtain (Fischer 1995, 38). Colonel Aaron Banks, the commander of the 10th SFG, believed that his fifty ODAs could raise a partisan force fifty battalions strong. For the Soviets to counter this force and protect lines of communications and rear areas, they would have to commit eighteen divisions from front line fighting (Fischer 1995, 38). The use of UW operations in this case would have been an exceptional economy of force operation that the out numbered NATO forces desperately needed.

**PCWE Threat Trends**

With the end of the Cold War, the balance of power in the world has changed and there is no longer a worldwide, Soviet-backed communist threat. The U.S. is the lone superpower. Because of this, one might think that this post-Cold War environment (PCWE) would be a safer place to live. Unfortunately this is not the case. The world is just as dangerous now as it was then; however, the nature of the threat has changed. The current and future threats in the world today are not as easily identified and countered as the threats seen in the bipolar Cold War Era.

Defining or predicting the threat trends of the PCWE is outside the scope and purpose of this thesis. For the purpose of establishing a frame of reference from which to later evaluate the potential application of aspects of UW, the threat trends identified in the latest *National Security Strategy* dated October 1998 will be utilized as a given. The primary current and future threat trends identified in this document are as follows:

**Regional or state-centered threats:** These are states that have the capabilities and the desire to threaten U.S. vital interests through coercion or aggression. These states
continue to threaten the sovereignty of their neighbors and international access to resources, and in many cases build their offensive capabilities. These capabilities include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and the long-range delivery systems required to employ them.

**Transnational threats:** Terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migrations, and environmental damage threaten U.S. interests, citizens, and the homeland itself.

**Spread of dangerous technologies:** Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists, and international crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on the U.S., its allies, and military forces abroad.

**Foreign intelligence collection:** Threat from foreign intelligence agencies is a combination of traditional intelligence adversaries that have targeted American military, diplomatic, technological, and commercial secrets.

**Failed states:** Governments failure resulting in civil unrest, famine, mass killings, environmental disasters, and aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups (Clinton, 1998, 6).

To summarize these threats, the *National Security Strategy* states that the future threats U.S. forces are likely to deal with will be, "fluid and unpredictable, U.S. forces are likely to confront a variety of challenges across the spectrum of conflict, including
efforts to deny our forces access to critical regions, urban warfare, information warfare, and attacks from chemical and biological weapons" (Clinton 1998, 23).

The threats mentioned in this chapter are the ones this thesis will accept as the most probable to produce major regional conflicts and contingency operations in the PCWE. Within this thesis, no further investigation will be focused on defining the future threat trends likely to be encountered in the PCWE.

**Skill Sets**

When discussing the individual skills required to conduct UW operations, they can be organized into two basic skill sets, indirect and direct. Indirect skills are those such as regional orientation, training skills, linguistic skills, and interpersonal and cross-cultural communication skills that allow a person to influence and establish favorable relationships with the indigenous people in the area of operation. Direct skills are those that deal with the conduct of direct combat operations, such as small and large unit tactics, weapons maintenance and proficiency, demolition skills, operation and maintenance of communications equipment, and other technical skills. A balance of both of these types of skills is required to successfully conduct UW operations.

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study is to identify aspects of UW operations that may be applied as an instrument to achieve national military strategic objectives in dealing with the transnational and asymmetric threat trends seen in the PCWE. This study uses the analysis of three UW historical case studies to identify aspects of UW operations that
have proven crucial to the success of the operations, and that may have utility for future application. The identification of these aspects will provide SF leaders with insight and focus as to the capabilities and skill sets SF must maintain, amplify, or develop.

Scope

This thesis will focus on the use of representative historical case studies of U.S. UW or unconventional operations (UO) from the pre-Cold War, Cold War, and PCWE. The analysis will concentrate on identifying aspects of UW that have shown a pattern of relevance and or utility, and any trends that have developed during the evolution of UW operations from World War II to the present. The case studies to be used are:

1. UW operations in the Philippines, 1943-1945

Research Questions

The primary research question is: What aspects of unconventional warfare are best suited to meet the transnational and asymmetric threat trends seen in the post-Cold War environment, and how can Special Forces apply them in support of the national military strategy?

Subordinate questions are:

1. What skills were most crucial to the success of the operations in the historical case studies?
2. How has SF’s role in UW evolved from WWII to the end of Cold War?
3. How has SF applied UW skills in the PCWE?
4. What skills or aspects of UW identified in the case studies show potential utility for application versus some of the future threats outlined in the National Security Strategy?

5. How do these skills need to be amplified, and do any others need to be developed in order to meet these future threats?

6. Is there historical data that demonstrates UW as an effective means of attaining U.S. national military objectives?

When the answers to these questions are known, SF leaders will gain insight into the aspects of UW operations that need to be maintained, amplified, or developed in order to meet future threats. This then provides leaders with the ability to establish a training focus that will maximize the maintenance or development of those skills that will provide the greatest utility in dealing with ambiguous threat trends during a time of reduced resources and funding.

Methods and Procedures

The examination of historical case studies is the foundation of this research methodology. Historical case studies will be used as a tool to discover how aspects of UW have been applied in the past and identify trends in the evolution of UW operations. The cases will first be evaluated using an adaptation of a methodology described by Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. This method entails establishing a timeline that defines the duration of the operation and highlights significant events or change points along the timeline. The cases are then analyzed using journalistic questions as a means to discover the important aspects of the case studies.
The cases will then be evaluated using the controlled comparison methodology described by Alexander George. Controlled comparison describes how cases are evaluated using the same factors to evaluate each case, thus the term "controlled." The factors used to evaluate each case are:

1. Command and control structure
2. Operational and or strategic objectives: What were they and were they achieved?
3. Political support to the operation, political environment in which the operation was conducted
4. What individual skills (for SF personnel) were critical to mission success?

The data discovered using this methodology will then be analyzed to formulate answers to the primary and subordinate thesis questions.

Assumptions

1. Present and future threat trends identified in the National Security Strategy dated 8 October 98 are correct.
2. SF will be required to conduct doctrinal mission throughout the full ranges of conflict.
3. Resource constraints will not allow SF to train to all primary missions and collateral activities equally.

Limitations

During the research of this thesis, research may be constrained by the fact that UW operations, as stated in the definition, are often covert or clandestine. Due to the
sensitive nature of UW operations, some critical information may not be available due to classification. Even though there may be some sensitive information that is not available, there are more than enough resources and case studies available to allow a thorough investigation of the selected case studies.

**Delimitations**

One representative historical case has been selected for study from the pre-Cold War, Cold War, and PCWE. The scope of this research has been limited to UW operations conducted by U.S. forces. The research is also limited to one case study per period due to the limited time available to complete this thesis.

**Significance of the Study**

As the Army undergoes changes in Force XXI and the Army After Next, it is imperative to the survival of SF that the missions and capabilities it develops and maintains are tailored to the threat. During this time of reduced funding and resources, the SF needs to identify and focus training toward skill sets and capabilities that offer the widest application to the ambiguous and varied threats that may be encountered in the PCWE.

One major change the Army has been going through during the PCWE has been drastic downsizing and budgetary constraints. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the U.S. Army of the Cold War has disappeared. Not only is the U.S. Army of today different from that of the Cold War era, it is significantly different from the Army that fought in the Persian Gulf War. Given these changes, effective use of limited training funds is more critical now than ever. This being said, it is extremely relevant to
evaluate how SF focuses its training dollars. Even though the Army and training dollars are being cut drastically, the operational tempo is busier than ever. This points to the need to carefully evaluate the focus of training and training resources. The SF must ensure the most efficient and effective use of its available training time, dollars, and soldiers.

Currently within the SF community, there seems to be some question about how to best focus training. Should training focus on the indirect skill sets required in conducting UW operations, or should it be focused on the direct skill sets required to conduct missions like direct action (DA) or special reconnaissance (SR). One school of thought held by many senior SF officers maintains that if SF soldiers focus their training on the skills required to conduct UW operations, they will be able to conduct any of the other doctrinal SF missions. The other school of thought believes that training should focus on direct skill sets. The opinion of this group is that the utility of UW operations has passed and that it is unrealistic to believe that SF soldiers will ever conduct classic UW operations again. Therefore training should focus on the “warrior skills” required to conduct missions like SR and DA.

The school of thought a SF group commander believes in can determine the training focus of the Group. While serving as the commander of a Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha in the First Special Forces Group, the author of this thesis experienced an illustration of how the training focus may change with the changing of Group Commanders. Under one group commander, the training focus was on the indirect skills required for conducting UW. As a result of this focus, the primary
training vehicle was foreign internal defense (FID) missions conducted during joint combined exchange training (JCET) deployments. Units within the group deployed as much as possible to maximize the amount of time SF soldiers were spending down range in the operational area working with the indigenous people, learning languages, practicing teaching and training skills, honing cross-cultural communication skills, and establishing relationships with various counterparts.

When group commanders changed, so to did the training focus. Almost overnight the focus changed from FID/UW skills to “go-to-war skills.” The amount of JCET deployments went from as many as possible to the minimum required to meet the units obligation under the Commander in Chief's (CINC) cooperative engagement strategy. Training was now focused almost exclusively on being ready to deploy to the Korean Peninsula in order to conduct SR and DA missions in time of war. With this focus, training was primarily conducted at home station or within the Continental United States (CONUS). This severely limited the amount of time SF soldiers were spending in the operational area.

This difference in schools of thought has the potential to have severe ramifications for the future of SF. As stated earlier, the SF needs to ensure its relevance or find its niche in the PCWE. The training focus of SF must be such that the skills maintained or developed are those that offer the best utility against the threat environment SF will encounter in the near future. Since limited training resources prevent SF from being able to train for every contingency mission that might be encountered, it is important to identify skill sets that are the most flexible and address
the most likely threats. If SF fails to do this, the future of the branch or at the very least
the role it plays in the nation's defense, could be in question.
CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Purpose

This chapter will evaluate the literature resources that provide the basis for a study in the investigation of this thesis. It will also address any patterns or gaps in the literature in relation to the subject of this thesis.

Research Methodology

The research methodology used in the investigation of a thesis is without doubt the cornerstone of the entire project. After an exhaustive literature search of the myriad of resource material available on this subject, two sources emerged as most relevant to the needs of this thesis. *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* by Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May and *Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets: Explaining Cyclical Support of U.S. Special Operations Forces* by Andrew Joseph Harris provide the sources from which the research methodology for this paper are derived.

*Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* is a resource tailored for people searching for research methodologies. Neustadt and May have strong qualifications and are uniquely experienced as they have worked extensively in academia and inside the Washington beltway. Both men are professors at Harvard University and have served as advisors to presidents of the United States and other high-level government officials.
The methodologies put forth in this work are clearly described and case studies are used to illustrate the utility of each method presented. This lends to a strong conceptual grasp as to how the methodology may be applied. Neustadt and May realize that the methods they share will not meet the needs of everyone. With this realization in mind, they explain the mechanics and purpose of each methodology, thus allowing the methodology to be adjusted or adapted to the specific need. An important aspect that Neustadt and May convey in this book is that their work is focused on the use of history, not the history per se. *Thinking in Time* provides a major component of the research methodology used in this paper. While this resource makes a valuable contribution to the construction of this paper's research methodology, other sources are required.

*Presidents, Generals, and Green Berets: Explaining Cyclical Support of U.S. Special Operations Forces* provides the additional method used in formulating this paper's research methodology. While the subject matter of this resource serves a minor utility in providing the background information on special operations, its most important contribution to this thesis is the research methodology described within.

Harris's academic background, coupled with his practical experience as a research associate and area leader for operations analysis at Analytic Services, Incorporated, blend together to make him remarkably credible. His experience shows as this resource is written in a very detailed manner, providing vast amounts of descriptive information. As a result of the detailed explanation of the methodology he uses, it was possible to modify its application to meet the specific requirements of this thesis.
These two resources, in combination, provide the methods that are blended together to create the research methodology used in this thesis. In view of these contributions, these works are critical to the overall quality of this thesis.

**Origin and Development of SF**

In any attempt to investigate how SF conducts UW operations, one must first gain insight into the development and origins of SF, as the two are invariably linked. Arguably the most widely read sources on the history and origins of SF are *Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years* by Charles S. Simpson III and *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* by Aaron Bank. This is with good reason, as these works are the premier sources on this subject. These books are the primary resources referenced by this thesis when investigating the origin and development of SF.

These two works are examples of sources written by legendary members of SF. Not only did these men experienced the origin and development of SF first-hand, they played important roles in making it happen. It is fair to say that they both have unquestionable credibility on the subject, although given their close involvement with the subject matter, they could be accused of being biased.

Simpson gives an overview of some of the more famous missions and operations conducted by SF from its inception up through the early 1980s. Besides covering the early history of SF and UW, he gives a very detailed description of the command and control relationships that were set up to direct these operations. This relationship includes both the Army and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The descriptions provided are valuable to this thesis as they shed light on how SF interacted with other
agencies during the conduct of UW operations, a trend that has continued throughout the Cold War into the PCWE. These relations help describe the origin and evolution of some of the command and control relationships seen today in Special Operations. Colonel Simpson is obviously an avid supporter of both SF as an organization, and the men who make it up. He does however, take a critical look throughout the book and makes an honest attempt to remain objective. The conclusions and recommendations he makes for the future of SF are valid and remain relevant today.

Being one of the founding fathers of SF, Colonel Bank gives a description of the early history and organization of SF as only he can. Being the commander of the Army’s initial SF group, the 10th SF Group (Airborne), and playing a major part in establishing SF as known today, he has insight that no one else has. Bank’s work lets the researcher understand the reasons for many of the early organizational structures of SF units, and most importantly, the original unit commander’s intent. Bank and Simpson stand as two pillars in the foundation and origin of SF and UW operations, who better to turn to for information when researching this topic?

_UW in the Philippines During World War II_

The subject of UW operations conducted in the Philippines during World War II is well documented. There are numerous resources available covering this historical case study, the majority of which are autobiographical first-hand accounts by American guerrilla leaders. Sources of this nature used in the investigation of this thesis are: *We Remained* by R.W. Volekmann; *Lieutenant Ramsey’s War* by Edwin P. Ramsey and Stephen J. Rivele; and *Lapham’s Raiders* by Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling.
These resources are critical to this case study because they offer the most information about the (day-to-day) conduct of UW operations. Information of this nature is crucial when trying to identify the skills and aspects of UW that have historically been shown to be most important. Taken together, these works furnish a complete picture of this operation from its disorganized beginning to the final stages of coordinated conventional operations in support of the Allied retaking of the Philippines.

*We Remained* by R.W. Volckmann is a first-hand account written with perspective. Colonel Volckmann waited nine years to write this work so that his feelings might be tempered by time and his point of view broadened (Volckmann 1954, xi). Colonel Volckmann organized and commanded the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon (USAFIP, N.L.). This force went from its original strength of four men, to a force of over 20,000. This experience provides Colonel Volckmann with irrefutable credentials to write on this subject.

Volckmann presents this work, not as a model for UW operations, but as a lesson to study. Colonel Volckmann states in the preface of his book that, “Guerrilla warfare will play an increasingly important role in future wars, it is therefore essential to study examples of guerrilla warfare in the past and glean from them the lessons that are likely to be applicable in the future (Volckmann 1954, xi).” Volckmann perfectly illustrates the utility of his work in researching this case study and to how it will contribute to the overall thesis. The book provides valuable insight into the requirements of organization and command and control of large-scale UW operations at
the strategic and operational level. *We Remained* provides one guerrilla commander's perspective; however, other guerrilla commanders had different experiences.

*Lapham's Raiders* by Robert Lapham and Bernard Norling is another first-hand account of UW operations in the Philippines. The utility of this resource is that it offers a slightly different view of these operations. Robert Lapham was a guerrilla commander in a different region on Luzon, and his experience was different from that of Volckmann's. Because the geography in central Luzon where he operated was vastly different from the heavy jungle covered mountains in which Volckmann operated, Lapham's operation was quite different. The perspectives and lessons Lapham's book offers serve to broaden the total UW experience in the Philippines.

*Lieutenant Ramsey's War* is another first-hand account by an American guerrilla leader. Ramsey offers yet another perspective to the UW operations in the Philippines. While the other guerrilla leaders operated in rural settings, much of the operations that Ramsey's forces conducted were in the urban setting of Manila. His experiences in setting up and running agent intelligence nets and conducting sabotage and subversion operations in Manila's urban environment provide much material for analysis.

All of these first-hand experiences are unique because each has its own unique story. Because each of these resistance elements developed separately and independently from the other and because the operational background and experience of the guerrilla commanders were varied, the organizational experiences of each was unique.
While the first-hand accounts of the guerrilla leaders provide insight into this operation at the ground level, resources that offer a larger, more-strategic view are necessary to gain total perspective. *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History* by Major General Courtney Whitney and *U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II* by David Hogan fill this niche. Whitney served as one of MacArthur's staff and he was in charge of organizing support for guerrillas operating in the Philippines. This put him in a truly unique position where he could experience first-hand MacArthur's intent for these operations, the organization of external support for the operations, and the type and quality of the intelligence that he was receiving from the guerrillas. He was in an excellent position to gain a clear understanding of the entire operational and strategic picture.

**UW Operations in Support of the Contra Rebels**

This Colonel War case study investigates UW operations in support of the Contra Rebels. The study will focus on UW operations conducted in Central America, primarily Nicaragua and Honduras from 1980 to 1988. Because of the highly controversial nature of these covert, yet widely known operations, broad research is required. Sources must be investigated encompassing all the primary schools of thought in order to gather a complete understanding of this case.

The resources that deal with this subject in an objective light are as follows: *Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua's Contra Rebel* by Sam Dillon; *With the Contras* by Christopher Dickey; *The Nicaraguan Resistance and U.S. Policy: Report on a May 1987 Conference* by David Ronfeldt and Brian Jenkins (Conference
Chairman); *The Contras, 1980-1989: A Special Kind of Politics* by R. Pardo-Maurer; *President's Secret Wars* by John Prados; *Everybody Had His Own Gringo* by Glen Garvin; and the *Tower Report: Final Report of the Tower Commission on the Iran-Contra Hearings* by Senator John Tower. These resources furnish detailed accounts of the development of the insurgency, the relationship between the Contras and the U.S. supporters, the political challenges and controversies involved in supporting the Contras, and the personal experiences of the people involved in the operations. The information extracted from these sources allows the researcher to put together a detailed account of this case study.

Garvin, Dickey, and Dillon all give objective accounts of the inner dealings of this UW operation from a first-hand observer's perspective. This experience lends credibility to these works and allows the researcher to analyze the observations and conclusions with more confidence and less skepticism.

The *Tower Report* adds political insight vital to this case study. Understanding the political environment is essential at this key point in the Colonel War as it is the major factor effecting support to this UW operation.

Pardo-Maurer’s book is unique because it describes the internal and external politics of the insurgency from the perspective of the Contras. Having been a member of the Contras, the insight he gives this case study is different from that of any others. All other accounts are written by U.S. personnel, historians, or participants, no other is written from a Nicaraguan (Contra). This unique perspective enables the researcher to gain a direct understanding from the Contras themselves, not a filtered interpretation of
an outsider. Though these objective works provide the majority of information used in the analysis of this case study, as stated earlier, it is imperative to include research from all schools of thought.

Many of the resources that have been written on this subject are less objective. These works must be included in this research in order to gain a balanced view of this case study. While these resources are written with an obvious slant, they do provide valuable information. *Out of Control* by Leslie Cockburn; *The Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era* by Jonathan Marshall; Peter Dale Scott, and Jan Hunter; and *Worth it All* by Jim Wright are the primary resources used to give the case study a symmetrical perspective. These works are credible as they are written in an investigative journalistic style that fully documents all discoveries presented. The major contribution these works make to this paper is that they emphasize and highlight the political dangers and volatility of conducting surrogate UW operations.

*The Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Operations in the Reagan Era* is an excellent resource for understanding and tracking the complex relationships of all the key players involved in the support of this operation. One entire chapter of this book is devoted to the role of Special Operation Forces in this insurgency. This book presents the researcher an unencumbered view of the historical working relationships of many of the CIA and SF operatives as well as the politicians involved.

*Worth it All* by Jim Wright (former Speaker of the House) is his personal account of the political workings that went on at the highest levels of government
during the Reagan administration's battle for congressional funding to aid the Contras. His involvement in the political infighting on Capitol Hill in opposition to the Reagan administration's policies toward the Contras resulted in his resignation. This resource is written from the perspective of someone trying to make their own defense; however, it is well documented and comes off as a credible work. This book is useful to the case study because it describes from an insider's vantage point, the political complexities, impacts, and challenges that are experienced when conducting UW operations.

There are many articles written about this operation and all offer useful information; however, Richard Sobel's "Contra Aid Fundamentals: Exploring the Intricacies and the Issues" was the most useful. This article gives specific details into all of the external support and funding the Contras received during the entire operation. It provides a clear and factual account of how much support aid the U.S. government, third countries, and private donors, and arms sales were provided to the Contras. This resource was essential in making clear the convoluted and confusing support network that was utilized during this operation.

All of these resources, with their differing views, taken together offer a balanced foundation of study from which this case can be analyzed. The primary schools of thought are included in this research and by using these resources, this case study gathers a fairly complete picture of these controversial operations.

Operation Uphold Democracy, Unconventional Operations in the PCWE

The final case to be studied in this thesis is that of Operation Uphold Democracy. This case study investigates the efforts of the U.S. government to restore
democratic rule in Haiti. Being that this is a very recent operation, primarily taking place in 1994-95, there is very little resource material in publication. The majority of resources available on this case are in the form of reports, monographs, briefings, after-action reviews, and a rare book or two. These type of resources are very useful to the study of this case as they are analytical in nature and are usually written by participants in the operation. In the monograph "Special Forces’ Mission Focus for the Future," Major Kenneth E. Tovo does an excellent job of evaluating the skills and aspects of UW operations that were applied during Operation Uphold Democracy. In Tovo's search of future missions for SF, he compares the skills needed when conducting indirect and direct missions. His monograph is a fitting resource for this case study because the indirect mission analyzed by Major Tovo is Operation Uphold Democracy. Tovo’s analysis shows that many of the skills required to conduct these indirect missions are the same skills needed for conducting UW operations.

Reports, such as Operation Uphold Democracy Initial Impressions: Haiti D-20 to D+150 by the Center for Army Lessons Learned and The United Nations Mission in Haiti: Trip Report by Preston Niblack, give an exceptional description and evaluation of the planning and execution of this operation. This enables the researcher to evaluate the planning process in preparation for the execution of the operation and then to give an evaluation of how it was actually executed.

Hayden are resources that give a precise historical account of this operation. Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel together investigate and analyze nearly every aspect of Operation Uphold Democracy. They provide a historical perspective that provides an understanding of how Haiti became the country as is known today. They then evaluate and provide an acute analysis of the mission from the initial planning through the final stages of the operation. The information, analysis, and conclusions this resource provides are essential in the understanding Operation Uphold Democracy.

*The Immaculate Invasion* by Bob Shacochis is one of the few books written on this operation. Shacochis attached himself to several SF detachments during the operation and chronicled their experiences and daily activities. He also captures their impressions and thoughts on the operation as they were conducting it. This account affords an opportunity to analyze the operation at the tactical level and understand the operational environment in which the operation was conducted.

**The Future of SF**

In order to make a contribution to the SF community, this thesis must present possible solutions to the future challenges and threats that may be encountered in the PCWE. Before this can be done, these challenges and threats must first be defined. The following resources are used in an effort to gain a better understanding of what these future threats may be: "Special Forces Missions: A Return to the Roots for a Vision of the Future," a masters thesis by David Maxwell; *LIC 2010: Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in the Next Century*, by Rod Pashcall; *Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces* by Susan Marquis; *Perilous*
Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy by Lucien S. Vandenbroucke; and Low Intensity Conflict: Support for Democratic Resistance

Movements a colloquium co-sponsored by the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State, and the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Maxwell’s thesis investigates the future missions for SF in the PCWE. The information and conclusions contained in Maxwell’s work are beneficial to this study as it is of a parallel nature. The research and analysis conducted by Major Maxwell may be referenced to supplement this work. Since trying to define future threats is obviously not an exact science, it is prudent to gather as many opinions and perspectives as possible.

In LIC 2010 Paschall expounds on his ideas as to the direction low-intensity conflict will take in the next twenty years. Having been the commander of Operational Detachment- Delta (Delta Force), he gives a very interesting prerogative as to what he believes lies ahead for the forces that deal with these future threats. In addition to future threats, Paschall address what he sees as the future requirements for technologies critical in dealing with these threats. This information is important to this thesis as it may help shed light on some of the future aspects of conducting UW operations.

Susan Marquis describes and analyzes the buildup of SOF during the Reagan administration. This information explains some of the operational constraints and limitations SOF has had to deal with during this period. Marquis’s most relevant contribution to this thesis is the chapter in her book that is devoted solely to the future
of SOF. Marquis makes valid points about the use of SF in the PCWE, giving examples of SF involvement in deployments and operations in the early and mid-1990s. In addition to this, the chapter addresses the possible utility of SF in the PCWE.

The *Low-Intensity Conflict* colloquium, January 1988, brings out important information reference the future of UW operations. Notable among this information are the discussions about possible future political support for UW operations. The information provided in this resource is produced by committees made up of very senior military officers, government policy makers, and academic experts. There were a tremendous amount of high-powered thinkers involved in putting this resource together, a fact that makes it extremely credible.

*Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of Foreign Policy* is a case study of four special operations missions in which the author seeks to identify the proper use and misuse of SOF in conducting these missions. This resource aids in answering some of the subordinated questions asked in this thesis, specifically in relation to the question of using UW as a tool to achieve national military objectives. By using case studies, it illustrates some past success and failures. These illustrations provide this thesis with a historical point of reference as it contemplates the future applications of SF and UW operations.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has discussed how the resources available on this topic were used in the investigation of this thesis. While conducting this research, it was noted that a gap exists in the amount of information available on UW operations conducted during
the late Colonel War and PCWE. This comes as no big surprise, however, as many aspects of these operations are undoubtedly still classified. In spite of this gap, there are ample resources available to allow a thorough investigation of this topic.
CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to detail the specific research methodology and techniques that have been used to investigate this thesis. This chapter will explain the methodology used to discover which aspects of UW may be best suited to meet the current and future threats seen in the PCWE. The information produced from the methodology described in this chapter will provide the body of information to be analyzed in the following chapters.

Methodology

The basis for the methodology described in this chapter is the analysis of representative historical case studies in UW operations from the pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods. The use of selected case studies will be the instrument that will aid in the discovery of answers to the questions put forth in this thesis. After an extensive search of potential research methodologies, no one method appeared to be adequately suitable in formulating the mechanism of discovery required to provide the data necessary to answer this thesis question. However, by combining two distinct methods and adapting their application, a methodology was developed that provides the required mechanism of discovery.

The Goldberg Rule

The foundation of the methodology devised to analyze the three selected UW case studies finds its origin in the combination of the Goldberg rule as described by
Ernest May and Richard Neustadt, and by the controlled comparison method described by Alexander George. The Goldberg Rule is exceptionally well suited for application to historical case study analysis. It helps draw out past realities in a manner that facilitates the formation of theories that may suggest possible answers to current or future problems. By examining historical case studies in this way, the researcher may enhance the recognition of what has been done previously. More so than just noting past occurrences, this method focuses a detailed study into the origins, processes, trends, and evolution of the UW operations in the selected case studies. Thus through reflection and analysis, the researcher may propose possible solutions to future problems based on what has historically proven to be successful or conversely, hard to attain. It may also give a prophetic look at what the possible cost may be. This, in itself, sheds light on the next logical steps that should be taken when determining viable courses of action to deal with these problems.

The basic elements of this method, as applied in this research methodology, consists of the following steps. The initial step requires establishing a timeline for the case study. This serves both in defining the period being studied and in tracking key events in the operation. The use of the journalistic questions of who, what, where, when, and why aid the researcher in closely examining all aspects of the operation being studied. This then enables the researcher to evaluate any trends that may be seen. By using the time line in conjunction with any trends discovered in the case, the researcher is able to focus on and more closely investigate key points or events that appear to be decisive to the outcome of the operation. These points or events may, for example, be
political decisions or policy changes, technological advances, or the addition or subtraction of physical resources. In addition to identifying these key points, this will also identify any change points. Change points are points in time that can be annotated on the timeline, and mark any substantial alteration or change in the operation that proves to have had significant impact on its final outcome.

**Controlled Comparison**

The second aspect of the methodology used in this thesis is the controlled comparison method. In that the Goldberg rule is well suited for discovering change points, key events, and trends within the case studies, there is other vital information it does not provide. Given these gaps and inadequacies, it is necessary to coalesce the controlled comparison method into this research methodology. The controlled comparison method focuses on using a set of constant, user-defined variables to evaluate each of the selected case studies in a like manner. When using this method, the researcher is able to select those specific variables that are essential in discovering the information vital to the thesis. The factors used to evaluate each case are:

1. Command and control structure
2. Operational and or strategic objectives: What were they and were they achieved?
3. Political support to the operation, political environment in which the operation was conducted
4. What individual skills (for SF personnel) were critical to mission success?
The application of these variables to each of the three case studies, in like fashion, makes it possible to ascertain likes and differences between the cases. Highlighting the likes and differences between the case studies enables one to view those aspects of UW operations that have been applied in each case study, throughout the different periods, and how they impacted the final outcome of the operation. Similarly, it can be shown that certain aspects of UW operations were not applied, and the impact this had on the operations may also be evaluated. By applying the same variables to each case, one can show that each individual case may offer unique solutions to like problems encountered in some or all of the selected case studies.

Case Study Selection

Realizing that any research methodology incorporating the use of historical case studies will be scrutinized for the relevance of cases selected, the reasons for selecting the three case studies used in this paper will be detailed. In order for this research to stand up to professional scrutiny and provide viable solutions to future challenges, the cases selected must be those that are representative, not exceptional. Should one choose cases that are exceptions to the rule, versus the norm, conclusions made from this analysis would be faulty and skewed.

The cases chosen for examination in this study are: UW operations in the Philippines during World War II (pre-Cold War), UW operations in support of the Contra Rebels (Cold War), and the unconventional operations conducted in support of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti (post-Cold War). In order to benefit the most from historical examples of UW operations, and capture any parallels, trends, or
evolution that may have occurred throughout the history of UW, representative cases were selected from pre-Cold War, Cold War, and post-Cold War periods.

The case of UW operations in the Philippines during World War II was chosen because it is an excellent representative case study of classic UW operations. While other UW operations from this period, such as the Jedburghs and Detachment 101, are classic UW operations, the Philippine case study was found to be best representative of this period. It is also well documented at the strategic, operational, and tactical level. This operation serves as the base of comparison from which UW operations from the other periods investigated will be compared.

The Cold War period is represented by the case of UW operations in support of the Contra Rebels. This case is by far the most extensively documented account of UW operations conducted by the U.S. during the Cold War. UW operations in Afghanistan and Angola were case studies that were candidates for inclusion in this thesis, but neither of these operations are documented in as much detail as is the Contra case study. In respect to the evolution of UW operations, the Contra case study presents an illustration of how UW operations have diverged from the classic operations conducted in the Pre-Cold War period. This divergence is representative of the majority of UW operations being conducted during the Cold War period, and thus supports the selection of the Contra case study as representative of this period.

Operation Uphold Democracy was chosen as the representative case for the PCWE. This operation was chosen over other contingency operations because of the heavy involvement of SF units and the extent to which it is documented. This operation
is an outstanding example of how aspects of UW may be applied to PCWE contingency operations. This operation represents a new type of mission, one SF finds itself conducting as a result of the changes in both the threat and operational environments characteristic of the PCWE. This new type of operation may be referred to as unconventional operations, as opposed to UW. While unconventional operations are different from UW in that there may be the absence of an enemy per se, the majority of the skills and aspects of the operation are the same as those required for UW operations. Colonel Mark Boyatt, commander of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) during Operations Uphold Democracy, made the analogy that the mission in Haiti was essentially a UW operation; the sources run by the SF Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) constituted the underground, the Non-Government Organizations and Private Volunteer Organizations provided support as the auxiliary would, and the Haitian populace were the guerrilla force. The tasks that the SFODAs were conducting consisted of organizing and training the “guerrillas” to run town governments, services, an others (Tovo 1996, 35). This case is significant and relevant to this thesis, as it once again illustrates the mutation of UW operations that has taken place from one period to the next. Another important factor that must be mentioned in the selection of this case is that of information availability. Virtually all of the information pertaining to this operation is unclassified or declassified. While there are other representative case studies for this period, none are as well documented and available for study as this one.
Summary

The methodology described in this chapter is designed to provide a mechanism to extract information specific to this thesis, that will bring to light important historical, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of each of the case studies. As a result of this research methodology and the information it produces, this thesis will be able to demonstrate the aspects of UW that are essential in identifying how UW operations must evolve in order to meet the challenges of the PCWE and remain a relevant mission.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data produced using the research methodology described in the previous chapter. The results of this analysis will provide insight into aspects of UW that may be suitable for application in dealing with some of the threats expected to be seen in the PCWE. This information will also provide direction and focus as to the types of skills and training SF needs to develop and maintain.

This data is organized and presented such that each of the three case studies are defined by a timeline of key events, an operational overview, factors of critical importance particular to each case study are discussed, the variables used in the controlled comparison are described, and the case study is summarized. This pattern of organization will be followed for each of the three case studies.

UW Operations in the Philippines During World War II

The belligerents during the Second World War not only developed weapons of mass destruction: they also developed methods of stratagem, subversion and psychological warfare which afterwards remained in their arsenals and became, as it were, institutionalized. In the ideological confrontation that developed after the war and with which we still have to live, honorable men of great ability served their countries by engaging in activities of a kind unjustifiable by any criteria other than the most brutal kind of raison d’etat, and by the argument that their adversaries were doing the same. (Prados 1986, 406)
Time Line

Dec 1941
8th Japanese air attack on Philippines
22nd Japanese Land at Lingayen Gulf and rout U.S./Philippine forces
23rd Colonel John P. Horan cut off vic Balete Pass in North Luzon and orders troops to disband, received permission from United States Armed Forces Far East on Corregidor to conduct guerrilla operations

Jan 1942 Guerrilla resistance starts
27th Major Claude A. Thorp and his raiding party slip through enemy lines on Bataan to start guerrilla operations in Zambales Mountains (with MacArthur’s approval), starts the Luzon Guerrilla Army Force (LGAF)
-14 Inf created with elements of Colonel Horan’s 71st Inf and officially redesignated by USAFFE on Corregidor (initially called 1st Provisional Guerrilla Regiment)
-121 Inf created with elements of a Philippine Scout Bn and officially redesignated by USAFFE

Apr 1942
9th Fall of Bataan, subsequent “Death March”

May 1942
6th Fall of Corregidor
9th Allied forces on Luzon ordered to surrender by General Wainwright

Jun 1942
10th Radio contact is made from 14th Inf to South West Pacific Area HQ in Australia (MacArthur’s HQ)

Jul 1942
-SWPA Received message of resistance on Luzon

Aug 1942
Japanese release majority of Filipino soldiers from POW camps

Sep 1942
-Major Russ Volckmann CPT Don Blackburn link up with LTCs Arthur Noble and Martin Moses, make plans to organize resistance on North Luzon

Oct 1942
10th LTC Moses assumes command of all Guerrilla forces on Luzon
15th Moses orders guerrilla attacks to begin
-As a result of these attacks, Japanese begin aggressive counter-guerrilla campaign
-Colonel Thorp captured by Japanese
Nov 1942
-Message from MAJ Peralta (on Visayan Islands) received by SWPA

Dec 1942
-SWPA sends CPT Jesus Villamore by sub to Visayan/Negros islands area to establish contact with Guerrilla forces and report on their organization

Jan 1943
-Message from CPT Ralf Praeger (on Luzon) received by SWPA

Jan 1943 (Continued)
-Noble/Moses/Volckmann decide to develop a trained cadre to support later guerrilla mobilization

Mar 1943
-SWPA sends out message to all guerrilla forces in Philippines to cut back contact with enemy to a minimum and focus on intelligence collection and organization and training of guerrilla units ("Lay Low Order")
-Forces on North Luzon lose radio contact with SWPA as CPT Praeger and his radio are captured
-SWPA sends Lt. Cmdr. Charles Parsons by sub to Mindanao to establish contact with guerrillas and report on their organization

Apr 1943
-Guerrillas in Ifugao area are well organized and make contact with adjacent guerrilla units

May 1943
-MAJ Manuel Enriqueze and CPT Ruffino Baldwin are captured by Japanese

Jun 1943
9th COLs Moses and Noble captured by Japanese, MAJ Volckmann assumes command of USAFIP, N.L. (U.S. Army Forces in the Philippines, North Luzon)

Jun 1943 (continued)
-Colonel Courtney Whitney (SWPA) put in charge of coordinating guerrilla activities (communication, supply etc) in the Philippines, selects 400 men from Filipino regiments stationed in the U.S. and trains them in communications, demolition, intelligence, and sabotage, plans to infiltrate them into the Philippines to help train guerrilla forces
Sep 1943
- MAJ Volckmann reorganized USAFIP, N.L. and re-emphasized the “Lay Low Order”

Nov 1943
- Lieutenant Ramsey reorganizes his East Central Luzon Guerrilla Army

Dec 1943
- LTC Charles Smith lands by sub in Samar to develop intelligence coverage on Luzon

Apr 1944
- Radio link established between guerrilla units in Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon to units on Mindanao completing link to SWPA

Jul 1944
- MacArthur flies to Hawaii for summit meeting with President Roosevelt and Admiral Nimitz to argue for his plan to retake the Philippines

Aug 1944
- 16 man (one officer and 15 enlisted Filipino technicians) arrive in Northern Luzon by sub with about half of its equipment (and none of its 15 tons of supplies as they had to stop unloading to keep from getting compromised by enemy patrol boats)

Oct 1944
- SWPA lifts the “Lay Low Order”
  20th MacArthur’s Eighth Army lands at Leyte

Nov 1944
- 21st 15 man (four officers and 11 enlisted Filipino technicians) contact party from SWPA and 25 tons of supplies arrive by sub in Northern Luzon

Dec 1944
- Sub delivers 25 tons of supplies to North Luzon
- SWPA issues order for guerrillas on Luzon to start mobilization and operations in preparation for U.S. landing at Lingayen Gulf
- Japanese move six divisions up into mountains of Northern Luzon

Jan 1945
- 6th President Roosevelt announces change of policy that shifts focus of the war effort from Europe to the Pacific
- 8th All out guerrilla offensive operations begin
9th U.S. Sixth Army lands at Lingayen Gulf and is met by guerrillas from ECLGA, USAFIP, N.L. placed under control of Sixth Army
31s All guerrilla forces on Luzon are placed under control of 6th Army
- Conduct combat operations with conventional forces from January to August

Aug 1945
15th Cease fire in Philippines

Sep 1945
1st Formal surrender ceremony for Japanese forces in the Philippines
-Guerrilla forces demobilized and or incorporated into Philippine Regular Army

Operational Overview

This historical case study is one of UW operations conducted in the Philippines during World War II. This case study serves as a representative case of what has become known as classic UW operations conducted prior to the Cold War. The focus of this case study is on the American led Filipino resistance units located on Luzon.

In December of 1941, Japanese invasion forces landed on Luzon at the Lingayen Gulf. The Japanese swept allied forces from the majority of the island, with Bataan and Corregidor being the last vestige of resistance. In April and May of 1942, these forces capitulated, and organized allied resistance in the Philippines appeared to be gone. This was not the case however. Some U.S. and Filipino soldiers either avoided capture or escaped from Bataan or Corregidor. These soldiers fled throughout Luzon and began to organize isolated bands of resistance.

As these pockets of resistance formed and guerrilla groups began to operate, they became aware of the presence of other guerrilla groups. Guerrilla commanders began to consolidate operational areas and eventually all of Luzon was carved up into separate operational areas.
Some guerrilla units were able to establish contact with General MacArthur’s South West Pacific Army (SWPA) headquarters in Australia. With this contact came the ability to begin the coordination for external support which would set the ground work that would allow guerrilla units to grow to large numbers capable of supporting the Allied landing that would eventually come. It also allowed for MacArthur to provide guidance and direction to the resistance. In turn, the guerrilla units were able to pass much needed intelligence back to MacArthur which was needed for planning his operations to recapture the Philippines.

When the Sixth Army landed at the Lingayen Gulf in January of 1945, guerrilla units were conducting operations in support of the landing. The guerrilla units continued to support the Allied attack to recapture the Philippines as they fought beside and in front of conventional Allied forces. In September of 1945, the Japanese forces in the Philippines surrendered, and guerrilla units were demobilized or assimilated into the newly formed Philippine Army.

Factors of Critical Importance to This Case Study

Popular Support

During the initial phases of the UW operations in the Philippines, the population played several key roles. Most notable among these contributions is the fact that in no small way, they were directly responsible for creating the possibility for a resistance to form. From the initiation of hostilities in the Philippines, the population immediately came to the aid of American and Filipino soldiers trying to escape capture from the Japanese. Filipino soldiers had a distinct advantage over American soldiers as they
could shed their uniforms and blend into the general population, this was not so for the Americans. The Americans were almost completely dependent on the local population to help them. Villagers took the fleeing American soldiers into their care and hid them from the Japanese. Were it not for these villagers risking their lives and the lives of their family, many men who would later go on to play significant and critical roles in the resistance would have died of disease, starvation, or at the hands of the Japanese.

Guerrilla Counterespionage Campaign

Because of the brutality of the Japanese occupation and the questionable return of the Allies, many Filipino citizens aided the Japanese in identifying guerrilla members and unit locations. These spies and informants began to take a severe toll on the resistance, and guerrilla commanders were forced to deal with this threat to their cause. Attacks against the Japanese were scaled back and efforts were focused on identifying and eliminating all collaborators, informants, and spies. This campaign was exceedingly violent, brutal, and extremely effective. People who were believed to be aiding the Japanese, known informants, and agents were killed.

The extensive guerrilla intelligence network played a role in this campaign. Many guerrilla agents worked for the Japanese military administration as well as the local constabulary forces. These agents were in positions to find out who was being paid for informing and who supported the Japanese. The identities of these people would then be passed to guerrilla units and the people identified would be killed.

Part of the counterespionage-security protocol for the guerrilla units had to deal with the disposition of personnel taken prisoner. The problem arose because in the
course of operations, situations occurred in which prisoners were taken. These
prisoners included Japanese soldiers and local civilians. The fates of the Japanese
soldiers were essentially sealed by virtue of the brutality they exacted on the Filipino
people and captured guerrillas. The case of civilian prisoners was different. If prisoners
were judged to be sympathetic to the Japanese, or a security risk, they could not be
released for fear of having the prisoners report what they knew or saw to the Japanese.
This would mean death to the family members of any guerrillas identified by the
prisoner, or attack on the guerrilla base if the prisoner knew its location. The guerrilla
commanders did not have the means for long-term detention or care for prisoners. This
presented guerrilla commanders with a very critical issue that impacted directly on the
survival of their units and themselves. The decision was made and the policy enacted,
prisoners thought to be a threat to the guerrillas were briefly interrogated and then
executed (Ramsey 1990, 264).

The type of actions undertaken in the counterespionage campaign sent strong
messages to any people considering being informants or spies, and within less than a
year, the number of informants and spies dropped off to near ineffective levels
(Volckmann 1954, 155). With spies and informants eliminated, the civilian populace
could support the guerrillas with less fear of being turned into the Japanese and killed.
This in turn allowed the guerrilla units to organize and grow.

Violations of the Law of Land Warfare

Actions taken by guerrilla leaders during this campaign highlight some
important issues that relate to challenges future leaders conducting UW operations may
have to face regarding the laws of land warfare and rules of engagement. When
Michael Howard made his address at Oxford and stated, "... honorable men of great
ability served their countries by engaging in activities of a kind unjustifiable by any
criteria..." he could very well have had this case study specifically in mind (Prados
1986, 406). When discussing this counterespionage campaign, it is important to
remember that this case study is one that contains an operational environment wrought
with violence and brutality. This case study differs from the others presented in this
thesis in that these operations were being conducted during a total unlimited war,
literally a battle for world domination. Because of this, there was very little
accountability for any violations of the law of land warfare and as a result, brutality
reached the scale of indescribable, arguably rivaling the worst ever experienced by
Americans in combat.

The actions taken by American and Filipino guerrilla leaders were taken out of
necessity for self-preservation and survival, as well as in retribution. This being said,
this type of operational environment is often the environment encountered when
conducting UW operations. It is reasonable to believe that future SF leaders conducting
UW operations will encounter a similar operational environment or situation. This is
especially true, as illustrated later in the Nicaraguan case study, when working with
surrogate forces. In these future UW operations, actions of the nature described in this
case study would definitely not be acceptable under standard U.S. rules of engagement.
The "No-Prisoners" policy the guerrilla leaders adopted in this case study is a violation
of the Laws of Land Warfare and as such, is not a viable course of action for U.S.
soldiers today. Should SF soldiers, or surrogates under their control, choose a course of action similar to those taken in this case study, it would definitely have a monumental negative impact, both militarily and politically. This aspect of the nature of UW operations is one that may make a UW course of action unpalatable for senior military and political leaders.

Intelligence

In UW operations, as in conventional operations, intelligence plays a significant role. During this operations, intelligence gathering was the key mission General MacArthur gave the guerrilla leaders (Whitney 1955, 133). The intelligence gathering methods the guerrillas used in this case study was primarily agent networks and clandestine communication, in both rural and urban settings. This was by far the most important source and method for obtaining and passing intelligence the guerrillas used. The skills required to plan and execute these type of operations were critical to the conduct of UW operations in this case study, and will remain critical in future UW operations. The ability to recruit, train, and manage agents is a skill the guerrilla leaders did not possess at the beginning of this operation, and it was a costly painful lesson to learn as they went. Many agents and guerrillas paid for these lessons with their lives. In this case study, intelligence operations were key in several aspects of the guerrillas operation.

Intelligence was a vital part of the guerrillas’ security operations. The most crucial source of intelligence that impacted security operations came from the guerrilla agent networks that were established in the cities and towns throughout Luzon. The
main efforts of these agents were focused in the capital city of Manila. Because of the concentration of Japanese military headquarters and Filipino government organizations there, there was an extraordinary potential for collecting strategic and operational intelligence. By the end of this UW operation, guerrilla agents had penetrated nearly every Japanese and Filipino puppet government organization in the Philippines and were providing guerrilla commanders and MacArthur with invaluable intelligence.

**Communications (Internal and External)**

Obtaining information and intelligence is very important. However if nobody receives it, it is worthless. Information and intelligence must get into the hands of the people who need it. The ability to communicate both internally and externally become critical. During the initial organizational period of the resistance, communications, both internal and external, were extremely limited. The primary reason for this in the early phase of the resistance was two-fold. Due to the size of radios at that time, the majority of soldiers who didn’t surrender and fled into the jungle, did not take one with them because they could not physically carry it. The other main factor was that there were few if any two-way radios among the civilian population anywhere in the Philippines.

This lack of radios was one reason for the disorganization that was rampant in the guerrillas' early attempts to organize. Without radios, the process of finding other groups of soldiers that had escaped was slow and relied solely on the “bamboo telegraph.” The bamboo telegraph was the term given to the way in which the Filipino civilians passed news and information from one village or barrio to another by word of mouth. While this system did work, it was less than efficient.
Because of the extremely limited ability to communicate, there was a general lack of a clear understanding as to the full extent of the situation on Luzon. Guerrilla units on one part of Luzon were unaware of guerrilla units operating in other parts of the island. This then caused an overlap of areas of operations and command and control, which added to the inefficiency and wasted efforts common place in this early phase.

Without a good communication system, guerrilla units were limited in their ability to pass information and intelligence to other guerrilla units in a timely manner. Lacking this capability was more than an inconvenience, it was often fatal. Not being able to warn another unit of the presence of an informant, or of an impending raid in a timely manner resulted in serious consequences. While this lack of internal communications between guerrilla units on Luzon impacted their operations, the lack of an external communications capability caused much greater problems and prevented the resistance from reaching its full potential.

Communications with SWPA in Australia occurred infrequently at best in the initial stages of the resistance. The first radio message received by MacArthur’s headquarters in Australia was on 10 July 1942 (Whitney 1955,128). The message was sent from Lieutenant Colonel Nakar, 14th Infantry (guerrilla), on Central Luzon, and was relayed to Australia by a coast watcher on the island of Java. Once radio contact was established with SWPA and MacArthur became aware of the resistance movement taking form on Luzon, he could begin organizing to support and give direction to the unit commanders.
Colonel Whitney, a lawyer in pre-war Manila, was the key player in planning operations in support of the guerrilla units in the Philippines. Given his understanding of the Philippines and its people, and his many business contacts, he was very well suited for this task. Communications was the most important issue Whitney had to tackle in this operation. Whitney had to find a way to make it possible for MacArthur to project his leadership across thirty-five hundred miles where there was at best, a patchwork communications capability. This necessity to expand the commanders span of control over subordinate units in isolated and austere locations is not unique to this case study. It was also of critical importance to SF commanders in Haiti, as will be described in the Operation Uphold Democracy case study.

Whitney’s answer to this challenge was to select five hundred Filipino soldiers from units on the west coast of the U.S. and Hawaii and bring them to Australia to train them for insertion into the Philippines to establish a network of radio stations (Whitney 1955, 132). These men were trained in radio operations and maintenance, intelligence, and other related subjects and later infiltrated into the Philippines by submarine. Once these men where in country, with the help of guerrilla intelligence operatives they became MacArthur’s eyes and ears in the Philippines. They also became the conduit through which intelligence, information and command guidance flowed, setting the stage for future support that would allow the guerrilla units to move into the conventional warfare stage of UW operations. Without this communication between the guerrillas and SWPA, outside support could not have occurred and the contributions the guerrilla units made in the fight for the Philippines would not have occurred.
Risk

From the very beginning of this case study one point is poignantly clear, it was a very dangerous operation. The risks inherent to UW operations must be discussed and described because of the important impact it has on the decision of whether or not to conduct such operations. Senior military and political leaders must understand the degree of risk involved with a course of action before it is selected, and then decide whether or not they are they willing to accept that amount of risk. The degree of risk of a mission is key because it relates not only success or failure, but also to potential casualties. The issue of casualties is one that has gained an unprecedented amount of attention in the U.S. in recent years, and it can almost singularly determine political and public support for any military operation.

As the casualty rates of the guerrilla units reflect, these operations were conducted in an environment of great risk. Lieutenant Ramsey who commanded the largest guerrilla unit on Luzon, lost 5,000 of his unit, a ratio he stated as one in eight (Ramsey 1990, 330). Colonel Volckmann stated his units total combat losses were 1,441 over the three year period of the operation (Volckmann 1954, 216).

The leaders of these guerrilla units were hit exceptionally hard during the early stages of this operation. The majority was Americans who were killed or captured during the Japanese counterguerrilla campaign. This point is important because it helps to illustrate one of the fundamental problems when SF soldiers conduct UW operations, Americans almost always stand out from the indigenous people. This is a problem that has been experienced in many UW operations, including the case study of Nicaragua,
and as a result, these soldiers stand out and are easy to identify. The men conducting this operation understood fully that to be captured by the Japanese and identified as a guerrilla, meant certain torture and death. This understanding may have accounted for the tenacity with which the guerrillas fought and why when captured, the American leader gave the Japanese no information. Colonel Moses and Noble, Major Thorpe, and Captains Praeger and Barker were held and tortured by the Japanese for over a year and then beheaded, yet not one of these men betrayed any information about the resistance and not a single person was captured or killed as a result (Ramsey 1990, 240).

**Controlled Comparison Factors**

**Command and Control Structure**

The command and control structure for the guerrilla units that conducted UW operations on Luzon was less than ideal. This is to be expected however when one considers the origin of the operation and the ad-hoc manner in which it was started. Since this was not a preplanned operation, no mechanism was established for a unified chain of command. As the guerrilla units developed, so to did the chain of command.

The one constant in the area of command and control that was understood by all guerrilla leaders was that the operations they were performing were in support of and were under the command of General MacArthur. Within MacArthur’s SWPA HQ, the guerrillas fell under the control of Colonel Whitney, director of the Philippine Regional Section within MacArthur’s intelligence staff. This is about where any mutual understanding of command and control relationships stopped.
Various guerrilla leaders decided that due to their rank, they were best suited to be the overall commander of guerrilla forces on Luzon. Since initially there was limited communications with SWPA, there was no guidance from higher to clear up the question of overall command on Luzon. With no clear guidance, many guerrilla leaders decided they would not subordinate themselves to the command of other guerrilla leaders. With such limited communications capabilities, both internal and external, they felt it was impractical to have a centralized chain of command (Lapham 1996, 113). There was also the feeling that since the different areas of operation on Luzon were vastly different and each possessed its own unique problems, no one centrally located person could fully understand and take care of the problems found in another area. Robert Lapham conveys his similar feelings when he stated, "Some central authority sending out orders and unsolicited advice would not have improved matters" (Lapham 1990, 114). This fundamentally captures the overall feeling held by the various guerrilla leaders toward having a central command and control structure, and thus it did not ever materialize during the operation. Guerrilla leaders carved out their own areas of operations depending on the size of the force they could organize and control.

When communication was established with SWPA, the question of overall command was put to MacArthur by Major Lapham. Lapham was the leader of the Luzon Guerrilla Armed Forces (LGAF) and Volckmann and several other guerrilla leaders who were senior to him, had tried numerous times to absorb his organization into their own. Tired of this reoccurrence, Lapham attempted to resolve the question once and for all. When message traffic was sent to MacArthur requesting resolution of
the matter of overall command of guerrilla forces on Luzon, he responded with vagueness. Instead of identifying a centralized chain of command, MacArthur simply addressed the leaders of each guerrilla unit independently (Lapham 1990, 115). Lapham took this to mean that he was not subordinate to any other guerrilla commander and continued to operate independently. Other leaders had similar understandings and acted in a like manner.

This is not to say that the units did not cooperate with each other. The various units did communicate with each other, and when necessary, passed information and intelligence. The units did occasionally support each other and work together operationally, however they usually stayed within their own areas of operation.

The chain of command remained as such until the Allies returned, at which time all guerrilla units were ordered to fall under the command of General Walter Krueger, commander of Sixth Army. After the cessation of hostilities, guerrilla units were either demobilized or assimilated into the Philippine Army.

**Strategic and Operational Objectives**

The strategic value of this operation has long been debated, and it has been argued that the campaign to recapture the Philippines was of limited strategic value. One school of thought, championed by Admiral Chester Nimitz, maintained that the Philippines could be by-passed and other more important targets like Formosa, should be attacked because of its location and utility as a base for strategic bombers (Ramsey, 1990, 249).
MacArthur subscribed to the idea that the strategic importance of the Philippines, specifically Luzon, was the key to taking and holding the Southwest Pacific (Ramsey 1990, 250). MacArthur believed that if the Philippines were bypassed with the objective of taking Formosa, the Japanese presence on Luzon would represent a massive enemy garrison of 120,000-150,000 men, located in the American rear where they could interdict supply lines and lines of communication (Ramsey 1990, 248, Volckmann 1954, 216). If the large Japanese troop population on Luzon was not engaged and tied down, there was also the possibility that they could be moved elsewhere and used in the defense of the Japanese homeland.

The UW operations on Luzon were the only means available to MacArthur to pursue his strategic objectives in the Philippines until he was given the conventional resources and manpower needed to execute his plan for its recapture. According to the strategic objectives MacArthur had for the Philippines, this operation played a substantial role in achieving the national strategic objectives.

In general, the operational objectives of this UW operation was to collect intelligence and information on the Japanese and prepare for the full mobilization of guerrilla forces in support of any future Allied landings. The preparation and mobilization for the Allied landing entailed preparing the guerrilla regiments to cut off Japanese communication capabilities, attack command and control facilities, vehicle and equipment parks, troop concentrations, and coastal defenses.

UW operation in this case study accomplished all the operational objectives MacArthur had set for this campaign. The guerrillas provided both indirect and direct
support to the retaking of the Philippines. The indirect support came in the form of intelligence reports of Japanese troop strengths and the disposition and location of enemy troops and defensive positions. The guerrillas provided direct support to the invasion by conducting pre-invasion attacks on all the target types mentioned above. The guerrillas met the invading Allied forces at the beach landing site and provided the conventional forces with guides and entire guerrilla units. These guerrilla units fought beside and in front of the conventional units in the battle to retake the Philippines.

Political Support to the Operation, Political Environment in Which the Operation was Conducted?

Politically there was support for the guerrilla operations conducted in the Philippines, although it was qualified. Because of President Roosevelt’s “Europe-First” policy, the Pacific theater, and thus the guerrilla units on Luzon, did not get the full support they required. MacArthur’s frustration as to this policy can be best summed up by a response he made to a guerrilla leader who asked this question in a message, “The oldest man in Apayo wanted to know if MacArthur, the only American who fights Japs, will get back before he [the old man] dies of old age.” MacArthur’s response was, “Perhaps I, too, may die of old age before I am given resources to return.-MacA” (Whitney 1955, 135).

While the political decision to place priority in Europe and not the Pacific, could be considered a lack of political support, it really was not. MacArthur did receive political support for the UW operation being conducted in the Philippines, however this operation was an ad hoc operation that was viewed as one that could produce only
marginal results at best. Politically he received no limiting mandates that effected his ability to conduct these operations, as was seen in the Contra case study, it was simply a matter of priority of support with limited resources. This priority changed in January of 1945 when President Roosevelt stated in a State of the Union Message to Congress that,

... a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations—a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory—a change which saved lives which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now neutralized far behind our lines. (Whitney 1955, 151).

With this change of plans came support for MacArthur’s plans to return to the Philippines, and in October of 1944 he was able to initiate it (Whitney 1955, 151).

What Individual Skills (for the American Guerrilla Leaders) Were Critical to Conducting This Operation?

Indirect Skills

The required balance of these skills can best be summed up by a descriptive phrase that has been used to describe the proper mix, "warrior diplomat." However, in this case study, a more accurate description would be “diplomat warrior.” The indirect skills possessed by these leaders proved to be more important to the success of these operations than did their direct skills. This is a phenomenon that will continue to be the pattern seen in each of the case studies presented in this paper.

The American guerrilla leaders relied on indirect skills to meet their first challenge, survival. Once these men escaped into the jungle, only their ability to convince the indigenous population to help them rather than turn them over to the Japanese saved their lives. From that point on, the importance of indirect skills only
increased. Guerrilla leaders had to influence the local village headmen or Barrio Mayors to support the initial small bands of guerrillas with food, more men, and equipment, or at the very least, keep their presence from the Japanese. Even though there was a predominant pro-American sentiment in the Philippines, the Filipino people knew that it could mean death to help or hide guerrilla forces. Thus getting them to do so was no small task.

Once the guerrilla leader’s immediate needs were taken care of, they got to the business of organizing a resistance. The asset they would rely most on when doing this was their ability to utilize cross-cultural communication skills. While the majority of the American guerrilla leaders spoke only limited Tagalog and none of the tribal languages, they were able to communicate through interpreters. The primary interpreters turned out to be junior officers and NCOs from the Philippine Scouts and Army units. These Filipino soldiers spoke English and many of the local tribal languages, making themselves very valuable assets. Being able to make oneself understood does not equal cross-cultural communication, there is much more to it than that. The guerrilla leaders who were successful took advantage of their time living with the indigenous headhunter tribes and other local people and learned their culture and customs. Understanding the importance these people placed in their rituals and customs, and respecting that importance, enabled the leaders to establish important personal relationships with their counterparts. These relationships were greatly responsible for the high level of support and loyalty the indigenous people gave the American guerrilla leaders. This is in parallel with how SF soldiers in Haiti would use
these same skills to build rapport and trust with the Haitian population. The importance of these skills and the relationships they helped to established cannot be understated. The understanding these leaders gained about the indigenous people they worked with allowed them to better utilize and integrate them into the resistance. The patience gained by fully understanding the people with whom they lived and fought, undoubtedly contributed to the long and close relationship established between these leaders and their units.

An extremely vital part of organizing the resistance was using indirect skills to establish and operate guerrilla agent intelligence networks both in rural and urban areas. The urban environment was of greater importance simply because the majority of the information and intelligence the guerrilla agents sought was maintained at the Japanese military and administrative headquarters which were located in Manila and other cities and large towns. The ability to establish and manage clandestine operations in the cities occupied by the Japanese was critical. The guerrilla agents infiltrated the highest levels Japanese military command organizations as office workers or in other positions that offered access to information sought by the resistance. Guerrilla agents held positions of power in the Filipino puppet government the Japanese placed into power. Most notable among these people was Manuel Roxas, the Japanese appointed President of the Philippines. Roxas kept in touch with guerrilla units throughout the war and relayed valuable intelligence to them without the Japanese knowing (Lapham 1996, 236).

The efficacy of the Japanese counterguerrilla operations impacted heavily on the operation of these agent networks and thus required the guerrilla leaders to constantly
manage them. Compromise of agents meant the immediate restructuring of networks and contacts and other activities that reduced the impact of the loss of sensitive information. New agents were constantly needed to take the place of those killed and captured, thus covers and positions for the new agent had to be established. Running these type of operations were extremely difficult and dangerous, but the information and intelligence they offered the guerrillas was of the utmost importance.

Having been described as diplomat warriors, many of these guerrilla leaders actually did rely heavily on diplomatic and political skills. The circumstances which arose and required these diplomatic skills could have spelled disaster for the resistance on numerous occasions. Colonel Russ Volckmann had an incident that had the potential to result in his death and the death of all of his force. While working with one of the headhunter tribes on Northern Luzon, Volckmann’s operational area extended into the traditional territory of another headhunter tribe. As fate would have it, the two tribes were long time adversaries who had been feuding for years. The danger to Volckmann’s unit was that during the Japanese occupation, many feuding tribes used the Japanese as a way of settling old scores. One tribe would inform the Japanese that the other tribe was anti-Japanese or that they were supporting the resistance. The result of this action, whether it was true or not, would usually entail the Japanese attacking and destroying as much of the tribe as possible. Fearing this would happen, Volckmann met with the headman of the rival tribe and was able to convince him to attend a meeting with the other headman with Volckmann as the mediator. Volckmann was able to broker a settlement to the feud and shortly there after, the tribes would work together
in the resistance under Volckmann and become close allies to each other. Volckmann’s
ability to gain the respect and confidence of these fierce headhunters through the
application of indirect skills saved not only his life and the life of his men, it made the
resistance stronger and more effective.

During this operation there are numerous such examples highlighting the
importance of indirect skills. Due to the nature of UW operations in the Philippines,
guerrilla leaders found themselves not only as military leaders, they were often times
the defacto ruler of their area of operation. They were responsible for essentially all that
occurred in that area, to include establishing laws and the pronouncement of punishment
for those who violating them. They might also became the local government,
responsible for the public administration of their territory. As strange and nondoctrinal
as this may seem, SF soldiers in the Uphold Democracy case study found themselves in
virtually the exact same situation. A guerrilla leader named Charles Putnam described
to Lieutenant Ramsey, himself a guerrilla leader, all that he felt was encompassed in
being a guerrilla leader:

It’s not a job... we control these people. We hold their lives in our
hands. Being a guerrilla leader is like being a king... you have absolute power
over people.” Putnam then refers to the headhunter tribes they are working with
and goes on to say, “... they love Japanese raids, Ramsey; they invite them.
You know why? Cause that’s the only time they have full bellies [referring to
their practice of cannibalism]. That’s not military, and it sure as hell’s no job.
That’s guerrilla warfare, and as far as they’re concerned I’m no captain, I’m the
king (Ramsey 1990, 163).
While this is not the definition one would find under UW in Joint Pub 1-02, it does lend some insight into the varied and unconventional aspects that are encountered in the conduct of UW operations.

**Direct Skills**

The direct skills utilized by guerrilla commanders refer to the skills required by the warrior part of the diplomatic warrior. Although it was stated that in this case study, the indirect or diplomat skills were of greater significance to this operation than the direct or warrior skill, that in no way implies that the direct skills were not of great importance.

The direct skills involved with planning and conducting combat operations were obviously important to these operations, as they are to any combat operation. They were, however, of less importance to these operations than other skills were mainly because of the mission MacArthur gave the guerrilla units. MacArthur wanted the guerrillas to lay low, organize, and gather intelligence. Initially this operation did not emphasize direct combat operations; however, many of the guerrilla units consistently conducted combat operations against the Japanese in addition to gathering intelligence. It was essential that the guerrilla commander understood how to plan, train, and conduct small unit tactics as well as large unit tactics. Initially when the majority of the guerrilla units were platoon to company size, a knowledge of small unit tactics sufficed. Being that the majority of the guerrilla commanders on Luzon were junior officers, they had limited or no pre-war operational experience leading troops above the company level. The only officers on Luzon that did have such experience either surrender or were
captured and killed by 1943. These junior officer guerrilla commanders had to develop the leadership skills needed to conduct large scale operations on the job. As guerrilla unit strengths grew and the operation transitioned into the conventional phase of battle, guerrilla leaders found themselves conducting division size operations (Volckmann 1954, 198).

The ability to organize, command, support, and train guerrilla units with strengths upwards of 20,000 men is no small task. The direct skills required to organization a command and control structure, logistics support structure, and communications network for units of this size are many. Without these skills, the guerrilla units would have been limited in both the size they could attain, and the types of operations they could undertake, ultimately the effectiveness of these operations would also be impacted. The ability to plan and support large scale guerrilla combat operations is a skill that has proven necessary not only in this case study, but was also required in the Nicaragua case study. Even though SF soldiers in Nicaragua did not directly lead guerrilla units, they were the primary planners of the large scale operations. The skill required to conduct such operations will continue to be needed as UW operations gravitate toward surrogate execution.

Another set of direct skills that was very important to the guerrilla leaders dealt with the technical knowledge of weapons and communications equipment. Due to the lack of external supply until late in the operation, guerrilla leaders had to improvise and use maximum ingenuity when trying to maintain and repair the limited amount of equipment they had. They often times had to fabricate that which they could not
procure. There are incredible stories of guerrilla units making bullets out of curtain rods, a diesel engine generator that ran on coconut oil, and miniature hydroelectric systems to power radios that were made from bits and pieces of other radios and electronic equipment.

Not only did these skills allow the guerrillas to maintain and produce such equipment, it enabled them to properly and effective employ the weapons systems and radios. Weapons and radios are critical to have, yet if one does not properly employ them, they are of limited utility. It is especially critical that guerrilla leaders understand how to achieve maximum combat power and fully utilize all assets at their disposal because by the nature of UW operations, they will almost always be at a marked disadvantage in this respect to their adversary.

**Case Study Summary**

UW operations in the Philippines present many valuable insights that contribute to answering the subordinate and primary questions of this thesis. These insights come in two general categories, aspects of UW operations and the nature of UW operations.

The aspects of UW operations that had the greatest impact on the success of this operation were those of the indirect skill set. This case study is an excellent illustration of the importance of interpersonal skills and cross-cultural communications. These two skills, more so than any other, made a tremendous contribution to allowing the resistance to begin, and were the same ones guerrilla commanders used to hold the resistance together. The ability of guerrilla commanders to influence, persuade, and build trusting relationships was critical to this operation, and has shown to be of
importance in the other case studies of this thesis. These same skills will be shown to have a parallel critical role in Operation Uphold Democracy. As did the guerrilla leaders in this case study, SF soldiers in Haiti will use these skills more than any other to achieve operational success.

Another indirect skill that was shown to be important in this case study is that of intelligence operations. The guerrilla's ability to establish and manage agent intelligence networks and clandestine communication systems was decisive to this operation. Their ability to operate in the urban terrain of Manila was absolutely critical. Because Manila served as the center of operations for both the occupying Japanese and the puppet Philippine government, the ability to operate intelligence nets there was crucial. This ability provided the guerrillas with intelligence they needed for their survival and operational needs, as well as providing General MacArthur with intelligence in support of his planning for future operations in the Philippines. This ability to operate in an urban environment will serve as a useful base of comparison that will provide contrast to the Contra case study.

Although indirect skills predominated, certain direct skills impacted greatly on this operation. The direct skills of planning and conducting large scale guerrilla operations is one that was shown to be significant in this operation. As noted in the case study, guerrilla resistance grew from isolated platoon size elements to literally division size elements. The ability to plan, coordinate, and support such large scale guerrilla operations was essential in this case study, and a parallel importance will be established in the Contra case study.
Another direct skill that was decisive to the successful outcome of this operation was the ability to communicate both internally and externally. The freedom of maneuver, increased span of control, ability to conduct coordinated operations, and the ability to coordinate external support were all tied to the ability to communicate. This was true in the Philippines, and the importance of being able to do so will be demonstrated again in the case study of Operation Uphold Democracy.

Besides providing insight into what aspects of UW operations were critical to this case study, the analysis of UW operations in the Philippines offers important insight into the nature of UW operations. When analyzing the nature of UW operations in the Philippines, the primary characteristics that stand out are the extreme violence of this operation and the violations of the Law of Land Warfare. This study helps to illustrate several important points about the nature of UW operations. The first being that UW operations tend to be conducted with great passion and extreme violence. The second being that even when these operations are conducted under direct supervision of American soldiers, atrocities can and most likely will occur. This point is important because as the case studies in this thesis will illustrate, there seems to be a shift toward surrogate UW operations. This case study will serve as a base of reference from which the Contra case study can be to in an effort to see if these type of violations occur more frequently in a surrogate operation. The inherent dangerous nature of UW operations is important to note because it may be the key factor that deters senior military and political leaders from choosing UW operations as a course of action to achieve national
military objectives. This may also be the key factor that is driving the shift toward conducting surrogate UW operations.

The other important lesson this case study provides about the nature of UW operations is that they can be effective in helping to achieve national military objectives. The successful contribution this operation made toward achieving the strategic and operational objectives during a major world war is valuable to the analysis of this thesis. This is an important point of comparison because this operation was conducted during a total war in which the guerrilla commanders were not restricted by political imperatives. They were essentially free of the constricting limitations that will be seen in the other case studies, and they had freedom of maneuver to do whatever was required to accomplish the mission. The contribution this UW operation made to achieving national military objectives during a total war will be useful in the comparison to the success of UW operations in differing levels of conflict.

**UW Operations in Support of the Contra Rebels**

We deplore the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua and the Marxist attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras....We will return to the fundamental principle of treating a friend as a friend and self-proclaimed enemies as enemies, without apology. (Dickey 1985, 70)

**Timeline**

17 July 1979  Anistasio Somoza overthrown by Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN)

19 July 1979  COL Justiniano Perez, commander of EEBI (Basic Infantry Training School), and 130 other Guardia officers and family members are rescued and flown to Miami, will become the core of the Contra resistance.
20 July 1979  National Guard unit called “Rattle Snakes” leave Nicaragua for Honduras, commanded by man named Pedro Ortiz Centeno, known as “Suicida”, becomes the most prominent guerrilla commander early in the war

Nov 1980  Nicaragua exiles (anti-Sandinista) trained in Guatemala by Argentines at location called “Detachment 101”

1979-81  Sandinista regime nationalizes many private industries and supports other Central American guerrilla movements.

20 Jan 1981  Reagan takes office and suspends all aid to the Sandinista regime previously approved by Carter administration.

Spring 1981  September 15 Legion is organized, anti-Sandinista insurgent group that will become one of the major components of the Contras

July 1981  Eden Pastora (“Commander Zero”), key figure in Sandinista insurgency, defects to Contras

1 Dec 1981  Reagan signs “finding” authorizing covert action in support of the anti-Sandinista rebels (Contras), $19 million in aid approved

14 Mar 1982  CIA trained and backed Contra rebels blow up two major bridges in Nicaragua, one on the Rio Negro, one on the Rio Coco

Dec 1982  Boland Bill passed, prohibited the support for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government, could use support to interdict the flow of arms from Nicaragua to communist guerrillas in El Salvador

Fall 1983  Command and Control structure changed, “Tactical Commander” established inside Nicaragua

Jan 1983  CIA and Central American third parties conduct covert mining of Nicaraguan harbors

Oct 1983  Suicida and three of his subordinate commanders tried and executed by Contra General Staff
  CIA “Q” boats with Contras and mercenaries conduct gunboat attack against fuel storage tanks at Corinto causing massive damage

Jan-Apr 1984  CIA mines major Nicaraguan harbors

Oct 1984  CIA gives Contras the very controversial PSYOP handbook (advocates selective assassination and use of criminal elements)

65
12 Oct 1984  Congress cuts off “lethal” aid to Contras and bars CIA involvement with the Contras, Lt. Col. Oliver North gets involved in finding alternate means of support for the Contras

24 Apr 1985  President of Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, makes publicized visit to USSR in search of addition military support

12 Jun 1985  Congress reverses its earlier decision and authorizes $27 million in non-lethal aid to the Contras

5 Oct 1985  CIA contract cargo master, Eugene Hasenfus, captured when C-123 he was in was shot down by Sandinistas while he was flying a resupply mission. Sandinistas recover incriminating documents exposing the CIA’s covert resupply activities.

27 Mar 1986  Congress approves 100 million dollar Contra support package (30 million non-lethal aid, 70 million in military aid).

Nov 1986  Iran-Contra scandal hits the press in the U.S.

7 Aug 1987  Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega signs regional peace agreement committing his government to democratic reforms in exchange from his four Central American counterparts to end their support to the Contras.

Oct 1987  $100 million Contra offensive starts.

Nov 1987  Sandinistas seek negotiations with Contras

3 Feb 1988  Congress votes down new $36 million Contra support package

21 Mar 1988  Sapoa Peace talks between Sandinista and Contra Officials begin, two days later peace agreement signed, called for temporary cease-fire and concessions by both sides to build mutual confidence.

Jan 1989  Bush takes office

7 Aug 1989  Central American Presidents agree to work together to disarm the Contra Army with in 90 days.

Nov 89-Jan 92 UN Observer Group in Central America

25 Feb 1990  Daniel Ortega concedes defeat in Presidential elections and the Sandinista government turns over power to the newly elected President, Violeta Chamorro.
27 Jun 1990  War's end ceremony presided over by President Chamorro, Contras demobilized

Operational Overview

This is a historical case study of UW operations in support of the Contra rebels in their war against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. This case study is offered as a representative example of UW operations conducted during the Cold War Era.

The Contra resistance movement begins with the overthrow of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in 1979. With the Sandinista government in charge of Nicaragua, remnants of the Nicaraguan Guardia Army forces flee to neighboring countries and begin to conduct resistance operations. These operations are very limited and of nearly no significance. The Sandinistas begin to seek Soviet and Cuban military support in an effort to build up the largest and most capable military force in Central America.

The Reagan administration sees this action as communist aggression in the U.S.'s backyard and begins covert operations in support of the Contras in December of 1981. As part of this covert operation, SF soldiers, working chiefly for the CIA, provided training and operational planning support. With this aid, the Contras are able to become a larger and better trained force that would eventually be able to conduct prolonged combat operations with operational bases inside of Nicaragua. This operation is influenced to a very large extent by the fluctuation of U.S. support due political battles between the Reagan administration and the Congress. This fluctuation
of support plays a major role in causing this operation to become a protracted war, lasting nearly ten years.

With U.S. aid, the Contras are able to engage Sandinista forces and hold their own. Having to fight an escalating war against the Contras creates economic and political pressure on the Sandinistan government as more than fifty percent of its national budget is being spent on military aid. This causes the standard of living in Nicaraguan cities to plummet, and inflation to soar up to 15,000 percent. This type of effect eventually forces the Sandinistan government to seek peace talks with the Contras. The end result is the initiation of democratic reforms, including free elections in which the Sandinistan Government is defeated. In June of 1990 the Chamorro government takes power and the Contras begin to demobilize.

Factors of Critical Importance to This Case Study

Political Risk

Political risk is inherent in conducting covert operations. The administration that decides to use these types of operations as a means of achieving national interests must realize the associated risks. One of the quickest ways to incur negative political repercussions during covert operations is to have them compromised and made known to the press. A rule of thumb in covert operations is that they seldom stay covert. Prior to approving such operations, the Reagan administration and the Congress certainly must have weighed the consequences that might occur should the program become compromised. This operation started off as a covert aid program to the Contras, virtually a secret war, but ended up as one of the most extensively covered stories in the
world. This case study serves as a glaring example for all future administrations to consider when contemplating the use of such operations to achieve national objectives. While this operation was compromised and the Reagan administration suffered some negative political fallout, many would argue that it was successful in achieving the objectives of the Reagan Administration; the eventual removal of the Sandinista government and the subsequent democratization of Nicaragua.

Compromise is one component of the political risk taken when conducting covert operations, although by no means the only one. Another aspect of political risk that was very important in this case study was that associated with surrogate warfare. When surrogate forces are utilized to conduct covert operations, there are many potential political risks. By choosing surrogates as a means to conduct covert operations, the administration is inevitably married to all that the surrogate forces do, good and bad.

In this operation, the U.S. initially used Argentine army soldiers from Battalion 601 to train Contra soldiers along the Nicaraguan border in Honduras and Costa Rica, and in Argentina (Dickey 1985, 124). The Argentines had just conducted extensive operations over five years battling communist insurgents in what is referred to as the “Dirty War.” During this conflict at least 8,960 people had disappeared in Argentina at the hands of the Argentine armed forces and police after they seized power in 1976 (Dickey 1985, 89). Many atrocities were committed by the armed forces during this struggle, so much so that “atrocities were commonplace, a daily practice” (Dickey 1985, 89). By 1980, the Argentine government forces were masters of effective, but
controversial techniques in dealing with the communist threat and were able to get the insurgency under control.

Because the Argentines had success with the techniques used in their "Dirty War," these were the types of techniques they taught the Contras. Thus it is not surprising to learn that many of the Contra units left a trail of murders, rape, torture and other abuses in their wake (Garvin 1992, 87). When these type of activities take place, they will inevitably reflect back on to the supporter of the program. When this happens it can be an albatross around the neck. In this case study, atrocities committed by the Contras had a direct negative impact on many of the Reagan administration's attempts to gain Congressional support for their Contra program. When Contra atrocities were spread across the world’s headlines, the Reagan administration reputation suffered globally. This illustrates the potential political risk of using surrogate forces to conduct UW operations. Being that UW operations in the Philippines showed violations of human rights and the laws of land warfare can occur in U.S. led operation, it is only reasonable to expect these violations to increase when surrogates are used.

An additional political risk stemmed from controversial and illegal activities conducted by personnel working in the Contra aid program. When controversial and illegal activities are carried out during covert operations, and they become publicly known, they will most likely have a significant negative political impact.

During this operation, the CIA officers in charge of the Contra program decided to mine Nicaragua’s harbors from January-April 1984 in an effort to interrupt the delivery of oil to Nicaragua (Garvin 1992, 127). As a result of this mining campaign
Dutch, Panamanian, Liberian, Japanese, and Soviet ships, as well as several Nicaraguan fishing boats hit mines (Garvin 1992, 127). This did not however, stop the flow of oil to Nicaragua. The Soviets continued to ship oil to Nicaragua regardless of the mines.

The CIA mining campaign came to a quick halt when Senator Barry Goldwater, the Republican chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, found out about it. He leaked the information to Wall Street Journal reporter Dave Rogers who promptly published an article detailing the CIA's involvement, effectively blowing the lid off of the covert operation (Wright 1993, 70). The mining of Nicaraguan harbors has been referred to as probably the most catastrophic covert action in the history of U.S. covert actions (Garvin 1992, 128). Not only did the mining campaign come to a quick halt, so to did funding for the Contras.

To complicate matters, around the same time of the harbor mining incident, another controversy was in the making. Feeling that the Contras needed to improve their psychological operations capabilities, the CIA had one of its officers put together a psychological operations manual. This manual turned out to be almost completely useless, as the majority of the Contras could not read (Garvin 1992, 130). Journalists, on the other hand, found it very interesting, especially the parts that suggested the Contras should provoke confrontation with the Sandinistas in order to, “cause the death of one or more persons, who would become the martyrs” (Garvin 1992, 129). Another section that drew their attention was the one that addressed using “professional criminals” to “carry out specific selective ‘jobs’” and suggested “neutralizing” Sandinista officials (Garvin 1992, 129). On 14 October 1984, less than a month before
the U.S. Presidential elections, the *Associated Press* ran a story on the manual. The reporter failed to mention however, that the section in question had been removed prior to mass distribution. The psychological operations manual became known as the "CIA murder manual" and it became the assumption of many that the CIA was back in the assassination business (Garvin, p. 130).

As a direct result of the harbor mining campaign and the murder manual, Congress shut down funding for the contras and the Reagan administration suffered a severe setback in political support for their program. With the loss of funding, some Reagan officials attempted to circumvent congressional restrictions. This led to the major constitutional crisis which came to be known as the Iran-Contra Scandal.

The more deeply involved with a covert operation a government gets, the more likely it is to raise the stakes to protect it. This can result in an unwanted or unintended escalation of force, one that can have negative political repercussions. This became the case in March of 1988. During this time of the operation, Congress had again cut off support to the contras and the CIA was to stop supplying the contras by the end of February. This caused the contras great problems as they were thus losing their only means of resupply. Not only that, tons of badly needed equipment and supplies were located on Swan Island off the Honduran Coast that had to be flown to the camps in Honduras. The CIA did so in extreme haste in order to get as many tons of supplies as they could to the contras before their authorization to do so ran out. In delivering these supplies, they created enormous stockpiles in several of the contra border camps.
This did not go unnoticed by the Sandinistas and on 16 March they sent about 4,600 men into Honduras to attack and destroy these stockpiles of supplies (Dillon 1991, 214). The Sandinistas were successful in their attacks and this success forced President Reagan to make an momentous decision; allow the Sandinistas to capture the only remaining stockpiles of supplies for the Contras, an action that would surely mean their destruction and the end of the Contra program, or deploy U.S. combat forces to save the Contras.

On 17 March 1988, President Reagan ordered the deployment of 3,200 soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) into the U.S. air base at Palmerola, Honduras as a show of force to try and intimidate the Sandinistas into halting their assault on the Contra’s supply stockpiles (Garvin 1992, 214). The political risk of this action was immense, had President Ortega not ordered his forces out of Honduras, there may well have been fighting between U.S. and Nicaraguan forces. Had American soldiers died in fighting in Honduras, it is very likely the political effects could have been disastrous for the Reagan administration, to include Vice President Bush who had his eyes on the White House.

Rural Operational Base

Unlike the UW operations in the Philippines, the population in this case study was not the Center of Gravity. It was, however, an essential part of the Contras’ operation. The Contras’ war against the Sandinistas has been referred to as a peasant war, and arguably this is a true statement. When one investigates the demographic makeup of Contra soldiers and their support network inside of Nicaragua, the majority
would most accurately be described as peasants. These people were predominately simple country people eking out an existence by farming or ranching, on a very small scale. Of these people, many were Moskito Indians, often the focus of Sandinistan oppression. Close study of a map depicting the regions the Contras controlled or operated in would show almost exclusively rural area. In the eight-year history of the war, the Contras never successfully penetrated the cities along the Nicaraguan Pacific Coast (Garvin 1992, 175). This is significant because sixty percent of the population of Nicaragua is located in the cities that are found along this coast line. The Contras lacked the skills and training to conduct urban guerrilla operations. Although they made several attempts, the Contras were unable to conduct effective urban insurrection, or even an occasional attack or act of sabotage in these cities. Had they been able to operate in the urban environment as effectively as the Filipino guerrillas did during World War II, one might effectively argue that the length of this war could have been substantially shortened.

While the Contras had their origins and bases of support in the rural areas, the Sandinistas had theirs in the city. When the Sandinistas were conducting their own insurgency against the Somoza government of Nicaragua, they were an urban based organization. They were made up primarily of the educated upper classes of people. They focused their propaganda and recruiting efforts at this cross section of the population, and as a result were successful in ousting General Somoza and his government. The Sandinistas were able to control that sixty percent of the Nicaraguan
population that lived in the cities, and they didn’t worry to much about the other forty percent dispersed throughout the rugged Nicaraguan country side.

Once the Sandinistas took power, they were able to capitalize on their urban strength and experience to deny the Contras access to the majority of the population. They were not however, able to protect the majority of the population from the economic repercussions of conducting an eight year war against the Contras.

Even thought the Sandinistas were receiving extremely large amounts of Soviet military aid, as much as $500 million by 1985, they could not get rid of the Contras (Garvin, p. 160). With the large purchases of military equipment, up to 18,000 metric tons a year, the Sandinistas were spending more than fifty percent of their national budget on the military, the war with the Contras was having a crippling effect on the Sandinista economy (Garvin 1992, 158; Dillon 1991, 184). This severely impacted on living conditions in the large cites; inflation went from 700 percent to 15,000 percent, industry collapsed, government cooperative farms went idle and the standard of living dropped drastically (Dillon 1991, 184). The Sandinistas may have effectively stopped the Contras from operating in the cities, but they could not stop them from influencing the populations residing in the cities. The Contras simply influenced and effected the population in a manner in which the Sandinista government did not anticipate, economically.
Controlled Comparison Factors

Command and Control Structure

This operation was controlled through the CIA, with an in-country station chief and various paramilitary case officers and contract agents, many of which were SF soldiers. Initially the Contras were composed of a core of ex-Guardia officers and enlisted men who had fled from Nicaragua when the Sandinistas had defeated General Somoza’s government forces. These personnel would eventually provide the leadership for the Contra Army. The political arm of the Contras was put together by the CIA, and it was made up of mostly well-to-do Nicaraguans that had previous experience working with U.S. corporations. They understood how Americans worked and they could speak English well.

The military arm of the Contras was called the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). The basic command and control structure was as follows: Military Commander in Chief, the General Staff consisting of Chief of Staff, Chief of Personnel, Chief of Intelligence, Chief of Operations, Chief of Logistics, Chief of Civilian Affairs, Chief of Counter Espionage, a Tactical Theater Commander (located in Nicaragua to facilitate the command and control of the Commander), Task Force Commanders (in command of multiple battalions of soldiers), Battalion and Company Commanders.

While this command and control structure existed, in actuality it did not function very well. With the general staff floating between Miami and Honduras, operations in Nicaragua were often left to the unit commanders at the tactical level. This prevented the Contras from functioning as an efficient coordinated force. Recognizing this as a
problem, the CIA urged the creation of a tactical theater commander (Dickey 1991, 244). With a tactical commander inside of Nicaragua, the span of control of the FDN commander could be better facilitated and the task forces could get better support. This would also improve the ability to conduct coordinated operations.

The political arm of the Contras consisted of a civilian commander in chief and the FDN political directorate. This directorate was comprised of many personnel with the task of lobbying the U.S. Congress to vote in favor of funding for the Contras.

While the Contras had a military and political arm, the CIA provided the majority of the operational guidance and control for both parts of the organization, except during the time frame in which the Boland Amendments restricted them from doing so. As advisors, the CIA officers were to advise the General Staff of basic operational matters and decisions and coordinate the support of the operations. As it turned out, the CIA had its own agenda and time schedule for the Contra operation. They maintained control of the operation and ran it according to their plan. This became a major fault later in the operation when Congress cut off contact between the CIA and the Contras. Because the CIA had been so busy running operations, they had not taken the time to fully train their counterparts to function on their own. When the CIA left the camps, so too did nearly all of the technical and operational experience. The Reagan administration desperately wanted the Contras to continue the fight, yet the CIA had not adequately prepared them to do so.
Strategic and Operational Objectives

The strategic importance of this operation lies in the geography of Nicaragua. By virtue of its geography, Nicaragua is essentially a blocking position in Central America. It extends from the Pacific coast to the Atlantic coast, and as a result, nothing can move through one end of Central America to the other without it being observed from Nicaraguan territory. Central America as a whole is essentially America's backyard, and activities in this region have always been carefully monitored by the U.S.

When the Marxist Sandinistan government took control of Nicaragua, the U.S. became seriously concerned. With a government that was bent on exporting Communism to all of Central America in control of this strategically vital country, the potential now existed that America could find itself with new Communist neighbors nearly as close as Cuba. This would also open the door to the Soviet Union in America's backyard.

Although the strategic objectives of this operation were not clearly stated to the U.S. Congress when the Reagan administration proposed its support program, they became clear as the operation unfolded. The strategic objectives of the UW operations conducted in support of the Contras was to topple the Marxist Sandinistan government, without using U.S. combat forces, and help emplace a Contra controlled government that was suitable to the U.S.

In this case study, the UW operation in support of the Contra rebels did help achieve the strategic objectives of the U.S. The Nicaraguan government was fundamentally brought to its knees by the economic strain caused by the war. This
eventually prompted the Sandinistas to sue for peace negotiations with the Contras and to institute democratic reforms. When these elections were held, the Sandinistas lost and gave up control of the government.

The operational objectives of this operation was to create an insurgent army that was capable of conducting a guerrilla war that could challenge the Sandinistas in the field and apply pressure on the Sandinista government. This pressure would come in the form of the military and economic cost of conducting an extensive counter insurgent oppression throughout Nicaragua. This pressure was to help persuade the Sandinistas to concede to democratic reforms and move away from the Soviet Union.

These objectives were eventually achieved, however due to the wavering and erratic U.S. support, it was very difficult. Although the objectives were achieved in the end, the Sandinistas were not driven away from Soviet support, conversely they were driven to the Soviets. As the war progressed, the Sandinistas became more dependent on Soviet military and economic aid. Not until the end of the war and after the democratic elections took place did the Nicaraguan government begin to remove itself from Soviet support. This reduction in Soviet support may have also been attributed to the fall of the Soviet Union that occurred shortly thereafter.

**Political Support to the Operation, Political Environment in Which it was Conducted**

The political support for this operation can best be described as inconsistent. While the Reagan administration supported it completely, the U.S. Congress did not. As the covert operation became compromised, and as politically damaging aspects of
the operation became known to the world, the Congress divorced itself from supporting the program. Only the Sandinistas seemed to have the ability to motivate the Congress to support the Contra aid program.

Because of either total political ineptness or sheer ignorance, Daniel Ortega committed several grave political errors that helped drive the U.S. Congress toward supporting the Contra operation. The trip he took to Moscow in 1985 in search of military aid, and the 1986 cross border attacks he ordered into Honduras were both done at exactly the same time the U.S. Congress was voting down support proposals for the Contras. Had his timing not been so incredibly poor, the Congress would most likely not have reversed the negative votes it had already registered. In both cases the Congress had already voted down the support proposals, only to approve them after Ortega’s actions. In the 1985 incident, the Congress had voted down a $14 million support package, but after Ortega’s announced trip to Moscow, they approved a $27 million support package (Garvin 1992, 161). The cross border raids of 1986 were the catalyst that inspired Congress to authorize the $100 million support package that ultimately resulted in the defeat of the Sandinistas. If one considers these occurrences, Ortega was most likely the most effective lobbyist the Contras had.

The political support for this operation is summarized in table 1:
TABLE 1

CONGRESSIONAL FUNDING BY YEAR AND TYPE
(Amounts in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Nonlethal Aid</th>
<th>Military Aid</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$19</td>
<td>$19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>49.75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Serafino 1990, 17.

**Individual Skills Critical to This Operation**

SF soldiers involved in this operation were generally in an advisory or teaching role and did not serve as guerrilla leaders, thus the individual skills most critical to the operation were primarily those of the indirect kind. SF soldiers participating in this operation did have to possess and be proficient at direct skills, but it was mainly for the purpose of advising and teaching, not executing.

**Indirect Skills**

When working with an insurgent force, such as the Contras, that is essentially an uneducated and nonprofessional peasant military force, there are many challenges that require the SF soldier to possess a wide variety of indirect skills.

Arguably the indirect skill that could have had the biggest impact on this case study, but did not, was that of persuasion. As was seen in the Philippine case study, and will be seen in the Haiti case study, the ability to influence the guerrilla tactical
commanders and soldiers is vital. The ability to transfer or impose certain critical values on the Contras could have made the battle to receive Congressional funding for this operation substantially easier. The reports of atrocities committed at the hands of the Contras was a constant thorn in the side of the Reagan administration as they battled for Congressional funding. While President Reagan referred to the contras as "freedom fighters . . . the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French Resistance," others referred to them as "terrorists" (Dickey 1985, 13, Garvin 1992, 245). The actions of the soldiers in the field had a significant impact on how the world perceived them, and their cause. World opinion, at least the opinion of the U.S. congress, was vital and was tied directly to military aid. Had each of the Contra TF commanders had an SF advisor attached with him, it is quite possible that many violations of the laws of land warfare could have been prevented. The ability to influence a commander with a large span of control and power is usually the quickest way to effect change in a military organization. If at the same time, the proper ethics and values could have been instilled in the Contra recruits during their initial training, it is reasonable to believe that major improvements could have been made in this area.

Two of the most frequently used indirect skills in this case study were language and cross-cultural communication skills. These were imperative because with a force such as the Contras, in which the majority of the soldiers were uneducated, very few spoke English. More so than merely speaking the language, the ability to understand the culture and the psyche of the local soldiers is an invaluable asset. This knowledge allows the advisor to organize successful approaches to conducting training and
operations. It is also a way to understand the soldier's value system, essential in
developing successful ways of emphasizing good values, and suppress the less desired
ones.

**Direct Skills**

The direct skill utilized most by SF personnel and critical to the success of this
operation was the application of the operational art of war. The American advisors were
the primary planners and coordinators for all of the operations conducted by the
Contras. Many advisors found themselves organizing the purchase of weapons,
ammunition, and equipment; planning and coordinating covert aerial resupply missions,
and planning large offensive operations all at the same time (Dillon 1991, 205).
Without this direct skill, it would have been extremely hard for the Contras to ever
become a credible fighting unit. A thorough understanding of all aspects of military
operations is required because when conducting combat operations in austere areas,
with irregular forces, advisors do not have all the resources a conventional planner
would have. SF advisors have to be able to utilize the limited resources at hand, and
adapt them to his needs and still come up with a product his peasant army can
understand and execute.

**Case Study Summary**

The UW operations in support of the Contra rebels investigated in this case
study build on the insights of the previous case study, as well as presenting some new
ones. These insights will again be addressed in two general categories, aspects of UW
operation and the nature of UW operation.
Similar to the findings of the Philippine case study, the aspects of UW operations that had the biggest impact on the operation were those of the indirect skill set. Because SF personnel served primarily in the role of advisors, trainers, and planners, the majority of the skills utilized were indirect. Among these, cross-cultural communication skills and the ability to persuade and influence guerrilla commanders were paramount. This case study presents and excellent illustration of the increased importance of these skills in a surrogate operation. Being that SF personnel were not generally permitted to have direct supervisory control over guerrilla forces in the execution of combat operations, they could not directly control their actions. With only indirect means of controlling the Contras, the primary way in which they could control the guerrillas' actions down range was through the application of persuasion and influence. This inability of SF soldiers to have direct control over guerrilla forces during combat operations is in stark contrast to the Philippine case study. This case study has illustrated some negative implications that may result when SF is restricted to apply only indirect measures of control.

Unlike the Philippine resistance, the Contras were not able to effectively operate in urban population centers. This inability effected the Contras' ability to penetrate the Sandinista government to any large extent. This then directly effected their ability to gather vital intelligence. Besides not being able to run effective agent nets in the urban population centers in Nicaragua, the Contras were unable to conduct substantial acts of sabotage or subversion. This is worthy of note because had the Contras been able to do so, it could have potentially shorted the duration of the war. By being able to directly
influence the major population centers, the Contras could have hastened the conditions that eventually drove the Sandinista government to capitulation.

This case study, like that of the Philippines, demonstrates the importance of possessing the indirect and direct skills needed to train guerrillas. Being their primary role, SF soldiers utilized nearly all of the indirect skills and their direct MOS related skills to train the Contras. As stated in the case study, this made a major contribution toward making the Contras a combat effective force.

This case study shows a parallel to the previous one in the importance of being able to plan, coordinate, and support large scale guerrilla operations. While SF soldiers supporting the Contras were not leading them in combat operations as was seen in the Philippines, they were however planning and supporting such operations. The skills and operational knowledge required to plan operations on the scale as seen in both of these case studies was critical.

The UW operations conducted in support of the Contra rebels is laden with valuable insight into the nature of UW operations. The biggest contribution it makes deals with bringing out some of the implications of working with surrogate forces. One of the major implications brought in this case study is that when conducting surrogate operations, the country training and directing the operation is ultimately responsible for the actions of the surrogate force. It was shown that the amount of the potential political risk of these type of operations increases substantially. It also demonstrated that when choosing to use surrogates, the ability to directly control the force is forfeited. As illustrated in the Philippine case study, the violent and
decentralized nature of UW operations offers ample opportunity for violations of the law of land warfare to occur. This case study demonstrates clearly that without direct control over guerrilla units, atrocities and violations of the law of land warfare will occur in increased incidences. It is then reasonable to expect that in future surrogate UW operations, the potential for show stopping incidents involving these types of violations will be exponentially increased over that of direct operations. This increased risk of violations is directly proportional to the potential increase in political risk.

UW operations in support of the Contra rebels, as does the Philippine case study, illustrates that UW operations can be an effective tool in achieving strategic and operational goals in support of national military objectives. What is also significant to this thesis is that the Contra case study was conducted in a different operational environment. This operation was conducted during the Cold War, not a major World War as was the case in the Philippine case study. This suggests that UW operations are flexible and effective in accomplishing national military objectives in a variety of operational continuums. What is unique about the Contra case study is that it demonstrates how UW operations can be employed as an economy of force operation to achieve national military objectives. In contrast to the Philippine operation, this was an economy of force operation by choice. Achieving the national military objectives in this manner was dictated by the complex political imperatives within which the operation had to be conducted. The differences in the operational continuums and the role in which UW operations played in achieving national military objectives suggests that the aspects of UW operations, specifically the skills required to conduct such
operations, are flexible and suitable for application across a wide spectrum of operational continuums. This is important as it implies that such skills may be useful in dealing with future threats in diverse operational and strategic environments.

**Unconventional Operations in Support of Operation Uphold Democracy**

All US officers—especially those in the combat arms—preparing to participate in a nontraditional operation should deploy with a mind-set at odds with much of what they have been taught about war. They should be prepared to see many traditional assumptions of their profession violated . . . they should learn to live with ambiguity . . . they should not expect to operate in a political vacuum . . . they should expect changing and additional missions and tasks . . . they should expect to be ordered to perform tasks for which they have never or rarely trained . . . they should expect to be called on to demonstrate restraint, together with a keen sensitivity to political considerations and to alien cultures, either or both of which they might find repugnant or unintelligible . . . they should expect ambiguity, fluidity, constraints, dejection, frustration and the unknown—in short, they should expect the worst. (Yates 1997, 61)

**Time Line**

30 Sept 1991 Aristide ousted from Presidency in coup led by Lieutenant General Cedras. Cedras takes over as the head of a military junta.

20 May 1992 President Bush signs an executive order requiring the Coast Guard to repatriate all Haitian boat people without letting them apply for asylum.

Jan-Feb 1993 President Clinton continues former President Bush’s Haitian boat people policy

Apr 1993 LTG Cedras rejects proposals of Dante Caputo, UN/OAS special envoy, which would have the military junta leaders step down thus preparing the way for President Aristide to return to Haiti and be reinstated as President.

3 Jul 1993 Aristide and Cedras sign Governors Island Accord, agreement has LTG Cedras retiring and President Aristide returning to Haiti by Oct 30, 1993. Also lifts UN and OAS sanctions.

8 Oct 1993 The USS Harlan County is denied access to the port of Haiti by Cedras organized demonstration, the Harlan County returns to U.S., Cedras decides not to abide by the Governors Island Accord and refuses to turn over power to Aristide.
14 Oct 1993  Guy Malary, Justice Minister for the transition Prime Minister, is assassinated by Cedras backed gunmen, rest of the transition cabinet goes into hiding.

15 Oct 1993  Deadline for Cedras to resign, he refuses and the U.S. emplaces a naval blockade around Haiti.

16 Oct 1993  UN Security Council authorizes military force to enforce the UN and OAS sanctions

5 May 1994  UN Security Council gives LTG Cedras 15 days to step down from power and leave the country, or the UN will use force to do so.

7 Jul 1994  U.S. deploys 2,000 Marines off Haiti and states that U.S. forces have been practicing for an invasion.

31 Jul 1994  UN Security Council Resolution 940 allows for the use of all means necessary to restore democracy in Haiti. LTG Cedras declares a state of siege.

8 Sep 1994  3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) alerted for Operations in Haiti

10-18 Sep 94  3rd SFG(A) deploys to Guantanamo Bay Cuba for staging in preparation for infiltration into Haiti

17 Sep 1994  Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation, with Major General Jared Bates, JCS representative, leave for Haiti to meet with LTG Cedras to discuss his resignation and the potential use of U.S. force.

18 Sep 1994  President Clinton signs execute order for Operation Uphold Democracy.
Carter Delegation sends word to President Clinton that agreement with Cedras has been reached that allows for unopposed landing of U.S. forces in Haiti.

19 Sep 1994  CJCS sends execute order to 10th Mountain Div (Light) to conduct unopposed landing into Haiti. 10th Mountain Div (Light) Cdr MG Meade and MNF Cdr LTG Shelton land with lead elements of 10th Mountain.

20 Sep 1994  Elements of 3rd SFG(A) arrive in Haiti

22-23 Sep 94  JSOTF set up and 3rd SFG(A) initiates “Hub and Spoke” movement into the inner areas of Haitian country side.
24 Sep 1994  Secretary of Defense and CJCS visit Haiti, U.S. Marine patrol has fire fight with Haitian Police, ten armed Haitians are killed, one U.S. interpreter wounded.

3 Oct 1994  U.S. Special Forces Staff Sergeant Donald Holstead wounded by Haitian gunman in Les Cayes, MNF begins operations against paramilitary groups, FRAPH headquarters are raided and weapons are confiscated.

3-5 Oct 94  3rd SFG(A) achieves all initial operational locations in “Hub and Spoke” plan.

13 Oct 1994  LTG Cedras leaves Haiti for Dominican Republic.

15 Oct 1994  President Aristide returns to Haiti.

25 Oct 1994  More than 1,200 Special Forces soldiers are in Haiti operating out of twenty-seven towns and cities.

6 Nov 1994  President Clinton approves the withdrawal of 6,000 U.S. troops from Haiti by Dec 1, leaving 9,000 troops to be reduced in phases to 3,000 troops in several months. The remaining 3,000 U.S. soldiers will make up the U.S. contingent of the UN Multinational Force.

30 Nov 1994  MNF reports the collection of a total of 14,943 weapons; 1,720 Haitians have graduated from the IPSF course at Camp d’Application; 8,670 U.S. soldiers remain in Haiti.

1 Dec 1994  CJCS approves drawdown of U.S. soldiers to 6,000 by 15 Dec 94.

4 Jan 1995  MNF Cdr MG Meade declares that a secure and safe environment exists in Haiti, one of the prerequisites for the transition of U.S. to UN forces.

12 Jan 1995  Special Forces Sergeant First Class Gregory Cardott is shot and killed by FADH officer at a road block in Gonaives, Staff Sergeant Tommy Davis is wounded.

14 Jan 1995  MG Fisher, Cdr 25th Infantry Division, assumes command of the MNF Haiti, 25th Inf Div replaces 10th Mnt Div.

17 Jan 1995  President Aristide officially dismissed the remainder of Haiti’s army and creates a boarder patrol force of 1,500 former FADH members.

11 Feb 1995  Armed Haitians attack police station (former SF ODA outpost) in Limbe killing several IPSF members, including their commander.

31 Mar 1995  Ceremony marks hand over of MNF presence in Haiti from U.S. to UNMIH.

Feb 1996  Last SF soldiers leave Haiti.

**Operational Overview**

This historical case study deals with the Unconventional Operations (UO) conducted by U.S. SF soldiers in support of Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from September 1994 to February 1996. It serves as an illustration of the types of UO SF units are conducting in the PCWE that require the use of UW skill sets. While UO is not yet an official doctrinal term, it is becoming part of the SF vernacular that refers to nondoctrinal contingency operations that rely heavily on UW type skills.

In September of 1991, General Raoul Cedras led a military coup that removed from power Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In the aftermath of this coup, throngs of Haitians fled for the U.S. by boat. This flood of "boat people" put political pressure on the Bush administration. In response, a Coast Guard blockade was established in order to prevent this illegal immigration of Haitians into the United States.

The United Nations and the Organization of American States took note of the situation in Haiti and started applying political pressure in order to persuade the Cedras Junta to step down. This pressure seemed to be effective as Cedras signed the Governors Island Accord which bound him to return power to Aristide. Cedras decided
to renege on the agreement, prompting the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 940 calling for the use of force to restore democracy to Haiti.

As the U.S. led Multinational Forces (MNF) initiated the invasion of Haiti, the Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation reached a last-minute agreement with Cedras and the invasion was called off. U.S. and MNFs instead conducted an unopposed intervention in Haiti.

The SF units arrived in Haiti in September of 1994 and began to move out into the Haitian countryside to begin operations in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. Their main task was to create a stable and safe environment that would allow for the peaceful transition of power from Cedras to Aristide. The execution of this mission required SF soldiers to conduct a myriad of tasks that ranged from serving as mayors, judges, and local civic officials, to training an interim police force to maintain the peace. In addition to these tasks, SF also conducted considerable nation-building activities in an effort to help the Haitian people help themselves in restoring some semblance of an infrastructure.

The SF units remained in Haiti during the hand-over of the operation from the U.S. led MNFs to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in March 1995. SF continued to conduct activities in Haiti until February 1996.

Factors of Critical Importance to This Case Study

The Individual Special Forces Soldier

While several factors will be identified as having critical importance to the conduct of this operation, every one of them builds off of one common factor, the
capability of the SF soldiers who conducted this operation. The manner in which SF soldiers accomplished the commander’s intent was truly remarkable. Their ability to receive broad mission guidance in an extremely complex and fluid politico-military environment, under the most arduous conditions, isolated and often times without the required resources, is truly a testament to the adaptability and flexibility of the soldiers filling the ranks of SF. The maturity, patience, restraint, and tolerance routinely exhibited by SF soldiers in Haiti during the most trying of situations, directly contributed to creating a stable and safe environment without alienating the local population.

These personal characteristics and qualities of the SF soldiers operating in Haiti are a direct parallel to those of the soldiers who conducted UW operations in the Philippines. This parallel shows how the individual qualities that served guerrilla leaders so well in conducting UW operations in the Philippines, are the same ones that are critical in dealing with non-doctrinal contingency operations found in the PCWE. This parallel also demonstrates the ability of the guerrilla leaders in the Philippine UW operations to be force multipliers. Because of the individual abilities of the SF soldier, the capabilities of SF units, and the manner in which they were employed, the 1,200 SF soldiers in Haiti were able to accomplish that which a like-size conventional force could not possibly achieve.

Cross-Cultural Communication

The successes SF soldiers were able to achieve during this operation were due in great part to their ability to communicate cross-culturally with the Haitian populace.
This ability to establish rapport and personal relationships with the indigenous population is a trend that has been seen in each of the case studies presented in this paper, and has been a crucial factor in each.

Haitian culture is very deep and complex. It is a mix of traditional Haitian customs and beliefs wrought with voodoo and mysticism, intertwined with western customs and beliefs. In parallel with the Philippines case study, the ability and willingness of SF soldiers to understand and tolerate the intricacies of this culture was paramount in establishing this cross-cultural communication. A key part of this operation was to get the SF soldiers participating in this operation out from behind the barricades of Port-au-Prince and out amongst the Haitian population. In general, the mission of the SF soldiers in Haiti was to help create a stable and secure environment and to facilitate the transition of the new government of Haiti (Boyatt 1997).

The approach chosen to accomplish this mission was through the engagement of the Haitian population. The mechanism used to deploy the SF Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) out amongst the Haitian population was the Hub and Spoke method. Colonel Mark Boyatt, Commander, 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne), uses this term to describe the way in which his unit established Operational Detachment Bravos (ODBs), the Hubs, in the larger cities of Jacmel, Cap Haitian, Port-au-Prince, and Gonaives and then pushed the ODAs, the Spokes, out into the rural towns and villages (Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel 1998, 116). This method of deployment allowed Boyatt’s forty-eight SFODAs to operate in over 900 towns and villages reaching up to 70 percent of the population of Haiti (Boyatt 1997). The ODAs would establish an operations base
usually in the local FADH (Haitian Armed Forces) garrison, which was in most cases abandoned. From this operations base, the SFODAs would conduct patrols throughout their area of operation and establish contact with all the towns and villages within. The ability to disperse units throughout the country in near total isolation and still remain an effective military organization capable of coordinated operations is a capability that is intrinsic to UW operations.

By living and working with the rural Haitian people, the SF soldiers were able to build rapport and establish relationships of trust. The ability of the SF soldiers and their interpreters to speak Haitian Creole or French, and their willingness to understand, respect, and work within Haitian cultural nuances allowed them to effectively conduct cross-cultural communication. This became the bridge that spanned their differences and allowed the SF soldiers to build the local support essential in restoring local civic governments, improving human rights conditions, organizing local civic action projects, identifying and detaining criminal elements, and disarming paramilitary factions. Collectively, all of these activities helped establish a secure and safe environment and aided in the transition of the reinstated Aristide government.

Communications

This case study illustrates, as did the Philippine case study, the importance of communications in unconventional operations. While there are many differences in the operational environments and characteristics of these two case studies, the aspect of having the ability to increase the span of control of subordinate units over long distances by radio is similar. When one looks back at the earliest UW operations conducted by
the U.S., the Philippine case study being one of these, the importance of being able to communicate has remained a predominant factor. The ability of the SFODAs to routinely and consistently communicate with their SFODBs and other higher levels of command was instrumental in their ability to operate in such isolated and austere locations. Given the extreme absence of nearly all aspects of an infrastructure in Haiti, radio communications was often times the only way the SF soldiers in the field could communicate with their higher commands. Throughout most of the Haitian country side, roads were either nonexistent or near impassable, ODAs often times could not drive to their higher headquarters. This is a crucial issue when dealing with force protection concerns while operating in an undetermined or fluid threat environment. Because of the SFODA's ability to consistently make communications with their chain of command, they had the freedom to maneuver in these isolated locations. Should trouble arise and the ODA was suddenly in the need of reinforcement, they could call for either air fire support platforms or heliborne reinforcements. In addition to force protection issues, the ability to communicate allowed freedom of maneuver in other ways.

Radio communication allowed SF commanders to increase their span of control over subordinate units. This ability enabled their units to operate in isolated decentralized areas, yet still allowed the SF commanders to interface daily with all of their units. The advanced capability of the communication assets used by SF soldiers allowed for the passing of real time information, vital in providing commanders with ground truth. This type of capability provided the means by which Colonel Boyatt
conducted his nightly fireside chats. Each night at the prescribed time, Colonel Boyatt would address all of his elements and relay information he wanted passed to all units, the subject of these chats often times dealt with force protection issues or the latest developments in the operation (Boyatt 1997). Without the ability to effectively communicate, Colonel Boyatt would not have been able to deploy his SFODAs as widely as he did, and his units would not have been able to engage the majority of the Haitian population.

**Human Intelligence**

Given the unconventional or asymmetric nature of the environment in which Operation Uphold Democracy was conducted, conventional high-tech intelligence platforms could not fully satisfy the intelligence requirements needed for this operation. Colonel Boyatt stated that, "Every overhead (intelligence) platform in the world did us no good in Haiti" (Boyatt 1997). While this may be slightly overstated, Colonel Boyatt is addressing the fact that the preponderance of the information and intelligence needed to effectively fulfill the intelligence requirements of this mission could best be obtained through human intelligence sources (HUMINT). Overhead imagery, no matter what the degree of magnification and clarity, can not see into the minds of the local populace. They are equally unable to sense the pulse of the population. In a similar vein, high-tech communications intercept equipment does little good when nearly none of the population owns any communications devices. Information pertaining to the overall mood or tone of the population can really only be effectively gathered through HUMINT.
As first demonstrated in the Philippine case study, and supported by this case study, the ability to organize and control agents and intelligence networks is still an important capability SF soldiers need to have. During this operation, SF soldiers utilized Low Level Contacts (LLC) and Low Level Sources (LLS) to gather HUMINT that provided essential information regarding force protection concerns and potential threat activities. By living and working with the local populace, the SF soldiers were also able to ascertain the identities of individuals who had been involved in serious human rights violations or other criminal activities. This contributed greatly to restoring stability to the environment as they were able to accurately identify and engage destabilizing forces.

The ability to conduct these HUMINT operations also allowed SF soldiers to effectively gauge the appropriate amount of force protection measures required. This allowed the SF soldiers to tailor their force protection levels as required, thus avoiding the “bunker mentality” displayed by the conventional forces in Haiti. Gauging the threat correctly is important because it impacts directly on the ability to conduct cross-cultural communication. When soldiers treat all indigenous personnel as potential enemies, and wear full combat gear looking as if they are on their way to a fire fight, the message that everything is all right and under control conflicts with the non-verbal signals they are sending. While extremely unpopular with senior conventional commanders, the decision to establish force protection measures commensurate with the threat, played an important role in the ability of SF soldiers to accomplish their mission.
Controlled Comparison Factors

Command and Control structure

The command and control structure for Operation Uphold Democracy during the planning phase and initial execution was as seen in figure 1. Once the Carter-Powell-Nunn agreement was reached, the operation changed to an unopposed intervention and the command and control structure changed to that seen in figure 2.

Figure 1. Military Command Relationships for planning and initial execution, OPLAN 2370, July 1994 (Kretchik 1998, 64)
Figure 2. Multinational Force command and control organization for OPLAN 2380 Plus, structure used until mission hand-over to UNMIH (Kretchik 1998, 94)

During Operation Uphold Democracy, nearly all of the 3rd SFG(A) deployed to Haiti under control of CJSOTF 188. The only numbered units that did not deploy to Haiti were one SFODB and six SFODAs (Boyatt 1997). These units were deployed to Puerto Rico to train elements of the Multinational Peace Keeping Force that were preparing to deploy to Haiti.

**Strategic and Operational Objectives**

The strategic objective for Operation Uphold Democracy was to restore and uphold the democratic process in Haiti. This essentially entailed reinstating President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the legitimate ruler of Haiti and established the conditions that would allow a democratic government to take form under his control. This operation
did return Aristide to power and allowed democratic elections to be held which resulted in the first peaceful transition of governmental power since 1804 (Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel 1998, 176). However, the establishment of a long term self-sustaining democratic process in Haiti is still questionable.

Many scholars and experts believe that this operation failed to make any long lasting changes in Haiti (Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel 1998, 177). Time will be the final judge of this, however, SF did make tangible gains toward this end state, albeit at the grassroots level in rural Haiti.

The operational objective for this operation was to create and maintain a secure and stable environment in Haiti. In the areas that SF soldiers controlled, this objective was achieved. With the SFODAs engaging the population and establishing their bases of operation amid the people, destabilizing acts of violence and criminal action were greatly reduced. The UNMIH identified a sustained SF presence as the key element in maintaining a secure and stable environment in the countryside (Tovo 1996, 32). By creating stability, life in the rural areas was such that it was possible to hold free and fair elections for the legislative and municipal offices, a rare occurrence in Haiti’s history.

By keeping rival factions from perpetrating violence against each other and the population in general, a stable environment was established. This stability allowed the SFODAs to lay the foundations for democracy to take hold by helped civic leaders to become educated and practiced in the democratic process. As stated earlier, approximately 70 percent of the Haitian population is located in the rural areas, should these people build on the foundation that the SF soldiers helped build, democracy may
have a chance. The burden is on the back of the Haitian people, they must find it within themselves to stop the chain of corruption and "predatory state" mentality before any long-term change can occur.

**Political Support to the Operation, Political Environment in Which the Operation Was Conducted?**

Due to the political origins of Operation Uphold Democracy, the operation received strong political support from both the UN and the US. This operation was unique in that it was the first ever case of interagency political-military planning directly linked to a military operation (Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel 1998, 163). This being said, the plan in execution fell short in that the interagency actors, chiefly the Department of State, failed to develop the parts of the plan they had agreed to draft, resulting in the failure to mass interagency forces effectively in order to achieve synergy with the military units involved in the operation (Kretchik, Baumann, Fishel 1998, 163).

The political environment within Haiti was exceedingly murky and vague. The origin of this political uncertainty came from the relationship between the U.S. forces and the different Haitian political/military organizations they had to deal with. The primary focus of confusion centered around the FADH and the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH).

During the initial pre-invasion planning, the FADH was considered the primary opponent of U.S. forces, the people the SF soldiers were coming in to kill (Boyatt 1997). Once it was determined that the invasion would not be executed and an unopposed entry would take place, the political environment changed. Under the new
operational plan, the FADH became the primary counterpart for the SF soldiers, and were now the people SF was supposed to work with. This created an awkward situation for both the FADH and the SF soldiers, as both understood what their initial relationship was to be, that of foes.

The FRAPH was the most controversial of the factions in Haiti. Prior to this operation, the FRAPH was considered a “paramilitary terrorist organization” that focused its attention on reducing President Aristide’s supporters among the population of Haiti (Shacoehis 1999, 29). Interestingly enough, the origins of this organization have been traced back to shortly after the Cedras lead coup, to the U.S. defense attaché in Haiti, and a Haitian thug known as Emmanuel “ToTo” Constant (Shacoehis 1999, 29). The FRAPH was the principal actor behind the “Harlan County Affair” (Shacoehis, 1999). Clearly this organization appeared to be a threat to the stability and security of Haiti and should have been treated as such. However this was not the case.

Initially, SF soldiers did focus their efforts on the FRAPH and they went after them hard. Colonel Boyatt stated that “When we first came, in September [1994], we went after FRAPH real hard. We knew they were the bad boys in town. What we were told was our aggression was causing problems and we were told to back off, we were told not to go after them but to treat them as a political party”(Shacoehis 1999, 379).

When asked who gave him this order, Colonel Boyatt simply stated that it had come through the chain of command on 8 October 1994, when further pressed on this question, he would not give any names (Shacoehis 1999, 379).

It would seem plausible that this type of order would originate from political sources. However when asked, Ambassador Swing, Ambassador to Haiti, stated that,
"In regards to the FRAPH, the military did their own thing, and for months I was frustrated" (Shacochis 1999, 378). When Brigadier General Richard Potter, Commander of both TF Raleigh and the JSOTF and Colonel Boyatt’s immediate supervisor, was asked about this order to back off of the FRAPH, he could not clearly remember its origin. *Miami Herald* journalist Bob Shacochis asked Brigadier General Potter about a meeting he attended with his chain of command and Ambassador Swing. After this meeting, Brigadier General Potter supposedly briefed Colonel Boyatt that the FRAPH was now a registered political party, and he qualified it with, “but I still think they are a bunch of thugs" (Shacochis 1999, 379.). Although acknowledging this quote, Brigadier General Potter did not think he referred to the FRAPH as a legitimate political party, he did however state that, “As far as I'm concerned, the policies that we (SF) followed in the field were approved by the entire chain of command. Miller, Shelton, Meade” (Shacochis 1999, 379). While the origins of this order to deal with the FRAPH as a legitimate opposition party may never be discovered, the impact it had on the political situation may.

Because the Haitian population associated the FRAPH with many murders and human rights violations, when SF started treating them as a legitimate opposition party, the U.S. forces may have lost legitimacy and trust with some of the population. Bob Shacochis stated that he thought this relationship, “contributed to the ongoing destabilization of Haiti and, more to the point . . . had potentially and gratuitously endangered the lives of his [Colonel Boyatt’s] men” (Shacochis 1999,379). While the tangible result of this question is not fully defined, it does serve as an excellent
illustration as to the convoluted and oftentimes confusing political environment in which SF soldiers operated during Operation Uphold Democracy.

What individual skills (for the American guerrilla leaders) were critical to conducting these operation?

While there were no guerrilla leaders in this case study, this question can effectively be applied to the U.S. SF soldiers who conducted this operation. As Colonel Boyatt routinely professed, he considered this operation, “essentially a UW operation” (Boyatt 1997). The tasks of the SFODAs were to organize, train, and advise the “guerrillas” to run town governments, jails, and other services; the sources run by SF soldiers constituted the underground; the NGO/PVOs provided support as the auxiliary would, and the Haitian populace were the guerrillas (Tovo 1996, 35). Given the unconventional nature of this operation, it is no surprise that the majority of the skills critical to conducting this operation were indirect skills. This however is not exclusively so, SF participants had to be proficient in a conglomeration of direct and indirect skill.

Indirect Skills

As identified earlier, cross-cultural communication was arguably the most important skill possessed by SF soldiers in Haiti. The combination of language ability, interpersonal skills and the willingness to embrace the culture and not try to change it helped the SF soldiers to establish themselves in a positive light with the Haitian population.
Understanding that voodoo has an important everyday application to many of the rural population of Haiti, SF soldiers respected this and often times used it to their advantage. The SF teams all over the Haitian country side were vanquishing werewolves and vampires with silver bullets, a service for which the local populace was especially grateful (Shacoчис 1999, 250). Dealing with voodoo problems may seem ridiculous from an urban Christian point of view, however to the majority of rural Haitians, it is a very real and serious concern.

Captain Craig Mark’s team encountered these problems with such frequency that he devised an SOP for dealing with them. He instructed all of his soldiers to carry four chemlights at all times; different colors to ward off different types of spirits, a kind of color-coded exorcism kit (Shacoчис 1999, 250). Green chemlights were used to ward off werewolves; yellow was used for generic hauntings; blue for trickster spirits; red ones for preventing vampires from stealing the souls of babies (Shacoчис 1999, 250). By applying a chemiluminescent cross on the forehead of a child, or applied liberally over doors, this procedure was an effective way of dealing with various ghouls and endearing themselves with the local people at the same time.

Another set of indirect skills that were critical to this operation were adaptability, flexibility, and restraint. The ability to apply these important indirect skills in combination enabled SF soldiers to accomplish much that other conventional soldiers could not. According to a *New York Times* columnist, “The more ambiguous threat [in Haiti] is better addressed by the Special Forces, not the infantry, which has had little to do in Haiti since October except guard itself” conversely, “They [Special Forces] do
everything from repairing wells and delivering babies to arresting notorious thugs and
rescuing victims of mob violence (Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel 1999, 121). These
indirect skills help break down barriers and created the opportunity to apply direct skills

**Direct Skills**

When it came to making a tangible difference in quick-return, quality of life
issues, the direct skills possessed by SF soldiers made many contributions. Foremost
among these direct skills were those of the 18D, Special Forces Medic, and the 18C,
Special Forces Engineer.

The Haitian countryside was devoid of medical facilities, save the medical
capabilities the detachment medics brought with them. Not only did the 18Ds provide
the teams with a medical capability to take care of themselves, it also offered them the
ability to administer life saving aid to the Haitian people when necessary. In one
instance, two 18Ds performed a successful emergency Cesarean section on a Haitian
civilian, an operation that took four hours to perform (Boyatt, 1997). These types of
advanced medical skills are a requirement when conducting operations in such austere
and isolated conditions.

Another significant skill that improved the quality of life for team members and
Haitian civilians alike were those of the 18C, Special Forces Engineer. With nearly all
of the rural towns and villages in the worst state or disrepair, the 18Cs had more than
ample opportunity to apply their skills. In addition to shoring up the protection
capability of the team’s operation base, these soldiers honchoed the majority of the civic
action projects performed during this operation. The preponderance of civic action
projects included such things as digging new wells, building market stalls, improving schools, and improving the local roads. These may appear as small projects at first glance, however, these projects were completed will little or no outside resources and the majority of the labor was provided by the local populace, free of charge.

Although addressed earlier in this chapter, it is of worth to note the importance of the direct skills of the 18E, Special Forces Communications Sergeant. Without addressing these skills in detail again, the ability of SF units to communicate was essential to the successful completion of this operation.

**Case Study Summary**

The part that SF played in conducting Operation Uphold Democracy, as analyzed in this case study, offers many contributions to the investigation of the thesis. The major contribution it makes is that it illustrates how aspects of UW operations, previously shown to be of importance in the representative UW case studies, were successfully applied to deal with a non doctrinal PCWE contingency operation. As was seen in the previous two case studies, these contributions are organized into the aspects and nature of UW operations.

The aspects of UW operations that have been of greatest importance throughout the historical case studies analyzed in this thesis, are echoed in this case study. The ability to communicate cross-culturally in Haiti was potentially the single most important aspect that allowed SF to accomplish its operational objectives. The use of primarily indirect skills in the conduct of this operation supports the parallels established in the previous case studies. The ability to establish rapport, build trust, and
influence their counterparts and the local population allowed SF soldiers to accomplish very much with very little. Because of the extremely challenging operational environment Haiti presented, primarily due to the culture and the physical environment, these skills were exceedingly important.

One of the primary indirect skills that SF soldiers used and benefited from during this operation was the ability to conduct HUMINT operations. This importance is in parallel to the importance this capability played in the Philippine case study. In Operation Uphold Democracy, the intelligence SF units collected during the conduct of such operations directly impacted on the ability of the SFODAs to successfully accomplish its mission.

All of these parallels are important to note. It is important because all of these indirect skills are primarily used to conduct UW operations, Operation Uphold Democracy was not however, a UW operation. This suggests that many of the same skills that have been applied in UW operations, as detailed in this thesis, were also applied to a nondoctrinal contingency operation in the PCWE and were shown to have parallel importance.

This case study demonstrates that several of the direct skills that were vital in conducting the UW operations analyzed in the previous case studies, were of primary importance to this operation. The ability to communicate both internally and externally once again showed to be of critical importance. Similar to the experience in the Philippines, this ability allowed SF commanders to increase their span of control,
conduct coordinated operations while their units were dispersed over a vast area, and to coordinate for external support.

While the long-term success of Operation Uphold Democracy is still unknown, a strong case can be made that SF did successfully apply aspects of UW operations to achieve the strategic and operational objectives in support of the national military strategy. Similar to the Contra case study, SF's role in this operation was one of economy of force by choice. It differed however, because in this case other options were available and were employed. SF conducted their mission in conjunction with a wide variety of conventional and other special operations forces. This demonstrated how dispersed SFODAs could apply aspects of UW operations to achieve that which conventional units could not. It would have taken occupational size conventional forces to control the vast areas SFODAs were assigned. Even then, conventional forces were neither trained or equipped to achieve that which SF achieved. The bottom line is that the legitimate democratic government was reinstated in Haiti, and at least in their areas of operation, SF soldiers were able to create a stable environment in support of the peaceful transfer of power from the Cedras regime to the Aristide administration.

Chapter Summary

The examination of the historical case studies presented in this thesis identify aspects of UW operations that were essential to their respective operations, and showed parallel importance to the other case studies. These same aspects were shown to be effectively applied to a nondoctrinal PCWE contingency operation. The analysis of these cases have shown that UW operations and aspects of UW operations can be
applied to achieve national military objectives. Additionally, these case studies bring to light valuable aspects of the nature of UW operations.

Indirect skills have been shown to predominate throughout all the case studies investigated in this thesis. While the indirect skills have shown to be of primary importance, certain direct skills have proven to be an integral part of the complete package needed to successfully conduct these missions. The indirect skills of most importance to all case studies were: cross-cultural communications, linguistics, interpersonal skills, HUMINT, and training skills.

Directly related to several of these indirect skills were supportive direct skills. The following direct skills proved to be vital to the successful conduct of all the operations detailed in the case studies investigated in this thesis: communications, application of the operational art of war, and the individual military occupation skills of the 18D SF Medical Sergeant, 18C SF Engineer Sergeant, 18B SF Weapons Sergeant, 18E SF Communications Sergeant, and the 18F SF Intelligence Sergeant.

All three representative case studies present a wide variety of important aspects of the nature of UW operations. Gaining an understanding of the nature of UW operations is extremely important because it is the very nature of these operations that have such a large impact on whether or not a UW course of action is chosen. SF leaders need to understand the nature of UW operations as such an understanding will provide insight into likely implications of conducting such operations, and it provides a "heads up" in the planning process. By understanding the nature of UW, SF leaders may be able to plan ahead for potential problems based on the experiences of previous
operations. This essentially allows leaders to augment their own personal experience with the experiences of others who have conducted such operations.

The individual operational continuums and political environments in which these operations were conducted serve to illustrate the flexibility with which UW operations and aspects of UW operations may be applied to achieve national military objectives. The Philippines is an example of UW operations conducted during an all out World War. This UW operation was one which was conducted as an economy of force effort out of necessity, as there were essentially no other forces available to fight in the Philippines. The backdrop of total war illustrates how the operation was able to be run with almost complete autonomy, with little or no restrictive political imperatives. The Philippine case study brings to light the extreme violent and dangerous nature of UW operations, something that is important to understand because of the impact U.S. casualties have on the political resolve of our senior political leaders.

The Contra case study is one that takes place during the Cold War and it presents an all together different picture of UW operations than was seen in the Philippines. Because it was conducted during the Cold War and shortly after the end of the Vietnam War, the political environment in which the operation took place was divided. The need to respond to communist aggression in the Central America was tempered with a fear of escalating the Cold War into World War III, as well as with the American public's post-Vietnam paranoia. Surrogate, interagency UW operations were chosen as an economy of force measure aimed at achieving the national military and political objectives, while appeasing the concerns of senior political leaders and without
a full scale military response. UW applied in this manner makes evident the fact that UW operations by themselves can be successful in achieving national objectives. Additionally, the case study brings out the potential problems with conducting such operations strictured by numerous political imperatives.

Primary among these potential problems was the implications of conducting surrogate operations. This case study showed that while the risk of U.S. casualties is reduced in surrogate operations, the political and operational risk is greatly increased. The political risk is primarily increased due to the increased chance of compromise of covert operations conducted by surrogate forces, and the potential for violations of the Law of Land Warfare and human rights. This was clearly evident as the Reagan administration suffered repeated negative political fallout due to the actions of elements of the Contra rebels.

The Haiti case study is an excellent representation of how aspects of UW operations can be applied to achieve national military and political objectives in the PCWE. The aspects of UW that were found to be vital to the Philippine and Contra case studies, were shown to be of parallel importance in a nondoctrinal PCWE contingency operation. This case study displays how SF units applied aspects of UW in a nonlethal manner, in order to perform an economy of force mission, that ended up being the main effort. The amount accomplished and the total contribution SF made to the successful achievement of national military and political objectives, was arguably more than all the conventional forces combined. This contributes greatly to answering
the questions this thesis presents as to the applicability of aspects of UW operations to
deal with the current and potential threats of the PCWE.

The combination of the aspects of UW operations and the nature of UW
operations discovered in the analysis of this chapter, provides the answers to the
subordinate and primary questions presented in this thesis. These questions will be
answered in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

We can neither orient ourselves in the present nor plan for the future
without understanding the past. In the realm of military affairs, history serves as
the empirical foundation for theory and doctrine and allows today’s officers to
draw upon the wealth and variety of experience amassed over the centuries by
their predecessors. On a higher level, it helps officers hone their critical
thinking faculties and ability to cope with complexity, recognize patterns, reject
monocausal explanations, distinguish between useful and false analogies,
identify the relevant and comprehend better the nature of war. With its emphasis
on change and continuity, history helps us chart a course through a seemingly
chaotic capricious world. (Morelock 1997, 12)

Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to apply that which Colonel Morelock describes
above, toward answering the primary and subordinate questions this thesis presents. It
is intended that by applying the insight and experience gained from the analysis of the
historical case studies presented in this thesis, SF leaders may use the aspects of UW
operations identified to help shape the way in which they train for and conduct
operations dealing with the current and future threat trends encountered in the PCWE.

It is important to note that this chapter presents the reader with the opportunity
to gain insight and benefit from the experiences of others. Analyzing past operations
conducted in like operational and or political environments may provide the reader with
parallels that may be applied to future operations. It is not intended to present a cookie
cutter solution to all similar UW operations. Similar military operations are not
identical. Each has its own unique aspects that are not applicable across the board.
That is why one must be careful when trying to apply past lessons learned arbitrarily. Instead it is vital to be able to recognize patterns and recurring themes identified in the analysis of the historical case studies presented in this thesis, and understand their implications. With an understanding of these implications, SF leaders and soldiers will be better prepared for participation in nontraditional or asymmetric operations in which there may be operational and political ambiguity.

Within these operations, subsequent missions promise to arise with great fluidity that require a vast variety of skills. Inevitably, SF soldiers will be called upon to conduct missions for which they have not specifically been trained to conduct, much like the missions required in support of Operation Uphold Democracy. As history has shown in the context of the Philippine case study, this is not a new phenomenon. Soldiers in UW operations will be required to conduct missions for which they have not specifically trained. By maintaining and building upon current capabilities, and developing others proposed in this chapter, SF leaders and soldiers will be as prepared as possible to deal with the uncertainty and ambiguity the PCWE promises to present.

**Answers to the Thesis Questions**

**Subordinate Questions**

1. **What skills were most crucial to the success of the operations in the historical case studies?**

   In each of the case studies analyzed in this thesis, it was shown that indirect skills proved to be utilized more than direct skills and were shown to have a greater impact on the successful conduct of all three operations. The ability to conduct cross-
cultural communications in all instances played a vital role that essentially placed SF personnel in a position to achieve success. The ability to establish rapport with the indigenous people and build trusting relationships was key to the success of both the Philippine case study and the Haitian case study. In the Philippine case study, this ability literally saved the lives of American soldiers dependent on the local population for their survival during the early days of the resistance. Later, this ability would be used to persuade indigenous people to join and support the resistance movement against the Japanese. In the Haitian case study, the ability of SF soldiers to accept Haitian culture and live with the rural population made great bounds toward building rapport and trust. Once rapport was established, SF’s soldiers were able to create a stable and safe environment in the Haitian countryside.

All three case studies illustrate the importance of being able to persuade and influence indigenous personnel. However, in the case of the Contras, this ability was of paramount importance as SF soldiers were not allowed to have direct control over combat operations. Because of the use of surrogate forces, an elevated importance was placed on the ability to indirectly control operations through influence and persuasion.

The ability and importance of being able to effectively train indigenous forces proved to be essential in each of the three case studies. In the Philippines, guerrilla leaders had to train recruits in preparation for combat operations in support of the Allied return to the Philippines. The primary role of SF soldiers in the Contra case study was that of trainer and advisor. It was this training that played an important part in the transformation of the Contras into a legitimate fighting force capable of standing up to
the Soviet backed Sandinista army. In Haiti, SF soldiers conducted training in support of restoring peace and order to the Haitian countryside. They trained Haitians to serve as an interim police force until a new national police force could be established. They also trained local civil leaders in public administration and the democratic process.

The skills required to conduct training of indigenous forces basically includes nearly all of the indirect skill set. In order to effectively train these forces, SF soldiers must understand and tolerate the local customs, culture, and language. They must exhibit patience and persuasiveness, influence, and establish rapport and credibility. This one task requires SF soldiers to be proficient in nearly all indirect skills. It also requires SF soldiers to be proficient in their individual direct skills.

The ability of SF soldiers to organize and operate agent networks and clandestine communications was shown to be of crucial importance in both the Philippine and Haiti case studies. In the Philippines, this ability provided the guerrilla units with vital intelligence needed for their own security and survival, as well as with intelligence that General MacArthur required for his planning of operations to recapture the Philippines. This ability, to a lesser extent, in Operation Uphold Democracy gave SF personnel accesses to intelligence that was not available through any other source. By using LLSs, SF soldiers were able to ascertain the identities of criminal elements, accurately judge the force protection levels required, and identify and engage destabilizing forces. While indirect skills were the dominant skill set used, direct skills were also demonstrated to be essential in all three case studies.
Direct skills are an important part of the indirect skill of training. In order to be able to train indigenous forces and establish credibility, SF soldiers must be proficient at their assigned direct skills. This then makes the individual SF soldier’s direct skills an important aspect that contributed to the success of the operations studied in this thesis. The direct skills required in planning and conducting large scale guerrilla operations is one that has shown to be important in the Philippine and Contra case studies. In the Philippines, guerrilla leaders would eventually be planning and conducting divisions size operations in conjunction with conventional forces. The Contra case study showed SF advisors planning and coordinating guerrilla operations that included up to 10,000 guerrilla soldiers. These case studies show the importance of being able to apply the skills of the operational art of war from the squad level to the highest tactical and operational levels.

The ability to communicate both externally and internally is a skill that was of primary importance to the Philippine and Haiti case studies. In the Philippines it meant the ability to receive outside support and guidance. The external support that was eventually provided by the SWPA would allow guerrilla units to grow to incredible numbers. It would also mean the ability to conduct coordinated attacks against the Japanese. Radio communication was the primary method used to pass intelligence gained from the agent networks, to MacArthur in Australia. In Haiti, the ability to communicate gave the SFODAs the ability to operate freely in the isolated and austere environment of rural Haiti. It allowed commanders to increase the span of control of their units, allowing them to engage the rural population in areas with literally no
infrastructure. The ability of the teams to communicate with higher command gave SF commanders real time information that allowed them to gain ground truth. It also provided the teams with a safety net should reinforcements be needed.

The Haiti case study clearly highlights the individual direct skills of the SF soldier. In addition to the ability to communicate, the other Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) of the SF soldiers were all utilized. The SF medics and engineers applied their skills to both taking care of the U.S. soldiers, and to improving the quality of life of the local population. The intelligence sergeants applied their skills analyzing information gained from various sources and helped in the planning of operations. The weapons sergeants set up and maintained team security measures. All the direct skills of the detachment personnel contributed to the overall success of the mission.

2. How has SF’s role in UW evolved from World War II to the end of Cold War?

The trends identified in the analysis of the case studies suggest that SF’s role in UW operations has evolved from primary executor to subordinate supporter. This is shown in a shift from being the primary participant to trainer and support coordinator of surrogate forces. The primary difference between these two types of UW operations is that during classical UW as seen in the Philippine case study, U.S. soldiers were the primary guerrilla commanders and they planned and directed combat operations. They were located in the AO and lived and fought with the guerrilla forces. In the Contra case study, the SF soldiers were primarily involved in a subordinate supportive role. The UW operation was an Interagency operation with the CIA in control and SF personnel subordinate to them. The SF soldier’s primary role was that of providing
training to surrogate forces and conducting operational planning and support
 coordinations. The SF soldiers worked in training camps outside of the AO and were
not involved in combat operations as part of their daily duties. Once guerrillas were
trained, they were led in combat operations by indigenous guerrilla leaders.

3. How has SF applied UW skills in the PCWE?

SF participation in Operation Uphold Democracy is arguably one of the best
examples of applying UW skills to meet some of the challenges seen in the PCWE.
This case study illustrates how SF units applied UW skills to accomplish a non doctrinal
contingency operation representative of those seen in the PCWE. SF's role in this
operation was a classic economy of force type mission that closely paralleled a UW
operation. SF teams deployed into the interior of Haiti, an operational area essentially
void of a developed infrastructure, and lived with the Haitian people while receiving
extremely limited external support. The teams were able to operate in near isolation and
engage the population, communicating cross-culturally and establish rapport and
relationships of trust. The SFODAs were able to use influence and persuasion to stop
factional violence between the FAHD and the FRAPH, collect weapons, and identify
criminal elements. This then enabled the teams to create a safe and stable environment
in which they could begin to organize and train the local population. An Interim Public
Security Force (IPSF) was organized and trained, U.S. led, Haitian executed, civic
action projects were initiated to improve the infrastructure, civic leaders were trained,
and human rights conditions were improved.
The SFODAs were able to control operational areas that covered hundreds of square miles and contained thousands of people. The ability of the SF units to effectively operate in such a vast and fluid environment allowed them to move from an economy of force supporting effort, to that of the main effort. This is an outstanding illustration of how SF soldiers have been applying the indirect and human element focused skills required of UW operations, to deal with some of the nondoctrinal threats encountered thus far in the PCWE.

4. What skills or aspects of UW operations identified in the case studies show potential utility for application versus some of the future threats outlined in the National Security Strategy?

Based on the NSS's vision of the threats expected to be encountered in the PCWE, there promises to be ample opportunity for the application of UW operations and aspects of UW operations. The global conditions that currently exist, and are responsible for producing many of the crisis situations that require the application of U.S. military resources, show no sign of resolution in the near term. In fact, many of these conditions show a propensity for exacerbation. The increase in global populations, urbanization, unbalanced infrastructure development, transnational crime, and incidents of ethnic and religious strife will all contribute to potential future instability.

The major transitions that are currently taking place in the Balkans and Russia, and ones that are likely to take place in regions such as the Korean peninsula, sub-Saharan Africa, and Cuba all promise to generate security implications for the United States military. These transitions will surely result in SF units participating in peace
operations, humanitarian assistance operations, and possibly low and high intensity
combat operations. The utility of applying classic UW operations, surrogate operations,
and UO as a means of shaping these regions or dealing with the implications created as
a result of these transitions is viable in nearly every case.

Should civil war breakout in Russia, classic UW operations could be applied to
prevent a transition back to a hard-line communist nation. Should this transition occur
and Russia does return to a hard-line communist state, classic UW operations would
clearly have utility in preventing former break-away republics from being reabsorbed by
Russia.

In Yugoslavia, direct or surrogate UW operations could be conducted to provide
existing insurgent forces with training and support. These types of operations, as
illustrated in the Contra case study, would provide the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) leaders with an alternative to conducting ground combat
operations with NATO forces. History has demonstrated that bombing campaigns alone
are seldom able to win conflicts. By supporting and leading insurgent forces, SF could
add another dimension to the uni-dimensional Operation Allied Force that is currently
being conducted in Yugoslavia, and increase the ability of NATO forces to achieve their
objectives. When hostilities in Yugoslavia end, either through a political agreement or
by a NATO military victory, SF will be called upon to conduct peace keeping or nation
building operations. Because of the nature of this particular conflict, it promises to
require the long term application of UO or aspects of UW operations.
The transition that will eventually take place on the Korean peninsula will, regardless of the outcome, involve SF units. Should the transition result in full scale war, classic UW operations may prove to be a vital economy of force measure. By using a combination of it's theater ballistic missiles and chemical, nuclear, or biological agents, North Korea has the ability to essentially isolate the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces on the Korean peninsula. By targeting airports, seaports, and staging bases in South Korea and Japan with persistent chemical, nuclear, or biological agents, North Korea can severely limit the ability of U.S. and UN forces to reinforce the peninsula with large conventional units. This would force the U.S. and ROK governments to fight the North Koreans, at least initially, with basically only those forces already in country. In this scenario, SF could support national objectives by using UW operations as an economy of force measure to engage and disrupt North Korean operations while Allied reinforcements are building-up in theater.

Should North Korea implode and the Stalinist regime of Kim Jong Il fall from power without a full scale war, UO similar to those conducted in Haiti may be of use to aid in the peaceful transfer of power to a new government, or the reunification of the two countries as one. Which ever way the transition on the Korean peninsula plays out, SF will play a critical role and the ability to apply aspects of UW operations will be of key importance.

Transnational crime and terrorism hold the potential to create situations that can best be addressed by aspects of UW operations. An example of this type of scenario may be seen in Colombia in the near future. Drug Cartels currently control much of
Colombia's territory. Because of the extreme sophistication of these organization's financial support networks, weapons purchasing capability, world-wide high-tech communications and intelligence capabilities, and force structure and training, it is extremely probable that these organizations will wrest power and control of major cities or regions from the legitimate government.

Should this occur, it is likely that the U.S. will be asked to assist the legitimate government in regaining control of its territory. The U.S. force of choice for this type of asymmetric threat scenario is SF, not the 1st Armored Division or the 10th Mountain Division. Should these type of conventional units be deployed, the enemy forces would undoubtedly meld into the general population and continue to conduct their operations and assuredly inflict numerous casualties on the conventional forces. SF, on the other hand, could apply aspects of UW operations and work with host-nation forces to target and counter Cartel forces. This type of operation would focus on conducting infrastructure warfare against the Cartel organizations. SF advised host-nation forces would attack the Cartel's key industries, utilities, finances, transportation, military forces, leadership organizations, and bases of support. This would most likely also require counterinsurgency operations. Should this be the case, it only adds support for the need of SF to develop UW skills, as the old adage states, "It takes a thief to catch a thief."

All of the potential threats and scenarios expected in the PCWE point to the need for SF to develop the "mind set" required to deal with a wide variety of threats that will present themselves in fluid political and operational environments. Because the threats
expected in the PCWE are of an ambiguous and asymmetric nature, SF must develop soldiers that are dynamic thinkers. With such varied threats that have the propensity to develop rapidly with little or no notice, soldiers deploying to engage these threats will have little or no time to train-up for the specific requirements of the mission. Thus far in the PCWE, soldiers have found themselves deploying from one contingency operation to another, with limited time in between to conduct additional training. This pattern promises to continue, and possibly increase.

In response to this pattern, SF soldiers must be capable of deploying rapidly to a wide variety of contingencies already possessing the skills required to react and adapt to different non-doctrinal contingencies and threat environments. This can only be achieved by making a commitment to training and developing the indirect skill sets identified in this thesis. These skills require a long term investment in the education of SF soldiers. As General Schoomaker, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, recently stated at the SF conference at FT Bragg, NC, "We train for certainty, but we must educate for uncertainty." Without question, the PCWE will present SF with uncertainty. SF must be prepared for this uncertainty by educating its soldiers to become dynamic thinkers and problem solvers. They must be in possession of cross-cultural communication, linguistics, interpersonal, HUMINT, and operational planning skills before these contingencies arise. There will not be time to train-up these skills on short-notice, they require time to develop.

Conversely, many of the direct skills required for these contingencies do lend themselves to short-notice train-ups. Generally, the direct skills utilized by SF soldiers
are fairly constant. Regardless of the mission, SF soldiers will always be required to be proficient in their individual MOSs. Doctrinally speaking, there is certainty that SF will conduct direct skill oriented missions such as Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action. The direct skills required to conduct such missions are trained and maintained, and when needed can be honed on short notice.

5. How do these skills need to be amplified, and do any others need to be developed in order to meet these future threats?

If one considers the evolution of SF’s role in UW operations to be a trend, then as UW operations move from direct to surrogate execution, more emphasis and training needs to be placed on developing interpersonal skills. Specifically the ability to persuade and influence people. Training should focus on the type of skills similar to those used by professional negotiators. Agencies such as the FBI could be used as a source for acquiring such skills. As the ability to directly control and influence operations conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces may be decreasing, SF soldiers must be better able to apply indirect techniques in order to maintain the ability to positively effect the outcome of missions and operations.

As addressed in the NSS, there is a trend in the global environment of the PCWE that indicates a population explosion resulting in the mass migration of people into urban areas. This urbanization has resulted in the creation of mega-urban environments with populations in the tens of millions, which will most likely become the Centers of Gravity in future conflicts. Because of this trend, it is increasingly likely that the these mega-urban areas will become the area of operations for SF soldiers
conducting UW or UO. In the representative case studies of this thesis, with partial exception of the Philippine case study, the majority of UW operations have taken place in rural environments. This then suggests the need to magnify skills already possessed, and develop new skills required to conduct urban operations. In order to effectively adapt to this new operational environment, SF needs to amplify its current capability.

Currently, only a small number of SF soldiers are trained in conducting special operations techniques in an urban environment. This is a start, but it is not enough. It is imperative that all SF soldiers possess these skills, not just those few soldiers assigned to Special Operations Techniques teams. As the Philippine and Haiti case studies have shown, the ability to organize and conduct HUMINT operations through the use of agent nets is a critical aspect of UW operations that can have a direct impact on mission success. This capability is currently very limited in SF, usually less than one trained person per team. In parallel to the trend identified in this thesis, the training for this skill is focused toward conducting such activities in a rural environment, with only a little emphasis on urban environments. This is a capability that SF needs to greatly magnify, at a minimum each team should have at least two trained personnel, and the training needs to focus on urban environments. Of the two trained personnel, one of them needs to be the SFODA commander, as he has ultimate command responsibility and oversight of these activities. While he is not the best choice for directly conducting these operations, he does need to have this skill in order to command such operations.

In addition to the capability already in SF, it would be beneficial to receive training from other agencies that conduct such HUMINT operations. One agency that
could be a source for obtaining additional training is the CIA. SF should look at conducting interagency training and exchanges in which SF soldiers gain training and experience in conducting these type of operations in an urban environment. While this training may be occurring now, it is done on a very small scale. Very little interagency training is being conducted between the CIA and SF.

The ability of SFODAs to conduct operational planning in support of battalion size units and larger needs to be amplified. As demonstrated by the Philippine and Contra case studies, SF personnel have planned and conducting operations at the battalion, brigade, and even the division level. While current doctrine states that SFODAs should be capable of training, advising, and assisting up to battalion sized elements, the actual ability to do so is questionable. Because the majority of SFODAs commanders have not had a company command in their basic branch prior to joining SF, their operational experience is often times limited. Once in command of an SFODA, they generally focus on ODA level operations. They rarely if ever actually train for planning and conducting battalion level operations. With an apparent trend toward conducting surrogate operations, it is very likely that SFODAs will be required to train, advise, and assist battalion or higher units. This capability needs to be shared by all detachment members, not just the Detachment Commander and the Operations Sergeant. In this scenario, the Detachment Commander and the Operations Sergeant will be required to conduct training and advising at the battalion level, and the senior NCOs on the detachment will be training and advising operations at the company level. In order to meet the challenges of the PCWE, this skill needs to be amplified.
The threats that may be encountered in the PCWE suggest that SF may need to develop skills and capabilities not already possessed by SF soldiers. This focus will most likely be on intelligence collection and information operations. There is definitely a need for SF elements to be able to leverage all available technology in conducting these type of operations. This then requires an emphasis on information operations training for SF soldiers, something that is currently severely lacking. It is likely that these type of future operations will not be the exclusive domain of “Black” or Special Mission Units. “White” SF units will also need to be prepared to conduct such operations.

6. Is there historical data that demonstrates UW as an effective means of attaining U.S. national military objectives?

The historical case studies presented in this thesis present, to varying degrees, different levels of success in achieving national military objectives through the application of aspects of UW operations. In the Philippines, the extent to which the UW operation aided the achievement on the national military strategy is debatable, but the fact that it did contributed to the retaking of the Philippines is not. During the liberation of the Philippines, no more than three U.S. divisions were committed at any one time against the 120-150,000 Japanese forces on Luzon (Volckmann 1954, 216). It was believed that due to the rugged terrain on Luzon, it would take at least six U.S. divisions to defeat the Japanese in their stronghold, thus the guerrilla units made up the difference of essentially three divisions (Volckmann 1954, 216). This was undoubtedly a major contribution.
In the Contra case study, a very strong argument can be made that UW operations largely by themselves achieved the national military objectives. Through the use of UW operations in support of the Contra rebels, the objective of removing the Sandinista government from power and the establishment of democratic reforms was achieved.

The role SF played during Operation Uphold Democracy played an substantial part in achieving the national military objectives. By effectively operating in the rural portions of Haiti where the majority of the country’s population was located, SF units were able to facilitate the establishment of a safe and stable environment that would enable the transfer of national power to be conducted peacefully. All three of these cases suggest that UW operations, applied in varying degrees and environments, are a viable course of action in contributing to the accomplishment national military objectives. It is important to remember however, that these operations require resolve and time, they are not a quick fix. In addition to the historical case studies presented in this thesis, there are numerous other examples such as Angola, Afghanistan, and other recent contingency operations in which aspects of UW operations have been successfully applied toward attaining national military objectives.

Primary Thesis Question

What aspects of Unconventional Warfare are best suited to meet the transnational and asymmetric threat trends seen in the Post Cold War Environment, and how can Special Forces apply them in support of the national military strategy?

In addressing the first part of the question, there are multiple aspects of UW that show promise in dealing with the current and future threat trends of the PCWE.
Primary among these aspects is the ability of SF to work through and with indigenous forces. This ability is in large part due to the indirect and direct skill sets already possessed by SF soldiers.

The indirect skill sets currently maintained by SF soldiers are cross-cultural communication skills, linguistic skills, regional orientation, HUMINT, and training skills. These skills have shown a pattern of critical importance in each of the case studies investigated in this thesis. These indirect skills were the dominant skill set required and applied in each of the three case studies analyzed in this thesis. While the indirect skills already maintained by SF have proven to be relevant and useful in three very different case studies, some of these skills must be amplified in order to deal with the future threats of the PCWE. Indirect skills that should be amplified in order to meet the requirements of future threats are HUMINT and interpersonal skills, specifically the ability to persuade and influence.

The individual direct skill sets currently maintained by SF soldiers are those of a technical nature, the Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) of the 18 series soldiers. These skills include advanced communications, demolition and construction, advanced medical, foreign and domestic light and heavy weapons, intelligence, and planning and conducting special operations. These direct skills, while slightly less dominant in their importance to the UW operations analyzed, are intertwined with the indirect skills required to train indigenous forces for conducting UW operations. The direct skills possessed by SF soldiers give them the technical expertise to train and advise such troops. They also provide SF with a unique capability unmatched by any conventional
force, and very few special operations forces, thus making SF the force of choice for many of the nondoctrinal asymmetric threats of the PCWE. While the existing individual direct skills have shown to be viable, some need to be amplified and other new skills need to be developed.

With a trend toward urbanization, the direct skill of conducting special operations techniques in an urban environment is one that all SF soldiers will need to have. As stated earlier in the subordinate questions, SF does have this capability but it must be greatly increased. SFODAs and SFODBs need to increase their level of knowledge in operational planning and support of large units. As was shown in the Philippine and Contra case studies, guerrilla operations may range from the squad to division level. By doctrine SFODAs are supposed to be able to advise and assist guerrilla units up to the battalion level. This ability is somewhat questionable given the conventional operational experience of SF officers prior to their detachment command, and the lack of training received in this area once they are on an ODA. Although doctrine stresses this ability, SFODAs rarely if ever train to it, they usually focus on ODA level operations. With the apparent shift toward surrogate operations, SFODAs and SFODBs are likely to be involved in planning operations at the battalion or higher level. In order to do this effectively, more emphasis needs to be placed on increasing this capability.

A direct skill that needs to be developed for application to the future threats of the PCWE is information operations. The level of this ability needed at the SFODA level is currently unknown, yet it is certainly is something that needs to be considered
for future use. The application of this skill would most likely be in area of intelligence collection, nodal analysis and attack, communications and countercommunications.

In addressing the second part of the primary thesis question, these aspects of UW operations can be applied either unilaterally by SF soldiers, or indirectly through surrogate forces trained by SF soldiers. This thesis suggest that SF’s role in UW operations has progressed away from direct execution and toward surrogate application. This evolution away from direct involvement in UW operations may be due to any number of reasons. This trend may be attributed to the inherent risk of conducting UW operations, primarily the political and personal risks of these operations as detailed in the historical case studies of this thesis. There is no indication that this trend will change in the near future. With the no-casualty military operations the American public has come to expect since Operation Desert Storm, it is very likely this trend toward surrogate operations will continue. Another indicator that this trend will continue is the senior political and military leaders advocacy of an over protective focus perpetuated by the American public’s demonstrated lack of resolve for any operation that has the potential for casualties or prisoners (most recently demonstrated in Somalia). Because of this trend, the likelihood of SF conducting direct UW operations similar to those conducted in the Philippine case study is highly questionable.

It is, however, still possible to apply aspects of UW operations to accomplish objectives in support of national military objectives by working with and through surrogate forces. This would most likely be achieved by having SF soldiers train, advise, and assist surrogate forces in country X, to conduct UW operations in country
Y, in a manner similar to that seen in the Contra case study. While the use of surrogate forces will alleviate some of the personal risks to SF soldiers and satisfy the reluctance of senior political and military officials, it does not, however, alleviate the operational and political risks of conducting UW operations.

Even though SF soldiers may not be directly participating in combat operations in surrogate warfare, there is still U.S. ownership to the operation. Because the U.S. has trained and supplied these surrogate forces, the U.S. will inevitably be the recipient of any negative fallout resulting from the transgressions of surrogate forces. As demonstrated in all three case studies, human rights violations are extremely hard to control given the intrinsic nature of UW operations. This has shown to be a problem during UW operations even when directly controlled by U.S. soldiers. In surrogate warfare, this difficulty is greatly magnified. As demonstrated in the Contra case study, surrogate forces conducting UW operations without SF soldiers in constant and direct contact, are very likely to violate the laws of land warfare. It is possibly very dangerous to assume that UW operations can be conducted by surrogate forces without the high probability of violations of the laws of land warfare and human rights occurring. The propensity for these violations to occur, and the subsequent focus of negative fallout on the U.S. is clearly illustrated in the Contra case study. As journalists covering the war in Nicaragua discovered atrocities and human rights violations suspected of being committed by the Contras, the Reagan administration was the recipient of the majority of the negative implications.
In addition to the political risks of surrogate operations, operational risk must also be considered. Operational risk deals with the potential success or failure of an operation, and the implications of both. In relation to surrogate operations, the quality of the forces conducting the operation are of primary concern. While surrogate forces can be effective fighting forces, they are generally not however professional military forces. The Contra rebels are a good example of this. They were effective in being able to conduct military operations that substantially challenged the Soviet backed Sandinista army, yet they were primarily an unprofessional peasant army. The SF on the other hand, are arguably the best trained UW oriented force in the world. Should SF directly conduct UW operations, the operational risk would be less than that of operations conducted by surrogate forces. By using surrogate forces, the personal risk to U.S. soldiers may be reduced, however the operational risk and political risks are increased. Senior political and military leaders must carefully consider and weigh all factors involved in this decision. If the objectives of such operations are of national importance, one must carefully consider the costs and benefits of not using the best capability available.

Suggestions for Future Research

The potential of conducting UW operations in mega-urban environments present several areas that warrant future research. Probably the most important area to research is the application of information operations at the SFODA level in support of UW operations. While nearly all senior SF leaders will expound on the importance of leveraging technology in the field of information operations, very few of them can
describe the possible applications of these operations. Fewer yet can actually describe
the technology available to conduct such operations. This suggests that there is a
legitimate need for research in this area.

Conclusion

This thesis has shown that aspects determined to be critical to the success of the
representative UW case studies have been and may continue to be applied to some of
the current and future threat trends of the PCWE. UW operations have presented
soldiers with arguably the most ambiguous and dynamically diverse operational
environment a soldier can encounter. After analysis, it is clear that the skills that most
enabled soldiers conducting these missions to operate successfully in this type of
tumultuous environment are indirect skills. These same skills promise to be the ones
most useful in dealing with the ambiguous and asymmetrical threats expected to be
encountered in the PCWE. Focusing training toward developing these indirect human
element oriented skills in technically and tactically proficient SF soldiers promises to
produce one of the most versatile and effective tools on the modern battlefield. If the
first ten years of the PCWE are any indication of the type of operations the U.S. military
will conduct in the next ten, SF soldiers possessing this capability will be invaluable.

In addition to the identification of critical skill sets, this thesis offers valuable
insight into the nature and aspects of UW operations. The historical data presented in
the analysis of this thesis shows that UW operations have been an effective tool that
may be used to achieve national military and political objectives. The selected case
studies also suggest that UW operations are flexible and may be applied in varying
operational and political environments. The case studies have demonstrated that UW operations can be both a force multiplier and an economy of force measure that can be applied as needed in across the spectrum of operational continuums.

The other important aspect of UW operations that is brought out in this thesis is that they have a high potential for political risk. This risk is derived from essentially two factors: the inherent risk to the soldiers conducting the mission, and the likelihood of violations of human rights and the laws of land warfare by the indigenous participants. Surrogate warfare has shown to be a trend in UW operations, most likely do to senior leaders efforts to reduce the risk factor to U.S. soldiers.

While on the surface this may seen a reasonable measure to reduce the overall political risk, analysis of the case studies suggests otherwise. It was shown that when surrogates were used to conduct UW operations, the factor of risk to U.S. personnel did decrease, but the incidence of violations of human rights and the laws of land warfare increased substantially. This essentially illustrates that as SF soldiers lose the ability to directly control and influence UW operations, the need to improve indirect methods of control is increased. This point supports the argument that future SF training should focus on the indirect skills set. America's senior leaders may or may not choose to use UW operations in the future. Regardless of this decision, this thesis has demonstrated that the skills required of UW operators in the past, are the same skills that SF soldiers will need to face the threats of the Post-Cold War Environment.
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