Vietnam Report

No. 2370
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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

VIETNAM'S THREAT POTENTIAL TO ASEAN EXAMINED

Kuala Lumpur ASIAN DEFENSE JOURNAL in English May 82 pp 16-27

[Article by G. Jacobs]

[Text] When evaluating the naval threat presented by Vietnam to the ASEAN countries, it is important to consider what requirements Vietnam must meet, in terms of "internal" security first, before it can consider the likely effectiveness of supporting with naval forces any "foreign" objective the political leadership may view necessary.

In this regard Vietnam has a requirement to maintain control of the "coastal" traffic of the fishing fleets along the coast and the small number of coastal trawlers still trading along the coast. This was not an easy assignment during the time of the South Vietnamese governments in Saigon - it cannot be viewed as being significantly less today. In one regard, recent refugee developments may have simplified the coastal patrol task, for it is believed that over 5,000 fishing boats and sampans were used in the massive exodus from the country two years ago.

Periodic "incidents" with Chinese gunboats plying the northern waters of the Gulf of Tonkin has further limited the extent of deep water fishing and has restricted the overall operational areas used by Vietnamese craft.

Beyond the above requirements, which are still probably met by the remainder of U.S. and Chinese patrol craft received during the Vietnam War, Vietnamese foreign policy has dictated a Vietnamese naval presence in the waters of Kampuchea. Since the Vietnamese invasion in late-1978, the Hanoi government has been intent on "legitimising" the legality of the invasion and subsequent occupation. Despite the Soviet aid to restore operations at Kompong Som, little trade is done there except by Soviet and Soviet bloc merchant ships (excluding Third World ships often under the Panamanian flag, owned by Vietnam). Vietnam however, does maintain a number of small patrol craft and gunboats in Kampuchean waters; to support their territorial claims and also to keep Thai fishing boats out of the area. It is not believed that any of these coastal patrol missions, and reports of occasional gunfire incidents with Thai naval security forces, have included ex-Soviet naval craft.

Other than the coastal surveillance mission for Vietnamese naval craft, one remaining requirement exists that requires larger naval craft. That is the capability to operate to and from the Vietnamese occupied islands of the Spratley Group. These are not solely occupied by the S.R.V. (for those unfamiliar with the island groups), Taiwan occupies Pratas and Thitu Island (to the north) of importance; the Philippines occupies Reed Bank and it's importance to the Nido Oil Field complex; and further north, the Chinese occupy the Paracel Islands - including an important missile patrol boat and gunboat base at Woody Island. The Vietnamese complained heavily in diplomatic circles when the Indonesians offered exploration tracts in the North Natuna Islands. All of these areas of oil exploration by the ASEAN countries are considered within the "influence" perimeter of the Hanoi government. For the ASEAN members, other than Thailand, it is in these waters of the South China Sea that Vietnam is likely to "con-
test” the presence of ASEAN economic ventures.

The S.R.V. occupies six islands - Spratley, Nam-yit, South-west Cay, Sand Cay, Ambonya, and Sin Cowe. It is understood from notice to Mariner's that Spratley Island now has more than 500 metres runway. This length might allow Vietnamese to operate their Beriev BE-12; plus C-7/BUFFALO, and C-123/PROVING DER tactical transports from this strip. All six coral islands are probably fortified with artillery, bunkers, etc. (not unlike those held by the Japanese in WW II).

In this naval environment, how prepared are the ASEAN naval forces? As indicated in the accompanying schematic, Thailand can be considered to have rough “equivalency”; while the garrison forces of Taiwan and the Philippines would be “overwhelmed” during any determined Vietnamese naval offensive against their current positions. The situation with regards to Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia is what might be termed “neutralized” - Vietnamese naval challenge to their authority is unlikely - defined as “parity” - due to the distance of operations required, and the rough naval “equivalency” between the ASEAN countries operating in their own “home” waters and the likely Vietnamese naval forces which might offer challenge to them. As illustration of this point, the only area where Vietnam is likely to challenge the 'southern three' ASEAN members would be in the area of the Natuna Islands. In such a situation, with adequate crisis “warning” time, the three countries could easily station a combined frigate and missile patrol boat/gunboat naval task force far exceeding the capabilities of a small Vietnamese expeditionary force composed of “Petya”, “Osa” and ex-United States ship types. While Indonesian naval forces have diverse geographical responsibilities, given seven days “alert” time, they should be able to concentrate the bulk of the frigate and submarine force within the extreme southern portions of the South China Sea.

If the Vietnamese chose such a ‘demonstrative’ act, to sortie to the area of the Natuna Islands, some period of “warning” time should be available. The United States might also be alerted through communications monitoring, though no assumptions should be made about the “availability” of a U.S. naval force within the immediate area. In all probability the S.R.V.’s timing of any island “assaults” in the South China Sea area would be done under the “cover” of another diversionary crisis in any part of the World. Further requirements for U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region, or a developing crisis on the Korean Peninsula would provide adequate “drawdown” of existing U.S. Carrier Battle Group forces so as to severely limit the likely ships in nearby ports (Hong Kong, Subic Bay, etc.). A study done at the U.S. Naval War College four years ago indicated that an “average” U.S. naval force “level” of ships deployed to the 7th Fleet - minus those in overhaul, included the following: two carriers, five missile cruisers, eight destroyers, and nine frigates.

There thus becomes two “levels” of analysis to consider when comparing Vietnamese naval forces with those of the ASEAN countries. One, the “theatre” balance (representing overall naval force totals - country by country); and, second, the naval “engagement” level of analysis. On a theatre-level analysis, the naval forces of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore would be capable of countering any likely Vietnamese incursion(s) into the most southern portions of the South China Sea.

On the “engagement” level, operational losses should be expected by the ASEAN naval leadership. The victories will not likely be as “clear-cut” as were the Israeli naval engagements (using some similar missiles and missile-boat platforms) against the Arab states during the Yom Kippur War (or before). While the Arab states used mostly Soviet missiles and gunboats of the same types operated by the Vietnamese, it should be expected that the Vietnamese will perform more proficiently with their “Osa”, “Sheraton” and frigate classes. On a ‘one-for-one’ basis, comparing Vietnamese and ASEAN missile and gunboats, a “qualitative” edge belongs with the individual ASEAN craft. It will none-the-less be a “fluid” battle situation (if a Vietnamese naval “assault” force is involved), where fast attack craft “formations” may not be easily held once losses begin to occur.

An added dimension to the long-range protection of Vietnamese naval forces is the fitting of SS-N-2/STYX surface-to-surface (SSM) missiles to the former U.S. cutter of the “Barnegat” class. It is not known how many launchers are fitted, but conceivably could include two launchers forward and two aft. This ship,
accompanied by a number of small missile and torpedo/gunboats, would still present a formidable escort force for any Vietnamese assault landing force intent on taking some of the islands of the South China Sea.

As for the small Taiwan garrisons, any defence from the sea for them will have to rely on the monthly transit of a destroyer to escort a garrison-resupply LST. The Taiwanese in the early-1970s were fond of sending one of their three-inch gunned frigates for this escort, for the diesel engines provided excellent range characteristics; not available from their larger turbine driven destroyers (which require a refuelling on the return leg of the trip). These diesel-powered frigates are no longer available, and must therefore limit the “loiter” time available for such resupply sorties. For the Philippines, “closer” situated and within air cover distance from both Philippine and U.S. air facilities in Luzon, they do not expect to have a problem with maintaining sovereignty over the islands that are now held. The various frigate class ships in service do not have the electronic fittings to counter the SS-N-2 missiles; therefore, any “engagement” would be at the choosing of the Vietnamese. Not a very acceptable situation to be in from the Philippine viewpoint - assuming U.S. destroyers were not operating in the area with any Philippine naval force. And this could happen in the “early” stages of a growing crisis in the South China Sea.

The Vietnamese also have acquired a maritime patrol capability over most of the South China Sea, with delivery of a small number of ex-Soviet Beriev BE-12/MAIL twin-engined amphibian flying boats. The aircraft possesses a nose-mounted search radar, and may or may not have the Soviet version of the Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD) gear for anti-submarine warfare. The aircraft can perform a circuitted patrol radius of 750 nautical miles (with adequate reserves for “loiter” time). A “water” take-off mission would be only half adequate warning of hostile ship movements within the southern zone of the South China Sea. These include Indonesian and Philippine GAF “Search Master” and SA-16A/ALBATROS aircraft. It should be expected that during any “crisis” in the South China Sea, U.S. Navy P-3 and RAAF P-3s would also be involved in search, photographic, and intelligence gathering missions.

Recent delivery of three Fokker-VFW F-27/MARITIME patrol aircraft will add significantly to the PAF’s ability to rapidly analyse shipping information - including determination of hostile warships “hiding” among merchant shipping transiting the waters of the South China Sea region. A further discussion of Vietnamese military capability appeared in an earlier author’s work entitled “Soviet Pacific Fleet, Vietnam and ASEAN” (A.D.J., August 1981). The observations made concerning possible “conflict” areas within the South China Sea region then, still remain valid at this time.

Super-power involvement in the potential naval conflicts that could occur between ASEAN and Vietnamese forces will likely be limited. Since the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, the Soviet Union has been increasingly active in the region as a whole. This has included a more regular rotation of TU-95/BEAR anti-submarine and reconnaissance activities, accompanied by a very significant rise in the number of Soviet support ships regularly stationed in or operating through the South China Sea. More detailed comments on these operations were included in the author’s work “The Soviet Navy: Supporting Its Overseas Deployments” (A.D.J., February 1982). Soviet interest is based on their concern about China, and protection for a major “client” state (the S.R.V.). In the latter case it is hoped the S.R.V. will off-set their own border (and political) difficulties with the Beijing regime (in the simplest of interpretations).

The United States is no longer a major naval force in the South China Sea, though the U.S. Navy does try to maintain as much presence there as commitments in North Asia and the Indian Ocean will allow at this time. It is understood the U.S. Navy is now maintaining a permanent monthly destroyer “surveillance” effort off the Soviet facilities in Vietnam. This should be viewed as a welcome development by the ASEAN countries, for it represents the concrete milli-
tary applications of the Reagan Administration’s political commitment to increasingly “stand-by” its friends. This should mean more U.S. Navy ships in the immediate area during any crisis with Vietnam. The ASEAN concern should be that it still might not be enough to discourage the Hanoi regime from military operations in the South China Sea region; therefore, the naval forces of the area must be increased and improved in order to defend their “own backyards”.

AIR THREAT

When considering the “air threat” that Vietnam presents to the ASEAN members, it is most difficult to make an indepth review, without making some generalizations - which may be difficult to support in detail without creating a great volume of minute details on weapons and missile systems specifications. Such detailing is beyond the intent of this article without access to classified information which in the author’s view would provide more accurate details.

Yet it is not on these technical details that major foreign policy decisions are made - including the one that commits one country to war with another. The military specifications and systems details are left to the military “establishment” to get the most out of the weapons that are on hand, to get the “job done” within the political guidelines.

The “air threat” presented by one country against another must be looked at sometimes in “generalities” only, for most often it is a “multi-dimensional” military problem and one that rarely allows the analyst to evaluate such criteria as: pilot proficiency, munitions availability (from iron bombs to LGBs), staff attitudes, contingency targeting and weaponry ability, and flying capabilities and restrictions on the flight personnel. Given these artificial restrictions placed on the analyst, there are some broad comments that often can be made which will remain valid at any given time.

What is true of an air force’s quality in one year, may no longer be valid five years later. Rapidly changing technology and new weapon systems adoption (or the lack of), will impact on the performance of both man and machine. And finally, there is nothing like prolonged “combat” experience.

The air force of Vietnam today is not what it was a decade or decade-and-a-half ago - for a number of reasons. For few of those pilots of (North) Vietnam who lived through the “air war” with the U.S. Air Force and Navy, would now be flying. Most would have been moved to desk jobs (administration). A few colonels might still be flying, but not regularly. Fuel costs and flight time restrictions would not likely allow it. The numbers and territory of operations have radically changed. Vietnam now includes Northern and Southern portions and includes responsibility for the Vietnamese “client” (occupied) states of Laos and Kampuchea. During the middle period in the “air war” - about mid-1968, the North Vietnamese Air Force was able to keep only about 20-25 aircraft within the whole of North Vietnam. This included a small number of Mig-21 and Mig-15/17 fighters clustered around the air fields at Kep, Gia Lam, and Phuc Yen. All the rest - over one hundred, were kept “operational” and for training, in China, “out” of the strike “areas” of American aircraft.

No longer do the Vietnamese combat pilots have any consistency of flight hours and combat operations, especially air-to-air combat. This deteriorates pilot performance, as well as air defence control direction personnel, (very critical in the Soviet-style air force system used by the Vietnamese). And the air force of North Vietnam was always a “defensive” force. To do battle with the nations of ASEAN it must become an “offensive” force. The transition is not as easy as one would assume, especially under the close supervision and controls that are part of the Communist bloc air forces.

What threat then remains? Vietnam has about 600 potential combat aircraft and transports. Additionally, supporting this large force are about 200 utility and forward air controller (FAC) aircraft; an estimated 250 operational helicopters and 60 training aircraft. There may be some photo reconnaissance versions of various Soviet aircraft in service (Mig-21/FISHBED-H, etc) and a small force of maritime surveillance BE-12/MAIL amphibian flying boats. The main air threat to the ASEAN countries lies with the large fighter component - estimated at between 240 and 300 fighters (also capable of short-range strike missions).
### VIETNAMESE AIRFIELD SYSTEM (NORTHERN AREA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>(AIRCRAFT TYPES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phuc Yen</td>
<td>Mig-21, -17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yen Bai</td>
<td>Mig-21, -19, -17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kep</td>
<td>Mig-21, -17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kein An</td>
<td>Mig-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gia Lam</td>
<td>F-5A/B/E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinh</td>
<td>Mig-17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Additionally, Dong Suong, Hou Lac, Bai Thuong, Vinh, Dong Hoi provide commercial and military services. During the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979, F-5/FREEDOM FIGHTERS were deployed ‘north’ to Gia Lam Airfield; though they are probably no longer there.

### SOUTHERN AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Da Nang</th>
<th>Mig-21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phu Cat</td>
<td>Mig-19 and A-37B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>(poss) A-37B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pham Rang</td>
<td>Mig-17 and T-37C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tan Son Nhut</td>
<td>F-5s and A-37B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bien Hoa</td>
<td>F-5s (Mig-21s?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binh Thuy</td>
<td>A-37B (poss. F-5s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Additional airfields include Vung Tau, Ban Me Thout, Phu Bai, and Pleiku; plus the Soviet Union’s operated facility at Cam Rahn Bay.)

### LAOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vientiane</th>
<th>AIRCRAFT TYPES:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Xiang Khouang</td>
<td>Mig-21 and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(poss) T-28D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(poss) Mig-21 and AC-47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Additional airfields used to include Pakse, Savannakhet, Luang Prabang, and Phong Savan capable of handling T-28 through Mig-21 type aircraft.

### KAMPUCHEA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phnom Penh</th>
<th>T-28D and</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ream Kompong Som</td>
<td>(poss) AC-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battambang</td>
<td>T-28D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siem Reap</td>
<td>T-28D and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(poss) AC-47</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This is composed of an estimated 130 aging Mig-17/FRESCO sub-sonic interceptors; 50 ex-Chinese Mig-19/FARMER-D fighter-bombers; and a growing force of Mig-21/FISHBED interceptors. The Mig-21 force is apparently in a state of quality upgrading, following the 1979 conflict with China. Most of the Mig-21s at that time were either FISHBED-D “all-weather” versions or a mix of FISHBED-C/E “clear weather” interceptors. In the mid-1970s a small number of FISHBED-Fs were purchased, providing further all-weather intercept capability. The D/F-models do not have internal cannon, though an external 23mm belly-pod is available. Reliance is primarily on the ATOLL or ALKALI air-to-air missiles (the latter may not be in Vietnamese service). The earlier C/E-models have an internal 30mm cannon. All four models
RECENT THAI ARMS PURCHASED FROM THE UNITED STATES

AIR FORCE:
1979-80
18 F-5E F/Tiger II fighters
34 T-33 trainers
3 C-130H/Hercules transports
4 F-5E/Tiger II fighters
(previously 43 F-5E 25 F-5A)
3 F-5F and 2 F-5B
6 OV-10C/BRONCO COIN/strike
3 Swearingen IV A/Merlin transports
4 CH-47C/CHINOOK helicopters
18 UH-1H/HUEY helicopters
180 AIM-9B/SIDEWINDER AAMs
40,000 2.75" HVAR rockets

1978-79

Missiles

GROUND FORCES:
Tanks:
35 M-48A5, 15 M-48A2
94 V-150/Commando A/C, 31 M-113A1
24 M-163A1/VULCAN AD system
38 M40A1/106 MM RR
6 MGM-71/TOW launchers + missiles
300 M-47/DRAGON launchers + missile
18 M-102/105MM towed Howitzer
7,000 M-16A-1 machine guns
7,100 M-203/40MM grenade launchers
244 M-60C light machine guns
170 M-29E/81MM mortars

APC:
AA Systems:
Anti-tank:

Artillery:

Infantry:

can also carry two 16-round rocket pods for 57mm rockets.

It is believed the Soviet Union airlifted or sealifted 25-30 additional FISHBED/Export-J versions into Hanoi during and shortly after the conflict with China in 1979.*

Reports beginning in 1981 indicated that Vietnam may have purchased another 50 FISHBED fighters, and that they were being assembled at what remains of the Da Nang Air Base complex. These probably involved “assembly” of crated aircraft, not manufacturing aircraft. There is little question that the Vietnamese did well with the slow-speed Mig-17 and high speed Mig-21 “mix” in air combat tactics during the Vietnam War. This mix is apparently still preferred, for the Vietnamese continued to receive Mig-17s from the Soviet Union after the March 1979 conflict. In an offensive role, the Mig-17 would be used in the “low altitude” fighter role; 5-10,000 ft altitude being likely. Accompanying the aircraft would be Mig-21s flying separate formations both at medium and lower altitudes. The Mig-17 would also perform the strike fighter mission, attacking lines of communication (LOC), airfields, supply and fuel dumps, etc.

Supporting this mission, but likely more “ground support” oriented, would be the A-37A/COIN light attack aircraft - of which about 35 probably still remain in useful service. New SU-17/FITTER-B strike aircraft would undertake “priority” targets under attack - where speed of approach might be important. Despite the limited offensive strike range of the aircraft, it is still capable of basing in Vietnam and striking major Thailand air bases. No sophisticated tactical missiles are reported in Vietnam, except those stocks left by departing U.S. forces. “Shelf-life” would probably make all those non-serviceable now. Some more sophisticated SU-20/Export FITTER-C aircraft may have been acquired since March 1979.

Reports at the end of the year indicated that Vietnam has acquired its first Mig-23/FLOGGER aircraft, (see “Far Eastern Review”, December 11, 1981) though this is not confirmed in other defence journals and comes from a Vietnamese-based diplomatic source. It is probable the variant in service is the FLOGGER-E, which is the all-weather intercept export-version of the FLOGGER-B. This version carries the same air-intercept radar (JAY BIRD) as late-model
FISHBED aircraft, and would provide a degree of commonality with Hanoi's Mig-21's. Hanoi might also be the recipient, now or in the near future, of the FLOGGER-F, an air support export variant of the Mig-23/FLOGGER-B.

In the air-intercept role, the FLOGGER-E would operate with four AA-2/ATOLL AAMs. The report indicates squadron-level operations at Kep Air Base, and Kontum (Central Highlands of the 'south'). The latter is very unlikely, as the limited airfield there has not been operated for combat aircraft since the South Vietnamese government departure.

If they are being operated in the 'south', it is more likely at Phan Rang, Phu Cat, Tuy Hoa, or Da Nang—all of which have been mentioned as locations where ex-Soviet jets are now stationed. The initial operations are probably based on a supply of 30 aircraft, though this might be only the first increment of another thirty or sixty aircraft of the Mig-23 type.

“GROUND THREAT”

It is not an easy task to directly compare the armed forces of the ASEAN states with those of the S.R.V. In general, the armed forces of the ASEAN states have been organized along counter-insurgency lines—light in armoured equipment with emphasis on light infantry weapons for the individual soldier.

The ASEAN governments were primarily threatened with “internal” subversion throughout the 1960s and '60s period, and tailored their ground forces to reflect this threat. Hanoi, emerging from the insurgency war that ultimately turned into an Asian-style “conventional” war for South Vietnam, in the mid-1970s with a major ground force organized along conventional warfare structure. For the first time, the ASEAN states (and particularly Thailand) were faced with a major land power who possessed significant quantities of light and medium tanks, medium and heavy artillery, and a significant number of helicopters and transports to support the combined manpower of the “northerners” and new draftees in the “south”.

It is very difficult to obtain an accurate picture of current Vietnamese ground forces, in any detail. Lack of access by Westerners and Asians into the areas of the former ‘South’, and the lack of travel in Laos and the ‘North’, severely limits the level of understanding about Hanoi's actual military capabilities on the ground. General summaries of available manpower are presented each year by the Institute for Strategic Studies (London); these do not present a picture that tells of the “loyalty”-level of southern draftees, disposition of major organizational units, ability of Vietnam to operate ex-United States equipment and what quantities are still in service. These are really more critical questions about Vietnamese military power than are total manpower questions.

Some understanding of the Vietnamese capability to “surge” and deploy larger-than-normal military units was demonstrated during the December 1978 invasion of Kampuchea. Accounts vary as to the actual number of forces involved; but one reasonable estimate is that a “low-to-high” estimate of the following organizations were involved: 6-9 Infantry Divisions, and 9-14 Independent Infantry Regiments. The attacks were directed across three broad fronts—in the ‘south’ from Chan-Tho; the ‘central’ thrust from the Parrot’s Beak and Loc Ninh; and, in the ‘north’ from the Central Highlands base at Pleiku. Some sources indicate that the Vietnamese also landed an infantry regiment at Kompong Som and along the coast south of Kampot city, though this author doubts that these areas were taken by “sea-delivered” ground forces. Vietnam used elements of light and medium tanks, including some ex-South Vietnamese equipment (mostly APC and armoured cars).

There appears to have been little difference between the Vietnamese assault methods used against Kampuchea and those used in the latter-days of the assault on the ‘South’; with the exception that some air support operations were part of the Kampuchean invasion. The total assault may have involved some 120,000 troops and supporting forces. While not using Soviet “steam-roller” tactics akin to the European area, the Vietnamese did make judicious use of their tank and armour support units to over-run quickly the lightly-equipped forces of Pol Pot.

Thus, from the above can be drawn some understanding of the Vietnamese capability to invade portions of Thailand, should the Hanoi regime make this political decision. This could come in the form of a “demonstrative” assault (such as was done during the fighting around Non Mark Moon) seizing small tactically advantageous locations; to a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION:</th>
<th>PERSONNEL STRENGTH</th>
<th>PERSONNEL WEIGHT (tons)</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT (type)</th>
<th>EQUIPMENT WEIGHT (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Howitzer Battalion:</td>
<td>260-275</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12 guns</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Soviet D-30 or Type 54)</td>
<td>est. 525-550</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18 guns</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Aircraft Battalion:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 guns</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37MM x 18; 14.5MM ZPU x 12)</td>
<td>est. 300</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15 trucks</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalion:</td>
<td>est. 110</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9 RR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoilless Rifle Company:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(57 or 75MM RR)</td>
<td>est. 2,800</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>Misc. Equip.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Regiment:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Total:</td>
<td>462</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>511</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: est. 973 tons

- Based on WWII style loading, each ex-US LST could accommodate the entire "assault" and subsequent "defence" group (Howitzers and anti-aircraft guns). All 4 LST's may not be operational.
- Alternately, three "POLNOCHNY" LSM and three ex-U.S. LSM ships could easily accommodate this regimental assault force.
- On short haul requirements, involving coastal waters only, the remaining LCM force could add significantly to the manpower lift capacity.
full scale "province" seizure effort involving combined infantry and armour forces of Vietnamese "regulars".

Thailand, on its part, has been attempting to "upgrade" its conventional warfare capabilities since 1978. Included in this programme is the gradual transfer of the anti-communist insurgency warfare responsibilities to the hands of the Thai Rangers. In the last four years, the force has grown to 160 light infantry companies with about 13,000 personnel. This will significantly increase over the coming years. By the end of the current year, about 20 per cent of the counter-insurgency responsibility will be in the hands of this "local" force. As expected, some " Maulings" have occurred at the hands of seasoned Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) "regulars". Similar experiences can be expected in the early development of this organization in other regions facing Laos too, until the organization gets a better hand on training and tactics. It is not a force to oppose Vietnamese, Laotian, or Heng-Samrim "regulars". The Thai Army is being upgraded for this task.

Indicative of the increased emphasis on "conventional" warfare by the Bangkok government, is the recent acquisition of ex-American M-48 (about 50) and M-60 (about 16-20) medium tanks, and 150 SCORPION light armoured tanks. Continued procurement of the Cadillac-Gage V-150/COMMANDO vehicle series, TOW missiles, and added quantities of 155-mm howitzers is indicative of the upgrading that is currently being pursued on behalf of the Thai army. However, the army still lacks some long-range artillery which was so successfully employed by U.S. forces during the Vietnam war, particularly the M-107 175-mm gun and M-109 155-mm self-propelled howitzers. Thus, while improving and upgrading its forces, there are still significant gaps in Thailand's capabilities to deter a determined Vietnamese conventional thrust into the country. While few observers would expect the new Reagan administration to stand by idly and watch Thailand be "absorbed" by the Hanoi regime, there is the continuing requirement that Thailand be able to defend its ground territory until U.S. air and sea power can augment the defences of the country.

The infusion of further armoured vehicles and long-range artillery will remain a continuing requirement for the Thai army for some years to come.

Ho Chi Minh City is known to be the headquarters of the 4th Corp. This is believed to have responsibility for all of the former 'southern' zone and Kampuchea. The divisions there are heavily equipped with 'southerners' drafted into military service; and most of the forces in Kampuchea are a "mix" of northern and southern "regular" divisions. Known divisions include the 330th Division (Can-Tho), 4th Division (Soi-Trang), plus the 2nd, 3rd, 9th, 10th, and 320th Divisions that are under this corps and have served in Kampuchea as well. The famous 324th and 325th Divisions are believed still stationed in the old-DMZ region and in adjacent Laos. What is believed to be Military Region IV is thought to be under the 3rd Corps Headquarters (possibly located at Qui Nhon on the coast).

Most of these organizational units must be considered in some degree inaccurate, in view of the fact that most of the existing information comes from refugees and defectors and has a lapse of timeframe involved. Additionally, with the continuation of the war in Kampuchea, it is likely Hanoi will have to 'rotate' divisions from the 'northern' regions into the area of combat (during major 'clean-up' operations which have some vague similarity to the U.S. 'sweeps' done during the Vietnam War). The problems remain somewhat the same with regard to flushing out various guerilla groups operating in Kampuchea. Until a major loyal Cambodian-manned armed force can be raised in Kampuchea, Hanoi will continue to have a major manpower requirement in this area. While few would doubt that Vietnam's armed forces are stronger and superior to any others in the immediate area, it is not a force without problems (logistical, loyalty, maintenance, etc.).

Given the fact that the ASEAN states have no contingency plans for the moving of combat forces to Thailand for Vietnamese thrust there, Thailand must be considered "on its own" with regard to getting Asian support during a future conflict. What is needed is a comprehensive military operation plan by the respective members of ASEAN to "forward deploy" military equipment in Thailand (for their exclusive use), and adequate plans to provide Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian combat infantry into Thailand during an "emergency". Likewise, there should be plans for moving ASEAN air squadrons (particularly F-5s for air de-
fence to free Thai air units); and, a plan of cooperation between the navies of Thailand and ASEAN for securing maritime security in the Gulf of Siam.

Annual exercises in these directions should be held, maybe along the lines of those held between U.S. and Korean armed forces each year. Australia during the 1962 Laos Crisis moved an air squadron of CA-77/SABRE jets into Thailand. ASEAN states should exercise in this same fashion annually, with emphasis on "air defence" exercises, because TACAIR operations would be less familiar to ASEAN countries operating in Thailand and the immense problems of coordination of differing air and ground forces in not operating under a common set of doctrines. ASEAN exercises have shown that each nation continues to operate under its own "set of rules", and that common doctrines are many years off—given that the political hurdles are settled by leaders of the different "states".

THE UNKNOWN FACTORS:
U.S. AND THE USSR

United States policy can be recognized to be in a state of flux at this time. The tendency was to reduce U.S. military commitments throughout Asia during the Carter Administration; now this seems to have been halted and a status quo established with regard to maintenance of naval, air, and ground force stations in "forward basing" posture throughout the region. Yet, despite various statements concerning the U.S. posture in Asia, American policy still appears to be not yet fully decided with regard to some areas. It may be due to the trauma of the Vietnam War and the fluidity of the region's power groupings which is still keeping the United States from being the "force" (economically, politically, and militarily) that it once was in the region.

Most important for the ASEAN states is the presence of an F-4/PHANTOM II fighter-bomber squadron normally at

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. MILITARY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL FORCES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMCARDIV 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned: USS MIDWAY (CV43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL SURFACE GROUP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEST. PAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned: (Flag) USS BLUE RIDGE (LCC19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Missile Cruiser (CG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Stores Support Ship (AFS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESTROYER SQUADRON 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 DDG, 4FF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBMARINE GROUP 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 SS (USS GRAYBACK - Subic Bay, P.I; USS DARTER - Sasebo, Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL AIR FORCES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 P-3 Patrol Squadrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FLEET MARINE FORCES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Marine Amphibious Force/Comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. 1st Marine Div.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Marine Division (est. 11,500 men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Marine Aircraft Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Marine Brigade (est. 4,200 men)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Force Service Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Amphibious Squadron's (each normally comprising 1 LPH, 1 LPA 2 LPD/LSD, 2 or 3 LST vessels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Tactical Fighter Wings (TFW) (approx. 72 aircraft each TFW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY FORCES</strong>, approx. 32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Strategic Bomber Squadron (approx. 14 B-52D/Stratofortress + KC-135s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMY FORCES, approx. 32,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One infantry division, one Support Brigade, one Air Defence Artillery Brigade, one Signal/Comm. Brigade, 4th Missile Command.
Clark Air Force Base, Philippines. Equally important is the presence at Cubi Point of a P-3/ORION maritime patrol squadron. The latter is important to the ASEAN states in maintaining consistent patrols of the South China Sea region, beyond its commitment to the U.S. naval posture in the Indian Ocean. The former U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Maurice F. Weisner previously wrote in 1978: "The ASEAN countries, wary of the military strength and intentions of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, believe that U.S. forces sustain the necessary atmosphere of security that allows them to proceed with their ambitious plans of economic development and nation-building." ".... ASEAN is a decidedly non-military organization”. Of the latter statement, there can be little question; emphasized by the problems of political agreement alone in approaching a solution to the Kampuchean problem during the Panyaweuyan Conference in 1981. 

The following statement by Admiral Weisner typifies senior military attitudes at CINCPAC (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific), Hawaii: ".... U.S. forward basing posture in the Asia-Pacific theatre thus reinforces the immutable fact that perceptions of relative power and resolve are critical factors in the balance and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, and that the forward military presence of the United States through its impact upon these perceptions, helps to deter conflict and more generally dampen destabilizing tendencies throughout the region. Clearly, military strength is not the only component of U.S. national power; ..... " This prophetic statement was published in the summer of 1978; the Kampuchean invasion by Hanoi began during January 25, 1978. 

Author Derek Davies (“Far Eastern Economic Review” Dec. 25, 1981) suggested that President Reagan might avail himself of the opportunity to re-activate the effort to establish full recognition of the Hanoi regime, and felt that Reagan could accomplish this task much in the same manner as President Nixon handled the opening of relations with China. His reasoning is that Hanoi would “thus be presented with a tempting alternative to its current dependence on Moscow.” Unfortunately, I do not feel this is a viable “reading” of President Reagan at least at this time in his presidency. If the Vietnamese leadership requires United States recognition in order to “ease” their country out of the Soviet-bloc “client” states, then Hanoi is a far weaker regime than this writer believes it to be. Mr. Davies then goes on to say that if the Reagan administration succeeded in this gesture, “he would have denied Moscow a cheaply-purchased surrogate in a strategically vital area of the world; he would have cauterised the chief source of violence and instability in the region and the main threat to America’s friends, and he would have changed the map of Southeast Asia as positively as Nixon’s visit to Peking (Beijing) .... Without doubt .... however, it fails to recognize the internal dynamics within Hanoi’s leadership and that there are supporters of Moscow within this collective leadership who fully want to continue their current “status” with Moscow - partly based on the fear of what Beijing would be likely to do if Hanoi were not in Moscow’s influence perimeter. Hanoi as a “client” state might be expensive now for Moscow variously estimated at between $US3 million to US $6 million a day (economic and military assistance), but it may be Moscow’s fervent hope that Vietnam will become a valuable military-alliance state in the future, particularly, in the way that Cuban troops have been used on the African continent in support of Communist regimes there.

As North Korean Mig-21 pilots used to fly in Libya, the same sort of non-Soviet troops from Vietnam might be useful in Africa or elsewhere at some future time. So Moscow has strong interests in maintaining the “relationship” with Hanoi, besides the often discussed advantages provided by the use of naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. The two major Soviet advantages are the proximity to the Chinese submarine and naval base at Yulin (Hainan Island); and, the potential development as an intermediary station on the “rotational” support of the Soviet Indian Ocean detachment from the Pacific Fleet.

That Moscow is concerned over the potential of Chinese naval power, the following is worthy of noting: “China is focussing increasing attention on the East & South China Seas and the Indian Ocean, and is drawing up plans for her military presence in their waters. In this connection, the American journal “Foreign Affairs” made the following observation:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPARATIVE AIR STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIUM RANGE BOMBERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIGHT BOMBERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGHTER-BOMBERS (+LIGHT-ATTACK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIGHTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECONNAISSANCE MARITIME RECON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORTS HELICOPTERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(op)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOOTNOTES:**

(1) IL-28/BEAGLE may still be in service; provided in the late-1960s. Soviet spares support would have to be continued over the years for the aircraft to remain serviceable.

(2) Includes 30 Su-7B/FITTER-A, 50 Mig-19/FARMER, 130 Mig-17 FRESCO. A soviet shipment of Su-20/FITTER-C strike fighter is believed to have been made at the time of the Sino-Vietnamese War, in March 1979.

(3) Estimated 160 FISHBED/Mig-21 and twenty-odd remaining serviceable F-5A/E fighters.


(5) RTAF F-5A/E fighters. Light attack aircraft include A-37B/COIN, T-28, OV-10C, etc.

(6) Includes F-5H/CRUSADER and F-5A fighters. Light attack include T-28D and SF-260.

(7) Includes F-5E and CA-27/Avon-SABRE. Light attack include OV-10F, and will soon include one squadron of the first A-4/ SKYHAWK strike fighters. Ex-Soviet types in storage include 22 Tu-16, 10 IL-28, 15 Mig-21, 35 Mig-19, and 40 Mig-15/17 types. All are useless without receipt of further Soviet spares - or, possibly some overhaul and spares support from either Egypt or China.
"Sea power, traditionally as much political, is a military instrument of national power, and seems ideally suited to China's new international role as well as to her Maoist strategic doctrine." *

As far as Moscow is concerned, it will be in Vietnam-Laos for some years, and is unlikely to support any Hanoi leadership that desires to change the current status of providing leased naval base facilities and AeroFlot air services throughout the Indo-China region.

VIETNAM'S FUTURE POSTURE

It is understood from meetings last year that Hanoi would continue to receive about the same levels of Soviet aid, both military and economic, that it had received the year earlier. This despite requests from Hanoi for significantly larger aid in both categories.

Therefore, what can the ASEAN states expect in the way of changes during the next couple of years? Understanding the military aid given in the last two years since the Sino-Vietnamese War in March 1979, may provide some alternatives. The following thoughts are based on recent changes, and are based on comparable aid packages provided by Moscow to other "client" states:

Air: It is reported that 50-60 Mig-21/FISHBED-J Export fighters (similar to those for India) are currently being assembled for service. The "J-Export" model provides improved engines, J-band radar, and an internal 23-mm cannon lacking in some of Vietnam's earlier FISHBED fighters. As the current generation of "export" fighters, it is expected Hanoi will continue receiving this version for another three or four years. It is essentially comparable to the F-5E/TIGER II. Vietnam operates a small number of SU-7B/FITTER-A fighter-bombers, shipped in early-1979. Vietnam is a likely candidate for large quantities (50-100) of the newer generation SU-20/FITTER-C (export version) within the next three years. The remaining A-37s will not be operational and the Mig-17s will only be marginally effective in the ground-support role. To replace the aging ex-U.S. transports remaining, it is likely that Vietnam will begin receiving the AN-12/CUB four-engine transports used by AeroFlot on military/civil air service throughout the region. Large numbers of AN-24/COKE and IL-14/CRATE light transports will continue in service for some years. Some additional MI-8/HIP will be received; as well as the first quantities of MI-24/HIND-A & D versions of this very impressive Frontal Aviation helicopter.

Naval: Half of the Vietnamese naval force has been incorporated within the last two years, including two "Petrya-I" escorts, four "Shershens" PTFs, four "Osa-II" PTGs, four "S.O.1" escorts. It appears the Soviets are transferring to Vietnam the remaining "Petrya-I"s, and the last remaining Soviet Pacific Fleet "Shershens" (replacing them with more modern "Stenka" class units). Half the remaining "Osa-II"s have been sent to Vietnam; another six or eight may still remain and might well be transferred ("doubling" the Vietnamese PTG force). There are also 20-25 "Osa-I" units remaining in the Pacific—probably under KGB service. Some of these may also go to Vietnam. Only one or two "Petrya-I" remain with the Soviet Pacific Fleet and it should be thought that Vietnam might be the recipient of these remaining ships or the "traditionally" transferred two "Riga" class gun frigates. The Soviets are listed with about ten units each of "Riga" and "S.O.1" class escorts, any number of which might be given to Vietnam. The first "T-43" or "T-58" minesweeper/escorts may be transferred; large quantities of which still exist in Soviet inventories. The ASEAN states should thus expect the Vietnamese to double their current naval force in the coming three years; providing greatly added flexibility to Vietnamese military options.

Army: The biggest items will continue to be Soviet tank and artillery transfers, including limited quantities of the T-62 (though now out of Soviet production and replaced by the T-64 and T-72). Further T-55s will still comprise the bulk of transferred tanks; for with its unsophisticated and rugged characteristics and a 700-km range (with auxiliary tanks), it still represents a formidable tank for the Southeast Asian area. Further PT-76 light tanks, plus quantities of APC's will enhance the "mechanization" of some Vietnamese infantry units. Further quantities of the venerable SA-2/GUIDELINE SAM will continue, as well as small quantities of the SA-3/GOA and SA-6/GAINFUL which will provide Hanoi with a more widespread SAM force.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>GUNS</th>
<th>TORPEDOES</th>
<th>MISSILE SYSTEM</th>
<th>SPEED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;U.S. BARNEGAT&quot;</td>
<td>1-127MM (5-in) (pose)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>2 (?) SS-N-2/STYX</td>
<td>est. 18 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37MM AA (3-in)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;PETYA I&quot;</td>
<td>4-76MM (3-in) (twin)</td>
<td>5-406MM (16-in)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>35 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Quintuple)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;ADMIRABLE&quot;</td>
<td>1-75MM (3-in) (twin)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2-40MM (single) up to 8-20MM (twin)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td></td>
<td>est 14 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;OSA-II&quot;</td>
<td>4-30MM (twin)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>4 SS-N-2/STYX</td>
<td>36 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;KOMAR&quot;</td>
<td>4-25MM (twin)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>2 SS-N-2/STYX</td>
<td>36 + kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Attack Craft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;SHERSHEN&quot;</td>
<td>4-30MM (twin)</td>
<td>4-533MM (21-in)</td>
<td>some units only</td>
<td>40 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(twin)</td>
<td>(mines)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;S.O.N.&quot;</td>
<td>4-25MM (twin)</td>
<td>(mines)</td>
<td></td>
<td>28 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;SHANGHAI&quot;</td>
<td>4-37MM (twin)</td>
<td>(mines)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>28 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;YURKA&quot;</td>
<td>4-30MM (twin)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>18 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing Ship Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;POLNOCHNY&quot;</td>
<td>2 or 4-30MM (twin)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>(none)</td>
<td>21 kts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 x 16 - 140MM Rocket</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Launchers (forward)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### REGIONAL NAVAL BALANCE: SOUTH CHINA SEA AREA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VIETNAM</th>
<th>THAILAND</th>
<th>PHILIPPINES</th>
<th>MALAYSIA</th>
<th>SINGAPORE</th>
<th>INDONESIA</th>
<th>CHINA (SOUTH SEA FLEET ONLY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DESTROYERS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRIGATES</td>
<td>3 or 5 (2)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2 (+2)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORVETTES</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (6)</td>
<td>7 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSILE ATTACK CRAFT</td>
<td>11 (3)</td>
<td>6 (+2)</td>
<td>0 (+3)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3 (+4)</td>
<td>Est. 25 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORPEDO ATTACK CRAFT</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Est. 75 (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUN ATTACK CRAFT</td>
<td>Est. 20 (4)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4 (+2)</td>
<td>28 (5)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Est. 125-130 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRAFT SUBMARINES</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (+2)</td>
<td>Est. 15-18 (13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in brackets refer to the 'class' of craft in Footnotes. 
"+" indicates additional weapons or craft on order.

### FOOTNOTES:

1. The Chinese South Sea Fleet force is "estimated" in all ship types listed; however, they are considered reasonably accurate and quite adequate for the general discussion of Chinese Navy presence available on "short notice" (1-7 days) for operations in the South China Sea and Gulf of Tonkin. It is postulated that the PRC can re-inforce missile boat and escort frigates from the East Sea Fleet in 7-14 days; and 10-20 days from the North Sea Fleet.

2. Two ex-Soviet "Petya-I" class delivered in December 1978. Some sources indicate two additional units delivered in April 1981. Third operational unit is ex-USN cutter of the "Barnegat" class; now SS-N-2/STYX surface-to-surface missile equipped.

3. Includes 8 "OSA-II" and 3 "Komar" PTG's.

4. Includes 4 "S.O. 1" PC, 16 miscellaneous ex-Chinese and U.S. types. Two added "Shenshen" torpedo attack craft are reported delivered in 1981 bringing class to 10 units. (Torpedo or Guns).

5. Includes 5 "Jerong", 18 "Sabah"/"Kris" classes.

6. Ex-Soviet "Kronstadt" class PC.

7. "Luda" class - three to five in South Sea Fleet.

8. 4 "Chengdu" (CSS-N-2) and 5 "Jiang-Nan" classes.

9. 6 "Kronstadt" one "Etorofu" class.

10. Mixed "Osa" and "Hegu" classes.

11. Includes 25 "Hu-Chuan"; plus "P-6 (and "P-4's" in reserve).

12. Estimated 100 "Shanghai II" and 20 "Shantou"; some "Hainan" class fast attack craft also serve in the area.

13. All "Romeo" class - usually operating from Yulin Sub Base (Hainan Island). Some "Whiskey" class operated from the "Yulin" base in the 1960's and into the early 1970's; and may have been the result of a reaction to U.S. carrier forces in the Gulf of Tonkin; and, insufficient numbers of newer "Romeo" class units. One "Whiskey" was reported seen surface-operating after the Chinese seizure of Woody Island in September 1974.
Thus, in the coming years, Vietnam will remain militarily strong in relation to its weak neighbours (excepting China); while the ASEAN nations will be strong economically, they will be likely to lack political and military strength in the mid-decade period. This "imbalance" between the ASEAN states and the Vietnamese-dominated states will give rise to the continued probability of further conflict in the region—until a more "equitable" balance is attained within the contending area as a whole, and between individual states within the region. ☐
BORDER TROOPS IN THANH HOA PROVINCE TRAIN MILITIAMEN

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 Apr 82 p 1

[Article by Van Coc: "Thanh Hoa Border Troops Organize Training for Over 1,425 Militiamen"]

[Text] The border troops of Thanh Hoa Province, in addition to fulfilling their task of training, patrolling, being ready for combat and maintaining border security, recently organized training for 1,425 militiamen from the villages in combat techniques and tactics on mountainous terrain and in combat schemes for the protection of the border during enemy violations. During tests they all satisfied the requirements, with 91.2 percent of them getting good and outstanding scores. Border posts 37 and 39 doubled their border patrols. Thanks to vigilance and tight control, their patrolling teams succeeded in uncovering three illegal deals and recovering tens of thousands of dong for the state.

Border posts 78, 82, 80 and 72 coordinated their activities with the local administrations' propaganda work in calling the youths into the army. They dug anew and repaired tens of kilometers of trenches and combat fortifications. Also in recent days post 37 got 500 additional fry to raise. The heroic combatants of post 41 taught teenagers and children of the Hmong and Thai ethnic groups four songs, which praise the party and Uncle Ho. The cadres and combatants of posts 43 and 45 assisted the local people by providing them thousands of man-days in building water-conservancy works to bring water into ricefields for on-schedule crop planting.

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CSO: 4209/324

18
PROTECTION OF STATE FARM PROPERTIES, PRODUCTS URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Apr 82 p 3

[Article by Tran Vu Nguyen, Thanh Hoa: "Protection of Products in State Farms"]

[Text] The movement to sign product contracts with laborers is being extended to all state farms. But the protection of the products there is not yet satisfactorily maintained. In Sao Vang state farm (Tho Xuan District in Thanh Hoa Province) the major product is sugar cane. Every year at the time of harvest, in spite of the fact that the state farm properly organizes patrolling and protection of sugar cane fields, with quite a lot of manpower invested in protection, unauthorized cutting of sugar cane is an ill that continues to take place. Some sugar cane fields of nearly 30 hectares were invaded by dozens of people who cut sugar cane to eat and to carry with them as much as they could. In Ha Trung state farm (in Thanh Hoa Province), although the men in charge of protecting the pineapple and peanut crops worked very hard during the harvest time, there still were losses of pineapple. In Lam Son state farm (in Thanh Hoa Province), even the cattle raised in the mountainous area were stolen, with their herds gradually decreasing in size.

We know that in many state farms serious stealing of such products as rice, manioc, tea, coffee and peanut was taking place. This situation was rather common and has been lasting for many years. That was the greatest concern of cadres and workers of those state farms. It also was hampering the paying of piecework and product wages and the improving of the standard of living of workers.

We think that protection of state farm properties is not solely the job of directors and protection committees but there must be a correct awareness on the part of local party committee echelons and administrations, particularly at village and district levels, and such specialized organs as the public security forces and the courts. These organs must promote close coordination, have a firm attitude and fairly handle all cases of violation of properties and products of state farms so as to gradually limit and eventually put an end to this negative practice.
STEP TAKEN TO STOP THEFTS AT CO LOA RAILROAD STATION

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 10 Apr 82 p 5

[Article by Vu Kim Toan of the Party Committee of the Ha-Thai-Hai Railroad District: "Stop the Theft of Cargo at the Railroad Station"]

[Text] The Co Loa railroad station handles a large volume of cargo. On some days hundreds of freight cars of the various kinds are loaded or unloaded. The principal goods are coal and the various kinds of iron and steel to serve the cities of Hanoi, Ha Son Binh, and Vinh Phu, and the goods of eight cargo shippers in the western border provinces.

There was a very serious loss of cargo before and after the issuance of directives 81 and 108 of the Secretariat, until the beginning of November 1981. Adults and children (from 9 to 16 years of age) often sneaked into the storage yards from many directions, entered the freight cars and the warehouses, and stole coal, iron and steel, and the other types of cargo. On some days there were several hundred such people. Adults and children carried goods weighing 30 to 40 kilograms -- baskets of coal, steel bars, and coils of steel -- on their heads and shoulders.

Every time a passenger train passed through or stopped at Co Loa the passengers witnessed such negative scenes. During 1980 and the first 6 months of 1981 all of the hundreds of tons of cargo.

Because of that negative situation, although the Co Loa railroad station set aside separate areas for each shipper so that the cargo could be protected, and although many shippers took many very positive steps, such as putting up barbed-wire fences, building high brick walls, and deploying protection forces night and day, cargo was still stolen! In view of that situation, the station master, a member of the Party committee of the Co Loa railroad station zone, many times reported to the Party committee and administration of Viet Hung Village and to the public security organ of Dong Anh District. Because of the concern of the District Party Committee, the public security organ of Dong Anh District sent a public security team to set up a post at the southern switching head of the Co Loa railroad station at the beginning of 1981.

That public security team took many positive steps to stop the thefts and ambushed, pursued, and arrested the perpetrators. Some of the public security policemen had accidents while fulfilling their missions. However, by the beginning of November 1981 they still had not been able to stop the theft of cargo. Indeed, it had become increasingly more serious.
In view of that situation, the Ha-Thai-Hai Party organization determined that the Co Loa railroad station was one of its key anti-negativism objectives. The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union chapter and the Party organization's military committee requested permission to carry out an anti-negativism project at the Co Loa railroad station to achieve accomplishments to honor the Party Congress.

When that matter was discussed in conference, everyone was worried that they would not be successful and that they would be subjected to revenge. Indeed, some people had poured kerosene into a collective well and crammed rocks into the switch boxes, the switch rails at the railroad heads, which created difficulties for production and threatened safety. Every time a train arrived it had to stop outside the station, which made it easy for those people to steal cargo and open the freight car doors so that the cargo would fall out. That caused the workers to exert a lot of effort, and sometimes when the train entered the station the freight car doors would hit people who were working. That caused everyone to be reluctant to participate in the anti-negativism campaign.

In fact, within a week after the beginning of the protection work of the unified guidance committee and the Assault Youth team of the Co Loa area, the thieves held back and dared not steal cargo brazenly, as in the past, but only by sneaking in three or four people. Only 3 days after the beginning of that campaign, Section 79 of the Hanoi Municipal Party Committee issued official document No 213 assigning responsibility for organizing protection to Dong Anh District, along with the shippers and the Co Loa railroad station. Two days after the issuance of the directive of Section 79 of the Hanoi Municipal Party Committee, Dong Anh District carried out administrative inspections in the two hamlets of Gia Duong and Duc Noi, and in the collective housing area of the cadres, workers, and personnel of the Co Loa railroad zone. The results were that 80 tons of coal and 4 tons of iron and steel were recovered from nearly 60 families. From some families there were recovered nearly 10 tons of coal, 5 kilograms of chemical sugar, and 300 to 400 kilograms of iron and steel.

Since the unified protection committee of the railroad station area and the assault team of the Youth Union chapter of the Co Loa railroad station area began their work, and since the decision of Dong Anh District to carry out an administrative inspection, progress has been made in stopping the theft of cargo in the Co Loa railroad station area.

The results attained in stopping thievery at Co Loa were that there was an organization to coordinate all aspects, from top to bottom and from the shippers to the railroad station, and the decisive action taken by the locality. If there are no administrative inspections by the district, and if everything is left up to the Loa railroad station and the shippers, even if results are attained they will not be permanent and absolute.

The second lesson that was learned was that it is necessary to carry out education to stop the evils of negativism within the ranks of the cadres, workers, and personnel of the shipping organs whose work involves the transporting of cargo, and especially those who work at the railroad stations and do protection work at the storage yards and warehouses, including the public security forces and teenagers in the schools and in the Youth Union.
The above-mentioned results were only initial ones which we must maintain and further promote if we are to stop the theft of cargo, especially coal being transported by train.

By means of the experiences of the Co Loa railroad station the Ha-Thai-Hai Railroad District will assign to the Youth Union and the self-defense forces in a number of other railroad stations the task of guiding anti-negativism in order to carry out directives 81 and 108 of the Secretariat.

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CSO: 4209/348

22
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

PORT OF HANOI TRIES TO STOP THEFTS

Hanoi GIAO THONG VAN TAI in Vietnamese 10 Apr 82 p 5

[Article by "P.V.": "The Port of Hanoi Takes Many Additional Steps to Protect State Property"]

[Text] In view of the serious extent of the theft of cargo at the port of Hanoi, the Municipal Party Committee assigned to the Party Committee and People's Committee of Hai Ba Trung Ward responsibility for exercising territorial management, closely guiding the public security sector, the port units, and the subward administrations, and applying many measures to resolutely stop negative phenomena in the port area.

The ward administration guided the subwards and villages around the port in continually investigating, bringing to justice, and stopping bad people who enter the port to steal cargo. The refreshment stands in the area, where the stolen cargo was harbored and sold, were closed and forbidden to do business. The protection forces were rectified and reorganized to ensure their quality. Workers who did not have a serious attitude toward their work, or who colluded with crooks and people who engaged in illegal livelihoods were disciplined and replaced.

With regard to the interior of the port, the Party Committee and director, along with the trade union organization, educated all cadres, workers, and personnel with regard to their responsibility and rights, while also teaching them the bylaws and regulations. In the course of the education and study, the port categorized its cadres and workers, 90 of whom were classified as Category C, people who habitually stole state property and goods at the port. With the slogan of stressing education, the port concentrated those weak, deficient people and educated them for 3 consecutive days. After studying, they reviewed their deficiencies and promised to correct them. If they continue to violate socialist property they will be punished according to law.

5616
CSO: 4209/348
SRV READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THAILAND

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 30 Apr 82 p 1

HANOI is prepared to take the "first step" to allay Thailand's concern about the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea.

"Thailand can then take the second step and the third step can be taken by us," Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach told PATRIOT in an exclusive interview.

Each step could be taken one at a time, but all of them should be linked to each other, he said.

Mr Co Thach, who concluded his visit to this country on Thursday, felt that the prospects of a comprehensive political settlement in South East Asia had improved during last one year. But we have still a long distance to cover and we have to work patiently for it," he added.

The Vietnamese Foreign Minister called for establishment of a zone of peace and cooperation in the region comprising of the ASEAN countries, the three Indochinese states, Burma and South Asian nations.

FACT OFFER

He reiterated the offer of a non-aggression pact to Thailand to be accompanied by other confidence-building measures.

Vietnam has already proposed partial withdrawal of its forces in Kampuchea, provided Thailand does not allow its territory to be used for destabilising the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Mr Co Thach felt that there was greater realisation among the countries of ASEAN that "the situation in Kampuchea is irreversable."

"In fact, there is no Kampuchean problem; the real problem is the Chinese policy of confrontation."

Of course, we can say that there is the problem of Vietnam's military presence in Kampuchea, but this is linked to the Chinese threat against us, against Vietnam and Laos," he added.

"Many people ask," Mr Co Thach said, "why Vietnamese troops continue to be in Kampuchea, if it has consolidated its position."

"This is so because there is China behind the remnants of the Pol Pot clique," he added.

Mr Thach did not visualise any immediate possibility of change in the Beijing policy in the area.

"The Chinese will continue to encourage conflict and confrontation in the region."

"We continue to live in the era of a coalition between China and the US, which was inaugurated with Mr Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1973," he remarked.

Mr Co Thach, who returned recently from a tour of some West European capitals, felt that South East Asia is far away from their minds. But they have lived for the past several years in a climate of doleful and they know that if peace is jeopardised in South East Asia, it could endanger détente elsewhere also. He did not think they would like the situation to deteriorate, there. He found several indications of a rethinking in West European capitals about the problems in South East Asia.

Mr Co Thach was very happy with his talks with External Affairs
HEROIC DEATH IN A RICE-SALVAGING OPERATION IN KAMPUCHEA

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Feb 82 p3

[Article by Nguyen Tran Thiep: "Because of Those Sacks of Rice Full of Loyalty and Love"]

[Excerpts] The people of Prek Takeo Village, Samrong Thom Subdistrict, Kean Svay District in Kandal Province intended to make a tombstone bearing an epitaph as a tribute to the Vietnamese soldier who had fallen in this land and had left in their hearts admiration and immense affection. Mr. Heng Man, the village public security cadre, said so to me. He then recounted what happened:

"I remember with much love that Vietnamese soldier. I have this house and have enough to eat and to wear -- all thanks to the revolution and the Vietnamese troops who, along with the Kampucheans, drove away the Pol Pot army. I saw with my own eyes the Vietnamese soldier die while salvaging the rice Vietnam sent over to aid our people. The generations of my children and grandchildren and we will never forget this loyalty and love."

Mr Heng Man mentioned the names of those people who had witnessed from the beginning to the end the act of dead hero Bui Van Tinh, including guerrilla Khmek, women's association chapter chairwoman Boot Vonna, etc. and added:

"For days we did not leave the bank of the river. All of us were very sad. Many of us wept, knelt and bowed where Tinh had sacrificed himself."

I had not known Bui Van Tinh and up to this day, in spite of much effort, I was still unable to get hold of a picture of that comrade who had upheld the qualities of VPA combatants while fulfilling an international task in a friendly country. I noted what was being said about him.

An Unexpected Accident

Every month Co-so-bi Corporation of Ho Chi Minh City was responsible for transporting goods, grain and foods -- our people's aid to the friendly country -- up the Mekong River to the capital city of Phnom Penh.
That time the boat Minh Giang 3 towed a barge full of rice. As it came to within 40 kilometers from Pnom Penh and while traveled in the river, the barge hit something hard. Water quickly entered it. To avoid the danger of the barge pulling the boat along with it while sinking, skipper Ho Huu Hinh ordered the severing of the boat from the barge.

Receiving subsequent orders from the captain right after the two had been separated, deputy captain Nguyen Thien Can quickly steered the boat away from the barge and rushed to the bank. Another unfortunate thing happened: Minh Giang 3 felt a strong collision. Water rushed in. The boat was gradually sinking.

A conclusion later was drawn about what had happened. That section of Mekong River was more than a kilometer wide. Although Minh Giang 3 was moving in the right lane, it unfortunately hit a Pol Pot army vessel that had been sunk many years back which nobody had marked anything about on the navigational chart. That regrettable accident was really unexpected and it was hard to predict such a happening.

The Right Solution

At 2000 hours on ..., Major Huynh Cao Son greeted the representative of Minh Giang 3. After recounting what had happened, the representative raised the question:

"We are very worried. If we do not salvage the rice immediately, it will be all lost. The rice is badly needed for the people who have just come back from where they were suppressed by Pol Pot to build a new life. We intend to hire people to retrieve the rice in the sunk barge, but about the 96 tons of rice in the freight cabins of the boat, we suggest that you lend us a hand."

Group leader Huynh Cao Son was faced with a dilemma. The state-operated boat Minh Giang 3 did not belong to Troop Station (Vietnamese: binh tram) M79 and sank as far as 40 kilometers from Pnom Penh; therefore, he had all the good reasons for turning down the request. But the conscience of a troops' unit commander working under some international obligation did not allow him to do so. Troop Station M79 (of the Transportation Department of the Rear Service General Department) had barges and many good swimmers. He said:

"Our people are not yet very well off. Every family has been saving some rice in order to pool their shares and to have this large amount of rice to assist a friend with, and the people of the friendly country are greatly in need of this rice. You can go and report that we will send Company 9 over to salvage the rice."

Tears of Loyalty and Love

The news of the Vietnamese soldier who had sacrificed himself was quickly spreading all over Prek Takeo Village. Women, old and young, elderly people and
children all rushed to the bank of the river. The most capable divers of the village volunteered to enter the boat to find the body of the Vietnamese soldier. Among the people, crew members, cadres and combatants of Company 9 many were crying and sobbing. Captain Tran The Vinh, the M79 political officer, was so anxious. The body of Tinh was inside the boat, but he could not remove it. He raised the question to the Ministry of Communications of the friendly country, which enthusiastically responded:

"We will have skipper Pich Prom go there immediately aboard a vessel equipped with a crane and a team of divers. This is our responsibility toward that Vietnamese comrade who has sacrificed himself for the international obligation."

The divers' team, including two good divers, Ung Von and Mat Et, of the friendly country, found the body of Tinh. Tinh died and left behind feelings of sorrows and affection among the people of Prek Takeo Village and adjacent areas. Troop Station M79 organized a period of learning the example of dead hero Bui Van Tinh, the member of the Communist Youth Union who had volunteered to do the hard work and upheld the qualities of a VPA combatant fulfilling the international obligation in friendly Kampuchea.

5598
CSO: 4209/324
STRENGTHENING SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL MANAGEMENT UNDERTAKEN

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Apr 82 pp 1, 4

[VNA News Release: "Strengthening Scientific and Technical Management in Provinces, Municipalities and Special Zones Subordinate to the Central Government"]

[Text] On 13 April, the chairman of the Council of Ministers issued a directive about strengthening scientific and technical management in the provinces, municipalities and special zones subordinate to the central government. The directive has this to say:

Lately scientific and technical management has been organized in the provinces, municipalities subordinate to the central government. Along with the nationwide system of scientific and technical management, this activity has shown its effects on the localities. After Resolution 37 of the Political Bureau on the scientific and technical policy was issued, the scientific and technical management in the localities has made further progress.

So far 39 out of 40 provinces and municipalities subordinate to the central government have set up their scientific and technical management organs. However, this managerial work on the part of the localities is still far from capable of satisfying all needs; scientific and technical activities remain scattered, with many progressive techniques which proved useful in the model centers still waiting for being widely applied; the ranks of scientific and technical cadres of these provinces and municipalities, which are quite large, have not yet been properly placed and used while very little importance is being attached to scientific and technical management and production management, with the same situation of doing things carelessly and sloppily, making counterfeit goods, etc. remaining and causing serious waste.

One of the reasons behind the above-mentioned situation is that the local scientific and technical management organizations have not yet been made strong enough to suit the task assigned to them. In many localities, the cadres in charge do not have the level of competence commensurate with their scientific and technical
managerial task, the cadres are weak in terms of specialized and professional capabilities and there is a serious lack of equipment, materials and work conditions. Many points related to the position of the scientific management organs in the overall management system of the localities have not yet been clearly defined; the leadership provided by party committee echelons over this work is far from strict, nor is it appropriate for the characteristics and law of development of science and technology.

Seriously implementing Resolution 37 of the Political Bureau on the scientific and technical policy for the purpose of overcoming the above-mentioned weaknesses, the chairman of the Council of Ministers gave this directive:

In the time to come, the provinces and municipalities concerned must properly mobilize the scientific and technical force of sectors and echelons in their localities and of the central research installations for a good survey of the local resources and natural and social conditions and, on this basis, take the necessary measures to properly exploit local resources and labor and to quickly and widely apply progressive techniques and production initiatives and experiences to production and everyday living. They must properly organize the dissemination of information and scientific and technical knowledge; make technical management in production an established practice on the basis of standards and norms, with accuracy of measurements and tight control of product quality being maintained; and effectively put an end to the situation of doing sloppy and careless work, running after quantity, making counterfeit goods and causing damages to the national economy and the people, for the purpose of vigorously developing agriculture, strongly expanding the consumer goods-producing occupations, increasing the volume of export goods and properly exploiting any local potentials.

To do this job properly, the localities must seriously implement the regulations, procedures and decisions issued by the state in connection with scientific and technical planning, initiatives, technical improvement and rationalization of production, dissemination of scientific and technical news, building of well-established technical management, adoption of standards, control of quality of products and goods, inspection and certification of measuring instruments, etc.

The directive points to the specific work that the provinces, municipalities and special zones must pay attention to doing properly so as to quickly perfect and strengthen the system of scientific and technical management from provincial to local level in terms of organization, the material and technical base, work conditions, as well as policies on cadres, etc.

Finally, the directive states the responsibilities of chairmen of provincial and municipal people's committees and the chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission for assuming leadership over the implementation of the Council of Ministers chairman's directive on strengthening scientific and technical management in the provinces, municipalities and special zones subordinate to the central government.
VO NGUYEN GIAP ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON QUALITY CONTROL

Hanoi TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC in Vietnamese No 3 Mar 82 pp 1-4


[Text] Dear Comrades,

I am very pleased to visit your national conference to review the quality control management of goods and products. I am also pleased to see that many comrades in charge of the sectors and echelons are attending the conference. However, the absence of representatives of a number of important sectors must be noted. First of all, I would like to convey the cordial greetings of Premier Pham Van Dong and of the other leaders of the Party and state to all of you, and through you to everyone engaged in managing the quality of products and goods throughout the country. Having monitored the reports of the participants, I think that the conference was well-organized. In accordance with the decision of the Premier, during the recent period many sectors and localities have reviewed their management and control of the quality of products and goods. You have heard the report of the conference's preparatory committee. That report mentioned the accomplishments that were achieved during the recent period as well as the extremely serious deficiencies in that sphere.

Today, on behalf of the government, I commend the enterprises, production bases, and groups of cadres, workers, and personnel which have, although encountering many difficulties in production, with a sense of responsibility toward their work and by applying positive measures, endeavored to stabilize the quality of products. I also commend the efforts of the standards, measurements, and quality organs of the sectors and localities in organizing the implementation of the quality control management of products and goods.

I commend the State Scientific and Technical Commission, and specifically its Standards-Measurements-Quality Department, for making all-out efforts in organizing, guiding, and supervising the sectors and echelons to implement Decision 159-TTg of the Premier regarding the management of quality control of products and goods.

I applaud the leaders of a number of ministries and localities who show concern for and tightly manage the quality of the products of their sectors and localities. I say "a number" because there are still a considerable of sectors and
localities which still are not truly pay attention to quality control. Among them are some extremely important sectors the heads of which are not participating in this conference.

At this conference, I would like to remind you of the displeasure of the Party Central Committee and the Government, and of the consumers, over the general situation of the quality of products of most of the production and commercial bases. That is the situation of the quality of products and goods steadily declining, which causes great economic harm and affects the ensuring of the people's living conditions and economic exchange relations with foreign countries.

In the course of organizing the implementation of the directive of the Premier, the sectors and localities have isolated the good points, deficiencies, reasons, and experiences in the management of products and goods quality. I hope that you will strictly review your own responsibility and that of your unit and in the future carry out better and more fully the important decision of the Premier regarding that matter.

In our meeting today, I want all of us to realize the importance of the quality of products and goods, so that we can work together to further strengthen the management of the quality of products and goods. All of the resolutions of the Party Central Committee mention the matter of improving product quality and regard that as a principal means of increasing the effectiveness of production, ensuring the people's living standards, and increasing our country's export capability.

Product quality is an extremely important aspect of economic activity. It may be said that the improvement of product quality is a matter of a law-like nature in the development of social production, especially socialist production. The improvement of quality not only increases the utilization value of goods but economizes on labor, materials, and raw materials, increases labor productivity and export capabilities, and in the final analysis satisfies better and more fully the needs of society and of the people.

You know that today, in the socialist countries the improvement of product quality is regarded as a strategic mission, as one of the main ways to improve economic effectiveness. I think that the same is true with regard to us. When we do economic work we must pay attention to economic effectiveness, to the products we produce. That means that we must be concerned with both quantity and quality. At one time or another it may said that there must be sufficient quantity to meet the needs of the people, then when production has developed there arises the question of quality. In fact, that is only a way to emphasize the problem, for if a product or a commodity is to have value and consumption value there must be not only quantity but also quality. Quantity always goes hand-in-hand with quality. If quality is poor and the product is useless, for all practical purposes there is no quantity. Therefore, when resolving the problem of quantity we must always be concerned with quality. At the same time, when we improve quality we also increase the quantity of goods that are usable and have high utilization value. Indeed, high-quality goods or equipment will be more durable and better, and the period of use will be many times longer than that of poor-quality goods. Therefore, there are more goods to fulfill needs and there is more economizing in the use of society's raw materials, materials, and labor, which creates the capability
to produce additional goods. Therefore, we must clearly realize that the needs of society can only be fulfilled when quantity and quality are attained. Quantity and quality are not in opposition to each other but are interrelated. At a very early stage Lenin set forth the slogan, "better few but good." Therefore, it is essential that we pay attention to quality.

When we speak of quality we must speak of the specific contents of quality under certain economic-social conditions. But under any given economic-social conditions the requirement is to attain the best possible quality. Therefore, under certain conditions quality has specific contents and a maximum degree. In the present phase, in which we are experiencing many difficulties, the question of quality is posed even more clearly, in order to be able to use labor, raw materials, and materials as well as possible in creating the greatest possible utilization value. From the reports you have clearly seen that failure to pay attention to quality leads to a terrible waste of raw materials, materials, and labor, to an extent that not only reduces utilization value but harms the people's health. We do not demand, and cannot demand, that the quality of products exceed the quality of raw materials, materials, machinery, and the level of technology. But we demand that those products have the best characteristics and capabilities that can be attained under the given conditions. That is a rational requirement. We criticize the viewpoint of being concerned only with quantity, chasing after quantity, and lighty regarding or ignoring quality. After the resolution of the 6th Plenum of the Party Central Committee, many production bases fully utilized all capabilities regarding labor, natural resources, and production capacities to "take off" and produce many products for society. That is the positive side. But a considerable number of bases only "take off" and are not concerned with quality. Thus they do not carry out that task in correct accordance with the spirit of the resolution. The resolution stated that "We must stress both quantity and quality, and strive to attain the maximum quantity and quality allowed by the actual situation. We must not work haphazardly and carelessly, which causes the waste of raw materials and creates bad habits in production and management."

In our country, in the past many localities had such traditional products as raw silk, silk cloth, silverware, etc. Under the socialist system, we must restore and develop those traditions and create new traditions. In addition to quantiative development it is essential that we improve quality and especially pay attention to the important products which can become products representative of our country, such as the various kinds of tropical agricultural products. Only thereby can we have products representative of our country's leading production sectors and localities, and only then can there be high-quality traditional local products.

The management of product quality control is a combined problem. Product quality control is a very important content of scientific-technical management, and it is related to many other problems regarding economic organization and management in general. Therefore, during this conference there should be present comrades with authority who represent the production and planning organs as well as the price, statistics, and financial organs. Product quality management must be regarded as an organic part of economic management. The combined organs of the state, the production, distribution, and circulation sectors, and the localities must share responsibility in the task of managing the quality of products and goods. The process of managing product quality must be carried out uniformly at
all levels, from the state down to the enterprises, in the manufacture and storage of products, from designing and manufacturing to circulation and distribution and operation or use; and among the management measures, from economic-technical management and scientific-technical advances to organizational, administration, legal, and educational measures.

I hope that the conference clearly understands the importance of quality, an never speak of quantity without speaking of quality. During the recent period some bases have done a good job of controlling the quality of products and goods and therefore have good products to supply for export. We commend those bases, but regret that there are not yet many of them.

Among the positive examples, I would like to mention some production means production means produced by the Ministry of Engineering and Metals. Recently that Ministry adopted the policy of improving the quality of its products, including a research program to improve the quality of machine tools. I believe that that was correct -- improving quality while increasing quantity. However, at present the quality of even the simplest workers' hand tools, such as knives and mattocks, is not yet high (indeed, in some places their quality is very poor) and they soon become useless, which causes the shortage of such tools to become even more serious. Although the durability of such products as diesel engines and Bong Sen tractors has been increased and the quality of some machine tools has recently improved, in general quality is still low and must continue to be improved.

We severely criticize the production bases and the responsible organs which have allowed the quality of many export goods to decline to a serious degree. Customers continuously complain about them and we are in danger of losing our markets for such products as frozen sea food, canned fruit and fruit juice, and a number of other products.

We are not pleased over the situation of the continuing poor quality of such essential consumer products as cloth, soap, etc., and the quality of such office supplies as fountain pens, ink, etc., greatly declining.

Especially, we are also worried over the quality of foodstuffs: there is a good deal of paddy, stones, and sand mixed in with the rice (in some cases 20 to 30 times more than the standard), wheat is mouldy, and the quality of fish sauce and dipping sauce has declined to a serious degree, are not very nutritious, and have a low ratio of protein. Thus, from the point of view of nutrition we see even more clearly how quality is related to quantity.

There are many reasons for that situation: in part it is because of the sense of responsibility and consciousness of the producers and in part it is because of deficiencies in the organization of production, scientific-technical management, and economic management. As you all know, the quality of products depends on their design, on the materials used to make them, on machinery, and on the organization of production. But in each of those aspects, man is still the most important factor. Thus in the final analysis the most important factor in quality is the devotion and quality of man's work. It is a matter of the quality of workmates, the quality of managers, the quality of those in charge, and the quality of our economic management.
Our Party is always concerned with gradually improving the people's living conditions. That viewpoint must be fully understood in managing the quality of products and goods. We must pay attention to the quality of products and goods not only in the state enterprises but also in the collective bases and even in the individual bases, as well as with regard to goods on the free market. I would like to say that if we have recently paid a certain amount of attention to the quality of goods in the state enterprises and some of the collective bases, we have paid practically no attention to products produced by the other collective bases and especially by individuals. That is a great deficiency that must be overcome, for at present such products still account for a large part of the total output and are usually essential consumer goods. Under our socialist system, all social products, no matter from what source, must have utilization value, be sanitary, and be safe. The state is responsible for providing close guidance and management. Every day we encounter many products that do not meet standards, are not sanitary, are of poor quality, or are ersatz goods. There are even ersatz medicines, some of which endanger the users' health or even their lives. Therefore, those free-market goods must be controlled by the state. In order to overcome that deficiency the responsible organs, especially the joint organs of the state and the relevant ministries, and especially those of the provinces and municipalities, must clearly understand that problem and take prompt steps to rectify it. They must study, and recommend to the government, ways to end the extremely poor quality of goods on the free market.

In the immediate future we must urgently study and regulate the quality of products and goods on the free market and severely punish those who produce adulterated or ersatz goods.

I hope that after this conference we will intensify the quality control of products and goods and cause the echelons, ministries, sectors, production bases, and workers to clearly understand the important role of the quality of products and goods. Following this conference the necessary tasks that were brought out in your reports must be codified and transformed into laws so that they can be implemented. Here I would like to stress a number of points:

First, the responsible organs in this sphere -- the State Scientific and Technical Commission, the State Planning Commission, the State Price Commission, the Statistics General Department and the Ministry of Finance -- must, along with the sectors and echelons, carry out studies in order to do a good job of consolidating and building the system of product quality management, with specific goals, specific objects, and specific requirements, and maintain and gradually improve the quality of products and goods, especially the essential consumer goods, the export goods, and the important means of production.

Second, the quality of products and goods, along with the numerical norms, must become legal norms in the production plans and in the circulation-distribution plans, as stipulated in the decision of the Premier. Furthermore, they must become a norm for evaluating the results of the contracting-out contracts at the present time. When products are contracted out it is necessary to clearly stipulate the quality norms.
Third, during the course of this conference I noted that you have manifested concern and worry, and have recommended many measures to maintain and improve the quality of products and goods. That is very praiseworthy. If those measures are to be applied there must be a plan to perfect organization and strengthen cadres and the material-technical bases, from the state standards, measurements, and quality control organs of the State Scientific and Technical Commission to the organs of the provinces and the production and circulation-distribution organs.

Fourth, it is necessary to set up a clear system of responsibility, for ultimately the quality of products is a matter of the quality of the managers, of the workers who produce the products, and of the labor of man. It is also an important manifestation of the spirit of collective socialist mastership. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the spirit of mastership and stress the creation of a clear system of responsibility for each worker, sector, echelon, and person with regard to the quality of products and goods.

The quality of products must be the yardstick for measuring the responsibility and conscience of each producer and management cadre toward the people and the country.

I hope that in the immediate future all of those tasks will be carried out. If the quality of products and goods is one of the principal contents of socialist economic activities and is a direction of strategic significance, the implementation of the tasks set by this conference will signify a new developmental step in our socialist production.

Today I will not speak at length, for to do so would be to emphasize "quantity" and would be inappropriate to the spirit of this conference, which is to stress "quality." I hope that all of you, including those of you who are present here and the comrades with responsibility and authority who are not present here today, will contribute positively to managing the quality of products and goods. You must be imbued with the thought of improving the quality of products and goods and regard that as an extremely important policy with regard to economic development in our country.

5616
CSO: 4209/337
BUILDING MATERIAL, TECHNICAL BASE OF SOCIALISM URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 19 Apr 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Building the Material and Technical Base of Socialism"]

[Text] Building the material and technical base of socialism is a basic task of socialist revolution, for this base is the factor of topmost importance that determines the success of the new system. The backbone of this base is the large-scale mechanized industry. The severe contradiction in the first stage of socialism is between consumption and accumulation, which are still small, but if we do not gradually raise accumulation, the contradiction will be more severe. This is a very difficult undertaking for us because as we move forward from an underdeveloped economy, we must first of all satisfy the minimum needs related to the standard of living and thus have a very limited initial capacity for accumulation. Expanded reproduction can be achieved little by little only with accumulation. Thus the party line on economic construction asserts the need to resolve correctly the relationship between accumulation and consumption, both to maintain the standard of living and national defense and security needs and to build the material and technical base of socialism so as to improve the standard of living and to satisfy the national defense and security needs at a higher level. Building the material and technical base of socialism in the stage ahead actually is carrying on the socialist industrialization in appropriate steps as determined by the 5th Party Congress. The political report of the VCP Central Committee points out: "To continue building the material and technical base of socialism is primarily aimed at stepping up agricultural production and production of goods for consumption and export, at the same time providing other economic sectors with more technical equipment and making preparations for a more vigorous development of heavy industry in the next stage."

With the above-mentioned goal, the capital construction plan in different periods must be set up in accordance with suitable development scale and pace. The basis for determining such development scale and pace is the objective material conditions and the ability, both present and potential, to obtain capital, materials and
technology. In the 5-year 1981-1985 plan, as the socioeconomic report of the VCP Central Committee indicates, since our materials and capital are limited and we must satisfy on a top priority basis the urgent needs of everyday life and export, we must rationally set the overall level of investment in capital construction and use the invested capital correctly and effectively.

A great shortcoming in capital construction was the state of investment being scattered, thinly spread and uncoordinated. Every sector and locality wanted to have big construction and to start many projects, but as capital and materials were not sufficient, those construction projects were left unfinished, the time of construction had to be extended and the results were a waste of wealth and energy and at the same time led to more imbalance in the national economy. This situation has not yet been overcome so far. Some localities, instead of firmly postponing any new projects, have even started new projects which they would not be in a position to continue until completion.

Economic effectiveness is the objective requirement of every economic activity. To ensure effectiveness in construction, we must start from the above-mentioned spirit and firmly concentrate capital on the key projects and sectors and the most important products. The key projects are the ones mentioned in the state plan for such sectors as agriculture, electric power, coal, oil and gas, machine industry, paper, yarn, sugar, communications and transportation, and export. In the national economy as a whole, in every sector and every locality as well, there must be review and rearrangement of capital construction projects to ensure increasing the rate of progress toward completion. Pay utmost attention to in-depth investment, exploit to the highest degree the existing capabilities and combine both intensive and extensive investment. As an immediate step, do not invest in additional construction projects when the old production installations of the same kind have not yet fully exploited their producing capacities. And stop construction work in any projects that are considered impossible to be completed or after completion of construction will be under no conditions to operate.

Building the material and technical base of socialism is the common undertaking of the country as a whole. Capital construction must be carried out in accordance with the slogan, "The state and the people, the central and local levels do the work together." In addition to the concentrated capital investment by the state, all sectors and localities have the obligation to mobilize their self-supplied capital and the capital of the cooperatives and people for transforming and widening the production installations and all welfare, cultural, educational and public health projects. The activities of the building sector must be directed toward properly fulfilling the task of reorganizing the building installations, improving the managerial structure in the sector and organizing and raising the professional capacity of cadres and workers so as to ensure and ceaselessly raise the effectiveness and quality of building and to correctly fulfill the state capital construction plan.
INVESTING IN CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS TO BE SELECTIVE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Apr 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Investing in Key Construction Projects"]

[Text] As our capabilities are limited, investing in only key construction projects to ensure fulfilling the key economic tasks is a correct policy that brings about the greatest economic results. The political report of the VCP Central Committee to the Congress pointes out: "Reorganize capital construction to make it more suitable for our capabilities and to guide it toward creating additional favorable conditions for further developing the existing material and technical bases, aiming at the most urgent economic and social goals."

Implementing this policy a number of sectors and localities have begun to reorganize investment in construction. The Ministry of Electric Power puts nearly 90 percent of the total capital into 2 large-scale key projects -- the Hoa Binh hydroelectric power plant and the Pha Lai thermoelectric power plant. The Ministry of Light Industry puts nearly 80 percent of the total capital into 4 key yarn factory projects in Hanoi, Nha Trang, Vinh and Hue and the Vinh Phu paper mill complex. Other ministries have also reduced by 5-10 projects from their original plans. Hai Hung and Ben Tre Provinces and Haiphong have reduced by nearly half of the projects as compared with the number of projects last year, etc. Investing capital in key projects has led to a concentration of materials, means and labor and made organization, management and leadership over construction stronger. Building and assembly plans can thus be carried out more easily with their goals being attained and surpassed. However, there are still quite a few places where investment is scattered. One province had only 12.6 million dong of capital but made investment in 62 projects. Another province where several construction projects had been left unfinished because of a lack of materials started dozens of new ones. One ministry, in spite of limited capital, invested in 88 projects above its rank. In the above-mentioned units, it turns out that a project receives a few hundreds of thousands of dong of capital only. Such projects surely are in no position to be carried out in a concentrated, quick, neat and coordinated manner; the labor force is indirectly affected as it grows larger because of the need to have people to manage and take care of the scattered materials and means.
With scattered investment and no calculation of results, almost all sectors and units organize their own construction force. Not only a ministry assumes the combined function of establishing a construction and assembly corporation but also a corporation dealing in vegetables and fruits has also established a construction enterprise. By actual count over 20 ministries and general departments have their own construction forces. In many provinces, almost all services have organized construction and assembly units. Labor productivity is low. Means and equipment are underused. The Hanoi area alone has more than 40 construction corporations; often on one street there are 4 or 5 construction jobs that are not so complicated but 7 or 8 corporations and enterprises from out of town are there to do the work. In the meantime, the local forces of wards and districts capable of handling these jobs must go elsewhere, even the far-away provinces, to make bids for jobs. The waste of fuels, means, materials and labor because of this uncoordinated and duplicated manner of organizing construction work is not small. To reorganize construction labor we cannot help having correct investment plans aimed at the key projects.

As they developed their construction plans, many localities began to carry out quite properly the motto, "The state and the people, the central and local levels work together." Some sectors, localities and local units provided their own capital which was 2-3 times the one invested by the central government in order to step up the building of their material and technical bases. This kind of action deserves encouragement. What needs more interest is no matter what kind of capital is used, the arrangement for a construction project must be considered carefully to comply with the principle of investing in what is more important and in accordance with the overall project and plan. Effectiveness of investment is considered on the basis of an overall view for the interests of the national economy as a whole. Investing another dong of capital in construction should always require some additional materials, fuels and means. Therefore, investing without seriously calculating such factors can very well lead to drawing materials from the key projects and worsening the lack of balance, which finally means all projects may remain unfinished, with great damages caused to the common undertaking.

Effectiveness of construction must be considered from a broad view, from the first to the last job. And being able to select a correct investment plan is the first job of great significance in the use of accumulated capital.
AGRICULTURE

EFFORTS TO BE MADE FOR SUCCESSFUL SUMMER-AUTUMN SEASON

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Apr 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Full Preparations for Summer-Autumn Production Season"]

[Text] The summer-autumn rice season is in the midst of busy seeding and transplanting. This is a season involving an area of more than 700,000 hectares, of which the provinces south of Binh Tri Thien account for the most, except for Nghe Tinh which has about 15,000 hectares. In the Nam Bo provinces, this is a new production season. The provinces in the Mekong River delta are switching from the habit of growing only one crop -- the tenth-month rice -- per year to growing two or three crops along the line of intensive cultivation and multicropping.

The summer-autumn rice season offers favorable natural conditions: enough water and plenty of light. Many "leafhopper-resistant" and high-yield varieties have adapted themselves and are being grown in larger areas. After 6 years the season has become more and more stable. Medium and small water conservancy works now under construction are the material and technical base that ensures a new production season. In the past hundreds of thousands of hectares of summer-autumn rice in some years had been a total loss because of early flood, but in 1980 although the flood was serious, only 30,000 hectares were lost thanks to the construction of embankments and drainage systems. If we can overcome drought early in the season and flood in the middle and at the end of the season, we will have a great possibility to extend the cultivated areas and to practice intensive cultivation to raise the crop yield.

For multicropping the summer-autumn rice is mainly grown in the ricefields where the winter-spring rice is grown. In the areas where only one rice crop -- a long-term variety -- is grown per year (no growing in the winter-spring season because of lack of water) we should plant two short-term rice crops: the summer-autumn rice and the late tenth-month rice. This possibility has been proved by actual planting. Binh Tri Thien Province in 1981 had some cooperatives that obtained an average of more than 4 tons of summer-autumn paddy in an area of 2,300 hectares. In some years the southern provinces harvested tens of thousands of tons of paddy more than what their plans had called for in that season.
This year work on the summer-autumn season is being under many favorable conditions. The rainy season arrives early. Good preparations are made for the "leafhopper-resistant" rice variety. There are materials, particularly chemical fertilizer and insecticide, in acceptably sufficient quantities. The plowing machine teams are consolidated one step further.

The best schedule for this rice season is to seed and to transplant in such a way that harvest will take place at the end of July or early August. Late harvesting will encounter rains and flooding, and there will not be time enough for planting the tenth-month rice. In the areas that encounter water difficulties and must wait for rain water, the schedule for seeding and transplanting of the summer-autumn rice is 15 May as the latest date.

To encourage everybody to grow an additional rice crop we must implement correct policies to ensure the interests of both producers and the state. As far as organization is concerned, we must continue to build and gradually consolidate the rice-growing areas where high yield is obtained, make appropriate investment in these areas to ensure stable production and at the same time pay appropriate attention to other rice-growing areas.

Although to have another grain season is not very much, this represents an important success of agriculture, which currently is the topmost front in terms of importance.

5598
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THIRD WEEDING DONE FOR RICE CROP IN NORTHERN PROVINCES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Apr 82 p 1

[Article: "The North: Third Weeding Done in 430,000 Hectares of Rice Crop; the South: Urgently Working for Summer and Autumn and Tenth-Month Rice Crops"]

[Text] According to the Statistics General Department and Ministry of Agriculture, as of 15 April, the northern provinces have completed the third weeding for 430,000 hectares of fifth-month and spring rice, an increase of 10,000 hectares as compared with the same time last year. Ha Nam Ninh and Hai Hung Provinces did the third weeding in more than 60 percent of their rice-growing areas; Thai Binh in more than 80 percent. The rice plants in the fields that had been weeded in time were growing nicely as there were thunderstorm rains and sunshine. In some areas where the rice had been planted late, the growth was not uniform. The cooperatives inspected the fields, put rice plants in groups of good and poor growth, looked for harmful insects so as to concentrate on caring for them and fertilizing and to enhance uniform growth and destroyed the insects they found. As compared with what had been 10 days before, the areas affected by harmful insects increased by 61,000 hectares; in addition to rice leaf rollers and leafhoppers there was rice blast that harmed the rice plants. In scattered areas some high ricefields still lacked water.

In the South, almost all winter-spring rice plants headed uniformly and ripened all at the same time. Harvesting was done quickly and neatly by localities to avoid damages caused by rains. The provinces have so far harvested 50 percent of the cultivated areas, with Ben Tre, Tien Giang and Kien Giang having harvested 80 percent and higher. Long An harvested more than 90 percent of its cultivated area. The estimated yield was quite good and surpassed the planned goal in many provinces: An Giang 45 quintals per hectare, Dong Thap 40 and Tien Giang 30.

The southern provinces have been urgently working for the summer-autumn and tenth-month seasons since there were lots of rains which came earlier than in the previous years. They have so far plowed 234,000 hectares and transplanted rice seedlings in 32,000 hectares. Of the latter figure the provinces south of Thuan
Hai have accounted for nearly 30,000 hectares. The provinces in the Mekong River delta did the first plowing for the tenth-month rice in 112,000 hectares and transplanted the early rice seedlings in more than 3,000 hectares.

The Ministry of Agriculture reminds the northern localities that they should attach importance to inspecting the fields to uncover any harmful insects for the sake of prevention and control, preventing drought at the end of the season and assuming tight leadership over applying fertilizer to rice plants before and during the time they are in boot in order to increase their yield and to avoid infestation and damage by harmful insects. They should strengthen the care and protection of vegetables, subsidiary food crops and industrial plants in the spring season. The provinces in the highlands should quickly complete their corn- and manioc-growing plans. They should check the quantities and quality of tenth-month rice seeds, pay attention to the varieties used in low areas and fight brown leafhoppers.

The southern provinces must quickly and neatly harvest the winter-spring rice crop; complete the water conservancy and ricefield-building projects; and properly distribute gasoline and oil, fertilizers, insecticide and vehicle and machine spare parts so as to step up rice and subsidiary food production in the summer-autumn and tenth-month season.

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GROWING SUBSIDIARY FOOD CROPS TO BE FURTHER STEPPED UP

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 16 Apr 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Clearing up Confusion and Doubts To Step up Growing of Subsidiary Food Crops"]

[Text] There still is much possibility for us to extend the areas for growing subsidiary grain crops, which are grown in dry soil, by means of multicropping in the delta and both multicropping and opening of new land in the midlands and highlands. To ensure satisfying the need for grain of more than 50 million people now and 60 million people by 1985, with the existing rice-growing areas and the ones to be developed but still inadequate, we cannot help raising the proportion of subsidiary food crops in the grain crop cultivation pattern. Subsidiary grain crops also contribute to developing animal husbandry (processing of feed), serving some industrial sectors (processing of liquor and alcohol) and export (tapioca). The 5th Party Congress resolution concludes: "To devote total energy to development of both rice and subsidiary food crops" so as to raise the volume of grain production.

In the second 5-year plan, grain production is to be increased at the average annual rate of 4.5 percent, including 2.5 and 18.2 percent for rice and subsidiary food crops converted to paddy equivalent, respectively. These figures prove that as we actively increase the areas and yields of rice, a precious grain crop now grown in the largest area and showing much potential increase of yield, it is correct to follow the direction of vigorously increasing subsidiary food crops since they make an important contribution to quickly increasing grain production and satisfying society's dietary needs. The provinces that have many hills and mountains like Lam Dong, Dong Nai, Son La, Lai Chau and Binh Tri Thien have grown subsidiary food crops accounting for 40-60 percent of the grain crop cultivation pattern. Thanks to multicropping, some delta provinces like Hai Hung and Ben Tre have quickly increased subsidiary food crops. More achievements will be scored in subsidiary food production if proper importance is attached to intensive cultivation and increase of crop yield. Although the subsidiary grain crops are supposed to offer high yields -- corn can provide 30-40 quintals and sweet potato, potato and manioc 150-200 quintals per hectare -- the actual yields of many such crops in all these years have remained low: corn yield was fluctuating at the level of 10-11
quintals, sweet potato 50 quintals and manioc 70-80 quintals per hectare. Many subsidiary food crop-growing areas remain unfertilized. Many difficulties are not fully resolved by the sectos concerned, including organization of harvest, purchases, transportation, processing and consumption, and as a result subsidiary food crops are not put into reserves nor become commodities; production effectiveness is poorer than in the case of some other crops; and farmers in a number of localities, particularly the ones that have enough grain for their own consumption, do not like to grow these crops. Subsidiary food crops are being restricted in terms of development and seem to be decreasing.

The directive about the third 5-year plan as pointed out by the 5th Party Congress is to raise the production converted to paddy equivalent of subsidiary food crops to 3-3.5 million tons by 1985 so as to have a volume of grain production of 19-20 million tons, i.e., to achieve average annual increases at the rate of 4 percent for cultivated area and 5 percent for output. The annual average output of subsidiary food crops in this 5-year plan must increase by nearly 1 million tons converted to paddy equivalent as compared with that in the preceding 5-year plan.

As to the subsidiary grain crops, we can either set up specialized-crop zones to grow them or have different families grow them in a scattered manner and open new land to extend the cultivated areas while using the existing land to grow them as additional crops. Since all localities have different natural conditions and customs, they should choose an appropriate cultivation pattern of their own rather than a uniform one. For subsidiary grain crops the possibility of growing additional crops is very great because their growth period is short and they can be grown in the spring, winter and summer-autumn crop seasons in accordance with a crop rotation system that suits each locality.

Since they are crops that are grown in dry soil, mostly in the land having some grade, hence a high degree of erosion, if we do not practice intensive cultivation and fertilize the soil, not only the yields will not increase but also the fertility of the soil will be reduced and in the long run the soil will be depleted, laterized and parched. Consequently, any localities that grow subsidiary food crops must pay attention to soil restoration for their ricefields, hilly and upland fields. To apply the technical progresses that have been determined as suitable for each crop, to apply them in a uniform manner and to create the necessary material and technical base is necessary to gradually raise and stabilize crop yields. To use stable and green manure made on the spot to fertilize subsidiary food crops and to adopt a rational crop rotation system, particularly in the case of leguminous plants, is to make the soil more fertile everyday for subsidiary food crops.

In the development of subsidiary food crops as products for self-sufficiency of individual areas to become commodities that are part of the distribution of products
in society as a whole, the greatest difficulty is to combine production with purchase, processing, transportation and consumption. The agricultural, grain, food, industrial, commercial and communications and transportation sectors must closely coordinate their activities and participate in resolving the question of subsidiary food crops in a timely and effective manner if they want to quickly raise the output of these crops and to contribute to resolving the grain problem for society as a whole.

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AGRICULTURE

LOCALITIES, SECTORS URGED TO BOOST SOYBEAN PRODUCTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Apr 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Vigorous Development of Soybean"]

[Text] Soybean has long been grown in all parts of our country, from the delta and mislands to the highlands. From 1954 to 1960, the North exported it in the form of seeds, but the quantities were rather small. However, soybean has never been grown on a large scale. It is limited in the traditional zones: it is planted in the land solely used for subsidiary food crops, in new alluvial soil, upland field and hilly land. In reality, it is considered a secondary crop plant within cooperatives and families. Since there have been no technical progresses in connection with seeds, prevention and control of harmful insects and arrangement of planting season, its yield is low; and with insufficient awareness of soybean the cultivated area and production, which remain small, tend to decrease even more.

Since late 1979 or early 1980 the awareness of the role of soybean has been growing. As it is compatible with the soil, climate and weather conditions of different areas, it can be widely distributed to take advantage of the natural conditions of our country. It supplies an important amount of protein in the diet of our people and for development of animal husbandry and serves as raw material of the food industry. Along with other plants of the legume family, soybean is a short-term crop that can be grown many times in a year and helps to improve the soil. It is an export product that has a large, lasting and stable market.

Soybean production is being on the rise. In 1980 it was grown in 48,000 hectares; and in 1981 this figure rose to 75,000, nearly twice the area of the previous year. Its yield rose from 5-8 quintals per hectare to 7 quintals in 1980 and 7.5 quintals in 1981.

Growing more soybean does not affect the cultivated areas of other crops in our country. It is grown mainly in the fields where only one rice crop is grown and the land is left fallow during the fifth-month and spring rice season; in the land
that is used to grow one subsidiary food crop and one rice crop; and in the fields solely used for subsidiary food crops and short-term industrial plants, or where favorable conditions allow growing additional crops between two rice crops. Therefore, the possibility of extending the cultivated areas is quite great. With technical progresses related to seeds, we now have varieties that offer high yield and grow within 70-120 days, others that tolerate moisture and relatively low temperatures, etc.; therefore, it is possible to extend the cultivated areas and to raise soybean yield within a relatively short time. The Fifth Party Congress decided that "soybean must be widely grown" and that by 1985 we should try to get a production of at least from 250,000 to 300,000 tons of seeds in order to prepare for better performance in the years to follow. These are the norms that are within our ability to fulfill but at a greater speed, which requires that all sectors and echelons make very great efforts and take synchronized measures.

In each locality of a region, arrangement must be made in terms of production base and appropriate crop rotation and multicropping to have a soybean-growing plan within the crop-growing plan and at the same time to determine steady steps to be made in each season and each year. In the third 5-year plan, we primarily use the varieties that have been definitely selected for different seasons and areas and at the same time prepare for conditions that allow producing new varieties that have greater adjusting capacity and offer higher yield. We must be sure to use 1 hectare to produce seeds for every 10-15 hectares of main-crop soybean growing. As we harvest soybean, we often have rains and generally high level of air moisture and, therefore, must have processing, drying and storage facilities in order to ensure good quality of seeds.

Although soybean can fix nitrogen in the soil, if we want to get high yield, we must need the things that the technical plan calls for, such as fertilizers, insecticide and water.

To quickly extend the cultivated areas we must have a close coordination among many sectors -- agriculture, industry, distribution and circulation. The Fifth Party Congress pointed out that "there must be a policy of encouraging development." All organs must be responsible for considering early and adopting rational policies, particularly the ones having to do with investment, prices, purchases, etc., and encourage collective production units and farmers and their families to actively apply technical progresses so as to extend the soybean-growing areas, to practice intensive cultivation to increase the yield and to reach the goal set in the plan for soybean production.
AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

DONG-NAI SUMMER-FALL RICE--Taking advantage of early rainfalls, peasants in Dong Nai Province have actively accelerated the cultivation of various kinds of summer-fall crops. To date they have planted summer-fall rice on 4,500 hectares or 35 percent of the planned acreage. [BK190939 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 14 May 82 BK]

DONG THAP GRAIN COLLECTION--As of 12 May, Dong Thap Province had collected more than 93,000 tons of grain. This figure, which represents some 62 percent of the annual grain collection norm, includes more than 18,000 tons collected in the form of agricultural tax. [BK190939 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 15 May 82 BK]

CSO: 4209/349
HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

HUYNH TAN PHAT ADDRESSES CONFERENCE ON CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION

Hanoi XAY DUNG in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 82 pp 1-3, 33

[Article based on opinions expressed by Huynh Tan Phat, Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers, at a conference on the organization and management of local capital construction in the north: "Gradually and Comprehensively Achieve the Contents of Capital Construction Management"]

[Text] On the basis of recapitulating the experience of the past several decades in the management of capital construction, and on the basis of the direction of improving the management of capital construction in order to enter into the achievement of the socialist commercial management mode and the capital construction management statutes promulgated by the government, which set forth the main principles to serve as basis for researching the amendment, supplement, and completion of the entire system of new regulations regarding the management of capital construction and overcoming the present situation of cost-reimbursement administrative management in capital construction.

Now, after the completion of the research and promulgation of 19 documents accompanying the capital construction management statutes, in accordance with Directive 32-CT of the Council of Ministers, we will concretize the management principles and modes set forth in the statutes by means of the regulations guiding all investment activities in capital construction investment from the central level to the local level, in the spheres of construction of the state, the collective, and the people. Thus we have begun to form a system of laws in the sphere of capital construction to serve as a means of effectively serving the management of capital construction during coming years.

Many opinions of the localities and sectors expressed during this conference have been very valuable to the State Capital Construction Commission and the state organs responsible for researching the drafting of the 19 above-mentioned documents to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for promulgation.

The promulgated management statutes were a foundation stone of the task of advancing to the perfection of the socialist commercial management structure in capital construction. That new management mode demands that we reorganize production and rectify the organization of management so that it can be appropriate. That was the central problem discussed by the conference, which reached a high degree of unanimity with regard to many points. Capital construction at both the
central level and the local level is a sphere which has a very broad inter-sector nature and is related to many spheres in the economic-social life of the localities. It demands concentrated management based on a rational division of labor and decentralization, in order to quickly bring an end to the situation of construction organization and the production of construction materials being too dispersed and fragmentary and lacking unified, all-round management in the sphere of the province, municipality, precinct, and district.

At the central and local levels, the prompt perfecting and improving of the activities of the organs fulfilling joint management functions with regard to capital construction is one of the urgent requirements to help the state and the people's committees at the various levels fully understand the capital construction management statutes and organize management in accordance with the statutes in all sectors and at all echelons.

I. Gradually and Comprehensively Carrying Out the Contents of Capital Construction Management in the Provincial, Municipal, and District Spheres

The strengthening of unified management of some aspects in the sphere of the provinces and municipalities has the following very urgent characteristics:

1. Management of Construction Planning:

In the management of capital construction the first link is plan management (including design planning), that task follows economic zoning and the distribution of production forces and is based on joint construction plans.

Under our conditions, because full basic studies have not been made and we have not fulfilled the plan to distribute the production forces throughout the country, there is no basis on which to zone the basic economic areas, but it is necessary to draft provincial and municipal construction plans. Prior to the time when there were over-all provincial and municipal plans we had to draft specific plans for the functional sectors, or had to provide specific construction sites. All aspects of planning must be carried out simultaneously, and it is not necessary to wait for one plan before drafting another plan, and the over-all plan must not be separated from the specific plans, for it is the next step at a certain ratio.

The management of construction according to plan is the responsibility of the organ exercising over-all management of construction; at the central level it is managed by the State Capital Construction Commission and at the local level it is managed by the provincial or municipal capital construction committees.

Decision 35-CP made the following division of labor: at the central level the State Capital Construction Commission has the function of managing construction in the sphere of the nation and directly drafting the over-all plans of the municipalities directly under the central echelon, the important tourist and economic areas, the industrial areas, etc., while the remaining tasks related to construction planning in the sphere of the province or municipality are undertaken by the localities. If the provinces are not yet capable of drafting plans they must build up their own forces and advance to working with the guidance and assistance of the State Capital Construction Commission or the assistance of the other provinces.
With regard to all construction projects in the localities, the provincial and municipal people's committees have authority and responsibility for selecting sites in accordance with the architectural and aesthetic plans and requirements of the municipalities and the factors regarding environmental protection.

The provinces must also promptly draft plans for their key districts. The State Capital Construction Commission must carry out the central level's key districts.

2. Design management:

Our weak links at present are that the planning of capital construction investment is not yet carried out well and that the same is true with regard to preparations for investment. According to the Statutes, beginning in 1982 there must be economic-technical justifications for the construction projects. The Council of Ministers is responsible for reviewing the economic-technical justifications, for the all of the important projects approved by the Council of Ministers are related to the strategic missions and economic line of the Party and state, of which the State Planning Commission is the staff in that regard (in accordance with Decree 35-CP), with the advice of the State Capital Construction Commission.

In the localities, as stated in the circular explaining the statutes regarding capital construction management, it is appropriate for the provincial capital construction section (or committee) to assist the review council, for the economic-technical justification encompasses many spheres of capital construction management for which the local administration is directly responsible, such as planning, the construction site, architecture, construction techniques, the foundation structure, etc., and not merely with regard to capital investment, for with regard to planning the localities are responsible for concretizing the plan balances the State Planning Commission has worked out with them.

All construction projects must be located in the localities, so if the localities do not exercise management with regard to architectural designing there will be adverse consequences. Therefore, one provincial and municipal people's committees are responsible for the above-mentioned planning aspects and for the architectural designing of all projects, including those constructed in the provinces and municipalities with capital provided by the central echelon.

3. Construction Economics Management (unit prices, norms, and estimates):

Unit prices, norms, and estimates are at present a major concern. The State Capital Construction Commission will go all-out to, along with the ministries, sectors, and localities, do a good job of carrying out those tasks and fulfill those requirements rapidly and accurately. Therefore, the provincial and municipal people's committees must provide close guidance and rely on their staff organs, the provincial and municipal capital construction sections (or committees).

With regard to cost estimates based on the new system of wholesale prices, the State Capital Construction Commission, having reached agreement with the State Price Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the other relevant organs, has submitted a report to the Council of Ministers so that it could stipulate the general increase ratios. The localities capable of doing so must compare their costs with the general unit prices and may recalculate the cost ratios. Before promulgating them they must seek the advice of the State Capital Construction Commission.
The determination of new unit prices is an extremely urgent task which requires the localities to concentrate on carrying it out so that it can be completed as soon as possible and in order to ensure the rationality and accuracy of the set of new unit prices.

The State Capital Construction Commission drafted a plan to provide professional training and guidance so that that task could be completed in 1988.

With regard to the cost estimate management regulations (applying the new wholesale price system), the State Capital Construction Commission held discussions with the functional ministries and the ministries with construction forces, in order to promulgate a complete set of new unit prices (regulations regarding secondary construction expenses, design costs, other expenditures among the cost estimates, etc.).

In balancing their 1981 books (beginning on 1 October 1981), many localities carried out that task under the guidance of the State Capital Construction Commission and completed it by the end of the year.

4. Construction Quality Management:

As stated in the report of the Capital Construction Commission, during recent years the quality of construction projects has steadily declined, with regard to the various kinds of industrial projects as well as the civilian projects, the communications and water conservancy projects, etc. Many projects are of poor quality, are unsafe, and unattractive architecturally.

The principal reasons are that quality control of the projects have not received attention and has been relaxed, and the situation of neglect and carelessness in designing and construction as well as in the approval of designs and even with regard to the architectural form.

At the same time, we have not yet been able to organize a good apparatus to control the quality of projects from the central level down to the local level. At the local level, there are no quality control elements at most of the corporations and construction sites, or if there are such elements their activities are very weak and ineffective.

The localities must promptly organize control apparatus and inspect construction quality down to the construction site level, with specific division of labor and decentralization. They must continually gain experience with regard to project quality (good projects, bad projects, etc. As far as the state is concerned, the State Capital Construction Commission is preparing to hold a conference on construction quality. The sectors and localities are responsible for helping the Commission and the relevant organs do a good job of preparing for that conference.

5. Scientific-Technical Management:

In order to do a good job of serving construction management and fulfill the above-mentioned management requirements, we must pay attention to scientific-technical management as well as to the application of advances in construction science and
technology to production, from designing to construction and the production of construction materials.

In order to fulfill the requirements of scientific-technical management and introduce new techniques to production and construction, the localities must be concerned with the corps of cadres doing scientific-technical work and continually cultivate, and do a good job of using, them in order to have a corps of scientific-technical cadres who are numerous and skilled in their specialties. To do so is to ensure the fulfilling of all requirements regarding the quality of construction and promoting technical advances in construction.

II. Other Important Tasks

1. Preparing for investment: The local capital construction sections must coordinate with the provincial and municipal planning committees in studying a capital construction investment plan in the 1981-1985 period, selecting lists of key projects in the localities, guiding the drafting of economic-technical justifications, and organizing the review of economic-technical justifications in order to prepare for the 1982 capital construction plan (the contents of economic-technical justifications will be promulgated in the coming period).

2. With regard to plan drafting, the provinces and municipalities must promptly complete over-all draft plans to submit for approval by the government, accompanied by study of regulations or rules that are appropriate to each locality. In managing production plans it is necessary to organize inspection teams to closely manage construction according to plan, in both the state sector and the collective and people's construction sectors.

3. With regard to organization, it is necessary to strengthen the provincial and municipal capital construction capital construction committees and the capital construction management elements in the districts and villages so that they can do a good job of fulfilling their administrative-economic management function in the sphere of capital construction, and take steps to train cadres in the system of capital construction management apparatus so that they can grasp the construction policies and regulations, while also propagandizing and explaining so that the people can clearly understand and correctly carry out the construction regulations.

In organizing construction, the State Capital Construction Commission will coordinate with the relevant organs in reorganizing production in each province and district so that it can be rational. It is necessary to consolidate the specialized production organizations (civilian, water conservation, and communications) and be concerned with organizing construction forces at the district level in order to build for the state while also building for the cooperatives and the people. The localities must pay attention to finding appropriate forms and measures to tightly manage construction in the agricultural cooperatives and for the people.
MEKONG DELTA FOOD INDUSTRY TO STRESS SUGARCANE, VEGETABLE OIL

Hanoi TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHQA HOC in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 82 pp 21-23


[Text] Along with the agricultural sector and the other sectors, the food industry sector produces products to serve the people’s diet, national defense, and export.

In the process of fulfilling that mission, in addition to developing the economy and the sector’s science and technology, we must be concerned with developing the local economy, especially the areas with land appropriate for growing and developing food industry crops, such as the Mekong Delta. That is a large area with relatively flat terrain and with rather favorable climate, soil, and other natural conditions. Its rivers, streams, canals, and roads greatly facilitate water transportation. Those are basic conditions which assist the zoning of concentrated, stabilized raw materials areas and the organization of a food processing network.

Participation in the scientific-technical program to meet the requirements of economic development in the Mekong Delta also creates conditions for us to carry out a number of research projects and apply over a large area the advanced techniques that are developed in the food industry sector. The economic development of the Mekong Delta also creates conditions for maintaining and developing the production of a number of specialized food industry sectors in the south.

In actuality, we have strongly promoted the research projects and completed the draft agenda of technical advances to be included in the 1981-1985 plan. The contents of that agenda will concentrate on the following matters:

I. The Growing and Processing of Sugarcane

Sugarcane has high utilization value in the food industry and in many other industrial sectors. Prior to the 1970's sugarcane was grown on a concentrated basis in such eastern Nam Bo provinces as Song Be, Dong Nai, and Tay Ninh, around Ho Chi Minh City, etc. But since then its cultivation has been spread to nine Mekong Delta provinces. Output and area have steadily increased. If in 1976 there
were only 23,420 hectares, by 1980 the sugarcane area had increased to 57,560 hectares and output had increased to 2,590,200 tons of sugarcane. Despite such obstacles as low-lying terrain, many areas being waterlogged for long periods of time, and high-alum soil, including some places with saline soil, sugarcane has continued to grow and develop rapidly. In the Mekong Delta it is also possible to use such facilities as junks, boats, motorized barges, motorboats, motorized vehicles, and nonmotorized vehicles to transport sugarcane to the places of processing.

The peasants of western Nam Bo have also accumulated much experience in growing and processing sugarcane. If in 1977 there were about 799 manual sugar mills in nine provinces; by 1981 there were 2,198 sugar mills in six provinces (not counting An Giang, Kien Giang, and Minh Hai). Such products as brown sugar, coarse white sugar, chunk brown sugar, and cask sugar are widely sold on the southern market.

In the south, the Ministry of Food Industry has a modern installation to research sugarcane seedstock, sugar mills, and sugar refineries. Over the course of many years the Ben Cat Sugarcane Research Station has researched and grown 285 varieties of sugarcane. In the course of experimentation and selection, there have been developed a number of promising varieties, such as NCO 310 and C0715, which are being grown in several eastern provinces; F156, which produces good yields and has good sugar content (if well cultivated it can yield 80 to 90 tons per hectare), and the residue ratio is 12 to 14 percent; VD94-143 and F134, recently introduced from the north; HN56-12, which has a rapid growth rate (in 6 months, it reaches a height of more than 3 meters; MY55-14 and Ir 60-5, high-yield varieties imported from Cuba, etc. During the coming period it is necessary to carry out a survey of the sugarcane varieties being grown in the Mekong Delta, combined with the experimental growing of a number of varieties, so that they can be monitored and selected in the course of the research, after ways have been found to adapt and crossbreed them and there are appropriate cultivation and vegetation protection conditions, in order to create a sugarcane variety structure appropriate to low-lying, waterlogged, and high-alum land and to the climate there. The struggle goal is to attain an average output of more than 45 tons per hectare by 1985.

With regard to processing, the Ministry of Food Industry has the Binh Duong sugar mill with a capacity of 1,500 tons of sugarcane per day; the Hiep Hoa sugar mill, with a capacity of 1,500 tons of sugarcane per day, and two modern sugar refining installations: the Bien Hoa refinery with a capacity of 60,000 tons per year, and the Khanh Hoa refinery, with a capacity of 45,000 tons per year. It is now constructing a number of new installations. The existing installations alone require a volume of raw materials that includes 800,000 tons of sugarcane and 105,000 tons of coarse sugar per year.

In order to meet the requirements of economic development in general and those of the food industry sector specifically, it is necessary to find the right policies regarding raw materials and products in order to increase the volume of products for export and domestic consumption. The policy of developing the growing of sugar sugarcane and producing goods for export is one of the sector's principal policies. However, in order to develop sugarcane growing and build installations to process sugar it is necessary to invest a large volume of capital, materials, and equipment, principally equipment designed and manufactured in our country.
An appropriate amount of land in the Mekong Delta can be set aside to grow sugar-cane. The factors of land, soil, climate, transportation, manpower, and cultivation conditions in the Mekong Delta are sufficient to grow sugar-cane and develop its processing.

In organizing the processing of sugar from sugar-cane we have weighed and carefully discussed a number of conditions and factors in order to select a policy toward processing. Among those conditions and factors were the following: Because sugar-cane is grown and developed in large area encompassing nine provinces, so the volume of sugar-cane that must be cut and transported so that it can be processed is very great. Assuming that by 1985 we can devote 500,000 hectares to growing sugar-cane, with an average yield of 45 tons per hectare, we will have to transport 22.5 million tons of sugar-cane in the shortest possible time, for 1 day after sugar-cane is harvested 2.7 percent of its sugar is lost; after 2 days 8 percent is lost, and after 3 days as much as 21 percent of the sugar content is lost. Thus there cannot be sufficient facilities to transport the sugar-cane from the west to the east, and the existing enterprises cannot manufacture sufficient facilities in time. Therefore, the policy with regard to processing during the 1961-1985 5-year period will be essentially to develop small industry sugar installations with a capacity of 30 tons of sugar-cane a day. If greater capacity is desired, we will install two or three additional sets of equipment to achieve a capacity of 60 to 90 tons of sugar-cane a day. They will be located in sugar-cane areas far from the large sugar mills. They will produce granulated sugar, lump sugar, molasses, and cask sugar for domestic consumption. Some of the cask sugar sent to the large sugar mills to be refined for export.

Accompanying the sugar mills will be installations to produce alcohol with capacities of 100,000, 3 million, or 5 million liters of alcohol per year in order to fully utilize the sugar-cane residue.

Our Ministry has assigned to the Design Institute the task of designing that equipment, including packaging equipment, and has assigned its manufacture to the machine-building enterprises. During the past several years we have equipped a number of localities, each time gaining supplementary experience and making adjustments. The only thing remaining to be done with regard to the main part of the research is to adjust the design one more time, manufacture the equipment, and install and operate it at a test installation so that it can be installed on a large scale. That technical advance can be disseminated to the provinces of Hau Giang, Ben Tre, Cuu Long, Dong Thap, Kien Giang, etc. The number of installations and their locations will continue to be discussed. The remaining problem with regard to the sugar equipment systems is that the ratio of sugar recovery and the quality of sugar are not yet high (one ton of sugar per 19–20 tons of sugar-cane). We have included further adjustments in our research plan. In the future the manufacture of equipment may be assigned to strong local machine-building enterprises or by machine-building enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City, with the cooperation of the army's machine-building factories.

II. The Processing of Cooking Oil (Vegetable Oil).

Fat, along with carbohydrates and protein, is one of the three principal components of our diet. We still produce too little fat to meet the requirements of our
people's diet and of export. The growing of oil-bearing crops to process into cooking oil and the exploitation of the existing processing installations is an essential matter. The Mekong Delta has natural conditions favorable for the growth and development of such oil-bearing crops as peanuts, soybeans, coconuts, and other crops. At present all nine provinces grow such crops but because there is no unified plan their production is dispersed, and yields are low and not uniform. Harvesting, preliminary processing and storage depend on private individuals and the customs in each area. Therefore, although the statistical numbers are large the amount of raw materials purchased is small and utilization value is also low.

The Southern Cooking Oil Combine has a number of modern oil-producing enterprises with a total capacity of 36,000 tons of refined oil per year. The Nha Be enterprise has a capacity of 48,000 tons a year, the Tuong An enterprise has a capacity of 18,000 tons a year, etc. But at present they can only operate at one-tenth of their capacity because they lack raw materials.

There are two principal phases in the processing of oil:

In the first phase the unrefined oil is obtained by pressing or extracted. In this phase simple, nonmechanized equipment or the various kinds of modern machinery may be used. The second phase is the refining and production of such vegetable oil products as salad oil, margarine, shortening, etc. In this phase, only if modern equipment and advanced processing techniques are used can good quality and a high oil utilization rate be attained.

On the basis of the actual raw materials situation and the sector's existing material-technical conditions, we foresee the course of development of cooking oil processing during the 5-year plan as being the establishment of many small-scale and medium-scale oil-pressing installations with capacities of from 1,000 to 2,000 tons of raw materials a year in the areas which grow oil-bearing crops on a concentrated basis, in order to process as much as unrefined oil as possible for export or to be refined. The Ministry of Food Industry has assigned to organs within the Ministry the designing and manufacturing of that equipment, which can be widely used in the localities. We plan to construct a number of installations in the provinces of Ben Tre, Cuu Long, and Dong Thap. The other places will exchange opinions and hold discussions in order to determine the volume of oil-bearing crops and carry out basic studies regarding natural conditions. That method of implementation will have many advantages and be economical: we can fully utilize raw materials scattered about in many places with the investment of little capital; it is appropriate to the local machine-building enterprises' ability to manufacture equipment, it can be carried out rapidly, and there can be a large quantity of unrefined oil to supply to the existing oil refining enterprises so that they can fully utilize their capacities. The refined oil can be exported. Furthermore, along with the oil-pressing mills there can be built factories to process such food products as soybean sauce, dipping sauce, soybean curd, animal feed, soap, soap powder etc., in the form of clusters of food-processing factories which form combines. By that method of growing and cultivating we can carry out the policy of simultaneously developing the central economy and building up the local economy, thus enabling the two sectors to positively assist each other.
In the sphere of research, we believe that it is necessary to carry out studies of the various cocoanut varieties, especially the tall cocoanut trees and the dwarf cocoanut trees, and the other high-yield varieties in the Mekong Delta. We must determine their yields, quality, and suitable conditions in order to have a basis on which to select varieties, zone their cultivation, and advance to cross-breeding and pure-breeding a number of recently imported varieties, in order to have a good variety structure. At the same time, we must survey and experimentally grow a number of oil-bearing crop varieties in order to determine which conditions and areas are appropriate for such crops and the techniques for harvesting and preliminarily processing them.

In the sphere of technical advances, in addition to mills to press crude oil we may stress the building of plants to produce fermented dipping sauce in order to fully utilize the residue of soybeans and peanuts after they have been pressed to obtain oil, on the scale of 600,000 to 1.2 million liters a year of dipping sauce that is 15 to 18 percent protein or 300 to 600 tons a year in the case of thick soybean sauce.

In order to contribute to the harvesting and preliminary processing of soybeans and mung beans, as well as a number of other grain food crops appropriate to areas with much rain or which must be purchased in large quantities when it is fresh and moist, the Ministry of Food Industry has a developed model drying machine with a capacity of 2.5 tons an hour (about 20 tons per shift) which uses such local fuels as rice husks, bean shells, etc., and reduces moisture content by about 6 percent (from 20 percent to 14 percent). The complete machine weighs 23 tons and costs 150,000 tons. All such machines produced in our country have been operating for 3 years in the Central Highlands.

The processing of foodstuffs in the localities includes many other varied problems: the production of confections, the processing of vegetables and fruit, the processing of meat and fish, salt-making, the production of soft drinks, etc. But in the 1981-1985 5-year plan we are dealing with only two problems: sugar produced from sugarcanes and the pressing of crude oil, and the related problems of producing alcohol from sugar residue, plants to produce food products (bean cakes, thick soybean sauce, soybean curds, and dipping sauce), and kernel-drying equipment. When there are conditions for doing so, the other products and the other forms of processing will be discussed specifically with the localities, for such technical that have been applied to actual production conditions and have attained economic and technical effectiveness. Nearly all such equipment is manufactured in our country, which facilitates its development. When working with the localities we will unify the specific measures in order to ensure that those technical advances are applied to actual production and contribute to developing the economy and improving the people's living conditions, especially in the Mekong Delta provinces.
'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL HAILS WOMEN'S CONGRESS

BK211305 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 20 May 82

[NHAN DAN 21 May editorial: "The New Developmental Step of the Women's Movement"]

[Text] The Fifth Congress of Vietnamese Women has concluded successfully. The congress unanimously approved the political report of the Women's Union Central Committee and a draft project for amending the union's regulations and action program for the 1981-85 period.

The new executive committee of the union consists of active members well experienced in the women's movement and of many outstanding women under the campaign to build new women for national construction and defense. The success of the congress marks a new developmental step of the women's movement in our country.

On behalf of the party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, Comrade Pham Van Dong, at the congress, analyzed the revolutionary situation and tasks of our country in the light of the Fifth Congress of our party, pointing out the fundamental party viewpoints on women's issue and on the task of motivating women and indicating the action guidelines of the union in the new revolutionary stage.

He said: As an heroic and powerful revolutionary body and a great social labor force, Vietnamese women have a high sense of responsibility and determination. There must be an action program from the central down to grassroots level for women to cooperate with the people throughout the country in accelerating the socialist revolution and making very important contributions on all fronts.

The women's union is dutybound to mobilize and help women to develop their collective mastery, make even more contributions to the country and socialism and continually struggle for the liberation of women and the building of new socialist women.

The 7-point action program of the Vietnam Women's Union reflects a thorough understanding of the Fifth Party Congress resolutions. It manifests the will and aspirations of women of all strata who resolve to unite around the party and the state to form a firm and strong bloc unified in both mind and action in order to overcome bravely all difficulties and ordeals, make positive contributions to the construction and defense of the socialist fatherland, and
implement victoriously the guidelines and tasks and the economic and social objectives set forth by the party congress for the coming 5 years.

Through this program, women exercise their collective mastery and their right to equality, and train themselves as new socialist women. With such an action program and implementing the slogan "Everything for the Socialist Fatherland and the People's Happiness" the women's union strives to mobilize women to emulate in productive labor and practicing thrift; encourage their husbands and children to fulfill military obligations; adopt birth control; build new cultural families; raise healthy and good children and organize family life well.

On the productive labor front--especially to produce grain, food products and consumer and export goods--women constitute a very important work force capable of turning out ever more and better products at low production costs for society.

The family economy is part and parcel of the socialist economy. State policies encourage rural women to cooperate with their husbands and and children to expand orchards and fish ponds, grow mulberry for silkworm raising, raise livestock and poultry and develop many other jobs and professions.

Female workers in cities, including civil servants who are assuming many decent jobs, are also our potential in the production of consumer and export goods, and in the expansion of jobs, sectors and services considered as very essential to the people's livelihood. We can actively create more job opportunities and increase the income of families.

Women are a powerful and very important force in the socialist revolution and national defense. Our party, state and people strive to do their best to ensure that women can have the chance to fulfill their duties as workers, wives and mothers, and to care more for their liberation cause.

All party committee echelons are responsible for intensifying leadership over the task of motivating women, making the viewpoints and policies of our party and state toward women understood thoroughly and implemented scrupulously. The women's union should change its scope and method of action to cope with the demands of each circle of women and to foster and train its cadres constantly and comprehensively so that they can surge forward and keep abreast of their new duties.

We resolutely struggle to eliminate all feudalistic habits belittling the role and ability of women, and all paternalistic, arrogant, departmentalist and sectarian behavior.

In the light of the Fifth Party Congress resolutions, with women's rights defined by the constitution and law, and with their mass organizations whose glorious and strong revolutionary traditions are developing increasingly, women in our country are fully conditioned to surge forward constantly and make even greater contributions to building and depending the socialist fatherland.

CSO: 4209/349
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

EDUCATION NEWSPAPER PUBLISHES ARTICLES ON ABUSE OF TEACHERS

Quang Nam-Da Nang Teacher Beaten to Death

Hanoi NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Mar 82 p 2

[Letter in Readers' Opinions column from Pham Hong Linh, Principal of the Duy Vinh Basic General School: "Teacher Nguyen An Passes Away"]

[Text] Teacher Nguyen An, an instructor at the Duy Vinh Basic General School in Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, was beaten in a classroom by Pham Thanh Len on 30 September 1981. During a period of more than 3 months the school had him treated in many hospitals — Duy Xuyen, Hoi An, the Da Nang General Hospital, etc. — but his injuries did not get better. On 19 January 1982 he died at the Da Nang General Hospital from injuries to the brain and lungs.

The death of teacher An was a great loss to his family and to the teachers and students. As for Len, the person who committed that painful crime, he is still beyond the law. After that beating took place he was jailed for a day and after teacher An died he was again arrested, but for some reason was released.

In order to protect the socialist legal system and defend the honor and prestige of the teachers and schools, we urgently recommend that the responsible organs promptly and severely punish the criminals.

Teachers Demand Protection

Hanoi NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Mar 82 p 2

[Letter in Readers' Opinions column from Dao Tien Thi on behalf of the teachers of the Yen Binh Basic General School in Vinh Lac District, Vinh Phu Province: "Teachers Must be Protected"]

[Text] Recently we have heard of many instances of teachers being beaten by hooligans. All of the teachers at our school are extremely angry. Recently there have been similar incidents at our school. Although no blood has yet been shed, they continually insult us, threaten us, throw dirt and rocks at us, provoke us, and pick fights. Most of them are youths 15 to 18 years old (and they win over a number of students in the school). They often gather at the school gate at night to throw dirt and rocks at the teachers' collective housing area. They insult and
throw dirt and rocks at teachers who have to work at night, and on one occasion they pushed a woman teacher into a pond. On another occasion they threw rocks into a classroom that was in session.

Such incidents occur not only in our school but also in many other schools in the area. We urgently recommend that the education management echelons hold discussions with the relevant sectors and take steps to immediately put an end to that situation in order to protect the teachers and ensure the quality of education. Hooligans who perpetrate such barbarous acts as in the Xuan Quang incident (Bac Quang District, Ha Tuyen Province) and the Duy Linh incident (Duy Xuyen District, Quang Nam-Da Nang Province) must be appropriately punished in accordance with law, to set an example for the others.

Student Convicted of Beating Teacher

Hanoi NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Mar 82 p 2

[Unattributed article]

[Text:] Recently the Hanoi People's Court conducted an appeal trial of the case of Hoang Cong Nang beating a teacher, Miss Nguyen Thi Da. The court declared Nang guilty of the crime of committing violence against a cadre fulfilling her duty. He was sentenced to 9 months in prison, beginning on the date of his arrest, with 6 months off for time already served. Miss Nguyen Thi Da was authorized to bring civil suit at the inferior court level (regarding compensation for injury).

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CSO: 4209/348
DIRECTIVE OUTLINES TASK OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE SCHOOLS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Apr 82 p 1

[Article: "Organization of Administrative Schools in Provinces and Municipalities Subordinate to the Central Government"]

[Text] The Council of Ministers recently issued Directive No 272/CT about consolidating organization of administrative schools in the provinces and municipalities subordinate to the central government.

The provincial and municipal administrative schools have the task of organizing elementary and advanced training for state management cadres in the localities in accordance with the state plan and policy, which consists of the following:

- To train incumbent cadres being members of village, subward and town people's committees and administrative officers of state management organs of district, provincial and similar levels.

- To train state management cadres in accordance with midlevel programs in order to provide the local administrations with additional cadres.

- Along with the organs concerned to organize advanced training for members of people's councils at all levels.

The cadres in charge of the schools and those unit chiefs are appointed and work under the regulations of the organs subordinate to the people's committees of the provinces and municipalities subordinate to the central government.

The directive defines the task of building the ranks of full-time and part-time teachers, building schools, providing the necessary means and creating favorable conditions for teaching and learning.

It also determines that the Central Administrative School is responsible for opening advanced training courses for teachers to be sent to provincial and municipal administrative schools, unifying curricula and ensuring the quality of teaching in the latter in accordance with the new task.
LIST OF 1981-1982 STATE PLAN SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL PROGRAMS PUBLISHED

Hanoi TAP CHI HOAT DONG KHOA HOC in Vietnamese No 3, Mar 82 pp 37-43

[Chart of "Priority Programs for Scientific-Technical Progress of the 1981-1985 State Plan"]

[Text] Editor's Note: The Council of Ministers issued Decision No 65-CP, dated 26 February 1981, approving a list of 71 priority state programs for scientific and technical progress in the 1981-1985 phase. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers then issued Decision No 139-TTg, dated 27 June 1981, and Decision No 43-CT, dated 2 March 1982, regarding the selection of directors for those programs.

Our journal has summarized the contents of those three decisions in the form of the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order</th>
<th>Program Number</th>
<th>Title of Program</th>
<th>Managing Organ</th>
<th>Program Director</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>02-01</td>
<td>Research to apply rice cultivation techniques on a scientific basis</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Vu Tuyen Hoang, Ph.D., head of the Grain and Food Crops Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>02-02</td>
<td>Determine and apply the technical measures for producing and processing subsidiary food crops: corn, kaoliang, white potatoes, manioc, and sweet potatoes</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Nguyen Kim, deputy head of the Grain and Food Crops Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>02-03</td>
<td>Researching and applying scientific-technical methods to develop hog raising in different economic areas</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Nguyen Van Thien, M.A., deputy head of the Animal Husbandry Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Author</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>02-04*</td>
<td>Research and application of technical measures to develop rubber</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Nguyen Huu Chat, head of the Rubber Research Institute of the Rubber General Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>02-05</td>
<td>Determination and application measures to increase our coffee production capability</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Pham Quoc Sung, M.A., director of the Coffee-Cocoa Research Center of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>02-06</td>
<td>Research and apply measures to increase tea production capabilities</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Do Ngoc Quy, M.A., head of the Phu Ho Tea Research Center of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>02-07</td>
<td>Determination and application of technical measures for producing legume crops: soybeans, peanuts, etc.</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Hoang Duc Phuong, deputy head of the Industrial Crop Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>02-08</td>
<td>Research and application of scientific-technical measures to develop the raising of water buffaloes and cattle and increase the output of meat and milk in the different parts of the country</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Nguyen Van Thuong, M.A., Assistant Professor, head of the Animal Husbandry Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>02-09</td>
<td>Creating and applying measures with scientific bases to increase the output of, and rationally use, animal feed in the different parts of the country</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Le Sinh Tang, M.A., deputy head of the Animal Husbandry Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>02-10</td>
<td>Creating, and applying in production, methods of intensive cultivation agricultural production, the process of zoning economic production, the specialization and concentration of production, and the process of economic and managerial stimulation</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture</td>
<td>Nguyen Lam Toan, M.A., deputy director of the Agricultural Economic Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The State Scientific-Technical Commission will recommend that the number of this program be changed to 43-01.
11 02-11 Creating and applying measures for increasing the fertility of the soil and effectively using land and fertilizer in the various parts of the country

Ministry of Agriculture

Nguyen Vy, M.A., acting head of the Soil-Agricultural Chemistry Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture

12 02-12 Creating and applying technical measures to develop cotton production

Ministry of Agriculture

Caọ Ky Tri, director of the Nha Ho Cotton Technical Center of the Ministry of Agriculture

13 02-13 Creating machinery systems and the scientific bases with regard to the organization and distribution of agricultural machinery stations, and measures to rationally use, repair, take care of, and maintain agricultural machinery and equipment

Ministry of Agriculture

Nguyen Dien, M.A., head of the Agricultural Implements and Mechanization Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture

14 02-14 Creating and applying measures for increasing capability to produce oil-bearing crops (cocoanuts, oil palms, and castor beans)

Ministry of Agriculture

Nguyen Xuan Han, deputy head of the Industrial Crop Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture

15 02-15 Applying scientific-technical advances in clearing waste-land and preventing erosion on newly cleared land

Ministry of Agriculture

Thai Phien, M.A., deputy director of the Soil-Agricultural Chemistry Institute of the Ministry of Agriculture

16 04-01 Researching, building, and applying the commercial forestry systems to ensure combined productivity and rational use of the various kinds of existing forests and carrying out afforestation with different objectives

Ministry of Forestry

Nguyen Huu Quang, M.A., Vice Minister of the Ministry of Forestry

17 04-02 Researching combined agricultural-forestry methods to be applied in the natural economic areas in order to harvest additional grain products

Ministry of Forestry

Pham Xuan Dat, Minister of Forestry
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Ministry of</th>
<th>Name and Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>06-01</td>
<td>Researching and applying irrigation systems and methods for using them in the different areas in our country</td>
<td>Water Conservancy</td>
<td>Dao Khuong, M.A., Assistant Professor, head of the Water Conservancy Institute of the Ministry of Water Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>06-02</td>
<td>Researching and applying combined measures for achieving the maximum use of our country's water resources in the 1981-2000 period</td>
<td>Water Conservancy</td>
<td>Phan Si Ky, head of the Water Conservancy-Hydroelectricity Design Institute of the Ministry of Water Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>06-03</td>
<td>Studying and drafting a scheme for the joint use of the water sources of the Red River, Mekong River, and Dong Nai River basins in the 1990-2000 phase</td>
<td>Water Conservancy</td>
<td>Tran Duc Kham, deputy head of the Water Conservancy Planning Institute of the Ministry of Water Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>06-04</td>
<td>Researching and applying rational structures and technical advances in the construction of water conservancy projects in the natural conditions of Vietnam</td>
<td>Water Conservancy</td>
<td>Nguyen Thanh Nga, deputy head of the Water Conservancy Science Research Institute of the Ministry of Water Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>06-05</td>
<td>Researching and applying methods and projects for flood control in the Red River and Mekong River deltas</td>
<td>Water Conservancy</td>
<td>Vu Tat Uyen, M.A., Assistant Professor, deputy head of the Water Conservancy Science Research Institute of the Ministry of Water Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>08-01</td>
<td>Researching and applying the scientific-technical bases in order to increase and rationally use the maritime products of the sea and the continental shelf</td>
<td>Maritime Products</td>
<td>Bui Dinh Chung, M.A., head of the Institute of Maritime Products Research of the Ministry of Maritime Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>08-02</td>
<td>Researching and applying the scientific-technical bases and methods to increase and rationally use fish and the other maritime products in inland waters</td>
<td>Maritime Products</td>
<td>Pham Manh Tuong, M.A., head of the Freshwater Fish Research Center of the Ministry of Maritime Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Person Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>10-01 Researching the optimal balancing of fuel and energy ... rationally and for each area in the 1986-1990 phase. Determining the principal direction for creating a fuel-energy balance by the year 2000</td>
<td>Ministry of Power</td>
<td>Pham Khai, Minister of Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>10-02 Determining the optimum degree of national electrification and researching the scientific bases of the construction of a unified Vietnamese electrical system by the year 2000</td>
<td>Ministry of Power</td>
<td>Pham Van Huan, M.A., Vice Minister of Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>10-03 Researching and applying measures for increasing the operational effectiveness of the thermoelectric plants</td>
<td>Ministry of Power</td>
<td>Vu Ngoc Hai, deputy director of the Northern Electric Power Corporation of the Ministry of Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>10-04 Researching and applying in the energy sector the automation and protection guidance and adjustment systems in order to increase the safety of electricity supplying, improve the quality of electric power, and reduce the loss of electric power in the electricity grid</td>
<td>Ministry of Power</td>
<td>Pham Tien Ba, M.A., deputy head of the Technical Department of the Ministry of Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>10-05 Manufacturing and effectively applying in the national economy equipment that uses new energy (solar, wind, biomass)</td>
<td>Ministry of Power</td>
<td>Vu Dinh Bong, head of the Technical Department of the Ministry of Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>12-01 Researching and applying measures to rapidly and rationally develop the coal sector in Vietnam</td>
<td>Ministry of Mines and Coal</td>
<td>Tran An Vinh, M.A., Minister of Mines and Coal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>14-01 Researching and applying effective methods to mine and use Lao Cai apatite ore</td>
<td>Chemicals General Department</td>
<td>Tran Ngoc Lai, director of the Mine Design Corporation of the Chemicals General Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Task Description</td>
<td>Ministry/Department</td>
<td>Name</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>14-02</td>
<td>Researching and applying new techniques to perfect the existing methods of producing chemical products used in agriculture</td>
<td>Chemicals General Department</td>
<td>Do Huy Dinh, M.A., deputy head of the Industrial Chemicals Institute of the Chemicals General Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>16-01</td>
<td>Creating and producing consumer goods for which there are broad needs (textiles, leather goods, earthenware and porcelain, paper, cardboard, etc.), with good quality and in many different varieties, on the basis of effectively using domestic raw materials with the existing equipment capabilities, and researching new production techniques and forms of labor organization</td>
<td>Ministry of Light Industry</td>
<td>Ngo Dinh Truong, head of the Technical Department of the Ministry of Light Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>18-01</td>
<td>Researching and applying new technical processes in the production of high-quality food products, and applying measures to develop the products and make combined use of raw materials</td>
<td>Ministry of Food Industry</td>
<td>Nong The Can, M.A., Vice Minister of the Ministry of Food Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>22-01</td>
<td>Establish a scientific basis for a policy regarding exploration for oil and natural gas, and evaluate the oil and gas reserves in Vietnamese territory. Determine the necessary conditions for exploiting and processing oil and natural gas in Vietnam</td>
<td>Oil and Natural Gas General Department</td>
<td>Le Van Cu, deputy head of the Oil and Natural Gas General Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>21-01</td>
<td>Establishing and applying effective technical processes and equipment to produce ferrous metals produces and raw materials</td>
<td>Ministry of Engineering and Metals</td>
<td>Tran Van Quy, M.A., deputy head of the Non-ferrous Institute of the Ministry of Engineering and Metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>24-02</td>
<td>Researching, selecting, and applying technical processes and equipment to mine and grade tin, bauxite, titanium, and rare earth ores, and process, smelt, and refine metals</td>
<td>Ministry of Engineering and Metals</td>
<td>Nguyen Duc Quy, M.A., deputy head of the Non-ferrous Metals Institute of the Ministry of Engineering and Metals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>24-09</td>
<td>Researching and applying in production technical processes, equipment, and assembly tools to produce and restore the worn parts of motor vehicles, diesel engines, and construction and transportation machinery</td>
<td>Ministry of Engineering and Metals, Hoang Duc Kim, M.A., deputy head of the Technology Institute of the Ministry of Engineering and Metals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>24-04</td>
<td>Improving the quality of machine tools and equipment</td>
<td>Ministry of Engineering and Metals, Nguyen Ngoc Le, M.A., head of the Machine Tools and Equipment Institute of the Ministry of Engineering and Metals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>26-01</td>
<td>Researching and applying in construction housing standardization plans, residential area projects, methods, and plans, and new technical procedures in construction and the production of construction materials</td>
<td>Ministry of Building, Pham Van Trinh, M.A., head of the Hanoi Ministry of Building Architectural College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>26-02</td>
<td>Fully utilizing potential regarding raw materials and the existing production capabilities to produce varied, high-quality construction materials to serve construction, life, and exports</td>
<td>Ministry of Building, Nguyen Van Man, head of the Construction Materials Institute of the Ministry of Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>28-01</td>
<td>Drafting a system to organize and protect the environment in eastern Nam Bo until 1995</td>
<td>State Capital Construction Commission, Dam Trung Phuong, architect, head of the Joint Construction Planning Institute of the State Capital Construction Commission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>34-01</td>
<td>Researching and applying measures to increase the ability of the Haiphong transportation hub to clear up the backlogs, with high economic effectiveness</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Transportation, Pham Xuan Thang, acting head of the Transportation Economics Institute of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>34-02</td>
<td>Creating, and mastering the manufacturing of, new ship designs, and creating and applying advanced techniques to restore and repair old and damaged ships</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Transportation, Trinh Xuong, acting head of the Ship Design Research Institute of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Ministry</td>
<td>Author</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>34-03</td>
<td>Planning a unified, balanced, rational communications and transportation network by the year 2000</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
<td>Tran Tuan Anh, head of the Planning Institute of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>34-04</td>
<td>Reorganizing the transportation network along the lines of creating a unified socialist transportation system throughout the nation, in order to fully exploit the latent capabilities of the transportation sectors, increase economic effectiveness, and gradually meet the needs of the national economy</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
<td>Bui Van Suong, M.A., deputy head of the Economics Institute of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>34-05</td>
<td>Industrializing the construction of communications-transportation projects</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
<td>Pham Huy Phuoc, M.A., Assistant Professor, head of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>38-01</td>
<td>Drafting a plan for a unified electrical communications network of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam</td>
<td>Post and Telegraph General Department</td>
<td>Truong Van Thoan, deputy director of the Post and Telegraph General Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>44-01</td>
<td>Creating the bases for drafting a long-range plan for geological exploration and geological-economic zoning within the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam by means of joint research in geology, geophysics, and fossil fuels, and drafting maps with scales of 1/500,000 and 1/200,000</td>
<td>Geology General Department</td>
<td>Tran Duc Luong, head of the Geology General Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>44-02</td>
<td>Evaluating the prospects regarding fuel and energy (coal, peat, radioactive elements, and geothermal) in Vietnam and drafting a policy toward geological exploration</td>
<td>Geology General Department</td>
<td>Pham Xuan Hoang, head of the Scientific-Technical Management Department of the Geology General Department</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
51 44-03 Evaluating the prospects regarding metal and non-metal ores in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, drafting a map of the potentially most important areas and drafting a policy toward geological exploration

52 44-04 Researching the hydrological and geological conditions of construction sites and evaluating the underground water resources of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

53 44-05 The economics, organization, and planning of geological exploration and the economic-geological evaluation of mineral raw materials in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

54 46-01 Researching the completion of a highly accurate land survey network for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

55 46-02 Creating the optimal technological procedures for drafting large-scale maps

56 48-01 Creating and applying biological measures regarding the selection of seedstock and breeding stock, the prevention and elimination of insects and diseases, and the protection of flora and fauna, and methods of using biological stimulants, fertilizer, and animal feed

57 48-02 Drafting and applying methods for preventing cracks in construction projects and overcoming the consequences of the formation of cracks in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
58 48-03 The drafting of a national atlas of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

Vietnam Institutes of Science

Nguyen Van Chieu, M.A., Professor, deputy director of the Vietnam Institutes of Science

59 48-04 Researching and introducing to production technical processes to produce technical electronic products and materials with which to manufacture them

Vietnam Institutes of Science

Vu Dinh Cu, Ph.D., Professor, deputy director of the Vietnam Institutes of Science

60 48-05 Researching and applying mathematical, cybernetics, and computer science methods to serve the development of production and economic management

Vietnam Institutes of Science

Phan Dinh Dieu, Ph.D., Professor, deputy director of the Vietnam Institutes of Science

61 48-06 Carrying out joint studies on the seas and continental shelf of Vietnam and researching ways to rationally use their natural resources

Vietnam Institutes of Science

Dang Ngoc Thanh, Ph.D., Professor, deputy director of the Vietnam Institutes of Science

62 48-07 Applying the accomplishments of space research and utilizing space

Vietnam Institutes of Science

Nguyen Van Hieu, Ph.D., Professor, deputy director of the Vietnam Institutes of Science

63 48-08 Applying measures for improving the quality of materials and technical equipment and increasing their durability when used in the hot, humid conditions of Vietnam

Vietnam Institutes of Science

Vo Phien, M.A., head of the research office of the Tropical Technical Institute of the Vietnam Institutes of Science

64 50-01 Researching the use of nuclear energy in the national economic spheres

Nuclear Research Institute

Pham Duy Hien, M.A., Professor, deputy head of the Nuclear Research Institute

65 52-02 Creating and putting into use new technical processes, and providing equipment, to manufacture precision parts, diesel fuel injectors, and hydraulic products, create new measuring equipment, and organize semi-manufacturing

Ministry of Higher and Vocational Middle Schools

Dang Huu, M.A., Professor, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Middle Schools
66 55-02 Establishing the scientific basis of protecting, restoring, and rationally using natural resources and the environment

Ministry of Higher and Vocational Schools
Nguyen Dinh Tu, M.A., Professor, Minister of Higher and Vocational Middle Schools

67 58-01 Researching and applying to production scientific-technical methods of labor protection in order to improve labor conditions and reduce labor accidents and occupational diseases

Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions
Dinh Ba Lan, head of the Labor Protection Scientific-Technical Institute of the Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions

68 60-01 Drafting a system of principles and regulations regarding management and organization, and measures to improve management in order to develop Vietnamese science and technology

State Science and Technology Commission
Doan Phuong, M.A., deputy director of the State Scientific-Technical Commission

69 64-01 Creating a source of raw materials from medicinal plants for the pharmaceutical industry in order to produce vegetation-based medicines and researching and applying methods to produce pharmaceuticals

Ministry of Public Health
Nguyen Van Dan, Professor, Vice Minister of Public Health

70 64-02 Carrying out medical research and organizational measures to create rational diets for the various age groups and occupations in Vietnam, on the basis of making optimum use of foodstuffs available in our country

Ministry of Public Health
Tu Giay, Professor, head of the Nutrition Institute of the Ministry of Public Health

71 70-01 Drafting a preliminary general plan for distributing production forces in the 1986-1995 period

Central Economic Zoning Committee
Nguyen Van Bien, member of the Standing Committee of the Central Economic Zoning Committee

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BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

Trần Tuấn Anh  [TRAANF TUAANS ANH]

*Head of the Planning Institute, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article "Some Thoughts on a Unified Transportation System" appeared in the cited source. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI No 6, Dec 81 p 4)

Nguyễn Hữu Bảo  [NGUYEENX HOAIF BAOR]

*Deputy head of the Education Service, Lam Dong Province; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Chuông Châu  [NGHIEEM CHUOWNGR CHAAU]

Director of the Education Service, Hanoi; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Hoàng Ngọc Giám  [HOANGF NGOOCJ GIOWIS]

*Head of the Education Service, Thanh Hoa Province; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Nam Hải  [NGUYEENX NAM HAIR]

Publisher of the communications and transportation journal KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited publication. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI No 6, Dec 81 inside front cover)

Nguyễn Hông  [NGUYEENX HOONGF] aka Nguyễn Nguyên Hông  [NGUYEENX NGUYEEN HOONGF]

deceased

Born on 5 Nov 1918; member of the VCP; member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Writers Association; president of the Haiphong Arts and Letters Association; he died on 2 May 82. (NHAN DAN 4 May 82 p 4)
Trương Thị Hồng [TRUWOWNG THIJ HOONGF]

*Director of the Education Service, Ho Chi Minh City; in Mar 82 she was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUO I GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Lưu Diện Khoa [LUWU DIEENR KHOA]

Head of the Education Service, Hà Bắc Province; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUO I GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Lê Sĩ Liêm [LEE SIX LIEEM]

Editor-in-chief of the communications and transportation journal KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited source. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT GIAO THONG VAN TAI No 6, Dec 81 inside front cover)

Thông Thị Kim Liên [THAAN THIJ KIM LIEEN]

*Deputy head of the Education Service, Cao Bang Province; in Mar 82 she was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUO I GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Vũ Ngọc Linh [VUX NGOCJ LINH]

Secretary of the VCP Committee, Bạc Thái Province; on 24 Feb 82 he attended the 10th anniversary ceremonies at the Thái Nguyên Industrial High School. (NGUO I GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 25 Mar 82 p 3)

Bùi Long [BUIF LONG], *Lieutenant General

Of the Border Defense Forces; his article "Execute the Nationalities Policy and Build a People's Defense Line To Protect the Border" appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 20 Apr 82 p 3)

Trần Đức Mai [TRAANF DUVCS MAI]

*Head of the Education Service, Nghe Tinh Province; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUO I GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Đông Chí Nam [DOONGP CHIS NAM]

*Head of the Building Service, Hải Hưng Province; his article "Changes in Hải Hưng Province's Building Industry During 1981" appeared in the cited source. (XAY DUNG No 3, Mar 82 p 9)

Nguyễn Thị Ngân [NGUYEENX THIJ NHAAN]

Deputy head of the Education Service, Hà Nam Ninh Province; in Mar 82 she was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUO I GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

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Rô Nhi [DOAN THI NHU]

Acting head of the Pharmaceuticals Institute, Ministry of Public Health; her article "Promote Production of Medicines for Women and Children" appeared in the cited source. (PHY NU VIETNAM 21-27 Apr 82 p 2)

Dô Nhi [DOOX NHUAANJ]

Secretary general of the Vietnam Musicians Association; editor-in-chief of the journal ÂM NHAC; his 60th birthday was noted in the cited source. (ÂM NHAN No 1 1982 p 7)

Ngô Hải Phong [NGOO HAIR PHONG]

Head of the Education Service, Long An Province; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Nguyễn Tư Phu [NGUEENX TUWJ PHUS]

Head of the Education Service, Hải Hưng Province; in Mar 82 he was a delegate to the 5th Congress of the VCP. (NGUOI GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 10 Apr 82 p 3)

Trần Hữu Sang [TRAANF HUWUX SANGS], deceased

Member of the VCP; former standing member of the VCP Committee, Nam Dan District, Nghe An Province; specialist in the SRV Chamber of Commerce; he was in retirement at the time of his death on 2 Apr 82 at page 62. (HANOI MOI 3 Apr 82 p 4)

Lý Văn Sâu [LYS VAWN SAUS]

Vice chairman of the Vietnam Broadcasting and Television Commission; on 10 Apr 82 he was scheduled to speak at the Doan Ket Club in Hanoi on current events. (HANOI MOI 10 Apr 82 p 4)

Vũ Văn Su [VUX VAWN SUWJ] aka Trần Hiện [TRAANF HIEENR], deceased

Member of the VCP; former chief of cabinet of the Hanoi Trade Union Federation; former deputy head of the Roads and Bridges Service, Hanoi; former trade union secretary of the Dien Co and Luong Yen Factories; he was in retirement at the time of his death on 10 Apr 82 at age 64. (HANOI MOI 13 Apr 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Tấn [NGUEENX TAANS]

Deputy editor-in-chief of the communications and transportation journal KHÓA HỌC KY THUẬT GIAO THONG VAN TAI; his name appeared on the masthead of the cited source. (KHÓA HỌC GIAO THONG VAN TAI No 6, Dec 81 inside front cover)

Lê Thanh [LEE THANH], Major General

*SRV military attache to the USSR; his article "Collapse of Peking's Expansionist Plans in South East Asia" appeared in the cited source. (Moscow VOYENNO ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL Feb 82 p 61)
Nguyễn Ngọc Trân [NGUYENX NGOCJ TRAAN]

Vice chairman of the State Science and Technology Commission; on 1 Apr 82 he attended a reception for a visiting French science and technology delegation. (HANOI MOI 3 Apr 82 p 1)

Nguyễn Đình Tư [NGUYENX DINHF TUWS]

Vice chairman of the Vietnam-Soviet Friendship Association; on 3 May 82 he attended activation ceremonies of the Liaison Committee of Vietnamese Who Studied in the USSR. (NHAN DAN 4 May 82 p 4)

Nguyễn Hữu VĂng [NGUYENX HUUX VUWOWNGJ]

*Deputy head of the Watercraft Construction Research Institute, Ministry of Communications and Transportation; his article "Some Thoughts on the Organization and Activities of the Watercraft Construction Research Institute" appeared in the cited source. (KHOA HOC KY THUAT BIAO THONG VAN TAI No 6, Dec 81 p 1)

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