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Muslims Urged To Keep Afghanistan From Christians
44040013 Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic
25 Aug 88 p 16

[Interview with Dr Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi by AL-MADINAH correspondent in Karachi; date of interview not specified]

[Text] His Excellency Dr Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi took part in a symposium entitled "A Look into the Future of Afghanistan at Independence." This symposium was held in Karachi between 10 and 12 August at the invitation of the late president of Pakistan, President Mohammed Ziaul-Haq. A number of politicians, economists, sociologists, managers, businessmen, and university professors attended the symposium which was also attended by a number of Pakistani ambassadors, experts on the Afghan question, and a representative of the freedom fighters.

Since Afghanistan needs 1.5 billion dollars initially just to bring people back into their homes and to begin reconstruction, and since there are Christian institutions which are willing to pay this sum and more, what are the possibilities that the Islamic world will support the freedom fighters and fill this vacuum before these Christian institutions do so without delay?

This interview which we conducted with His Excellency Dr al-Dawalibi gives us a sense of the magnitude of the tragedy that we will have on our hands if plans are not made in advance.

[Question] It is being said that after wars nations suffer from famine. To what extent does such a statement apply to the Afghan freedom fighters after the Russians' withdrawal?

[Answer] The men, machinery, and thinking which are required for war differ considerably from the men, machinery, and thinking which are required for reconstruction. Freedom fighters must take note of that.

Afghans of all classes and groups took part in the fight for freedom because everyone felt how oppressive colonialism was.

Statistics were conducted in Afghanistan to determine what the country will need in the future so that preparations can be made and the country can get ready for the post-victory stage: the stage of reconstruction in agriculture, education, and in all areas of life.

One man, for example, was involved in fighting battles around the clock. He had no chance to eat, drink, or sleep. In spite of the fact that he was injured and exhausted, he continued to fight until he achieved victory. After the war, however, he could find no water to quench his thirst, no bread to satisfy his hunger, and no medicine to treat his wounds. He expired.

The figures for Afghanistan's losses are astounding.

First, there are 5 million refugees outside Afghanistan, and most of them are in Pakistan.

Second, 5 million persons have been displaced in Afghanistan's various regions. This means that two-thirds of the population had to leave their homes.

Third, one-third of the farm land has been destroyed.

Fourth, 5,000 villages are no longer habitable, and 300,000 homes have been destroyed. This means that approximately 3 million persons are homeless.

Fifth, over 1 million persons lost their lives.

Sixth, 1 million children are orphans and have no homes; they have no fathers and no mothers.

Seventh, 2,000 schools have been demolished.

Eighth, 100 hospitals have been demolished.

Ninth, millions of heads of cattle have expired.

UN studies estimated that 1.5 billion dollars will be required for the first stage to bring the refugees back to their homes. A very simple calculation will show us how much money we will need to transport 5 million Afghans from Pakistan to Afghanistan. This sum would not include the cost of food, drink, and medicine for those refugees. This sum will cover what they will need for a short period until they can stand on their own feet. They have to have tents for shelter, and they have to have many other things.

Between 2 and 3 billion dollars will be required to start the wheels of the economy turning so that we can resume production and start cultivating the land and rebuilding the country.

When the fight for freedom started, Afghans of all groups, levels, and positions were fighting the enemy. That is why several different leadership organizations emerged and grew, each in its own environment. People maintained their affiliation with those leaders even after they left their environment. At one time there were 65 leadership organizations which were separate in every way, even though they were in agreement about getting the enemy out of the country. Each group would ask for assistance, but no group would assist another or get to know another group.

I recall that when I traveled to the borders a few years ago, I did not know with whom I was talking, nor did I know who was responsible.

So I asked the late President Ziaul-Haq to make them commit themselves to unite and merge together because that would make it easier to go back to leaders who are of
the same opinion. Such unity would make it easier to offer financial and moral support. So they started unifying their ranks under the leadership of seven principal parties. I told them if they did not speak with one voice, their blood would be shed in vain.

[Question] There have been reactions to the Afghans' victories. What are these reactions?

[Answer] 1. Pakistan will benefit from having a Muslim ally.

2. Bangladesh declared that it will apply Islamic law.

3. A few neighboring countries and other countries that do not want Islam to regain its vigor will become concerned. One such direct reaction to the Afghans' victories came from the Hindus in Bangladesh. They declared they would emigrate if Islamic law were applied there.

2. [as published] A case was filed in an Indian court calling for the Holy Koran to be burned.

We want the factions to unite and unify their ranks without delay. They were facing one enemy, and they used to capture weapons, ammunition, and other things from that enemy. Today, however, they are facing many enemies who have nothing which Afghan factions can capture except poverty, ignorance, disease, and the destruction of homes and dams. There are many enemies.

We are urgently asking freedom fighters to unite without delay so that they can form one rank and be faithful to God in their struggle for freedom.

After victory, we hope that freedom fighters will forgive those who treated them unjustly so that the unity of the land and the people can be preserved. We hope they will do what the prophet did, may God bless him and grant him salvation. He told the people of the holy city of Mecca, “What do you think I will do with you?” They replied, “You are a generous brother and the son of a generous brother.” He said, “Go! You are free.”

[Question] What role will the Islamic world play after the withdrawal? What preparations did it make to confront this critical stage?

[Answer] The enemies of Islam have been thinking and planning. They know that the war will leave widows, orphans, and destruction, and capital is required for all that. So they started building schools, hospitals, and orphanages. The price tag on all that is adopting Christianity and becoming Westernized. The Islamic world has to prepare itself to stand by these people in the postvictory period.

Does the Islamic nation expect the people who build schools and pay the teachers' salaries to graduate students who memorize the Holy Koran and al-Bukhari's "Sahih" and who are fighters for the cause of God? Does the Islamic nation expect Afghans to emerge victorious one way or another?

Pictures of Jesus Christ are in every office and room in hospitals, and copies of the Bible can be found everywhere.

The gist of the symposium is that a group of opinions was formulated by thinkers, scientists, academic professors, businessmen from the Islamic world, and Pakistani citizens, including a few Pakistani ambassadors and a representative of the freedom fighters. These opinions revolve around two points:

The first has to do with the problems which are expected to develop inside the country and abroad after the withdrawal.

The second has to do with solutions and projections.

What are the resources of the Islamic world whose sympathies lie with the Afghan question? Are there various Islamic relief organizations? What about the United Nations Organization and other organizations?

We hope our fellow freedom fighters will unite without delay, and we hope they will prepare themselves for the postwar period, the period of construction. We hope they will fight for the cause of God. When they become strong, the world will deal with them and will not be able to dismiss them. Islamic institutions are being called upon to contact the United Nations and win its confidence. Planning and technical, scientific, and administrative cadres are required for Islamic action.

The Editor: Issue No. 45 of the Afghan magazine AL-JIHAD which came out in the month of Dhu al-Hijrah 1408 A.H. reported that 70 Christian institutions had asked the freedom fighters' government for permission to operate inside Afghanistan. The magazine reported that 19 Christian institutions met with Sadr-al-Din Agha Khan to coordinate operations and make preparations for the next stage. The Islamic nation has to face this attack with wisdom and with deliberate action.
REGIONAL

Strategic Center Studies Shift in Arab Relations
450400018 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
30 Sep 88 pp 38-39

[Article by Usamah ‘Ajjaj: “A Strategic Report on the Arab Situation, Now That the Struggles Are under Control: The Period of Deterioration Has Ended and the Stage of Positive Considerations Has Begun!”]

[Text] The importance of the Arab strategic report the Center of Strategic and Political Studies in Cairo has been working assiduously to put out for 3 years will continue to increase with each of its issues, because it is eliminating some of its mistakes and bringing some new subjects into its purview. In general, the importance of this report arises from its status as an initial Arab attempt to formulate an Arab intellectual articulation of international, regional, and Arab events with a section bearing on Egypt added on. This latter section may enjoy obvious support on the part of people interested in and studying the Egyptian situation, because it deals with all Egyptian political, party and economic issues without touchiness in a scientific, impartial form—so much so that in the previous report it dealt with two issues in which it broke new ground. The first bears on a study of the role of the institution of the Presidency in Egypt in formulating political decisions, the composition of this institution, and its ways of managing its activity; and the second bears on what it called the “political forces which have been deprived of legitimate status.” The past report concerned itself with Islamic organizations and groups. This year’s report continued in the same vein. It concerned itself with a study of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, its mode of operation, and its administration and also with one of the forces “deprived of legitimate status.” This year, Marxist organizations were granted significant, separate study. While this year’s report adopted the same intellectual framework—which is concerned with the study of developments occurring on three levels: international and regional order, Arab regional order, and the Arab Republic of Egypt—the part bearing on the political structure of the Arab order and its study of official interactions within it merits pause for contemplation and review because it reaches an important conclusion, arriving at the synopsis that 1987, the subject of the study, was the year of the halt in deterioration of the Arab order. The report says that at the beginning of last year the elements of crisis development came together and the Arab order seemed to be in a position where it was unable to deal with the course of threats, chaos, and violence with any degree of effectiveness. The mood of despair grew deeper as a result of developments in the Lebanese arena and the Gulf war. The war of the camps also opened up a deep wound in the Arab conscience. However, at the end of the war, something akin to relief flickered on the horizon, however relative and abstract. Five basic elements helped advance the sense of relief, these were:

- The attainment of a degree of control over the regions of open conflict in the Arab nation;
- The attainment of a degree of attenuation in the competition and relations of mutual intimidation among major Arab countries;
- The results of the Arab summit conference in Amman which gave an impression of efforts in the direction of a kind of Arab consensus;
- The restoration of diplomatic relations between most Arab countries and Egypt; and
- The splendid uprising of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

The report begins with further detail in regard to these five elements. The report says that in the areas of the regions of open conflict in the Arab nation—in Lebanon, the Western Sahara, the southern Sudan, and the Gulf—the objective is to realize greater control over open conflicts, that is, to create arrangements regarding the political and military situation in the areas of these struggles so that, in principle, they will allow for the discovery of a way out or a peaceful solution. This does not of necessity mean that the overall magnitude of violence in these areas has greatly declined, but it does mean that it is necessary to acknowledge that the magnitude of the violence has declined in overall form—indeed, 1987 is to be considered the least violent year in a fairly long period in the Arab nation.

The report mentions that the military and political arrangements which were made in Lebanon last year succeeded in generating a reduced amount of violence. That can principally be attributed to Syria’s assumption of direct security and military responsibility in Beirut alongside the al-Biqa’ in realizing a greater degree of control over the militia forces loyal to it with Syrian diplomatic activity in the direction of a greater amount of moderation. To that should be added other elements including: the settlement in practice of the violent rifts within the main militia forces, the relative stability of the military commands in these forces after the series of assassinations which took place in 1986, the attainment of Palestinian reconciliation in the context of the Palestine National Congress and the confrontation with the war of the camps which produced political and military coordination on the rank and file level. This is simultaneous with the financial and economic crisis which has seized Lebanon, the extension of the crisis to the war economies, and the continued intensification of Israeli operations against the national resistance in the south.

The report stresses that following construction of the Moroccan defensive walls the struggle in the Western Sahara witnessed a number of the most intense and violent battles between Morocco and the Polisario in comparison with previous years. In spite of that, last year witnessed an obvious reduction in the number or proliferation of violent clashes. This can be attributed to concentrated Arab diplomatic activity aimed at curbing the war of the Western Sahara, at restoring relations between Algeria and Morocco to a normal state as part of the rectification of the Arab atmosphere in general, and at reviving the efforts aimed at promoting the unity of
the Maghreb. The mediation which the servant of the two holy shrines, King Fahd, carried out between Algeria and Morocco is to be considered among the most important efforts exerted in this direction since the mediation yielded up a tripartite summit meeting in May 1987 and resulted in the conviction on the part of Algeria and Morocco to undertake direct negotiations on the problem. The problem was also brought back to the halls of the United Nations once again.

The report points out that the war in the southern Sudan is the sole exception as far as the decline in the level of violence goes, especially since talk about peace initiatives generally has been accompanied by a serious escalation in the fighting between Garang’s forces and the Sudanese Army, prompting a drop in the credibility of the talk about a peaceful solution. The report finds fault with the Arabs for their failure to realize the significance of the problem and their inability to carry out initiatives concentrated on a sound understanding of ways to get out of it. Consequently, the Arab order has had almost no effect on the course of the struggle in the Sudan. The report cites Egypt and Libya as an exception to this. Egypt is making a concentrated attempt at mediation between the Sudan and Ethiopia, and Libya is too, though its stands on the problem of the south have vacillated in accordance with its position and its relations with the Sudanese Government.

With respect to the violence in the countries of the Gulf, the report mentions the successful experiment the state of the emirates carried out in dealing with events in the Emirate of al-Sharqiah and also the possibility of rising above potentials for an armed clash between Oman and South Yemen and containing the situation between the two segments of Yemen following President ‘Ali Nasir’s removal. Kuwait and the Sudan took part in this effort.

The report takes up the second element in the halt in the deterioration in the Arab order, which is the attenuation of Arab competitions and rivalries. It points to attempts exerted to develop relations within the area of the Maghreb through an attempt to declare unity between Libya and Algeria or through the declaration of Libya’s adherence to the brotherhood agreement embracing Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania. To that one should add the declaration of the restoration of relations between Tunisia and Libya which took place through Algerian mediation. The report points to the Iraqi Libyan conciliation which took place without Arab intervention and can be attributed basically to an important change in Libyan policy, particularly with respect to the Gulf war. To that one should add the consummation of Saudi and Jordanian acts of mediation and those on the part of the State of the Emirates in the holding of a meeting between Presidents Hafiz al-Assad and Saddam Husayn. It had been hoped that these efforts would realize a specific achievement regarding the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but what happened did not amount to more than a discussion of procedures and did not go beyond that to a real reconciliation of positions and policies. Nonetheless, it is not possible to say that all these efforts were wasted.

The report deals with attempts and efforts at mediation between Syria and the Liberation Organization, which met with a lesser share of success, though Syria was exposed to pressures to modify its position on the realization of Palestinian national reconciliation at the National Congress meetings in addition to support for this reconciliation by Libya and Algeria. However, a gradual relinquishment of a hard Syrian position toward the organization began at the meeting held between a delegation of the Liberation Organization, consisting of people close to Yasir ‘Arafat and ‘Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, and a limited relaxation occurred after the Amman summit, though it did not produce a reconciliation between the organization and Syria.

The strategic report pauses to consider the third element in the halt to the deterioration in the Arab situation, pointing to a move in the direction of “mutual Arab contentment” which the Amman summit embodied. The report spells out two basic, major issues which witnessed a state of “negative rapprochement” as the report calls it:

1. The issue of the Arab-Israeli struggle. It discusses the developments which have occurred in the positions of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt in this regard, and points out that the Syrian position has witnessed a certain degree of flexibility which has brought it to approach the position of the moderate bloc to a reasonable degree. This approach is embodied in acceptance of the notion of the international conference as a formula for the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli struggle within the limits of the principles of the Fez initiative. Syria has committed itself to a position of acceptance of that on a number of international occasions—in agreement to the final communiqué of the Islamic summit conference, in the joint Soviet-Syrian communiqué following the al-Asad-Gorbachev summit meeting and in the Arab summit resolutions.

The Egyptian position also made positive progress toward rapprochement with the position of the moderate bloc. One may point to three developments of the utmost importance. The first was something attributed to Marshal ‘Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah in a statement he made about a joint meeting of the National Security and Arab Affairs Committees in the People’s Assembly in which he pointed out that Israel, in spite of the peace treaty, still constitutes Egypt’s main enemy and that the growth of Syrian military power inspires satisfaction in the Egyptian command and inspires the anxiety of the Israelis who realize that the attainment of Arab solidarity means a real threat to Israel’s security and that if coordination takes place between the Syrian and Egyptian military commands, the forces available to them will then be able to realize a decisive victory over Israel. The second development is the Egyptian position on the
Palestine and Arab causes and the revival of Egypt’s commitment to the joint defense treaty. Indeed, Egypt enabled Arab leaders to read the contents of a letter from [former] American President Carter in which he acknowledges that his interpretation of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty includes Egypt’s ongoing commitment to the joint defense treaty.

The report points out that the third development was in the intensification of American and Israeli pressures on Egypt, their effect on some movement, and the return of the Egyptian ambassador to Tel Aviv following the agreement on arbitration and two meetings between President Mubarak and Shim'on Peres. However, in exchange for this flexibility the Egyptian command replied to the demands of its Arab orientations and rejected any alternate formulations from Israel on the international conference, the revival of autonomy talks, or agreement to the holding of a regional conference which would include just Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.

There is also the Jordanian position, which the report describes as the most flexible of the Arab positions regarding settlement problems and issues. It points out that Jordan has been subjected to American pressures which it has rejected although there have been many differences in the positions of the three countries. There are essential constants, since none of the parties can gamble any longer by itself on removing itself more than a specific distance no matter how much flexibility it might arrogate to itself.

As for the status of the move in the direction of mutual contentment of the Iraqi-Iranian war, it has been broader than the scope of the Arab-Israeli struggle. The movement has been characterized by a schizophrenic character. It appears that the Arab countries which have declared an armistice with Iran have moved a step toward the assumption of a hard position, while the Arab countries which were Iran’s allies have moved in the opposite direction, that is, in the direction of breaking relations with Iran and getting close to those who had been proponents of declaring an armistice with it. The Syrian position has seen movement, if only minor, in the direction of concurring with the GCC countries and even with Iraq. Syria has reduced the level of its hostility toward Iraq from obvious enmity to coldness. Conversely, relations between Syria and Iran have been characterized by the development of tension, with the outburst of a number of major points of dispute between the two countries. It appears that the Libyan position on the Gulf war has become clearer.

There is a fourth element which is the restoration of diplomatic relations between Egypt and the Arab countries. This restoration has led to a general feeling of contentment and optimism although the form and style of this restoration have not progressed as far as had been hoped. The report points out that the restoration has been a matter of limited significance because it has not come as part of an agreement to a specific program for national salvation or even as part of specific steps for an executive program. This is not to deny that the Arab feeling of satisfaction with the return of Egypt to all areas of the [Arab] world has justification in that it has come about in conjunction with positive political and psychological circumstances. There have been two views on the return of Egypt. The first assumes that this return in the current circumstances entails the expansion of the scope of Camp David and acceptance of Israel’s status as a regional power, and the second assumes that the return will take place via the Gulf question, following the Egyptian stand in support of Iraq and the GCC countries.

The return has come about in a manner contrary to predictions and theories. In terms of form, the Amman summit resolutions, which paved the way for the return, came as strict notice against the unilateral adoption by any party of any resolution to the Arab-Israeli struggle. In this sense, Egypt’s return is endorsed without endorsing the Camp David agreement. The fact is that President Mubarak, as the report says, has mentioned more than once that Camp David is to be considered part of the legacy of the past, and the essence of statements by Egyptian officials is that in spite of Egyptian’s unreadiness, at least at the present time, unilaterally to abrogate the Camp David agreement, it aspires to go beyond it in terms of political content.

Then comes the fifth and final element in strengthening the impression of a relaxation in Arab conditions, which had grown critical, which concerns not the official Arab order but, specifically, coping with the inadequacy of this order. The Palestinian uprising broke out in the bank and Gaza after the people of the occupied territories became convinced that the Arab leaders had been unable to offer them cause for hope through the emergency summit conference in Amman. The Palestinian uprising realized massive political achievements. In the context of the calculations of power in the equations of the Arab-Israeli struggle, the uprising has asserted the impossibility of bringing down the Palestine Liberation Organization and has asserted that it is not possible to carry out any settlement without the participation of the organization in its capacity as the Palestinian people’s sole legitimate representative. It has also asserted that time is not necessarily working on Israel’s behalf against the Arabs, at least as regards Israel’s ability to absorb the land and the people. Talk has also started on a transformation of the uprising to a comprehensive movement of civil disobedience. The uprising has also foretold the end of the era of political submissiveness among the people in the Arab countries themselves.

Since the state of optimism has continued to spread over the Arab nation, especially since important variables have entered into the Arab equation, the report has not dealt with this since it just analyzes the events of 1987. There are, for example, the cease fire in the Gulf war and the possibilities of attainment of a formula for a peace treaty between Iraq and Iran, and there is the increase in the momentum of the Palestinian uprising, in addition to the talk about the unity of the Maghreb and the end to
the struggle of the Western Sahara. All these things fall within the category of positive developments.

**Gulf Contracts Awarded to UK Firms**

*44000056 Doha GULF TIMES in English 11 Sep 88 p 12*

[Text] London: Contracts totalling some [pounds sterling] 23.9mn have been awarded to Wimpey Alawi LLC in Oman and Al Wimpey Roads and Construction (Abu Dhabi).

Work has started on a [pounds sterling] 7.5mn contract awarded by the Royal Guard of Oman for an officers' mess complex adjacent to Seeb Barracks. The project is for the construction of an officers' mess and accommodation blocks, civilian and ancillary accommodation together with roads, landscaping, boundary walls and recreational facilities.

Under a [pounds sterling] 5.7mn contract for Oman's Ministry of Communications Wimpey Alawi will carry out road construction work, resurfacing and widening of the Buraymi carriageway. The contract also covers bridges, culverts, intersections and drainage works. The company will also upgrade 18.5km of roads in Buraymi town, and 24km of road between Mahadah and Buraymi.

In Abu Dhabi, Al Wimpey Roads and Construction has been awarded a [pounds sterling] 500,000 contract by the Al-'Ayn Municipality for earthworks to retaining bunds on a water catchment area at Shwaib.

Elsewhere in Abu Dhabi, an extension to port facilities at Mina Zayid Port is being carried out under a [pounds sterling] 7.8mn contract for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, Public Works Department. Work is due for completion in November next year and involves building a 360-metre extension with sheet-piled retaining walls to the container terminal. Included is the removal and replacement of the fendering on 640 metres of wharf face, an electrical sub-station, 800 metres of piled crane rail beam, and the dismantling of three steelwork sheds and re-erection in other areas of the port.

At the new Al-'Ayn vegetable market in Abu Dhabi, Al Wimpey has started work on the access roads, parking areas, and ancillary external works. Valued at [pounds sterling] 2.2mn, the contract is due for completion in early 1989.

**Inter-Arab Electricity Projects Proposed**

**Projects To Link Arab World to European Grid**

*45040009 Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic 4 Sep 88 p 74*

[Article by Ibrahim Abu-Zayd]

[Excerpt] Minister of Electricity and Energy Mahir Abu-Zaah asserted that the coming period will witness important strategic development in the evolution of units to produce energy from the wind and manufacture solar heaters at lower cost, and all Arab countries will be linked up in a unified electricity grid which will at the same time be connected to the consolidated European grid encompassing eastern and western Europe.

This important strategic step will provide the Arab countries with a leap forward in civilization. The linkup of the Arab countries to Europe will take place in three stages, including cooperation between Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and Turkey on the European side.

The Turkish minister of electricity has sent an invitation to the electricity ministers of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia to attend a meeting next 19 September in Turkey to investigate the executive steps of the project.

The Council of Ministers recently gave agreement to the subdivision of the Western Electricity Company into two companies. The measures will be carried out soon, for the sake of the well being of the masses and their receipt of consumption bills in an organized manner. The operation of 8 million television sets at once, above and beyond air conditioners and heaters, requires guidance from us, because the peak in electricity is in consumption, not in production.

The chairman of the Egypt Electricity Authority, Dr 'Imad al-Sharqawi, said, "Cooperation among companies operating in the electricity sector will make the ministry's plan a reality. At present, a station is being built to generate electricity by wind in the north coast to provide electricity for tourist villages, and three projects for the use of solar power are being carried out for use in a fish-preserving freezer in Wadi al-Rayyan in al-Fayyum."

Concerning the projects being carried out in the al-Buhayrah area, the deputy minister, Mahmud 'Abd-al-Muta'al, said: "The al-Mahallah al-Kubra transformer station is being built over an area of 10 feddans to support the al-Gharbiyah Governorate load, it is being linked to the new Dumyat electricity generating plant, and the Damanhur plant is being expanded as well. Units one and two in the Kafir al-Dawwar electricity generating station are also being replaced and renovated." [passage omitted]

**Joint Jordanian, Egyptian Electricity Network**

*45040009 Cairo MAYU in Arabic 5 Sep 88 p 4*

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] These discussions occurred in the framework of the higher joint Egyptian-Jordanian committee which the prime ministers in the two countries are heading. These discussions focused on the possibility of establishing a joint Egyptian-Jordanian industry in the realm of machinery for generating stations, transformers, meters, and equipment for exploiting wind power. The discussions also included the
exchange of expertise and information in technical and administrative areas and data banks related to electricity and energy between the two countries.

The main focal point around which the discussions revolved was the linkage of the two electricity grids in the two countries and the executive measures for completing this project.

It is well known that a memorandum of understanding exists which the two parties signed in Amman in 1986 related to these areas.

The discussions resulted in the signing of a protocol for joint cooperation between the two countries in the area of electricity and energy which Engineer Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity and energy, signed for the Egyptian party, and Dr Hisham al-Khatib, the Jordanian minister of energy, signed for the Jordanian party. [passage omitted]

What is new is the interest in this project on the part of the Arab Fund for Economic Development, which expressed its readiness to help in financing the project and studying it to investigate the possibility of benefitting from this project as a nucleus and starting point for other joint Arab projects. The fund requested the sending of an Egyptian expert to attend the fund meetings bearing on this project. Dr Mustafa Suwaydan, the vice chairman of the Egypt Electricity Authority for planning and studies affairs, will represent Egypt.

MAYU met with Dr Hamdi al-Sha'ir, the vice chairman of the Egypt Electricity Authority for operating affairs, to explain to us the importance of linking up the electricity grids to the two countries. He said that the process of linking up electricity grids among countries is an economic investment activity which has great benefits. As far as Egypt and Jordan are concerned, the linkage of the two electricity grids will be done through an underwater cable to be built across the Gulf of al-'Aqaba. This connection will make it possible for each country to benefit from the other country's resources in terms of electricity, in the sense that the electric generating plants in Egypt will be a strategic heartland for the electricity plants in Jordan and vice versa, bringing benefits to the citizens of the two countries, and since it will be possible to make use of these systems in peak periods and regulate these periods. In addition, in emergency circumstances, Egypt will represent a reserve for Jordan. This is in addition to the economic feasibility of the project, since it is a 100 percent investment project, as it will be possible to export electricity at high prices from its generating sites at low cost by means of it. In the future, by linking up these two systems, it will be possible to tie the Arab world to Europe, and this will realize great benefits.

Dr Hisham al-Khatib, the Jordanian minister of power, felt that linking up the electricity systems among the Arab countries will have other political and economic dimensions, since this may be a beginning for common Arab cooperation in other industrial and economic areas in arriving at a realistic notion of the thought of Arab integration. [passage omitted]

In his visit to the national control center in Imbabah, Dr Hisham al-Khatib praised the high level of Egyptian expertise in operating electronic control systems. Concerning this center, Dr Hamdi Sha'ir, the vice chairman of the Egypt Electricity Authority for operating affairs, said, "This center is considered one of the newest international systems in regard to central control, regulation of the activity of the electricity stations, and distribution systems throughout the republic, and provision of the means for rapid communication with all areas of the system and transformers to predict and repair breakdowns. This center realizes two goals for distribution systems and stations, which is guaranteeing the safe functioning and the economic operation of generating stations and saving the quantities of fuel used in operation. By means of this system it has been possible to make savings in fuel consumption in generating stations at a rate of more than 2 million tons of distillates a year. The control system in this center guarantees central control in all distribution systems throughout the republic and the fastest possible communication with them through a special microwave system; and through the data and daily and monthly statistics it provides concerning fuel rates, it makes it possible to predict the quantities of fuel the stations will need in the future as well as their costs. This will make it possible for us to save these quantities in coordination with other authorities, so that we will not be subjected to shortages or compulsory circumstances."

The cost of this project amounts to $40 million.

Dr Hisham al-Khatib participated with Eng Mahir Abazah in the inauguration of the newest transformer station on the north coast, the Burj al-'Arab station, whose transformer capacity comes to 250 megavolt-amperes and cost is DM21 million, in addition to 1 million Egyptian pounds.

Eng Mahir Abazah stressed that this new station is working to provide the necessary electricity for agricultural, industrial and tourist projects on the north coast as part of the plan to redevelop the north coast, and this station is considered the nucleus of others by means of which the transformer stations on the north coast up to Egypt's western borders at al-Sallum will be interconnected. Thus the Egyptian electricity system will cover all areas of the republic and will guarantee the availability of the power necessary for redevelopment of the north coast.
Therefore, is the armed struggle against the Zionist entity a bedouin response, and is the killing of criminals among enemy leaders in revenge for the crimes which they perpetrated a bedouin response as well? Is sitting with them at the negotiating table after greetings, embraces and a warm reception the height of civility? It appears that the statement that 99 percent of the cards for solving the problem are in the hands of the Americans has become a fact which supporters of an international conference find unacceptable as a subject for discussion. What a joke!!

Project To Recycle Solid Industrial Waste Discussed
44040018 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 31 Aug 88 p 7


[Excerpts] The Bahrain Center for Studies and Research decided to adopt a major scientific research project whose benefits to the country’s economy and health will be considerable. The subject of this research is “Recycling the Solid Waste of a Factory in Bahrain.” This research is being carried out by a team of scientists led by Dr Isma’il Muhammad al-Madani of the Arabian Gulf University. The team includes Dr Muhammad Hasan al-Sayyid, Dr ‘Abd-al-Rahim Yuzdar of Bahrain University, and Rafid Ran, a researcher from the Environmental Protection Committee. This research will last 1 full year.

Dr Isma’il al-Madani spoke about the importance of this research and its goals. He said the research would take part in recycling the solid waste materials which are accumulating in a factory in Bahrain for use in appropriate areas. It would contribute to protecting the environment and the health and safety of factory workers since these waste materials would be removed gradually from the factory. In addition, recycling has an economic return, and scientific researchers would be encouraged to pursue this fertile scientific field.

We asked Dr Isma’il: What steps are to be taken in conducting this important scientific research?

Dr Isma’il said: “These steps consist of the following:

1. Finding out how much waste materials exist at the present time and how much of these materials are produced annually by the factory that has been chosen.
"2. Conducting chemical and physical tests on the waste materials to find out precisely what their physical and chemical characteristics are.

"3. Conducting experiments on the waste materials to determine the appropriate area in which they can be used. The following are among these possible applications:

"A. Waste materials may be used in manufacturing bricks for streets.

"B. Waste materials may be used to stabilize the soil.

"C. Waste materials may be used to pave roads."

"To find out about these applications," says Dr Isma'il, "special tests will be conducted on the waste materials. Afterwards, we will be able to make an appropriate decision based on the scientific experiments."  

Regarding the underlying assumptions for pursuing this research, Dr Isma'il al-Madani says, "The whole world is thinking now about this subject. From now on a remedy for the problem of solid industrial wastes in our country has to be pursued. Furthermore, I have a personal interest in that subject. I am grateful to the Bahrain Center for Studies and Research for subsidizing a study I conducted approximately 3 years ago on toxic and dangerous industrial waste materials which are produced by factories in Bahrain. In that study I estimated how much of these materials are produced, and I looked into ways of dealing with them and methods for disposing of them.

"Solid industrial waste is also the central topic of the study we are conducting at the present time. Operations in one factory in Bahrain produce thousands of tons of these waste materials annually. These waste materials can now be seen piling up in a huge heap at the plant site. Undoubtedly, the presence of waste materials at the plant in such large amounts and the increase in those amounts every year constitute a threat to workers at the plant. These materials also constitute a heavy burden for officials because disposing of them is costly since it involves transporting them from the site and shipping them on trucks to another location where they would be stored for a very long period of time. We would thus be moving the danger from one location to another. That is why we must have another solution to these waste materials, and that solution has to be a radical one to reduce their danger and even enable Bahrain to put them to good use. Therefore, recycling these materials is the only solution: Instead of storing them, they are to be put to good use. Scientists have agreed that storing or burying waste materials is tantamount to having a bomb ticking which might explode at any moment."

Dr Isma'il al-Madani provided general scientific background on the subject of waste materials. He explained how they are divided; how they may be disposed of; and how they may be utilized in scientific experiments in that field worldwide.

He said, "In the 20th century, this subject has become one that arouses interest in scientific research and in-depth study. Students and scholars are now competing to find appropriate, scientific solutions for it.

"That subject, which is now one of the most pressing subjects worldwide, is that of solid waste materials which are discarded from homes, restaurants, and stores or those which are discarded from factories." [passage omitted]  

The following is a summary of the ways in which waste materials may be utilized:

A. Household garbage may be used in generating methane gas. After the garbage is buried, a complicated series of biological and chemical reactions take place. Ultimately, methane gas is released, and that gas can be used in numerous areas including the following:

- Generating electricity for homes, factories, and other uses.
- Generating heat for heating homes.
- Preparing some chemical compounds.

B. Land which was used as a landfill is to be used for other purposes. For example, playgrounds and parks may be built on that land.

C. Household garbage may be used directly to generate methane gas before being placed in a landfill. This garbage may be placed in special anaerobic reactors where that process takes place. That method is common in many countries which have no natural gas. It is especially common in villages and rural areas which are far away from urban areas where gas is used to light lanterns and to cook.

D. Waste materials may be processed in special aerobic reactors to turn them into organic materials and fertilizers which enrich and improve the soil.

E. Useful and valuable ingredients may be extracted from garbage, and these ingredients would then be recycled. For example:

- Glass may be separated from the garbage, and the glass can be melted and then used.
- Paper may be collected, treated and used once again.
- Iron may be separated from the garbage, smelted, and used.
- Aluminum cans may be smelted and reused.
F. Special incinerators are to be used for burning waste materials, and the heat generated from that process can be utilized either to generate electricity or to heat homes.

Household waste, which many think of as garbage, contains very useful materials. Instead of allowing these materials to become a major burden to man and society, they can be recycled and easily changed into products which man can use in his daily life.

Because its area is very small, Bahrain must now look into ways to utilize household waste materials.

So much for solid household waste materials. But what about solid waste materials which are discarded by factories?

Second, Industrial Solid Wastes

If we examined the international and local press, we would find that the subject of industrial waste materials is not only stirring the interest of scientists and academicians in universities and scientific institutions, but it has also become a subject that worries all people. People are so worried about this grave subject that the popular press has adopted it.

When the press takes up a subject and gives it that kind of attention, that means that the matter is serious, dangerous, and must be looked into. Waste materials are now on the doors of all countries, especially Third World countries which are being asked to accept these materials from industrial countries for burial in their territory. Many secret deals have been concluded between countries regarding the disposal of waste materials in their territory. Time did expose some of these scandals and secret deals, and newspapers publicized them. Two examples of many such deals happened recently in Lebanon and in Africa.

Gaza University Head Describes Role of School, Directions for HAMAS

44040020 Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic
23 Aug 88 pp 18-20

[Interview with Dr Muhammad Siyam, president of Islamic University in Gaza, by 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Imari; date and place of interview not specified]

Excerpts] In his interview with AL-MUJTAMA', Dr Muhammad Siyam, president of Islamic University in Gaza, said that occupation authorities had accused him of writing the statements issued by the Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS. They confiscated his poetry, and they said every word in his poetry prodded people to act against them.

Dr Siyam affirmed that Islamic University had mobilized the Palestinian people and prodded them to act. He affirmed that university students were at the forefront of the fight against and the opposition to the Jewish enemy.

Dr Siyam considered the occupation authorities' decision to close Islamic University a recommendation to be proud of. He indicated that HAMAS was the strongest movement on the scene and that the masses in their daily confrontations were rallying around it.

Dr Siyam said that subsidies which are sent via the PLO are sent to the organization's leaders, and only a small amount of those sums are distributed. He said the money was distributed to some groups but not to others.

The text of the interview with Dr Siyam follows.

[Question] Why can't you go back to occupied Palestine?

[Answer] I emigrated from the Gaza Strip in 1960, and I've been working in Kuwait since then. May God reward Kuwait because it uses every opportunity it has to support our people in occupied Palestine and to provide them with every assistance it can. Five years ago, for example, I was on loan from Kuwait to work at Islamic University in Gaza, but I don't know whether serving as the university's president since then was my good fortune or not. Dr Muhammad Saqr, who was the president of the university, had been expatriated from the Gaza Strip. The occupation authorities renewed my residence permit annually. In past years I was assigned the task of delivering sermons in al-Aqsa Mosque. Thus, from the pulpit of al-Aqsa Mosque and through the lectures I delivered on various occasions at Islamic University, I managed to instill in our people's hearts a disposition to rebel against the enemy and oppose him so that the situation under which our people have been living would not be reinforced. I did not want our people to put their trust in this world and to forget the fact that they were living under a hateful and dirty occupation which they must resist every day. They must never become accustomed to the occupation. That is why the enemy's authorities accused me of trying to stir up the people against them. I was trying my best to reach people as quickly as possible to tell them what I wanted to tell them, because I knew that one day I would be stopped and arrested.

I also published articles in newspapers, and some of the statements I made in the sermons which I delivered in al-Aqsa Mosque used to appear in the publications of the Islamic Resistance Movement, HAMAS, which came out periodically. That is why I was accused of complicity in writing the statements. Whenever a statement came out, I would be summoned to the military governor's office, where I would be told that such a statement had been taken from one tape and another sentence was spoken by me in such a place, and so on. [passage omitted]

Islamic University Is Responsible

[Question] What role did Islamic University and its Student Council play in the uprising?
[Answer] None of our people, be they far or near, would deny that Islamic University is responsible for the uprising. None of them would deny that Islamic University has been mobilizing the people and prodding them to act for many years. One-third of the courses which are being taught at the university deal with the Palestinian and Islamic perspective. That means 50 out of 150 credit hours. Islamic University is the only university offering eight courses on the Palestinian question. That is why our students are more aware of the question: It is a bigger part of their lives, and they have a greater interest in it than others do. That is why they have always been at the forefront of the masses in positions of leadership. Before the uprising, those who carried out individual actions against Jews, such as stabbing them with knives, seizing the soldiers' weapons, and carrying out other actions, were students at Islamic University in Gaza. Most of the young men who lost their lives in action were university students. And even those who recently lost their lives a short time before the uprising were members of the Islamic movement. They were freedom fighters who had engaged the enemy in al-Shuja'iyah after fleeing from prison. Four of them died in action, and three of those were university students.

Thus, Islamic University, the Muslims' stronghold, did have a role to play. It stirred people's emotions, and it anticipated events, contriving confrontations which paved the way for this blessed uprising.

The Student Council Arrested

When workers were run over by cars on the evening of 7 December 1987, the dead and wounded were taken to al-Shifa' Hospital. On the morning of 8 December, students assembled on campus under the leadership of the Student Council which was run by the Islamic Bloc. From the microphone of the university's mosque, students were asked to go to the hospital. Students seized control of the university's switchboard, and they placed telephone calls to all areas in Gaza, asking people to assemble at al-Shifa' Hospital. Thus, university students went out in an awesome demonstration, chanting, "God is great; death to the occupier!" They arrived at the hospital before the occupation forces, and they went inside to donate blood. When the occupation forces arrived, they engaged them, opposing them with their bodies, their stones, their hands, and their roaring Islamic cheers. On that first day, the casualties, the wounded and those who had lost their lives, were people from the university.

Since that day students have dispersed throughout the Gaza Strip, inciting people to rebel, organizing them, and leading the opposition. The occupation authorities then arrested the members of both the old and the new Student Council, all of whom are members of the Islamic Bloc. Members of the new Student Council were arrested only a few days after they took office. The occupation authorities regarded the old Student Council responsible for instigating the uprising and the new Student Council responsible for managing this unrest and leading the people. That is why they arrested everybody. When I left Gaza, some of these young men were still in prison. The president of the old council is the student Yahya Musa al-'Abadisah from Khan Yunis, and the president of the new council is the student Usamah al-Mazini from al-Shuja'iyah. A few days before my departure from Gaza, I was told that a celebration was held in prison to commemorate the fact that the president of the new Student Council had completed memorizing the Koran.

University students who are Muslims are at the forefront of the uprising. That is why the occupation authorities put considerable pressure on us to open the university. They want to bring university students together in one place on campus so it would be easy for them to surround the students and massacre them. But the president of the university strongly rejected that request.

A Military Decree: a Recommendation

[Question] What charges did the occupation authorities level against Islamic University?

[Answer] They said that the curricula offered by this university and the students' activities made the university nothing more than a stronghold producing inflammatory rhetoric against the enemy. They said that the university's printing and photocopying equipment were being used to print statements and leaflets. They said that university students were distributing these statements, and they said they had found such inflammatory materials, like signs printed on fabric and Palestinian flags. The occupation authorities openly accused the university of being responsible for this uprising. The charge is true. This, as you see, is the military decree shutting down the university. It is a document that we cherish; we consider it a recommendation, but they consider it an indictment.

I Speak on Everyone's Behalf

[Question] How responsive are the people to demands and directives from HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement, and from other factions as well?

[Answer] People in Palestine know that the HAMAS Movement and the unified command are in charge of the uprising. Whenever I was summoned by the military, I would speak on behalf of the Palestinian people and all their Islamic and national factions. That infuriated the Jewish soldiers because they could not tell whether I was with this group or the other. They wanted to exploit the differences that exist among our people. I used to tell them, "I am the president of Islamic University which has people from all Islamic and other factions. That is why I speak on everyone's behalf. All our people are in the same boat."
There is no doubt that the HAMAS Movement, which represents the Islamic faction, is the strongest and most powerful faction on the scene. It is the one which can move all people to action. That is because the people are Muslims by nature, and they sympathize with that movement’s fundamental and sincere premises.

Actually, however, those who are committed to organizations that subscribe to certain factions cannot single-handedly carry out all the requirements of the uprising. The masses must be moved to action. Thousands of people can be moved into action by the words, “Allahu Akbar” [God is Great], and “La Ilaha illa Allah” [There is no God but Allah].

The Mosques: the Foundation for HAMAS

Various institutions, such as universities, schools, and societies which are sponsored by Muslims and other factions, have been shut down by orders from the military. The only place which stayed open, in spite of the enemy, is the mosque, the starting point and the foundation for the HAMAS Movement. [In Gaza] every lane has a number of mosques, and that has infuriated the enemy because it is in the mosque that people are assembled and prodded to act against the enemy. Preparations for such actions are made in the mosque from which angry demonstrations take off. People are called upon from the minarets of the mosque, and they are then assembled or directed to go to a certain place which had been attacked by the wicked Jews. Palestinian flags are flown from these minarets. Contributions are also collected in the mosque and distributed to needy families. Leaflets and statements are also distributed in the mosque. And all that gives the Islamic Movement the advantage of continuous and daily contact with the Palestinian masses. In fact, other factions took note of that fact, and their members started coming to the mosque.

[Question] Based on your daily contacts with the people in Palestine, what would you say are the people’s attitudes toward peaceful solutions and an international conference?

[Answer] You are putting me in a politically awkward position. I don’t know about politics, but let me say what I sensed based on my contacts with the people there. People have suffered a great deal from the occupation. The general and pressing popular demand is that the occupation in all its forms must be removed no matter what; it must be removed regardless of the sacrifices that have to be made and no matter how much time will be required to get the job done. People are also determined not to give up one tiny particle of Palestinian soil. Our people rejected some of the feeble proposals that were made, such as Abu-Sharif’s document. Some leaders made statements indicating they would be willing to recognize the Jews and give up the blessed territory of Palestine in return for an emaciated, Palestinian state that would be established alongside the enemy’s state, and so on. But our heroic people responded to such notions by stepping up their uprising against the Jews. It is a fact that we will have a disaster on our hands and that relations between the organization and the people would be broken if the organization were to adopt something which the Palestinian people had rejected. As far as the international conference is concerned, I attacked it from the pulpits of al-Aqsa Mosque, saying the same thing that a Palestinian poet had said about it:

It’s under the soldiers’ recruitment tent,
Not under the roof of the Security Council
That rights are restored.
One shell made of iron is more effective than 2,000 verbal shells.

[Question] What about the subsidy funds which come from abroad?

[Answer] My university always gets its share of the subsidy which comes to the universities. I would like to go on record and to thank Kuwait for subsidizing the universities in occupied Palestine. During all these months employees have been receiving their salaries with Kuwait’s backing, and they will continue to receive those salaries until the end of this school year and the holiday. We receive this kind of subsidy, but contributions and support are collected from the people by charitable, Islamic societies. These funds, which are collected in mosques in the various countries, arrive here and are distributed to the needy.

[Question] Do you have a final comment you would like to make?

[Answer] I have two points. The first one is for you and for all Muslims. The point is made in a few lines from my poem, “Atfal al-Hijarah” [The Stone-Throwing Children]. In that poem I say,

Support the stone revolution, if you want it to triumph!
Avoid the dalliance of politicians: they will abort it.
After taking command, too many politicians spoiled and thwarted;
Too many destroyed the prosperity that was entrusted to them.

[My second point] is addressed to Arab rulers:

Is there no end, noble Arabs, to this night and gloom?
Should Palestinians be left to twist and turn in the wind?

Where are the Arabs' burnished, cutting swords

Now that the streets of Jerusalem teem with sin and debauchery,
And adulterers freely enter al-Aqsa Mosque?
When will the Arab world roar like a volcano erupting
To save al-Aqsa and root out the enemies?

EGYPT

Al-'Urabi On Arab Military Industries
JN0710101488 Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 7 Oct 88 pp 28, 29

[Interview with Lieutenant General Ibrahim al-'Urabi, chairman of the board of directors of the Arab Military Industrialization Organization by Ulfat Qata mish in Cairo-date not given]

[Text] [Qatamish] How do you view the Arab strategic security in light of changes?

[Al-'Urabi] I begin by talking about military industrialization, which is one of the foundations of the Arab strategic security. I sum it up very clearly: There should be a unified Arab view that agrees to a minimum and determines the goals, strategy, and policy of military industrialization.

In light of surrounding threats, these goals and this policy should cover all industrialization capabilities in all the Arab countries, so that these goals can be achieved. The quality of arms produced should be determined. The Arab world's industrial base in general, and its military industrialization in particular, enjoys great capabilities, greater than that imagined by the ordinary man. If these capabilities are mobilized, we will produce all that we need. By capabilities I mean human, scientific, technological, and financial.

[Qatamish] What about the Israeli satellite?

[Al-'Urabi] Any country or group of countries that determines their goal and mobilizes their resources can achieve what they want. This applies to the Arabs. Let us agree, set goals, and mobilize resources. Then we can produce whatever we need. I say this with all confidence.

My evaluation of the new threat is that we will continue to be the same as long as we are unaware of the threat to the Arab countries. However, if we realize the extent of this threat, we can do something. We should look at the launching of the Israeli satellite not only from the perspective of its orbiting in space, but we should look into how this satellite was launched—I mean the missile that launched the satellite and the threat this missile constitutes. Such missiles may reach very far distances well known by the military.

[Qatamish] Can we do something with the Arab Military Industrialization Organization [AMIO]'s money frozen in banks?

[Al-'Urabi] There is $690 million frozen in 18 banks in 8 countries. If this frozen sum is released, I can do all that the Arab countries want in the field of planes, missiles, armored vehicles, and electronics. However, I personally believe that we should produce a great thing about which the entire world speaks, such as manufacturing a fighter plane that is the most advanced in the world. I mean we should focus our efforts on a major industry. We are capable of keeping this promise.

[Qatamish] Today, to what extent has the AMIO regained its old position?

[Al-'Urabi] There are contacts with the Arab countries at the political level because the organization concerns the states. Contacts are continuing with all parties with a view to restoring the full activity of the organization and achieving its goal. It is known that the contributing countries are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar.

[Qatamish] Does our Arab production fall within a unified Arab strategy?

[Al-'Urabi] I can definitely say that it falls within the Egyptian strategy. But when the policy and strategy of the organization are laid, the expected needs of the Arab and African countries should be taken into consideration so that our plans can be realistic.

Even during the period when relations [between Egypt and other Arab countries—FBIS] were severed, there were contacts at the military level to study these countries' needs of the organization's production. These studies succeeded, because after relations with Arab countries were restored, the AMIO's production was well received by these countries. We have actually succeeded in concluding some contracts to sell the products of the organization to some Arab countries. We are discussing sales to some other countries.

[Qatamish] What about the products that were sold?

[Al-'Urabi] We sold the "Al-Fahd" armored vehicle and the "Al-Jub" vehicle to Kuwait. Iraq's markets have long been open for us. We sold artillery shells, "Al-Jub" vehicles, and "Tucano" planes to Iraq. We also provided some technical services to Iraq in the field of air force, such as providing spare parts, repairs to fighter planes, and helicopter engines.

[Qatamish] What about Sudan?
[Al-'Urabi] Sudan’s economic circumstances are known. However, it has the desire and readiness insofar as the quality of arms is concerned. This depends on the financing method. We are ready to supply Sudan as an Arab country with its needs from an industrial point of view. There were contacts with the Arab Maghreb countries. We have some equipment currently being tested in the UAE within a strong competition with other foreign countries. From my follow up of the results of the tests, I am very assured that we will win the competition. All signs indicate that our production has surpassed that of other foreign countries and met the conditions and principles set for these tests, which are being made on the “Al-Fahd” armored vehicle and the “Al-Jub” vehicle.

We do not seek profits from our sales to the Arab countries. The aim of the organization is to provide the Arab countries with advanced arms. The last thing we think of is making profits. [Qatamish] Is there any relationship in the field of war industrialization with states outside the Arab world such as Africa, for example, which has cooperation with Israel?

[Al-'Urabi] We have sold and will sell to Africa. The African market is large and open for competition to those who offer merchandise that best meets the needs of the purchasing country in terms of price, quality, and importation terms. No doubt, the excellent political relations with the African states represent an advantage. African states purchase their needs from the organization. However, we do not view the organization’s production as a complete one and we deal much in selling part of our production to Zaire and other states. There are also dealings with European states. For example, we manufacture numerous parts for the French war industries such as parts for the Mirage 2000 and for missiles.

[Qatamish] Is there any contradiction between bilateral agreements with Egypt and other agreements with the organization?

[Al-'Urabi] There is full coordination between the organization and Egypt. Many contracts and much of the organization’s imports were made through officials in Egypt. This is a natural matter, because after the three states participating in the organization withdrew from it, Egypt insisted that the organization should continue to exist and that its production, which was planned since its establishment, should also continue. In other words, it was Egypt which safeguarded, supported, and financed this organization so it could attain today’s status despite the current economic circumstances. A simple example of this is that when the three states withdrew from the organization in 1979, the organization comprised only four factories. But now there are nine operative and productive factories. These are the aircraft factory, the engines factory, the Saqr factory for advanced industries, the Qadir factory for advanced industries, the Arab-British helicopters company, the Arab-British engines company, the Arab-British dynamic industries company, the Arab-U.S. car industry compagny, and the electronics factory.

Following the boycott, money came from two sources: The organization’s limited resources, and funds from the Egyptian Defense Ministry for large projects. However, what we manufacture for some foreign states is not considered a source of funds because we conduct transactions on purely economic bases. [sentence as published] The latest industries in the organization involve aircraft. The production line is working on the production of the Tucano plane in addition to the major amendments on various fighter planes, particularly for the Egyptian Air Force.

Regarding the production of other weapons, I cannot reveal a new product involved in a contract with another party because, as a general rule, it is the other party that may or may not announce such a new product. I am a manufacturer, and I conclude a contract with a state. According to the provisions of the agreement, I am committed not to announce anything because it is a matter of privacy for the other party. In the organization, we do not cease the promotion of current products in order to increase their capability and effectiveness. We also try to reduce their prices because the whole world is engaged in competition and the arms trade has become a major source of national income for many countries. Moreover, we should not forget that some states impose a political price while we offer very cheap prices to win the markets so we should face this reality.

It is noteworthy that in 1966 we began with two factories belonging to the war production organization and we managed to fly the plane “Cairo 300” at 1.6 times the speed of sound. Currently, four factories are producing aircraft using sophisticated technology. The sophisticated plane “Alpha Jet” has actually been produced, and parts for the Mirage are being produced. In the factories of both this organization and the military production organization as well as the factories present in the Arab states—Iraq has a large industrial basis for war production—we are now capable of producing any fighter plane.

Mufti’s Testimony in ‘Those Delivered From Fire’ Case Revealed
45040020a Cairo AL-SHA’B in Arabic 20 Sep 88 p 4

[Article by Rabi‘ Shahin: “Government Press Fails To Publish Mufti’s Serious and Daring Opinions; Any Regime That Intentionally Disregards Applying Shari‘a Is Oppressive and Unjust; Ask People’s and Consultative Assemblies About Reasons for Not Fully Implementing Shari‘a; Neither Muslim Nor Non-Muslim May Be Tortured; Tormentors Must Be Punished”]

[Text] At the outset of the session, Counselor ‘Umar al-Utayfi, the court chairman, declares that the two men present, namely the mufti and Shaykh Salah Abu-Isla‘il, are two veeredulema; that they are protected by the court; and that neither the defense nor the prosecution will be permitted to ask any provocative or irrelevant [kharijah] questions.
A confrontation begins between the prosecution and the defense when Counselor Mahir al-Jundi, the chief public attorney representing the prosecution, stands up to declare that the case did not require the presence of the two aforementioned shaykh and that he didn't know why they had been brought to the court. Al-Jundi then surprises the court by submitting a report from the venerable al-Azhar on the defendants' ideology and concludes that they are outlaws who embrace intellectual creeds close to those of Khomeyni's, consider society and the government infidel, refuse to work in government institutions, and regard public property to be ownerless. The defense challenged this report and declared it null and void, considering that it cites in part statements taken from the defendants during interrogation under pressure, coercion, and torture, as the defendants had asserted. Moreover, the prosecution carried out this step without decision or assignment by the court. The defense also said: If the court wishes to hear the testimony of al-Azhar's shaykh, then let the shaykh come here to give his testimony in the court.

Lawyer Sayyid 'Abd-al-Fattah interrupts this development to say that the defense counsel and all the detainees denounce this report, that the defendants embrace the Sunni creed, the same as their Egyptian society, and that they do not regard society or the ruling regime as infidel.

Hot Questions

Dr 'Abd-al-Halim Mandur began the questioning:

[Question] You have decided that God's restrictions must be implemented when the conditions apply. Why isn't the theft restriction, for example, implemented?

[Mufti] The theft restriction is incompatible with our times. I believe that the provision is right. But there are circumstances that require the ruler to move carefully and deliberately. Implementation was suspended in the year of al-Ramadah.

[Question] Does what you have said mean that whoever fails to rule in accordance with God's book disavows a part of what is in the book and is an infidel?

[Mufti] Whoever disavows a ruling or a provision of the book, be he the president or the simplest citizen, and whoever slights such a provision or a ruling is an infidel and a turncoat. However, if the ruler, while continuing to respect the Koran and the Sunna, is excusably prevented from implementation but fails to do what is right, then he is "unjust." But if he resorts to excuses which he personally creates, then he is "not righteous." [as published]

The court asked the mufti to clarify and to make a distinction between the three cases. The mufti responded: It hasn't been proven that anybody in the Arab Republic of Egypt, from the president of the republic to the last Muslim, has disavowed anything necessarily stressed by the faith. As for the second case—inequality—if somebody rules in violation of what is right or honest, then there are superiors to deter him. I don't personally know anybody who has ruled unjustly. If I did, I would report such a person immediately. As for nonrighteousness, it is tantamount to straying from what is right and moderate, such as failing to perform prayers on time.

Ask People's Assembly

[Question] You have said that Shari'a is not fully applied and that it is suspended in part, as in the case of the restrictions. Have you been notified of any legitimate excuse that permits the ruler to suspend God's Shari'a or application of the restrictions?

Before his eminence could answer, the prosecution objected to the question because it contains the word "suspend" which signifies predetermination. The court rephrased the question.

[Mufti] A mufti's task is to explain the rule. The person seeking the explanation may or may not apply the rule. If he doesn't, then he is accountable before God. The mufti may not force anybody. I have not been personally notified of any excuse and I have not been asked. Ask the People's and Consultative Assemblies about the excuses that have prevented them from applying Shari'a.

[Question] Is there an acceptable or legitimate excuse founded on God's book and on His prophet's Sunna?

[Mufti] This issue, (the mufti reasserted) is not within my jurisdiction. The People's and Consultative Assemblies or the authority concerned have to justify their laxity in this regard.

[Question] What are the excuses that permit suspending the [Shari'a] rules and provisions?

[Mufti] I don't know them.

[Question] What do you say to a law that completely fails to make provision for the restrictions and to judges who do not apply them? What is your opinion of such a system of government?

[Mufti] This issue is up to the ruler or the judge. It so happened that 'Umar [the second caliph to follow the prophet] did, as I have already said, suspend some of the restrictions.

[Question] What do you say to a law that totally disregards these provisions?

[Mufti] It is an inadequate law. A Muslim country must be ruled by a law based on and derived from the Islamic Shari'a.
[Question] What do you say to a law that permits usury, adultery, and alcohol? What is your opinion of a system of government that does not prohibit these things?

[Mufti] A law that permits something prohibited by God is "unsound" and illegal.

[Question] What does your eminence say to a ruler or a legislator who permits these things?

Sit Down, Soldier

[Mufti] A person who rules or legislates this way... (At this point, the prosecution interrupted the mufti and voiced its objection. The defendants shouted: "Sit down, soldier. Let him speak." Dr Mandur then said: Does not the highest court and the prosecution know that the law permits these things? Yes, Egyptian law permits them).

The prosecution objected, saying that Egyptian law prohibits and penalizes these monstrosities. Dr 'Abd-al-Halim Mandur retorted: A law that permits a mature woman of 18 or more years to marry [only] with her consent and does not prohibit such a marriage is tantamount to a law that permits adultery because it permits what God has prohibited.

The mufti then answered, saying: My words are clear. I am not aware of this law. If it exists, it is wrong and the ruler who permits it is also wrong.

[Question] The defense asked: Wrong in what way?

[Mufti] If the ruler intends to or insists on applying what is wrong, then he is unjust. But if he does what he does for legitimate reasons founded on a [Koranic] provision, on the Sunna, on analogy, or on consensus, then he is an interpreter. If his interpretation is right, then he will be doubly rewarded and if he is wrong, he will be rewarded but once.

[Question] Can it be said that a ruler who allows and permits these crimes is an interpreter who will be doubly or singularly rewarded?

[Mufti] I have not said this because there can be no interpretation where there is an explicit provision. If he permits something prohibited by God with an explicit provision, then he is a turncoat from Islam.

Dr 'Abd-al-Halim Mandur then noted how Egyptian law permits adultery by failing to stipulate the penalty of stoning for a legally adult woman who meets [sic] with a man.

[Mufti] This is prohibited by Shari'a.

Banks, With Their Loans and Certificates, Are Suspect

[Question] What is your eminence’s opinion of Egyptian law’s provision concerning the fixed interest rates banks charge for loans and the interest rates they pay for deposits?

[Mufti] These are different issues. There are Islamic banks that do not prohibit or limit interest and that also deal with their customers on the basis of profit and loss. The consensus on these banks is that they are permissible. As for investment certificiates Type A and Type B, the ulema have included them with that which is suspicious because they delineate the time and amount of profit. Though not prohibited, they are suspicious. The ulema have permitted the Type C certificate because it adopts the prize system.

The mufti added: The majority of ulema have established that dealings with banks are usurious and suspicious. But some ulema have permitted dealing with government banks because they consider individuals' dealings with governments the same as children's dealings with parents. As for loans paying fixed interest rates, the majority of ulema have prohibited them whereas some ulema have permitted such dealings, considering that they are intended for services and for increasing production to serve society. All these are controversial issues.

[Question] So what do you say to a ruler or a regime that permits selling and drinking alcohol and that collects fees and taxes for the production of alcohol?

[Mufti] I have already said that whatever God has prohibited with a firm provision, which includes alcohol, cannot be subject to interpretation. A law or a ruler who permits such a thing is wrong.

[Question] What is the judgement on Egypt's ruler or Cairo's governor who permits alcohol and gambling?

[Mufti] Whoever slights or disavows these restrictions is undoubtedly an infidel and a turncoat from Islam.

[Question] Is a Muslim woman permitted to expose her bare arms and legs to a stranger?

The judge interrupted to say: Who among us permits his wife to do such a thing? This is untrue.

The [defense] lawyers shouted: The top officials and the country's rulers do this openly in front of the television cameras, your honor.

[Mufti] Islam has not permitted this and no reasonable man approves of unveiling women. Every man is responsible for his wife and his children.
[Question] Then what is your opinion of the information material and of the lewdness and nakedness displayed by the films shown by the media?

[Mufti] No less than 50 percent of what the media shows is good, consisting of religious and cultural material. I demand that this material be increased. I have already expressed my opinion and have demanded that the bad material be reduced.

[Question] Lawyer Sayyid 'Abd-al-Fattah asked: Your eminence has defined evil [al-taghut] as oppression and defined oppression as swerving from God's restrictions. God, may He be praised, says: "And any who transgresses the limits of God does verily wrong his own soul." So what do you say to Articles 273, 27, 277, 318 and other articles of the Egyptian penal code? For example, one of these articles says that a wife committing adultery in the marital home shall be punished with a prison term of no more than 2 years whereas God's rule is that she shall be stoned to death. Isn't this article a transgression against God's limits?

A strong argument erupted between the court chairman and the lawyer on the mufti's familiarity with and knowledge of the Egyptian law. The court chairman said that the mufti is specialized in the Islamic Shari'a. The lawyer responded that the mufti is a most learned man and must familiarize himself with the real situation including the Egyptian situation. Otherwise, he is not fit to be a mufti.

[Mufti] If adultery is proven.

[Lawyer Sayyid] Yes, it is definitely and positively proven.

[Mufti] Then it is a transgression against God's limits.

[Lawyer Sayyid] Then the positive legislator in this case is considered an oppressor?

[Mufti] Yes.

[Lawyer Sayyid] Meaning that he has become evil?

[Mufti] No objection.

[Lawyer Sayyid] Thanks to his eminence the mufti.

[Question] What do you say to a confession obtained from a defendant by coercion, beating, imprisonment and torture, all of which have been proven by medical reports?

[Mufti] Coercion may not be used for any purpose, not even to make people embrace Islam.

[Question] Supposing coercion is attributed to a certain ideology and that a man is brought before the court on the basis of coercion but when the man appears before the natural judge, he disavows coercion and declares that his confession was made under coercion, then may such a man be tried on the basis of this ideology?

Smiling, the judge interrupted to say: Then the case is ended and the sessions terminated. Counselor Mahir al-Jundi, the prosecution representative, objected to the question, saying: There is a difference between those who come to their senses and are rewarded by God and those who confess during interrogation and then disavow their ideology before the court. The [defense] lawyer interjected: Do you task people for what is in their hearts and have you opened their hearts to find out what is inside them? If the defendant repents for the acts he has committed and if he turns away from the ideology he has embraced, provided that he meets the requirements of repentance, then he is entitled to his reward from God who treats him leniently and the court may declare him innocent. But if this mistaken ideology has harmed some people by attacking their property and honor, then the perpetrators must be tasked for the consequence of their acts.

Prosecution Questions

The prosecution asked: According to the prosecution's interrogations, some defendants acknowledged that they necessarily consider, on the basis of what they call "establishing the Islamic state by force," society to be an infidel society. You have acknowledged that Egypt is an Islamic state. So, is this [belief] considered evil?

The defense objected to the question and the defendants yelled: These are the prosecution's words, not ours. These statements were taken from us under torture.

[Question, presumably by prosecution] Some defendants have confessed—interrupted by the defendants who yelled: Complete the sentence, soldier, and say "under beating and torture"—that they have committed murders, planned more such acts, and resisted the authorities. What is Islam's rule on this?

The court refused to address the question and the defendants shouted: God is great.

The defendants then voiced some questions. Defendant Isma'il 'Abd-al-Hamid asked: Is it a crime to grow one's beard?

The mufti answered: Noobody has ever said such a thing. Rather, it is a virtue urged by the prophet. The defendant demanded that the session minutes show that the fifth charge made against him is the charge of growing a beard.

[Question] May a foe, meaning the State Security Intelligence, act as a witness?

[Mufti] He may not.
Defendant Ahmad Rizq asked: What do you say to one who tortures a Muslim in jail?

[Mufti] Neither Muslim nor non-Muslim may be tortured. The tormentor must be punished.

**Various Oil, Gas, Mineral Exploration Agreements Reached**

45040013c Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
27 Sep 88 p 5

[Article by ‘Adil Ibrahim: “Foreign Companies Will Spend $900 Million to Drill 200 New Exploratory Oil Wells”]

[Text] Mr ‘Abd-al-Hadi Qandil, minister of petroleum, declared that foreign companies will be spending more than $900 million on oil exploration and drilling activities in more than 200 new exploratory wells along with their expenditures on discovery development in addition to $100 million in grants which will not be paid back. He said that the international companies are racing one another to offer new bids to search for natural gas and exploit it through the production-sharing system in accordance with the system in effect in crude oil agreements, and that so far three agreements have been signed to search for gold in the Eastern Desert and sulphur east of al-‘Arish and the Gulf of Suez.

In a statement delivered for him at the opening of the annual scientific conference of the Arab Mining and Petroleum Society by geologist Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Halim, chairman of the Geologic Survey and Mining Projects Authority, the minister stated that in spite of the difficult circumstances the world oil industry has passed through, lead by the drop in international oil prices which has made the oil companies reduce their investments in the area of exploration because of the drop in their revenues and the instability of the world markets, new areas have been offered for oil drilling in the Western Desert, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Suez, and the Delta.

The minister of petroleum said that at present an integrated plan is being carried out to upgrade geologic survey and mining exploration activities by the Geologic Survey Authority, whose goals have developed and reorganized to bear the burdens of the search for and development of mineral resources and the provision of specialized services to all mining, housing, utility, agriculture, land reclamation, and irrigation bodies.

The minister stated that the Sinai coal company has been established to produce and market coal, assuming responsibility for the mining of the coal from the al-Maghara mine in northern Sinai for use in the coal coke plants and operation of electric stations.

The minister of petroleum pointed out that the draft of a new law for mines and quarries has been prepared to preserve mineral resources and encourage domestic and foreign investors. Distribution of the first integrated geologic map of Egypt, at a scale of 1:500,000, will start early next November.

Attending the conference which began yesterday and will continue for 2 days were Dr ‘Adil ‘Izz, minister of state for scientific research; Engineer Mashhur Ahmad Mashhur, chairman of the Arab Mining and Petroleum Society; Engineer Muhammad Mu’bid, chairman of the Petroleum Authority; and leaders of the oil and industry sectors.

**Awqaf Ministry Working To Combat Youth Extremism, Drug Use**

45040011 Cairo AKHIR SA’AH in Arabic
14 Sep 88 pp 8-9

[Interview with Awqaf Minister Dr Muhammad ‘Ali Mahjub, by Tihami Muntasir; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Are there foreign plots to export extremism to Egypt? Is there a deliberate plan behind the inundation of Egyptian youth with all sorts of drugs? Why don’t the schools have their share of religion, proper mosques, and teachers who can explain religious matters fluently and easily? Is there a religious vacuum which has allowed religious imposters to gain control of the young people's minds? Since Egypt has, according to Awqaf Ministry figures, close to 70,000 mosques, are there enough preachers and ulema to serve this huge number of mosques? Where are the enlightened religious books which would forcefully and clearly refute the nominally-priced destructive tracts now flooding the market? And finally, what assessment has been made of the “caravans of light” experiment which fanned out to all the governorates during the past few months, and what sorts of questions did the young people ask at these meetings?

Awqaf Minister Dr Muhammad ‘Ali Mahjub says, “Yes, there are foreign plots behind the extremism and the widespread drug addiction, plots aimed at sabotaging the young Egyptian’s personality and destroying his morale. This extremism has come about because the state has had no informed religious plan, although amends are now being made for this lack by the ministry and learned scholars in all religious, social, legal, psychological, and political fields.”

Dr Mahjub says that religious books will be developed by an Islamic publishing house, and that the young people’s questions were limited to applications of the Islamic Shari‘ah, bank interest, and foreign loans. The awqaf minister said that President Husni Mubarak receives regular reports on the travels of the “Caravans of Light”, and is trying to solve all problems by issuing prompt decisions, such as the decision to release the young people involved in the recent ‘Ayn Shams incidents.
[Question] In light of President Mubarak's concern and his instructions to develop and strengthen the Islamic Call's methods in such a way as to conform with the circumstances of the country, what are the main outlines of the plan for the near future?

[Answer] To begin with, I would like to emphasize that President Mubarak never misses an opportunity to ask me, and all the agencies concerned with youth, to instill a love of God in our young people and improve their physique and their education, for they are the pillars of society and the hope of every mother, and Egypt's future depends on them. Because President Husni Mubarak believes in the role of the mosque in the neighborhood and the society as a whole, and the role of the ulema in guiding the young people and leading them away from whatever might harm them, he has asked me to conduct a comprehensive, careful study on developing and strengthening the methods being used by the Islamic Call. [passage omitted]

How Can the Call Be Developed?

[Answer] In this connection, we are proceeding along three courses.

The first course consists of scientifically and soundly preparing the preacher for the scope of the cause he will be applying himself to and the message he will be preaching and furthering. Accordingly, the Awqaf Ministry has set up training institutes and centers in all the governorates, the mission of which is to refashion the personality of the preacher and to bring up the contemporary problems troubling the Egyptian citizens, especially the young people, and discuss how to respond to and deal with them and what the Islamic opinion is on these problems. Afterwards the students are culled, and the winners have another opportunity to study at the advanced training institute in Cairo, where knowledgeable Islamic professors whose competence can be attested to, such as Dr Sufi Abu-Talib, Dr Ahmad Shalabi, Dr Sayyid ‘Uways, Dr Kamal Abu-al-Majid, and others, lecture.

The second course concerns books. The Awqaf Ministry has decided to provide missionaries, ulema, and preachers with learned Islamic libraries which will serve as references when they prepare their lessons and sermons and when they discuss important religious issues with other individuals and groups. The ministry will also provide them with periodic publications needed by the young people, dealing with many important issues and topics. In addition, we are concerned with the preacher's general appearance. He should not be repulsive or disgusting, for we have come to realize that the imam's appearance is part of his personality. The ministry has decided to set up a joint factory to produce Islamic clothing (gowns, cloaks, caftans, and turbans) to be sold on very easy interest-free installments to shaykhs and preachers—subsidized by the ministry, of course. This factory will cost more than 2 million Egyptian pounds.

Foreign Plots Aimed at Egypt

The third course in the plan to develop the Islamic Call is that significant reliance is being placed on the "Caravans of Light," which were started by His Excellency Dr Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, the Mufti of Egypt. In other words, caravans of ulema, including leaders from al-Azhar and the Awqaf Ministry, make the rounds, like travelling pulpiteers, to groups of young people at schools, universities, and places of work. These caravans concentrate on two basic issues.

The first issue is the dangers which the young people face when they bring up religious matters. We try to listen to them, discuss these things with them, and explain the definitive Islamic viewpoint.

The second issue is the danger of becoming addicted to the deadly poisons which shatter the minds, ambition, vitality, and positivism of the young people of Egypt, and which are crucial to the deception and ambushing of our dear Egypt. Here I am convinced that some country, or some international gang, is making Egypt's youth the target of a plot to harm them, and is spending millions of dollars to destroy the determination of Egyptian youth and undermine their strength, so that they cannot lift their arms to build their Egypt and achieve greater production so that we can dispense with their loans and grants. These wealthy gangs want destruction, ruin, and backwardness for Egypt. In their studies and research, scholars have proven that the trafficking in various kinds of poisons, as well as addiction, is a foreign-designed and foreign-financed plot aimed at Egypt through its good Muslim young people who believe in themselves and their country. For this reason we are giving this issue the utmost attention. His Excellency the Mufti and I will be going to the universities, institutes, and schools, accompanied by professors of sociology and psychology and narcotics officers, to show documentary films which will give the young people, through images and sound, a picture of drug addicts, how they live, and the far-reaching effects that narcotics have on them. Pictures don't lie; this is one means of persuasion, one way to take the young peoples' hand and lead them away from the abyss, dissolution, and deviation.

[Question] The school year will be beginning soon. Will the ulema have any part in guiding the students at the schools, institutes, and universities?

[Answer] As I said before, I believe that the danger is very grave. As long as the young people are the target, we must be present in force at all the Egyptian schools and universities. We will accompany the professors of psychology and sociology and the narcotics officers to explain the facts we have to the young people, in order to fortify them with facts, evidence, and proof before they fall into the hell of addiction. The ministry will prepare a pamphlet, to be distributed free of charge to the students, which will explain the effects and danger of addiction and the Islamic and scientific viewpoint on it.
The Religious Vacuum Is the Reason

[Question] Where does this extremism come from?

[Answer] The reasons for this extremism are many and varied. As only one example, I might mention the deep-seated religious and intellectual vacuum in the minds and hearts of the young people, which has been present for a long time, ever since the early sixties. [passage omitted]

Another reason for this extremism is that our children are ignorant of many of the facts of the true, tolerant religion which knows nothing of violence and extremism. Then too, they have turned to people who are not religious experts, with whom they have unknowingly become infatuated. [passage omitted]

No, my children, I hope you won't listen to those who tempt you and claim that Egypt does not practice the Shari'ah. They are stirring up your religious zeal, which we all—president, government, and ulema—value. Reject them, and we will be with you on the road to truth and Islam. We do not have to fear that God will be a harsh critic. [passage omitted]

Fighting the Yellow Books

[Question] Misleading yellow books promoting erroneous concepts like autocracy and holy war are available on the streets of Egypt. Why aren't ideas being fought with ideas? When will these problems be solved? They hand out their books free of charge, while the student cannot buy a single book of enlightened knowledge. What is being done about this?

[Answer] By God, you are right. The young people, in addition to having this religious vacuum, are religiously illiterate and have a thirst for knowledge. This is the way the good youth of Egypt are, and for this reason it is a mistake and a shame to leave the field to the authors of those distorted yellow books and the destructive ideas with which they fill the minds of the young people and so destroy them. For the first time, I will tell you a secret: it has been decided to allocate about 1 million pounds to set up an Islamic publishing house to be supervised by the ministry. It will have the latest-model printing press, and its mission will be to issue religious books, with high-quality printing and binding, written by respected professors known to be the best ulema and professors. The ministry will subsidize the books and offer them to the young people at prices lower than those dubious books. This is the first step towards replying to them, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.

But, I ask, where is the state publishing authority? I believe that, as a national, patriotic organization, it must give some thought to this problem. If it is re-examined, it might be able to make some contribution to this patriotic mission.

A Report on the “Caravans of Light”

[Question] In how many governorates have you met with the young people? What have the “caravans of light” accomplished? Have they achieved the purpose for which they were created?

[Answer] Only yesterday His Excellency the Mufti and I finished visiting almost every Egyptian governorate, the last ones being Isma'iliyyah, Port Said, and al-Shari'iyah. This means that we went to about 26 governorates. Praise God, the young people of Egypt are fine young people. President Mubarak has assured himself of that, and has expressed his complete satisfaction with the results of our trips and our discussions with the young people. All observations and reports indicate that the young people know the truth about themselves, have bare the plots of the enemies and the ignorant ones who are lying in wait for them. I will not conceal from you that President Mubarak has asked me to give him weekly reports on the young people's circumstances and the problems they are bringing up, so that they can be discussed and some action can be taken to solve them.

What Are the Young People Asking?

[Question] Based on the 2 whole years you lived with them, what kinds of problems and ideas are perplexing the young people? [passage omitted]

[Answer] I am fully convinced that only a very small number of the young people are bringing up secondary Islamic issues such as veils, gowns, beards, rosaries, and birth control, which they all disagree on according to their own convictions, to the point of coming to blows. We have explained to them that Islam is not veils or rosaries or beards. We have told them that a Muslim is a Muslim with or without a beard, and that a Muslim sister can wear a veil or not according to her belief. Yes, all these things are part of Islam, but they should not become such bones of contention that our young people become preoccupied with them. There are bigger, greater issues confronting Egypt, its prosperity and its security. Isn't it strange to see a doctor, engineer, or accountant concerning himself with such minor matters? I wish that the engineer would attend to a new invention or a new theory which would contribute to Egypt's scientific standing and increase production. If only the doctor would devote himself to his work and his specialty and discover a new cure for cancer or AIDS or at least bilharzias—dangers which are threatening our health. Wouldn't this be of benefit to Egypt and the Egyptian people? But, I repeat, the best of Egypt's young people are the target of agents carrying out hostile plots. Egypt's very own children are in a deep sleep, not realizing what is in their interest. Whenever the government acts against some of the agitators, they cry out that the state is persecuting Muslim youth.
I tell them sincerely, with God as my witness, that the state is on the side of the young Muslims, cares for them, and is looking after their interests. There are 70,000 mosques in Egypt where the Muslims pray. Is the state persecuting them? Frankly, we have never heard of this at all. Every Muslim citizen goes to pray and listen to the Friday sermon in complete safety. A few mosques which had been taken over by some misled young people and which can be counted on the fingers of one hand are being monitored, the state having learned that some young people have not observed mosque and prayer etiquette and have turned some of these mosques into places for spreading their poisoned ideas.

Preserving Doctrines and Religious Observances

As for the sorts of problems and ideas which the young people are bringing up, I had the feeling that, from Aswan to Alexandria, there were three main issues which were repeatedly raised: applying the Islamic Sharī’ah, bank interest, and foreign loans. God granted us success in responding to them. The mufti and I told them that in Egypt the Sharī’ah is in good shape and is actually being put into practice in the following areas: doctrines and religious observances, business dealings, morals, and guidelines set by the law to protect society.

With respect to the doctrines and religious observances, I ask: Have you heard of anyone standing up in the middle of a public square and saying that God is not one and Muhammad was not his prophet? Such a thing could never happen. The Egyptian Baha’is were tried because their faith doubted God and our master Muhammad.

Similarly, the number of mosques is increasing day by day, and the devout are crowding into them to pray. They are going on the pilgrimage, giving alms, and fasting during Ramadan. These religious observances are applied in the best way possible; indeed, they are being applied in an ideal manner to the highest degree.

As for business transactions, I say that usurious interest is the only breach which they have brought up. We have explained to them that usury between individuals is absolutely forbidden. Similarly, in the matter of Group A and Group B investment certificates, there are two opinions, one allowing them and the other forbidding them, and it is up to the Muslim to take whichever opinion pleases him. As for Group C investment certificates, the mufti has ruled that they are permissible, confirming a fatwa issued by His Excellency Shaykh ‘Abd-al-Majid Salim of al-Azhar 50 years ago.

There are also two opinions on dealing with banks, one permitting it and the other forbidding it, and it is up to you to adopt whichever opinion pleases your heart. In both cases, they are permissible, and I say that there is absolutely no prohibition against dealing with banks.

There is a definitive reply to the matter of foreign loans. We said that we are forced into getting them so that Egypt’s development projects do not come to a halt. The Koran is quite clear here, for it says, “If one is forced by necessity, without willful disobedience, nor transgressing due limits—Then is he guiltless.” [Surah 2:173] If we refrained from getting loans, the country would lose. It is odd that the young people don’t work, don’t produce, and do not appreciate their country’s circumstances, and then demand that there be no loans. By God, every Egyptian wishes this could be so. But, with the strong arms of the young people, Egypt can achieve this goal. If we increased our production, we would not have to resort to loans.

Last comes the problem of civil law, which is the crux of our problems with the young people. I say, my brothers, do you know that the man who wrote the Egyptian civil code was a revered al-Azhar scholar, a Muslim leader, an authority on jurisprudence and religion—the late Dr ‘Abd-al-Razzaq al-Sanhuri, who interpreted the law in a way which would both please God and achieve the good of the country? He wanted the laws to be literally taken from the verses of the Koran, with a very few exceptions, and God willing, we will find the passages which permit these exceptions. Is there any Muslim who doesn’t want the Sharī’ah to be applied in its entirety? In this way, I was able to convince the young people, with God’s grace, that almost all of the Sharī’ah is being put into practice.

The Problem of Bad Imams

[Question] How many mosques are there now? Can the ministry control them, through knowledgeable imams, in such a way as to meet the shortage of responsible ulemas and preachers?

[Answer] By the grace of God, there are 70,000 mosques. Egypt is an Islamic country, and its most important cause is to protect and defend Islam and spread it to every country to the best of its abilities. However, I want to stress the fact that these mosques are a heavy burden on the ministry and need well-prepared and informed imams. But how can we achieve this goal? Al-Azhar sends us its graduates and we distribute them, and therefore the education and initial preparation of the imams is not our concern, but al-Azhar’s. I agree with the people and with every Muslim that the level of some of the preachers is extremely poor. I ask that the preacher be excused, because he didn’t have access to an adequate, carefully-planned curriculum which would qualify him to call people to God in an informed, knowledgeable manner.

[Question] Why isn’t there any coordination with al-Azhar to draw up improved curricula?

[Answer] Once we told their excellencies the shaykh of al-Azhar and the president of al-Azhar University about the level of its students, a start was actually made on this. At a wide-ranging meeting, it was decided that al-Azhar
would reexamine its acceptance procedures for first-level students, so that only those who had memorized the Koran would be permitted to enroll, and would change the curricula in those colleges which graduate preachers, such as the College of the Call, Religious Principles, and Islamic Studies.

[Question] Why aren't university professors and Islamic Call leaders assigned to deliver sermons in the mosques?

[Answer] Who says this isn't done? Many mosques employ university professors and senior ulama, paying 15,000 pounds to a university professor, 10,000 pounds to an assistant instructor, and 8,000 pounds to a licentiate.

Even so, as I said earlier, we are evaluating the training courses in order to remedy previous shortcomings.

[Question] Is one month's training for a preacher enough?

[Answer] It is not enough, but what can we do? We have set up an institute for amateur preachers, and we are doing everything we can to get good students from al-Azhar.

[Question] How much of the Call's attention is directed to prisons?

[Answer] There is a prison chaplains' department subordinate to al-Azhar, which is doing its duty. We at the ministry will be arranging various kinds of visits and lectures for prisoners, to discuss things with them, find out what they are thinking and what is troubling them, and explain the religious view on their crimes and the importance of morality and a stable life for their families. We will begin this program next month, God willing.

Public Execution of Drug Dealers

[Question] What do you think about drug addiction, and how can we stop it?

[Answer] The solution is to publicly execute smugglers and drug dealers in public squares, so that the people can see those who have let themselves be seduced into playing this destructive game. I have no other solution than this. The dealers and smugglers must be executed, and the addicts must be treated and registered. If a person goes back to addiction after being cured, he must receive deterrent punishment by being isolated from society, as a lesson to anyone who listens.

[Question] A final question: What is the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs doing in Egypt and abroad?

Suffice it to say that the Supreme Council spends more than 10 million pounds each year, some of it on study grants for people from the Islamic world and elsewhere who want to study Islam at al-Azhar in Egypt and then go back to their people and their country as ambassadors who will preach Islam with wisdom and good counsel.

Another large portion of this money is spent on publications printed by the council to revive the Islamic heritage and reprint lesser-known Islamic sources which are found in other Islamic countries but not in Egypt. The council prints Korans for circulation in Egypt, and also prints pamphlets and letters to be given to religious homes, ulama, young people at youth centers, and company and factory workers in the form of Islamic libraries.

Next comes the council's overseas role. It supervises more than 15 Islamic centers in London, France, and American, German, and African cities, the mission of which is to preserve the identity of people in Islamic colonies, teach them the religion, and spread the Islamic Call among non-Muslims. Praise God, Egypt has an eminent reputation overseas, and our Islamic centers are increasing in number. Even though other international centers exist, Egypt is still the leader, the mother, and the learned professor for all time.

Air College Director on 3-Year Program, Admissions

45040013b Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
30 Aug 88 p 6

[Article by Jamal Kamal: "Why 3 Years of Study in the Air College? The College Director: Grades Are Not the Criterion for Admission"]

[Text] The decree by Field Marshal Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, deputy prime minister and minister of defense, lowering the years of study in the Air College to 3 years instead of 4 and eliminating the condition of grades for admission, has provoked a number of questions and requests for information on the preparation of pilots, especially the pilots of modern fighters. Is it possible to prepare pilots in just 3 years to fly the most modern airplanes in the world, the Mirage 2000 and the F-16? What are the criteria for admission to the Air College? Has the college fully provided all the elements of development for preparing the eagles of the air, the pilots of the future?

In this investigation we will reply to these questions.

Air Major General Ahmad 'Abd-al-Latif, director of the Air College, considers that the process of preparing and admitting pilots into the Air College is distinguished by a continuity of study and development which is connected to development in the world of aviation and the nature of admissions and education in Egypt. In the past 4 years, the college, in cooperation with the Air Force, has carried out a number of studies on conditions for admission to the Air College for students receiving the general secondary in the framework of the presence of components of the educational process in the college in terms of modern laboratories, training aides, and the mastery of theoretical and practical aspects. The result of
these studies has been that the grade the student receives in general secondary is not the sole, basic criterion regarding the extent of this student’s aptitude for learning aviation sciences. Therefore, the college council’s decree was made, eliminating the condition of grades for admission to the faculty, with reliance on basic criteria to ascertain the applicants’ abilities for learning aviation sciences and flight through basic tests in the selection center in the Air College by means of written tests using ground instruments to arrive at an advanced stage of intelligence on the part of the student and determine it in a practical sense to measure the power of observation and clarity of thinking; test verbal ability; test for general information, mechanical comprehension, drawing up plans, and the student’s capability for rapid, precise, visual discrimination; and test auditory perception. All these tests ascertain in the students admitted the extent of their speed of reaction, power of observation, stability of psychological state, and extent of ability to deal with others. All these tests assuredly have no relation with the grades the student obtains in general secondary.

An Opportunity for Literature Students

However, if such is the situation why isn’t the opportunity given to students in the literature section in general secondary to apply to the Air College?

Maj Gen Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Latif considered that the Air College is in the process of preparing a study which will be completed next year on the possibility of admitting students from the literature section. The college actually has started application of this philosophy on a broad scale in admitting graduates of universities and higher institutions in various areas of specialization in order to graduate them as pilots after just a year and a half’s study to obtain a bachelor’s degree in aviation.

Although this experiment began only last January, in its initial successful results it indicates the aptitude of university graduates in various fields of specialization for mastering aviation education during such a brief period.

Is it the success of the experiment of preparing university graduates to be fighter pilots within a year and a half that prompted the college to reduce the period of study for students who had obtained the general secondary to just 3 years instead of 4?

The director of the Air College asserted that aviation instruction is not just the memorizing of the learning in the educational program—aviation normally an instinct and in the college it is developed and practiced. The method of preparation is not just a scientific one which has the goal of teaching engineering curricula; rather, it is a scientific one which serves the technical aspects of combat training. Preparation of the pilot in the faculty proceeds through three stages. There is the stage of initial preparation and maintenance of the pilot’s aptitude for flight through a sports and nutrition program which continues throughout the 3 years of study. Then there is the stage of academic preparation which serves the technical aspects of airplanes and the like in teaching certain fields of engineering specialization, aviation engineering, accounting, and electronic sciences. Next there is the final stage, which includes an aviation training program to develop aviation instinct and aptitude through the use of the al-Jumhuriyah, Tukanu, and Alpha Jet airplanes above and beyond training with live ammunition including bombs and rockets. This program will qualify them to work directly in Mirage-2000 and F-16 airplane squadrons. Nonetheless, in spite of the brief years of study the number of hours of flying time are no less than the international rate, which ranges from 100 to 200 hours.

The System of Intensified Instruction

Maj Gen Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Latif, the director of the Air College, asserted that reducing the years of study in the college to 3 for graduating fighter pilots directly reflects the completion of the educational program in the college, applying the intensified instruction system with the allocation of a classroom to every 15 students and a teacher for each student and provision of the most modern center for the traditions of aviation in the world—not to speak of the provision of the college with a number of laboratories in various areas of aviation, the realization of practical instruction at a greater rate than the theoretical, and the mixture of theoretical considerations with the practical ones.

Does this mean that the Air College has reached the final stage of development of aviation instruction in Egypt?

Maj Gen Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Latif said that there are basic elements through which it is possible to judge the extent of the development of the Air College. These are the concurrent instruction of the nature of modern war, modern weapons, and scientific command; the development of traits of thinking and scientific research; then the concurrent instruction of psychological and social makeup, development of the material and technical base of education, and the linkage of education to military doctrine. In light of the application of these scientific criteria to what has been taking place in the college, we find that the Air College uses the most modern international training aircraft and that the curricula studied there observe the diverse development of military science, engineering sciences, and aviation science above and beyond the availability of the various scientific elements in developing the academic base with attention to practical education.

An Exceptional Class Next January

Air Maj Gen Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Latif, director of the Air College, said that an exceptional class is to be admitted next January from science branch general secondary students with grades lower than those for admission to the Air College, and also a new class of students from universities and higher institutes of various fields of
specialization for graduation as pilots following a year and a half's study.

Commentator Reacts To Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy
45040020b Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 20 Sep 88 p 5

[Article by Salah Shadi: "Keys to U.S. Policy"]

[Text] The Egyptian press cautiously acquaints one with news of termination of the Iraqi-Iran war. For example, one reads a report on the U.S. administration's plan to impose sanctions against Iraq because of the latter's violation of the international rules of war by using chemical weapons in its war against the Kurds.

Then in other reports about Iraq in this connection, one reads that the United States has run out of patience with Iraq because of its refusal to deliver to the former a Russian tank so that it may make use of the advances the Russian technology has introduced into the tank industry and that this impatience has motivated the United States to accuse Iraq of using chemical weapons in its war against the Kurds.

Surprise nearly makes one lose the balance one must maintain when reading these reports about the United States, the country of contradictions, rather total contradictions, that characterize the U.S. political thinking with which we, the Arabs, are confronted. When we consider the U.S. objectives in this part of our Arab world, we must, when discussing U.S. thinking...we should keep these principles in mind:

First, exclude the possibility that the honorable values that govern political action are the motive behind this thinking which delineates the projected framework of the [U.S.] political action. It is only the interest of the United States or of its ally, Israel, (that determines the dimensions of this framework).

Second, if the projected [U.S.] political thinking serves an Arab or Islamic issue, then we must raise all the possibilities that would lead us to identify the other part of the Islamic or Arab world that the projected U.S. thinking seeks to destroy or to hit in a vulnerable spot.

Third, the genuine long-range objective of U.S. policy is to plant and entrench Israel's feet in the heart of the Arab and Islamic world in a manner that permits Israel to move freely and rapidly in all parts of this Arab and Islamic world.

These are the three keys that open the door to U.S. thinking.

If we bear these focal points in mind when discussing any U.S. resolution, then we can learn the motives, dimensions, and objectives of such a resolution.

In application of these rules, we find upon reviewing the immediate past that the United States supplied Iran with sophisticated weapons to use in its war against Iraq and that, simultaneously, it supplied Iraq with satellite information on the Iranian Army's deployment.

Thus, the objective is to destroy, and solely destroy, certain countries of the Arab and Islamic world. It is as if an old vedetta urges the United States to embark on this dual confrontation which is characterized by moral baseness and the lack of human values.

What urges the United States to denounce Iraq's war against the Kurds now, even though it was clearly proven in the past that chemical weapons had been used in killing the Kurds? The reason is that the commodity the United States had sought to barter with Iraq was not ready. The United States has received no response from Iraq on delivering the Russian tank—a base act which the United States wants Iraq to commit against Russia which has helped Iraq. But the entire act is characterized by baseness. However, the level to which the United States is asking Iraq to sink is truly the abyss to which all those involved have sunk.

Moreover, if we review the U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue we will find that this policy has revolved entirely around entrenching Israel's feet in the Arab and Islamic world from the time Israel came into existence to the present, the dimensions of which are drawn by the Palestinian youth with their so-called uprising. This uprising is, in fact, the people's revolution, the nation's hope and, a manly stance.

When the uprising issue was presented to the United Nations, the United States took its transient stance to abolish the UN resolution concerning the Palestinians' right to regain their land in the West Bank and Gaza.

Having realized the dimensions of this U.S. policy, we must plan a long-range policy that frees us of the evil U.S. shackle that seeks to destroy and demolish, not build and develop.

In this planning, our attention must be primarily focused on seeking economic liberation from the tentacles of the U.S. octopus. In his latest speeches, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak left no doubt in the people's mind as to the difference between the aid the U.S. Fund provides Egypt—aid embodied in withholding subsidies and increasing the prices of essential foodstuffs—and the aid that Egypt seeks. This difference has compelled the Egyptian president to acknowledge the failure of the U.S. policy to provide the cure. Consequently, we are left with nothing but our intrinsic ability to tackle the deteriorating economic situation. As a result of this sincere reflection on the true problem, the Egyptian people have realized the real nature of the effort they are required to exert to make up for what they have missed, to tackle their crushing current crisis, and to enhance their future.
If we understand the importance of the step to build our economic future, then we must also understand the true nature of the “game” the United States is planning for the Arab and Islamic worlds.

If we understand this game correctly, then we will understand what we should do practically vis-a-vis this game. What our Arab and Islamic world lacks is not a unified understanding of the problem, but unified action vis-a-vis this problem.

Neither the government nor people of Iraq or of Iran are unaware of the U.S. position on the ongoing war between them. They are aware that the United States wishes the war to be prolonged and intensified. Developments provide us daily with evidence that confirms rather than refutes this statement. The most immediate evidence is the Kurdish problem which the United States has detonated at this sensitive time when the hope of healing the rift between Iraq and Iran has come within a hair's breadth.

The unified action required of the two governments here is to abandon their private rancors and to turn to the greater enemy who has provoked and intensified the problem to achieve his secret and declared objectives—objectives that culminate with supporting and strengthening Israel and achieving its minor and major aspirations by way of the devastating consequences of this war for both Iraq and Iran. It is not difficult for the two governments to understand the objectives the United States seeks to achieve by perpetuating the war between them. No great intelligence is needed to understand these objectives which have been declared by the United States and endorsed by Israel. It is difficult for all governments and peoples to abandon the private rancors that Iraq and Iran need to abandon. Such abandonment can be achieved only by those who have tied their hearts to God, whose love for God has elevated them above their hatred for their enemy, who have bought God's pleasure by antagonizing the devil, who discount what people say from their calculations and who consider this life's trivialities too low to stop them from pursuing the divine procession and too weak to prevent them from reaching the (guarded spring). A gulp from this spring is enough to quench the faithful's thirst forever.

This hatred which has struck deep roots in the hearts of the Iranians and the Iraqis is the same hatred that has struck deep roots in Lebanon whose back has been broken by fanaticism and whose days and nights have become (barren). Lebanon has turned into a refuge for every covetous party, a servile mount to every rider and the object of every looter. Syria moved to grab its share of the loot and the shattered Iran turned its attention to the debris of the plundered Lebanon. The Shi'ites and the Maronite militias have seized Lebanon's territories. Internal invasions have been coupled with external Israeli invasions from the south. The malady has worsened, the catastrophe has spread, and the devil has come with his horses and men but has found none to tempt because human devils had preceded him, performed his role, and upheld his covenant.

Here we are in this humiliating state of human stupidity, alternating between one bad condition and another like infidels alternating between their fates and their indifferance to their condition whether in this world or in the hereafter. Waves upon waves of men and mixtures after mixtures of people have failed to understand the truth and to pursue it. It is to these people that God has said: “Sit ye among those who sit (inactive).” Will we rise to where God loves to see us rise so that we may free ourselves of the humiliation of this world and of a disgraceful hereafter? I have conveyed the message, and God be my witness.

Article Explains Workings of New Investment Law
45040013a Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 29 Aug 88 p 11

[Article by Ra'fat Amin: “The New Financing Instruments of Fund-Receiving Companies: How Are Dealings With Them To Take Place?”]

[Text] In the context of Law 146 of 1988 and its executive bill, what is the difference between an investment certificate and a financing certificate? What are the features of the similarity and difference between them, in terms of form, the rights of their bearers, or the rules on issuance and transactions? What is the position of people holding deposits with fund-receiving companies, their financial rights when these companies' conditions are reconciled, and their position when the opposite occurs, that is, when conditions are not reconciled and consequently the depositors' funds are returned within the grace period, which the law sets at 2 years, in accordance with a schedule it declares and executes precisely?

Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Tihami, professor of business administration and financial and economic advisor to the Money Market Authority, says:

“The law on the receipt of funds for investment has created new financial instruments in the Egyptian money market. These instruments are the investment certificate and the variable-rate financing certificate. In my belief, these financial instruments will satisfy many savers' desires and at the same time those of investors. These financial instruments have much flexibility in a form which meets these desires in terms of return, risk, liquidity, and period of pay-out, and this in the end functions and realizes the major goal which is to direct savings toward investment in a manner which will realize the national economy's economic and social goals.

“There are basic differences between investment and financing certificates and features of similarity between
them. They both consist of financial commitments which the companies issue in exchange for the receipt of money. However, there are points of difference between them.

"As far as the issuing body goes, companies whose objectives include the receipt of money for investment issue investment certificates. Variable-rate financing certificates are issued by corporations, whether publicly- or privately-owned or joint corporations; their objectives do not include the receipt of funds for investment in accordance with the law on the receipt of funds.

"As far as the financial class of the certificate goes, the company determines this in the case of the investment certificate. It can start at a pound or any figure and therefore is in keeping with the saving capabilities of the various classes of savers. In the case of financing certificates, the law has set the financing class for this at 10 pounds as a minimum and 1,000 pounds as a maximum. Consequently, it enjoys the basic advantage of a low par value and therefore a possibility of its purchase by small savers, which results in helping to attract small savers in addition to easing conducting transactions in these certificates later.

"As far as the type of currency of issuance goes, the law has left the companies the freedom to issue investment and financing certificates in Egyptian pounds or their equivalent in foreign currencies. Consequently this characteristic enables the companies to accumulate funds in the foreign currencies they need.

"As far as transactions in the certificates go, there is a basic difference between these two types of certificates. The legislators have determined that transactions in investment certificates will take place through the issuing company. It is possible to buy and recoup the value of the certificates through the company, and therefore the legislators have preserved the method people conducting transactions with these companies were familiar with in the past. In the case of financing certificates, as financial paper, these certificates are handled in the same ways as stocks and bonds, and the public can buy new certificates from banks and so forth and from companies which are permitted to receive underwritings upon issuance for the first time. In the case of previously issued certificates, these can be bought and sold in securities markets after being registered there on either the temporary or permanent price schedule. In the event the certificates are fit to be converted into shares, there is also a basic difference between investment and financing in that the investment certificate may not be converted into ordinary shares but, in the case of financing certificates, the bill on the law on the receipt of funds has given the companies issuing this financial paper the freedom to issue financing certificates which can be converted into stocks in accordance with specific rules.

"As far as ownership goes, both the investment and financing certificates are name-bearing, that is, the name of the owner of the certificate is written on the certificate itself.

"As for as the period of the certificate, in the case of certificates of financing and investment the legislators have left the determination of the period to the issuing company, giving these papers flexibility in a manner which will respond to the desires of the savers and investors.

"As far as revenues go, revenues from investment certificates are determined in accordance with the results of the company's activity, and the person possessing the certificate, the shareholder, is entitled to his share of the profits as soon as the general assembly's decree distributing them is issued, within a month of the issuance of the decree. The distribution of profits in full among people possessing certificates and owners of capital takes place in accordance with the ratio of the net value of the certificates to the net right of ownership after deduction of the company's share of the profits which can be distributed in exchange for management and bearing risk at a rate of 1 percent of the profits for every amount it receives for its issued capital up to a maximum of 10 percent of these profits in the case of financing certificates. That depends on the result of the activity and is in accordance with what is stipulated in the conditions on their issuance. A company which has been permitted to issue financing certificates can issue different types of financing certificates such as financing certificates for participation in profits, financing certificates for participation in profits and losses, and financing certificates with a revenue which will guarantee a minimum revenue. As a consequence, participation certificates in profits or profits and losses will reduce the company's burden of financing. If profits are realized, a payout will be distributed, and if losses are realized people will not receive profits. At the same time, the savers are permitted to obtain financial profits in the event the company realizes high profit rates—that is, it is a type of participation in financing.

"As far as participation in management goes, the owners of investment and financing certificates do not have the right to take part in management but in exchange the law has given many benefits to preserve the rights of the owners of investment and financing certificates.

A Liquidation Schedule in the Event of the Failure To Reconcile

"With respect to companies which have informed the authority of their lack of desire to reconcile their conditions, they have a commitment to prepare a schedule for returning all the funds they have received to their owners within a period not to exceed 2 years of the date the law went into effect. In the schedule, the sums due each person, the date of their deposit, and the method by which these funds will be returned will be spelled out and the Money Market Authority will be informed of this date and it will be published in two widely-circulated daily newspapers. The owners of the money will then be notified by registered letter of the places and dates of return of their funds in accordance with the program the company has spelled out. Anyone who has deposited
amounts in any company has the right to petition the Money Market Authority, as it is the body that is responsible. Like authorities which oversee the money market in advanced countries, it is the body responsible for regulating the money market, and every stockholder has the right in general to resort to the authority in the event problems arise.

"In the national context, financing certificates return the money market in Egypt to its normal conditions by striving for a flow of savings directly into investing units in the form of corporations, and thus we are striving to eliminate the inflationary effects of bank financing and to revive the money market. These certificates make it possible for the companies to respond to their short-term and long-term financial needs and also make it possible for them to receive the financing necessary to finance an operation in itself or company activities which might have difficulty in obtaining such financing from well-known financial institutions. This source of financing makes it possible for companies to rectify their conditions and financial structures. In addition, there is something new in the law on the receipt of funds; it has made it possible for private saving funds to invest the money that has accumulated for them in savings and investment vessels which are expected to give high revenues that ultimately will enable them to realize the goals for which these funds were established.

"This law has also provided an opportunity for covering financing certificates directly through banks, insurance companies, funds, and financial companies whose objectives include the marketing of securities and guaranteeing cover for them. This makes it possible to invest the liquid funds that accumulated within these various institutions and at the same time enables the companies issuing the financing certificates to obtain their financial needs.

"Since effective oversight of the companies takes place, the law has requested the money-receiving companies to present on a periodic basis a group of financial lists, for instance, a list on the movement of certificates and a list on the sources of funds and features of their investment; this will make it possible for the authority to oversee effectively these companies to preserve the rights of the owners of investment certificates."

ISRAEL

Jerusalem Mayor Addresses Issues Facing City
44040002 Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic 3 Sep 88 pp 29-30

[Answer] How did you carry out this opinion poll? I do not wish to comment on these figures because I am not sure that you have carried out a scientific and free poll. Carrying out a scientific and free poll here is difficult. Where the Arabs are concerned, I am not sure that they give the true answer because of fear of harm befalling them. But I am ready to comment on the elections. There is a large proportion of people—I am not sure of its size—that is not ready to vote for any Israeli institute. Therefore they will not take part in the municipal elections. A certain part of the population will not vote because they were not used to voting during Jordanian rule; this is particularly true of women who did not have the right to vote. There are people who own no property, and so they do not pay property tax. They are not used to voting. We find a similar situation in some Arab towns in Israel despite the passage of 40 years since the establishment of the state! In Jerusalem only 20 years have passed [since Israeli rule]. This goes to show that the number of those who will go to the ballot is going to be small. I believe that it will be the Arabs who will suffer for not taking part in the elections. Municipal elections are not political. In my view, the Arab world gives a political character to everything, even to this matter.

Municipal voting brings practical results in the interest of the inhabitants. It has nothing to do with the establishment of a Palestinian state or otherwise. I believe that they are committing a grave mistake in this regard and that this cannot be changed. It is a character of the Arabs that they want everything all at once. They are not ready to follow the course we Zionists have followed, when we built the state in stages. We began donum by donum, hospital by hospital, and factory by factory until we reached where we are today.

[Question] Will you address the Arab citizens in Arab Jerusalem?

[Answer] I will not address them. I expect nothing from them since there is no benefit to be gained from addressing the Arabs. Why should I address them? They must think for themselves. If they come to the right conclusion, then they will go to the ballot box. This is what I want to say: The percentage of those who took part in the elections recently was somewhat acceptable. Some 13,000 to 14,000, that is 20 percent [of the Arab population], voted for reasons I understand. This voting was not in the interest of the state of Israel. Rather they voted out of fear that somebody else will come to power and so their lives and their holy places as well as their way of life would be in jeopardy. They can see that this (municipal) administration, though not as strong as it should be, can yet preserve their interests. For these reasons, some of them have come forward and voted.

[Text] [Question] We have conducted a public opinion poll in East Jerusalem regarding the citizens' attitude toward coming municipal elections next February. This has shown that 83 percent will not go to the polls, 11 percent are still undecided, and only 6 percent said they will vote. What is your comment on this?
[Question] Do you believe that the uprising is the cause for the drop in the number of people that want to go to the ballot box?

[Answer] This could be so. If that is the case, then there is no use whatsoever in my addressing them.

[Question] What is your opinion of the situation in eastern Jerusalem?

[Answer] The situation in Jerusalem is somewhat saddening; it is not good. Many things are happening which are better if avoided. But the situation in Jerusalem is much better than the situation in the occupied territories. A regrettable incident occurred when a young man from among the Old City inhabitants was killed outside Jerusalem. This incident led to disturbances and riots in that area. This is a difficult subject to understand, when each side looks at itself without looking at the other side.

[Question] Are you optimistic about the situation in Jerusalem being better than it is in the territories?

[Answer] I did not say that the situation is going to remain as it is. I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but I hope to be realistic in what I say. The Arabs' main complaints and allegations in Jerusalem today concern the Border Guards' harsh attitude and actions. I suppose that most of the complaints are true, but there is also a certain exaggeration. But the same actions are also taken in dispersing Orthodox Jews who demonstrate on Saturday evening, bearing in mind that this is the action of one Jew against another. Druze (policemen) take part in this action against the Arabs within a Jewish framework. There are two sides to the issue: One is that the Druze are forced to come here to serve; the uprising forces them to come because there are not enough policemen. If the police reaction were to be less than that, then the situation would develop into another Beirut. On the other hand, it is clear that the police should be given the power to take such tough action. Every time the minister of police and the police inspector general try to arrest those people (policemen) who shout, curse, and beat the pedestrians at night. [as published] They put them on trial. The Arabs do not realize that the minister of police and the police inspector general punish policemen who violate their orders because they do not want to understand that.

For example, a policeman from Julis village [inside Israel] has been away from home for 3 months. He does not like to be away. Therefore, he goes out and vents all his anger against the Arabs. This should not happen. We do not accept this, but we should understand that this is the situation.

[Question] What can be done to stop this?

[Answer] Many things can be done: Not carrying out "acts of sabotage, not throwing fire bombs, not throwing stones."

How did the incident in the Old City occur? After the young man's body was brought back, disturbances broke out. A big rock was dropped on the head of a policeman from Julis. He was taken to hospital in serious condition. His colleagues avenged him. They stormed several houses, beat their inhabitants, and used force. I do not accept this, but I understand it. The inhabitants suffered damages. What we could do was to repair their homes. They said the police shouldn't do this.

Both sides are right; this is a difficult matter. I believe that if such actions are repeated the Arabs will suffer more than others. We are doing our job and providing health services, water, and social security to citizens. Looking from the window, you can see Arabs wearing kaffahs freely in West Jerusalem's streets. We are continuing to provide services, but the situation could become different. I do not want to make threats. I am doing all I can to continue to provide services, but what will happen if some young men tomorrow destroy the water pipes. They (the Arabs) do not appreciate the situation in any way. So I believe that addressing them or explaining things to them is not going to be of any use. I give you an example: In one of the recent incidents two young men were stabbed near the Hospice Hospital. This happened a year and a half ago, that is on 28 January 1987. I had just returned from Bethlehem. I found 20 young men in a restaurant in al-Musararah quarter planning to wreck the Arab shops in the Old City. Therefore, I invited everybody, including the social workers, to the Municipality, for a meeting. We calmed down everybody, not through the police but by persuasion.

We called on Arab traders not to go on strike, but they did not have the courage to respond to the request. They said this was none of our business.

[Question] What is your opinion in levy taxes, especially on Arab hotels in conditions of an acute political crisis?

[Answer] We have held a meeting with them and reduced taxes. They frequently say that they receive financial aid from abroad. Why does the PLO not help them. Tax collection is in the citizens' interest. Providing all these services costs money. Continuing to provide services depends on tax collection. The accusation is not made every year. We have been telling them to advertise to attract tourists, but they refused that and remained isolated.

[Question] Is there a drop in the standard of services in East Jerusalem?

[Answer] There is a drop in that. This happens when some employees refuse to go there to provide services except under police protection. This is not a unique case. On Friday night I received a telephone call from a Jewish rabbi in a religious quarter complaining of the lack of
services. I told him that I cannot send anybody there on
Saturday because they [Orthodox Jews] throw stones at
employees. The same thing happens in Arab areas.

[Question] When will the scholastic year open in Jerusa-
lem?

[Answer] I don't know. I hope that we will start the
scholastic year next September.

[Question] The question of Sharon taking up residence
in the Islamic quarter had an impact on the situation.
How do you explain that?

[Answer] It had a severe impact, but it is almost finished.
Sharon's taking up residence in East Jerusalem was a
foolish action. He bought a house in the Old City not
because he wants to be close to the holy places. By buying
a house he wanted to hold festivals, make publicity, and
deliver many speeches.

[Question] What was the impact of the excavations in
the Via Dolorosa leading to the Holy Mosque?

[Answer] The Awqaf authorities know that the excavations
in Via Dolorosa do not lead to the Mosque. The Awqaf
authorities do not admit the facts as they are. They are
lying on this matter. They are afraid that the Jews will
reach one of the Mosque's gate and will force their way in.
But practically the excavations harm nobody, not even the
Awqaf people themselves. But they are in a state of
hysteria and they want everybody to be like them.

[Question] What about the family reunions program for
the inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem?

[Answer] This matter is no concern of the municipality.
It is the concern of the Ministry of Interior. This minis-
try should approve more family reunions than it is doing
now. The municipality is the liaison between the other
institutes and the citizens.

[Question] What about the Arab workers? Is their strike
having any effect?

[Answer] There is no complain because they are report-
ing to work most of the time.

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**JORDAN**

Consequences of Jordan's Break With West Bank
Discussed
44040016 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
21-27 Sep 88 pp 26-29

[Text] Jordan's decision to break its ties with the West
Bank has affected the Jordanian and the Palestinian
peoples in different ways. In general, more light has been
shed on the consequences for the inhabitants of the West
Bank, since they are the ones most affected. Some 1.4
million Palestinians live in Jordan, comprising 42 per-
cent of the total population, and 30 percent of them are
still refugees, living in 10 camps. Ever since the decision
was announced on 31 July 1988, these people have been
considered Jordanian citizens with full rights and duties.
Who are these Jordanian Palestinians? How did they
receive the news of the break? What effect did it have on
them? This investigation will gauge the effects of this
decision on those of Palestinian origin.

Whenever two friends sit down at a coffeehouse in
Jordan to talk of things in general, a visitor to the
coffeehouse listening in on the conversation will not be
able to tell which one is the Palestinian and which the
Jordanian. Whenever Jordan and the PLO participate in
an Arab or international conference or meeting, several
members of the Jordanian official delegation will very
likely be Palestinians, or there will be Jordanians among
the members of the official Palestinian delegation.

During the fifteenth conference of the General Federa-
tion of Arab Writers and Authors, which met in Baghdad
in 1986, the conference formed a subsidiary committee
to defend the freedoms of writers in the occupied Pales-
tinian territories. A Bahraini author headed that com-
mittee, and membership was limited to two authors, one
of Jordanian birth and origin, and the other of Palestin-
ian birth and origin. However, the Jordanian committee
member represented the Palestinian delegation to the
conference, while the Palestinian committee member
represented the delegation from the Palestinian Writers'
League. When the committee chairwoman realized the
the unusual composition of the committee, she said, in
her Bahraini dialect, "Which one of you is the Jordanian,
and who is the Palestinian?"

The Bahraini writer's question may be the clearest
picture yet drawn of the nature of the Jordanian-Palest-
inian human fabric, in which it is difficult to find any
signs which might permit one to distinguish between the
Palestinian and the Jordanian citizens. This fabric
existed before the Transjordan became independent and
before the PLO was established. While the advent of the
PLO made the people realize that they belonged to two
regional entities instead of one, this discovery was con-
sidered a sort of theoretical slogan which neither
impaired the unified social and cultural composition nor
allowed the emergence of any sensitivities between the
two sides.

In 1970, because of the September incidents, signs of
wariness between the two intermingled peoples began to
appear. Even so, these signs were latent and had no effect
worth mentioning on the interests, goals, and common
dangers which united the two peoples. Then came the
Jordanian decision, announced by King Husayn on 31
July 1988, to break the legal and administrative links
between the West Bank and Jordan.
Describing this decision's effect on the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, a prominent Jordanian intellectual said, "The decision had a shocking, bewildering effect on the simple popular sentiments. This shock and bewilderment may have been of some benefit, in that it revealed once again the importance and necessity of unity. It is just like the way you feel that it is only natural and usual for water and electricity to come to your home, and that you don't have to thank the authorities involved. However, when you are shocked by the cut-off of these two essential needs, you quickly protest and demand that everything go back to the way it was."

He adds, "The decision to break ties made the unity of both banks seem tangible and visible to everyone on both sides, who had arranged their lives and their social, cultural, and political future on the assumption that this unity would remain, just as water and electricity continue to flow."

In general, the people, who are not concerned with the political factors behind the decision to break ties, agree that no matter how much the surface (or political) tension between Jordan and the PLO increases, the Jordanians and the Palestinians are still one people, as they have been for hundreds of years, before, during, and after the union between the two banks. They are like one big family, extended and scattered over two big neighborhoods called Jordan and Palestine, or East and West Jordan, since it is rare to find a single family in which all the members live on the same bank.

Abu-Salih, an elderly Jordanian who lived through the early stages of Zionist migration to Palestine, says, "Whenever one of us would go from the Jordanian town of al-Salt to the Palestinian town of Nablus or vice-versa, he never felt that he was going from one country to another."

Political and economic analyst Dr Fahd al-Fanik says, "The union which existed between the two banks was the strongest and best union which ever existed between two Arab countries. Will the break in the "official union" between the two banks lead to a break in the "popular union"?"

It is hard to answer this question, but the historic union of the two peoples has certainly been shaken. It has become an unprecedented topic of discussion, especially since the Palestinians living in Jordan, who make up about 42 percent of the total population, have as of 31 July 1988 become Jordanian citizens with full rights and obligations conferred by the Jordanian constitution and Jordanian laws and statutes. Meanwhile, the Palestinians living in the West Bank have, as of the same date, become Palestinian citizens, whose official political affiliation has been transferred from Jordan to the PLO or to the anticipated Palestinian state. This means that if a man was living in Amman on the day the decision was issued, while his wife or family members were living in the West Bank, the family will find themselves in a very unusual position, since some of them will have Jordanian citizenship while the others will hold Palestinian citizenship.

The delegations from the PLO and the Jordanian government have spent a long time over this anomaly, and, at negotiations held in Amman a few weeks ago, tried to deal with the situation in such a way as to cause the least possible amount of social, psychological, and economic harm to those persons affected by the decision. The main idea proposed by the Jordanian government delegation in this regard was that Jordan is prepared to comply with whatever measures the PLO demands to reduce the effects of the decision. Accordingly, the Jordanian side has agreed that the Jordanian passports held by Palestinian citizens residing in the West Bank can remain in the possession of the holders, provided that the passports are valid for only 2 years (instead of 5 years for Jordanians and Jordanian Palestinians), and that the Jordanian passports held by West Bank Palestinians be considered travel documents only, not documents to prove Jordanian citizenship.

Issues like the passage of goods and persons across the Jordan River bridges, birth, death, divorce, and inheritance documents, school and university examination documents, and import and export documents from and to each bank have been handled in the same brotherly spirit as this matter of passports was handled.

However, there is one issue which the Jordanian and Palestinian sides have been unable to resolve, and which basically affects those Palestinians living in Jordan or those who became Jordanian by law as of 31 July 1988. During the negotiations, which were headed by Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian delegation asked whether the Jordanian Palestinians enjoy membership in the Palestinian entity in addition to their Jordanian citizenship, and whether they could take part in any referendum on Palestinian self-determination which might be held subsequently. The Palestinian delegation also brought up the question whether the Palestinian refugees living in the camps would lose their UN-conferred refugee status once they become Palestinian citizens. Will this mean the "assimilation of the refugees?"

While the Jordanian Government has not announced its final decision on all these questions, official sources emphasize that every Palestinian living in Jordan has the right to either renounce his Jordanian citizenship, if he wants to, or to retain Jordanian citizenship, in which case his loyalty, affiliation and political identity will remain with the Jordanian state, without that implying that he must relinquish his right to return to a liberated Palestine or his economic interests in and social ties to the West Bank.

An official Jordanian source, analyzing the consequences of the decision to break ties and its effect on the Palestinians living in Jordan, says, "There is one question which might seem provocative but which must be
The decision was made to strengthen and enhance the Palestinian national personality and identity, and to stress that Palestine is not Jordan and Jordan is not Palestine. By crystallizing an independent Palestinian national identity, this clear, decisive formulation convinced the world of the seriousness and significance of the Jordanian decision. Therefore, those who are Palestinian and those who are Jordanian cannot be mixed. While Jordanian popular emotions are not yet capable of grasping this situation, especially since 70 percent of the Palestinians living on the East Bank were born on Jordanian soil, the two identities must be separated, so that the Palestinians living in Jordan can become full Jordanians, and the Palestinians living on the West Bank full Palestinians, without any superposition of citizenship or any conflict between Palestinian and Jordanian loyalty in the national identity.”

The Jordanian Palestinians—Who Are They?

Before asking about the choice which the Jordanian Palestinians will be making, we must try to define the nature of the Palestinian human presence on the East Bank. If we go back to the period before 1948, when the people went back and forth between both banks without passports, we find that the influx of Palestinians into the East Bank began during the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948. This means that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have been living in Jordan on a continual basis ever since that time. Figures show that 65 percent of the 900,000 Palestinians who emigrated in 1948 went to Jordan, while the rest went to Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank, which had not yet fallen under occupation. In 1948, a limited number of Palestinians went to Egypt, Iraq, or emigrated colonies in the Americas. When the West Bank was occupied in 1967, a half-million Palestinians immigrated to the East Bank. For most of them, this was their second migration, following the first one of 1948.

They were called emigres [naziyun] to distinguish them from the refugees [la'ji‘un], who were under United Nations care by the UNWRA agency. After 1967, a large number of Palestinians also went voluntarily to Jordan in search of better opportunities, particularly in the Arab Gulf states, which needed manpower in various specializations and professions. Unofficial figures show that after 1967, 400,000 persons left the bank voluntarily, in addition to several hundred who were forcibly expelled by the occupation authorities or who chose to join the forces of the Palestinian revolution in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.

According to the 1987 census, the total number of Palestinians in Jordan is estimated at about 1.4 million persons, 30 percent of whom live in ten camps located on the outskirts of major Jordanian towns. The al-Wahdat, Jabal al-Husayn, Marka, al-Baq’ah and al-Zarqa' camps are all located on the outskirts of Amman. Near the northern town of Irbid there are the Irbid, al-Hasan, Suf and Jarash camps. The tenth camp is the al-Taibiyah camp near the town of Ma’daba, 30 km south of Amman.

The Palestinians living outside the camps in Jordan are concentrated in Amman, al-Zarqa’, Irbid and al-Rafiah. Socially and economically, the Palestinians living in Jordanian cities represent an important segment of the Jordanian entity, because of the upper-level positions which many of them hold and their successful economic activities. Furthermore, the professionals and artisans who left the camps for the cities have been able to improve their social, economic and educational circumstances, and have become a basic part of the infrastructure of Jordanian society.

The Political Option

In light of this rapid overview of the nature of the Palestinian presence in Jordan, we again bring up the question of the political choices which those Palestinians will have to make following the decision to break the link between the West Bank and Jordan.

A prominent scholar of Palestinian affairs offers the following picture of the Jordanian Palestinian’s status following the decision and the subsequent measures: “Most likely they will combine two political identities, the first being the Jordanian political identity they originally had, which was consecrated by the decision, and the second being the Palestinian political identity they bear in their hearts while they wait to return to Palestine.”

This scholar adds, “Constitutionally and legally, the Jordanian Palestinians are Jordanians, with no implication of any sentimental or emotional conflict with their Palestinian identities. I believe that the implied meaning of the decision observes this aspect by stipulating that Jordanian citizenship and loyalty to Jordan does not deprive the Palestinians in Jordan of their legitimate rights in Liberated Palestine or their livelihood and social interests in the West Bank.” He also adds, “The Palestinians in Jordan cannot expect or demand any more than complete equality in rights and duties. It would not be in their interest to do so, for they are partners in Jordan and its economy and everything it has, and whatever happens to Jordan happens to them.”

It should be noted that the Jordanian Palestinians were not affected by the decision as much as had been expected, and that (since the decision) there has been no change in their everyday life from the economic, social and even political angles. Everything remains as it was. More than 40 days have passed since the decision was issued without any indications appearing on the horizon that the Jordanian Palestinians will be treated as second-class citizens, as some people had expected in the beginning.

Obviously, the fears still felt by some people are due to the fact that the decision created a commotion, and there has been no time to absorb or grasp it yet.
Knowledgeable Jordanian political sources say that what most inspires reassurance as to the future of the Palestinians in Jordan is the fact that the Jordanian Government and the PLO both clearly and profoundly understand the extent of the shock to which the Palestinian-Jordanian popular emotions have been subjected. Jordan and the PLO both realize that controlling these emotions is the only way to guarantee the improvement and consolidation of the relations and consequences of the decision to break the ties between Jordan and the West Bank.

Palestinian Refugees in Jordanian Camps

According to sources at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees [UNRWA], figures as of 30 June 1986 show that there were a total of 2,145,794 Palestinian refugees in Arab countries, distributed among 61 camps in five areas:

1. the West Bank: 20 camps with 365,315 persons
2. the Gaza Strip: 8 camps with 425,478 persons
3. Jordan: 10 camps with 822,624 persons
4. Syria: 13 camps with 250,953 persons
5. Lebanon: 13 camps with 271,423 persons.

According to PLO statistics, the total Palestinian population amounts to 4.62 million persons, with refugees accounting for 45.1 percent.

About 45.3 percent of the Palestinian people are living under Israeli occupation. They can be divided into three groups: 950,000 on the West Bank, 540,000 in the Gaza Strip, and 900,000 inside what is known as the Green Line, i.e. the Palestinian territories occupied in 1948.

There are 35,000 Palestinian refugees living in Egypt and 25,000 living in Iraq, none of whom are registered with UNRWA.

When Do We Return?

Out of the ten camps in which 30 percent of the Jordanian Palestinians live, we chose the largest one, the al-Baq’ah camp near Amman, in which about 70,000 Palestinians are living. It may give a good picture of the everyday life which is repeated in every camp without exception.

This picture was sketched in the course of our talk with Umm ‘Ali, who sells old clothes in a shop near the shack in which she lives.

There was a small sewer running in front of her shop and her hut, flowing with black water, a mixture of sewage and drainage water in which insects and odors proliferated.

We asked Umm ‘Ali about her situation and that of the other people in the camp, and after a deep sigh she replied, “The situation pleases neither enemy nor friend. I have four daughters and three sons, and two of my boys are married. We all live in an area no larger than 60 square meters.”

We asked her about the “shop profits,” and why she doesn’t add on to her house. She sighed again and said, “They don’t let us.”

“Who doesn’t let you?”

Umm ‘Ali quickly replied, “the agency.” (She meant the UNRWA). “By God, every time we ask something from your agency, it says no. We want to build another room? No. We want to build a sewer? No. We want a hospital like the rest of the world? No. Even the children’s books, and the notebooks which the agency had given them in the past, we have to buy with our own money.”

We asked Umm ‘Ali about the Palestinian state, and she said, “Who is leading you to the gates of heaven? It is just a newspaper story. We have nothing but our land and our houses. But how and when would it happen? I swear, if we got a state, I would race to it, cry out with joy, and dance.”

Sources Of Academic Scholarships

44040037 Nicosia FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 4 Sep 88 pp 29-31

[Article by Director of the PLO Department of Exchange Students and Scholarships Husayn Abu-al-'Ala]

[Text] Broad are the hopes pinned on knowledge and education for the Palestinians, and many are the problems faced by exchange students and graduates. The following official figures on both of these areas will be useful as a social survey, and even more useful for our dear students, who have turned this magazine into a “consulting bureau.” A hearty welcome to them, and we hope that they will have a bright future in the country they are building with their strong arms and their minds.

There are 5 million Palestinians, of which about 50 percent live in the occupied territories and the rest in the Diaspora, especially Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, Egypt, Iraq, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.

The Palestinians are a young people, since about 48 percent of them are less than 15 years old and about 50 percent of the labor force is from 15 to 64 years old. This means that more than half the Palestinians are outside the labor force, thus raising the rate of welfare.

It is worth mentioning that each year more than 20,000 students graduate from secondary schools inside and outside the occupied territories. The PLO obtains about 1,000 scholarships each year. While some students enroll
at Arab universities in Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt on their own, there are very few of them compared to the number of secondary school graduates each year.

In Occupied Palestine, there are six universities at which about 3,000 students enroll each year. For this reason, there is a pressing need to increase the number of scholarships and scholastic chairs given to the PLO by friendly countries. With the fraternal countries, emphasis should be placed to the possibility of their absorbing a larger number of Palestinians at their universities and technical institutes.

The PLO, as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab Palestinian people, has made urgent efforts to obtain scholarships at various universities and in various areas of specialization for Palestinian students, keeping in mind the requirements for building the independent Palestinian state and the need for skilled cadres to serve their homeland. The PLO has succeeded in obtaining a number of scholarships each year, although they are inadequate for the huge number of students who apply to the PLO, the Central Exchange Student Office, Solidarity, and the Higher Education Department to obtain overseas scholarships.

The Arab countries, such as Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan, the YAR, Kuwait, and Tunisia, offer scholarships to their universities for Palestinian students. Similarly, the friendly socialist countries provide university and vocational scholarships in various areas of specialization. These countries include the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, East Germany, China, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia.

Other European countries, such as France, Italy, Greece, and Spain, have recently been offering university and vocational scholarships to Palestinian students. It is worth mentioning that until 1974, the scholarships for Palestinians had been given out through the General Federation of Palestinian Students and some other Palestinian groups, and there were far fewer scholarships than there are today. In 1974, all the friendly countries began dealing with the PLO on an official basis and independently of the Palestinian groups which had had individual relations with some of these countries. The friendly countries initiated their relationship with the PLO by giving it 150 scholarships, in the case of the Soviet Union, and 50 scholarships in the case of Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba.

Some Palestinian groups are still accepting scholarships from socialist and Western countries, working independently of the PLO.

Here are some details of the number of scholarships given to the PLO by fraternal, friendly, European, Islamic, and other countries.

Scholarships From Arab Countries

There are at the most only 250 scholarships given by Arab countries each year, distributed, as we mentioned above, among Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan, Kuwait, the UAE, the PDRY, and the YAR.

1. Algeria is the foremost Arab provider of scholarships to Palestinians. Each year about 150 scholarships for studies in Algeria in the following fields of study are set aside for Palestinians and given to the PLO:
   a. Various areas of specialization in science, taught in Arabic, for holders of secondary school certificates in science, who must have a grade point average of 65 percent or more; and
   b. Various areas of specialization at the college of liberal arts for holders of secondary school certificates in liberal arts, and at the business college, which requires a secondary certificate in business; the required grade point average is 60 percent or above.

2. Morocco sets aside ten scholarships each year, five to the college of liberal arts and five to the law school, in addition to 10 scholastic chairs distributed in the same manner. In order to receive these scholarships and chairs, the applicant must have a grade point average of 65 percent or more.

3. The Sudan allocates 25 scholarships for various university specializations for Palestinian students. The concentration is on liberal arts, since a grade point average of 85 percent or more is required to enter any colleges of science, especially medicine and engineering. Each year two scholarships are awarded through the Arab Education, Culture and Sciences Organization (ALECSO) for higher studies in liberal arts at Sudanese universities.

4. Kuwait usually gives ten scholarships each year to Palestinian students living in Kuwait, which are awarded through the PLO. However, this year the number was reduced to five scholarships.

5. The UAE has been giving the PLO ten scholarships each year for studies at the University of al-Ayn, but last year the PLO received only six liberal arts scholarships.

6. The PDRY offers ten scholarships in various fields to Palestinians each year.

7. The YAR offers ten scholarships in various fields to Palestinians each year.

8. Tunisia provides several scholarships to the PLO each year, through the PLO office in Tunis.

It is worth mentioning that some Palestinian students obtain scholastic chairs in other Arab countries through their own efforts, and not through the PLO. This is the case in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Furthermore,
each year Saudi Arabia provides several scholastic chairs at the kingdom's universities to Palestinian Arabs living in Saudi Arabia, and these are issued through the PLO office there.

Scholarships From Socialist Countries

The PLO receives a large number of scholarships for Palestinian Arabs from socialist countries, chiefly the Soviet Union. Each year about 300 scholarships are distributed by the PLO, various Palestinian groups and popular organizations, and the Friendship Society. These scholarships given to Palestinian students are distributed among East Germany, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and China.

1. The Soviet Union gave the PLO 100 scholarships to various universities and institutes this year, distributed among all areas of specialization without restriction. It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union accepts a huge number of Palestinians; according to the PLO's Central Office For Exchange Students and Solidarity, more than 2,700 Palestinian students were accepted at Soviet universities and technical institutes, and each year between 150 to 200 Palestinian students graduate from these schools with various specializations.

2. East Germany gives the PLO 45 scholarships each year, 30 of which are for university studies and 15 for vocational studies, as well as a grant for higher studies, as part of a cooperation agreement between the PLO and the GDR.

3. Bulgaria has allocated ten university scholarships and ten 10-month political studies chairs at the party academy this year. In previous years, there had been 20 scholarships, but Bulgaria's present economic circumstances have brought about a drop in the number.

4. Czechoslovakia allocates ten scholarships in various areas of specialization, including higher studies for Palestinian students who graduate from Czech universities. The applicants must have received high grades.

5. Poland sets aside close to 100 scholarships in all areas of specialization each year, which can be obtained from various official agencies. The PLO is also provided all facilities by the authorities, particularly those which concern students. At present about 500 Palestinian students are studying at the various Polish universities.

6. Cuba assigned 15 scholarships to various Palestinian organizations, including the PLO, this year, at the rate of three scholarships per group—one vocational scholarship and two university scholarships. Until 1982, the Cuban Republic had given all the scholarships to the PLO, but as we mentioned they have begun distributing them to other Palestinian groups as well. There are about 150 Palestinian students in Cuba, studying various fields, particularly medicine and engineering.

7. Hungary, for the first time, gave the PLO the scholarships for all of the Palestinian groups with which it had been dealing previously. There are six university scholarships and nine vocational grants, distributed to the PLO, the PDFLP and the PFLP.

8. Romania used to hold second place in the number of scholarships given to Palestinians by socialist countries, after the Soviet Union. However, since 1983 the PLO has received only three scholarships from Romania.

9. Yugoslavia sets aside ten scholarships each year. Last year it excused itself from offering any scholarships because of its economic circumstances, and so far the PLO has not received any new scholarships.

10. China offers eight scholarships a year to Palestinian Arabs, a number which has held steady for 9 years and still applies now. It should be noted that China requires an entrance examination administered by the Chinese embassy in whatever country the student is applying from.

Other European Countries

The PLO receives a number of scholarships from other European countries, such as France, Spain, Italy, and Greece.

1. France began giving scholarships to the PLO in 1980, at which time 20 grants in all areas of specialization were allocated. This year, eleven scholarships in various fields were set aside for the PLO.

2. As for Italy, Palestinians receive scholarships to Italian schools through the various parties and societies. These grants began in 1977. Last year there were ten scholarships, and this year the PLO will very likely receive ten university and several vocational scholarships.

3. Greece began giving the PLO scholarships in 1981, in which year it gave 20 university scholarships. For economic reasons, this number was reduced last year to only three scholarships. However, this year Greece set aside ten university scholarships in various areas of specialization.

4. As for Spain, in 1982 the municipality of Madrid gave three scholarships to Palestinian students as a sign of solidarity with the Palestinian people and their beleaguered revolution in Beirut. Last year the Spanish government issued a decree setting aside 12 scholarships for the PLO, six of which are for students from the occupied territories and are to be issued by the Spanish consulate in Jerusalem, and the other six of which are for Palestinians living outside the occupied territories.
Palestinians receive university scholarships and scholastic chairs from several Asian countries such as India, which allocates ten scholarships to Indian universities each year, and Pakistan, which allocates only scholastic chairs and not scholarships. There are about 25 or so such chairs at the colleges of engineering, medicine, and pharmacy.

In Bangladesh, the Islamic Conference's Islamic Institute sets aside 15 scholarships each year for various vocational studies. In the past, several scholarships had been given to the PLO in Afghanistan, but present conditions have interrupted these scholarships.

Suggestions Concerning Scholarships

In light of the PLO's experience with fraternal countries concerning scholarships for Palestinians, and in order to permit the PLO to utilize these scholarships to the maximum, we offer the following suggestions.

1. An effort should be made to conclude cultural cooperation agreements with Arab and friendly countries, in order to regulate cultural and educational exchanges with these countries.

2. The directors of PLO offices, and PLO representatives in various countries, should be urged to obtain a greater number of scholarships for Palestinians. Each year it can be seen that there are fewer scholarships from several countries. We believe that this is due to the inactivity of some office directors, who would rather have fewer Palestinian students in the countries where they work so as to avoid their problems. This kind of thinking will keep Palestinian students from obtaining many of these scholarships.

3. Cultural advisors should be assigned to overseas PLO offices, to provide cultural and educational advice and follow up with Arab, friendly, and Islamic countries.

4. Islamic countries—especially Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey, and the African countries—should be contacted in order to obtain new scholarships.

5. An effort should be made to get fraternal and friendly countries to expand university and vocational education within the occupied homeland by offering assistance for this purpose.

6. The PLO should work with friendly countries to expand their university and vocational education by contributing Palestinian experts and professors, who will be able to deal with the Palestinian students at the universities and institutes where they work.

Among the common items that were agreed upon was that the Arabs bear the greater part of the responsibility for what has befallen them, and that the remainder is attributable to the political situation and to the nature of the geographical location, due to the fact that the Arab region lies at the point where the interests of the great powers intersect, with all the conflict and disagreement that that entails.

The discussion turned to Egypt and its role and position, past and present, as a region of contact between the states of the East and West, and how one could always bet on Egypt to isolate and remove itself from its Arab surroundings so that it might deal individually with each Arab state, and try to reach partial solutions instead of permanent, comprehensive ones.

However, Egypt had always been committed to the issues of its nation, and it had played an effective role in support of those issues.

Egypt has a full agenda, especially in relation to what concerns the defense of the Palestinian question. Therefore it was natural that the Palestinians should be mindful at the appropriate time to the strategic mistake that caused a rift between Egypt and Palestine through hasty political resolutions and stiff-necked, seasonal positions.

The Gulf states have set out to rectify the balance, and they restored their relations with Egypt, leaving the door open before the other Arab states so they might review their positions and build bridges between themselves and their elder sister. This process was not easy, and indeed because of it the Gulf states were hurt by many wounding arrows and irresponsible accusations. In spite of that, the GCC states were able to bring the Arab situation into a cleaner and clearer climate.

With regard to the subject of Egypt returning to the Arab League, that question no longer concerns Egypt alone, rather it has come to concern the Arab states themselves. The person speaking to me said that the efforts that ought to be made now should not be to return Egypt to the Arab League, but to return the Arab League to Egypt.
For the League, as a regional Arab establishment, is not merely stone structures and buildings; rather it symbolizes the concepts of unity, nationalism, and collective action. These symbols cannot find their full expression and destiny in life except through Egypt, since Egypt is the strategic point, or station, on the Arab map.

Therefore, efforts must be concentrated on returning the League to Egypt, to its original site, to where vitality, vigor, and spirit would be brought back for outside of Egypt the League is dead, and it is necessary that we work to revive it and send new blood through its veins.

LEBANON

Roget Tamraz Announces Candidacy for Presidency

44040382 Beirut AN-NAHAR AL-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14 Aug 85 pp 6-11

[Interview with presidential candidate Roget Tamraz, by Jubran Tuwayni and Nabil Barakis; date and place not given]

[Text] His name is Roget Tamraz.

When you hear his name, what comes to you is the image of a green piece of paper that has beaten our blue, yellow, and green pieces of paper.

What comes to you is the image of the dollar—a ghoul, or rather a wild beast that has nearly swallowed up our pound and our economy, just as the conspiracy has swallowed up the components of our homeland.

Yes, unfortunately—for Roget Tamraz—his name is associated with dollars, deals, and problems of banking, trade, and finance.

But when you speak with Roget Tamraz, the image changes. The accused becomes the prime defender—not of himself, but of the pound, the economy, and the homeland.

Here he is before us, not defending himself—as we said—but to propose himself as an economic savior to rescue and salvage the homeland.

Here is Tamraz. He frankly announces his candidacy in AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI. His only precondition is that he be brought to trial in a year if after his election he fails to carry out his promises.

Whoever thought Tamraz would some day dare to announce his candidacy for the presidency?

But Tamraz has become a candidate. His announcement was a challenge to the politicians and political landlords in their own house.

"Politics have destroyed the country; economics will rebuild it." That is Tamraz's proposal—a clear, realistic proposal based on figures and calculations.

Should we believe Roget Tamraz, or should we consider him, like the other candidates, a man of slogans and promises?

Should we be satisfied with what he says and with his economic project?

Should we believe him when he tells us that within a year he will bring nearly $3 billion into Lebanon?

Should we believe him when he says he will triple the income of every Lebanese citizen?

Should we believe him when he says everything will be solved in Lebanon and that the only thing lacking is decisionmaking?

No one knows. But the greatest and most serious question is whether we have the right not to believe him and lose another possible opportunity. Or should we believe him, trust what he says, and obey a man who for many years was fought by many circles?

Here is the problem. Here is the dilemma. To believe, or not to believe. If we believe him, on what basis? If we refuse to believe him, who will bear responsibility for missing an opportunity?

We here have come to need decisionmaking—a decision to conclude an internal debate nourished by statements and claims from every side.

In any case, we, unfortunately, are not the ones who vote. Here is the information we have. Here is candidate Tamraz. Let every official bear his responsibility. Let him study the candidates' records. We hope our honorable parliamentary deputies this time will be faithful to their duty and consciences—faithful especially to us and to this homeland that has suffered greatly from the policy of no decisionmaking and no responsibility.

[Question] In this interview, we will speak about everything and try to open all the records with you, just as we did with the others. Our first question is: Who is Roget Tamraz?

[Answer] Roget Tamraz is a young Lebanese who studied in four universities, from Cambridge to Harvard, etc. After studying, he entered the economic field and specialized in international finance. Afterwards, I went to Wall Street, where I trained and worked in American economic fields. At that time, I began to be interested in the process of rescuing companies and institutions that faced management difficulties or bankruptcy, as I did with Intra in 1966, when I studied the record and
undertook the operation of rescuing the company—or even on the international level, as with Egypt, the Sudan, Libya, and a number of other countries.

[Question] Some people say that all of Roget Tamraz’s achievements fall into the category of idle talk—not to say suspicious or dirty operations. What is your reply to such statements?

[Answer] My reply is that I have been working in the banking and finance field for more than 30 years—since before the term of President al-Jumayyil. You can read many international newspapers, specialized and nonspecialized, that have published articles about me—frank articles about the work I was doing, with its pluses and minuses. These newspapers never mentioned any idle talk or dirty operation such as you mentioned. I do not think such newspapers can be bought or sold. Internationally, my reputation is well known.

Locally, I understand these attacks. I think one of their causes is pure envy. It is political, directly tied to resentment against the administration by opponents.

[Question] But, sir, there are many people who think Roget Tamraz is “a man of deals”—or, more bluntly, “the administration’s man of deals.” What is your reply to this accusation?

[Answer] Everything I have done in my work is available and clear. All the records are ready and present. I challenge any person, party, or agency to uncover for me any suspicious deal undertaken by me. We should not forget that in my field of endeavor I was not working by myself. There were boards of directors and an integrated work team. If you want me to be even clearer with you, integrity in its positive sense was present.

[Question] Then how do you explain such talk?

[Answer] As I told you, doubtless there are many parties or persons who have targeted me—perhaps because I did not put through certain deals they proposed to me. So I say again to you, “Let anyone who accuses me please confront me to my face, unless he fears becoming the accused person himself.”

Theoretical Bankruptcy

[Question] As an economist, do you think Lebanon has collapsed economically? Is it on the edge of bankruptcy, never to rise again?

[Answer] No, I think Lebanon is still strong. The problem now is that of managing this Lebanese machine soundly and effectively so that it again produces not just what it used to produce, but much more.

[Question] Then Lebanon is not in a state of bankruptcy?

[Answer] Lebanese bankruptcy today is merely a theoretical bankruptcy. This state may change the moment the right person is obtained who knows how to get the wheels of all the economic and living establishments in Lebanon turning again.

[Question] Do you consider yourself up to restoring the strength of this economy, as you describe it to us? Do you have a study or concept ready for rescuing the Lebanese economy?

[Answer] I think there are no difficulties involved in rescuing the Lebanese economy. But we need swift, powerful, and effective decisions accompanied by a comprehensive, new, and innovative theory completely different from the old, traditional theory that brought us to the edge of the abyss.

[Question] Without going into matters of theory and promises, how do you view the possibility of rescuing the economic situation?

[Answer] I say again that we must emerge from this vortex crowned by classical and quite ordinary measures. The situation we face is abnormal. We need a swift plan of operation, one that departs from the ordinary. Then everything will become possible.

[Question] Then let me ask you an important and very simple question: Are you a candidate for the presidency of Lebanon?

[Answer] Yes. Today I announce in your magazine that Roget Tamraz is a candidate for the presidency of Lebanon.

[Question] Do you consider yourself capable of rescuing Lebanon?

[Answer] I think I have sufficient ability to help Lebanon rescue itself economically, socially, and, furthermore, politically.

[Question] You have spoken of your rejection of the classical solutions. Now that you have entered the “classical” ranks by becoming a presidential candidate, you have become like all the other candidates!

[Answer] They and we are worlds apart. I say “we,” not “I,” because I include ordinary citizens with myself. The politicians are in one world, and the citizen is in another. I am not a politician. I think we have reached a very delicate stage today. It is no longer permissible for us merely to propose resounding political slogans, all of which revolve around promises whose implementation we have never seen. We have had enough slogans. The people have had enough exaggerated sloganeering. The country needs deeds. Deeds take place on the ground. All of them revolve around the economic and political problems over which the country and the citizens are stumbling. The issue is one of making decisions and
moving from a period of empty sloganeering to one of proposing real solutions. Again I tell you I am not one of the politicians. I am not a political candidate. I am a candidate with an economic program aimed at settling political and social conditions in the country.

Today the rescue operation is one of accounting, not one of sloganeering. I am not concerned with slogans. I am another kind of candidate. I am a candidate in the name of the economic rescue of Lebanon, the social rescue of Lebanon, the rescue of the citizen’s daily bread.

The coming period will be one of rebuilding what politics and war have destroyed. Rebuilding means economics and work. We need a new Marshall Plan. In all humility, I consider myself the author of a new Lebanese Marshall Plan.

$3 Billion

[Question] What do you mean by “a new Marshall Plan”? What is your plan?

[Answer] Again I say to you that the problem today is not political. The problem is one of daily bread. To give you an example: I have 5,000 employees in my companies. I don’t hide from you the fact that when I see that the each employee’s average income is roughly $50 a month, I can’t help thinking of Bangladesh.

Would anyone believe that Lebanon has become like Bangladesh? In Lebanon—let us say it plainly—because of politics and politicians, there has been a split between the classes. One class is quite satisfied; another class is on the edge of hunger. Therefore I say to you that we need an economic plan or an economic planner. With my economic plan and project, I could bring into Lebanon within 1 or 1 and ½ years the sum of $3 billion for all sectors for ordering the economic household. However, this requires a healthy foreign and domestic climate. In other words, a political truce as well as a military truce is necessary; and arranging the situation with Syria is very important.

[Question] Then you are telling me that if you are elected president you can guarantee $3 billion for Lebanon.

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] With $3 billion, Mr. Tamraz, how much will the dollar come down?

[Answer] It is not just an issue of the dollar’s coming down. Certainly, the dollar will come down a lot when such large sums reach Lebanon. But this operation will accompany or be accompanied by a working plan, so that the brunt of the lower value of the dollar is not again borne by Lebanese citizens who have been forced to protect themselves with dollars because of deteriorating political and security conditions.

If you want me to give you a quick indication, I think the dollar may come down—if what I have indicated takes place and all the desired preconditions are fulfilled—to below 150 Lebanese pounds.

Security and Mutual Understanding

[Question] Let us talk about the restricted level of income. You told us that the Lebanese people today have begun to suffer distress and hunger. What do you guarantee Lebanese citizens as an income, if you are elected president?

[Answer] I think one can assume that a worker’s income will become three times what it is today. That is my goal. It is not a theoretical goal or a mere slogan; it is a goal that can be applied. But I say to you again that the first requirement is security—mutual understanding. Then Lebanon will again become the economic beacon in this region.

[Question] Do you mean to tell me that if you are elected president, citizens will return to the standard of living that existed before the war, or better?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] And they will no longer confront the economic distress they confront today?

[Answer] Yes.

Syria

[Question] Since you are a candidate, let us talk a bit about Lebanon’s foreign affairs. What is your idea about the special relationship with Syria, which has become a fundamental problem today?

[Answer] There is no doubt that we are destined in one way or another to come to an agreement with Syria. Lebanon wants something from Syria, just as Syria wants something from Lebanon. The important thing is how we can give something to Syria without infringing upon Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence. And the opposite is also true for Syria. I am against our becoming prisoners of phrases or terms. The important thing is not that relations with Syria be called special or not special. I am an economist and a practical man. My proposal is that we sit down with Syria after the presidential elections and speak frankly about what Syria wants from Lebanon and what I can give Syria. I have many things that I want from Syria before I bring up the question of what Syria wants from Lebanon. Just as Syria wants security from Lebanon, I also want security from Syria. In other words, just as Syria does not want Lebanon to constitute a danger to its regime, I do not want Syria to constitute a danger to Lebanon’s regime and territory. Of course, states are not charity associations. Why do you want them to preserve you and your sovereignty? If you give them a lot, you get a lot. However, if you sit around a table and negotiate with them about what is possible, they accept what is possible with you. As I told you,
sovereignty and independence are things on which no president can make concessions. Other than that, we should not be afraid to enter into talks with Syria to arrive at bilateral relations that serve the interest of both countries. There are many examples in the world: Germany and France, America and Japan, or even America and the Soviet Union. We see clearly that agreement between two countries that were at odds or in conflict is possible—very possible.

In any case, international opening is the predominant thing today. The time of war is over. The end of war means peace, and peace means economics. Syria is suffering more from economic problems than is Lebanon. Lebanon, in a state of recovery, could help Syria economically. It is on this basis that I understand partnership. I will help Syria on the basis that Syria will help me in other areas. There is nothing free in the world. That is the difference between me, for example, and the politicians who base their entire Syrian policy on promises and slogans, without going into the details and the subjects that really interest Syria. We should remember that today, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Syria has oil problems. No one knows whether Iran will continue to supply Syria with nearly $1 billion in oil. That is the way I understand the problem and the new dialogue to create solutions for both countries. Thus, relations will be bilateral, governmental, tangible, and serious, and will not overstep the red lines we all know.

[Question] Then you link everything not to politics, but to economics?

[Answer] Mr. Jubran, what is politics? Let us take a member of parliament, for example. The member of parliament represents the people. What else do the people want but economic achievements related to living standards and growth? At the international level, all the world’s politics are linked to vital economic interests. The causes of all wars were connected with vital economic problems. Likewise, all the solutions revolved around, and continue to revolve around vital economic interests. Therefore, there are no politics outside the sphere of economics. Talking in theoretical terms—beliefs, Mr. Jubran, don’t feed you bread! The country is hungry, and the people are hungry. We have wasted enough time. People are emigrating. We may reach the edge of a population vacuum if we continue thus.

[Question] Since we are talking about emigration, if you are elected president, do you guarantee an end to emigration?

[Answer] Yes. I even guarantee that everyone who left Lebanon will return.

Israel

[Question] We have spoken about Syria, but there is a problem with Israel, and Israel is occupying the South.

[Answer] Certainly. If we want to reach a solution to the problem of the South, we have to guarantee an end to all military operations against Israel from the South. However, we have to understand fully that every plan aimed at solving the problem of the South must take place in coordination with the superpowers and the Arab states, Syria being the foremost among them, so that Lebanon can have the necessary cover and not pay the cost of so-called “separate agreements.” There is an international solution for the Middle East problem today. Lebanon must carefully study this solution, so as to be in step with it and benefit from it, just as all the countries involved in the Middle East problem will benefit. If there is Arab peace with Israel, that means Lebanon will have peace with Israel. However, if the Arab decision is to attack Israel from all the Arab borders, including the Golan, Lebanon will doubtlessly stand beside the Arab states in that decision.

[Question] If I have understood you, your policy is one of speaking frankly to the Syrians on all subjects, especially regarding the circumstances of a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the South.

[Answer] Of course, especially since today we alone are paying the price. Israel is satisfied with its position in the South. As for the Lebanese situation, you know even more about it than I.

[Question] Do you think there is a possibility that the Israeli army will withdraw from the South?

[Answer] Certainly. But again, I stress to you that any agreement, even military, between Lebanon and Israel must be approved by Syria, because Syria considers Lebanon to fall within its defense perimeter. This is something well known. It would be stupid for us to think we can reach an agreement between Lebanon and Israel without Syria’s approval. We are in the same position as Jordan vis-a-vis Syria, for example.

Unification, Decentralization

[Question] Do you think the unification of Lebanon will take place on the basis of the accomplished fact of decentralization, or on the basis of the 1943 National Pact?

[Answer] It would be difficult for us to return to the 1943 National Pact after 13 years of war. Naturally, I am for decentralization. But before approving it, we have to confer with all the groups about our understanding of this decentralization.

[Question] What kind of decentralization are you for?

[Answer] I am for an expanded decentralization, one based on development. I am against a political decentralization. As I said to you, I do not want to be a prisoner of phrases. I am against partitioning Lebanon.
In any event, the decentralization I think appropriate is one based on regional and district development—social, also, if you wish, and even financial.

[Question] How?

[Answer] Without getting into something as explosive as gunpowder, I mean that the tax system might change. There could be a tax for the local district and a tax for the central government, so that the people of a region would become partners in the process of developing their region through the taxes they pay to the local district. In this way, citizens would no longer have the feeling that the money they pay goes to the central treasury and gets lost.

The tax for the central government would be one that all citizens also paid—based on a new tax system, as I told you—so that they might share in funding certain sectors belonging to the central government. This system is used in all advanced countries.

If such decentralization were correctly applied, the layers between the regions and between the people also might be abolished. With the abolition of the layers, the people might again draw close to each other.

I want to add here that the role of the central government in the operation might be to help fund the treasury of a region, if it needs projects that it cannot cover from its own treasury.

The Dollar

[Question] Let us go back to the subject of the dollar. People always used to say, “Tamraz made the dollar go up; Tamraz made the dollar go down.” What is your comment?

[Answer] Mr. Jubran, it is impossible for an individual by himself to make the dollar go up or down. It would certainly be a matter of pride for me if it were true that I had made the dollar go up and had made it go down by myself. But it is not true. The people who raised the value of the dollar were the frightened citizens of Lebanon who sold pounds and bought dollars because of their fear. That is something natural, especially since I am in a free economic system. Roget Tamraz was not the cause of the fear that led to citizens’ buying and selling. Roget Tamraz did not sell anyone. Roget Tamraz has no militia. He did not bring in foreign armies and did not impose contact lines. He did not engage in politics and political one-upmanship. Ask the politicians and military men. I understand the reaction of the citizen in selling and buying. By so doing, the citizen wanted to protect his family and daily bread.

Unlike the politicians, Mr. Jubran, I come to fill the citizen with confidence and get him to sell dollars and buy pounds.

[Question] Then the dollar will come down.

[Answer] Certainly.

[Question] We have become accustomed to promises by politicians and officials, but when they finally get into office, you might as well be talking to dead men; and since there is no one to call them to account, the people as usual pay the price. How do you want the citizens to trust Roget Tamraz or call him to account for these promises of his?

[Answer] I talk figures, economics, and promises based on figures and economics; so it will be easy for the citizen to call me to account in a year about these figures I gave him. If after a year I have not been able to carry out my promises, I won’t hold on to my seat. I will go away—resign. Let the people try somebody else.

[Question] You tell me you’ll resign. If the citizens ask you to resign, and you don’t agree, what are they to do? How will you guarantee your departure to them?

[Answer] As soon as I am elected, I will amend the constitution. By means of the amendment, I will create a supreme court to try presidents. I will ask it in advance to put me on trial and dismiss me—I will give it that right—if within a year I have not carried out the promises I made to the people. If I fail, I shall have the honor of being the first president this court tries.

[Question] Do I understand that you are signing your resignation in advance, if you fail, and that it is as if you were signing a contract between yourself and the court?

[Answer] Yes. Why do you want me to stay in office if we fail? The office is not my property; it is the property of the people. They have the right to try me, if I fail.

Mr. Jubran, I am an economist. I have concluded many contracts in my lifetime. Today I come to sign a contract with the citizens of Lebanon. I will carry out economic and social issues that will revive them and revive the country. If after a year I have not carried out what I promised, in accordance with the new constitution—as I said—and by means of the supreme court whose authority will be higher than mine, I shall be brought to account and dismissed.

I do not belong to any militia, party, or political crew. I am a man who comes as a citizen. The citizens know me. There are shortcomings to me, and there are pluses in my favor.

I come to solve a problem. If I can’t, I'll leave. I won’t even have the right to say that I am not at fault if I have not carried out my promises after a year; that the others are at fault; that some political situation prevented me, etc. I am responsible for everything.
[Question] This is a precedent and something new in Lebanon. This proposal of yours might anger the politicians.

[Answer] Yes. The people have the right to be able to try the highest official. We are in a democratic system. That is a right of the people.

A Maronite From the South

[Question] Let us return to the subject of your candidacy. Are you a Maronite? Excuse the question, but it is necessary.

[Answer] I am a Maronite, although I am not a sectarian. My education is Anglo-Saxon and American.

[Question] What region are you from?

[Answer] My father was born in Sidon—a Maronite from Sidon. My father was a treasury director under the Ottoman administration. I am a southerner. My heart is in the South, as I believe the heart of everyone is in the South—for example, the heart of brother Rafiq al-Hariri.

[Question] You have named Rafiq al-Hariri. If you are elected, will you appoint him prime minister during your term?

[Answer] I think brother Rafiq has played an important role in the Lebanese economy. As an economist, I greatly respect him. It is apparent that al-Hariri is from the new generation and is serving the new generation.

[Question] Are you interested in the new generation?

[Answer] I think the most important thing today in Lebanon is interest in the new generation. There is a split between the old and new generations—a generation gap. We have to remedy it, because the future belongs to the new generation, not to the old. The new generation needs someone who understands it.

[Question] Do you understand the new generation—the war generation?

[Answer] I think I understand the war generation, because I am from it. I have suffered with it and come in contact with its members.

[Question] Mr. Tamraz, what brought you into politics?

[Answer] Economists have come in all administrations and in all difficult periods. There is no special school for politics. Politics are decisionmaking; and the business and economics sector teaches you how to make decisions, particularly ones that are very delicate and depend on correct facts and correct calculations.

[Question] How do you categorize yourself?

[Answer] I am a self-made man. I studied, got an education, and understood that in life one has to be just with people. With justice, truth, and frankness one can find solutions to all problems. I would compare Lebanon to a safe with two keys: the president has one key; the prime minister has the other.

If the two leaders do not agree with each other about opening the safe at the same time with the two keys, it becomes impossible to open the safe. Thus I think all the talk about the powers of the president or the powers of the prime minister is empty and vain. What is the use of powers on paper, if there is disagreement? What interests me is the result; and the result comes through partnership and mutual understanding.

[Question] You have spoken about the new generation that does not know Lebanon and does not understand unity. How do you wish to rebuild it?

[Answer] The politicians drove us apart from each other. As for the new generation, I think it no longer understands what befell it, that the future belongs to it, and that its members must become reconciled with each other. In this area, I think I can play an important role to bring together points of view among members of the new generation.

[Question] Then you can create interregional mutual interests that will bring people together?

[Answer] The interests must be economic ones. In my work, I deal with all the groups. I know there are no miraculous means. The means are economic and based on interest. Economic interest is the only language that unites us and brings us together.

[Question] When we hear you speak, we think that if you are elected, the problem will end.

[Answer] If I weren’t optimistic and self-confident, why would I be a candidate? I am not a politician. My goal is not political. If I am elected and fail, I too shall lose. I believe the time is right for a solution. The only thing missing is boldness in decisionmaking and embarking upon the solution.

[Question] Do you consider yourself different from the class of politicians?

[Answer] Yes, I believe the politician candidates run for office as if they were engaging in sports, as if it were a matter of fashion with them, and just for the sake of running. I have not come just to run. I have followed the actions of the politicians from below and have seen what they have bequeathed to the country and the citizens. There is a fire burning in the country today. I am not a fireman; but if no fireman comes, it is my duty to get down and put out the fire.
I Have Contacted Everyone

[Question] Do you think you can put out the Lebanese fire today?

[Answer] Yes. I have contacted all the local and regional factions and know that the way to solve the problem is not as difficult as some suppose. Now that political revolution has destroyed the country during a period of years, we need an economic and social revolution. Political revolution, Mr. Juhran, ruined the country; economic revolution will rebuild it.

[Question] It seems to me that you have been considering running for a long time, because your platform is ready. How long have you been thinking about the subject?

[Answer] For a long time I have been following the Lebanese situation and Lebanese problems without becoming involved in politics. Now, however, I have gotten the feeling that there is a political vacuum and that the politicians are also in a vacuum, so that agreement between them has become very difficult. Thus I got the idea that we need a new style or a new method of dealing with the problem.

[Question] Why didn't you place your economic plan at the disposal of the political candidates?

[Answer] I saw that they were not serious about implementing it and not capable. It became clear to me that the politicians are not practical. They are men with theories, while the situation requires realism and implementation. So I am becoming a candidate to implement my plan.

I Salvaged “Intra”

[Question] Do the people trust you?

[Answer] Tell me, Mr. Tuwayni, do the people trust the politicians? What have the politicians done, that the people should trust them? The difference between them and me is that I have a recognized economic credibility. No one can say that Roget Tamraz was never able to rescue a number of companies that were on the edge of bankruptcy. In 1967, when Intra Bank went bankrupt, I was a university student. I presented a plan to rescue Intra, and I succeeded. I was 26 years old. At the time, not even the Rockefeller Group was able to rescue Intra. The chairman of the committee at the time was the political leader Sarkis. That was when I got to know (former) President Sarkis. I went into his office and said, “I have a plan to save Intra Bank. May I present it to you?” He looked at me and said, “Do you have a check for $200 million with you?” “No,” I said. “Then,” he said, “we have nothing to talk about.” I said to him, “Allow me to say to you that if I had a check, I would buy the bank and its affiliates.” “What is your plan?” he asked. I presented the plan to him, and we embarked upon it. Intra was rescued and benefited the Lebanese economy and the Lebanese state.

When Egypt failed in the oil pipeline extension project, I was successful in 1973 and built the oil pipelines for Egypt. I bought the Italian Tam Oil Company, which was bankrupt, and rescued it. Then the Libyans bought it. Today they sell $2 billion in oil through it. From this point of view I am well known and have succeeded. If some people attack me and try to distort my image, I am not a public relations man. I have no media or social means to reply to them. It isn't even important that I reply to them. I say to you again that I have become a candidate because I saw a political vacuum. Thirteen years of war are enough. The issue of the presidency must not turn into what we are seeing today—a lottery, with nobody wishing to acknowledge his candidacy. Nobody has a serious plan. This is unreasonable and unacceptable.

[Question] Then you consider yourself to be coming in the name of the new generation, to save it from the sicknesses of the war?

[Answer] Yes, because this time the new generation will not accept a person like a lottery ticket—somebody who has no clear plan, and who himself is not clear. People know me, with my bad points and good points, and I have my plan. I therefore became a candidate. Whoever has a question, let him ask it.

Time for the Solution

[Question] It has become clear to us, Mr. Tamraz, that this is the first presidential candidate interview we have held that is ending rather quickly.

[Answer] When I was young, I learned from my father. One day, I intended to sign a contract to repay a bank loan. The contract was 20 pages long. When I began reading it, my father said to me, “Don’t read it.” “Why?” I asked. “Sign!” he said. “Why?” I asked. “Are you prepared to repay this debt?” he asked. “Of course,” I said. “Then sign,” he said, “and don’t read.”

I learned this from my father. As you have seen, I don’t talk a lot. Perhaps I don’t talk well, because I am not a literary man. I am a man of figures and economics. I don’t need flowery language; I need two words—yes, or no. That is the basis on which I manage my affairs and deal with people.

[Question] Let us clarify a point: after a year, if you are elected and then you fail, will you resign immediately?

[Answer] If I fail, why do you want me to remain?
[Question] Then, as you said to us, upon your election you will appoint a supreme court and sign in advance your letter of resignation in case it deems you to have failed.

[Answer] Yes, I am ready. If I fail after a year, I am not ready to fail for another 5 years. The time for a solution has come for us Lebanese. Everyone around us must understand that we have made a decision to solve our problem, because the people can no longer bear more than they have borne.

[Question] Do you have a final word to add?

[Answer] If I am elected, I promise the citizens of Lebanon that every emigrant will return to his home. Every Lebanese whose home was destroyed will have the ability to rebuild it himself. I will not give a gift, but I will provide resources for people to get on their feet again by themselves. The Lebanese are against pity, and I am against pity. We have our dignity, and I will preserve it.

As I said to you, if I am elected, by means of my economic plan I will give every Lebanese citizen the ability to educate his children, obtain medical care for himself, and assure a minimum level needed to live in dignity. The dignity of the Lebanese will return through the dignity of their economy and through the strengthening of this economy.

Article Explains Locations of Various Groups Ruling Beirut
44040028 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
31 Aug 88 pp 14-15

[Article by Dr Jalal Muhammed: “Who Rules Beirut?”]}

[Text] On the eve of Lebanon’s presidential elections, the dream of “administrative Beirut” has crumbled. After 13 years of battles, killing, and destruction, Beirut has turned into “Beiruts.” Each quarter is a capital, every militia a “state,” and every armed person a “ruler” with his weapon.

“Administrative Beirut” is bigger than actual geographic Beirut and smaller than “Greater Beirut.” What is meant by the geographic Beirut is the area located between the seashore to the west and Mount Lebanon Governorate to the north, east and south. Geographical Beirut’s northern borders are at the port, its eastern borders at the old Furr al-Shubbak police station where the highway to the mountain starts, and its southern borders are at the Sports City where the highway to the south starts.

But “administrative Beirut” extends northward to include the old electric train area known as the Nahr Beirut-Burj Hammud line, which is an area inhabited by an Armenian majority; the al-Dawrah area; and al-Karantina area. This Beirut extends further northward to reach Nahr al-Mawt Bridge at the foothills of Northern al-Matin and the villages of al-Zulfah, Dubayyah, and al-Dikwanah at the border of Juniyah.

Eastward, “administrative Beirut” extends beyond the vast Furr al-Shubbak area to include the areas of al-Tawlitah, ‘Ayn al-Rummanah, and al-Shayyah, the start of Camille Cham‘un-al-Hadath Corniche and al-Sayyad Circle, or al-Hazimiyah, in the direction of al-Fayyadiyah. Southward, it extends beyond the Sports City to reach the Kuwaiti Embassy Circle, the airport, and the southern district including Burj al-Barajmah, Bi‘r al-‘Abd, Harat Hurayk, and al-Ghubayr [presumably al-Ghubayri].

Before thinking of “administrative Beirut,” anybody who has heard of or known Beirut asks: What remains of this city? Entire quarters such as Ra‘s al-Nab‘, the commercial markets, and al-Karantina have been destroyed, and there is between East Beirut and West Beirut a green line on which the contact points are located.

The contact points are the vital artery and the bridge between East and West Beirut. The Lebanese are entitled, with some exceptions, to cross these contact points on foot. Even though the distance to be crossed is no more than 500 meters of sands and mud, depending on the season, it is a distance fraught with fear and terror. Beirut’s crossing points abound with barricades and are exposed to snipers’ fire at any moment.

Traffic between the two Beiruts continues because the divided city refuses to surrender to the will of full partition. Huge trucks, cars, fuel tanker trucks, and people move foodstuffs and goods between the capital’s two parts daily. Moreover, the crossing points have turned into illegal “customs posts.” Militias on both sides collect fees which are tantamount to “protection money” for any goods moving from one Beirut to the other.

Many are the times when a sniper positioned on the contact lines has decided to open fire for sport, hitting an old person or a child, and many are the times when citizens going through the crossing points have been kidnapped, with Beirut thus returned to its isolation.

What are these contact lines? Who has delineated them on the real ground? Who in Beirut controls whom and who controls what? Who rules East Beirut, West Beirut, or the southern suburb? What is Beirut’s geographic, military, or political map?

Contact Lines

The contact lines are considered a single line extending from the capital’s port in the northwest to Mar Miha‘il Church, al-Shayyah, in the southeast. This line is, in fact, the old Damascus highway. The line is supervised by brigades of the Eighth and Fifth Armies, and its security...
is actually controlled by a mixture of armed militias deployed in barricades or on highrise rooftops close to the line in both parts of Beirut. Militia barricades are always located behind positions of army units. Acts of kidnapping, beating, and killing often occur within view of the barricades legitimate army which makes no move to intervene.

Military and political control all along the contact line is divided as follows:

In the east: The Lebanese Forces—Samir Ja'ja'. In the west: Hizbullah. Amal's control extends from the port to al-Sayfi, the museum, al-Shayyah Circle, and to Mar Mikha'il Church.

In the east, the Lebanese Forces are in control of the area extending from Mar Mikha'il Church to al-Hadath and to al-Shayyah, located across the southern suburb. In the west, Amal, Hizbullah, and a number of "national" parties are in control.

The Syrian forces have their barricades behind the Lebanese Army positions in West Beirut. These forces share a joint barricade with the army at 'Ayn al-Muraysah and other barricades at other points in the area.

What is proposed currently is withdrawal of the militias in the east and the west to be replaced by Lebanese Army units, reinforced by the Syrian military presence in West Beirut within the framework of crystallizing the "administrative Beirut" plan. The Syrian deterrence forces have political and military control over all of West Beirut's quarters that are adjacent to the sea. They have a large number of barricades extending from the destroyed U.S. Embassy building in 'Ayn al-Muraysah to al-Rawshah and al-Ramleh al-Bayda', considered to be the headquarters of these forces. The control of the Syrian forces, along with units of the [Lebanese] Army, extends southward all along al-Awza'i road to al-Damur Bridge where the Progressive Socialist Party has its own post. The Popular Liberation Army, the Ma'ruf Sa'd, forces have their own post at al-Awwali Bridge.

It is well known that the Lebanese Army, supported by the Syrian deterrence forces, has posts in most of West Beirut's quarters excluding the southern suburb.

West Beirut's political and military control was previously divided among the parties, particularly the Progressive Socialist Party, the communist party, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, al-Murabitun Movement, Amal and Hizbullah. But this military control has now been somewhat ended, except in the southern suburb where Amal and the militarist Hizbullah continue to be present and where political control is under the canopy of Syria's resolution.

The Socialist Party has its political position in Karakul al-Duruz area, in al-Manarah, 'Ayn al-Muraysah, and in al-Musaytibah whereas Amal controls the al-Laja Quarter, al-Batarkiyyah area, and Wadi Jamil. The Nationalist Party's basic [political] position is in Verdin and al-Hamra' areas and Hizbullah's is in al-Bastah area. But the fact that the armed elements' weapons have been hidden away and that Syria is in military control has rendered political control in these areas useless.

Southern Suburb

Even though the Syrian deterrence forces have spread out and deployed in Beirut's southern suburb since the latest battles between Amal and Hizbullah, the political decision-making continues to be in the hands of Hizbullah and Amal, depending on the quarters and on the political families involved.

But with the Syrian military deployment, Hizbullah's and Amal's military and militia presence has diminished. This Syrian deployment has had its positive impact on protecting the Beirut International Airport road which is parallel to the southern suburb and on which flying roadblocks had been set up from time to time, thus obstructing passenger traffic and engaging in kidnap activities. The current military and political reality puts the Beirut Airport road and the airport, with its installations, under the control of the Syrian forces and of the Lebanese army and security forces.

East Beirut

The Syrian forces and the Lebanese Army are in charge of security from the airport to the contact line in the museum area. The eastern side of the contact line is controlled by army units (a brigade different from the one controlling West Beirut). Barricades manned by the Lebanese Forces are located close to these units. This line extends from the port, which is currently under the control of the [Lebanese] Forces, to Badaru and al-Hadath areas.

East Beirut includes quarters that extend along the northern shoreline and al-Karantina. The Lebanese Forces' military and political headquarters are located in one of these quarters—a quarter which embodies the reality of Lebanon's war. This quarter used to consist of zinc-sheet and wooden structures which housed Kurds and poor Muslims. In 1976, the Phalanges militias occupied al-Karantina, perpetrated their well-known massacre, bulldozed the zinc-sheet houses, and built buildings in the area.

Political and military power in East Beirut is almost exclusively controlled by the Lebanese Forces excluding B'abda, al-Hadath, and some areas overlooking al-Man. These areas are controlled by Lebanese Army units and by armed units of the Phalanges Party and of the National Liberals Party. However, the [Lebanese] Forces incorporate the absolute majority of the armed militia.
men in East Beirut and believe that their future struggle will be against the Lebanese Army which is trying to impose its control on the area, but without a clear and explicit political and military resolution [to back its endeavor]. Consequently, one of the aspirations of the "administrative Beirut" [plan] is to enable the Lebanese Army to establish full military control over East Beirut. It is well known that the Phalanges Party, counted as a pro-President Amin al-Jumayyil party, turns to the army to deal with its security affairs in the present phase.

The possibility of a confrontation between the Lebanese Forces and the army in East Beirut is likely in case plans are made for the Lebanese elections to be held peacefully or in case plans are made for Lebanon to begin its journey in the direction of peace. The proposal for the creation of "administrative Beirut" calls for totally entrusting its security to the Lebanese Army and for withdrawing the armed elements from both parts of the city. This is easy to achieve in West Beirut now that the Syrian deterrence forces have entered it. But it is difficult to achieve in East Beirut under the current conditions. Moreover, establishment of "administrative Beirut" calls for reuniting the city and eliminating the contact lines that divide it.

Even though the combatants in the Beirut arena have tried, each with his own weapons, to foil the "administrative Beirut" plan, this plan continues to be the ideal formula and the primary project of any future Lebanese president seeking to initiate the peace phase in the fragmented homeland.

PDO remained active in exploration and added two concessions with a combined area of 75,336 square kilometres. One is offshore south Oman and PDO has expanded its oil rig fleet to 12 in order to undertake the extra exploration and development work (MEED 2:9:88).

PDO's efforts to cut costs reduced expenditure by nearly 37 percent in 1987, trimming total spending to $661.5 million from $1,055.8 million in 1986. The sharpest decline was for construction and acquisition of fixed and movable assets, down to $180 million from $448 million a year earlier. Operating expenditure fell to $274 million from $338 million in 1986.

**QATAR**

**Government Dispenses With Pakistani Military Advisers**

44000055 Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 15 Sep 88 p 18

[Text] Qatar is dispensing with Pakistani military advisers and has asked India to provide military expertise for its armed forces, DEFENCE and FOREIGN AFFAIRS WEEKLY reported in New Delhi. It said that as a first step, Qatar had hired Lieutenant General Himmat Singh to be the senior adviser to the Qatari defence ministry.

**Price Rises Kept Within 2.7 Percent**

44000057 Doha GULF TIMES in English 5 Sep 88 p 1

[Text] Increases in the price of commodities in Qatar has not exceeded 2.7 percent annually, the director of the Ministry of Economy and Commerce Shaykh Hamad ibn 'Abd-Al-Rahman al-Thani said in an interview with QNA.

He said the state's policy since independence had been aimed at diversification of income through expanding the industrial base and encouraging the private sector. This policy had started to yield results, with growth in various industrial sectors.

Falling oil exports and prices had negatively affected the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which rose 28 percent from 1979 to 1981, falling to lower levels in the following years.

Qatar's oil exports reached 102mn barrels in 1985, compared to 181mn in 1979. Despite the fact that oil exports reached 112mn barrels in 1986 that year witnessed serious fluctuations in oil prices.

Despite the relative stability of oil prices last year, 1987 saw a remarkable drop in oil exports.

On agriculture, Shaykh Hamad said the value of agricultural produce jumped from QR212.2mn in 1982 to QR318.1mn in 1986, while fish production met 63 percent of local needs in 1986.

**OMAN**

**Oil Reserves Reach Record Levels**

44000059 London MEED in English 30 Sep 88 p 39

[Text] Figures released by state-owned Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) show an 8.7 percent rise in oil reserves to a record 4,075 million barrels. PDO also recorded an average output of 571,000 barrels a day (b/d) in 1987—slightly higher than the self-imposed quota of 565,000 b/d—according to PDO's annual report.

The rise in oil reserves was achieved through a combination of new discoveries, exploratory appraisal and re-evaluation of previous discoveries.

New finds added 187 million barrels, of which 124 million barrels were from eight new fields. Six exploratory appraisal wells added 63 million barrels. A further 138 million barrels came from the re-evaluation of existing fields.

Eleven fields were brought on stream in 1987, helping to lift annual production by 4 percent to 208 million barrels. At 571,000 b/d, average output was up by 20,000 b/d from 1986 levels.
Production of dairy produce met 64 percent of local needs and vegetables met 47 percent of local requirements in that year, he added.

**Prospects for Economic Development Discussed**

44000058 London MEED in English
30 Sep 88 pp 25, 27-28, 31-34

[Text] The Qatari economy has recovered much of its poise after the shock of the 1986 oil price crash. The country is now looking ahead to implementation of the North Field gas scheme in an environment made more secure by the 20 August Gulf war ceasefire.

These developments will create a twin challenge for the carefully—some would say conservatively—managed economy. With an indigenous population of about 90,000, Qatar is the most lightly populated Arab state. Yet it has established a position in the Arab world that belies its size. As a member of OPEC and of the GCC, and as a steadily emerging economic and political Middle East force, Qatar sits on some of the region’s most powerful councils.

Its special position is founded on the twin pillars of oil and stable, consensual government. Oil was discovered in 1938, and production now averages 300,000 barrels a day. This brought in about $2,000 million in export revenues in 1987, equivalent to around $2,200 for each national.

Consistent government is provided by a close-knit group of officials drawn mainly from the ruling Al-Thani family. The administrative tone is set by the amir, Shaykh Khalifah. He has been head of state since 1972, not long after British forces withdrew from the Gulf and Qatar gained independence. Still in his mid-50s, he can be expected to lead the country into the next century.

A clear line of succession is provided by his eldest son, Crown Prince Shaykh Hamad, and his second son, Shaykh ‘Abd-Al’-Aziz, finance and economy minister since 1972.

Conscious of Qatari society’s vulnerability to the forces at work in the Gulf since 1945, the government has sought to encourage economic and social development without destroying the roots of a people with a proud bedouin heritage in which an austere form of Sunni Islam plays a central role.

The oil price booms of the mid and late 1970s helped to boost living standards remarkably and laid the foundations for independent statehood. However, concern about the impact of too rapid growth prompted the government to introduce economic change at a pace the country could handle.

The biggest worry was that heavy investment in infrastructure would draw in huge numbers of Arab, Iranian and Indian workers. Development policy has sought to avoid creating an expatriate flood, but Qataris are still in a minority. Estimates put the number of foreigners now in the country at more than 100,000 although this is below the peak earlier in the decade.

Transformation since independence 17 years ago is impressive. According to the UN, the average Qatari now has a life expectancy of 66 years and infant mortality has fallen to little more than 50 a thousand—although both figures leave room for improvement.

The national education programme has cut illiteracy rates to less than 33 percent—one of the lowest levels in the Arab world.

Doha, the capital, has been turned into a pleasant, modern city. The bay has been extended into a crescent dominated by the pyramid-shaped Doha Sheraton, owned by the government. A series of public buildings, substantial without being imposing, provides a backdrop to the corniche road leading to the old town.

Such measures are aimed at laying the foundations for the next phase of development, signalled by the end of hostilities in the Gulf. Proud of its independence, yet aware that it is too small to pursue an entirely autonomous economic strategy, Qatar is looking to the GCC to provide the proper context for the challenges ahead. It is a shareholder in Gulf Air, which it owns with Bahrain, Abu Dhabi and Oman. Other Gulf institutions in which it has an interest include Gulf International Bank (GIB) and Gulf Aluminium Rolling Mill Company (Garmco) in Bahrain, and Gulf Investment Corporation (GIC) in Kuwait.

The GCC aims to create a new development environment in the peninsula, one that offers Qatar the chance to make further economic progress by giving access to a market of about 15 million people with similar historical and cultural backgrounds. At the same time, it will be free to maintain its identity, and the special attractions it offers business and political partners in the Gulf and elsewhere.

**The Hard Road to Economic Independence**

Hopes of a recovery in oil earnings have been hit by the continuing glut. The result has been depressed spot market prices for Gulf crude, now selling for about $13 a barrel, compared with the OPEC target of around $18.

For Qatar, which depends on oil for more than 90 percent of its export earnings, this will inevitably take its toll. Government plans for more infrastructure investment—in power, water and urban services—will be delayed, but progress is still expected in the North Field gas development programme, a scheme that will cost the equivalent of 25 percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP) in its first phase alone.

Qatar has estimated crude reserves of 3,200 million barrels, less than 1 percent of the world total. This is equivalent to about 30 years’ output at current levels,
and represents a tiny proportion of the Gulf region's reserves. Nevertheless, as a member of OPEC, it is among the most powerful oil exporters, a mixed blessing at a time of surplus and OPEC indiscipline.

Qatar is a more significant player in the world gas league. Natural gas reserves are estimated at 4,400 million million cubic metres, more than 4 percent of the world total. Only the United States, Soviet Union, Iran and Abu Dhabi have larger reserves.

This lies behind the plan to develop the North Field, seen as a long-term guarantee of national prosperity in the post-oil era. The country's limited oil reserves help explain the output policy. Its OPEC quota, strictly adhered to, is less than 2 percent of the August output of all 13 OPEC states.

The unpredictability of oil prices is encouraging the government to look to non-oil sectors as sources of national income. Services, including banking and hotels, account for more than half of national output, and further growth is expected. Government investment in fertiliser, steel manufacture and petrochemical industries has helped create a significant industrial base. In 1986, about 10 percent of total output and 15 percent of non-oil output was manufactured goods.

The government is considering developing an aluminium industry to exploit the strong demand that has transformed the prospects of the smelter in Bahrain. Forecasts of rapid growth in petrochemical consumption may also prompt a review of possible expansion plans for Qatar Petrochemical Company (Qapco), which produces ethylene and low-density polyethylene.

Qatar has made brave attempts to promote farming in an effort to reduce dependence on imported food. However, output accounts for little more than 1 percent of GDP, and is neither a significant source of income nor employment.

The construction sector, which accounts for about 10 percent of non-oil output, can be expected to record steady growth as the North Field project continues. Significantly, financial services was the most buoyant sector in 1987, growing by 6 percent and accounting for 10 percent of GDP, making it the largest component of non-oil activities.

The balance of payments is mainly determined by oil. The decline in the price of oil means exports are likely to fall below $2,000 million, possibly as low as those recorded in 1986, the year of the oil price crash. The trade surplus, which recovered to over $1,100 million in 1987, is forecast to fall to $800 million in 1988. The current account will show a deficit of $300 million, according to The Petroleum Finance Company of Washington. This is worse than in 1986.

The deficit is worrying. Figures published in the August edition of International Finance Statistics, published by the IMF, shows that total reserves excluding gold were slightly less than $600 million at the end of March. However, foreign assets are more than $2,200 million, indicating that Qatar has sufficient hard currency savings to support a deficit on the scale projected for 1988.

Qatar trades with many countries, particularly the advanced economies of North America, Europe and the Far East. In 1986, almost half its imports came from European countries, led by the UK, the country's largest supplier after Japan, which accounted for 17 percent of imports. The United States' share of the market has been in decline throughout the 1980s, falling to 6 percent of the total in 1986 from almost 11 percent in 1982.

### Balance of Payments, 1985-88

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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td>1,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>+2,090</td>
<td>+720</td>
<td>+1,140</td>
<td>+800</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current account</td>
<td>+690</td>
<td>-240</td>
<td>+160</td>
<td>-300</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Forecast
Source: Petroleum Finance Company, Washington

### Oil Production, 1986-88

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output ('000 b/d)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of OPEC</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of world</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, August 1988


However, the decline of the dollar in 1987 against most leading currencies has given American exporters a boost in Qatar, which ties the value of the riyal to the dollar. Figures released by the U.S. Commerce Department show exports to Qatar rising 21 percent to $76 million, about 9 percent of the total market.

Japan’s sales in 1987 were close to the 1986 level of $149 million, but exports from the UK, France and West Germany were all significantly lower.

Lower oil revenues will have a bad effect on Qatar’s public finances. A budget deficit has been recorded for two consecutive financial years and the 1988/89 public spending programme will produce a further shortfall. The budget, unveiled in February, envisages a deficit of more than QR 6,000 million ($1,650 million) for the year, the biggest ever. The oil price slump this summer suggests that the actual deficit will be even higher.

Its dependence on oil exports continues to be Qatar’s economic Achilles heel, but there appears to be no easy way of avoiding or even reducing it significantly. The depressing oil market prospects mean the government will have to continue with austere budgetary policies. This may affect the pace at which the North Field project progresses, although foreign financing is being sought.

In the long term, the economy should benefit from the expected oil price recovery in the late 1990s. This may coincide with the flow of income from the North Field. The people of Qatar will then start to enjoy the fruits of the government’s patient and cautious economic development programme.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>GDP QR million</th>
<th>% change on 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil sector</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>+4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil, of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacturing</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>+4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>power and water</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>building and construction</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>+3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade, restaurants and hotels</td>
<td>1,172</td>
<td>+2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport and communications</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>+0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finance, insurance, real estate</td>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>+6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other services</td>
<td>5,875</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Qatar Monetary Agency, 11th annual report, 1987
from January to August 1988 stood at 303,750 b/d, 6,000 b/d more than quota.

The onshore Dukhan field produces about 50 percent of Qatar's oil. Around 70 wells produce oil and 11 gas. Offshore activity centres on three main fields, where output from recoverable reserves is predicted to dwindle in the 1990s.

Conservation of reserves has enabled output to remain within OPEC production levels. The government wants to keep output at present levels to maintain the flow of gas. The priority is improving recovery techniques, Al-Murri says. At current production levels, reserves will last about 30 years. They now stand at 3,200 million barrels.

The U.S.' Amoco and British Petroleum (BP) are undertaking exploration and seismic surveys, BP—which took over Standard Oil Company of Ohio's exploration contract when it bought the company—is working on a five-well offshore drilling programme. Three wells are complete and the resulting data are being analysed. BP says it is mobilising to drill the other two by 1989. Amoco plugged three dry wells in 1988 and is continuing work on another three. No major oil strikes have yet been announced.

Qatar is self-sufficient in refined products and will remain so for the foreseeable future, Al-Murri says. The 50,000-b/d Umm Sa'id refinery supplies 12,000 b/d for domestic use and exports the surplus. Refined products output rose 14 percent in 1987, while local consumption increased by 3 percent. Diesel and fuel oil production reached 997,000 tonnes in 1987.

Daily gas output in 1987 from the Khuff non-associated gas reservoir was 400 million cubic feet, a 12 percent increase on 1986. Propane and butane production was 58,000 tonnes. Natural gas exports totalled 652,000 tonnes, 20 percent more than in 1986.

BP, Royal Dutch Shell International and Japanese companies are the main buyers of refined products. Two local firms, Qatar Oil Trading & Transport Company and AKT, also buy and sell in international markets.

The new oil products pipeline linking the Umm Sa'id refinery to the export terminal which opened in early 1988 will enable National Oil Company (Nodoco) to export up to 18,000 tonnes of gasoline, 20,000 tonnes of aviation fuel, 30,000 tonnes of light gas oil and 50,000 tonnes of fuel oil. Feasibility studies to expand capacity at the refinery are virtually complete and plans are awaiting government approval.

About 260,000 b/d of crude are sold through evergreen term contracts renewed annually. The Japanese are the biggest customers (see table). Prices are revised on a monthly basis. The remainder is consumed locally, sold on the spot market or supplied to Singapore refineries.

Deals with Singapore have become increasingly attractive, accounting for around 40,000 b/d in 1987. The plunge in crude prices in March 1988 made Singapore a more profitable option, and marks a move by Qatar to increase sales of refined products.

Officially, Qatar sticks to OPEC quotas and prices. While its performance on quotas has generally been in line with the organisation's rules, its customers have urged it to adopt a more flexible pricing policy. Qatar has maintained that it supports OPEC's pricing policies and denies offering discounts. However, oil industry observers say that a flexible pricing system has been in existence since May 1987. Otherwise, they add, the country would have been left with a lot of oil on its hands and have lost its customers. It has limited bargaining power because its production is small in world terms.

In February 1987, Doha announced it would fix prices in line with OPEC instructions, at $17.62 a barrel for Qatar Marine and $17.82 a barrel for Dukhan. However, many customers refused to pay official prices, and rebelled by lifting only 50-60 percent of their contracted amount. This caused a big slump in oil output and revenues during mid-1987, leading to the introduction of a market-related pricing system in May 1987, which had the immediate desired effect on exports and production.

In 1988, Qatar has been under pressure from Japanese companies for further discounts. In March, crude was sold at Oman spot prices with a premium of $0.05 for Qatar Marine and $0.10 for Dukhan. The government managed to increase this in April but, by June, it had returned to March levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term Contracts for Marine and Dukhan Crude</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(000 barrels a day)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Marine</th>
<th>Dukhan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mitsubishi (Japan)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marubeni (Japan)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Itoh (Japan)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petrobras (Brazil)</td>
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<td>Mobil (U.S.)</td>
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<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitsui (Japan)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Elf Aquitaine (France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caltex (U.S.)</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>128</td>
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Source: Middle East Economic Survey

North Field Gas Scheme on Schedule

Work on Qatar's largest industrial project, the North Field gas scheme, is right on schedule. Qatar General Petroleum Company (QGPC) has proudly announced Denmark's Maersk Drilling started work in mid-August on the first of the field's 16 wells.
Financing remains a problem, with 90 percent of the capital for the $1,300 million project's first phase expected to be committed in 1988. QGPC says it expects to conclude arrangements in September.

The much-delayed project is urgently needed to revitalise Qatar's gas-dependent industries, desalination plants and power stations when present supplies begin to run out in 1990. Gas needs are now met by offshore associated gas from the Khuff reservoir under the Dukhan oil fields. Khuff provides about 98 percent of non-associated gas production with the rest coming from a gas cap beneath Khuff.

The North Field, discovered by Shell International in the 1970s, covers an area of 6,000 square kilometres in shallow waters north-east of the Qatar peninsula. It has proven reserves of around 150 million cubic feet, but is estimated to hold as much as 380 million million cubic feet.

Local firms can expect many job opportunities to stem from the project, QGPC managing director Jabir al-Murri told the daily GULF TIMES in mid-August. “Stage one is essential to sustain the present economic activities and living standards in the near future.” There will be more than 260 contracts for equipment and material supplies, and civil and engineering works, over the next two years, he added. High-technology work will go to international engineering companies, but local firms will be offered less advanced jobs. The start of drilling should boost economic activity, he said.

This is good news for local contractors—largely dependent on government contracts—as major work has been virtually absent in the past few years. This was due to the government's conservative fiscal approach, cutting back spending to compensate for falling oil revenues.

However, the increased economic activity created by the project's start-up will result in a substantial increase in imports. Strong demand for materials, food, consumer goods, housing and services will keep the markets busy, but will aggravate balance of payments problems.

The first phase is expected to produce 800 million cubic feet of gas a day (cf/d). It entails installing two offshore platforms, and building two pipelines to the shore and two to the Umm Sa'id refinery, where a new natural gas liquids (NGL) plant will be built to transport dry gas to the domestic grid. QGPC also wants new facilities to re-inject surplus gas into the planned onshore Dukhan formation. Storage installations for NGL and naphtha destined for export will be included (MEED 5:6:87).

The shape of the second and third phases has not been clarified. They depend on market forces, QGPC says, and on deals that the government manages to make with prospective customers. One suggestion is for a further 800 cf/d to be pumped ashore to be processed and distributed to other GCC states. However, observers say there may not be sufficient demand, although it would have regional political advantages.

In phase three, a further 800 cf/d will be pumped ashore and a liquefied natural gas plant built near Umm Sa'id by Qatargas, a joint venture of QGPC, and the UK's British Petroleum, Total (Compagnie Francaise des Petroles) and Marubeni Corporation of Japan, each with a 7.5 percent holding. This will be for export, with Europe and Japan the most likely markets.

Finance has caused the delays in the scheme's development, and forced changes in QGPC's plans several times. Original proposals called for around $1,700 million-2,000 million to be spent during the first phase.

The U.S. Bechtel Corporation completed basic designs for the first phase in January 1986. In September 1986, plans were revised and costs whittled down to $950 million. At present, the cost of the first phase stands at around $1,300 million, exceeding projections by some $300 million. Al-Murri says the increase has resulted from the incorporation of activities not previously included in cost estimates, such as commissioning, spare parts and insurance. Also the original estimates were based on 1985 currency values, and have been hit by inflation and a weaker dollar.

Engineering work, being carried out by management consultant Bechtel and France's Technip, appointed in May 1987, is 50 percent complete, Al-Murri says. By 1989, 90 percent of the capital expenditure will be committed. A total of $600 million has already been committed, according to Al-Murri. By mid-August 1988, $200 million had been pledged to construction and consultancy services, $300 million to procurement of materials and equipment, and over $100 million to drilling and related activities. However, with most contracts expected to be awarded and mobilised by the end of 1988, financing for the massive project remains an open question. QGPC says it will reveal its plans soon, nearly one year after First Boston was appointed as financial adviser.

QGPC has estimated that “the project could support on its own some $600 million in external financing. This continues to represent the upper limit for foreign financing to be sought,” Al-Murri told the GULF TIMES. QGPC has given priority to obtaining most, if not all, financing on a non-recourse basis.

Since November 1987, QGPC has allotted 30,000 barrels a day (b/d) of oil to pay for the project. This should generate about $200 million a year. Al-Murri says the loans can be repaid from revenues raised from North Field products, estimated at over 40,000 b/d of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and condensates. This still leaves considerable amounts needed to cover immediate commitments. In July, the company said the money to pay
for work in 1988 was assured. If necessary, withdrawals would be made from QGPC funds and reserves, although they declined to elaborate (MEED 1:7:88).

The company has been considering for some time financial deals from several Japanese, Korean and Brazilian groups, although it has declined to give details. “However, these offers do not as yet conform to our terms or fully meet our requirements, but they do have certain positive elements in them,” Al-Murri said. In June 1986 QGPC received offers from Japan’s Marubeni Corporation and the U.S. Amoco, but rejected both. Marubeni’s offer comprised a complete package, including marketing gas at home and abroad. Amoco’s covered the setting up of production facilities to meet domestic needs (MEED 28:5:87).

Financing arrangements have not, however, halted the steady award of contracts during 1988. More are expected during October, with many firms already mobilising for work, contacting sources say.

The local National Petroleum Construction Company started 1988 by winning the fabrication work for two well head platforms and finished work on schedule in mid-1988. The UK’s Kurvers International Supply Services won the order to supply steel for the platforms. Local firm Taysir Contracting & Trading was hired to do on-site preparation for the new NGL plant (NGL3) in March. The work is worth about QR 10.7 million. It involves detailed engineering procurement and supply, filling and rough grading of the NGL plant site and the storage tanks site, preparing for road building within the plant and installation of security fencing (MEED 19:3:88).

The Bahrain branch of the U.S. Brown & Root in May won the contract to install all the jackets and modules for the offshore topside facilities, including treatment, living and utility platforms, using cranes and barges. Work is due to start in early 1989.

Gulf Housing was awarded the job of building a temporary camp for 150 people at Umm Sa’id. This also involves site preparation at two compressor station sites at Fahahil Khatriah, near well 31, and infrastructure work, including utilities, distribution systems, offices and warehouses. Work is due for completion by the end of 1988. Gulf Housing won another job—to build the workshop facilities, including office accommodation for the consultants (MEED 29:7:88).

More than 57 equipment orders have been placed. The largest is with Italy’s Nuovo Pignone, to supply five heavy industrial gas turbine-powered compressors valued at around $30 million, including three booster compressors for the NGL plant at Umm Sa’id and two for the compressor station to be built at Duka Dukhan.

Qatar General Insurance & Reinsurance became the project’s sole local insurer in March. The UK’s Thomas R. Miller will act as London reinsurance broker for Qatar National, placing 95 percent of the property and liability coverage. Qatar General won the job by tender, after QGPC dropped the idea of letting three local companies—Qatar General, Qatar Insurance Company and Al-Kahleej—take on the job jointly. Several policies have now been placed on the London market, Miller says.

Package 18, which comprises construction inspection and site supervision, has been split between two UK firms. Atkins Inspection Services, an affiliate of consultants W.S. Atkins, is to do onshore inspection for the NGL plant and the gas re-injection facilities at Dukhan. Solas Schall has been awarded the offshore work.

Bechtel and Technip’s management contract is proceeding according to schedule, QGPC says.

QGPC is keeping a tight rein on the purse strings, according to prospective contractors. Quality standards are very high. Payment is released on a percentage basis as a contractor reaches a project milestone—for example, delivery of equipment on site. There is no way of avoiding the project milestones, contractors say. If a company cannot reach the first, they will not be paid for subsequent targets, even if they are attained. With companies borrowing from banks to complete the work, penalties for missing deadlines are severe. One firm has even employed a special consultant to assure it meets the standards and deadlines demanded, and to cope with the huge amount of paper work generated.

The first phase of the North Field is expected to be completed by November 1990, or early 1991, when commissioning and production can begin. Those involved in the project have to wait until this autumn to assess the long-awaited financing proposals.

Banks Do Good Business

The financial sector is healthy, leading the non-oil economy growth league in 1987. The total assets of Qatar’s commercial banks rose almost 11 percent in the year, reflecting growth in credit to the local private sector and increases in banks’ foreign assets.

The rise in banks’ liabilities was due mainly to increased private deposits, which rose 10 percent in the year. Private deposits accounted for 74 percent of funds available to the banks at the end of 1987.

The growth in banks’ assets outstripped the expansion of their capital and reserves. These fell to 9 percent of liabilities at the end of 1987, compared with 9.3 percent a year earlier. Nevertheless, the banks are well-capitalised by regional and international standards. At the end of 1986, their free capital to risk asset ratio was 10.3 percent, compared with an average of 6.6 percent for GCC banks.
The sector is dominated by Qatar National Bank (QNB), which is 50 percent state-owned. Its assets at the end of 1987 totalled more than $3,000 million, making it the 14th largest GCC bank. Its assets accounted for two-thirds of the total for all banks in Qatar.

QNB was one of the most profitable banks in the Middle East last year, reporting a return on assets of 1.72 percent. This gives it the third highest profit rate among GCC banks.

The bank is reorganising and seeking a wider international presence. It also plans to introduce computer systems, including automated teller machines (ATMs).

The three other local conventional commercial banks are much smaller. Doha Bank had assets of just above $400 million at the end of the year. Commercial Bank of Qatar was about half this size and Al Ahli Bank of Qatar, the GCC's most profitable bank in terms of return on assets, had assets worth $157 million.

**Qatar's Commercial Banks, 1986-87**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Bank</th>
<th>Assets ($ million)</th>
<th>Loans ($ million)</th>
<th>Net profit</th>
<th>% Return on assets</th>
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<td>61</td>
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<td>Al Ahli Bank of Qatar</td>
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<td>101</td>
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Exchange rate: $1 = QR 3.75

**Status of North Field Gas Project Discussed**

44040041a Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 28 Aug 88 p 1

[Article by Siddiq al-Zayn]

[Text] Dr Jabi r 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Marri, director general of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and acting director general of the North Field gas project, has lauded the great interest being shown in the oil and gas sector, thanks to the total support his highness the ruler of the country and his highness the crown prince and defense minister lend to this sector. Speaking at a press conference on the occasion of the 17th anniversary of Qatar's independence, Dr al-Marri said that the oil and gas sector, at the direction of the minister of finance and petroleum and chairman of the board of directors of the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation, has fulfilled its responsibilities and contributed to the implementation of the country's development plans.

Dr al-Marri announced that the North Field gas will be available for consumption in approximately 3 and ½ years from now, that is, at the beginning of 1991. It will provide 750 million cubic feet of (lean gas?) daily in order to meet domestic consumption and 48,000 barrels of liquid hydrocarbons for export, which would bring additional revenue for the country.

The North Field gas is the world's largest concentration of non-associated gas. Extractable deposits are put at 150 trillion cubic feet.

Dr al-Marri said that the project's first stage will cost $1.3 billion. However, this amount is expected to be less in the light of the contracts that will be finalized by the end of this year.

The implementation of the first stage is making good progress and according to schedule, Dr al-Marri added.

In view of the enormous natural gas reserves, Qatar is seeking to become a gas-exporting country and to occupy a leading position in the world's gas trade. The Qatar Gas Company is aiming at building and operating a liquefied gas plant with an output of 6 million tons annually, as well as exporting what it produces. Dr al-Marri said that the company is looking for opportunities to market gas in Japan, the Far East, and Western Europe. In addition, it will proceed with projects to export gas to the neighboring countries via pipelines.

Dr Jabi r al-Marri said that the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation is considering implementing several projects for the manufacture of export goods based on natural gas, such as methanol, aluminum, and petrochemicals industries.

In response to a question by AL-RAYAH, Dr Jabi r al-Marri said that the future is good for the Qatar gas market and its international competitiveness; it will play a major role in the world markets because of the vastness of this field.

He said that the contracts that have been and will be concluded for marketing this gas will cover dozens of years to come.
QGPC To Enter Capital Market
440000526 Doha GULF TIMES in English
15 Sep 88 p 21

[Text] Qatar General Petroleum Corporation [QGPC] is to enter the capital market shortly to raise a loan of over $400mn to part-finance the tapping of the world’s largest single gasfield—North Field.

According to reliable sources semi-government Qatar National Bank may be chosen to play an important part in the syndication.

Several international, Gulf and local commercial banks have expressed their keenness to participate in the North Field financing. But a final decision as to who will lead-manage the syndication has not yet been taken.

A crucial meeting to decide the question and a firm amount to be raised from the market is to be held at QGPC headquarters this week. Representatives of First Boston Corporation, financial consultant for the North Field project, have already arrived in Doha to help the project financing committee—headed by QGPC technical manager Abdulaziz al-Dulaimi—to resolve the question.

According to earlier projections the QGPC which owns the field was to seek between $500mn and $600mn in international cash credit to fund the first stage development of the field meant to feed and fuel domestic industries. But a relative improvement in the availability of internal resources has rendered the need for a heavy credit of $500-600mn unnecessary. The first stage project is being financed from the revenue of 30,000 barrels a day of crude oil, earmarked since 1 July last year, for this purpose.

A current guess is that if oil prices improved to $20 a barrel, then the QGPC may not need even any loan at all to execute the project.

Industrial Development Contributes in Diversification of Revenue
44040038 Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 2 Sep 88 p 7

[Text] (QNA)—Owing to the wise policy established by HE Amir Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani and the crown prince, the country’s industrial sector has seen great progress in diversifying sources of revenue within the country.

In order to develop this sector, study projects, carry out the intended industrial, agricultural and geological surveys, and determine the economic benefits therein, HE the amir promulgated a law in 1973 establishing the Industrial Development Technical Center. HE the amir realized that industrial development was the quickest, most effective way of diversifying sources of revenue.

The center has been quite active in this regard, carrying out studies and a geological survey to determine certain industries’ specifications for domestic raw materials and studying potential agricultural spheres in the country, treatment of well water for desalination, and modern irrigation methods.

The center’s activities in 1987 involved several areas, including signing an agreement with Klockner, the West German consulting company, for a survey of the Qatar market for investment opportunities in light and medium industries, prior to choosing a specific number for further economic studies.

The center also met with several Arab and international organizations to strengthen cooperation on specifications and standards.

The center prepared a report on activities of industrial corporations in the country last year, including their production, employment, marketing and sales achievements.

The report showed that production of ammonia by the Qatar Chemical Fertilizer Company (QAFCO) for 1987 was 682,300 tons, an increase of 23,300 tons over the previous year. Urea production was 733,800 tons.

The report pointed out that the company’s ammonia sales amounted to 267,847 tons, compared to 219,213 tons the previous year. Sales of urea amounted to 696,242 tons.

According to the report, the Qatar National Cement Company’s production rose last year to 126,512 tons of cement and 13,542 tons of pure lime. Sales of cement were 124,079 tons, and price lime sales came to 13,535 tons.

Regarding the Qatar Petrochemical Company Ltd., which began trial operations in 1981, the report said that last year’s production of ethylene, polyethylene, and sulfur was 262,687 tons, 173,891 tons and 48,211 tons, respectively.

Sales were 94,426 tons of ethylene, 167,826 tons of polyethylene, and 47,442 tons of sulfur.

Turning to the National Petroleum Distribution Company, the report indicated that the country’s refining capacity had expanded in three stages, the last of which was the production begun in 1983, which led to a production income of 62,000 barrels a day.

Production continued to rise, last year reaching 1,597,344 barrels, an increase of 196,407 barrels over the previous year. Production included liquified petroleum gas (58,040 barrels), both types of benzine (275,463 barrels), aircraft fuel (97,486 barrels), diesel fuel (601,065 barrels) and fuel oil (565,290 barrels).
On the subject of sales development, the Technical Center's report showed that overall sales amounted to 529,340 barrels, an increase of 1,835 barrels over the preceding year.

Last year's production by natural gas liquids factories amounted to 315,724 metric tons of propane, 223,383 metric tons of butane and 182,592 metric tons of natural gasoline.

These products totaled 838,289 metric tons last year, an increase of 17,012 metric tons over the preceding year.

The country uses these products in fertilizer factories and as fuel for various industrial purposes, and sells the remainder.

The Qatar Milling Company was established in 1980 and doubled production in 1985. According to the report by the Industrial Development Technical Center, the company's production of all types of flour was 32,982 metric tons last year, an increase of 1,613 tons over the previous year.

Products were 22,598 metric tons of No 100 flour, 3,751 tons of No 2 flour and 6,633 tons of bran.

Last year's sales amounted to 35,989 metric tons, an increase of 2,014 tons over the preceding year.

The organic fertilizer factory, which began production in 1977 and helps convert waste into organic fertilizer for agriculture and soil improvement and extracts a considerable amount of scrap iron, produced 32,954 metric tons of organic fertilizer and 1,218 metric tons of extracted scrap iron last year.

The factory sold 21,123 metric tons of organic fertilizer and 1,700 tons of extracted scrap iron.

Continuous Japanese Support in Gas Projects Sought
44000052a Doha GULF TIMES in English 9 Sep 88 p 21

[Text] Japan was given a briefing on the proposed exploitation programme of Qatar's North Field gas industry, which started up recently, when the second meeting of a joint committee for cooperation between Japan and Qatar took place this week in Tokyo.

A joint statement issued later said the Qatari side asked for Japan's continuous support of the Gulf state's gas projects. The Japanese side stressed, in this connection, that the matter should be dealt with on a commercial basis.

Both sides were satisfied with the "steady development" of economic relations between the two countries and stressed willingness to expand relations in various sectors, including cultural affairs.

In reply to a Qatari request for strengthening technical cooperation by the dispatch of experts and acceptance of Qatari trainees, the Japanese side voiced its country's intention to continue technical cooperation, considering "friendly and cooperative" relations already existing. "The Qatari side appreciated that," the statement said.

Both sides confirmed significant roles played by cultural and sports exchanges.

During energy discussions the Japanese side appreciated Qatar's "well balanced" oil policy contributing towards stabilisation of the world oil market and confirmed the further promotion of exchange of views in years ahead, in all aspects of energy.

Japan, Qatar's main oil customers, bought 200,000 barrels daily in the first half of this year—almost 70 percent of all Qatari output.

The Qatari delegation for the meeting was led by Ibrahim Nooh al-Muttawa, director of marketing and transport with Qatar General Petroleum Corporation. The delegation included officials representing ministries of finance and petroleum, industry and agriculture.

Represented also was the Industrial Development Technical Centre.

The Japanese side was led by Takashi Onda, director-general of the Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry. His delegation included representatives of ministries concerned with foreign affairs, international trade and industry.

Expressing satisfaction with the "frank and fruitful" discussions, the two delegations agreed their next meeting should be in Doha, at a date to be fixed.

Telecommunications Situation Improves
4404004lb Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 2 Sep 88 p 4

[Text] In its first year since assuming the administration of the telecommunication sector, the Qatar General Telecommunications Corporation has shown remarkable progress and dynamism that were evident in improving domestic services and linking Qatar to the rest of the world.

Salih al-Muhannadi, director general of the corporation, said that in its first year the corporation has provided communication service with the international public information network through the (Doha PAK) service in order to benefit from the computer services in compiling and extracting data and information, bearing in mind that this is a new service that the corporation is introducing in Qatar for the first time.
In a statement to QNA, al-Muhammad said that direct international communication services have been established with a number of new countries, including Bulgaria, Guinea, Iran, Mauritania, and the Sudan, which brings the total of countries with which we have direct communication to 165.

With regard to international telephone services, al-Muhammad said that there has been a large increase in the number of exported minutes [as published] from the State of Qatar to the world, representing a 17 percent increase in the Corporation's first year. The number of exported minutes [as published] from 1 July 1987 to 30 June 1988 was about 34 million minutes, representing 6.2 million telephone calls.

Telephone traffic from Qatar to the GCC states has continued to rise, increasing from 1.34 million minutes per month since the corporation was first established to 1.36 million minutes per month after one year.

With regard to local telephone services, the corporation director general told QNA that about 430 telephone lines are being installed per month, and at the end of August the number of telephone lines totaled 81,420 lines and the number of car telephone subscribers totaled 2,750. The existing car telephone network is expected to be expanded in order to increase it to 4,500 subscribers.

As for telex and telegram services, there has been a slight drop in view of a greater tendency toward using facsimile services and direct international telephone service.

Regarding international television transmission, the corporation director general said that the average number of television transmission reception totaled about 170 minutes daily, bringing the corporation's total reception in the first year to about 62,300 minutes. Television transmission from Qatar to the world countries totaled about 3,700 transmission minutes.

In conclusion, al-Muhammad said that the electronic exchange for al-Khawr with a capacity of 10,000 lines has been completed. In the first stage, 4,350 lines will be installed in order to serve inhabitants of al-Khawr, al-Dakhirah, Umm Jurn, and al-Shamal, for whom an advanced and highly efficient telephone service will be made available.

SUDAN

Official Discusses Current Relations, Issues With Egypt
43040233b London AL-DUSTUR 4 Aug 88 pp 17-18

[Interview with Dr 'Ali Hasan Taj-al-Din, member of the Council of Head of State, by Ahmad Yusuf: “We Call on Garang To Return Under an Egyptian Guarantee”; date and place not given]

[Excerpt] AL-DUSTUR met Dr 'Ali Hasan Taj-al-Din, member of the Head of State Council in the Sudan who is currently visiting Cairo, and the “new aspect” of his official mission to fraternal Egypt was an entree into an extensive, frank conversation concerning the outer and domestic worlds in the policies of the new coalition government in the Sudan.

Dr 'Ali Hasan Taj-al-Din said, “It is not so much that there is anything new or any secrets behind my visit to Cairo, as it is a transition from the south to the north of the valley. Perhaps what is new and concerns AL-DUSTUR in the journalistic sense is that I have carried out enlarged meetings with President Mubarak, the prime minister, the chairman of the People's Assembly and the foreign minister, in order to inform them of the nature of and reasons for the latest constitutional developments in the Sudan during the last 3 months.”

[Question] Was your visit and your provision of information to officials in Cairo based on a Sudanese initiative or a response to a desire on Egypt's part for reassurance concerning the destiny and future orientations of the government in the Sudan?

[Answer] The fact is that it came in the context of the new traditions which the Brotherhood Charter signed by the two countries has implanted. It requires consultation and the exchange of information so that each party in the eternal relations which link the two peoples of the Nile Valley will be accurately apprised of the conditions, concerns, and aspirations of the other party. This course, in my estimation, will eliminate any misunderstanding in relations such as occurred in the past as it arises.

[Question] So what information and new explanations have you brought to officials in Egypt concerning the Sudan's policies?

[Answer] The fact is that President Mubarak's recent visit to Khartoum had a good effect in the official and regular respects, and it embodied Egypt's concern that the Sudan rise above the difficulties and problems inherited since the time of the deposed President Numayri, especially its initiative of perseverant mediation to solve the problem of the south peacefully. This was one of the issues on which discussion was held with the officials in Cairo in addition to the strong tendency which arose in the Sudan to form a government of national agreement to confront the inherent problems from a national perspective in accordance with a specific program which will be carried out over the remaining period of life of the constituent assembly.

[Question] In your meetings in Cairo, did you raise the Sudan's emphasis on putting the Brotherhood Charter into actual execution?

[Answer] The fact is that we are indeed serious in this regard. The Sudan has established a special department in the Foreign Ministry headed by an ambassador to whom is assigned the task of field followup of all the agreements which take place in the framework of the Brotherhood Charter. Cairo witnessed the early fruits of
extensive activities which have the goal of implanting the bonds of cooperation, coordination, and integration between the two countries through the successful visits, discussions, and agreements which have taken place between the ministers of trade and the economy, defense, irrigation, and youth which will perhaps be followed by other steps in the framework of the ministers of agriculture soon. We hope that in the coming period up to October the meeting of the higher committee of the Brotherhood Charter will take place along with the declaration of common planned field and executive action which will have the interests of the two peoples as its goal whether that concerns the solution of problems which obstruct the course of the two countries, in particular the provision of their need for food, or the setting out of the bases for their foreign policies in accordance with a single vision.

[Question] Do you believe that the objective circumstances have sufficiently matured for consummating the demand for the unity of the Nile Valley?

[Answer] The relationship between Egypt and the Sudan is a unique one in international relations. It is true that geographically they are two countries, politically they are two countries, but the eternal state of affairs that has been experienced is that of a single country extending from the north to the south and from the south to the north. The relationship between the two even after independence has continued to be marked by a strategic character although all the charters and official agreements continued to be restricted to embracing the two peoples' aspirations in terms of actual conditions in the sense that we are now aspiring to catch up to the spirit of the 20th century, which has only 12 years remaining. I mean the spirit of solidarity, integration, and unity.

[Question] However, it is clear so far that we are still the captives of slogans. When will we start the first step in catching up to the spirit of the age?

[Answer] Let me give you an example in the northern region in the Sudan, in which the cultivation of wheat has been a success, since it is possible to grow between 2 and 3 million feddans of wheat with Egyptian technology and expertise. Won't such a project meet our food requirements? There are also between 8 and 10 million head of livestock in the west of the Sudan alone, while we have 22 million head of livestock throughout the country. Can't these resources be used to realize self-sufficiency in meat and milk and dairy products? I believe that that is the real achievement of the Brotherhood Charter.

[Question] What is the status of cultural relations between the two peoples in the Brotherhood Charter?

[Answer] The bilateral aspect of relations between the two peoples extends to the ancient cultures of the Nile Valley. It appears that we were diverted from developing bilateral relations until after independence, and here is where the source of the danger is and the importance of having us put our concerns and strategic plans at the top of the list since, without homogeneous culture and mutual knowledge, we will not be able to advance to the realization of the Brotherhood Charter in its economic, political, and social areas.

[Question] Have you in your visit to Cairo brought a specific concept that can be carried out within the framework of the Brotherhood Charter?

[Answer] Our concept is that the executive plan of the Charter should be completed in the first stage over a period of 4 years. For example, the capital of the Sudanese-Egyptian agricultural company project is now $22 million and it is farming 80,000 feddans. A joint holding company will be formed with capital of $200 million which will take charge of all the economic projects in the context of the former integration charter. It is in the plan for us to farm 200,000 feddans in this stage. We have also proposed the establishment of a council for cooperation liberated from restrictions and red tape which will engage in all areas of cooperation between the two countries in agriculture, industry and politics, and I have indeed met with a great reception in Egypt. [Passage omitted]

Pricing, Marketing Problems in Cotton Growing Reviewed
45040233a London AL-DUSTUR 11 Jul 88 pp 36-38

[Article by al-Safi Musa: "The Dilemma of Prices, Strains, and Acreage"]

[Text] The result of the crisis in prices which became prominent in the negotiations that took place between the Sudanese Government and farmers a few days ago at the beginning of the new farming season as a consequence of the high cost of production has been that the farmers of al-Jazirah and al-Manaqil went on strike, not planting cotton for this season since last 25 June, until the attainment of their demands which are included in their memorandum submitted to the Council of Ministers. This crisis, which is threatening the main cash crop in the Sudan, seems many sided. In one respect it seems like a struggle among farmers in a single project, and in another it seems like the result of a dispute between the productive organizations and the Sudan Cotton Company concerning strains and acreage. If the rise in the costs of production and consequently the increase in prices of crops are the essence of the crisis, the strains are the basis of the struggle which has brought the crisis to the fore. AL-DUSTUR paused to consider this during its meeting with a number of people concerned with the issue who described its various aspects and repercussions.

At the outset, the meeting was at the Agricultural Research Authority in the city of Wad Madani with Prof Ibrahim al-Jak, the national cotton coordinator, who spoke about the strains and what is happening in their
regard throughout the Sudan. He said, "At the 49th meeting of the category committee last February, the Sudan Cotton Company submitted a memorandum to the meeting concerning the marketing status of Sudanese cotton now being supplied and which is expected will be produced in the 1988-89 season. Because of the reduction of the area farmed in Egypt and the noticeable improvement which has occurred in sales of cotton of the Barakat strain in the recent bids, the company therefore recommended an increase in exceptionally long staple Barakat cotton acreage because of its expectation that sales of it in the 1989 marketing season would be stimulated. It recommended an increase in the Barakat area of around 350,000 bales, in long-staple cotton of the Shamiyat strain of about 300,000 bales, and in the medium-staple of the al-Akala strain of about 150,000 bales.

"Since this was the strategy its marketing policy was founded on, we objected to the acreage the productive organizations had recommended, which was 291,000 feddans to be planted with the Barakat strain, broken down between al-Jazirah and Tukar, while the Shamiyat area increased to 460,000 feddans, broken down among al-Jazirah, al-Rahad, Halfa, the White Nile, the Blue Nile and al-Suki, and the area of al-Akala strain cotton decreased to 16,000 feddans, to be planted in Halfa and the Blue Nile.

"However, the Sudan Cotton Company objected to the productive organizations' recommendations and during the meeting stressed that the increase in the Shamiyat acreage to 460,000 feddans, or the equivalent of 600,000 bales, was unacceptable and would subject the Shamiyat cotton to a deterioration in price. Because of the insistence of all the organizations on that increase, the meeting did not succeed in reconciling the marketing with the productive issue."

Regarding the lack of reconciliation between the prices and the productive organizations, Dr Ibrahim said, "The company sought the aid of the economic technical committee to submit a memorandum last April to the minister of finance in which it stated the risk in expanding the Shamiyat acreage, referring to the improvement which has occurred in Barakat sales. In this memorandum, the company recommended an increase in the prices of high grades of Barakat to equal the purchase price of the Shamiyat and al-Akala cottons as an incentive to farmers to increase the Barakat acreage and reduce Shamiyat.

"After that memorandum, the committee came up with a formula for reducing Shamiyat acreage in the Halfa, al-Rahad, and Blue Nile organizations, and it asked al-Jazirah to submit the areas it intended to reduce in Shamiyat and those it wanted to increase in Barakat, but it did not submit that. Another category committee meeting was held in which it decided the acreage problem between the company and the other organizations. Al-Jazirah did not attend, because it had not received an invitation. However, the meeting presented a recommendation by the minister of agriculture in which he demanded that al-Jazirah reduce Shamiyat acreage to 120,000 feddans and increase Barakat to 320,000."

Concerning the justifications for this recommendation, Dr Ibrahim al-Jak said, "Shamiyat farming started in al-Jazirah in the 1985-86 season because of the drop in prices and the spread of the wilt disease in al-Jazirah and al-Manaqil. The area was 86,000 feddans. In the 1987-88 season, the area increased to 120,000 feddans, and at that time the al-Jazirah department informed the category committee that ginning capacity was adequate for processing more than this acreage. In spite of that, the area it was farmed was 145,000 feddans, and it promised to complete the ginning before the fall season. Therefore, al-Jazirah recommended increasing the area for the 1988-89 season to 190,000 feddans, because the modification in the gins would be completed.

"As for other organizations, their sole justification for increasing the Shamiyat acreage was the price differential between the two strains of Shamiyat and al-Akala, which prompted the al-Akala farmers in al-Rahad, al-Suki and the Blue Nile to abstain from growing al-Akala cotton and demand to grow Shamiyat."

To state this issue in a more comprehensive form, Dr Ibrahim cited what had been stated last June at the 51st meeting of the category committee which reviewed the al-Jazirah project's justifications for increasing the Shamiyat acreage and the category committee justifications which it opposed. Dr Ibrahim said, "Shamiyat requires four times the ginning capacity of Barakat, and from this standpoint al-Jazirah stated that the modification had begun in some gins and that ginning capacity had risen 70 percent. With the completion of the modification, it would be able to gin the proposed area (190,000 feddans). The meeting demanded to know the productivity of the gins before and after the modification or, in other words, to know the mill's per-hour productivity of cotton, of fiber. However, this information was not presented; rather, what was presented was that the capacity had risen 70 percent."

Dr Ibrahim added, "Al-Jazirah informed the latest meeting of the cotton category committee that it would finish ginning its cotton at the end of June. If the area planted for the last season was 145,000 feddans, and the ginning was to end at the end of June, is it in the capacity of al-Jazirah to finish ginning its cotton at a suitable time when the acreage increases to 190,000 feddans? On the basis of these justifications, the meeting decided that al-Jazirah would reduce the Shamiyat acreage to 120,000 feddans and Barakat would be raised to 320,000 feddans, and the matter would be left to the minister of agriculture to come up with the formula which would reconcile production with marketing, along with the al-Jazirah project management. The minister called for a meeting last 12 June at which he determined, in the presence of the Agricultural Research Authority, the
al-Jazirah project management, the cotton company and the federation of growers of the Sudan, that al-Jazirah would reduce the Shamiyat acreage by the desired quantity, and the al-Jazirah growers' federation demanded to know the Barakat prices before beginning to increase the acreage of it."

The Catastrophic Increase

What does the increase in the Shamiyat acreage mean, wondered Dr Ibrahim, and he answered by saying, "In the event of an increase in Shamiyat to 600,000 bales, that will mean a very great increase in long-staple cotton whose supply on the world market does not exceed 10 percent. That will mean flooding the market with large quantities and consequently demand will decline and prices will drop, and that will be a catastrophe for a new strain whose life has been no more than 4 years. In general, when a new strain is derived it is expected that the increase will be reasonable and minor so that the spinners will be able to accommodate it and deal with it and then expand in it."

"The Shamiyat cotton strain is still a new one, and the increase in its production will harm it. As for the increase in the al-Akala strain, the situation will have the effect of responding to the requirements of local factories which have refrained from using Shamiyat because of its high prices, and it is considered a defense against Shamiyat, which is still confronting a problem the category committee meetings ignored, that of ginning and early preparation, which has not yet been solved. Consequently, it has been expected that the ginning and preparatory problems would be dealt with and that the Shamiyat cottons would be presented for spinning in an acceptable manner with a guarantee of consistency in individual bales about which some spinners complain. As a consequence Shamiyat's reputation will be greatly affected not by the increase in acreage, but by the ginning problems."

A Comparison and a Blunder

Concerning the discussion which took place at the category committee meetings, Dr Ibrahim said, "The productive organizations asked that marketing be subjected to production and not the contrary, that is, that production be subjected to marketing. In other words, the Sudan Cotton Company considered that what determines the price is the law of supply and demand. Therefore, production is subjected to the market, and therefore, said Dr Ibrahim, the dispute between the company and the producer is not great, and consequently it can market any quantities of Shamiyat if their preparation has been good, starting with the picking and ending with the ginning."

Dr Ibrahim compared Shamiyat and Barakat by stating, "It is well known that Shamiyat develops earlier than Barakat since it starts opening up at the end of October or November, but the actual picking does not start until December, or the end of December since there is a period of a month when the opening of the strain occurs at a high rate and the picking of it has not started yet because the fava bean and corn harvest occurs at the same time as the picking of Shamiyat cotton, especially when the planting of peanuts is delayed, and this is reflected in the delay in the picking of Shamiyat and exposes it to many problems which affect its preparation. To that end, the company recommended as of last season an incentive for early picking, which has not been applied in the desired manner, and this has led to a review in the timing of the incentive which reflected a misunderstanding on the part of many delegations of spinners most of whom believe that blemishing is a characteristic of Shamiyat."

"However, this phenomenon is not a characteristic of Shamiyat. Rather, it comes about as a result of a delay in picking. If the farmer can start picking Shamiyat early, its preparation would be good and it would not be exposed to pollution through blemishing. Therefore, Shamiyat can rise above all its ginning and preparation problems and its future will be brilliant and encouraging, because there is nothing to equal the Shamiyat cotton in the world market as far as its unique spinning characteristics go. Therefore it is possible to market large quantities of it, and it is also possible to benefit from the high grades of Shamiyat in the event its preparation has been good in order to compete with the Barakat cottons. Consequently we may benefit from the improvement which has occurred in exceptionally long-staple cottons."

"As for Barakat, its picking starts in January. At that time the farmer has finished the harvest of the corn and fava bean crops and has turned to picking Barakat. Therefore the Barakat strain does not face the preparation problems which face Shamiyat."

A Balance in Strains

Lest the strains be subjected to convulsions and fluctuations, and to guarantee the production of reasonable amounts of the four well-known strains, to facilitate their marketing, Dr Ibrahim said, "The Agricultural Research Authority has recommended the introduction of the system of a single category for a single organization, for a number of reasons, among them that farming two strains in a single organization creates or brings to the fore dissatisfaction among farmers because of the difference in price; examples are al-Rahad and Halfa. When the strain is unified, these differentials disappear. This is what was applied in Halfa with the farming of al-Akala and in al-Rahad with the farming of Shamiyat. Also, the system enables the Sudan Cotton Company to market reasonable amounts of a number of strains and reduces the mixture and consequently the deterioration of strains."

"The Agricultural Research Authority recommends that al-Jazirah specialize in the production of exceptionally long-staple strains of the Barakat category, al-Rahad in
Shamiyat ginned with vertical strokes, Halfa in al-Alkala, the White Nile in Shamiyat ginned in a cylindrical manner and al-Suki, the Blue Nile, and al-Zaydab in medium-staple.”

Prof Ibrahim concluded his statement by saying, “A preservation of balance among strains will result from this strategy. The company wants it in order to facilitate its marketing task, stating that the system could have begun in the 1988-89 season but because of the delay in the program to reproduce some new strains that had an effect on its application, and it is expected that it will be applied in the two coming seasons.”

Al-Jazirah's Resources

After that, AL-DUSTUR met with Mr 'lzz-al-Din 'Umar al-Makki, manager of the agricultural department in the al-Jazirah project, and asked him for an explanation of the government’s strategy for self-sufficiency in wheat, which is concentrated on expansion in al-Jazirah, and whether that will have an effect on cotton acreage, especially since some farmers have demanded an expansion in wheat farming in place of Barakat cotton. The manager of the agricultural department answered by saying “if we look at the resources of the al-Jazirah project, we will find that it covers an area of 2.1 million feddans, broken down into a four-part cycle, each installment of which accounts for about half a million feddans. Therefore, if it is provided with the necessary resources, the al-Jazirah project can produce no less than 60 percent of the country’s wheat requirements, and therefore the horizontal expansion which can cover about half a million feddans will not affect the acreage allocated to cotton.”

As for the relationship between that and what the farmers have been bringing up concerning the Barakat strain, Mr ‘lzz-al-Din said “What is being raised concerning the Barakat strain is totally removed from the anticipated expansion in wheat. It is connected to the other cotton strains, those that are more productive, resistance to plagues and diseases, and the strains that can realize greater profitability, although the aspect of quantitative production is the basic element which influences the farmer’s decision in preferring one strain over another. There are other basic considerations which impose themselves upon the adoption of decisions in determining the acreage of each strain. Perhaps the most important of these elements are the markets available for each strain and the ginning capacities for the various strains.”

Concerning the decision to increase the Shamiyat acreage in al-Jazirah from 145,000 to 190,000 feddans, which the cotton company has objected to, the manager of the Agricultural Department said, “That decision was taken after careful calculations of ginning capacity and the calculations were founded on the basis of a modification of all existing gins through the installation of the modern innovation which will raise productivity by a suitable amount, in some cases attaining an increase of productivity in a mill of 50 percent over its capacity before the modification. If the modification is done in accordance with the predetermined plan, there will be no problems in ginning which will delay its completion until after the specified date.”

As regards the preparations for the new season in the case of cotton, Mr ‘lzz-al-Din said, “Cotton lands have been prepared over an area of 441,000 feddans through deep plowing, the work on Sarab has been completed, the Abu 'Ishrinat and Abu Sitat channels have been excavated, the operations of digging the channels and making canals are taking place now, seeds have been sent to all field inspection offices in accordance with the proposed acreage for each inspection office in accordance with the strain which is to be planted there, the necessary money has been provided for buying pesticides and fertilizers, 37,000 tons of fertilizer have actually reached the country and the arrival of the fertilizer will be completed in or before next September.

“As for the area set aside for the crop, that comes to 300,000 feddans. Although corn and fava beans lie in the same installment, the farmers, in my view, will work to expand the planting of corn at the expense of the fava bean crop to provide their food.”

Concerning prices bearing on cotton, Mr ‘lzz-al-Din said, “The Sudan is still accepting prices and not imposing them, because great basic factors govern the world cotton market, the most important of which is the volume of world production and world consumption. All these factors negatively or positively affect prices. Although production costs have started to escalate to the point where they have reached several times what they were a few years ago, all that makes it inevitable to set out a price policy which will bring benefit to the producer first of all and will be a source for providing foreign currency for the country.”

Unseen Costs

On the basis of what has been mentioned above, world production costs are the reason which have brought the negotiations between the government and the farmers to a dead end and have resulted in the abstention from farming by the farmers of al-Jazirah and al-Manaqil. To learn about the magnitude and nature of the problem, AL-DUSTUR had a meeting with Mr Ahmad al-Badawi, manager of the economic and social research unit, who stated that they were making cost appraisals from the beginning to the end of the season in random samples and supervising all the steps and operations the farmers made, pointing out “Costs differ from one farm to another and the cost of picking also differ. At its inception, it is different from what is in the middle or end of it. Our cost is always greater than what the al-Jazirah project management sets out since it gives the farmer credit for the picking at a rate of 90 piasters per qintar while the real cost it records ranges from 3 to 5 pounds per bushel. The project management, for example, holds
the farmer accountable for about 800 pounds per feddan which in our costs is equal to 1,100 pounds per feddan. This difference is in effect the cost of the agricultural labor the farmer performs, since the average costs come to about 1,120 pounds per feddan, since the marginal costs are about 11,000 pounds, seen and unseen.”

Mr Ahmad al-Badawi added “The unseen costs, including all labor costs, come to about 369 pounds per feddan. Subtracting the loans from these costs leaves a sum ranging from 230 to 260 pounds, which are costs the farmer actually defrays from his own pocket.”

“On that basis, because of the policies which have been applied along with the processes of al-Jazirah project modernization and reconstruction, and in view of what is taking place now between the farmers and the entities concerned, a review in prices with respect to crops is to be anticipated, and also to provide incentives for the farmer to agree to produce. When we determined the prices last October, the price of cotton was 70 cents a pound for long-staple cotton and the estimate was correct at that time. Therefore, the farmers’ demand today is restricted to the increase that has occurred in world long-staple cotton prices, and the same is the case with respect to wheat. Therefore, due to inflation need calls for a review of prices, because the world price for cotton today is equal to $1.35 a pound, along with a review of prices to realize something for the farmer which will help him produce for the coming seasons. Flexibility is necessary in the relationship between the farmer and the government, especially since there is a tendency on the government’s part to increase long-staple cotton acreage. If the farmer does not meet with encouragement he will have no production.”

At the conclusion of his discussion Mr Ahmad al-Badawi said, “We are on the side of the farmers, and as an economic unit in the al-Jazirah project our task is to serve the farmer and offer him advice and counsel regarding everything that will serve his cause.”

Suffering

AL-DUSTUR also met with a farmer, Mr al-Fazzari Babakr from the Hamd al-Nil office, who reflected the suffering the farmer faces because of the lack of knowledge of cotton prices by stating, “In view of what is being said about cotton prices and their being high and encouraging, we sell most of the livestock and other crops such as corn that we own for the sake of picking the cotton. After that, we wait for the price, which is still up in the air although we are on the verge of the season. I bought corn sacks at the picking for 90 pounds and gave them to a single picker. I have 5 feddans which I had prepared 13 workers for, passed a sack of corn to each of them, and paid 250 pounds to bring them over as well as 250 pounds to take them back. I provided them with materials to build houses costing 600 pounds and other things, and, although we are on the verge of the new season, we do not know what the cotton ‘millieme’ is. Now the farmer is looking for a sack of corn for 140 pounds.”

Writer Claims Islamic Laws Relevant to Non-Muslims

45040241 Khartoum AL-RAYAH in Arabic
7 Aug 88 p 5

[Article by Dr al-Makashfi Taha al-Kibashi]

[Text] The 1988 Criminal Code stems from the Islamic shari’ah and its general principles. This is because, according to Sudan’s 1986 provisional constitution, Islamic law is the principal source of legislation. This law has implemented the wishes of the vast majority of Sudan’s Muslim population taking into account the rights and duties of the non-Muslim minority. This law does not require the non-Muslim minority to adhere to Islamic laws in their regions, does not impose Islamic rules on them, and does not force them to embrace Islam.

Leftists and their followers and secularists in general objected to this law: they called for all laws to be secular. As an additional dimension they injected the problem of the south and brought another party [into this debate]. That led some parties in the south to call for secular laws in both the north and south. Even though British colonialism is the root of the problem in the south and that Islamic laws had absolutely nothing to do with it. The secular tendency, which opposes Islamic laws, is supported by the church, by international and local communism, by a few political parties in the south, and by the rebellious movement of the rebel, John Garang. Their goal and their purpose is to fight Islam in Sudan.

Those who oppose Islamic laws agree that secularism would be suitable to Sudan’s conditions because Sudan has different religions, creeds, denominations and various tribes practicing different religions. Any Islamic or religious laws would be unsuitable because they would stir civil strife. They would create separation and fragmentation, and they would divide the country: one part would be under Muslim rule and the other would not. The strongest opposition to the 1988 Criminal Code comes from the Bar Association.

I am saying that these opponents—leftists, secularists, and their followers—do not base their opposition to the 1988 Criminal Code on logic, evidence, proof. Their claim that Islamic laws would create civil strife and fragmentation is refuted by history and by the facts. The Islamic shari’ah gave non-Muslim minorities rights and privileges that no other system anywhere in the world gave them; it was applied in Medina in the first Islamic state during the prophet’s life, may God bless him and grant him peace. Jews in Medina at the time enjoyed their full share of rights, duties, and privileges. A document was written by the prophet, may God bless him and grant him peace, for the entire population of Medina: both Muslims and Jews. This document is tantamount to an alliance, a covenant and a constitution; it explains to all citizens all the rights of citizenship and all constitutional rights. It states, “The Jews of Bani ‘Awf together
with the believers constitute one nation. Jews have their faith, and Muslims have theirs; [this applies to] their allies as well as themselves. Excluded are those who commit injustice or sin, for they defile only themselves and their households." The document also states, "God's covenant of protection is the same for all. It protects the least among them. Believers are allies one to the other to the exclusion of everyone else. Jews who follow us shall have victory and equality. They shall not be treated unjustly nor shall they be suppressed."

The document also states that "Jews must bear the burden and Muslims must bear the burden in gaining victory over those who fight the supporters of this document. They owe each other admonition, advice, and succor—not evil."

Muslims and Jews treated each other amicably and fairly. Sufice it to say that at the time the prophet—may God bless him and give him peace—died, his shield was pawned to a Jew for a debt the prophet owed him. There was no separation and no fragmentation among Muslims and Jews; they were united, and they held close to each other. The situation was the same under the rightly-guided caliphs when the justice of Islam manifested itself quite clearly, and Muslims and non-Muslims enjoyed it in equal measure. It is significant to mention in this context that the prince of the faithful, 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, was involved in a dispute with a Jew over a shield that belonged to 'Ali; [the case was presented] to 'Ali's judge, Shurayh, and 'Ali refrained from invoking his authority as caliph in having the Jew arrested and the shield seized. The judge Shurayh applied the law of Islam thus assigning ownership of the shield to the Jew because the evidence which the prince of the faithful, may God be pleased with him, had presented was insufficient. The Jew was stunned by the verdict and exclaimed, "The prince of the faithful takes me to court where his case against me is heard by a judge of his people who rules against him! Such are the traits of prophets. I declare that there is no God but Allah and that Muhammad is His prophet. The shield is yours, Prince of the Faithful; your grey camel left the herd so I followed it and took the shield off it." 'Ali then said, "Now that you have embraced Islam the shield is yours."

The non-Muslims living in Muslim countries have recognized the justice of Islam because they found that they were treated amicably and enjoyed full rights. The Christians of southern Syria told Abu 'Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah during the administration of the prince of the faithful, 'Amr ibn al-Khattab, "You, who are not of our faith, are kinder and more merciful than those who are."

In Sudan, the imam who fought for the cause of God, the late Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, God rest his soul, established an Islamic state in the 19th century. People in the north, south, east, and west of the country joined him in solidarity in a splendid show of Islamic unity that was shielded by the justice of Islam and surrounded by its tolerance. That state sought to establish the fraternity and equality of Islam and Islam's way of honoring all humanity. It was only in the shadow of leftist tribes and their followers, of secularists and the like that we encounter divisiveness and fragmentation.

Opponents, [take note of the fact that] Islam alone can dissolve all tribal, family, sectarian, and regional differences. We saw this in 1983 when the true laws of God were applied; people saw it too. There was no fragmentation and no separation. Instead, there was total unity, and Nubians, blacks, and Arabs came together as one. Their motto was the words of God, may His name be blessed and revered: "O mankind, We have created you male and female and appointed you races and tribes that you may know one another. Surely the noblest among you in the sight of God is the most godfearing of you" [al-Hujurat: 13].

The vast majority of the Sudanese people want Islamic laws to prevail in Sudan. The principal parties set forth the problem, Islam as a system of government, in their election programs to the National Coalition Government. The National Ummah Party proposed the Islamic Awakening Program; the Democratic Union Party proposed the Islamic Republic; and the National Islamic Front a comprehensive Islamic program for all aspects of life: political, economic, social, etc.

Faced with the wishes of the vast majority of the masses, the National Coalition Government set forth the 1988 Criminal Code which meets the wishes of the Muslim majority and takes into consideration the rights of non-Muslim minorities. This code does not require non-Muslims to adhere to Islamic laws, and it does not force them to adopt Islam. They have their religion, and we have ours. There is no discrimination and no fragmentation, and we do not have in our country one region that is a potential seat of war for Muslims and another where Islamic laws are established and enforced.

After this introduction let us look at the prominent characteristics and the general principles of the 1988 Draft Criminal Code. Let us show the theological adjustments it makes and the legal authority for them.

A. The Principle of Decentralization in Regard to Legal Matters:

The 1988 Draft Criminal Code exempted the southern region from enforcing penalties for drinking alcohol and trafficking in it. It exempted that region from enforcing legally prescribed punishments in crimes of theft, libel,
apostasy, plunder, adultery, and punishment for immorality; such exemptions guard the rights of non-Muslims and uphold the principle of enforcing Islamic laws taking regional differences into account.

Paragraph Three of Article Five of this bill stipulates the following: "The provisions of Articles 8; 82; 129; 142.A.; 149.1.; 149.2.; and 149.3. ; 160; 171.1.; and 174 shall not apply to the southern region unless a defendant requests that they be applied to him."

It is on this basis that consuming, buying, and selling alcohol in the southern region are not punishable crimes. The legally prescribed punishment for apostasy, which is stipulated in Article 129, and the punishment for deliberate immorality prescribed in Article 142.1 do not apply to residents of the southern region. In the case of immorality, the punishment is disciplinary in nature: a prison term and a fine. The legally prescribed punishment for adultery, as mentioned in paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 149 does not apply to them. Punishment in such a case should be to discipline only. The legally prescribed punishment for slander, stipulated in Article 160, does not apply to them. The legally prescribed punishment for plunder, stipulated in Article 7.1., also does not apply to them. In such a crime punishment should discipline, unless someone is killed. In that case the defendant receives the death penalty. The legally prescribed punishment for theft, which is stipulated in Article 174, does not apply to them. In this case punishment should be disciplinary.

The draft criminal code is firmly rooted in the Islamic shari’ah. There is a tendency in Islamic jurisprudence to give the ruler a choice: he may allow the non-Muslims, whether they belong to one or to various creeds, to practice their religion; he does not have to impose the [Muslim] criminal code on them in their region. Legally prescribed punishments, then, would not be enforced in their areas, and they would be at liberty to consume, buy, and sell alcohol. This is the school of thought of Imam Malik, Imam Ahmad, and Imam Abu Hanifah. Such is also one of two opinions held by Imam al-Shafi’i: it is supported by two types of evidence: scriptural and rational.

The scriptural evidence consists of God’s statement: "If they come to you, give them your judgment or let them be... But if you act as their judge, judge them with fairness" [al-Ma’idah: 42]. As Ibn Qudamah says, God gives [His apostle] the choice. There is no disagreement about the fact that the Jews of Medina with whom the prophet held a peace treaty, may God bless him and grant him peace, were the subject of this revealed verse besides the verse was not abrogated as some theologians claim. The rational argument is that we have agreed that they should retain whatever [doctrine] they held as unbelievers; their life as unbelievers included all aspects of their laws and therefore nothing should be imposed on them other than what the agreements sets forth. To honour the covenant with them is to let them practice their religion and their laws; they bear the consequences of their sins.

This principle in Islamic jurisprudence leans toward regional laws. As long as non-Muslims remain in their own regions, we should leave them alone and leave their laws and their judgments alone. We should not look into their affairs or question them about them. We should leave them alone and not meddle in their judgments and their laws. Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal says, "They are not to be investigated or questioned unless they come to us and appeal to us. Then we can apply legal punishments to them the same way the prophet did, may God bless him and grant him peace."

Theologians allowed non-Muslims living in Muslim countries to consume alcohol and pork: there is neither crime nor punishment as long as they performed such deeds within the boundaries of their region. They pay a tax on their property even when such property is alcohol or pigs. They pay a tax on the value of this property. However, they are the ones who are to sell the alcohol and the pigs in their own communities. Customs fees and land tax fees are also collected from them. In this regard the provisions of jurisprudence are clear and precise. They are the legal authority for the draft criminal code which allows the consumption and sale of alcohol in the southern region.

That was reported in Ibn Qudamah’s “al-Mughni,” but Ahmad’s account about customs fees differed in regard to alcohol and pigs. In one place he says: "Umar said that if one decides to sell them, it is obligatory to take a portion as tax." This he quoted on his own authority from Suwaday ibn Ghaflah, in the course of commenting on ‘Umar’s words: "If they decide to sell alcohol or pork they must pay a tenth." Ahmad said that the authority of this account was good, and “Mansur,” al-Nakh’i and Abu Hanifah share that opinion. Muhammad ibn al-Hassan agrees with them, especially on alcohol.

Suwaday ibn Ghaflah related that Bilal told ‘Umar, “Your workers are taking alcohol and pigs in payment for the land tax.” ‘Umar said, “Do not take these things from them. Instead, make them sell those goods and take the proceeds from the sale.”

The author of [the book] "al-Mughni" said, “The price of a pig may be taken from them as a tax on their herds and their land thus complying with the law. This is what ‘Umar says. We may take from them the sale price of their pigs because the pigs are included in the property we decided they could dispose of.”

This tendency agrees with the General Islamic Criminal Code. Exclusion of the southern region [from the jurisdiction of Islamic laws] has been the prevalent practice in the 1983 experiment to apply Islamic law. Legal criminal rules were enforced in the northern region,
which has a Muslim majority. The southern region which has a non-Muslim majority has not been subject to the application of criminal Islamic laws in spite of the fact that the general law exists. Thus, legal punishments were not enforced on non-Muslims, who were not prohibited from making and consuming alcoholic beverages. That was the practical, applied side of the law. A law or a statute should have been enacted to exempt the southern region from these provisions because the majority of its residents are non-Muslims. But this shortcoming was avoided theoretically in the 1988 Draft Criminal Code.

It is worth noting that exemptions from legal punishments and the enforcement of penalties are not made on a personal basis at all. That would make legal punishments and penalties ineffectual and tantamount to nothing more than ink on paper. Muslims and others would then be encouraged to commit prohibited acts with impunity. Religious hypocrisy would be encouraged, and Muslims would escape punishment by claiming that they were not Muslims. No theologian, knowledgeable of Islamic jurisprudence, has ever called for anything like that.

In summary, the fact that the Draft Criminal Code exempted the southern region from enforcing legal punishments as well as some penalties, and the fact that simultaneous legal criminal provisions were enforced in the northern region—have met the wishes of the majority in each region. Thus, there is no division, no separation, and no fragmentation at all. This approach resolves problems, whether real or contrived. This diverse legislative situation is approved by all contemporary regimes, and it is applied in some countries. Actual practice in the past as well as in the present has shown that this diverse legal arrangement unites people because it meets the wishes of the majority in each region. It neither fragments nor divides the same country into a war zone and a house of Islam as claim those who oppose whatever profits the country and the people, seeking to fish in troubled waters and to reap personal gain from disturbance and chaos.

SYRIA

Some Areas Face Severe Lack of Water

Citizen Digs Well, Sells Water

_Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 21 Aug 88 p 5_

[Article by Nawal Ahmad: “Citizen Digs Well and Supplies Water to Inhabitants of Tishrin Quarter in al-Qabun; Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment Is Absent”]

[Text] A total of 100,000 citizens in Tishrin Quarter, al-Qabun area, are experiencing a real tragedy in their effort to secure the essential services they need. Their main problem is the problem of securing water. Water has not been [officially] supplied to this quarter yet and there is no sign of hope that it will be. Here, you may find children and women transporting water from other quarters in cans carried on their heads. The citizens have despaired of submitting applications and of the promises they have been given. Because water is essential and indispensable to their life, another means had to be found to obtain it. This is why a citizen has drilled an artesian well to supply the citizens with water and to meet their needs. We have explored this quarter and have interviewed this citizen and others to find out how they get their water.

Citizen Husayn ‘Azzah said:

I and my children have been living in this area and we have suffered extreme hardship in obtaining water. This is why we have drilled a 110-meter deep artesian well for private use and fitted it with a pump. But when we realized that the quarter is suffering from this problem, we decided to help our neighbors by supplying them with water. We sell by the hour, charging 20 Syrian pounds per hour. The buyer can get 12 barrels per hour. We supply according to demand and at any hour or time. Even on holidays, I make one of my children available so that people may not be denied water when I am not here. I have installed on each (pump) a one-hour meter or a 15-minute meter. Nearly 40 hoses extend from the well to supply water to tens of houses. This operation, along with drilling the well and with the sanitary equipment required, has cost 50,000 Syrian pounds. This is a private project which has not received assistance from anybody. We respond to demand day and night. We earn nearly 5,000 Syrian pounds a month, of which we pay 3,000 pounds for electricity. We have the receipts to prove this. Thus, our income [from the well] is 2,000 Syrian pounds monthly. As for our dealings with citizens, we only have minor problems with taking turns. Everybody here is very grateful. I and my son spend the entire day and a part of the night supplying water because the quarter has no source of water other than this well. We get absolutely no water from al-Fijah. Neighboring quarters suffer from the same problem and have the same kind of project. We sell to an area within a diameter of only 400 meters from our site. A sample has been taken from the well and tested by the Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment and the water has been found to be fit for consumption, according to their report. We did not build this project for profit, but to render assistance.

Citizen Ibrahim ‘Abd-al-Rahman Shaykh Ibrahim said:

This well has been a good project. We have used it to get water any time we want. But we are not certain if the water is fit for consumption or not. This is why we use the well water for laundry and for other purposes. As for drinking water, we get it from al-Batth Quarter which is one kilometer away from our quarter and from which we transported our water before this well was drilled. Our women and children used to spend their days carrying water. We spend our holidays doing this. We were told to
apply to the Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment. We did apply and were promised that water would be supplied to us. We have been waiting for several years and we have seen nothing. When power outages occur, we run out of water.

Existing Crisis

Safi Shamma, an employee, has said:

This well has come as an act of mercy for us. We experience extreme hardship in getting water. However, this well is not enough to supply the entire quarter which continues to experience a crisis, though a lesser crisis than in the past. We buy the water for 20 Syrian pounds per hour. We get it at any time and according to turn. This water is cheap and inexpensive. We wish every citizen had the capability to drill his own well. But our capabilities are limited and our income does not permit such an undertaking. Consequently, we are compelled to drink from this well. We have no other means. We have submitted more than 20 applications [to the authorities] but nobody has responded. We don't know why the Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment has not responded to us, keeping in mind that the officials say that the water tank and the power transformers are ready.

Citizen ‘Abd-al-Fattah Diyab said:

We, the quarter citizens, have submitted more than 40 applications to the Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment. An application expires in 3 months and so we hasten to submit another one. We suffer from a real problem of which nobody else is aware. We now get our water from this well which has rescued us and reduced our hardship. But we don't know if its water is fit for consumption or not. Therefore, we are compelled to transport drinking water from another quarter. But there is another problem. Water is (raised from the well and pumped through the pipes by electricity) and when power outages occur, another problem develops. We are now awaiting the Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment's mercy and decision to supply us with water.

Citizen Muhammad ‘Azzah said:

Before the well was drilled, no water was available in the quarter and we used to get our water from the mosque. The mosque official was then transferred and we had to stand at the mosque gate to get it because water had caused the previous official problems. The well supplies 6,000-7,000 people with water that is fit for drinking and for making tea.

To conclude, water is a totally indispensable necessity of life. It is difficult and regrettable to see entire quarters living without water. We hope that the Drinking Water and Sewage Disposal Establishment will consider this situation and will come up with an immediate solution to these citizens' hardship. This quarter suffers, moreover, from other problems such as the dust that fills its streets because its side streets are not asphalted. There is also the problem of electricity. The high-tension [cables] extended between buildings pose a threat to the citizens and endanger their lives. We hope that these problems will be examined and that solutions will be developed for them as soon as possible.

Five Thousand Face Thirst

44040029 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
24 Aug 88 p 7

[Article by Isma'il al-Hajj Muhammad: “Al-Tawani and Drinking Water Problem; 5,000 People Face Thirst; Water Is Cut off Forcibly and Nobody Moves To Tackle the Problem”]

[Text] Water is the secret of existence and the pulse of life. Where water exists, civilizations are created and man inhabits the land. Water is the blood flowing in the heart of existence and in the arteries of the earth. Life's procession depends on the availability of water.

Our topic focuses on the drinking water crisis in al-Tawani village in this blazing summer. Because of the crisis, we have had these dialogues:

Mahmud Ibrahim, the mayor of al-Tawani, talked to us on the crisis, and said:

“People are partners in three things: Water, pasture, and air.”

Nobody may be denied these blessings and they may not be withheld from any individual, group, or society. Al-Tawani is one of four villages irrigated by the same project. The others are Jaba'din, Ma'ula, and ‘Ayn al-Tinah. From the time it was built and equipped, this project was intended to supply water to the four villages equally. A main reservoir with a capacity of 1,000 cubic meters was built and then linked to two subsidiary tanks by outlets with equal diameters to pump water to these tanks. One of the two tanks was designated for Ma'ula and ‘Ayn al-Tinah and the other for Jaba'din and al-Tawani. The project was built in an ideal manner to supply water to the four villages equally, regardless of the scarcity or abundance of the water.

But an independent tank was recently built for the village of Jaba'din and the executing party, namely the Rural Damascus Governorate Water and Sewage Disposal Company, made a number of mistakes. This poor implementation has caused the disruption of water supply to our village since last June. Since then, we have spared no effort and have not failed to knock on every door. To date, we have seen no tangible act promising an end to the crisis in this blazing summer, keeping in mind that
the villages of Jaba'din, Ma'lula, and 'Ayn al-Tinah have other sources of drinking water. This is in contrast with our village which has no source other than the project water.

**Abundant Water Exceeding Need**

Engineer Yusuf al-Hayik talked to us on the issue, saying: Well water is abundant and sufficient to meet the need if properly used. Our hardship began when others decided not to supply us with water. The outlet supplying water to our village has often been forcibly shut. I recall that it was once blocked with a piece of wood designed for the purpose. Thus, the water, though abundant, was withheld from our village.

The Water and Sewage Disposal Company's recent construction of an independent tank for Jaba'din village was accompanied with the construction of a joint pressure breaker which was intentionally built in a faulty manner to raise the level of the outlet supplying our village a little above the level of the outlet supplying Jaba'din village with the purpose of diverting the greater share of the water to Jaba'din village, keeping in mind that the flowline from the site [tank] to al-Tawani village is more than seven kilometers long and that al-Tawani water network is much larger than the Jaba'din water network by virtue of the greater area of al-Tawani village. By slightly raising the level of the outlet supplying water to our village, air is allowed to enter the outlet and form bubbles that hamper and obstruct the flow of water to the village. We have complained to the water company. But the problem persists even though the company dispatched technicians who corrected the outlet by installing an elbow joint. It has become easy to tamper with the outlet. Air outlets were installed but it is easy for irresponsible people to block these outlets with clear tape or with other materials. The crisis has persisted since last June, keeping in mind that the malady is well known and incurable [sic]. But the company insists on approaching and tackling the issue without coming up with a fundamental solution that will relieve us and the company from this farce which has gone on for too long. It has become impossible to bring the tamperers and the offenders to account, even though they are well known.

**Lack of Supervision During Implementation Is Cause of Problem**

Engineer 'Adil al-Hams, a member of [al-Tawani] Municipal Council, said to us: The faulty construction carried out recently, namely the work in the pressure breaker, must be dismantled and the breaker must be rebuilt on the basis of distributing water fairly. The village conditions can withstand no more procrastination, delay, or promises. Being a technician, I know that any project, regardless of how small, must have an advance study. During implementation, technical supervision must be present. I am surprised at how faultily this work was carried out to lead to this outcome, serving the interest of one village at the expense of another.

Out of eagerness not to allow the fault or its perpetrators go unasked, I hope that the offending executor and the supervisor of this work will be brought to account. I believe that implementation in this manner was intended to allow Jaba'din village to get the greater share of the water. But what has happened has exceeded the expectations of both the executors and the supervisors who have been exposed. Water supply to our village would have been completely interrupted if some people had not intervened to provide us with water.

The water crisis prevents village citizens who live outside the village from visiting.

Citizen Shafiq Hijazi talked to us on this issue briefly, saying: I am a citizen of this village but I live in Damascus. I miss my village and I look for opportunities to visit it, especially during the summer when there is time to do so.

One must keep in mind that the weather here is pleasant and that our village's natural environment is pretty and charming and makes it worthwhile to stay in the village if it is supplied with adequate essential services. But since the academic year ended this summer, I have been making quick visits to the village without my family and then returning to Damascus because of the unavailability of water, keeping in mind that my wife and children implore me to bring them here. This applies to all the village citizens who live elsewhere. It. How can it be otherwise, considering that the Syrian Arab citizens who live in the diaspora come to visit their kinsmen and their homeland in the summer!

Citizen Muhammad Mahmud 'Ulayyan expressed his observations on this crisis, saying: The opinion we have formed and the conclusion we reached as of the beginning of this summer imply that the people in charge of the water project, supported by some irresponsible parties, have agreed not to supply us with water.

Water supply is often disrupted forcibly. Despite this, we find that some circles justify such disruption and offer unreasonable excuses for it. For example, water is at times made available in abundance to the other villages supplied by the project while it is cut off to our village. Yet, there are those who justify, support, and defend such conditions.

Since the start of the crisis, some [village] citizens have been frequenting the water company and complaining about thirst and the unavailability of water. The company often sends technicians to tackle the issue and pays them exorbitant costs and wages. However, even though the company is aware of the cause of the crisis, it has not tried to eliminate this cause and to tackle the issue fundamentally. We find that the company beats around the problem without touching it, as if giving sedatives to a patient requiring surgery.
It has been decisively proven to the company that water is withheld from our village by some unconscionable people who are well known. Yet, no steps have been taken against them. This is why they continue to repeatedly, and heedlessly, withhold the water.

It has become customary for us not to get water until we pay a visit to the company and meet with its officials. We then get water for a couple of days and only according to the principle of the well-known song, namely “By the eye dropper.” Many houses get no water even though control keys to other quarters are turned off and their water is diverted to other areas. Despite all this, they find it too much for us to get water even in this manner.

On 14 August 1988 and in the wake of a disruption lasting more than 5 days, a village delegation visited the water company to complain. The company director showed enthusiasm for eliminating the pressure breaker, for direct linkage with the tank which supplies Jaba’din, and for some other technical work to prevent tampering.

On 15 August 1988, a workshop proceeded to the work site and was confronted by a number of people from Jaba’din who prevented the workshop workers from carrying the work for which they had gone to the site. Instead of carrying on with its work in spite of those opposing it, the company disregarded the work it had planned.

The above makes it certain that there is need to deal with the water problem fundamentally and immediately because drinking water cannot be subject to bargaining. This makes us await a decisive step from the Rural Damascus Governorate.
INDIA

Summary of Reserve Bank of India Annual Report
46001048 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
9 Sep 88 pp I, 9

[Text] Bombay, September 8. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has decided to continue cautious monetary policy in 1988-89 despite the prospects of a recovery of output. This is considered essential in the context of the high rate of inflation in 1987-88.

The RBI has estimated the growth of real income in 1988-89 of the order of nine per cent as a sequel to buoyant agricultural output, following the good monsoon. It has pointed out that monetary policy will, therefore, aim at providing adequate credit to both agriculture and industry to facilitate the expected increase in production.

At the same time, considering the past experience of price rises in years immediately following drought years, and the strong growth in reserve money in recent years, related in part to fiscal impulses, it considers that the overall expansion of liquidity in 1988-89 should be contained to a level below the average of around 17 per cent per annum for the previous years.

The annual report of the central board of directors of the RBI points out that the integral links between money, output and prices cannot be viewed exclusively within a narrow time frame of a year, since there are intricate lags in the system. Historical experience shows that this inter-relation is more enduring over a somewhat longer time frame. And, hence, the need to continue to pursue a cautious monetary policy.

Despite a severe drought, the Indian economy performed reasonably well in many respects in 1987-88. Unlike the drought years in the past, when real income actually declined, it is expected to show a growth rate of around 2.5 per cent in 1987-88. This indicates satisfactory management of the economy in a difficult year.

The growth in industry at a reasonable rate and the continued expansion of the tertiary sector contributed to the growth of real income. Another favourable development was an accelerated growth in exports. A noteworthy feature of the management of the food economy was the large augmentation of essential supplies by drawing down in buffer stocks of foodgrains and by imports of other essential commodities.

Areas of Concern

There are, however, certain areas of concern such as a decline in agricultural production, inflation rate, signs of slow down in the healthy industrial growth in the latter half of fiscal year and the difficult external payments.

The report points out that during the first three years of the seventh plan, agricultural production declined by 1.9 per cent per annum. This is in sharp contrast with the target growth rate of four per cent per annum over the plan period. Foodgrains production target has been set at 166 million tonnes for 1988-89 and 175 million tonnes for 1989-90.

While adverse weather conditions in recent years have contributed greatly to the decline in agricultural production, part of the problem lies in the slowing down in addition to net irrigated areas, fertiliser consumption and the spread of high yielding varieties of seeds. The R.B.I. has called for reversing these trends.

Referring to the stagnating production of pulses and oilseeds, it is pointed out that remunerative prices may by themselves not be sufficient to accelerate the production of these crops. Changes in technology as well as adequate marketing arrangements are needed.

The reports points out that the rate of growth of industrial production of 7.7 per cent in 1987-88 can be regarded as satisfactory. However, the growth was unevenly spread among various groups of industries.

Referring to the recent changes in industrial policy, which have sought to promote greater competition, the report points out that the transition from a protected environment to a more competitive situation is not all that easy. Many industries have to readjust their production pattern.

The RBI feels that the financial institutions can lay a useful role in the realistically assessing feasibilities and prospects of new investments. It has also stressed the need for containing the unit cost of production. Indian industry has to move away from the "low volume-high margin" syndrome to a "high volume-low margin" situation.

Drawing the attention of the area of concern regarding overall growth, namely the deceleration in the rates of domestic savings and investment, the report points out that after attaining an improvement in 1985-86, the aggregate net domestic savings rate declined from 13.1 per cent of net domestic product in 1985-86 to 12.7 per cent in 1986-87, and further to 11.8 per cent in 1987-88.

A disquieting feature is the growing signs of net dis savings by the public sector. It has, therefore, called for immediate focus on improving the financial performance of the public sector.

Referring to the fiscal imbalances in the economy arising out of a lower growth of revenue receipts in relation to that of expenditure, the report has pointed out that the Centre will have to make concerted efforts to contain its deficit within the budgetary level of Rs 7,484 crores for 1988-89.
The Centre's net market borrowings, which financed 24 per cent of the plan expenditure in 1986-87, would finance 27.2 per cent of the same in 1988-89, although several public sector organisations have reduced their dependence on the budget through direct recourse to the capital market.

During the first four years of the seventh plan, interest burden of the Centre has risen sharply and the net interest outgo has risen by nearly two and a half times over that in 1984-85. During 1988-89, net interest payments of Rs 6,913 crores would absorb 21.9 per cent of Centre's tax receipts compared to 11.4 per cent in 1984-85. The fiscal stance, therefore, should be to evolve a policy framework which would keep the domestic debt at a reasonably level.

The report points out that the growth of exports was heartening during 1987-88. However, the current account deficit in 1987-88 will be larger than in 1986-87 in absolute terms as also in relation to gross domestic product (GDP). The larger drawing down of reserves of Rs 1,446 crores in the first quarter of 1988-89 against Rs 424 crores in the same quarter of 1987-88, is also worrisome, the report points out.

Debt Service Ratio

The debt service ratio (debt service on external borrowings to exports and gross invisible receipts) has risen sharply from 13.6 per cent in 1984-85 to 21.2 per cent in 1986-87 and further to 24 per cent in 1987-88. The repayments of the IMF drawing would peak in 1988-89. It is, therefore, necessary to reverse, over the medium term, the rising trend in the debt service ratio. This would call for a sustained and strong rate of growth in exports. A careful watch on growth in imports is also considered necessary.

Referring to the trends in the capital market, the report points out that a number of new savings instruments have lately been introduced. While the formulation of various savings schemes are necessary to meet the requirements of different groups of savers, these schemes do not clearly reflect the maturity and liquidity of savings instruments. Rationalisation of the structure of effective interest rate on various savings instruments is thus called for.

Referring to the banking scene, the report points out that the banking industry has made phenomenal progress in the last two decades. While fulfilling a number of social objectives the banking system has been put under strain. It has, therefore, become necessary for the banks to enter a phase of consolidation.

Efforts are being made in this direction. The new service area approach in order to make rural lending more productive and purposeful is expected to effect a distinct improvement in the quality of rural lending.

External Sector

The rising trend of gross disbursements under external assistance in nominal terms continued during 1987-88. Such assistance amounted to Rs 5,013 crores in 1987-88 showing a rise of Rs 1,435 crores over the previous year. Amortisation payments relating to external assistance at Rs 1,546 crores in 1987-88 was also higher than those of Rs 1,166 crores in 1986-87.

Consequently, the net inflow of external assistance (net of repayments) amounted to Rs 3,467 crores in 1987-88 against Rs 2,412 crores in 1986-87, due mainly to larger net flow of assistance from Japan and the World Bank.

The accretion under non-resident (external) rupee account scheme during 1987-88 was Rs 409 crores against Rs 485 crores in the previous year. At the end of March 1988, these deposits aggregated Rs 5,224 crores.

The net inflow under the FCNR scheme during 1987-88 was Rs 1,398 crores against Rs 1,169 crores in 1986-87. The level of these deposits at the end of March 1988 was Rs 4,947 crores. The report points out that the sustained and sizable inflow of funds under these accounts have facilitated financing of the balance of payments deficits.

Mizoram Situation Brings Questions on Laldenga
46001051 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
10 Sep 88 p 5

[Article by Wasbir Hussain: “MNF Revolt Over Laldenga Decisions”] [Text] Aizawl, Sept. 9: The coup in Aizawl, which eventually led to the dissolution of the state Assembly and imposition of President's rule, has raised a lot of questions about Mr Laldenga as a leader.

The massive ovation that he received after the Mizo peace accord, signed in June 1986 gave him the exalted status of a legend in his own time. But the turn of events in the ruling Mizo National Front which led to defections from the party and the eventual fall of Mr Laldengga's government, have proved that the MNF chief's charisma was not enough to hold the party together.

The general complaint is that he has failed to take legislators into confidence. He is accused of being autocratic and running the administration according to his whims.

Mr Vanlahruaia, one of the senior leaders to have quit the MNF, said Mr Laldenga unilaterally inducted the People's Conference MLA, Mr Rammwi, into the party and then into the ministry—a charge strongly contested by Mr Laldenga. He said the MNF legislators were also not consulted by Mr Laldenga before he introduced the Mizoram Sales Tax Bill in the Assembly.
But it was his liquor policy that, to a great extent, invited the wrath of a section of his partymen and the public.

Said Mr P Siamliana, former leader of the Mizo Zirlai Pawl, Mr Laldenga issued liquor permits ignoring public opinion and appeals by the Church and voluntary organisations.

Commenting on this charge, Mr Laldenga said the MNF had “never promised prohibition.” He said his government had stopped issuing fresh licences to retailers.

Leaving aside these allegations and counter-allegations, it is now a fact that the current political crisis in Mizoram has left the MNF a divided organisation. The governor, Mr Hiteswar Saikia, quoted official reports to say that the former Mizo National Army guerrillas, too, were almost evenly divided over Mr Laldenga and the breakaway group. Out of nearly 600 MNA returnees, about 242 have pledged their support in writing to Mr Laldenga, sources said.

But when veterans like former “Major” Kapchhunga desert Mr Laldenga, the issue demands closer examination. Mr Kapchhunga was president of the ex-MNA Welfare Association. Mr Laldenga, however, says that Mr Kapchhunga was expelled and that only about 15 ex-MNA members have left the MNF.

In fact, the MNF has undergone serious faction-wars during its bush-war days and the current crisis is only reflective of the inherent instability of the organisation as a political party. Mr Laldenga’s swing to extremists first got him into trouble with the “Blue Group” who saw the futility of fighting India. But when he suddenly changed stance and started negotiations with New Delhi in the late Seventies, it was the hardliners turn to challenge his authority, suspecting a sellout.

Top leaders like Mals Awmma Colney, Thangchuaka and Biakchunga have all tried at some time to depose Mr Laldenga as the numero uno of the MNF.

According to the Governor, he had no alternative other than recommending the dissolution of the Assembly and imposition of President’s rule since no party was in a position to command an absolute majority in the 40-member house. Mr Laldenga, however, does not appear to be displeased as he is aware that the move has made the PCC(I) president, Mr Lalthanhawla, lose face.

Mr Lalthanhawla, on his return from New Delhi on Wednesday morning, went to meet the Governor with his followers to stake his claim to forming the government little knowing that the Centre had already imposed President’s rule in the state. According to Raj Bhavan sources he was shocked when the Governor informed him of the directive from New Delhi.

It is not known whether the eight breakaway MNF legislators are repentant now that their hopes of becoming ministers have been frustrated.

**Paper Reports TNV Rebels ‘Homecoming’ Ceremony**

46001053 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
11 Sep 88 p 1

[Text] Gobindbari, Sep 10—Four hundred twenty seven TNV guerrillas formally left behind their decade-old jungle past by laying down arms before the civil and army authorities at a simple ceremony at Gobindbari border village of north district today.

Union Home Ministry additional secretary P. Sribabat, State chief secretary Iswari Prasad Gupta, task force commander-major general Sher Amir Singh, north district's district magistrate and superintendent of police attended the ceremonial 'home coming.'

The laying down of arms began at 11.30 a.m. and was completed within one hour. Three TNV battalions—TNV, comprising about 100 guerillas in each battalion, clad in olive green TNV dress led by three battalion commanders Captain Kripasadhant Jamatia, Captain Kutrai Koloi and Captain Muji Marak appeared before the dais from their headquarters about five km inside the Chittagong hill tracts of Bangladesh.

Thereafter TNV supremo Bijoy Hrangkhawl with his council members came. They were followed by four women and finally armed guerillas, the underground operational unity of TNV led by Major Kamini Debbarma and Lieutenant Colonel Amulya Koloi came near the dais and bid farewell to arms.

Soon after the laying down of arms, additional secretary Sribabat gave a brief speech welcoming the rebels.

The chief secretary welcomed them and assured speedy rehabilitation of the returnees. He said the recruitment to various para-military forces would be started from 15 September in the TNV peace camp at Ganganagar in north district.

TNV supremo Bijoy Hrangkhawl, who spoke in Kokborak (tribal dialect) and English said, “I want to go with the flow of the nation.” He said that from now onwards there would be lasting peace in Tripura. ‘Instead of arms, now we want tools for green revolution to feed my tribal brethren. He sought the active cooperation and help of the entire nation for the development of the tribal people.’

He hoped that people would forget and forgive their past deeds. He also requested the State Government to ensure their security and appreciated the role of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi saying that the tripartite agreement could be signed only because of the genuine will of the Prime Minister for solving the TNV problem.
The 60 arms laid down by the rebels today included 34 303 rifles, eight guns with one Chinese assault rifle, two revolvers and two pistols, eight self-loading rifles, three TMG, one GS rifle, two sten guns, one DBBL, 28 grenade launcher, one binocular, five bayonets and 29,000 ammunition.

Later, the chief secretary said altogether 375 TNV guerrillas including four ladies have come overground today.

Fiftytwo persons who deposited their arms earlier will join in the Ganganagar peace camp on Monday next. The returnees with their commanders and council of ministers will stay tonight at Golbindari. Tomorrow they will arrive at Chhamanu transit camp. On Monday they will reach Ganganagar where they will again appear for the ceremonial 'home coming' before Governor Krishna Rao and Chief Minister Sudhir Ranjan Mazumdar.

With the 'ceremonial home coming' of all the underground TNV guerrillas, the decade-long insurgency in Tripura, which rocked the tiny State, has come to an end. The TNV was formed on 2 December 1978 at Kasku in south Tripura. TNV president Bijoy Hrangkawl disbanded his outfit in October 1980.

Since then the TNV guerrillas killed over 500 people including over 50 security personnel. Finally on 12 August, this year a tripartite agreement was signed to end the problem for ever.

Sources here, however, said that about 50 per cent of the total returnees are not genuine while some arms are reportedly kept hidden.

Jubilant TNV guerrillas today celebrated the 'home coming' soon after surrendering arms, unlike the erstwhile Mizo National Front (MNF) guerrillas, who literally cried after laying down arms.

Bharat Debbarma, a young TNV rebel, said, "we are happy now it is to be seen how the State Government implements the terms of the accord." Top TNV leaders Ananta Debbarma, Kartik Koloi and three TNV battalions commanders expressed their hope that the State Government would meet their aspirations and work for the uplift of the tribals.

Papers Report West Bengal Settlement of Gorkha Problem

Hill Council Bill Passed
46001054 Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 6 Sep 88 p 9

[Text] Calcutta, September 5. The West Bengal assembly today unanimously adopted the much-awaited "Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Bill, 1988" which, the chief minister, Mr Jyoti Basu, said would open a new chapter of peace, amity and friendship in the Darjeeling hill areas.

The chief minister, who introduced the bill, said the formation of the Darjeeling Gorkha hill council was aimed at satisfying the aspirations of an easily-identifiable group of people concentrated in a compact area without tearing apart the basic fabric of the state. The bill was important not only for West Bengal but also for other states which had similar problems.

Mr Basu said the bill was not an effort to resolve the problems of all Nepalis residing in West Bengal or other parts of the country. It would only fulfill the aspirations of the 600,000 Nepalis residing in the three hill subdivisions of Darjeeling. He pointed out that while the bill envisaged regional autonomy for the hill people of Darjeeling, care had been taken to ensure that nothing was done which might encourage parochialism and would weaken the national fabric.

Narrating how the tripartite agreement was arrived at, the chief minister said the Prime Minister, the Congress and the Left Front government in West Bengal had had reservations about inclusion of the term "Gorkha" in the nomenclature of the hill council. But later, when they found that Mr Subhash Gheissi was sincere about dropping the demand for a separate state, they agreed to include the term "Gorkha" in the nomenclature of the hill council.

Mr Basu said that while peace had generally returned to the hills since the signing of the accord, there were still reports of incidents of attacks on political opponents. It was essential to restore normal conditions so that political parties could function freely and to ensure that the large number of GNLF and CPM activists who had to take shelter elsewhere during the agitation were able to return safely to their homes.

He sought the co-operation of the GNLF leadership and other political parties for the successful implementation of the bill.

Mr H B Rai, CPM MLA from Kurseong, said that while the agreement had been signed at the "upper level" the situation at the lower level was not so good. He said that CPM supporters were still being prevented from moving out from their pockets. There had also been a number of incidents of kidnapping of CPM workers by the GNLF since the signing of the accord.

He himself had once been attacked by more than 1,000 kukri-wielding GNLF supporters, he alleged. He felt that all efforts should be made to restore peace otherwise democratic functioning of all political parties would not be possible during the poll campaign for the hill council election.

Both Mr Satya Ranjan Bapuli and Mr Sadhan Pandey of the Congress fully supported the bill. The veteran Congress member, Mr Fazlur Rahaman, congratulated the
chief minister on his statesmanship because the hill council would unfold a new chapter in Bengal’s history by preventing another division of Bengal.

The Congress members had earlier walked out of the house on a different issue, but later returned to participate in the discussion on the hill council bill.

The West Bengal food and supplies minister, Mr Nirmal Bose (Forward Bloc), felt that the problem could not be resolved earlier because of the Centre’s prevarication on the issue.

Details of Settlement
46001054 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English
17 Aug 88 p 6

[First paragraph is introductory editorial remark]

[Text] This is the full text of the confidential memo circulated among the members of the West Bengal cabinet on Saturday which defines the jurisdiction of the proposed hill council in Darjeeling.

Home Department Political Cabinet Memo
Calcutta, the 13th August, 1988.

A tri-partite meeting was held in New Delhi on the 25th July, 1988, between the Union Home Minister, the Chief Minister and Shri Subhas Ghising, President, GNLF. The GNLF leadership agreed to drop the demand for a separate State of Gorkhaland. In this context, it was agreed that for the social, economic, educational and cultural advancement of the people, residing in the three hill subdivisions and some other areas of the district of Darjeeling, an autonomous council will be set up under a State Act.

1. Shri Subhas Ghising was insistent on the inclusion of the term ‘Gorkha’ in the name of the Council. The Government of India and ourselves had reservations on this. However, ultimately, we agreed to this inclusion. It has, accordingly, been decided to name the Council “Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council.” In the preamble of the proposed Bill, specific mention has been made that the Bill will cover not only the Gorkhas but also other sections of the people residing in the hill areas.

2. There was no unanimity of view regarding what other areas, in addition to the three hill subdivisions, would be included within the Hill Council. The GNLF had asked for inclusion of areas covering upto Doobars in the district of Jalpaiguri. The State Government rejected this outright. However, it was agreed at the meeting on the 25th July, 1988, that the mouzas in the Siliguri subdivision contiguous to the Kurseong subdivision having majority of Nepali speaking population be identified and added to the area of the Council. Some mouzas have been identified on the basis of this principle. Shri Subhas Ghising has been pressing for inclusion of some other mouzas also in the Siliguri subdivision not conforming to this principle. We have intimated to the Government of India our firm stand in the matter. We are yet to get the reaction of Government of India or Shri Subhas Ghising in this respect. It is hoped that this issue will be finalised soon.

3. Mouzas referred to in preceding para to form additionally parts of the Hill Council will continue to remain within the Civil and Criminal jurisdiction of the Siliguri and Naxalbari police stations of the subdivision of Siliguri. It has also been the decision that the district of Darjeeling will continue to remain the basic administrative unit.

4. The Council will have forty-two members of whom twenty-eight will be elected and fourteen will be nominated by the State Government. The electorate will include voters in the towns, villages, teagardens, forests, cinchona plantations etc. in the hill areas. In other words, the composition of the electorate will be as it is for the Assembly Constituencies unlike what is prescribed in the Panchayat Act. The State Government will nominate to the Council representatives from the minority communities like the Lepchas, Bhutias etc. The MLAs, and the MP from the hill areas as also the Chairmen of the three municipalities in the hill areas of Darjeeling will be the nominated members of the Council.

5. The GNLF had asked for constitution of an interim Council prior to the elections to the Council. We could not agree to this, but have indicated that the elections to the first Council will be completed by the second week of December, 1988.

6. The Hill Council will be called the General Council and will have an executive body called the Executive Council. The Chairman of the General Council will also be called Chief Executive Councillor, and will be elected by the elected members of the General Council. The Executive Council shall have nine members including the Chairman-cum-chief Executive Councillor and the Vice-Chairman. To the Executive Council five members will be nominated by the Chief Executive Councillor from amongst the elected members of the general Council and two shall be nominated by the State Government. Government servants nominated to the General Council shall not be eligible to be a member of the Executive Council.

7. The members of the General Council shall hold office for a period of five years from the date of the first meeting of the General Council.

The proposed Bill prescribes that subject to other Acts, and any general or special direction of the State Government, the General Council will have powers in the hill areas in relation to the following subjects:

1) Allotment, occupation or use etc. of land other than reserved forests.

2) Management of any forest not being reserved forest.
3) Use of any canal or watercourse for the purpose of agriculture.

4) Agriculture.

5) Public Health and sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries.

6) Tourism.

7) Vocational training.

8) Public Works—development and planning.

9) Construction and maintenance of roads, except National and State Highways.

10) Transport and development of transport.

11) Management of burials and burial grounds etc.

12) Reservation, protection and improvement of livestock and prevention of animal diseases, veterinary training and practices.

13) Pounds and prevention of cattle trespass.

14) Water i.e. water-supply, irrigation and canals, drainage, embankments, water storage.

15) Fisheries.

16) Management of markets and fairs.

17) Primary, Secondary and Higher Secondary education.

18) Works, lands and buildings, vested in or in the possession of the Council.

19) Small-scale and cottage industries.

9. It should be highlighted that powers conferred by or authorities created under any Central Act or State Act relating to specified matters in the hill areas will be beyond the jurisdiction of the Hill Council. Similarly, functioning of Statutory Boards will also be outside the purview of the Hill Council. Law and order, administration of justice, labour, land reforms, tea gardens and reserved forests, cinchona plantations etc. will also be outside the ambit of the authority of the council. The extent to which Governmental functions in respect of subjects mentioned in paragraph 8 can be assigned to the Hill Council will be regulated by issue of directions.

10. The council shall have a Chief Executive Officer appointed by the Government in consultation with the Chief Executive Councillor. Government Officers and staff may be deputed to the Council for the purpose of this Act as may be required by the Council.

11. Funds allocated by the Central and State Governments for the hill areas shall be assigned to the Council fund. Investment of surplus funds shall be in accordance with rules prescribed by Government. Audit of the Council accounts shall be entrusted to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India. Budget of the Council will come up to the Government for approval. The State Planning Board shall have power to supervise and evaluate the works of the General Council. A Commissioner for hill affairs and other officers shall be appointed by the State Government. The State Government shall have powers to issue directions, amend or suspend resolutions and by-laws in certain cases. The Government will also have power to dissolve the Council under certain circumstances, but the Council shall have to be re-constituted within six months from such dissolution.

12. The Chief Executive Councillor shall have the status and privileges of a Minister of State.

13. It has been agreed that all the pending criminal cases connected with the GNLF agitation will be reviewed immediately and all cases excepting those for murder will be dropped. GNLF has agreed to give a call to its cadre for surrendering all unauthorised arms. They have also agreed to withdraw all agitational activities and help, restoration of peace and normalisation of political processes in the hills.

14. The final agreement is expected to be signed in Calcutta on the 20th of August, 1988. A copy of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Bill, 1988, is circulated herewith. This Bill has been referred to the Legislative Department for vetting. It is expected to bring up this Bill and Bills for consequential amendment to the West Bengal Panchayat Act and the Bengal Municipal Act before the West Bengal Legislative Assembly in a special session to commence on the 29th August, 1988.

15. Approval of the Cabinet is sought to the introduction of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council Bill, 1988, subject to vetting by the Legislative Department in the ensuring session of the State Assembly.

16. Amendments of the West Bengal Panchayat Act and the Municipal Act as identified by the Panchayat and Local-Govt. and Urban Development Departments are also under process. There will be no Zilla Parishad for the hill areas of Darjeeling. A Mahakuma Parishad is proposed to be constituted for the Siliguri subdivision of Darjeeling district which will have all the powers and functions of a Zilla Parishad within its jurisdiction. As regards the municipalities in the hills of Darjeeling, certain powers of supervision are proposed to be given to the Hill Council amendment of the Bengal Municipal
Act. These two amendment Bills have been referred to the Legislative Department for legal vetting. Approval of the Cabinet is sought to the introduction of these two amendment bills in the ensuring special session of the State Assembly.

17. Certain amendments to the West Bengal Primary Education Act and West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act are necessary in this context and are being processed in consultation with the Legislative Department. It is proposed to bring these amendments also before the ensuing special session of the State Assembly.

18. Approval of Cabinet is sought to the proposals contained in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 above.

Agreement With CPI-M Ideology
46001054 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 2-3 Sep 88

[Article by Manini Chatterjee]

[2 Sep 88 p 1]

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 1: The granting of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council by the West Bengal government is not merely the result of Mr Jyoti Basu’s statesmanship or Mr Subhas Ghising’s perseverance, but is rooted in the CPI(M)’s broader understanding of the nationalities’ question.

The Communist analysis of the nationalities issue is a complex one and has often been misunderstood and misinterpreted. Both the Communist parties define India as a “multinational state” which has several distinct nationalities based on different languages and cultures.

For many years, the Communist programme included the Leninist clause of “the right of all nationalities to self-determination.” It was at the ninth party congress at Madurai in 1972 that the CPI(M) formally deleted this clause. The party today is of the view that the linguistic reorganisation of states in the 50s has broadly met the aspirations of the different nationalities and no further division of states should be allowed within the Indian Union. It lays emphasis on greater autonomy to the states and equality of all languages as a key to safeguarding the identity of different nationalities.

While refuting the demand for separate states, the CPI(M) however, makes a special case for tribal areas. The note on the national question adopted at the Madurai congress states: “It (the party) is aware that the tribal people and more particularly the small border nationalities, in several respects, suffer not only from class oppression but also a sort of ‘national’ oppression at the hands of other more advanced nationalities. Their social emancipation as well as success of their struggle against all traces of national inequality rests with the unity and united struggles of the working class of India, but not in the demand for secession or actual secession.”

The CPI(M)’s vision of the state structure of people’s democracy—that is, after a working class party comes to power—also includes the clause: “All states in the Indian Union shall have real autonomy and equal powers. The tribal areas or areas where population is specific in ethnic composition and is distinguished by specific social and cultural conditions will have regional autonomy with regional government within the state concerned and shall receive full assistance for their development.”

The extensive autonomy granted to the tribal areas autonomous district council in Tripura and the long-standing demand for regional autonomy in the Darjeeling area stem from this basic theoretical understanding of the party. The party’s insistence that Nepali be included in the Eighth Schedule is also in keeping with its ideological stand of “equal status for all languages” rather than the imposition of a sole official language on the rest of the country.

There has been considerable criticism over the years against the Communist definition of India as a multinational state, and not only the BJP but even the ruling party has used this to accuse the Communists of being too internationalist and unpatriotic. However, CPI(M) documents show that its belief in the nationalities thesis is not contrary but complementary to the struggle for national unity.

On the question of a multinational state, the party’s view is that the concept of a nation is a “historical category which arises at a definite stage in history with the development of the bourgeoisie and the capitalist mode of production.” Therefore, to talk of India as a nation from the ancient or medieval period is “unhistorical” and unscientific. The note on the national question states: “The Indian Union, both before and after its participation, is a vast country, comprising people speaking different languages, living in different compact and contiguous areas and belonging to varied ethnical, racial and cultural groups.

It adds, “The fact that almost all states had to be reorganised and reconstructed on linguistic basis, and the fact that there exists an irrepressible demand for real autonomy and greater powers for the states eloquently support the contention that the Indian Union is multi-lingual and multinational in character.”

The question which often arises is why the CPI(M), in contrast to the Naxalites or even some sections of the CPI, remains totally against the formation of a separate state of Jharkhand, Gorkhaland or Uttarkhand while advocating greater autonomy for all states and ethnic communities. The answer perhaps lies in its thesis that in
post-independent India, there is no “oppressor nation” as such but only class oppression and this can be combated through the unity of various groups.

[3 Sep 88 p 4]

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 2: The CPI(M) readiness to give regional autonomy to the Darjeeling area and the demand for inclusion of the Nepali language in the Eighth Schedule has been seen by many as a weakness towards separatist sentiments but party sources insist that more autonomy results in greater national unity.

The CPI(M), which today is seen as a champion against secessionism in Punjab and elsewhere in the country, maintains that unless decentralisation and more autonomy is given, regional and chauvinist forces take advantage of the situation and resort to separatism.

The main thrust of the CPI(M), naturally enough, is on the class question and it believes that chauvinist elements ultimately disrupt unity among the people and thus willy-nilly help keep the ruling elite in power. In practical terms, CPI(M) sources feel that the refusal to grant regional autonomy to Darjeeling by the Centre led to the phenomenon of the GNLF, resulting in the division of the working class in the tea gardens of Darjeeling.

Though the traditional Marxist-Leninist doctrine, underlined the “right of all nationalities to self-determination,” the CPI(M) rejected this concept as irrelevant to the post-Independence situation in India. Giving reasons for the rejection at its 1972 congress, the party said, “With the winning of political independence in 1947, the national question in our country has undergone a significant change. The demand for self-determination and political independence in secession from the British imperialist state has been won and therefore does no more remain in the orbit of the demand of political democracy, but acquires the pronounced character of the struggle against the economic dependence on the imperialists...”

It went on to state, “Similarly, the different linguistic or subnational currents and struggle for their economic advance is not a struggle against one or the other oppressor nation in the Indian union but is a part of the common struggle of all nationalities in the country for the liquidation of economic dependence and backwardness. This common struggle will be facilitated by the preservation of Indian unity.”

While the Congress(I) and other centrist parties emphasise on one nation and one language and believe in the concept of a strong centralised system to contain separatist tendencies, the CPI(M) believes this will and is proving counter-productive. Party sources argue that the ruling party follows a twin policy of over-centralisation and whipping up regional linguistic and religious differences to maintain itself in power.

As one CPI(M) source put it, “the 40 year record of the bourgeois-landlord state (the CPI(M) epithet for the ruling party) shows that far from consolidating national unity, it has succeeded in eroding the common heritage of the fight against British imperialism. The alliance with landed interests resulted in the continuance of old feudal and backward ideologies based on caste and religious obscurantism.”

While attacking the ruling party, the CPI(M) is equally against separatist movements such as the Khalistan or even Gorkhaland agitations. They say such movements divide the class-based unity in existence.

Despite the ideological theses on the issue, the CPI(M) has failed to explain to the people at large the line that exists between their advocacy of more autonomy and the struggle to maintain national unity. The ideological position notwithstanding, the CPI(M) was overtaken by the virulence of the GNLF agitation and was unable to forge tribal-nontribal unity in Tripura. The question of effectively putting theory in practice is, therefore, likely to come up again in party forums.

Calcutta Papers on Status of Golden Temple Complex

Amritsar Authorities' Decision
46001049 Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 9 Sep 88 p 1

[Text] Amritsar, Sept. 8 (PTI): The district authorities today handed over the Golden Temple complex to the Shrimanani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), its secretary, Mr Manjit Singh Calcutta, said here.

A senior official spokesman, when contacted to confirm this, said: “A decision has been taken in this respect in principle.” Mr Calcutta said the various buildings in the Serai area, including the Akal resthouse, the Teja Singh Samundari Hall, Guru Ram Dass Serai and Guru Nanak Niwas, had been handed over to the SGPC. The entrance of the Serai area leading to Harmandir Sahib was also thrown open for the devotees this morning.

The security forces would, however, remain in the first floor of the pilgrims' inn of Guru Ram Dass Serai. They set up a new barricade on the Serai gate for frisking devotees.

Mr Calcutta said the SGPC offices, which were shifted temporarily to the Guru Ram Dass hospital on the outskirts of the walled city when Operation Black Thunder began on May 9, would reopen in the Teja Singh Samundari Hall and Guru Nanak Niwas within this week.
Denying that the SGPC had agreed to the presence of security forces in the complex, Mr Calcutta said since the government had agreed in principle to hand over full control of the temple to the SGPC, the presence of security forces inside the complex was unwarranted.

Mr Calcutta said the SGPC held several rounds of talks with government authorities before the temple complex was handed over to it. "We were pressurised to take over charge of the complex conditionally but we continued to maintain a bold stand against the government pressures," he told UNI before a routine SGPC executive meeting at Guards' Hall this afternoon.

He said that in accordance with gurdwara traditions, henceforth no one would be allowed to stay in the residential areas of gurdwaras for more than one day. This restriction would be applicable to all SGPC-controlled gurdwaras, he said.

Mr Calcutta said, "Now we have to be extra careful about the capturing of rooms and security of devotees in the holy precincts so that the sanctity of the temple complex is maintained."

Sikh Official's Denial
46001049 Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN in English 11 Sep 88 p 7

[Text] Amritsar, Sept. 10.—The SGPC secretary, Mr Manjit Singh, today said the SGPC had neither been handed over nor had it taken complete charge of the Sri Darbar Sahib (Golden Temple) complex as had been made out in a section of the Press in a written statement. Mr Manjit Singh termed the story planted in newspapers by a news agency as irresponsible, mischievous and mala fide. He said the administration yesterday allowed a few of the SGPC staff members to go to the SGPC offices complex to assess the damage and to undertake the cleaning and repair of the offices as a first step.

Mr Manjit Singh said the SGPC was endeavouring to end the impasse and salvage the situation resulting from Operation Black Thunder.

The present confrontation could end only if the administration and the SGPC did not interfere in each others' domain. The management of Sri Darbar Sahib complex and other gurdwaras was the sole prerogative of the SGPC which was the only legal constitutional authority having representive capacity with a mandate from the Sikhs. This right could neither be abrogated nor interfered with by the government or by any other agency individual.

Papers Report Developments in Defense Production

Network of Laboratories
46001052 New Delhi PATRIOT in English 10 Sep 88 p 5

[Text] The defence production sector is now the second largest industrial activity in India. The value of production has risen from a mere Rs 41 crore in 1961-62 to about Rs 1,500 crore now, reports UNI.

Mostly away from public gaze and even media attention, India's defence arsenal has put on formidable muscles in the past decades. And keeping it literally on war footing is a nationwide network of research and development laboratories. In a field where obsolescence is the worst abomination and innovation the best news, India's defence edifice is taking no chances, indeed.

The first-ever test-firing of India's tactical surface-to-surface missile "Prithvi" in February tells the tale of giant strides made by India in the field of defence research. India has now joined the select group of four countries which have developed this class of surface-to-surface missiles.

"Prithvi" is based completely on indigenous design and development efforts of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and has a range of 250-km with different types of large payload warheads. It also has the best warhead-to-weight ratio compared to other missiles of this class.

The test-firing of "Prithvi" was hailed as a milestone in India's programme to achieve self-reliance in areas of high-technology and of considerable significance to its defence preparedness.

The DRDO laboratory at Hyderabad has already established basic technology for missile systems in solid and liquid propulsion control and in guidance and precision fabrication under the integrated guided missile development programme.

The DRDO, the focal point of all scientific and technological aspects of national security, operates through a national network of 45 laboratories.

The priority given to defence R and D is clear from the annual expenditure in defence research which has risen from about Rs 10 crore in 1965 to Rs 223 crore in 1985. Last year the annual budget for defence R and D was Rs 420.2 crore comprising more than four per cent of the total revised defence budget.

In aeronautics Indian scientists are currently concentrating on the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) project, Pilotless Target Aircraft (PTA), Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs), Gas Turbine Engines (GTE) and parachutes for various applications.
The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) has already made considerable progress on the LCA project. Prototype of PTA has been tested and several test flights of RPVs have also been conducted.

The design and development of indigenous boosters for launching pilotless aircraft has also been completed and a light infantry platoon mortar and its ammunition is also under production.

Several major hardware systems, needed for modern warfare, have been developed during the past decade or so. Notable are the prototypes of the Main Battle Tank (MBT), development of a sonar, torpedoes, flight simulators, rocket pods, fields guns and anti-tank ammunition.

With significant advance in warfare strategy after the Second World War it has become imperative for any military force to rely greatly on R and D to remain in the reckoning.

India, according to experts, was one of the first developing countries to realise the need for a systematic scientific back-up for developing a modern defence system and started creating a national infrastructure for design and development.

The transfer of technology to Bharat Electronics for the production of low-level surveillance radar has already been completed and work on an improved version “Indira-II” is progressing satisfactorily.

Work on Electronic Warfare (EW) system, a Radio Trunk System (RTS) and a Radio System (RLS) of communication equipment is also on.

Notable achievements of Indian scientists in the field of optical and electro-optical systems include development of low-light-level television, thermal imagers and laser-ranging equipment.

The scientists are at present engaged in investigating advanced optical and electro-optical techniques like holography and fibre-optics for developing an integrated fire-control system for various types of weapon platforms.

The areas where computers have a significant role to play have also progressed as software and communication hardware are under development for the proposed computer network to link all DRDO centres.

The Indian defence scientists have also contributed to the country’s expeditions to Antarctica. Special accommodation for use in the frozen continent, winter clothing and, tools and tablets for converting snow-melted water to potable water were all supplied by the DRDO.

Naval R and D efforts of Indian scientists include marine acoustics, underwater acoustic counter-measures and oceanography.

Progress in Guided Missiles
46001052 Madras THE HINDU in English
10 Sep 88 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 8—The country’s guided missile programme has received a major boost with the Army placing an order for Trishul surface-to-air and Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles worth Rs 600 crores. The order which has been recently placed with the Bharat Dynamics Ltd. which is the production agency for the missile designed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), has committed the army to pay 10 per cent of the cost (Rs 60 crores) as an advance and the delivery of the missiles will begin sometime in 1990-1991.

It may be recalled that the first test of the Trishul system was announced in April last year and that of the Trishul this February. The success of the tests have permitted DRDO to move on to development flight trials without going through any more experimental flights.

The Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme which began in 1983 has been the most successful of the country’s domestic design and development programmes in the defence field and the credit for this must go to DRDO as a whole and the team of labs coordinated by the Defence Research and Development Laboratory, Hyderabad headed by Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam.

‘Super accurate’: The Prithvi, a ‘super accurate’ tactical missile of a range of 250 km will serve with special units of the artillery and be held at the corps level of the army as a battlefield support system capable of destroying targets such as adversary ammunition and fuel dumps, staging areas, railway marshalling yards or airfields. It is one system in which the country will have near-contemporary status since the U.S. has only just recently tested its Tactical Missile System (TACMS). The missile will be mounted on the chassis of a Tartra truck which is being produced under license from Czechoslovakia by the Bharat Earth Movers Ltd.

The Prithvi as a surface-to-surface system may not be unique in that many countries possess missiles of the type, but its design concept is contemporary i.e. it is not designed to be used with a nuclear or chemical warhead but a conventional one. Such missiles began the missile age in the form of the V-2 rockets used by the Germans against Britain. But missile technology has come a long way since the unguided missiles rained terror on Britain too late to alter the course of World War II.

Most observers today predict that ‘super accurate’ missiles with conventional warheads could be a lethal weapon in tomorrow’s battlefield. The reason is the efficient guidance systems that land them very close to the target to inflict lethal damage. Virtually impregnable to ground or air defences, they can play havoc in the
critical areas at the rear of an army such as railway junctions, bridges, fuel dumps, airfields, etc. In this sense they are likely to raise the threshold of destruction in conventional warfare.

Easy transportation: The Prithvi is powered by a cluster of two liquid propellant engines, and its frame is made of light aluminum alloys and the wings are made of magnesium alloy. The tanks for the storage of the liquid propellant involve fairly complex process and are completely sealed once they are filled, making for easy transportation on cross-country terrain.

The missile has been designed with a strap-down inertial navigation system where the inertial sensors (rate gyros and accelerometers) are mounted on the body itself. An on-board computer performs real-time mathematical operations to generate navigational information. The computer is also used to carry out the tasks of missile guidance, flight control, pre-and-post launch sequencing, checkout of systems, telemetering and a large number of analogue and digital data of the missile during flight.

The guidance and control is a complex system which compels the missile to move on a pre-determined optimised trajectory stored on board. Various on-board software packages were developed and qualified at the DRDL.

Likewise the Trishul system will be mounted on a chassis of a truck of an Infantry Combat Vehicle with loads of six missile a truck. The system is a low-level quick reaction missile designed to provide protection against the swiftly developing threats from low-level air strikes. These will not be unique since the country already possesses the highly effective SA-8B OSA-AK system. However, the system will enable the country to be self-reliant in this critical field.

The Trishul cab move faster than the SA-8B, an important function since it has to attack low-level air threats which develop with just 20-60 seconds available for reaction. Further it has to be able to take care of a variety of jamming systems that are integral to strike aircraft or are carried on escorts. The Trishul is powered by a solid propellant motor and its casing made of special steel with alloys and plastic reinforced resins being used for the frame both of which allow the missile great manoeuvrability against evasive action by targeted aircraft.

Since the programme began some five years ago, two missiles system “have been successfully test-launched.” They are the low-level surface-to-air “Trishul” missile and the surface-to-surface missile “Prithvi.”

The President, Mr R. Venkataraman, inaugurates the Advanced Missile Technology Research Centre of DRDL near here on Saturday. Dr P. C. Alexander, Governor of Tamil Nadu, who is also Governor of Andhra Pradesh, Mr N. T. Rama Rao, A. P. Chief Minister, and Mr K. C. Pant, Defence Minister, are participating in the function.

Located in Imarat Kancha village, 10 km from the DRDL campus at Kanchanbagh, the new missile centre complements the various frontline technology centres created at DRDL as part of its missile development programme."

Specialist Centres: It will house specialist centres in advanced control, guidance and avionics, missile integration and automated checkout systems and a composite products centre.

The new centre will also have a full range of reliability laboratories “where missiles can be tested in their full-scale configuration for the severe environment in which they have to operate.”

The centre offers a unique environment where the best talent from the academic, industrial and scientific world can interact and work in the frontline of missile technology."

DRDL is part of the nationwide chain of Defence laboratories and it specialises in guided missile technology. In 1983, indigenous efforts in this area were focussed in the form of a partnership of Defence R and D and other national laboratories, academic institutions and public and private sector industries, over 60 in number, called the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP).

Competence in Crucial areas: In the process, DRDL has established competence in certain crucial areas of guided missile technology. They are: Jet rocket technology—a technique of propulsion offering very high energy levels utilising atmospheric air instead of carrying the oxidising components on board, the technology of “strapdown” inertial guidance where the inertial sensors are mounted on the missile body itself, advanced composites—the use of carbon and glass filaments to fabricate complex yet light weight missile shapes.

More on Missiles
46001052 Madras THE HINDU in English
27 Aug 88 p 11

[Text] Hyderabad, Aug. 26—Two missiles, the medium range surface-to-air missile “Akash” and the advanced anti-tank missile, “Nag,” are in “advanced stages of development,” here under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme, initiated by the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL).

Small Arms Production
Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English
31 Aug 88 p 3

[Text] The armament research and development establishment (ARDE) has undertaken an important...
programme of developing the 5.6 MM Indian small arms system (INSAS). The INSAS was undergoing user trials at present and the results are excellent, Mr N. S. Venkateshan, ARDE director, said. He was confident the Indian jawans would soon be equipped with the next generation of small arms, the best available in the world to meet operational requirements.

Mr Venkateshan said since several hundreds of thousands of this weapon system would ultimately be required, the ARDE was conscious of the challenges in the technology transfer phase and was working closely with the ordnance factories.

He said that by the end of this century it would not be necessary for the country to import any ammunition. The techniques developed at present have resulted in production of armament 30 to 50 per cent cheaper than the imported items.

Another prestigious weapon system project of the ARDE was the 120-MM main armament and ammunition system for "Arjun," the main battle tank.

The ARDE has developed a prototype high velocity gun and a family of ammunition with fin stabilised armour piercing discarding sabot (FSAPDS) as the primary kinetic energy kill mechanism. While the performance of the system would remain classified for some time to come, the fire power of "Arjun" would be comparable with the contemporary main battle tanks available in the world, Mr Venkateshan said.

Only four gun systems in this performance class have been developed abroad. They are in the UK, West Germany, France and Soviet Union. Even the U.S. and Japan have opted to adopt and licence the German gun. ARDE scientists were proud to have joined this select club with totally indigenous technology, he added.

He said a Rs 100-crore ultra modern plant would come up within the three months at Tiruchirapalli to produce anti-tank ammunition. He said the design for the plant and the FSAPDS had been given by the ARDE. This was the first such plant of its kind in the country.

Mr Venkateshan said that even after the advent of highly sophisticated guided missiles, it was generally accepted that the most cost-effective weapon was the high velocity gun mounted on the opposing tanks. This was accomplished by firing FSAPDS ammunition. ARDE had successfully developed 105 MM FSAPDS ammunition for the Vijayanta and the UP-gunned T-55 main battle tanks, he said.

He said refinements and the free flight artillery rockets and multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) systems formed a powerful adjunct to the field artillery and medium artillery guns after World War II.

Mr Venkateshan said various battlefield doctrines being evolved today dictated that conventional weapon capability of very high order would be required to deter nuclear wars. ARDE had plans to achieve excellence in conventional armaments, purely through indigenous effort, he added.

**PAKISTAN**

Bangladesh Daily Views Democratic Process in Pakistan

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[Editorial: "Democracy in Pakistan"]

[Text] Parliamentary politics in its true form seems to be picking up, both as a concept and a process, in Pakistan. It is doing so seemingly setting at naught the gloomy pointer emerging from the recent ethnic riots, particularly in Karachi and Hyderabad. Among the possibilities pointed out by Pakistani watchers, at home and abroad, was that far from the democratic process completing itself through the elections schedule for November 16, the ethnic trouble might be used as an excuse for a return to full-fledged martial law. It may be said that martial law, de facto or de jure, had been a force in Pakistan over the past eleven years or so. The elections held in 1985 with a ban on political parties to participate in them was more an apology for democracy and had more or less left the country where it was under official martial law for the best part of the 40 years since partition. By a little hindsight coupled with some political insight, it may be plausibly argued that the political disasters Pakistan experienced since its birth in 1947 and the stagnation that accounted for its stunted political growth, including the 70's marked by Bhutto's rule and his ouster, have much to do with the democracy never given a chance to grow.

This holds true for quite a few other third world countries some of which have recently turned the corner, politically speaking, but are yet to found on a sound basis the essentials of a government for the people and by the people. A lone exception is a strife-torn country like Burma whose ruling junta could not care less for the rule by consent; and the elections announced by it hold little promise of parliamentary politics ever growing in line with the wishes of the people.

Pakistan with a toll of about one thousand people killed in Karachi and Hyderabad since 1985 could hardly be expected to wax politically mature so soon. Since the Pakistan Supreme Court's ruling on October 2 that political parties should be allowed to contest the parliamentary election due on November 16, party organisation, and polarisation of political forces have gone ahead amid a new found enthusiasm both among the leaders and the people. The latest development of two factions of the Pakistan Muslim League merging to face the
challenge posed by Benazir Bhutto's PPP [Pakistan People's Party—FBIS] has neatly drawn the battle-line across which the November election will be fought. For the first time in 11 years Pakistan has got the chance to choose their own leaders in a free and fair election on a party basis. Had there been a parliament with a strong opposition motivated more by the welfare of the state than the desire for power, intestine tribal and ethnic violence between Muhajirs, Sindhis and Pathans would have little fuel to keep blazing.

November 16 is crucial to Pakistan in more than one sense: a country that looked like being pulled apart by internal fighting will have the first chance to pull itself together and couldn't just afford to miss it. Secondly, with the Afghan issue yet to be resolved, the future political shape of its closest neighbour remaining still unpredictable and Pakistan's need to build up its economy and defence remaining paramount, a democratically re-born Pakistan is critically vital. One thing Pakistan (like some other third world countries) should resist is the temptation to scupper the chance for the country to return to civilian rule by a return to martial law.

Despite some die-hard authoritarian governments obstinately looking away from it, the futility of rule by decree is being increasingly recognised in the hitherto closed societies of the world. At the heart of this new opening up, particularly in third world countries, ties [as published] the message that continued martial law or rule by decree can ruin a country both politically and economically. Burma is not the only case in point. The philosophically convincing part of the message is that there is no substitute for democracy.