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VIETNAM REPORT

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MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COMBAT READINESS TRAINING DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 5, May 82 pp 8-15

Article by Colonel General Le Trong Tan: "Training Troops for Precise, Timely Action in the Various Stages of Combat Readiness"

A vivid manifestation of the high level of unanimity and the unshakeable determination of our people's armed forces in the performance of the two strategic tasks set forth by the 5th National Congress of Delegates of the Party is maintaining a high level of combat readiness in order to join all the people in promptly and strongly retaliating against every act of aggression by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists, whenever and wherever they occur, thereby successfully implementing our strategy, firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland and fulfilling our international obligation. This is also the basic and constant function of our people's armed forces in the new stage of the revolution.

Following their shameful defeats in the two wars of aggression filled with crimes on the southwestern border and the northern border of our country, the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists are waging a multi-faceted war of sabotage while preparing for a large-scale war of aggression with a view toward annexing our country. We all know that between their war of sabotage and a large-scale war of aggression waged by them to weaken and invade Vietnam there is a close relationship but no clearly definable line. In activities from reconnaissance and the insertion of intelligence agents and commandoes into our territory for the purpose of committing sabotage or causing armed conflicts in order to encroach upon and occupy important land and ocean (island) areas of ours, the Chinese aggressors can take advantage of those places and times at which they consider us to be weak or negligent in order to launch surprise attacks on land, foment internal rebellion, ambush our air and ocean routes on a large scale and launch a war of aggression against our country. Therefore, constantly raising the level of combat readiness of the various units, agencies, academies, schools, enterprises and hospitals, of the various branches and services, of main force troops and local troops, of troops on the frontline and troops on the rear line... in a manner consistent with the tasks assigned to them has become an objective, pressing and long-range necessity. The effort to meet this requirement is not only related to the people's armed forces, but also closely related to the agencies
of the state and the other sectors engaged in social activities. Here, we will only discuss the matter of training the people’s armed forces.

The new developments of a modern people’s war to protect the socialist fatherland against a large-scale war of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists together with the new historic conditions of our country demand that our people’s armed forces promptly fight the enemy using the greatest possible strength, fight them on land, in the air and at sea, on the frontlines and in the rear area by means of diverse forms of warfare suited to the large scale of combat from the very outset. Therefore, our entire army must meet the requirement mentioned above in a basic, comprehensive, specific, regular-force and firm manner. This involves a very strict and scientific process of training, educating and forging the entire army and establishing uniformity of revolutionary vigilance, a high will to maintain combat readiness and the actual ability to effectively maintain combat readiness in accordance with the combat readiness regulations promulgated by the Ministry of National Defense. These regulations have put into the form of laws and orders the entire issue of maintaining combat readiness by our people’s armed forces, such as the tasks, specifics, order in which actions are taken, regulations, rules and discipline regarding combat readiness, requirements that must be met and so forth as regards everyone from the commander and the command staffs on the various echelons to the soldiers of units and the agencies of the various branches and services in the various stages of combat readiness. It can be said that for the first time in the history of their combat and buildup, the people’s army, in particular, and the people’s armed forces, in general, have such combat readiness regulations. They put the maintenance of combat readiness by the entire army on a regular-force, modern and specific basis for the purpose of insuring that the people’s armed forces are always ready to perform their combat missions in an effective, timely and orderly manner and attack the enemy with the greatest possible strength during the decisive, complex situation that exists at the start of a war as well as in other situations. This meets the new requirements regarding maintaining combat readiness in order to firmly defend an independent, socialist nation that possesses a complete system and possesses territorial sovereignty over its land, air space, ocean waters and continental shelf and in order to resist every act of aggression by the enemy under the conditions of a modern war.

The experience of many wars in our country and the world shows that it is an extremely difficult and complex matter to send a large force into combat in an effective and orderly manner, in exact accordance with strategy and promptly attack the enemy in many different directions under conditions in which the opposition is carrying out massive, decisive acts of aggression on land, in the air and at sea, on the frontlines and even in the rear area during the first hours and days of the war. A difficulty involving signal operations, an incorrect signal, an incorrect document number and so forth can cause incalculable harm to the entire information and alert system. Carelessness on the part of the chiefs or deputy chiefs of the combat alert sections in the headquarters on the various echelons can lead to chaos in shifting the unit from one stage of combat readiness to another. The commander of a detachment who acts in a confused manner when he receives an alert order can cause an entire military corps to act slowly. Haphazard
actions in the fields of fuel, ammunition or armament or at a vehicle depot will seriously reduce the initiative and timeliness of units entering combat. The failure to promptly or adequately mobilize manpower, grain, fuel, trucks, equipment and so forth by state agencies in accordance with the defense plan of the locality can cause major obstacles to the maintenance of combat readiness by the armed forces.

Under the conditions of modern warfare, of "electronic warfare," the phenomena mentioned above can cause large forces to suffer heavy losses or be annihilated before entering combat. We know about the very heavy loss of forces suffered by the armies of various countries when the German fascists launched their surprise attacks. On the very first day of the invasion of France, Belgium and Holland, the German air force attacked 72 airfields and, in 2 days, France lost 272 aircraft. During the first day of the war, the Polish army (old) lost 20 percent of its fighter planes. In Israel's war against the Arab countries in 1967, the Israeli air force destroyed or shot down 375 aircraft of the Arab countries in the space of only 5 hours. These lessons must be studied by us when our army and people must contend with an enemy that has a large army with modern equipment and is near our mainland, ocean waters and air space. Actively studying and creatively applying the experiences of the Soviet state, of the Red army and of the Soviet navy are a very important requirement in order for our army and people to correctly meet the combat readiness requirements of the armed forces, of our people in a modern war.

The analyses presented above lead to an inevitable conclusion, namely, that our army must be well trained so that it can take precise and timely action in the various stages of combat readiness. This is one of the main elements involved in improving the quality and increasing the fighting strength of our people's armed forces in the new stage of the revolution.

Training troops to take precise and urgent action in the various stages of combat readiness is part of the process of combat training and campaign training, in general. It is closely linked to the process of technical, tactical and campaign training, to the process of leading and teaching ideology throughout the army. The results and the quality of the process of technical, tactical and campaign training are the premises for improving the quality of training for shifting from one stage of combat readiness to another. For this reason, these two types of training are not in opposition to each other, rather, they have an impact upon each other and cause the training process to comply ever more closely with the requirements of the combat tasks of the military corps, branches, services, military regions and forces in a war to defend the fatherland.

However, combat readiness training involves specific requirements and elements of its own; as a result, suitable methods must be employed to organize and conduct this training in order to achieve high quality.

One element of basic training is providing troops, primarily the commanders and command agencies on the various echelons, with a firm understanding of combat
readiness regulations and the requirements, specifics and actions involved in each stage (level) of combat readiness. The primary objective that must be achieved in training is to give the commanders and command agencies on the various echelons, give troops a clear understanding of the basic contents of combat readiness regulations so that they comply with them in a precise and strict manner. This not only involves disseminating the contents of these regulations but also guiding their specific implementation by each unit. A general requirements is that the entire army must receive basic and comprehensive training in combat readiness in accordance with regulations, must have a firm grasp of the specifics, requirements, order in which actions are taken, systems, rules, discipline and so forth of the combat readiness process, from low stages of combat readiness to high stages as well as the specific requirements of each stage of combat readiness. The purpose of this is to achieve a solid uniformity of awareness as well as action in the maintenance of combat readiness throughout the army, to achieve a regular-force level of combat readiness under the new conditions of defending the socialist fatherland. On this basis, each unit, agency, military corps, branch, service, military region and so forth must be trained to implement combat readiness regulations in a manner consistent with the missions assigned to them.

The requirements of commanders and the command agencies on the various echelons and the requirements of troops differ with regard to combat readiness training as well as with regard to shifting from a low stage of combat readiness to a high stage and vice versa. The units and agencies must organize training in exact accordance with the guidance from the High Command.

Training the headquarters on the various echelons in taking precise, timely and smoothly coordinated action in the various stages of combat readiness is a very important part of training. The headquarters on the various echelons, from the regimental and similar echelons upward, are the places that issue, receive and disseminate orders and directives regarding combat readiness and the shift from one stage of combat readiness to another. The accuracy and timeliness with which the officers, technical personnel and soldiers in the headquarters on the various echelons act during the very first minutes affect, either well or adversely, the subsequent actions of the entire unit. For this reason, the officers, technical personnel and soldiers that replace one another in the performance of tasks at the headquarters on the various echelons must receive full, specific and detailed training in combat readiness.

To begin with, on the basis of the function and tasks of the headquarters on their echelon, units and agencies must, through training, give their combat alert officers (chiefs and assistant chiefs of combat alert sections), technical personnel and soldiers a firm grasp of their tasks, duties and specific actions in the various stages of combat readiness. This training must delve into specifics, from how to receive signals indicating the stage of combat readiness, receiving and comparing stipulated document numbers, reporting to the commander and transmitting signals to subordinate units and agencies to putting the entire headquarters on the stipulated stage of alert, implementing the directives and orders of the commander, preparing to move the headquarters to another place, etc.
All elements of the headquarters on each echelon must be trained so that they can take precise, rapid action, comply with regulations and closely coordinate with one another when shifting to another stage of combat readiness. This must be based on the results of forging and cultivating regular-force operational procedures on a routine basis at the headquarters on the various echelons.

It is also necessary to train the various units, branches, services, main force and local troops and troops on the frontline as well as in the rear area in how to organize and build the headquarters on their echelon. The various units, agencies, military corps, branches, services, military regions, provincial, municipal and special zone military commands, the military commands at airports, seaports and so forth must organize the headquarters on their echelons in a manner consistent with their functions, tasks and the nature of their operations. The training of the headquarters organizations on the various echelons must be comprehensive training encompassing organization and makeup; the functions and tasks of officers, technical personnel and soldiers; construction (positions and trenches); information and liaison equipment, secret document cabinets, maps and charts; work regulations and rules... These elements of training must be unified throughout the army on each echelon.

The various units and agencies must make the greatest possible effort to overcome their difficulties and shortages and make full use of existing capabilities in order to organize the headquarters on their echelon in accordance with the requirement of becoming increasingly regular-force and modern and in a manner consistent with combat readiness requirements. They must resist the phenomena of formalism, ostentatiousness and not being practical as well as the phenomena of doing as one sees fit and operating as "guerrillas" when organizing headquarters.

Another element of basic training that is designed to raise the level of combat readiness of the people's armed forces is training commanders and the command agencies on the various echelons so that they are skilled in organizing and commanding troops in shifting from one stage of combat readiness to another. On the basis of the general training in combat readiness regulations, the training process must be designed to give the commanders on the various echelons a full understanding of the requirements, specifics and actions of themselves and their troops in each stage of combat readiness. These comrades absolutely must be well versed in the order of organizational and command jobs that must be performed when shifting to another stage of combat readiness, such as receiving orders from the upper echelon; disseminating information on the situation; issuing orders and directives; organizing the performance of work by the staff; reporting to the upper echelon; commanding the withdrawal of troops from their billeting areas (or the initiating of combat operations); organizing the receiving of officers and soldiers, weapons and ammunition at stipulated sites; commanding troops as they continue to prepare for combat at centralized sites... As regards the commanders on the military corps echelon and higher, especially the commanders of tank units, mechanized artillery, infantry combat vehicles and so forth, this training must be deeper and more detailed with regard to commanding operations at truck depots, at artillery depots, at places where ammunition, fuel and military gear are received and so forth with a view toward insure that troops act in a
precise, urgent, orderly and secret manner when shifting from one stage of combat readiness to another. The specifics involved in the training of the commanders on the various echelons of the air force, the air defense force and the navy must be consistent with combat readiness regulations, with the tasks, equipment and actions of each service in each stage of combat readiness. Attention must be given to the need to train the commanders on the various echelons in how to use the staff of their echelon to correctly and promptly perform the large volume of work involved in combat readiness.

The training of command agencies in combat readiness is part of the process of the training of the commanders on the various echelons. Of importance is the need to train the members of the command agency on each echelon in closely coordinating with one another and taking smoothly coordinated actions in organizing the implementation of the directives and orders of the commander and in inspecting, guiding and supervising the actions of troops in each stage of combat readiness. Officers have the responsibility of proficiently carrying out specific matters, such as providing information-liaison equipment in order to transmit alert signals and disseminate orders and directives in a precise and rapid manner; drafting combat documents; calling back officers on leave; and organizing the distribution of weapons, ammunition, fuel, military gear and so forth to each component. The command agency on each echelon as well as the system of command agencies on the various echelons must establish firm operating procedures based on a single order of jobs in each stage of combat readiness without duplication, without doing as one sees fit. This is a basic measure that will help to insure that the various units, agencies, services, branches and elements of the military act in a precise, urgent and unified manner when shifting from one stage of combat readiness to another. This level can only be achieved through the results of regular forging in tactical and campaign command maneuvers and maneuvers with troops.

Training troops to take precise, rapid action in accordance with the specifics and the order of jobs involved in the various stages of combat readiness is a pressing requirement in order to raise the present level of combat readiness. The activities of infantry troops, tank troops, artillery troops, missile troops and anti-aircraft troops, of warships, of combat aircraft, of hospitals, enterprises and so forth in the various stages of combat readiness must be the subject of detailed and unified training within each branch, each service, each arm of the military. Soldiers must be trained in the requirements and order of activities when an alert order is received, such as assembling to be informed of the task at hand, removing from storage and receiving weapons and ammunition at the storehouse, marching to the staging area and so forth so that they take these actions correctly. Each soldier and each cadre in command of the various detachments within the units, agencies and enterprises must be trained so that he knows what to do and acts correctly in each stage of combat readiness. The technical branches and services must receive detailed training in the order of jobs and the technical requirements involved in removing from storage and starting vehicles and machines, inspecting the operation of equipment and so forth in exact accordance with regulations. Full importance must be attached to training the cadres in command of detachments, the cadres in charge of technology and the
combat alert units in organizing the command of detachments, organizing technical support and promptly going into combat when ordered. When training troops, light attention should not be given to such small matters as the alert signal, how to arrange packs, how to carry equipment, how to board vehicles and disembark from vehicles, how to arrange ammunition on vehicles, etc. Experience has shown that confusion in actions of minor importance can pose an obstacle to the entire detachment, to the entire unit when the situation is urgent.

The training matters that have been presented are not separated from one another but are part of a unified process of training designed to raise the level of combat readiness of our people's armed forces. The effort to meet these training requirements must proceed from a low level to a high level, from a part to the whole, from the simple to the complex. The various branches and services, the main force troops and local troops must establish the specifics and requirements of their training in a manner consistent with combat readiness regulations and the guidance of the High Command and in a manner that reflects uniformity throughout the army.

The organization of training and the methods of providing training in the specifics involved in the various stages of combat readiness must be closely coordinated with the organization of training and the methods employed to provide training in tactics and campaigns to the various branches and services. In tactical and campaign training and maneuvers, it is possible to include the specifics involved in shifting from one stage of combat readiness to another in order to coordinate training on each echelon. However, when necessary, the military regions, branches and services can carry out this type of training as a separate training subject in accordance with a directive from the ministry.

Training to raise the level of combat readiness in the various units and agencies will involve more than a few difficulties. In view of the general circumstances of the country, of the army, each unit and agency, on the frontlines and in the rear as well, must make the greatest possible effort to appropriately resolve such problems as finding the necessary time, acquiring equipment, fuel and so forth and gradually putting the training process on a regular basis and achieving increasingly high quality. The upper echelon must maintain close contact with and understand the difficulties of the lower echelon and try to effectively resolve the problems of units and agencies so that they can provide combat readiness training with increasing ease.

It must be emphasized that the results of training troops in the various stages of combat readiness are closely related to the process of ideological leadership and education to heighten the spirit of revolutionary vigilance, the will to fight and the morale, attitudes and sense of organization and discipline of troops. The organizations of the party, the commanders on the various echelons, the political agencies, the organizations of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union and so forth must truly concern themselves with providing ideological education and leadership in a basic and routine manner in order to create a decisive, stable factor in the process of raising the level of combat readiness. The effort to lead and teach
ideology, politics-morale and the sense of organization and discipline must be concretized in a manner consistent with the specifics and requirements of each stage of combat readiness. Together with this, command and management activities designed to insure strict compliance with the regulations governing daily life in squads, gun units, vehicle units, warships, aircraft, seaports, warehouses, hospitals and so forth and with orderly and combat alert regulations and inspecting the maintenance of weapons and technical equipment in order to create firm habits are a basic prerequisite to the process of training to raise the level of combat readiness.

Training troops in the various stages of combat readiness is very closely linked to the activities of the state agencies and the other sectors engaged in social activity. Such matters as mobilizing reserve forces to supplement the table of organization of units when alert orders are received, mobilizing corvee laborers to support combat operations, mobilizing transportation and information equipment, supplementing the supply of grain and fuel and so forth in accordance with the general defense plan of the locality cannot be carried out solely by the armed forces. For this reason, in accordance with directives from the ministry, the various units and agencies must take the initiative in coordinating with the agencies of the state and the various sectors within the locality in which they perform their task and propose specific areas of training in which they can coordinate and gradually achieve an increasingly high level of training. On this basis, they must actively give state agencies and the various sectors a clear understanding of combat readiness requirements and display greater responsibility on their own part in defending the beloved socialist fatherland and crushing the scheme of aggression of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

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DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS AGAINST SEABORNE LANDINGS ANALYZED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 5, May 82 pp 16-27

[Article by Major General Doan Bac Khanh: "Seaborne Landings and Defending Against Seaborne Landings"]

Seaborne landings emerged as a form of warfare in ancient times and have been used in armed struggle ever since. The military history of the world still records the seaborne landings of the Persian and Roman armies and the armies of a number of other countries in the 4th and 3rd Centuries B.C. During this period, landings were made by boats propelled by sails and the weapons used were bows and arrows and spears. Landings were usually carried out easily without encountering direct retaliation from the opposition.

In the feudal age, in the period of navies on sailing ships, with the development of landing vehicles, the organization of the army and military art at that time, landings were carried out on a larger scale and were conducted farther away. The organization and training of seaborne landing troops and the types of landings became more diverse.

However, it was not until capitalism was formed and developed that significant steps forward were taken with regard to the means for combat and transportation at sea and the organization of navies as well as the methods and scale of seaborne landings. The capitalist countries of Holland, Great Britain, France, Portugal and Spain competed with one another for colonies and new land areas. The navies of these countries were not only a part of the armed forces operating at sea, but were also the most competent tool for carrying out their scheme of expanding to and exploiting the colonies. More and more seaborne landings were carried out utilizing increasingly improved and sophisticated means and weapons. In the 17th Century, transport ships were used to transport landing troops and warships were used to escort and protect transport ships. In the space of only 150 years, from 1744 to 1894, Great Britain, France and Holland conducted more than 200 seaborne landings. From the 19th Century onward, steel clad ships powered by steam emerged, cannons and personal weapons were improved and many kinds of equipment were introduced to transport artillery, transport horses and transport animal drawn carts from landing ships to the shore.
In World War I (1914–1918), seaborne landings were widely employed using greatly improved equipment and were conducted on a very much larger scale. For example, in the "Albion" landing to occupy Petrograd and annex Russia in September, 1917, Germany mobilized nearly 300 transport ships and warships together with a contingent of its navy's air force; Germany landed 24,500 troops, 8,500 horses, 2,500 transport vehicles, 240 pieces of artillery, 220 machine guns and 80 mortars on the land of the opposition.

However, whereas there were only two seaborne landings in the nature of significant, major campaigns in World War I, in World War II (1939–1945), the participants conducted more than 70 campaign and strategic landings. Some campaigns involved the landing of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and very much equipment and technical weaponry. In the landing on Sicily in 1943, the attackers mobilized nearly 400,000 men, more than 5,000 combat aircraft and transport aircraft and nearly 3,000 ships of various types, including aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, mine sweepers, transport ships, landing ships and support ships.

Some seaborne landings had the purpose of attacking and occupying islands or groups of islands in order to intimidate, blockade or disrupt the communications at sea of the opposition. There were also seaborne landings on mainland areas to attack and occupy advantageous areas, divide, surround and envelop the opposition or coordinate with operations on land to destroy some of the opposition's forces. On the basis of seaborne landing missions and the scale of landings, they were divided into strategic landings, campaign landings and tactical landings. The Normandy landing was a strategic landing. This landing, which was carried out by British and American troops in 1944 in order to open "a second front" against the German fascists, brought troops from Great Britain through the Mung-se Sea ("Vietnamese phonetics") to France in order to advance ahead of the Soviet army, occupy western and central Europe and, at the same time, prevent the German fascists from transporting troops into France. The force that was mobilized consisted of millions of men in 32 landing divisions and 12 brigades. The landing on Okinawa in 1945 was an example of a campaign landing. The United States landed on this island of Japan more than 180,000 Marines together with a large quantity of weapons and means of war. There were very many tactical landings in World War II. According to military documents, the number of these landings exceeded 500. The rapid increase in the number, the size, the forms and the level of organization of seaborne landings was closely linked to the development of landing and combat equipment, military art and coordination in warfare among the various branches and services as well as in the ability to organize command operations, provide rear service support, provide technical support and provide information and liaison support in large-scale military operations and was, to a large degree, the cause of this development.

Facts have shown the tremendous, indispensable position and effect of seaborne landings in modern war, especially in a war of aggression. With seaborne landings of different sizes, it became possible to open a new front: attacking and occupying islands and naval bases or important campaign and strategic defense areas of the opposition, became possible to attack the flanks or the rear of the
troops defending against seaborne landings in order to coordinate with offensive blows by ground troops near the sea.

Since World War II, together with the development of the organization of armies and military art in modern warfare, the means and methods employed in seaborne landings have constantly been improved and updated. New landing ships with greater capacity and versatility have been and are being researched and manufactured. In the early 1960's, the United States began to construct new special purpose ships for transporting helicopters for seaborne landings armed with sea to air missiles. In recent years, in order to implement their plan for "mobile bases at sea," the United States constructed multi-purpose combat landing vessels that can operate for 60 to 90 continuous days and nights without requiring resupply. Practically all of the large and modern landing vessels of the naval forces of NATO have been equipped with transport helicopters or other landing means. Amphibious vehicles and track vehicles are considered the most important means for transporting marines from ships to shores. At present, the United States is quickly implementing its "landing vehicle assault" program, which will replace track-mounted amphibious vehicles with ships that ride on a cushion of air. According to the western press, in the 1980's, this type of ship will be widely used by U.S. Marines. In order to overcome the modern obstacles to seaborne landings, increase the speed with which landings are made and reduce casualties taken in landings, many capitalist countries are looking for new ways to conduct seaborne landings with improved equipment and even equipment used in World War II. At present, particular attention is being given to seaborne landings by helicopter and hover craft coordinated with landings and support from the air.

The modern armies of the world are studying and applying modern seaborne landing methods in both the shore-shore mode and the shore-ship-shore mode. The matter of controlling the sea by means of surface vessels and submarines, by means of naval air forces, strategic air forces, missiles and so forth is being examined for implementation under many different plans. Coordinating seaborne landings with the blockading of sea routes and the sabotaging of the communications of the opposition at sea is a matter that has been researched and resolved in many naval maneuvers of Great Britain, the United States and Japan. Air raids and airborne landings are also being rather widely employed in seaborne landings and are carried out before or during seaborne landings in order to attack and occupy bridgehead islands and advantageous terrain areas and destroy the landing defense organization of the opposition.

Ordinarily, landing forces on the offensive have good conditions for selecting the time and place of landings in a manner consistent with the battlefield situation and strategy, for making thorough preparations and for achieving a superiority of forces, especially control of the sea and air in the area of the landing; they can employ many measures and many methods to achieve surprise in the landing campaign; they are capable of putting out of combat a component of the landing defense force of the opposition even before the landing is initiated or capable of isolating the area of the landing from the other components of the landing defense force. However, the press in many countries has pointed out the
weakness of landing operations. A large-scale landing campaign requires much
time for preparation and can very easily be detected by the opposition. The
large number of forces participating results in the various stages of the campaign
and the actual conduct of the campaign being more complex. The fleet of ships
transporting seaborne landing forces can easily be attacked when at sea, especially
when landing troops on the beaches of the opposition. Moreover, control of the
air and sea within the area of the landing is very difficult to achieve, etc.

According to U.S. military strategists, in wars that do not involve the use of
nuclear weapons, the navy will play the role of consort of aggressor forces,
among which the main forces will be landing forces and landing support forces.
Seaborne landing operations have become one of the most important methods for
performing tactical and campaign missions and, in some cases, even performing
strategic missions in modern warfare. Therefore, in a modern war, defending
the coastline and defending against seaborne landings are a necessity to every
country participating in the war that has a coastline.

Since ancient times, since the times of Ngo Quyen and Tran Hung Dao, Vietnam
has had to fight on its rivers and ocean waters to defeat foreign aggressors.
We have more than 3,000 kilometers of coastline and vast offshore waters and our
country lies in Southeast Asia, which is one of the centers of sea traffic between
the oceans and the continents and a place where the forces of national liberation,
socialism and peace and the reactionary, aggressor powers are fiercely opposing
each other. Approaching our country from the South China Sea is also a direction
that the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists can select in their scheme to
commit aggression against our country. For this reason, in the work of
strengthening the national defense system and maintaining our readiness to
fight in defense of the fatherland, our army and people absolutely must attach
importance to defending the coastline and defending against seaborne landings.

Defending against seaborne landings primarily involves battles and campaigns
involving very complicated coordination among the various branches and services,
battles and campaigns that occur in areas at sea, along the seacoast and in the
air in which the enemy is conducting a landing in order to annihilate their
landing forces, destroy their landing equipment and crush the enemy's landing.
Due to the high concentration of forces and means of war on the part of the
side staging the landing and attack as well as the side defending against the
landing and due to the resolute nature of landing operations and defense
operations against landings, seaborne landings and defensive operations against
seaborne landings are usually very fierce. The experience of World War II showed
that even when the side that is conducting the landing and the attack enjoys
political and military superiority, enjoys a superiority of forces and means of
war, it is not easy to carry out a seaborne landing. The landing by the United
States on the Japanese island of Okinawa was a very clear example. The landing
force of the United States was six times larger than the Japanese force on the
island. The United States also controlled the sea and air. Yet, more than
80 days passed from 1 April 1945, when the landing on the island began, and
23 June 1945, when Lieutenant General U-xi-di-ma, Vietnamese phonetics, the
commander of Japan's 23rd Island Defense Army committed hari-kari and this army
surrendered, thus making it possible for U.S. troops to occupy the island. Although the landing was victorious, more than 400 ships of the United States had been sunk or damaged. In the landing and the defense against the landing at Normandy, 122,000 allied troops and 117,000 German troops were wounded or killed.

Even successful landings encounter many difficult, complex situations and are fiercely opposed by the forces defending against the landing. The Normandy landing had been in preparation for 2 years but, on the first day of the landing, landing forces were still unable to rapidly overcome the obstacles in the landing defense system and unable to rapidly move forward. The rate of their advance during the first stage was very low, only about 0.6 to 0.7 kilometer per day. The three British and American armies that were landed by air to coordinate with the seaborne landing forces were mistakenly bombed by the very planes that dropped them, thus causing many losses. In the landings by Japanese forces in Port Morseby (Southeast New Guinea) in May, 1942, and on the island of Midway (in the middle of the Pacific) in June, 1942, the attackers suffered heavy losses, were forced to abandon their landings and victory in the campaigns belonged completely to the forces defending against the landings. In its combat operations against the Soviet Union, the German command was unable to successfully carry out even one seaborne landing campaign. These events confirm the tremendous possibilities for winning victory in defensive campaigns against seaborne landings.

Victory in defensive operations against seaborne landings is controlled by many subjective and objective conditions. Of these conditions, it is first of all necessary to discuss the system of landing defenses; the effectiveness with which the enemy is reconnoitered and detected in order to promptly attack them while they are still far away; the effectiveness of commanding coordinated operations against the landing; the combat capabilities and the utilization of the role of the branches and services participating in the campaign against the landing.

The System of Seaborne Landing Defenses

This system is constructed on the basis of the existing, peace time battle positions of the coastal defense units in those areas in which it is predicted that enemy forces will conduct landing campaigns. The system of seaborne landing defenses consists of such elements as: the system of battle positions on the islands, along the seacoast and on the mainland of naval and marine units, mobile ship units and army units consisting of infantry, tank, artillery and other forces supported by trenches, pockets of resistance, field fortifications, permanent fortifications, the observation and reconnaissance network and the information and command centers coordinated with the system of combat villages and islands and the district military fortresses; the firepower system of missiles, artillery, air forces and the other types of weapons that can attack the enemy when they are far away or near; the system of project obstacles and obstacles such as mines and bombs placed on the shore and in the water at places that might be crossed by landing troops near the shore or on the shore; the system of reserve forces.
on the various echelons; the system of roads for the mobility of forces and material resupply; and the rear service and technical support bases. In order to firmly strengthen the defense system and deceive the enemy, we also deploy equipment to combat electronic reconnaissance by the enemy and build key tank defense areas, duplicate battle positions, reserve battle positions and fake battle positions.

The most basic factor determining the strength of the system of seaworne landing defenses is the close coordination of the local forces and the mobile forces of the entire system in order to stop and wear down the landing forces and annihilate each of their components by means of the coordinated strength of the various branches, services and arms of the military, thereby making it possible to conduct continuous combat operations, attack the enemy at all ranges and in all areas, on the sea, on the islands and on the mainland as well, inflicting the heaviest possible losses upon the enemy in all stages of the campaign against the landing, carrying out a prompt and effective counter-attack against the enemy forces that reached the shore and crushing their landing operation. Under the conditions of a highly developed people's war, we can mobilize the forces of the standing army, which include the units of the navy, the air force, the ground forces and the air defense troops, the forces of main force troops, local troops and the border defense troops operating in the coastal area and, at the same time, mobilize the forces of the ocean and coastal militia and self-defense forces to participate in the defense against a seaworne landing. The militia and self-defense forces are highly capable of conducting reconnaissance and observation at sea; deploying defenses to attack enemy troops landing by sea or by river; promptly attacking enemy troops at landing sites and on the sandbars that appear between the sea and the mainland; releasing mines and deploying obstacles; and providing rear service supply rescuing the wounded and resolving the aftereffects of combat. Of importance is the need to research the capabilities of these forces in order to employ them in a manner consistent with the conditions of modern warfare in operations to defend against seaworne landings in a war to defend the fatherland.

Due to the special characteristics of modern warfare in defensive operations against seaworne landings, we cannot fail to guard against enemy troops attacking our rear or flank, defend against strong enemy attacks by means of the firepower of naval artillery or the air force and sometimes even missiles, especially in the stage when troops are making their landing, and guard against the use of chemical weapons and weapons of mass murder, even the electronic warfare measures of the enemy. Consequently, preparing the forces and the system of battle positions to defend against enemy air attacks and airborne landings and guard against the enemy enveloping us by river routes while making use of camouflage and decoy forces and building battle fortifications and force mobility have become very important matters.

According to military summaries, in World War II, there were as many as 50 cases of airborne landings coordinated with seaworne landings to attack the rear or the flank of forces defending against landings. There were even times when seaworne landings met with defeat but airborne landings resulted in victory, as
was the case when the British army routed the German fascist army conducting a
seaborne landing but airborne troops of Germany occupied the island of Crete
(Greece) in May, 1941. Therefore, it would be a mistake in defensive operations
against seaborne landings to not attach appropriate importance to and not
properly organize the effort to defend against airborne landings.

As regards the matter of camouflage and the deception of the enemy in defending
against landings, many military books remind us that the German army deployed
equipment in areas on the northern coast of France to "create the impression of
danger" for airborne landing operations and constructed "traps" that appeared
to be vital defense areas in order to deceive the opposition. The British, on
the other hand, used "intimidating" camouflage by deploying on the shores of their
country many types of fake combat weapons and technical equipment. This was
one of the important reasons why the German army thought that the British had
a "strong defense" and abandoned their plan to attack the British Isles in 1940
and 1941. Camouflage and deceiving the enemy in defensive operations against
landings can be achieved in many ways: taking advantage of the terrain to deploy
troops and technical weapons and using materials to provide concealment while
concealing battle positions and building fake battle positions; using secrecy and
decoys in information and liaison operations; causing radio interference;
transporting decoy troops and giving a false impression of force mobility, etc.

The Effectiveness of the System Reconnoitering and Detecting Enemy Landing Forces

In defensive operations against seaborne landings, countries usually do not
deploy large forces in their coastal waters year after year in order to defend
against landing troops at a time when they see no signs that the opposition will
attempt a landing. Nor do they stretch their forces along a coastline measuring
thousands or many thousands of kilometers in order to organize a defense against
seaborne landings. The problem faced is that of tightly managing the offshore
waters, conducting reconnaissance and observation and detecting and determining
the signs of preparation for a landing by the opposition in order to strengthen
our defenses, organize the system of defenses against seaborne landings and
mobilize and centralize combat forces and means at the right time and in the
necessary area. Therefore, conducting reconnaissance and determining the
intention and actions of the enemy at an early date are a manifestation of
activism and initiative in coastal defense work, in defending against seaborne
landings. The system that reconnoiters and detects the enemy at sea is a part
of the warning and reconnaissance system of the nationwide defense organization
and operates in a manner closely coordinated with the other systems.

In order to achieve surprise, the attacking side usually employs many methods of
camouflage in all stages of the landing campaign, from the stage of preparing
for the campaign and having troops board ships to the stage of landing forces
departing, travelling at sea and landing on the beach of the opposition. For
this reason, reconnoitering and detecting the enemy in a precise and timely manner
is not simple work.

In the stage of preparing for a landing campaign, the attacking side usually
looks for every way to cause the opposition to incorrectly predict the site at which
the landing will occur, when troops will land, the direction of the main offensive and the forces participating in the landing. They can employ such tricks as sending false signals, spreading rumors to direct our attention in the wrong direction, transporting decoy troops, organizing fake command agencies, destroying the technical observation system of the side defending against the landing, deploying their material support plans and means for the landing campaign at many different sites in a minimum amount of time, reducing the amount of time taken to make preparations, etc. In actuality, the preparations for the landing campaigns at Sicily and Okinawa required 6 months and for the Normandy landing required 2 years. Therefore, if it organizes reconnaissance and observation operations well, collects strategic intelligence on political and military affairs, on the mobilization of the army and means of war, on the preparation of ships and the training of landing forces and so forth of the opposition, the side defending against a landing can detect the enemy early and attack the enemy while they are still far away.

In the various stages of moving troops at sea and landing troops, the side making the landing can employ many measures, such as taking advantage of geological and meteorological conditions; jamming the electronic radio equipment of the opposition in order to conceal the location of their forces; camouflaging their ships as merchant vessels; conducting highly visible operations in a secondary area; having landing units depart from many seaports and proceed to landing sites by many different routes; staging a symbolic landing and staging fake paratroop landings in order to draw our attention in the wrong direction; landing troops over a broad area and coordinating landing troops with bombing raids by aircraft and artillery firepower when the landing begins or not using any aircraft or artillery at all in order to achieve the factor of surprise and so forth. As a result, the problem facing forces defending against a seaborne landing is that they must have a complete observation network that employs modern equipment, makes full use of rudimentary means, has specialized forces as its nucleus and utilizes the widespread capabilities of the non-specialized forces in and outside the army in the offshore waters and along the seacoast. It is necessary to coordinate ground and sea reconnaissance with reconnaissance from the air; coordinate signal gathering and optical reconnaissance with electronic reconnaissance; coordinate the various branches and services participating in the defense against the landing; and coordinate military intelligence with civilian intelligence to insure that landing forces do not go undetected. Here, it is necessary to recall what happened during the Normandy incident in 1944: even Germany knew for certain that the allies were preparing to attack France, in their defense against the landing, German reconnaissance failed to detect 700 ships of the landing forces that appeared from the southern seaports of Great Britain and advanced toward the northern coast of France.

Because the side that is conducting the landing employs many modern technical means and coordinates numerous camouflage and decoy measures, the side defending against the landing must give very much attention to maintaining regulations, procedures and discipline in the management of offshore waters; conducting reconnaissance, making observations, following developments and reporting developments; supplementing and filtering information; and rapidly restoring reconnaissance and observation systems that have been destroyed to insure a timely and uninterrupted flow of information and communications.
The Effectiveness of the Command Organization in Coordinating Combat Operations Against Landings

Combat operations defending against seaborne landings are combat operations that are coordinated among many more branches and services than any other type of combat or campaign because it involves the participation of the national navy, air force, ground forces, air defense forces and sometimes even the strategic missile forces and the majority or virtually all of the branches subordinate to these services. Therefore, the unique feature of the command organization in the defense against seaborne landings is that it is a large-scale, coordinated command organization.

Effectiveness in the art of defending against seaborne landings is manifested in early and accurate detection of the enemy; in organizing the landing defense system in a prompt and strong manner; in using and closely coordinating the operations of subordinate forces in order to create the greatest possible strength for successfully fighting the enemy in all stage of the opposition's landing campaign; and, in particular, in precisely determining important opportunities, areas and targets in order to crush the landing of the enemy with high combat efficiency.

World War II established the precedent for attacking landing troops at their point of departure and in the process of their movement at sea. Many military documents show that the attacks by U.S. aircraft carriers on the Port of Lae and the Port of Salamaua in March, 1942, which put more than one-half the Japanese ships there that were preparing for a landing out of combat, was related to the defeat of Japan in the landing to occupy Morseby (New Guinea) in May, 1942. The defeat of Japan in the attack on Midway Island in June, 1942 was a case in which the landing flotilla had been destroyed while still at sea. In the attempt by Germany to attack and occupy the island of Crete in Greece in May, 1941, the seaborne landing troops were unsuccessful because both the first and second landing units suffered heavy losses on their way to the island.

Today, with such modern means of war as strategic aircraft, inter-continental missiles, large, nuclear powered aircraft carriers and so forth, the side defending against a landing is increasingly able to destroy a seaborne landing campaign by the opposition at its point of departure, when troops are boarding ships and when landing troops are being transported at sea. In the case of hostile countries that are only separated by a narrow bay or sea, this capability is a realistic capability even when the defending country does not have long-range strategic weapons. Of course, in such a defense against landings, command operations must be very effective, very determined, very positive. They must be command operations that correctly and promptly employ the strength of the navy and the air force on a large scale and employ the forces of the navy and air force as well as the air forces of the navy on the basis of extremely precise calculations consistent with the combat mission and existing capabilities as well as on the basis of extremely precise intelligence in order to firmly assure victory.
World War II also showed that the highest requirements regarding command operations to coordinate the defense against a seaborne landing generally occur in the stage in which the enemy deploys its formation to advance toward the beach and conduct the landing. In this stage, each and every force participating in the campaign to defend against the landing must play the greatest possible role in order to annihilate the enemy while they are still in the water and not allow them to step foot on the beach. Therefore, this coordination must be very specific with regard to the targets that must be destroyed, the area of combat operations, the range of firepower effectiveness, the timing of the start of the operation and the duration of the operation. The targets that must be destroyed are usually command ships, troop transport ships, landing craft and aircraft carriers carrying helicopters for use in landings.

The effectiveness of the command organization in combat operations against landings also lies in predicting the primary direction from which the landing will occur and the primary formation of the forces conducting the landing and promptly making accurate decisions concerning the utilization, reorganization and mobilization of forces and means. Here, the commander must be calm, creative, alert and determined in order to guide the combat operations of the units in the various branches and services in smoothly coordinating with one another, attacking the enemy at those ranges and in those areas permitted by capabilities, from far away to near, and hitting the primary formation of the landing forces, thereby delivering a decisive blow in order to rapidly defeat their campaign.

The landing operation and the operations in support of landing forces on the beach require many support, artillery and air forces. If these forces are weakened or destroyed, the plan to attack from the sea will be threatened. As a result, destroying the aircraft carriers, large battleships and the aircraft of the attacking side is one of the primary matters in commanding a campaign to defend against a landing.

Many measures must be employed and many forces must be coordinated in commanding the defense against a landing in order to organize coastal air defenses and air defense operations at bases and attack enemy forces landing by air, thereby insuring control of the air in the area of the campaign, primarily on the main front and in the decisive period of the campaign. The experience of World War II showed that when the side defending against a landing isolates the component that has reached the shore from the remaining components of the enemy's forces that are still at sea and launches a surprise counter-attack against the rear or the flank of the formation, the defenders usually annihilate the attackers. Therefore, submarines, large and small surface vessels and primarily aircraft are employed to surround the jump-off points occupied by the landing forces. At those places at which the defenders gain control of the air, they are usually able to cut the communications at sea and the contacts among the units of the landing forces, thereby competently helping the defense against the landing to be victorious. The command organization must also concern itself with the matters
of retaliating against and crushing sea raids conducted by armed vessels of the opposition, small-scale raids in the nature of reconnaissance or sabotage operations by the enemy and attacks to occupy favorable terrain first and throughout the course of their landing campaign.

Victory in defensive operations against landings is very heavily dependent upon the formulation and implementation of the landing defense campaign plan. This plan must reflect the deployment of the enemy's forces and our forces; predict the methods and direction of attack of the enemy; predict the combat missions of the combat units in the various branches, services and arms of the military; and predict the order in which and the time by which these missions will be completed in accordance with a combat plan that encompasses the greatest possible number of eventualities; and setting forth comprehensive support measures for the campaign, the command organization and coordination. The staff agencies on the various echelons and the heads of the various sectors must, on the basis of the decision of the campaign commander and the campaign plan, prepare to utilize the forces under their control and initiate operations in an urgent and coordinated manner. In particular, the persons engaged in staff work must familiarize themselves with the parallel work method, always make calculations in a well based manner, not forget any force or component and have a firm grasp of the combat capabilities of units and the technical and tactical properties of equipment in order to make use of the combined strength of all elements of the branches and services participating in the campaign and, on this basis, increase the effectiveness of command activities to coordinate combat operations.

The Combat Capabilities of the Various Branches and Services in Defensive Operations Against Landings and Developing the Role Played by Them in These Operations

Combat against seaborne landings places very high demands upon the combat capabilities of units. Of course, these capabilities can only be formed through the serious combat training of all branches, services and arms of the military and through basic, comprehensive and systematic training in technology, tactics, physical conditioning, discipline and style of fighting. In addition to general requirements, combat at sea and along the seacoast have special requirements in many areas. Everything from the techniques involved in piloting aircraft at sea and the tactics of the air force in the air space over the sea, from the firing equipment and the actual firing of coastal missiles and artillery in order to hit targets at sea...to the activities of the various types of naval ships at sea and along the coast to coordinate with forces on the shore and in the air in attacks on the landing forces and so forth differ completely from the independent operations of each branch and service and from operations on the mainland. Moreover, all branches and services participating in the defense against a landing find it difficult to avoid the offensive measures taken by the enemy by means of electronic equipment. For this reason, training in the techniques and tactics of combat at sea, along the seacoast and in the air space over the area in which the defense against a landing is taking place and training in the measures for retaliating against the electronic warfare of landing forces,
in organizing, commanding and carrying out staff work and information-liaison support work and maneuvers for each unit as well as coordinated maneuvers in the offshore waters and along the seacoast have become a major requirements in order to create the necessary combat capabilities for the units defending the seacoast and defending against seaborne landings. The local army units, militia units and self-defense units on the islands and the seacoast, which are familiar with the offshore waters, must be assigned suitable tasks and must train and conduct maneuvers based on these tasks and on the plan for defending against landings.

In the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, we gained much experience in defending against the air and naval war of destruction of the United States and against sea and coastal blockades by the United States. These are valuable experiences that we must apply in a positive and selective manner to the new conditions of a war to defend the fatherland. However, these experiences alone are not enough to meet the requirements regarding modern combat capabilities in defensive operations against seaborne landings in a war to defend the fatherland. Consequently, combat training, combined maneuvers and maneuvers conducted in accordance with the combat plan have become increasingly necessary.

Even when the combat capabilities of the units of the branches and services defending the seacoast and defending against seaborne landings meet these requirements, victory in defending against seaborne landings still depends, to a very important degree, upon developing the role of each branch and service in coordinated combat operations.

The realities of World War II showed that the specifics involved in developing the role of the various branches and services in defensive operations against seaborne landings are not fixed, rather, they can change periodically depending upon the level of organization, the equipment and the combat capabilities of each army, upon the comparison of forces of the participants in the war and upon the specific battlefield situation. In the British and American armies, because their navies were strong, they had the main task of destroying the landing forces of the enemy at sea and on their way to beaches. Of these forces, the basic force was the large surface vessels, especially the attack aircraft carriers and coastal air force. Therefore, this usually led to battles at sea and in the air waged by large naval and air groups. Due to the superiority of the British and the Americans at sea and in the air, the German fascists considered ground forces to play the primary role in campaigns against landings. The German army usually relied upon its pre-deployed system of coastal defenses to annihilate landing forces of the opposition. However, the nature of combat in the defensive campaigns of the Japanese army against landings changed much in the course of the war. When the naval forces of Japan were still strong, the primary task of defending against U.S. landing forces was assigned to the aircraft carriers, the large surface vessels and the air force. When Japan no longer controlled the sea, the Japanese military command primarily had the forces of the army perform these missions. These forces used the dense network of permanent
projects and the various types of natural and manmade obstacles along the seacoast in their combat operations.

Despite the changes and differences mentioned above, many matters in the nature of laws governing the utilization of the various branches and services in operations against seaborne landings have emerged. They include utilizing the air force, the navy and the air forces of the navy as the primary force for defeating the campaign of the attacking side at their point of departure and in the course of the movement of landing forces at sea and attacking landing forces while they are still far away. They include making integrated use of all forces of the air force, the navy, the coastal firepower system and the artillery, tanks, infantry and so forth of ground units as well as every local force that can be mobilized in order to create a tremendous coordinated combat strength with which to attack landing forces when they arrive in the landing area, deploy their formation and begin to carry out their landing. They include the utilization of strategic air defense forces, field air defense forces and local air defense forces together with the air forces participating in the campaign to defend against a landing in air defense activities to gain control of the air space over the area of the landing, etc.

Therefore, we must improve the combat capabilities of units on the basis of the principles governing the utilization of the branches and services in defensive operations against seaborne landings and must, on the basis of the combat mission and the actual combat capabilities of units, apply these principles in a correct and reasonable manner, thereby creating a tremendous combined strength with which to win victory over the enemy in defensive operations against seaborne landings.

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LOCAL SUPPLIES EMPHASIZED IN SUPPORTING TROOPS

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 5, May 82 pp 44-51

Exchange of Experiences column: "Organizing and Supporting the Living Conditions of Troops"

Editorial Note: recently, the Rear Services General Department held a conference on supporting the living conditions of troops. The Military Supplies Department also organized a conference on resolving the problems regarding the meals of troops. We have printed excerpts from the speeches by Major General Dinh Thien, acting head of the Rear Services General Department, and Senior Colonel Le Tien Thinh, chief of the Military Supplies Department, at these conferences.

SEVERAL MEASURES FOR ORGANIZING AND SUPPORTING THE LIVING CONDITIONS OF TROOPS

Excerpts from speech by Major General Dinh Thien

In order to successfully carry out one of the major work programs on rear service work in 1982, namely "endeavoring to maintain and support the living conditions of troops (in terms of food, clothing, shelter and health care) while trying to steadily increase and maintain the percentage of able-bodied troops and organise the rescue and treatment of wounded and ill soldiers in a prompt manner reflecting high quality," the effort to support the living conditions of troops in the new situation must involve the successful implementation of the following measures:

1. It is Necessary, on the Basis of the Firm Battle Position and the Combined Strength of the People's War, To Develop upon the Strengths of the Entire Country and Each Locality, Accelerate Production To Create Local Sources of Supplies and Reduce the Strain on the Transportation System

The units and agencies throughout the army must adopt guidelines and plans for efficiently utilizing and organizing their forces and must establish reasonable modes of labor in order to further accelerate the movement to increase production with a view toward producing an increasingly large quantity of grain, food products and consumer goods; at the same time, they must organize the processing
of crops well in order to use some in the meals of troops, use some to support livestock production and put some in storage. In conjunction with accelerating production in accordance with the plan and norms of the army, it is necessary to actively participate in the building districts, provinces and municipalities that are economically and socially strong in order to lay the groundwork for building rear service bases and establishing strong local rear service positions within the people's war to protect the fatherland. Of first and primary importance is the need to coordinate with expanding the construction of the district fortresses and the combat groups and villages on the border defense line in the North and along the seacoast in order to work with the various localities to accelerate the movement to increase production and create local sources of supplies with a view toward effectively maintaining and improving the diet of troops while always having grain and food products in reserve, thereby reducing the need for transportation from the rear.

The units on the frontline must make an effort to meet some of their units' need for green vegetables. All places can raise fish, poultry or livestock and produce some subsidiary food crops and grain in order to supplement the daily diet and establish reserves.

The units on the rear line must make every effort to accelerate production and increase the output of grain and food products. As regards crop production, importance must be attached to raising vegetables, beans, peanuts, sesame, industrial crops, fruit crops, tobacco, sugarcane, tea, pineapples, bananas and so forth. As regards livestock production, it is necessary to strongly increase the size of hog, buffalo and cattle herds and accelerate the movement to build "Uncle Ho fish ponds" with high economic returns. As regards grain, the more subsidiary food crops and grain that can be produced in a manner consistent with capabilities and without affecting the combat readiness of the unit, the better.

In order to achieve the objectives mentioned above, in addition to maintaining the production of food around barracks and battle positions, the various services, branches, military corps, divisions, military regions, provinces and districts should strongly develop small and medium-scale centralized production installations. All of these organizations have forces that specialize in labor in accordance with the table of organization and receive some seed, capital, supplies and necessary production equipment. Where favorable land conditions exist, it is possible to organize these forces into state farms and forestry sites that operate under cost accounting with a view toward meeting some of the needs of the unit and locality for grain and food products and eventually contributing to the nation's needs.

In conjunction with organizing production, importance must be attached to building installations that process grain and food products, primarily to developing the various forms of small-scale processing by means of manual tools and folk methods in order to process subsidiary food crops and wheat, make bean curd, soysauce, dried food products and so forth.
The units and localities that have the conditions needed to carry out industrial production should strongly develop the sectors and trades that make hats, soap, candy, clothing, building materials and the various types of barracks furniture of wood and iron while gradually strengthening and building new barracks and improving the equipment used by the unit in its work and studies.

The units and localities on the frontline as well as those in the rear must accelerate the production and cultivation of pharmaceuticals. Every company should have a medicinal herb garden in order to treat ordinary illnesses. All regiments and divisions should have installations processing medicinal herbs in order to meet some of their medicine needs on their own.

2. Closely Coordinating with the Localities, Provinces, Districts and Villages in Order To Build Models of Organizing and Supporting the Living Conditions of Troops Locally

Organizing and supporting the living conditions of troops by means of local products in coordination with the supplies received from the upper echelon and from far away is a correct step to take, is a step that is consistent with the present circumstances of the country. To accomplish this, we must know the strengths of each area and adopt good guidelines, plans and measures for developing upon these strengths in order to work with the various localities to build models of organizing and supporting the living conditions of troops. In addition to working closely with the locality in order to receive and utilize all of the supplies distributed locally, it is necessary to organize the receiving of products from afar in coordination with two-way transportation or to trade products that have been produced with the locality in order to increase the sources of supplies for troops.

The year 1982 will mark the organizing and gradual development of the army commerce system in the regiments and divisions and the organizing of canteens in battalions and companies. In coordination with the commerce sectors of the provinces and districts, the organizing of general merchandise stores or local service stores will help to meet the essential needs of cadres and soldiers and actively contribute to managing the market and stabilizing prices within the locality. Together with the local public health agencies and installations, it is necessary to organize and maintain good disease prevention sanitation among the people and troops. Depending upon the capabilities and strengths of each locality, each regiment should establish two to three relatively complete installations supporting the living conditions of troops in order to gain experience and create the conditions for expanding these installations in 1983.

3. Strengthening Management, Practicing Strict Economy, Upholding Every Right and Delivering Consumer Goods to the Hands of Each Soldier

Practicing thorough economy has become a national policy of our state. As regards the people's armed forces, practicing strict economy in consumption means creating the highest possible returns from rear service materials in the daily lives of
troops and in maintaining combat readiness as well as in combat. Every sector and level must have a specific economization program for its sector and level and for each kitchen. We must immediately put an end to unnecessary expenditures and strongly reduce the consumption and waste of products in order to meet all the standards applicable to soldiers.

In order to create a widespread economization movement throughout the army, it is necessary, in conjunction with teaching ideology, to take appropriate administrative and economic steps, award fair bonuses, exact fair penalties and promptly provide incentive for units and individuals to implement the economization policy well.

Importance must be attached to further strengthening the various management measures in an effort to reduce the loss rate during transportation and at warehouses. We must fully implement the system for reclaiming old goods, damaged goods and packing materials in order to put back into use or recycle products at the rate of 50 to 90 percent of the quantity of products issued (depending upon each product).

All of the activities mentioned above must be closely guided; in particular, we must regularly conduct inspections, take inventory of goods and implement the joint troop strength inspection system and the payment and settlement of accounts regulations. We must put an end to theft and the failure to fully comply with the orders, regulations and provisions regarding the use of military gear, grain, food products, medicine and so forth in order to insure a full supply in exact accordance with standards to each soldier while taking determined steps to combat every act of pilfering and unfair, unreasonable distribution in the various elements and on the various levels.

4. Strengthening the Leadership of the Various Party Committee Echelons, Developing upon the Capabilities of the Masses and Heightening the Responsibility of the Deputy Commander in Charge of Rear Services and the Rear Service Agency in Order To Support the Living Conditions of Troops Well

The party committee echelon must provide direct and comprehensive leadership of the effort to organize and support the living conditions of troops and must, in particular, routinely inspect the organization of the implementation of the resolutions of the party committee concerning organizing and supporting living conditions while fully developing the responsibility of the deputy commander in charge of rear services and the rear service agency in the effort to organize living conditions.

The commanders on the various levels, who are the persons responsible for organizing and supporting the living conditions of troops, must, on the basis of the directives and orders of the upper level and the resolutions of the unit's party committee, adopt correct, specific programs, plans, norms and measures and, at the same time, routinely inspect, supervise and closely guide the organization of their implementation by rear service cadres and the rear service agency.
As the persons who are directly responsible for organizing and supporting the living conditions of troops, the deputy commanders in charge of rear services must display a high sense of responsibility in managing the rear service agencies, must take positive steps to overcome every difficulty and must display creativity in organizing implementation in order to meet the food, clothing, shelter and health care needs of troops well in every situation with a view toward maintaining and improving the health of troops.

Rear service cadres, soldiers and personnel must consider supporting the living conditions of troops to be their primary political task and must always consciously try to overcome difficulties, complete tasks well and successfully meet stipulated norms.

The cadres and soldiers of agencies and units must regularly be educated in the sense of collective ownership, must comply with established regulations and standards well and must help to tightly manage grain, food products, military gear and military supplies in order to prevent losses. At the same time, they must voluntarily, actively and fully participate in the performance of each rear service task of the unit, especially in productive labor as well as in the management and practice of economization.

**MAINTAINING THE EATING STANDARD OF TROOPS**

Excerpts from speech by Senior Colonel Le Tien Thinh

In 1982, we must meet the following norms and take the following measures:

1. Supporting Combat, Maintaining Combat Readiness and Building the Army

It is necessary to keep very closely abreast of the changing situations on the various battlefields in order to promptly support the immediate combat mission while making every effort to build and firmly strengthen the unit in every respect while preparing for a large-scale war should one occur.

In the process of performing the jobs mentioned above, one routine job of immediate, pressing significance and basic, long-range significance in supporting combat and the maintenance of combat readiness is that of very strictly complying with the regulations on the maintenance of combat reserve forces in terms of grain and food products for each echelon and each area.

As regards grain, it is absolutely necessary to provide a full and regular supply of grain while trying to increase and not consume grain reserves. From the strategic echelon to the campaign and combat echelon, we must always have a plan for inspecting and determining the stockpiles of grain at key places and must always maintain the required level of grain reserves. If grain reserves fall below the stipulated level, they must be promptly replenished from granaries in the rear and, when it becomes necessary to trade grain, this must be done immediately in order to not allow a shortage to occur or allow a situation to
develop in which there are no grain reserves. There must be close guidance and inspection of compliance with the regulations concerning the storage of grain.

--It is necessary to promptly and fully support the plans for moving and adjusting forces while properly supporting maneuvers and, in this manner, conducting a review and gaining valuable, practical experience in order to improve the qualifications of the cadres and agencies within the sector and supplement the campaign and combat support plan.

--It is necessary to strongly promote the formulation of the plan for preparing to mobilize military supplies in accordance with the overall plan of the ministry in order to be ready to take the initiative in meeting every mobilization requirement in war time.

--It is necessary to strengthen the periodic and unscheduled inspections of compliance with the regulations and rules governing air defense, artillery defense and defense against enemy sabotage, thereby insuring the absolute safety of grain and food storehouses and the means required to provide military supplies in combat.

2. Regularly Supporting the Living Conditions of Troops

It is necessary to closely coordinate the receiving of all goods supplied under standards with developing local sources of goods and accelerating production and processing; every effort must be focused on meeting the need for food and essential consumer goods in order to help stabilize the living conditions of troops and promptly support the various tasks of the army.

The requirement of supporting and maintaining the eating standard of troops must involve a very large effort on the part of the various agencies and units, the entire country and each locality. Each battlefield, each front and each area of operations must make the highest possible use of the economic capabilities of the locality and adopt appropriate support modes that are based on the requirements of troop messing and are consistent with the policy regarding establishing a balance within the province and district. As regards grain, the state has adopted the policy that every locality must meet its own need for grain in 1982. The state has assigned the army the task of taking delivery of grain from the provinces in the rear and shipping it to the front to support the units on the frontline. In order to correctly implement this policy, the military supplies sector on the various levels absolutely must take specific and well coordinated measures and work with the grain sector, the transportation sector, the finance sector and other sectors in and outside the army in order to do a very good job of receiving, transporting and storing grain. On the other hand, in order to maintain the flow of supplies at the present level of ration standards and supplement grain reserves, all units must accelerate their production in order to insure that ration standards are met. By implementing the mode of supplying grain locally, the units receiving grain within the
locality will also receive a certain percentage of subsidiary food crops, consequently, they must take the initiative in organizing the prompt processing of all of these crops to insure that the ration standards of troops are met. All types of grain, subsidiary food crops and wheat supplied under ration standards must be very tightly managed, must be stored very well and must be distributed for use in meals in exact accordance with standards and ration requirements. The grain that is supplied in accordance with the ration standards for daily meals of soldiers absolutely may not be used to trade for supplies, goods, etc.

As regards food products, we must be determined to maintain the level of supply to the units that are performing an international task, units on the frontline and units on the islands regardless of the situation. In order to provide good support in this area, it is necessary to strengthen the division of levels: some food products should be transported from the upper level to the lower level and some food products should be obtained locally by the unit. We must thoroughly organize the receiving of food products, harvest and process food products locally and increase food product production in order to fully meet the food ration standards of the unit. At the same time, we must give attention to insuring that food products are distributed to the right persons, distributed in exact accordance with standards and distributed in a fair and reasonable manner and insuring that supply norms are only used to meet basic food ration standards and are absolutely not distributed to persons who receive allowances to purchase their food at high prices.

We must closely guide the basic units, especially the units on the frontline; we must guide the redistribution of food among the various kitchens and the adjustment of food supplies from one day to the next in order to avoid a situation in which there are shortages at some places and surpluses at others. We must initiate weighing, counting and measuring procedures as well as public cost accounting at kitchens. We must be determined to build skilled troop messing centers and introduce scientific and technological advances in their support operations in order to gain experience for guiding all other units.

The year 1982 is the first year in the implementation of the mode of providing supplies at high prices to a number of recipients, consequently, these units will encounter difficulties organizing and creating sources of supplies; therefore, each unit must strengthen its ties with the local commerce sector and develop the army commerce system on the various levels in order to create additional sources of goods.

As regards general merchandise, the level of supply of main products stipulated for each recipient will be maintained but units from the general department level to the division and regimental level must be responsible for developing additional sources of goods for their units by establishing relations with the various localities to purchase goods not governed by ration standards and purchase these goods in accordance with the supply capabilities of the commerce sector.
3. Making Every Effort To Create Sources of Military Supplies

The supply sources of the state are the primary, regular and most important sources of supplies. Making an effort to create every possible condition for receiving all of the supplies provided under the norms of the state plan is the responsibility and the most important objective of the various professional sectors. Units must maintain close contact with state agencies and be ready to receive supplies, ready in terms of finances and transportation, to take all of the supplies provided under state norms.

In conjunction with organizing the receiving of goods supplied by the state, it is necessary to accelerate the development of local sources. Wherever their troops are stationed, all units must organize the development of local sources of supplies well by means of making full use of the results of productive labor, increasing their purchases or engaging in trade in order to meet some of their food needs. Units maintaining combat readiness on the border must at least try on their own to meet their need for vegetables and some of their need for food products. Each and every activity of units to organize and develop local sources of supplies must be carried out in accordance with a unified program and plan and must be closely linked to the activities of the commerce sector and each locality in order to create sources of goods, insure good distribution and circulation and manage the market and prices well.

Under the present two price policy, in addition to receiving all of the goods supplied in accordance with ration standards at supply prices, units must give their attention to expanding the development of sources of supplies outside plan norms and strengthening their processing operations. Units as well as military supply stations must attach full importance to establishing relations with the locality, making the army commerce system of the unit a center of commerce in the locality and fully utilizing the capabilities and strengths of the locality and the unit to develop additional sources of goods at negotiated prices and engage in trade to increase the supply of goods to the unit.

All agencies and units in the rear and all units on the frontline must expand the processing of supplies in order to increase the quantity, variety and quality of troop messing supplies, insure that the unit receives the full amount of food required under its standard and prevent spoilage and waste.

4. Accelerating Production

The grain and food products produced by the unit are an important source of supplies, one that helps to maintain the eating standard of troops. Units must develop upon their own capabilities and the capabilities of the locality in which they are stationed to produce additional grain and food products in order to insure that ration standards are met and create grain and food reserves. At those places at which favorable conditions exist in terms of arable land, the climate and weather, it is necessary to make full use of all land, engage in intensive cultivation to increase crop yields and produce agricultural products of high
economic value in order to carry out trade among units and within the military supply sector with a view toward stimulating production and improving the diet of soldiers. However, regardless of the scale on which production is increased, the economic returns of production and the results in improving the diet of soldiers must be taken into consideration and a determined effort must be made to combat the practice of operating in any manner seen fit and carrying out production at any cost.

5. Strengthening Management and Practicing Thorough Economy

If, in the work of organizing and supporting the meals of soldiers, we do not provide good management, do not practice economy and allow losses to occur, the eating standard of troops will decline even if the state provides a full supply of products and the unit increases its production. We must tightly manage every activity, especially distribution, not operate in a haphazard fashion, and insure that supplies are delivered to the proper recipients in exact accordance with standards and policy. Key products must be distributed in accordance with stipulated troop strength; if the actual troop strength of the unit differs from its stipulated troop strength, the upper level must certify the unit's troop strength before issuing supplemental supplies. Strict economy must be practiced in all areas: production, processing, transportation, storage in warehouses and consumption. From the military supply agencies and units on the strategic level to each kitchen, each cadre, each personnel and soldier, everyone must have a specific plan quota in order to endeavor to successfully meet the requirements set forth by the Ministry regarding the practice of economy.

In order to strengthen management and practice economy, we must look for every way to apply scientific-technological advances in every area of the activities of the military supplies sector. We must properly comply with inspection, control and inventory regulations, especially those regarding goods and the processing of goods, comply with payment and settlement of account regulations, joint troop strength verification regulations, the regulations and policies governing distribution and use and so forth. In conjunction with taking positive steps to prevent and stop acts involving misappropriation and waste, it is necessary to appropriately deal with misappropriation and waste and properly praise and reward those units and individuals that provide good management and practice economization well.

7309
CSO: 4209/454
PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

NEW DISTRICT BOUNDARIES DRAWN, NAMES CHANGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Sep 82 p 4

[Text] VNA—On 30 August, the Council of Ministers issued a decision redrawing the administrative boundaries of some districts and changing the name of Dong Thieu District in Thanh Hoa Province as follows:

1. Luong Ngoc District is divided into two new ones under the name of Lang Chanh and Ngoc Lac Districts.

   a. Lang Chanh District comprises 10 villages named Yen Khuong, Yen Thanh, Tri Nang, Giao An, Giao Thien, Quang Hien, Tam Van, Tan Phuc, Dong Luong and Lam Phu.

   The office of the District People's Committee is in Dong Luong Village.

   The boundaries of Lang Chanh District are as follows: It borders on Ba Thuoc District to the north, on Thuong Xuan District to the south, on Ngoc Lac District to the east and on Quan Hoa District to the west.

   b. Ngoc Lac District comprises 20 villages named My Tan, Van Am, Cao Ngoc, Nguyet An, Phung Giao, Phung Minh, Phuc Thinh, Kien Tho, Minh Son, Minh Tien, Ngoc Trung, Cao Thinh, Loc Thinh, Ngoc Son, Ngoc Lien, Quang Trung, Dong Thinh, Thach Lap, Thuy Son and Ngoc Khe and also includes two state farm towns named Lam Son and Song Am.

   The office of the District People's Committee is in Ngoc Khe Village.

   The boundaries of Ngoc Lac District are as follows: It borders on Cam Thuy and Ba Thuoc Districts to the north, on Thuong Xuan and Tho Xuan Districts to the south, on Tho Xuan District to the east and on Lang Chanh District to the west.

2. Vinh Thanh District is divided into two new ones named Thach Thanh and Vinh Loc Districts.

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a. Thach Thanh District comprises 25 villages named Thach Tuong, Thach Lam, Thach Yen, Thach Son, Thach Binh, Thach Cam, Thach Dinh, Thach Dong, Thach Long, Thach Vinh, Thanh Truc, Thanh Tan, Thanh Quang, Thanh My, Thanh Minh, Thanh Cong, Thanh Tam, Thanh Van, Thanh Tho, Thanh An, Ngoc Trac, Thanh Long, Thanh Tien, Thanh Kim and Thanh Hung and also includes two state farm towns named Thach Thanh and Van Du.

The office of the District People's Committee is in Thanh Kim Village.

The boundaries of Thach Thanh District are as follows: It borders on Ha Nam Ninh Province to the north, on Cam Thuy and Vinh Loc Districts to the south, on Ha Trung District to the east and on Ba Thuoc District to the west.


The office of the District People's Committee is in Vinh Thanh village.

The boundaries of Vinh Loc District are as follows: It borders on Thach Thanh District to the north, on Thieu Yen District to the south, on Ha Trung District to the east and on Cam Thuy and Thieu Yen Districts to the west.

3. Trung Son District is divided into two new ones named Ha Trung and Nga Son Districts.

a. Ha Trung District comprises 24 villages named Ha Long, Ha Giang, Ha Bac, Ha Tien, Ha Yen, Ha Tan, Ha Binh, Ha Linh, Ha Son, Ha Dong, Ha Ngoc, Ha Phong, Ha Ninh, Ha Lam, Ha Duong, Ha Van, Ha Thanh, Ha Thai, Ha Lai, Ha Chau, Ha Phu, Ha Hai, Ha Toai and Ha Vinh.

The office of the District People's Committee is in Ha Phong Village.

The boundaries of Ha Trung District are as follows: It borders on Bim Son City to the north, on Hau Loc District to the south, on Nga Son District to the east and on Thach Thanh and Vinh Loc Districts to the west.


The office of the District People's Committee is in Nga My Village.

The boundaries of Nga Son District are as follows: It borders on Ha Nam Ninh Province to the north, on Hau Loc District to the south, on the Eastern Sea to the east and on Ha Trung District to the west.

4. The name of Dong Thieu District is changed into Dong Son District.

9332
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PHAM VAN DONG FORESTRY CONFERENCE TALK

OW211123 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 12, 13 Sep 82

[12 Sep 82, Part 1]

[Text] As we have reported, chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong recently called on, and addressed, the national forestry conference, which discussed measures to develop forestry according to the 1981-1985 5-year plan and during the 1980s. Comrade Pham Van Dong's address is composed of two parts. The first part is as follows:

I. Importance of Forests to Economy, Life Environment and National Defense

Located in a tropical and monsoon zone, our country is endowed with abundant tropical forests. People often speak of many countries in the world, including Vietnam, which possess abundant and beautiful forest resources. Our forefathers used the phrase "gold forests and silver seas" to affirm the richness of our country's forests.

Forests occupy an extremely important position in the economy and life. They provide essential raw materials and products for the construction industry and the communications and transportation sector and consumer goods for the people's livelihood.

Our forests contain many species of precious timber, famous special products, rare birds and beasts, valuable medicinal plants and innumerable species of trees, whose qualities, effects, scientific significance and economic value are still unknown.

Forests are a type of biological resource that is able to procreate and develop unceasingly. If they are properly exploited and if they procreate in conformity with their law of development, they will become a very important source of forest products to satisfy the requirements for national building and many other needs of our national economy and people's life.

Forestry is one of the activities which can generate a great income for the state, the collective and family-sideline economy. Forestry development is of great significance, it can help create jobs for millions of people and actively contributes to achieving labor distribution and utilization in the entire country.
When speaking of forests, we must deal with their important role vis-a-vis man's life environment. Today, in the face of the severe and serious consequences of the practice of destroying forests and of the evidence of the chain effect caused by the destruction of botanical resources, mankind can firmly attest the extreme importance of forests for the natural environment in general and the ecological environment in particular.

Forests are reservoirs for water storage and control. Forest destruction will result in devitalizing soil and destabilizing the course of rivers, brooks, streams, lakes and the capacity of dams. For this reason, to protect forests is to protect land, water conservancy and hydroelectric power projects and the source of water for man and domestic animals and to minimize damage caused by flood and drought. History has shown that, as a result of forest destruction, many countries in the world have become deserts.

In our country, due to many reasons, weather, climatic and hydrographic developments have become rather complex in recent years. And the palpable reason is that our forests, especially watershed forests, have been seriously damaged.

Forests and vegetation can also help control wind and sandstorms, purify air, reduce noise and create an environment favorable for production and human life.

The nature-protecting forests; the forests for relaxation, recreation, excursion and tourism; parks and the vegetal network, which constitute the belts around cities and industrial centers, are always connected with the requirements of social life. The higher society's living standard, the greater these requirements will be.

Regarding scientific research and the protection of nature, our country's tropical forests occupy an important position and are of great significance. Thus, we must immediately expand the systematic study of the application of plans for protecting closed, natural and nature-protecting forests and for preserving typical species of plants and animals in tropical forests.

Forests have a great effect on national defense. Throughout thousands of years in our people's struggle against foreign invasion, the role and great effect of forests on national defense have always been affirmed. Along with bringing direct economic benefits, afforestation and forest protection in our border provinces, coastal areas and elsewhere are necessary because of the immediate and permanent tasks in consolidating national defense.

Although forests have thus a great position and effect, it is regrettable that we have not yet achieved all we are capable of doing to meet the requirements for preventing and controlling natural calamities and for environmental protection. It is very important to be fully aware of the above-mentioned significance in order to pay attention to satisfactorily implementing the necessary tasks to prevent forest destruction and to henceforth establish a new order in the protection, management, building and development of forests in accordance with the new spirit of the resolution of the fifth party congress.
II. Forestry Activities in Past Years and the Tasks of Building Up and Promoting Forestry in the Coming Period

Looking back on the past more than 2 decades of organizing and building up our country's forestry, we realize that it has scored a number of achievements in serving production and the needs of socialist construction and the consolidation of production relations and material-technical bases. Especially in recent years, forestry has undergone noticeable changes and has made notable progress in the new direction: making forest preservation and replenishment of forest resources at the grassroots level a central task. Across the country we have cultivated more than 400,000 hectares of concentrated forest and planted more than 2 billion trees on dispersed areas, which cover an equivalent of more than 0.5 million hectares of cultivated forest. The cultivation rate and quality of the cultivated forests during the period 1976-1980 were better than in preceding years.

Despite our limited forest resources, the forestry sector has harvested nearly 2 million cubic meters of lumber annually to meet essential domestic needs and export needs. However, the achievements we have scored are still below our requirements and capabilities. The most noteworthy fact is that our forests are dwindling in acreage, resources, and quality. Wasteland and bare hills are increasing. Our forests' supply and protection capabilities are decreasing to an alarming level. Our forests have not been satisfactorily managed and protected. Tree planting and afforestation are developing slowly. The afforested area ratio is still low. Forest exploitation has been done without any regard to its regeneration. Wood processing and maintenance are still inadequate. Tremendous waste still occurs in the use of wood and forest products while an acute wood shortage is affecting both our state and people. All these inadequacies result from concrete causes. You, comrades, should make an in-depth review in order to find suitable measures for resolving each concrete problem correctly; and this requires your thorough grasp of the party's basic viewpoints, whose correctness has been proved by realities of the past more than 2 decades.

1. Our forests and forested land are common property of all our people; and the protection, buildup and development of forest resources also are an understanding involving our entire people—under the capitalist system, the situation is different. Therefore, our forests can be protected properly and our forestry can develop rapidly only if we succeed in making everyone clearly understand this matter and correctly work in accordance with the motto: "Joint state—people work, joint state run-collective work, joint central level—local level work." This is the viewpoint on which our party and state base the placing of our forests and forested land under district management and having the cooperatives carry out business transactions in accordance with state projects, planning and laws.

Over past years we have allocated more than 2 million hectares of forest and forested land for production and business endeavors by cooperatives, and a number of localities have carried out decentralization of power by placing
state forests under district management. However, not many achievements have been scored because the allocation of forests and forested land to cooperatives must go along with restructuring of production so that all the favorable conditions are created for cooperative production: the placing of forests under district management must go along with the improvement of the management mechanism, the strengthening of the socialist legal system, the upgrading of the district's managerial level, and the assignment and training of more forestry technicians for the district level. We should do well the work relating to the cooperative and the district level so that the allocation of forests and forested land for district management and cooperative production and business transactions in accordance with the state projects, planning and laws can rapidly have a great impact.

2. Ours is a small country with a large population and a very low per-capita amount of forest and forested land acreage and forest resources, whereas our people's multi-sided needs in everyday life and in socialist industrialization require an increasingly greater supply of resources from our forests. We can resolve these contradictions only through strict forest management and preservation and the thrifty and most efficient utilization of our existing forest resources. In the meantime, we should actively carry out afforestation on millions of hectares of wasteland and bare hills and strive, within a few 5-year plans, to achieve stable, high-quality forest resources with high economic values.

We should proceed toward performing intensive forest cultivation at an early date, toward practicing forest cultivation just as we do gardening. We should carry out comprehensive business transactions and profitably use all resources. We should attach importance to the tasks of forest regeneration, maintenance, fostering, preservation and exploitation as well as the tasks of processing and preserving forest products in order to increase efficiency in using forest resources. We must pay attention to using wood and other forest products thriftily and must adopt the most efficient policies and measures to economize on wood in exploitation, production and consumption. We must put an end to the highly irrational and wasteful use of wood. We must always pay attention to utilizing forests and forested land effectively and developing to the highest level the soil potential, the biological potentials of animals and vegetation, and all potentially favorable conditions of the tropical climate.

It is the objective and task of forestry to develop forestry in the direction of coordinating forestry and agriculture, coordinating forestry and stock-breeding, and fully and comprehensively exploiting all natural resources in the most appropriate manner. The application of the method of coordinated agriculture-forestry production not only brings about high economic efficiency but also creates an ecological pattern suitable to the natural characteristics of our country's society and helps meet our people's multi-sided requirements in everyday life. Therefore, this production method should be applied in all parts of the country.
More than 20 years ago, President Ho, our beloved and esteemed leader, initiated the tree-planting festival. This is a creative and appropriate form of combining agriculture with forestry for the provinces in the lowlands, midland and mountainous and coastal regions. As everyone knows, this has had great practical results.

We have recently reviewed the tree-planted festival movement. We should take measures to step it up widely and continuously and to further heighten its effects and quality.

The combining of agriculture and forestry must be reflected in the production orientation and tasks of each state forest, state farm and cooperative and of each family's garden. But the ways to combine agriculture with forestry are very diverse because of the differences in natural and social conditions and objectives in each region, area and production unit.

This problem requires that our country's scientists quickly create an appropriate model for combining them. In reality, models and experiences in combining agriculture with forestry have been well known among our people for many generations. We must pay attention to recapitulating these experiences in order to create typical models.

The combining of agriculture and forestry is an important progressive scientific and technical program of the state. It requires positive participation for many scientific sectors. I hope that, with a sense of responsibility and in a creative spirit, our scientists will satisfactorily complete this strategically significant research program.

3. Forests and forest land are essential objects of production. They are connected with the lives of the compatriots of various nationalities and are one of the advantages of the economy in the midlands and mountain region. The forest economy must be developed in the direction of combined agro-forestry as a part of the advance toward combining agriculture, forestry and industry. This is for the benefit of these sectors and of building socialism and defending the country. We must thoroughly comprehend and follow the party's nationalities policy in the economic and cultural construction and development of the mountainous region.

Building and developing forestry must be closely coordinated with setting and turning nomads into protectors of forests and will participate in afforestation, forest exploitation, forest product processing and in forestry, agricultural and industrial production. This is a major policy of our party and our state aimed at advancing all nationalities to the same level of development, and at equality in all aspects in the community of nationalities of the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. Thus, all echelons and sectors must closely cooperate in these activities and must properly fulfill their responsibilities. In particular, the Ministry of Forestry, which is entrusted by the party and the state with the task of uniformly managing these activities in accordance with the state guideline, plan and policy, must fulfill its responsibilities.
Since nomads of various nationalities bear their own traits, we must pay attention to the differences in their economic, cultural and social lives and in their customs and habits in order to correctly implement the policy regarding settlement of nomads. The nomad settlement committees at the central level and in each province and mountain area should assign forestry work to designated comrades who have a thorough knowledge of the party's line and policy regarding nationalities and who can deeply understand each nationality. You comrades should know that no one else can understand a nationality better than the people of that nationality who can grasp the party's viewpoint on revolution and nationalities.

Regarding the recruiting of compatriots of various nationalities for the forestry staff, it is necessary to pay attention to the characteristics of each nationality and not to apply the same system of recruitment, education, treatment and labor management. Meanwhile, it is necessary to redistribute social labor and send the compatriots from the delta to build the economy and culture in the mountainous region.

Reorganization of agro-forestry-industrial production must be coordinated with the reorganization of populous areas and the building of new townships, state forests, state farms and villages in order to improve the material and cultural livelihood of the compatriots of various nationalities and of forestry laborers and to gradually change the socioeconomic situation of the mountain region.

Regarding investments in this region, we should take into account not only the purely economic results but also the results in many other aspects, including the implementation of the party's nationalities policy.

4. The buildup and development of forestry and all other tasks in socialist construction and national defense are placed under the party's leadership, the laboring people's collective mastery, and state management. All success is dependent on firmly grasping and correctly implementing this relationship. However, today I am not going to talk at length about this principle, I am going to talk to you, comrades—including the comrades representing the provincial and municipal administrations present at this meeting—only about the question of state management of forestry by law and the necessity to uphold law enforcement in forest management and preservation and in managing the distribution of forest products and forest-derived material supplies—topical issues of forestry management.

As you know, afforestation, forest preservation, and forestry development are not done solely in the interest of the forested localities but also in the interest of the country as a whole. Destruction of forests in the mountainous region not only causes damage to the mountainous region localities, but also causes greater damage to production and the lives of our people in the Red River delta and in the entire country.
When a piece of equipment or an item of supplies is destroyed, we suffer a concrete loss that may be calculated in terms of money; but when a forest—a greenery network—is destroyed, its harmful effect is incalculable, and it takes a very long time for it to be restored. That is why any state that is concerned about its forests pays attention to formulating a body of laws on forest.

In Russia, only a few months following the October Revolution victory, on 25 May 1918, Lenin signed the first Soviet administration's decree on forests. Lenin had a very firm attitude toward violators of forest and tree preservation regulations. The following account, excerpted from (Gill's) book "Six Years of Living With Lenin" is proof of his firmness.

One summer afternoon in 1919, Lenin arrived in Gorkiy village from the Kremlin. After a stroll along the pine-lined alley in the park, he came to rest on a rock. He observed the scenery and noticed that one of the two big, beautiful pines that he had seen during his previous visit to the park was missing. He summoned the warden and told him of what had happened. He angrily said: This is lawlessness. Who dared to do that? The perpetrator must be identified. We will not overlook this incident.

After an investigation, the comrade warden reported to Lenin that 2 days before the manager of the Gorkiy rest house had ordered the felling of the pine because he thought it was dying and was no longer needed. After thinking for a while, Lenin said: He must be appropriately punished for his act. And the diligent manager got a stern warning.

On another occasion he visited the (Sofol) public park. After passing by the (Bogatyr) factory and feasting his eyes on the beautiful scenery, he came across spots of resin that had come out of pine and poplar logs. Due to a fuel shortage, the factory management had sent its men to fell trees in the forest. Enraged by what he had learned, Lenin said: That is terrible. People have robbed forest property and destroyed forests. That practice must be put to an end. Do they know the consequences of forest destruction? People are deprived of resting places. It is easy to destroy a forest, but afforestation takes a long time. The following day he ordered that destruction of trees in the (Sofol) forest be immediately stopped and ordered the organization of forest and public park preservation. Afterwards, decrees were signed to protect the natural forests in 30 areas around Moscow.

In our country, although a body of forest laws still does not exist, we have laws regulating forest preservation as well as regulations on many other specific aspects. However, those laws and regulations that have the force of law have not been scrupulously enforced. Forest destroyers, poachers that kill valuable and rare species of forest fauna, people who authorize forest destruction without having to turn in forest products as regulated by law and who authorize the use of forest products at their discretion, and so forth, have not been correctly handled. It is time we do this work urgently and scrupulously in order to stop forest destruction, which entails incalculable consequences.
5. The imperative and extremely important task is to continue stepping up the tree planting movement which was launched by our very beloved and esteemed Uncle Ho.

In the past, this movement has developed in the Red River delta provinces and we must now draw experiences from it in all aspects, including the organization of forces, policy and relationships between the state enterprise and cooperatives and between cooperatives and households, in order to quickly expand the afforestation movement throughout the country.

All sectors and echelons must pay great attention to this task as well as other production tasks of the state plan.

As you know, the world is greatly concerned about the energy issue; and the developing countries, including Vietnam, are paying special attention to afforestation to solve the problem of fuel and timber, of which rural and urban areas have a great shortage. This makes us ponder, because we are living in a country endowed with sufficient solar energy, abundant rainfall, important land, plentiful manpower and trees which grow fast and are useful in many aspects.

What do you think of this situation? Reality has proved that in the Red River delta—with a small land area and a large population—a number of cooperatives, through properly organizing labor, applying a rational and sensible system of income distribution and providing close leadership and guidance, have successfully planted species of trees which yield lumber, firewood, fruit and raw materials for artisan industry and handicrafts to produce art objects and export, thus creating a great many jobs and increasing the income of cooperative members and households. On the other hand, due to their failure to plant trees, some localities, despite their vast virgin lands and the availability of labor and working tools, have suffered a shortage of firewood, lumber and other things which forests and trees can provide.

To achieve quality and effectiveness in afforestation, we must pay great attention to science and technology. What types of trees are to be planted? Where and how to plant trees? This whole series of problems must be studied and reviewed.

We possess many varieties of valuable trees, including oleaginous, resinous and indigenous trees. We must correctly determine the land area, the type of soil and necessary technical measures. In particular, we must concentrate on satisfactorily implementing seed selection, an imperative requirement of afforestation. It is the task of selecting, crossbreeding and propagating outstanding seeds that must be carried out in such a way that remarkable progress can be achieved in this task of the forestry sector so as to insure sufficient good and high-yield seeds to meet the afforestation requirements of state-operated and collective installations and the people.

One of our major objectives is to utilize many positive measures to restore soil fertility, achieve a balance in nature and insure a stable development of agricultural production.
In afforestation, good results have been obtained particularly in planting trees to improve the soil and to get firewood, lumber and fruit. Our country can achieve that. In mountainous and hilly areas where the land is steep and there are heavy rainfall and erosion, our peasants have created gardens which yield many products, such as firewood, lumber, fruit, industrial crops, grain and food products, thus creating a great source of income while protecting the soil and preserving the source of water.

In areas with many infertile and rocky grassy hills, many cooperatives and families have planted trees to improve the soil, in coordination with grain and foodstuffs production, thus further increasing their incomes and soil fertility.

So, you should seek to understand why this can be achieved in one place and not another. Is it because soil is infertile or because men have no determination? We must deeply understand and correctly implement Uncle Ho's teaching that tree planting is for 10 years' benefits and cultivation of men is for a century's interests.

If we know how to plant and select trees, we can obviously build millions of plentiful gardens which will produce large quantities of useful products for society within 10, 20 or 30 years, thereby changing the entire vast hilly area.

The party and the state have set forth two correct ways to produce sufficient grain: to achieve intensive cultivation and expansion of the existing cultivated acreage, and to build new economic zones. If an area can combine agriculture with forestry, protect forests, plant trees to improve the soil and carry out intensive cultivation on ricefields and gardens, it can make production prosper. Otherwise, if an area does not grow trees and destroys forests to obtain land on which to plant grain and food crops in such a way that the soil is depleted, land will thus be reclaimed and then left untitled.

All elements in nature have a very close dialectical mutual relationship. Any violation of this relationship will be punished. For example, tree felling and forest destruction will inevitably cause erosion, drought, low yield in cultivation and therefore insufficiency of food for human subsistence.

Theory and reality have clearly proved the important benefits of afforestation, thus, it must be carried out anywhere land is available for production, such as state forests, state farms and cooperatives. This is the implementation of the policy of the state and people working together. And afforestation is an undertaking of the entire people. If everyone and every household engages in tree planting, 10 million hectares or one-third of our country's land area, which have been left fallow, will become productive land, thus contributing to feeding all our people.

Our party's and people's efforts in turning fallow lands into prosperous economic zones and in expanding the cultivated area are very urgent and greatly significant. Expansion of cultivated land is connected with afforestation. You comrades are surely aware of that and you must have high determination to achieve it.
Party resolutions have clearly pointed out the three strengths of the midlands and mountain region, namely: forestry, industrial crops and stockbreeding. These three business lines must be interlocked, with tree planting and afforestation serving as the basis, because only with the existence of trees and forests can conditions be created for agriculture and stockbreeding development.

Developing forestry in accordance with the above factors and direction requires knowledge and a creative work method. In this domain, we have models and rich experience. Ly Nhan is a district located in the low-lying area of Ha Nam Ninh Province. Over the past more than 25 years, thanks to its coordination of agricultural and forestry activities, it has scored comprehensive achievements in intensive crop cultivation and secured a large income from wood products. On the average, this small, but populous, delta district has annually exploited more than 25,000 cubic meters of lumber, 12,000 tons of firewood, and over 300,000 bamboos—an exploitation output equalling that of two forest-rich mountain districts combined. The Thai-nationality (Muong Truong) cooperative in Muong La District, Son La Province, implementing the agroforestry coordination policy, has properly developed the forest strengths, closely managed and preserved forest resources, satisfactorily resolved the grain production problem, and stepped up stockbreeding. As a result, it has developed its production and improved the local people's living conditions. (Foc Sen) village, inhabited by Nung nationality people, in Cao Bang Province, thanks to its proper motivation of the local people to develop their experiences, has succeeded in formulating forest preservation agreements and having the local people voluntarily implement them. As a result, the local forests have been preserved. Also, the local people have put in more than 1 million man-days to plant trees, turning 750 hectares of bare hills and stone mountains into luxuriant forests. Once a forest is regenerated, brooks and streams reappear.

Displaying its creativeness and relying on the local people's efforts, Huu Khanh village in Lang Son Province, over the past 20 years of continuous effort, has planted 90 hectares of collective forest and 400 hectares of gardens for lumber, fruit and special products. In addition, families have planted grain and food crops. The area has thus become a prosperous economic zone. The average per-capita income is over 400 kilos of paddy; each family's yearly produce-derived income is more than 15,000 dong; the villagers' savings amount to 500,000 dong.

The elders and people in Vinh Thanh village, Yen Thanh District, Nghe Tinh Province, over the past more than 20 years, have turned 15 hectares of bare hills into in-memory-of-the-uncle tree gardens. Using a rational cultivation pattern, they have planted 5 million assorted trees. Part of the wood produced was used for the construction of collective facilities such as schools, warehouses, village offices and a public health station. A total of 2,800 cubic meters of timber have been sold to the local people for house construction. The cooperatives' income derived from tree cultivation is 50 million dong. This does not include the value of the remaining trees in the gardens.
We can also cite typical examples of tree-planting to create windbreaks and improve soil conditions, such as those in Trieu Hai District, Binh Tri Thien Province, Thang Binh District, Quang Nam—Danang Province, and many other areas. Especially, at the Can Kiem Cooperative in Thach That District, Hanoi Municipality, the tree-planting team has successfully transformed arid laterite—soil hills into luxuriant forests and orchards.

The experience and industry displayed in labor work by old Mr Nguyen Van Que and the other elders in the tree-planting team of the Hoa Tien Cooperative in Cia Hung village, Gia Vien District, Ha Nam Province—who carried soil from rice paddies to a stone mountain for tree planting; their work has delivered benefits to the collective—commands everyone's admiration and serves as an example for everyone to emulate, especially those in the areas with favorable soil conditions who not only have failed to carry out afforestation but have destroyed forests.

The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress has clearly shown the line, policy and major objectives of forestry for the 1981—1985 5-year period. We must substantiate that line and policy with realistic measures in order to successfully achieve the set objectives. However, due to the forest's long-term production characteristics, the forestry plans for the period 1981—1985 and the remaining years of the 1980's are just a short step in the long course of advancing our country's forests from their status of scattered, naturally—grown, and seriously ravaged forests to the stabilized situation of properly planned forests with rational objectives and cultivation patterns.

Socialist countries within CEMA already have fairly concrete plans for forestry development covering the period extending to the year 2000 and beyond. We should also concentrate our efforts on the same work, which will serve as the basis for solving many questions, including the question of international cooperation in the field of economy and forestry technology. To achieve these objectives, we must solve such questions as conducting forest surveys and planning, consolidating production—business organizations, accelerating scientific—technical work and promulgating or amending policies in order to promote and protect production and preserve forests. We must pay attention to making adequate investment in forestry—primarily investment for the expansion of the road network, in order to serve, at the same time, forestry, economic production, the people's lives and national defense. We should gradually build material—technical bases for forestry, give forestry more equipment and modernize forest exploitation techniques.

Aside from the capital invested by the state, forestry should build up its own assets through the exporting of forest products in order to have the means to equip itself with the necessary machines. However, in order to perform these very important and essential tasks well, we must consolidate and strengthen the organization system of forest management from grassroots to ministerial level. Based on general state regulations [words indistinct] forest management, in which we should clearly determine the responsibilities between sector and echelon and between central and local level and particularly develop the role of the district level in the field of state administration—economic management and production—business management.
To help party committee echelons and administrations at all levels exercise unified management over forestry activities, to help systematize forestry organization and to help the forestry ministry, through this system, to exercise its management function over the forestry sector, there must be, in all provinces and municipalities subordinate to the central level provincial or municipal forestry service, and in all forested districts, responsible forestry organizations. All these questions should be specifically regulated on the basis of an increasingly simple, better, more compact and more efficient organization system of forest management.

Consolidating and perfecting organizations always involves cadres. Today I do not want to go deeply into this matter. I just want to remind comrade leaders at all levels to pay particular attention to training and rationally using cadres—particularly scientific and economic-management cadres—putting the right man in the right place, and creating favorable conditions for cadres in their work, study and contributions of their energy and intelligence in the undertaking of building up our forestry.

The forestry section and all related sectors, party committee echelons and local administration should pay due attention to the lives of forestry workers and forestry cooperative members. Our forestry must undergo changes. That is a requirement in socialist construction and national defense, a requirement of our party and our people. I hope this conference is the one that initiates the changes.

CSO: 4209/24
EDITORIAL DISCUSSES PROPER IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCT CONTRACTING

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Sep 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Develop New Factors, Perfect the Managerial Mechanism of Agricultural Cooperatives"]

[Text] The system of product contract with labor groups and laborers in agricultural cooperatives has been applied broadly in the past three agricultural seasons. It is a rational form of labor organization in agricultural cooperatives where manual labor is still prevalent; it is also a method of remuneration which links the laborers' responsibilities and interests to the end product. Along with the implementation of incentive policies for production and the application of an appropriate management system which has been promulgated, the facts of life have demonstrated clearly that product contracting is creating a strong motive inducing every laborer, household and production unit to fulfill the cooperative's production plan and that it is also launching a rural mass movement to step up agricultural production development, to increase the gross social product, to enhance the effectiveness of production and business activities of socialist collective economic units and to help consolidate the new production relationships.

The experiences drawn from the application of the end-product contract system to rice and subsidiary food crops are being applied to many kinds of industrial crops and domestic animals. The laborers' sense of responsibility for production has been heightened and a higher output achieved wherever and whenever the product contract system is applied widely according to a sound plan and with rationally set norms and if rewards and penalties are handed down rightly. This experience is being broadly applied in state agricultural installations and is beginning to obtain good results.

The product contract system has been applied well in certain areas and not so well in others; moreover, in the same production unit, some tasks have been carried out satisfactorily while others are not. Though organizational and operational shortcomings must be corrected resolutely and promptly, one must realize that the new contract mechanism is based on an appropriate method, that the good points are basic and that consequently the application of this system must be expanded energetically among cooperatives and production collectives.
The method of end-product contracting with labor groups and laborers suits all categories of cooperatives no matter whether they are advanced, average or weak and are situated in different regions. However, it is necessary to apply this method in accordance with the characteristics of each region and each category of cooperative in order to attain the set goals and maintain the formulated principles while cleverly conforming to the standard of each locality. Constantly guaranteeing the cooperative members' ownership, fully using the existing possibilities to develop production and continuously consolidating the new relationships are the most accurate yardstick to evaluate any management method.

The application of the product contract system in agricultural cooperatives is only part of the managerial task but it is also helping promote an overall managerial improvement among cooperatives and among various levels, especially the district one. In any unified production and business unit, the contract and reward systems must be applied uniformly to different tasks and trades so as to incite everyone to increase labor productivity. The joint efforts of various economic-technical sectors and between the district level and cooperatives will lay a basis for implementing the contract plan. It follows that if the contract system is to be improved and turned into a perfect management mechanism of any socialist collective economic unit as requested by the Fifth [Party] Congress, it is necessary to improve the management of cooperatives—primarily with regard to the planning task, production incentive policies and cadres' organization—while agriculture promoting sectors must pay greater attention to agricultural production at the grassroots level and must carry out economic contracts properly.

Product contracting and agricultural cooperative management are also creating new problems which must be solved satisfactorily to make it possible to develop agricultural production and simultaneously and gradually to build the new socialist rural areas. The sectors concerned and all localities have the duty to review the situation, to correct outmoded practices quickly and to formulate policies and systems conformable to the new management system in order to meet the requirements of life.

Product contracting is essentially a way to encourage laborers to do their utmost to develop production in cooperatives and production collectives. It is now a strong but not unique motive. While applying various production incentive policies, party organizations must ceaselessly intensify the politico-ideological education of peasants and continuously instill into collectivized peasants a respect for labor and production, a high sense of responsibility for the work they are doing, a spirit of mutual assistance and a sense of the need to wholeheartedly contribute to the common benefit and to protect the socialist property. Linked to the carrying out of three revolutions among which the scientific-technical one plays the key role, the new contract mechanism will exert an ever increasing effect and will continuously promote agricultural production development.

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MEASURES TO PREVENT, CONTROL FLOODS URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 30 Aug 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Actively Prevent, Control Typhoons and Floods"]

[Text] The entire nation is midway into the rainy, typhoon and flood season. To stand ready against unusual but possible natural calamities is an important task for all sectors, echelons and people during this season. The latter generally ends with September in the north and with November in the south, barring unexpected circumstances which cause it to last longer.

This year's dike building plan has been completed; however, this is no reason for laxity in preventing and controlling natural calamities. Rains, floods and typhoons follow an established pattern; but, occasionally they occur with suddenness and gravity. As a result of restricted state supplies and capital, the volume of dikes built this year is much smaller than the ones in the past, although a larger volume is now needed to strengthen and repair damaged spots. The dikes on the Red River, unchallenged by big floods in more than 10 years, contain many cracks, cavities and still undetected damages. Since construction quality is not insured, even freshly built segments include spots prone to permeability and subsequent breakup. This year, because of reduced state capital, only a number of vital segments have been strengthened. This leaves the rest of the dike system to be attended to by localities and the people, with their own manpower and materials, and with a properly atuned dike management and protection organization.

In recent days, the weather has given rise to concern. Of late, there were big rainfalls in Bac Bo, causing level-3 alerts on many rivers and waterlogging on tens of thousands of hectares of rice. At present, there are heavy floods in Bac Bo, the former Zone 4 and the Mekong River Delta, while flood rains have just begun in Trung Bo. Often it is now the time for foreign typhoons to strike our country. Thus, during this season of frequent natural calamities, we must avoid the worst, and be ready to cope with typhoons, heavy rainfalls, flooding, high tides and crop waterlogging. The more we are combat-ready, the less damage will occur. Even if the material and technical basis for preventing and controlling natural calamities is weak, man's organization for combat—from flood and typhoon control committees to dike management and protection forces—can achieve high efficiency by showing an adequate sense of responsibility and high determination, and by carrying out the best restorative plan. In 1971,
heavy floods damaged thousands of spots on major river dikes; nevertheless, the whole system continued to be safe, due to proper protection, and to the fact that the forces involved fulfilled their responsibilities, staying close to each meter of dike and promptly taking corrective measures.

Nationwide, many rivers are protected by dikes, but others are not. Thus, we must adopt concrete but flexible steps to fit in with local situations. In the first place, and in light of the campaign against the recent flood rains, party committee echelons, administration officials and flood and typhoon prevention and control committees, must review their plans thoroughly—including the ones that prepare various forces for protecting dikes, controlling typhoons and waterlogging—so as to rectify shortcomings with the most enthusiastic spirit.

We must closely follow meteorologic and hydrologic conditions, and promptly inform the leadership and people of weather changes. The information and communication task must be carried out better than previously, especially concerning key antiflood and typhoon centers. Security patrols, prompt repairs, and protection of dikes with locally available supplies are technical activities which have a decisive impact on dike protection. All damages to dikes always begin with small cracks; hence, prompt detection and action will help erase concern and reduce costs. During the recent floods, however, this task was not properly carried out at a number of places. Guards often stayed inside their posts, rarely patrolling along the dikes. Many posts lacked supplies and earth, which should have been kept handy, even bells or drums for use as emergency signals. Untrained dike protection forces still were embarrassingly unfamiliar with their work, and lacked close coordination.

All sectors and echelons must see closely to it that sluice gates be closed and opened in accordance with technical regulations in force during the flood season. They must also strengthen the security network, resolutely prosecute thefts of antiflood supplies, and violations of dike protection regulations.

While actively protecting dikes, we must continue properly to "protect the rear," especially the zones contiguous to dikes, and low-lying areas. In particular, the zones located within the scope of antiflood plans must prepare very carefully and thoroughly for evacuating the people, swiftly and securely, whenever the necessary order is given. Sector storehouses located in the flood-affected areas must be placed under direct control of respective sector chiefs with a view to protecting them to the highest degree. While preventing and controlling floods and typhoons, we must regularly pay attention to irrigation and drainage to enable the 10th-month rice to grow properly, and to ensure that pumping stations have enough electricity for removing water from drain canals.

The provinces in Trung Bo have no dikes; but because of steep hills and short waterways, flood waters there use to rise suddenly and fiercely, sweeping away large chunks of crops. Hence, efficacious flood prevention and control plans must be drawn up, so as to avoid human casualties and reduce crop and property damages to a minimum. The provinces in Trung Bo are rarely hit by typhoons; but this is no cause for slighting the prevention and control of floods and typhoons. The lessons learned from the 1978 floods must be used as a basis for making antiflood plans. We must focus on developing embankments in places which have the conditions for crop protection.
We must always act according to the precept that to prevent and control typhoons and floods is even more urgent than to prevent an enemy attack, because natural calamities arrive very swiftly and violently. To stand ready on all occasions is like placing ourselves in a winning position.

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NGHIA BINH'S BIGGEST RICE CROP REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Aug 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Nghia Binh: Summer-Autumn Rice Crop Reaches Unprecedentedly High Yield"]

[Text] So far, Nghia Binh has harvested nearly 35 percent of its summer-autumn rice area. In the first harvesting wave, many districts such as An Nhon, Tu Phuoc and Son Tinh, and the cities of Quang Ngai and Qui Nhon, reached a yield of from 38 to 42 quintals of paddy per hectare; many agricultural cooperatives, such as Nhon Khanh and Dap Da, yielded more than 50 quintals per hectare. During the third harvesting wave, the yield was rather lower; nevertheless, statistical estimates have put the average yield across the province at 29 to 30 quintals per hectare--1 quintal more per hectare as compared with the 1978 summer-autumn rice crop, the biggest one ever, and 2 quintals over the 1981 yield. Due to many measures--intensive farming to increase crop yield, use of new rice varieties, and of more organic fertilizer, adequate irrigation and care, and prompt prevention and control of pests--the obtained yield was close to the norms despite the fact that the summer-autumn rice area covered only 83.3 percent of plan.

Along with swiftly and cleanly harvesting the summer-autumn rice, Nghia Binh has also sowed and transplanted more than 41,000 hectares of 10th-month rice, fulfilling over 70 percent of the plan. Agricultural cooperatives in the provinces have urgently sowed and transplanted in order to fulfill the 10th-month crop norms; besides, they have strived to nurse the rice, dig canals, dredge wells, and concentrate manpower on fighting drought, in an effort to reach an average 28 quintals of 10th-month rice per hectare.

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SUMMER-FALL RICE CROP IN AN GIANG HARVESTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 4 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] VNA—An Giang has completed harvesting the summer-fall rice crop on all of the 75,000 cultivated hectares, with an average per hectare output of more than 30 quintals of paddy. This is the second crop grown by the province this year which has achieved the highest productivity and volume of production.

The three island districts of Phu Tan, Phu Chau and Cho Moi—whose entire arable areas are suitable for the cultivation of two rice crops [per year]—have neatly harvested their 45,000 hectares of summer-fall rice and have obtained the highest output in the province.

After finishing the summer-fall rice harvest, cooperatives, production collectives and peasants are plowing, turning up and drying the soil and are sowing and transplanting the winter-spring rice crop. The material supply, banking and grain sectors are continuously providing gasoline, oil and capital for production installations. The districts of Thoai Son, Cho Moi and Phu Tan are strengthening machine operating collectives, organizing repairs and distributing mechanical plows proportionally to every region in order to ensure rapid plowing and harrowing and careful drying of the soil.

Beside harvesting the summer-fall rice and tilling the soil to prepare for the winter-spring crop cultivation, the two districts of Tri Ton and Tinh Bien are carrying out sowing and transplanting the 10th-month rice crop of an additional 5,500 hectares of high level fields which are difficult to irrigate, thus raising their total 10th-month rice area to 28,000 hectares representing an increase of 2,000 hectares over the previous crop.

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COOPERATIVIZATION, LAND DISTRIBUTION IN AN GIANG REPORTED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Sep 82 p 1

[Text] In the two months of June and July 1982, An Giang built 136 production collectives. Phu Tan District took the lead in launching the movement to reform agriculture rapidly and steadily by applying the "simultaneously building production installations and training managerial cadres on the spot" motto. As a result, 110 production collectives were set up and agricultural cooperativization was completed by three villages. In addition, many other wards and villages in Phu Chau, Cho Moi and Chau Thanh Districts and Long Xuyen City completed cooperativization.

Throughout the province, there are now 570 production collectives, 6 agricultural cooperatives and 1,885 production solidarity teams. During the summer-fall and 10th-month seasons of 1982, 229 collectives and 6 agricultural cooperatives have applied the system of product contract with laborers. This means an increase of 102 collectives [which applied contracting] as compared with the 1981 summer-fall season and an increase of 45 collectives and 1 agricultural cooperative as compared with the 1981-82 winter-spring season.

The collectivized production movement has developed rapidly and steadily in the province because a correct leadership has been exercised and also because peasants have gained practical experiences.

At the same time, Tinh Bien, Tri Ton, Phu Chau, Chau Thanh and Chau Phu Districts have set up steering committees for land readjustment, with the result that 5,606 hectares have been retrieved and that 5,983 hectares have been distributed to 7,375 peasant households who owned no land at all or not enough land for production. Since the liberation day, An Giang has distributed in total 44,100 hectares of land to 59,100 households with a population of 339,190. This move has drawn a sympathetic response from the peasantry because all localities have tried to avoid infringing the common policy of the province.

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BRIEFS

SUMMER-FALL CROP—During the cultivation of the summer-fall rice crop this year, early rains fell in the Nam Bo provinces and were followed by a protracted drought which hampered production in the middle of the season. However, all localities tried hard to carry out sowing and transplanting and raised the entire crop area to more than 532,000 hectares, fulfilling 99.3 percent of the plan norm and achieving an increase of more than 75,000 hectares over the same period last year. Seven provinces and city surpassed the planned area norm, with Cuu Long exceeding it by nearly 14,000 hectares, Ben Tre by nearly 11,000 hectares, An Giang by nearly 4,000 hectares, Hau Giang by 3,300 hectares, Dong Nai by 2,700 hectares, Ho Chi Minh City by 1,700 hectares and Dong Thap by more than 1,100 hectares. All provinces and cities have harvested more than 40 percent of the total rice area. An Giang has completed the harvest. An average per hectare output of about 34 quintals is expected from all provinces and cities. This shows that the Nam Bo provinces have surpassed the plan norm for total output of the summer-fall rice crop and have produced much more than in the previous years. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Sep 82 p 1] 9332

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HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

INSTALLATION OF HO CHI MINH CITY–CAN THO POWER LINE COMPLETED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 2 Sep 82 p 3

[Article by Thien Anh: "Power Line 2-9"]

[Text] "Power Line 2-9" is the name of high tension wires which cross the Tien River. The construction of this project is to be completed on the occasion of the National Day this year. These wires constitute an important section of the entire power transmission line linking Thu Duc (Ho Chi Minh City) to Can Tho (Hau Giang). Passing through six provinces and cities, these wires vividly symbolize the efforts of the working class in the electricity sector to serve agriculture in the Mekong River Delta—a key rice area of the whole country.

The Power Line 2-9 project has been built by senior workers from large collectives such as the Electric Wire Installation Corporation, Station No 2, Enterprise No 1 of the Joint State-Private Electric Works Construction Corporation and the Dong Tam Electric Works Construction Combine.

The high tension wire poles form a row which stretches over a long distance along Route 4, which goes toward the western region through the districts of Cai Lay, Cai Be and Chau Thanh and which traverses an immense green carpet constituted by areas planted with precious fruit trees. Standing out from this row of poles are the two ones which hang the wires across the Tien River. Each of these poles is nearly 100-meter high; its foundation is composed of 15 steel stakes driven into the ground at a depth of 25 meters and is filled up with 150 cubic meters of concrete. Electric wires are made of aluminum, with a steel core of 411 sq mm [of cross section surface] and rustproof wires of 94 sq mm [of cross section surface], and are stretched over clusters of 15 porcelain and glass bowls each.

The wires traverse a rather complex terrain composed of ponds, marshy fields and orchards and are 1 to 5 kms far from communication roads—which made construction quite difficult. However, by bringing into play the offensive spirit of the August Revolution, workers in construction teams tried by all means to overcome difficulties. For many months in a row, they awoke at 2 or 3 am and started working with the rising tide to make it easy to carry machines, equipment and materials over canals and into work sites, without going to the great expense of using thousands of man-days to build transportation roads. They continued to work in both the sunny and rainy seasons without taking a rest.
They tried to save each kilogram of cement, each meter of aluminum wire, each small piece of timber and each bolt. With its boldness to think and act, a six-man production team of Construction Unit No 9 proposed to its director to rehabilitate two wire pulling machines, each with a pulling capacity of 8 tons to replace 80 manually pulling men. Working assiduously for less than 2 months, they restored both machines which had long been forsaken amid a heap of scrap iron. Each machine could simultaneously pull two 230-kv power transmission cables from a distance of 10 to 15 kms, thus replacing all the manpower in the wire pulling section at the work site and making a saving of thousands of dong.

There were four poles numbered from 284 to 287 to hang wires beside and across the river. They constituted the main points of a key work. The contract for the execution of this work was accepted by Enterprise No 1 of the Joint State-Private Electric Works Construction Corporation, the Construction Service and the Dong Tam Electric Works Construction Combine. Owing to very economical but rather bold plans, to a contingent of engineers, technical cadres and select workers and to the wholehearted aid of the corporation, this work was completed 7 months ahead of schedule and in conformity with technical regulations and had a good quality.

The construction of the wire section over the Tien River has been completed at the beginning of the historic month of August. Certain minor works will be perfected so that the bridge may be closed in time to connect two power networks.

Once the Thu Duc-Can Tho power line is completed, power from the Da Nhim Hydroelectric Plant and the generator plants in Ho Chi Minh City will be merged with the Tra Noc power and spread by means of high tension wires through the Mekong River Delta provinces down to Minh Hai to serve large industrial installations such as the Kien Luong Cement Factory, the shipbuilding enterprises and the frozen and canned export goods enterprises and also to operate water conservancy networks used to control drought and waterlogging. Irrigation and drainage will be carried out according to scientific methods on hundreds of thousands of hectares of fields where it will be possible to grow two or three rice crops [per year]. Thousands of hectares of virgin land will be opened for rice production. The material and moral life of some ten million people in this region will be further improved.

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RATIONAL USE OF BITUMINOUS COAL, LIGNITE URGED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Aug 82 p 2

[Article by Huy Lien, Sub-Institute on Coal Processing: "Rational Use of Bituminous Coal and Lignite"]

[Text] In our country, the reserves and output of bituminous and brown coals are smaller than that of anthracite. Each year, we must import bituminous coal and coke to meet the needs of a number of production, communications and transportation sectors. To overcome that difficulty, we must pay attention to rationally exploiting and using our bituminous and brown coals.

As for bituminous coal, in addition to large mines such as Phan Me, Lang Cam, etc, our country also has smaller ones scattered across the provinces of Son La, Lai Chau, Nghe Tinh, Ha Nam Minh, Bac Thai, Ha Son Binh, etc.

In recent years, many provinces have mined local coal, including bituminous and brown coal. Bituminous coal has high economic value only after being processed into coke; however, in the provinces local bituminous coal often is used to bake bricks and tiles, and for other usual burning and roasting purposes. This is not rational. Transformation of bituminous coal into coke requires appropriate exploitation measures, especially in mines having a thin vein and unchanged coal quality. Moreover, processing scales and methods must be defined in line with the capability of providing supplies, equipment, machinery and capital, with the technical standards of management and utilization units, and with production time. Those provinces having bituminous coal mines can exploit and process coal into coke for supply to their own foundry sector, and partly to other provinces.

Recently, the Coal Science and Technology Research Institute (Ministry of Power and Coal) helped a number of localities transform local bituminous coal into coke. That process is easy to follow, requiring little capital and easily found, locally available, supplies and raw materials. Its short construction time and simple technique are fit for small-scale exploitation and the transportation situation, which is causing difficulties to the provinces.

When burning, brown coal produces a long fire—a must for such equipment as rotary kilns for cement production, steam engines, and chinaware baking kilns.
Formerly, we had to import a number of varieties of long-fire coal from the brown coal family for the production of Portland cement. In recent years, we have used our own coal to produce cement, because brown coal can meet the technical requirements of cement production. At present, the rapid increase in cement output calls for a corresponding volume of coal. Na Duong coal is not enough to meet the needs of production. Nevertheless, at the same time brown coal is used at some places to bake bricks and to roast. Use of brown coal to bake bricks and tiles also causes difficulties, because its ability to generate high heat requires an appropriate technique to prevent products from cracking and breaking up. Therefore, it is rational and more economical to use brown coal to produce cement and coal cinders to produce bricks and tiles.

Local coal mines under exploitation contain varieties, the technical parameters of which meet the requirements of steam engines. At present, the Coal Science and Technology Research Institute and the Hanoi Locomotive Section are testing coal on steam engines. By stepping up the exploitation of these mines, and by fully using all varieties of bituminous coal which do not fulfill the standards for coke transformation, we can meet the needs of rail traffic. With a view to rationally using bituminous and brown coals, we propose the following: The state must have a uniform policy on managing and using these coals. The state must encourage the provinces to mine local bituminous and brown coals. The exploitation of local coal mines may bypass a number of unimportant procedures; however, regulations must be issued to avoid wastes and to ensure that coal be used rationally. The use of bituminous coal in loose form to operate trains must be restricted, before being terminated, because loose coal costs two, three times more than briquets. And the use of bituminous coal to keep a smoldering fire in a stove must be restricted.

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