Vietnam Report
No. 2416
NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
NOTICE

The VIETNAM REPORT is being discontinued effective 1 January 1983. Vietnam material will subsequently be published in the JPRS SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT.
VIETNAM REPORT
No. 2416

CONTENTS

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Political Work Along Northern Border Discussed
(Bui Nguyen; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 82) .......... 1

Senior Colonel on Campaign Staff Work
(Nguyen Phu Chut; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 82) .... 8

Senior General Hoang Van Thai on Staff Training
(Hoang Van Thai; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Sep 82) ..... 12

Combat Training of Militia, Self-Defense Troops Examined
(Le Manh Xe, Hoang Giang; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN,
Sep 82) ..................................................................... 31

Heightening Level of Combat Readiness Urged
(Editorial; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 25 Oct 82) ................. 38

Political Training for Local Armed Forces Urged
(Editorial; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 29 Oct 82) ................. 40

Fulro's Activities Discovered in Dac Lac
(A Ma Tha; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 29 Oct 82) ................. 42

Combat Requirements of Tank Troops Outlined
(Le Xuan Kien; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 82) ...... 44

Conclusion of Trung Dung Article on War of Sabotage
(Trung Dung; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 82) ....... 54

Army Journal Editorial on Theoretical Work
(Editorial; TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, Aug 82) ........... 74

Opium Smuggler Apprehended by Police
(Phan Tuong; HANOI MOI, 17 Sep 82) ............................. 83

Misappropriation of State Goods Brings Long Prison Sentences
(HANOI MOI, 18 Sep 82) ............................................... 85

- a -

[III - ASIA - 110]
Editorial Stresses Importance of New Criminal Laws  
(Editorial; HANOI MOI, 17 Sep 82) ......................... 87

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

Ho Chi Minh City Supplies Goods to Hanoi Market  
(HANOI MOI, 19 Sep 82) ................................. 89

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

Typhoon No 7 Causes Damage to Nghe Tinh  
(QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 25 Oct 82) ...................... 90

Consequences of Storm  
Thanh Hoa Crop Damage

POPULATION CUSTOMS AND CULTURE

Urgent Need for Reduced Population Growth Declared  
(HANOI MOI, 12 Sep 82) ................................. 92

Municipal Station Chief Interview,  
Luong Thi Ngoc Thai Interview  
Growth Danger Emphasized, Editorial

Superstition in Hai Ba Trung Ward Suppressed  
(Minh Nguyen; HANOI MOI, 11 Sep 82) ................. 96

PUBLICATIONS

Table of Contents of 'TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' No 8, 1982 ... 97

Table of Contents of 'TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' No 9, 1982 ... 98
POLITICAL WORK ALONG NORTHERN BORDER DISCUSSED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Sep 82 pp 32-37

Article by Bui Nguyen: "Political Work at Places Fighting Encroachment and Occupation by the Enemy"

While the conditions do not exist for launching a large-scale war of aggression against our country, the Chinese reactionaries are frantically waging an extremely malicious war of sabotage in a vain attempt to implement their basic, long-range strategy of weakening and eventually annexing our country. As a result, as the resolution of the 5th Party Congress pointed out, our country is in a situation in which it is at peace but must contend with a multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists; at the same time, we must be ready to deal with a large-scale war of aggression launched by the enemy.

The war of sabotage being carried out by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists is completely different from the air and naval war of sabotage waged by the U.S. imperialists against North Vietnam in past years. It is a war of sabotage being conducted in areas: the economy, the military, politics, social attitudes, culture and so forth. Although these various kinds of sabotage have different specific objectives and are carried out by means of different measures, forms and tricks, they are closely interrelated, support one another and are all designed to weaken us from many directions in order to eventually topple and annex our country.

It is not surprising that in the recent past, in conjunction with accelerating the sabotaging of the economy and everyday life, intensifying psychological warfare operations, intensifying the espionage war and so forth, the enemy has continuously launched military activities, the most significant of which have involved the armed occupation of hills and important positions along the northern border, such as Hills 1800A, 1800B, 1688 and 1059 in Vi Xuyen District in Ha Tuyen Province, at level 400 in Gao Loc District, Lang Son Province and so forth.

Were these acts of encroachment and occupation nothing more than spontaneous clashes between militia forces along the border? Were they only scattered, insignificant "attacks against petty hegemonists in self-defense" by border soldiers and local troops as frequently proclaimed by the enemy? If we do not clearly see the sinister scheme behind these acts of encroachment and occupation, it is easy to lose our vigilance, be indifferent toward our task and not appropriately heighten the political responsibility of the strongpoints along the border in the cause of defending the fatherland at this time. As a
result, party work and political work at strongpoints must undergo a change, must be extremely sensitive in the face of the schemes and tricks of the enemy and must equip cadres and soldiers with strategic vision so that they can correctly and fully examine and evaluate the enemy's acts of encroachment and occupation as part of their entire war of sabotage plan and excellently complete the political task of the strongpoints along the northern border.

To begin with, we must insure that cadres and soldiers, on the basis of gaining a deep, comprehensive understanding of the schemes and the nature of the war of sabotage of the enemy, very fully evaluate the significance of their acts of armed encroachment and occupation, heighten their vigilance and their will to fight and are ready to fight the enemy, maintain strongpoints and firmly defend each bit of soil along the border. The enemy's acts of armed encroachment and occupation are not accidental, spontaneous acts. They have become a new strategic measure, one that is designed to implement the new military policies in the comprehensive war of sabotage strategy of the Chinese reactionaries regarding our country.

In these acts of armed encroachment and occupation, the enemy generally utilizes medium and small-scale forces, primarily infantry forces coordinated as necessary with artillery, tanks, the air force and so forth. By means of engaging in true acts of war that are "held" at a level below that of an actual war, they can cease these activities if they are defeated by us; however, if our resistance and retaliation prove to be weak and feeble, they can occupy a site and consolidate their position, occupy another site and consolidate their position and so forth, can develop these scattered acts of occupation into a long, planned war of encroachment and occupation with clear objectives.

The war of encroachment and occupation being waged by the Chinese reactionaries is primarily designed to "wear down" our military, political and economic forces on the frontline and place our border areas in a state of constant tension in which they are always being intimidated and pressured and lose all stability, thereby affecting production and everyday life and impeding the effort to build forces and strengthen the locality. On the other hand, the enemy is also seeking to competently support their psychological warfare operations, espionage warfare operations and commando operations and encourage and create the conditions for local reactionaries to foment rebellion, topple the local revolutionary government and so forth, thereby coordinating attacking us from the outside with attacking us from the inside.

Their acts of encroachment and occupation against strongpoints along the northern border are designed to occupy a portion of our territory. There, they have constructed fortifications, consolidated their positions, established lines of communication with the rear area, improved and strengthened the deployment of their forward forces and established new jump-off points in order to continue to carry out acts of encroachment and occupation and create a favorable position for launching a large-scale war of aggression when they have the necessary conditions. By means of acts of encroachment and occupation, the enemy also seeks to determine our strengths and weaknesses in each defense zone as well as
along the entire defense line and to determine our intentions, our policies
and the preparations we have made in every area. This is also a way to "train"
Chinese troops on a rotation basis in order to familiarize them with battle-
field realities without having launched a large-scale war of aggression. Moreover,
by means of acts of encroachment and occupation, by means of gradually nibbling
away at our territory, the Chinese reactionaries hope to gradually achieve their
objective while avoiding adverse public opinion at home and in the world and not
having a major impact upon their "four modernizations" plan.

The highest political task of the strongpoints is to protect themselves, to
protect the defense zone assigned to them; they must also annihilate the enemy
and route their attempt to encroach upon and occupy positions. The strength and
stability of each strongpoint will create overall strength and stability for
the entire group of strongpoints, for the entire defense zone. In order to
make the most positive contribution to the completion of this task, party work
and political work must give each cadre and soldier a thorough understanding of
the task, give them a thorough understanding of the thinking of taking the
initiative, of mounting an obstinate defense and of determinedly taking the
offensive and heighten the spirit of fighting independently, annihilating the
enemy, protecting strongpoints, protecting the area of operation and not
relying upon or waiting for the rear area to act. Every cadre and soldier at
the strongpoints must have a clear understanding of the position of the strongpoint,
must have a firm grasp of their specific task and that of their unit and must
know what they must do and how they must do it in order to help firmly defend
the strongpoint. It is necessary to cultivate within each person high
determination to fight, determination to cling to one's position and be ready to
annihilate the enemy, to strongly retaliate against their acts of encroachment
and occupation. Every person must predict the most difficult, decisive and
complex situation that could occur so that everyone is determined to successfully
protect the strongpoints regardless of the scale of the operation or the tricks
employed by the enemy to encroach upon and occupy territory.

By engaging in acts of armed encroachment and occupation directed toward one
place at one time and another place at another time, the enemy hopes to force
us to reveal our forces, reveal our system of firepower and our system of
fortifications, reveal the strengths and weaknesses of our defensive deployment
and our preparations for combat and, in this manner, gain an understanding of
our defensive intentions and plans and make preparations for other acts of
armed encroachment and occupation and a large-scale war of aggression when they
have the necessary conditions. As a result, emphasizing the spirit of fighting
independently at each strongpoint, emphasizing the need for each strongpoint to
carry out its combat mission on its own and win victory in combat assume even
greater importance. This is because if each strongpoint employs its full
fighting strength and completes its task well without needing reinforcement from
friendly units, from the upper echelon, the defense line will become increasingly
strong, secrecy will be maintained, it will be difficult for the enemy to
determine our plan for the deployment of firepower and the firepower system along
the entire line of strongpoints and it will be difficult for the enemy to learn
our strengths and weaknesses.
Party work and political work must keep abreast of the political task at the strongpoints not only to conduct ideological work, but also to delve deeply into organizational work, deeply into the tasks of preparing for combat and engaging in combat.

The effectiveness of ideological work, be it much or little, is immediately manifested in actions; as a result, ideological work must be closely coordinated with organizational work and the results achieved in the practical, daily activities of cadres and soldiers must be used to examine the thinking, examine how well the political task is understood at the strongpoints.

Even before the outbreak of combat against the acts of encroachment and occupation of the enemy, party work and political work must actively contribute to the formulation of the combat plan and must give everyone, from cadres to soldiers, a thorough understanding of the combat plan. It is necessary to strongly tap the creativity of each person through discussions to contribute opinions concerning, supplement and perfect the plan with a view toward depleting and annihilating many enemy forces, firmly protecting the strongpoints and holding our losses to the lowest possible level. At each strongpoint, many plans based on the different projections about how the combat situation will develop are generally adopted. Of these situations, political work must attach special importance to giving cadres and soldiers a full understanding of the plan that is most likely to be employed; at the same time, both ideological and organizational preparations must be made for the most fierce and arduous possibility. Every cadre and soldier must have a firm grasp of the task assigned to him under every combat plan; he must know what he must do in order to make the greatest possible contribution to depleting and annihilating the forces of the enemy and protecting the strongpoint.

The process of performing one's task at a strongpoint is the process of constantly maintaining combat readiness and continuously being prepared to fight. The political work performed at strongpoints must have a strong impact upon this process. The combat plan and the results of the preparations made in every area for implementing the plan must be used to teach, mobilize, organize, inspect and guide the masses. When fighting at a strongpoint, every person must be familiar with the terrain, must know the system of firepower, the system of obstacles and so forth. Every cadre and soldier must be proficient in the use of the various types of weapons and technology with which they have been equipped and must also know the weapons of the enemy so that they can use every weapon that they have in their hands and are ready to switch to other weapons when necessary.

Political work must not only delve deeply into the process of the preparations made by each component and each person for combat, but must also delve deeply into each area of work and promptly point out matters to be supplemented or corrected by cadres. The requirements of the plan for the most fierce combat that is likely to occur and the requirements of the most arduous combat situation that is likely to occur must always be used to examine the preparations that are made. A high will to fight and good methods of fighting must be coordinated with
full material and technical preparations before it is possible to insure victory and create firm confidence on the part of cadres and soldiers. How is it possible to engage in independent combat operations and fight for many days in accordance with the combat plan if soldiers have weapons but not enough ammunition to meet combat requirements or have weapons but not a well coordinated supply of ammunition; if they have trenches but they are not interconnected and do not meet technical standards; if they have weapons but their rear service and military medical support are poor, they do not have adequate rice, food, water, medicine and so forth?

Thus, preparations for combat are extremely detailed. It can be said that this is a process that never stops, is a process that must always be supplemented and improved upon. The fuller preparations are, the more victory in combat is guaranteed. This is the task of the commander, of staff, rear service and technical work; it is also the task of party work and political work at strongpoints.

The ideological work, organizational work and activities of the party organization and the Youth Union organization and the other political activities conducted in this process must be oriented toward accelerating every aspect of the effort by strongpoints to prepare for combat, with the results of the effort to increase the fighting strength of the strongpoint being used to evaluate one's actual effectiveness.

Acts of encroachment and occupation and resisting these acts of encroachment and occupation are an important part of the entire fight against the war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists. As analyzed above, this is a constant, long-range fight. As long as the Chinese expansionists exist, they will continue to scheme to weaken and annex our country and, as a result, combating the enemy's acts of armed encroachment and occupation is always a foremost, continuous task of the strongpoints along the northern border defense line. Forces that are performing a task at a strongpoint must constantly be in a high state of combat readiness. This is an objective requirement as well as a characteristic of the operations on the line facing enemy troops. When the enemy conducts acts of encroachment and occupation, we must victoriously combat them. When the enemy creates a state of constant tension, we must organize life at the strongpoints in a rational manner so that tasks can be performed in a routine and long-range manner. For this reason, normalizing life at the strongpoints is of very important significance and has a very large impact upon the attitude and morale of troops. This is also a requirement of party work and political work at strongpoints at this time.

Normalizing life at the strongpoints does not mean being complacent, relaxing our vigilance and so forth, rather, it means normalizing life as permitted by the need to constantly maintain a high state of combat readiness. To accomplish this, it is not only necessary to put every combat readiness system on a regular basis, but also necessary to create the conditions for and organize a happy, wholesome and intense life consistent with actual circumstances at a strongpoint. The urgency of combat readiness and combat tasks is no reason for life at the
strongpoints to be a hand to mouth existence, to be a matter of merely getting by. To the contrary, on the basis of firmly maintaining the various combat readiness systems, it is necessary to rapidly put life, that is, the spiritual life, the cultural life and the material life, at the strongpoints on a regular basis. In actuality, many strongpoints have come to see this as something that can and must be done.

Many strongpoints have successfully resolved the problems of arranging for their forces to listen to the radio, read newspapers, receive information, hear talks on current events and so forth. Under the very difficult conditions that exist at the strongpoints, many companies and battalions have established well arranged clubs and cultural halls. Some strongpoints, such as the strongpoint of the 1st Battalion, although only 100 meters away from the enemy, still maintain the physical training movement; all strongpoints have places to play table tennis and volley ball, have horizontal bars and parallel bars, have badminton courts and even have small soccer fields. The singing movement is an intense movement. There are many company bands that use primarily instruments made by their members, such as flutes, single string guitars, two string violins and so forth. Many places have also attached importance to organizing the material life of troops and have achieved good results. Even at the hills along the northwestern border that are 300 to 400 meters in altitude, cadres and soldiers have overcome every difficulty and constructed troughs to transport water from 2 to 3 kilometers away in order to provide water for daily use and store water for use during combat. Some units have converted natural ponds into fishponds, thereby creating a source of fresh food even on high mountains in order to directly improve the daily diet of units. Many units are raising chickens and hogs and have brought greenery to their battle positions by raising vegetables, beans, gourds, melons and so forth, thereby achieving self-sufficiency in or producing a surplus of green vegetables and reducing, by an important degree, the difficulties encountered in the unit's rear service work. Developing upon local strengths, many units have cut timber, tre bamboo, mu bamboo and so forth and built dining halls, living quarters, clubs and meeting halls, made tables, chairs, desks, beds, personal chests and trunks and so forth.

Normalizing life at the strongpoints is consistent with the objective requirements of the combat task and is, at the same time, a very legitimate aspiration of cadres and soldiers. This matter not only demands thorough organizational work, but, more importantly, we must also know how to uphold the right of collective ownership and tap the spirit of creativity and the sense of overcoming difficulties of the mass of cadres and soldiers in their effort to be the masters of their lives.

The acts of encroachment and occupation of the Chinese expansionists are not isolated actions, rather, they are coordinated with the other activities of the enemy in the war of sabotage along the border.

In the present situation, as pointed out in the resolution of the 5th Congress, fighting the war of sabotage of the Chinese reactionaries is a major part of
defending the fatherland and is the responsibility of the entire party, all the people and the entire army.

In order to victoriously fight the enemy’s acts of encroachment and occupation, we must closely coordinate this effort with the struggle against the acts of sabotage of the enemy in the economic, political and psychological fields and coordinate the strength of the armed forces with the strength of the locality, thereby creating a tremendous combined strength with which to fight the enemy and win victory over the enemy in all fields.

At the strongpoints along the border, the same holds true: to win victory over the enemy in the war of encroachment and occupation and to combat the enemy’s acts of encroachment and occupation, party work and political work must be strengthened and must be closely coordinated with the fight against the psychological war, the espionage war and every act of sabotage of the enemy. In conjunction with this, it is necessary to build the strongpoints and the groups of strongpoints so that they are strong politically, ideologically and organizationally. We cannot give light attention to the destructive impact of the psychological warfare arguments, the acts of sabotage against rear service bases, weapons and technical equipment and the espionage warfare tricks of the enemy. Facts have shown that winning victory over the enemy in the field of political-ideological sabotage and the sabotaging of our fighting strength is always the first prerequisite to winning victory over the enemy in the fight against the enemy’s acts of encroachment and occupation.

In order to successfully fight the enemy’s war of sabotage, the political work conducted at strongpoints must be carried out on the basis of the combined strength of localities in which many troops are stationed and must be closely coordinated with all the activities being conducted to fight the war of sabotage by the local government and mass organizations under the centralized, unified guidance of the party committee echelons.

The political work conducted at strongpoints must be thoroughly planned. Cadres and soldiers must be kept informed of the schemes and actions of the enemy within the area in which they are stationed and informed of the policies of the locality; on the other hand, everyone must be made clearly aware of the task of the strongpoints as well as the task of each person in the common struggle against the war of sabotage by the localities and the armed forces along the northern border.

7809
G90: 4209/38
SENIOR COLONEL ON CAMPAIGN STAFF WORK

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Sep 82 pp 38-41

Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Phu Chut: "Exchange of Experiences Concerning Campaign Staff Work in Modern Warfare"

The recent campaign maneuvers faced the various campaign headquarters and agencies with the problem of resolving a rather sharp contradiction. It was the contradiction between the large volume of work that had to be performed during the stage of preparing for the campaign and the very limited amount of time available. In modern warfare, it is sometimes necessary to complete every campaign document which includes the various documents concerning the decisions of the commander, the combat plan, the plan for coordination, the orders issued to the lower echelon and so forth, within the space of only 24 hours from the time that an order is received.

This is an inevitable requirement in taking the offensive as well as seizing the initiative and promptly retaliating against surprise attacks by an aggressor army.

The realities of the recent maneuvers pointed out that it is necessary to resolve, in a well coordinated manner, a host of problems regarding awareness, organization and the work methods and technical measures employed by both headquarters and the campaign agency in order to meet the requirement mentioned above. Of course, this requirement can only be met on the basis of a very high level of unanimity regarding the line, viewpoints, thinking, military art and the organization of troops; command cadres and the cadres of command agencies must become relatively proficient in this area through training.

In this article, we will only discuss a number of matters pertaining to staff work in the stage of campaign preparations, primarily to preparing the commander for making decisions, preparing the components for formulating the campaign plan and preparing the commander for assigning tasks to the lower echelon and organizing coordination.

The actual experience of our army as well as the experiences of the armies of the fraternal countries show that the best work method is the parallel work method, under which the commander and the staff agency work together, the upper echelon and the lower echelon make preparations together and one echelon need not wait for the other echelon to complete all its work.
Concerning the Making of a Decision and the Formulation of the Campaign Plan

Concerning this matter, we frequently hear such different opinions as: is it absolutely necessary for the campaign agency to only begin to formulate its plan after headquarters has made the official decision? What is the difference and what is the line between the contents of the decision and the plan? Is it necessary to formulate a plan when there is very little time available in which to make preparations? Must the plan be a detailed plan or can it be an abridged one?

To begin with, it is necessary to correctly understand what is involved in each job. The decision made by headquarters encompasses our basic intentions in the campaign, a judgement concerning the scheme, tricks and strengths of the enemy and, in particular, a determination concerning the direction in which the enemy will focus their efforts. On this basis, we define the objective of the campaign, the primary front, the order in which enemy forces will be annihilated, the methods employed to annihilate the enemy, the organization of firepower, the deployment of the campaign formation, the tasks that will be assigned to subordinate troops, the matters of primary importance concerning the establishment of coordination and support operations, the schedule for the completion of the various tasks in the campaign, etc. Thus, the basic matters contained within the combat plan have already been decided. In order to decide these matters, the staff agency must prepare various projections and propose ideas to the commander. In this process, the agency also makes projections concerning the combat plan; therefore, once the commander has made his basic decision, the staff agency can formulate the combat plan more quickly. The formulation of the campaign plan by the staff agency and the heads of the various branches and services involves concretizing a number of factors contained within the decision, such as calculating in greater detail the order, methods and deadline for the completion of assigned tasks; determining the number of components in the campaign and their specific deployment (specifically, one echelon lower than in the decision); establishing specific measures regarding political work, combat support operations, command organization and so forth. As regards logic, both the decision and the combat plan are in total unison with each other; the decision is a general plan and the plan is the decision concretized. Therefore, in cases in which there is little time, is not enough time to formulate a campaign plan, headquarters and the campaign agency have the foundation needed to guide the campaign; in the course of conducting the campaign, they can gradually supplement and perfect this foundation when preparing for the key battles of the campaign. For this reason, the line between the decision and the plan lies in the degree to which the various factors are detailed.

In our opinion, when studying the fundamentals, when training in staff work and so forth, it is necessary to do so in a systematic manner, such as presenting the decision that has been made on a map along with explanatory documentation, after which it is absolutely necessary to fully complete the various campaign plan documents; and, an effort must be made to do the same thing in actual practice. In actual combat, these guidelines can be flexibly applied depending upon the amount of time available; if little time is available, the combat agency
can formulate the combat plan by means of concretizing the factors needed to guide the campaign utilizing the campaign decision map.

Concerning the Assignment of Tasks and the Organizing of Coordination

In actuality, these two jobs are very closely related. For example, when assigning tasks in offensive operations, the campaign headquarters clearly defines the task of each unit on each campaign front by stating which objectives must be destroyed, when they must be destroyed and which targets must be attacked and occupied. Thus, when assigning tasks to units, headquarters takes an important step in coordinating the actions and efforts of units on the basis of specific targets, deadlines and sites.

However, merely assigning tasks to the lower echelon is not enough to establish close and continuous coordination. In the past, coordination was usually established after headquarters assigned tasks and approved the decisions of the lower echelon. In modern warfare, the amount of time that is available to make preparations is very short, consequently, it is not always necessary to follow the procedures set forth above. In a number of recent maneuvers, the campaign headquarters organized coordination when assigning tasks to the lower echelon. Both the assignment of tasks and the organizing of coordination are closely linked to each other, not only in terms of substance, but also in terms of timing and method of implementation.

However, to accomplish this, work methods must be very flexible and well coordinated to insure that the commander, the staff agency and each component can play a full role and insure that no component has any "dead" time. This is the essence of the parallel work method.

The maneuvers showed that this method reduced the amount of time required to formulate the campaign plan by one-third to one-fourth compared to the method of doing things in order. As a result, much more time is available for troops to make preparations for combat. At the same time, the experience gained in the maneuvers confirms that the parallel method can only be effectively applied when all command agencies operate in a tightly organized manner, have open lines of communication and display high professionalism in staff work, especially when command officers are trained in the uniform staff regulations and combat regulations of the army.

In order to implement the parallel method among the agencies on an echelon, the work of the commander, the deputy commanders and the heads of the various services and branches must be very efficiently organized in order to insure that everyone can simultaneously gain an understanding of the portions of the task that relate to themselves and simultaneously begin to prepare the factors and the data needed for the commander to make a decision. For example, at the meeting to study and gain a thorough understanding of the order issued by the upper echelon, the commander must work with the chief-of-staff, the deputy commander in charge of politics, the deputy chief-of-staff in charge of combat operations and a number of combat assistants, but not with the deputy commanders in charge of rear services and technical services yet, so that these comrades
can study the rear service and technical service orders issued by the upper echelon and prepare a situation report and opinions to present to the commander.

In the process of the commander gradually defining the factors in his decision, the concerned officers must immediately grasp the matters that pertain to them and simultaneously initiate the work of their component, their sector.

The same applies to the command agencies on the lower echelon; the officers receiving guidance or being assigned jobs by the commander, the deputy commanders or the heads of the services and sectors must immediately transmit the necessary notices and orders by the most suitable and rapid means of communication. In this way, the lower echelon can think about its decision and formulate the combat plan for its echelon before officially receiving the task assigned by the upper echelon.

The experience of the maneuvers has also shown us that it is necessary to be more creative in the development of optimum technical measures in view of the fact that our means of command and communications are still very limited in both quantity and quality. Of utmost importance is the need to transmit directives and orders to the lower echelon rapidly, accurately and in secrecy. To begin with, it is necessary to research and improve the organization of information and cryptography and streamline and unify the format of communiques, directives and orders throughout the army.

We must develop a signal system that consists of many means: radio relay, wired radio, mobile radio, and signal equipment. Each means has its own role to play and must be utilized well; none can be given light attention, including mobile information and signal equipment. On those echelons that have been equipped with a television system within the headquarters, widespread use must be made of this equipment. At the same time, research must be conducted in order to make more use of the various types of agreements concerning the transmission of groups of each type directive and order in a campaign in order to truly condense the contents of documents as well as reduce the time required to transmit these contents by the various means of communication. The innovation of establishing a section of officers who special in registering, observing, inspecting, supervising, determining the order of priority and selecting the most suitable means of transmission has permitted the sending of a very large volume of information and made an important contribution to completing campaign preparations on schedule.

The above are several initial thoughts drawn from the realities of the recent campaign maneuvers in the hope of making a small contribution to the effort to research and improve the method and art of commanding troops in the modern campaigns of our army.
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SENIOR GENERAL HOANG VAN THAI ON STAFF TRAINING

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Sep 82 pp 1-18

[Article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai: "Training Commanders and Staff Cadres in Modern Warfare"]

Text Under the correct and creative leadership of the party and with the help and support of the people, our armed forces have, in the nearly 40 years of their buildup and combat, become increasingly strong and won glorious victories, recording the most impressive feats of arms in the history of the nation.

The formation and development of our command and staff sector have been closely linked to the buildup, the development, the combat and the glorious victories of the armed forces. Each stage in the growth of the armed forces has been a stage in the development of the command and staff sector; conversely, when command and staff activities reach a new level of qualitative development, they create a new factor that has a decisive impact upon the growth and victories of the army.

The decisive role played by command and staff activities has been verified by the realities of war. In the history of war, no army has ever recorded an imposing feat of arms without having talented commanders and a talented staff; and, history has never recorded a case in which the cause of a defeat was a shortcoming on the part of soldiers.

For nearly 40 years, together with developing the strength of the army, we have been making every effort to build a system of staff agencies on the various echelons and within the various sectors that has a large corps of competent, professional and specialized cadres. This system has made the most important contribution to the strong buildup and the glorious victories of the army.

In 1945, following the success of the August Revolution and the birth of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the first worker-farmer state in Southeast Asia, the agencies guiding our armed forces were also formed and the General Staff was established. In his directive establishing the general staff, President Ho Chi Minh, the beloved father of the Vietnam People's Armed Forces, issued the following general instructions: "We recently won our independence and

12
freedom and the entire country is actively engaged in construction. The liberation army and self-defense forces must be maintained so that, together with all the people, they can maintain our independence and freedom. We must establish a general staff to command the army nationwide. The general staff, which is the important military agency of the organization and is the nerve center of the army, has the task of building a strong army, training troops well, knowing the enemy and ourselves, formulating resourceful strategies and plans and organizing unified, precise and timely command operations in order to win victory over every enemy. At present, we lack experience and have no knowledge of staff work, consequently, we are encountering difficulties; however, we must try to perform this work, must work and learn at the same time and, if we are determined, every difficulty can be overcome. We must, regardless of the circumstances, build a strong and talented Vietnam staff sector for the army that is worthy of the resourceful, creative, heroic and unyielding nation of Vietnam in order to protect the independence of the fatherland and the freedom of the people.

In keeping with Uncle Ho's instructions, staff agencies were first only established on the central level, where the staff agency was the general staff, and on a number of fronts. When the army unified its table of organization and organized battalions and regiments, staff agencies were also established from the regimental echelon upward.

Immediately after they were established, the staff agencies on the various echelons, headed by the general staff, even though they had a few recently regroups cadres, lacked knowledge of military matters and lacked professional skills; however, they directed their efforts toward guiding the buildup and development of the armed forces and struggling against the Chiang Kai-shek reactionarities in the North while organizing forces to fight the French colonialist aggressors in the southern region of the fatherland.

In the war of resistance against the French colonialists, the general staff and the staff agencies on the various echelons effectively supported the leadership echelon and the commanders in successfully organizing and managing the combat operations of the armed forces. The staff sector, together with the rest of the army, advanced from fighting a war of resistance against the French in the South to fighting a nationwide war of resistance beginning in December, 1946, from the victory in Viet Bac in 1947, which defeated the enemy's strategy of attacking quickly and winning victory quickly, through the offensive and counter-offensive campaigns to the great victory of the 1953-1954 winter-spring campaign, which concluded with the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign.

After defeating the French colonialists and liberating one-half of the country, the Vietnam revolution entered a new stage of struggle, a stage in which extremely large, new tasks faced the armed forces, in general, and the staff sector, in particular.

Under the leadership of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, the general staff and the staff agencies on the various echelons made positive contributions to the performance of the new and very complicated tasks of building
and developing the armed forces and building and developing a regular force, modern people's army suited to the tasks of liberating the South and defending the North; prepared plans for defending the country and prepared the battlefield in the North; researched suitable modes and forms of warfare; organized the strategic transport system in order to reinforce the great frontlines; and helped the commanders on the various echelons organize successful combat operations on the various battlefields in order to defeat the new enemies, the U.S. aggressor army, the lackey army, and the armies of the vassal countries.

Defeated in the "special war," the U.S. imperialists prepared to send massive numbers of troops into South Vietnam in order to wage the "limited war" in a vain attempt to achieve the objective of their aggression. In keeping with the resolutions of the Party Central Committee, the Political Bureau and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee and quickly ascertaining the intentions, the capabilities and the basic measures of the enemy, the general staff proposed the redeployment of our strategic positions on the various battlefields, researched various methods of fighting and made comprehensive preparations. When the U.S. Army sent massive numbers of troops into South Vietnam and began waging the war of destruction against the North, the staff agencies on the various echelons on the battlefields, carrying out the intentions of commanders and operating on the basis of pre-deployed battle positions, organized and successfully carried out counter-offensives and offensives and defeated one strategy of the enemy after another in the "limited war." The bankrupting of scores of strategies employed by the U.S. imperialists in their war of aggression against both South and North Vietnam, such as the "two-pronged strategy," "the de-Americanization of the war strategy," "the Vietnamization of the war strategy," "the war of sabotage strategy" and so forth together with the resounding victories won in the general offensive and uprising in the spring of 1968, in the years 1971 and 1972, when we crushed the strategic air raids carried out by B-52's and, in particular, the great victory in the spring of 1975, the highpoint of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, reflected our party's skillful and unique art of guiding the war, an art to which the staff agencies on the various echelons made worthy contributions.

With the great and complete victory of the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation and the reunification of the fatherland, the staff agencies of our armed forces, under the correct and creative leadership of the party and with a full understanding of the revolutionary line and tasks, of the military line and task of the party, began the work of preparing to defend the fatherland and resisting aggression by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists collaborating with the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys. The glorious victories won in the two wars to defend the fatherland against the wars of aggression of the Beijing clique and the lackeys on the southwestern and northern borders of the fatherland reflected the significant growth and the tremendous contributions of the staff sector.

Our staff agencies on the various echelons have also made very important contributions to the fulfillment of the international obligations of our army and people to the peoples and armies of fraternal Laos and Kampuchea, thereby
strengthening and developing the militant solidarity of the three peoples on the Indochina peninsula against common enemies, the French colonialists, the U.S. imperialists and the Chinese expansionists.

In the new stage of the revolution, the 5th Congress of the Party again confirmed that our country's revolution has two strategic tasks: "The first is successfully building socialism and the second is maintaining combat readiness and firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland." The Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in collaboration with the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys, are urgently intensifying their schemes of aggression against Vietnam and the two countries of Laos and Kampuchea. "For this reason, our country is in a situation in which it is at peace but must contend with a multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the Beijing reactionaries and must, at the same time, be ready to deal with the possibility of the enemy launching a large-scale war of aggression."

In order to successfully complete the task of firmly defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland, our army and people are making every effort to strengthen and build a modern national defense system of all the people and preparing to successfully carry out a modern people's war to defend the fatherland; the people's armed forces are taking positive steps to improve their quality and build a regular force and modern people's army. Our staff sector also has a new and especially important task and role. The successful performance of this function and role depends primarily upon the results of the efforts to build the staff sector and upon the training of command and staff cadres. This is a very important matter, one that encompasses very profound and comprehensive aspects. Here, we will only deal with a number of the main aspects of this matter:

1. The Characteristics of Modern Warfare Have Raised New Requirements Regarding the Command and Staff Sector

Today, the scientific-technological revolution, which is developing with the force of a typhoon, is rapidly stimulating the process of the modernization of armies. A modern army consists of many services and branches that are equipped with increasingly modern weapons and material-technical means.

Modern warfare, as we know, is warfare that is coordinated among the various branches and services. In modern battles and campaigns, many components of the technical branches and services participate, large quantities of weapons and technical equipment are utilized and the quantity of supplies consumed, the extent of damages and material-technical means become increasingly large. Warfare is very fierce, the level of mobility is high and the battle situation changes very rapidly and unexpectedly. Warfare is conducted by many very different modes and forms over a large area and in an increasingly short space of time.

In the process of preparing for and carrying out coordinated combat operations, the commander and staff agency must perform a very large amount of very complicated work in a short space of time. In the past, in the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation, several months were taken to prepare for an offensive campaign. Today, in a modern people's war to defend the fatherland,
the amount of time available to prepare for an offensive campaign is only a number of days and, sometimes, only a number of hours but many times more work must be performed than in past years. Modern warfare is waged by means of the unprecedented combat strength of our armed forces. Under the circumstances of coordinated combat operations, the commanders and staff agencies on the various echelons must have a firm grasp of the situation on the entire battlefield, must make prompt decisions, be flexible, maintain continuous and firm coordination among the various elements of the combat formation, among the various forces participating in combat, conduct good support operations, etc.

In the face of the new tasks, with the care and concern of the party, the state and all our people and with the tremendous and effective help of the heroic Soviet army and people as well as the armies and peoples of the other fraternal socialist countries, our army is moving toward becoming a regular force, modern army. Our people's armed forces, especially the people's army, are building and perfecting their organization and many branches, services and special units have been equipped with increasingly modern technical combat equipment. Soon, as they advance toward increasingly regular-force and modern operations, the organizational structure of our armed forces will surely undergo many new developments and will include many more modern weapons and technical equipment. Our people's armed forces are building and developing both main forces and the local army, mobile forces and stationary forces that are of increasingly high quality and possess increasingly high fighting strength. These developments on the part of our armed forces, of the people's army will, of course, lead to new developments in modern warfare.

In a people's war to defend the fatherland against the Chinese aggressor army should they recklessly invade our country, modern warfare will also reflect the new elements of the military line and military art that have been established by our party. The mode of waging a war, the mode of armed struggle, such as a war waged by the main force military corps and a local people's war as well as the close coordination between these two modes, will involve many new factors regarding strength, scale of warfare and the methods employed to prepare for and conduct a war. Many forms of warfare and forms of campaigns of a highly integrated, popular and modern nature are employed in keeping with the spirit of the general methods of fighting that have been established and on the basis of the pre-deployed and constantly improved battle position. Combat operations coordinated among the various branches and services are combined with independent combat operations conducted by the various services, with large-scale, combat coordination playing the decisive role in defeating the aggressor army on the battlefield and bringing the war to a victorious conclusion.

Developments in modern warfare such as those mentioned above, do, of course, raise many new and very high requirements in the forging and training of commanders and staff cadres as well as staff agencies.

2. The New Requirements of Command and Staff Work in Coordinated Combat Operations

a) Our army is implementing the one person in command system.
Our armed forces are under the direct, centralized and unified leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party. On the basis of fully understanding and thoroughly implementing this basic principle, the Party Central Committee decided to implement the one person in command system within the people's armed forces and has defined the role of the individual in charge for the purpose of developing the responsibility of the commander as highly as possible. The need to implement the one person in command system on the basis of the party arose from the objective requirements of the military task, the development of the armed forces in the new stage and the requirements of modern warfare. Commanding troops under modern conditions involves commanding combat operations that are coordinated among the various branches and services for the purposes of unifying the efforts of each force participating in combat, utilizing the various types of weapons and technical equipment with the fullest possible efficiency, creating the largest possible combined strength and orienting this strength toward specific targets within a specific area and span of time in accordance with a unified intention and plan for achieving the objectives that have been established. The Party Central Committee has decided to implement the one person in command system within the people's armed forces. The Report Reviewing Party Building and Revising the Party Statutes at the 4th Congress of the Party pointed out: "In view of the fact that our army has matured, it is necessary to implement in the best manner possible the collective leadership system of the party committee echelons in conjunction with implementing the commander system in accordance with the regulations of the Party Central Committee."

The Report on Party Building at the 5th Congress confirmed: "...In order to meet the requirements involved in building the army and strengthening the national defense system and the requirements of a people's war to defend the fatherland, we must further strengthen the party's leadership of the armed forces, fully implement the one person in command system and insure that the commander fulfills his responsibility in performing the tasks assigned by the party and state, makes decisions and deals with situations in an effective, resolute, precise and prompt manner and leads troops in taking resolute, urgent actions in order to win victory and complete each task well."

The one person in command system is a new and important matter to our army, one that must be correctly understood in order to be implemented well. It must be clearly understood that the implementation of the one person in command system is never contrary to the principle of the party providing collective leadership within the army, rather, it is the concretization of this principle under the specific conditions of our armed forces at this time. It constantly strengthens the leadership role of the party and perfects the command organization in a manner consistent with the military line of the party, with the tasks of the army, with the development of military science and military art in the new stage, with the advance to regular force, modern operations within our army and with the growth of our army's corps of cadres. The realities of the wars to defend the fatherland and the buildup of the army in the recent past have confirmed that the successful implementation of the one person in command system is one of the decisive factors in the advance by our army to becoming a regular force, modern army and in insuring the completion of each task in a modern people's war to defend the fatherland.
The purpose of implementing the one person in command system is to develop, as highly and fully as possible, the responsibility of the commander of the unit or the person in charge of the agency, highlight the effectiveness with which troops are commanded and managed and material-technical bases are managed and determinedly and promptly organise the successfully implementation of the orders and directives of the upper echelon and one's own echelon. The commander is the person with highest authority and is, at the same time, the person who bears the first and the greatest responsibility for the results of the performance of military tasks, political tasks, rear service tasks, technical tasks and economic tasks as well as for the entire material and spiritual lives of the unit. The implementation of the one person in command system will eliminate the phenomena of depending on others but not practicing democracy, of being arbitrary but not decisive and correct the lack of a system without clearly defined responsibilities. The implementation of the one person in command system will never restrict, rather, it will fully develop the spirit and sense of democracy and tap the intelligence of the collective. Because, as his responsibility becomes increasingly heavy, the commander comes to the realisation that he cannot command by himself and must have the close collaboration of deputy commanders, the command agency, the political agency and so forth; as a result of which he must sincerely listen to every idea that is presented, must avoid practicing democracy in a form for form's sake manner and must avoid being arbitrary. Without sufficiently strong command agencies, the commander cannot command troops in modern combat. For this reason, the commander will realize that it is necessary to have agencies, necessary to know how to rely upon them and will, as a result, make every effort to strengthen his agencies, especially the staff agency.

The staff agency, which is the nerve center in the commanding of troops, is responsible for helping the commander organize the successful performance of each military task under all circumstances and in every situation.

The commander and his staff agency comprise a collective that is unified and closely united in the spirit of serving the army and serving the people with their entire intellect and will. The staff agency must consider supporting the commander in accurately, promptly and effectively managing all the activities of the troops subordinate to him, completing every work task well and winning victory in combat to be its highest objective. This is also a graphic, concrete expression of the spirit of serving the party, serving the people and serving the army as the part of the command agencies on the various echelons. The commander must be more skilled than his agencies and must know how to effectively utilize them as this is the only way he can command troops and guide his agencies in successfully performing their tasks. He must always remember that his knowledge in a certain field is not always greater than that of the collective of specialists within his agencies. A skilled commander must have strong agencies and strong agencies are the result of having a skilled commander. For this reason, the commander must rely upon and utilize as well as build and train increasingly strong agencies. This is a very important, indispensable standard of every command and guidance echelon.
In modern warfare, the commander not only knows how to organize his own labor well, but must also know how to organize the labor of the various agencies in an efficient and smoothly coordinated manner. The commander cannot simply rely upon the intelligence of the collective, rather, he must continuously study in order to improve his skills and qualifications in command operations and staff work. Modern warfare requires that the commander be skilled in command operations and, at the same time, skilled in staff work. Only by being proficient in staff work can the commander know how to utilize his staff agency and concern himself with building it. Staff cadres must not only be skilled in staff work, but must also be knowledgeable of and skilled in command operations. Because, the staff agency must not only know how to assess the situation and process information, but must also have the ability to evaluate and predict developments in the situation; the staff agency not only supplies the data needed by the commander to make a decision, but must also be skilled in making scientific forecasts and proposing optimum combat plans.

Because they do not have much experience in organizing the command of large-scale, modern combat operations, some of our command cadres on the various echelons still give little attention to utilizing their agencies and do not concern themselves with building or training them. This is a very serious shortcoming on the part of command cadres within our army. Therefore, we must be determined to correct this shortcoming in order to meet the new requirements of tasks.

This does not mean that the requirements of the commander should be considered the same as the requirements of staff cadres.

The commander must be a model person in all fields: his viewpoints and thinking must be firm; he must possess pure revolutionary ethics and be diligent, frugal, honest, just, devoted and impartial; he must possess basic knowledge of general science as well as military science and military art and be able to unite the collective, listen to its opinions and tap its intelligence; he must be competent, be willing to accept responsibility and be willing to make decisions but must not be arbitrary, must not rely upon others to do his work; he must be brave, flexible, creative and righteous; he must be farsighted and must take the initiative in combat and work. In summary, the commander must be a model for everyone, must be the most reliable base of every job. The talented commander is not constrained by perilous situations, rather, it is such situations that his talent is displayed.

In actuality, there is no lack of cases in which the commander is skilled but the staff is not. Conversely, some commanders are skilled in staff work but not in commanding troops.

This problem demands that cadres be appraised and evaluated in detailed manner, not in a general manner based on formulas, so that correct guidelines can be adopted for utilizing and training cadres.

b) Establishing the correct relationship between the means of war and the various forms and modes of warfare, between space and time in combat, between the timing and the volume of work.
As we know, the rapid development of the technical sciences has caused the means of armed struggle to be improved at an especially rapid rate. Since World War II, these means (aircraft, warships, missiles, tanks, electronic equipment, communications equipment and so forth) have experienced several generations of development in the space of only 20 years. Meanwhile, the development of the modes and forms of warfare has, at times, stood still, has not kept pace or been consistent with the development of the new means of warfare. This has given rise to a contradiction between material-technical means and methods of fighting. The relationship between material-technical means and the modes and forms of warfare is the relationship between the material and consciousness; it is the relationship between technology and art. Therefore, the development of the mode of warfare, in general, and fighting methods, in particular, generally lags behind the development of the means of armed struggle. At the same time, we should, on the other hand, remember that the methods of fighting are not only under the impact of material-technical means, but are also under the impact, sometimes the decisive impact, of the guidelines for the development (manufacture) of these means.

Correctly establishing the above mentioned relationship is an important responsibility on the part of the command cadres and staff agencies on the various echelons and the agencies that research science and technology. This matter is of special importance during the period of preparations for a war against aggression as well as in the process of waging such a war. In order to successfully resolve this problem, it is necessary to possess deep knowledge of military science, have a firm grasp of the military technical sciences and be able to use all the various means of armed struggle.

Every form of combat is carried out within a given area and a given time frame. In the past, the length of time that combat lasted and the size of the area in which combat was taking place were directly proportional to each other; as the fighting spread over a larger area, it lasted for a longer period of time. Today, now that the means of armed struggle possess unlimited range, possess very great destructive force and possess the ability to reach their targets very much more rapidly and now that the means of command, support and mobility can reach anywhere on the earth, the factors of space and time have developed in the opposite manner. The area in which fighting occurs has markedly increased while the amount of time that fighting lasts has constantly declined and is very much shorter. The realities of the wars in our country also point this out. For example, the Dien Bien Phu Campaign lasted 55 days and nights and took place in an area the size of several villages; however, in the war of resistance against the United States, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign lasted only about 1 week but took place over an area encompassing several provinces. This trend is developing more with each passing day in keeping with the development of the means of war. Modern warfare is not only reducing the amount of time that fighting lasts, but it is also reducing the amount of time needed for preparations.

The completion of all preparations as well as the victorious conduct of combat operations in a short amount of time demand that a very large volume of work involving very many jobs that are many times more complicated than previously be completed in a truly precise and timely fashion. As a result, an increasingly deep contradiction arises between available time and the amount of work to be
performed. The continuous nature of modern warfare further increases the volume of work that must be performed. Because, in modern warfare, preparations for the next campaign must be virtually completed in the course of conducting the present campaign. Whereas, in the recent war, the act of preparing for the Hue-Da Nang campaign in the process of conducting the Central Highlands campaign was a special situation, such preparations will be commonplace in the future.

Here, the time factor becomes even more obvious; time is of decisive significance in warfare, especially modern warfare. Time is a force, time is a strength and, as Engels pointed out: "Time is a soldier." Correctly establishing this relationship is part of the responsibility of the commander and the agency. Every delay, every lost opportunity in modern warfare limits the size of the victory that is won or leads to heavy losses, frequently to defeat.

c) The relationship between the commander and staff agency and the political and other agencies.

In order to command troops in peace time as well as in time of war, the commander must have an apparatus consisting of many agencies. Each agency, the staff agency, the political agency, the rear service agency, the technical agency and so forth, is an integral part of the entire command and leadership organizational system. Each part has a specific function and task and operates in accordance with its established function and regulations, operates on the basis of a specific mechanism. If the organizational structure of one of these parts is larger or smaller than necessary and it operates outside its prescribed function, it will interfere with the other parts, create chaos and ultimately destroy the system. Of course, we should not understand this matter in a mechanical, rigid fashion. As a part of the system of command and leadership agencies, each agency can and does have the responsibility to uncover and participate in the common, important jobs of the unit and the army. And, in each unusual case in which the commander must assign a task to an agency that is "outside its function," every agency must perform this task in a scrupulous fashion and achieve good results.

In order to command troops in winning victory in modern war, the commander must know the function and task of each agency, establish an efficient table of organization for each, establish work methods and procedures for each agency and establish the relationship between each agency and the other agencies. On this basis, the commander must resolutely demand that the agencies complete their tasks as best possible, display the spirit of socialist cooperation and help one another in the spirit of comradeship with a view toward completing the common tasks well. However, the most important matter is that each component must fulfill its tasks and duties correctly and well. This is the most positive and effective way to help the other agencies.

The staff is the command agency, is the agency that has the function of serving as the center in organizing and maintaining coordination throughout the unit as well as among the different agencies. Therefore, the staff agency must truly be strong in all areas, must have a good reputation and must truly be the base of the other agencies.
In order to fulfill its function, the staff agency must maintain a close relationship and wholehearted collaboration with the political agency and the other agencies.

Every agency must fulfill its responsibility and display the full measure of zeal in order to complete its task; at the same time, it must closely collaborate with and wholeheartedly help the other agencies in the spirit of comradeship. These are the manifestations of strong agencies, of competent commanders, of a unit, an army that possesses high fighting strength and maintains a high level of combat readiness.

Therefore, in order to insure the completion of combat missions, the commander must, in peace time, train his agencies in fulfilling their duties, establishing scientific work procedures, always maintaining good relations with other agencies and being ready to collaborate with one another to complete the common task.

In order to constantly move forward to meet the requirements of modern warfare, the commander and staff cadres must possess deep knowledge of military science and military art; understand modern military technical science; be familiar with the means of modern war; know how to apply the achievements of the various sciences in the military field; be competent and have a good reputation; adopt truly scientific work methods and a truly scientific work style; and know how to organize their own labor as well as the labor of the entire agency in an efficient and well coordinated manner.

3. Some Measures for Improving the Skills and Qualifications of the Commander and the Agency

In order to improve the command and staff qualifications and skills of the various echelons, a series of well coordinated measures must be taken. Here, only a number of the most necessary measures will be discussed:

a) Constantly studying and training in order to improve skills and qualifications in order to meet the new requirements that exist.

Today, commanding troops has become a very important part of military science. It applies the latest achievements and discoveries of virtually all of the natural sciences and social sciences. Moreover, commanding troops is not only a science, it is an art as well. It is the art of creatively applying the laws of military science and the knowledge of command science to specific conditions and developing the greatest possible combined strength of troops in order to win victory over every enemy. In the history of our wars to defend and save the country, our nation has won victory over aggressors many times larger than we as a result of its remarkable art of providing guidance and commanding troops.

Under modern conditions, command science and command art have been and are developing very rapidly, thereby requiring that the command cadres and the staff cadres on the various echelons continuously study in order to learn new knowledge, acquire new skills and improve their command of this art and improve their command capabilities.
Our cadres have much experience in command work and staff work in both building the armed forces and in combat and have been frequently challenged in the realities of war. This provides a rare foundation for deepening their knowledge and improving their skills. However, compared to the new requirements that exist, our cadres still have major shortcomings, such as a lack of basic, systematic knowledge of military science, Marxist-Leninist science, modern military technical science, etc. This is a very large obstacle to the effort to upgrade our army to a regular force, modern army and this obstacle will, if we do not take determined steps to overcome it, limit the victories we win in the future.

This situation faces us with the pressing task of constantly enriching our military knowledge in a comprehensive and systematic manner and improving our command and staff skills.

In order to perform this task, command and staff matters must be considered an important part of the training programs at schools as well as in on-the-job courses. The training of cadres in command and staff operations must be basic, systematic and comprehensive and must, at the same time, improve their professional skills and qualifications in this work. Of course, training subjects and methods must be suited to each echelon and each case; however, these subjects must be part of a complete system in order to insure that the cadres who graduate from the system of schools possess complete knowledge and the command and staff qualifications and skills needed to meet the requirements of modern war. It must be remembered that command and staff cadres must successfully meet the basic requirement of being skilled in the operations conducted on their echelon, understanding the upper echelon and being thoroughly familiar with the operations on the lower echelon. Without such qualifications, the commander will fail, when trying to understand the task he has been assigned, to see his role, position and task in the formation of the upper echelon and fail to complete his task as well as fail to command the lower echelon. There must be good coordination between raising the command of theory that cadres have and improving their practical skills through training. The purpose of studying is to perform work, to perform work well. This is the highest objective of studying. For this reason, the most important requirement, the primary requirement of schools is to concern themselves with cultivating the practical skills of their students. Students must receive training through the lessons and drills held at schools and even through the practical activities conducted within units. Importance must be attached to and a plan must be adopted for conducting the various types of command and staff exercises on a regular basis. This is the most effective way to train commanders and staff cadres.

Of the various subjects employed in training and study, special importance must be attached to the command and staff experiences gained by us in the recent wars.

On the other hand, together with studying under a general program and plan, the command and staff cadres on the various echelons must make every effort to study and train on their own in their everyday activities in order to improve their qualifications and skills. This is a matter of very decisive significance, especially in view of the present circumstances and situation concerning our
cadres. Because, subjective effort is always the decisive factor in the completion of every job as well as in the completion of one's studies.

b) Making every effort to learn soviet military science and the experiences of the soviet army and the armies of the other fraternal socialist countries.

In their comprehensive cooperation and militant solidarity with Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries are helping us to build a regular force, modern army and preparing our country to resist a war of aggression. If we do not study the experiences and learn the knowledge of our friends, we cannot effectively utilize this valuable assistance. Moreover, soviet military science, in general, and the command science, in particular, of the soviet army are the most advanced in the world. The theory of command and staff operations as well as the experiences that the army and navy of the Soviet Union have gained in their combat and buildup are extremely valuable to the Vietnam People's Army in the course of its development to a regular force, modern army. For this reason, it is necessary to study the soviet military science and experiences of the soviet army and the armies of the other fraternal socialist countries. It is necessary to learn them fully and to apply them in a creative manner consistent with the specific conditions of Vietnam. They must be studied under a specific plan, studied in an effective, selective manner in order to achieve good results.

In order to learn the military science and the experiences of our friends well, it is very important that we resolutely combat conservativism and overcome the malady of dogmatism as well as the mentality of feeling inferior. These are two aspects of the same matter; when combating one aspect, it is necessary to guard against the other and necessary to avoid deviations in our methods of thinking.

c) Cultivating and forging new work methods for the commander and staff agency.

Methods are of especially important significance in the successful performance of any task under any set of difficult circumstances. General Secretary Le Duan said that once the correct line has been adopted, methods play the decisive role in the successful implementation of the line; if the line is correct but the methods employed are incorrect, defeat will result.

In modern warfare, the commander and the staff agency must not only possess knowledge of military science, military art and military technical science, but must also possess truly scientific work methods and a high level of professionalism. Without meeting these requirements, they cannot complete their task.

In preparations for warfare (campaigns), the commander and the staff agency must, after they have received their task, perform the following jobs well: gain an understanding of their task; set up a schedule; issue forecast orders to the lower echelon; evaluate the various aspects of the enemy situation and our situation; make decisions; assign tasks; formulate a combat plan; organize coordination; organize command and support operations in the various areas; inspect and supervise implementation and so forth. In each of the jobs mentioned
above, such as evaluating the situation, it is necessary to collect and process a very large volume of information from very many different sources, information that frequently is contradictory and of varying degrees of accuracy. Each and every one of these jobs must be performed in a very short amount of time, time as measured by hours, not days.

The realities of training and maneuvers in the recent past show that our commanders and staff agencies have not adopted suitable work methods and lack unity and coordination: at times, they fail to complete all their work but, at other times, they sit waiting for work and waste much time. Commanders do not know how to efficiently organize the labor of the various agencies; staff agencies are not fulfilling their function as the center coordinating the other agencies in every job. New conditions demand new ways of working. In order to perform a large amount of work in a short amount of time as mentioned above, there must be scientifically organized labor, must be creative labor on the part of the entire collective of the various echelons and sectors. Therefore, when engaged in making preparations, the commander must know how to organize the entire unit, all agencies and all sectors so that their operations are precisely coordinated like the running of a machine. For example, when gaining an understanding of the task, the commander must not try to do this on his own, rather, he must gain the participation of concerned comrades (deputy commanders, a number of heads and so forth); at the same time, he must have the entire unit perform those jobs that can and must be performed before an order has been issued and while making decisions as well as formulating the plan; along with this, the factors must be created for the lower echelon to think, make a decision and formulate a plan. The agency commander and the lower echelon can begin their various stages of work at the same time or at different times. This depends upon whether there is much time or little time available for preparations. However, regardless of how much time is available, the commander and the agency must always keep one basic principle in mind, namely, the need to give the lower echelon much time to prepare.

This is called the parallel work method in modern warfare.

In the past, when the timing of combat operations was not very crucial, little concern was given to developing efficient work methods for agencies. Therefore, the orderly work method was considered the only method before as well as following previous wars. In actuality, however, when combat alert orders were issued back then, everyone from the units, sectors and agencies to each individual soldier knew what they had to do and began the work of making their preparations for combat without waiting for orders to arrive. Of course, these actions were spontaneous in nature.

Today, through the realities of preparing for and engaging in combat in many different wars and as a result of the demands of modern warfare, man has discovered and developed a new method of working, the parallel work method, and has applied this method in a highly conscious manner. This is the most suitable method at this time and is constantly being improved. For this reason, it is necessary to teach and provide training in this method to cadres, especially to commanders and staff agencies.
There are some who maintain that the contents and the stages of work in the activities of the commander and the staff as recorded in the order and the regulations are only suited to training conditions and cannot be applied in actual combat. This thinking is totally incorrect. It will lead to doing as one sees fit and will create confusion in work. It must be remembered that the contents and the stages of work set forth in the order and the regulations represent the crystallization of the combat and training experiences of our army in its several decades of combat and buildup. These stages of work are binding upon everyone in the buildup of the army as well as in combat. Because, they are rational jobs that absolutely must be performed. They are consistent with the logical thinking of the commander in the process of making his decision because only by gaining an understanding of his task and evaluating the situation can the groundwork be laid for making a decision, formulating a plan and organizing cooperation and the other areas of work; they are scientific because only after listening to the heads report on the situation does the commander have the objective basis needed to make a decision; they uphold the role of the agency and insure the collective nature of command operations because they tap the intelligence of the collective; and they insure that the amount of time needed is reduced.

Of course, these activities only become rational when the commander and the agency know how to fully and correctly meet the requirements of each stage of work with a high level of professionalism.

The opinion mentioned above is also incorrect because it separates training and combat and does not view training as having the purpose of insuring victory in combat. The purpose of studying is not simply to study. The purpose of sweating on the training grounds is to reduce the shedding of blood on the battlefield and win victory. We must always remember the teaching of the great Lenin: "We must train in those things needed in war" and if we do not give troops a grasp "of the things needed in war," do not give troops a grasp of the things that war demands and, we will not only commit a mistake, we will commit a crime as well.

In modern warfare, the art of commanding troops is closely linked to the ability to organize and to work methods. Without correct work methods, without the ability to organize and without a precise and detailed plan, combat decisions, regardless of how correct they might be, become empty slogans and are never implemented.

It is necessary to have a correct understanding of this matter, necessary to be determined to change ways of thinking and working that are no longer suitable in order to constantly keep pace with the rapid development of the situation.

d) Cultivating and forging a regular-force workstyle.

In order to complete their tasks in modern warfare, the commander and agency must not only employ new work methods, but must also possess a suitable workstyle. Modern warfare demands modern work methods and a modern workstyle. Our army's advance to a regular-force army demands that our cadres employ regular-force work
methods and display a regular-force workstyle. At present, however, our cadres are still heavily influenced by the guerrilla style. And, once something becomes a style, it has inertia, it becomes conservative and becomes a very large obstacle to understanding and accepting the new.

It has come time for us to become determined to abolish the careless, haphazard method of working, abandon the practice of operating on the basis of guesswork, of leaving things half-done and not operating on a scientific basis; we must be determined to correct the practice of working in a simple, general manner lacking in initiative and principle. This is an important requirement in insuring the cultivation of a new workstyle. The regular-force workstyle of command cadres and agencies is expressed primarily in the following:

The ability to think and make scientific forecasts: without this capability, it is impossible to perform command and staff work in modern war. In modern war, developments in combat occur very unexpectedly and continuously. This requires that the commander predict the developments that will occur in warfare, predict the development of a process and predict the orderly development of the process as well as its development by leaps forward in accordance with the law of cause and effect, which includes predicting the main, decisive developments.

The ability to think and make scientific forecasts involves using one's knowledge of objective laws and making a swift, dialectical and realistic analysis of complex developments to predict events and processes, to see their causes and the conditions under which they will arise in order to employ suitable methods of action with a view toward achieving the established objective.

In modern warfare, the ability to think and make scientific predictions is of especially important significance in many areas. It is a factor that insures that initiative can be taken in every combat activity of the armed forces, in general, and the operations of the various command echelons, in particular. In the military fields, the staff agencies on the various echelons are collectives that symbolize scientific predictions. The staff agencies correctly predict the process and the development of combat activities in a manner consistent with each scale: the strategic scale, the campaign scale and the tactical scale. Here, the role played by the commander assumes even more special importance. Because, the commander is the person who has the first responsibility and the final decision concerning scientific predictions. This is a minimum demand of every commander. Without the ability to make scientific predictions, a person cannot be a commander. Because, in order to provide guidance, a person must see problems in advance and, the higher the echelon of guidance that a person is on, the more foresighted he must be, the broader his vision must be; otherwise, a person who provides guidance will lead the lower echelon as well as himself into a deadend, into a position in which they are unable to take action in work as well as in combat.

The ability to think and make scientific predictions in the military field is based on profound and deep military knowledge and a firm grasp of the laws of war and armed struggle; on a firm grasp of the Marxist-Leninist method of recognition; and
on the basis of maintaining close contact with reality. This ability is also closely linked to one's experience in combat and the buildup of forces; it is a product of an entire process of very detailed training carried out by each cadre with high zeal and a high spirit of responsibility.

The sense of organization, the sense of discipline and the spirit of responsibility of the collective of the agency and of each cadre; in modern warfare, every agency and every sector as well as each and every cadre is an indispensable part of the entire command system. For this reason, every component and every individual must successfully fulfill their task and duties within a specified amount of time; fully comply with the orders and directives of the upper echelon; strictly obey each regulation; respect time and maintain very strict discipline with regard to deadlines. To the commander and the staff agency, these are very important requirements because they not only have a decisive influence upon the completion of the unit's task, but also closely link everyone together within a strong collective.

Operating in a planned manner: the purposes of operating in a planned manner are to clearly define objectives and tasks; establish guidelines for achieving objectives and define the steps that must be taken as well as the order in which they must be taken, which includes defining the main steps on which efforts must be focused; determine the forces and means that must be employed to achieve the objective, in general, as well as complete each step, in particular; define command matters and insure the completion of work; and, finally, set the deadline for the completion of work. Operating in a planned manner requires that one have a specific picture of the task that must be completed and make correct basic predictions concerning the developments and events within a process. It helps the commander and the work agency establish a clear objective, determine the main job and focus their efforts on this main job in order to complete it. Operating in a planned nature also helps to create a unity of action, as a result of which very different activities are combined within a unified process, thereby avoiding fragmentation and the lack of coordination; it helps troops to see the prospects for which they are working and to be highly determined and firmly confident when taking action. Finally, it helps in evaluating the results of work in a correct and specific manner and in avoiding evaluating results (achievements) in a general, vague manner, such as, "results are encouraging, should be developed upon, and so forth. We must be determined to overcome shallow thinking, thinking that is less than thorough, is in the nature of "guesswork" and must eliminate the shoddy workstyle, the style of doing whatever happens to be in front of us; we must forge and cultivate a planned, scientific, specific and precise workstyle.

Being precise: being precise is manifested in making every observation, prediction, proposal or action on scientific, objective analysis and consideration and on clear, detailed and precise calculations. It is totally foreign to working on the basis of sentiments, on the basis of one's will, on the basis of distorting the situation or distorting facts to suit one's subjective desires and on the basis of guesswork. Being specific is a general requirement of the command cadres and agency cadres on all echelons, not the specific requirement of any one particular echelon.
There is the opinion or the biased contention that being specific is an attribute that is only needed on the tactical, on the implementing echelon; the upper echelon need only be general and the strategic echelon need only have "several strategic options." The truth is just the opposite. When engaged in work, every echelon must be precise and specific. This applies to the strategic echelon as well. It must be remembered that the accuracy achieved on the strategic level must be high because every mistaken calculation, even the smallest, by the strategic echelon will affect the entire situation. In order to be precise, it is necessary to be specific. The problem here is: that which is specific on the strategic echelon is not that which is specific on the tactical echelon. The strategic echelon must have comprehensive vision, must view the whole and resolve problems related to the entire army, the entire war; however, it must always be remembered that comprehensive and whole are not synonymous with vague, general and cursory.

The precise and specific workstyle reflect the resolve of the commander or, in other words, the resolve of the commander is manifested in being precise and specific. For example, when any echelon assigns a task to a lower echelon and only describes the task in a general manner lacking specific details, lacking in precision, lacking a scientific basis, it only serves to confuse the lower echelon so that it does not know how to complete this task. This affects the confidence and the determination of the persons performing the task. And, no one assumes responsibility for the completion of the task. Being specific is not synonymous with being involved in everything, with being involved in the mundane and it is the opposite of the commander performing the work of agency, of the upper echelon performing the work of the lower echelon but not fulfilling its own task and duties.

In order to cultivate and forge the habit of being precise, every cadre must cultivate for himself a workstyle that involves researching the situation in a comprehensive, specific and detailed fashion, making scientific and precise calculations and knowing how to use modern means. Every cadre, especially staff cadres, must be extremely faithful, possess a high spirit of responsibility, bravely dare to tell the truth, dare to protect the truth, not engage in opportunism or individualism and always place the interests of the revolution, of his work above everything else.

e) Working, studying and gaining experience at the same time in the realities of training, combat and work.

Developing the command science and the command procedures of our army in the new stage is a pressing requirement, but is also a very complex matter. However, as Uncle Ho taught: "We must try to work and study at the same time and must be determined to succeed regardless of the difficulties we face."

We must not only study at schools and academies, but must also actively study on our jobs, in practice, in combat, must work and study at the same time. Reality is constantly developing and changing, consequently, it is very diverse. During the time we spend at schools, we are only equipped with the world view and methodology of Marxism-Leninism as they are applied in military affairs, only equipped with the basic theory of military science and military art. For this
reason, we must actively apply theory to practice in order to shed light on our actions and must, on this basis, reach new conclusions that supplement our knowledge as well as raise the professional level and enrich Vietnamese military science, in general, and the science of command, in particular.

We must constantly gain experience and take notes during each training lesson, each exercise and drill, in maneuvers and in jobs; in particular, we must learn lessons regarding command activities, staff work, the other work sectors, theory as well as our profession and work methods as well as workstyle.

Our army cadres must rapidly overcome the phenomenon of performing much work but giving little attention to conducting a review and promptly gaining experience from actual work, not being very willing to study or not studying under a plan. In order to meet the requirements of rapidly advancing our army to regular-force, modern operations and insuring victory in combat in a war to defend the fatherland, each of us must actively study, must make every effort to study, must, as Lenin taught, "learn, learn, never stop learning."

Under the leadership of the party and in view of the glorious tradition of the army, in general, and the staff sector, in particular, we are firmly confident that we will surely build a regular force, modern command sector that meets the requirements of the combat and buildup of our armed forces in the new stage. Our corps of command cadres and staff cadres, who possess a high spirit of responsibility and much very valuable experience, will surely be determined to study and to forge themselves in order to constantly improve their skills and qualifications and be worthy of the expectations of the army and the people.

7809
GSO: 4209/38
COMBAT TRAINING OF MILITIA, SELF-DEFENSE TROOPS EXAMINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese Sep 82 pp 42-47

Article by Lieutenant Colonel Le Manh Xe and Major Hoang Giang: "Training Militia and Self-Defense Forces in a Manner Based on the Requirements of the Combat Task"

Text: The purpose of training is to win victory in combat. The training of militia and self-defense forces must be based on the requirements of the local combat task within each area of operation to insure the completion of the task of fighting to protect the village and supporting the effort to win victory in combat; help to maintain political security and social order and safety on the basic and local levels; defeat the acts of encroachment and occupation and take the initiative in promptly retaliating against acts of aggression of the enemy; stop and promptly crush rebellions; and, at the same time, be able to participate in combat as soon as militia and self-defense forces supplement the main force units. Combat training must insure that militia and self-defense forces are able to fulfill their role in independent combat and know how to coordinate in combat with local troops and main force troops, thereby completing every assigned task well. Only in this way can the military training of militia and self-defense forces be of high quality and have clear objectives. We must correct such mistaken thinking as giving light attention to the training of militia and self-defense forces; thinking that any level of training will suffice; providing training merely to complete the training program within the specified amount of time; not attaching importance to actual results; and the conservative, complacent thinking of being satisfied with old experiences. We must wage a determined struggle against the maladies of ostentatiousness and quickly training troops en masse in a manner not consistent with reality. On the basis of the training order issued by the upper echelon, the provincial and district local military agencies have the task of defining the specifics and requirements involved in the training of each type trainee and providing advanced training to the cadres on the various echelons, especially those cadre who personally train militia and self-defense forces, so that they have a firm grasp of the training guidelines, objectives and task of each unit and each force during each period of time.

Providing training that is consistent with the requirements of the combat task of the militia and self-defense forces within each locality and at each
installation is a pressing requirement at this time and is also an important experience of a number of localities. During the past year, as a result of attaching importance to this matter, the militia and self-defense forces in the border areas have recorded good achievements even when performing their combat task and have helped to maintain political security and social order and safety. The militia and self-defense forces have killed hundreds of enemy soldiers engaged in acts of encroachment and occupation along the border; killed or captured many groups of enemy spies and commandoes infiltrating our territory; and helped to partially defeat the multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in the border areas. In the maintenance of political security and social order and safety, the militia and self-defense forces in the various areas of the country have made worthy contributions and, together with the other forces, have arrested many groups attempting to cross the border or flee the country by sea; uncovered and stopped many acts of sabotage and theft of public property; reclaimed much property for the state, the collective and the people; and, at the same time, played the shock role in productive labor and contributed together with the people to developing the economy, stabilizing the standard of living and building socialism within the locality.

Technically, the general requirement in the training of militia and self-defense forces is that they must become proficient in the use of the weapons and equipment with which they have been equipped or which they have made themselves, must be skilled marksmen and must be skilled in the use of mine and boobytraps. Tactically, on the basis of the specific combat task and combat plan of each place, militia and self-defense forces must be trained in how to conduct surprise attacks, ambushes and searches; how to surround a target, exert pressure upon it and tighten the encirclement; how to fight as small, scattered forces; how to fight as a concerted force; how to fight independently; how to coordinate in combat with other forces; how to attack communications lines, how to conduct sapper operations and so forth. Militia forces must also be trained in how to conduct patrols, stand guard, conduct reconnaissance and so forth. However, the focal point of training must be determined on the basis of the situation at each locality and installation. For example, in border areas, militia and self-defense forces must be skilled in annihilating groups of enemy spies and commandoes, firmly maintaining strongpoints, protecting villages, attacking enemy troops engaged in acts of encroachment and occupation and so forth. In coastal areas, militia and self-defense forces must know how to coordinate their production tasks with patrols, combat alert operations and combat at sea and on the islands and know how to detect and promptly report the appearance of unknown ships and boats in our offshore waters, how to detect and apprehend persons illegally leaving the country by sea and so forth. On the mainland, militia and self-defense forces must know how to fight enemy troops that make airborne landings, put down rebellions, maintain political security and social order and safety within the locality and so forth.

Training Troops in How To Fight Enemy Forces Engaged in Acts of Encroachment and Occupation

Along the northern border of our country, the Chinese reactionaries have been and are employing many different forms of activity and coordinating many different
tricks in order to wage a war of gradual encroachment upon and occupation of our territory. Together with sending troops to encroach upon, occupy and nibble at our territory, they have also inserted commandoes and spies into our country to assess the situation, make contacts with reactionaries who are in hiding, build underground bases, spread malicious rumors, sow division among the ethnic minorities and between the army and the people, assassinate cadres and party members, commit acts of sabotage, cause disruption and so forth in a vain attempt to weaken us in preparation for committing aggression against our country when the conditions exist. Therefore, the militia and self-defense forces along the northern border must be thoroughly trained so that they can defeat the actions of the enemy in their war of sabotage. It is necessary to research the specific enemy situation, learn the laws governing their activities and provide training that is consistent with the combat task, the terrain and the weather at each place. The experience of Cao Loc District in Lang Son Province shows that if militia and self-defense forces are tightly organized and thoroughly trained, they can become a very effective force in surrounding, exerting pressure upon and attacking enemy forces engaged in acts of encroachment and occupation. The militia there have been trained in the necessary methods of fighting and have begun to apply these methods in victorious combat. The militia there have coordinated with the other armed forces to surround and exert pressure upon the enemy troops at level 400, thereby preventing the enemy from expanding the scope of their acts of encroachment and occupation, cutting their position off from their rear area, limiting their ability to search the area and plunder and wearing down and annihilating enemy forces, both during the day and at night as well. The militia of Cong Son, Hai Yen, Cao Lau and other villages have participated in the fight and killed many enemy troops. At level 400, militia snipers killed 75 enemy troops in 2 months. Luc Van Chung, a militiaman in Hai Yen Village, killed eight enemy troops; Hoang Phi Xin, a militiaman in Cong Son Village, killed five enemy troops; Duong Mui Vien, a militiaman in Cong Son Village, also participated in the sniper operation, killing three enemy troops.

Providing Training in Fighting Groups of Enemy Spies and Commandoes

This is a subject in which militia and self-defense forces must be thoroughly trained. Research must be conducted in order to learn the tactics employed by the enemy when they infiltrate our territory, learn how they organize themselves and react when detected, learn the areas and the terrain that the enemy might utilize, learn the targets that the enemy might attack and so forth. On this basis, the specifics involved in training must be established in a manner consistent with the combat task of the militia and self-defense forces within each area. The militia and self-defense forces must be trained in how to detect signs that the enemy is present, how to determine that strangers have entered the locality and how to coordinate with and signal for coordinated attacks upon the enemy among the combat teams and units of the militia and among the militia forces and the local people and the other armed forces.

In the past year, in many localities along the border, such as Cao Loc, Binh Lieu, Phong Tho, Muong Khuong, Vi Xuyen, Ha Quang and so forth, militia and
self-defense forces, with the help of the people, have found and killed many enemy personnel; at some places, they have killed entire groups of enemy spies and commandoes as soon as they stepped foot in our territory. Militia and self-defense forces have killed or captured nearly 50 percent of the total number of enemy spies and commandoes that have been killed and captured; in Phong Tho (Lai Chau Province), they account for 72 percent and in Binh Lieu (Quang Ninh Province), they account for 58 percent. At sea, militia and self-defense forces have also recorded many achievements in detecting unknown boats and ships and coordinating with other armed forces to drive them from our waters.

As a result, full attention must be given to training militia and self-defense forces in how to detect and fight groups of enemy spies and commandoes. In the recent past, this training has not been researched in detail, has not been made an official lesson or subject, rather, training has not gone beyond merely presenting this need when providing training in patrols and combat alerts. The experience of Vi Xuyen District in Ha Tuyen Province shows that training in these subjects must be coordinated with actual operations when units are performing combat alert tasks at strongpoints or at sea. The units in the rear must also be trained in how to detect, fight and coordinate with other forces to surround, pursue and annihilate groups of enemy spies and commandoes when they infiltrate the locality.

Providing Training in How To Fight and Put Down Rebellions

This is an important combat task of the militia and self-defense forces in contributing along with the other forces to protecting the installation, protecting the locality. It is a factor which insures that the militia and self-defense forces take prompt and effective action when such a situation occurs. In the present multi-faceted war of sabotage of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, they consider exploiting and creating opportunities for fomenting rebellions against us to be a very important measure. The effort to effectively deal with this type of sabotage is related to many sectors and many areas of work and is under the centralized, unified guidance of the local party committee echelon and government. As the local combat forces, as the armed forces on the basic level that directly protect the revolution, protect the locality, the militia and self-defense forces must be well trained and prepared in every respect so that they can detect and exterminate the germs of rebellion as well as rapidly crush rebellions caused by the enemy.

This aspect of training must be under the direct guidance and leadership of the local party committee echelon and government in accordance with the approved local defense plan. In the combat maneuvers in protecting installations and protecting villages that are conducted to provide training to individual teams, units and components of the militia and self-defense forces in accordance with the specific tasks assigned to them, it is necessary to practice dealing with each specific situation that might arise. Training must also be provided in coordinating with other forces in order to determinedly annihilate enemy forces and preventing them from developing and spreading.
One aspect of training that is consistent with the combat task of militia and self-defense forces is the need to establish close coordination between training and productive labor. The militia and self-defense forces are both civilians and military personnel. Their combat training must be closely coordinated with productive labor at each place and each installation in order to achieve high results. For this reason, providing training that is closely based on the requirements of the combat task requires establishing good coordination between training and the productive labor of each locality and each installation. Training subjects and times must be established in the manner best suited to the specific conditions and tasks as each place; training cannot be provided to everyone all at once nor can training subjects, programs and times be left up to the lower echelon to determine. This is a difficult matter with which the local military agencies have been concerned for many years in order to improve the quality of the combat training of militia and self-defense forces. The specific task of the militia and self-defense forces differs from place to place; consequently, training programs cannot be the same everywhere. Production tasks vary from place to place and even among the units at one place, consequently, training must be scheduled for the most suitable times. This requires that the agency formulate a training plan for militia and self-defense forces that is very scientific and specific, is positive and resolute, is effective and flexible.

In 1981, the Vinh Phu Provincial military agency formulated the training plan for the militia and self-defense forces from the provincial to the village levels at an early date. The plan and the contents of the training program were divided into two blocks: militia forces (in the countryside) and self-defense forces (at agencies and enterprises). As regards time, the militia block was divided into two stages of training: stage one in March and April and stage two in September and October, with general maneuvers conducted in accordance with the combat plan for protecting the locality. The self-defense block was also organized into two short phases in July, August and September, with organized training exercises conducted in accordance with the plan for protecting agencies and factories at the completion of study. In establishing such stages of training, especially for the militia (agriculture), Vinh Phu Province gave attention to closely coordinating training with the production season.

As a result of adopting appropriate training plans at an early date and having the support of the various party committee echelons, levels of government and mass organizations, the results of the military training in 1981 of the militia and self-defense forces of Vinh Phu Province were rated as the best in the 2nd Military Region. In many districts and cities, such as Tan Thanh and Vinh Yen City, 100 percent of the villages and self-defense installations completed their training programs, studied all subject matter in exact accordance with the plan and achieved the required quality.

The Advanced Training of Cadres Must Be Carried Out Well

As everyone knows, a unit can only be a good unit if it has good cadres. Whether or not the combat training task mentioned above is carried out well depends first
upon cadres. At present, the cadres that train militia and self-defense forces on the basic level differ in terms of their qualifications, their health and their age. One characteristic of the corps of militia and self-defense cadres is that their economic lives and each of their daily activities are closely linked to their families. Therefore, more than a few difficulties are encountered each year in assembling these cadres for advanced training. Many places only assemble 75 to 90 percent of the cadres in need of advanced training. Moreover, these cadres change from year to year, especially installation cadres and detachment cadres. Many difficulties are generally encountered in preparing materials, subject matter, training grounds, eating facilities and living quarters, consequently, the quality of cadre training classes is limited. This directly affects the results of the combat training of militia and self-defense forces. Many localities, such as Quang Ninh and Vinh Phu Provinces, have taken many steps to gradually correct this situation and have established the advanced training of basic level cadres as the central task in the training of militia and self-defense force each year.

It is necessary to establish a division of echelons regarding the management and advanced training of cadres. The agency of the military region provides advanced training to the training cadres on the provincial (municipal), district and city levels and to the leading cadres on the village level on important fronts. The military agency on the provincial level provides advanced training to village unit cadres, self-defense force commanders, the commanders of mobile companies and the commanders of branch detachments; the military agencies on the district and village levels provide advanced training to the remaining cadres. In advanced training, importance must be attached to providing training in the staff work involved in the formulation of training plans, organizing and commanding combat operations and organizing and managing training. Importance must also be attached to having cadres attend the formal training classes of the upper echelon on a rotating basis. Developing the ability to provide basic training must be considered the main requirement.

The advanced training of militia and self-defense cadres must be under close guidance on each echelon and during each stage of training and must be closely coordinated with the production season and production plan. Organising training in alternate stages, in cycles, which is a good training method of the entire army at this time, can be employed to provide advanced training to militia and self-defense cadres in the process of providing training.

The Mobile Combat Detachments of the Militia and Self-Defense Units Must Be Well Trained

To begin with, importance must be attached to the units on the frontline, the units stationed in important areas and the other mobile units. To train these units, it is possible to assemble cadres who have much training experience and to give these units priority in terms of documents, materials and training aids. In training, importance must be attached to combat subjects,
combat support subjects and supporting the frontline; at the same time, importance must be attached to guiding the people in protecting themselves from and avoiding enemy aircraft, artillery, chemical weapons and so forth.

The local military agencies on the various echelons must intensify their guidance and inspection of the implementation of training plans and hold exercises and maneuvers in order to improve the quality of training and evaluate the results of training during each stage and each year. They must do a good job of disseminating the combat experiences of the militia and self-defense forces on the frontline and the experiences in maintaining political security and social order and safety on the rear line so that militia and self-defense units can widely apply them in a manner consistent with their task and apply them even in the process of providing training.

Whether each task involved in the buildup and combat of the militia and self-defense forces, in general, and the task of providing training in a manner consistent with combat requirements, in particular, are carried out well or not depends upon whether or not the centralized, collective leadership of the local party committee echelons is strengthened. The local military agencies on the various echelons must seek the close leadership and guidance of the party committee echelons and local governments in every area in order to constantly increase the fighting strength of the militia and self-defense forces and successfully complete each task assigned to them in the new period.
HEIGHTENING LEVEL OF COMBAT READINESS URGED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 25 in Vietnamese 25 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Never Stop Strengthening the Level of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Combat readiness is the yardstick for measuring the fighting strength of each unit and the entire army, in peace as in war time. Activities of the army in the building and training process all aim at the ultimate goal of enhancing the army's combat readiness.

The fighting strength of the army originates from a number of factors. To win a war, each soldier must arm himself with a strong fighting spirit and must be ready to sacrifice himself for the defense of the fatherland, while being constantly aware of every plot and hostile action of the enemies. He must acquire sufficient knowledge of the army's skills, be confident of his fighting ability and know how to develop the powers of his individual weapons and equipment to the maximum by coordinating his forces with those of the entire unit.

But whether this combined force is adequately developed depends on how ready and active each cadre, soldier and unit is to fighting the enemy. Therefore, to always improve the state of combat readiness while never disregarding political training, through building up of the fighting spirit, by sharpening of the revolutionary consciousness of each cadre and soldier, and by organizing training which will achieve high quality in building determined soldiers and which is close to the combat realities, all units must maintain the level of combat readiness set for them by higher authorities.

Each unit and sector in its role of defending the fatherland must keep its combat readiness at the level set forth by regulations. Regulations concerning combat readiness constitute a strict order which must be faithfully followed because they make us ready for whatever unpredictable circumstances we may encounter and help us actively resist any foreign aggression at the very beginning of the war, at each sector level and throughout the nation.

Combat readiness is the fruit of scientific organization. Each condition of combat readiness specifically spells out what a commander and his unit should do in managing their personnel, weapons, equipment, and in the timely performance of each step of the combat plan. Consequently, suffice it to look at the quantity and quality of the tasks performed to be able to assess the degree and quality of a unit's combat readiness.
As with other tasks, it is the commander who is responsible for the quality of his unit's combat readiness. Ready to fight now and forever is not pure propaganda but a serious obligation. A commander must fulfill the need of his unit's combat readiness by helping his fellow soldiers, through education and training, obtain good performances, strictly assigning on-duty missions to soldiers, commanding officers and combat units, exercising rigid control over his soldiers and having them observe faithfully all regulations concerning combat readiness. With a commanding apparatus working that smoothly, a high degree of combat readiness will never interfere with other daily activities, and fellow soldiers will not feel tense or under constraint.

Always being ready to fight and always strengthening the level of combat readiness are a question of principle for the armed forces. This must be thoroughly recognized and carried out by all levels, echelons, cadres and soldiers, whatever they do and wherever they are stationed.

12238
CSO: 4209/78
POLITICAL TRAINING FOR LOCAL ARMED FORCES URGED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Political Training for Militia and Self-Defense Forces"]

[Text] In years past, the political training for the militia and self-defense forces has helped making cadres and soldiers thoroughly understand the party's line and clearly recognize the situation, the role of the revolution and that of the armed forces, strengthening their consciousness, and helping them carry out their missions.

However, shortcomings still exist. The contents of the program were not relevant to the audience and far from being realistic. Therefore, they do not effectively help boost the image of the militia and self-defense forces in their fundamental role of producing and protecting production. Teaching method was simplistic and poor in form, consequently, did not help develop the students' initiative and creative ability, especially when those students were themselves research cadres or veteran militiamen from organizations and enterprises. Methods of assessment of students' performances were also inappropriate.

To carry out the party's resolution on strengthening the political training and the General Political Department's decision on improving contents, program and method of political training, local military organizations must, depending on their respective capacity, effectively share with the party's political officers and local authorities the responsibility of planning local affairs that help enhance the quality of the political training for the militia and self-defense forces.

It must be clearly understood that the aim and requirements of political training for the militia and self-defense forces is to help them thoroughly understand the party's military line and mission central to which is to consolidate the national defense, build up local people's armed forces and carry on the people's warfare to protect the fatherland. The theme of the training must be based on two most fundamental objectives, i.e. the party's line and the responsibility of the armed forces in this new era. The training must spread over several years with specific cycles advancing from easy to difficult levels, giving higher priority to subjects that must be studied first, and using the knowledge gained in 1 year to improve the knowledge to be acquired in a later year. Make sure that the contents of the political training for the militia and self-defense forces does not duplicate that of the political
training for youths, women and trade union associations, and that no important subjects are to be omitted. Training method and teaching materials must be improved to conform to their audience and to different situations. As for the ethnic minority militia, proper communication methods are essential; namely, questions and answers, pictures with graphics as illustrations, students' participation, etc. For the militia of the deltas, cities and towns and urban self-defense forces, teaching materials can be of classroom type and questions may be brought up for discussion. The better educated self-defense forces of the research organizations should edit teaching and research materials. With regard to the organization of the program, each ward, village, enterprise should be regarded as a unit for the conduct and management of study. Lectures and class discussion must be echeloned so that senior cadres, militiamen and members of the self-defense forces will not have to retake what they were already taught.

Allowing time for each training period is a key factor that helps make the training program effective. Regulations concerning both training and learning must be carried out conscientiously and completely--no parts of the program are to be left out. To be able to do so, localities and basic-level units must be adept at execution of the political program in conjunction with production; those units belonging to the industry, with their shifts and teams; those in agriculture, with the seasons; and those in administration and street militia units, with the month and quarter of the year.

To ensure complete and perfect execution of the program, emphasis should go to the selection of appropriate timing and the selection and training of the teaching staff. Teachers can be recruited among the party's cadres, local authorities, retired cadres and cadres who have had experience in teaching local military subjects and advanced training be given to instructors so that they are fully aware of the contents and objectives of the program.

However, preference as instructors should be reserved for commanders and political officers of the military organizations of wards, villages, enterprises and organizations so as to respect the motto according to which superiors are responsible of the education and training of their subordinates; and as result, training and theory will be closer to reality. Political training is equally important as military training to militia and self-defense forces. Units must carefully organize training to insure correct implementation of the program and to achieve high quality.

12238
CSO: 4209/78
FULRO'S ACTIVITIES DISCOVERED IN DAC LAC

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 29 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by A Ma Tha: "Actively Track Down the Enemy"]

[Text] Senior Sergeant Le Huu Luong, commander of the reconnaissance team of Post No 2 of the Dac Lac Province's border guard, excitedly put the knapsack over his shoulders and hurriedly left—the commander of his post had just ordered him to go out on a reconnaissance mission in preparation for a forthcoming plan to destroy the Fulro bandits. He used short cuts through woods to reach Dac Rue Spring where he would wait for the enemy's moves. After about 5 kilometers of walk, he spotted a singular footprint next to a pothole full of water from an early morning rain. A close look revealed that the water was muddy suggesting that someone had just stepped through it. "The tribal village is at least 7 days of walk away through paths in the woods," Luong said to himself. "Who could have come here so early? Moreover, tribesmen rarely pass by here, for this place has been the refuge of the bandits. Be alert, the bandits might make a move soon." Luong, then, quickly pull back the breech of his rifle to allow a bullet to load into its chamber and kept on walking. After rather a long walk, he sighted some fresh tree branches on both sides of his trail and the grass was flattened and showed a pathway. Following this path, Luong caught sight of four Fulro bandits digging hurriedly for wild tubers, while another kept watch walking back and forth and holding an AR15 ready. As fast as a squirrel and taking advantage of the natural camouflage provided by the site, Luong cautiously moved closer to the group. By now he was only 10 to 13 meters away. "The guard must be taken alive," he thought; so he reached for and hid behind a big tree trunk. But at the very same moment, the guard caught sight of a wild tuber in Luong's direction and rushed for it. Luong decided he must act quickly or the guard would alert his companions to escape. So, with his bayonet, he stabbed the guard in the chest. The guard barely had time to utter a loud piercing cry, when he fell down. Aware of the danger, his companions ran off to the Dac Rue Spring as fast as they could. Luong kept pursuing the enemies for about 7 more kilometers when he lost sight of them. Determining not to allow the enemies to escape, Luong returned to his post to ask for a support unit. For 2 consecutive days, eating and drinking just enough to survive, Luong and his unit searched one area of the woods after another without success; but patience never failed them. The next morning, around 0800 hours, they found lying by the border of the spring some shredded tobacco; the tobacco was still burning suggesting that the enemies were not far away. Luong's unit promptly spread into combat
formation. At the same time, from a hillock, the four bandits also discovered the presence of Luong's unit. The one armed with an M.79 was about to fire at our formation, when from an advantageous position, Luong shot him; the bandit fell down, his gun thrown out of his hands. Convinced that the enemies would soon retrieve their companion's body and his gun, Luong and his unit waited. Minutes later, two of the enemies attempted to remove the body while a third covered their action with a burst of diversionary fire to draw our attention. Luong's unit did not move. But as soon as the enemies reached for the M.69, they opened fire killing both men on the spot. Taking advantage of the circumstance, Luong fired and wounded the support man.

12238
CSO: 4209/78
COMBAT REQUIREMENTS OF TANK TROOPS OUTLINED

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 82 pp 46-55

Article by Senior Colonel Le Xuan Kien: "The Assault Power of Tank Troops in Modern Offensive Campaigns"

Text It was in World War II (1939-1945) that tank troops became the main assault force of modern armies. In the great war of national defense (1941-1945), the soviet Red army mobilized thousands or several thousands of tanks and pieces of self-propelled artillery for offensive campaigns, especially strategic campaigns, and created an offensive power unprecedented in the history of war.

Since World War II, the use of tanks on the battlefield has increased. On the battlefield in our country, a battlefield on which the communications-transportation network is not highly developed and there are many mountainous forests, rivers and streams, it can be seen that the role and the fighting strength of tank troops have been very important and very necessary in helping to increase the assault power, the mobility of ground forces in modern offensive campaigns. The great victory of the general offensive in the spring of 1975, the pinnacle of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, and the glorious victories won in the war to protect the fatherland on the southwestern border of our country in 1977, 1978 and 1979 confirm this.

Today, the combat tanks of the new generation possess strong firepower and are superior in terms of their mobility, their ability to protect themselves and their level of automation to the tanks of previous generations. Today's tanks have also been improved to meet the conditions of nuclear war and are capable of withstanding the blast wave, the radiation and the radioactivity of an atomic bomb. Tank troops, who have been trained and forged so that they are able to take rapid, precise action, have much greater endurance than tank troops in previous wars did. Even in the conventional wars that have occurred since World War II, countries have fully concerned themselves with building up tank troop units and making rather widespread use of them on the battlefield. Therefore, the role and the impact of tank troops as the primary assault force of the ground forces in modern war have not only been maintained, but have reached an unprecedented level of development. This is clearly evident in the rapid increase in the number of tank troops, in the complexity and breadth of the
missions assigned to them, in the latest developments in offensive operations, in the ability to coordinate with the other branches to deliver large, annihilating blows and increase the speed of modern offensive campaigns...

I. The Factors That Combine To Form the Assault Power of Tank Troops in Modern Offensive Campaigns

When talking about the assault power of tank troops, we are talking about the fighting strength of tank units, tank corps or tank groups mobilized for battles, offensive campaigns and counter-offensive campaigns. This power is the result of developing upon the mobility and the breaching ability of tank troops so that, together with the other branches, the rate at which tank troops advance and attack is increased with a view toward annihilating large enemy forces and achieving the decisive targets of the campaign. The clearest, most vivid manifestations of the assault power of tank troops are strong power to breach enemy lines, high mobility and the ability to advance at a rapid rate. In other words, these are the factors that combine to form the assault power of tank troops in modern offensive campaigns.

Breaching enemy lines is a universal action in offensive operations on land. In offensive operations, after successfully breaking through the basic defensive position, the tactical defenses of the enemy, it is possible to promptly send large forces deep within enemy defenses to break through their campaign defense line, rapidly carry out the specifics of the mission, increase the rate of the attack and annihilate large enemy forces and the main troop encampments of the defending forces. Armies that are on the defensive can differ in many ways in how they organize their defensive battle positions, how they utilize and deploy their forces, how they conduct combat operations and how they conduct defensive campaigns. However, modern defensive operations have the following characteristics in common: there is a system of strong defensive positions that include combat equipment, hidden fortifications and well structured communication lines that are camouflaged by many means and many modern methods; there is a dense system of firepower to block and inflict casualties upon troops attacking from afar; there is a system of obstacles consisting of many different types that are difficult to cross; there is a system of strong combined branch reserve forces; there is coordination between defending the basic area and taking the initiative in launching counter-attacks and attacks in order to annihilate the attacking forces of the opposition and so forth. As a result, breaching operations frequently become very fierce and complex and have a very large influence upon the entire battle and the entire campaign. In a modern offensive campaign, campaign breaches do not only occur once or only in one place, rather, they can occur many times and at many places along the defense line of the enemy. For such campaigns, the necessary breaching power requires the assembling of large forces, large amounts of technical equipment and large numbers of tank troops. As for themselves, tank troops must utilize the technical and tactical properties of their equipment and the combat skills of their cadres and soldiers as the decisive element in this breaching power.

Whereas in World War I (1914-1918), breaching operations accounted for 50 percent of the operations and more than 50 percent of the time in an entire campaign,
in World War II, these percentages were reduced to only about 10 percent. One very important reason for this decline was the concerted use of large numbers of tank troops in breaching operations. For example, on the Belorussian battlefield in June and July, 1944, the soviet Red army amassed more than 100 divisions, more than 4,000 tanks and so forth on four fronts to attack and annihilate the German army along a front some 600 kilometers long. By means of their high mobility and strong breaching power, the units of the Red army advanced 150 kilometers in the space of only 6 days. In the historic campaign to liberate Berlin, the soviet army used more than 6,000 tanks and pieces of self-propelled artillery. The tactical and campaign breaching effectiveness of our Vietnamese tank troops has been clearly displayed in the battle of Ban Me Thuot in March, 1975, which opened the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign (April 1975) and in the war to protect the fatherland on the southwestern border of the country in which we coordinated with the Kampuchean Revolutionary Armed Forces to defeat the Pol Pot-Teng Sary clique in the spring of 1979. Of course, the fact that breaching operations account for less time in offensive campaigns is also due to the strong growth of the infantry, the artillery and the air force and to the development of campaign art, in particular, and military art, in general.

Together with strong breaching power, the high mobility of tank troops is of very important significance in offensive campaigns, especially when tank troops became a basic branch of modern ground forces. As regards the army, in general, high mobility enables it to avoid unexpected blows by various types of modern weapons, such as artillery, aircraft and even the nuclear weapons of the opposition; enables it to rapidly assemble in secrecy in selected areas and reorient its efforts from one direction to another in order to launch strong surprise attacks against the opposition; enables it to achieve a superiority of forces and technical means over the enemy on the primary front and attack the enemy at a rapid rate and deep behind their lines; and enables it to deliver large, annihilating blows to groups of enemy forces. In modern offensive campaigns on land, tank troops are a key force in creating the rapid mobility of the attacking forces. In these campaigns, tank troops frequently must move their entire front and formation, shifting their operations from one direction to another, from the rear to the front, from one mission to another and experiencing different scales of operation and many different situations.

In the Soviet Union's great war of national defense, there were many examples of rapid mobility on the part of military corps and tank formations in order to carry out newly arisen missions. One capital garrison tank group rapidly moved from the Berlin area to Riga to promptly attack the enemy forces there and then moved toward Prague to coordinate with the army and people of Czechoslovakia in annihilating the fascists. Our tank troops have also experienced many cases in which they have had to make major movements on the battlefield. After Tank Corps Number 3 had finished working with friendly units to complete the task of liberating the Central Highlands (March, 1975) and was advancing in the midst of victory toward the coastal lowlands of Zone 5, it had to quickly change direction toward the northwest, toward Saigon, in order to participate in the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign. In the fight in Kampuchea in January, 1979
one tank corps that had just participated in the attack on and the liberation of Phnom Penh immediately received orders to go fight the enemy in the direction of Route 5. Facts have confirmed the tremendous contributions made by tank units in giving mobility to attacking troops.

As a result of their rapid mobility and strong breaching power, tank troops have achieved a rapid rate of attack in campaigns. In modern campaigns, tank troops and mechanized troops are the main forces in creating the speed with which attacking forces attack. By means of conducting high speed attacks, the attacking side can gain time, seize the initiative and, as a result, put the defending forces in a passive position, in a position from which they are taken by surprise. The high rate of speed achieved by the attacking forces can cause the defenders to lose all or a portion of the ability to move their forces and equipment, make it difficult for them to utilize reserve units or make it impossible for them to mount an organized defense. With their high rate of speed, attacking forces can rapidly and deeply penetrate enemy lines, encircle the enemy and isolate enemy forces; they can destroy or disrupt their campaign rear area and complete the mission assigned to them in a short amount of time with the lowest possible losses of personnel and equipment.

In the strategic offensives of the Red army in the great war of national defense (1941-1945), which had the participation of the various branches and services, of many troop fronts, including tank and self-propelled artillery groups and corps, a rate of advance of 20 to 25 kilometers per day was achieved by infantry troops and 40 to 50 kilometers per day by tank and mechanized troops. In the Visula-Oder campaign, Capital Garrison Tank Groups Number 1 and Number 2 achieved a rate of advance of 75 kilometers on some days.

In the general offensive in the spring of 1975, the highpoint of which was the historic Ho Chi Minh campaign, the rate of advance achieved by the military corps that deeply penetrated enemy territory along with the key forces, the tank- armored units and the infantry troops riding on trucks, was 50 to 60 kilometers in one day and night. This rate of advance actually helped to insure that our troops could seize total initiative on the battlefield, thereby depriving the puppet army of the time needed to reorganize their blocking forces and, wherever they did organize these forces, their effectiveness was very limited. For this reason, our offensive military corps rapidly attacked and occupied the main targets in the campaign, such as Independence Palace, puppet headquarters, Tan Son Nhat Airport and so forth.

One of the lessons learned by Vietnamese tank-armored troops in the general offensive in the spring of 1975 was: operating in close coordination with the various branches and services, the tank corps with their ability to advance at a rapid rate helped to reduce the amount of time available and the ability of the enemy to consolidate its position and send in reinforcements and enabled our troops to achieve the factors of secrecy and surprise in order to rapidly and systematically annihilate the enemy even in the case of employing large forces; as a result, it was possible to achieve high campaign efficiency, high combat efficiency. On this basis, we see that increasing the assault power of tank troops in offensive campaigns in a people's war to protect the
fatherland becomes a necessity that must be truly researched and resolved in the process of building up, training and raising the level of combat readiness of our army.

II. Several Basic Matters in Increasing the Assault Power of Tank Troops in Modern Offensive Campaigns

The matter of increasing the assault power of tank troops encompasses tactics and technology, organization and equipment. It is the result of military training, combat command operations, battlefield preparations, material-technical support and the utilization of forces and means. Here, we will only discuss a number of main points.

1. Utilizing troops in a centralized manner involving secrecy, surprise and close coordination with the other branches and services is a very basic aspect of military art in increasing the assault power of tank troops in modern offensive campaigns.

If we review the second and third stages of the great war of national defense waged by the Soviet people, we see that at the breached sections along the line of attack, which constituted only 8 to 12 percent of the entire line of attack of the various fronts, 50 to 80 percent of the infantry, nearly 70 percent of the artillery and 80 to 100 percent of the aircraft and tanks of the entire campaign were assembled. Reducing the size of the sections of the line breached by the military corps in the offensive campaign permitted the Soviet army to create a high density, in the years from 1943 to 1945, of forces and means per kilometer of line breached: 200 to 300 pieces of artillery and mortars and 15 to 24 tanks and pieces of self-propelled artillery. As a result of assembling forces and means in such high concentrations, the Soviet armed forces achieved superiority over the enemy on the main front and crushed the enemy's forces in a short period of time. This concentration not only depended upon the table of organization and technical equipment, but also, to a large degree, upon the talents and skills of the campaign commander. The commander must have a firm grasp of the mission of the campaign and the battlefield situation, make accurate decisions and be determined to assemble his forces, means and tanks on the main front, for the main mission and in the main area at the decisive time in order to create strong breaching power for tank troops themselves and the entire campaign.

Compared to previously, our army, with includes tank-armored troops, has developed much in terms of its organization and equipment. However, tank troops still do not meet every requirement of modern offensive campaigns. Therefore, correctly applying the principle of making concerted use of tank-armored troops in campaigns is even more necessary. With the tanks in the table of organization and the additional tanks provided, the commander of a campaign can, if he knows how to utilize these tanks in a skillful manner and concentrates their use of the main front, in the key, decisive battle and at the most important times, always create for himself an immediate, strong fist and reserve forces needed to guide the development of the campaign as intended by him.
Moreover, due to the characteristics of the operations of the opposition and due to the road, bridge, terrain and weather and climatic conditions of our country, it can be seen that tanks are not needed on every battlefield, on every front or in every battle. The problem lies in utilizing tanks at the correct place, at the correct time and to the correct degree, using them in a precise, determined and concentrated manner in order to create the necessary assault power and insure the completion of the assigned combat and campaign tasks. Utilizing tanks in a decentralized manner does not increase their effectiveness, rather, it reduces the available tank force to an "ordinary force" and makes it impossible to create any significant power.

Under certain conditions, the use of tank forces in a highly concentrated manner by the attacking force is a major surprise to the defending force. Whenever tanks are being used, secrecy and surprise must be maintained. We must maintain secrecy and take the enemy by surprise in everything from how we intend to use tanks, in which direction and on which battlefield we intend to use tanks and the battles in which we intend to use tanks to the number, quality and type of tanks used, the tank units employed in battles and campaigns and so forth. Therefore, we must do a very good job of reconnoitering and assessing the enemy, preparing the battlefield, preparing mobility routes, providing technical support, organizing coordination and command operations, establishing decoy forces to deceive the enemy and so forth. In the major offensive campaigns conducted in 1971 and 1972, we struck panic into the hearts of the American and puppet forces when they saw our tank troops emerge, even though they had "electronic fences" and the most modern electronic reconnaissance equipment. In the Central Highlands campaign (March, 1975), our tank troops took the enemy by surprise not only because they were utilized in a concerted manner in the key, opening battle of Ban Me Thuot, but also because they employed many measures and forms of mobility, crossed many treacherous mountains, crossed the outer perimeter defense line of the enemy and arrived at their battle position in secrecy and safety before and immediately after the battle commenced. In such cases, the power of the attacking side is not merely added to, but is clearly multiplied.

However, the role and power of tank troops cannot be highly developed if there is a lack of close coordination with the forces participating in the offensive campaign. This involves coordination among the units and components, between advanced components and main force components, between one type of tank and another, between combat elements and support elements and so forth within the tank forces participating in the campaign. It also involves coordination between tanks and the mechanized infantry, the artillery forces, the anti-tank forces, the engineer forces, the air forces, the airborne landing troops, the naval forces supporting ground operations and so forth participating in the campaign. Maintaining close coordination between tank troops and infantry, mechanized infantry and engineer troops has become an especially important requirement in the art of utilizing tank troops in a modern offensive campaign on our country's battlefield in view of its harsh terrain, road, weather and climatic conditions. This coordination not only has the purpose of utilizing the strength of tank units and the units of the other branches, but also has the purpose of overcoming the weaknesses of tank troops themselves and helping tank troops to limit the
losses caused by enemy firepower and assaults and increase the operating ability and the safety of tank troops in order to increase their assault power in campaigns. Therefore, a lack of coordination between tanks and the other branches and the separation of tanks from infantry, mechanized infantry and engineers are things that must be avoided in the utilization of forces and the organizing of the command of tank troops in offensive campaigns.

2. Increasing the effectiveness of the command organization and making good battlefield preparations are demands that are constantly faced in increasing the assault power of tank troops.

The effectiveness of the command organization of the commander of tank troops and the campaign commander is most clearly evident in the results achieved by tank troops in the completion of their mission within the campaign. When the command organization is highly efficient, it means that tank troops can utilize their assault power to annihilate or occupy the targets assigned to them with the lowest possible losses and in the shortest possible amount of time, thereby making positive contributions to the completion of the campaign mission.

In order to achieve high effectiveness in the organizing of command operations, the tank troop commander and the campaign commander must possess basic military knowledge and be highly experienced; must possess the virtue of determination, be able to make accurate decisions, be flexible when employing forces, correctly utilize the technical and tactical properties of each type of equipment and utilize equipment with full consideration to combat support, safety and technical support conditions; in particular, they must be able to accurately and rapidly organize the implementation of the directives and orders of the upper echelon in the course of the campaign. The person who has the highest authority to organize the command of tank troops in an offensive campaign is the campaign commander. Of course, the tank units participating in the campaign are always under the direct command of their unit commander. The effectiveness of the command organization is also concretely expressed in the commander issuing orders and directives that are consistent with the situation and that guide the actions of tank troops in exact accordance with his intentions. To accomplish this, the commander must know his forces and means, know the combat capabilities of his troops well, establish accurate requirements and create the minimum conditions needed to meet these requirements; he must insure that tank forces always ahere to their mission, always adhere to the final target in the offensive and overcome every obstacle so that they can play their primary ground assault role in all situations and successfully achieve the objective of the battle and the campaign. High effectiveness in command operations is also manifested by continuing to efficiently deploy troops and encouraging tank units to increase the speed of their attack, make deep penetrations, surround and isolate the enemy even in complicated, decisive situations in order to join other forces in rapidly and systematically annihilating the enemy.

Modern offensive campaigns in a people's war to protect our fatherland are not only carried out under favorable conditions but are also sometimes carried out under difficult conditions in terms of the comparison of forces, time, space,
terrain and weather. A number of such campaigns can occur during the initial period of a war to protect the fatherland. Therefore, the tank troop commander as well as the commander of the combined branches must possess firm skills and not waver in the face of decisive resistance by the enemy, in the face of terrain and weather difficulties. On this basis, they must take determined, accurate and rapid action to employ the assault power of tank troops and contribute along with the other branches to reversing the situation and advancing the campaign to victory. In the course of the campaign, the tank troop commander must organize good protection against enemy aircraft, enemy artillery, enemy chemical warfare, enemy ambuses and enemy attempts to destroy roads and bridges, must prepare the battlefield and must prepare the various areas of combat support in a planned and effective manner. It must be remembered that every battle, every offensive campaign has its own peculiarities, its own specific requirements. This demands that the commander not only possess basic knowledge, but also be creative, positive and flexible in the process of commanding troops.

Battlefield preparations for tank troops in an offensive campaign consist of many things: assessing the enemy situation, their deployment of forces and their anti-tank capabilities; reconnoitering the network of roads and bridges for force mobility; selecting the direction and routes for force mobility; establishing and apportioning the plan for the use of mobility routes among units; selecting staging areas and points of departure; investigating and calculating the support required by tanks and the ability of tanks to resist the enemy in the air and on the ground; deploying the material and technical support system, etc. In this area, insuring mobility is always the most basic, the most important requirement.

Offensive campaigns in a war to protect the fatherland will be carried out first on the frontline of the fatherland, where virtually all of the terrain is either mountainous jungles or coastline. On mountain roads, the speed of tanks can be three to four times slower than on lowland roads. The quantity of repair work performed and the amount of spare parts consumed increased three to five times. Therefore, in order to reduce the difficulties encountered in mobile operations, every tank and armored unit within the strategic deployment and in accordance with the established combat plan can and must, in peace time before war even breaks out, set aside time to research the terrain and build roads for mobility, roads consisting of north-south roads, east-west roads, roads into battle positions, routes to be used when carrying out an offensive and so forth. On a longer term basis, it is possible to reconnoiter the roads for development in depth of an offensive mission or for tank forces to use to make deep penetrations, encircle and entrap the enemy. Because our country has many rivers and streams, tank and armored units can also prepare water routes to transport tanks to combat staging areas and, in this way, save fuel for vehicles, reduce the amount of time vehicles are in operation and maintain secrecy and surprise for the battle and campaign.

Facts have shown that organizing mobility support within offensive campaigns for tank troops has become a matter of major importance to the campaign command organization. Only by conducting a detailed investigation, making scientific calculations, skillfully organizing and coordinating forces, developing upon the
key role played by engineer troops, guiding the jobs that must be performed first and last and so forth in an efficient manner is it possible for the campaign commander and command agency as well as the commander and the command agency of tank units to resolve problems well and create additional capabilities for tank troops to increase their speed and their assault power in campaigns.

3. Training to achieve proficiency in tactics and techniques in order to insure that every unit is capable of conducting major operations under every decisive, difficult condition caused by the enemy, the terrain or the weather is also a very basic requirement in raising the assault power of tank troops.

Technical and tactical proficiency is exhibited by tank cadres and soldiers who are the masters of their equipment and weapons, who use their equipment and weapons the way that they are supposed to be used and who develop upon the superior nature of their equipment and weapons in their methods of fighting in order to increase the mobility, the breaching power and the self-defense capabilities of each tank as well as the entire unit with a view toward successfully completing each mission. Technical and tactical proficiency is not only exhibited in the ability to learn the knowledge and skills needed to operate tanks in modern warfare, but also in the ability to successfully apply this knowledge and these skills under the combat conditions of tank troops on the battlefield in our country.

On a battlefield on which a large percentage of the terrain is mountainous jungles, the density of rivers and streams is high, the enemy's airspace, territory and ocean waters adjoin ours and the enemy has large forces and many cunning tricks, our tank cadres and soldiers must be proficient in the techniques and tactics employed in modern warfare in accordance with the requirements of modern offensive campaigns in a people's war to protect the fatherland. Our tank troops gained some experience in coordinated combat operations in the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation as well as in the war against the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists and their lackeys; they also have the experience being gained in the maintenance of combat readiness now. We must enhance and develop upon this very valuable, very practical experience in order to train troops. High quality technical and tactical training is a firm foundation that enables tank troops operating under difficult conditions to still possess strong breaching power and high mobility, still be able to use few forces to defeat many enemy forces and successfully complete their mission. Training must insure that tank troops can apply many different methods of attack, sometimes attacking the enemy while crossing rivers, sometimes attacking enemy forces in defensive field positions or permanent fortifications, sometimes making landings by sea in order to attack enemy forces, etc.

The enemy is always looking for every way to annihilate us. Sometimes, they use large detachments and, at other times, they use small teams; sometimes they attack us openly and, at other times, they attack us by stealth in order to keep the offensive power of our tank troops in check. They use the firepower of artillery troops, infantry troops and mortar troops, even explosives, mines and other obstacles in regular-force and "guerrilla" operations in order to ambush and block our tanks, etc. Any delay, any "naivete" on the part of our
tank soldiers in the face of the enemy can bring serious consequences. Therefore, through the forging of technical and tactical proficiency, we must train tank soldiers who possess firm resolve, are able to think quickly and can operate well in many different circumstances and situations in the face of a very malicious enemy.

We must train tank troops who can operate effectively in the various types of warfare and the different scales of offensive campaigns in a war to protect the fatherland. Special attention must be given to training tank troops who are skilled in coordinating with many branches on a large-scale, coordinating breaching and penetrating operations with encircling and entrapping the enemy on the scale of a campaign in order to annihilate large numbers of enemy forces. In particular, we must actively provide training and practical application in techniques, tactics and command organization in order to increase the assault power of tank troops in accordance with the requirements of modern offensive campaigns in the initial period of a war to protect the fatherland.

Of course, the technical and tactical proficiency of tank units is also closely linked to the stability of their organization and equipment, to their rear service and technical support organizations and to the effectiveness of the command organization of each tank detachment and each tank corps. In every case, the commanders of tank units must give the campaign commander a full understanding of their forces and capabilities so that they can be utilized in the most efficient manner possible. As for themselves, the commanders of tank units must be thoroughly familiar with their entire table of organization and equipment and must utilize the function of each member force, from the reconnaissance force, warning force and advanced detachments to main force detachments, mechanized infantry (or infantry) and accompanying engineers. Of importance is the need for these forces to always operate in close coordination with one another and, in this manner, create the assault power of tank troops in the campaign.
CONCLUSION OF TRUNG DUNG ARTICLE ON WAR OF SABOTAGE

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 82 pp 18-36

[Conclusion of article by Trung Dung: "Being Resolved To Win Victory Over the Enemy's War of Sabotage"]

[Text] Part II

Following several decades of arduous fighting and sacrifice, we completed the task of liberating the nation and reunifying the fatherland and are now advancing the entire country to socialism and building a life of peace in our independent, free and socialist country.

However, our socialist revolution is taking place against the background of many complex changes in the international situation. On a worldwide scope, the bellicose powers of imperialism, led by the U.S. imperialists and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists, who are collaborating with each other, are assembling forces in order to counter-attack the world revolutionary movement, primarily the Soviet Union and the socialist community.

In Southeast Asia, the Chinese reactionaries and the imperialist powers have directed the thrust of their efforts toward Vietnam and the two countries of Laos and Kampuchea. They have carried out two wars of aggression at either end of our country. They are, in addition, making every effort to carry out a multi-faceted war of sabotage while constantly threatening to unleash a large-scale war of aggression against our country.

As a result, along with the process of building the economy, developing the culture, building socialism and building a life of comfort and happiness, we must be resolved to win victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy while insuring that our country is always sufficiently ready to win victory over any enemy in any situation.

The war of sabotage against our country was secretly prepared for by the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists for a long time, is being frantically carried out by them now and will be waged by them for a long time to come. Winning victory over this war of sabotage of the enemy is a necessity in winning
victory in the process of the socialist revolution in our country. We must have a correct understanding, must adopt correct positions and must employ suitable measures in this struggle, determined to defeat this insidious war of sabotage of the enemy.

1. Fighting the enemy's war of sabotage involves an arduous, decisive, complex and long struggle by our army and people, a struggle that is closely linked to preparing the country to win victory over a large-scale war of aggression waged by them, closely linked to the struggle between the two ways of life, between socialism and capitalism, within the socialist revolution in our country.

As everyone knows, the struggle between the nation of Vietnam and the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists is an uncompromising struggle, is a decisive class struggle for survival between revolutionary forces and counter-revolutionary forces. Moreover, this is a struggle between the revolutionary forces that symbolize the times and the most counter-revolutionary force in history; between a genuine Marxist-Leninist party and a traitorous Maoist party that is masquerading as a Marxist-Leninist party and is opposing Marxism-Leninism; and between a genuine socialist state that brandishes the banner of national independence and socialism and a Maoist, bureaucratic, militaristic state that pursues a policy of expansionism and hegemony, rules the people at home and sabotages and annexes neighboring countries in a vain attempt to open the way for them to become rulers of the world.

To our army and people, whose territory, ocean waters and air space adjoin those of such a dangerous, immediate enemy, it is clear that resisting the hostile policy of the Chinese reactionaries truly involves a struggle to insure the survival of our nation, protect the priceless fruits of our country's revolution, protect the sacred independence of our fatherland, protect the right of collective ownership of our people and protect the life and dignity of we Vietnamese. At the same time, it is a struggle to protect the complete loyalty and the noble international responsibility of the nation of Vietnam to the two fraternal nations of Laos and Kampuchea, protect a bastion of the socialist system and a spearhead of the three revolutionary currents in Southeast Asia, protect the purity and invincibility of Marxism-Leninism and, at the same time, protect the friendship between our people and the people of China.

To the Chinese reactionaries, a prosperous and strong, independent and unified socialist Vietnam is a major obstacle to their expansion southward. Therefore, even if they must encounter numerous defeats, they will never abandon their scheme to conquer and annex Vietnam. They also know that if they do not conquer and annex Vietnam, they surely cannot annex the entire Indochina peninsula, consequently, it will be difficult for them to sweep into Southeast Asia. Also for this reason, the entire reactionary nature and the entirety of the wicked ambitions of the Chinese expansionists have been and are being revealed in the schemes and tricks of their war of sabotage and their preparations for a large-scale war of aggression against our country.
As a result, this struggle between ourselves and the enemy is an arduous, decisive, complex and long class struggle. To our entire party, all our people and our entire army it is truly a steadfast, tenacious struggle requiring skill.

We consider defeating the war of sabotage of the enemy to be a very important struggle to thwart and repulse their scheme to carry out a large-scale war of aggression. Of course, the enemy also knows that conquering and annexing Vietnam by means of a large-scale war of aggression will not be easy. However, subjectivism and recklessness are characteristics of all types of reactionaries, even the Chinese reactionaries, which everyone recognizes. Therefore, together with being resolved to win victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy, we must, at the same time, make the preparations needed to insure that our country always possesses the strength to win victory over the enemy in any situation. We must make every effort to build the national defense system and build the people's armed forces and the people's public security forces. In particular, we must make every effort to insure that our country becomes strong in every area, is strong in every situation, and must very closely coordinate economic construction with the strengthening of the national defense system and the maintenance of security in order to defeat the scheme of the enemy to weaken and topple us, meet the pressing economic demands and demands concerning living conditions of the people and create the conditions for repelling the threat of a war of aggression and possessing the full strength needed to win victory over the enemy should they recklessly unleash a war of aggression.

In would be both incorrect and harmful for us to only be concerned with preparing to deal with a large-scale war but being subjective and simplistic in the face of the enemy's war of sabotage or, conversely, focusing our intelligence and efforts on resisting the war of sabotage while being lax with regard to making preparations for winning victory over a large-scale war of aggression of the enemy. Such thinking would reflect a simplistic, shallow understanding and a on-sided method of appraising the new enemy, both in terms of their nature and their tricks.

The struggle between socialism and capitalism is, by its nature, a decisive and complex class struggle; the struggle between the two ways of life in our country is even more decisive and complicated against the background of the present international situation and the war of sabotage of the Chinese reactionaries and hegemonists. A foremost target of the war of destruction of the enemy is to oppose the socialist revolution of our people; every force that opposes socialism becomes their natural ally, becomes a force supporting them. The Chinese reactionaries look for every way to directly control elements that are opposed to socialism in order to use them in their schemes and look for every way to provoke elements that feel class hatred, spontaneous capitalist forces and the habits of small-scale production and every other decadent element in order to sabotage socialist transformation and socialist construction in our country and perpetually weaken us in order to make us yield to them and follow their lead. For this reason, the struggle against the war of sabotage
must be closely linked to the struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country. This is an objective necessity.

In socialist transformation in the southern provinces, especially in the transformation of industry and commerce, we must not only struggle against exploiters; in the effort to perfect the socialist production relations in the northern provinces, we must not only struggle against profiteers and persons who disrupt production, circulation, distribution and so forth, but, in both regions of the country, we must also be highly vigilant and determined to punish the reactionary lackeys of the Chinese expansionists and even the U.S. imperialists, who are instigating and supporting these elements opposed to socialism.

In the building of socialism, the building of economic and cultural projects, we must not only concern ourselves with dealing with natural disasters, but must also constantly guard against enemy attacks. We must not only guard against them insanely sabotaging our production installations, destroying our warehouses, machines, crops and so forth, but must also be vigilant against their attempts to buy and seduce decadent elements, profiteers, persons who steal materials, persons who pilfer or switch raw materials and so forth in a vain attempt to weaken our production and render the laws, regulations, rules and procedures in our economic management and organization of life ineffective.

The same holds true with regard to the ideological and cultural front: we cannot only struggle to abolish the remnants of the culture and ideology left behind by the old system, but must also crush, in a truly determined and prompt manner, those persons who are now intentionally maintaining and encouraging every aspect of the reactionary, decadent culture and directly struggling against our people's ideological and cultural revolution.

Thus, accelerating the socialist revolution and accelerating socialist transformation and socialist construction are a very important prerequisite to winning victory over the enemy's war of sabotage; on the other hand, victory in the struggle against the war of sabotage will be a very important source of support for the process of carrying out the socialist revolution in our country.

2. Mobilizing and organizing all the people in the struggle, with the nucleus of the struggle being the entire dictatorship of the proletariat system; closely coordinating security forces with the national defense and other forces in order to create a new combined strength within our people's war against the enemy's war of sabotage.

The largest, strongest forces in the revolutionary struggle, in the revolutionary war in our country in past years have always been the forces of all the people, the forces of the entire country, the forces of the entire nation. This was true in the war of national liberation, was true in the recent war to defend the fatherland and is true in the struggle against the war of sabotage today.
However, the popular nature of the struggle against the war of sabotage has its own special characteristics. In their war of sabotage, the enemy is not employing concerted armed forces to attack us on the military front as it did in the other wars of aggression. They are using many forces and many tricks to directly attack all our people from one end of the country to the other. They are not only violating the sovereignty, territorial integrity and borders of the fatherland, but are also attacking the awareness, the thinking, the attitudes and the feelings of millions of persons, attacking life, attacking the most vital requirements of each citizen, thereby posing acute difficulties to the effort to meet the food, clothing, shelter, travel, education, health care and other needs of all the people in order to, on this basis, attack our line, our leadership and even our revolution. Whereas in armed struggle, only the armed forces serve as the nucleus and directly fight the enemy while all the people participate in many other fields of activity, in the struggle against the war of sabotage, every citizen can directly fight the enemy immediately within his or her field of activity. Therefore, each person, each household must be fully aware and must actively struggle against the war of sabotage of the enemy in order to contribute to the common victory and directly protect themselves.

Since antiquity, our people have been very patriotic, very desirous of independence and freedom and extremely proud of the heroic tradition of the nation. When our people fully realize the malicious scheme, the insidious nature of the Chinese expansionists, especially when they see the fraudulent revolutionary face, the fraudulent Marxist-Leninist label, the fraudulent humanitarian attitude and the very clever tricks of the enemy, such as attacking the people while practicing demagoguery, creating additional difficulties and blaming these difficulties on our leadership and so forth, all our people, young and old, male and female alike, will surely not tolerate any action taken by the Chinese reactionaries and their supporters to deceive the masses, provoke sentimentiality and sabotage the revolution.

We must not only mobilize all the people, but must also organize all the people in fighting the enemy and must have appropriate nucleus forces for each field of struggle in the struggle against this war of sabotage of the enemy.

In the struggle against the war of sabotage, armed struggle occupies a very important position and is usually concentrated along the border; of course, in this struggle, the people’s armed forces must be the nucleus. However, in the struggle to protect their line, protect our leadership and protect our organization, the corps of cadres and party members are the nucleus. On the security and order front and in the field of economics and culture, which are vitally important and extremely complex and which are not restricted to any one area but are nationwide in scope, it is also necessary to have a nucleus force, etc. As a result, in this struggle, the nucleus force cannot only be the armed forces nor can it only be the army, rather, it is clear that we must employ many forces within the dictatorship of the proletariat system, from the central level to the local level and each installation, to each and every family, including the people’s public security force, the people’s army,
the militia and self-defense forces, the forces of the economic, political, cultural, social and other sectors in a manner dependent upon the nature and scope of each field of the struggle. There must be close coordination among the various sectors, arms of the military and forces, especially between the public security force and the army, the public security force and the other sectors, under the centralized, unified leadership of the party committee echelon; we must create an overall combined strength in this fight, create a combined strength in each locality and on each front in order to always be in a position to overwhelm the enemy and continuously take the offensive and win victory over them.

3. Building and strengthening a battle position from which to fight the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy on a nationwide scale, especially along the border and in the political, economic and cultural centers of the country and each locality, and, in particular, building a strong battle position on the basic level.

The war of sabotage and the fight against this war of sabotage are very complicated, are both overt and covert, develop into armed conflicts at some times and places, such as along the border, and smolder under the surface even in the hinterland of our country. Therefore, the battle position that we need in order to win victory over the enemy in this struggle is a combined battle position, a military, political, economic, cultural and social battle position that is broad in scope and deep in detail, that exists at each installation and within the hearts of the people. Basically, this battle position is part of the battle position of the national defense system and the people's war to defend the fatherland. However, due to the special characteristics of this style of war of the enemy, the position from which we wage our struggle against the enemy's war of sabotage also has different characteristics and requirements.

In areas in which we are face to face with enemy troops, such as along the border and on the frontline, our battle position against the war of sabotage must be a position from which we can directly fight the enemy's acts of encroachment and occupation and are ready to retaliate against each of the enemy's armed activities and every infiltration of our territory by the enemy; it is the battle position of the combat village, the district military fortress, the provincial and municipal strategic unit, the defense lines, etc.

At other places, especially in political, economic and cultural centers and at communications-transportation and trade centers, densely populated areas, remote but strategically important areas...of the entire country or of an individual locality deep within the hinterland, the battle position for fighting the war of sabotage is, over the long range, the same as the position within the national defense system; however, on a day to day basis, importance must be attached to strengthening the maintenance of political security and social order and safety. These are usually the places that the reactionary lackeys of China and even of the United States infiltrate and mix among the people or hide in secrecy in order to sabotage us politically, ideologically or
psychologically, sabotage our economy, culture or society, sabotage us by means of intelligence, spies, armed activities and so forth. Together with the border, it can be said that these are the places at which the struggle between ourselves and the enemy is most decisive and complex, the places where this struggle takes place on an hourly and daily basis in many different fields, by means of many different measures and many different forces. Wherever and in whichever field we are subjective, simplistic and lax, the enemy will encroach upon us and cause a serious lack of security and order. Conversely, in those localities and agencies at which we are constantly vigilant, constantly take precautions and constantly in a high state of vigilance, at which we keep abreast of the enemy situation and our situation and at which we effectively guide the fight against the enemy, the enemy is easily stopped and we maintain our safety; in addition, the enemy is not only prevented from committing sabotage, but is attacked and defeated by us as well.

In this struggle against the war of sabotage, it can be said that the place at which the struggle is of decisive importance is the basic level: the streets, subways, villages, hamlets, alleys, agencies, enterprises, worksites, schools, markets, wharves and so forth. Of course, the enemy does not have the ability to infiltrate each of our basic units. They must go through installations in order to gain a foothold and commit sabotage. If all of our basic units are educated well and managed tightly, if each person and each household is vigilant and alert, the enemy will be unable to find a hiding place and, as a result, they will be unable to sabotage us or, if they do recklessly try to commit sabotage, they will be immediately detected and appropriately punished.

On the basic level, the party chapter is the command staff, the center providing leadership and guidance, the soul of the struggle against the war of sabotage. This struggle demands that the party organization on the basic level neither have nor permit the existence within its ranks of leaders and fighters of anyone who is corrupt or degenerate, especially anyone who is dissatisfied or deviant. These elements not only create additional difficulties and obstacles to the effort to lead and command this fight, but are also important weaknesses that the enemy searches for in order to infiltrate our organization. Party chapters that are truly strong and pure, this is not only a basic requirement of party building, but also a pressing demand of foremost importance in fighting the war of sabotage on the basic level.

The public security force and the militia and self-defense forces together with the people's committees in the subways and villages, with the commanders, heads, management boards and directors of the enterprises, agencies, worksites, schools and so forth must, of course, be the key forces in the struggle against the enemy's war of sabotage on the basic level. The public security force and the militia and self-defense forces have a role and responsibility that are as large and important as those of troops on the frontline; they must be truly strong and effective, must be able to block both covert and overt sabotage by the enemy and firmly maintain security and order on the basic level just as the defense forces along the border block every act of aggression by the enemy and firmly protect the borders of the fatherland.
The mass organizations also play a very important role in mobilizing and educating their members to display high vigilance and fight the enemy's sabotage. The majority or virtually all manual workers, civil servants, farmers, intellectuals and persons in the other strata of society usually belong to one of the mass organizations. If the mass organization trains its masses well and insures that each of its members never intentionally or unintentionally supports the enemy and is, in addition, a tenacious, steadfast and effective soldier in the fight against the enemy, the enemy will surely find it difficult to hide and commit sabotage at the installation.

If the locality is one of the main areas in the struggle against the war of sabotage, the leadership and guidance provided by the locality of the struggle against the enemy's sabotage at the installations within the locality must be an important direction. The basic level can only develop the greatest possible strength for fighting the enemy and achieve the highest possible results when all installations within a precinct or district, within a province or municipality combine to form an entity, operate in a tightly coordinated manner and continuously attack the enemy under the unified leadership and command of the precinct, district, province or municipality. As a result, not only the basic level, but the precinct, district, provincial and municipal levels as well play an important role in determining victory in the struggle against the war of sabotage on the basic level.

4. Resolutely and continuously fighting the enemy's sabotage on the military, political, economic and cultural fronts by means of many suitable, creative and effective methods and measures.

Taking the offensive has always been the strategic thinking of the revolution, the revolutionary struggle and the revolutionary war in our country. In the war of national liberation as well as the war to protect the fatherland, we always firmly adhere to the strategic thinking of taking the offensive and this thinking has become a very large strength of ours. In this struggle against the war of sabotage, it is even more necessary for us to thoroughly display the strategic thinking of taking the offensive because, only by taking the initiative in resolutely and continuously attacking the enemy is it possible to thwart, stop and repel the enemy's sabotage. Facts have very clearly shown that wherever we do not take the offensive, the enemy brazenly moves in and insanely opposes us. We must not wait to fight the enemy until they have committed sabotage against us, rather, we must take the initiative and eliminate the conditions used by the enemy to commit acts of sabotage. We must not wait until the enemy has destroyed a large storehouse before we search for and attack the enemy, rather, every measure must be taken to prevent the enemy from attacking every target, from attacking large storehouses as well as small storehouses. We must not wait until the enemy has caused an insurgency before we crush it and pursue them, rather, we must look for every way to prevent them from causing any kind of insurgency, any kind of rebellion, be it large or small.

We must attack the enemy in many different ways. We must strengthen the defense of the country, especially along the northern border lines, resolutely protect
each bit of soil of the fatherland, fully predict every situation and promptly crush the acts of provocation, the acts of encroachment and occupation and the acts of sabotage of the enemy by military means.

Propaganda, both domestic propaganda and foreign propaganda, occupies an especially important position in the fight against the war of sabotage. The foremost requirement of propaganda activities and ideological work is to give our people and the people of the entire world as well as the people of China an increasingly clear understanding of the reactionary nature, the decadent scheme and the malicious tricks of the Beijing expansionists and hegemonists, especially their wicked ambition, their vacillating attitude and their fraudulent nature. We must arm all the people, arm each of our citizens with the ability to fight the enemy on their own so that they not only refuse to believe the psychological warfare arguments of the enemy, but also refute their clever propaganda arguments.

We must intensify the fight against the espionage and intelligence war of the enemy; promptly expose and forthrightly punish their organizers, commanders and support forces; tightly control the "entrances" from the outside and regularly conduct inspections at key places and among key segments of the population within the hinterland; and crush the schemes of sabotage of these persons in their infancy.

Maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety are a very important offensive front in the struggle against the war of sabotage. It can be said that this is a front on which there is a decisive hour to hour, day to day struggle between ourselves and the enemy. Sowing "chaos in society and confusion in politics" is the objective in the nature of a "ideal" of the Chinese reactionaries as regards our country, the purpose of which is to enable them to wage a war of subversion in the style of "winning victory without fighting" or creating the conditions for a large-scale war of aggression based on the theory of Maoism that "war solves everything." Therefore, on this front, more than anywhere else, we must attack the enemy in a truly determined and timely manner, must suppress counter-revolutionaries, crush the schemes of the various types of reactionaries to raise their heads, punish each act of sabotage of the enemy and wipe out the sources of rebellions.

Protecting the solidarity of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea and the solidarity of Vietnam, the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries are also a matter of major importance in this struggle. International solidarity with the fraternal communist parties, with the fraternal socialist countries and with the world revolutionary movement has always been part of the nature and the line of our party, has always been a revolutionary quality and political attribute of our army and people. Today, the Chinese reactionaries are looking for every way to isolate us in the international arena and directing their efforts toward dividing Vietnam from Laos and Kampuchea, from the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, consequently, it is even more necessary for us to make our international solidarity stronger than ever before, crush the distorted arguments of the enemy concerning our party’s spirit of socialist
internationalism and expose the deceptive nature of the so-called Maoist style spirit of internationalism.

The methods of fighting the enemy in this style of struggle are very comprehensive and creative and involve fighting the enemy by military, political, economic and cultural means, by means of mass movements and specialized forces, by means of the strength of public opinion and the weapon of law. There must be close coordination among the installations within a locality, among the various localities within a strategic area, among the various strategic areas within the country and among the three countries on the Indochina peninsula. Of utmost importance is the need for all forces to always be vigilant in every situation and wherever they may be and to take the initiative in attacking the enemy under the centralized leadership of the party committee echelon.

5. Fighting the enemy's sabotage must go hand in hand with building and protecting our forces; of utmost importance is the need to protect the line, protect our leadership and protect our organization while building a national defense system, people's armed forces, people's public security forces and political forces of the masses that are increasingly strong.

In a war of sabotage or a war of aggression, the enemy gives attention to attacking us from two directions: from the outside and from within. However, in a large-scale war of aggression waged by means of large military forces and waged primarily by means of armed struggle, the enemy, of course, primarily attacks us from the outside in coordination with provoking internal rebellion. To the contrary, in a multi-faceted war of sabotage conducted by means of many different forces and many different tricks, the main forces of the enemy attack us within our own territory and within our own organization in coordination with military, diplomatic and other forms of pressure from the outside. For this reason, building and protecting our forces will defeat the enemy in their attempt to achieve one of their most important targets in the war of sabotage and deal an important defeat to their preparations in their plan to launch a large-scale war of aggression.

In the past, every act of sabotage and aggression by any enemy required that we annihilate the enemy, protect ourselves and protect every achievement of the revolution as well as each potential of the country and the nation. However, in this kind of war of sabotage, protecting our line, protecting our leadership and protecting our organization are a foremost requirement because they are the most important targets of the Chinese reactionaries, of the Maoists.

Chinese expansionism and hegemony are no different than colonialism and imperialism as regards their reactionary nature, the targets involved in sabotaging the revolution and their cruel, wicked and malicious nature; however, they do differ with regard to the methods and measures employed to achieve their targets.

To achieve the target of annexing our country, the colonialists and the imperialists and, before them, the Chinese emperors and feudalists primarily
employed wars of aggression followed by establishing systems of colonial and feudal officials in our country. Later, due to the nature of the times, and in view of the awakening of the nations of the world and the tragic bankruptcy of old-style colonialism, the imperialists, led by the U.S. imperialists, had to shift to the policy of neo-colonialism, which is a kind of colonialism concealed behind regional lackeys, behind "fake national" lackeys, in order to commit aggression against South Vietnam.

Today, the Chinese traitors and reactionaries, the Maoists have gone even further and have cleverly concealed the face of another kind of colonialism. One way to achieve their goal of annexation is to wage a large-scale war of aggression; however, they consider this to be a "bad policy" because it would reveal them to be counter-revolutionaries; and, they cannot impose a Chinese governor upon us as their emperors of old once did nor can they impose a plenipotentiary upon us as the benevolent colonialists once did because this would be the "worst" of the "bad policies," would be very outmoded and brazen.

They consider changing our line and toppling our leadership to be the "best policy," to be the "most ideal" situation; because, they maintain that this makes it easy for them to conceal their counter-revolutionary nature and enables them to attack the most vital organ of the revolution. Destroying the line of a revolution would mean the death of an entire revolution, the death of national independence and socialism and would have a much greater impact than the achievement of other specific targets. They could topple the leadership and then change the line as they did in Kampuchea. Without resorting to a large-scale war of aggression, they could put the Pol Pot clique back into power in the party and state system and then change Kampuchea's line, as a result of which the Kampuchean revolution would be betrayed, the Kampuchean people would be massacred and the entire country of Kampuchea would become one of their client states. In another country, they could bribe and conquer the leadership and then change the line. They need not wage a large-scale war of aggression in order for a country to become a vassal state of the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists.

They have been and are looking for numerous ways to undermine the revolutionary line that was set forth by the 4th Congress and was reasserted and further defined at the recent 5th Congress. They not only directly distort our line, but also insanely sabotage and create additional difficulties for our country in order to create better conditions for them to attack the line of our party. They do this because they know that the line of our party is a genuine revolutionary line, a genuine Marxist-Leninist line, a line that will strengthen national independence and socialism in our country, a line that will bring back prosperity, strength and civilization to our fatherland, bring back a life of comfort and happiness to our people and a line that will strengthen our international solidarity and increase the strength of the revolutionary movement in Indochina, Southeast Asia and the world. This line is the complete opposite of their traitorous, reactionary line of expansionism and hegemony, of going through Vietnam to expand into the South. Prior to the 5th Congress of the Party, they generated public opinion demanding that the line be re-examined(?); since our
entire party, from the congresses on the basic level to the national congress of delegates, confirmed the correctness of the line, they have looked for every way to distort our line.

Even more dangerously, they have focused their efforts on verbally attacking our leadership and have made every effort to verbally attack our Party Central Committee and the Political Bureau of our party, verbally attack the supreme command of our country’s revolution, the collective of architects of our party’s correct and creative revolutionary line. They have also deceived, bought and provoked some cadres and party members in a vain attempt to sow internal division, monopolize our organization and so forth. All of these efforts have been designed to topple our leadership, change our line and force us to yield to them, to follow them within their orbit.

For this reason, protecting the line, protecting our leadership and protecting our organization, which have always been important matters in the revolutionary struggle, have become more important today than ever before in the face of this malicious scheme of the enemy. It can be said that protecting our line, protecting our leadership and protecting our organization have become a very important, very vital matter, a matter that is not only related to victory in the struggle against the war of sabotage, but which also has an effect upon the victory of the entire revolutionary undertaking of our army and people, upon the present and future life of each Vietnamese. We are determined to not tolerate any direct or indirect action by the enemy against the revolutionary line adopted by the party; and, of course, we also cannot tolerate any action that consciously supports the enemy or distorts our line, attacks our leadership or disrupts our organization. Because, be they intentional or unintentional, such actions that support the enemy are contrary to the interests of the people, the fatherland and the revolution and, as a result, harm the people and benefit the enemy, are a crime against the people and the country and are no different than the crime in ancient times of "making swords for the enemy," a crime which our nation, which each Vietnamese hated and disdained very much.

We must always clearly distinguish between the psychological warfare arguments of the enemy and the attitude of dissatisfaction and displeasure of some persons in the face of the negative phenomena in production and everyday life as well as the mistakes and shortcomings in the management of the economy and society. However, each of our cadres and party members, each patriotic Vietnamese must give consideration to the harmful consequences of words and attitudes that reflect a lack of calm, a lack of vigilance and a lack of responsibility of some persons who indifferently allow themselves to be used by the enemy to spread nonsense that harms the people, harms the country and harms our sacred revolutionary undertaking, for which we have sacrificed and struggled for countless years.

Together with being resolved to protect our forces, we must make every effort to build the forces defending the fatherland, build a comprehensive, modern national defense system, build powerful, regular force, modern revolutionary people’s armed forces, build people's public security forces that are pure and
strong in every respect and build the youth organization, the women’s organization, the trade union organization and the other mass organizations within the fatherland front, the economic organizations, cooperatives and so forth within the dictatorship of the proletariat system and the system of socialist collective ownership of our people with a view toward strengthening our forces and being determined to win victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy while insuring that our country is always ready and possesses the strength to win victory over the enemy in any situation.

Part III

The foremost function of the people’s armed forces, of the people’s army in every situation is to be ready to fight and defend the fatherland. At present, in view of the fact that our country is at peace but must constantly deal with a multi-faceted war of sabotage being waged by the enemy and must, at the same time, always be ready to deal with a large-scale war of aggression launched by them, it is even more necessary for our people’s armed forces to direct their efforts toward winning victory over the war of sabotage of the enemy and being ready to win victory over a large-scale war of aggression launched by them.

Because a war of sabotage differs from a large-scale war of aggression, the key forces of the people in the struggle against the multi-faceted war of sabotage are not only the armed forces, but all the forces within the dictatorship of the proletariat system as well. However, our people’s armed forces, both the local troops and main force troops, the militia and self-defense forces as well as local troops and regular troops, play a large role and have an important task in this struggle. In the multi-faceted war of sabotage, sabotage by means of military activities is an important guideline, an important method of the enemy and sabotaging our armed forces is a vital target, a vital objective of theirs.

As a result, joining the people in fighting and winning victory over the multi-faceted war of sabotage has been and is becoming a very important and pressing part of the most important political task of our people’s armed forces of defending the fatherland, becoming an hourly and daily requirement of leadership and command on the party committee echelon, on the part of the commanders, command agencies and political agencies on the various echelons throughout the army.

1. Constantly improving the maintenance of combat readiness and insuring that the key forces of all the people defeat the enemy’s method of using military activities to commit sabotage.

In this multi-faceted war of sabotage, as we have seen, the enemy’s use of military activities to commit sabotage occupies a very important position in their entire sabotage strategy. They frequently employ large military forces massed along the border, continuously employ many armed units to commit sabotage against us in many areas of life along the border, constantly build battle positions and prepare battlefields with a view toward being ready to
unleash a large-scale war of aggression. They consider sabotage by means of military activities to not only directly reduce the strength that our army and people have with which to defend the fatherland, especially along the border, but also consider it to be a very important supplement to their political, economic and social sabotage, psychological warfare and their espionage war.

In the struggle against the multi-faceted war of sabotage of the enemy, we must surely win victory over them militarily and defeat one of their important types of sabotage. We must constantly strengthen every aspect of the country's defenses, especially along the northern border. The entire army, beginning with the units performing tasks on the frontline, must constantly display high vigilance and always be in a state of combat readiness. The vigilance and the level of combat readiness of troops cannot only be expressed in their morale, thinking, will and determination, but must also take the form of daily actions; expressed in constantly keeping abreast of the enemy situation and its trend of development; expressed in the formulation of combat plans for the different situations and plans for combat operations that are coordinated among the various arms of the military and the various forces; and expressed in constantly strengthening the defensive positions in the various zones and increasing the fighting strength of troops, especially in thwarting and defeating the acts of encroachment and occupation by the enemy along the northern border.

These extremely important jobs must be researched in a very meticulous and painstaking manner, must be under very detailed, close guidance. It is necessary to provide regular training to troops, continuously conduct inspections and continuously supplement our efforts in order to constantly improve all the preparations made for combat and for winning victory in combat, insure that preparations are improved each time that they are made and fight the enemy's sabotage by means of military forces with increasing effectiveness. We must insure that the enemy know that they will only court larger defeats if they intensify their sabotage by means of military forces, thereby increasingly limiting their other forms of sabotage.

Of course, in accomplishing this, the units of the armed forces on the frontline play a very large role and have a very heavy responsibility. It can be said that victory in the struggle against the enemy's sabotage by means of military forces depends, to a very large degree, upon the determination and the capabilities of all cadres and soldiers, especially the commanders and command agencies on the various echelons that have been and are on the frontline. However, it can be said that victory also depends, to a very important degree, upon the reinforcements provided to the frontlines by the rear lines, to the frontlines by the entire country, to the armed forces that face the enemy day and night and are ready to sacrifice everything to firmly defend the borders of the fatherland by the political, economic, cultural and social sectors.

On the one hand, the armed forces cannot consider defeating the sabotage conducted by means of military forces to be the responsibility of anyone else, rather, it is primarily their responsibility and they must be determined to
complete this weighty, glorious task. However, the forces of the other sectors and the forces on the rear lines cannot leave everything up to the armed forces, to the frontlines because defending each bit of soil of the fatherland is the foremost sacred obligation of each and every person, of each and every force, of all sectors and levels.

In the effort to defeat the acts of sabotage by military forces conducted each day along the border with the enemy, the local army, the forces on the basic level, the forces on the spot play a very large role and have a very important responsibility. In defeating the sabotage carried out by the enemy by means of air and naval forces, the air defense forces, air force, naval forces and the armed forces at sea and along the coast must be the key forces of importance in determining victory.

2. Closely coordinating with the security forces and the forces of the other sectors within each area and working with all the people to win victory over the enemy's methods of political, economic, cultural and social sabotage.

The armed forces are a vital component of the dictatorship of the proletariat system, are one of the key forces of all the people in the fight against the war of sabotage. As a result, the armed forces must not only assume direct responsibility for defeating the enemy's sabotage by military means, but must also join the other sectors, primarily the public security sector, in defeating the enemy's political, economic, cultural and social sabotage. Not all of the armed forces participating in the fight against the war of sabotage are on the frontlines, rather, these forces are to be found throughout the country, are army forces stationed in each area, are militia and self-defense forces operating at all installations. Therefore, all armed forces, all cadres and soldiers, both main force and local troops, militia and self-defense troops from the north to the south, from the borders to the islands, from the mountains to the lowlands, from the countryside to the cities...have the responsibility of joining all the forces within the dictatorship of the proletariat system, joining all the people in winning victory over the enemy's war of sabotage.

To begin with, local troops and militia and self-defense forces must join with security forces, must closely coordinate with the forces of the other sectors within each locality and each installation, especially in key areas, under the centralized and unified leadership and guidance of the party committee echelon and local government in order to defeat the enemy's political, military, economic, cultural and social sabotage within the locality and installation. It must be asserted that this is one of the very important and pressing political tasks of the local armed forces at this time and absolutely cannot be considered nothing more than an "extra task" to be participated in at will. The local armed forces are very vital, indispensable forces in winning victory over the war of sabotage of the enemy within each locality and installation and cannot be considered an "insignificant" force that does not make any difference. Recent facts in many localities have shown that wherever and whenever the party committee echelon and local government firmly rely upon and make good use of the two key forces, that is, the public security force and the local troops, militia and self-defense forces, together with the important forces of
each sector, together with the mass of people, to struggle against the enemy's sabotage in the economic field, the cultural field and so forth, the enemy is stopped, is continuously pursued and is appropriately punished. The local military agencies have a very large role and responsibility in the successful performance of this task.

The main force troop units, wherever they are stationed, have the responsibility of taking the initiative in coordinating with the forces within the locality in the sabotage of the enemy. The main force troop units are usually quite capable of contributing along with the locality in mobilizing and organizing the people to fight the enemy's sabotage, in fighting the psychological war, the espionage war and the reactionary, decadent culture of the enemy and in encircling and stopping each act of armed sabotage by the enemy. In many localities, especially in important strategic areas, large main force troop units are stationed on a regular basis. Although these are not local armed forces, they are a large armed force present within the locality. If there is close coordination between the locality and main force troops, between the local party committee and government and the commander and command agency, a very large strength will be brought to bear in the struggle against the enemy's sabotage within each locality.

Maintaining political security and maintaining social order and safety are one front in the fight against the enemy that is very important and pressing, is a front on which all armed forces, each cadre and each soldier everywhere in the country can actively participate. On this front, it is even more necessary to thoroughly understand the viewpoint of the party that "national defense and security are one," to thoroughly reflect this viewpoint in one's awareness and thinking, in our organization and actions from top to bottom, on the central, local and basic levels; national defense and security must be closely coordinated in every area from researching the enemy, detecting the enemy and assessing the enemy to attacking the enemy, pursuing the enemy and annihilating the enemy, coordinated in a manner that insures initiative and effectiveness, with a view toward eliminating the sources of all disruptions of order and security.

3. Actively fighting the enemy's sabotage must go hand in hand with protecting the armed forces internally, protecting them politically, ideologically and organizationally; protecting their equipment and weapons, protecting their other means of combat and their fighting strength, in general.

One of the malicious tricks and salient characteristics of the enemy in this war of sabotage is that they attack us within our own country, attack us within our own organization in coordination with pressure exerted from the outside, consequently, they consider the exploitation of our domestic, internal forces to be an area of utmost importance. In view of the extremely important position they occupy in the work of defending the fatherland, our armed forces have been and are one of the prime objectives, one of the main targets of the enemy's sabotage.
They look for every way to sabotage and reduce the fighting strength of our armed forces, of our army in a vain attempt to make it impossible for our troops to fight the enemy's sabotage by military means in the war of sabotage and even more impossible for our troops to win victory over them in a large-scale war of aggression as well as impossible for our troops to firmly defend the fatherland and, as a result, to fulfill their international obligations to Kampuchea and Laos.

Consequently, protecting the armed forces internally and protecting the comprehensive strength of the army, beginning by firmly protecting the army politically, ideologically and organizationally, protecting its weapons and equipment and protecting its other combat means have been and are a very pressing and important requirement. This requirement is not only related to victory in the struggle against the war of sabotage, but also related to our ability to prevent and repulse the danger of a large-scale war of aggression, to our ability to win victory over the enemy should they recklessly unleash a large-scale war of aggression and to all the work involved in building the army, strengthening the national defense system and protecting the fatherland at present and over the long range.

The matter of greatest importance is the need to resolutely and firmly protect troops politically, ideologically and organizationally. We must insure that our entire army, that 1 million persons as 1, are united as one, united tightly around the Party Central Committee, headed by General Secretary Le Duan, and scrupulously complies with the revolutionary line of the party in the new stage set forth by the 4th Congress and confirmed and defined in further detail by the 5th Congress. This is not only something that is part of the revolutionary nature, the revolutionary tradition of our army, but is also the strength and the source of invincible strength of our armed forces.

We must protect the correct revolutionary line of the party, protect the party organization. This is the way to protect the just and inevitably victorious revolutionary undertaking of our people because the party is the organizer of each victory of our country's revolution. It is also the way to protect the source of invincible strength of the armed forces because the leadership provided by the party is the primary factor determining the growth and the victory of our army. Achieving a high degree of unanimity concerning the line, scrupulously complying with the line, resolutely protecting the line, protecting the organization and crushing every psychological warfare effort of the enemy concerning the line and the organization of the party are the matter of utmost importance in protecting our army politically, ideologically and organizationally and are the most effective way to fight the enemy's sabotage.

We must protect the corps of cadres, protect each cadre of the party within the army and protect the key force in building a powerful revolutionary people's army. We must protect the organization of the army, protect each unit, from the small detachments to the large military corps, in order to not only prevent the enemy from infiltrating the army's organization by any means, but also insure that no unit allows any military personnel to degenerate or become deviant because these are persons that the enemy can easily exploit in order to infiltrate and sabotage our internal organization.
We must also make every effort to protect the blood brother relationship between the army and the people against the scheme of the enemy to divide the people and the army and not violate the beautiful relationship between the army and the people; we must resolutely protect the life and property of the people and not allow the enemy to find excuses for sabotage, take advantage of or provoke actions that would harm the tradition of solidarity between the army and the people.

Special attention must be given to maintaining the close, constant and strong relationship between the army and the public security force, between the two dependable and effective tools of revolutionary violence of the party and state, the two key forces in the struggle being waged by all the people against the war of sabotage of enemy. Facts have shown that wherever and whenever the forces of the army and the public security forces are closely linked to each other, they are closely coordinated with each other in reconnoitering the enemy as well as in fighting the enemy, it is difficult for the enemy to conduct acts of sabotage and, when they do, they are crushed immediately.

We must also make every effort to thoroughly protect each weapon, piece of equipment and the other means of combat. These are some of the extremely important factors in the fighting strength of our army in the new period and are also a target of sabotage that is very deserving of the enemy's attention. They have been and are looking for every way to commit acts of sabotage against storehouses, battle positions, piers, airfields, commit acts of sabotage to damage or cause the loss of things that seem small but which have a major effect upon fighting strength, such as an important component of a tank, a missile launch pad, a piece of artillery, an airplane, a warship and so forth. In the face of this situation, protecting battle positions, weapons, equipment and means of combat not only means protecting a very important component of fighting strength, but also means thwarting one of the enemy's malicious tricks.

4. Being resolved to win victory over the enemy's war of sabotage while making every effort to fully prepare to win victory over a large-scale war of aggression launched by them.

While frantically waging a multi-faceted war of sabotage, the enemy is still making every effort to prepare for a large-scale war of aggression against our country. Whereas in the struggle against the war of sabotage, all the forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat are the key forces in fighting the enemy on the military, political, economic, cultural and social fronts, in a people's war to protect the fatherland against a large-scale war of aggression, the people's armed forces, the people's army, the military corps and the various branches and services must perform the very large task of being the nucleus in the fight being waged by all the people against the enemy, of annihilating the large military corps of the enemy, crushing their will to commit aggression and firmly protecting the fatherland.
As a result, when joining all the forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat, when joining all the people in fighting and winning victory over the war of sabotage of the enemy, the armed forces, especially the main force units, must concern themselves night and day with building up their forces and building their battle positions, with constantly improving their ability to fight and win victory, considering this to be a stern warning to enemies who have plans for committing aggression and to be a firm guarantee of victory should they recklessly unleash a large-scale war of aggression. As regards the army, which is the force that has the most important task in defending the fatherland, working with all the people to fight and win victory over the war of sabotage is only one component of its sacred task, one very important part of the work of defending the fatherland; another very vital component, very vital part is making urgent, thorough preparations and being ready to fight and win victory over a large-scale war of aggression of the enemy should they unleash one.

The buildup of the people's armed forces, the people's army in the new stage, which is a very important part of the overall preparations for dealing with a large-scale war of aggression of the new enemy and which we have been carrying out for several years, experienced stern challenges in the realities of the two recent wars to defend the fatherland at either end of the country; now, we must continue to review, research and resolve the problems that we have been working on and the new problems that have arisen to insure victory over the enemy in every situation. The 5th Congress of the Party established the guideline for building the army, for insuring victory over the enemy and for defending the fatherland as "continuing to successfully carry out the campaign to build our army into a revolutionary people's army that possesses an unshakeable will to win, possesses strict discipline, possesses a serious style, becomes increasingly regular force and modern in nature, constantly improves its combat readiness, is always ready to fulfill every task assigned by the fatherland..." Only in this way is it possible to meet both the requirements of being ready to fight and win victory over a large-scale war of aggression waged by the enemy and the pressing demands of winning victory over their war of sabotage.

We must continue to devote our efforts to studying and resolving, under the guideline of seeking constant improvement, the problems that face or will face the armed forces, the army, as a result of the requirements of a people's war to defend the fatherland against a large-scale war of aggression waged by the new enemy. We must constantly improve the fighting strength, raise the level of combat readiness, improve the quality of troops and raise the level of modern military science; make every effort to improve the military science and art involved in defending the fatherland, become the masters of modern military technical sciences and become the masters of each piece of modern equipment, weapon and means of war that we have now or will acquire; and constantly improve our military organization and troop organization in accordance with the requirements of the national defense system and a people's war to defend the fatherland. The army must join the sectors and agencies of the state, the local governments and all the people in strengthening the country's defense posture, especially on the frontline, to insure that the entire country and each locality are always prepared and fully capable of winning victory over the enemy in every war situation.
Thus, while actively fighting the war of sabotage, the army must never, not for one minute, relax its effort to prepare to win victory over the enemy and firmly defend the fatherland.

It can be said that under the rule of Beijing expansionism and hegemony, "China is large but not strong." This assessment was rather clearly evident in their two recent wars of aggression and is even more evident in the present war of sabotage. They are waging this war of sabotage because of their reactionary nature, because they oppose Vietnam and because, on the other hand, their position is weak and they are not now able to unleash a large-scale war of aggression. They are also waging this war at a time when our people are the masters of the entire country, the dictatorship of the proletariat system has been established from the North to the South, our national defense and security forces are very much stronger and the forces and the strategic position of the three countries of Indochina are stronger than ever before. All the actions of the enemy are taking place in a situation in which they have lost the confidence of the people, they are acting illegally and their activities can be brought to light and appropriately punished at all times and places. It can be said that the comparison of forces between the enemy and ourselves in this kind of war is one in which we are always very much stronger than the enemy and possess, in some areas, the strength to overwhelm the enemy.

However, in this kind of war, the most wicked thing the enemy does and the thing that can cause serious harm is that they falsely call themselves revolutionaries in order to deceive the masses and win back the confidence of the people while choosing as their targets our places of greatest difficulty and tension, namely, the economy and the standard of living, in order to undermine our line, create internal and domestic disruptions, discredit and isolate our leadership and so forth. If we mobilize and organize the people well, expose the true counter-revolutionary nature of the enemy and be resolved to protect our line, protect our leadership, protect our internal organization and hinterland, employ the combined strength of the dictatorship of the proletariat system and the right of collective ownership of the masses, constantly develop the economy, stabilize living conditions more with each passing day and so forth, the enemy will surely become increasingly mired in a weaker position and not only find it increasingly difficult to sabotage us, but will also be constantly exposed, attacked and punished.

The matter of decisive importance in winning victory is that the various party committee echelons, from the central level to each locality and every installation, must provide resolute, close, effective and timely leadership and guidance; the assessment of the enemy and the struggle against the enemy's sabotage must be carried out in a well coordinated, urgent, continuous and clearcut manner by all forces, sectors, levels, localities and installations.

7809
CSO: 4209/69
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

ARMS JOURNAL EDITORIAL ON THEORETICAL WORK

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 82 pp 5-13

"Editorial: "Theoretical Work Within the Army and the Task of Gaining a
Thorough Understanding of the Political Line and the Military Line of the
Party"

"Text: "In the theoretical work conducted within our army, gaining a
thorough understanding of the political line and the military line of the
party must be considered the basic task. As the Political Report at the
5th Congress of the Party pointed out, "theoretical work and research in the
social sciences must be closely linked to researching, determining and
disseminating the lines and policies of the party and state." Only in this
way can the theoretical work performed within the army have clear objectives
and guidelines, profound subject matter, strong vitality and the practical
effect of guiding the attitudes, thinking and actions of cadres and soldiers
with a view toward successfully completing the political and military tasks
assigned by the party to the people's armed forces. Otherwise, theoretical
work can easily become general and vague in nature, become divorced from
reality, become empty theory, which is not only useless, but is sometimes
harmful as well. This is why Lenin said: "without revolutionary theory,
there can be no revolutionary method." This is also why revolutionary theory
can and must become a material strength. Providing a thorough understanding
of the revolutionary line of the party, this is the first lesson in the
nature of a principle of a theoretical journal of the party, is a manifestation
of the party spirit of a theoretical journal.

How can theoretical work provide a thorough understanding of the line of the
party? It can do this by propagandizing and disseminating the line of the
party, revealing the theoretical and practical foundations of the line and
using theory and practice to shed light on the line, to prove the correctness,
the creativity, the objective and scientific nature of the line. It can do
this by helping to concretize the line, helping to organize the implementation
of the line and helping to turn the correct line into real victory; in this
way, it can help to continue to refine, supplement, perfect and develop the
line."
The effort to provide a thorough understanding of the line cannot stop at general matters of theory, but must also be closely linked to explaining the specific positions and policies of the party and government and analyzing the pressing contemporary issues in the various fields of real life at home and in the international arena.

Providing a thorough understanding of the line also involves a struggle to protect the line and to criticize attitudes, viewpoints, thoughts and actions that are contrary to the line.

The theoretical work within the army must, above everything else, still provide a thorough understanding of the political line of the party, considering this to be the foremost task. We should not think that it is only necessary to delve into matters regarding the military line. The political line of the party is the political order of the army and determines the military line. The political line of the party determines the combat ideals and objectives of the army. Our army must clearly understand the entire revolutionary struggle being waged by our people under the leadership of the party and must, on this basis, see the position, the role and the responsibility of the army in this struggle. Many problems regarding the awareness and the thinking of our cadres and soldiers arise and are resolved primarily within the very profound realities of the revolutionary struggle of all our people in the political, economic, cultural and ideological fields both at home and abroad, not merely in the military field.

Experience has shown that in order for theoretical work to provide a thorough understanding of the political line of the party, we must have a firm grasp of the revolutionary and scientific substance of Marxism-Leninism and fully analyze the specific historic conditions and circumstances of our country's revolution. We must strictly adhere to the teaching of the founders of Marxism-Leninism: Marxist is not dogmatic, rather, it is a compass guiding actions. We must be very creative when analyzing the specific situation in order to reach practical conclusions, not reach dogmatic conclusions based on general theories contained within books and not automatically make our conclusions conform with existing experiences. Of course, every effort must be made to study basic theory in order to grasp its essence; every effort must be made to study the valuable experiences of the world revolution in order to apply them in a manner consistent with our conditions. We must also give attention to criticizing revisionist trends and eradicating the influence of Maoist viewpoints in order to clarify the correct and creative Marxist-Leninist revolutionary line of the party. We must crush the anti-communist propaganda arguments of the bourgeoisie, especially the arguments contained within documents that bear the label "scientific research" by so-called "theoreticians" of imperialists who vainly attempt to distort socialism and communism while justifying imperialism and making it look attractive.

At present, in the theoretical work within our army, importance must be attached to providing a thorough understanding of the general line of the socialist revolution, the line on building the socialist economy and the domestic
and foreign policy lines that were set forth at the 4th Congress of the Party and defined in further detail at the recent 5th Congress of the Party. We must delve deeply into the theory of the period of transition to socialism in our country, especially the present stage of the period of transition, in order to clearly see the objective foundations of the economic strategy of the party during the 5 years from 1981 to 1985 and for the 1980's. Attention must be given to the law of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production and the law of building socialism in conjunction with protecting socialism under the specific historic circumstances of our people's revolutionary struggle on a nationwide scale, within Southeast Asia and on a worldwide scale. We must give attention to criticizing incorrect schools of thinking and must be determined to defeat the psychological warfare arguments of the enemy.

When our cadres and soldiers clearly understand the line of the party in a scientifically based manner, they are constantly heightening and strengthening their confidence in the correct leadership of the party and the bright future of the nation; on this basis, they display unshakeable determination to successfully complete every task assigned by the party. And, our cadres and soldiers are also able to detect shortcomings and possibly even mistakes in practical organizational work and in the specific positions and policies of the party and state; on this basis, they display a high spirit of responsibility, display a high spirit of collective ownership and contribute to the leadership of the party, to making the positions and policies of the party and state increasingly correct and complete.

The effort to mold the awareness and the thinking of troops must be scientifically based, highly principled in nature and strongly persuasive in terms of both theory and practice. This effort cannot be accommodating, lax, rightist, simplistic or crude. The purpose of this effort is to heighten the militant nature of theoretical and ideological work, not to engage in subjective, unilateral, groundless criticism.

Providing a thorough understanding of the political line of our party also has the purpose of laying the groundwork for gaining a thorough understanding of the military line and correctly resolving the problems involves in the combat and buildup of the armed forces and in strengthening the national defense system. Here, it must be said in addition that we must have a full viewpoint concerning the relationship between politics and military affairs, between politics and war.

Everyone knows the Marxist viewpoint that "politics controls military affairs and military affairs are subordinate to politics." Many persons also talk about the famous viewpoint of Clausewitz that "war is the continuation of politics by violent means." However, people usually only see the main difference between politics and military operations as violence and see politics as the determining factor in military operations only as regards determining the political objectives of military operations, determining the political nature of the war. Consequently, too much emphasis is usually placed
upon the laws of military operations, maintaining that once a war has started only the laws of war are applicable, as though the laws of politics were no longer in effect.

We must realize that with regard to military affairs, politics not only determines the objective of military activities and the nature of war, but also determines military forces and the forces conducting a war and determines, to a very large degree, military "method," the methods of war, that is, the mode of warfare, military science and art and even military technology. In war, there are not only the laws of war, but also the laws of politics; the laws of politics continue to have an impact in the course of a war both through the laws of war and at the same time as the laws of war.

This is the dialectical, organic and unified relationship between politics and military activities, is the objective basis of the dialectical, organic and unified relationship between the political line and the military line of our party. It can be said that in terms of the contents and scope of the line, it is difficult to distinguish the political line from the military line. Matters regarding the objectives of the revolution, revolutionary forces and revolutionary method in the revolutionary line of the party very profoundly control matters regarding the political objectives of a war, the forces that conduct a war and the mode of warfare. This is especially true when we are fighting the enemy not only by means of our army, but also by means of the combined strength of all the people, fighting the enemy on the basis of the strength of revolutionary forces that are organized and turned into strength in war and that employ the many methods of fighting of both the army and the people. The people's war line of our party during the war of resistance against the United States for national salvation in the war of liberation in the South (such as waging a comprehensive war of all the people, coordinating armed struggle and political struggle in all three strategic areas and so forth) was closely linked to and represented the logical internal development— in the military field and the field of war—of the basic matters contained within the revolutionary line of the party (such as brandishing and coordinating the two banners of national independence and socialism, tapping the combined strength of all the people with manual workers and farmers serving as the main force, coordinating attacks upon the enemy in the countryside and the cities, coordinating armed uprisings with revolutionary war and so forth).

We can also talk about this relationship between the Maoist political line and the military thinking of Mao Zedong in order to see the difference between the people's war line of our party and the so called "people's war" of Mao. In fact, on the basis of overstating the role of violence, considering violence to be nothing more than armed struggle, considering "government to come from the barrel of a gun," considering peasants to be the main force and so forth, Mao Zedong absolutized the role of war, considered war to be nothing more than armed struggle, considered the army to be peasants in uniform and adopted the line of using the countryside to surround the cities. Although Mao said he relied upon the people, he actually relied upon the army and upon weapons; the primary comparison of forces was based upon the army and weapons. To Mao, the "people" were actually the peasantry; when talking about man being the decisive factor in
war, he was referring to numbers as embodied in the thinking of "drowning them in a sea of humanity." For this reason, in the war of resistance against Japan, China once mobilized 500 million people to attack the Japanese imperialist aggressors, who only had a population of 70 million at the time, but Mao observed that the comparison of forces was one of using weakness to attack strength, that their strategy was to use one person to fight ten persons, that they he to adopt a defensive strategy and so forth. Meanwhile, the people's war of the Vietnamese, which was a war waged by a small country against the U.S. imperialists, whose economic might and military might were many times greater than ours and who could employ a combined strength, was conducted under the consistent strategy of taking the offensive in order to gradually defeat the enemy and win total victory.

The practical conclusions reached here is that our theoretical work within the army must creatively resolve military problems on the basis of the fundamental matters contained within the political line of the party and, of course, in accordance with the special requirements of the laws governing military affairs.

On the basis of providing a thorough understanding of the political line and at the same time as providing a thorough understanding of the political line, theoretical work within the army must focus on providing a thorough understanding of the military line of the party and help to resolve problems pertaining to military science and art and to military technology.

At present, the theoretical work performed within our army must continue to provide a thorough understanding of the military line of the party in the period of building and defending the fatherland.

We must clarify the theoretical and practical bases of the relationship and the reciprocal impact between the two strategic tasks of building socialism and maintaining our readiness to fight in defense of the fatherland, which were set forth by the 5th Congress, in the face of the schemes of the Chinese reactionaries, who are collaborating with the U.S. imperialists, to weaken and annex Vietnam and annex the three countries of Indochina in order to sweep into Southeast Asia. We must expose the anti-Marxist, anti-Marxist-Leninist and anti-socialist nature of Maoism and Maoism after Mao as the theoretical and ideological foundation of the political line of the Maoists within the ruling circles in China at this time. We must analyze in a theoretical and scientifically based manner and from the viewpoint of dialectical materialism and historical materialism the correct argument of our party that under the rule of the Beijing reactionaries, China is large but not strong. On this basis, we must correctly evaluate the new strategic object of our country's revolution and the new object of warfare of our army and people and correctly evaluate the comparison of forces between the enemy and ourselves in a people's war to defend the fatherland, on a strategic scope as well as in terms of campaign art and tactics.

The theoretical work performed within our army must also contribute to concretizing and applying the fundamentals contained within the political line
and the economic line of the party within the military field and within the
work of strengthening the national defense system and building up the army.
This involves such matters as building and creating the combined strength of
the national defense system of all the people and a people's war to defend
the fatherland throughout the country as well as within each area and
increasing the fighting strength of the armed forces on the basis of firmly
maintaining the dictatorship of the proletariat, upholding the right of collective
ownership of the laboring people, simultaneously carrying out the three
revolutions, building the new system, building the new economy, establishing
the new culture and molding the new, socialist man. It includes such
matters as coordinating the economy with the national defense system in the
initial stage of the period of transition to socialism in light of the special
characteristic of our country of advancing from small-scale production to
large-scale socialist production, in accordance with the economic strategy for
the 1980's and in accordance with the requirements of our military strategy.
It includes such matters as organizing the military and leading, commanding
and managing the army in accordance with the mechanism "the party leads, the
people exercise ownership and the state manages" as applied within the army;
building modern arms, branches and services of the military and building the
standing forces and reserve forces; the army performing economic work,
construction work and national defense work; and preparing the country to take
precautions against war, preparing for a wartime mobilization, insuring the
quality of the armed forces and insuring the combat readiness of all the people
while successfully meeting the pressing requirements regarding production and
everyday life and accelerating economic, cultural and social development.

One very important matter facing theoretical work within the army is that of
helping to develop Marxist-Leninist military theory in Vietnam and developing
the military science and art of a people's war to defend the fatherland. We
must correctly summarize the experiences gained in the several decades of the
war of liberation and war to defend the country against the imperialist
aggressors, research the new requirements of a people's war to defend the
fatherland against our new enemy, the Chinese expansionists, and, on this
basis, learn the general laws of the people's war in our country under the
leadership of the party and in view of the special characteristics of a
war to defend the fatherland in order to correctly resolve matters pertaining
to strategy, campaign art and tactics, matters pertaining to combat and
the buildup of forces, matters pertaining to party work, political work and
so forth. We must combat the deviations of empiricism and dogmatism; every
effort must be made to study the armies of the fraternal socialist countries,
beginning with studying the progressive experiences of the soviet army and
navy and the valuable knowledge contributed by soviet military scientists to
meet the requirements of a people's war to protect the fatherland under modern
circumstances. We must swiftly learn the latest developments of military
science and military technology in the countries of the world and not be
complacent or satisfied, not be conservative and stop moving forward. In
addition, we must criticize the new arguments, the "new theories" of imperialist
military scientists and bourgeois military viewpoints as well as criticize the
military thinking of Mao Zedong in the post-Mao period and eradicate the influences
of Maoist military thought. As a result, military scientific information activities
play a very important role.
Experience has shown that in order to perform this task well, we cannot be satisfied with knowledge of politics, rather, we must also possess military knowledge. We must have a firm grasp of the spirit and substance of Marxist-Leninist theory concerning war and the army; every effort must be made to learn the military and technical knowledge that reflects the special laws of armed struggle, knowledge that has been accumulated through the history of war. We must also have a full understanding of the military realities of the country and must know how to inherit and enhance the military tradition of the nation. Our nation of Vietnam formed and has developed not only in the process of productive labor to build the economy and develop the culture, but also in the process of fighting and winning victory over many aggressors larger than we over a period of many generations. These historic circumstances created for our nation of Vietnam a special military quality, one that reflects the essence of our nation in the fields of ethics, culture and intelligence. Therefore, researching the origins and this special military quality of our nation and developing upon the nation's military tradition in the undertaking of defending the socialist Vietnamese fatherland are a very important task in military theoretical work.

In particular, we must be very creative in the military field. Whereas the revolution requires creativity, even greater creativity is required in the military field. Because, the general law of war is that the strong win victory and the weak are defeated; under the circumstances of a small nation that must contend with large aggressors, we cannot win victory if we are not creative. This was our experience in the war of resistance against the French and especially in the war of resistance against the United States. And, we must also be creative in the new historic struggle against the Chinese reactionaries. Many countries of the world recognize the positive contribution made by the people of Vietnam to the storehouse of modern military knowledge through their recent sacred wars of resistance. We must be humble and must not be satisfied with ourselves but we must also be assertive. In the military field as well as every other field, objective laws always exert their control; however, in the military field more than any other field, the role of subjective efforts has a very decisive reciprocal impact. Within the military field, the following truth is very evident: the history of man has developed in accordance with objective laws outside the desires of man but man himself has rewritten his history. We are opposed to the theories of voluntarism and subjectivism; at the same time, we also reject the theories of pre-determination and objectivism.

In this regard, another matter of major importance is the need to fully understand and properly apply Marxist methodology in the military field in order to correctly resolve problems pertaining to military theory and practice within our army and country. Here, as well as in every other field, the truth is always very concrete, not abstract. Therefore, we must know how to analyze the specific situation within the military field in detail in order to reach specific, correct conclusions and solve the specific military problems that arise in the struggle with the new enemy aggressor.

The above mentioned tasks of theoretical work demand that the persons performing this work have a grasp of the spirit and essence of the line, have a firm grasp
of the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism, have a clear understanding of the positions and policies of the party and state, possess necessary scientific knowledge in the various fields and, in particular, employ correct methodology and correctly analyze the problems arising in practice, even before these problems become fully evident. Only in this way can they take the initiative and act in advance of developments in the situation, accurately resolve the practical problems that arise and guide the thinking and the actions of the masses.

Theoretical work within the army, within the military field is very important. We should not think that the military does nothing more than "fight" and does not, as a result, require theory. This would be a very large mistake. Without military theory, it is impossible to win victory over the enemy. Without theory, it is impossible to take conscious action and it is easy to fall into empiricism. Without military theory, it is impossible to resolve military problems in a scientific manner; in view of the fact that our nation usually must use small forces to fight large forces, the lack of military theory makes it impossible to know how to create a strength greater than that of the enemy by means of using forces that are smaller than the forces of the enemy, impossible to create resourceful, skillful and highly effective methods of fighting in order to win victory over the enemy. Of course, theory must always be closely linked to practice, otherwise we will fall into dogmatism. President Ho often said: theory without practice is empty theory, practice without theory is blind practice.

In a civilized society, in a modern army organization, it is absolutely necessary to have a scientific division of labor; this results in the formation of types of cadres who are specialists in a specific job or specific field. The same holds true within our army: there are command cadres, political cadres, scientific-technical cadres, professional and specialized cadres, a corps of cadres who specialize in leading and organizing implementation and a corps of cadres who specialize in theoretical research and instruction. Although an all purpose knife can cut everything, there are no persons who can do everything! However, the cadres who specialize in leadership and practical organizational work must make every effort to study theory and the cadres who specialize in theoretical work must keep abreast of practice as this is the only way they can constantly improve the quality of their work. Of importance is the need to know how to develop upon the strengths of each type cadre and skillfully coordinate these two types of cadres in supporting the effort to achieve the common objectives, namely, providing a thorough understanding of the political line and the military line of the party, building and developing Marxist-Leninist military theory in Vietnam and constantly increasing the military potentials of the country, thereby helping to firmly protect the beloved socialist fatherland.

We must take positive steps to build the corps of instructors, theoreticians and scientific research cadres of the various sectors within the army so that this corps is of sufficient size and of high quality and can serve as the nucleus in providing basic, regular force and systematic training to army cadres for the purposes of building up the army and strengthening the national defense system over the long range. We must improve the cooperation and division of
labor between theoretical cadres within the army and the theoretical cadres of
the other sectors of the party and state with a view toward having them join
efforts in order to resolve the theoretical and practical problems raised by the
requirements of the tasks of the revolution and military tasks.

The cadres who perform theoretical work must possess pure souls, must be
unbiased and faithful. They must be very objective and scientific, firmly
adhere to principles, unswervingly adhere to the truth, be boldly creative
and dare to reject their own theoretical conclusions when they show themselves
to no longer be consistent with practice. They must cultivate the ability to
engage in scientific thought and must be able to reach accurate conclusions
on the basis of practice. They must be sensitive to the new and wholeheartedly
support the new in order to stimulate development; they must not be conservative
and must not restrict the masses but they also should not flatter or follow
the masses. In military activities, this is a very strict requirement because
it is related to the flesh and blood of cadres and soldiers, to the lives of
the people, to victory or defeat in combat.

The theoretical cadre must always remember the immortal words of Goethe, the
great German poet whom Lenin frequently quoted: "All theory is gray, only
the tree of life is perpetually green and filled with flowers." Therefore, only
by closely linking it to the rich and creative lives of combat and labor of
the people, of the mass of cadres and soldiers, is it possible for the theoretical
work conducted within our army, as well as theoretical work in general, to be
"forever green and filled with flowers."

7809
CSO: 4209/69
OPIUM SMUGGLER APPEHENDED BY POLICE

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 17 Sep 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Phan Tuong: "Resisting Speculation, Smuggling; Story at Noon"]

[Text] Unit Chief C. appeared impatient, diligently glancing at his watch every few seconds, at 15 minutes to 12 and again at 10 minutes to 12. The municipal theatre whistle blew and precisely as expected, from the direction of Dong Da hill appeared a dark-eyed short-haired individual riding a green Vespa with the license number PM440 in the direction of Nga Tu So. The vehicles slowed down and stopped in front of a building across from refreshment bar X, where Unit Chief C. and reconnaissance agent Th. were sitting. The two men were both elated because the bait had arrived but they continued to drink their iced tea while their professional eyes followed every movement of the man on the vehicles. The man parked his vehicle in front and calmly walked into the building across from them. No 10 minutes later, the dark-eyed man came out, followed by a tall thin youth with light skin, long hair and a fairly presentable mustache. The dark-eyed man pushed the vehicle into the street to start the motor and told the youth to get on behind him. The Vespa sped off in the direction of O Cho Dua.

Where was Vespa PM440 going? According to the prepared plan, this net had been set to catch a major group of "black rice" smugglers in this very building, a location in which they had arranged to deliver the goods. Now however, the dark-eyed man had arrived and departed and no goods at all were seen. Where was he taking the youth?

Unit Chief C. wrote a few dong on the bill and said to the proprietor, "Thank you, sir, we must go immediately. I hope you understand. When we finish our job, we will return." The proprietor took the bill and mumbled as if talking to himself, "I know. When necessary, they come. It's no trouble. It's hot outside but they only drink one cup of tea and sit all day."

Unit Chief C. arranged for the reconnaissance agent to secretly enter the building across from the refreshment bar in order to ascertain the situation.

Truly, the dark-eyed individual on Vespa PM440 was extremely cunning. When he entered the building to meet his "customer," although he saw a bag of money ready for payment, he immediately said, "Leave the money here and come with me to bring back the goods. 'Going along with' this group, you and I will form a long-term 'partnership.' On each expedition, you need only carry a few bowls of your 'black rice' to have enough to 'spend.' After six or seven trips, you will be a rich man. At that time, do you
think you've remember this guy? Ha, ha, that's all there is to it. Surely you know about ocean-going soldiers. They have a good time and have great character and morality. Have a smoke." He pulled out a pack of "555" cigarettes and gave it to the youth to convince him that the "ocean-going sailors" were in connivance with him. "Let's leave now at noon. At this hour, the cards are right and it is safe because the 'forbid' group (meaning the public security personnel) are on their noon siesta.

Upon hearing the report, Unit Chief C. immediately decided that this was even better, no different than enticing a "tiger" out of the jungle to shoot it, both capturing the tiger and protecting the jungle. That is, apprehending this illegal group would both protect the basis of the mass movement and the security of the fatherland.

The reconnaissance agents were ordered by Unit Chief C. to spread the net immediately. The precinct deputy public security commander used a short wave radio to coordinate with check points at both ends of the street.

Unit Chief C. and reconnaissance agent Th. moved their position to a section in the middle of Tay Son Street. C. selected a position suitable for observation while positioning a traffic policeman in the direction of a gas station.

It was only 15 minutes to 1 when in the distance, Unit Chief C. saw the green Vespa returning with the two men as before. When the vehicle approached, the traffic policeman blew his whistle. The Vespa stopped and the policeman asked to examine the driver's license. Immediately, reconnaissance agent Th. and Unit Chief C. came up and took out a large package wrapped in paper from in front of the vehicle's foot rests. It was actually a package of opium which they needed to serve as undisputable evidence. The unit chief took out his identification badge and said, "You are under arrest for trading in goods forbidden by the state."

The dark-eyed man was Nguyen Phu Chu, 45 years old, from 44 225th Street in Dong Da District, originally a driver in Transportation Group 2 who had pretended to be sick in order to "rest" but actually to engage in smuggling. For many years, Chu had served as a middleman for undesirable elements in vehicle convoys trading in illegal goods, especially opium, from provinces in the northwest. They plan was fairly ingenious: when a vehicle was returning from the northwest carrying "black rice" and encountered a vehicle coming back up, the "goods" were transferred to that vehicle and transferred back again when another vehicle was encountered coming from the northwest. This transfer and retransfer was aimed at confusing pursuit by the masses and security forces.

At the beginning of August 1982, receiving agent information about a group of opium smugglers, the Dong Da District public security command decided to assign an economic police unit to set a net. The soldiers immediately began the battle. The "ocean-going sailor" was assisted by the masses in making contact with the group of Nguyen Phu Chu and he was tested many times by Chu before Chu trusted him to deliver goods during the "noon hour" on 19 August 1982.

According to Chu, the noon hour was a "safe time." However, at that very hour, Chu fell into the net of the law. Afterwards, the members of his group were captured one after another.

7300
CSO: 4209/96
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

MISAPPROPRIATION OF STATE GOODS BRINGS LONG PRISON SENTENCES

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 18 Sep 82 p 4

[Article: "Individuals Engaged in Corruption, Distribution of Misappropriated Socialist Property Severely Punished"]

[Text] In October 1980, the Warehouse and Transportation Corporation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade consigned an amount of synthetic yarn (of a valuable type) to the Weaving Materials Enterprise of the Ministry of Light Industry. This yarn was brought from a foreign country by the vessel "Tra Ly."

In April 1981, the Weaving Materials Enterprise sent Vu Van Thanh with two other men to pick up the yarn and deliver it to drivers for transportation back to the warehouse. Duong Van Cuong and Duong The Phan, two enterprise drivers assigned the mission of transporting the yarn, connived with Thanh and established contact with Le Thi Bai, chief of the wrapping team, to take and sell the yarn. From each load, they took two balls of yarn, each weighing 1.2 kolograms (at a state price of 192 dong per kilogram). During the two days of 13 and 15 July 1981, Cuong and Phu took 320 balls of yarn for sale to Le Van Phuc at 32 Dai La, Hanoi for 55,000 dong and sold 10 balls at the Nhu Quynh station for 1,000 dong. By misappropriating the yarn, this corrupt group cost the state 71,572 dong. Actually, the vessel "Tra Ly" lost 5,434 kilograms of yarn for a loss of more than 1 million dong.

These were organized criminals who discussed, connived and contacted each other from the packaging to the transportation and delivery steps.

This type of yarn must be purchased by the state with foreign exchange to develop production and to answer the clothing needs of the people under conditions in which the nation is encountering many difficulties.

The illegal actions of this group not only caused great losses in socialist property but also created additional difficulties for production and daily life.

Severely punishing the group engaged in corruption and misappropriation of socialist property, in a recent trial, the Municipal People's Court sentenced:

Vu Van Thanh to 6 years in prison and a fine of 12,000 dong.

Le Thi Bai to 6 years in prison and a fine of 14,000 dong.

85
Duong Van Cuong to 5 years in prison and a fine of 20,400 dong.

Le Van Phuc to 4 years in prison and a fine of 32,400 dong.

The other defendants received 8 to 12 month suspended sentences and were forced to repay their ill-gotten gains.

7300
CSO: 4209/96
EDITORIAL STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF NEW CRIMINAL LAWS

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 17 Sep 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Implement Laws To Punish Those Conducting Illegal Activities"]

[Text] Everyone hates those engaged in smuggling, speculation, production of counterfeit goods and illegal business activities. They take advantage of or deliberately exploit the difficulties of our country's economy in order to "fish in troubled waters." They overlook no cunning or unking means: buying up various kinds of merchandise and material and hoarding them until the time is favorable for sale at a cutthroat price; bribing and seducing degenerate elements in agencies and enterprises in order to misappropriate the rare and valuable goods and raw materials of the state; and taking advantage of the scarcity of a number of supplies in order to produce counterfeit goods, including medicines of a type with a direct bearing on the health and lives of the people. Some dishonest merchants have organizations and networks in many provinces establishing contacts in foreign countries to trade in goods forbidden by the state such as gold, foreign exchange and opium.

Their illegal actions cause great harm to society. They destroy state policies and positions on economic management and price stabilization, disturb the market and cause great damage directly to the daily lives of the laboring people. They corrupt and pervert a number of cadres and workers. While the laboring people are leading an honest and simple life and encountering many difficulties, they are living in an extravagant and unrestrained manner, causing an unfair and irrational situation which creates obstacles in the education of a labor concept and building of new ethics and the new man. It is possible to state that whether intentionally or unconsciously, they have tacitly assisted those waging a multifaceted war of destruction against our people.

Laws recently passed by the state to punish the crimes of speculation, smuggling, goods counterfeiting and illegal business activities answer the requirements of the masses who are demanding that the illegal activities above be halted. This struggle in the capital is increasingly urgent and severe because this is the economic center and an important communications junction. On the basis of profoundly propagandizing the significance and theme of these laws among the people and relying upon the assistance of the eyes and ears of the people, agencies directly responsible for implementing the laws such as inspectors, public security organizations, the courts, tax collectors, the navy, etc. must do their jobs well, conduct a resolute attack and punish the parasites destroying society, first of all striking the leading, organized and most dangerous groups. The punishment methods of our state are just and straightforward: every criminal, no matter who, must be punished with ringleaders, stubborn
individuals and repay offenders receiving severe punishment and other punishments matching the objective and severity of the violation. Cadres and members of law enforcement agencies must be increased in number and raised in quality in order to assure that the laws are positively enforced. Collectives and individuals actively discovering and resisting those engaged in illegal activities must be promptly rewarded.

Along with promoting and developing production, improving distribution and circulation and strengthening management in every aspect, the resolute punishment of criminals in keeping with the spirit of the law will make an important contribution to reducing negative occurrences, upholding state discipline, maintaining order and social security and stabilizing the lives of the people. Therefore, party and administrative echelons must give their full concern to leadership and supervision.

7300
CSO: 4209/96
HO CHI MINH CITY SUPPLIES GOODS TO HANOI MARKET

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 19 Sep 82 p 1

[Article: "Receipt, Sales of Goods Provided by Ho Chi Minh City"]

[Text] Implementing the policies of the standing committees of the Municipal Party Committees of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, the city of Ho Chi Minh recently supplied Hanoi with a fairly large amount of goods of many types. Included in these goods were 700 tons of sugar, 100 tons of monosodium glutamate, 60 tons of wool and woolen clothing and 1 million meters of cloth.

The Standing Committee of the Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal People's Committee estimate that the goods above have had an effect in supporting the requirements of the workers, public servants and people and in contributing to further enrich the variety of goods on the Hanoi market. Of the goods received from southern Vietnam, estimated to be worth 250 million dong, nearly all have been sold with the exception of a small amount due to seasonal factors (woolen and ready-made clothing) and a number of others due to poor quality (ball-point pens and bicycle tires.) According to the Municipal People's Committee, the amount of poor quality goods accounted for only 2 percent of the total and these were the results of the professional shortcomings of a number of trade cadres in the two cities.

The Municipal People's Committee through management sectors has supervised and promoted the sale of slowly selling goods and requested that production locations exchange poor quality tires for good ones and repair a number of goods where possible.

7300
CSO: 4209/96
HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

TYphoon NO 7 CAUSES DAMAGE TO NGHE TINH

Consequences of Storm

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[VNA News Release: "Other Localities Help Nghe Tinh Overcome the Consequences of Typhoon No 7]

[Text] In view of serious damage caused by the typhoon, the VCP Standing Committee of Dien Chau District met to discuss measures to be taken to help overcome the consequences of the disaster. They enlisted the help of villages located on the west side of Route 1 on behalf of those on the east side (the seaside), especially with regard to construction materials and plant cuttings, in order for the latter to be able to work their land for the winter-spring season and starting by complete transplanting of 1,700 hectares of late-winter sweet-potatoes on "one rice, one sweet-potato, one peanut" areas. The district also urged cooperative members, especially those in peanut-producing areas, to check the inventory of their available cuttings and make more sweet-potato cuttings; and the cooperatives themselves, to contract out the propagation of sweet-potatoes as a means of preparation for the transplanting of 2,300 hectares of spring peanuts and more than 2,300 hectares of spring sweet-potatoes. Thanks to good preservation and mutual aid, the district also has more than 1,500 tons of different types of rice seeds, such as Nong Nghiep-8, VL3-2, IR702 and 75-2, etc. to be transplanted at the fifth-month and spring season. The district also preserved 40 tons of nitrate fertilizer and 40 tons of peanut cuttings to be given to fellow compatriots for their spring cultivation.

Together with the zoning and embankment to retain water and the desalinization of affected areas, the District's Agricultural Irrigation Station was directed to irrigate salted ricefields and help with desalinization in order for farmers to transplant in time for the winter-spring season.

Due to the typhoon the number of accident victims and sick needing to be examined has increased. The city of Vinh offered all available rooms at its hospital, including offices of doctors and top cadres, to accommodate them. Cadres and employees of all branches and offices promptly repaired leaking roofs, sanitized rooms and helped clean the victims' clothes. In no time, they changed 12 deteriorated roofs of the pediatric buildings to make them suitable for our children patients.
Presently, the city hospital has 82 patients of which 18 are lying-in women, 18 are babies who were born on the night of 17-18 October, 21 are infant patients and 38 were injured during typhoon No 7. All received good and conscientious care.

To help Nghe Tinh overcome promptly and effectively the consequences of typhoon No 7, the provincial VCP committee, the people's committee and the Fatherland Front Committee of Phu Khanh Province launched a vast campaign urging their cadres, public servants and all other people to increase production and reduce expenditures in order to help Nghe Tinh with money, rice and other food products.

Following suit, cadres and workers of the Port of Nha Trang-Ba Ngoi, braving bad weather, decided to carry out the state's plan for 1982 ahead of time and offered to handle an additional 40,000 tons of merchandise, including 5,000 cubic meters of lumber from Nghe Tinh which they exchanged for food products of the Mekong delta regions with the highest efficiency and in the shortest time. Cadres and workers volunteered to share part of their earnings and food allowances, which amounted to 20,000 plasters and 400 kilograms of rice, with fellow compatriots of Nghe Tinh.

Having heard of typhoon No 7 and the vast damages it had caused to the people of Nghe Tinh, the Teachers University of Quy Nhon Nghia Binh sent a telegram of comfort to the Provincial Education Service of Nghe Tinh. The Teachers College and the Teachers University of Vinh organized activities to help the educational branch of Nghe Tinh.

In this very October, each of nearly 1,000 cadres, teachers and students was able to save a kilogram of rice. Youth groups earned funds by working and pledged to help Nghe Tinh with school supplies.

Having heard that the recent typhoon had caused serious damages to five districts of Nghe Tinh, cadres and workers at our Permanent Mission to the United Nations and those attending the 37th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations sent $210, which they accumulated through reducing their expenses, to help the victims.

Thanh Hoa Crop Damage

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 October p 1

[Text] [photo caption] Typhoon No 7 slammed into Thanh Hoa flattening 60,000 hectares of 10th-month rice, of which 15,000 hectares were flooded. Right after the storm ended, people rushed to their ricefields to straighten the fallen plants and quickly harvest those that were ripe. Thirty-five pump stations equipped with 215 pumps operated without interruption. After 2 days Thanh Hoa saved 30,000 hectares of rice.
URGENT NEED FOR REDUCED POPULATION GROWTH DECLARED

Municipal Station Chief Interview

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 12 Sep 82 p 3

[Interview with Luong Thi Ngoc Thai, MD, chief of the municipal station on protection of mothers' health and on birth control: "Goal: Bring Down Population Growth Rate in Hanoi to 1.5 Percent"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Question: Please tell us about the situation in Hanoi relating to births per year?

Answer: Prior to the birth control movement, the annual birth rate in Hanoi was very high. In 1962, Hanoi numbered 1,047,506 persons, including 45,646 births—a 4.35 percent rate. On the average, a family had up to 5 children, and the number of women experiencing more than 4 parturitions accounted for 50 percent of these births.

In 1963-64, the birth control movement began in Hanoi, aiming mainly at reducing the birth, and with focus on multiparous women. The birth rate has decreased gradually: In 1981, with a population more than double that of 1962 (2,570,747 persons), Hanoi counted 66,800 newborns—a 2.60 percent rate. The number of women experiencing 4 parturitions was down to 16.38 percent. Among cadres, workers and civil servants, the birth rate has clearly decreased.

Nevertheless, these birth rates were still higher than required. The annual number of newborns was equal to one-third the population of a ward like Hoan Kiem. It can be said that each year a district gives birth to a new village, and a ward to a new subward....

Question: In light of the present birth rate, what difficulties are in store for society, Doctor?

Answer: In our present economic conditions, in spite of considerable progress—intensive farming, multicropping, increased gross output of grain—the per capita grain production has clearly decreased because there are too many newborns each year. The two villages of Tho Loc (Phuc Tho) and Da Ton (Gia Lam) are a case in point. In 1956, the population in Tho Loc was 2,700 persons, on the average each person had 2.2 sao of land and produced 15 kg of paddy per
month. In 1980, as the population rose to 4,700, per capita land surface was down to 1.6 sao, and per capita production to 7 kg of paddy. In Da Ton, the 1956 population figure was 4,000, each person having 3.3 sao and producing 17 kg of paddy on the average. In 1981, as the population rose to 7,000, per capita land surface was down to 2 sao, and per capita production down to only 10 kg of paddy. It should be noted that the production records of these 2 villages are fairly good, and that during more than 20 years their crop yield has clearly exceeded previous levels.

Each day, Hanoi has some 200 newborns. In the next 10 to 20 years, our economy—even if it has become gradually stable and achieved good development—will not be able to strike a balance between population growth and social products increase. The biggest contradiction lies in a shortage of grain, food, and then of housing facilities, day nurseries, schools, hospitals and utensils, even jobs. One has clearly seen the vicious circle generated by numerous, uncontrolled births, with consequences such as poor production, dwindling income and snag-filled economic development…. Uncontrolled births also lead to many other misfortunes. Statistics in 1968 showed that it was very difficult to raise premature babies. The mortality rate among newborns weighing less than 2 kg was high. A health survey of children at a number of enterprises and state farms showed that 80 percent were of average or below average health. Most of them came from families with numerous children.

Summing up, the present birth situation obviously has a bad impact on living standards, family happiness and society in general.

Question: Doctor, please tell us what Hanoi has done to step up the birth control movement and achieve high efficiency?

Answer: Our station on protection of mothers' health and on birth control has set up a far-reaching organization extending from subwards, villages, wards, districts to the city. On the one hand, we actively conduct propaganda to make everyone aware of the concrete interest in birth control; on the other, a professional and technical system steps up its activities everywhere. Besides the municipal maternity hospital, each ward and district has a center on birth control techniques which is in charge of carrying out and supervising measures to avoid pregnancy, ranging from simple to complex ones. Mobile teams take turns going into orgams, enterprises and villages, to give obstetrical exams and insert IUD's. In 1981, 126,425 persons in Hanoi applied anticonception measures. As a result of that effort, Hanoi has been awarded Labor Order Third Class for carrying out the birth control task; especially Hoan Kiem Ward has been awarded Labor Order Third Class for reducing population growth to below 1.5 percent.

Question: In 1983, what should the whole city do in order to achieve the 1.5 percent rate?

Answer: We have would up our work for 1982, and continuing from this past August, all of those involved in birth control proselytization have effectively begun work for 1983. During these last months of the year, if preparatory work is not done properly, it will be difficult to fulfill next year's plan. As for
us, we will work with wards and districts to conduct a population and birth
census, and advise those for whom birth control is intended in order and urge
them to comply. The public health sector will also expand technical and
professional work with focus on high-level safety.

I believe that this problem concerns all other economic, cultural, educational
sectors.... And I hope that sectors and mass organizations, along with indi-
viduals in charge of protecting the mothers' health and carrying out birth con-
trol, will devote more effective attention to that issue, now a centerpiece
of state policy.

Growth Danger Emphasized

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 12 Sep 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "A Problem Facing Each Family As Well As the Whole Society"]

[Text] Birth control, not a new problem, has been much discussed in the past
20 years. However, it must always be treated as a new problem by young couples
newly embarking upon marital life. Both husband and wife must study and work
to understand how to bring births into accord with social development require-
ments to ensure long-term happiness for themselves.

After 20 years of family planning, our nation's demographic growth has de-
creased; but its 2.2 percent rate still is among the higher ones in the world.

The laws of economic development show that each 1 percent increase in population
must be matched by corresponding hikes in grain produced and national income,
by 2.5 percent and 4 percent respectively, in order to ensure a stable living
standard. Considering our production conditions, for the time being and in
many years to come, if our population continues to grow at the present pace,
it will clearly be very difficult to give every citizen a minimum living
standard—let alone an improved one.

The danger of accelerated population growth urgently demands a reduction in the
birth rate to be in line with the country's economic development and production,
and with our people's political tasks. The party Central Committee's polito-
cal report to the Fifth Party Congress clearly stated, "We must decide on and
carry out a sound population policy, featuring an extremely important task with
a strategic bearing on economic and social matters, which all party and admin-
istration organizations at all levels must keep close tabs on and directly
attend to—the task of continually stepping up the birth control movement.
We must update a number of obsolete policies and procedures, reinforce and
issue related policies, and strictly supervise their implementation with the
determination to bring population growth down to rational levels.

The Council of Ministers also has issued directives on bringing down by 1985
the average national population growth rate to 1.7 percent—with 1.5 percent
and below for the north and 1.9 percent and below for the south. Each family
is urged to give birth to 2 children only, and at least 5 years apart. Hence,
the problem of childbirth, albeit a personal one facing each citizen and each
family, has instead a direct impact on the common life of society. Everybody must understand clearly that the revolutionary meaning of birth control lies in benefiting, first of all, oneself and one's family, then by extension, the nation.

In the capital, as a result of many years of patiently campaigning, the average annual birth rate has tended to decrease; nevertheless, it has not achieved the norms, and still is uneven, from one place to another. Of four wards, only Hoan Kiem has reached 1.5 percent. In the districts, especially the more remote ones, a more active effort is still needed. There are many causes; but an important one still is the unsatisfactory leadership and guidance on the part of various party, administration and mass organizations' echelons. Many places still don't understand that birth control is a strategic issue closely related to the country's economic, cultural and social aspects, as well as to the people's livelihood; worse yet, some leading cadres have not set examples for others to follow. As for the target population, we must focus not only on women, but also on men, toward whom we must step up propaganda and proselytization; we must concentrate, not only on families with a number of children, but also on newly-married couples; and we must particularly educate marriageable youths.

In this revolutionary movement, Hanoi has had many advantages. Cadres and the people have shown sharp consciousness and a high level of knowledge. The city is a place where many basic installations capable of supporting the movement technically and vocationally, are concentrated. We must strive to ensure that the municipal population growth rate will achieve 1.5 percent right in the coming year of 1983.

9213
CSO: 4209/93
SUPERSTITION IN HAI BA TRUNG WARD SUPPRESSED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 11 Sep 82 p 2

[Article by Minh Nguyen: "Hai Ba Trung Ward Summarizes Preliminary Results of New Lifestyle Proselytization Work, Discusses Movement Against Superstition"]

[Text] Hai Ba Trung Ward has just met to summarize preliminary results of recent proselytization work for a new lifestyle and new cultural family. Attendance included a large number of cadres from different subwards, street citizen teams, representatives of organs and factories located within the ward, and a number of Buddhist monks and nuns.

The ward committee for the guidance as to a new lifestyle and new cultural family has drawn up multistage plans for building a new lifestyle, with the assistance of subwards and local sectors, concentrating at first on a given pilot center, then expanding to other places, taking advantage of traditional ceremonies and festivals, and focusing on compliance control, as well as on regularly and resolutely urging the people in neighborhood blocks and along communication axes to take part in the movement.

As a result of these inspections, the committee has uncovered 483 violations; removed tons of long-accumulated garbage; dredged thousands of silted up sewers; dismantled hundreds of streetcurb tents and huts and many other illegally built houses; imposed fines on cases of lack of sanitation in food, eating and drinking, and of unlawful trade; confiscated many bad books and newspapers; reactionary, decadent tapes and records; disbanded clandestine sessions of exorcism; confiscated tools used by those earning a living on superstition, astrology and fortune telling; and referred recalcitrant con artists to neighborhood block people for reeducation. Tuong Mai, Dong Nhan, Dong Tam, Bach Dang, Vinh Tuy and Quynh Loi Subwards...and a number of organs, production units, and units in charge of inspecting compliance with regulations have properly carried out new lifestyle work.

9213
CSO: 4209/93
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF 'TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' NO 8, 1982

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 8, Aug 82 p 72

Letter from President Ho to the Military Journal (p 1)

Directive from the Standing Committee of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee on Continuing To Improve the Quality and Develop Upon the Role of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in the New Situation (pp 2-4)

Theoretical Work Within the Army and the Task of Gaining a Thorough Understanding of the Political Line and the Military Line of the Party (pp 5-13) (Editorial)

We Must Be Extremely Creative in the Military Field (pp 14-17) (Article by Senior General Van Tien Dung)

Being Resolved To Win Victory Over the Enemy’s War of Sabotage (pp 18-36) (Article by Trung Dung)

The National Tasks and the International Task of Our Army and the Special Vietnam-Laos-Kampuchea Relationship (pp 37-45) (Article by Ha Giao)

The Assault Power of Tank Troops in Modern Offensive Campaigns (pp 46-55) (Article by Senior Colonel Le Xuan Kien)

Twenty-Five Years of TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN (pp 56-59)

Methodology in the Military Field

The Dialectical Thinking of the Commander (pp 60-67) (Article by Nguyen Dinh Phieu)

Foreign Military Materials

The Chinese Air Force (pp 68-71)

7809
CSO: 4209/69
TABLE OF CONTENTS OF 'TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN' NO 9, 1982

Hanoi TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese No 9, Sep 82 p 72

Training Commanders and Staff Cadres in Modern Warfare (pp 1-18)
(Article by Senior General Hoang Van Thai)

Offensive Campaigns (pp 19-31)
(Article by Senior Colonel Pham Xuan Huyen)

Political Work at Places Fighting Encroachment and Occupation by the Enemy
(pp 32-37)
(Article by Bui Nguyen)

Exchange of Experiences

Exchange of Experiences Concerning Campaign Staff Work in Modern Warfare (pp 38-41)
(Article by Senior Colonel Nguyen Phu Chut)

Training Militia and Self-Defense Forces in a Manner Based on the Requirements
of the Combat Task (pp 42-47)
(Article by Lieutenant Colonel Le Manh Xe and Major Hoang Giang)

Research

Operations Research in Staff, Command and Combat Training Operations (pp 48-56)
(Article by Major Nguyen Duy Nhat, M.A. in science-technology)

The Armed Forces of the Fraternal Countries

Some of the Main Characteristics of the Leadership Organization of the CPSU
Within the Soviet Army and Navy (pp 57-66)
(Article by Senior Colonel Trinh Quang Tan)

Foreign Military Materials

The Aviation Industry of China (pp 67-71)
(Unattributed article)