West Europe Report
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FINLAND'S FOREIGN MINISTER, NORWAY'S PREMIER HOLD TALKS

Helsinki. HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Apr 85 p 15

[Article by Erkki Pennanen: "Foreign Minister's Visit to Norway Begins; Vayrynen Discusses Nordic Security"]

[Text] Oslo—On Thursday Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen had a long conversation with Norwegian Prime Minister Kare Willoch about the security policy situation and in particular a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

Vayrynen afterwards described the conversation as being very interesting. During the course of it they went into many details in a fashion that is rare at such a high level, Vayrynen said. Willoch made it clear that Norway does not regard a Nordic nuclear-free zone as a project of actual importance in the immediate future. This we knew beforehand. Nevertheless, the Finns felt it was worth noting that we can already enter into a serious exchange of political opinions at a high level. In previous years there would have been no question of this.

Arriving in Oslo on an official foreign minister's visit, earlier in the day Vayrynen engaged in official political discussions with Foreign Minister Svend Strayen. Both sides declared that nothing new or surprising had been presented in connection with them.

Visit Balance Leaning

The real reason for the visit was the fact that the balance in the exchange of visits between the two countries has been leaning heavily in the direction of Finland. Not a single official visit by a prime minister of a foreign minister had been made from Finland to Norway since 1976. During that time, on the other hand, two prime ministers and also current Foreign Minister Stray, on a visit to introduce himself, visited Finland from Norway.

At a press conference organized for the Norwegians and the Finns, Foreign Minister Vayrynen laid emphasis on the particularly favorable development of Finnish-Norwegian relations. According to Vayrynen, both countries understand one another much better than in previous years when there was from time to time friction and misunderstandings.
During a speech delivered at the dinner given by Foreign Minister Strayn, Väyrynen reminded his listeners that it was important that all the Nordic countries make an effort to take each other and the overall situation in the Nordic area into consideration when they make security policy decisions. "It is also important that, in the future as well, the superpowers avoid those actions that might increase tension in Northern Europe."

During the official discussions both were of the opinion that the situation at present prevailing in Northern Europe is in the interests of both countries and must be preserved unchanged in the future as well. Väyrynen acknowledged Norway's policy.

According to Norwegian sources, he gave no indications of possible concern on the part of Finland over the reanimation of NATO activity in Nordic areas.

Border Peace Pact Always Timely

Väyrynen reiterated that Finland regards proposals for a Nordic nuclear-free zone and a border peace pact as being of constant timeliness. In Norway they want to link a nuclear-free zone with more extensive European connections. A border peace proposal, on the other hand, has been ruled out as being entirely unnecessary.

The Norwegians stressed the fact that the Finnish-Norwegian border is a peaceful border even without pacts. Some sort of special arrangement would only raise issues, by no means resolve them.

In Väyrynen's opinion, in the Nordic countries they should strive for more far-reaching dispositions, on an overall European scale, which increase trust, than were aimed for at the Stockholm conference. Väyrynen felt that the fact that at the Stockholm conference Norway tried to promote within the scope of NATO greater restrictions on superpower military forces in Northern Europe than elsewhere in Europe was encouraging.

The Norwegians, however, emphasized that this would have to happen as part of an agreement affecting Europe in general, just as a potential nuclear-free zone would too. The Nordic countries' going their own ways does not fit in with Norway's plans.

In Norway the U.S. star wars plan is more and more being reacted to with suspicion. At NATO's recent defense ministers conference Norway voted along with the others for a research program, but the decision gave rise to sharp criticism.

The government has indeed rejected the research collaboration offered by the United States as far as the military is concerned. Norway agrees with Finland that the arms race must not be extended into space.

Finland and Norway's bilateral problems, primarily those involving cooperation in the Nordic Arctic, were also dealt with during the official discussions. Väyrynen complained that Norway restricts border trade with noticeably tighter
regulations than Finland and Sweden do. These regulations especially affect imports of meat and other foods.

Norway promised to primarily investigate the possibility of considering special arrangements that would make border trade easier in the Nordic Arctic. The chances of realizing this do not give the impression of being very promising because of Norway's agricultural interests.

In order to alleviate Tenojoki salmon fishermen's problems, Väyrynen hoped that Norway would restrict drift net fishing in the sea. Then salmon would more easily be able to swim up the Teno River. In Norway they promised to consider the matter, in which the interests of open-sea fishermen and river fishermen are at odds with one another.

As part of his official visit, on Friday Väyrynen will spend 2 days traveling through Tromsø, Kirkenes and Vesijärvi to familiarize himself with Nordic Arctic problems.

At the press conference Norwegian reporters pressed him with questions about Finland's refugee policy. An immediate issue was the Danes' decision to raise Finland's strict policy before the European Council.

According to Väyrynen, behind the criticism that has arisen in Denmark and Sweden is the fact that their own liberal refugee policy has led to great difficulties in those countries. "We intend to continue with our strict policy," Väyrynen said, and declared that Finland would comply with the Geneva international agreement on refugees.
MOCK ON PROBLEMS, FUTURE OF PEOPLE'S PARTY

Vienna PROFIL in German 18 Mar 85 p 23

[Interview with Austrian People's Party (OeVP) Chairman Alois Mock by Herbert Langsner of PROFIL, date and place not given: "I Can't Offer Any Excuses"]

[Text] [Question] At the 1983 party conference, you closed your speech by saying: "See you at the Ballhausplatz [federal chancellor's office]!" Looks like you will instead be seen on the opposition benches once again.

[Answer] My goal remains the same. We have made some progress since the party conference. The spectacular results of the provincial government elections demonstrate that we are in a position to overtake the Socialists. The fact that we have suffered a temporary reverse does not change this.

[Question] Why is that?

[Answer] For two reasons: The general political altercation has tarnished the reputation of our party system. The Hainburg matter is a dead-end issue; then there are the arguments between Frischenschlager and Sekanina and the Zwetendorf issue. The second reason: during these debates party lines became indistinct. There was no clear alternative. That is how we took a loss.

[Question] All the things you mention were mistakes made by the government in office. This should work to the benefit of the opposition-- according to opinion polls, about 40 percent.

[Answer] All the parties were losers. But this of course does not change the fact that we fell back. When I say that the party lines were obscured, this implies that we made mistakes also.

[Question] What mistakes, specifically?

[Answer] Our upward trend continued as long as there were clear positions on economic, social and basic policies. What damaged us were controversies which took precedence over normal policy and our failure to pay sufficient attention to alternative positions.

[Question] How should the OeVP have done things differently last year?
We should have dealt with our alternative policies earlier and more energetically and we probably should have clarified our positions on the controversial subjects which surfaced last fall and winter. Especially in the Hainburg and Zwentendorf matters. We did not sufficiently publicize the achievements arising from our specific efforts to maintain the OeVP's growth rate and the public's trust in it.

As the saying goes, it was a public relations failure.

It is not that simple. I cannot blame the media nor the public information efforts—the entire party must do better.

Do you take responsibility for the OeVP's mistakes?

The final responsibility always rests with the party chairman, even if others contributed to failure.

Why isn't the party doing better?

Last fall there was some discouragement.

What was discouraging the OeVP?

After the spectacular results in the provincial government elections we suffered some relative reverses in those provinces where we had been ahead.

Go on.

I do not wish to flog a dead horse.

The party secretary for the province of Upper Austria came out with a charming saying concerning the policies of the opposition: "This is not the way we are going to hack it."

I agree—if the reverses continue next year, we are not going to hack it. If we perform the way we did during the first year of the legislative period, we'll hack it.

By vacillating as it did in the Zwentendorf affair the OeVP is not likely to rack up a majority.

The fact that we can gain a majority we have already proven in 1983/84; at the same time we have experienced the possibility of suffering reverses. We will just have to arrive at more precise positions once again. On the Zwentendorf issue we certainly did not demonstrate our capacity for keeping to the straight and narrow.

Well, the OeVP party line is not even an unanimous within the party itself. Shouldn't this tempt you to lift the requirement for enforced unanimity on the Zwentendorf vote?
Our position was arrived at unanimously, in the delegates' caucus as well. On that occasion, I asked if that vote constituted a crises of conscience for anyone. No one responded.

Here is the problem: first there are unanimous decisions, and afterwards dissenting expressions of opinion.

On major issues there will always be a certain spectrum of opinion; I can accept that. The question is: can I then find a common political denominator which I can make my own position? That has happened.

Why exactly do you want to become federal chancellor?

To follow a different type of policy, which I consider appropriate for this country.
RUMORS OF LEVESQUE'S POSSIBLE RESIGNATION

Paris LE FIGARO in French 11 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by Axel Mauguy]

[Text]. Montreal—There is no need to haunt the corridors of the National Assembly in Quebec to sense the intense uneasiness of the representatives of the Quebecois Party. People say that many deputies are at present avoiding the holding of conventions in their counties, just a way of letting Rene Levesque know that they are waiting for his departure before "getting their feet wet." The rumors about him have not subsided. On the contrary. Sometimes they have to do with the state of his health and sometimes they raise the possibility of an imminent resignation. But endurance demands it of him: The chief interested party is bravely resisting the attacks.

To be sure, no member of the clan will force "the founding father" of the Quebecois Party to resign from the chairmanship. Nevertheless, in the wake of many abortive efforts these past few months some people would feel relieved if he yielded to the invitations. In private, those eager for a new lease on life state that, like Trudeau, he should withdraw. The outspoken veteran too is beginning to go into a cold sweat when he thinks of the coming elections.

Suspense

But, while our national "Ti-poil" (the nickname given Rene Levesque) is creating anxiety, he is still very popular among the populace. That he should want to face the music one last time in a confused situation is not surprising. We recognize the old wolf, courageous and tough. A fighter to the end, Rene Levesque? No. Rather, anxious at leaving the party to certain pretenders to the throne who would with relish risk destroying so much work and hope.

A revealing sign: The liberals as well as the "orthodox members" in the end fear his departure. The political chessboard would be utterly disrupted. Bowing out before the rough-and-tumble of the elections would unleash a race for the succession: It would result in risks of confrontation between partisans of the orthodox members led by Camille Laurin, Gilbert Paquette and Jacques Parizeau and those of the revisionists led by Justice Minister Pierre-Marc Johnson.
Since the possibility of Rene Levesque's resigning cannot be excluded, Quebecois Party strategists will have to choose a damned good "orchestra leader" to calm hostile brothers and permit their troops to avoid defeat.

If Rene Levesque decides against all odds to retain his post, he will be facing Robert Bourassa for the fourth time.

For the time being, blowing sometimes hot sometimes cold, he keeps up the suspense to his liking by constantly sowing contradictory clues. He recently declared that it would be stupid to set in motion by-elections in June to elect deputies who will not be sure of gaining seats." Read: The elections will take place before this summer. But that same day he rejected the idea of premature general elections. Read: the opposite.

The liberals declare themselves to be ready, optimistic and sure of winning. Especially the red ballots are being set aside for Justice Minister Pierre-Marc Johnson, one of the presumed heirs who recently did not get off scot-free in the records of the Quebec Criminal Investigation Department. That is to say, he is still very popular. Too much so in the eyes of Rene Levesque, who did not seem annoyed at seeing him sample a few swallows from the cup of bitterness in that affair.

While waiting for the umpire to signal the kick-off, the liberal machine is running at full capacity. All winter long conferences and meetings maintained the ardor of the troops. At the end of April nearly 100 candidates (they need 110) will have been chosen in the counties. No one is complaining about their financial situation since the coffers are full. This is the same as saying that the liberal leaders fervently hope that the elections will take place in June; in the opposite event, they fear that the torpors of the summer will weaken their forces. Considering the scenario decided on at the meeting last June, the "Pequistes" strategy might give them more to think about, doubly so since the orthodox movement is still organizing itself.

Man Who Is Rising

Formed within the Democratic Rally for Independence (RDI), an authentic forum for those who do not appreciate the federalization of the Quebecois Party and the intrigues of the revisionists, as the weeks go by this movement is acquiring a certain importance. Its object is to maintain a clearcut option, Clever, for the moment its leaders refuse to consummate the break with the Quebecois Party, thinking — not without reason — that, as soon as there is a race for the succession, they may be able to regain power in the party. If they fail to beat the revisionists, they will sever the bond with the party. Meanwhile, these different factions need one another. Independent Deputy Gérome Proulx's return to the Quebecois Party this week clearly indicates that returns to the fold are not unthinkable.

Another figure is rising, Bernard Landry, the minister of international relations, a skillful politician considered to be a centrist. When the time comes, this pragmatic man could appear as the unifier of the party's different factions.
For the moment, the RDI has several cards up its sleeve and is obviously deriving part of its strength from a very fluid situation.

Will the hostile brothers have the intelligence to bury the hatchet in order to try to stop the liberal wave and will they succeed in reversing a difficult situation? This is in no way certain, especially if we place importance on the opinion polls, which very much favor Robert Bourassa's liberals. But then they did in 1981 too. In the end everything will depend on the scenario that has been concocted and it will have to be a really good one to straighten out a situation which is in no way rosy.

11,466
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DISARRAY IN SKDL PARLIAMENT GROUP REFLECTS CP PROBLEMS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 13 Apr 85 p 13

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen: "Saarto's Seven Kinds of Peacemakers"]

[Text] When Parliament left for its Easter vacation, a group reduced in number assembled in SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] delegation leader Veikko Saarto's (Communist) office. Saarto served his loyal henchmen drinks, naturally at the expense of the delegation.

There were neither hard-line moderates nor hard-line Stalinists in the group. There were only those Saarto had gathered about himself from every faction.

It has been claimed that Saarto distributes delegation speeches, trips abroad, committee seats and appearances in KANSAAN UUTISET in the same way he does drinks to the delegation just before Easter. Or has distributed them up to now; recent attempts at classifying him have failed too.

What politician would not act like this? Saarto is defended because he has kept the delegation together. The end has justified the Jesuit means employed.

There is room in the 27-man SKDL delegation for traditional moderates, traditional Stalinists, the moderate hard line and the "profoundly sensitive" women Communists and socialists who have gone along with the third line. There are other factions too.

To boot, there is Pirikko Turpeinen as well.

Saarto has assembled behind himself a mixed majority and thereby unified the delegation. Unification did not succeed without division. Since dividing the Stalinist minority was not successful, Saarto divided the moderate majority.

Saarto's tactic was based on the fact that the moderates had lost in the elections and the Stalinists had strengthened their position. At the same time the "Kajanoja movement" was the trump card in the SKP [Finnish Communist Party].

And when the election defeat confirmed the SKDL's place in the opposition, there was no reason to divide the delegation. When you don't do anything, you don't make mistakes either.
The period in the opposition was a blissful time, but one without significant political achievements. In its precipitations of strikes the SKDL indeed successfully intimidated the Social Democrats and it is easy to shake the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] in matters of agricultural policy.

The Minister and the Minute Program

The tumult in the SKP has gradually been reflected in the delegation and may even rapidly lead to a split next fall, for example.

Saarto still has the manners of a minister, even though it has been years now since he was minister of transport. The secretary draws up a minute-by-minute program for Saarto every day just as he would for a minister.

In the delegation they claim that Saarto is hungry for public appearances. "If we could once again get on television with it," was Saarto’s response last fall to someone who encouraged him to once again try to reach agreement with the government on the budget.

What has been happening in the SKP does not bode well for Saarto. Moreover, familiar with the parliamentary delegation as first secretaries of the SKDL and the SKP respectively, Reijo Kakela and Esko Vainionpaa are potentially more dangerous opponents for him.

While Saarto occupies no official post in the SKP, he has freely dispensed advice as to how the party should follow the example of the parliamentary delegation.

But not for no reason are people saying that Jouko Kajanoja is planning to give Saarto a weather vane for his 50th birthday.

Saarto’s Angels

Saarto’s proteges among the moderates are women. Kalmikko Inger Hirvela, Ulla-Leena Alppi and Heli Astala are known by the nickname of "Saarto’s angels."

They say the angel chorus is splitting up. Hirvela is trying to get back to the moderate majority’s books and is "hysterically active" because of it. The youngish grandmother also dreams of getting the SKDL vice chairwoman’s seat.

Alppi has most tenaciously adhered to the third line. The SKDL vice chairwoman’s most notable achievements have been signing the High Court of Impeachment summons and falling in love.

Astala falls into the category of the quiet moderates. The chairmanship of the Cultural Committee, which is a traditional province of the SKDL, has reputedly been better handle.

Astala’s opposite number — at least in speed of verbal delivery — is Anna-Liisa Jokinen, of whom it is claimed that she is capable of expressing three different opinions on the same issue in the same speech.
Jokinen too has been one of Saarto's proteges. As an advertising editor, she knows what kind of photos it pays to have made up for election publicity.

Belonging to a class of her own is Turpeinen, a triple-threat doctor of psychiatry. She was the guru of the women delegates until they became familiar with her creative interaction in practice.

Turpeinen is described as a late bloomer who has made it her life's work to tell people how to conduct a revolution. Kajanoja remained at the head of the SKP for fully 2 years by giving the same lessons.

Kati Peltola marches in the ranks of the moderates. She is bothered by the reputation of forever being number two since she has advanced into Parliament from an alternate's post three times.

Socialists Lauha Mannisto and Vappu Sailynoja are also counted among the moderate women delegates. They say that Mannisto's voice in particular carries weight in making decisions.

Despite her socialist background, Sailynoja belongs to the "hard line" and has made herself a politician through the rare stratagem of admitting that her abilities are inadequate for becoming chairwoman of the SKDL.

Of the men moderates, Esko Helle is an important link with Saarto. Good-natured Helle has been to Moscow and he is Saarto's protege for chairman of the SKDL.

Hard-Line Teammate

The hard-line's number-one influential man, Arvo Kemppainen, has set traps for Saarto. The operation, which brought pressure to bear on the delegation leader by complaining about those who went to Moscow, was primarily Kemppainen's handiwork. The handwringing engaged in over the trip irritated the moderates so much that they held their own first meeting of this election term about the issue.

Kemppainen's teammate is impatient Terho Pursiainen, for whom the title of national philosopher would be more appropriate than that of member of Parliament. Pursiainen's thinking flies so high that he is alienated among conventional moderates.

Pekka Leppanen and Timo Leaksonen also belong to the extreme hard-line moderates.

Leppanen was elected almost unnoticed to the delegation committee, which guarantees the moderates a majority, last winter.

Leaksonen has the reputation of being a rising politician, a reputation that has grown as he has detached himself from Saarto's apronstrings. It has been claimed that Saarto tried to get Leaksonen onto the parliamentary delegation to Moscow in place of himself.
If Saarto's flight is checked in the middle of his election term, Laaksonen could advance to become head of the delegation.

Nilo Koskenniemi has followed Saarto but, since he himself comes from the hard line, he will be in a tight spot.

Koskenniemi is closely tied to his constituents. When the delegation discussed the two-price system for milk, he expressed the opinion that production limits cannot be lowered very much because cows in some constituent’s barn would have to be slaughtered.

Osmo Vepsäläinen is one of the delegation’s unassuming and hard-working members.

On the other hand, the "emperor of Reahe," Juhani Vahakangas, knows what he is worth. Having entered Parliament as a socialist, Vahakangas joined the SKP—he says that there was no more ideological reason behind it than that.

Satisfied Stalinists

Saarto's rule was acceptable to the Stalinist minority at times it actually gave the Stalinists a majority. The pressure has recently increased for him to brighten his image.

Saarto has attempted to split the Stalinist minority by supporting Marja-Liisa Salminen, Irma Rosnell and Ensio Laine and by ousting Matti Kaukno, Sten Soderstrom and Esko-Juhani Tennila.

Salminen is considered to be an expert on many issues; Marjatta Stenius-Kaukonen has the same reputation. Both are hard workers in the delegation. One of those who has been a member of Parliament for the longest time, Rosnell is a free and easy star figure who is a good speaker.

The delegation's overwhelming demagogue is Tennila, who got into Parliament on his own ticket. They say that during his election campaign he agitated his voters so much that in Lapland unknown women came to wail: "What do those awful Communists intend to do to Esko-Juhani?"

Laine is the Stalinists' guardian and the moderator at regular delegation meetings. Pentti Liedes is a peculiar Stalinist inasmuch as he was not so long ago in the biggest entrepreneur, until the summer home construction company went bankrupt. The firm's successor also suffered precisely the same fate.

The "pelimanni [traditional rural musician] doctor," Seppo-Toivainen, is a quiet intellectual who is not really at home in Parliament.

The 11th Stalinist, Mikko Kuoppa, is a basic Stalinist klutz.

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CSO: 3617/105
CP PLANNING SECRETARY HOKKANEN ON PARTY'S ROLE

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 14 Apr 85 p 17

[Commentary by CP planning secretary Matti Hokkanen: "Politics Must Be Politicized Again: 'According to Present-Day Consensus Thinking, Only Capitalist Interests Are National Interests'"]

[Text] Who needs the parties and why? Have the parties lost their way and are they drifting without guidance toward an obscure future?

In this series of articles in which the respondents are members of the different parties, we have been looking for answers to these questions. Matti Hokkanen (Communist) concludes the series.

Hokkanen, 32, is the planning secretary of the SKP [Finnish Communist Party]. He is a moderate. He has participated in the preparation of the party platform since 1981. He is preparing material for next fall on the basis of which they plan to endorse the new party platform at the 21st congress in 1987.

[Hokkanen] First they spoke of the future of politics. Now they are speaking of a more moderate and orderly future for the parties. There is little evidence of a future for politics per se. On the contrary, the parties have detached themselves from politics.

The worker movement — at the top of the list the Social Democratic Party (SDP), but also the People's Democratic movement — is concentrating on demands concerning the distribution of income while leaving the struggle against capitalism in the background. The worker movement is concentrating on concerning itself with its election support instead of the ideological struggle and is content with governing instead of having power.

Consensus politics sharply limits ideological and political debate, which is still narrow bickering over the distribution of the means and the selection of the ways.

The subjects of politics are the parties, or rather their leaders, while its object is the people, which, according to election results and the Gallup polls, is divided into blocs. Politics becomes a contest among party leaders for the national pie and each of them has his own bloc's strength behind himself.
Then socialist interests and class struggles are forgotten. Social, nonpartisan political manifestations like the peace movement, the tenants' movement, the environmental movement, worker opposition and the women's movement are ignored. They either try to politicize them or consider them to be dangerous alienations from politics.

This kind of thinking ignores a desire to be socially active, which is not channeled into activity in today's parties or in politics.

Politically, Finnish society is relatively stable at the parliamentary level. The price of upper-level political stability is, however, a high one: The worker movement's social and political identity has been greatly weakened.

I am not enthused over Kalevi Sorsa's ideas on the power of the media, but publicity also creates reactions among citizens. Reporters are often as superficial and technocratic as politicians. When these two groups come together, a repellent show is produced.

Like the church, the SKP has recently been conspicuous only because of differences of opinion. The controversy over women pastors, the Raisas dispute and the Kallio parish elections in Helsinki have been the most visible church issues.

Consensus is built on mutual understanding between labor and capital. At the present time consensus politics continues to exist as a nonsocialist interpretation. Only capitalist interests are interpreted as being national interests.

The worker movement has been put on the defensive. Instead of an antimonopoly front, it is precisely the monopolies that have rallied a public opinion majority about their important interests. The ability to compete and the national interest keep this union together. The nonsocialists now dominate the national scene.

Party leaders reacted a bit flippantly to sociologists' warnings before the municipal elections. The municipal elections came as a shock to the Left. Right after the elections the emptiness of politics was discussed in the leftist newspapers too.

Support for the worker movement has never been as low as it was in the last municipal elections since 1937.

Freedom Movement

The parties have ruled arrogantly. Now they must humble themselves and take notice of citizens' wishes and needs. Lately developments have been disastrous, especially for the SKDL and the SKP.

As in Sweden, the SKP may drift as a party representing [only] a few percent if matters are not reevaluated. Its membership is naturally declining since a third of all SKP members are over 65.
Change must begin from inside the party and, if the goal of reform is an open SKP that discusses matters, it cannot be achieved by actions that are just the opposite of that.

The SKP must be made to grow as a party that is capable of showing the way out of a political and social blind alley. The SKP must politicize its politics.

The party must be capable of developing realistic alternatives to the present situation that have the support of broad social sectors. The SKP must reject a simplistically and convincingly narrow view of politics.

Sharp self-criticism is required now. The party's position with regard to the national government and those civic bodies that are not tied to the government like, for example, the municipalities, the trade-union movement or the parties must be reconsidered.

Society is constantly changing. New political factors, other than the Greens as well, will in the future come into being in Finland too. It may be that not even Ville Komsio or Osso Soininvaara will then have as conspicuous roles as they now have. In politics the Greens now have the same role of reformer that the worker movement had at one time.

They should relearn how to make policy in the SKP and the worker movement, not as organizations but as human beings and citizens. Government-focused thinking should also be gotten rid of. It is in fact a historical misconception.

I agree with Kimmo Kevatsalo that the worker movement should be reborn as a freedom movement. Power should be demanded for the citizens.

Self-government is one of the key words. More and more, people must be able to control their own lives. The party should support civic opposition, among other things.

People must be allowed to influence affairs more directly. At work workers must be able to influence what is produced, with what kind of energy and how, how large a labor force is employed and how much high-level technology is used.

If we undertake to implement socialism in Finland, it may only be insofar as the achievement of self-government is set as a definite goal.

Relations between labor and capital have changed their form. Formerly capitalism was personified in the employer. Today owners are concealed behind complex proprietary relationships.

The quarrel between labor and capital is, nevertheless, just as real as it was before.

The SKP and the worker movement must first analyze the status of today's society. A project research study on social classes conducted at the University of Tampere shows that not everything is the way it was imagined to be.
According to their analysis, the SKP must rediscover its function in a capitalist society and redeem its place as a freedom movement with new ways of making policy.

Self-Respect

The SKP and the worker movement are now in a blurred state. The only realistic major reform goal would appear to be radical shortening of the work week. Achieving this might also restore the working class’ self-respect.

People’s work week would be shortened to 30 or 35 hours. The old notion of a 30-hour work week and a 6-hour work day might also perhaps in part be raised. Then, for example, in the busiest offices and businesses they could operate 12 hours a day in two 6-hour shifts.

The struggle against nonsocialist domination is also a big challenge for the SKP. It is a fight against intolerance and a mightier right. It is a fight against concentration of ownership and a right to private property generally regarded as inviolable and sacred.

In the SKP they ought to keep up with valuable scientific research. People’s future needs must be assessed.

The SKP must also describe the methods and they cannot be completely unrelated to the desired end result. In the party they have to speak of political and ideological reform. Too often the typical topic of discussion is, however, the avoidance of organizational solutions.

I am not without hope, even though the SKP’s internal situation is a difficult one. Discussion is difficult since the battle lines are drawn straight and loyalty to one’s own bunch is presumed.

Dispute

If a cure could have been found that would have been used to heal the SKP without killing the patient, it would certainly already have been used. The dispute between the moderates and the Stalinists is already politically anachronistic.

Finland, the transition in the structure of the society in the 1960’s: flight from the rural areas into the cities and citification. The SKP was incapable of responding to these challenges.

Since the SKP was then incapable of developing one correct response, the party developed two incorrect responses.

A difference of opinion was perceived in the SKP, a majority and a minority faction were recognized and rules for playing the game were established for them. These institutions began to lead their own lives.
In 1985 the factions are still trying to resolve problems that arose 20 years ago. Because of this obstinacy, those people in the SKP who use their heads have thrown in the towel.

The SKP is now facing much more real and actual problems than memories of the 1960's. The SKP has three alternatives: 1) get rid of these institutions in the party and allow different opinions; 2) extend the present existence of the majority and minority factions through the resolution of the 1970 special congress or 3) the factions form their own independent parties.

The worst alternative would be the second one. The best would be the first one, but that is the least likely one.

11,466
CSO: 3617/105
ESKO HELLE, NEW SKDL CHAIRMAN, PROFILED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Apr 85 p 9

[Article by Kyosti Karvonen: "Helle — Quiet Man from Hame; Candidate to Head SKDL Stresses Independence from SKP"]

[Text] "Oh no, one is right now in progress!" Member of Parliament Esko Helle (People's Democrat) moaned in reply to the request for a new interview. He consented to it anyway.

Belonging to the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] socialists and a specialized dentist and candidate for the party chairmanship, he is one of those politicians who protest that they do not aspire to any post. He is one of the most convincing of them.

Helle, 46, said that he has developed a "personal driftwood theory," according to which he has drifted into many duties without even trying.

A native of Hame [natives of Hame are by reputation silent], Helle is, if possible, even quieter and more taciturn than the current chairman of the SKDL, Governor Kalevi Kivisto (People's Democrat). "I haven't actively striven for this post, I've merely answered reporters' questions," Helle sighed and said that he had curtly replied "oh, indeed" to the committee member who had told him of his candidature.

Helle has rummaged through every SKDL echelon. His career began with student politics at the end of the 1960's.

Possessing a solid organizational background, Helle is at the moment a member of the SKDL council. He managed to get a seat in Parliament in 1983 with his sixth attempt. If the man is not a climber, he is at least tenacious.

"The SKDL Is Not an Extension of the SKP"

His rambling, Koivisto-like way of thinking becomes pronounced when the SKDL becomes the topic of conversation.
"People must not get the idea that the SKDL is an extension of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP). The SKP's quarrels have clearly narrowed the SKDL's field of action."

Helle feels that the straightening out of the Communists' administrative affairs is a positive factor since the SKP is the SKDL's biggest member organization.

In Helle's opinion, the fact that real political issues can be raised for discussion instead of organization issues is a beneficial aspect of the straightening out of SKP affairs.

"We must always keep sight of where given actions are leading," Helle replied to a question about the dangers of the SKP's becoming a moderate organization, but he did not feel that opinions to the effect that the SKP was threatened by "moderate Stalinism" were justifiable.

A Place for the Stalinists in the SKDL

The Stalinists will be in a difficult situation at the party congress at the end of May inasmuch as the new districts founded by the SKP moderates and boycotted by the Stalinists will be participating in the congress. They have already managed to be accepted as members of the SKDL.

Helle promises that there will be a place for the Stalinists in the SKDL corresponding to their voting strength as long as they do not go ahead and found their own organization. Organizational measures will be shelved until then.

Helle has been a member of the SKDL parliamentary delegation at a rare time during which it has not once been divided. He is of the opinion that the situation the party is in will not necessarily be reflected in the delegation during the final period of this election term either.

"In a way the delegation is a separate organ. It cannot be outright subordinated [to the party] and its independence must be maintained up to a certain point. Of course, intelligence contacts have to be dealt with," Helle said.

In Helle's opinion, in principle the SKDL's objective is to be where they can influence decisions, in the government.

Helle said that a government coalition will depend on the SKDL and the SKP's determination and policy line. He noted that cooperation with the Left functions flexibly in the trade-union movement and in the Workers Sports League.

"There is now no basis for a government coalition. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) is too soft with regard to, for example, health and social policy issues," Helle said and added that in the SDP they are apparently waiting for the SKDL and the SKP to first get their act into shape.
Criticized for Being Good-Natured

Helle has been criticized for being too much of a good-natured slowpoke who would not find a way to oppose, for example, SKP chairman Arvo Aalto when the time came to oppose him.

"I don't know... I'd describe myself as being pretty sparing with words. I rarely say anything bad. I have no clearcut formulas, but I've participated for a long time and have become a part of the SKDL," Helle said, and from time to time bestirred himself to ask what the question was.

"Dealing with the public is mostly guesswork."

People have been laying bets on whether Helle will get a candidate to run against at the Tampere congress from perhaps some faction other than the Stalinists. Helle said that he feels that voting is a part of democracy and that he does not believe his prestige will suffer if they vote for him.

At any rate, he will very likely be elected the new chairman of the SKDL in May. In different comments people have assumed a waiting position and are hoping for confirmation.
SKDL PARLIAMENT GROUP ISSUES WARNING TO STALINIST MP'S

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Apr 85 p 15

[Text] On Thursday the SKDL parliamentary delegation issued a warning to the five Stalinist members of Parliament who had registered a protest with the Parliament-appointed legal counsel regarding the use that has been made of the party subsidy the SKP received.

On the basis of a delegation executive committee motion, the parliamentary delegation decided by a vote of 12 to 9 to issue a warning. The votes were divided according to the traditional moderate-Stalinist division.

Stalinists Matti Kautto, Ensio Laine, Mikko Kuppa, Marja-Liisa Salminen and Marjatta Stenius-Kankonen have received warnings.

Warnings and expulsions from the delegation are the SKDL delegation's forms of punishment.

Moderates Have Their Own Powwow

The delegation moderates had already decided to issue a warning at their own powwow held Thursday morning, at which delegation leader Veikko Saarto (Communist) and Heli Astala (Communist) would have preferred to limit punishment of the Stalinists to censure. The decision to issue a warning was, nevertheless, unanimous.

In their protest the Stalinist representatives were dissatisfied over the fact that the SKP moderate leadership cut off payment of the party subsidy to the eight Stalinist districts last fall.

At the same time the moderate leadership began to subsidize the new moderate districts established in Stalinist areas.

In the protesters' opinion, SKP leaders are using the party subsidy to reinforce their own power and to stifle differing opinions.
Several Votes

In the opinion of the delegation moderates, the protest should have been raised for discussion by the delegation. They feel that the SKDL-SKF's internal use of funds is one those matters that should be resolved inside the organizations, not through public protests.

During the past few months the SKDL delegation has several times been driven into voting following a 2-year period of calm.

The most conspicuous dispute was engaged in over Stalinist Esko-Juhani Tennila's having taken a delegation from the parliamentary delegation of a trip to Moscow. When the delegation voted to oust Tennila, the CPSU extended him its own invitation.

A charge made by several Stalinists and two defectors from the moderate coalition in which they demand an accounting from the ministers before the High Court of Impeachment of their administration of employment has also caused a stir.

The SKP situation has begun to be reflected more clearly than before in the parliamentary delegation too. This week negotiations were entered into between the different factions, as a result of which the traditional moderate majority is beginning to strengthen its grip on the delegation.

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SDP PAPERS' POLL FINDS PARTY MEMBERS WOULD REELECT SORSA

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Apr 85 p 16

[Article: "Tyolajarvi Tells Social Democrat Papers: 'Disturbing Gallup Poll Democracy'"]

[Text] Deputy speaker Pirkko Tyolajarvi described her reaction as disturbed on learning of the opinion poll reported in the provincial Social Democrat newspapers, a poll in which a successor to Kalevi Sorsa was sought. "I have heard, but cannot believe, that it was commissioned by the Social Democrats."

On Thursday five Social Democrat papers: TURUN PAIVALEHTI, HAMEEN KANSA, KANSAN LEHTI, EETEMPAIN and VASTIN, published the results of an opinion poll they had commissioned the Finnish Gallup Poll Company to conduct. Through the poll the papers were trying to find the favored successors to Sorsa. The opinions of supporters of the other parties were also asked for aside from those of Social Democratic Party (SDP) followers.

The poll indicated that, if Sorsa is — contrary to his recent statements on the matter — prepared to stay on in 1987, he will enjoy broad support. Tyolajarvi, party secretary Erkki Liikanen and Environment Minister Matti Ahde cropped up as the top names of candidates to succeed him.

"In my opinion, no appraisals can be made on the basis of the results. I am disturbed that Gallup poll democracy has gone so far," Tyolajarvi said of the list of favorites published by her own party's papers.

She did not wish to make a statement with respect to the question as to whether she would be available for the party chairman's seat in 1987. She felt that issuing a statement in reply to the question as to whether she would prefer to leave for Turku as governor was just as repugnant to her.

"I will not consent to discuss these matters on the basis of such a report," she said, referring to the opinion poll.

Liikanen: "Simple-Minded!"

Party secretary Liikanen did not want to discuss his possible candidacy for the leadership of the SDP either. He too had little to say about the poll.
"The idea of asking supporters of the other parties who they want to be chairman of the SDP is simple-minded."

The interviewees were, among other things, asked whom they felt would be a suitable candidate for chairman of the SDP in 1987 when the SDP is to hold its next party congress. Including the Conservatives and the Communists, 34 percent of those interviewed felt that Sorsa would be the most suitable. Forty-four percent of the SDP supporters and 50 percent of the SDP members supported him. Eleven percent of the SDP supporters felt that Liikanen would be the most suitable and 12 percent that Tyolajarvi would. Sixteen percent of the SDP members supported Tyolajarvi and 18 percent Liikanen.

If Sorsa is not available, 25 percent of the SDP supporters would back Liikanen and 23 percent Tyolajarvi. Over a third of the SDP supporters were uncertain about their favorites and did not declare themselves.

When the respondents were asked which of the six names they would like to be chairman of the SDP, they overwhelmingly indicated Tyolajarvi.

Forty percent of the SDP supporters backed Tyolajarvi, 25 percent Liikanen and 14 percent Ahde.

Reino Paasilinna, Ulf Sundqvist and Pertti Paasio had to content themselves with 3, 4 and 2 percent respectively.

During the poll 2,280 people were interviewed, 541 of whom supported the SDP.
Mitterrand raises immigrant vote issue again

Mitterrand Comments

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Gilles Bresson]

[Text] The president asserted at the Human Rights League congress that "immigrants' participation in the administration is a fundamental demand that must be realized."
It is up to us to convince a hesitant public of this through "consciousness-raising campaigns."

Since 1981, a few quickly forgotten precedents

The idea is not a new one since it figured as early as in candidate Francois Mitterrand's 110 proposals. At that time the future president of the republic promised immigrant workers the right to vote -- for the municipalities.

Whispered about at the beginning of the 7-year presidential term by Francois Autain, then secretary of state for immigration, it was quite officially revived in August 1981 by Claude Cheysson on a visit to Algiers. That summer the minister of external relations did not exclude the possibility that a bill to that effect would "soon" be submitted to parliament.

Once again Claude Cheysson had "put his foot in his mouth"; a week later he was given the lie by Francois Autain. "Everything at its proper time," he stated at the time, confirming the fact that immigrants "will not vote in the 1983 municipal elections." And, according to the secretary of state, this was for three reasons. First, public opinion was not ready for such a reform. Second, because this reform posed a constitutional problem (editor's note: Article 3 of the Constitution in fact provides that "all French citizens of both sexes who are of age and in possession of their civil and political rights are voters under the conditions specified by law").

The third and last reason evoked at the time: It is more urgent to give immigrant workers those rights that they do not have, like the right of association or their eligibility to participate in social institutions like labor arbitration courts.
Since then, the matter has been shelved. Meanwhile, it is true, the government legalized the status of 130,000 workers without papers. Meanwhile too, it attempted to combat illegal entry and residence before going on to more repressive measures. And meanwhile finally, Francois Autain lost his secretary of state post.

It was forgotten until the sixth of last November when, during a LE MONDE interview, Minister of Interior Pierre Joxe said: "I personally feel (...) that granting immigrants who have resided in France for a given uninterrupted period of time the right to vote in local elections would be a very powerful factor in their integration." Pierre Joxe was at one time chairman of the Human Rights League's "Immigrants" Commission, before which the president therefore raised the issue of this reform again on Saturday.

In politics everything is a matter of the right symbol and the right moment. Francois Mitterrand knows the score. Received as a "friend" by attorney Yves Jouffa, the president of the Human Rights League, which was holding its 55th congress, he did not disappoint his friends, especially since his visit was the first one a chief of state has made to this organization since its creation in 1898.

Forgoing the issues that stir up politicians — coexistence, readjustment — he loudly and clearly asserted his leftist convictions. In the domain of freedoms and the struggle for human rights "nothing will stop him" from achieving what he "believes was the fundamental covenant taken for granted by the majority of French citizens in 1981," he declared. For him there is no question of evading what very much appears to be a cornerstone of the Left.

After hoping that France "would be the tireless champion of the advances made in human rights in the world" and drawing up a balance sheet of government action in the domain of civil liberties, he tackled a ticklish subject, immigrants' right to vote. It is true that in his welcoming speech Yves Jouffa had just underlined the fact that, while he "did not regret the choice of Francois Mitterrand made in 1981," congratulating him on the abolition of the death penalty and the elimination of special tribunals, he nevertheless regretted the absence of democratization of the Army and immigrants' right to vote, Francois Mitterrand hastened to attack the subject.

He has a "conviction," a well-known one: "The participation of immigrants in the local administration seems to me to be a fundamental demand that must be realized.... But you will admit that the government has its own demands that are made on it and that it must also take into account people's habits and attitudes. It is therefore a very difficult mission to accomplish," he said. Drawing on the lessons learned from the private education bill, he therefore felt that we must not rub people the wrong way, "a public that is already very often hesitant due to a lack of information." And he added: We must first win over public opinion so that we do not find ourselves totally exposed to general repudiation, which does not advance the affairs of a progressive government." In short, while he is ready to support immigrants' right to vote, he is first of all and especially asking the organizations of the Left, particularly the Human Rights League, to pave the way, "to participate so that this
conviction can be made widespread" by launching "consciousness-raising campaigns."

While giving the impression that he has assumed a progressive attitude toward this issue — a way of showing that he has not retreated — he has taken a step backward, or rather he is standing still, bound by reasons of state.
"One cannot simply count on the state and the government," even if the latter "must perform its role to impose its convictions, as was the case with the death penalty," he insisted on reminding his listeners. The argument is a clever one — all the more so because it is multipronged. By setting himself up as a champion of the struggle against racism, he passes himself off as a guarantor of the nation's values: "The dividing line is no longer between Right and Left, but between all those who want to see to it that the rights of all human beings prevail everywhere and in all instances (...). In short, this dividing line is the one that divides the nation (...). If today, as yesterday, immigrations provoke the same hostile reactions, it is the duty of the state to control them."

He has done so by issuing an executive order restricting concentrations of immigrant families. He replied to those who have criticized him with a tautology: "One can count on a government like ours' seeing to it that these laws are just; they must continue to exist." In short, a government of the Left can only enact laws of the Left, therefore good laws....

This loud and clear reminder of his convictions in favor of immigrants' right to vote has enabled Francois Mitterrand to retort to charges that the government has promoted the rise of Le Pen and the National Front. A weighty argument against which he intended to fire a barrage. On Saturday Francois Mitterrand employed this tactic before the Human Rights League by obtaining an acquittal for his human rights policy. He insisted, however, on explaining, as some Socialist leaders have been doing for several weeks now, that this increase in racism is first and foremost due "to the conservative parties."
"In order not to miss out on an election victory (specifically in Breux), they have begun to use this issue to demolish France's action with regard to the foreigners who immigrate into France. Who can now be surprised if other organizations (the National Front), in no uncertain terms and without hypocrisy this time, make use of the way that has been paved for them, establish themselves and prosper? The mines of disdain for these organizations have lost their salt," he remarked ironically.

Editorial Comments

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Apr 85 p 3

[Editorial by Gerard Dupuy: "The Flame Versus the Blaze"]

[Text] In raising the even remote possibility of granting immigrants the right to vote, Francois Mitterrand has displayed incontestable courage. The issue is far from being a popular one, as the French president noted. It has never been one and the ugly exasperation of the racist sentiments France has experienced for some years now cannot but make the repudiation more distinct.

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In this context it is really risky for Mitterrand to remind us of his loyalty to his convictions. Among these risks is the risk of providing the opposition with the opportunity to achieve a unanimity (in its public outcry) that it scarcely would have had these days.

Mitterrand was aware of all this and morality certainly does not exhaust the significance of his gesture. All the more so since it clashes with the polished look that has been in effect since Fabius. First of all, the forum itself where Mitterrand spoke is not an indifferent one: the Human Rights League, an old institution with an impeccable republican pedigree. Thus the gesture is equivalent to a sign of relevance: The administrative and modernist Left has not consigned its old principles to oblivion.

All the more so since from this "advanced" position Mitterrand can open fire on the "conservative parties" which find themselves accused of having contributed to the increase in racism. It is alleged that the lack of "republicanism" of certain rightist elements has opened the way to the Le Pen phenomenon. And indeed, Mitterrand’s challenge has forced the leaders of the Right to once more sing in unison with their troublemaker, the National Front. At the risk, for the Right, of somewhat rebuffing the celebrated "floating electorate" of the Center.

Moreover, Mitterrand’s sally was cleverly programmed on the political calendar to respond to one of the chief objections raised against the introduction of proportional representation: specifically, that it would permit Le Pen and his confederates to gain entry into Parliament. Tactically harassing the Right and ideologically the Left, it will henceforth be harder to turn this remark against Mitterrand.

Thus the president wanted to combine political advantage with moral necessity.

Furthermore, we can only deplore the extraordinary sociological resistance to an idea that is as obvious as it is modest: that immigrants may be allowed to influence, if not the general policies of a country of which they are not "citizens," at least the local environment in which they live and often experience their most serious affronts. In August 1981 the idea of immigrants voting produced the first ruffle in the calm sky of the existing state of grace. Almost 4 years later nothing has changed. Save the fact that some immigrants have slowly been making it their business too.

Statistical Implications

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Apr 85 pp 3,4

[Article by Nicolas Beau]

[Text] A new development: Immigrants are mobilizing to gain the right to vote, like the "Civil Rights Collective" which met in Paris Saturday. Oh incidentally, the parties are beginning to consider what the immigrant vote will involve.
A lucky break for a modest assembly. The president's statements to the dele-
gates of the Human Rights League provided with singular glamor a meeting that
same day on the Rue de Sevres in Paris of the "Civil Rights Collective,"
found in 1962 in conjunction with the immigration journal, SANS FRONTIERES.
Some 50 elected representatives and candidates of immigrant origin as well as
officials of associations of young immigrants made an effort to consider "new
voters, civil rights and election deadlines" — whether the last-named are
local or national, and there is a big difference between these and the official
line....

In terms of participation in the political process by the foreign segments of
the population, the Barkis [ex-Algerian Moslem auxiliaries employed by the
French], who benefit from de facto French citizenship, play a leading role.
The 20-odd representatives of North African Moslem origin elected during the
1983 municipal elections were all Moslem French with the exception of Farid
Bencouar, the son of an immigrant and town councilman (Socialist Party (PS))
from Venissieux, the town in the eastern part of the Lyons area famous for
having sheltered the Minguettes ZUP [expansion unknown]. Their success never-
theless seems to be less associated with their ethnic origin than with their
appearance on the tickets of the coalition of the Left.

In fact, in the cantonal elections, particularly in the North, some 10 Moslem
French ran openly, not under the banner of the Moslem French Party (PMM). They
were crushed and these candidates obtained only between 2 and 3 percent of the
vote. Alone, Elouardi Bouheda racked up over 5 percent of the vote in his
name at Grande-Synthe. He was, however, supported by the ecologists.

The cantonal elections were, therefore, not a success for these 30-odd candidates
of foreign origin, none of whom was elected. On that occasion, however, the
unexpected interest of some people in these "swarthy" tickets was revealed;
The National Front actually ran five Moslem French candidates.

The political parties cannot ignore these new votes. A gold mine. The number
of voters of foreign origin who, benefiting from French citizenship, could
vote in 1986 is estimated at 800,000: 250,000 young people born in France of
Algerian parents after 1962, who automatically benefit from French citizenship;
300,000 Barkis and their offspring over 18 years of age; 10,000 North African
Moslems; and nearly twice as many in the other communities that have opted for
French citizenship these past few years. These are figures that have not
escaped the eyes of the political parties, whether it be the RPR [Rally for
the Republic], in which a delegate has been appointed for the Moslem French, or
the Socialist Party, when Georges Morin, the head of the Office of the Presi-
dent of the National Assembly, at the start of this year organized a meeting
with young descendants of immigrants to consider the ways and means for
achieving the right to vote.

For politicians, the issue is of all the more current importance since, under
pressure from the young people, the immigrant community is mobilizing locally
here and there. In Marseilles, Martigues and Aix several associations launched
publication of the review SAHRA this winter: "For many, many years now they
have lorded it over our awareness," we read in the editorial in the first issue, "Our place is here in France. We must go on with our future here and that is accomplished through the vote. It is up to us to assert ourselves as a full-fledged component of the French nation." A poster in black and white on a red background conceived in Bouches du Rhone shows a young man with his mouth sealed, surrounded by menacing heads with the slogan: "Use your voice against racism by voting; don't let them decide for you." An association of French of Algerian origin is also appealing for a campaign in Paris for the right to vote.

A new development: These activists who are encouraging immigrants to take out French citizenship maintain friendly relations with the Algerian Government, which is traditionally opposed to such changes of status. And since Saturday night, following Francois Mitterrand’s statements, the right to vote was favorably alluded to several times on the podium at a demonstration organized in Villeurbanne in connection with "Prevent Delinquency Week": "While this campaign began in Marseilles and Roubaix," Christian Delorme, one of the promoters of the Beur march in 1983, asserted, "it seems to me that it is spreading in the Lyons area."

All of these are good reasons for the Civil Rights Collective to today launch a national campaign for people to register to vote. With greater chances of success than in 1983, when the symbolic vote organized at the Mutualite on 4 March during the first round of the municipal elections attained only the success of beginners. But with the persistent reservations of some members of the immigrant community, who do not view this demand as a priority. Thus their rights as regards justice and the police, rather than a hypothetical right to vote, have mobilized the Beurs of the inner cities who are most exposed to police violence.

Gerard Fuchs (PS), the president of the National Immigration Office, feels that "giving foreigners the opportunity to participate in the democratic life of the cities in which they live and pay their taxes seems to me to be an approach in keeping with the ideals of this republic of the Left. I'm glad that the president has reminded us of it."

"Francois Mitterrand either said too much or not enough," This appraisal by Charles Piterman during [the program] "RTL - LE MONDE Grand Jury" might be turned against himself. He admirably avoided answering yes or no to the question as to whether the PCF [French Communist Party] is for immigrants' participation in local elections. "What we must do is to in any event favor the integration of those who want to remain in France," the ex-minister was content with remarking.

"Let's reverse the approach, attack the problems," he said. "If after attacking these problems (unemployment, living conditions) people want to look into immigrant participation in local affairs, we will be open to discussion," Mr Piterman was specifically referring to people's attitude toward the election of young, second-generation immigrants. "They have the right to vote, but they don't vote since they feel that they are excluded because of these problems."
Opposition Reactions

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Apr 85 p 3

[Text] The opposite would have been surprising. The leaders of the Right were flabbergasted by Francois Mitterrand's statements about the immigration vote.

In the RPR the reactions are, nevertheless, rather calm. For Jacques Toubon, the secretary general of the RPR, "there is nothing new in the position" assumed by the president, who, he specified, did not say that he would get involved in this reform. "Our position is, at any rate, known: It is no." As for Philippe Seguin, he went even further: What is involved is an "inopportune and surrealistic initiative." For the deputy from Vosges, "the only effect that statements of this sort can have is to reinforce certain repudiatory reactions which, unfortunately, are only too much in evidence."

With regard to this issue, UDF [French Democratic Union] tenors sang louder. Reminding us that he is "opposed to the right to vote for immigrants of any stripe, no matter which vote is involved" and underlining the fact that, according to the Constitution, only French citizens may vote — "which the president pretends to ignore, the last straw!" — Jean-Claude Gaudin, the chairman of the UDF delegation to the National Assembly, asserted that "it is stupid and even criminal to lump together the danger of racism and the Right to be able to arrive at the conclusion that the opposition carries a fascist tendency in its midst." As for Jean Lecanuet, who presides over the destinies of the UDF, he had "a reaction of stupefaction and repudiation." He sees "an avowal and a threat" in the president's statements: to wit, that, if Francois Mitterrand "were to remain in power, he would reinstate, one after the other, the leftist orientations he seems to be abandoning today."

For Didier Bariani (Radical), who reports to the UDF on immigration matters, "there is a line between human rights and the Third-World hallucinations of the president, one which the latter blithely crosses." He added: "If the chief of state had wanted to lend the extreme Right a helping hand, he would not have acted otherwise."

Sure enough, the National Front came out with the most "solemn" communique in the world to remind the president of his constitutional and national duties. "The independence of the nation," Jean-Marie Le Pen stated, "would be seriously affected" by this measure which "would result in the destiny of the French people's being decided on by foreign minorities or foreign nations." He said that the president of the republic is "the guardian" of the Constitution, not its "interpreter."

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C50: 3519/220

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WEAK PEACE RALLY SEEN TO REFLECT CHANGED CITIZEN VIEW

Paris LIBERATION in French 23 Apr 85 p 7

[Article by J. G.]

[Text] The missing links were many in number yesterday in Paris, where the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament in Europe (CODENE) failed in its attempt to organize a 4-kilometer-long human chain between the headquarters of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Ministry of Defense. Although they expected 4,000 demonstrators, the organizers of the rally did not get half that many. Gathering together early in the afternoon on the Invalides Mall, the participants carried balloons, signs and peace badges and moved in fairly compact groups toward the initial goals of the march. However, they could set up only fairly scattered "chains." The largest had great difficulty joining the Military School with the AEC headquarters, near Avenue de Suffren, only a few hundred meters away.

Belonging to the some 30 organizations making up CODENE, the demonstrators, who included General de Bollardiere, Solange Fermeix and navigator Eugene Riguidel, heard one of the leaders of the movement recall the purposes of the demonstration. Fabienne Schlund, from the MRJC (Rural Christian Youth Movement), repeated that "nonaligned" CODENE opposes the "logic of the blocs" and the "false consensus on nuclear deterrence." For the speaker, the debate on the French defense policy is between "the interest and pressure groups, "which try to impose construction of a neutron bomb," and those who consider that "it must be based on freedom and solidarity development in order to arrive at disarmament." CODENE also believes that "of all the defense weapons, democracy is the most effective." It claims that France should "take the first step toward de-escalation" in order to arrive at the creation of "new zones free of all nuclear weapons."

The relative failure of the demonstration reminded one that pacifists have had a very difficult time in France becoming a force of any importance. While in most of the other European countries belonging to NATO, the debate on the establishment of the Pershing missiles or the American cruise missiles has served as a springboard for often considerable movements and has unleashed broad debate in recent years. France has remained on the outside. One can undoubtedly see here one of the effects of the "Franco-French" strategy of deterrence, reaffirmed over and over since 1981. The consensus on the French
defense policy therefore remains an important factor of national political life, even among the young.

A recent poll by the newspaper L'ETUDIANT reveals that 72.3 percent of all French people between the ages of 15 and 25 believe that the strike force is indispensable to the country's defense. Four years ago, the figure was only 56 percent. Moreover, 64 percent approve of arms sales abroad, undoubtedly sensitive to the argument that such trading helps avoid employment problems for a half million persons who are working in France for the military industries, either directly or indirectly. CODEMÉ did not refer to this problem at its rally.
DEBRAY ON FOREIGN POLICY, DEFENSE ISSUES

Paris LIBERATION in French 22 Apr 85 pp 8-9

[Interview with Regis Debray by Alexandre Adler and Gerard Dupuy; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The tone is set immediately: It is not enough to do oneself harm to be right. With this sarcastic remark, Regis Debray gives notice that war has been declared for a new battle against his customary enemies and a few others to boot.

In opposition to De Gaulle's arrogant idea of a France alone and despite Gaullist loyalties proclaimed against the trend, the author suggests the hope of a politically unified Europe which unassumingly provides itself with the means of a military independence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, cultural independence vis-a-vis the United States and political independence vis-a-vis itself.

And yet, while I share the feeling of a loss of substance on the part of the Soviet power in the past few years, I do not believe that one can deduce its inoffensive nature therefrom; quite the contrary. Facing failure on several fronts, the USSR can give way to dangerous and rash acts, as we have repeatedly seen in the past few years.

[Question] In your book ("Les Empires Contre l'Europe," by Regis Debray, Gallimard, "Le Monde Actuel" collection, 110 francs), there is a contradiction between the controversial tone of many developments and the conclusions that are much closer to a certain consensus on the strategic questions which we are in the process of receiving in France today.

[Answer] That is true. Generally speaking, I have a good understanding with military leaders, diplomats and the experts. I do not get along at all with the ideologists or those so-called experts one sees on the screen. But first of all, it is generally a fact that those who know do not speak and those who speak do not know! The experts to whom I refer are people little known to the public. I am thinking of Poirier, Fricaud-Chagnaud, then a number of active military practitioners. Furthermore, it is true that the options are very limited when one is inside the government. Therefore, the consensus is nearly required.

Having said that much, consensus on what? Let us proceed point by point. There is a consensus on the policy in the East, but what is France's Eastern policy?
I think that the intellectual leaders of public opinion would be disappointed to learn that it is not an obsessional policy polarized by the imminence of the arrival of Russian tanks in Paris. It is not an emotional or sentimental policy. Rather, it is a cold policy.

Concerning the policy on the South, to take another major category, there is no consensus. Likewise, our policy on Central America is not understood. Our policy in southern Africa would be understood even less. The proof is that there is a great deal of talk of antiracism, but I scarcely see any manifestation in France against the only country that has expressed racism in its legislation, meaning South Africa. The vicinity of its embassy in Paris is totally peaceful.

Since our policy on the Near East is balanced, it has the luck to lend itself to a double reading, either pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli. Therefore, no conflict on that.

As for the military policy, here again, one has terrible misunderstandings. All those who feed the fear of the Soviet Union unwittingly add fuel to the Soviet fire. By making one's adversary stronger than he is, one plays his game. If one overestimates his capabilities, one exposes oneself to later blackmail. Above all, one lays the ground for the protection racket.

Everything that now foretells the obsolescence of deterrence, that fantasizes about the utopian and perverse space shield, certainly does not help European independence. Here I believe that there is basic disagreement, if there were at least a discussion of substance rather than this public monologue for several voices of the laggardly wait-and-seers seen in the major media.

I therefore believe that this consensus of which you spoke is finally trivial, which is characteristic of a consensus, but when seen up close, one nevertheless has the disagreements that must be straightened out.

[Question] Your main disagreement has to do with the evaluation of Soviet power.

[Answer] Just as the Copel scenario from the military standpoint sees the 1980's of electronic warfare through the 1940's of Guderian, one grasps Soviet power through an obsolete definition of power: one based on territory, population, iron and steel, physical strength. At the present time, we are witnessing a mutation of the parameters of power which shifts it toward the ability to process, store and distribute scientific or technical, as well as cultural and political, information, which makes the Soviet Union a country that is not only missing the third industrial revolution, but one that is more and more becoming the conservative continental power of the 19th century, lacking the real means required by a world political superpower in the 20th century.

The Soviet world is out of date, not only because of the cut of the trousers or the type of music one hears there -- the rock of the 1960's -- but the very models of political power are technically outdated.
The fact remains that the USSR is sometimes surprising. For example, people thought that the Mirvs (missiles with multiple warheads) were out of its reach.

The USSR will always catch up with American military advances, sooner or later. That does not give it any political advantage.

It is now thought that it is not capable of responding to the space war, which does not seem to me to have been proven.

Of course. One has here both an overestimation of the current threat and an underestimation of the fact that if the Soviet Union is half as rich as the United States, it has twice as many holes in its belt and therefore, it is capable of sacrifices and a system of resource allocation consistently oriented toward the military. But it is the strategic utopia of the SDI to make an analogy with the Apollo program, which is purely technical, because no one on the moon was determined to prevent Armstrong from setting foot there, while in strategy, one has the enemy's countermeasures. In this sense, it is certain that the Soviet Union, with a relatively low investment, can cancel the three costly deployments of American space weapons.

Having said that much, there is much less worry in the offices of the Pentagon than in the editing rooms in Paris. I am struck by the skeptical irony one finds among many American experts when one evokes Soviet superiority, even in conventional weapons. They know their formidable lead in electronics, which is now the nerve center of war and peace. The emerging technologies, the so-called "intelligent" weapons, the whole range of antitank weapons and in-depth detection systems give the Western camp at least a 15-year lead over the Soviet camp, even for conventional weapons. The Americans are only profiting militarily from their formidable industrial lead in the civilian field, which has to do with their capacity for innovation, of industrialization of scientific discoveries and the free circulation of information. Truly, one has no reason to be terrorized by the Soviet Union. You just have to be careful.

The weakening of an empire does not necessarily mean its increased irrelicism!

No one believes that the Soviet Union is for the reconciliation of nations, the opening up of borders and the dissolution of its system in a kind of convergence of industrial companies. Do me the favor of realizing that such is not my position. It is a matter of knowing whether the USSR has the means of its ideology, and I believe it no longer does. Furthermore, it no longer believes in its own ideology either.

At the present time, our view of the USSR is completely ideological, meaning that it is a reflex system conditioned by certain words such as "goulag," which makes it possible to build a mythical country dotted with concentration camps, KGB officers and political commissioners on every street corner, with dissidents constituting the majority, the expression of the Russian people. That vision is at least 30 years behind the truth and is purely whimsical.
French Sovietology seems to me to be a Franco-French philosophical exercise and does not come close to the work of the Americans or the British.

[Question] Of course, but on the other hand, you believe that concerning the power structure in the United States, there is great ignorance.

[Answer] Almost complete ignorance, yes. There is an idealization of America that even excludes the fact that it might be the subject of study.

[Question] You are moving a bit fast. We are flooded with journals, figures, statistics. All the dollars are counted, all the screws inventoried.

[Answer] The economic and financial machine, all that is dissected. But the trends of thought, the decision-making process, the internal contradictions in the Reagan Administration or another, even the federal structure, all that seems to me to be little known. Furthermore, it is so little known that one is very surprised, when one lands in New York or Washington, to find Americans who are much less pro-American than most French commentators! I say that in order to de-Americanize one's head, one should go spend at least 3 months a year in America. It is only in France that one can see petitions circulating in intellectual circles supporting the contras in Nicaragua.

[Question] One problem nevertheless remains: The gradual weakening of a great power does not necessarily result in a corresponding attenuation of its aggressiveness. It would not be difficult to show that the Germany of William II was a total retreat compared with Bismarck's Germany. And yet, was it not aggressive? The second parallel objection: Does the relative eclipse of the USSR since Brezhnev not risk ending with the new government?

[Answer] If the USSR represented no threat, then I would not support the 1-percent increase in the portion of the GNP devoted to the French military effort. The USSR is a threat among others, even the main threat. Having said that much, the strategic break of 1945, the bomb, considerably reduces the role of numbers in the way in which one calculates the ratio of forces. The numerical superiority of the Soviet battle corps is no longer the spectre it could have been in 1914. Furthermore, just as one makes armies with civilians, one makes war with the society one has and Soviet society has become profoundly petty bourgeois, a consumer, skeptical society.

There is a retreat into the private sphere on the individual and family level, just as there is a retreat to Europe in Soviet strategy. They don't give a damn about Latin America, obviously. They have lost interest in Africa and with good reason, since Africa has lost interest in them. They are containing China in Southeast Asia with the Vietnamese alliance. But in Asia, as throughout the Pacific, it is America that leads the way. Ten years after Vietnam, American positions in this half of the world are at their peak. At worst, the race is a three-way one: the United States, Japan and China, and the USSR is not in it!

There remains Central Asia and the very costly Afghan operation. It is relatively costly because only 5 percent of the Soviet soldiers are engaged in
Afghanistan compared with one-third of the American soldiers in Vietnam in 1968. These are long and difficult police operations over which the Soviets, according to talks I have had with them, are very embarrassed.

There remains Europe, but the USSR facing rich Europe looks like an underdeveloped country facing the industrial world. I do not see what decisive strategic card the Soviets could have in Europe today. I believe that the blackmail over Germany is much less effective than one thinks and I wonder how an anti-model exposed and laid bare in front of everyone could tetanize or hypnotize the Germans.

[Question] Naturally, the Soviet Union has suffered a weakening, but it is not total. The USSR could agree to give up excessive world ambitions in order better to concentrate its forces on a limited theater: Europe.

[Answer] The USSR has lost the battle of the Euromissiles despite the considerable concentration of propaganda and diplomatic efforts. That battle is the umpteenth battle lost by the USSR. The deployment of the Pershing and Cruise missiles has taken place, is taking place. As for interpreting the so-called German pacifists, who are mainly nationalists, as the fifth column of the USSR, allow me to think that that is somewhat frivolous.

The USSR is seeing its political and psychological means of intervention constantly weakened. The decline of the communist workers movement in Europe is patent. The only Communist Party that remains standing, the Italian party, is no longer communist except in name and has broken its ties with the USSR. I cannot see what means of domestic subversion the USSR still has.

As for those who think that conventional military superiority is automatically expressed in political and psychological advantages, they are not seeing the facts. The conversion is usually in the opposite direction. It increases fear and therefore resistance. That is what has happened in Europe in the past 10 years, as in Japan, moreover.

The USSR has a great deal of work to be done at home, with Siberia, which will not be the California it had wanted, but which is nevertheless a good outlet for dreams and the young. Furthermore, East Europe is increasingly going to slip out of its hands and even if the technology of Soviet intervention in East Europe is improved, it cannot check the slow movement of emancipation of the East European societies, in short, halt the Finlandization of East Europe, although America has been much better able to counter the Finlandization of West Europe.

[Question] Why would the Europeans give up the American "umbrella" that has so far turned out to be effective?

[Answer] Perhaps effective on paper, but more doubtful in case of crisis, in the hour of truth. The French could not live without German partners, while America can perfectly well survive without Germany and perhaps soon, without Europe. France can be a foil for the Europeans, if it is arrogant as it can be, for example, when it demands foremanship of an industrial cooperation program at all costs. It is a lack of tact and realism that has sometimes cost us dearly.
Having said that much, one cannot conceive of European defense based on the classic canons of a pyramidal system with a single political authority at the top and a clear chain of command, leading to a centralized decision-making center. European defense is a maze of wires beginning with the conventional and finally leading to the French strategic deterrent, strengthened by the British, if need be. One cannot overcome the internal inequality in the European strategic theater, given the fact that the non-nuclear status of Germany is recorded, not only in the treaties, but in the flesh of East and West Europe. Germany's access to nuclear weapons is excluded and unthinkable for the Germans themselves. The extension of the French nuclear guarantee to Germany is also excluded and unthinkable, unless we question the very credibility of our military apparatus.

On the other hand, a system of interdependency in which any conventional attack on a European margin can set off a series of detonators leading to a French nuclear charge is sufficient to deter the Russians from any attack, even conventional and limited to Europe. I see European defense as an overlapping of different kinds of security spaces that do not need to be homogeneous. It is certainly not a federative supranational system with a man at the top who pushes the button for all the others.

[Question] But it is difficult to have the different public opinions accept that. American protection has the advantage of being comprehensible to any voter.

[Answer] It also has the disadvantage of not responding to the interests of the United States. I do not see why the United States, which in the past was not willing to risk the lives of the American people to safeguard Europe by resorting to their central systems, as we now know from MacNamara's private papers, would now agree to endanger American cities through the Euromissiles. There is an obvious loss of credibility in the American nuclear umbrella, as shown by this formidable slip of an antiair shield, an anti-cruise missile shield. In the Pandora's box which the SDI is, there is also the abandonment of Europe and passage from the impossible world war to conceivable limited war. The United States tends to withdraw into the "American fortress," with an inclination to the now preponderant Pacific, as shown by the growth in commercial trade and technological solidarity woven between Japan and the United States.

The Europeans must therefore admit their solitude instead of sticking their heads in the sand or in who knows what Reagan-type antinuclear scheme. The rush toward increased integration in an Atlantic-type system no longer responds to the vital interests of the Americans, even if the Americans still remain in Europe, not out of disinterested generosity but because their interests are served by it, naturally.

[Question] Basically, at a time when Gaullism and communism are spectacularly fading from the French ideological scene, you are swimming against the current. Is it still your "aristocratic pleasure to displease"?
[Answer] I have nothing to do with communism nowadays, for it is a dead, uninteresting planet. And I am not a contemporary of De Gaulle, who at one time sublimated the French will to live that others now embody. I simply want to show the world as it is, not as we would like it to be or as it was 30 years ago.

As for the pleasure of displeasing, I would happily do without it, being neither a dandy nor a wet blanket. At most I am a European warn out by delays, conformity and bias, ready for anything, even to create a sensation, in order to convince the French that without an independent Europe, they will be nothing more in the future -- and you and I along with them -- than the lost, vain zombies of a sub-America. It is most urgent.

11,464
CSO: 3519/219
CATHOLIC CHARITY GROUPS' MARXIST IDEOLOGY, ACTIVITIES VIEWED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 13 Apr 85 p 132

[Article by Guillaume Maury: "Christian Charity or Marxist Subversion?"]

[Text] As they are every year, Catholics were asked to make their Lenten offering to the CCFD (Catholic Committee Against Hunger and for Development), an organization that has been challenged for several years. In 1984, the national Lenten offering brought in 64,692,482 francs, or 60.71 percent of the budget.

The CCFD is a church service and consequently enjoys the continuous and renewed support of the Episcopacy. On 3 March 1984, the president of the Episcopal Conference, Monsignor Vilnet, assured the CCFD of "its support and solidarity in spite of all opposition." Backed by this support, the CCFD does not hesitate to write that attacking the CCFD means attacking the Church.

Since 1961, the date of its creation, the CCF, becoming the CCFD in 1966, moved from charity work to Third World political commitment.

In 1971, the "National Committee arrived at a consensus: No project is neutral. It must move in the direction of liberation, implying the participation of the masses by the training of members and leaders. Concerning projects, it would appear that the problem is neither hunger nor underdevelopment. The means do exist to fight hunger. The basic problem is ensuring that all people may be freed from all oppressive structures and all alienation."

This ideological discourse has been gradually imposed by the leaders of the CCFD such as Philippe Farine, who has gone from the Christian Democrats to the Socialist Party, a socialist adviser in Paris, Menotti Bottazi, former member of the CGT and a candidate in the latest municipal elections on a socialist-communist slate and Francois Bellec, currently deputy secretary general, former editor in chief of TEMOIGNAGE, the newspaper of the ACO [Catholic Workers' Action] and a former leader of the metallurgy CGT in Saint-Denis. A Marxist, he has never concealed his support for the class struggle.

The Third Worldist positions of the CCFD are often a repetition of those of the socialist International. The notebook of the CCFD, "The Peoples' Appeal for a New World Order," is presented, among others, by the last minister of
agriculture of Allende, J. Chonchol. In the journal INTERPEUPLES, devoted to the CCFD, one reads: "Impossible to overcome hunger? Not completely. Two countries in the Third World have tackled the task with some success... As if by accident, they are two socialist countries... The most densely populated country in the world, China, and Cuba, long subject to American domination."

The use of funds is directly related to the socialist option and the "liberation" struggles.

The CCFD's sources of financing are many, from the system of Catholic education officially mobilized by Father Guiberteau to the European Communities. But if the financial structures are known, the apparatus for ideological dissemination is much less and no one has ever drawn attention to the main action of the CCFD. With the exception of the Communist Party, no organization has as many resources available to it as the CCFD. The entire official Catholic press relays the socialistic-Third Worldist messages of the CCFD as well as the diocesan weeklies and the monthly CCFD-INFO, which has a circulation of 350,000. One must add DIAL (Dissemination of Information to Latin America), the Justice and Peace Commission, TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN, a publishing house and more recently, a photo agency.

The ordinary Catholic cannot know this because the information is not directly accessible to him or remains without real significance. If he wants to know what is done with his money, he is told: "The fact of giving money (which presumes that we are no longer the owners of it) does not give us any control over it."

Therefore, when the list of projects financed mentions in Mexico a subsidy for the journal CHRISTUS and one for the Montenisos center, the reader does not know that it is the journal and center of the Mexican Jesuits who spread the theology of liberation throughout the Latin American Continent. When one reads that a grant has been given to the Central America Institute in Managua, it is impossible to know that the Institute's action is related to the journal CHRISTUS, which reprints a debate in which Fidel Castro asks for a strategic alliance of religion and socialism.

The CCFD financed the Jesuit journals ENCUENTRO in Peru and MENSAJE in Chile, which do the same work in behalf of the theology of liberation.

If one looks at aid granted by the CCFD to SWAPO (Southwest African People's Organization), one is greatly surprised. In addition to the fact that the movement is led by Soviets and Cubans and that the "refugee" camps are the Angolan guerrilla bases in Namibia, the CCFD also finances literacy training using the method of Paulo Freire, Brazilian correspondent for the CCFD and the author of a method of Marxist indoctrination by teaching people to read.

In New Caledonia, where no oppressive structure has caused hunger, as early as 1980, the CCFD opted for independence. Its president, Gabriel Marc, an active agent of the government, was summoned after the Nainville-les-Roches talks in July 1983, by the Kanaka representatives of the Caledonian Union, then by the
secretary of state "to a sharing of the elements of this important meeting."
Assumptionist Brother Bernard Holzer, now secretary general in charge of part
of the CCFD's relations with the Eastern countries, already knew 2 years ago
that that position on New Caledonia would bring reactions.

What remains difficult to understand is the attitude of the hierarchy, for the
Third World will not be saved by socialism and it is to be feared lest the
enlightened, concerned Catholics seek to know more about it.

11,464
CSO: 3519/219
NETHERLANDS: OPPOSITION TO POLICE REINFORCEMENTS FOR ARUBA

Willemstad AMIGOE in Dutch 23 Mar 85 p 3

[Text] The Hague/Willemstad—By means of written questions to Minister Jan de Koning of Netherlands Antilles Affairs, PvdA [Labor Party] Members of the Second Chamber Wijnie Jabaay and Willem Vermeend have expressed their disapproval of the stationing of Dutch policemen on Aruba. The members of parliament are of the opinion that the government in The Hague ought not to give in to the request of MEP [People's Electoral Movement] Leader Betico Croes to transfer 21 policemen from the Netherlands to Aruba in the framework of technical assistance.

AMIGOE already reported previously on statements of the Aruban political leader who had said that he would make an appeal to the Netherlands if a shortage of policemen should arise after the separate status. When Croes made this known, the minister of justice, according to an official information bulletin, had agreed to more than 20 requests for transfer of policemen currently working on Aruba. However, according to the police union on Aruba, amongst others, already over 50 requests for transfer are waiting, and the minister of justice recently also announced that he was concerned about the exodus of Aruban police personnel to be expected after the separate status goes into effect.

The Dutch opposition party PvdA informed Minister De Koning in advance that it is opposed to the stationing of Dutch police personnel. This party is of the opinion that the Netherlands should expand training opportunities on Aruba and possibly supply money for that purpose. The members of parliament do point out, however, that in order to preserve order and security on the island, one won't permit a gap to arise either. In the written questions addressed to the minister of Netherlands Antilles Affairs this week, the members of the chamber recall the problems which were caused in the past by such transfers, as well as the fact that the Dutch police union has dissuaded its members from applying for possible vacancies in Aruba. This took place recently, after the request of Betico Croes with respect to the transfer of Dutch police officials became known.

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CSO: 3214/23
CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONGRESS SETS PLATFORM FOR CAMPAIGN

Willoch on Domestic Program

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Apr 85 p 3

[Article: "No Cutbacks--Increased Effort, Willoch Maintains; More Than Ever for Our Welfare"]

[Text] We have managed to limit the growth in public expenditures in individual areas, but more than anything the savings have been used for an increased effort in more important areas, especially in order to solve welfare problems. Prime Minister Kåre Willoch stressed at the Conservative Party national congress in Ålesund yesterday afternoon that there has in no way been a question of cutbacks in public appropriations. Although the growth in expenditures has been limited, total public expenditures are clearly rising. And the prime minister pointed out that, "Even with our plan it will be a difficult job to prevent public expenditures from still increasing faster than production."

In this connection Willoch pointed out the effect of the Labor Party's big promises: The State will have to collect in the form of taxes and duties increasingly more of everything which is earned here in the country.

Experiences tell what such irresponsibility will contribute to, Willoch continued: In the 10 years from 1971 to 1981--when the Conservative Party was out of the government--the cost of living increased 2.5 times what it was at the change in government in 1971. This had several reasons, but a too strong increase in public expenditures was one of the most important. And the rise in prices was climbing, with a maximum of 15 percent over the course of 12 months in the last part of the period.

The result was that we lost so much of our ability to compete that industrial production stopped growing and gradually even declined. It is this lesson which more and more outside of the Conservative Party are asking that we forget as quickly as possible, by returning to the irresponsible increase in expenditures which created inflation, stagnation and the terrible increase in debt in the 1970's.
Taxes

The prime minister maintained in his speech to the Conservative Party national congress that the tax system must be revised in order to become simpler and fairer. In this connection he referred to the fact that it is first under the present government that something has become of measures against zero-taxpayers. "We want everyone to pay taxes according to his ability, but on a fairer basis than under a Labor Party government."

Settlement Unrealistic

"The government advocates pursuing the Tax Commission's ideas part of the way. We are working for lower State tax rates, and we will accept some change to taxation on a gross basis as an element of this work, besides a reorganization of deduction items," "But," the prime minister emphasized, "we cannot accept the Tax Commission's proposal to the extent the Labor Party desires. Besides, the Labor Party's demands for increased public expenditures will require such large tax increases that all talk regarding a settlement on the tax system will be unrealistic. It is not possible to take in such heavy taxes as a Labor Party administration would demand without a more heavy-handed tax system than we can accept."

Results

Willoch went in further detail into the results of almost four years with the Conservative government and a non-socialist coalition government:

"We turned threatening stagnation in Norway's economy around into new growth for Norway, with increasing investment, higher production, higher employment and higher real wages."

"We turned increasing inflation around—-with the threat of a galloping rise in prices and total destruction of our ability to compete—into a lower rise in prices than for a long time. This has at the same time been an important contribution to dropping unemployment."

"We have put more money into social problems than any time previously. In spite of the problems, we can assert that the health service has been expanded and we can demonstrate increasing efficiency and a greater return from the money invested."

"We have put our money on Norway's future by the strong expansion of further and higher education. The increase has been so strong that a distinctly greater percentage of rapidly growing schools for continuing education are now gaining this valuable basis for later efforts."

"The research effort has again increased more strongly in the national product. At the same time this effort is also being made more efficient so that we will be better equipped to meet today's and the future's inspiring technological challenges."
"We have promoted the spreading of power and plurality, with greater freedom of choice for the individual, a more open society and the strengthening of ownership rights. Thereby we stopped the development in the direction of an increasingly greater concentration of power and direction by the State."

"We see a new dynamic, exciting initiatives and growing courage to press forward in both occupational life and cultural life. Therefore, we look with optimism on the country's possibilities."

But Willoch stressed also, "We do not want to paint everything the same color. We certainly see the many remaining unsolved problems. But we respond when our opponents first put blindfolds on and then complain that everything appears black."

Main Tasks

Four quite special main tasks were called attention to in Willoch's speech to the national congress delegates. He pointed out the dramatic drop in the birth rate, which places a question mark beside the community's very future in the long term. "We have staked much on improving the conditions of families with children, but still more is needed!"

In addition, the prime minister referred to the fact that there will be a strong increase in the number of older people—especially the very old—which will mean special obligations and enormous expenditures which must be given highest priority. "Here, too, much has been staked, and much more is needed!"

Expansion of the health service must be advanced to still better coverage of growing needs. This also requires more money and better and more efficient organization. "Both the effort and efficiency have been increased, and must be increased further!"

In order to cope with this, the prime minister found reason to emphasize especially the fact that the growth in power in private professional life must also be maintained and strengthened so that it can create sufficient income to fulfill its part of the basic task of providing work for everyone.

"The results we want to achieve we will be able to achieve in the future too only in coalition with the Christian People's Party and the Center Party," the prime minister said. He commented on the fact that the spotlight is most often placed on possible splits in this coalition, but emphasized that what characterizes the present government is not at all splits, but an obvious ability to find uniting solutions to difficult problems. "I would like in front of this assembly to commend the members of the government from all three government parties for their coalition efforts."

Willoch stressed that if this coalition is to work as intended everyone must be permitted to consider the members of the government as elected representatives of their Storting groups, with proxies to enter into compromises which obligate themselves and those who assign them tasks.
"Those who depict concessions to a coalition partner as a defeat and who portray the desire for cooperation as weakness are performing a destructive function against the cooperation which is necessary in order to govern the country."

"We are now so strong that the Labor Party cannot win without getting help from non-socialist politicians against non-socialist parties. It cannot be hard to deny them this. I know that a united government will do its part to cement the unity which will produce a victory," Prime Minister Kåre Willoch said.

Staying Course in Foreign Policy

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 27 Apr 85 p 3

[Article: "Security Policy: Continued Steady Course!"]

[Text] "The government will not depart from its responsibility for a continued steady course in foreign and defense policy. We will not enter into any compromises which can imply vagueness regarding this. No one must be able to bring into question our reliability, our trustworthiness, our predictability, at home or abroad. We are our friends' friend, and we know who our friends are." In his speech to the national congress Prime Minister Kåre Willoch left no doubt regarding the Conservative Party's and the government's defense and security policy line.

He emphasized that the government has steered Norway's security and influence in the world through a steady course in foreign and defense policy. "We have been exposed to strong attacks from an opposition which wanted us to abandon important parts of what we previously agreed on. We stood against the squalls and pursued the line further and see that our relations with both superpowers and friends in all parts of the world are good."

"We must preserve the longterm historical perspective as the basis for our foreign policy. Here hectic campaigns with constantly new tactical initiatives are no way to go. In this perspective we see a free and dynamic USA which several times, in 1917, 1941 and 1949, stepped in and rescued Europe and the balance of power in our part of the world. At the same time we see our place in a democratic West Europe which is again playing a growing international role, and we see broad and fruitful daily cooperation with our Scandanavian neighbors."

The NATO Alliance

Kåre Willoch emphasized that it is primarily Norway's active contribution in the NATO alliance which has resulted in the fact that today we have a greater degree of contributory influence over international questions, too, than we have had any time previously in our history--in any case in 635 years. We are taking part with responsibility, competence and our proposals in allied deliberations regarding the decisive arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union which have now gotten under way in Geneva. Unity alone can create
progress in these talks, the prime minister said, who emphasized that it must not once be experienced that circles in the West--by supporting the Soviet Union's demands--give the impression that the Soviet Union can have its desires fulfilled regarding arms limitations in the West without limiting its own forces.

In this connection the prime minister emphasized Norway's confidence in the USA's sincere desire to achieve balanced results in Geneva. Besides, he displayed a definite impression that the government's steady course is respected by the Soviet Union. "I received new confirmation of this during my conversation in the Kremlin last month with Soviet Prime Minister Tikhonov," Prime Minister Kåre Willoch said.

Paper on Social, Economic Planks

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Obvious Alternatives"]

[Text] The Conservative Party is going to the election as a united party. The goal is to ensure a continued non-socialist majority and a new 4-year term for the coalition government. The mood is optimistic, but no one is enjoying an election victory in advance. The Conservative Party is a party in harmony with itself, which is asking for confidence in continuing a policy which can ensure growth and well-being.

The coalition limits what the Conservative Party can achieve as far as tax relief and debureaucratization are concerned, to name two areas in which the Conservative Party's platform goes further than its coalition partners are ready to go. But at the same time the Conservative Party has every reason to be content with what has been achieved in the four years which have passed since the last election.

The broad non-socialist coalition, with its limitations and possibilities, is the only alternative to a new socialist government. It is an obvious choice. The Labor Party's national congress last month confirmed that the opposition is more occupied with increasing public expenditures than with ensuring the economic growth which is necessary to protect the welfare society.

The Conservative Party on its part stands united regarding a policy which urges efforts, new aims and solidarity. The tensions which exist in the Conservative Party are not greater than they must be in a broadly popular party at the political center. The Young Conservatives just have to put up with the fact that this breadth, for one thing, contributed to the fact that the national congress swept aside the plank regarding making composition in the alternative language an optional subject. The New Norwegian element involved in the debate would have been an impossibility a few years ago, and is a sign of new breadth and new strength.

However, of greater fundamental interest is the equally engaged debate regarding room tapping in the police's investigation of narcotics cases. The
national congress's message to Justice Minister Mona Røkke is shinningly clear: "Room tapping as a method of investigation is rejected." It surprises us that the minority obviously did not realize that this is not only a practical problem, but a question which fits basic conservative-value attitudes.

The range is there. But there is also no one who can be in doubt that the "Conservative Party is the Conservative Party," as the party's parliamentary leader, Jo Benkow, worded it in his summation of the political debate. The voters know where they have Conservatives, both as an independent party and as a foundation for the broad non-socialist coalition.

As far as the most important sociopolitical question in today's situation is concerned, the retirement age, the Conservative Party is content with beginning semi-retirement upon reaching the age of 65. We can only regret that the Conservative Party as the social reform party we assume it ought to be did not think it could go further. Extensive retirement reforms will be effected, preferably in the form of more flexible arrangements. We are disappointed that the Conservative Party is not stepping into the breach in this respect. A more flexible retirement age ought to be prioritized, possibly at the expense of other good objectives.

Willoch on SDI Stand

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 29 Apr 85 p 49

[Article: "Better Prepared Than in 1981, Willoch Says: The Coalition Has Been Strengthened"]

[Excerpt] "We are even better prepared before the election now than we were in 1981." Prime Minister Råge Willoch described in this way during the Conservative Party's national congress the coalition situation between the Conservative Party, Christian People's Party and Center Party. The prime minister emphasized that now there are no unsolved political problems between the three parties and that there is no qualified—as there was in 1981—but clear support for a continued government coalition. The importance of the fact that the government parties agree regarding the retirement age question was especially called attention to by Willoch.

Prime Minister Willoch met a combined press corps during the Conservative Party's national congress and declared himself satisfied with the economic limits of the party's new platform. "The Conservative Party did not fall into the same trap as the Labor Party, which at its national congress approved a number of costly items. The difference between the Conservative Party's and the Labor Party's platform items goes up into the billions," Willoch emphasized.

Self-Praise

The prime minister was asked whether there had been too much self-praise at the national congress. To this he answered that it is natural for a party's
elected spokesmen to throw light on their own party in this way. Willoch said that there are enough of those who have come to attack the Conservative Party, but he pointed out that it is also not the party's own wish to hide problems.

In this connection Willoch called attention to the fact that he himself constantly repeats that the economic situation is not problem-free. The government head emphasized that he is worried about the development in international economics, especially with the thought of the rate of exchange on the dollar and oil prices.

"When I stress that we now have to be realistic, I am met with attacks from the opposition. It is, after all, it which portrays the situation in such a manner that just more money is to be used."

Space Weapons

The prime minister was asked in addition to comment on the resolution at the Christian People's Party's national congress regarding space weapons. It appears from this resolution that the Christian People's Party is especially skeptical regarding research in this field, too.

Willoch answered that he must go by Party Chairman Kjell Magne Bondevik's authoritative interpretation, which is to the effect that the resolution is not in conflict with the government's viewpoint. Willoch emphasized that what the government's policy is can be seen in the letter which the Foreign Affairs Ministry sent to the Foreign Affairs Committee. He called attention to the fact that this letter was written in agreement with the three parties' parliamentary leaders and the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Christian People's Party's Jakob Aamo.

Paper Lauds Foreign Policy

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Steady Course"]

[Text] Prime Minister Kåre Willoch emphasized in his political message to the Conservative Party's national congress that the government will not deviate from its responsibility for a continued steady course in foreign and security policy. This was, with all due respect, a quite unnecessary piece of information. The Conservative Party is a guarantor of Norway's security policy. No doubt can prevail about this.

But ingratitude is the world's reward. In any case the opposition did not find any reason to thank either the Conservative Party or the Willoch government. On the contrary, the government was exposed to strong attacks from an opposition which stepped into the breach to abandon important parts of a policy the Labor Party and the Conservative Party previously agreed on.

Public opinion knows where it has Conservatives, and will, it is hoped, show that it values this in the fall election, too. A steady course is more
important than perhaps any time before, among other things because the Social Democratic opposition in central areas is in the process of distancing itself both from its own past and from the NATO alliance's policy as it has been worked out in connection with the talks with the Soviet Union.

Whether it is a question of the deployment part of the alliance's two-track resolution, nuclear-free zones or behavior toward American research aiming at possible space-based antimissile weapons, it is being claimed that it is a question of differences of nuance. And it is possible that there is a kind of nuance in the sense that it is a question of tactical initiatives.

But in the security policy area, more than in any other area, hectic and casual campaigns with constantly new tactical initiatives are not a practicable route. We are consequently grateful that the Willoch government is conscious of the responsibility it has of maintaining a steady course.

We give our full support to the summation Willoch gave the Conservative Party's national congress: "We will not enter into any compromise which can imply vagueness regarding this. No one must be able to call into question our reliability, our trustworthiness, our predictability, at home or abroad. We are our friends' friend, and we know who our friends are," as he worded it.

As far as the current situation relating to the American research program and the Geneva talks are concerned, the present government has confidence in the USA's sincere desire to achieve balanced results in Geneva. It is equally obvious that Norway, as the prime minister pointed out, cannot advise the USA against continuing its research on the basis for weapons which can stop nuclear missiles in space.

There is simply no room for further compromises in this specific matter. As far as the security policy is concerned, on sheer principle as well as in practice, Willoch speaks both as the Conservative Party's foremost spokesman and as the government's head. We are thankful for this, and the non-socialist Storting groups should take note of this.

8985
CSO: 3639/110
CENTER, CHRISTIAN MPS: CHANGE GOVERNMENT TO SET UP 'ZONE'

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by Bjorn Talen: "Haarstad (Center Party) Agrees With Liberal Opposition: Change of Government Necessary for Nuclear Free Zone"]

[Text] Norway needs a new government if there is to be any progress in efforts toward a treaty-based nuclear free zone in the Nordic area. This was asserted by the Labor Party's Thorbjorn Berntsen and the Socialist Left's Hanna Kvanmo at a Nordic press conference which was arranged at Holmenkollen yesterday. It was more noteworthy, however, that Member of Parliament Ragnhild Q. Haarstad of the Center Party agreed with the position.

"Treaty Now" -- the Nordic movement for a treaty establishing the Nordic area as a nuclear free zone -- had gathered together a group of parliamentarians from the Nordic countries yesterday in order to demonstrate its support for the movement. The Finnish Social Democrat Saara-Maria Paakinen was able to state that 160 of the 200 members of the Finnish parliament had signed a petition of support.

The movement has received support from Parliament from among the Labor Party delegation, the Socialist Left and five non-socialist representatives: Hans Hammond Rossbach and Mons Eipelid from the Liberal Party, Ragnhild Q. Haarstad and Lars Velsand from the Center Party, and Christian Democrat Johannes Vaganes. "More undoubtedly would have signed if there had been more time," Ragnhild Q. Haarstad asserted.

"The problem is that, in contrast with the other Nordic national legislatures, there is no outspoken majority in the Norwegian parliament," states a Dane, Pelle Voigt. And from the Norwegian side, all blame was placed on the Conservatives. "It is a fact that the Conservatives are a brake block in this matter as well as on the issue of a freeze," said Thorbjorn Berntsen, who added that without the opposition from the Conservatives, the work would have made progress long ago.

"It is only the Conservatives who are resisting. It is impossible to get Prime Minister Kare Willoch and others to understand that it is not a unilateral agreement with the Soviets which we support," stated Hanna Kvanmo. And Hans Hammond Rossbach instituted a search for the political will within the government.
It was regarding the issue of whether she also agreed that a new government was necessary in order for there to be any progress in the treaty movement that Ragnhild Q. Haarstad made the following statement:

"Yes, unfortunately. I would wish that I would be able to answer 'No' to the question." But she emphasized as well that this applied to this particular issue. A short time ago, this Center Party representative caused further attention by asserting that she preferred cooperating with the Labor Party on cultural politics.

"The treaty effort creates special problems in Norway and Denmark by reason of their membership in NATO. But all Norwegian parties, with the exception of the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, have included in their platforms to strive toward creating the Nordic area as a nuclear free zone. The most serious hindrance is that the largest governing party is so negatively disposed," were among the comments she had to make.
PSD REFERENDUM: MAJORITY FOR CHANGE

Non-militant Preferred

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Apr 85 p 6.

[Text] Less than a week away from the official announcement of the results of the referendum conducted last week in the PSD [Social Democratic Party], on the preferred profile of the presidential candidacy, the political results of that referendum are already well known.

The first major finding is the overwhelming approval of the idea of a "project for change" underlying the presidential candidacy to be supported by the PSD.

Over 90 percent of the party members who participated in the referendum voted in favor of this "project for change"; it is presumed that the results already verified (not yet complete) will not be very much altered by the few data still lacking.

The "project for change" was opposed by less than 300 of the 80,000 PSD members and the approximately 55,000 members eligible to vote because their dues are paid up.

Another important result has to do with the second question, as to whether the candidate should be a party member or not.

About 60 percent of the participants in the referendum (or 13,000) voted against a party member and 40 percent (or 9,000) voted in favor of a party member.

Of the 9,000 who voted for a party militant, over 5,600 came from the Azores and Madeira and about 1,500 were from the Lisbon District.

The majority vote against a party candidate in response to the second question was corroborated by the affirmative responses to the third question, which in several districts was understood not only as a confirmation of the previous question but as a reaffirmation of the decision of the Council of Viseu to exclude candidates who are members of other parties, namely the PSD [as published] and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party].
Comparing the affirmative responses to the second and third questions, the percentages were about 1/3 and 2.3 percent, respectively.

The first districts to turn in results were Lisbon, Faro, Castelo Branco, Braga, Portalegre and Viseu, followed by the autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores.

The last districts to round out the picture of the results were Vila Real, Porto and Aveiro.

Within Lisbon, where a majority went for a party candidate, there were "pockets" of opposition; for example, Oeiras, Olivais and zones C, F and G.

In districts that clearly opposed a party candidate, there were also pockets to the contrary, for example: Oliveira do Hospital, in Coimbra; Matosinhos Paredes and Povoa de Varzim, in Porto; Alvito, in Beja; Miranda do Corvo, in Braganca; Pegoes and Barreiro, in Evora; Cartaxo and Salvaterra de Magos, in Santarem; and the municipality of Braga, in Braga District.

Results by District

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Apr 85 p 7

[Text] The "quorum" of one third of voting members was achieved, although just barely. Under the rules, the quorum was calculated according to the number of party members whose dues were paid up (somewhat less than 60,000) and was not based on the total membership (80,000). If the latter figure had been used, there would probably not have been a quorum, without which the results of the referendum would not be considered binding.

Faro, Vila Real, Viseu Lead Opposition to Party Candidate

Faro, Vila Real and Viseu, followed by Coimbra and Castelo Branco, led in the vote favoring a candidate who is not a party member, with 80 percent or more of the votes, representing an endorsement by the rank and file of the district organizations which had recommended this line.

Azores and Madeira Favor Party Militant

The Azores and Madeira led in favoring a party member as a candidate; about 90 percent of their voters followed this line, or more than 5,600 of the some 23,000 which should represent the universe of respondents to the referendum.

Lisbon: 60 Percent for Party Member

In Lisbon (Metropolitan Area), 60 percent of the voters, or more than 2,000 of the 5,649 registered members, supported a party militant, while only 40 percent opposed a party militant. This was a victory for District President Jose Miguel Judice.
Braga Abstains and Porto Breaks Even

Braga District was distinguished by its abstentions; only 200 of the some 800 registered party members voted. In Porto, the results were about even, leaning against a party member.

Even so, significant sections, such as Povoa de Varzim and Santo Tirso (Eurico de Melo's territory), voted for a party member.

One disappointment: in Vila Nova de Gaia, much less than one third of the membership participated in the referendum.

Mass Registration

A curious phenomenon: in the last 6 weeks, in certain districts of the center and north of the mainland, there was a massive registration of new PSD members, who were eligible to take part in the referendum.

For example, in Vila Pouca de Aguiar, the PSD members who presented themselves for the referendum numbered 150 more than 6 weeks ago, when the election was held for delegates to the next Congress of Figueira da Foz. Another curiosity: of the 498 voters from this section, only 1 voted in favor of a party candidate and 497 opposed a party member as candidate. This was one of the first returns to reach Lisbon.

Voter Registers Requested

To control the results of the referendum, the National Jurisdictional Council even considered requesting some voter registers to verify the exact percentage of voters. Apparently, however, there would have been some difficulty in complying with this request.

Press Conference

The results of the referendum will be announced next Tuesday, 9 April, in a press conference by the National Jurisdictional Council, with the National Political Council probably present.

Mota Pinto, Balsemao Supporters, Versus "Nova Esperanca"

A comparison of the preliminary results of the referendum signals a trend comparable to the results of the elections for delegates to the Braga Congress, 1 year ago.

Supporters of Mota Pinto and Balsemao supporters (who formerly supported Neta Amaral) joined in opposing a party candidate. A party member as candidate was preferred in the sections where the Nova Esperanca ["New Hope"] had won and in some other sections.

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POLL RESULTS PLACE PSD IN FOURTH PLACE

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Apr 85 p 10

[Article by Margarida Viegas]

[Text] It was nothing very showy: 3.2 percentage points lost in 1 month, between two polls. It had already happened—to the other parties. However, in such a well-guarded political stronghold, it was enough that it had happened to the PSD [Social Democratic Party]—and without any showy gains by the other parties—to turn everything upside down. Suddenly, the first is last. The PS [Socialist Party] is apparently first and only 0.3 percent separates the bloc from the combined opposition parties.

In a NORMA/SEMANARIO poll conducted between 14 and 24 March, regarding legislative elections, the PSD stood at 18.4 percent, not only making its worst showing ever in this type of survey but also suddenly turning the political map upside down. There are no miracles and, contrary to how it was beginning to appear, the party of Rui Machete, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, Joao Salgueiro, Mota Pinto et al was not invulnerable; the electoral state of grace in which it had escaped the erosion of power by assuming opposition postures was, finally, denied to it.

—Unless it is simply a matter of a statistical variation deriving from the margin for error of plus or minus 4 percent which NORMA notes in the technical description of the survey.

But no: give or take a point, the trend toward a certain doubt among the Social Democrat electorate has to be real. On the other hand, in view of the figures which we are publishing today, it would make no sense to interpret the change in the relative position of the two coalition parties as a revolutionary political fact. From February to March, the PS gained only 0.4 percentage points. Its current electoral standing of 21.1 percent is in line with its usual results. The PS has already done better (23.5 percent last December, for example), without escaping second place.

The bottom line is that, at a moment of the spectacular reversal, the PSD is only 6.4 points below the results in the 1983 elections, whereas, at the hour
of its supposed triumph—first place!—the PS has declined 13.9 points since those elections.

This excitement in the majority area arises, however, in a period in which the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] has apparently finally achieved the equilibrium of regular growth. It has been rising for 3 months. It rose 1.6 points between February and March, reaching 19.2 percent and breaking all previous records. The CDS can thus rejoice in the idea that, at least in one survey published in SEMANARIO in April 1985, it led the Portuguese Right.

PRD; Unfamiliar

If the CDS does not happen to shine as the second national party, it is because the APU [United People's Alliance] asserted itself as a party, with a sudden leap of 2.2 points in the last month. Perhaps it would please Dr Cunhal to see this as a direct result of the intensification of the great struggle of the workers against the government. There is another explanation: with the inclusion of an "Eanist party" in the last survey, the Communists suddenly lost 2.5 points, standing well below their average score. Well, in the current survey, the designation PRD—"Democratic Renewal Party"—was used for the first time and it is quite likely that some of the respondents have not yet identified the PRD with Eanism. This is indicated by the contrast between the 10 percent achieved by the "Eanist party," as against the 5.5 percent achieved by the PRD.

Under the circumstances, it may be assumed that some of the APU votes which went traveling returned home this month.

In any event, the APU is 1.1 points below the result achieved in the last legislative elections. Of the four major parliamentary parties, only the CDS has gained ground: 5.2 percentage points.

Whereas in April 1983 the PS and PSD held a large lead of 24.7 percent over the opposition parties, today that lead is reduced to 0.3 percent: the bloc with 39.5 percent and the opposition parties with 39.2 percent.

Lisbon in APU Hands

When such scant political distances are registered on the political map, almost nothing is needed to switch—on paper—all the places.

Suddenly, the APU, which usually leads only in Evora, is leading in no less than three cities: Lisbon (where the PS is 0.2 percent behind it), Coimbra (0.3 percent ahead of the Socialists), and, obviously, Evora. Porto, which went to the PSD in the last survey, is now dominated by the PS, with the CDS in second place. The Socialists also won in Vila Real. Viseu went to the Social Democrats.

In summary, assigning the lead by cities, we have the APU/PS now in the lead in Lisbon and Coimbra; the APU/PSD leading in Evora; the PS/CDS in Porto; the PS/PSD in Vila Real (the only real "bloc" dominance); and the PSD/CDS in Viseu.
The PSD now makes its best showing, 28.7 percent, in Viseu, and its worst showing, 17.2 percent, in Coimbra (this was already the case a month ago). Incidentally, in these two cities, the PSD gained slightly in March (the Coimbra percentage was a disaster in February) and it also gained in Vila Real.

The PSD scare was not reflected uniformly throughout the country, because of declines in Lisbon, Porto and Evora.

Meanwhile, in comparison with the results of the April 1983 elections, Evora presented the least PSD erosion (down 3.6 points) and Vila Real presented the most (down 11.4 points). The PSD did not make a better showing anywhere.

The trends in voter shifts observed by NORMA indicate that, although the Social Democrats lost votes to all the competitors and to abstentions, the most frequent switch was to the CDS.

PS Hour

For its part, the momentously triumphant PS, which has also lost votes to everyone [since 1983], sees the PRD as the most constant threat. Since 1983 the PS has retreated on all fronts, with the record loss in Coimbra (down 20.4 percent) and the smallest loss in Vila Real (down 8.6 points, in the city where it had and still maintains its strongest support: 32.7 percent today.).

Evora is still the champion of anti-Socialism, or anti-Soarism; there, only the CDS saves the PS from bringing up the rear, since the PS has been surpassed not only by the APU and the PSD but by the PRD and even by "others"; this despite the fact that the Socialists came up last month in the Alentejo city, as well as in Porto, Viseu and Vila Real. The PS lost points in Lisbon and Coimbra.

CDS Comes Up

Evora is also the only city of the lot in which the CDS has not grown since 1983 and where the Centrists have made and are making by far the poorest showing: 5.1 percent. At the opposite pole, Viseu gave the CDS 21.8 percent. In Viseu, as in Porto (the city with the greatest CDS gain: 6.8 points), the party of Lucas Pires is in second place, and it is third in Lisbon and Coimbra (topping the PSD) and also third in Vila Real.

Except for the Tras-os-Montes capital, where the CDS lost some votes to the PS, the PSD was the sole beneficiary of the discontentment with the Centrists.

The CDS was also the only party which did not give away any votes to the PRD.

Evora's Revenge

The improvement in Lisbon, Porto and Coimbra accounted for the growth of the APU in the last month. Even so, the APU has lost votes in the capital since April 1983. Based on the 1983 results, however, the greatest loss has occurred in Evora, where, although it is still indisputably in first place, the APU has lost almost 10 percentage points.
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blank/Null</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table: a Comparison of Voter Preferences in Previous Elections and in Previous and Current Surveys in Six Cities (in percentages)
However, the APU and all the other parliamentary parties lost points in Evora to the Eanists. There, the PRD grabbed 15.5 percent of the votes, not to lose sight of the results in the other cities. This figure, smaller than the 18.2 percent which had gone to the "Eanist party" in the previous poll, carries more weight when one considers the spectacular 17.6 percent which went to "other parties." It is possible that some Evorans were unfamiliar with the PRD label, but they wanted to demonstrate their intention to vote for the Eanists; to achieve this end, they may have opted to vote for "others."

The fact is that, in Evora, the PRD and "others" together achieved no less than 33.1 percent, even surpassing the APU.

In the other cities, the PRD received noticeably less support than had the "Eanist party." The exception was Coimbra, where an important meeting of the future new party was being held as the survey was being conducted.
POLITICAL

PORTUGAL.

POLL PUTS PINTASILGO AHEAD OF OTHER CANDIDATES

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 4 Apr 85 p 11

[Article by Margarida Viega]

[Text] It is clear that the weak development of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] and CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] presidential strategies--particularly the attempt to go the way of a common candidate--could make the results of the current NORMA/SEMANARIO survey obsolete from one day to the next. For the present, however, these are the results: Soares is vying with Pintasilgo--who is further and more securely in first place--for the second round in the race to Balem.

It is certain that the combined votes either for Firmino Miguel/Lucas Pires or Miguel/Jardim by far surpass the vote for Soares, although they still fall far short of the vote for the "grand" Pintasilgo.

Such combined tallies, however, are obviously arbitrary.

As usual, NORMA tested two lists of hypothetical candidates. Pintasilgo, Soares and Firmino Miguel appeared on both lists. List 1 also included Adelino Palma Carlos--who is still not identified in the survey as the Fanist candidate, nor is there any particularly compelling reason to do so--and also Lucas Pires. On the second list, Alberto Joao Jardim replaces Pires.

As in previous surveys, Jardim beats Firmino Miguel. For the first time, however, Jardim loses to Soares, although by a few tenths of a percent; the combined effect is one of an imperceptible decline by the Madeiran leader and a gain of about 2 points for Soares.

For his part, Firmino Miguel--who, in the actual political scene, may have reached the hour of the big move--lost ground in relation to the February survey, allowing Lucas Pires to move ahead of him, also by a toenail.

In the Pintasilgo camp--excluding the odd case of Vila Real, where she has lost about 20 points--the innovation is in the male support; which was previously scanty. Having won over this bastion of resistance, the lady leads in all columns: men, women, young and not so young, poor, rich and middle-income--a sweep.

64
Phenomenon

Give or take a point, Engineer Lourdes Pintasilgo came up with 25 percent. Beg pardon: in Evora, she reached 35.5 percent (List 1) or 36.9 percent (List 2). Evora continues to stand out on the political map as the city where the vote is already quite clearly defined; that is, whereas, on the nationwide scale, a percentage of respondents ranging between 36.1 percent (List 1) and 38.7 percent (List 2) reject all the names or give no response, in the Alentejan city, the proportions are reduced to 26.7 percent and 24.5 percent for the respective lists. Evora has made up its mind. It is going for Pintasilgo.

Hold on: there is an admissible explanation for the considerable distance between Pintasilgo and her closest competitor right now. Since Soares, who is about 12 points behind, is the only candidate to date whose candidacy is actually announced, the survey results in this case more closely reflect reality than do those of the other, still nebulous, candidacies.

Soarism?

Whether it is for this reason or for deeper motives, Soares is not catching up. Lisbon's deplorable disdain (11.9 percent on List 1 and 11.5 percent on List 2) is still damaging Soares' average, and the female electorate is also reticent with its support. As a consolation prize and thanks to the eccentricity of the Pintasilgo label, Vila Real gives Soares his only victory of the day.

Firmino took tricks away from Soares in Viseu, on both lists, and also beat him among voters in the highest income bracket, on both lists. Moreover, Soares has the support of fewer women and young people than Lucas Pires or Jardim.

Revenge on the Right

Firmino Miguel, who stands fourth on both lists (10.5 percent and 9.2 percent), emerges as the real champion of irregularity. First of all, he has twice as many [male] and older supporters as female and newer voters. Moreover, Coimbra and Vila Real almost ignore his existence, in contrast to Lisbon (around 11 or 12 percent) or Viseu (13 to 14 percent).

Incidentally, it is only in Viseu—the city where Firmino and Jardim achieved, respectively, their best and worst results—that the general gets the better of the Social Democrat.

The revenge against Lucas Pires is easier to come by. Firmino beat him in Porto, Viseu and Evora, and the two are running even in Lisbon. In the general tally, however, Pires managed to install himself in third place, with 10.6 percent.

It is in the capital and Coimbra that the CDS leader, who is quietly moving forward, does the best, at about 13 percent. Contrary to Firmino's experience, Pires has almost twice as much female support as male support.
Table 1: Response to survey question: "Which of these candidates would you vote for?" (List 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Coimbra</th>
<th>Evora</th>
<th>Lisbon</th>
<th>Porto</th>
<th>Vila Real</th>
<th>Viseu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pintasilgo</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Soares</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lucas Pires</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firmino Miguel</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palma Carlos</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Response to survey question: "Which of these candidates would you vote for?" (List 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>18-44</th>
<th>45+</th>
<th>Socioeconomic Class</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A/B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pintasilgo</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mario Soares</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joao Jardim</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firmino Miguel</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None of these</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No response</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For some mysterious reason, the upper class, which had held him in great esteem, has suddenly given Pires the cold shoulder, while the lowest bracket, finally aware of his existence, gives him 6.2 percent—as much as Adelino de Palma Carlos.

However, the most disadvantaged voters also decided to consider Jardim; once completely ignored by this bracket, he has leapt into second place, knocking out Soares. Jardim is also in second place in Lisbon, with 14.5 percent, and in Evora, with 18.5 percent—a personal record. Since he does not enjoy the same good will in the rest of the country, his average stands at 13 percent, putting him in third place.

Palma Carlos ranges between a maximum 5.2 percent in the capital and a minimum of 0 percent in Porto; the respondents obviously see him as the least likely of all the possible candidates suggested.

6362
CS0: 3542/167
PCE ORGAN USED TO PROSELYTIZE CONVERGENCE POLICY

Minority Faction Attacked

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 18 Apr 85 pp 46-47

[Commentary by Pedro Pablo Novillo, from the Regional Committee of Castile-La Mancha: "Who's Afraid of Convergence?"]

[Text] The conference is over. Now begins the unavoidable work: to discuss and elaborate on the convergence proposal within the party, group by group, and outside the party, neighborhood by neighborhood, town by town, in factories, with peasant farmers, with all social movements. To make the proposal a reality. To rescue and strengthen the party.

The purpose of this commentary is to contribute to this effort, without new wrinkles and without bitterness, along two lines. First, the convergence proposal must be accepted out of more than just loyalty to the party and its leadership in an effort to close ranks and attack internal problems; it must be embraced with full-fledged conviction after a rigorous, calm analysis of what prompted it, why it is needed and how broad its scope is. Second, we must wage a political battle against the "message" of the minority by demonstrating its fallacy, inasmuch as this "message" is still echoed somewhat in the mass media and raises doubts in many comrades, not to mention an odd "neutralist" stand in others.

Even before the 11th Conference, the "leaders" of the minority commonly engaged in a practice that while longstanding in other parties, is something new in ours: inventing a series of "specters" and then conveniently attacking them. Such an effort is as easy as it is futile, but it does sow confusion.

What are those specters today? There are basically three of them.

First, the specter of liquidationism, of the existence within the leadership of a group of agents carrying out a plan to destroy the party and to build on its ashes a "new left" organization that would be unrecognizable to revolutionary Marxism.

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Second, the specter that the policy of convergence is the tool that has been selected to carry out the plan to liquidate the party and to abandon its "essences."

And as a result of the two previous ones, the third specter: the need for "revolutionary courage among a minority" of enlightened members who can put a stop to the maneuvers of the party leadership and, most of all, counter its main tool, the proposal for a political and social convergence.

This, in my judgment, is the core of the minority's "message," which is later embellished with certain working class and messianic phraseology and with a heavy emotional charge so that it appeals more to the audience's feelings than to its reason.

But on what specific analysis of the specific situation (in the party, in Spanish society or in the world) are these specters based and these assertions advanced? To put it even more clearly, is there any Marxian analysis underpinning these "conclusions"?

Obviously not. It seems, rather, that this select group of "intrepid revolutionaries" has been judging motives. This could easily backfire on them if others judge them the same way. That is to say, one could conclude that because they have refused to resign themselves to a loss of leadership and party control, they are opposing the policy of the 11th Congress, the new leadership, the majority, internal democracy and unity of action. It would not, of course, matter to them that they are undeniably furthering what they claim they want to prevent: the weakening, first, and then the destruction of the party.

It is not my intention, though, to judge motives; I merely want to clarify and to encourage reflection and discussion. Let us begin.

Who in the party denies that the party itself is needed? No one. Today's realities underscore the need to overhaul the language, the methods, the style and the practices of the Left and of the party as a major element in it, and they strengthen the conviction that the party is still a necessary tool today. Yes, to overhaul, so that the party continues to be a tool for a Marxian analysis of realities, of new, dynamic, changing realities that in turn create new problems and new "revolutionary subjects" to be joined to, not set at odds with the working class. Yes, to overhaul, so that the party continues to be a real tool for change by opening itself up to group debate, by embracing new needs, by incorporating new forces and by advancing proposals that appeal to the new sectors that want another type of society.

The point, then, is not to engage constantly in futile verbalism by reaffirming the necessity of the party over and over again on paper and in declarations. On the contrary, because we are Marxists
and revolutionaries, the point is not to lose our way amid the new times, because if we lose the present, we are also surely going to lose the future. Without losing our identity, our roots, we must win the future to change history, to overhaul, to sustain and to move forward.

The point is not to deny anything that is still valid, creative and transforming; the point is to affirm it in real life, dialectically, in Marxist code, while staying far away, of course, from metaphysical essentialisms that began fading centuries ago.

What, then, should we liquidate? The obsolete, the practices that are holding the party back, that are making it out-of-date, a useless tool. To liquidate anathemas, dogmas, personality cults, punitive methods, labels. That is what we are agreed on.

This being the case, is convergence a road to disaster? Quite the opposite. Convergence will enable us to rescue the party, which is a goal of the recent congress and which the minority and all of us have been so insistently calling for. But more than just rescuing the party is involved. First and foremost, we must set in motion a program to rescue civilian society and to bring social and political forces together to halt the program of resignation and submission that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] heads up. We are after a strong civilian society to counter the domination of the State's old and new apparatuses. Our challenge is to shatter the two-party pattern and to move towards a participatory democracy in which the lower classes become the masters of their own destiny. Ours is a broad, Marxist, strategic political proposal, an alternative to waiting in isolation for the PSOE's funeral.

The convergence policy is neither confusing, nor alien to the party's tradition, nor rightwing. It has nothing to do with these invalidating prejudices. If there was anything that we learned at the recent conference, it was that precisely that such a policy is necessary and is consistent with all of the PCE's alliances during its history and with the finest tradition of party unity and mobilization. We would do well to recall that this party, and not specifically this leadership or the present secretary general, has often proposed "convergences" with rightwing forces and factions, and rightly so. The call today for a convergence with progressive, alternative-seeking forces, with forces for change, is a clearly leftwing, revolutionary policy.

We are being told, however, that there is no one to converge with, that we are proposing something that is not viable. This odd argument reflects a degree of political short-sightedness, a quick disregard of the recent past (what about the policy of democratic concentration?) and a heavy dose of historical pessimism by denying that there are actually forces that are demanding a new life, a new society and a new future and that are not among traditional working class ranks.
In the face of this specter we must remember (someone mentioned this at the conference, quoting Gramsci) that a true Communist Party must be capable of triggering events, of creating conditions. The fact is that convergence is not going to come about just because we desire it, just from the force of our will. We must make it, create it, put it together. We must not passively resign ourselves to recording what is going on; we must act to create what is coming.

All of this involves a gamble, a risk, of course; above all, though, it holds out hope for utopia, the utopia of what is possible. If we fail to move towards what must be, we will be unable to change the present.

Convergence is possible because it is necessary. To bring it about we do not need a recalcitrant minority that thinks it is blocking the diabolic plans of agents bent on destroying the party. What we need is for the majority and the minority to join forces in a common undertaking. We do not need new platforms, because we already have one, the best one: the entire party, open to all communists, to all of society in an ongoing effort to recover, to unite and to integrate.

Before concluding, I would therefore like to again issue a personal appeal to my comrades and to my friends (some of them more than friends) who back the minority's ideas today, to join the party's group efforts while respecting the tenets of our democratic workings, which do not exclude dissent. Alongside many of you I learned to be a communist, to love the party and to struggle for a new world and a new man.

Party Democracy Emphasized

Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 18 Apr 85 p 47

[Commentary by Francisco Perez, organizational secretary of the Communist Party of Andalusia (Cordoba): "The End of the Monolith"]

[Text] The National Conference of the PCE has, among other things, meant progress in the party's internal democracy, as well as a move against a monolithic structure. As delegates to this conference, we have criticized and suggested improvements for the performance of the party's Central Committee.

Moreover, we have also taken a step towards consolidating group work and drafting political proposals, an issue that was dealt with in Gerardo Iglesias's report.

What has emerged from the conference is a party ready to cope with new realities, that is calling on its activists to draw up political proposals for dealing with the specific problems facing the country, our cities or towns, in a word, a party that is closer to the "collective intellectual."
We cannot pretend, however, that the proposal has not had opponents, such as Santiago Carrillo, who have refused to attend the conference, where they could have set forth their political and ideological differences with the majority of this party.

When someone claims that he is defending the distinguishing characteristics of the party of which he is a member, the first point on which we have to agree is that he must be active in the party and not refuse to participate in the number one forum between congresses: the National Conference.

These people did not attend for three basic reasons:

1. They are deliberately opposing the rebuilding of the PCE.

2. They refuse to accept the democratization of the party and, thus, group efforts.

3. They refuse to answer to the party for all of the charges they have leveled in forums in which they could not be countered.

Because they ignored the most elementary standards of our organization, the National Conference, after 7 months of patient efforts to find a way out of the situation, finally said enough. Enough, because our party must present its programs to society. It must establish political and organizational channels for the spontaneous rallies that have sprung up, in the university for example, in support of withdrawal from NATO, industrial reconversion, the day laborer rallies, etc.

The National Conference has tried to respond to them. It has tried to adapt us to the realities of a country in which the scientific and technological revolution is intensifying, in which man is less of a participant in the production process and in which, therefore, the concept of the working class is changing. There are new segments of society today, such as the 2.7 million unemployed, the 9 million women who have not had access to the production process, the 5 million young people between the ages of 14 and 26, and the 6 million pensioners and retirees. We must bring these new segments together in the struggle for a more just society, a society in which the struggle for peace (including rallies to get Spain out of NATO), the environment, the quality of life and a shorter work week is becoming increasingly important because of the changes it entails.

From this stems the importance of reaffirming the policy of a "social convergence," which in our autonomous community has taken the form of the "Convocation for Andalusia." This strategic, not tactical movement is consistent with our history and with the changing times.
It is consistent with our history because it represents, with the logical differences, the continuation of the social bloc for progress, the pact for freedom, the Democratic Board; that is to say, it confirms our party's nature as an enlivening force in society. It is consistent with the new times because we are confronting the changes that are coming about in the system of production, which is giving rise to new forms of organization.

Therefore, a convergence that is electoral, not just social could represent a step forward; it could prompt and, in fact, is already prompting a move away from do-nothingism.

Like it or not, the National Conference is another step towards the PCE's recovery, both as an organization and at the polls.

In a word, ours is a party that places great hope in our country's future.

8743
CSO: 3548/122
FEW INTERESTED IN IGLESIAS': CONVERGENCE POLICY

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 21 Apr 85 pp 18, 19

[Article by Carlos Gomez: "Finessing by Gerardo"]

[Text] The dictionary definition of "to converge" is to come together and unite in a common interest or focus. The politics of convergence that the Gerardo Iglesias faction of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] is pursuing to heal the rifts in the party and rebuild its strength at the polls is an attempt to put together a leftwing alternative to the Socialist government. This complex, ambitious operation, whose promoters do not hesitate to describe it as requiring much finesse, aims at garnering between three and four million votes by hammering out common goals and programs among minor parties, nationalists, civic movements and well-known independents.

Gerardo Iglesias's initiative faces an uncertain future because of the belligerent opposition of the Carrillo faction to the policy of convergence within the PCE, because of the desire of other groups in this operation to be in the limelight and because of the widespread reluctance of social and civic movements to allow their struggles to be used for partisan purposes.

According to Andreu Claret, the PCE's official spokesman, the policy of convergence is going to be built around three major objectives: putting together an alternative to the administration's economic policies (emphasizing job creation and strengthening the public sector and small and medium business); a policy of neutrality and a defense of freedoms.

In the judgment of the PCE, an election platform centering around these three goals is viable and certain to command support because of Miguel Boyer's monetarist economic policies, which have not only failed to create jobs but have destroyed tens of thousands of them; because of the sharp dichotomy between the Spanish public and the Spanish Government on the issue of remaining in NATO, and because of the Interior Ministry's and the administration's policies in the area of freedoms.
"There are three or four million Spaniards who back these goals," according to Claret, and the PCE "must help bring these votes together. But the convergence must be more than an electoral operation. It must be a social and political convergence, not an election platform." As examples he cites the so-called committees [mesas] for peace and for the referendum that various political groups have set up.

The PCE secretariat has already authorized Nicolas Sartorius and Claret himself to initiate contacts, with an eye towards convergence, "with various political groups, social organizations and well-known figures for the purpose of setting up a broad-based committee to draft an alternative program to the PSOE's [Spanish Socialist Workers Party]."

The PCE is convinced that the general elections will be held in May or June of next year and that they will likely coincide with two others: the balloting in Andalusia and for the European Parliament. Now that it regards the crisis with the Carrillo faction as officially over, it is thus hastening to establish nationwide contacts (they are already under way in Andalusia) to achieve a convergence.

Again according to Claret, the secretariat has, in fact, already set up another committee, consisting of Nicolas Sartorius, Gerardo Iglesias, Enrique Curriel and various regional PCE organizational chiefs, to select candidates for the upcoming elections. "They will be PCE candidates at the national level and coalition candidates in regions in which there are major names or forces, but the selection process will always be very open. In this case we will use an approach similar to Democratic Convergence's: the names of the candidates will be accompanied by the corresponding initials."

With whom is the PCE going to converge? According to the party's official spokesman, it plans to hammer out common ground with professional organizations and unions (CCOO [Workers Commissions] and COAG [Farmers' and Cattlemen's Coordinating Commission]), with social movements (neighborhood, peace, environmental and feminist groups), with Socialist groups that are not part of the PSOE (Alonso Puerta's party and groups in Extremadura and Las Palmas), with leftwing nationalist parties or groups (Basque Left, Republican Left of Catalonia, Galician Left, Majorera Assembly of the Canaries), and with parties like that of Tamames and well-known independents such as attorney Jose Maria Mohedano.

"We are also going to extend the offer to dissident PSOE factions and we will speak, directly or indirectly, with the Extreme Left, although here there are serious differences in our political approaches." Speaking for himself, Andreu Claret also feels that the party should speak with Ignacio Gallego's people (the pro-Soviet PC).

Claret is aware of the huge difficulties involved in putting together such a patchwork: "It will take a great deal of finesse to bring together so many things."
The PCE is going to encounter its first difficulties with this strategy in the social movements. The neighborhood associations, which are probably the biggest social movements in Spain (about 80,000 members in Barcelona and Madrid), have serious misgivings. Prudencio Sanchez, the president of the Federation of Neighborhood Associations of Barcelona and acting head of the State Coordinating Board (the post rotates annually), feels that "it would be suicidal for any neighborhood association to join an election coalition. We would lose our hard-won independence."

"No one has yet offered a convergence to us," Sanchez adds, "but I am convinced that the great majority of the associations will reject the offer. In any event, the PCE plan is no surprise to us, because political party manipulation and coopting of neighborhood associations has been quite common."

During election campaigns neighborhood associations "tend to urge parties to represent their grievances but do not join any political organization. If the PCE attempts to make the associations part of its election coalition, it will at the very least be guilty of an indiscretion," Prudencio Sanchez remarked.

It will not be easy either to establish common ground with the feminist movement, which comprises several thousand women throughout Spain and exerts an influence over many more. Montse Olivan, from the Group of Lesbian Feminists of Madrid, asserts that "Iglesias's proposal is going to be received very badly. We are not willing to let any specific party use the feminist movement for vote-getting purposes."

 Lidia Falcon, who heads the Feminist Party, is even more categorical: "We are open to alliances on specific objectives. But the policy of convergence is little more than an attempt to appropriate the assets that the feminist movement has built up over 10 years of hard work. It is odd that the PCE is so concerned now about women, unlike 10 or 15 years ago, when most of us belonged to it."

The environmentalists and pacifists are other components of the patchwork that are mostly ill-disposed to a serious bid for convergence. The attempts to set up "green" parties have come from urban environmental and energy-conservation groups, which have the smallest memberships and whose ranks include a great many former activists from leftwing parties. The conservation groups, although larger, are still very small and, in general, are dead set against mixing politics with their activities.

Nationalist Groups

A coalition with nationalists does not seem likely either. Juan Maria Bandres, a Basque Left deputy (somewhat less than 100,000 votes in the Basque Country in the 1982 elections), has made the point quite clearly: "The fact that we are on common ground with the PCE
on certain issues does not mean that there are going to be electoral pacts. There is no interest in a convergence. We don't want any election coalition, which far from being positive could mean a step backwards for us in the Basque Country."

According to our correspondent in La Coruna, the PSCG [Galician Socialist Party]-Galician Left (a thousand members, 50 municipal seats and an autonomous assembly deputy) has ruled out any alliance with the Communists for the year-end autonomy elections.

"We are in favor of consolidating a leftwing alternative in Galicia," says home-rule assembly deputy Camilo Nogueira, "but it must be placed in a nationalist framework, not be a by-product of the PCE's internal workings."

Republican Left of Catalonia (close to 130,000 votes in the home-rule elections) is not well-disposed towards convegence with the PCE either. Our correspondent in the Balearic Islands reports that the Socialist Party of Mallorca-Nationalist Left (PSM) has in recent months been receiving veiled offers to take part in the PCE's convergence operation, "although none of them have so far been official," according to its secretary general, Sebastia Serra. "We will decide what road to take at our seventh congress late in the year." In Serra's view, "the party's survival has priority."

The Majorera Assembly (AM), the leading political force on the island of Fuerteventura and a broad front in which various leftwing, mildly nationalist factions coexist, has recently received offers from Gerardo Iglesias (PCE), Ramon Tamames, the green party and the Canarian Nationalist Left. According to our correspondent in Tenerife, the AM people reject the possibility of future alliances in principle.

Workers Commissions

One of the main groups that Andreu Claret has mentioned in connection with the PCE's convergence policy is Workers Commissions (between 500,000 and 600,000 affiliates, compared to 60,000 for the party). The union's secretary of political, unity and institutional relations is Julian Ariza, one of Carrillo's leading backers in the PCE and a staunch opponent of the Iglesias strategy of convergence. Ariza recalls that 3 months ago both the Executive Committee and the Confederation Committee of the CCOO decided that the union's stand on the upcoming elections "will continue to be in opposition to rightwing parties and in support of those who identify with the CCOO's proposals, without coming out in favor of any specific party. The only change in our traditional position has to do with making our affiliates see what the PSOE's economic and social policies have meant."

Arize, who admits that the degree to which the union is being manipulated is unprecedented, feels, nevertheless, that convergence will not succeed, "because it would jeopardize the union's unity, which has
so far been based on plurality." If an attempt is made to push through Iglesias's ideas, there will be major internal tensions; the 50 seats on the CCOO Executive Committee are distributed among the supporters of Marcelino Camacho (27), the Carrillo people (14), Ignacio Gallego's backers (8) and 1 Trotskyite.

The COAG, which comprises some 100,000 small and medium-sized farmers and cattlemen, is not so inclined either. Its regional branches include affiliates who are card-carrying members of the Basque Nationalist Party, Convergence and Union and the PSOE, and they would raise the roof in the COAG if it made a commitment to the PCE.

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CSO: 3548/122
CARRILLO RECOUNTS ROAD TO POLITICAL FALL-OUT

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 22 Apr 85 pp 40-42

[Interview with Santiago Carrillo by Juan Altable; date and place not given]

[Text] Rank-and-file party member Santiago Carrillo Solares is not ready to jettison his entire past. "I plan to keep on working as I have for a PCE [Spanish Communist Party] in which all Communists have a place." No longer a party leader, not even with a seat on the congressional speakers platform, he has no regrets, not even about his iron-fisted rule. "I can reproach myself only for having opened up the PCE too much." He also feels that all is not lost, that he enjoys the sort of personal support that neither purges nor the ouster of his comrades can do away with.

Santiago Carrillo: If the PCE's current leadership had been smart, it would not have tried to destroy the person who, whether they like it or not, most symbolizes the PCE in Spain and throughout the world.

CAMBIO 16: Do you have the feeling that everyone in the party has agreed to avenge the heavy-handed policy that you pursued when you had power?

Santiago Carrillo: If there is anything that I can accuse myself of, it is that I reorganized the party too much. I went too far revamping the PCE. I allowed many long-time officials with a tremendous history of sacrifices to be replaced by youngsters who were worthy intellectually but who did not have the background of many of these veterans. If I were to criticize myself at this point, it would be for having opened up leadership posts to so many young people.

CAMBIO 16: So you've even lost the support of the old guard...

Santiago Carrillo: I have a theory about that but I'm not prepared to make it public. Moreover, I love being with young people; it

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shows that my positions do not belong to the past. That doesn't bother me. If it bothers anyone, it's the people who have been my backers all their lives and who suddenly became my adversaries.

CAMBIO 16: But you appointed Gerardo Iglesias as a straw man so that you could continue running the PCE from backstage.

Santiago Carrillo: No. I nominated Gerardo because he had always followed my line; in fact, he was even more of a hardliner than I was, if that's possible, even though he now claims to be a moderate. I picked him because he was not an influential figure in the party and was not going to encounter much resistance. Gerardo was a man who could run the party until the congress during a period in which a new balance of power would take shape.

CAMBIO 16: So he was just an interim secretary general?

Santiago Carrillo: I must confess that at the time I wasn't really sure whether he was going to serve as secretary general only until the next congress or whether he would remain on afterwards. It was all supposed to depend on how he reacted. As far as I am concerned, Gerardo Iglesias is a stopgap secretary general. I would have been able to play the same role that Dolores Ibarruri did with me when I was elected secretary general in 1960. Her support and personality strengthened me during the first few years. I would have done the same for Gerardo, if the current leadership had been smart.

CAMBIO 16: So you feel that by not playing along, Gerardo betrayed you?

Santiago Carrillo: Well, to a certain extent I feel betrayed. Because a man who was always one of us, whom we nominated turned around in less than a month and became a "Euro-renovator." Moreover, he said that he was not afraid of following my lead. In this sense he has betrayed me, because he has not remained faithful to a tradition.

CAMBIO 16: Many of your comrades feel that you ran out of steam when you fell out of favor with Adolfo Suarez and the consensus came to an end...

Santiago Carrillo: No. What happened was that the party was left isolated when Prime Minister Suarez made the mistake of shattering the consensus. That move didn't do him any good either, as we saw. Our role in national politics shrank considerably as of the 1979 elections and the municipal pacts. I even wonder whether we did the right thing by supporting the Socialists' censure motion. If we had had more historic foresight, we would not have done so. Because the people who Suarez was really up against were the powers that be in this country and the Americans, in other words, the forces against which we have struggled.
Cambio 16: Might it not be that deep down your policy during those years was merely an attempt to "rub elbows with the powerful," to "walk on plush carpeting"?

Santiago Carrillo: That's what the people who are fighting with me over the plush carpeting are now saying. I spent almost 40 years in the underground and I've gone to the Moncloa because I had to go there to talk with Suarez. And I've gone to La Zarzuela because as the leader of a parliamentary party I had no choice. But I have always felt out of place in those situations. I have, however, tried to show that we Communists are civilized people, that we know how to behave in society.

Cambio 16: It seems that the moderate image that you speak of, Mr Carrillo, did you no good at the polls, especially in October 1982.

Santiago Carrillo: I think that we lost the last election because of the attempted coup in 1981. From that point on, many people on the Left began thinking that a another civil war was possible and that the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] was the only tolerated leftwing party. Furthermore, the danger of Fraga winning the elections intensified the trend towards the so-called votes that count. The outcome could not have been otherwise.

Cambio 16: Couldn't it also be that people were abandoning a party that was marked solely by expulsions and rifts?

Santiago Carrillo: The crises in the party did not stem from the expulsions. The fact is that everything began to come apart when our showing in the first election was far worse than we had expected for a party that had struggled so hard against Franco. From that point on the differences of opinion in such a complex membership began to intensify until they became irreconcilable.

Cambio 16: And what do you plan to do now as just another member of the rank-and-file?

Santiago Carrillo: Well, keep on working as I have all along, making every effort to help get an authentic Spanish Communist Party off the ground again.
VIETNAM AID DEBATE VIEWED IN LIGHT OF CAMBODIA, PRC FIGHTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Apr 85 p 2

[Commentary by Hans Sjoberg: "Sweden and Indochina Today: Bai Bang and Kampuchea"]

[Text] How should the 10th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War be commemorated? It was, after all, the event in foreign affairs which had absorbed the attention of the greatest number of Swedes since World War II.

The Swedish Committee for Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, headed by its former chairwoman, Minister of Immigration Anita Gradin, commemorated the event in Stockholm last Saturday. The commemoration was on a modest scale—-it was free of nostalgic overtones and centered on what is happening now: Bai Bang, Sweden's most important practical followup to its political commitment to peace during the war years, and Kampuchea, where the current Indochinese war is going on.

A lot has been said about Bai Bang, and perhaps even more will be said. Anders Forsse and Christina Rehlen from SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority] and Katarina Larsson, coauthor of the report on conditions for the lumberjacks, most of whom are women—a report that attracted much attention—added hardly anything very new to the discussion.

The debate over Bai Bang is easily distorted because deep down—as Anders Forsse pointed out—it is often concerned not with Bai Bang as an aid project but with Vietnam as the recipient country. For his part, the head of SIDA said that on a scale of 1 to 5, he would give the project a 3.75, but he said at the same time that perhaps something less difficult should have been chosen to begin with.

With the results before us, it is easy to agree with that statement, but this does not imply a questioning of Swedish aid to Vietnam, which is justified on several counts, especially the fact that Sweden's presence in Vietnam constitutes a counterweight—no matter how small—to Vietnam's growing dependence on the Soviet Union.

Not even the living conditions for women lumberjacks—conditions that are revolting even in Vietnamese circumstances—are justification for reconsidering
aid as such. But as Katarina Larsson pointed out, Sweden ought to be able to
do more without drifting into colonialism. As far as the forests are con-
cerned, SIDA is now going to sign agreements on continued cooperation for only
1 year. On the other hand, a final 5-year agreement on the papermill itself
is now being reached.

One main reason for Swedish criticism of aid to Vietnam is Vietnam's military
intervention in Kampuchea in 1978 and the continuing warfare there. Kampuchea
was discussed by Gunnar Fredriksson, former editor in chief of AFTONBLADET,
and Bengt Albons of the DAGENS NYHETER staff, who wrote articles from Kampuchea
in the early 1970's.

Few people ask what "happy Kampuchea's" lacerated people want. It seems rea-
sonable, however, to agree with Fredriksson's assertion that a resurrected Pol
Pot regime is what inspires the greatest fear. Of course, that does not ex-
cuse the continuing Vietnamese occupation, which—as Albons emphasized—is due
chiefly to an ambition to dominate Indochina.

The roots of the conflict between Cambodians and Vietnamese go back centuries
in history. Today, however, that conflict is of minor importance in compari-
on with the equally centuries-old antagonism between China and Vietnam. The
solution to the Kampuchean question must be sought ultimately in the relation-
ship between the big power—China—and the "regional big power," Vietnam.

Bengt Albons said that the best conceivable future for Kampuchea—from a real-
istic standpoint—would lie in a government friendly to Vietnam and placed
under the man who has been a national symbol for nearly half a century, Prince
Norodom Sihanouk. The Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh
has hinted, incidentally, that it might consider beginning talks with Sihanouk—
provided that he breaks with Pol Pot, whom he himself describes as a monster
but a brilliant military commander.

But that will not be very easy, since China supports Pol Pot, who from the
military standpoint is the completely dominant power in the opposition coal-
tion. And China does not want to see any Vietnamese dominance in Indochina,
especially now that the Soviet Union has acquired military strategic advantages
in the area—an example being the right to use the former American base in Cam
Ranh. An end to support for Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea is still one of
China's three conditions for better relations with Moscow and also, according
to a statement by Deng Xiaoping the other day, the easiest one for the Soviet
Union to meet.

Vietnam has presented a timetable for its military exodus from Kampuchea that
extends to 1995. Perhaps the intention is honest, but that is a very long
time, and a great deal can happen in a decade.

The key to a solution to the Kampuchean conflict lies in Peking and Hanoi, al-
though things might be facilitated by a thaw in relations between Moscow and
Peking. The only possible counterweight to both China and Vietnam in Southeast
Asia is the United States, which, 10 years after the end of the Vietnam War, is
not pleased—one would like to say "Thank Heaven"—with the idea of getting
very deeply involved in the area.
And an international solution—which is the formula put forward by the ASEAN countries—will be meaningless if it does not include first and foremost an agreement between China and Vietnam. Moreover, it is not easy for the ASEAN countries to work together on such a solution, since they lack a unified perspective of the threat. For a country such as Thailand, which borders on Indochina, the dominant threat comes from Vietnam's ambition to be a big power. This explains Bangkok's support for the anti-Vietnamese opposition in Kampuchea. But at a greater distance from Vietnam, people are asking themselves whether China will not present the chief danger in the long run, and they view with some concern the possibility of Thailand's increasing dependence on China.

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CONSERVATIVES DROP SLIGHTLY IN LATEST POLL

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Apr 85 p 8

[Article from TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA]

[Text] Swedish voters want to preserve their social security and do not want the Conservatives' changes of the system involving reduced health insurance benefits, higher rents and the transfer of child care to the private sector.

This is the way Bo Toresson, party secretary of the Social Democratic Party, explained the setback of the Conservative Party by 2.5 percentage units in the most recent poll taken by the Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research. The poll shows a reduced distance between the two political blocs. The difference is now 2 percent.

According to Georg Danell, party secretary of the Conservative Party, the reduced majority of the Conservative Party is due to the ruthless campaign on the part of the Social Democratic Party against the economy proposals of the nonsocialist parties.

"They have avoided taking up their own issues, and this affects the undecided voters," says Georg Danell.

"They, moreover, have a machinery of power and funds to carry on a campaign. Money that we have not got."

"Dip"

With regard to the setback of the Conservative Party, Georg Danell says that it is "dip" which the party has experienced quite regularly, approximately once every 6 months and which has become adjusted in the following poll.

The nonsocialist bloc gets 50.5 percent of the vote as against 48.5 percent for the socialist bloc, according to the poll taken by the Swedish Institute of Public Opinion Research for the month of April.

The Social Democrats and the Communist Left Party have each advanced by 1 percentage unit compared to the poll taken in March, while the nonsocialist parties have lost a total of 1.5 percentage units.
The Social Democrats advanced by 1 percentage unit to 43 percent in the poll taken in April. The Communist Left Party also advanced by 1 percentage unit and now has 5.5 percent of the vote.

The Conservative Party had a setback of 2.5 percentage units to 28.5 percent. The Center Party advanced by 0.5 percentage unit to 13.5 percent. As a result, the Center Party has got 10.5 percent after an advance of 1.5 percentage units, while the Christian Democratic Party has lost 1 percentage unit and is down at 3 percent.

The support among the voters of the Liberal Party increased by 0.5 percentage units to 8.5 percent.

The distance between the blocs decreased in 4 consecutive months from 9 percent in December, 8 percent in January, 6.5 percent in February, 5.5 percent in March to 2 percent in April.

The share of undecided voters is 8.5 percent.
PALME INCREASINGLY EAGER TO WAGE BATTLE OVER DEFENSE POLICY

Stockholm  SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 17 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Palme's Game"]

[Text] This country's writers of editorials and news commentators are these
days knitting their brows considerably. How is Mr. Thunborg's article in the
Sunday DAGENS NYHETER to be interpreted? And how should one look at Olof
Palme's "criticism" of the Conservatives, as the EKO program put it?

The person who seeks answers to these questions on the foreign policy posi-
tions of the different parties is searching in vain.

The debate which is going on has very little to do with the actual content of
our foreign policy and security policy. What we are watching is a political
game which may primarily be explained by the fact that, for one thing, an
election is coming up in Sweden and, for the other, that strong personal
differences exist between Olof Palme and, above all, the Conservative Carl
Bildt.

The reason why the discussion came to a head right now is associated with the
work of the defense committee. In May, it will result in a part report on the
security policy.

The Conservatives have realized for a long time that they gain nothing from a
conflict on the security policy. They know that the Social Democrats have for
a long time past enjoyed great confidence in matters of peace and security.
As a result, Ulf Adelsohn and Carl Bildt have kept a rather low profile more
or less since the defense committee was set up. And Carl Bildt has apparently
endeavored to achieve agreement within the committee.

Also the Social Democrats within the defense committee seem to have wanted to
achieve agreement. However, the picture of the endeavors of the Social Demo-
crats is somewhat unclear. For while the work within the committee has pro-
ceeded in relative harmony, the Social Democratic Party has prepared a platform
which states that a dispute will be carried on with the Conservatives on the
security policy. And the Social Democratic Party spokesman has shown
the party's platform extremely great respect. He has not missed any chance to
strike out at Adelsohn, Bildt and others.
The defense committee is thus in the process of completing its report. If the report becomes unanimous, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives are unquestionably in agreement on the policy of neutrality, the evaluation of the security policy situation, the basis for the defense policy and all of the other matters which the dispute on the security policy might possibly have concerned. And, on top of all the trouble, it is, to use the prime minister's subtle way of saying it, "that fellow Bildt" who signed the security policy agreement with the Social Democrats.

Olof Palme's continual attacks on the Conservatives, of course, come at a rather unfortunate time if the committee reaches an agreement.

The alternative is that Olof Palme forces his party colleagues to disagree with the Conservative members of the committee. The Social Democrats will then have to formulate foreign policy and security policy positions for the express purpose of ensuring that the Conservatives will not agree to them. For one thing, this will, of course, be revealed (since the committee already seems to be largely in agreement). For the other, it cannot, of course, be said ahead of time how far such an endeavor for disagreement will force the Social Democrats to go.

In the first case, a unanimous report, Olof Palme will have to try to find proof that he and his fellow party members have forced the Conservatives to submit.

Olof Palme touched on this in the EKO program yesterday morning.

After having condemned the "special line" of the Conservatives in the security policy, he said that the Conservatives have no "alternative" and, therefore, are forced to "give in" in the defense committee. (It did not appear from the prime minister's well-considered statement what a special line which does not constitute an alternative looks like; nor did it appear how one withdraws from such a non-alternative special line.)

The feature in the EKO program will probably have to be interpreted as an indication that Olof Palme has started preparing the ground for the argumentation concerning "submission."

The other alternative, a non-unanimous report, presupposes that the Social Democrats will actively seek formulations which Carl Bildt cannot approve.

Olof Palme, in a way, is also preparing the ground for the latter alternative. He is now cultivating a favorite expression about "dual message" on the part of the Conservatives. In the Swedish parliament and in other official contexts, they accept the traditional policy. But more informally it is claimed that they say what they actually believe; they would in such situations deviate from the traditional Swedish policy of neutrality.

This conspiracy theory slander may easily be developed by Olof Palme into an open conflict. If disagreement does arise within the committee, he may claim that the Conservatives have now shown their "true face."
In the interview on the EKO program, Olof Palme said that he had been forced to deal with this entire handling of the matter to retain the respect of foreign countries for the Swedish foreign policy.

It is possible that Olof Palme has got that idea.

Actually, it is no longer too important for foreign observers what Olof Palme says and does. In the course of the last 2 to 3 years, the prime minister has lost the credibility he used to have.

On the other hand, it is important what the defense committee does. The responsibility rests with its members not to allow their work to become entirely subordinated to the party policy game which writers of editorials and commentators in this country are now trying desperately to sort out.

7262
CSO: 3650/233
NONSOCIALISTS FAVOR ADELSOHN--Thorbjorn Falldin, leader of the Center Party, has got least chances as a candidate for the post of prime minister in case of a nonsocialist election victory in the fall. Even among the party's own members there are more voters who prefer Ulf Adelsohn over Falldin. Of 2,000 Swedes 28.5 percent want a Socialist election victory as against 27.5 percent for a nonsocialist victory. Among those who want a nonsocialist election victory, 32 percent prefer Ulf Adelsohn as prime minister, 9 percent Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg and 7 percent Thorbjorn Falldin. However, according to the poll, 25 percent of those polled want a coalition government of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the Center Party and the Social Democratic Party. The poll was carried through by the Swedish Central Bureau of Statistics on behalf of the Foundation for Opinion Polls and was paid for by the Federation of Trade Unions, the Swedish Civil Servants' Union, the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the political parties. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 26 Apr 85 p 10] 7262

CONTINUED AID FOR BAI BANG--The board of directors of the aid organization SIDA [Swedish International Development Authority] decided last Wednesday to continue its aid to the Swedish forest industry project Bai Bang in Vietnam. The board of directors accepted a two-year cooperation agreement for 300 million Swedish kronor in 1985-86 and 300 million Swedish kronor in 1986-87. The Conservative Party's member of the board of directors, Margaretha af Ugglas, made reservations against the cooperation agreement. "Against the background of Vietnam's participation in the war in Cambodia, the cooperation ought to be discontinued," she said. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 25 Apr 85 p 8] 7262

CSO: 3650/233
'WINTEX' EXERCISE SIMULATES CIVIL-MILITARY MOBILIZATION

Logistical, Air Defense Weaknesses

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 18 Mar 85 p 2

[Article: "'WINTEX' Indicates Weaknesses"]

[Excerpts] According to CDU defense expert Willy Wimmer, the secret command post exercise "WINTEX" which ended last week showed that the conventional combat strength of the West has increased but still has some weak points. In an interview with DPA (German Press Agency) Sunday in Bonn Wimmer went on to say that unlike the past, the NATO alliance is no longer dependent solely on the first-use of atomic weapons in case of war.

"WINTEX" has clearly shown that the nuclear aspect has been returned to its "political role." According to Wimmer, the efforts of the FRG government will clearly be to substantially raise the atomic threshold without sacrificing its deterrence capability. While the social democrats placed great emphasis on constant modernization of its atomic capability during their term in office, the CDU/CSU is directing its efforts toward reducing the number of atomic weapons in Europe. It is a matter of placing "greater political emphasis on the deterrence effect" of these weapons, said Wimmer.

According to Wimmer, several weak points became apparent during the exercise. These weak points primarily involved intelligence capabilities, electronic warfare, medical supplies, security units behind the lines and coordination of air defenses. These were the same points, he said, on which the Bundeswehr wanted to make improvements in planning by the mid-1990's. Bonn has already created the necessary financial prerequisites for accomplishing this task.

In conjunction with the less than optimum situation in the medical and health services, "WINTEX" showed that serious problems would arise in a crisis situation for soldiers as well as the civilian population due to the lack of an "emergency control and provision law for health services" and to the critical situation with regard to medical assistants, Wimmer went on. According to Western sources, the Warsaw Pact could use nerve gas very early on; East Bloc troops are trained and equipped for this situation. "We have almost nothing with which to combat this," said Wimmer.
In a war situation continuous waves of troops from the East are to be expected. For NATO to combat them at the East-West German border therefore requires first of all a well-functioning intelligence network so that Western units can be placed most effectively in the forward defenses. "WINTEX" once again confirmed that the means for technical information-gathering were lacking, particularly in the intelligence-sensitive area extending about 150 km into the country. The West is attempting to close these gaps as quickly as possible.

During "WINTEX" it also became apparent how dangerous Warsaw Pact plans are for sending sabotage units into the West German interior. NATO does not have adequate defensive forces to combat these attacks on facilities of military significance. Sufficient security units are lacking. The Bundeswehr plans to train more reserves for these defensive tasks. Coordination of air defenses did not turn out well during "WINTEX." In this area "vigorous" efforts toward improvement need to be made.

This command post exercise has again shown the importance of a smooth-running, quickly coordinated forward defense within the FRG by the Allies. It is particularly important that all allied troops stationed in the FRG take up defenses along the border. Defense Minister Manfred Woerner has repeatedly called attention to the fact that about 30 percent of the population of the FRG and of its industrial potential lies within a strip about 100 km wide along the East-West German border.

Civil Mobilization Scenario

West Berlin TAGESZEITUNG in German 26 Feb 85 p 1

[Article: "Panic in the Streets--Emergency Government in Bunker"]

[Excerpts] Berlin (TAZ)--The Soviet Union is occupying Yugoslavia and Finland. The western European NATO countries begin to mobilize. The U.S. reinforces its troops in western Europe and threatens the USSR with military countermeasures. Panic erupts. A flood of refugees moves from the northeast of the FRG to the southwest in the direction of Switzerland. At the same time the FRG government and its agencies are confronted with internal disturbances; the "Alliance of the Friends of Peace" and the "United Opponents of Atomic Weapons" organize demonstrations.

This operational planning practice is part of the scenario on which the command post exercise "WINTEX-CIMEX" is based, as TAZ was informed by reliable, well-informed sources. "WINTEX-CIMEX" begins this Tuesday and lasts until March 13. The scenario and the individual locations involved in the exercise are top secret.

"WINTEX-CIMEX" will test the introduction of food ration cards, compulsory service by the labor force, confiscation of vehicles and buildings, the shutting down of private telephone lines and the release of hospitals for civilian and military war casualties.
According to the information TAZ has received, the main emphasis of this year's exercise is on the handling of a flood of refugees completely filling the streets and trains and hindering the progress of troops and tanks. Another point of emphasis involves supplies of food: How can the "food-producing capability" of agricultural areas be assured?

Senior Civil Authorities Involved

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 Feb 85 p 3


[Text] Bonn, 19 Feb--It is no practical joke, but a serious matter: Waldemar Schreckenberger, absent-minded professor and state secretary in the federal chancellery, will become chancellor on March 8. On this date war will break out within the context of the command post exercise 'WINTEX 85'. Led by Schreckenberger, the FRG government will retreat from a Bonn threatened by bombs to an atomic-bomb-proof bunker in the nearby valley of the Ahr. The red wine produced there is a tried and true means of combatting "bunker fever," which experience has shown to befall some members of the ministerial bureaucracy in the dim neon light far below the cliffs of the Eifel region on the third day of the exercise.

This retreat to the concrete fortress also means a defeat for Alois Mertes, state minister in the foreign office, who from the beginning of "WINTEX" on February 26 is chancellor for just under one week for the purpose of the exercise and is responsible for crisis management. The way in which he mastered this difficult role during "WINTEX 83" won him the respect of the exercise participants at that time. Nevertheless--this time too--tensions between "Orange" and "Blue" escalate until at the end of the first phase of the exercise Mertes' only option finally is to declare a state of emergency and request the Americans to begin mobilization and send troops across the Atlantic.

And that occurs promptly. Within 40 days tens of thousands of reinforcements and a thousand aircraft land unhindered in western Europe. In actual fact nothing moves at all; not one soldier; not one transport aircraft; not one freighter. Requisitions from civilian stocks and the initial deployment of forces take place only on paper--naturally in secret. That is why this initial deployment phase of "WINTEX" (Winter Exercise) can make a "leap in time" and be shortened to two and a half days.

The Result is Already Known

After the "leap in time" Waldemar Schreckenberger goes into action as the chancellor. The announcement that he would slip into the role of Helmut Kohl from March 8 to 13 brought forth an "Oh, good grief!" from many experienced people who have already undergone this paper war in the bunker many times before. This is due to concern about Schreckenberger's hasty nature, descriptions of which are generally just exaggerations, but which at the chancellery
itself and among the coalition parties was made out to be one of the reasons for the notorious "mishaps" during the past year. In November 1984 Kohl finally deprived his long-time colleague of power, relieved him of his position as head of the chancellery and left him, in addition to coordinating the intelligence services, only with special assignments which are universally regarded as not top priority: European questions, media policies and communications technology. At the same time Kohl, in describing the responsibilities of the new minister in the chancellery, Wolfgang Schaeuble, judged his friend Schreckenberger rather harshly, saying that Schaeuble would have to improve coordination in the Chancellery itself, in the cabinet and between the government and the political parties within the government, and that government activities would have to be structured more effectively.

Now Schreckenberger, as the "practice" chancellor during the "hot" phase of "WINTEX," which according to the official version is "within the realm of the most acute level of the crisis," is to have command over the German armed forces and to do all he can to "limit the damage" in this fictional defense situation. He will chair the daily emergency sessions of the cabinet. The ministers will make decisions, consult with allies and review the situations presented in which, according to the "anticipated course of events," the military and internal political situations are described as well as the problems of food supplies for the civilian population and the response of the press to the events taking place.

Reports and commentary by the media will be invented accounts by employees of the German Press Office. Censorship, which is provided for by constitutional law during time of war, will not be in effect--much to the disappointment of some of the allies, particularly the British. Within NATO they have been urging the Germans for years to finally agree to curtail freedom of the press during times of crisis. Up to now the defense ministry in Bonn has resisted bravely. Those in charge of the German Press Office see war-time problems less in terms of censorship or preventing unfavorable reporting than in terms of having a platform for official declarations and appeals to the mass media. This is because in an actual war situation representatives of the press will not be allowed access to the sources of information in the bunker in the Ahr valley. They must stay in Bonn.

The purpose of the exercise is to train "high-level active political decision-makers" in crisis management and in "procedures" which have been developed in order to "reestablish the integrity of FRG territory should it become necessary." At any rate that is what it says in an internal administrative document. In reality, and to the regret of those who spent three year's worth of detailed effort on preparing the exercise, the politicians are not much inclined to go into the bunker. They are usually represented--like Kohl--by high-level bureaucratic officials. The only departmental head participating is Defense Minister Manfred Woerner who will offer his services for one day among the several involved to inform himself of the situation and also to "join the exercise for a few hours." The rest of the time he will be "represented" by permanent State Secretary Lothar Ruehl.
Other NATO countries draw the people to play the roles of the real politicians from far lower in the administrative hierarchy. The American president, who during an actual war would make the decision regarding the use of atomic weapons, is traditionally played by an "official below the level of state secretary," goes the careful criticism heard in Bonn. But the use of atomic weapons is not planned for "WINTEX 85" anyway because of the arrival of American reinforcements. It still remains a possibility however, because the crisis and war-time "scenario" should "leave as much maneuvering room as possible."

In addition to the military (up to the division level) and to Bonn's hundreds of ministry officials within the bunker, the governments of the Laender and--by chance only in those Laender governed by the CDU/CSU--the presiding government committees, as well as selected local communities will take part in the exercise. The response of local parliamentarians belonging to the Green Party is awaited with anticipation. For training purposes the local government councils are to participate in implementing emergency measures which may become necessary according to "information supplied by the leaders of the exercise." These measures involve such things as the use of rescue services, fire departments or police, for example, in the case of evacuations or following the destruction of a hospital or a bridge which is crucial not only for military convoys but also for maintaining food supplies to the civilian population. These activities should provide cities and towns the chance to practice implementing their own emergency plans now gathering dust on office shelves.

Regardless of how the Green Party members of the community councils and the leadership of Schreckenberger may effect the course of the exercise, the results are already in: According to press release by the FRG government, the exercise--held every two years--will "increase the defense readiness of NATO and the NATO member nations and emphasize the solidarity of the Western alliance. It is thus an important contribution by NATO and the FRG government to the cause of peace."

Emergency Preparedness Planning

West Berlin TAGESZEITUNG in German 26 Feb 85 p 3

[Article by Ursel Sieber and Franz Oberliessen: "War Games in Coat and Tie"]

[Excerpts] (in box) Bonn's Emergency Parliament

The 22 members of the Bundestag are:
CSU/CSU: Dr. Jenninger, Dr. Barzel, Dr. Dregger, Dr. Marx, Mueller (Remscheid), Reddemann, Ruehe, Schmitz (Baesweiler), Stuecklen, Dr. Waigel, Weiskirch (Olpe).
SPD: Dr. Vogel, Porzner, Dr. Apel, Jahn (Marburg), Roth, Westphal, Dr. Ehmk (Bonn), Mrs. Renger, Kolbow.
FDP: Mischnik
The Green Party: Schily
(One representative is also named for each delegate.)
In addition there are 11 members of the Bundesrat:
Dr. Eyrich (Baden-Wuerttemberg), Minister of State Schmidhuber (Bavaria), Dr. Scholz (Berlin), Senator Kahrs (Bremen), Senator Bobrecht (Hamburg), Dr. Guenther (Hesse), Minister Hasselmann (Lower Saxony), Minister Schnoor (North Rhine Westphalia), Minister of State Gaddum (Rhineland Palatinate), Dr. Knies (Saarland), Minister Schwarz (Schleswig-Holstein).
(The delegates are chosen by the Bundestag on the basis of party representation.)

Disaster service organizations of the Laender, local authorities, Kreis administrative bodies, presiding government committees, the postal service, the federal railroad, the leadership of the police and fire departments are expected to subordinate their organizations to military requirements within the scope of "overall defense." The German Red Cross, the largest assistance organization, has up to now not taken part in the exercise either at the federal or Land level. The exercise will practice the introduction of food rationing cards, compulsory service by the labor force, confiscation of vehicles and buildings, the shutting down of private telephone lines and the release of hospital beds for war casualties. As of March 7, the city of Hamburg is assigning 150 employees from within the administration to work in shifts on the exercise under the "direction of the central leadership of the city of Hamburg; "experts in other fields including public and private enterprises," along with bus companies, will also participate. "The 'scenario' is secret and cannot be revealed for reasons of national security," was the Senate's reply to an enquiry by the GAL (Green/Alternative List). In contrast to other kinds of maneuvers, WINTEX takes place unnoticed by the public because it is strictly an exercise on paper. Actual troops and weapons are not employed. All troop movements, battles and administrative measures take place only on paper, on the computer screen or by telephone. Mobilization is simulated within the government agencies, command centers and bunkers. The immediate effect on the population is only that normal administrative activities are at times set aside because of the exercise.

Daily Events and Inserted Events

The preparations for a WINTEX-CIMEX exercise begin at the NATO level in Brussels a good 2 1/2 years before the exercise takes place; today plans are already being made for WINTEX-CIMEX 87. Under the leadership of NATO headquarters in Shape, the basic direction the exercise will take is being determined by establishing the purpose and overall national objectives, and describing the initial international situation and the development of the political-military situation.

Then the military and civilian authorities within the individual NATO countries go into action; in the FRG the "Agency for Study and Training Exercises in the Bundeswehr" and the "Academy for Civil Defense" are in charge. Under the direction of the ministries of defense and interior these institutes implement and supplement the conditions outlined at the NATO level taking national aspects into account. In so doing, directives and guidelines called "daily events" and "inserted events" are prepared. What is meant by "daily events" is explained as follows by Colonel Hermann Holle at the "Agency for
Study and Training Exercises in the Bundeswehr" who is intimately involved with WINTEX-CIMEX: They "stipulate the framework for the prescribed and intended sequences of daily events within a national area in the course of the exercise." As examples Holle mentions, "subversive actions, supply problems, movement of refugees, border closings." "Inserted events" refers to events stipulated according to time, place and other closely related circumstances" which are "inserted as messages, orders, reports or proposals from the agencies in charge" during the exercise: The railroad bridge at (place) is badly damaged; repairs cannot be made before (date). From these "inserted events" the experienced people involved in the exercise know that detours must be organized for reinforcements.

WINTEX-CIMEX primarily covers the period prior to the outbreak of a war, in particular the mobilization phase. Only within the last few days does it come to the great (atomic) exchange of blows between "Blue" and "Orange" which, however, is strictly a military matter. At this time the civilian authorities no longer have anything to do. The civilian part of the exercise is concluded shortly beforehand.

Dutch Pacifists Pilfered Documentation

West Berlin TAGESZEITUNG in German 26 Feb 85 p 3

[Article: "'Onkrut's' Plunder"]

[Text] The heaviest veil of secrecy surrounds the international situation produced as a result of mobilization efforts and the military-political scenario on which WINTEX-CIMEX is based. Thanks to the anti-military group "Onkrut" of the Netherlands, we at least have a more concrete and tangible idea of what is being played out by the government officials with their secret documents.

Members of "Onkrut," armed with cutting torches, broke into two civil defense command bunkers in April 1983. They obtained four postal sacks full of documents including secret records of WINTEX-CIMEX 81. Parts of the 1983 scenario also fell into their hands. According to these documents, the exercise proceeded approximately as follows:

The increasing international economic crisis leads to internal political tensions in the western European nations, the U.S. and Canada. The U.S. confronts growing instability in the Near East by dispatching a large fleet of ships. The "Blue Alliance" (NATO) closely watches the increased military activities of the "Orange" (the Warsaw Pact) along the Norwegian and Turkish borders. The U.S. sends reinforcements to Europe. The "Orange" invade Yugoslavia...

Against this background the civilian authorities must deal with any internal political phenomena which may arise:

- problems with food and energy supplies
- chaos in terms of monetary transactions

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- guest workers depart in large numbers, creating difficulties in industrial production and military transports
- strikes in the armaments industry, and also in other enterprises
- large-scale peace demonstrations
- sabotaging of military facilities
- several million German refugees head west and become wedged together with troops moving east

Territorial Army Support Role

Herford KAMPFTRUPPEN/KAMPFUNTERSTUETZUNGSTRUPPEN in German Jan 85 pp 10-13

[Article by Manfred Schlenker: "The Exercise for Territorial Command Head-quarters" passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Excerpts] Practice and Training Possible for Territorial Command Head-quarters

Bearing the burden of national military defense, the territorial army has broad responsibilities during times of crisis and war. These responsibilities include:

- serving an intermediary function between the military and civilian sectors
- preserving maneuverability, particularly for the NATO forces
- special leadership and support tasks
- guaranteeing the combat readiness of army personnel, logistics and medical services, and providing supplies for their own forces and to a limited extent also for allied forces, Bundeswehr administrators and needy civilians
- supporting civil defense

These five areas should give a clearer indication of the intermediary function and the maintenance of maneuverability as examples of possible exercises during WINTEX.

The Intermediary Function

The intermediary function pervades all areas of responsibility with regard to military national defense and is at the same time a separate responsibility which is realized through cooperation.

This includes representing the requirements of the NATO forces and the forces remaining under national command to the civilian sector on the one hand; and representing the concerns of the civil defense sector to the armed forces on the other. Opposing interests must be balanced out; and planning must be coordinated.

The territorial army already is assigned this task in peacetime. However, during times of crisis and war, rapidly changing situations mean carrying out this task under substantially increased time pressure.

Plans and procedures agreed upon in peacetime must then prove their usefulness; situation-specific proposals and requests by the military and also by the civilian sector must be checked, coordinated and passed on. Example:
Brigade 48, as a reserve unit within the division, is responsible among other things for capturing enemies who have broken through the lines. After scouting the area the brigade informs VKK (Military Subregion Command) 811 that preparations should be made to blow up the high-tension-line towers located at the scouted positions in order to improve the chances of using the MILAN antitank rocket. Twenty minutes earlier the head of the liaison detachment of VKK 811 informed the chief administrative official of the kreis of this operation planned by the brigade. This official has raised serious objections to the plan because the high-tension-lines are of great importance in terms of providing energy supplies to the kreis capital, to some of the companies on which people depend for their livelihood and to the hospital.

In this situation the VKK must balance the interests of the civilian side against those of the brigade.

A possible way of balancing those interests would be, for example, to suggest shutting off the power to the high-tension lines shortly before the engagement begins.

Due to such wide-ranging participation in the exercise, WINTEX-CIMEX offers a way to practice such potential situations with the involvement of all military and civilian agencies. The advantage over other exercises is that requests and decisions are not simulated by the territorial command posts but are made by the actual authorized agencies.

Thus command headquarters has a unique opportunity to gain experience which can be applied during additional planning later on.

It thus holds that:
WINTEX provides for experiences much larger in scope than other exercises.

Maintaining Maneuverability

Maneuverability allows the NATO forces to base their operations on secured areas, communications links and objects.

This task is frequently viewed in terms only of protecting rear areas. Although that is its central purpose, it is only a part of its overall task. Practicing the other parts involved in the overall task is just as important.

This also includes, for example, managing military traffic and damage control.

Managing Military Traffic

Why can the management of military traffic be practiced more extensively during WINTEX than in other exercises?

It is through participation by the traffic organization of the army and that of the other NATO countries, as well as that of the reinforcements from outside the country, for example, that it is possible for cooperation by
the national traffic organization to be practiced in accordance with procedures agreed upon for traffic across national boundaries.

An important point is also to include traffic problems which can result from residence regulations for the population.

The following situation, for example, is possible:
/In the areas assigned to the 24th (Combat Unit) Division, the scene of heavy fighting, refugees have been fleeing for the past hour. The refugees are using numerous streets which are to be used in dispatching the reserve corps of the IVth (Combat Unit) Corps in six hours. Ten minutes ago the Division appealed to the VBK (Military Region Command) 811 for the assistance of civilian agencies in diverting the fleeing refugees away from these streets. /

Through participation by:
- the civilian agencies responsible for enforcing residence regulations
- the authorities responsible for dispatching the police
- organizations responsible for managing military traffic,
WINTEX offers the otherwise seldom available civilian participants a chance to work through the problem, and urges military commanders at all levels to take evacuations and fleeing refugees into account in their operational planning.

Damage Control

Another area of consideration is damage control.

Damage to vital or defense-related areas of the infrastructure may affect maneuverability. Rapid repair is thus requested by the field forces.

The following situation, for example, is possible:
/Helicopter Brigade 95 sends request to VKK 711 to repair roads leading to and from the bridge near Village A within 24 hours in order to permit supply traffic to resume.

The damage estimate by the VKK and the situation in the civilian construction sector (lack of construction materials and equipment) indicate that repairs cannot be made in less than 85 hours.

Moreover, the VKK has received additional requests for repair work from other field forces.

In this situation Territorial Command Headquarters can do the following: practice procedures as they pertain to the infrastructure in conjunction with the Bundeswehr administration and the civilian authorities and agencies, set priorities and at the same time provide the armed forces with a realistic picture of the time frame required and the repair options.

From these two examples it should be apparent that WINTEX can provide more extensive and more realistic training than other exercises.
Conclusion

These examples should highlight the importance of the WINTEX-CIMEX exercise for Territorial Command Headquarters.

Important prerequisites for taking full advantage of the exercise are:

- imaginative preparation for the exercise which will provide practice in all principal staff functions
- thorough briefing of all participants in the exercise

The more these two factors are in evidence, the more interesting and informative the exercise will be.

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CSO: 3620/336
IMPACT OF NATO STRATEGY UPON BUNDESWEHR ARMAMENTS PLANNING

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Apr 85 pp 14-20

[Article by Brig Gen Helge Hansen, military adviser to the FRG NATO delegation, Brussels: "NATO Strategy and Its Impact on Armaments"]

[Text] The political strategy goal of the alliance is to prevent war through deterrence and to restore the "status quo ante" in case of conflict. This amounts to a defensive strategy because NATO will never take the first step. It will always perform leave the initiative to the adversary. It will do so as regards the choice of the area where the adversary's attack takes place; as regards the time factor of when he decides to attack and it will always have to leave the choice of what weapons he uses to start a conflict to the adversary. The following article by Brig Gen Helge Hansen of the German delegation to NATO in Brussels deals with NATO's strategic goals and ideas on how to meet a possible case of conflict; how it means to keep it from happening and with what its most wide-ranging aims are in the field of armaments and equipment.

At a time when the alliance has by and large gotten over the discussion on modernization and the initial deployment of medium-range missiles in Western Europe and the strategic principles of the alliance have been restated there is an increasing awareness of the fact that we must do what is necessary to maintain that strategy by improving our conventional defense capability both by our individual contributions to it and by joint undertakings.

In my view, the nuclear weapons and the conventional capability issues represent two sides of the same coin, i.e. the onward development of our strategic principles. To that extent, the recurrent call for a new alliance strategy seems to me to overshoot the mark. The flexible response concept continues to be totally valid because it consists of the following elements:
—the principle of the prevention of war through deterrence;

—the principle of the symmetry of risk as between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which forms the basis of this deterrence;

—the principle of deliberate, controlled reprisal to re-emphasize to the adversary what the risks connected with an aggression initiated by him are and to cause him to stop that aggression;

—the principle of forward defense which includes our territory in the protective sanctuary and keeps it from becoming a military "glacis" in case of conflict.

In fact, the debate within the alliance itself and politically aware public opinion over the past few months has shown that there is a need not to rethink the actual principles underlying NATO strategy but rather to update the means to be employed in order to implement them, if necessary.

In this context, what are nuclear and conventional weapons to be used for by the alliance?

Conventional weapons have one basic role to play: their purpose is to protect territory. If the integrity of any particular territory is violated, their job is to restore the "status quo ante." Nuclear weapons cannot take their place in performing this function. Nuclear weapons are not military means in the first instance but instruments designed to influence the political rationality of the adversary; to make him aware of the risks inherent in a possible conflict and, in case of actual conflict, to try to restore his rationality under political control and in pursuance of political goals. Simply put, conventional weapons are to be used, if and when hostilities have actually erupted whereas nuclear weapons are primarily designed to prevent such an eventuality.

But I do want to stress that the one who initiates the attack does not have the power of selecting the weapons the defender will use to strike back. No adversary can count on the fact that he will be able to start a conflict using a specific type of weapon and that we will stink to that weapon. He who starts a war bears the full responsibility for the consequences which may arise from it. This means in turn that the adversary's territory would not be a sanctuary in case of such a conflict, i.e., that it could not be excluded from the consequences of such a conflict. Now this applies to the use of both conventional and nuclear weapons. Nor does it imply that we will accept and fight out such a conflict in an
unlimited way as regards duration, intensity and territorial scope or that we will allow ourselves to be confronted with the alternative of avoiding the consequences of a conflict by surrendering unconditionally.

In the light of the above, what is the purpose of improving our conventional defense capability?

As far as I can see, we must have a conventional defense capability at our disposal in the years to come which makes it impossible for the opponent to hope for a quick military victory no matter under what conditions. We would achieve two things by having such a capability at our disposal. On the one hand, it would confront the opponent with an additional risk, i.e. the risk of military defeat and on the other hand, it would preserve—so as not to say underscore—the credibility of the threat of nuclear escalation, since the possible use of nuclear weapons would not be the response to the threat of military defeat of the alliance or a kind of "last ditch escalation." The fact is that this would demonstrate that nuclear weapons were not being used as a substitute for the lack of combat capability on the battlefield but as a deliberate priority means—based on political considerations—toward the end of restoring deterrence.

Strategic Criteria

What are the actual strategic criteria which should guide us in seeking to achieve an improvement in our conventional defense capability? Our conventional forces will have reached that goal, if and when

—the Soviet Union must go on the assumption that any attempt to achieve rapid and deep penetration of NATO forward defenses by means of a surprise attack of the Warsaw Pact forces will be doomed to failure;

—the Soviet Union must accept the fact that its offensive military resources in the air will be neutralized after the start of hostilities by offensive and defensive air actions on the part of NATO;

—the Soviet Union must anticipate that the Warsaw Pact forces will encounter intact NATO forward defenses even when the WP second echelon has been committed to action;

—the Soviet Union realizes that it will not be in a position to cut the alliance's primary sea links for any appreciable length of time;
the Soviet Union realizes that it will not be able rapidly to circumvent the nuclear threshold and will therefore be faced with an incalculably high risk to its own existence.

What does this mean in concrete terms? Our conventional forces of the future will have to be in a position to:

—reconnoiter the foe at an earlier stage and to commence fighting him sooner after he launches his attack. At the same time, our forces must be ready to defend themselves sooner and be able to hold out longer;

—reconnoiter the opponent far deeper inside his own territory than previously and be prepared to engage him in combat in the depth of his territory as soon as he launches his attack. At the same time, our forces must be able to limit the widening of a conflict on our own soil as well as defend against and repel any quick thrusts into the depth of the areas we intend to defend;

—weaken the combat effectiveness of the foe early on during the deployment and advance stages at the start of his attack so that he will not be able to affect the balance of forces on the battlefield to his advantage at will. At the same time, we must be able to maintain our own combat effectiveness for a longer period of time at a level which rules out a rapid deterioration of the balance of forces to our disadvantage.

How can we attain this goal? In the first instance, our efforts must be focused on those areas which have an immediate impact on the capabilities we intend to create. These are:

—enhancing the reaction capability of our forces which depends on the one hand on the operational readiness level and the combat readiness of our forces and on the other on actual warning time;

—enhancing the staying power of our forces which depends on manpower reserves, our equipment and ammunition stores as well as the prompt arrival of overseas reinforcements;
—enhancing the combat effectiveness of our forces through modernization of weapons and equipment and the addition of new conventional options.

The second thing we will have to do in these areas is to:

—identify existing weaknesses and then correct them;
—make sure that a continuing modernization of our forces is undertaken;
—open up additional options by systematically putting new technologies in operation.

For the time being, however, it would seem necessary from our point of view to adapt the needs of our own ground, air and naval forces to an overall operational concept of NATO so as to make sure that the limited resources are employed according to specific, agreed upon priorities. This is a task presently being undertaken by the alliance which is in the process of developing the so-called overall conceptual guidelines.

Looking at common alliance priorities from the German point of view, we would come up with the following list of priorities for our ground, air and naval forces in line with the abovementioned strategic-operational considerations, with our limited financial resources and the present state of technological feasibility:

Our Priorities

Our first priority is the defense against the about 57 divisions of the USSR and its allies which are stationed in the GDR, the CSSR and Poland. Of these 57 divisions about 27 are deployed in the forward line at the start of the attack with the remaining 30 deployed in a depth of up to 150 kilometers so that they can be used to create points of main effort up front.

We assign the same priority to air defenses against an expected massive surprise attack by enemy aircraft and to attacks by our own aircraft which should follow immediately, if at all possible, against the enemy's offensive air capability on its own soil. We would also assign the same priority to the operations of our naval forces and naval aviation to defend against WP naval forces far in advance of our own coastlines and to interdict WP lines of advance. All these tasks will have to be undertaken almost simultaneously. Guaranteeing this first priority is synonymous with a credible capability to implement forward defense operations.
Our second priority is to engage the enemy ground forces stationed in the so-called western military districts of the Soviet Union in the depth of their own territory. The possibility of such engagement offers itself at certain narrow points, dictated by geography, which force the enemy to mass his forces there. The deployment of these forces may be expected to take place during the first 5 to 7 days of the conflict.

Our third priority is to engage enemy ground forces while in motion and/or at brief rest stops in the course of deployment not dictated by terrain difficulties but by operational considerations.

The second and third priority goals thus are of a complementary nature. Their purpose is to lend support to the forces committed to the task of forward defense on the boundaries of the alliance.

Armaments Planning for Our Forces

The abovementioned tasks and the order of their priority correspond to current armaments planning of our armed forces:

—the enhancement of the reconnaissance and antitank capability of our ground forces through the introduction of improved reconnaissance drones; of the all-weather, night vision capable antitank helicopter (PAH-2) and the MARS medium-range artillery missile system using bomblets, shaped-charge mines and terminally guided, armor-piercing ammunition;

—the enhancement of our air defense capability through the introduction of the Patriot and Roland air defense missile systems and the development of the fighter aircraft for the nineties—and along with this, the optimization of the Tornado air attack system through the use of MW-Is and Maverick Ds,

—finally, the outfitting of our naval forces with second generation naval guided missiles; the introduction of a naval attack helicopter; an air defense missile system; a new generation of mines and, in the long term, the introduction of the frigate 90 and the 211 class submarines.

It is easy to understand that we would look beyond the equipment currently in the planning stage and direct our attention to our medium-term and long-range technological needs which will arise from the alliance point of view in terms of foreseeable military-operational tasks.
In this connection, let me now turn to FOFA, the long-range planning guidelines on Follow-On-Forces Attack, recently approved by the alliance.

**FOFA**

The purpose of this guideline is to create an increasing longer-range capability to bottle up the enemy's so-called second echelons (or simply reserves) which are brought up behind the attacking forces at the start of an aggression so that the enemy cannot constantly feed its attack from the depth of its own territory or shift forces at will with the aim of seriously altering the balance of forces in his favor at the focal point of attack. These second echelons or reserves exist at all WP levels of command—at the division, army and battlefront level. It must be our aim to reconnoiter them early enough and in sufficient depth, i.e. starting at 50 kilometers and reaching as far as 500 kilometers, if possible; to pinpoint targets and to keep pursuing them so they can be promptly engaged—whereby their effectiveness on the frontlines, i.e. ahead of our defense positions and inside our territory can be minimized. The principle on which this guideline is based is not new. It has been one of the responsibilities of our air forces since the early seventies.

In view of the disadvantages we still face in terms of our limited reconnaissance capability in the depth of the enemy's territory and the relatively minor impact of our available weapons (preferably bombs), the alliance would in some instances be forced to turn to nuclear weapons to do this job. But as the appropriate technologies gradually become available (and that is the aim of this guideline from the standpoint of armaments policy) this military task can be carried out by conventional means on the one hand and more effectively on the other because it can be dealt with in a more systematic manner.

Briefly put, the planning guidelines just approved are not new in principle; but the means to be used to implement them are new. The guideline's aim is to enhance our forward defense capability, i.e. it is a defensive strategy from the standpoint of political strategy in that it focuses on the restoration of our territorial integrity but not on more far-reaching political or indeed military goals. Essentially, the aim is to combine certain individual components in an overall system in order to establish urgently needed military-operational options. Let me list the various components of the system:

- reconnaissance, target location and target tracking;
- immediate transmission of collected data;
—processing of information for quick command decisions; implementation of some via troublefree command and operational telecommunications;

—high-penetration, accurate-aim weapons and munitions carriers of various ranges using various types of ammunition and sub-ammunition to strike different types of objectives;

—capability to interdict enemy command and operations telecommunications by means of electronic interference to the greatest extent possible.

This makes it clear that we are not dealing with entirely new responsibilities or entirely new ways of meeting them but with a system combining various components to optimize their effectiveness.

There are three ways of going about the enhancement of our capabilities in these fields:

—the optimization of existing equipment, i.e. the enhancement of its combat effectiveness;

—the gradual improvement of new equipment as yet to be introduced;

—the development and procurement of entirely new equipment designed for new tasks.

Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition

In the area of reconnaissance and target acquisition, we must differentiate between the national component (which goes up to the corps level) and the integrated component (which goes from the corps level up).

The national component comprises the organic reconnaissance systems at the battalion, brigade, division and corps levels. The greatest depth of reconnaissance—the so-called corps sphere of interest—extends up to 300 kilometers, with lesser distances applying to the lower levels of command. From the military standpoint, the various systems must be coordinated as part of a real-time operation, providing for data correlation and an around-the-clock, all-weather capability. In view of its technological obsolescence, there are serious limits to the possibility of optimizing existing equipment. What we need above all are short-range electro-optical sensors and in addition, acoustic, seismic and infrared sensors capable of identifying targets, e.g. distinguishing between different types of tanks and of transmitting data over longer distances. If at all possible, this should be passive equipment.
The integrated component, above the level of corps, calls for a genuinely coordinated system. The reconnaissance centers assigned to army groups and/or supreme commands should either be directly connected to the various national reconnaissance systems and/or have multinationally operated surveillance systems (such as the AWACS) at their disposal. Once more, this calls for quasi real-time operation, all-weather and round-the-clock capability and a range of approximately 1,000 kilometers in order to spot, monitor, locate and identify targets. The biggest challenge faced by such systems would be their vulnerability in case of long-lasting surveillance and target-tracking operations. Present equipment might be optimized by equipping the Tornado with EW and/or enhancing and expanding SIAR capability. Improvements could be made on the basis of Stealth technology and indirect, i.e., passive friend/foe identification systems. New equipment might include depth reconnaissance drones, depth reconnaissance cruise missiles, systems similar to AWACS and expanded reconnaissance by satellites.

Command Resources

A second important area is that of command resources which include command systems and communications transmission systems.

Our command post technology—particularly that of the German ground forces—lags behind that of comparable NATO members generally speaking. In a broader context we might say that our armed forces within the alliance are quite far behind in this regard although the time factor is of cardinal importance in reaching command decisions. Our goal in this area then is to gain time by means of data reduction, data preparation and data display at all command levels.

By making use of new technologies, it should be possible to construct small, highly resistant systems with a high level of redundancy and protection against the effects of enemy EW and EMP. It will be essential to provide interoperability in the transfer of data from the national to the NATO-integrated systems.

It seems it will be difficult to optimize the communications transmission systems. Decisions on the use of new technologies are therefore essential. The need here is for extensive automation, redundancy, protection and wide-ranging crypto operation capability.

Weapons and Munitions

Weapons carriers as well as weapons and munitions for target engagement offer a wide range of possibilities for improvement of combat effectiveness. The short and medium term armaments decisions already cited which have thus far been reached in the area of weapons carriers are designed
in the first instance to enhance and improve combat effectiveness with the main emphasis on increasing the range, the night vision capability and the fire-and-forget capability as well as on improving armor. In the long term, however, new systems will become absolutely essential so as to provide relief for our manned aircraft at distances from over 30 to about 500 kilometers. They will be used to support them and not to substitute for them.

In fact, their use should make it possible to free the more valuable, manned system for more sophisticated tasks while support operations would be taken over by battle drones, cruise missiles and at times even by ballistic missiles. While the former could be used to attack mobile area targets, the latter are better suited for use against point targets because of their great accuracy. In the weapons and munitions area, decisions have been reached on procurement and stockpiling which will result in a very substantial enhancement of combat effectiveness. But it does not seem sufficient to optimize over the short and medium term. Improvements by means of terminal guidance control with laser illumination as well as the improvement of shaped-charge munitions have their obvious weaknesses and limitations. New developments of passive homing, intelligent ammunition through the use of infrared search heads and EHF technology will be essential, e.g. the development of antiradar ammunition. Intelligent mines capable of combating tanks with improved armor as well as relatively inexpensive area ammunition will also have to be developed.

Electronic Warfare

Electronic warfare offers a great number of possibilities for defensive as well as offensive operations. For obvious reasons, high priority must be assigned to safeguarding our command and control communications against enemy EW even under the most adverse conditions. In times of tension and crisis and in case of conflict, they are a prerequisite for well-functioning crisis management at the highest military and, above all, political levels—including possible consultations on the use of nuclear weapons. In a national defense emergency, they provide the military command with a means of taking the best possible advantage of firepower and mobility in rapidly changing situations. The introduction of digital communications equipment will permit us to make an almost exponential leap forward in this field.

In the field of offensive electronic warfare, the war in Lebanon has clearly demonstrated once again that the interference with and/or elimination of enemy reconnaissance and communications may at times result in more rapid and above all less dissipative gains than the actual use of manpower.

From what I have said thus far I hope it has become clear that the coordinated system I have been describing is an improvement in several ways over previous coordination in the area of military policy planning and armaments policy financing.
—with regard to the need for interoperability relating to both the national and the integrated systems;

—with regard to the technological parameters both as relates to technology transfer among members of the alliance and the prevention of the undesired transfer of information to the enemy;

—and finally, with regard to the financial basis both as it relates to national and joint financing and to the competition between the private sector enterprises in the United States and the more predominant—ly government-controlled armament industry of Europe—not to speak of the coexistence of "rich" and "poor" nations within the alliance itself.

Prospects

In the years ahead, the conventional defense capability of the alliance will be the subject of a debate between two different schools of thought and their particular views regarding security policy. The active and self-confident policy of the United States, oriented toward its global and regional leadership role and based on military strength, is frequently confronted with a basic philosophy on the part of most European members of the alliance which restricts itself to Europe to a large extent, which is hesitant and at times wracked by self-doubt as to the effectiveness of its security policy potential. The FRG’s primary strong point from the standpoint of alliance policy consists in our economic strength, in the recognized substance of the extent and the quality of our defense efforts, our steadfastness with regard to the deployment of the medium-range missiles and, most recently, our political courage with respect to the decision on lengthening our draftees’ terms of service. On the opposite side of the ledger, there is an increasingly critical view of our allocation of resources for defense which has raised sub liminal doubts—particularly in the United States—regarding the future of our major role within the alliance. In view of our inescapable role as a pilot nation for the European segment of the alliance, it will be our job during the present phase of fairly critical transatlantic relations within the alliance—both in our own interest and in that of Europe as a whole—to dispel these doubts and to avoid irritations.

This will depend in no small measure on how well we all succeed in bringing about a consensus within our own society once again on the following basic issues:

—the basic values of our form of government and our social system and the nature of the systems of neighboring countries which are opposed to our society on ideological and power political grounds. Or to put
it even more simply: the incompatibility of freedom, justice and human dignity on this side and despotism, injustice and coercion on the other!

—the resulting will to self-preservation of our society as an absolutely essential condition for a willingness not merely to tolerate security strategies but to accept responsibility for them—a strategy which does not hold out the promise of security without risk but which has a proven record of keeping the risk to security at a minimum;

—a willingness to make the necessary sacrifices on behalf of the defense of this society in the absence of which our armed forces will not have what it takes to prevent war. In this context, one should also take into consideration that the Soviet Union is well aware of our high level of technological-industrial achievement which means that the type of equipment we provide to our armed forces undoubtedly constitutes a clear signal to the Soviets as to the extent to which our society is prepared to make the actual expenditures necessary to provide for the best possible level of security, i.e. the extent to which this society has the will to make genuine use of its capabilities for the purpose of self-defense. If it becomes clear that we do not do this, it will lead to far-reaching conclusions as to the credibility of our will to self-preservation—with all the consequences for our security arising from it.
MILITARY SCIENCE INSTITUTE CHIEF URGES MORE STUDY ACTIVITY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 17 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Prof Mikko Viitasalo, the research director of the Military Science Institute; he was formerly first secretary of the Science Advisory Board for National Defense at the Defense Ministry: "We in Finland Are Contributing Less and Less to Defense Research"]

[Text] Research and development activity is generally conceived of as a progressive and positive effort in the development of societies. Reservations on its value are attached to it when military research and development operations are involved, the object of which is, among other things, the development of new weapons systems and methods of warfare.

In Finland there is little military research and development activity and it is purely defensive in nature. Since this activity is funded almost entirely by the Defense Ministry, we are justified in applying to it the handy and comprehensive expression: "defense research;"

Here in Finland the need for defense research is also obvious. This year our defense expenditures will amount to about 5 billion markkas. Despite the low figure in comparison with other countries, our defense expenditures nevertheless account for over 5 percent of national expenditures and 1.6 percent of the GNP.

It is unthinkable that we could today get along without research and development operations in so important a field requiring abundant national resources. The development of our Armed Forces will also in future require an ever-growing contribution to our research and development activities, just as other national fields of activity do.

About Emphasis on Defense

The general objective of Finnish defense research is — taking into account economic resources — to produce the military equipment, systems and methods that will enable our Armed Forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them.

From the nature of Finland's defense system it follows that an emphasis on defense is reflected in the development of all weapons systems and operational methods.
We do not ourselves develop the most expensive and complex military equipment; we procure that from abroad. Fighter planes, tanks and missiles for the different branches, among other items, belong in this category. Because of the restrictions imposed by the Paris peace treaty, bombers and submarines are not a part of our Armed Forces equipment.

Finland views nuclear as well as other weapons of mass destruction negatively. The enormous resources of the superpowers' military research efforts are in large part directed toward the development of mass destruction weapons, especially nuclear weapons.

In their minds citizens often associate military research and development activities precisely with the development of superpower mass destruction weapons or the development of state-of-the-art conventional warfare equipment. Finnish defense research is far removed from these.

The effects of mass destruction weapons must be studied here too so that we can acquire the fundamentals for our protective measures and for training in that field. From the effects of a nuclear explosion an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has most recently come to light, something that was intensively studied in Finland too in the 1960's and 1970's. The phenomenon may be compared to a powerful thunderbolt. Its damaging effects are focused primarily on a nation's electronic systems. Thanks to the knowledge of it gained through research, they have been able to develop protective procedures.

Expenditures for Finnish defense research for the current year are estimated at 40 million markkas. Since research funding has so far come almost entirely from the Defense Ministry, we may compare them with both defense expenditures for 1985 and the nation's research funding.

We use less than 1 percent of our defense expenditures for research and development operations. Defense research will probably account for 2 percent of the nation's research funding this year. The percentage has been alarmingly reduced. According to statistics on research, it was still 4 percent in 1975.

Cutting corners in our contribution to research and development activities will mean a setback and in time greater dependence on orders and procurements from abroad. They have completed about 200 work years of research at the Defense Ministry or in organizations funded by it.

Comparisons with the corresponding expenditures of foreign countries must be made with great caution. In order to accurately compare the expenditures of different nations, we would have to know which expenditures are chalked up to research and development activities. In some cases the costs incurred in, for example, the testing of a prototype and the evaluation of a new product are counted as expenditures.

The Stockholm Peace Research Institute's (SIPRI) 1984 yearbook, however, provides abundant data on the tendencies followed by expenditures for military research and development operations and expenditures for similar purposes throughout the world.
Finland Trails Behind

According to SIPRI, in 1983 the United States expended $22 billion for military research and development activities, Great Britain $3.5 billion, France $3.1 billion and West Germany $900,000. Since the figures are given in 1980 dollars, they should be compared with one another.

Since accurate information on Soviet and Chinese military research and development activities is lacking, knowledge of total worldwide expenditures for military research and development activities depends on an estimate.

The 1984 SIPRI yearbook estimate of 1983 military research and development expenditures throughout the world is $60 billion. The expenditures in question were less than 12 percent of defense expenditures in the United States and the same in Great Britain. The corresponding percentage in France was about 11 percent, but only slightly more than 5 percent in the Federal Republic of Germany.

According to estimates, Norway's corresponding expenditures in 1983 were 296 million Norwegian kroner, Sweden's 1,482 billion Swedish kroner (fiscal year 1982-1983), Finland's 32 million markkas and Denmark's 6 million Danish kroner. (As concerns Denmark, there is a note added to the table in the 1984 SIPRI yearbook to the effect that the expenditures for some new programs are not included in the figures.)

In Sweden defense research expenditures accounted for about 6 percent of defense expenditures (1982), here in Finland slightly less than 1 percent and in Norway about 2 percent.

In Finland defense research accounted for 2 percent of the nation's research expenditures in 1983, 9.6 percent in Norway in 1983 and 19.2 percent in Sweden in fiscal year 1982-1983. The figures are from the 1984 SIPRI yearbook and there is reason for bearing in mind the exceptions I noted earlier when comparing them.

Important Key Areas

The question has recently been raised as to how we might also take into account security policy considerations in deciding on key areas in technological policy and in drawing up plans. Armed Forces commander Jaakko Valtanen referred to this in his address at the inauguration of the 95th Armed Forces course last March. Among other things, he asserted that there was a need for determining "what the present-day and future technological areas are in which Finnish know-how is at its best and which represent those interests of national defense that must be monitored."

From the standpoint of the Armed Forces, the important areas, among others, are territorial surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence, the applications of electronics and automation required by guidance systems, the transport techniques of the different branches, surface handling and equipment technology and the electrotechnical solutions required by our fire-control and fire systems.
In Sweden they are becoming familiar with the same sorts of problems on an extensive scale. The Academy of Engineering Sciences (Ingeniorvetenskapsakademien) and the Royal Academy of Military Sciences (Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademien) are working on a project based on four symposiums.

At one of the two symposiums that have already been held they studied those trends of technical development that are of importance in terms of industrial strategy and security policy. The subject of the second one was Sweden’s dependence on foreign countries observed from the standpoint of security policy. To be held later are still two symposiums, the subjects of which will be electronics and information technology and the opportunities and threats they pose to Sweden as well as the research, industrial and security policies for the 1990’s.

**Firms Participating**

In Finland importance must be attached to how we can get firms more extensively and voluntarily interested in developing defense materiel in their production and applying new technologies to these products. We should also attach increasing importance to the activation of small and medium-size industry and to familiarity with the defense sector.

This type of product development effort has its difficulty in Finland. Production runs risk being small and unit prices high. Exports too have their own special features. If we want to preserve our know-how in this risk-prone sector, full and systematic support provided firms by the government would appear to be the only solution.

The end result would in any event have to be such that a firm does not incur losses if, for example, it has developed defense equipment on the basis of an Armed Forces report recommending it and the specifications, and it has not succeeded in delivering it to the Armed Forces or exporting it. The know-how will then remain in our own country and be invested in our security.
COMPOSITION OF NEW DEFENSE PLANNING COMMISSION ANNOUNCED

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 19 Apr 85 p 16

[Article: "Matti Tuovinen Heads Defense Policy Commission"]

[Text] On Thursday the government appointed the "parliamentary Defense Policy Planning Commission," which has been long in preparation. In terms of size and mandate, the commission is smaller than the previous parliamentary defense committees.

They ended up with the form of a commission primarily after the Social Democratic Party (SDP) had rejected the appointment of a new committee. The Social Democrats did not consider it desirable for them to once again undertake to interpret the commitments imposed by the Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Pact in a committee, as had been the case in earlier committees.

A commission differs from a committee in that a commission can only make recommendations with regard to plans drafted by other officials. A committee, on the other hand, independently formulates its own reports.

The just-appointed Defense Policy Planning Commission will be asked for a recommendation on Armed Forces development plans for 1987-1991 before this spring is out.

The chairman of the parliamentary Defense Policy Planning Commission is retired Secretary of State Matti Tuovinen representing the Center Party and the vice chairman is Member of Parliament Pekka Myllyniemi (Social Democrat).

Two of the commission's total of seven members come from the SDP and one each from the Conservative Party, the Center Party, the SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League], the SMP [Finnish Rural Party] and the RKP [Swedish People's Party]. Personal alternates were appointed for the members.

Experts representing the Defense Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Finance Ministry, as well as two secretaries, have been appointed to the commission. It was decided to provisionally set the term of office at the time remaining during this session of Parliament, that is, until the end of March 1987.
Member of Parliament Esko Aho has been appointed commission chairman Tuovinen's alternate. Vice chairman Myllyniemi's alternate is Member of Parliament Anna-Liisa Piipari.

The other members and vice members are: party secretary Erkki Liikanen, Social Democrat, (international affairs secretary Lauri Kangas); vice chairman Tapani Morttinen, Conservative, (Member of Parliament Mauri Miettinen); chief editor Jorma Hentila, People's Democrat, (department head Kalevi Suomela); Member of Parliament Veikko Vennamo, SMP, (Member of Parliament Urho Pohjo); and party secretary Peter Stenlund, RKP, (information chief Henrik Nordell). The SKP's [Finnish Communist Party] Stalinist minority lost the seat it used to have on the defense committees.

The permanent experts are Vice Adm Jan Klenberg of the General Staff, Undersecretary of State Klaus Tornudd of the Foreign Ministry and Budget Secretary Vesa Jalkola of the Finance Ministry. The commission's secretaries are Col Jorma Kaarmola and Chief Inspector Pauli Jarvenpaa.

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CSO: 3617/105
FORMER ARMY CHIEF IN BOOK DENIES USSR COULD INVADE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish: 28 Apr 85 p 20

[Article from TIDNINGARNAS TELEGRAMBYRA]

[Text] Neither of the Great-Power blocs today has sufficiently strong forces to invade any major part of Sweden in a surprise attack.

The superiority which the Soviets are said to have in Central Europe is, moreover, not adequate for a surprise attack to succeed.

These conclusions were drawn by former Army Chief Nils Skold in a newly published book "Relative Strengths in Europe."

In order for an attack to succeed, experts on strategy traditionally find that a superiority of strength of 3 to 1 on the part of the attacker is required.

In his book, Nils Skold shows that after 24 to 36 hours of preparation, the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe has a superiority of approximately 1.6 to 1.

Not even against the Scandinavian countries will the Soviet Union be capable of mobilizing sufficient forces to bring about an early outcome. Taking North Norway without any large-scale preparations is not possible, and only limited parts of the Finnmark may be conquered.

Should the Soviet Union want to carry through a surprise attack on Norrbotten, they have at their disposal only one air-landing division, the rest would have to go by land through Finland with all of the problems this would entail.

7262
CSO: 3650/233
DEFENSE COMMITTEE MP CITES SHORTAGE OF HELICOPTERS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 Apr 85 p 3

[Article by Hans Lindblad, Representative of Liberal Party in 1984 Defense Committee]

[Text] Including reserves, Sweden has an army of 700,000 soldiers. To serve the army in warfare, we have 40 helicopters, including mobilized civilian helicopters. In Sweden, there is thus a helicopter for every 17,500 soldiers. The U.S. army has a helicopter for every 163 soldiers, writes Hans Lindblad.

The United States has got an army that is twice as big as that of Sweden but more than 200 times the number of helicopters for transport and attack purposes in warfare on land. Sweden has got a hundred times more soldiers per helicopter than the United States and thirteen times more than West Germany. This is a strange balance in a developed industrial country with a high level of technical know-how.

Our modern equipment has dropped sharply. The situation is worst within the air force, where the number of fighter aircraft since 1960 has dropped from 33 to nearly eleven divisions, at the same time as the threat in the air has become much greater. The six anti-aircraft [guided] missile divisions for high altitudes (Bloodhound) were abolished and sold back to Great Britain at a low price. The number of submarines has been reduced by 50 percent and is now twelve.

Inferior Protection

However, we have the same number of soldiers as before, for which reason only some of them may be provided with modern equipment. Inferior protection, a low rate of mobility and limited firepower of the units may be disastrous in a combat situation marked by rapid movements and intensive fire from an attacker. Large numbers of soldiers and inferior protection involve the risk of enormous losses.

Swedish soldiers lack protective vests, even if such vests in many situations provide protection against splinters and bullets. In Israel, protective vests are considered an obvious necessity. In Norway, the army may for the present defense budget period state that "the procurement of personal protective suits is nearly completed."
In spite of the fact that our country is large and distances are long, the Swedish Defense has got extremely few helicopters for the conveyance of patients in war. The longer it takes for the wounded to become operated, the higher the mortality and disability rates. Sweden has an unfortunate balance between the number of soldiers and facilities for transportation and care of wounded soldiers.

The importance of helicopters in modern warfare has increased enormously. Helicopters were used to a vast extent by the United States in Vietnam and by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It is thought-provoking to make comparisons between Sweden and other countries. The use of helicopters in hunting down submarines and for other purposes than warfare on land is not taken into account in the comparison. I have taken the figures from THE MILITARY BALANCE, published by the Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

The army of the United States comprises, including reserves, 1,463,000 persons (139,500 of whom are women). If we deduct 250 training helicopters, the U.S. army has 9,000 helicopters at its disposal. That gives one helicopter per 163 soldiers.

Including reserves, the West German army has approximately 900,000 soldiers. It has 697 helicopters, thus one helicopter per approximately 1,300 soldiers. In defensive warfare within the NATO area, West German units will probably receive helicopter assistance from American units.

One for Every 17,500

Including reserves, Sweden has an army of 700,000 soldiers. In case of war, we have 40 helicopters for the use of the army (including mobilized civilian helicopters, for example police helicopters). The number does not include ten very small training helicopters (Hughes 300C) even if they may be used in war for local observation purposes.

The comparison involves helicopters for purposes of attack, transport of patients and transfer of troops or equipment. In Sweden, there is thus such a helicopter for every 17,500 soldiers.

It may be said that the home guard, involving 100,000 men, should not be included in the comparison. Helicopters and thus early involvement, however, would probably be of great importance against such infiltrations which the home guard will primarily have to encounter.

None Armed

Fifteen of the helicopters are in Sweden referred to as "medium heavy." They were supplied in 1962 and have been renovated to make do for another few years. It is the same type as the American army's UH-1 "Huey" (from Bell), from a historical point of view the military helicopter above all others.

It appeared nearly 30 years ago. More than 8,000 of such helicopters were built and used in fifty countries. The helicopters was used heavily by the United States in Vietnam. The U.S. army still has 3,600 of such helicopters left.
(The first attack helicopter, the AH-1 Cobra, was a version developed from the UH-1). The version found in Sweden will take eight soldiers or six stretchers.

The remainder of the Swedish equipment consists since 1969 of the five-seat Jet Ranger, with considerably less capacity. (It is the same type that the police have.) Today, there is no other armed helicopter in Sweden. It has been decided, however, to purchase 20 West German BO 105, first and foremost for anti-tank defense purposes as they are equipped with the American missile TOW.

Need Not Smaller

Since Sweden has a vaster area than West Germany and our terrain, especially in the north, is less accessible, it may be found that the need for helicopters should not be any smaller with us from a comparative point of view. A less far-reaching proposal would be a solution involving, for example, 350,000 soldiers and 250 helicopters (one helicopter per 1,400 soldiers).

Within the present defense framework it would involve proper reinforcements in the areas of defense (primarily armor) and firepower (for example, considerably more missiles). We should then be able to gather firepower for existing combat zones at a considerably faster rate than now.

For the defense of the upper Norrland—the area where an attacker may bring in heavier ground forces than in the parts of the country which require invasion from the sea—it would be a more or less dramatic improvement.

Different Emphasis

I have used helicopters to elucidate shortcomings in equipment. There are several other examples. Quite simply because Sweden has a defense of far greater numerical strength than may be provided with modern equipment within a reasonable defense framework. The number of soldiers has in the twentieth century (with the exception of 1925-1942) depended upon the birth rates for boys.

If instead one took as one's basis the requirements caused by the situation of threat and war environment, the emphasis would probably be different. Like in the defense budget of 1936 which reinforced anti-tank, aircraft and air defense—purposes which were considered more urgent than providing all men with military training.

Increasingly Untenable

In making a comparison with the United States, one should probably also include the marine corps in addition to the figures for the army. For it is of greater importance than the army in the NATO plans for the Nordic area. The reduced marine amphibious brigade which according to the agreement with Norway will receive advance support in Trondelag comprises a marine infantry regiment of approximately 5,000 men.

They would have at their disposal 75 helicopters—thus twice the number of helicopters of the Swedish army. The brigade would, moreover, be accompanied
by its own fighter and attack aircraft which would be larger than the Norwegian air force.

The warfare in Afghanistan shows offensive use of Soviet helicopters. The Norwegian study of the forces of the Soviet Union in the area bordering on the Nordic countries describes the development in the last 20 years. As far as tactical helicopters are concerned, the study says that "the development has been formidable." The Soviet Union is assumed to have a total of 4,100 helicopters, some of which are very large. They have 1,100 helicopters of the heavy attack helicopter Mi-24 Hind model.

There is reason to wonder for how long Sweden will be able to give priority to numbers rather than to quality. If the situation is not reevaluated, it will become increasingly untenable.

7262
CSO: 3650/233
CARL BILDTSAYS PALME UNDERMINES THUNBORG'S EFFORTS

SDP Government Divided

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 21 Apr 85 p 3

[Op Ed article by Carl Bildt]

[Text] Anders Thunborg's article on security policy, which appeared in DAGENS NYHETER on 14 April, is a refreshing departure from the polemical tone that has characterized other statements from Social Democratic quarters in recent times--above all those by the prime minister himself. Especially valuable and important, naturally, is the statement by the minister of defense [Thunborg] that "in all essentials, political unity prevails as far as the principles of security policy are concerned." Also welcome is his statement that "political unity has intrinsic value because it shows the rest of the world that our security policy is built on national support."

In those important respects, Anders Thunborg's statements stand in glaring contrast to the prime minister's criticized appearance in Parliament's foreign policy debate on 27 March and his subsequent contribution to the debate that appeared in AFTONBLADET on 30 March, where, in one of his increasingly frequent attacks of quarrelsomeness, he declared that "it is no longer possible to speak of fundamental agreement among the parties in Parliament."

That statement attracted well-justified attention. It would have done so regardless of who had made it. But it is especially noteworthy in that it came from the prime minister, one of whose chief tasks is to uphold our security policy before the rest of the world and whose natural ambition should always be to seize on what unites rather than what divides. And Anders Thunborg's remarks in general indicate a genuine will to conduct a serious debate, although I find it hard to follow him in his historical review of Conservative Party policy.

I will therefore leave the 1950's an open question, even though a historian would probably have a good deal to say about the picture presented by Thunborg. I will also say nothing about the interesting foreign policy debates of the 1920's and 1930's. But the 1970's and 1980's are a different story. And the debate during that period has been over foreign policy and defense policy.
We Conservatives did not adopt a "security policy program" in 1982. Nor have we ever talked about a "crusade" in East Europe, much less about "practically starting a war against the Soviet Union," as the prime minister claimed in one of his inflammatory speeches in Parliament.

What we are doing is merely pointing out that freedom for every people is a condition for the peace of the whole world and that that truth applies even to the European continent which we share with nations and peoples that have lost their independence and freedom. It is not surprising that there are places where people do not like for these things to be said. But it is still a mystery how a party with the traditions of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] can choose to dispute the point.

The basis for many of the episodes and debates that have characterized the past few years is to be found in the change of government in 1982 and the policy which the Social Democrats tried to introduce at that time. Organization and the choice of people created considerable problems for the government when it came to dealing with the strains being imposed on Swedish security policy.

The prime minister seemed to consider it appropriate to use Swedish foreign policy as a kind of lengthened arm for his more or less partisan-colored international involvement. That was how we got the Bahr episode. It was also the reason why we had the debate over Palme's role on the so-called Palme Commission. And that is probably where we must look to find the reasons for quarrel-someness.

The minister of foreign affairs was appointed to his post even though he had no background and no experience. A great many of his statements over the past few years have caused surprise even within the government. Because he has openly demonstrated an astoundingly naive view of the Soviet superpower's policy—a view later corrected to some extent by the prime minister—and spread mistrust of the basis for the protest against submarine intrusions that was presented to the Soviet Union by the government in April 1983, it has been impossible to take him seriously as the upholder of a firm Swedish policy. He is the first minister of foreign affairs in modern times to have a petition for a vote of no confidence directed at him.

Disarmament Ambassador Theorin has long advocated a different view of security policy than that supported by the big parties. She has frequently engaged in genuine guerrilla warfare against the basic orientation not only of our own security policy but also that of our neighboring countries.

Those circumstances, combined with the challenges of a partly new kind that are confronting the policy in question, have created a situation like the one described by DAGENS NYHETER in two major articles on 14 and 15 October 1984 under the headline "Hawks Versus Doves in Government: Split View of Soviet Union," or the one described by DAGENS NYHETER in another major article on 10 February under the headline "How Deep Is the Rift in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?"
Those are the circumstances which we Conservatives have criticized. No one with a concern for consistency in Swedish policy could have done otherwise. Our criticism has been expressed clearly and in a straightforward manner whenever justified. But we have not tried to pick everlasting quarrels, and we have not been slow to express our appreciation when there was reason to so so.

Anders Thunborg has been almost alone in advocating a traditional strict policy. His more important speeches—the latest being his speech to the French Institute of International Relations in Paris on 5 February—have summed up our security policy with a strength and clarity that deserve respect and support.

Anders Thunborg emphasizes that we must speak of "Swedish security policy" and not—as others in and around the government do—of "Social Democratic security policy." That is a refreshing statement. He adds that he takes "special pride" in what the Social Democrats have accomplished in that area.

It is worth noting that he says he takes that "special pride" in what happened during the 1950's and 1960's. Because Anders Thunborg can scarcely take "special pride" in Social Democratic defense policy from 1976 to 1984 or in the Social Democratic management of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1982. And it is precisely that—not history!—which has been the issue.

Now that Anders Thunborg is calmly questioning us Conservatives as to future policy, his questions deserve answers. He is not rejecting our desire for a stricter foreign policy and a stronger defense policy. He is simply asking—not at all unreasonably—that it be made more specific.

A stricter foreign policy is a foreign policy in which national solidarity always takes precedence over international partisan considerations, objective competence in the management of foreign affairs is not neglected, we apply the same rules regardless of whom we are dealing with, we are not naïve with respect to any power, pronouncements do not constantly need to be corrected and denied, reality is not viewed as dreaming, the objective low-key approach is more important than loud talking, the government speaks with one and the same voice on central issues, and the line being pursued in connection with foreign policy and security policy does not depend on the time of day or which dinner companions one has chosen.

What it boils down to is a demand that we return to the traditional general policy that Anders Thunborg attempts to formulate in his article. It also means a demand for change with respect to a good deal that has happened over the past few years. A stronger defense policy is necessary as an integral part of our neutrality policy at a time when our situation as regards security policy has become more exposed. On that point, some Social Democratic rethinking is required.

Every important defense decision during the years from 1976 to 1982 was made to the accompaniment of Social Democratic protests. The battle flag was hoisted even as far back as the 1977 defense decision. The slightest proposed increase in defense spending at that time was rejected because "the credibility our country has gained through its active role in the field of disarmament may
be affected negatively by approval of the government's proposal." And when, during its spring session of 1982, Parliament reached its important decision on the JAS project, Olof Palme declared in Parliament that the decision meant that "today, unfortunately, we must bury unity on the question of Swedish defense policy."

That was how the Social Democrats dealt with security policy when they were in the opposition. No serious Social Democrat can take pride in that.

It would be wrong to conceal the fact that the policy pursued by the Social Democrats in the 1970's and early 1980's constituted, in sum, a demand for a gradual shift in Swedish security policy away from the unanimity that had prevailed during previous decades.

It was frequently Mrs Theorin and her group that dominated the Social Democratic debate. The role of defense policy in the overall neutrality policy should be toned down, they said. Military defense should be weakened. In their place, increasing confidence was to be placed in the ability of an active foreign policy to also handle major security problems in our own part of the world.

In our opinion, the result of that policy was a clear weakening of our ability to protect our national interests in a situation in which the strategic importance of Northern Europe and the North Atlantic area was growing. It was and is naive to think that our ability to pursue a strong and consistent policy of neutrality is not affected negatively by a serious weakening of our military defense. Words may fly high, but they are not enough to defend our airspace. And no intruding submarine has ever yet been frightened away by our words.

It was those trends in Social Democratic security policy that we Conservatives found reason to warn against at the time. And it was when those trends—and the ideas behind them—collided with the solid reality of security policy during the submarine crises of the 1980's that the problems for the government became obvious.

Unfortunately, the SDP's line on security policy has not been altogether clear since 1982, either. In the spring of 1983, Anders Thunborg submitted a bill calling for a departure in essential respects from the 1982 defense decision. He recommended a cutback even greater than the one proposed by the SDP in opposition a year earlier. When the so-called Capital Attack Squadron with its Draken aircraft is closed down this summer, that will be a direct consequence of the regrettable decision reached in 1983.

But in the summer of 1984—after the crisis in defense finances had become acute—there was an agreement on defense policy between the government and the opposition. It provided for a budget increase twice as high as the one the prime minister had said he wanted. Without the efforts of the nonsocialist parties—and the good will of the minister of defense—that would never have been possible.

The 1985 election will determine the makeup of the Parliament whose defense decision in 1987 will lay the foundation for our defense forces far into the
1990's. It is a natural necessity that the Social Democrats should, before the election, explain the general pattern that they think our defense policy should follow.

Will the Social Democrats recommend a policy involving the continued weakening of primarily our military defense, as they did in connection with the defense decisions of 1968, 1972, 1977, and 1982? Quite obviously, that would reduce our ability to maintain our neutrality in a critical situation.

Or will they endeavor to build further on the realism which was demonstrated in the 1984 agreement and which also showed itself in the significant reversal that occurred at the party congress in September of last year? A clear stand against a continued weakening of the various components of our defense would be a valuable statement for the future.

We need an objective and levelheaded debate on the specific issues involved in security policy. No one ought to have any interest in harping on old episodes or distorting history. We have had more than enough linguistic lack of judgment, continual quarrelsomeness, and dramatic bridge burning.

What we need instead is respect for each other's viewpoints, an honest will to look at what unites, and a clear view, shared by all sides, of the requirements being imposed on our foreign policy and defense policy in the 1980's.

And I find it hard to believe that Anders Thunborg and I would not agree that a stricter foreign policy and a firmer defense policy involve stronger support for our aspiration for neutrality.

Paper Examines Bildt's Assertions

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Apr 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Bildt Continues the Fight"]

[Text] Social Democrats and Conservatives both want unity as regards foreign policy—unity on their own terms, that is. In his Op Ed article on Sunday, Carl Bildt confirmed and rounded out that impression—already gained from the previous week's series of interviews with the standard bearers in the battle. He adopted a restrained tone in his response to Anders Thunborg, but his article was by no means an attempt to spread oil on troubled waters.

A week earlier, the article by the minister of defense had concluded with two questions addressed to the largest opposition party: what do the Conservatives mean by a stricter foreign policy, and what do they mean by a stronger defense policy?

The fact that the Conservatives want more money for defense is nothing new at all, and it has never led to a really harrowing fight. Never mind the fact that Bildt actually raises the threat that continuing the SDP's old defense policy would "obviously reduce our ability to maintain our neutrality in a
critical situation." One wonders: how many additional hundreds of millions of kronor per year would mark the turning point in such a case?

The meaning of the expression "stricter foreign policy" was illustrated a few days ago by Conservative Party leader Ulf Adelsohn when he presented a catalogue of wrong steps taken by the Social Democrats: the comments on Bai Bang by Palme and Bodstrom as well as by Minister Roine Carlsson, the BP's Algerian deals, and so on. He declined to talk about deviations from the general policy line. Rather, what seemed to be at issue were the kinds of mistakes that the Conservatives are not trying to "turn into a serialized novel."

Does this mean that a Conservative foreign policy would manage to avoid mistakes? How is a "serialized novel" being avoided if one is constantly prescribing a stricter policy and bringing up everything that was not "strict"?

Carl Bildt's perspective was a little more elegant. But when he describes what that stricter policy is supposed to involve, his list nevertheless becomes a reiteration of the whole string of old accusations, including something that seems to be an odd demand that Palme not consult his foreign friends—Bahr and others. That they should stop formulating Swedish foreign policy, however, is another matter.

Bildt urges: return to a traditional policy line! What he calls for expressly is Social Democratic "rethinking." In his summing up, Bildt wants not only "respect for each other's viewpoints" and an "honest will to look at what unites," but also a "clear view, shared by all sides," of the requirements of the 1980's. What that means in Bildt's mouth can scarcely be anything other than a Conservative clear view.

As usual, Lennart Bodstrom is the one who says he favors fights. The minister of foreign affairs reiterated last week that speeches about unity must not become an end in themselves and conceal deep differences. But he then said enigmatically that if a real crisis occurred, it would not be hard to find solidarity in the nation.

There is no reason whatever to expect Olof Palme to express any such confidence openly. Such strong attacks on the Conservatives were necessary because the latter have created uncertainty about where Sweden stands, says the prime minister. He says he agrees with the minister of defense that in all essential respects, unity prevails as far as security policy is concerned—in the sense that the Conservatives have no alternative whatever. The only thing for them to do on the Defense Committee is give in, says Palme. That must be interpreted as meaning that no matter what the Conservatives do, they deserve criticism.

According to the prime minister, he and Anders Thunborg share exactly the same opinion. Anyone can see that that is not the case. To feign unity is unworthy. Couldn't we all be appreciative if even members of the government from the same party would occasionally talk openly about their differing opinions?
In any case, Thunborg's opinion is described as follows by the head of the government: if the Conservatives give up their separate policy, the conditions will exist for unity. He now expresses his own opinion in this form: as long as they continue, there will be no unity. Compared to Palme's statement some time ago that "it is no longer possible to talk about fundamental unity," that sounds like a return to the starting point in the debate on foreign policy, when Palme said he wanted to give the Conservatives a chance to rally to the support of the government's security policy.

The prime minister obviously feels that in such a case, the Conservatives, in order to win favor, must limit their criticism to what he himself considers right and reasonable. They must stop their unjust accusations, he says. It is the Conservatives who must make an extra effort, not the Social Democrats.

Add that to Bildt's demand for a clear view. We have a long way to go if we are to avoid a strenuous battle over security policy in the election campaign.
EC 'TRANSPORT MASTER PLAN'

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 24 Mar , 85 pp 193-195

[Article by Salvatore Tallarita: "A Down-to-Earth Continent"]

[Text] Crossing Europe by land today is very time consuming. But the EEC is about to launch a plan that will bring countries closer together.

Rome—Judging by maps, the distances may be equal, but it is one thing to travel 500 kilometers in a country like the United States, and quite another to travel in Europe, for example, from Paris to London, or from Milan to Strasbourg. Bad roads, antiquated railways, lines of vehicles at the frontiers, sea crossings, mountain tunnels and passes, nerve-wracking customs inspections, and finally, different laws from country to country: These things make what would in the United States be little more than a long walk an interminable trip in Europe. An adventure. The situation is still worse as far as merchandise is concerned. The old continent does not have an efficient port network that is well-linked with cities of the interior. At a time when high speed is a goal that was achieved years ago in other countries, the trains lumber along at a snail’s pace, that is, when they are not stalled for hours in the stations. It is not by chance that now 80 percent of transportation within the EEC is by road. But even this offers no great satisfaction: The long lines of the TIR [International Road Transport] vehicles at the frontiers are by now an everyday occurrence. And sometimes the delays stretch out for days. In short, it is a disaster. It is a total failure for the organization, the EEC, which 25 years ago was born precisely with the objective of ensuring free circulation of goods and passengers. But something is changing. The Italian transportation minister, socialist Claudio Signorile, recently visited the main European capitals and submitted an ambitious "Transport Master Plan," to his EEC colleagues. It is a pilot project that is expected to represent a sort of constituent charter for European transportation. Signorile said, "The Master Plan is primarily the choice of a method, the beginning of a project in a sector in which national political myopia has prevailed so far."

What does he foresee? First of all the identification of the main traffic lines within the EEC, that is, the roads that are most important for the Community where the percentage of international traffic is highest. Along these "axes" (see small map), the plan proposes two lines of action.
First, improve the roads. The EEC ministers, as far as Italy is concerned, would have wanted to limit Community action to the Tyrrhenian side but finally accepted expanding the project to the Adriatic side as far as Bari and Brindisi.

Second, develop a highspeed rail network of the kind used by the Japanese, or the French TGV [High Speed Train] between Paris and Lyon. Signorile announced that "meetings for this purpose between European railway companies already have been started; development programs, so far seen only from a national point of view, must be integrated: What sense does it make if travel in the community from Paris to Lyon, or from Bonn to Hamburg, is fast if transportation between France and Germany remains as slow as it always has been?" And, actually, 25 years after the Treaty of Rome, 4 west Europeans out of 5 prefer a long trip within national boundaries over a similar trip crossing a frontier. Ports also have a strategic importance for the development of European transportation. Today, international maritime traffic is entirely unbalanced toward the north of Europe to the ports of Rotterdam and Hamburg with enormous disadvantages for member countries farther away. Signorile said, "We must instead build a network of community ports capable of meeting specific community objectives, offering joint specialized services." In this regard, the master plan identifies two distinct areas: the "continental," which includes Marseilles, Genoa, Venice and Trieste in addition to Rotterdam and Hamburg, and the insular and peninsular area made up of British ports, the south of Italy and Greece.

But real mobility of goods and passengers will not be achieved if "physical and regulatory penalties" (as defined in the master plan) are not eliminated. This refers to the natural and legal obstacles that now slow down trade within the EEC. In the north, England must be linked with the European continent as must Denmark, (and the master plan does not indicate whether a bridge or a tunnel would be best for either of those two links); in the south, there must be more rapid communication with the Iberian Peninsula and the Middle East (through Greece and not the Balkans), and the Brenner tunnel must be enlarged.

Transportation laws in member states must be made uniform: for industrial and nonindustrial vehicles (weights, volume, taxes, etc.), for air traffic (gradual liberalization also of rates), ships (elimination of unfair competition), and security of transportation in general. The transportation minister said, "In this latter regard the establishment of a community agency is planned."

Obviously, this is an ambitious plan. "It is the only one possible," Signorile added, "if we really want to see Europe grow. Community transportation together with agriculture should have been in the takeoff stage 25 years ago. But each time, only a single problem was dealt with. And agreement was never reached." Now the Master Plan, which is expected to be formally approved by the European Community on 23 May, deals systematically with the problem of infrastructures and regulations: "Now that there is a well-defined frame of reference," Signorile concluded, "it will be easier to reach agreement on specific measures."
Here are the European superhighways as they will be developed according to the Master Plan, the project for European transportation development that the European Community is preparing to launch.
The map shows the large infrastructural facilities and the high-speed rail network set forth in the Plan.

All customs clearance and warehousing operations for merchandise will be concentrated in a few strategic points. These points will be well-linked with the railway, highway and port network. There will be about 12 in the entire Community. Italy will have four or five at most.

Key:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Italian City</th>
<th>English City</th>
<th>German City</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Londra</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>Parigi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruxelles</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Strasburgo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amburgo</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>Lione</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lyon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Napoli Naples
Berlino Berlin
Francoforte Frankfurt
Stoccarda Stuttgart
Monaco Munich
Marsiglia Marseilles
Basilea Basle
Ginevra Geneva
Zurigo Zurich
Milano Milan
Torino Turin
Firenze Florence
Roma Rome

[Box] Highways of the Future

Large infrastructural projects

1--Bridge or tunnel linking Denmark
2--Cross-channel link
3--Pyrenees tunnel
4--Expansion of the Brenner
5--Greek superhighway
6--Strait of Messina

[Inset]: Plan for highspeed railway network

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STUDY REFUTES CLAIMS OF YOUTH PESSIMISM, WORK ALIENATION

Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 15 Mar 85 pp 95-102

[Text] What do young people think of their work? What expectations do they have of the future? A study by Professor Klaus Allerbeck and Dr Wendy J. Hoag of the University of Frankfurt comes to some very surprising conclusions: The young no longer speak of having "no future".

Two attitudinal areas of young people are often considered dangerous: their attitude towards their work and their view of the future. It is widely believed that the youth of today are less ready for work and achievement than the generations before them and that they lack the optimism that characterized earlier generations and made them capable of achievements leading to growth and progress. As widespread as such assertions may be, they have no sure basis. Now, the detailed study shows: the youth of today is not really so different from their parents when they were young—especially as far as work and willingness to achieve are concerned.

Pronouncements concerning the past are often myths. For this reason, we repeated a 1962 empirical investigation of sixteen- to eighteen-year-olds more than twenty years later. Great efforts were made to ensure the two investigations could really be compared, that possible differences would in fact represent changes in the good twenty years between the inquiries. The results are surprising.

People often speak of the change from an ethic of duty to that of hedonism, a change of values in the realm of work. In 1962, four statements on the theme of work were presented to the young people: Two intermediate statements led from the maxim "Only through work can one really become happy" to the judgement "One can lead a happy life even without work" (see the "Work Is Necessary" table). The changes seem rather small. The proportion, for example, of those who leaned towards the view than "One can lead a happy life even without work" only increased from 6.1 percent to 8.4 percent.

But this certainly does not mean that nothing has changed in their concept of work. This becomes clear when one examines the subgroups separately. One of the big changes is that students enjoy going to school appreciably less today.
than in 1962. But this just is not a general decrease in the willingness to achieve, since the trainees of today do their work just as willingly as the apprentices of 1962 (see the "Overwhelming Majority" table). Of course, one has to consider here that there are very many more students among the sixteen- to eighteen-years-olds today than in 1962. The cause of this difference in attitude between students and trainees is not obvious; it may lie with the goals of higher education having become uncertain.

Table 1. Overwhelming Majority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Übergewichtige Mehrheit</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frage an Lehrlinge: Machen Sie Ihre jetzige Arbeit gern oder nicht so gern? (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Angaben in Prozent)</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sehr gern/gern</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teils-teils</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nicht so gern/sehr ungern</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1) Asked of apprentices: How well do you enjoy working at your present job? (figures in percentages)
2) very much/a lot
3) so-so
4) not so much/not at all

But aren't the youth of today still often more unenthusiastic at school and at work? Couldn't the survey results be deceptive, when they thus contradict one's own experience? Isn't there a lot of "I could care less" sort of talk? This may be, but it does not prove any change in values—rather, it is the norms that have changed. Nothing indicates that students took much more joy in their schoolwork twenty years ago, that apprentices performed their duties with greater enthusiasm than today; but at that time one was not allowed to simply say that one didn't want to—instead, people found excuses. Today it is fully legitimate, in some parts of German society, to express one's lack of motivation, as if it were a matter of the result of a scientific measurement. But this means a change in the norms of the organization of education and labor, not a change in the values of youth and society.

Even greater is the change in the relation of the sexes to work. In 1962, the role stereotype where the man must go "out into the hostile world" while inside the "virtuous wife reigns" seemed to hold even for the youth. Today, work outside of the household circle has become appreciably more important for women. Compared with boys, the importance of work in the life of girls has increased considerably.
Table 2. Work Is Necessary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arbeit gehört dazu</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auch ohne Arbeit könnte man ein glückliches Leben führen</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Etwas Arbeit gehört mit zu einem glücklicheren Leben</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohne Arbeit ist ein glückliches Leben kaum möglich</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nur durch Arbeit wird man wirklich glücklich</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key:
1) Asked of young people: Every person has his own concept of what work means in his life. Can you tell me which of these views comes closest to your concept of work? (figures in percentages)
2) One can lead a happy life even without work.
3) Some work is necessary for a happy life.
4) A happy life is scarcely possible without work.
5) Only through work can one really become happy.

Girls today usually imagine that they will later be working. Acquiring a profession is just as natural for girls as for boys. The criteria that girls use in choosing professions are also identical to those that the boys name. The compatibility of a profession with raising children ranks only in fifth place—after form of work, job security, pleasant coworkers and the freedom to make one's own decisions. For boys, the compatibility of the profession with raising children comes only in seventh and last place. But a new role image has not taken the place of the "housewife-and-mother" cliche, rather it has simply stepped aside. The problem of reconciling the contradictory demands of the two roles is largely ignored or suppressed. Many times, following the motto "My future husband will help me", the woman's future double burden is at first not perceived at all. The generation of boys of the same age, on the other hand, seems less determined to make their contribution to a new generation of women.

If, using a number of individual questions, one looks into the life plans of the girls, the result for the majority is what the researchers often call the "three-phase model": work until the first child, then only housewife and mother until the children have to go to school, and finally resumption of work
on a half-day basis. Here, a long-term trend is visible. In 1962, nothing had yet been asked along these lines. Now, this appears as a central future problem of our society.

Today's professional structure forces young women to choose between motherhood and profession; but the girls do not want to decide, the want to reconcile the two. The solutions thus far proposed are insufficient. The structural problem that can be seen here cannot be solved by social measures. Nor are supposed technological escapes like electronic housework—as we can imagine them today—any solution to the problem of how to make it possible for women, who want to work without entirely neglecting the role of mother, to combine the two. For in our society a profession means contact with people, and social contacts are a primary motive of the wishes of younger women for a work place outside of the home. Hard as it may be, a greater flexibility in professional roles will be essential. The labor organizations must meet this challenge.

Unemployment among youth and the job market for young people appear, according to the data, different than in public discussion. Uncertainty is great, applications are often very numerous; the figures for multiple offers are strikingly high. Thus, many apprentices have no trouble finding a training position—they succeed on the first try, while others have found no position despite great efforts.

The study was not, however, directed only towards the job market and so certainly cannot correct the official statistics; but it did yield many indications of the "waiting times" component of the unemployment statistics for young people. For example, whoever already knows when he will be drafted and wants to study—but can do this only after his time in the army, will of course be unemployed during the months between leaving school and his date of induction, without having the job market at his disposal. On the other hand, the problem of acceptance after training is relatively neglected. Most apprentices are very worried about their prospects for acceptance, and some youths, when asked for details of the most important events in their lives in the last half year, cited "I wasn't given notice" as the main event.

Our data cannot confirm that the problems with the job market are chiefly caused by insufficiently informed, too inflexible young beginning workers. The figures show a comprehensive view of the social imbedding of the choice of professions and ranking of preferences—which, however, are often poorly and inaccurately depicted in the statistics. By far, not everyone wants one single, specific profession; many want above all a specific employer, like the main employer of the given region, and many have clear hierarchies: "Best of all, training as X with firm A, but if that doesn't work, I would like to learn Y at firm B." Whoever can think only in a professional framework; may find this pointless; we see clear rankings in this—formed, to a not insignificant degree, by the information that reaches the young people via family members.

Young people have very clear ideas of the future, when it is a matter of their own field within which they themselves can make decisions. Few dream of great advancement; many would like to just break out for a while someday, before the seriousness of life starts up.
One can scarcely ask about individual, very personal dreams with standardized surveys; but they give some clues. Most of those questioned (81.2 percent) describe themselves as "more optimistic", only one in five as "more pessimistic". The country's future is also overwhelmingly considered hopeful rather than not: hopes predominated for 56 percent, fears for 46.

There are no comparable data for general expectations of the future from the 1962 study. At that time, the question of whether the world had a future was not the focal point, but rather whether the future of the world would belong to the Russians or the Americans, to the Free World or the Soviet Bloc. The Cold War had reached its highpoint: Even before the last person then questioned gave his interview, there came, with the Cuban crisis, the sharpest confrontation between the superpowers in the atomic age.

There was, however, one question posed then concerning the economic future that we were able to repeat: "Do you believe that our economic conditions will improve in the next five years, or do you believe that they will worsen?" The baffling result: there is less pessimism today than then! While only 21.4 percent expected an improvement in 1962, today it is 35.9 percent. The explanation is simple, and reveals itself to anyone who reads the business section of the daily papers from fall of 1962: No trace of optimism, though other fears than today: Overheating of the business cycle as an imminent danger, fears of inflation with rates of price increases that were lower than today's. The exuberant optimism of the sixties is simply a legend that was created later.

The characterization of today's youth as the No-Future generation is also a myth. Is this an indication of a sudden shift in German youth? Did hopelessness still reign a few years ago, and have the youth now found new courage? Of course, we only have data for the two years of 1962 and 1983, but these results and all the experiences of survey research speak against sudden shifts in basic orientations.

When the German youth of one year ("Youth '81") is followed by the next, naturally entirely different "generation" (the "youth" of the next year), one likes to explain this by saying that changes of heart are simply typical of adolescence. The data from our panel survey show that this may need to be viewed as a misjudgment of the actual situation. Our study is the first in Germany to also investigate nationwide the consistency of the opinions of young people. If one only asks once, one can never say whether the answer given at the time was a firmly rooted opinion or an inspiration of the moment. For this reason, we had the youths questioned by interviewers in the spring and asked them to fill out questionnaires we mailed in the fall. With most of the youths, the opinions they expressed in the spring agreed to a large degree, often pretty exactly, with the answers they gave in the fall.

The young people's opinions on the central political controversies or on their life plans seemed consistent—certainly no less consistent than the opinions of adults. Young people do not arbitrarily change their mind from one moment to the next. Thus, the adult world cannot avoid taking seriously the opinions that this young generation expresses.
EEC, NETHERLANDS ECONOMICS STUDY GROUP TO VISIT

Willemstad AMIGOE in Dutch 29 Mar 85 p 11

[Text] Willemstad--A delegation of experts of the European Commission and the Dutch Government are coming to the Antilles in order to study the possibilities of achieving a better adjusted association with the EEC. This could bear important fruits in the area of trade regulation and financial cooperation.

As known, Minister of Economic Affairs Don Mansur, accompanied by drs Wellen and drs Saab, has made a study trip to The Hague and Brussels. The most important reason for this trip was the upcoming reassociation of the Netherlands Antilles with the EEC. This reassociation takes place every 5 years and is especially important in connection with considerable benefits in the area of trade and in the financial support of the EEC for development projects in the Netherlands Antilles.

During the visit the extremely difficult economic situation in the Antilles was referred to both at the official and ministerial levels in The Hague and Brussels. The minister therefore made a request for special attention to the Antillean desires for reassociation. A novelty in the over 20-years association with the EEC was the achievement of a delegation of experts of the European Commission and the Dutch Government coming to the Antilles for further deliberation in order to study possibilities for arriving at a better adjusted association with the EEC. Both in the areas of the trade regulation with the EEC and financial cooperation this could bear important fruits, which would certainly benefit the economy of the Netherlands Antilles in the medium term.

During Don Mansur's visit to The Hague and Brussels, various other subjects also were raised. For example, there was a discussion with the Netherlands Credit Insurance Company (NCH), which promised support for the development of an export credit system in the Netherlands Antilles. This will have to be discussed further with a task force formed in Curaçao. Minister Ruding of Finance promised during the visit of his Antillean colleague to have a study carried out on the adjustment of the Dutch export credit insurance in order to facilitate exports from the Netherlands to Latin America, whereby the Antilles are utilized as a way station.
Important promises have been made as to the promotion of the development of the agricultural sector in our islands. Those were made in discussions with the Dutch Rabo Bank and with the chairman of production for Cattle and Meat. The Rabo bank will continue to support the agricultural financing branch of the OBNA [expansion unknown] both financially and technically and, moreover, it proved to be willing to extend a helping hand also to the Aruban Development Bank.

The Minister of Economic affairs also had several discussions with various companies on the possibilities of commercial establishment in the Netherlands Antilles. Some of that could result in actual establishments.

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UNEMPLOYMENT TO WORSEN BY 1986 ELECTIONS,

Madrid MERCADO in Spanish 19 Apr 85 pp 25-27

[Passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Ten prodigious years after the advent of democracy, unemployment is still the number one problem of the Spanish economy; what is worse, no prospects for solution are visible in the short or medium term. Despite the government's feeble attempts to sugar the pill of a possible drop in the unemployment growth rate, the sometimes absurd manipulation of registered unemployment statistics, and bombastic promises to create jobs, unemployment continues to rise. Often one has the impression that it is soaring upwards at a dizzying rate. After the relative respite of 1983, when "only" 198,800 new workers were added to the jobless rolls, last year 435,000 more people entered that vicious circle (about 225,000, discounting the statistical effects of community employment). In 1984, 297,000 stable jobs were lost; the statistical effects and the implementation of some employment development programs, with the creation of temporary jobs, barely averted a total disaster in a fiscal year characterized by a far-reaching economic adjustment.

These figures are irrefutable and alarming. So is the fact that the unemployment growth rate went from 8.9 percent in 1983 to 17.9 percent in 1984; that the last 6 years of economic crisis have cost the Spanish economy the elimination of 612 jobs each day. In other words, taking into account the expansion of the workforce, every 24 hours the economic machinery spit out 779 more jobless workers. Also disturbing is the fact that this foreseeable acceleration of unemployment will bring the total number of jobless far beyond the 3 million mark this year (see Figure 1). It is not difficult to foresee this trend, since the Workforce Survey already shows a total of 2,869,200 people out of work (as of the fourth quarter of 1984). It also reveals an unemployment rate (the number of jobless workers as a proportion of the workforce) of 21.7 percent.

The acceleration of unemployment may reach intolerable levels this year. Official sources at the Ministries of Economy and Labor told MERCADO that in the second half of 1985, based on the fragmentary data available so far this fiscal year, the historic record of 3 million unemployed may be surpassed. These same partial data indicate that the unemployment rate in some parts of the country is approaching intolerable levels; for example, it is already
around 42 percent in Seville. In view of these figures, it would be difficult
to explain why a pre-revolutionary situation does not exist, if it were not
for the presence of the underground economy, a phenomenon that has not been
properly studied and is just now being analyzed. Preliminary estimates indi-
cate that between 800,000 and 1,000,000 workers who are supposedly out of work
may actually be benefiting from this economic activity. These figures are
just a guess, and cannot be relied upon until the extent of the black-market
economy is determined in a detailed analysis.

There are many economic theories that portray the unemployment problem as
practically unsolvable in the medium term, but they can be classified into
three different groups: those that blame an ineffective economic policy,
those that point to the "discouraged" workers, and those that look to the
pending reconversions, which of course will include more companies than have
officially been admitted so far. These three reasons act in concert against
unemployed workers, who moreover lack useful and current information about
possibilities for employment in other economic sectors or geographic regions.
Thus, the unemployment problem lies not only in its very existence, but also
in the fact that it becomes entrenched in specific geographic areas and among
workers whose skills cannot easily be adapted to modern economic times.

In a freely competitive economy, employment is created through economic growth
in the system. The macroeconomic framework of the Spanish economy over the
next 4 years (including 1985) shows very little promise of a short-term
revitalization. For the next 4-year period, "modest growth in the GDP" is
foreseen, "without major cyclical alterations, without major imbalances."
This citation is drawn from the report by the Center for Economic Forecasting
(CEPREDE), and although one may quibble with the exact figures of its estim-
ates for the Spanish economy, they nonetheless provide a guideline.

A GDP growth rate of 2.45 percent is expected for 1985, with slight increases
in the succeeding years (2.69 in 1986, 2.72 in 1987 and 2.83 in 1988). Ob-
viously, these are spectacular growth rates. The remaining macroeconomic
variables that have a direct influence on employment are equally /dazzling./
Gross capital formation is expected to rise by 48 hundredths this year, by
1.83 percent in 1986, and to "take off" in 1987 and 1988 (2.32 and 2.49
percent, respectively) Real disposable family income, a fundamental
parameter for basing the recovery on domestic demand, will increase briefly
this year (0.68 percent), will fall in 1986 (0.54 percent) and then begin a
timid rise for the next year (0.9 percent) and in 1988 (1.3 percentage points).

Under these macroeconomic conditions, with evident mediocrity and atrope, it
will be impossible to create stable employment. Getting into more precise
details, we see the basic pessimism of these predictions confirmed. In 1984,
net fixed investment by businesses was approximately 45 percent of what it was
at the beginning of the crisis, back in 1974. Not only are firms investing
less, but an increasing proportion of what is invested is for the replacement
of capital goods, which must be depreciated.

The international economic situation is not helping, either. It is fairly
clear that in 1986 a slight recession will take place in Europe, and that will
have a very adverse impact on the recovery of the Spanish economy. But the
international experience does have some valuable lessons for us; for example, the countries that did generate employment during the crisis are the ones that have managed to bring down their labor costs considerably. This phenomenon is also emerging in Spain, but businesses do not appear to be responding to it very flexibly yet. According to orthodox economic policy, maintaining the wage freeze and lowering labor costs are indispensable conditions for contemplating a possible recovery of employment in the long run.

The problem is, even if it were possible to achieve GDP growth rates high enough to "cut off" the acceleration of unemployment, the Spanish population is maintaining a "reserve army" of the unemployed, as the apt expression goes, which will come as an unpleasant surprise. The people in question are the so-called "discouraged" workers, those who are out of work, have not registered as unemployed, and are not seeking work because they believe they will not find any. Their chances of finding it at this point are certainly slim, but if the economic conditions were to change for the better, a good part of this reserve would automatically be added to the jobless roster. The number of "discouraged" workers varies, depending on the yardstick used, between 500,000 and 700,000 people. In any case, Julio Alcaide contends that this army of discouraged workers will prevent unemployment from coming down to reasonable levels for at least 5 years.

The third factor that greases the wheels of unemployment is the pending reconversion of the Spanish productive apparatus. Here the figures say it all. In the chart below one can see the impact the reconversion plans that are underway will have on employment, as well as that of the jobs that still must be "adjusted." By mid-March of this year the employment reduction objectives were already approximately 65 percent completed, so the column showing the degree of completion as of 31 December 1984 is already a bit out of date.

Although the industrial reconversion process is important, however, it is nothing compared to what may happen in the services sector. The initial effects of that phenomenon may begin to appear in the Workforce Survey of the first quarter of this year. Sources close to the Labor Ministry told MERCADO that the initiation of a process of covert reconversion in the services sector "is feared," and this process could have an impact on labor and society similar to that produced in the Spanish economy when manpower from the farm sector began to move to the industrial sector. The fact that many of those employed in the tertiary sector hold temporary jobs may attenuate that seismic effect somewhat.

These and other minor reasons feed the widespread fear that the Spanish economy will have to endure a high rate of unemployment for 5 years or more.
Key:
1. Basque Territory
2. Navarre
3. Catalonia
4. Balearic Islands
5. Valencian Community
6. Andalusia
7. Canary Islands

(Unemployment rate for each Autonomous Community)
Predicted Trends in Workforce and Unemployment (in thousands of people)

Key:
1. Workforce
2. Source: Ministries of Economy and Labor, and our own compilation.
### Projection of Employment by Sector
(in thousands of people)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agricultura</th>
<th>Industria</th>
<th>Servicios</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>829.4</td>
<td>1,786.7</td>
<td>5,305.4</td>
<td>7,921.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>801.2</td>
<td>2,520.3</td>
<td>5,327.7</td>
<td>8,649.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>777.3</td>
<td>2,309.5</td>
<td>5,353.1</td>
<td>8,440.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>757.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:**
1. Services
2. Industry
3. Agriculture
4. Construction
5. Source: Departments of Economy and Labor, and our own compilation.

8926
CSO: 3548/121
STRUCTURE, IMPLICATIONS OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSESSED

Madrid MERCADO in Spanish 19 Apr 85 pp 28-35

[Text] The internal structure of unemployment is perhaps just as serious a matter as the number of jobless workers. Like a disease, it feeds primarily on the weakest tissues of the social body, and produces a progressive deterioration that can easily be detected. In an initial attempt to analyze unemployment in depth, one might say that it is concentrated primarily in the young (those under 25 years of age), who have not yet found their first job; that the industrial and construction sectors account for about 40 percent of overall unemployment; and that at the same time, Unemployment Insurance coverage benefits only 37 percent of the jobless population. Thus, one can go on and on citing figures that reveal the extraordinary dimensions of unemployment in Spanish society and the entrenchment of unemployment in social sectors that are now almost beyond help.

It is known that approximately 25 percent of Spanish families have a jobless father, mother, child or sibling. One-third of young people between 20 and 24 years of age do not have jobs. If the process of eliminating jobs continues, and this seems a reasonable assumption, by 1986 one out of every four workers will be out of work. The core of working people who will have to support the entire Spanish population is shrinking alarmingly. In 1985, each working person pays the social and economic costs of 3.7 non-working people (due to age, illness or unemployment), and this ratio is rapidly moving toward one to four.

But let us get right to the heart of the issue. Although unemployment among youths under 25 is causing a bulge in the population that is entering the job market for the first time, and despite some other singular phenomena such as the fact that a growing number of people between 25 and 30 years of age have never held a permanent job, nonetheless the most damaging unemployment from the social standpoint is that among people between 25 and 54 years of age. The simple reason for this is that this group bears family responsibilities, and if large numbers of this population were unemployed, there would be a multiplier effect in terms of social unrest. It is this factor that has prompted governments to keep targeting unemployment subsidies at this sector of the population, while meeting the employment needs of younger workers through programs to promote temporary hiring and other such "band-aid" remedies.
The unemployment rate for workers between 25 and 54 years of age grew by approximately 2.5 percent in 1984, to a total of 14.9 percent. The growth rate appears to have accelerated, given that the 1983 jobless rate for this group rose by 1.5 points over the 1982 figure. The importance of male unemployment should be noted. While women 25 to 54 years old have an unemployment rate of 14.9 percent, men in this age group have a slightly higher rate (15 percent). This situation of "superiority," which has a particularly strong impact on so-called heads of household (or principal wage-earners in the home), is anomalous, since the jobless rate among women is generally higher than among men.

The studies conducted by the Economy Ministry and the INEM [expansion unknown] reveal that if jobless workers are grouped according to age and family position, 781,400 heads of household are unemployed in Spain, or in other words, in 781,400 families the person who provides the main income of the home is out of work. The rate of increase of jobless heads of household is alarming. According to data from the Workforce Survey, in 1980 the number of unemployed heads of household was 452,400; thus, in 4 years the number has grown by 329,000. The social effects of unemployment on this stratum of the Spanish population are incalculable, but easily imaginable.

As a Jesuit saying goes, "No matter how bad a situation may be, it can always get worse." And this one is. Not only is the number of families with jobless fathers growing, but the amount of time these people remain out of work is lengthening as well. A short study by the EPA [expansion unknown] shows that whereas in 1980 38,600 heads of household had been out of work for more than 2 years, in 1984 that number had risen to 204,800. Nearly half of the jobless heads of household have been out of work for more than a year. It is easy to deduce that a growing number of these people will gradually exhaust their Unemployment Insurance benefits, with foreseeable consequences for Spanish society.

Although this is a grave situation, however, we should not succumb so easily to pessimism. A comparative measurement of the number of unemployed heads of household in 1980 and 1984 reveals that despite the spectacular net growth, the percentage of these people among jobless workers as a whole is declining. Whereas in 1980 they represented 29.3 percent of the total number of unemployed, 4 years later the percentage had declined to 27.3. During this 4-year period, the number of unemployed workers over 16 years of age rose by 83.7 percent, while that of jobless heads of household rose by 71.1 percent. In the words of a recent unpublished study by the Labor Ministry, this "reveals a transfer of unemployment to people on which the family has not traditionally relied for support."

This brings us once again to the thorny issue of youth unemployment. More specifically, although the two concepts are not identical, we are dealing with those who are looking for their first job. According to the EPA, the number of unemployed workers seeking their first job totals 1,118,600, an increase of 170,100 over 1983. The group of unemployed workers looking for their first job is the first hurdle in the path of the people who stream into the job market. Despite the measures adopted to increase the time youths spend in
school, in the next few years about 80,000 to 100,000 new people will flood into the job market each year.

A sector-by-sector analysis of unemployment provides repeated proof of a constant decline in employment in all sectors, except for sporadic and minimal recoveries in the services sector. Employment in agriculture has dropped by 126,700 jobs in the last 2 years; industry fell by 114,500; construction lost 110,800 jobs; and services, despite increases in employment in the second quarter of 1983 and the first quarter of 1984, lost 34,200 jobs. All sectors exhibit a downward trend, and prospects for the services sector, the only one with any hope of maintaining and even improving employment, are somewhat dim. The unemployment rate in the agrarian sector is 10.2 percent; in industry, 16.1 percent; in construction, 36.4 percent; and in services, 10.5 percent.

Unemployment is spreading like an uncontrollable oil slick. Thus, approximately 25 percent of jobless workers who have held a job at one time have been unemployed before. Only one in every five jobless workers quit his job voluntarily; over 40 percent were laid off, and 38 percent had their contracts run out. More than 70 percent of laid-off or contract-expired workers lost their jobs because of the company's economic situation; of them, approximately 50 percent were put out of work because the firm declared bankruptcy or went out of business, and 30 percent—also approximately—lost their jobs because of a response to a crisis or a payroll reduction. These figures would appear to confirm the theory that the adjustment in employment could be touching bottom, because the figures for unemployment due to industrial or sectorial adjustment are similar, and because of the "ideal adjustment" of the economic system.

The so-called job-search time is another variable to take into account in analyzing unemployment; it is also worsening little by little. The number of unemployed who have not found a job in 2 years is on the increase. Approximately 921,000 jobless people have been in this plight for 2 years; and 634,000 have been looking for work unsuccessfully for between 1 and 2 years. Women tend to spend more time out of work than men; 36.3 percent of unemployed women have been out of work for more than 2 years (32.1 percent among men), and 25 percent of them have been unemployed between 1 and 2 years (22.1 percent among men).

Opinions of the Unemployed

Jobless workers have very little faith in the institutional apparatus that oversees unemployment, and in businessmen. In a recent survey conducted by INEM among a broad sample of unemployed workers, only 8 percent said that they believe employment offices are a useful system for finding work. Fifty-seven percent believe that there is unemployment,"because businessmen are not concerned about reforming or organizing their businesses," and 78 percent believe that it is because "those in charge do not want to do anything about it." Clearly there is widespread cynicism; sometimes despair emerges.

Forty percent of the jobless workers are not looking for a specific job, but "a job." Eighty-three percent would accept a job that required fewer qualifications, while 77 percent would accept such a job "immediately." Only one in every six unemployed workers insists on staying in the same trade;
nearly 50 percent are willing to emigrate, and 60 percent would accept a job without Social Security. This core of responses reveals a certain resignation by the unemployed to an increasingly risky economic situation. There is also a congenital despair: 77 percent of the jobless workers believe they have very little chance of finding work.

The time during which workers remain out of a job is getting progressively longer. Approximately 45 percent of the workers are unemployed for more than a year and a half; these long periods are seen primarily in people looking for their first job. Twenty-six percent of the unemployed go out to look for a job immediately, and approximately 50 percent wait 1 to 3 months to begin looking.

The Unemployed by Age
(in thousands of people)

Key:
1. 16-19 years
2. 55 and over
3. Source: EPA 1984
Distribution of Unemployment by Sector
(in thousands of people)

Key:
1. Agriculture
2. Industry
3. Construction
4. Services
5. Seeking First Job
6. Source: EPA 1984

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