Additional Copies

To obtain additional copies of this audit report, contact the Secondary Reports Distribution Unit of the Audit Followup and Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8937 (DSN 664-8937) or fax (703) 604-8932 or visit the Inspector General, DoD, Home Page at: www.dodig.osd.mil.

Suggestions for Future Audits

To suggest ideas for or to request future audits, contact the Audit Followup and Technical Support Directorate at (703) 604-8940 (DSN 664-8940) or fax (703) 604-8932. Ideas and requests can also be mailed to:

OAIG-AUD (ATTN: AFTS Audit Suggestions)
Inspector General, Department of Defense
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, VA 22202-2884

Defense Hotline

To report fraud, waste, or abuse, contact the Defense Hotline by calling (800) 424-9098; by sending an electronic message to Hotline@dodig.osd.mil; or by writing to the Defense Hotline, The Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1900. The identity of each writer and caller is fully protected.

Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces, Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTAF</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTAPS</td>
<td>Contingency Tactical Automated Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>Secure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBMCS</td>
<td>Theater Battle Management Core System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y2K</td>
<td>Year 2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
(FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


We are providing this report for review and comment. This is a follow-on audit to Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-173, “U.S. Central Command Year 2000 Issues,” July 2, 1998. We considered management comments on a draft of this report when preparing the final report.

DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly and there is special urgency regarding year 2000 conversion issues. Comments from the Army regarding the requirement that criteria used for reporting system year 2000 status conform to established criteria and providing information on subordinate commands' year 2000 status were nonresponsive. Comments from the Navy regarding providing information on vessel year 2000 compliance status were partially responsive. The U.S. Atlantic Command and Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia did not provide comments on the draft report. In addition, only the Air Force provided comments that addressed subordinate command submissions of unfunded requirements to support U.S. Central Command's operational evaluations. We request that the Army provide additional comments on system and subordinate command reporting; the Navy provide additional comments on vessel status information; the U.S. Atlantic Command comment on the Joint Communications Support Element status; the U.S. Central Command or the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia comment on systems for inclusion in the Air Combat Command database; and all U.S. Central Command's subordinate commands, with the exception of U.S. Central Command Air Forces, comment on submission of unfunded requirements needed to support the operational evaluations. We request that additional comments be provided by May 24, 1999.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the audit staff. Questions on the audit should be directed to Mr. Harlan M. Geyer at (703) 604-9593 (DSN 664-9593), email hgeyer@dodig.osd.mil, or Mr. Donald A. Bloomer at (703) 604-9477 (DSN 664-9477), email dbloomer@dodig.osd.mil. See Appendix D for the report distribution. Audit team members are listed inside the back cover.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing
Executive Summary

Introduction. This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the year 2000 computing challenge. For a listing of audit projects addressing the issue, see the year 2000 webpage on the IGnet at http://www.ignet.gov.

Objectives. This is a follow-on audit to Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-173, "U.S. Central Command Year 2000 Issues," July 2, 1998. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the ability of the U.S. Central Command to resolve year 2000 issues to avoid undue disruption of its mission.

Results. The U.S. Central Command headquarters refined its year 2000 conversion efforts and was making progress in addressing its year 2000 problems. Coordination within, and among, the Component commands must improve to ensure that all year 2000 problems within the command are resolved. For example, erroneous reporting of Army system status to U.S. Central Command must be eliminated. In order to mitigate risk, U.S. Central Command and its Component commands must intensify their efforts in the limited time remaining before the year 2000. See the Finding section for details.

Summary of Recommendations. We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, develop system contingency plans for all mission-critical systems and continuity of operations plans; require Component commands to report the status of mission-critical systems using DoD reporting criteria; assist U.S. Central Command Air Forces by providing information on subordinate wings and units forward-deployed into the theater; coordinate with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, to deconflict year 2000 reporting issues involving U.S. Marine Corps forces jointly supporting both commands; require Component commands to use the thin-line approach to identify mission-critical systems; and require Component commands to develop system contingency plans for their mission-critical systems and continuity of operations plans. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, require all reporting of year 2000 compliance conform to DoD guidance. We also recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command; the Commanders in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet; and the Commander, Air Combat Command, assist U.S. Central Command Component commands by providing information on subordinate units for information related to year 2000 status. Further, we recommend that the commanders of forward-deployed Air Force units report all users of systems to Air Combat Command, and that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, provide information to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, on the Joint Communications Support Element year 2000 status. Lastly, we recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces, Central Command; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command; Commander, U.S. Central Command Air
Management Comments. The U.S. Central Command concurred with the finding and recommendations and provided details on efforts to develop, or acquire, and test system contingency plans; develop continuity of operations plans for mission-critical functions; task Components to report year 2000-related information using DoD reporting criteria; establish an information flow to enhance visibility of deployed forces; deconflict reporting issues regarding U.S. Marine Corps forces jointly shared with the U.S. Pacific Command; and task Components to develop thin-lines for their critical mission functions, develop system and operational contingency plans for their mission-critical systems and functions, and to take action in the area of host nation support. The U.S. Pacific Command also commented that their Y2K task force had discussed the recommendation regarding jointly shared U.S. Marine Corps forces reporting issues with U.S. Central Command and there were no longer any unique Y2K reporting format requirements from either command. The U.S. Atlantic Command did not provide comments on the draft report. The Army concurred with the recommendations, but disagreed that the U.S. Army Forces Command’s plan established separate criteria for reporting system year 2000 status. The Army also stated that U.S. Forces Command has in the past provided and continues to provide access to the Army’s Y2K database to all reporting organizations. The Navy and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet concurred with the recommendation to provide information on the year 2000 status of vessels being deployed into U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility, but provided no details on how this would be accomplished. The Air Force concurred with the recommendation and stated that the Air Combat Command was actively working with U.S. Central Command Air Forces to address concerns and provide wing readiness information. Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia did not provide comments on the draft report. Finally, only the Air Force Component of U.S. Central Command’s subordinate commands commented on submission of unfunded requirements needed to support the operational evaluations. A discussion of management comments is in the Finding section of the report and the complete text is in the Management Comments section.

Audit Response. The Air Force and U.S. Central Command’s comments were fully responsive and no additional comments are required. Comments from the Army regarding the requirement that reporting system year 2000 status conform to established criteria and providing information on subordinate commands’ year 2000 status were nonresponsive. Comments from the Navy regarding providing information on vessel year 2000 status were partially responsive. We request that the Army provide additional comments on system and subordinate command reporting and the Navy provide additional comments on vessel status information. We also request that the U.S. Atlantic Command comment on the Joint Communications Support Element status and the U.S. Central Command or the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia comment on systems for inclusion in the Air Combat Command database. Finally, we request that all U.S. Central Command’s subordinate commands, with the exception of U.S. Central Command Air Forces, comment on submission of unfunded requirements needed to support the operational evaluations. We request that the Army; the Navy; U.S. Central Command; U.S. Army Forces, Central Command; U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command; U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command; U.S. Special Operations Command, Central Command; and Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia provide comments on the final report by May 24, 1999.
# Table of Contents

Executive Summary i

Introduction 1

Background 3

Objectives 3

Finding 4

Status and Coordination of Year 2000 Issues Within U.S. Central Command 4

Appendixes 25

A. Audit Process
   Scope 25
   Methodology 26

B. Summary of Prior Coverage 27

C. Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandums 29

D. Report Distribution 31

Management Comments 35

Department of the Army Comments 35
Department of the Navy Comments 37
Department of the Air Force Comments 39
U.S. Central Command Comments 41
U.S. Pacific Command Comments 44
U.S. Atlantic Fleet Comments 45
Background

The year 2000 (Y2K) problem is the term most often used to describe the potential failure of information technology systems to process or perform date-related functions after 1999. The Y2K problem is rooted in the way that automated information systems record and compute dates. The U.S. military is highly dependent upon information technology – computer hardware and software. That information technology may not work if the programming cannot handle the Y2K date rollover. Because military operations depend on an infrastructure driven by information technology, commanders must ensure continuity of their mission capability despite Y2K risks of system or infrastructure degradation and failure.

Because of the potential failure of computers to run or function throughout the Government, the President issued an Executive Order, “Year 2000 Conversion,” February 4, 1998, making it policy that Federal agencies ensure that no critical Federal program experiences disruption because of the Y2K problem. The Executive Order also requires that the head of each agency ensure that efforts to address the Y2K problem receive the highest priority attention in the agency.

DoD Y2K Management Strategy. In his role as the DoD Chief Information Officer, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) is coordinating the overall DoD Y2K conversion effort. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) issued various iterations of a Y2K management plan to provide direction and make the DoD Components responsible for implementing the five-phase Y2K management process. The “DoD Year 2000 Management Plan, Version 2.0” (DoD Management Plan), December 1998, is the most current iteration. The target completion date for implementation of mission-critical systems was December 31, 1998, and for non-mission-critical systems was March 31, 1999.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no executive authority to command the combatant forces. The Secretaries of the Military Departments assign all forces under their jurisdiction to the unified commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with unified strategic direction of the combatant forces, unified operation of the combatant commands, and integration into an efficient team of air, land, and sea forces.

The “Joint Staff Year 2000 Action Plan” (the Action Plan), March 1998, provides the unified commands and Joint Staff directorates with the corporate strategy and management approach for addressing the Y2K problem. The Action Plan uses the same target completion date for the implementation phase as the DoD Management Plan. The Action Plan states that the goal is to have all warfighting (mission-critical) systems certified as Y2K compliant not later than December 31, 1998.
Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandums. The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have issued memorandums on DoD Y2K efforts. In the Secretary of Defense memorandum “Year 2000 Compliance,” August 7, 1998, the Secretary of Defense stated that DoD was making insufficient progress on Y2K conversion, which he termed “a critical national defense issue.” He directed a number of actions, including that the commander in chief of each unified command shall review the status of Y2K implementation within the command and subordinate units and formulate a Y2K operational evaluation plan. The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, “Year 2000 (Y2K) Verification of National Security Capabilities,” August 24, 1998, which directed the Principal Staff Assistants of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to verify that all functions under their purview will continue unaffected by Y2K issues. Each Principal Staff Assistant was required to provide the Deputy Secretary of Defense with plans for Y2K-related end-to-end testing of each process within communications, health/medical, intelligence, logistics, and personnel. See Appendix C for more details on the Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandums.

U.S. Central Command. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is one of nine unified commands in DoD. USCENTCOM was activated on January 1, 1983. USCENTCOM is the administrative headquarters for U.S. military affairs in 20 countries of the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Northeast Africa, and the Arabian Gulf. That region contains more than 70 percent of the world’s oil reserves, making it vital to the economies of the United States and its allies. The Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM, reports through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense. The overall mission of USCENTCOM is to support U.S. and free-world interests by:

- ensuring access to theater resources;
- helping friendly regional states to maintain their own security and a collective defense;
- maintaining an effective and visible U.S. military presence in the region; and
- deterring threats from hostile regional states and providing U.S. military forces into the region, if necessary.

USCENTCOM is supported by Component commands from each Service that provide forces as required to conduct operations. The USCENTCOM Component commands are the U.S. Army Forces, Central Command (ARCENT); U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT); U.S. Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF); U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command (MARCENT); and U.S. Special Operations Command, Central Command. Additionally, the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and Security Assistance Offices in several nations complement the U.S. military forces in the region by coordinating the efforts of USCENTCOM with their respective host nations.
Objectives

This is a follow-on audit to Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-173, "U.S. Central Command Year 2000 Issues," July 2, 1998. The overall audit objective was to evaluate the ability of USCENTCOM to resolve Y2K issues to avoid undue disruption of its mission. We did not review the management control program related to the overall audit objective because DoD recognizes the Y2K issue as a material management control weakness area in the FY 1998 Annual Statement of Assurance. See Appendix A for a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and Appendix B for a summary of prior coverage.
Status and Coordination of Year 2000 Issues Within U.S. Central Command

USCENTCOM refined its overall Y2K efforts and was making progress in addressing its Y2K problems. However, the levels of Y2K efforts within USCENTCOM and its Component commands varied in scope and were still evolving. Coordination between USCENTCOM and its Component commands must improve to ensure that all Y2K problems are resolved. In order to mitigate risk, USCENTCOM and its Component commands must intensify their efforts in the limited time remaining before the year 2000.

USCENTCOM Y2K Efforts

Follow-On Audit Effort. From January through March 1998, the Inspector General, DoD, conducted an audit to evaluate the status of the progress of USCENTCOM in resolving its Y2K computing issues. Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 98-173, “U.S. Central Command Year 2000 Issues,” July 2, 1998, made numerous recommendations to USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff. USCENTCOM and the Joint Staff concurred with the recommendations and reported actions they were taking to implement those recommendations. USCENTCOM was incorporating actions necessary to implement those recommendations into its overall Y2K efforts.

Some of the actions USCENTCOM took in response to that audit included:

- engaging the entire command in identifying the mission-critical systems used by USCENTCOM;
- beginning to coordinate Y2K efforts with its Component commands; and
- planning operational evaluations to verify that USCENTCOM can perform warfighting missions, functions, and tasks in a Y2K environment.

The pace of the USCENTCOM Y2K efforts was significantly influenced by operational requirements. For example, USCENTCOM was scheduled to host a Y2K senior leader meeting in November 1998 with its Component commands to establish the USCENTCOM-Component command Y2K relationship. The meeting had to be rescheduled because of a crisis surrounding United Nations inspections in Iraq. That crisis caused USCENTCOM and its Component commands to change focus and plan for the deployment of U.S. forces to the area of responsibility and the possibility of conducting contingency operations. The senior leader meeting was held in December 1998. At the meeting, the
Component commands briefed their responses to an October 26, 1998, USCENTCOM message, “Operation Order for USCENTCOM Y2K Efforts,” which tasked Component commands with numerous Y2K actions. All Component commands formally responded to the USCENTCOM operation order except ARCENT.

**Task Force.** USCENTCOM formed a full-time Y2K task force composed of operators, planners, and technical experts from across the staff to accelerate and better focus the overall USCENTCOM Y2K effort. The USCENTCOM Y2K task force is led by the Command and Control Division Chief within the Operations directorate and is composed of the Operational Evaluation and Contingency Plans Branch and the Assessments and Technical Compliance Branch. The overall goal is for USCENTCOM and its Component commands to expeditiously formulate a detailed and decisive Y2K effort to ensure critical operational missions can be executed throughout the entire area of responsibility in a Y2K environment. The principal USCENTCOM Y2K effort includes extensive contingency planning and operational evaluation. As of December 1998, 25 of the 36 billets approved for the task force had been filled.

The USCENTCOM Y2K task force developed the Y2K Master Actions Plan to guide a comprehensive and coordinated effort to ensure command attention and effective application of personnel, funds, and technical resources to the Y2K effort. The USCENTCOM Y2K Master Actions Plan identifies key actions and milestones; offices of primary responsibility; and estimated completion dates for Y2K operational evaluations, Joint Staff contingency assessments, and technical compliance activity. The USCENTCOM Y2K Master Actions Plan states that USCENTCOM and its Component commands will ensure that all system components are compliant and then test components in interconnectivity before rigorously conducting operational evaluations of critical missions, supporting communications, and computer systems.

**Critical Missions and Functions Thin-Line Approach.** USCENTCOM identified its critical missions, functions, and tasks. Those critical missions, functions, and tasks were derived from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the associated Joint Mission Essential Task Listings. For example, critical missions included major theater war and peace enforcement operations, and some of the critical functions identified were providing theater strategic reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and synchronizing forcible entry into the theater of war. As of December 1998, USCENTCOM had identified 56 mission-critical systems that support critical functions and tasks within its headquarters. Of the 56 mission-critical systems, USCENTCOM is the executive agent for 4. USCENTCOM was conducting a final staff review of those 56 mission-critical systems, which included identifying all critical interfaces for each mission-critical system. Once the review is completed, USCENTCOM will conduct connectivity studies for all system “thin-lines,” which are the minimum number of systems, interfaces, and applications needed to perform the critical missions, functions, and tasks. After the connectivity studies are completed, USCENTCOM will conduct point-to-point testing on all segments of each thin-line.
Operational Evaluations. USCENTCOM had begun initial planning for Y2K operational evaluations. USCENTCOM was tasked by the Joint Staff to perform operational evaluations on three critical missions: major theater war, peace enforcement operations, and peacekeeping operations. USCENTCOM will also plan, support, and participate in system evaluations conducted by other unified commands, the Services, and agencies. The objective of the operational evaluations is to verify that the unified commands can successfully perform wartime, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping operations, missions, functions, and tasks in a Y2K environment. In December 1998, USCENTCOM conducted its initial planning and concept development conferences for the Y2K operational evaluations.

Contingency Assessments. USCENTCOM is participating in the Joint Staff-developed Contingency Assessment Program to evaluate the ability of DoD to accomplish national tasks in the event mission-critical systems do fail. USCENTCOM is included in a series of Joint Staff-sponsored exercises covering the mobilization, deployment and redeployment, intelligence gathering, and sustainment phases of an operation. USCENTCOM was also preparing contingency plans for systems critical to the command's accomplishing its mission in the event those systems fail.

Service Component Oversight and Guidance. USCENTCOM had provided some guidance to its Component commands. The USCENTCOM operation order Y2K message directed the Components/subordinate units to complete several actions, including:

- appoint a senior officer (O-6 or above) to lead the Y2K effort;
- identify critical missions;
- identify critical functions and tasks that support the critical missions;
- identify critical computer and communication systems/applications required to support the critical missions, functions, and tasks;
- identify the current Y2K compliance status for all mission-critical systems;
- identify key Y2K issues that USCENTCOM can address to the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff;
- identify external resources (funding, personnel, technical support) required to successfully implement the overall Y2K effort; and
- confirm the engagement of host nation officials on Y2K infrastructure issues (power grids, sewage, water, etc.) and have, or develop, contingency plans in the event the services are lost.

Continued Improvement Needed. Although USCENTCOM had made significant progress, continued improvement was needed, especially regarding the Component commands. The USCENTCOM Y2K Master Actions Plan
states that the USCENTCOM Component commands will play an active role in
the planning, development, and execution of the USCENTCOM operational
evaluations. USCENTCOM had just begun working with its Component
commands to ensure a collaborative Y2K effort. In order to ensure that all of
the Component commands are reporting the same information, USCENTCOM
needs to establish uniform and appropriate criteria for the Component
commands to report the Y2K status of their systems. Also, USCENTCOM and
its Component commands must develop system contingency and continuity of
operations plans.

USCENTCOM Component Commands’ Ongoing Y2K Efforts

Y2K Program Management. The status of Y2K efforts within the
USCENTCOM Component commands varied. To address the Y2K problem,
each USCENTCOM Component command established an individual Y2K
program. USCENTCOM-Component commands did this differently, with some
developing formal Y2K plans with personnel dedicated solely to Y2K efforts
and others operating their programs on an informal basis. None of those
programs were established in response to USCENTCOM guidance, but instead
were developed under the direction the Component commands had received
from their Services. Due to the various methods of addressing the Y2K
problem used by the Component commands, their existing Y2K program
management structure might need to be adjusted to meet the requirements and
needs of USCENTCOM.

ARCENT. To address the Y2K problem, ARCENT established a
formal Y2K program. A Y2K plan was issued on November 3, 1998, to
document the overall ARCENT strategy and actions necessary to ensure that no
mission-critical systems fail due to the Y2K problem. The plan assigns the
Directorate of Communications (G-6) the responsibility for coordinating the
Y2K efforts of ARCENT. Although the plan formalizes a Y2K task force, as of
December 1998 only one person from the G-6 had been dedicated to the Y2K
task force. Other staff sections’ participants in the task force conduct their Y2K
duties as additional duties. The ARCENT Y2K plan documents and codifies the
ongoing Y2K efforts of ARCENT as well as addressing the Y2K actions
required in the October 1998 USCENTCOM operation order Y2K message. An
ARCENT official stated that one of the hurdles encountered in coordinating with
USCENTCOM and the other Component commands was the lack of ready
access to a Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) terminal. The
official stated that although some material that could assist the command in
identifying and resolving Y2K-associated problems had been posted to
unclassified network terminals, most material was placed on the SIPRNET.

Part of the Y2K problem facing ARCENT was having to report to, and follow
the guidance of, more than one higher headquarters. In addition to being a
Component command of USCENTCOM, ARCENT is dual-hatted as Third
U.S. Army, a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command
(FORSCOM). Prior to the October 1998 USCENTCOM operation order Y2K
message, ARCENT had been following the guidance contained in "U.S. Army
Forces Command Y2K Implementation" (the FORSCOM Y2K Plan), Version 2.0, December 16, 1997. The FORSCOM guidance directed its major subordinate commands, installations, and direct reporting units to take the following actions to address the Y2K problem:

- execute the FORSCOM Y2K Plan,
- appoint a Y2K project officer as a single point of contact for Y2K actions and establish a Y2K working group or task force at each location,
- appoint an installation project officer for non-information technology to manage the Y2K Infrastructure Process at the installation,
- identify mission-critical systems at risk,
- task appropriate subordinate elements for actions required, and
- establish and maintain information technology and non-information technology infrastructure databases to ensure all systems are addressed.

ARCENT was in the process of implementing the actions in the FORSCOM Y2K Plan and the USCENTCOM operation order Y2K message; however, the guidance conflicts. For instance, one difference between the USCENTCOM Y2K effort and the guidance in the FORSCOM Y2K Plan is the criteria used to denote system compliance. Under the USCENTCOM effort, a system is compliant when it has completed all five phases (awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation) of the Y2K management process. Under the FORSCOM Y2K Plan, a system is considered compliant when the tasks associated with a particular phase are completed or on schedule; the Y2K correction does not need to be in place, tested, validated, and certified. That criteria for determining system compliance is not in accordance with criteria used by the Office of Management and Budget, DoD, or the Army. Unless ARCENT and FORSCOM implement criteria that conform to the more stringent DoD, Army, and USCENTCOM guidance, there will be inconsistent reporting of system Y2K compliance and no assurance that systems reported as compliant will operate as they were intended to.

Another condition facing ARCENT was the relative lack of visibility over the Y2K status of weapon systems, augmenting forces, and National Guard and Reserve units. Because the command is dual-hatted, it must rely on other U.S. Army major subordinate commands for information related to the Y2K status of their organizations and systems. Even though ARCENT does not have tactical command of the forces and their weapon systems until one of the USCENTCOM operation plans is executed, the success of ARCENT in supporting USCENTCOM is directly related to the ability of those external organizations to overcome their own Y2K-related problems. As long as Y2K status information is not available to ARCENT and USCENTCOM, the capability of ARCENT to carry out its mission in support of USCENTCOM cannot be assessed.
NAVCENT. To address the Y2K problem, NAVCENT established a Y2K program. However, NAVCENT had not formalized the program in a published Y2K plan or strategy. The Directorate of Communications (N-6) was given the responsibility for coordinating the Y2K efforts of NAVCENT. A Y2K task force was established, led by a representative from the N-6. Similar to ARCENT, NAVCENT identified additional-duty points of contact from the other staff elements and detachments, as well as from tenant units on Navy facilities in the theater. Those additional-duty points of contact continued to work full-time on their assigned duties and incorporated the Y2K duties into their work load. Also similar to ARCENT, NAVCENT is dual-hatted as the U.S. Fifth Fleet, a major subordinate command of the Navy. NAVCENT was responding to Y2K guidance from both the USCENTCOM operation order Y2K message and the Navy.

NAVCENT had been following the guidance contained in the “Department of Navy – Year 2000 Action Plan” (the Navy Y2K Plan), Version 1.3, April 1998. The Navy Y2K Plan contains guidance for units to ensure that:

- only Y2K-compliant products are purchased;
- Y2K compliance language is included in all contracts;
- Y2K renovation activities are prioritized based on mission requirements;
- financial resources are available to address Y2K issues;
- sufficient personnel are dedicated to manage the Y2K effort;
- a Y2K coordinator is appointed for each command;
- all Y2K-related risks are assessed;
- contingency plans are developed for potential Y2K issues and malfunctions;
- all systems, devices, and infrastructures, including interfaces, are tested; and
- all systems, devices, and infrastructures are certified as Y2K compliant.

NAVCENT was in the process of implementing the actions in the Navy Y2K Plan, which parallels the USCENTCOM operation order Y2K message. Similar to the problems encountered by ARCENT involving visibility of augmenting units, NAVCENT also had limited day-to-day visibility of the vessels that will deploy to the theater. That was because NAVCENT only has operational control over the vessels when they are deployed to its theater. Although the NAVCENT Commander is dual-hatted as the Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet are the force providers for the theater and, as such, are responsible for the Y2K conversions on all of the
vessels in the theater. NAVCENT must maintain oversight of information on vessels' Y2K conversions to ensure any exchanges of data that may occur between vessels deployed to the theater and NAVCENT systems located in the theater will not be corrupted because of Y2K-related problems.

CENTAF. To address the Y2K problem, CENTAF established a Y2K program. However, CENTAF had not formalized its program in a published Y2K plan or strategy. The Director of Communications (A-6) was designated the lead for coordinating the Y2K efforts of CENTAF. A Y2K task force, composed of representatives from the A-6, was established. However, only one person was dedicated solely to the task force as of December 7, 1998. The other representatives perform their duties as additional duties. Although there was interest and enthusiasm among CENTAF personnel in all of the staff sections, their contributions had not been fully used. CENTAF should take greater advantage of total participation in support of the Y2K effort.

Similar to the problems ARCENT encountered in dealing with Y2K issues, CENTAF must also report to more than one higher headquarters. CENTAF is dual-hatted as 9th Air Force, one of the numbered Air Forces of Air Combat Command. Prior to the October 1998 USCENTCOM operation order Y2K message, CENTAF had been following the direction that Air Combat Command had issued. Air Combat Command's guidance to Y2K points of contact at the wing/base and tenant units is contained in the "Air Combat Command Year 2000 Infrastructure Guidance Package" (the Air Combat Command Y2K Plan), Version 1.1, April 8, 1998. The Air Combat Command Y2K Plan tasks subordinate units to:

- follow a three-phase process (inventory, assess, and fix) to manage mission risks;
- participate as a member of the base or tenant unit Y2K working group;
- inventory items based upon operational mission;
- determine mission impact;
- determine compliance;
- if not compliant, fix, replace, or ignore;
- plan for contingencies; and
- report inventory to the appropriate Air Combat Command Y2K point of contact.

Although USCENTCOM provided guidance to the Component commands, the guidance does not address the scope of their assurance efforts. For example, the USCENTCOM guidance tasks its Component commands to identify the current Y2K compliance status for all mission-critical systems. CENTAF officials interpreted the tasking to include the Y2K status for systems such as the F-16
and B-52 aircraft. CENTAF officials stated that the command is too small and the commander has too many other priorities that conflict with efforts to look beyond the headquarters staff. Additionally, under the peacetime chain of command in the Air Force, CENTAF has no direct oversight of the Y2K status of its subordinate wings. Under the peacetime chain of command, the information is reported from the various wings directly to Air Combat Command. Although CENTAF does have visibility of the wings’ Y2K status via the Air Combat Command database, the forward-deployed Air Force elements report directly to USCENTCOM. As a result, CENTAF does not have visibility of all Air Force units that would report to CENTAF if one of the USCENTCOM operation plans is executed. Additionally, because of the short-term rotations for forward-deployed personnel, CENTAF was not sure who were the in-theater Y2K points of contact. Unless CENTAF and USCENTCOM have visibility of the Y2K status of units and their associated systems, the ability of CENTAF to carry out its mission in support of USCENTCOM cannot be assessed.

MARCENT. To address the Y2K problem, MARCENT was implementing the Y2K program established by U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific. MARCENT is dual-hatted as U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific. The “Marine Forces Pacific Year 2000 (Y2K) Action Plan” was issued in November 1998 to document the overall strategy and actions necessary to ensure that mission-critical systems will not fail due to the Y2K problem. The plan assigns the Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications (G-6), as the overall lead for Y2K coordination, and the G-6 chairs the U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, Y2K Working Group. Other U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, staff sections were assigned Y2K responsibilities. For example, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (G-3), is responsible for exercise/operational evaluation coordination; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Resources and Installation Support (G-8), is responsible for Y2K installation and facilities issues. The U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, action plan parallels the U.S. Marine Corps strategy of centralized management and decentralized execution. The U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, action plan incorporates the DoD and U.S. Marine Corps guidance and the DoD Management Plan five-phase approach. The action plan tasks subordinate units to:

- identify Y2K-affected systems,
- review the inventory-affected list and assign priorities,
- closely monitor Y2K progress and Y2K level of effort,
- be prepared to report on the systems’ Y2K status, and
- plan ahead for Y2K system failures by developing contingency plans and continuity of operations plans.

Because MARCENT is dual-hatted as U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, it reports to two unified commands, U.S. Pacific Command and USCENTCOM. MARCENT officials stated that one of the greatest hurdles facing MARCENT was providing simultaneous status reports to multiple higher headquarters. The
officials stated that they were more than willing to provide the information, but questioned whether unique reporting formats were required for each higher headquarters. As MARCENT, the officials are subordinate to USCENTCOM; as U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific, they are subordinate to U.S. Pacific Command. As a supporting command, they also provide information to U.S. Forces, Korea. Lastly, they provide information on their Y2K status to U.S. Marine Corps headquarters. Streamlining the reporting process would assist them, and the other Component commands, by requiring fewer unique reports.

Joint Communications Support Element. The USCENTCOM Component commands were not aware of the Y2K status of augmenting National Guard forces. Specifically, the Y2K status of critical units such as the Joint Communications Support Squadrons were not known. Joint Communications Support Squadrons, subordinate parts of U.S. Atlantic Command's Joint Communications Support Element, provide vital communications support to USCENTCOM in the event of hostilities in the theater. Unless USCENTCOM and its Component commands have oversight of the Y2K status of critical augmenting units, there can be no assurance that missions critical to the success of military operations can be successfully carried out.

Unit Y2K Readiness Reporting. The issue of commander in chief oversight of the Y2K readiness status of assigned and augmenting forces is addressed in the Inspector General, DoD, Report No. 99-122, “Y2K Readiness Reporting,” April 2, 1999. USCENTCOM and its Component commands, as previously discussed in this report, raised concerns about that issue. Action taken to implement the report recommendations should assist all the unified commands with oversight of the Y2K status of most units that would be involved in an operation plan.

Identification of Mission-Critical Information Systems. Although each of the Component commands had engaged in identifying and inventoring mission-critical information systems, the adequacy of the identification process varied. USCENTCOM used the thin-line approach to ensure that it had identified every system used to perform critical missions. For example, if the deployment of forces is identified as a critical mission, the thin-line approach would identify the minimum number of systems necessary for the command to be able to deploy forces. The Component commands should also use the thin-line approach. Most Component commands had identified or were in the process of identifying their mission-critical systems, but not by using the thin-line approach.

ARCENT. ARCENT may not have identified all its mission-critical information systems. Efforts were ongoing to fully inventory the Y2K status of ARCENT mission-critical systems. ARCENT was still in the early stages of identifying systems that might be affected by the Y2K problem, and the most recent efforts were focused on identifying the automated systems used to perform critical missions and tasks using the thin-line approach. Each ARCENT staff section generated an inventory of their information systems, with the Y2K task force consolidating their efforts into an overall database. However, the level of effort and detail varied significantly from staff section to staff section. Some sections received input from all of their internal
departments, including personnel familiar with the systems used by ARCENT elements forward-deployed in the theater. Other offices had not progressed beyond listing their desktop computers. Although ARCENT made progress from October through December 1998, the various staff sections may not have adequately identified all mission-critical systems. As a result, some systems may have been missed or improperly identified as critical or non-critical.

**NAVCENT.** NAVCENT used various methods to identify its mission-critical systems. A contractor was hired to generate an inventory of NAVCENT systems. The contractor conducted a 10-day on-site inventory at NAVCENT and its tenant units in the theater. The thin-line approach was not used in conducting the inventory. Not included in the review were Navy vessels deployed in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. That was because NAVCENT only has operational control over the vessels when they are deployed to its theater; U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet are responsible for addressing the vessels’ Y2K issues.

**CENTAF.** CENTAF had not ensured that all its mission-critical information systems were identified. Efforts were ongoing to fully inventory the Y2K status of CENTAF mission-critical systems. However, following the guidance from Air Combat Command, CENTAF left the responsibility for identifying and reporting the information systems and infrastructure that could be affected by Y2K problems to the Shaw Air Force Base Y2K task force. That task force collected information from every unit located at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, including the staff sections of CENTAF. The CENTAF staff elements developed a Y2K inventory of information systems and infrastructure they use and provided it to the Shaw Air Force Base Y2K point of contact to be forwarded to the Air Combat Command Y2K database. The Shaw Air Force Base Y2K point of contact asked that systems used by more than one squadron at Shaw Air Force Base be reported by only one of the squadrons. That was done to avoid reporting duplicate systems in the Air Combat Command database. The result of that method of Y2K reporting was that the particular systems were identified only as a part of the squadron reporting the system, while other squadrons did not report the system in their inventory. The determination of mission criticality for the automated systems reported in the database was being performed by each individual staff section and was not a coordinated command effort. As a result, not all of the systems used by CENTAF appear in the Shaw Air Force Base Y2K inventory database and were not included in the Air Combat Command Y2K database. Further, the systems used by Air Force units deployed in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility were not included in the Air Combat Command Y2K database. Instead, the information was reported only to USCENTCOM. Those units include Air Force elements of Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia, the 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing, the 9th Air Expeditionary Group, the 320th Air Expeditionary Group, and the 332nd Air Expeditionary Group. Since the issuance of USCENTCOM guidance, CENTAF reidentified its mission-critical systems, based on the CENTAF Joint Mission Essential Task List. CENTAF published the information in the CENTAF Y2K Mission to System Traceability Matrix. The reidentification of mission-critical systems was completed in the absence of specific guidance from USCENTCOM and was not done using the thin-line approach used by USCENTCOM.
Contingency Planning. The USCENTCOM Component commands had not uniformly developed contingency and continuity of operations plans for systems and missions that may be affected by Y2K problems. Y2K contingency planning addresses two areas of risk: known or suspected sources of disruption and unknown or unforeseen disruptions. Continuity of operations plans are important in identifying the necessary workarounds for systems that may fail because of Y2K problems. Documenting contingency plans and continuity of operations plans will assist in mitigating risks and provide workarounds in the event of the loss of essential services or resources because of Y2K problems. To ensure that Y2K problems will not cause undue impairment of the ability of the Component commands to support the USCENTCOM mission, the Component commands need to develop Y2K contingency plans. The Component commands also need to perform Y2K risk assessments as part of the Y2K contingency planning process in order to identify system-related risks before they adversely impact execution of the mission. Addressing those risks may include renovating or replacing a system, devising workarounds, or any combination of those activities.

ARCENT. ARCENT had not fully considered the potential impact on its ability to execute its critical missions and functions if systems fail as a result of Y2K problems. Specifically, contingency and continuity of operations plans had not been developed or documented for a Y2K scenario. Y2K risk assessments had not been performed to ensure that all affected mission-critical systems were Y2K compliant or sufficient workarounds had been planned for and documented. Workarounds for mission-critical systems had not been developed or documented. Additional ARCENT efforts are required to provide a sufficient level of assurance that its ability to conduct its mission will not be compromised by Y2K problems.

NAVCENT. NAVCENT had not fully considered the potential impact on its ability to execute its critical missions and functions if systems fail as a result of Y2K problems. Specifically, contingency and continuity of operations plans had not been developed or documented for a Y2K scenario. Contingency and continuity of operations plans will serve as the framework for all naval organizations to protect their critical systems, mission areas, and core business functions from disruptions caused by Y2K problems. Continuity of operations plans should be developed to preserve core missions and processes of Navy forces afloat and ashore, including the development and activation of manual or contract procedures, to ensure mission-critical functions continue effectively and without interruptions due to Y2K problems. Continuity of operations plans should be written by naval operators and end-users. Y2K risk assessments had also not been performed to ensure that all affected mission-critical systems were Y2K compliant or sufficient workarounds had been planned for and documented. Additional NAVCENT efforts are required to provide a sufficient level of assurance that its ability to conduct its mission will not be compromised by Y2K problems.

CENTAF. CENTAF had not fully considered the potential impact on its ability to execute its critical missions and functions if systems fail as a result of Y2K problems. Contingency plans, continuity of operations plans, and risk assessments for Y2K scenarios were being developed and documented.
However, the risk assessments and continuity of operations plans were being completed in isolation by the staff sections and reported directly to the Chief of Staff, CENTAF. The Y2K task force will only be involved in consolidating the plans. CENTAF officials stated that their focus should be continuity of operations, that the command’s main effort is the Air Operations Center, and that it is the wings’ concern to make sure their airplanes will fly. At the Air Force activities we visited, the continuity of operations plans being written did not use consistent workarounds. The workarounds for similar tasks, using the same systems, were not the same. For example, one squadron may identify that its workaround for a particular system is to have 10 personnel use telephones to place orders for items that are usually transmitted through an information system. Another squadron (of the same size) may identify that it also intends to use telephones to place orders, but to have 20 personnel assigned to the task. The potential result could be an overload of the systems that more than one wing uses, such as the Standard Base Supply System. For example, although the wings that use the Standard Base Supply System may increase the number of personnel manually placing orders, the activity that fills the orders may not have enough personnel to receive and process all incoming orders in a timely manner. Additionally, as personnel are diverted from their main duties to perform tasks normally carried out by automated systems, the ability of the command to successfully execute its wartime mission is degraded. Workarounds at CENTAF were not incorporating the realities of limited resources, particularly personnel.

Other Major Issues

Theater Battle Management Core System. The Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) will replace the Contingency Tactical Automated Planning System (CTAPS). The Air Force Electronic Security Command, located at Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts, was scheduled to field TBMCS during FY 1999. CTAPS is used by joint forces to produce air tasking orders, which facilitate much of the day-to-day request and scheduling activities for joint air operations. Accurate and timely air tasking orders are critical to the effective and efficient employment of joint air capabilities in support of operational requirements. According to joint doctrine, joint force Components conduct their planning and operations based on a prompt and executable joint air tasking order and are dependent on its information. Further, CTAPS uses the air tasking order generation and dissemination software that allows joint force air operations centers to be interoperable with other force-level Service command and control systems.

The actual date of delivery of TBMCS software, and its full operational implementation, was in question. There was concern at USCENTCOM and the Component commands that delayed delivery dates would not allow sufficient time to integrate the system into all joint force and Component command headquarters and to conduct the required proficiency training. During the audit, the implications of delayed delivery and implementation of TBMCS had not been addressed by the TBMCS program manager or the Joint Staff. The status
of TBMCS and CTAPS has been briefed to the DoD Year 2000 Steering Group, however, and the problem is being intensively managed by the involved components. We will update the status of those efforts in future reports.

**Funding and Staffing.** The USCENTCOM Component commands had not adequately identified resource requirements for their Y2K efforts. Although USCENTCOM and its Components commands each established a Y2K task force, the resources to support those efforts were acquired from other activities within their respective commands. Funding for all of the USCENTCOM Y2K efforts came from their operation and maintenance funds. USCENTCOM identified unfunded Y2K operational evaluation requirements of over $6 million for FY 1999 and $4.5 million for FY 2000. However, the Component commands had not identified their Y2K funding requirements.

Similarly, the Component commands had not identified other resource requirements that would be required for their Y2K efforts. For example, most of the Component commands assigned Y2K duties to personnel as additional duties; the personnel were not dedicated to the Y2K effort. That was true at both the junior officer and senior officer levels. USCENTCOM, however, established a full-time task force. The positions that comprise the USCENTCOM Y2K task force were redirected from their day-to-day duties; they were not additional positions provided to USCENTCOM. The same process should occur at the Component commands. Similar to the actions taken by USCENTCOM, the Component commands should facilitate their own and higher level decisions on reallocations of funding or staffing by first identifying all Y2K resource requirements.

The combination of turbulent operational demands on USCENTCOM and the limited availability of resources to effect Y2K activities placed significant demands on units tasked with planning and executing joint operations. For example, NAVCENT headquarters is located in Bahrain, and Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (responsible for overseeing the ongoing Operation Southern Watch) is located in Saudi Arabia. Similarly, Combined Task Force-Kuwait, an ARCENT subordinate command, is located about 40 miles from the Iraqi border. The systems that those organizations use in conducting day-to-day operations cannot be taken off-line to conduct testing and validation of Y2K repairs without putting U.S. forces, ships, and aircraft in the area of responsibility needlessly at risk. Solutions to problems such as the need to repair Y2K-related problems on systems used day-to-day in the theater and within existing resources constraints should be identified by USCENTCOM and its Component commands.

**Y2K Host Nation Support Issues.** USCENTCOM and its Component commands had not obtained assurance of Y2K compliance from any of the host countries in the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. Host nation support to U.S. infrastructure within the USCENTCOM area of responsibility is vital to the success of any operations conducted there. Under the host nation support program implemented by USCENTCOM, the identification of available host nation support is the responsibility of the Service Component assigned as the executive agent for that country. Nevertheless, availability of Y2K data on host nation infrastructure is limited. For example, there is a reluctance of the
various host countries to commit to provide resources to the United States until the support is actually required. According to the Special Assistant to President Clinton for Year 2000 Conversion, relatively few national governments, especially in non-industrialized countries, have demonstrated active Y2K conversion programs. USCENTCOM and its Component commands may be able to acquire additional information on host country Y2K status from the Defense Attaché Offices or the State Department. In December 1998, USCENTCOM officials stated that they were going to get their security assistance country team personnel to address Y2K issues with the host countries. In any event, lacking assurance of Y2K compliance, there should be heavy emphasis on contingency planning.

Using Selected Command and Joint Exercises for Y2K Operational Evaluations

Because of time constraints posed by Y2K issues, using selected command and joint exercises to test Y2K scenarios may assist USCENTCOM to make further progress to identify and resolve Y2K problems. In addition, using selected command and joint exercises would provide USCENTCOM and the other unified commands with the opportunity to correct Y2K interoperability issues or would identify alternative measures if resolution of Y2K issues is not timely. Other unified command Y2K reports issued by the Inspector General, DoD (see Appendix B), recommended that the Joint Staff and unified commands integrate Y2K scenarios into operational requirements for joint exercises to determine the impact and extent of Y2K problems on warfighting capabilities. The Joint Staff and the unified commands concurred with the recommendations.

The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261) (the Public Law) directed the Secretary of Defense to submit:

a plan for the execution of a simulated year 2000 as part of military exercises . . . in order to evaluate, in an operational environment, the extent to which information technology and national security systems involved in those exercises will successfully operate during the actual year 2000, including the ability of those systems to access and transmit information from point of origin to point of termination.

The Public Law also directed that at least 25 of those exercises “are conducted so as to include a simulated year 2000 [and] at least two of those exercises are conducted by the commander of each unified or specified combatant command.” Lastly, the Public Law also states that “all mission critical systems that are expected to be used if the Armed Forces are involved in a conflict in a major theater of war are tested in at least two exercises.”

Performing command and joint exercises to test Y2K interoperability of system interdependencies and interfaces may not be possible if the Services and agencies have not implemented the necessary Y2K corrections to the required systems. In such cases, contingency plans should be tested in an operational environment to help USCENTCOM assess its capability to continue operations.
if systems fail because of Y2K problems. Exercises such as the Chairman's Contingency Assessment can provide the opportunity for the testing of those contingency plans.

Conclusion

USCENTCOM and its Component commands made significant progress in addressing the Y2K problem. However, additional work must be done. Uniform and appropriate criteria for designating systems as Y2K compliant must be issued and implemented by USCENTCOM and all of the Component commands. Additionally, the Component commands must dedicate sufficient personnel to their Y2K task forces, especially at the senior leadership level. Similarly, USCENTCOM and the Component commands must develop contingency plans and continuity of operations plans to ensure that there are no disruptions in the commands' abilities to successfully execute their missions. At the time of our audit, USCENTCOM was unique among the unified commands in having personnel deployed to an area of intermittently active hostilities involving U.S. forces. The limited resources available to USCENTCOM and the Component commands are already taxed by the ongoing operations in the area of responsibility. Additional resources would assist USCENTCOM in ensuring that all relevant Y2K concerns are addressed. However, in order to accomplish that, the Component commands must identify their unfunded resource requirements.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Audit Response

1. We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command:

   a. Continue to develop system contingency plans for all mission-critical systems.

   U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that it continued to mount an aggressive effort to develop, or acquire, and test system contingency plans. As of March 25, 1999, it had developed or acquired 43 plans and expected to test all of them in operational evaluations during April, May, and July 1999.

   b. Develop continuity of operations plans.

   U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that it had developed 75 continuity of operations plans that cover all mission-critical functions and planned to test all of them in operational evaluations during April, May, and July 1999.
c. Require Component commands to report the status of mission-critical systems using the reporting criteria established by DoD.

U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that its Components had been tasked to report an extensive amount of Y2K-related information, to include current status of mission-critical systems. USCENTCOM added that the Components also submit a monthly report that is reviewed by the USCENTCOM Y2K task force and then briefed to the senior leadership.

d. Assist U.S. Central Command Air Forces by providing information on subordinate wings and units forward-deployed into the theater.

U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that information flow had been established between the USCENTCOM Y2K task force and the CENTAF Y2K task force, which will provide better visibility of forward-deployed forces. USCENTCOM further stated that the CENTAF Y2K task force was also working with Air Combat Command and USCENTCOM J3 (Operations) to satisfy information requirements.

e. Coordinate with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, to deconflict year 2000 reporting issues involving U.S. Marine Corps forces jointly supporting both commands.

U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that it had been working with the U.S. Pacific Command and MARCENT/Marine Forces, Pacific, throughout the operational evaluation planning process. Marine Forces, Pacific, will participate primarily in U.S. Pacific Command's operational evaluation, but will share data and lessons learned with USCENTCOM and also participate in the USCENTCOM operational evaluation in July 1999.

U.S. Pacific Command Comments. The U.S. Pacific Command stated that its Y2K task force had discussed the recommendation with USCENTCOM and there were no longer any unique Y2K reporting format requirements from either command. MARCENT can provide Y2K status information to both USCENTCOM and the U.S. Pacific Command in the format used for reporting to U.S. Marine Corps headquarters.

f. Require Component commands to use the thin-line approach to identify mission-critical systems.

U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that this was a special interest item for all the unified commands and that the Components had been tasked to develop thin-lines for their mission-critical systems. USCENTCOM added that it had reviewed the Components' initial inputs; the Components were finalizing their thin-lines and expected to have all of them completed by April 15, 1999.
g. Require Component commands to develop and document system contingency plans for their mission-critical systems and continuity of operations plans, to include conducting risk assessments.

U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that the Components had been tasked to develop system and operational contingency plans for their mission-critical systems and functions.

h. Require Component commands to develop contingency plans for all support provided by host nations in the area of responsibility.

U.S. Central Command Comments. USCENTCOM concurred, stating that it had tasked the Components to take action on the host nation Y2K issue. USCENTCOM stated that the tasking was done at the Y2K senior leader meetings in December 1998 and January 1999, in operational evaluation planning meetings, in a USCENTCOM J4/7 (Logistics and Security Assistance) message to security assistance officers, and in a USCENTCOM Deputy Commander in Chief message in March 1999. Initial host nation infrastructure vulnerability assessments and contingency planning status reports are due from the Components by May 1, 1999. The USCENTCOM staff will develop courses of action based on the evolving Y2K threat and Component vulnerability assessments.

2. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command:

   a. Require that all reporting of year 2000 compliance of all systems conform to the reporting criteria established in the DoD Year 2000 Management Plan.

Army Comments. The Director for Information Management, Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Department of the Army, concurred, but in fact disagreed with the finding and recommendation. The Director stated that the FORSCOM Y2K Plan had always been in concert with the DoD Management Plan and the Army Y2K Management Plan. The Director stated that the finding discussion should be deleted because it was erroneous, and that the recommended action should be considered as complete.

Audit Response. The Army comments were nonresponsive. The FORSCOM Y2K Plan does identify the same five phases as the DoD Management Plan. However, the FORSCOM Y2K Plan also establishes separate criteria for reporting the phases that differs from the DoD Management Plan, and that additional reporting criteria is causing erroneous data to be reported. This is fact, not opinion.

Appendix T of the FORSCOM Y2K Plan establishes reporting requirements for major subordinate commands, installations, and organizations. Under the criteria established in Appendix T, a task may be reported as “green” (compliant) if the task has been completed or is on schedule to be completed. Although that appendix was intended only for internal reporting to FORSCOM headquarters, it had also been used by the subordinate commands to determine
their system inventories and status, and then to report information to both FORSCOM as well as other commands and organizations. For example, that criteria was used as the basis for reporting system status by ARCENT at the USCENTCOM Y2K senior leaders meeting in December 1998. When questioned about the status of specific Army systems at the conference, ARCENT officials explained that they were allowed to report a system as green even if the system was not compliant, provided the Y2K fix required had been identified. That misrepresentation of actual system status was also observed at another FORSCOM organization in Kuwait in February 1999. Microsoft Office 97 was being reported as green by the organization, even though only 60 percent of the personal computers on the installation had actually been updated.

Under normal circumstances, it is acceptable for FORSCOM to establish internal reporting procedures for its subordinate organizations. However, confusion already abounds concerning Y2K status at the subordinate level, and the conflicting reporting criteria creates additional confusion. Furthermore, we found that subordinate commands more often used the alternative criteria, which allowed the commands to report more systems as green. Therefore, we believe that the FORSCOM Y2K Plan should provide only one set of reporting criteria, and that Appendix T should be modified to allow green to only represent a completed task, not a task that is on schedule. The Director's request that the discussion be removed from the report does not correct the problem that exists within FORSCOM.

We request that the Director for Information Management, Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Department of the Army, reconsider the comments on the draft report and provide comments on this final report.

b. Assist U.S. Army Forces, Central Command, by providing information on subordinate commands’ year 2000 status.

Army Comments. The Director for Information Management, Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Department of the Army, concurred, stating that FORSCOM has in the past provided and continues to provide access to the Army’s Y2K database to all FORSCOM reporting organizations.

Audit Response. We consider the Army comments nonresponsive. Allowing FORSCOM organizations access to the Army Y2K database will provide information on the various systems that an organization would use. The database would not, however, provide information on the Y2K status of units. The Y2K status of an organization would certainly include information on whether the systems in the organization had been identified by their respective system program managers as being date or time cognizant. The database would not provide information on whether a particular unit had remediated all of its Y2K issues. Nor would a gaining command be able to identify if a reporting organization were bringing equipment that would create unique interfaces.
We request that the Director for Information Management, Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers, Department of the Army, reconsider the comments on the draft report and provide comments on this final report.

3. We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, assist U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, by providing information on the year 2000 status of subordinate vessels.

Navy Comments. The Deputy Chief Information Officer for Y2K and Information Assurance, Office of the Chief Information Officer, Department of the Navy, concurred, stating that the commanders of NAVCENT and MARCENT are taking appropriate steps to ensure that the conduct of their missions will not be adversely affected by Y2K-induced failures. The Inspector General, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, stated that he had no objection to the recommendation and stands ready to assist NAVCENT. The Inspector General added that U.S. Atlantic Fleet will provide NAVCENT information relative to any remaining Y2K problems associated with ships scheduled to deploy to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility; however, to date, there have been no requests for information.

Audit Response. We consider the Navy comments to be partially responsive. No details on how the U.S. Atlantic and U.S. Pacific Fleets would provide NAVCENT with Y2K status of subordinate vessels were provided. In addition, we believe that U.S. Atlantic Fleet’s comment that information will be provided to NAVCENT when requested is insufficiently responsive given the operating tempo of events in the theater. We believe that vessel Y2K status should be reported to the gaining command by the losing command prior to the time of transfer to alleviate any chance of misunderstanding of vessel status. We request that the Navy reconsider the comments on the draft report and provide comments on this final report.

4. We recommend that the Commander, Air Combat Command, assist U.S. Central Command Air Forces by providing year 2000 status information on subordinate wings and units.

Air Force Comments. The Director, Communications and Information, Department of the Air Force, concurred, stating that the Air Combat Command Y2K Program Office is actively working with CENTAF to address concerns and is providing wing readiness information. The Air Force also provided examples of specific actions that had been taken to improve the CENTAF Y2K program. Those actions included formalizing the Y2K program at CENTAF; having the CENTAF Y2K office review and track all thin-lines and continuity of operations plans from all of the functional areas to ensure the plans meet both USCENTCOM and Air Combat Command requirements; and using the thin-line approach to develop continuity of operations plans at CENTAF.
5. We recommend that the Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia; the Commander, 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing; the Commander, 9th Air Expeditionary Group; the Commander, 320th Air Expeditionary Group; and the Commander, 332nd Air Expeditionary Group, report all users of systems to the Commander, Air Combat Command, for inclusion in the Air Combat Command Y2K database.

Management Comments. No comments were received on the draft report from any organization specifically addressing this recommendation.

Audit Response. The USCENTCOM response to Recommendation 1.d., stating that information flow had been established between the USCENTCOM Y2K task force and the CENTAF Y2K task force, which will provide better visibility of forward-deployed forces, may satisfy the information requirements addressed by this recommendation. USCENTCOM also stated that the CENTAF Y2K task force works with Air Combat Command to satisfy information requirements. We request that either the Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM, or the Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia, provide comments on the final report to clarify whether the information requirements have been addressed.

6. We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, provide information to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, on the Joint Communications Support Element year 2000 status.

U.S. Atlantic Command Comments. The U.S. Atlantic Command did not provide comments on the draft report.

Audit Response. We request that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, provide comments on the final report.

7. We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Army Forces, Central Command; Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command; Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces; Commanding General, U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command; Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Central Command; and Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia, determine resource requirements to correct year 2000 problems in their commands and to support U.S. Central Command's operational evaluations, and that they submit unfunded requirements through the chain of command to their Service headquarters with copies to U.S. Central Command.

Management Comments. The Director, Communications and Information, Department of the Air Force, concurred, stating that Air Combat Command had gathered CENTAF funding requirements in January 1999 and passed them on to the Air Force Y2K office. No comments were received on the draft report from any of the other organizations specifically addressing this recommendation.
Audit Response. We request that the Commander, ARCENT; Commander, NAVCENT; Commanding General, MARCENT; Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Central Command; and Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia, provide comments on the final report.
Appendix A. Audit Process

This is one in a series of reports being issued by the Inspector General, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the Chief Information Officer, DoD, to monitor DoD efforts to address the Y2K computing challenge. For a listing of audit projects addressing the issue, see the Y2K webpage on the IGnet at http://www.ignet.gov.

Scope

We reviewed and evaluated the ability of the USCENTCOM and its Component commands to resolve Y2K issues to avoid undue disruption of its mission. We also reviewed issues related to host nation infrastructure, TBMCS, and funding and staffing as they applied to Y2K concerns. We reviewed the President's Executive Order, "Year 2000 Conversion," February 4, 1998, and the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261), October 17, 1998. We reviewed and evaluated DoD, Service, and Joint Staff directives, policies, and processes related to Y2K activities dated from March through December 1998. For this report we visited Headquarters, USCENTCOM; Headquarters, ARCENT; Headquarters, NAVCENT-Tampa; Headquarters, CENTAF; and the MARCENT-Liaison Office.

DoD-Wide Corporate-Level Goals. In response to the Government Performance and Results Act, DoD established 6 DoD-wide corporate-level performance objectives and 14 goals for meeting the objectives. This report pertains to achievement of the following objective and goal.

Objective: Prepare now for an uncertain future. Goal: Pursue a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key war fighting capabilities. (DoD-3)

DoD Functional Area Reform Goals. Most major DoD functional areas have also established performance improvement reform objectives and goals. This report pertains to achievement of the following objectives and goals in the Information Management Functional Area.

- Objective: Become a mission partner. Goal: Serve mission information users as customers. (ITM-1.2)
- Objective: Provide services that satisfy customer information needs. Goal: Modernize and integrate Defense information infrastructure. (ITM-2.2)
- Objective: Provide services that satisfy customer information needs. Goal: Upgrade technology base. (ITM-2.3)
High-Risk Area. In its identification of risk areas, the General Accounting Office has specifically designated risk in resolution of the Y2K problem as high. This report provides coverage of that problem and of the overall Information Management and Technology high-risk area.

Methodology

We focused our review of USCENTCOM on the Y2K efforts of the unified command headquarters and its subordinate Component commands. We assessed the progress of USCENTCOM since the most recent Inspector General, DoD, review of the unified command's Y2K issues. We reviewed the process employed by USCENTCOM and its Component commands to identify mission-critical systems, develop system contingency plans, develop continuity of operations plans, and conduct risk assessments. To determine the status of the Component commands, we reviewed their respective criteria and processes for identifying and reporting Y2K compliance activities. We interviewed the leadership and members of the Y2K entities established at USCENTCOM and its Component commands. We also interviewed members of the unified command and Component command staffs to determine the respective command's level of involvement and interest in addressing Y2K problems; to assess the Y2K impact on joint force architectures; to identify any mission-critical systems not previously considered; to evaluate the impact on the commands caused by the delay in the fielding of TBMCS; to determine the funding and staffing requirements of the commands; and to assess the status of host nation Y2K efforts. We reviewed the impact and influence of supporting commands on USCENTCOM Y2K compliance and testing efforts. We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Audit Type, Dates, and Standards. We performed this program audit from September through December 1998 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States, as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD.

Contacts During the Audit. We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within DoD. Further details are available upon request.

Management Control Program. We did not review the management control program related to the overall audit objective because DoD recognized the Y2K issue as a material management control weakness area in the FY 1998 Annual Statement of Assurance.
Appendix B. Summary of Prior Coverage

The General Accounting Office and the Inspector General, DoD, have conducted multiple reviews related to Y2K issues. General Accounting Office reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.gao.gov. Inspector General, DoD, reports can be accessed over the Internet at http://www.dodig.osd.mil. The following Y2K reports have been issued on summary Y2K issues or on other unified commands.

Inspector General, DoD


Army Audit Agency


Air Force Audit Agency


Appendix C. Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandums

The Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense have issued two particularly significant memorandums on DoD Y2K efforts.

**Y2K Compliance.** The Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, "Year 2000 Compliance," on August 7, 1998, which asserted that DoD was making insufficient progress on Y2K conversion. He directed a number of actions, including the following:

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff was to develop a Joint Y2K operational evaluation program and to provide the plans to the Secretary of Defense by October 1, 1998.

- The unified commanders in chief were to review the status of Y2K implementation within their command and the command of subordinate Component commands.

- The Senior Readiness Oversight Council was to report the readiness implications of Y2K.

- The Defense agencies were to report every Acquisition Category I, IA, and II system within their purview. The report was to address Y2K compliance or areas of noncompliance of each respective system.

- The Defense Information Systems Agency was to provide a report to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) by October 15, 1998, listing all Megacenter* domain users who failed to sign explicit agreements with the Defense Information Systems Agency by October 1, 1998. Based on the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) recommendations, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) was to withhold funds from the domain users named on the list.

- The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) was to issue guidance to the Military Departments and Defense agencies on the funding prohibitions before October 1, 1998.

---

*A Megacenter is a Defense Information Systems Agency organization that provides overall management, operations, and maintenance of all assigned information processing elements, ensuring responsive, reliable, and cost-effective processing services are provided to all customers.
Additionally, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Military Departments, commanders in chief, and Defense agencies ensure that effective October 1, 1998:

- the list of mission-critical systems under their respective purview be accurately reported in the DoD Y2K database maintained by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence), with each change in mission-critical designation reported and explained within 1 month of the change;

- funds are not obligated for any mission-critical system in the Y2K database that lacks a complete set of formal interface agreements for Y2K compliance;

- funds are not obligated for any information technology or national security system contract that processes date-related information and that does not contain the Y2K requirements specified in Federal Acquisition Regulation 39.106, “Year 2000 Compliance”; and

- funds are not obligated for any domain user in a Defense Information Systems Agency Megacenter if that domain user failed to sign all associated explicit test agreements with the Defense Information Systems Agency.

**Y2K Verification.** The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued the memorandum “Year 2000 (Y2K) Verification of National Security Capabilities” on August 24, 1998. The memorandum states that each of the directors of the Defense agencies must certify that they have tested the Y2K capabilities of their respective Component’s information technology and national security systems in accordance with the DoD Management Plan. In addition, all Principal Staff Assistants of the Office of the Secretary of Defense were to verify that all functions under their purview will continue unaffected by Y2K issues. Each Principal Staff Assistant was required to provide the Deputy Secretary of Defense with plans for Y2K-related end-to-end testing of each process within communications, health/medical, intelligence, logistics, and personnel. Each Principal Staff Assistant was to certify that the test plan included:

- functional risk assessments,
- Y2K effects on continuity-of-business operations, and
- associated contingency plans.

Further, the test plans were to include all mission-critical systems involved in each test. The Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, was to help the Principal Staff Assistants with cross-functional, inter-Service, and cross-system testing.
Appendix D. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
  Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence)
  Deputy Chief Information Officer and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Chief Information Officer Policy and Implementation)
  Principal Director for Year 2000
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command
Commander, U.S. Army Forces, Central Command
Chief, National Guard Bureau
  Inspector General, National Guard Bureau
Auditor General, Department of the Army
Chief Information Officer, Army
Inspector General, Department of the Army

Department of the Navy

Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command
Auditor General, Department of the Navy
Chief Information Officer, Navy
Inspector General, Department of the Navy
Marine Corps

Commandant of the Marine Corps
Commanding General, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific
Commanding General, U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command
Inspector General, Marine Corps

Department of the Air Force

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Commander, Air Combat Command
Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces
Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force
Chief Information Officer, Air Force
Inspector General, Department of the Air Force

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
  Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Transportation Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command

Other Defense Organizations

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Information Systems Agency
  Inspector General, Defense Information Systems Agency
  Chief Information Officer, Defense Information Systems Agency
  United Kingdom Liaison Officer, Defense Information Systems Agency
Director, Defense Logistics Agency
Director, National Security Agency
  Inspector General, National Security Agency
Inspector General, Defense Intelligence Agency
Inspector General, National Imagery and Mapping Agency
Inspector General, National Reconnaissance Office
Non-Defense Federal Organizations and Individuals

Office of Management and Budget
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division,
General Accounting Office
Director, Defense Information and Financial Management Systems, Accounting and
Information Management Division, General Accounting Office

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,
Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations, Committee on Government Reform
House Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science
MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VA 22202

SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report on Year 2000 Issues Within U.S. Central Command and the Service Components (Project No 8LA-0052)

Reference memorandum, February 2, 1999, subject: Audit Report on Year 2000 Issues Within U.S. Central Command and the Service Components (Project No 8LA-0052). As requested, the following Army response to subject draft report is provided.

Recommendation 2a: We recommend that Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command require that all reporting of year 2000 compliance of all systems conform to the reporting criteria established in the DoD Year 2000 Management Plan.

Response: Concur. The FORSCOM Y2K Implementation Plan has always been in concert with the DoD and Army Y2K Management Plans. It defines a system as compliant when all five phases of the DoD/Army remediation process are complete. Supporting documentation can be viewed from the FORSCOM Y2K Web Page at http://fiddic.forscom.army.mil/y2k/ that contains the FORSCOM Y2K Implementation Plan and a description of the five phases required for Y2K remediation. Recommended action should be considered as completed.

Recommendation 2b: We recommend that Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command assist U.S. Army Forces, Central Command, by providing information on subordinate commands' year 2000 status.

Response: Concur. FORSCOM has in the past and continues to provide access to the Army's Y2K database to all FORSCOM reporting activities. This database provides the current Y2K status of all Army mission critical and mission essential systems.

Additional Army comments: In the last paragraph on page 8 of the draft report it states that "Under the FORSCOM Y2K Plan, a system is considered compliant when the tasks associated with a particular phase are completed or on schedule; the Y2K correction does not need to be in place, tested, validated, and certified." This statement in the draft report is erroneous and needs to be removed from the report. The FORSCOM Y2K Plan has always identified the same five phases required for Y2K remediation that are contained in the Army and DoD Y2K Management Plans. Reference the URL for the FORSCOM Y2K Web Page above. This erroneous statement, along with the entire paragraph that discusses different criteria for compliance between the FORSCOM Plan and the CENTCOM criteria, needs to be deleted in the report.
My point of contact for this action is Mr. William Dates, 275-9483

Enclosure

Miriam F. Browning
Director for Information Management

CF: SAAG-PMO-L
CDR FORSCOM, ATTN AFCS-IR
CDR FORSCOM, ATTN AFCI-R
Department of the Navy Comments

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING

Subj: DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON YEAR 2000 ISSUES WITHIN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND SERVICE COMPONENTS (PROJECT NO. 8LA-0052)

Ref: (a) DODIG memo of 2 Feb 99

I am responding to the draft audit report forwarded by reference (a) concerning Year 2000 issues within the U.S. Central Command and Service components (project no. 8LA-0052).

One of the Department of the Navy's highest priorities is to ensure no mission critical system failures occur due to Year 2000 (Y2K) related problems. To address this issue, the Department has provided guidance which outlines a centralized management/decentralized execution policy. The Department's Y2K progress is reported to senior management during regularly scheduled briefings. These reports examine Echelon II Commands for proper allocation of resources, for progress against Department of the Navy and Department of Defense mandated milestones, for contingency plans, for responsibility assignment and identification of system interfaces, for required Memoranda of Agreement, and for use of the Department of the Navy Y2K Database.

The Department of Navy concurs with the findings and recommendations in the draft report. The Commanders of U.S. Naval Forces and U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command take their Y2K responsibilities seriously and are taking appropriate steps to ensure that the conduct of the Command's mission will not be adversely affected by Y2K induced failures.
Subj: DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON YEAR 2000 ISSUES WITHIN THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND SERVICE COMPONENTS (PROJECT NO. 8LA-52)

Your findings and recommendations have been helpful in identifying necessary changes in our approach to solving this very important challenge. My point of contact is Ms. Mahnaz Dean, (703) 602-6280.

D. M. Wennergren
Deputy Chief Information Officer
for Y2K and Information Assurance

Copy to:
CMC
CNO
UNSECNAV
ASN(RD&A)
Naval Inspector General
Inspector General Marine Corps
Naval Audit Service
USMC CIO
USN Y2K Project Office
NAVINSGEN(02)
Office of Financial Operations (FMO-31)
MARCENT
NAVCENT
MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AUDITING
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FROM
AF/SC
1250 Air Force Pentagon
Washington DC 20330-1250

SUBJECT
Follow-on, Year 2000 Issues Within the U.S. Central Command and the Service Components, (Project 8LA-0052)

This is in reply to your memorandum requesting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) to provide Air Force comments on subject report.

We concur with the recommendation that ACC assist U.S. CENTCOM Component commands by providing information on subordinate units' Y2K status. The ACC Y2K Program Office is actively working with CENTAF to address concerns and is providing required wing readiness information. The ACC Y2K Program Office established the Senior Leader web site (SIPRNET), containing all pertinent Y2K information regarding Y2K status of the ACC wings. The web site contains each wing's operational risk assessment and continuity of operations plans. Proposed improvements to the Senior Leader web page include identifying wing support in CINC and Air Force-sponsored Operational Evaluations and end-to-end tests.

We also concur with the recommendation that the Commander, U.S. Central Command Air Forces determine resource requirements to correct Y2K problems and support CINC Op Evals, and identify those requirements to their Service Headquarters. ACC gathered CENTAF funding requirements in Jan 99 and passed them to the Air Force Y2K Office.

Request the following updates be included with the final audit report:

1. Pages 10-11. STATEMENT "CENTAF had not formalized its program in a published Y2K plan or strategy." UPDATE CENTAF Y2K office now has three full time people engaged in the process and a much expanded group of part time participants from across the staff. Furthermore, JTF-SWA/J6 designated a one-year PCS slot as the Y2K POC for consistency of purpose. This greatly helped in resolving some of the continuity of operations issues. In addition, JTF-SWA is following a plan very similar to ACC's for developing databases of non-compliant systems and tracking them to either correction or replacement. Every base in the AOR has a Y2K POC, resulting in significant improvement in Y2K visibility throughout the AOR.
CENTAF is also actively involved in upgrading Theater Missile Defense and Air Defense Systems to Y2K compliancy.

Page 14: STATEMENT: "CENTAF had not ensured that all its mission-critical information systems were identified" UPDATE: CENTAF has centralized the thin line monitoring process and Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). The CENTAF Y2K office is responsible for reviewing and tracking all thin line and COOP inputs from all of the functionals to ensure the scope meets both CENTCOM and ACC requirements. This process will ensure critical processes are identified and COOPs are continually refined across the board through shared experience.

Page 15: STATEMENT "CENTAF had not fully considered the potential impact on its ability to execute its critical missions and functions if systems fail as a result of Y2K problems" UPDATE: CENTAF changed its approach to COOPs. They were mistakenly developed without using the thin line process, but this has been corrected. However, there is still an issue of conflicting corrective actions undertaken at multiple levels. The megacenters responsible for several critical functions still need to make the field aware of how they intend to continue to operate without normal information flow. By doing so, the affected agencies can incorporate these actions into their COOPs and eliminate overuse of very limited resources.

Page 16: STATEMENT "Anticipated delays in fully implementing the Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS) will seriously impair the ability of USCENTCOM and its components to carry out their wartime missions" UPDATE: CENTAF appreciates the importance of TBMCS and its successful pre-Y2K integration. The execution of combat operations (i.e., HQ to unit direction or sensor to shooter information) is dependent upon the successful integration of TBMCS. Current Air Force plans for TBMCS provide for fielding of a tested system in time to support CENTAF wartime operations on 1 Jan 2000.

My point of contact is Major Karen Cook, AF Y2K Office. She may be reached at 703-602-2207 or DSN 332-2207.

WILLIAM JOOHUUE, Lt Gen, USAF
Director, Communications and Information
MEMORANDUM FOR CCIG

SUBJECT: Year 2000 (Y2K) Issues Within U.S. Central Command and the Service Components (DoD/IG Audit Report, Project No. 8LA-0052)

1. This memorandum provides a response to the draft DoD IG draft audit report, same subject.

2. The pace and scope of Y2K activities has greatly increased since October 1998 when a full-time Y2K Task Force was formed. We have worked closely with the DoD IG Y2K team, our components, other unified commands and national agencies since the Fall of 1998 to identify mission-critical systems, identify and obtain Y2K funding, plan two operational evaluations (OPEVALs), develop numerous operational and system contingency plans, establish oversight of component Y2K efforts, and implement comprehensive reporting procedures. Component oversight was established and reinforced by a variety of diverse means: the USCENTCOM Y2K OPOPD, senior Y2K leader meetings, three OPEVAL planning conferences, and extensive formal and informal correspondence; to include message traffic and several personal communications between USCENTCOM and component senior leaders.

3. The Y2K Task Force met with the DoD IG team at USCENTCOM on 8 March 1999 and informally discussed our overall Y2K effort and this particular audit report. Specific formal responses to DoD IG team recommendations are found below.

   a. Recommendation: Continue to develop system contingency plans for all mission-critical systems.

      USCENTCOM Response: Concur. We continue to mount an aggressive effort to develop, or acquire, and test system contingency plans. We have developed or collected 43 plans to date and plan to test all of them in OPEVALs in April/May and July 1999. Our components are developing plans and also intend to test them.

   b. Recommendation: Develop continuity of operation plans.
SUBJECT: Year 2000 (Y2K) Issues Within U.S. Central Command and the Service Components

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. We have developed 75 continuity of operations plans that cover all our mission-critical functions. We plan to test all of them in OPEVALs in April/May and July 1999. Our components are mounting a similar effort.

c Recommendation: Require component commands to report the status of mission-critical systems using the reporting criteria established by DoD.

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. Our components have been tasked to report an extensive amount of Y2K-related information, to include the current status of mission-critical systems. They submit a monthly report to USCENTCOM where it is reviewed by the Y2K Task Force and then briefed to the senior leadership.

d Recommendation: Assist U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF) by providing information on subordinate wings and units forward-deployed into the theater

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. Information flow has been established between the USCENTCOM Y2K Task Force and USCENTAF Y2K Task Force, to include better visibility of deployed forces. The USCENTAF Y2K Task Force also works with Air Combat Command (ACC) and USCENTCOM J3-0 to satisfy information requirements.

e Recommendation: Coordinate with Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), to deconflict year 2000 reporting issues involving U.S. Marine Corps forces jointly supporting both commands.

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. We have been working with USPACOM and U.S. Marine Forces Central Command (USMARCENT)/Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) throughout the OPEVAL planning process. MARFORPAC will participate primarily in USPACOM’s OPEVAL, but they will share data and lessons learned with USCENTCOM and also participate in our OPEVAL#2 in Jul 99.

f. Recommendation: Require component commands to use the thin-line approach to identify mission-critical systems.

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. This is a special interest item for all unified commands. The components have been tasked
CCJ3-C-Y2K
SUBJECT: Year 2000 (Y2K) Issues Within U.S. Central Command and the Service Components

by USCENTCOM to develop thin-lines for their critical mission functions. We have reviewed their initial inputs and the components are finalizing thin-lines now. We expect to have all of them complete by 15 April 1999.

g. Recommendation: Require component commands to develop and document system contingency plans for their mission-critical and continuity of operations plans, to include conducting risk assessments.

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. See responses to 3a and 3b above. The components have been tasked by USCENTCOM to develop system and operational contingency plans for their mission-critical systems and functions.

h. Recommendation: Require component commands to develop contingency plans for all support provided by host nations in the area of responsibility.

USCENTCOM Response: Concur. USCENTCOM has tasked the components to take action in this area. This was done at the Y2K Senior Leader meetings in December 1998 and January 1999, in OPEVAL planning meetings, in USCENTCOM J4/7 message traffic to security assistance officers (SAOs), and in a USCENTCOM Deputy Commander in Chief message in March 1999. Initial host nation infrastructure vulnerability assessments and contingency planning status reports are due back from the components by 1 May 1999. The USCENTCOM staff will develop future courses of action based on the evolving Y2K threat, being monitored by USCENTCOM J2, and component vulnerability assessments.

3. My POC for this is Mr. Tom Price, USCENTCOM Y2K Task Force, DSN 968-8037, e-mail pricetd@centcom.mil (NIPRNET), or pricetd@centcom.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

David C. Nichols, Jr.
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director of Operations
U.S. Pacific Command Comments

To: Mr. Shelton R. Young, Director, Readiness and Logistics Directorate
Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, VA 22202-2884

Subj: USCINCPAC COMMENT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL (DODIG) DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON YEAR 2000 ISSUES WITHIN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE SERVICE COMPONENTS (PROJECT NO. 8LA-0052)

Ref: (a) DODIG ITR of 02 Feb 99

1. Reference (a) reported the U.S. Central Command has refined its Year 2000 (Y2K) conversion efforts and was making progress in addressing its Y2K problems. However, the level of effort within U.S. Central Command and its component commands varied in scope and was still evolving. One of the DODIG recommendations was for the U.S. Central Command to coordinate with USCINCPAC to deconflict Y2K reporting issues involving Marine forces jointly supporting both CINCs.

2. The USCINCPAC Y2K Task Force (Y2KTF) reviewed reference (a). At the time of the audit, MARCENT (dual-hatted as MARFORPAC) expressed concern about possible separate unique Y2K reporting formats for CENTCOM and USCINCPAC. The USCINCPAC Y2KTF discussed the DODIG recommendation with CENTCOM and MARFORPAC and this is no longer an issue. There are no unique Y2K reporting format requirements from either CENTCOM or USCINCPAC. MARCENT (MARFORPAC) will continue to provide Y2K status information to both CENTCOM and USCINCPAC in the format used for HQ Marine Corps.

3. The USCINCPAC project officer was Ms. Lily Kamikihara, Y2KTF at DSN (315) 477-7210. The USCINCPAC point of contact is Mr. Wayson Lee, J053 at DSN (315) 477-1182 or fax 477-0535 or e-mail (leewc000@hq.pac.mil).

RANDOLPH W HOUSE
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff
From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (NO001G)

To: Inspector General, Department of Defense (IG.DOD)

400 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202-2884

Subj: AUDIT REPORT OF Y2K ISSUES WITH U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE SERVICE COMPONENTS (PROJECT NO. 8LA-0052)

Ref: (a) IG DOD ltr of 2 Feb 99

1. A review of reference (a) noted only one action item for CINCLANTFLT: "assist U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, by providing information on the year 2000 status of subordinate vessels."

2. CINCLANTFLT has no objection and stands ready to assist U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command (NAVCENT). To date, there have been no requests for information. CINCLANTFLT will provide NAVCENT information relative to any remaining Y2K problems associated with ships scheduled to deploy to USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The CINCLANTFLT N6 action officer, Ms. Wendy Burkett (CLF N6Y2K), is available to answer additional questions. She can be contacted as follows: e-mail burkettv@clf.navy.mil and telephone DSN 836-5447/COMM (757) 836-5447.

3. CINCLANTFLT IG points of contact for audit matters are Mrs. Debra Arnold (NO01G31) at DSN 836-3571 and Mrs. Shari Keller (NO01G32) at DSN 836-3575.

Copy to:

CINCLANTFLT (N6)
Audit Team Members

The Readiness and Logistics Support Directorate, Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD, produced this report.

Shelton R. Young
Harlan M. Geyer
Donald A. Bloomer
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew L. Vonada, U.S. Marine Corps
Steven W. Hutchins
Richard B. Vasquez