## East Europe SUPPLEMENT

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Maglaj Ham Operator Appeals For Help
93PS0196A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 26 May 93
p 17

[Report by Eyup Stetkovac and Jamil Rupa'll]

[Excerpt] Belgrade—A report by a ham radio operator inside Maglaj, northern Bosnia, stated day before yesterday. “They are repeating in this city the loathsome operations that they perpetrated in Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and other cities with Muslim majorities, which they destroyed, eradicating their populations and putting the rest of them in completely powerless protectorates.”

The population of Maglaj is about 40,000, including the original inhabitants and the refugees from the neighboring villages occupied by the Serbs—most of them Muslims. The city is about 110 km northwest of Sarajevo on the main road that links the two cities of Doboj and Zenica and goes on to the capital, Sarajevo. Maglaj controls the mountainous region surrounding the city of Tuzla. It, like Gradacac, is located in the area of a pass that the Bosnian Serbs are demanding to connect their territories with the Republic of Serbia. The two cities are still putting up fierce resistance to prevent the Serbs from achieving their goal of securing complete control of the pass area.

Sidovic, the ham operator, said to AL-HAYAH that the current Serbian attacks began on Sunday morning, with the firing of various types of artillery shells at the city at the rate of about 10 shells per minute from 12 positions, which command all of the approaches.

He described the situation in the city, “The ground was shaking as a result of the explosions. The buildings were destroyed and became rubble from which flames and smoke columns rose. We do not know what became of the inhabitants. It was difficult for them to flee because of the besieging forces striking at all of the suburbs.” He stated that the information available indicates that the Serbs prepared a large force for this attack composed of units of the former Yugoslav Army, the militias of the extreme rightist Serbian leader Vojislav Seselj, and local armed men.

Sidovic added, “In spite of the continuing bombardment of our city for more than a year, we have not known such a difficult situation as the one in which we find ourselves now. We face a deadly fire from all sides. The situation resembles a real hell. There are many dead and wounded, and we cannot know how many.”

He stated that he, at the request of the population, directed a call to representatives of the humanitarian organizations, international peace forces, news media, and the Medicine Sans Frontieres organization to come to the city and stay there a few minutes “to see with their own eyes the destruction and bloodshed and death in all parts of the city, which the Serbian enemy is attacking without mercy.”

He also said that President Alija Izetbegovic had made a call for rapid action to save what remains of the population before it is too late, especially since the light weapons possessed by the defenders cannot stand long before the heavy weapons the attackers use, and since food and medicine in the city are extremely scarce. [passage omitted on AFP report]

Issue of Posavina Corridor Considered
93BA1016A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
27 Apr 93 p 6

[Article by Cvjetin Milivojevic: “Blue Barrier for Serbian Dream”]

[Text] According to Radovan Karadzic, the controversial province three (Bosanska Posavina) is a “question of the physical survival of the Serbian people in the Serbian republic and the republic of Serbian Krajina.”

According to Lord Owen, an extraterritorial corridor (5 km on each side of the road) through Posavina, which would be guarded by UN forces, is enough for the Serbs; according to the Russian intermediary in the negotiations, Vitaliy Churkin, Russian troops under “blue helmets” would be a strong enough guarantee for the Serbs....

The presidential trio from Serbia and Montenegro, however, in their letter to the Bijeljina assembly, interpreted the talks with the British lord on the Posavina corridor in their own way: “We noted that in province three, a new reality was emerging with the greater concentration of the Serbian population, and that this very fact, regardless of the regime for traffic through that province, would undoubtedly ensure the necessary link, and the issue of this vital corridor would be fully adequately resolved, especially since the solutions already offered (although for the time being we are not satisfied with them) exclude any possibility of cutting off this route....”

Although so different, the three interpretations of the future of a quite ordinary road (a combination of upturned asphalt and macadam) suggest the same conclusion: the Vance-Owen plan, but also the issue of war and peace in Bosnia and perhaps beyond, depend directly on whether a solution in Posavina satisfactory to all three sides will be found. The unlucky “corridor of life” (or rather, death) that the Serbian army “drove through” last summer, with enormous casualties of its own and of the enemy’s—as things stand now—is not even a corridor. This is because that road from Serbia through Semberija toward the Bosnian and Knin Krajinas, according to Serbian sources, “passes through Serbian land, through which there is no corridor.”

Before the civil war, few people traveled from the Krajina to Serbia along this road. Krajina residents, those from the Banja Luka region, went out to the Zagreb-Belgrade highway near Okucani, and reached Belgrade most quickly from there, through Croatia. There was one more route from Knin, the one through...
Grahovo, Drvar, Petrovac, Kljuc, Banja Luka... and then, once again, near Orasje (now under the control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]) they crossed into Croatia, to the Fraternity-Unity highway. The third possibility was to reach Srebrenik (under Muslim control), and to go from there to Tuzla, Ugljevik, and Bijeljina, to cross into Vojvodina across the old bridge on the Sava which—isn’t it absurd—was erected by the Germans. Finally, the last and slowest alternative was to travel from Srebrenik, through Brcko, along the Sava, through Semberija, and again to the old bridge.

The only road from Serbia to the Krajinas today starts with Pavlovic Cuprija on the Drina, or the above-mentioned bridge between Bosanska Raca and Sremska Raca, through Bijeljina, and then goes for 40 “safe” kilometers through Semberija, which, according to the peace arbitrers’ plan, belongs to the Serbs. Somewhere between Brezovo Polje and Brcko, however, the corridor, because of frequent shelling from neighboring Croatia, “avoids” its old route along the bank of the Sava, and goes through remote Serbian villages. Also, from Brcko, through Obudovac, Modrica, Derventa... it winds its way to the Banja Luka province. The fact is that the road mostly passes through villages that were settled by the Serb population even before the war. The whole of province three, however, which Vance and Owen awarded to the Croats, is very mixed in terms of ethnic composition. Only the Croatian municipalities of Orasje and Odzak are indisputable. In Brod and Samac, for instance, there are somewhat more Croats than Serbs (41 percent to 33.8 percent, and 44.7 percent to 41.5 percent, respectively); in Modric there are mostly Serbs, and equal numbers of Croats and Muslims; in Derventa there are also mostly Serbs; while in the Brcko municipality, the Muslim population dominated before the war. The ethnic picture is further complicated by a considerable percentage of Yugoslavs.

Today the ethnic reality in Posavina has been dramatically changed. Partly because of pressures, and partly because of a desire for ethnic grouping in central Bosnia, most of the Muslims have left. The Croats have mostly withdrawn toward Orasje and villages in the vicinity of Brcko that are controlled by HVO units, while Serbs from central Bosnia and part of western Slavonia have moved into the abandoned houses. It is probably precisely this card that Cosic, Milosevic, and Bulatovic are playing in “consoling” Serbs from Bosnia in their letter.

Finally, there is also a new obstacle: Vance and Owen, in persuading Alija Izetbegovic to sign the map, gave the Muslims a corridor, a way out from Tuzla to the Sava, precisely near Brcko. Obviously a “trinational loop” would therefore be necessary near Brcko—otherwise the Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian roads would cross at one point near this city.

If the Serbs abandon Posavina, most of which they hold militarily, that would probably also be the end of the Serbian dreams of a united Serbian state for the foreseeable future. This type of Serbian sobering would certainly be joined by an end to the hopes in the Serbian Krajina for a state “divorce” from the new Croatian state. Consequently, in the wake of the thesis of some analysts that Serbia and Montenegro are hostages of the Serbs outside Serbia, two more conclusions can also be reached regarding the issue of the corridor. The first is that the Serbs in Bosnia, in a way, are also prisoners of the ultimatums and pressures from the Serbian Krajina not to give up the “corridor of survival.” The second conclusion, however, is that the corridor is not equally important to all the Serbs in Bosnia (for instance, in the Herzegovina and Semberija provinces), because they have a territorial link with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The decision by the Serbian Republic’s Assembly, however, and probably also the results of the announced referendum of the Bosnian Serbs, will return the story of the corridor to the beginning. Not even a possible willingness of the international community to make concessions to the Serbs on the other side (Popovo Polje, a link between Sekovic and the rest of the parent province, Potkocorzje and Grmec) can compensate for the significance of province three. Whether some other means for talks besides war will be found, however, does not just depend on the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina and their unfortunate leaders. If Karadzic was right about anything, it was precisely his insistence that the problem of Posavina be resolved in bilateral negotiations between the Serbian and Croatian sides, because in this case it would not be at the expense of a third side, the Muslim one. Why did the peace co-chairman halt the talks on a barter of territories that had already been started? As indirectly acknowledged by Mr. Vance and Owen, it is precisely because any Serbian dream of all Serbs in one state, even in the future, is being destroyed over the Posavina corridor....
* Unemployment During 1993 Estimated

93CHO647A Prague EKONOM in Czech 5 May 93 pp 27-28

[Article by Jaroslav Mouliš: "How Many Unemployed Will We Have in 1993?"]

[Text] From the sociopolitical point of view, the development of the labor market in the Czech Republic (CR) during 1992 looks positive. The rate of unemployment during that period kept declining (with an insignificant exception in the last months of the year), from the so far highest reached value of 4.30 percent to 2.27 percent by 31 December 1992. In the first two quarters of last year, that decline even proceeded more quickly than was the case in the previous growth phase of unemployment, characteristic for the year 1991. In the last two quarters of 1992, the decline slowed down markedly, and the average rate of unemployment was 2.6 percent.

Such officially reported rate of unemployment is a record among the industrialized countries of the world: It amounts to roughly one-third of the average in OECD countries, about one-fourth of the average unemployment rate in the EC (and the Slovak Republic), and about one-fifth to one-fourth of the unemployment rate in the postcommunist countries of Central and East Europe during the same period. At the same time, in all of these compared areas, there is a visible tendency toward further growth of unemployment. An especially marked increase in the unemployed is anticipated by this year's forecast of the International Labor Organization in the postcommunist countries, especially in connection with the process of privatization. The governments of those countries can, of course, regulate to a certain extent the ratio between the speed (and success) of the transformation changes in the economy and keeping a socially acceptable rate of unemployment. In that respect, the developments in the CR were markedly successful.

Contradictory Economic Consequences

From the economic point of view, however, the development of the labor market during the past year cannot be assessed entirely positively, particularly because, during that year, the disparity between the overall output of the CR economy and the number of unemployed increased further. With a stabilized labor market, one would expect exactly the opposite development. According to some indications, the overemployment in a number of industrial branches continued and even deepened during last year.

The situation in the labor market also does not indicate any significant beginning of structural changes taking place in the national economy (for example, the relatively low demand for retraining in comparison with advanced countries, and so forth). We can expect that a fundamental impulse to structural changes will be given in the near future by the results of the large privatization and, in a more immediate sense, by the easing of bankruptcies of deeply insolvent enterprises. That, of course, can lead to pressure to release superfluous employees. (According to experience in other countries, the more careful procedure of using preventive consolidation leads, in fact, to roughly the same results.) On the other hand, given the low wage costs, we can assume that our enterprises will maintain their competitiveness even with higher employment than is technically necessary.

As far as the further course of action in restructuring the economy is concerned, it will obviously be necessary to weigh a choice from among several alternatives. Very likely, not a small role could be played here by the risk of significant growth in unemployment, to which a "Thatcher-like" radical liberal alternative could lead. On the other hand, in the present political-economic climate, it is difficult to defend the policy of subsidies to unprofitable enterprises and of artificially maintaining insufficiently economically effective jobs, which is nevertheless evident in a number of countries, especially those in West Europe. Experience in Sweden, for example, shows that, with the help of public expenditures, it is possible to create at least at any time a sufficient number of new jobs. In the present global recession, that policy is also finding new proponents in other parts of the world. In this strongly schematic enumeration, we can finally consider as a third alternative the policy of moderate and mostly indirect government incentives to stimulate the process of restructuring (for example, protective tariffs, regional development funds, tax relief, and easy credit granted to promising restructuring projects, targeted retraining, and so forth).

Future Structural Policy

It is likely that structural policy will follow more closely than last year the social tolerability of unemployment and other aspects of the standard of living, in the spirit of the present liberal concept, and that the most used will be elements of structural policy that place less demand on the budget (restructuring programs, which will not be run by the state). We can further expect that there will be a great effort to solve future problems linked to the growth of structural unemployment, apart from retraining, more by stimulating the creation of new job opportunities than by paying unemployment benefits.

Because, from the short-term point of view, it may be less costly for the state budget to maintain certain overemployment in the enterprise sphere, which is, as it turned out, considerably favored by the management of a number of enterprises, the risk of slowing down or blocking the structural changes cannot be ruled out.

If the privatization maneuver proceeds smoothly and if last year's growth of the number of new job opportunities is maintained, the 6-percent average rate of unemployment anticipated by the budget need not be exceeded by too much. But other factors could obviously be at work here—for example, increased pressure on the tax discipline and the impact of the new system of social and health insurance, which could impel citizens employed in the so-called informal sector and the unregistered
unemployed to legalize their unemployment status and further the possible impact of the tax burden and the overall increase in costs, especially in the case of small and medium-size entrepreneurs, who, as a rule, do not have sufficient reserves at their disposal. A limit on the means for the so-called active employment policy could also manifest itself (the mandatory limit for 1993 is 1.65 billion korunas), as well as a likely increase in the number of retirees looking for work, the possibility of an economically motivated migration of labor force from Slovakia, the potential for increased migration from other East European countries, and so forth.

Absorption of Unemployed

On the other hand, however, in 1992 the CR labor market showed a very good ability to absorb the unemployed. The number of available jobs in relation to people looking for work was relatively satisfactory, and any significant decline in it occurred only at the end of the year. The integration of approximately 180,000 school graduates (an echo of the baby boom of the 1970's, which will still have a marked effect this year and next) went surprisingly smoothly. We succeeded in reducing the unemployment rate (by approximately 1 percent) by employing more citizens with inadequate work morale or skills, particularly on public works. In spite of that, however, a certain portion of the population in economically productive years probably remains unrecorded and obviously tends to find substandard forms of employment in the so-called informal sector (estimated at 200,000 to 300,000 citizens). We may be able to better estimate these marginal segments of the labor market from the results of the sample study currently being carried out by the Czech Statistical Office.

Many experts justifiably consider the share of the long-term unemployed, and especially the share of long-term unemployed young people, to be more significant data than the average unemployment rate. In 1992, the number of people unemployed for more than one year rose markedly in contrast to the previous year (from 8,700 to 23,000 by the end of the calendar year). Unfortunately, there are no statistics kept on the number of long-term unemployed young people. However, unemployed young people (up to age 29) accounted for almost half of all of the recorded unemployed (46.8 percent at the end of 1992).

From the viewpoint of the future competitiveness of our economy, it is also advisable to keep under review the skills structure and innovative capacity of the labor force. The number of college students still especially appears inadequate, even in comparison with a number of developing countries. Also inadequate is a broader base for innovative activities (including R&D in enterprises). To rely on technological stimuli provided by foreign capital could prove shortsighted. Foreign interest is primarily directed at "heads" not at "hands," as is becoming evident.

What Statistics Says

The data on employment, which do not fully complement the data on unemployment, in their most reliable component, which concerns the number of employees in organizations with more than 25 employees, attest in a republicwide summation to some older tendencies of the period of transformation. According to preliminary data, the greatest increases in 1992 in the number of employees were registered by finance (44 percent), insurance (22 percent), and public administration (21 percent). In larger organizations (over 25 employees), employment declined by about 0.5 million employees, of that mostly in agriculture (decline of 22 percent), mining and ore processing (decline of almost 30 percent), and some branches of light industry. There is only an indirect correlation between the average wages and the movement of the labor force. The largest increase in wages in 1992 was again registered in finance (by 56 percent), and the lowest in agriculture and communications (13 percent and 11 percent, respectively).

According to data on social and health insurance, in the course of 1992 in organizations with up to 25 persons, the number of workers increased from 162,000 (on 1 January 1992) to 501,000—that is, more than threefold. The number of self-employed people at the beginning of 1992 was 317,000 and, during its course, increased to 428,000—that is, by 15 percent.
* Ukraine Treaty: Reactions to Border Provision

* Csurka’s Philosophy

93CH0666A Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in Hungarian May 93 p 4

[Article by Istvan Csurka: “The New Grand Coalition or the ’93 Ukrainian Front—Taverna in Parliament”]

[Text] The Soviet troops were still in Hungary when Sándor Sara’s rambling epic film “Drumfire” was swept off the television screen. The audience knew the reason for not being able to see the entire movie, and why it had to listen to the many arguments injected in the text. At that time the people’s sense of pride was satisfied by the fact that some courageous producers had created that film. “God willing, we will see it some day....”

Actually, the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] published a book on Transylvania before, or coinciding with its establishment. Every founder of the MDF, from Gy. Csaba Kiss to Attila Begany, took part in this effort; we also published it in the English language and handed it to inquiring foreigners, diplomats, and journalists. Initially, as a result of Sándor Csóor’s and Lajos Fúr’s earlier commitment, protecting the interests of Hungarian people beyond the borders became one of the MDF’s basic activities.

The MDF was linked to Hungarians beyond the borders by a system of relationships which determined our political conduct from the outset. Therefore, the MDF also represented the resurrection of a new image of the Hungarian nation—one that was played down by communist internationalism—and when voters cast their ballots for the MDF, they voted for an MDF that represented all Hungarians, and that gently touched Kolozsvár [Cluj-Napoca, Romania], Kassa [Kosice, Slovakia], Szabadka [Subotica, Serbia] and Pozsony [Bratislava, Slovakia].

Kadar-Aczel I, II, III

This MDF no longer exists. It was laid to rest in the six-party internationalism that voted for the Ukrainian-Hungarian basic agreement. The MDF fell apart because of a government headed by the MDF. The government caused this to happen not primarily by consummating a bad agreement and defending it with teeth and nails thereafter instead of admitting its fault, but by not only accepting, but also adopting the argumentation of the Left, which is virtually identical to the Kadar-Aczel system’s sour, liberal-left-wing argumentation.

This line of thought calls for the persecution of every form in which the Hungarian character manifests itself. It calls for preventing Hungarians from escaping to the resurrection of populist culture or to the method used by Kodály, and cautions in particular against talking about cooperation with Hungarians beyond our borders, and about our lost homeland. Sóros György once said at a social gathering that he refused to support Transylvanian

causes because Hungarians talking about Trianon and embracing each other meant the beginning of the persecution of Jews. In his days, György Aczel based his statements on the same consideration when mentioning “our nationalists,” and the same ideology was followed by party directives which periodically resulted in the removal of books written by populists and others from the shelves of public libraries, and which prohibited meetings between writers and readers in certain counties. They were spreading nationalism.

Lex Kadar-Aczel II flowed from Lex Kadar-Aczel I: Considering the fact that we also satisfied the governments of the successor states by holding Hungarian nationalists—and everyone else whom they temporarily or permanently declared to be nationalists—on a tight leash, i.e., by taking the first step to satisfy the innermost desires of the Little Entente and committing ourselves to accept the constrained situation faced by a state that had lost the war, we would also expect them to persecute only the nationalists from among the Hungarians entrusted to their care. In turn, the comrades observed this gentleman’s agreement, because they, too, found themselves in the comfortable situation of being able to declare anyone they wanted to be a nationalist.

In turn, Lex Kadar-Aczel III declared that a surrendering, servile, coward, miserable nation-policy must, at all times, be declared to be successful, and that Hungarians finding themselves in situations of dependence must be persuaded to accept it; they must be brought to believe that official silence about acts of murder, the closing of schools, the spread of Romanian influence in cities, the miseries and humiliations of crossing borders, and the unquestionable consequence that the situation of Hungarians was deteriorating everywhere—all that was done in the interest of Hungarians, both in and outside of Hungary.

In the background of this policy of looking in the other direction we find a Soviet imperial order that prohibited mutual critique at the governmental level of the foreign and domestic policies of CEMA member countries. In contrast, chief party secretaries were free not to engage in kissing.

Kadar bragged about not permitting Ceausescu to come to Budapest, and in large group photographs he tried not to stand next to Ceausescu. For this reason the Hungarian government never brought up the issue of persecution experienced by Hungarians, it did not reject this practice in a satisfactory way, and did not agree to play the role of the spokesman for Hungarians in the Western world.

This role was relegated to periodicals like TISZATAI, nevertheless, they, too, were beaten down from time to time. On such occasions official Hungarian politics played the role of the protector of Hungarians to the extent of using some catch words, and officials took advantage of such opportunities to explain their credentials. These explanations conveyed the sense that we had
to be cautious because “they” had 2 million hostages in their hands, and that these hostages would suffer reprisals for every word we said aloud, and for every stand we took. Such occasions were followed by concessions, surrender, and unfavorable agreements, and by tough statements distancing the government from nationalists in Hungary.

The Will of Kiev

Sandor Csordi was banned because he wrote a foreword to Miklos Duray’s book, and Duray was put in prison at Pozsony.

This totally impotent policy and argumentation, from the national standpoint at least, was resurrected by the government in the course of debating the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement. The foreign minister’s argument does not hold water. According to this argument, the sentence objected to—that Hungary does not, and will not have territorial demands against Ukraine—means protection and a benefit and provides guarantees to Hungarians of the Lower Carpathian region, and the National Assembly debate or, possibly, the rejection of the treaty could mean increased stringency, or the withdrawal of benefits granted by Ukraine. This statement is also invalid because of an oblique assumption implicit in the statement, that Ukrainians did not grant what they had granted based on their own good intentions and convictions supportive of democracy, but on the basis of business considerations, in exchange for a renunciation.

But this comes as natural. Ukraine wants to sever itself from Russia. Even severing itself from the Soviet body requires national strength. This cannot be implemented by the reformers of the Ukrainian communist party, it requires the will of Kiev. It naturally follows that the Ukrainian will has certain excesses, that it does not take note of a small people under its authority, of the vital issues of 200,000 Hungarians. It is the function and duty of the Hungarian government to remind the Ukrainians of these people. Accordingly, the Hungarian government’s actions in this regard were appropriate. The Ukrainian leadership understood that it had to take into consideration the Hungarians of the Lower Carpathians, as long as it sought support for its independence endeavors. This then enabled a popular referendum on autonomy, and this is how negotiations about a special economic zone in the Slovak-Hungarian-Ukrainian border area began. Great hopes and promises, however, were followed by far more modest implementation in both cases. But this, too, has become customary. These negotiations only served to commit the Hungarian government and Hungarian society to continue fighting for the realization of both autonomy and a special economic zone.

Guilt Feeling Left Behind

An old guilt feeling based on Lex Kadar-Aczel, left behind from Soviet times, must not be part of this struggle. At the same time, however, the second article of the agreement—the provision at issue—is none other than an entirely unnecessary expression of a Hungarian guilt feeling. This is so because as long as Ukraine has no rational basis to establish territorial claims against Hungary for no Ukrainians reside in Hungary, asserting to Ukraine that Hungary does not and will not have territorial claims in the Lower Carpathians against a Ukraine which thus far had nothing to do with great power decisions assigning the Lower Carpathians to one side or the other—a Ukraine which, in reality, did not even exist as an independent state—is none other than the integration of a World War II Hungarian guilt feeling into a new relationship, moreover, to the detriment of the Hungarian people.

The Lower Carpathian region was formerly called Ruthenia. Despite all the similarities, the language used by a large majority of the populace is not a Ukrainian dialect, but a separate language. The people’s culture is even more independent. In the course of their history, Ruthenians were members of the Hungarian Sacred Crown for the longest period of time, and they lived in rather great poverty. Many Ruthenians fought among Tamas Esze’s foot soldiers, the Kuruc armies. All these things, however, amount to additional considerations only.

Of essence is the fact that Ruthenians, too, want to be autonomous, and that in this regard they should be able to count on help from Hungarians. At this point, however, they are probably greatly disappointed, because who should support Ruthenian endeavors for autonomy if the Hungarian government renounces the idea of supporting the autonomous endeavors of Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians based on some unjustified guilt feeling? There is no external Ruthenian state, a parent country; Ruthenians exist only as a community in the foothills and mountains of the Carpathians, and their only hope for support and understanding rests with Hungarians.

We are a small nation, we assert countless times, perhaps more often than necessary. How can we be so indifferent toward nations even smaller than ours? The Ruthenians are the smaller ones, and so far they have looked upon us with hope.

With the Support of Those Who Use Kalashnikovs

There is great uproar in the country today. People have difficulty digesting the fact that precisely the MDF was the one who accomplished that. The true domestic policy content of these events has yet to be revealed. It could be that we witnessed a phenomenon unique in the history of European parliamentarism. All opposition representatives voted for the agreement signed by the head of government. Not a single representative from FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats], the SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats], or the MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party] abstained. Everyone who agreed to vote and did not walk out—and there were only a few members of these parties who did so—voted yea. Even though they
were very well aware of the strong resistance within the ruling coalition, and of the fact that the government would fail if they voted "nay." To be more exact: The government would experience a fiasco.

All those who use kalashnikovs stood on Jeszenszky's side.

Those, who agitated on the bridges during the taxi blockade like communist commissars during the Commune and demanded that the government resign, now stood up for the government and claimed to have a sense of responsibility. Well, of course. We may attribute this to the resurrection of the common Marxist mentality, to the indifference manifested toward Trianon that has characterized every halfway or fully left-wing party for decades. But not even this explains the opposition's full support given to the government. We must also examine the other side of this issue: For what reason, and how did the government assume such great a risk? The agreement has been there for many long months. Why was it placed on the agenda at this time, when the rift within the MDF is the greatest ever. And finally, on what basis did the government hope for the opposition's support? Aware of the results, the answer is simple: it did not hope to receive the opposition's support, it knew it would receive that support.

The Opposition—The Government's Base of Support

This vote represents the evolution of something that has not yet been given a name, but that functions the more. By now the government's support cannot be found within the MDF, but in the opposition, and the two also have a common enemy: those who did not vote for the treaty, the uncertain ones, who abstained from voting. Members of the MDF faction had to announce their intent to be absent during balloting. A list of representatives intending to be absent was prepared.

The great rearrangement, the grand coalition aimed for by the SZDSZ since the announcement of the election results, has come about. Those left on the outside are the ones whom they had wanted to be on the outside from the beginning. Quite naturally, the Hungarian Way is also on the outside.

Many others are also on the outside. The World Federation of Hungarians, the organization that has the greatest prestige in society has also unmistakably distanced itself from the bombastic system of the basic agreement, and from the terms of renunciation at issue. The World Federation of Hungarians, the global organization which provided so great an uplift to the entire nation since its congress last August, and an opportunity to the head of government to demonstrate his commitment to all Hungarians, even though at that point the agreement had already been signed. (Presumably, "A Few Thoughts ..." spoiled this festive mood.)

This is a sad situation. The government won its case in parliament, but lost it in the country. Never before has there been so solid a majority in that chamber, at the same time however, never before has an action in that chamber caused so great a disappointment in the people's souls.

Some tough measures are going to follow. Attila Begany is not going to be only one to be persecuted. They are going to liquidate the entire network of Hungarian Way, those who truly supported the Hungarian Way, and others, assumed to have supported the Hungarian Way. The relentlessness, which, unfortunately, could not manifest itself against the communists, is going to manifest itself against those who violated party discipline, as well as their friends.

The problem is great, the vacuum is huge. Cooperation by sober, consistent, determined Hungarians can no longer be postponed. The system change must be started anew. It is still possible to do so.

* Csukra Supporters’ Views

93CH0666B Budapest MAGYAR FORUM in Hungarian 13 May 93 pp 2-3

[First paragraph signed by Istvan Csukra; unattributed introduction: "Hungarian-Ukrainian Basic Agreement: Legislators Cannot Claim To Have Been Under Duress; Parliamentary Representatives on Dangers Posed by the Infamous Article 2"; text of speech by MDF Representative Zsolt Zetenyi: "We Adopted a Dangerous Provision"; text of speech by MDF Representative Gyula Zaeck: "Who Wrote the Text?"]

[Text] Normally I dedicate this space to convey to the reader the mutual resonances of Hungarian and world politics from the scene. I now yield, because I must yield to the event of outstanding significance that occurred last week, and to its spokesmen of definitive influence.

Istvan Csukra

A whirlwind of outrage of elementary force has thundered through the Hungarian parliament when debate over the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement began last week. The political-meteorological storm was predictable, because not only representatives, but simple citizens, too, learned—who knows how—that certain terminology which not only suggested, but also finalized the self-paralyzing, self-shackling, renouncing, acquiescence and political lethargy had been included in the proposed text of the basic agreement. Let the incriminated partial sentence of Article 2 that whipped up the storm be printed here verbatim: "THE PARTIES SHALL RESPECT EACH OTHER'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND STATE THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE, AND WILL NOT HAVE, TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AGAINST EACH OTHER."

The fact that this self-offering renunciation would not divide parliament along party lines could be seen in advance. The Hungarian hired workers of diplomatic diversion were, and are aware of the fact that they could not adopt this article only on their own behalf, and as
national forces described in their program statements, thus a simple ruling party majority could hardly suffice for the adoption of the fatal clause that reinforced Trianon with some additional safety chains. To accomplish this, they, by all means, had to count on collaboration with the opposition, because this national suicide-death certificate could have been written by the opposition parties. Nevertheless, the real or artificial storm generated in parliament, set aside or postponed this fatal decision. We present the remarks of Zsolt Zetenyi and Gyula Zaszkely, the two representatives in parliament who took the most firm, and most professional stand against the blaze that is destroying the nation, against declared liberal and bolshevik indifference.

(Reports received at press time indicate that high-ranking government official Attila Begany had announced that he would initiate a popular referendum to prompt Hungarian society to take a stand. The Hungarian National Assembly voted to approve the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement on 11 May.)

Zsolt Zetenyi: We Adopted a Dangerous Provision

Finalizing the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement in many respects represents a historical event in this region, and to the two countries. We have before us a by and large laudable piece of work. I happen to be one of those who uses praise sparingly, but who easily takes note of something he does not like, something that is flawed. No words could suffice to condemn this attitude. This agreements contains only a few mistakes. Nevertheless, Article 2 Section (2) of the agreement deserves mention.

The border issue had a fatal and frightening ring of a symbolic force in the ears of the Hungarian public, people who had to suffer as a result of the injustices of the two peace treaties, the loss of two-thirds of the country, and more than half of its population. This country has always been realistic, even when it signed the Trianon peace dictate and the Paris peace dictate, and even when it affixed its signatures to the UN Charter among other international agreements prohibiting aggression, and the Helsinki Final Accord prohibiting the forceful change of borders.

Under such circumstances the question arises whether the executive power entering into the agreement, and the legislative power affirming the agreement have a special responsibility that needs to be discharged. The answer to this question must be clear: The agreement does not take force unless the legislative power so decides, and the legislative power cannot claim that it is acting under any kind of duress, some impact that paralyses its will: It must listen only to its own conscience, and observe the limits of its conscience.

What We Would Agree To Do in Exchange for a Mere Promise?

I am certain that the issue before us is not whether there will or will not be an agreement with our largest neighbor, an exemplary agreement of broad scope containing ample promises for the observance of minority rights, even though it is incapable of expressing the ideal condition, as that would be necessary. Instead, from our standpoint the question is whether we are making an irreparable, or almost irreparable mistake. I am afraid, that by leaving the text unchanged, and approving it as is, we would be making a mistake like that.

Is this agreement, the condition established by the agreement which states that the parties to the agreement have no, and will not have any territorial claims against each other, suitable to advance the interests of the Hungarian nation—Hungarians residing both within and outside of our borders—as well as stability in Central Europe and the evolution of good relations in the appropriate direction?

When Hungary signed the Helsinki Final Accord on 1 August 1975, it recognized that "In the framework of international law, all participating countries have equal rights and duties. The participating countries respect each other's right to define and implement their relations with other states in a manner consistent with international law, and in the spirit of this declaration according to the best of their ability. The participating countries believe that their borders can be changed in a manner consistent with international law, by using peaceful means and agreements." By signing the Helsinki Final Accord Hungary adopted the principle of abstaining from threatening with and using force, and affirmed the principle of the inviolability of borders.

The partial text I mentioned is unnecessary and superfluous, because first, and overwhelming majority of the countries in the world do not enter into such agreements, they regard as natural that they would not lower themselves to a point of manifesting conduct condemned by international law. This remains valid notwithstanding the fact that Germany, which did not consummate a peace treaty, has entered into such agreements with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the fact that the Soviet Union, too, has entered into such an agreement with Poland, an unfortunate country ground between the milestones of two great powers, a country that justifiably required assurances in the absence of a German peace treaty.

Second, this provision is also unnecessary and superfluous, because as of most recent date, the Paris peace treaty clearly settled the borders of Hungary. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was one of the signatories to this 1947 peace treaty. And further, it is unnecessary and superfluous to enter into such an agreement, because no rational historical, economic or demographic argument exists on the basis of which territorial demands to be enforced by peaceful means could be established against Hungary.

In other words, this provision is a unilateral condition to be observed by Hungary. It is a unilateral condition vis-a-vis a country which has not even mentioned any
territorial demand to its neighbors, but instead has given numerous indications of its intended peaceful cooperation.

The Condition for Peace and Balance in Europe

This part of the text is also unnecessary and superfluous because we have not reached the point where we would have an opportunity to accomplish regional settlement. Just how far are we from a situation where agreements like this could be reached by, for example, Romania and Ukraine, or Russia and Ukraine, or Romania and Yugoslavia? And insofar as settlement it not based on regional principles, the worth of the agreement amounts to only a precedent, and even at that only in one direction, notably to remind Hungary of providing unfounded guarantees which it might be forced to refuse to provide to other countries.

The principle of equal rights of nations and national self-determination prohibits, and implicitly contradicts any agreement which provides a preferential treatment to one nation and not to another, either by assigning different roles to the two parties to the agreement within an agreement, or by omitting this clause from other agreements.

Such distinctions must not be allowed to be made in relations with various states, because only Hungary, and especially the Hungarian minorities beyond our borders will suffer as a result.

The condition for peace and balance in Central Europe is a broadly based enforcement of internationally guaranteed minority rights along with international adjudication and resolution that can be implemented under international control. This international system to protect minorities, and the rights to be protected by this system do not exist at a depth and scope they should exist. It should suffice to make reference to the tragic processes we are witnessing in the South Slav region, at our Southern neighbors.

The fact that official Hungarian foreign policy has declared on several occasions that it would not initiate changes in borders is one thing, and to make a declaration of principle to this effect creating an obligation in security policy documents is another.

What does a condition like this mean in our region, in the Carpathian basin?

First of all, it means an encouragement to nationalist forces in the neighboring countries to further tighten restrictions on the already difficult lives of Hungarian minorities, to further infringe upon their rights. This condition is also interpreted by parts of our nation beyond our borders as a gesture of renunciation, because they believe that the Hungarian state entering into the agreement has renounced the effective support of Hungarians beyond our borders. Stipulating this also means that the lives of Hungarians beyond the borders are going to become even more difficult, and that existing tensions in regional relations are going to increase.

Finally, the threat of waveling is implicit in a clause like this. Let us recall the kinds of processes that had their beginnings in the second half of the 1950s, when the authoritarian Hungarian leadership expressis verbis [in express terms] stated its indifference.

Should We Lose Even Our Hope?

Accordingly, the threat is not that Hungary is endeavoring to change its borders through peaceful means, because there is no indication to that effect. The threat is that parts of the Hungarian nation beyond our borders are going to lose their hope for the betterment of their lives, that assimilation processes are going to accelerate and that resettlement to Hungary is going to take place at a faster rate.

As I said before, one cannot be certain about having to link the minority issue to guaranteeing the border, but it is certain that guaranteeing the borders by providing excessive insurance by no means advances the cause of resolving the minority issue.

In due regard to the fact that the fate of Hungarians beyond the borders raises cause for concern, and considering the fact that the Hungarian minority in the Lower Carpathians enjoys neither government administrative, nor cultural autonomy, and further, considering the fact that Hungary's borders are guaranteed by peace treaties, I regard giving force to this provision of the agreement as unnecessary and damaging, and consequently as absurd.

The appropriate formula for the text would be as follows: "Having declared that Hungary endeavors peace, it will abstain from taking any forceful steps, in due regard to the interests of Hungarian minorities beyond its borders, by observing international agreements to which Hungary is a signatory, such as the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Accord, and therefore Hungary does not intend to treat its borders as the subject of yet another agreement."

The only instance in which Hungary could deviate from this principle would be the existence of an agreement that deviates from the present situation in favor of Hungary.

Based on the above, and since I am convinced that this agreement could catalyze or reinforce irreversible processes and tensions, I am going to vote against the resolution to confirm this agreement. Dixi et salvari animam meam. [To say this, and to save my soul.] Thank you for your attention.

Gyula Zászec: Who Wrote the Text?

On 6 December 1991 Jozsef Antall and Leonid Khrav-chuk signed a good neighbor and cooperative agreement between Hungary and Ukraine in Kiev. This agreement is subject to confirmation by the National Assembly. In the spring of 1993 the National Assembly placed on its agenda a resolution to confirm the agreement, but soon
thereafter, all of a sudden, on the day a vote on the agreement was expected to take place, the resolution was removed from the agenda.

To this date the public does not clearly recognize what went on in reality and why.

The reason for removing the agreement from the agenda was the closing partial sentence of Article 2 Section (2): "The parties shall respect each other's territorial integrity and state that they do not have, and will not have territorial claims against each other."

For more than a thousand years the Hungarian nation has lived in a practically unchanged area as an organic part of Europe. The borders of the Hungarian state established by Saint Stephen were not much different from the borders of Hungary that served as a basis for dismembering Hungary on 4 June 1920, based on the Trianon peace treaty.

The present situation was affirmed by a Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement reached in Moscow on 29 June 1945. Article 1 of this agreement states: "Carpathian Ukraine, an area annexed to the Czechoslovak Republic as an autonomous territory by virtue of an agreement reached on 10 September 1919 in Saint Germainen-Laye, is being united with its ancient homeland, Ukraine, and thus becomes part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic based on a desire expressed by the populace, an on a friendly agreement between the two High Parties to the Agreement.

"As a result of these changes, the borders that existed between Slovakia and Carpathian-Ukraine as of 29 September 1938 will become borders between the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Republic."

The protocol appended to the agreement provides conditions by which Ukrainian and Russian, and Slovak and Czech nationals residing in the two countries may change their citizenship and are obligated to resettle.

Not a single word in the above-mentioned agreement and protocol states that Hungarians, too, have lived in the Carpathian-Ukraine for more than a thousand years, because, had a statement like this been made, they could not have said that the region was about to become "united with its ancient homeland, Ukraine." But have the issues of autonomy and Hungarian nationality been settled this way?

The agreement signed by the Antall government consists of 24 articles, 277 lines. The terms "Hungarian minority," "Hungarian nationality," or "Hungarian ethnic group" do not occur even once in the agreement, and this suggests that the agreement was signed in order to provide guarantees that Hungarians residing in the detached areas can remain where they are. Unfortunately, however, all this can also be said about the two documents referenced in Article 17 of the agreement.

What could this unheard of courage in Hungarian foreign policy mean? Could it be that Hungarians living in the detached region of the Lower Carpathians should not be counted as part of the 15 million Hungarians of whom Jozsef Antall is, in spirit, the prime minister?

Deviates From the Helsinki Final Accord ...

The Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement attests to full compliance with the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Accord, the Paris Charta, and other CSCE documents by both parties.

Here is what Article 4 of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement has to say: "The Parties to the Agreement commit themselves not to enter into agreements with another state or with other states which conflict with international law, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Accord."

Let us take a look what the Helsinki Final Accord has to say regarding border issues: the signatory states "believe that their borders can be changed in a manner consistent with international law, by using peaceful means and agreements."

In contrast, what did Hungarian foreign policy incorporate in the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement? According to Article 2, "The parties shall respect each other's territorial integrity and state that they do not have, and will not have territorial claims against each other."

Thus, today's Hungarian government firmly ruled out for the present and the future taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Helsinki Final Accord, i.e., the changing of the present situation by peaceful means, based on agreements.

The situation is fully unequivocal and clear, Article 2 of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement violates the provisions of the Helsinki Final Accord, or deviates from its contents. This provision also places future Hungarian governments into impossible situations. Let's see why.

A minister of the Hungarian government has declared that the agreement had already been signed, and that the Ukrainian parliament had already confirmed it, and thus there was virtually no chance of changing it. Only one possibility exists: for the Hungarian National Assembly to confirm it, and that's it. And even otherwise, the minister argued, the agreement remains in force for 10 years only, and this sentence must be left out when extending the agreement!

This outlook is indeed becoming to a thorough statesman who gives sufficient thought to things! Article 22 of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement has this to say: "This Agreement remains in force for 10 years. The agreement automatically remains in force for additional five year periods, unless one of the parties to the agreement notifies in writing the other one year prior to the expiration of the Agreement about its intent to cancel the agreement."
One need not have special educational qualifications to be able to say how politicians of the various states in the Carpathian basin and Ukraine would react if, ten years hence, the Hungarian party proposed the deletion of the ominous sentence!

... And From International Customs

Dr. Istvan Dioszeghy, a diplomatic history researcher of international acclaim had this to say relative to the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement in the radio program "Without Borders" on 17 March 1993:

"In general, one cannot find situations in international practice, in which borders established as a result of peace treatise are reaffirmed in additional interstate agreements. History provides precedents for statements made by individual politicians regarding certain territorial settlements. For example, in the 1870s the Italian foreign minister declared that he gave his word of honor that Italy would not assert a claim for Trieste. Despite the word of honor, Trieste became part of Italy."

The history of international relations and international law knows of only one case in which existing borders sanctioned and confirmed by a peace treaty were reaffirmed by a new interstate agreement: the Locarno Agreement of 1925.

The basic agreement is unique in international practice. It is not worth entering into an agreement in which I recognize the borders, while you provide autonomy to the minorities. Incidentally, the agreement does not mention the establishment of guaranteed Hungarian autonomy. Such thing is not usually part of agreements, and conflicts with every kind of contractual spirit. (This is proven by the Czechoslovak agreement regarding Carpathian-Ukraine.) It would be harmful to believe that noble gestures would improve the situation of the Hungarian minority.

Hungarian Views—From Beyond the Border

Why should Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians think differently about their future than those residing in Transylvania? After the 13 February 1993 semiannual general meeting of the Transylvania World Federation— in which Istvan Kreczinger, Denes Czirc and Karoly Kiraly also participated—a bulletin issued by the Federation had this to say: "It is the opinion of the general meeting that Hungary has no reason to fear and to refrain from stating its opinion—to smile in every direction to create a semblance of one-sided friendship, and to tolerate attacks on, the deprivation of rights of, and the violation of Hungarians outside of Hungary's borders. At the same time, however, Hungary has no right to renounce anything that could become possible in the future, for and on behalf of Hungarians beyond Hungary's borders; all Hungary is authorized to do is to register the existing facts. We must have faith in the future, and we must act for the future, because anything is possible in a changing world."

The last paragraph of the bulletin has this to say: "No Hungarian from Transylvania wants to see a situation in which the beloved and precious homeland, an island of peace and calm, becomes involved in a conflict that is dangerous and fatal from the standpoint of the entire Hungarian nation, but they indeed expect Hungary not to enter into negotiations about the recognition of the present borders beyond the provisions of the Helsinki Final Accord, and not to make promises of this nature."

Who and What Is Responsible—For the Odd Present?

I believe that Hungary has a natural need to have settled relations with its neighbors. At the same time, however, no one is authorized to permanently and irrevocably renounce part of the nation based on the unjust Trianon peace treaty. Not even those have a right to do so, who presumably request the National Assembly on behalf of Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians to renounce them. If the Hungarians of the Lower Carpathians had such suicidal tendencies, they would have a single opportunity to do so: to liquidate their Hungarian nationality status and for each and every individual to renounce his future Hungarian belonging. Thank God, this is not the case! Even if only one of them refuses to do so, no one is authorized to renounce the opportunity that may arise tomorrow, just because of that one person.

The best polished part of governmental policies is foreign policy; the government is extremely proud of it, and therefore, understandably, this issue is very sensitive. Nevertheless, I would like to ask a few simple questions:

- Who is responsible for the disputed sentence in the agreement?

Who wrote the text?

What political authorization did the Hungarian government have, to sign this unique agreement in Hungarian history?

Who provided the political authorization, if such authorization existed at all?

Have Geza Jeszenszky and Jozsef Antall read the text of the agreement at all, before signing it?

If so, did they agree with the text?

Why have they not presented the proposed agreement to the National Assembly, if they knew that the National Assembly had to confirm it?

How come the "Declaration" and the "Protocol" signed on 31 May 1991, whose existence is indicated in Article 17 of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement, was not attached to the agreement when presented to representatives?

With what sense of responsibility and conscience will those representatives render decisions who did not require additional information yesterday?
On what basis did the Foreign Affairs Committee of parliament decide that parliament should confirm this agreement with a good conscience? Who decided this matter? Who were the ones—if there were any—who nevertheless dared to register their protests?

Could it be that due to the failure to perform the major house cleaning promised by the MDF, Foreign Ministry professionals continued with their Kadar era nationalities policies and that the foreign minister was unable to see through the situations of entrapment?

Is anyone able to assume responsibility for the consequences of all this? And what could these be?

The government should not have placed this agreement with its present contents on the parliament's agenda! It should not have done so, because:

If parliament refuses to confirm the agreement, we are going to have a domestic policy scandal on our hands, and the resultant situation could also harm Ukrainian-Hungarian relations.

But even if parliament confirms the agreement, we are going to see the beginnings of a domestic policy crisis of a kind that creates a national crisis both in Hungary and among those residing in the detached areas.

Action proposed by a member of our cabinet does not provide a solution either; he said that "anyone, to whom adopting the agreement causes a crisis of conscience should not participate in the voting process." No comment!

What Solution Is There?

Article 21 of the agreement states that "The Parties to the Agreement will resolve disputes regarding the interpretation and application of the present Agreement primarily through consultations, direct negotiations, fact finding, mutual agreement, and conciliatory proceedings." By invoking Article 21 of the agreement, the government should change the wording of the agreement with the Ukrainian party so as to use more exact terms, on grounds that the present agreement violates the Helsinki Final Accord; this being the reason for the request to express in more accurate terms the indicated sentence in Article 2.

If the Ukrainian party endeavors to have good neighbor relations, and is serious about its signature on the Helsinki Final Accord—a thing I certainly believe to be true—it should understand the reason for the Hungarian request.

* Political Motives Seen

93CH0666C Budapest HETI MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 14 May 93 p 3

[Article by MDF Representative Zoltan Speidl, in his weekly column "Parliamentary Corridor"]

[Text] Clearly, the internal opposition of the MDF, i.e., Istvan Csurka and his team intend to use the debate over the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement as a tensile test, with no concern for the MDF, the government, or Jozsef Antall himself. They want to break out, and they want to determine the manner and timing of their departure.

It is entirely clear that this matter does not involve a decision over a high caliber issue, the resolution of differences of opinion that evolved around that issue, and similarly, it is beyond dispute that Csurka's chief moving force is something other than concern for the Hungarian people. The chief moving force is a well-defined group in the largest ruling party that finds itself in the minority, and relentlessly attacks its own (?) government—more brutally than the opposition parties attacked the government at any time.

The bomb is ticking. Istvan Csurka has set up the explosive device, he wants to determine the time when it should be detonated. On the other hand—to stick to this comparison—the place where the explosive device was installed, and the intent of the person preparing the attack, are known, and the only question remaining to be answered is whether we should have explosives experts disarm the bomb professionally, causing the least possible danger?

The answer to this question is clear. It has become evident by now in the parliamentary faction that an overwhelming majority regards the present situation intolerable. I will venture to say: Many of those who for a long time tended to accept the message contained in the infamous study of 20 August 1992—not only the phenomena described, but also the therapy—had enough of the existing conditions. My experience in the county also shows that people who previously rallied around Csurka have realized that the leader had no concept, and that unrecognized ambition for power lurked under the sweet national glaze.

Some believe that Csurka wants to decide for himself when to leave the faction and the MDF. Others feel that he would be satisfied if others performed the job, and if he and his followers were excluded from the party. Doubtless: the latter solution, too, could be favorable from their standpoint, because in either case they could claim that the minority that followed the path of truth had become a burden to the majority composed of "derelicts without a homeland," and "traitors devoid of national sentiments." The fact is that in either case, Csurka and his followers are going to become martyrs for a while. Many people say: Let him become a martyr, as soon as possible.

One thing is certain: In its present condition the MDF is unable to face autumn, because, as I said before, the bomb is ticking, and it would be impermissible to allow them to blast the bomb whenever they wanted to. The bomb must explode, but at a time when it claims the least number of victims. That time is now. And one
wonders what nation-saving policies are going to evolve around the triangle formed by Agnes Maczo, Jozsef Torgyan, and Istvan Csurka.

We must put an end to the present situation, because rumors are that in Csongrad County they want to nominate their own candidates; in that county there already exists a committee that examines people from the standpoint of their Hungarian sentiments, and it is only a matter of time that attempts to take similar steps are going to be made elsewhere. Let them go on with that if they wish, but not within the MDF.

Estimates vary from county to county regarding the proportion of the membership that would line up behind Csurka. In some places this ratio is estimated as 5 percent at the maximum, in other places they say that 20-30 percent would follow Csurka. Whatever this percentage is going to be, it is certain that some of those scared away from the MDF by advocates of Csurka's demagoguery, are going to return at this point, moreover, we are going to be able to win the support of some new, primarily white collar, entrepreneurial, and "petty-bourgeois" groups.

I always objected to assertions according to which Csurka's supporters were intellectually inferior, quasi lumpen elements. In other words, that his supporters were people whose departure one should not regret. Such statements are unacceptable, because a significant part of his supporters remained on the peripheries of society truly by no fault of their own, and therefore these people should not be blamed. These people do not want to be informed, they want to make a living. I am convinced that most of these people can be won over by using wiser and more humane terms. A majority of the trend-setters, people who have been unsuccessful earlier just as they are today, simply because they were and remained untalented, could already have left before.

And the "unity" that evolved at the sixth national meeting remained the same as it was in the moment of its creation. It is a semblance of unity at best. Maintaining this semblance of unity would amount to political suicide.

* Ethnic Hungarian Leaders Comment
93CH0666D Budapest BESZÉLO in Hungarian
15 May 93 pp 7-9

[Summarized responses given in interviews with Sandor Fodor, chairman of the Hungarian Cultural Association of the Lower Carpathian Region, Andras Agoston, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Community of Vojvodina, Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence Movement of Slovakia, Gyorgy Tokay, vice chairman and parliamentary faction leader of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania, and Laszlo A. Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party of Slovakia, by Ilena Kiss; place and date not given: "Carpathian Trap; There Is and There Will Be No One. . . .; Roundtable About the Hungarian-Ukrainian Agreement"]

[Text] "The Parties to the Agreement will resolve disputes that may arise exclusively by peaceful means, consistent with the UN Charter and commitments made in CSCE documents. Never, under any circumstance, will they be first to use armed forces against each other.

"The parties shall respect each other's territorial integrity and state that they do not have, and will not have territorial claims against each other."

(Article 2 of agreement establishing foundations for good neighbor relations and cooperation between the Hungarian Republic and Ukraine.)

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At press time, the increasingly venomous debate over the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement continues in parliament, thus it is worthwhile to recall how this "trap" evolved, a trap into which the seemingly unguarded ruling party segment faithful to Antall had walked in. Geza Jeszenszky is still trying to save what can be saved: He is referring to the strength of Ukraine as a nuclear power with 50 million inhabitants; by now, Tamas Katona invokes only his grandmother and mother, both of whom were born in the Lower Carpathians—if anyone, he would know what was going on there. Jozsef Antall maintains silence. Just as he maintained silence in 1990, when he was supposed to show his colors for the first time, stating whether his party would renounce border revisions. Akos Mester was questioning him in a talk show the day after the Romanian revolt, on the eve of the Hungarian elections. The SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] clearly stated his party's still prevailing view: We could have the rights of Hungarians beyond the borders recognized only if we firmly and clearly renounced any kind of border revision. At that time the SZDSZ politician received a number of letters expressing outrage, and some believed that the clear, noncontrovertible linkage of demands for minority rights with the rejection of territorial revisions scared away many voters. Jozsef Antall was more shrewd than that. He entered the elections on a party ticket that left the public in the dark regarding its view of the realities of foreign policy. He needed the votes of both the sober segment of the public, and the ones who had a tendency to advocate "irredentism." This trap became permanently shut two weeks ago, at the Antall-Kravchuk meeting at the Druzhba hotel in Ungvar [Uzhhorod], where the Ukrainian president himself forced Antall to show his colors: Was he willing to link the minority issue to the border issue? A self-confident Antall responded in the affirmative, and the document to be ratified was placed before parliament the next day.

There is hardly any doubt whether the agreement is going to be confirmed, because outside the opposition, the "sober" segments of the Christian Democratic and the MDF factions are going to vote in the affirmative; this, however, is not going to resolve the issue, because Jozsef Antall continues to maintain silence. He does not respond to inquiries about how his party feels about the borders. Jozsef Antall should reassure his voters and those who
would vote against him that the “cynics” are in the minority. He should state that there is not going to be a Great Carpathian Region, but there is not going to be war either. The need for clear statements is even greater, because we do not yet have basic agreements with either Romania or Slovakia, and, if possible, even more complications may arise in those countries in the absence of sober talk.

Our editorial office contacted the leaders of Hungarian organizations beyond the borders by telephone to find out how they felt about the quarrel in parliament that erupted in conjunction with the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement. We wanted to find the effects of this on public opinion in their countries, how this would impact the situation of the Hungarian minority, and how the border and the minority issues could be linked in the framework of basic agreements to be consummated with their countries in the future.

(The interviews were conducted by Ilona Kiss. We publish the responses in an abbreviated form.)

Sandor Fodor, chairman of the Hungarian Cultural Association of the Lower Carpathian Region [KMKSZ]

“We’re in a Trap”

The Hungarian Government made a great mistake when, in 1990, it failed to elicit the views of Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians concerning the disputed Article 2, at the time the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement was developed. Despite this mistake, I believe that ratification can no longer be avoided. But the KMKSZ leadership is not unanimous in this regard, the board is divided insofar as ratifying the agreement is concerned.

In a certain sense, we find ourselves in a trap. Including this sentence in the agreement was not a fortunate choice, but by now we must opt for the lesser evil. Failing to ratify the agreement would present greater problems. Aware of the attitude of Ukrainian leadership circles, the cause of Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians would be greatly harmed if the Hungarian party demanded to renegotiate the agreement. Despite the fact that my political views coincide with those of the MDF, I am not disturbed by the fact that the opposition parties support the idea of ratifying the agreement, while a segment of the MDF does not want to ratify it. My attitude in this regard is based on the fact that the belonging of Hungarians of the Lower Carpathians is not going to be decided by Hungary, anyway. This is our own, personal issue.

Two weeks ago Jozsef Antall and Leonid Kravchuk issued a joint statement concerning the establishment of Hungarian cultural autonomy and autonomous Hungarian governance, as well as full, equal rights for Hungarians. These provisions would satisfy our needs. The only trouble is that the public in the Lower Carpathians no longer trusts the Ukrainian leadership presently in power; they are viewed as members of the previous nomenklatura. I, personally, am not so pessimistic: as long as a legal framework for autonomy exists, the situation can no longer be regarded as the old Soviet Union. In a certain sense it depends on us how we want to provide substance to this framework.

We are very serious about realizing Hungarian cultural autonomy, we want to establish its foundations in the course of this year. As a first step, we intend to place the Hungarian school network entirely under Hungarian management, under the professional leadership of the already functioning Association of Hungarian Educators. About 70 schools are involved, and some of these are intermediate schools granting diplomas accepted at universities. We plan to develop an entire network of Hungarian language nursery schools, and we want to take charge of public educational institutions.

We just began establishing an independent Hungarian school network, but certain achievements have already been registered in the field of equal language use: bilingual signs have appeared, and if these are still missing, that is caused only by a lack of time and money, or by negligence. We want to achieve a situation in which official forms, school certificates, and personal identification cards are also printed in the Hungarian language; at this time questions and directions are printed only in the Russian and Ukrainian languages. We lack funds, therefore I do not believe that we are going to be able to accomplish all this in 1993; the Ukrainian state was also unable to exchange the Soviet passports.

The situation regarding teacher training is bad, locally, at the University of Ungvar they are training educators only in the field of Hungarian language and literature, at the same time, however, we have 200 students enrolled in gymnasiums and universities in Hungary. We would like to see all of them return home, despite the fact that the incomparably better conditions in Hungary prompt them to stay in Hungary. We asked the competent Hungarian authorities not to permit them to settle in Hungary. The real solution is to develop full scale Hungarian teacher training locally, with the help of Hungary.

Signing the agreement could enhance our possibility to realize all these plans. But I must admit that it is very difficult to explain this to people in the Lower Carpathians. They are tied to Hungary by thousands of threads. It is very difficult to reassure the emotions of people here to the effect that the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement does not represent a betrayal of Hungarians in the Lower Carpathians, but that it is the sole chance for Hungarians to prosper.

Andras Agoston, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Community of Voyvodina [VMDK]

“Autonomy First, Basic Agreement Thereafter...”

The VMDK does not want to interfere with the actions of the Hungarian parliament, of course. Nevertheless we believe that issues pertaining to the autonomy of minorities on the one hand, and bilateral basic agreements on the other, must be dealt with separately. We would find
a possible bilateral agreement with Hungary useful only if Hungary's demands for the autonomy of minorities and for self-governance became a reality prior to entering into such an agreement. This is very important in the case of Serbia and the Vojvodina, and I believe that we could expect the Hungarian parliament and government to treat this matter the same way.

In the Lower Carpathians a decision concerning autonomy was reached as a result of a popular referendum in those days, therefore the enforcement of cultural independence is, in principle, not impossible. Having accomplished this, I am unable to object to signing the bilateral agreement. The same applies to every successor state. Once our endeavors for autonomy become a reality, there may come about bilateral agreements which could guarantee peace for decades to come.

Once political institutions needed for the representation of minorities come about and are alive, provisions of bilateral agreements pertaining to minorities lose some of their significance, and at that point it becomes easier to rely on international documents, on decisions made by international bodies.

Never before have Hungarians of Vojvodina been so close to dialogue concerning their endeavors for autonomy than now, because the letter written by the three presidents to the Serbs of Bosnia has catalyzed a qualitatively new process. The significance of the use of force and war is being scaled down, and democratic methods are gaining strength. If Serbia, or a Small Yugoslavia want to show spectacular results, one can be certain that the first thing they are going to do is to enter into dialogue with Hungarians, because the best chance to find a mutually useful solution exists in this regard. This is why we initiated the establishment of a minority autonomous government based on civilian principles and on personal autonomy.

Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence Movement of Slovakia

I See No Sense in Exceeding the Helsinki Principles

I feel that it is very important that the Hungarian parliament ratify the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement, but I must note that the dispute in conjunction with the agreement erupted by no coincidence. The second article includes an obscure logic, one that can be traced to a certain extent to communist logic. That provision repeats things already contained in the Helsinki document.

The fact is that manifestations of mutual trust must be codified somehow, and this has indeed been accomplished most clearly since World War II by the Helsinki document: The countries which signed that document declared among other things, to respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and not to endeavor changing the borders by using force. One cannot define mutual trust in an interstate document more clearly.

Article 2 of the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement includes some additional, somewhat contradictory provisions. For example, it states that the parties to the agreement refrain from using armed forces against each other. If either party violates this provision of the agreement, there no longer is a need for additional commitments to strengthen trust. Namely, the one who commits himself to avoid armed conflicts, also commits himself automatically to respect the other's territorial integrity and territorial status. Except for one or two armed incidents, every war in European history involved the acquisition of territory. Accordingly, Article 2 overemphasizes even this self-evident fact.

The Paris peace treaty has clear provisions regarding territorial claims, and with respect to territorial integrity and border issues, the Helsinki document establishes clear-cut requirements and obligations. Once we begin establishing additional, new formulas, we prove that something is not in order in Central Europe, and this causes suspicion of a magnitude that cannot be dissolved by the declarations themselves. Therefore, this Article 2, or rather the incorporation of this article in the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic agreement may be perceived as if the corresponding article of the CSCE final accord does not provide sufficient guarantees for peaceful and secure coexistence in Europe.

The Helsinki principles must be observed if a Hungarian-Slovak basic agreement is consummated. If we were to question the intent to endeavor to achieve security as stated in the Helsinki documents, we would also have to state that the provisions of the Helsinki document were inadequate. And if something else is indeed needed, we must initiate action to convene a new conference on European security. We are able to control the validity of the Helsinki principles, but we have not established guarantees for the implementation of those principles to this date. I see no sense in declarations exceeding the Helsinki principles. In the final analysis, such declarations resolve nothing, they produce no results that could be "cashed in." The conflict in Yugoslavia proves that no country can be held to account for violating internationally accepted principles. The countries that signed the Helsinki document do not have the strength to force another state to settle a conflict by peaceful means, once started.

A renunciation of territorial claims must be incorporated in a future Slovak-Hungarian basic agreement as stated in Chapter 4 of the Helsinki Final Accord: It is consistent with European mentality. We found out that the Soviet and communist type thinking of "forever and never any other way" has no credibility. It is yet another matter that there is not going to be a basic agreement between Hungary and Slovakia without settling other, existing disputed issues between the two countries.
Gyorgy Tokay: political vice chairman of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ], and head of the RMDSZ parliamentary faction

“The Romanian Party Wants Seemingly Excessive Guarantees”

Under the given historical conditions, Article 2 of the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement may be regarded as something natural; signing the agreement does not mean that Hungary renounces its sense of responsibility for the minority beyond the borders. Accordingly, ratifying the agreement would be, or would have been justified.

Just how an article with a similar content could be incorporated in a future Hungarian-Romanian basic agreement must be evaluated from many vantage points. First of all, one has to consider the differences between the two agreements. These differences stem, in part, from the historical situation (unlike Ukraine, Romania and Hungary were independent states when signing the Paris peace treaty, both countries signed the treaty and both parliaments ratified it), and in part from numerical differences in the size of the Hungarian population in the two countries. At the same time, however, the circum-spect settlement of the minorities’ fate beyond the borders is the constitutional duty of any incumbent Hungarian government.

One could expect that in a future Hungarian-Romanian basic agreement the two disputes would emerge: first, the situation of the minority in Romania, and second, the renunciation of future territorial claims, but an appropriate form to express this must be found. Only the future will tell, whether this statement will amount to a categorical repetition of the text incorporated in the Hungarian-Ukrainian agreement, or to some other wording.

At first glance it seems that the Romanian party demands excessive guarantees from the other party. It expects the neighboring country not only to declare now that it has no territorial claims against Romania, but it also wants this declaration to expressly state that it is not going to establish territorial claims in the future either. At the same time, however, the Romanian government has refused to express provisions to protect minorities, provisions to include more detail than the principles established at the Copenhagen conference. Even though simple peasant logic dictates that something must be given in exchange for another thing. If the fate of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania is satisfactorily settled, there also must exist an acceptable solution in regard to the special, extraordinary guarantees sought by Romania.

More than 70 years have passed since Trianon. As compared to the Romanian population, the ratio of the Hungarian population has rapidly declined and the map of Transylvania, from a practical standpoint, the map has been redrawn. For the first time the absolute number of Hungarians has also declined, by almost 200,000 between 1977 and 1992. This is a danger sign which sheds light on the threatened condition of the Hungarian minority. This situation requires special rules expressed in legal terms, which can only be expressed in a Hungarian-Romanian interstate agreement. The rules must take into consideration the special status of Hungarians in Transylvania, the fact that aside from Russians, this is the largest minority in Europe, among other things. Accordingly, we are dealing with two requirements of a special character: with the protection of the Hungarian minority, on the one hand, and with territorial guarantees for Romania, on the other; this issue stands or falls on these mutual “excessive guarantees.” No sober mind wants to, and cannot think of changing the borders. But the national identity, the commitment to traditions of living people must be preserved somehow.

It is reassuring that as of more recent date, both parties pay more attention to what the RMDSZ has to say. In order to obtain information about relations between the two countries, Hungarian political leaders and the government have invited RMDSZ leaders before, while the Romanian foreign ministry has done the same for the first time last January.

Lazlo A. Nagy, chairman of the Hungarian Civic Party of Slovakia

“I Object To Be Treated as a Hostage”

Regarding border issues, we may choose between two models of conduct and action: the West European and the East European models. Although in different ways, both question the results produced by the Trianon and the Versailles Treaties.

As a result of diligent cooperation and negotiations during the past, almost 50 years, the West European model has produced a Europe that became unified even in its variations, a place where state borders no longer exist in the classical sense: It would not occur to any sane politician in these countries to initiate political debate about changing borders.

The situation is different in the East European countries. Here we find examples for all kinds of approaches. Raising an oblique suspicion in literary and current events newspapers, using minorities for mutual extortion and for checkmating each other, defamation of character before international bodies, the scare tactic of seeking malicious allies, the deployment of economic weapons, the halting (or starting) of arms shipments to each other or to third parties, holding back on agreements, wars, civil wars, attempts to forcefully change borders, etc. This is how far we got in East Europe fifty years after World War II.

We have a choice! I reject the idea of anyone treating me as a hostage just because I am a member of a minority—even if the issue is as important as an agreement to be reached between two countries. As a European I choose the European path.
* Expelled From MDF, MP Views Party's Fractions

93CHO623A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Apr 93 p 4

[Interview with Imre Korosi, National Assembly representative recently expelled from the Hungarian Democratic Forum; by Pal Szombathy and Era Nemeth; place and date not given: "The Representative Expelled From the MDF Criticizes Imre Konya; 'Jozsef Antall Is Surrounded by Poor Advisers'"

[Text] According to Imre Korosi who has been expelled from the MDF faction, significant changes in personnel are to be expected in the MDF in the near future. The concept of party center is a nonexistent myth; it only comprises representatives loyal to Imre Konya. Korosi said that Jozsef Antall is surrounded by poor advisers.

"I learned from the radio news early Wednesday morning that I was expelled from the MDF faction and from the party," began Imre Korosi, who was elected to the parliament on a party list. "I did not believe that the MDF would make such a mistake and that the faction would respond so hysterically to something that it should have expected."

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] What should it have expected?

[Korosi] I have been sending out signals for a year and a half, either in writing or verbally, regarding the problems in agriculture and the shortcomings of privatization. Prime Minister Jozsef Antall responded to my letters by saying that I was right. I prepared programs which also elicited positive responses from the prime minister. All this to no avail. I believed that my actions were right, but it seems that I have stirred up a nest of hornets.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Has there perhaps been corruption in certain transactions of privatization?

[Korosi] Corruption can be detected even at the State Property Agency's [AVU] internal auditing. This is why privatization should be made public; public exposure is definitely a deterrent. No party should undertake the management of privatization; a parliamentary committee should have been set up. In practice, the MDF is the only party today that is involved in privatization, its coalition partners not getting an insight into the process. Thus, the temptation is great for MDF representatives and politicians. However, after the 1994 elections, the new administration of a different makeup will no doubt investigate certain transactions and will be able to monitor individual disclosures of assets.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] It would be embarrassing if the new administration were compelled to investigate the actions of its predecessor.

[Korosi] That is why I suggested a year ago that a privatization committee should be set up in parliament. It is shocking that corruption in state administration is a general topic; it would be a crime to ignore it.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] What is the extent of the responsibility of Privatization Minister Tamas Szabo in this?

[Korosi] I have named those who are responsible for the chaos in privatization. They are: Erno Racz, director of AVU who is responsible for agriculture, and Ministry of Agriculture State Secretary Erno Racz who is also a member of the AVU's Board of Directors. I have indicated that they are definitely responsible for selling entire industrial branches and for the crisis in the grain industry. Tamas Szabo's responsibility is also obvious.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] You have been considered earlier one of the candidates for the post of minister of agriculture. How is it that you became "disgraced"?

[Korosi] This state of being disgraced has been going on now for almost six months. My short-range agricultural program was well received by the profession. First it were the people close to Jozsef Antall who withdrew their confidence in me; this circle often suggested this to the prime minister as well—in his own best interest. It seems that Jozsef Antall allowed himself to be convinced, even though it turned out that these people have made some professional mistakes. The prime minister is under bad influence: He is surrounded by a "layer of cotton." However, I am convinced that sooner or later the misguided policies will have to be acknowledged: at present, the personal and political stance needed for that is still absent.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] In view of all this, what do you think of your political future?

[Korosi] One thing is certain: I will not join any party. Possibly, I will withdraw and resign from my mandate as representative; in the past three years, I have seen excessively boorish and unprepared parties. For the time being, I will sit among the independents. I still feel at present that the MDF would consider my resignation now a retreat. I seriously hope that the MDF will come to its senses and will call me back.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Are you not being naive to put any hope in that?

[Korosi] The elections are approaching; if they continue their present policies, the MDF will disappear from the scene. I am absolutely certain that several present party leaders will be forced out, for there is much dissatisfaction among the party membership which will sweep away the leadership that edged itself in in 1990. I am referring to Imre Konya and his group; They were never really part of the MDF. Representatives do not even go anymore to faction meetings. Konya is an interesting man who would not hesitate to make a 180-degree turn from one week to the next. He was the one who stated that his paper was the model for Csurka's article—but, otherwise, he demanded that [Csurka] be called to account without mercy. Aside from the fact that it did not mention the Jewish question, Konya's paper was much more consistent and intolerant than that of Csurka. And yet, this same person later ferociously attacked Csurka....
[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Can the restructuring within the MDF undermine the center as well? Can Antall's personal competency be questioned?

[Korosi] Not Antall's personal competency. Antall is the kind of politician who can temporarily make even such a party presentable. His health permitting, his position as a leader is unquestionable. It is another matter that the so-called MDF center is a nonexistent myth. There are representatives who are loyal to Konya's circle: They are called the center. On the other hand, I consider Antall a good enough politician to recognize that poor advisers have gotten hold of him.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] What is the role of Istvan Csurka's line in the changes within the party?

[Korosi] Csurka has built on dissatisfaction and has perceived that something has gone very much askew. He expounds on basic truths, through exceptionally bad methods and generalizations. Interestingly enough, although I do not generalize but present professional criticism, I proved to be much more menacing than Csurka.

[MAGYAR HIRLAP] Do you think that if everything remains the same, the MDF will lose in the elections?

[Korosi] I am certain that not everything will remain the same. I have no doubts that a special national MDF convention will soon take place.

[Box, p 4]

In reply to our question, MDF Deputy Chairman Ferenc Kulin said that Korosi was expelled because of his inappropriate conduct as a parliamentary representative. Several people claim that Korosi did use dirty words (get the f... out of here). In addition, the faction was of the opinion that Korosi entered into a verbal argument with his own minister—in a manner that was inappropriate for a government representative.

*Controversy Over State's Role in Harbor Ownership*

93CH0624A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 29 Apr 93 p 5


[Text] Mahart Hungarian Shipping Corp., owner of the Csepel harbor, disagrees with the way in which the concession law for the [industrial] branch is being implemented, said company Deputy Director-General Gyorgy Jakab. In his opinion, the law must be observed, but it is not entirely immaterial how the ministry does that, not to mention the fact that the state continues to have a majority share in Mahart and, thus, in essence, a corporation, which is to operate the harbor and the majority of which is owned by the state, does already exist. As Gyorgy Jakab said, Mahart appealed the resolution of the shipping authorities, which extends the concession law and which specifies the harbor area that the state must own. The resolution was subsequently withdrawn and negotiations began last January on the issue of ownership, but negotiations were broken off and the authorities issued another resolution which was the same as that of last year. Mahart appealed again. In essence, the issue of the debate is, how much of the harbor area should be owned by the state. The harbor area is 230 hectares, 90 hectares of which is occupied by the docks that are actually operating. Mahart is ready to surrender the latter area for an appropriate compensation, but the remaining 140 hectares are leased on the long term to industrial plants, and commercial and distributing companies, and Mahart also has other investment plans. Development programs for these areas, costing hundreds of millions of forints, have already been prepared, and there are interested investors as well, but, because of the uncertainties regarding ownership, the investment projects have not yet been started. As Jakab said, Mahart is ready to take legal action if no agreement is reached.

Gyorgy Jakab said that the ministry should use the state funds allocated for shipping not for the acquisition of the harbor but for improving the waterways. In addition, the harbor network should be developed in line with the general conditions in Hungary's economy.

Development makes little sense until an increase in the demand for water transportation can be expected. But the present trend ignores this. The volume of river transportation has dwindled to half since the collapse of CEMA. Traffic at the Csepel harbor decreased by two-thirds during the past years, in which Hungarian industry shares the blame. Only one-third of the harbor's capacity is being used. At present, the harbor is one of Mahart's independent business divisions. Earlier, traffic in the harbor amounted to an annual 1-1.5 million [metric] tons. Two-thirds of that traffic was connected with water transportation, and one-third with public storage that was independent from the waterway. The biggest item in this traffic is steel products. The free harbor has 3 large and 12 smaller cranes, and a 20,000 to 30,000-ton storage capacity. Ships of every country along the Danube use the harbor, but, of course, there is a wide distribution of shipping companies as to their size and share. Mahart is confident that the present low volume of traffic will increase; it could also be boosted by the opening of the Danube-Main-Rhein canal.

*Draft Law Ends State Monopoly in Higher Education*

93CH0624A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by K.B.: “State Monopoly in Higher Education Is To End”]

[Text] The government will present to parliament a draft bill on higher education next week, which will be discussed by the parliament together with the bills on the
According to higher education's development program that will run until the year 2000, the number of university and college students will reach 120,000 by the end of the millennium, said Minister of Culture and Public Education Ferenc Madl yesterday at the committee meeting of the Union of Employees in Higher Education [FDSZ], which was focused primarily on the draft bill on higher education.

In talking about the individual elements of the bill, Madl said that state monopoly in maintaining institutions of higher learning would end, and more emphasis would be put on research and scientific development and on closer cooperation between the institutions of universities and the Academy, especially in doctoral programs. According to the draft, universities and colleges would be able to engage in joint activities and to establish new institutions of higher learning, which would be accredited through ad hoc statutes. Higher education as a whole would be under the supervision of a so-called council of higher education; this body would decide on the budgets and development of individual areas. The government, the institutions, and students and unions in higher education would each delegate seven members to the council.

At the FDSZ committee meeting, special emphasis was put on the system of promotion and pay, specified by the law on public employees, which also includes employees in higher education. The minister said in this connection that the modification of the law on public employees should include a new category and a new multiplier. However, this would merely create a legal framework; financial resources would also be needed for the modification's implementation. The appointment of teaching assistants and assistant professors for a specified time period was also a subject of much debate earlier. This is also regulated by the law on higher education. Ferenc Madl said that the present system of appointing teaching assistants and assistant professors for an indefinite time period will probably not be changed, but the performance of those appointed after the law goes into effect should be evaluated every four years. The appointment of a teaching assistant or an assistant professor may be renewed once or twice, respectively. This provision is for the purpose of improving the quality of instruction. According to the bill, rector's would have the right to appoint business executives, after prior consultation with the minister.

At the press conference that followed the committee meeting, FDSZ Chairman Laszlo Kis Pap said that the 40-percent increase in the number of students, which is expected by the end of the millennium, will entail a 60-billion-forint increase in costs.

The FDSZ does not expect parliament's approval of any category added to the law on public employees, therefore, it is planning to present to parliament, through representatives, a proposal regarding a new pay system.

* Liberals Debate Patriotism, Role of Church
93CH0624A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 26 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by Szabolcs Szereto: "Liberals' Dialogue in the Castle; Liberal Democracy and National Prosperity"]

[Text] On Friday evening, Alajos Dornbach opened the national convention of liberal associations (Liberator) in the Castle of Buda. This convention, which has become a tradition, was different this year: While earlier it used to be a "star parade" of SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] leaders, at this time representatives of four parliamentary parties (SZDSZ, MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], FIDESZ [Alliance of Young Democrats], and MSZP [Hungarian Socialist Party]) participated in discussions on current Hungarian economic, social, and political issues.

Following the opening remarks, the first panel discussion took place under the title "Liberalism and Patriotism," with the participation of Istvan Elek (MDF), Peter Molnar (FIDESZ), Gyorgy Janosi (MSZP), and Ferenc Koszeg (SZDSZ). On Saturday, the program began with two presentations under the titles of "Is the Common Market a Goal or a Dream?" and "Market Economy Without Public Support?" (Details on page 13.)

In the discussion on the church's role in society, Lutheran Minister Geza Laboroczi (SZDSZ) said that the present situation offers an opportunity for the church to find its real role in modern society. Laboroczi said that there is a need for a complete separation of church and state, for the church must be critical toward any given power establishment.

Lutheran Minister Gabor Roszki (MDF) agreed with Geza Laborocz on several issues, but called attention to the fact that, in connection with religious education in Hungary, a humiliating and hostile campaign has been launched against the church during the past years, which had no precedent even during the past regime. It was this same discussion in which Szilard Sasvari (FIDESZ) voiced his opinion, saying that the church will become independent only through financial independence. "I am confident that the church has no intention to be part of the power establishment," he said.

The closing discussion took place Saturday evening under the title "Liberalism in Today's Parties," with presentations by Tibor Balazsi (MDF), Ivan Vitanyi (MSZP), and Alajos Dornbach (SZDSZ). Viktor Orbán's (FIDESZ) name was also listed among the participants on Liberator's invitation, but his chair remained vacant, for he was unable to participate because of a commitment in Nyiregyhaza.
“No One Can Be Accused of Being Antinational”

The discussion on liberalism and patriotism elicited great interest; among other things, Viktor Orbán’s statement, which he made at the FIDESZ convention, that the FIDESZ is a liberal people’s party with a national commitment, was also mentioned.

Gyorgy Janosi (MSZP) said that national, liberal, and social values can be found at all three poles of Hungarian politics. The degree of emphasis is the only difference between them, and no one can be accused of being antinational, he said. Janosi (who is deputy chairman of the MSZP) said that the parties should strive to find pragmatic answers to practical questions instead of engaging in ideological debates.

Istvan Elek (MDF) was of the opinion that the opposition shares the responsibility for turning the debate on the national issue into a free-for-all fight, for they could have provided cleverer answers to criticisms regarding their commitment to the nation. According to the assessment of Elek (a politician who belongs to the nationalist-liberal wing of the largest government party), Viktor Orbán’s above-mentioned statement was not only an attempt to fend off criticism directed against the liberals, but also an indication of a better understanding of natural national feelings.

Peter Molnar (FIDESZ) said that liberal democracy is the best way to achieve national prosperity and, thus, the contraposition of liberalism with patriotism makes no sense. Several persons from the audience questioned the validity of Orbán’s statement, claiming that it was a concession to national demagogy and that the declaration of a commitment to the nation was an allusion to the existence of other liberal forces as well. Those who voiced this criticism claimed that there was no need for such a statement since all political forces in Hungary are naturally committed to the nation. In response to what was said, Peter Molnar said that they had to somehow clear themselves of the accusations of the extreme right-wing forces and that it is precisely this national demagogy which they attack with statements about their commitment to the nation.

Ferenc Koszeg (SZDSZ) called the alleged antithesis between liberalism and patriotism an artificial contraposition. Koszeg, who is editor in chief of the BESZÉLO, said that when the democratic opposition of the 1980’s stood up for fundamental human rights, it represented national interests at the same time. Koszeg said that the SZDSZ also had the same problem as the FIDESZ. Selecting birds in national colors as their emblem was no concession to nationalism either; however, they learned that extreme right-wing criticisms cannot be fended off with such gestures.

Balazsi: The Role of National Liberals May Become More Valuable

In response to the question about the role of national liberals within the MDF, Tibor Balazsi (MDF) said during the discussion entitled “Liberalism in Today’s Parties” that this group has become a political force, thanks, above all, to its statements to the press. National liberals do have dialogues with almost all political forces, therefore, their role may become more valuable with the approaching elections. “The MDF should make better use of their presence,” said Balazsi.

According to Ivan Vitanyi (MSZP), in Hungary, social democrats and liberals are much closer to each other than to conservatives; regarding fundamental issues, the MSZP’s policies are identical with those of the liberals. “The MSZP is also liberal,” he said, “but with the added socialist angle.”

“The SZDSZ has defined itself from the beginning as a party of freedom and solidarity,” said SZDSZ executive Alajos Dornbach. In his opinion, the MSZP has a frequent inclination to make unfounded promises. On the other hand, he said, the liberals maintain that only an economic upswing can bring about an improvement in social conditions.

* ‘Sharp Debate’ Over Health Care Workers’ Earnings

93CH0625E Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Apr 93 p 6

[Article by Judit Horvath: “Will the Introduction of the Public Employee Law Be Delayed? Thirty Billion Forints Are Missing?”]

[Text] We announced in our Saturday issue that, according to the plan for the consolidation of public finances, the law on public employees would go into effect only on 1 January 1996 instead of the original date of 1 January 1994. However, it came up during the past weeks that health care workers, whose number exceeds 200,000, should be excluded from this law.

Health care workers received their 13th-month pay last year under rather tempestuous circumstances. Most likely, this year will not be different. For the billions needed for the implementation of the public employee law are missing from the 1993 social security budget this year again, just as it was missing last year.

According to certain estimates, almost 30 billion forints would be needed in health care for the complete implementation of the law. If the provisions of the law would be observed, physicians would be entitled to an average of 16,000 to 18,000 additional forints a month, said Bela Doktorits, general secretary of the Hungarian Medical Chamber. The situation of health care specialists is not any better: Their present basic monthly wages are short by an average of 6,000 to 8,000 forints in comparison with the pay categories prescribed in the public employee law. Bela Doktorits said that the differentiation between holders of public offices and public employees is hard to understand. While the pay categories of the former are based on salaries of higher officials, the law on public employees is constructed from below. Its starting point is
the minimum wages of two years ago. This results in strange situations. Rectors of universities, for instance, may receive a maximum of 68,000 forints, before taxes, including their executive's supplement. This roughly corresponds to the salary of a mid-level ministerial employee.

All this is only one of the reasons, however, for the sharp debate of the past weeks on the status of health care workers: Should they be considered public employees?

The law groups public employees according to precisely determined pay categories. As to which pay category an employee is entitled to depends solely on the number of years in public service and on the employee's educational background and professional qualifications. Thus, it can happen that a home physician, who has no patients but is considered a public employee, can receive not only his 13th-month pay but also all the benefits provided by the law. On the other hand, the health care reform ignores seniority and promotion, giving priority to performance. These two principles are difficult to reconcile, although Dr. Marta Jaki Dudas, department head at the ministry of public welfare, said that it is possible to resolve this contradiction. Employees may come to an agreement with their superiors as to the form in which the remainder of the revenues are used for performance remuneration as supplementary benefits, in addition to their pay and regular benefits. The results of these negotiations must be indicated either in the collective contracts or in the regulations concerning public employees.

There are other problems as well. The expected layoffs in hospital staffs, for instance. It is an open secret that these will affect not so much the professional workers but primarily the physicians. The prioritization of economic factors will probably result in closing down little-used hospital wards. According to the provisions of the public employee law, people who become unneeded this way must be offered another suitable job in exchange for their old job. However, this is not always feasible in health care because a gynecologist cannot be employed as an internal specialist, and vice versa. Release would be another option, but directors of institutions would obviously think that over carefully because the law provides for long periods of notice and—in comparison with the Labor Code—is rather generous with regard to severance pay. Under such conditions, this option can only be used by directors of hospitals with solid capital. They may even forgo the necessary restructuring because keeping vacant beds is cheaper, at least in the short term, than staff reduction.

It is possible, of course, that the heated debates about the health care workers' legal status of public employees will soon lose their meaning. For we have information that, according to the plans for consolidating public finances, the law will not go into effect until 1 January 1996.

* MP's, Official on Social Security Changes 93CH0633B Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 27 Apr 93 pp 8-9

[Interviews with Hungarian Socialist Party Representative Judit Csehak, Federation of Young Democrats Representative Imre Frajna, and Ministry of Public Welfare Deputy State Secretary Dr. Gyula Pulya by Erno Kardos; place and date not given: “Ownership Interest in Social Security; Autonomous Social Security Governing Boards Without Authority; Pension and Health Care Based on Insurance Principles”]

[Text] Autonomous social security governing board elections will be held on 21 May. The stakes are high: Is it going to be possible to separate the social security fund from the state budget, is social security going to be able to acquire its long overdue assets? And after all this takes place, is autonomous health insurance and pension insurance going to function in the interest, and to the satisfaction of the beneficiaries? Erno Kardos spoke with Representatives Judit Csehak from the Socialist Party (MSZP—Hungarian Socialist Party), and Imre Frajna from FIDESZ (Federation of Young Democrats), as well as with Ministry of Public Welfare Deputy State Secretary Dr. Gyula Pulya.

[Kardos] To what extent can pension increases and health care be removed from daily politics, if the autonomous social security governing board elections prove to be successful? What is your view, as a representative of the socialist party?

[Csehak] I do not expect to see these issues removed from the forefront of daily politics or public attention; instead, I expect them to be freed from the mistakes and errors of the rather superficial and unprofessional parliamentary decisionmaking system. In part, at issue is the establishment of two bodies, each composed of 60 persons, which would head the pension fund and the health care insurance fund respectively; these people will deal with the most important issues from January until December—not only with laws and proposed legal provisions, but also with making certain decisions.

The Government's Taste

[Kardos] Don't you think that based on the existence of autonomous governing boards alone, one cannot be certain of increased pensions and better health care in Hungary?

[Csehak] Establishing these bodies will not yield more money for pensions. But so far the government was able to sabotage the transfer of some 300 billion forints worth of assets to social security, as required by a decision of parliament. Since the autonomous governing bodies would have authority to propose legislation, they could initiate legislative proposals or National Assembly resolutions. And in my view, these boards would not wait for long before recommending the urgent transfer of assets. I expect this body to distribute the available funds not
according to the government's taste, but primarily based on the interests of the beneficiaries, the recipients of provisions.

[Kardos] Nevertheless, the real decisions are going to be made in parliament, under the authority of the majority that rules at any given point in time.

[Csehák] Parliament is going to decide the amount of money to be used for pension increments. But we could authorize the autonomous governing board, rather than the government, to develop the detailed rules. We have the same thing in mind regarding health care financing. It is not the government's and the minister of public welfare's function to determine the amount of money a physician should charge, how much the chips should cost; instead, the medical chamber and the autonomous health insurance board should reach agreements, thereafter the decisions that need to be expressed in the form of laws could be presented to parliament.

[Kardos] FIDESZ did not agree with the establishment of autonomous boards before. Do you believe that the establishment of autonomous boards is not going to result in increased pensions and improved health care?

[Frajna] Pensions are certainly not going to increase, and we don't know yet whether health care is going to improve, but there is not much chance for that either.

[Kardos] As long as citizens have a better chance to become involved with social security, why do you think that they are not going to vote through their representatives for increased pensions and for better health care?

[Frajna] Autonomous social security boards may vote for whatever they want to vote, but they have no authority whatsoever that could produce more money. The pension fund is the best example for that. This entire fund is a channel through which funds flow, whose function it is to pay out the funds collected under the law for provisions to which people are entitled under the law. On top, for the past several years, each year they collected less money than the amount that had to be paid out. They are unable to raise the contribution level, and they are unable to reduce the level of provisions, all these entitlements are based on the laws, and thus the autonomous governing boards have no decisionmaking authority whatsoever.

**Bureaucrats Decide**

[Kardos] In other words, are you saying that social security will continue to remain under the supervision of parliament and the government?

[Frajna] Most certainly from the standpoint that the size of contributions and the scope of provisions will continue to be governed by laws.

[Kardos] This is what FIDESZ says, in contrast, however, five parties seated in parliament claim that autonomous governing boards are going to be able to operate social security more efficiently. This is also important, because social security may acquire significant assets in the near future, i.e., there has to be an autonomous governing board that oversees these assets. Situations may occur in which the autonomous governing board withdraws its confidence from certain hospitals, if those are not able to fulfill the norm.

[Frajna] It should be obvious to everyone that assets could really be operated efficiently only if they had real owners with clear-cut ownership interests. From this standpoint, in an economic sense, an autonomous social security board is by no means a more efficient manager than the state, because bureaucrats continue to make decisions about someone else's money. On the other hand, in the health care field, a more broadly based social discourse could produce more efficient solutions than those flowing from direct governmental management. There is only one problem with this: It is easy to say that we are going to withdraw our confidence from a given hospital. This may be conceivable in Budapest, where citizens would have to travel a few station stops by Metro. But what could anyone do with a county hospital, for example? These elections are going to produce one dividend on the side: As long as vote participation is large enough, we will know for a fact the extent of political support given by the people to the various trade unions.

[Kardos] People say that parliament decided that 25 percent of the people must vote to have valid elections in order to avoid a conflict between the government and strong trade unions. In other words, many count on the fact that this many people will not vote, and therefore there will be no autonomous social security boards. I wonder whether it is good or bad from the standpoint of the government if trade unions are strong, and if autonomous social security governing boards exist? What is the Ministry of Public Welfare Deputy State Secretary Dr. Gyula Pulay's view of this?

[Pulay] I believe that the government benefits from the existence of trade unions prepared to cooperate, unions which represent real interests, which can be trusted by both employees and the people. In this respect a 25 percent participation also represents a watershed, not in a political sense, but rather from the standpoint that if not even 25 percent of the people go to the polls because of a lack of interest in social security, and if people say that things are fine the way they are, we should really think twice before granting autonomy in the field of social security.

[Kardos] Yes, but they say that if people do not go to vote, they abstain not because they are indifferent, but because they really do not envision how their pensions would increase and how health care could be improved. Since this is the people's expectation, and since supposedly this is not going to be given to them by the autonomous governing boards, they are rather indifferent when it comes to the elections. And this could
benefit the government in power at any given point in time, because under these circumstances there would be no strong trade unions.

[Pulay] From the government's standpoint whether unions are strong or weak is unimportant, the extent to which the government is able to cooperate with trade unions in the interest of finding solutions is important. Returning to the question of whether we could expect miracles as a result of having autonomous boards manage social security, in other words, whether multiple increases in pension would result the following day, the answer is an obvious "no." The National Assembly could vote for the exact opposite of what the autonomous boards voted for. But it is at this point where the extent of support given to this autonomous governing body gains significance. If parliament knew that this autonomous governing body was elected by 70 percent of the populace, and that the body represented the real will of the people or of employees, it would take into consideration the advance decisions made by the autonomous governing board to a maximum extent.

[Kardos] These autonomous governing boards would include not only trade unions, but also employers, of course. What do you think, could the amount of social security contributions be reduced if employers and trade unions took joint action?

[Pulay] I do not believe that contributions to social security could be reduced in the near future. We should much rather try to improve the standards of provisions based on the given level of contributions.

* Military Technology Development Choices Viewed

93CH0634A Budapest MAGYAR HONVED in Hungarian 23 Apr 93 pp 4-5

[Interview with Colonel Dr. Gyula Janko, division director at the Military Industry Office, by Miklos Monus; place and date not given: "Are We Manufacturing, (Should We Manufacture) Weapons?"]

[Text] We want to reduce the manpower and develop the weaponry of our military in order to comply with the recently adopted security policy concept and the basic principle of national defense. The way development takes place, the way this can be accomplished is not indifferent either from a strategic or an economic standpoint. What role does or could Hungarian (military) industry play in this regard, or could it at all play a significant role?

[Monus] Does a military industry exist in today's Hungary at all?

[Janko] It does not exist, because a military industry, in the classic sense of that term, did not evolve after World War II. The so-called special production was of a mixed profile, i.e., it was performed by enterprises which produced both civilian purpose and military equipment and technology. Hungarian industry produced the largest value military technology equipment in 1988: 35,000 employees of close to 40 enterprises produced military technology products worth well over $400 million. This represented 3-4 percent of Hungary's total machine industry production. From the standpoint of military technology, most of Hungary's production conformed with the specialization that evolved within CEMA in those days. Today perhaps 25 or 30 mixed profile enterprises are engaged in producing military technology items or perform technological services for the military for a total annual value of about $50 million. This value is produced by about 10,000 or 15,000 employees, mostly in the form of repair, maintenance, and renewal to maintain standards.

[Monus] What caused the decline in the course of a few years?

[Janko] There are several reasons, most important of which is the tightening of the markets, the heavy decline in solvent demand. The Hungarian Honved Forces are struggling with a spare parts shortage, and suffer as a result of the fact that its means are not modern, nevertheless, lacking money, they are unable to place orders. Other countries which were our partners in this regard find themselves in similar situations.

[Monus] I think that the lack of solvent demand you just mentioned is due to a certain degree of backwardness. I believe that customers would exist these days, even if not Hungarian customers, if Hungarian industry were able to offer high standard military technology products. Do you agree?

[Janko] I agree, but with some strong reservations, because when it comes to military technology, the situation is far more complex than, for example, at the food industry. The food industry is also struggling because of a tightening of its traditional, Eastern markets, nevertheless it changed over to Western sales with an impressive speed. Enterprises which also produce military industrial products are unable to do so within a short period of time, because machine industry developmental projects require multiples of the amounts invested in the food industry, among other reasons.

[Monus] Accordingly, in the times of CEMA, Hungarian military industrial production fell substantially behind military production in the developed countries. Is this backwardness still restricting our developmental opportunities?

[Janko] It does, but Hungarian industry is not always to blame for our substantial backwardness. Just like the rest of the CEMA countries, much of Hungarian industry produced military items based on Soviet licenses, while the Soviet partner refused to recognize achievements resulting from Hungarian development.

[Monus] Would you expand on this statement?
It is a well-known fact that well over three-fourths of the Hungarian Honved Forces' armaments were of Soviet origin, i.e., they were made in the former Soviet Union, or elsewhere, based on Soviet license. Since the 1960s, Hungarian industry produced primarily weapons for the infantry and the artillery, ammunition, communications and electronic equipment, and special vehicular technology. In many instances Hungarian firms pursued developmental projects on their own. But products that turned out to be more modern than originally planned were not purchased by the Soviet Union, nevertheless they did make use of the blue prints. Simply put: Hungarian enterprises would have engaged themselves in modernizing, but the partner began to use the more up to date designs without paying for them. Well, with the passage of time, Hungarian firms “forgot about” their endeavors to modernize most of the equipment. The bulk of our products that could be exported in those days resulted from our own developmental projects, because things manufactured under license also fell behind the global state of the art. Our backwardness is rather significant, it cannot be made up in the course of one or two short years.

[Monus] Is it at all possible to catch up?

[Janko] It is. Although at present Hungarian industry produces virtually no part of the standard military technology, so to speak, it could become suitable to manufacture modern equipment within a few years. With targeted work we could have a situation in which Hungarian industry produced 25-30 percent of the military technology equipment needed by the Hungarian Honved Forces, or more appropriately: by the Hungarian armed forces, at a level that could be regarded as modern.

[Monus] What items are we talking about?

[Janko] Hand-held weapons, mortars, military vehicles, ammunition, hand grenades, anti-aircraft machine guns, chemical defense items, and last, but not least: electronic equipment. We would like to achieve the 25-30 percent ratio I mentioned above as soon as possible, but doing so is extremely difficult.

[Monus] The greatest difficulty must be the lack of funds for development, I would think.

[Janko] That is correct. On the other hand, the security policy concept plays a definitive role. The Hungarian Honved Forces are preparing for defense against a potential aggressor, and under no circumstance do they prepare themselves to attack. As a result of this, the production of defensive military technology items could be the task of the Hungarian (military) industry. In this spirit, we are already working on the long-range military technological development plan of the Hungarian Honved Forces. One thing we know already: From the standpoint of industry, air defenses represent our most important field of development, technology that strengthens air defenses. Within that, fighter airplanes, locators, automated guidance systems, special vehicles, hand-held weapons, and the personal gear of soldiers play an outstanding role. We are trying to stimulate the Hungarian military industry potential to produce primarily these items, in a variety of ways we are trying to shape our military industry so that they produce these things.

[Monus] Should I understand this to mean that Hungarian industry is going to produce the items you just listed, including fighter airplanes?

[Janko] No. You should understand this to mean that we are stimulating Hungarian industry to manufacture these items in the framework of international cooperation.

[Monus] Is this so because by itself, Hungarian industry would not be well suited to produce these items, at least at the state of the art level?

[Janko] Our efforts to accomplish this in a cooperative framework are also based on grounds of developmental technology, and in every case on economic considerations. In this regard the most important basic principle to be observed is that the size of series production be efficient, irrespective of whether this involves spare parts, component parts, or finished products. Since the domestic market is small even from the standpoint of buying military technology items, in an overwhelming majority of the cases a profitable size of series production can only be assured if we cooperate both in terms of production and sales with similar firms in other countries. Returning to the subject of fighter airplanes: It would hardly be conceivable for Hungarian industry to efficiently produce, i.e., in large series, some modern fighter airplanes, but we could produce profitably component parts and spare parts in the framework of international cooperation, in which the end product is a modern fighter airplane.

[Monus] The opportunity to cooperate exists primarily with the former CEMA countries, I would think, because we have been cooperating with them for decades.

[Janko] The idea is good, except for the fact that as a result of the recent changes most of our partners have simply ceased to exist. For example: Military industrial cooperation with our Northern neighbors was previously coordinated on their part by the Federal Ministry of the Economy. But this ministry has been done away with. For this reason, most of our military industrial cooperative relations have ceased. As of more recent date the entire country broke up into two separate republics, as a result of which relations that might have existed before were also disintegrated.

[Monus] Accordingly, is it virtually impossible to cooperate these days with the neighboring countries?

[Janko] That is not at all the case, what we have to do is to once again develop the framework for cooperation, and not only at the governmental level, but also, and most importantly, at the enterprise level. The Military Industry Office is making serious efforts to reestablish contacts. Regarding Poland, we have reached the point.
where we are working out details: Very many common interests exist in both research and development, and in manufacturing and sales at third markets. We are presently planning to make a more thorough assessment jointly with the Romanians, we would examine the available opportunities. But we also made contact with Russia and Ukraine. We are conducting so-called preliminary negotiations with them.

[Monus] Where do we stand regarding cooperation with the West?

[Janko] I would like to make clear, first of all, that in this regard the West is not a geographic, but a political unit. In this context, Turkey, for example, is part of the West, even though it is not to the West of Hungary from a geographical standpoint. We have already established contact with Turkey in order to accomplish military industrial cooperation. But we also established contact—in some instances on an exploratory basis, in other instances at encouraging levels—with Italy, France, Spain, and with other European countries, and even with the United States, moreover, with India, too.

[Monus] Do these contacts suggest mere possibilities for now, or have they already produced some tangible results?

[Janko] We have already reached an agreement to establish a joint enterprise, figuratively speaking we are a few days away from signing a contract. We still have to clarify a few details. I cannot reveal at this time which country and which enterprise is involved, because this constitutes a business secret until the contract is signed. We have signed letters of intent with a number of firms in several countries. During the past year or two we received inquiries from more than a hundred significant foreign firms; in most instances they wanted to sell something, but in the course of negotiations they declared that they would not rule out cooperation with Hungarian firms. We prefer the latter solution, the development of cooperative relationships, rather than direct purchases. We want to acquire certain modern technologies as a result of cooperation, and this is how we want to ensure the production of series of efficient sizes in our future manufacturing efforts.

[Monus] Your views suggest that the Military Industry Office is busy at work in the four quarters of the world. Don’t you think that with this approach you are spreading your energies too thin? Would it not be more useful to be active in only one or two directions?

[Janko] No. Having as many as possible cooperative relations is useful in order to discontinue our unilateral dependence in regard to items of military technology, too. We would like to enlist not only foreign producers, but also as many as possible domestic producers. The small industry, for example, as well as the small and medium-size enterprises. From among our several initiatives, let me call attention to one. The Military Industry Office, in cooperation with the Hungarian Honved Forces, the National Association of Entrepreneurs, and other organizations, is preparing a show to persuade small business ventures to join our effort. This is expected to take place in July. We are going to exhibit spare parts and component parts we would like to purchase, the lack of which causes many problems to our troops. We are going to provide documentation and other assistance to anyone agreeing to manufacture these items. Regardless of whether we are dealing with our initiatives in the West, the East, or in Hungary, we have one important thing to observe: Items needed by our troops must be offered at acceptable prices. In every context, we are going to support the manufacture of things approved by the soldiers.

*Bethlen on Plans for Bank Network in Counties

93CH0625C Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 26 Apr 93 p 13

[Interview with Istvan Bethlen, National Assembly representative and economic expert of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, by S.P.; place and date not given: "We Asked Whether There Will Be a Bank Network in the Countryside"]

[Text] [S.P.] Two years ago you made the statement to the MAGYAR HIRLAP that a bank in the countryside would soon be established. But nothing happened. What is the reason for the delay?

[Bethlen] I will state in advance that there will be a bank network for the counties and that, according to the promise of Finance Minister Ivan Szabo, this network will already be servicing the loans needed for the fall work. There are several reasons for the delay. On the one hand, the Hungarian National Bank initially rejected the idea. The position of the Hungarian Central Bank changed when Peter Akos Bod was appointed president. It was the MDF faction that assigned me the task of beginning the negotiations with it concerning the establishment of a bank for the counties. It did not help the situation that two main departments (I do not wish to identify them) of the Finance Ministry, then under Mihaly Kupa's direction, could not come to an agreement. It is also true that Mihaly Kupa wanted to support this initiative during the last third of his term as minister. From the first minute, the FM [Finance Ministry] and the bank inspectorate supported the idea; discussions centered on how to implement it well. Because the clarification of ownership issues—I am referring to the new land distribution—requires a new land law to serve as a basis for the justification of land mortgage institutes.

[S.P.] What kind of a guarantee is there for starting the county bank network by the fall?

[Bethlen] The guarantee is that negotiations are underway between the Commercial Bank, the Agrobank, and the OTP [National Savings Bank] concerning technical implementation, for these are the banks which have a significant number of county offices. As opposed to the earlier concept—namely, that the county bank network would have been built on the existing network of savings
cooperatives—the new one is different, and this is the reason why the OTP is also playing a role.

[S.P.] Finance Minister Ivan Szabo stated unequivocally at the meeting of the National Assembly’s Agricultural Committee that the estimated sum of 8-10 billion forints needed for the operation of the county bank network cannot, under any circumstances, be taken from the budget; it must be raised through foreign working capital. In your opinion, how many billions of forints would be needed for the start?

[Bethlen] In my opinion, 6 billion forints would be needed at the most, but I add that even that has to be raised not all at once, but continuously, spread out over several years.

* State Intervention in Housing Problems Urged

93CH0625D Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Apr 93 p 6

[Article by K.SZ.: “Apartment Renovation in Budapest: A 200-Billion Lag”]

[Text] The result of a critical shortage in new apartment construction is not only that it is practically impossible to acquire an apartment, but also that the existing apartments have become extremely run down in Budapest. If this trend continues, it will be impossible to renovate buildings even if money were available, because there are no vacant apartments which could be temporarily used by tenants whose apartments are being renovated.

The “last year of peace” in terms of apartment construction was 1988 when the number of apartments built was the same as the number by which existing apartments decreased, namely, 35,000. However, only 14,000 have been built each year since then, and last year all apartments were built by private investors because neither the state nor the local governments have built any apartments. According to a national apartment construction program, which has been prepared by the Ministry of Welfare and which is expected to be presented to the government this week, the situation is grave, so much the more as those state revenues which have been allocated for apartment construction have not been pumped back into this sector and, consequently, buildings, which are in a bad condition to begin with, are further deteriorating. The operation of an old house is expensive and, according to the experts, the value of the renovations that did not take place is in excess of 200 billion forints. If Budapest’s apartments had a book value (they do not), then their value would decrease to zero by the turn of the millennia because that is when the apartments would reach the critical age of 100 years.

However, most of these apartments are now in private hands. Thus, in addition to the burden of maintenance and expensive operation, the new owners also have the responsibility for renovations that have become indispensable. This is considered such a great economic and social problem by the authors of the apartment program that they think that it is absolutely necessary for the state to play a role by properly allocating its revenues slated for this sector and by supporting the private sector through low-interest loans.

* Privatization in Agriculture Proceeds Unevenly

93CH0625B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 28 Apr 93 p 12

[Article by I.V.F.: “Uneven Privatization”]

[Text] An agreement of cooperation was signed yesterday by Minister of Agriculture Ivan Szabo and League of Food Industrial Workers’ Unions (EDOSZ) Secretary-General Bela Vanek. Accordingly, the ministry will consider the EDOSZ’s recommendations from now on in working out new concepts. For instance, EDOSZ will have a say in privatization, restructuring, employment and, among other things, in the establishment of product councils. Representatives of the grain industry mentioned during the negotiations that privatization is too rapid in that sector and that the timing of privatization of mills coincides with harvesting. The situation is dangerous because mills can be acquired by the new owners under favorable terms, but it is a question whether they will have enough working capital for buying up grain. Ministry of Agriculture (FM) State Secretary Gyorgy Rasko promised that the concept of grain market privatization will be expanded at the next meeting of the AVU’s [State Property Agency] Board of Directors. Accordingly, the process of privatization may only begin if the transaction can be completed by August and if a bank guarantee for the capital needed for the purchase is included as a condition. Moreover, a program of restructuring is also in the making, through which county grain distributors in Gyor, Somogy and Szolnok Counties would be assisted by 200-400 million forints each.

On the other hand, EDOSZ found the privatization of the dairy industry to be too slow, in view of the fact that only 70 percent of the processing capacity of BTV [Budapest Dairy Enterprise], the largest company, is unused [as published], for instance. A rapid injection of capital would be sorely needed. However, EDOSZ disagrees with AVU’s concept of decentralized privatization, because the purchase of separate units may only be done on a cash basis. This way workers have practically no chance of buying components of plants.

According to the agreement, workers must be kept informed continually about issues of restructuring or privatization and about the use of social and welfare assets. It is also indicated in the agreement that the FM will support EDOSZ’s initiative to establish in the food industry mid-level forums of interest reconciliation for employers and employees.
* Employer Share of Sick Leave Payment Increased

93CH0625A Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 27 Apr 93 p 1

[Article by A.G.: "Companies Will Have To Pay More for Sick Leaves; Not 10 But 30 Days"]

[Text] (MAGYAR HIRLAP information)

As of next year, companies will have to pay not for 10 but 30 days of sick leave, if a decision is made on plans that are still in the making in government circles. The difficult situation in social security is well-known, so it is not surprising that the public is becoming aware of ever newer ideas. Companies responded heatedly to the news that new burdens employers will have to face will be introduced. (Opinions are on page 13.)

The deficit of the social security fund was 30 billion forints last year. According to experts, the deficit may, under the same conditions, reach 75-80 billion forints this year. In order to improve the situation in social security, new ideas have been presented, e.g., that companies should take a larger share in financing workers' sick leaves. As of January 1992, the government obliged companies to finance the first 10 days of their employees' sick leaves. This would be increased to 30 days as of next January. This is expected to lower the costs of social security by 12 billion forints. (However, the authorities have no data on the average number of days spent on sick leaves, nor on how much companies had to pay for the 10-day sick leaves.) Laszlo Gerencser, department head at the National Social Security Main Directorate, said that companies lowered the costs of social security by 4-5 billion forints last year by paying for the first 10 days of sick leaves. Social security was thus able to maintain appropriate sick leave payments; the actual amount of sick leave payments was 28.9 billion forints. However, Gerencser said that, as a result, social security has lost much of its prestige.

* Police, Agents Confiscate Unlicensed TV Equipment

93CH0633D Budapest TALLOZO in Hungarian 22 Apr 93 p 754

[Article by Jeno D. Szabo: "Del TV Transmitting Equipment Removed"—reprinted from FUGGETLEN DELVIDEK, 14 Apr 93, page not given]

[Text] What many could not even have thought of happening, has happened.... As it is known, due to the commotion and delaying tactics involved in the frequency moratorium, in several places people acted in anticipation of the law and began operating small-capacity television broadcast stations here and there, based on the legal void that had evolved.

It appears that in certain places the authorities felt that the time had come to act and ordered the removal of the equipment, if not otherwise, with the help of police.

Yesterday, after 11 o'clock, FGI [Frequency Management Institute] employees supported by the local police appeared at the Del TV studio, and despite all the protest they dismantled the transmitting equipment.

Just before Easter I received a report, according to which the authorities were planning coordinated action for the 13th, i.e., on Tuesday, at 10 am, to render low-power local television stations throughout the country inoperative by removing the equipment. The report seemed incredible, nevertheless the bug remained in my ears. My premonitions seemed to be even more justified when others potentially affected by this action confirmed the report.

On Easter Monday I paid a visit to National Assembly Representative Andras Nagy; he, too, is involved in this matter because of his interest in Bacs TV of Nagybaracska, and surely, he, too, said only that the report was true, that someone, or some people were determined to "create order" in this field.

The same afternoon, at 10 minutes past 6 o'clock, he and I conversed at the studio, in the course of which we expressed our positions. I told the viewers that anyone wanting to demonstrate solidarity with us, or protest this proceeding, should come to the Del TV studios at 10 o'clock the next day. I must admit that even during the final, sleepless night I tried to persuade myself that this could not be true; a coarse, and certainly ugly proceeding reminiscent of the olden days would be impossible today....

Supporters from Baja responding to my call, began to gather at about 10 o'clock; some came by car, others on foot or by bicycle, young and old alike. (I take this opportunity to thank everyone who came, people who tried to help.) Before noon we broadcast the call three more times. Time passed, and everything was peaceful and quiet until half past eleven. (By then most persons who had appeared were gone, but there was still a rather large "committee" to receive the FGI and police cars which appeared, even though with a delay.) The cars rolled with the greatest of self-confidence across my lot, then stopped in front of the house, and then the action started. I told them right at the beginning that I had not received any official advance notice, that I regarded the entire proceeding illegal, and that I wanted to enforce my rights by all means regarding my personal residence and the inviolability of my home. They responded with a forgiving smile, pulled out a search warrant completed in advance, and told me in clear terms that any complaint would be in vain, at least there and then. I could complain later after being confronted with facts. When I asked that they justify the proceeding I was told that a complaint had been filed on grounds of the illegal, unlicensed television broadcasts, and therefore they had to proceed, moreover in the form of seizing and removing the transmitting equipment.

I immediately asked them to show me the complaint, so that I could at least learn its contents, but my request was
denied. I must mention something before I go on telling this story. By looking at the persons present from the Baja police headquarters I could tell that the situation was extremely unpleasant from their standpoint; one of them privately told me that they were aware of the fact that this action would create outrage, but they had no choice, and an order was an order. In the end, after a small delay while I tried to convince myself I recognized that there was nothing I could do, and after saying farewell for the final few minutes we were able to broadcast, I opened the studio and yielded the place to the professionals. They immediately disconnected the transmitters from the network and the television screen—who knows for how long—turned dark. Thereafter they unscrewed the equipment from the wall, and acting as if they had done a good job, they removed the equipment. No one bothered to consider that the equipment was my property and that it cost several millions of forints, moreover, they conspired by saying that this would remain my property, except that I could not dispose of it. They also told me that I had every opportunity to challenge the entire proceedings through legal channels.

I do not want to qualify this proceedings. What good would it do? All I can say is that up to now I would not have believed that this could be done, and after this incident I was forced to draw the conclusion that anything could be done in this country. I cannot tell anything to our dear viewers, except that I am going to initiate legal proceedings as early as tomorrow, that I am going to pursue this matter to the ultimate forums, and that I probably will ask their help in the form of a future signature drive. Despite the above, I am trying to keep my faith, and I say farewell by saying: “until the next time,” as soon as possible, on the television screen, I hope.

* Former Hankiss Protege Assesses Situation at TV

93CH0633C Budapest MAGYAR NARANCS in Hungarian 22 Apr 93 pp 4-5

[Interview with Peter Heltai, producer of current affairs and political shows at the Hungarian Television under Elemer Hankiss, by Andras B. Vagvolgyi; place and date not given: “I Wish I Were Mistaken”]

[Text] [Vagvolgyi] Next to Gabor Banyai, you were the second very important person whom Elemer Hankiss brought to the Hungarian Television under his leadership. Banyai was catapulted together with Hankiss, yet you remained. On the other hand, I saw an invitation to a conference the other day that described Peter Heltai as a freelancer. What is the present situation?

[Heltai] Yes, I, too, was wondering about that. This is an accidental misprint. A witty, accidental misprint, because slowly, I am indeed beginning to feel like a freelancer. Most likely everyone felt—I also did, to be frank—that after throwing out Elemer Hankiss, then Gabor Banyai and Laszlo Nagy, a new kind of leadership would take power, one, which is intolerant of anyone in the world who agreed to perform any kind of leadership function during the so-called Hankiss era. This is what is happening more or less, but they are probably going to implement this more cautiously and with more tact. Although it is true that no one was kicked out from the Hungarian Television for political reasons, as they say, but the proceedings that began on grounds of economic considerations—in the course of which they kicked out Laszlo Nagy and Banyai—were, in reality, politically motivated. Incidentally, I know of no one else having been kicked out. Those presently in power explain this situation by invoking purely economic reasons, and this amounts to a downright lie.

[Vagvolgyi] What is your present assignment?

[Heltai] I have no function at all. As soon as they established the new Organizational and Operating Rules [SZMSZ], it became self-evident that I would not be asked to do anything. In several statements to the press I made clear that I disagreed with the new SZMSZ. It was yet another matter that within the television quite a few journalist-producers, editors in chief got together and wanted to establish a workshop to operate without the inclusion of several levels of the top hierarchy, one that would not become integrated with the the new SZMSZ. The related proposal indicated that they wanted me to be the head of that workshop.

[Vagvolgyi] Are you talking about the workshop of the 30 TV employees?

[Heltai] We would have had far more programs than that, but it would have involved about 30 editors in chief, producers’ offices, and program people. This was the only thing I would have accepted, because this would not have been a bare bone thrown to me by the new leadership. The fact that the Hungarian Television has a new leadership must not mean that the leadership privately owns the television. This is the only television in Hungary; there is no other television to which one could transfer if it did not like something. The SZMSZ is one thing, the programs are another. The fact that a new leadership took office at the top level of the television does not mean that every program must be automatically discontinued. Even more so, because this is not a daily newspaper, but a public service, a national television, so they say, where, in theory, everyone should be able to get his word across. This is why it was not so simple to act bravely and to say that “I—we—do not like this new company, therefore we stand up [and walk out].”

[Vagvolgyi] But there were some old-timer radio professionals—like Zsolt Szalay and Zsofia Mihancsik—who said that they were not willing to broadcast under this regime.

[Heltai] More than one strategies exist on the basis of which one can relate to this unfortunate situation. Zsofia Mihancsik quit on entirely different grounds than the strategy used by Zsolt Szalay when he decided to quit the
Hungarian Radio. But I can easily imagine that this process is also going to start at the Hungarian Television. But there is one big difference: At the radio the new program structure was made public, i.e., the people who created, who prepared the programs knew exactly which program would be discontinued, which one would disappear, or would be transferred to a frequency range that could not be received. As of this moment, the television continues with the old program structure until 1 July, they are planning to make changes as of that date, and we do not know at present what those changes are going to be. We have certain hunches, but not definite decisions have been made. The creative people do not know at this time whether their programs are going to be discontinued. But there are no problems as long as those who create the programs are able to edit and put together the programs; but they may stand up and get out if they discontinue their programs.

[Vagvolgyi] What is the situation of foreign policy programs at the Hungarian Television at this time?

[Heltai] Laszlo Benda, the former editor in chief of PANORAMA won his labor law suit, but the judgment has not been affirmed. I do not know whether the leadership of the television has filed an appeal. I am afraid that in the future no one is going to prepare programs, except those closely linked to Alajos Chrudi-nak.

[Vagvolgyi] What forms of conduct, what survival techniques emerged at the Hungarian Television after they rejected the integration of the before mentioned group of various TV workshops? What atmosphere prevails at the television?

[Heltai] I think the atmosphere is bad, but I am sure this is my subjective view. I am certain that 10 or 15 people are very happy. Insofar as the television workshop is concerned, the proposal has not yet been rejected. I was verbally encouraged by the vice president that he would support the idea. I regard this as a response, although no written response has been received. An unheard of procrastination is taking place: They think that people are going to become bored with this whole thing, that their nerves are not going to be able to take this, and that thereafter the new vice president are going to force the creative talents to become integrated with the new studios. Despite the lack of response, the creative producers' offices, the offices of editors in chief are being forced to make a choice. On the other hand, and this is a new and interesting thing, the conduct of editors, directors, and employees has fundamentally changed as compared to the conduct they manifested prior to 1989. They are more courageous, more resisting, and they have greater self-respect. Although not everyone is happy with seeing once again the same faces in high positions, faces with which they have become bored a long time ago.

[Vagvolgyi] Are you saying that a counter-development has taken place at the television, and that the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] did not take power?

[Heltai] A counter-development took place to the extent that most of those who gained power—and I stress, most of those—had been the leaders of the television prior to 1989. I do not believe that this took place because they were the only ones who had talent. Whether the MDF acquired power? But which MDF? What MDF are we talking about today? At one point in time, in early 1989, an MDF was also formed at the Hungarian Television, it consisted of people who professed the values represented by Csegey, Csoori, Lezzak, etc. If I understood their words correctly, their goal within the television was to get rid of the old communist leaders. An MDF core, in a more or less changed form, still exists at the Hungarian Television. They are now realizing that the same people are sitting on top of them.

[Vagvolgyi] This, however, is contradicted by the fact that Istvan G. Palffy became the head of the television's HIRADO [news] program, and not, let's say, Mrs. Jozsef Matuz.

[Heltai] True, but I understand that G. Palffy did not belong to this MDF core at the beginning. I believe that his intentions are good, and I also believe that he believes in what he is doing, on the other hand, I find untenable the way he perceives news casting in Hungary. I believe that the editor in chief of HIRADO should be a highly level-headed, calm person devoid of any emotions, political preferences and even of ideologies. Palffy stated that HIRADO would play a serious role during the elections, and this is simply baffling. Incidentally, I do not regard Istvan G. Palffy to be part of the communist counter-development. Despite his position of being the party secretary, I do not regard him as one of the blood-thirsty communist leaders.

[Vagvolgyi] Since its establishment, the Hungarian media, the Hungarian Television had its best years in 1989 and 1990. I recognize a gradual deterioration as compared to those years. Elemer Hankiss quite often avoided answering the question of what kinds of letters and telephone calls he received trying to influence him in making changes in program structure and in other respects.

[Heltai] It is hard to tell whether Elemer Hankiss received letters and telephone calls, trying to influence him. I am not aware of everything. If you ask me how many letters and telephone calls I received, I will tell you that I received some at the beginning, but not many....

[Vagvolgyi] From what levels did these originate?

[Heltai] From National Assembly representatives, for example....

[Vagvolgyi] From one side only, or from several sides?

[Heltai] From several sides, but more from the government side. This can be broken down into three phases. At the very beginning I received a few telephone calls and warnings. This was followed by a relatively long period without smiles, a period characterized by an endeavor to
properly cooperate; in the third period I made telephone calls to save some of the programs, but they did not even return my calls. I became isolated, so to speak, but I also could say that they isolated themselves from the television screen.

[Vagvolgyi] The Hungarian Television had serious problems with receiving funds ever since the beginning of Elemer Hankiss' presidency, at the same time, however, the government has been visibly going ahead with full steam to build up the Duna TV. In a country with relatively modest economic opportunities one cannot really understand why Duna TV is needed at a time when they already acquired the regular television. Why could not the programs of the Hungarian Television be bounced back from a satellite? This would be much cheaper, I would think, than establishing a new structure costing several billions of forints.

[Heltai] This makes sense, of course. Hungarians beyond the borders are interested primarily in the Hungarian Television, I would think, and therefore it appears as entirely logical to broadcast a selection of these programs through satellite. This could have been done, moreover, preparations had already been made, and this would have cost far less money than starting up another satellite television. Duna TV has not started broadcasting as of this moment, I would not even call it a television: It amounts to no more than a film archive. It is the fixed idea of a small group of well-intentioned people, acting without professionals.

[Vagvolgyi] Does this group consist of TV people or is this a political group?

[Heltai] It is a certain political group which attracts film people, who have an obvious interest in making this television operate and in keeping it alive. Their intentions are probably good, although the time has really come for political decision makers and for those who influence politics to sit down with a larger group of people and to consult with them. If the honest goal is to broadcast Hungarian language television to Hungarians beyond the borders, they should discuss how this could best be accomplished, in the most useful way from the standpoint of Hungarians beyond the border, and also in the most efficient way. It would also be worthy considering whether two channels are needed in Hungary, or if one of the channels should slowly be privatized. There would be a greater need for a public service television channel transmitting overland, and another public service channel using a satellite. The other overland channel could be privatized.

[Vagvolgyi] True, the MDF acquired the television, and thus establishing Duna TV appears as superfluous. But isn't the logic behind all this the fact that next year, even if they lose the elections, they will still have the Hungaria Foundation that finances Duna TV? This is a private foundation funded by public money, registered at Sandor Csoori's apartment, and this would remain in the founders' hands even after the elections. Are we not seeing something that every democratic party continuously tries to protect against, not to have any salvaging, the previous MSZMP [Hungarian Socialist Workers Party] assets should not be salvaged; isn't this a certain salvaging of public funds to the MDF and into the private economy, in anticipation of 1994?

[Heltai] I do not regard as an unequivocally MDF television what I see evolving at the Hungarian Television today. And I do not even believe that every wing of the MDF is uniformly supportive of the situation that came about at the MTV [Hungarian Television]. I am not entirely certain whether the MUK [Community of Hungarian Journalists] corresponds in every respect with the various interests of the MDF. On the other hand, it is beyond dispute that the MUK has acquired power at the Hungarian Television. One cannot rule out the possibility that quite a number of the leaders at the Hungarian Television are closer to Csurka than to the government. I wish I were mistaken. But I am certain that the government has played a role in this, it has approvingly helped this entire transformation process. Insofar as Duna TV is concerned, it no longer is registered at Csoori's apartment, to my knowledge. The basic ideology definitely calls for broadcasts for Hungarians beyond the border. But one also has to realize that this transaction does not involve the transfer of budgeted funds, but the transfer of a share of assets, which cannot be used immediately by Duna TV. There was no need to shroud this issue in fog, the way the political state secretary did. One would have to prove whether this amount to the salvaging of property. I am not certain whether this resembles the MSZMP-type salvaging of property, but we may suspect something like this: Why would a clear-cut case like this have to be made secret? The scandal may be attributed exclusively to working with two left hands: Neither the MDF, nor the government know how to deal with the public.

[Vagvolgyi] Even so it remains a bit worrisome to me, because a television station is being born, would be born, one that could offend the sensitivities of neighboring countries.

[Heltai] Yes, but all this amounts to supposition. The spokesmen, managers, and representatives of Duna TV continuously, almost pathologically try to make the point that Duna TV does not intend to talk politics, it endeavors to remain at a distance from political television journalists. Duna TV bases its news programs on MTI [Hungarian News Agency] reports exclusively, and does not broadcast commentary.

[Vagvolgyi] Could the opposition, too, establish a satellite television?

[Heltai] A satellite television cannot be established overnight. The case of Duna TV also goes to prove this. It requires an awful lot of money: government guarantees, or, at least, heavy bank guarantees are needed. The founding of studios is subject to licensing by the Ministry of Culture, obtaining a license involves tedious, lengthy
paperwork and frequent obstacles. In reality the frequency moratorium should be lifted, but most likely the government would not even want to hear of that. In any event, at present, among all the former socialist countries, Hungary has the most antidemocratic situation insofar as the electronic media is concerned.

[Vagvolgyi] Clausewitz says that wars represent the continuation of politics, using different means. With what other means could the media war be continued? Where are the battle grounds in this new belligerence?

[Heltai] The media war has not come to an end. It might have slowed down, but it could not be concluded, because they were unable to resolve the problem. Moreover, I am concerned, that they have further deteriorated the situation. Many members of the radio and television journalists' community have been coarsely humiliated. To mention just one example, MUOSZ [National Association of Hungarian Journalists] has about 7,000 members, while MUK has perhaps 400, but the new leadership at the television does not have a single MUOSZ member. At the same time, the MUK board could hold its meetings at the Hungarian Television. The government has launched a new attack against an important segment of society that fundamentally defines public opinion: the journalists. I do not believe that everyone supported Hankiss under the previous regime, but one thing is certain: the present setup was not established to make peace with journalists and to the satisfaction of journalists. On top, they tried to place journalists fully committed to the government into positions, so much so that the opposition is not likely to swallow this. I am afraid that the circus is going to continue.

[Vagvolgyi] How is all this going to affect the Hungarian Television?

[Heltai] I would mention only one recent, specific case: the muzzling of Sandor Szenasi. This was an extremely sensitive issue from the standpoint of the new news director: he muzzled a journalist on some absurd grounds he was able to drag out. I do not know what the news director is going to do when some journalists and television personalities highly respected by the present Hungarian ruling coalition make mistakes which could violate some serious, even foreign policy interests. I regarded this decision as a bit too hasty. It could be that the news director should pay attention to a lot of other things when he accedes to such muzzling. Perhaps he should also look at the other side when he muzzles.

[Vagvolgyi] Should we expect to see an overt house cleaning effort?

[Heltai] I am afraid that there are going to be large scale dismissals; in vain did the vice president of the Hungarian Television proclaim that as a humanitarian politician he would like to leave the staff of the Hungarian Television intact. Most likely, very many people will be dismissed from the Hungarian Television for political reasons, but based on economic justification.
* Differences in Poll Results on Electoral Preferences

93EP0266B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
18 May 93 p 3

[Article by Renata Wrobel: “May You Have To Conduct a Poll on Electoral Preferences!”]

[Text] The April “electoral” polls conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), Demoskop, and the Social Research Laboratory (PBS)—the last was commissioned by RZECZPOSPOLITA—are in agreement on only a few points. Most votes would have been obtained by the Democratic Union (UD), Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (SdRP), and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), and perhaps even the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) would not have problems in independently exceeding a 5-percent threshold. A few other groupings (“Solidarity”, the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD), the Union of Labor (UP), the Christian-National Union (ZChN), and, according to CBOS, Party “X”) have a good chance, but their leaders cannot sleep peacefully. That is really as much as can be said with any kind of certainty.

Who Will Merge With UD

According to the electoral law passed by the Sejm, those parties that independently, throughout the country, obtained at least 5 percent of the votes (for a coalition the threshold would be 8 percent) would be represented in parliament. If those regulations had been in effect in 1991, of the 29 committees whose representatives were then in the Sejm, only nine would remain.

Few people are willing to predict how it would be today. For many months, only UD, according to all polling centers, is easily reaching that threshold. The figures on the KPN, the PSL, and “Solidarity” are shaky. As a rule, the KLD has been in the 5-percent range, and, for a certain time, also UP and the ZChN. The SdRP is strengthening its position in the upper regions. That may mean that it is winning supporters, but there is also another hypothesis. The friends of that party frequently in the past concealed their preferences. Events of recent months, the decreasing political isolation of Social Democracy, may mean that people are no longer ashamed to admit that they belong to it.

Our charts show electoral support for the strongest groupings, according to the polling sources.

Whence the Differences

If anyone wanted to think up a curse to hurl at the researchers of public opinion in Poland, it would be, “May you have to determine electoral preferences!” What in stable democracies is a routine poll conducted almost exclusively in the periods preceding elections, in our country becomes risky speculation—conducted every month, at that. “In Polish conditions, a poll is often a very tough job,” says Jaroslaw Najdowski of the CBOS.

The pollers who, despite everything, want to obtain an answer to the question “If the elections were held today, who would you vote for?” are encountering many difficulties:

- There are a great many parties. None of the research centers even attempt to cover all of the possibilities. The CBOS gives the respondents a list of 20 groupings, and the PBS also 20, but somewhat different ones. Demoskop decided to limit their number to 11, taking the risk that the results would be skewed. For example, leaving only one peasant grouping on the list, the PSL, could overstate its electorate (18 percent in Demoskop, 14 percent in the CBOS, and 8 percent in the PBS).

- The parties are constantly merging, dividing, or changing their names. The voters are confused and often indicate the wrong groupings. The CBOS and Demoskop, in order to facilitate “communication” between the polier and the poliee, give the names of the party leaders alongside the names of the parties. It was observed that that has an effect on results. For example, in CBOS polls, the Movement for the Republic (RdR) obtained a trace of support. When Jan Olszewski’s name appeared with it, it obtained 3 to 4 percent of the “votes.”

- The Polish voter often decides who to vote for at the last minute. A well or badly conducted election campaign can change everything. Sufice to recall how Stanislaw Tyminski’s popularity grew in 1990.

- The material researched is extremely delicate, and even a small difference in date, how the question is posed, or the selection of the sample may change the results. For example, in a Demoskop poll, the possibility that the respondent would like to vote but does not yet know for whom is not taken into account; other research centers include an “undecided” category. In CBOS polls, there are 6 percent of them, and, in PBS, 14 percent.

- When there is a huge scatter of responses, the statistical error (usually plus or minus 3 percent) makes a great many of the results questionable. It is one thing when we are not sure whether a given grouping obtains 42 or 45 percent of the votes, and another when we are talking about 2-5 percent. In addition, the “electorates” of most parties are far too small to be able to characterize and describe them.

Who Represents Us

Given all of this, is it at all worthwhile to conduct these types of studies? The experts say it is. Even when they contain errors and do not forecast the results of elections, they say a great deal about the political views of the Poles, especially if they are supplemented with additional questions. In April, the CBOS asked respondents whether, in their opinions, the particular groupings represent the interests of ordinary people very well. Most
people have a firm opinion ("it is hard to say," received the least replies) regarding NSZZ "Solidarity," UD, and the ZChN. "Solidarity," UD, and the PSL were rated favorably most often, and Party "X", the RDR, and the PC (Center Accord) least often.

Liberals and Traditionalists

The respondents who are most liberal in the field of the economy are attracted to the KLD, UD, and "Solidarity," and the most traditional, from the political standpoint, to the ZChN, the RDR, and the PC. The answer to a question on an April poll conducted by the CBOS proved that. The "liberals" were regarded to be the people who believe that the pace of privatization is too slow, who expect benefits rather than losses from privatization, and who accept small unemployment as beneficial for the economy. The "traditionalists" are regarded as advocates of the teaching of religion in the school, respect for Christian values on television, and the impermissibility of abortion.

Based on the following polls: CBOS from 15-18 April, a 1,077-person representative random sample of adult residents of Poland; PBS from 17 and 18 April, a 1,027-person representative sample of the adult population of Poland; Demoskop from 16-21 April, a 968-person random-quota sample of residents of Poland age 15 and above.

* Political Context Surrounding No-Confidence Motion

93EP0266A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 21, 22 May 93 pp 1, 11

[Article by Janina Paradowska: "To Frighten the Government"]

[Text] The no-confidence motion seems to have been mislaid. Presumably it exists, but it is as though it did not. Maybe it is simply hanging in the air or lying in a drawer somewhere. Perhaps it is lying in the drawer of the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN). Or maybe it is in some desk in the "Solidarity" parliamentary club.

Jan Rulewski, very upset, said that his colleagues wrote something down on paper. Whether there was a no-confidence motion on that paper we do not really know, although Jan Kulas, Rulewski's party colleague from the party called "Solidarity" Trade Union, announced from the Sejm podium that the club "voted that it be prepared." What distance separates the "voting to prepare" and the actual preparation and submission of the appropriate motion, we do not really know.

But the very knowledge that there is a no-confidence motion somewhere has turned out to be extremely stressful for an already agitated political scene. It has to be said that the ones who look most upset by all of this are the initiators. They put forth an idea and now do not know what to do with it. The situation is a little like a cuckoo's egg that no one really wants to see hatched. Even the independent confederates, who are solicitous about very premature ideas, are solicitous about this one, it is generally believed, only as a matter of principle. If they really wanted to overthrow the government, they would have prepared a constructive motion, with a serious candidate for prime minister. Yet the gossip is that the candidate will be Leszek Moczulski, and the majority of parliament somehow did not treat that seriously.

The left-wing democrats are clearly embarrassed. They are the ones who supported universal privatization, which presumably did not sit very well with the electorate, and they cannot allow themselves to vote for a government in which, as Minister Rokita stated, there are strong anticommunist feelings. Thus, the left-wing democrats would like to wait until the election law is passed. The PSL (Polish Peasant Party) members do not look sure of themselves, either. There is no certainty that they will be able to have their own prime minister, especially because the number of people to whom President Walesa promised that job is growing fast. As we know, the president stabilizes the system but by a rather specific method, using from a few to several options. The choice of option may occur at the last moment and be completely different from that which was expected. Deputy Ryszard Bugaj believes that the choice of the option depends to a large degree on the president's current mood. Deputy Bugaj also does not feel good about this no-confidence motion. If it were constructive, the talk would be different. Unfortunately, it is as it is. The Labor Union, therefore, is ready to come to the government with a pact containing constructive proposals. The party rulers will decide the shape of the pact in a few days, but we know that, for the most part, it will provide that the opposition does not interfere with the government as regards the budget and the composition of the Cabinet, but, in exchange, it wants a referendum on matters dealing with the economic system (putting the universal privatization program to a general vote) and establishing a date for elections—to be held in approximately a year.

The leader of the liberals, Donald Tusk, is also coming out with constructive proposals. He proposes that the trade unions be reduced to the role of unions—that is, amending the law on trade unions and limiting the influence of the ZChN (Christian-National Union) in the government, particularly the influence of Deputy Prime Minister Goryszewski, whom the liberals cannot forgive for his lack of support for universal privatization. In any case, it is worth noting that the deputy prime minister has a great talent for disappearing in difficult situations. He has disappeared somewhere during the present crisis also, even though the possible amending of the budget looks like a strictly economic matter.

The conservatives supported the liberals. They, too, will soon prepare a draft amendment to the trade union law and collective bargaining. Generally, the point will be to declare political and sit-in strikes to be unlawful, to
introduce a provision on lockouts, the principle that consultation of draft laws will take place after they are accepted by the Council of Ministers and not in the course of the work because that effectively paralyzes the work of the government, to lay down a law banning strikes in schools and transportation, and so forth.

Let us say immediately that the chances of such amendments passing in the Sejm are very negligible. Even those who today say that, fortunately, the union members do not know the laws very well because, if they did, they could paralyze, within the complete majesty of the law, the work of every enterprise, will not vote for the changes because, after all, there is the electorate. And the electorate of most of the parties is precisely in the work places. That, at least, is what the parties believe. The Peasant Party members are not interested in supporting the changes, either, because they are supposed to also apply to the principles for organizing farmers’ strikes—for example, not to block roads. A strike without roadblocks is not a very serious strike. In any case, roadblocks are used in Europe, and we are now becoming part of it.

Anyway, it should be noted that the appearance of a no-confidence motion has brought forth a large number of different ideas. Unfortunately, it turns out that those that seem reasonable are not very realistic—for example, the idea that the union be a union and not a new leading force. The more realistic ideas are not very reasonable. It seems that the initiatives of the KPN, which are extremely concrete, are best suited to meet social requirements. For example, the confederates submitted to the Sejm a draft resolution requiring the government to amend the budget in such a way that the funds for education would rise by 9.33653 trillion zlotys [Z], and those for the health service by Z11.833447. I understand that those sums were rounded out slightly because it may be that it should have been Z11.833447239 or something like that. In any case, the calculations are impressively precise, and it is no wonder that the chief of the Mazowsze Region, Mieczyslaw Jankowski, agreed to be photographed with Krysztof Krol recently, after which both gentlemen said that they have a great deal in common—meaning more than just a photograph.

Deputy Janusz Korwin-Mikke also submitted some ideas. His program calls for closing all of the striking schools and dissolving the contracts of all of the striking teachers and putting all of the schools buildings up for sale, with the people purchasing them receiving a mortgage credit after a 2-percent down payment. The same thing should be done with the remaining schools at the end of the school year and the entire health service. The Ministry of National Education (MEN) should be dissolved, along with all of its branches (it should be noted that the KPN is against all of these demands; it proposes a gradual liquidation, with the entire leadership of MEN to be dismissed right now), and should be privatized. But the deputy hurt the social impact of his program when he called the striking teachers “desperate rabble,” which was not well received even in parliament. Although it applauded the deputy’s various displays of talent, this time it was in agreement that the teachers were striking for a just cause. Differences appeared only in the opinion as to whether the strike is just in relation to today’s realities (pay the Z600,000 increases), or in relation to the future (provide increases in next year’s budget). The opposition was of the opinion that the teachers are striking because of today’s realities, and the governing coalition was inclined to regard this as a strike for the future and for reforms.

Generally, there were problems in interpreting the strikes, and not only in parliament. It might even be said that the more different higher union echelons joined in the protest, the more unclear became its goals. Initially, it appeared that the strike is because the teachers are receiving starvation salaries and were not paid the increases at the time they were promised (quite paradoxically, this year the delay was shorter than in past years). When the matter went to the regional levels, it turned out that the teachers are striking as a vanguard for a general strike. When the matter reached the National Commission, the strike was already for a motion of no-confidence in the government. When it reached the chairman of the union, it suddenly turned out that it is not just a matter of a vote of no-confidence in a single concrete and rather weak Cabinet, whose overthrow is not such a very big thing, but also a case of testing the entire political system. The testing would be of a vetting character. If the communists support the government, we will know explicitly how things stand, the head of the union said. With that statement, he had to have enormously embarrassed Deputy Niesiolowski, who, as a fervent supporter of the present government, could, as a result of this test, find himself unexpectedly in the postcommunist system. When the whole problem finally reached the forum of the parliament—that is, the highest authority in the state—it turned out that the strike was in order to have the government implement the “Solidarity” Trade Union program. This, to the stupefaction of the Cabinet and some part of the parliament, was announced by Deputy Kulas, appearing, as it were, in behalf of the union’s parliamentary representation.

Additional complications were caused by the large independence of the regions, particularly Mazowsze Region, which, as it turned out, is supposed to strike to overthrow everyone—the government, parliament, and even the president. It is possible that the large independence of the Mazowsze Region paradoxically helped the prime minister because, before the president left for Portugal, he gave her only a 50-percent chance, and, after his return, he seemed to have given her more. But it is still not clear in what position the cap on the president’s pen is at the moment. Before he left for Portugal, it was almost entirely removed from his pen in order to sign the law on the lowest retirement pensions and branch supplements, after which the government should resign without waiting for someone to open the drawer containing the no-confidence vote. It seems to me that, at this moment, observation of the cap on the pen is far more important for the future of the government than
looking for the vote. In the Sejm, even the oppositionists are already dissatisfied (at least some of them), particularly with the branch supplements. In recent days, a few of the deputies, unquestionably in the opposition, explained to me that certainly they were in favor of increases for the lowest retirement pensions, but not so much in favor of the branch supplements, but that somehow the result of the voting was that the state’s expenditures were increased beyond its means.

Two weeks ago I wrote that two important contests are being fought in Poland today—on the shape of economic reforms and on the model of the state’s political system. The strikes and the political byplays around them have caused those contests to become very dramatic. In our country, unfortunately, all it takes is a few dramatic gestures and a little yelling to heat up the political atmosphere. Yet the truth is that, although many people would like to overthrow the government, most of them are really afraid of its downfall because no one is sure what this “president’s alternative,” talked about so frequently but seemingly not regarded seriously, will look like. The truth is also that there is no reason for a general strike because the pact on a state enterprise, also negotiated by “Solidarity,” which is strangely distancing itself from those negotiations today, is proceeding through the Sejm quite smoothly. It seems that the union has so deeply involved itself in some kind of political games, the end of which it itself cannot see, that it is executing mainly uncoordinated gestures not tied to any logical whole. I admit that the explanation that a motion of no-confidence in the government is being announced not in order to overthrow it but to frighten it seems to be a case of practicing politics on the kindergarten level. Far more sensible is the proposal submitted during the last Sejm debate by Deputy Wit Majewski of the OPZZ (All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement) to conclude the same pact on the matter of the budgetary sphere as the one on the enterprise. And that all union headquarters conclude it, negotiating together and not in separate rooms as in the past. Because “Solidarity” right now cannot sit down jointly with the OPZZ even in a television studio.

What the government has to offer in the budgetary sphere is another matter. In recent days, everyone recited in one voice: Let us talk about reforms. It was like an opera, where all of the singers are calling loudly “let us hurry, let us hurry,” and everyone is standing in place. For years they have been standing in place and, at most, have been belaboring each other because they cannot agree on the shape of the reforms. They always infringe on someone’s interests, and no one wants his interests to be infringed upon. One way or another, the government, in order to emerge from the defensive—and even a minority government can do this—must finally present some very concrete plans on the method of constructing next year’s budget. A new government expose, a serious debate over it, and a timetable of actions are needed. It is high time a couple of matters are explained—matters that, for the last few weeks, have been floating around in Poland, such as the no-confidence motion, seemingly present and seemingly not. Such a floating matter, for example, as the 5-percent growth in national gross income. We do not know whether it refers to this year or next year, and we do not even know where it came from, but it appears on all of the strike banners. I am already a little ashamed to write about this because how many times can you write about the same thing, but changes in the government itself are needed, even during a time of strikes, even if it looks as though they are being made under pressure. I do not predict that this Cabinet will see calmer days, and postponing the situation only makes the situation worse.

We see precisely what this endurance and this crawling slowly over obstacles will lead to. It will lead to a situation in which parties having a few deputies will begin to issue ultimatums because everyone today thinks that the government is so weak that that can easily be done. And so—watch out! The Union for Real Politics has just become stronger, by as much as 25 percent, because it obtained a new deputy. I see no reason for it not to demand the execution of its program. I am reducing this to an absurdity? I would not be so sure.
Transylvanian Hungarians Evaluate Budapest's Duna TV
93BA0995A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
23 Apr 93 p 18

[Report on statements by four members of the Hungarian minority in Romania, by Zoltan Csaky: “Transylvanians on Duna TV”]

[Text] We left for Transylvania to film Easter folk customs. In Kalotaszeg [Hungary], Kolozsvar [Cluj], and the region of Aranyoszet [not further identified] where Hungarians live scattered, we were constantly asked: What is going on with Duna TV?

They are astonished and frightened at the barrage the Hungarian press began at this enterprise, because Hungarians in Transylvania and other areas where they live scattered brought great financial sacrifice to set up satellite dishes, frequently paying many times their monthly income, and in many places disobeying regulations by the authorities.

Their only wish is that party conflicts in the mother country not extend to this area, as well.

In our selection we interviewed members of the Kolozsvar intelligentsia. I think their statements will be useful not only to the critics and opponents of the Hungarian satellite program, but also to the small group of its creators, the visionaries of Duna TV.

[Janos Pentek, university professor] I would assess the importance of Duna TV especially from a linguistic point of view, because the border isolated the groups and larger blocks on the outside in linguistic terms, as well. The program should counteract this linguistic isolation and recent fragmentation.

Here, in Transylvania, it was noticable in the level of language competence how far the effects of Hungarian media reach. In the western part of Transylvania, up to Kolozsvar, where the reception of Hungarian radio is good, the state of the language is perceivably better than in the eastern parts where a sort of language erosion has taken place recently. This can be detected especially in the scattered Hungarian population of southern Transylvania and the large cities. I myself noticed the effects of the Hungarian satellite program especially among the eastern Szeklers. It was really a great experience for the people when the first satellite dish was set up: The villagers gathered together, more or less as we used to gather around a radio in the fifties here in Transylvania. Now, something similar is taking place, but the linguistic effects cannot be measured in such a short time. However, if the program continues, a sort of linguistic consciousness-raising can begin. It is possible that it would even have an effect on the Csangos [Hungarians living in the northwestern part of Romania], and all those on the verge of linguistic assimilation.

[Laszlo Muradin, researcher at the Academy of Sciences] Our speech in Transylvania is on the retreat, so to speak, in a defensive position, because there are fewer and fewer opportunities to express ourselves in Hungarian. We were really looking forward to the satellite program very much. When they said they would install cable television, we concentrated our efforts on being able to receive Duna TV here in Kolozsvar. Unfortunately, this has not happened yet. According to the news, there are political reasons for this. The Portal company keeps promising that as soon as cable television is installed in the entire city, they will do their best to insure that Duna TV can be received.

[Pentek] To a certain extent one is being fed with promises here, until one subscribes to cable TV, only to be rejected later. There is much insinuation involved in the matter, but let us say it openly: a hidden language discrimination is taking place, because while cable television is airing in three, four, five languages, Hungarian is currently excluded. However, wherever Hungarian television can be received, it influences the attitude of Romanians, as well; this is perhaps the reason why they are averse to it.

[Lajos Molnos, Kolozs county president of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ)] It is also a fact that the mayoral office is exerting pressure on the cable television company.

[Pentek] And as far as the program is concerned, it is not necessary for Duna TV to launch a series like Dallas or air mysteries, because there is enough of those on TV already. It is much better if we can see Hungarian movies, even old movies, because not only young people, but also those who are old today have never seen them; they simply had no occasion to see them. Old neglects must be compensated for; in time, the composition of the program will certainly change.

[Muradin] We are lagging behind; a great portion of universal Hungarian culture did not reach us. This applies to Hungarian movies and Hungarian theater productions, and Duna TV must make up for this. But in my opinion the editorial concept must find the correct proportions in the dosage.

[Lajos Kantor, general editor of KORUNK] I want to indicate a certain sense of deprivation and announce a desire which I think I share with many people. Because while it is good that the viewers of Duna TV have a chance to hear Hungarian and see many Hungarian movies, the question arises what is profitable and what is not. Because there is intellectual profitability, as well, beyond the economic one. In the initial period it was obviously necessary to show existing movies—if we conducted a poll, I think a great portion of the viewers would express their pleasure at seeing numerous movies which they were unable to see before. But I think Duna TV could do a lot in illuminating current topics, precisely in order to improve the concept of history, the relationship to culture, and the view of Hungarians. I am sure it costs more to produce a new program, a new movie, but this will be intellectually, and ultimately
economically, much more profitable, because this is what forces people to face their own problems, and not movies from the thirties, forties, or even sixties. Thus, this is what I consider to be the most important: Duna TV must be edited not with a view to the past, but to the present and the future.

[Jozsef Koto, vice-president of RMDSZ] The program of the RMDSZ also stresses that we want to organize our cultural life in the spirit of cultural autonomy. In reality this means that we must fight for the financial means which we can spend on maintaining culture. The most important issue and our primary task is the establishment of the system of institutions which is able to maintain a self-governed minority culture. For this reason we, the people in the minority, expect the program first of all to assist us in this work of building culture and society, including teaching our people to run a business, and launch an enterprise, to answer the call of the times. A program of this sort would be beneficial to all, and with this I perhaps also said that we think it is very, very important to have a program like this that speaks to all Hungarians, thinks in terms of all Hungarians, and helps us continue the cultural and value-creating activity as this ethnic group has done for centuries.

[Molnos] What should be on Duna TV? I thought, and this may be the intent of it, that this will be the television of Hungarians beyond the borders. From this television a person living in Sepsiszentgyorgy [Sfintu Gheorghe—Romania] or Nyitra [Nitra—Slovakia] could find out how Hungarians live in Vojvodina, what the problems of people Subcarpathia are, and how far advanced the people of Burgenland [Austria] are. This could be useful from two aspects. On the one hand, we can obtain information from areas about which we know very little; on the other hand, it becomes visible that they are trying to achieve certain goals in the region where they were born, where they are staying, and this could have the effect on us, too, that see, it is possible to remain where we live, where we were born, and it is not absolutely necessary to leave.

[Kantor] I would consider it very important that life here, and the life of all Hungarians beyond the borders, be handled not only as a topic, but that artists, literary scholars, and public figures from those regions also appear. If for no other reason, then because here there is still a rich artistic life to be found, with significant performers and actors. The activity of Duna TV must by all means be coordinated with the work of Hungarian language radio and television studios in Romania. Because for instance, if there is a program on Kolozsvár—and I saw one on Hungarian Television—I can imagine performers from Kolozsvár to be featured in it, and they could recite the poems on the program.

[Molnos] A great number of Hungarians in the Carpathian basin live scattered. Living scattered means at the same time that in the villages where they live there is no school, in most cases there is no priest, and no Hungarian intelligentsia. They are left to their own devices. It would be a very important role for Duna TV, in order to preserve the consciousness of ethnic identity, to air programs expressly aimed at this isolated community.

[Kantor] It is vital for Duna TV to have its own profile. At the same time, I do not think it is impossible for it to borrow programs from TV 1 or TV 2. But not programs dealing with party politics. Because unfortunately there are indications that they intend to bring in criteria of Hungarian party politics, and thus divide Hungarians here. Thus, the important thing in my opinion is not the assertion of party criteria, but rather that Duna TV be the representative of a national idea which is neither conservative, nor overly liberal; that it contrast various aspects and try to give an overview in that way. I must say that it seems to me that in the fairly few independent programs I have seen, a more conservative national idea could be discerned.

[Koto] Perhaps one should somehow forego the national game of blackballing and seclusion which, unfortunately, is beginning to lead to trampling on values in Hungarian intellectual life and culture. Should Duna TV be able to accomplish this, it would fulfill a historical calling. This is what we, the ethnic minority, primarily expect from the editorial concept of Duna TV. Because they often ask us how they could help us. The real help for us would be if a Hungary free of blackballing and seclusion could integrate the nation’s creative forces and play a stabilizing role in the region. This is the real help we need.

[Molnos] I also read and heard that a certain campaign was launched against Duna TV because it is allegedly the government’s mouthpiece. I cannot be the judge of this. But it would be good to know one thing, not here, but on the other side, that Hungarians here did not pick up on the fact that this television was created by MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum], financed by SZDSZ [Association of Free Democrats], or promoted by FIDESZ [Association of Young Democrats]. They regarded it as an opportunity created by the mother country for Hungarian to be heard here, as well. I meant the mother country, and not the party which is currently in power or forming a government. It would be good if there, in Hungary, the matter were perceived in the same way; in other words, that it is the mother country, and not one of the parties, that provides this opportunity to Hungarians beyond the border.
* Ethnic Hungarian MP's Speech on Problems, Dangers
93CH0630A Bratislava SZABAD UJSAG in Hungarian
28 Apr 93 p 5

["Text" of speech delivered to the Slovak parliament on 23 April by Laszlo Dobos, a representative of the Coexistence Political Movement: "Understanding Instead of Accusations!"]

[Text] What I heard in yesterday's parliamentary debate made me sad: Again, we ended up where we usually end up when ethnic issues are discussed. At flaring passions and accusations. I have the feeling that we have been sitting on the same merry-go-round for decades, on the merry-go-round of the lack of understanding. In the course of these decades, the reactions have become settled, and so has the stack of concepts and phrases used to criticize us. If we speak about ethnic issues in general, apparently everything is in best order, but as soon as we touch concrete issues, the cogwheels are beginning to grate.

Indeed, the solution of problems, this is the key to every political situation. To the current one, as well. The solution of problems, because this has been due to us for long decades. At the beginning of the Sixties, we were already arguing with Comrade Karol Bacilek, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Slovakian Communist Party, about the spelling of the names of municipalities. I was a member of the committee—chaired by the commissioner of the internal ministry, Jelen—entrusted with the task of solving this problem. One month ago, we were trying to explain to the delegates of the European Council what our problems were in registering first names [of newborns] and the bilingual use of the names of municipalities. Totalitarianism was unable to find a solution to our problems. Democracy, too, unfortunately, up to this day. One of the delegates from the European Council told us: "What can be the problem, when the choice of given names is the autonomous right of the parent?" Couldn't we solve the problem in the same way, with one sentence? After all, the current practice, having to obtain a permit from the internal ministry, has become obsolete in many places of the world.

We keep repeating it, like a broken record: We are not Slovakia's enemies; after all, it is also our homeland. We want nothing more than setting our basic human rights issues. Why cannot we sit down with the authorities to discuss the problem of bilingualism? Why cannot we discuss the problems of Slovaks who live in areas with a mixed population? Let us finally deal with the real issue; let us look for the solution, let us formulate recommendations. There is no other way to stop the merry-go-round going round and round in a daze.

About our letters abroad and about Strasbourg, I merely want to say: This is like a bad marriage. If the young wife finds no understanding at home, she first begins to complain to her girlfriends, then to the neighbors, and finally she runs home to her mama. This is elementary human logic.

To Representative Laluha I would mention about the visit of the European Council that we were the most surprised how short—a few minutes—our meeting with the delegates of the European Council was who came here to investigate the situation of minorities. We expected something completely different.

In its report, the government deals with the issue of minorities. However, we do not consider this to be an evaluation, because we could only find a few general, superficial sentences in it. Since the government took office, we have discussed our matters several times, and submitted numerous recommendations. Instead of concrete results, however, we keep hearing flourishes, arguments, and most often, monologues. And rejection. There are very few or no concrete solutions. They keep repeating the refrain: "Yes, we are handling the minority issue according to European standards." These are pretty words without concrete results. In this way, this is only a platitude. Instead of general proclamations, one must make concrete decisions. One must make decisions, and we would like to learn the intentions of our government, whether it will accept the European charter on local self-governments; the charter on regional and minority languages; the minutes of the European Convention on minority rights, and the treaty on civil and political rights.

We know, independent statehood is a historical event in the life of the Slovak nation. We also know that in three-fourths of the year, no government is able to work wonders. Still, we cannot accept that minority issues can only figure in words, arguments, and endless accusations.

We initiated meetings with the premier several times. In three-fourths of a year, there was no time to accomplish this. True enough, this is not a matter of time, rather of attitude. It is not normal if the premier ignores the legitimate political representation of his country's Hungarian citizens. Rather, it is nearly incomprehensible. We do not discuss one single concrete problem. It is also not normal that issues which ought to be discussed at home are discussed in a correspondence with the European Parliament. Last July, in the course of the discussion of the government's program, I suggested that its policy be founded on a wide consensus. I was ridiculed.

Up to this point, we were only able to conduct a dialogue with the cultural minister. I could enumerate concrete examples which render the relationship between the government and Hungarian representatives more difficult. I do not want to complain now. Rather, I am looking for the cause of the unfavorable relationship. But wherever I begin, I arrive at distrust. In the evaluation of every proposal we make, distrust plays the leading role. Whichever concrete case I take, this is what I find: distrust and rejection. And this distrust is, unfortunately,
very deeply rooted: It is so great that it makes a sober assessment of minority problems impossible. Such relations do not lead anywhere. Only the conflicts keep accumulating.

In March I visited the former Yugoslavia. In the vicinity of Eszek [Osijek], I was at the Croatian-Serbian front line. I talked to civilians and soldiers. What I experienced was appalling: fear and hate. Hate which feeds revenge results in killing. As I returned home I felt I had to do everything in order that this would not happen here.

The dissolving Yugoslavia is a great reminder. Politics cannot allow small matters or apparent quibbles to turn into conflicts. Everywhere in the world, bad political relations are founded in distrust. One must conduct an open dialogue about every concrete matter, even about the most unpleasant issues, even if at times we have to tell very unpleasant truths to each other's face.

We must look each other in the eye and find a solution to every problem, because the current political practice in the area of ethnic policy can only lead to a dead end.

* SNS Publishes Draft of New Program

93CH0632A BRATISLAVA SLOVENSKY NAROD in Slovak 20 Apr 93 pp 2, 10

[Text of program theses dated 8 April 1993: “Responsibility for Slovakia”]

[Text]

Motto: Fate of Slovakia Is in the Hands of Slovak Citizens

Slogan: The Best for Slovakia

After resuming its activities, the SNS [Slovak National Party] became the only party to politically formulate the idea of Slovakia's own statehood as a necessary condition for an all-round development of our society. It entered the subsequent elections with the slogan “Free citizen, self-governing community, sovereign state.” Today we are able to say that our main political goal, the creation of our own state, became a reality. Mindful of our historic responsibility, which is the greatest that any of the political parties of present-day Slovakia has, and building on the SNS's more than 130 years of experience and tradition, we are updating the goals contained in our program, which were formulated in the distant as well as in the recent past, in a way designed to win for their realization as broad as possible support of the public, support of the present generation, on whose shoulders lies the responsibility for the first steps of the young state.

We are taking as our point of departure the more than a-thousand-year-old tradition of Cyril and Methodius, the legacy of our national awkeners, the conciliation between Catholics and Protestants symbolized by the handshake between Andrej Hlinka and Martin Razus in Zvolen, and the historic roots of Slovak statehood.

We affirm that the main goals of our program are unchanged: In our own, sovereign state, we put in first place patriotism and a sense of belonging together by the citizens of Slovakia. We want the citizens of Slovakia to live in a democratic state, in which the Constitution, the rights contained in the Covenant on Human Rights, and the laws are fully respected. The abiding goal of our politics is to strengthen democracy under the conditions of a rule-of-law state and to develop a market economy. We stand for using the intellectual potential of Slovakia, for years suppressed by various ideologies, to uplift our state economically and intellectually.

The highest goal of our politics is the moral regeneration of the nation, the betterment of nationalities, the personal well-being and contentment of the citizens. Taking as the starting point an analysis of the geopolitical status of the Slovak Republic [SR], the external and internal political factors, an analysis of the initial economic recession, and the domestic social and societal phenomena, it is essential to implement the following specific programs in order to achieve that goal:

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We are convinced that long-term policies must be based on the principles defined in the individual programs, which will be reflected in clearly formulated, effective, democratic laws. Only in this way can an all-around development of Slovakia be achieved. Everything is basically in the hands of the citizens. We advocate the kind of governing of a society that does not take away from the citizens the right to share in the responsibility for themselves and for others. The abhorrent feature of the recent regimes and governments was that they acted in a narrowly partisan way. We reject the principles of authoritarianism and partisanship. In governing, professionalism must have precedence over partisanship. Our credo is equal opportunity for everyone; the odds are with the most competent. Nationality, religious affiliation, or world view must not be an obstacle to the self-realization of every Slovak citizen.

Our party is the party of opportunity, choice, responsibility, and patriotism. We shall see to it that Slovakia becomes a country where every person can live decently, without fear of persecution or discrimination, or of having his rights curtailed. We shall offer everyone a
chance to succeed, but his success must also be Slovakia’s success. Then we shall sustain a strong and united Slovakia. We are a generation that has the opportunities but also the responsibility. Responsibility for Slovakia.

Slovakia—International Crossroads

Duke Rastislav himself began to build his empire at the crossroads of two large trade routes, the Jantar road and the Danube road. Slovakia must use that wisdom of our ancestors as a starting point and pursue a wise, balanced foreign and foreign trade policy in order to become a dignified and respected member of the United Nations, and be integrated into all of the important European structures. Our abiding responsibility is to maintain the defense capability, state sovereignty, and integrity of the SR. Our fundamental goal in foreign policy is gradual integration into the EC. We place great importance on the cooperation of the Visegrad Four and integration into the system of collective security. Through our foreign policy, we want to create the conditions for our role as a bridge between East and West, striving for a balanced influence of the powers on our internal conditions.

We want to build relations with our closest neighbors on the principle of mutual respect and self-respect. Through good economic cooperation and exemplary policy toward national minorities, we want to mutually reduce the tension between the SR and the Hungarian Republic. We place special importance on relations with the Czech Republic [CR]. We must develop a model of such mutual cooperation that will consistently respect the signed bilateral agreements. There is no reason to foment hatred and break such ties that work for the benefit of both states.

Our goal is to work out concrete programs for cooperation with Slovaks abroad and their associations. Return to them Slovak citizenship and a feeling of being at home in their old country. So far, the world knows little about Slovakia. We must make the most of every opportunity to present an objective picture of Slovakia.

Prosperity and Ownership

Our goal is a prosperous Slovakia that increases the well-being of its citizens, with legal protection for ownership rights of every private citizen and legal entity. Slovakia’s road to prosperity can be quick, but it will require the support of all citizens, especially during the first stage, which will see a decline in the living standard of a large majority of citizens, and during which the decline in productivity must be stopped and the economy revived. The main goals are:

- Convertibility and stability of the currency.
- By means of gradual demonopolization, the creation of conditions for the functioning of the market and full liberalization of prices.
- With a flexible tax and credit policy, support of the creation of new job opportunities in the private sector.
- Effective privatization.

- Strict control over the proper use of public expenditures.
- The beginning of a restructuring of the Slovak economy.

Convertible and stability of the currency are the conditions for the recovery of the SR economy. Strengthen convertibility of the currency by encouraging exports. Introduce reasonable protection of the Slovak market that will respect all of the international obligations of the SR—GATT, Visegrad Four, and the customs union with the CR. The government must keep inflation at an acceptable level because uncontrolled inflation leads to a fight for survival and puts social peace and citizens’ savings at risk.

Our goal is a gradual reduction of the tax burden mainly on those businesses that create new job opportunities, engage in export, increase production of finished goods, reduce energy consumption, and use domestic raw materials. Equally important is speeding up privatization because the state is not competent to ensure efficient management of the property it administers. In the privatization process, priority must be given to quality business plans of Slovakia’s entrepreneurs, and employee participation must be made possible by means of preferred employee stock. The conditions must be created for extensive investments of foreign capital, but at a rate that benefits Slovakia and prevents cheap “sale” of our country. Support must be given to undertakings that will bring into our economy competition, resources, and new technologies. We want to direct domestic and foreign resources primarily into the development of the infrastructure on the bases of governmental guarantees. Important for internal stability is a uniform development of regions, and ties of local entrepreneurs to the communities. All direct and indirect instruments could be used for a gradual restructuring of the Slovak economy, especially in tourism, services, and transportation.

Put a stop to the continuing decimation of primary agricultural production and give full support to ensuring food availability and self-sufficiency for reasonable and healthy nutrition from our own resources for our population. Use tax instruments to achieve a broader replacement process in the production of basic foods, taking into account the differences of the heterogeneous climatic and soil conditions that exist in Slovakia. Establish basic and permanent legal and legislative principles for an efficient policy of subsidies to support active agricultural entrepreneurial entities.

With the implementation of the objectives proposed by us, we expect quick stabilization of the SR economy and its orientation toward beneficial cooperation with our neighbors and other countries.

Responsibility for Others

At a time when our country is searching for its new image, many people, through no fault of their own, are finding themselves in difficult circumstances as a result
of many radical changes in the economy. The social net has holes in it, and the umbrella of charity is not working. We support the feeling of responsibility of the rich and the healthy for the poor and the sick. It must be supported also by appropriate legislation. As a political party, we assume responsibility not only for those who voted for us but also for other SR citizens.

We realize the necessity to support young families with children because they are the basis of a future healthy population. We want to guarantee retirees a dignified life. We shall not allow such a situation to develop where some strata of society or an entire generation will find themselves outside the social system and living in conditions that are beneath the dignity of a human being. Privatize primary health care, dental and nursing services. Decentralize the administration of health care, introduce private management and a high degree of institutional autonomy. Build a pluralistic system of insurance and make possible alternative forms of insurance.

We realize that the implementation of our concepts requires an immediate solution of a great number of problems the previous power structures left behind. Halting the decline in economic efficiency and restoring the devastated environment and the moral and spiritual values are necessary for a gradual revival of the economy and other spheres of life. In spite of the economic recession, investments in health care and the social system cannot be restricted any longer if the consequences are not to turn against us.

**Spiritual and Moral Rebirth**

We consider the spiritual and moral rebirth of Slovakia no less important than the economic one. The renewal and application of ethical standards, based on traditional Christian values, our culture, mutual respect, and tolerance are our long-term aims in the bringing up of children, education, and culture. After a long period of spiritual devastation, we shall offer the alternative of spiritual renewal.

Our goal is a reorientation toward traditional values that are typical for advanced democracies. Without the right to choose the parameters and the method of acquiring education, it will not be possible for the Slovak school system to fulfill the requirements of the International Covenant on Human (Children's) Rights. Only such a right will make possible the participation of very diverse individuals in achieving the redirection of schools at every level.

We are unequivocally in favor of the right to school choice and the right to influence what the school will look like. We see the basic strategy for implementing these rights in the specific community, which will have an influence on what kind of school it will have. Raising the material level of the schools and ensuring the existence of a pluralistic school system is possible only by a radical change in the economic and legal structure of relationships within the educational system. The state system of allocating money for education must be combined with the decisionmaking authority of the principal, the school, and the community. Our goal is to remove the barriers and differences between state and private schools and to establish schools according to the needs of the public. To focus education on the prevention of drug addiction and alcoholism. To give young people the alternative of moral and spiritual values.

We shall support the creation of a supradepartmental agency that will ensure a flexible and coordinated management of science and technology; priority directions in research will be determined in accordance with the concept of the revival of the economy and its restructuring. Support for schools, science, art, and charity will be subject to significant tax exemptions.

**The Regreening of Slovakia**

We have our country on loan from our descendants, and it is our duty to improve and return it. To make Slovakia green again, we intend to contribute as much as possible to a dynamic balance between the limited natural resources and the growing demands of society. We refuse to exploit natural resources at the cost of damage to regions and devastation of the environment. By direct and indirect measures, we shall promote the use of recycled raw materials before using up nonrenewable sources of raw material.

The state cannot shed its coresponsibility for the historic ecological damage by making changes in ownership relations, and must repair the damage universally within the framework of international cooperation. All new undertakings and entrepreneurial activities must be judged according to international ecological standards. We shall support the adoption of legal standards that will ensure objective analysis and evaluation of the impact of construction plans and activities on the environment. We shall not support the combining of economic and environment protection activities within individual departments.

We shall establish a special prosecutor for the environment, whose main task will be to involve at the horizontal level all inspection officials, especially state ones, in its protection.

The goal of our ecological policy is to guarantee every citizen a right to live in a healthy environment, and not only to declare that right but also, with the active cooperation of the state and the citizens, to implement it.

**Freedom and Law**

We want to build a rule-of-law state. Laws must apply equally to everyone. We shall support a reform of the laws and the judiciary that will regain the trust of the citizens. Support of lawful behavior and respect for the law must be with the citizen from childhood. The spirit of the Constitution and the laws must generate belief in the internal strength of our country.
The citizen has the right to plan his or her own life and must know what kind of conditions to expect in the coming months and years. We have already gotten many surprises. We want the government to keep to its program, to conduct its governing according to the approved procedures, to provide information about steps that concern the entire population, and to guarantee by law and expand the inalienable right to individual economic initiative.

All people are equal and have certain inalienable rights. The rights are not granted by the state, which means that the state cannot, in fact, take them away from a free citizen. The state serves the citizen; the citizen does not serve the state.

We shall aim to increase the citizens’ security and will fight criminal behavior and international crime. We shall legally formulate the rules for fighting drugs, dirty money, and an underground economy.

Self-Governing Community

A community should have all of the rights it is able to support and implement. We shall devolve the necessary economic and tax decisionmaking authority from the state and its administration to the level of communities and regions. The local government must be made closer to the citizen.

We propose more local taxes and less state taxes. Every community must have in its hands the real possibility to make decisions about its development. Every community must have the right to control its schools, its institutions of social services, and its enterprises according to its needs or, by local taxes, create the conditions for business, services, and production according to what the community needs.

We also want to gain support abroad for our strategy for developing Slovakia, but, above all, we want to give incentive at home to a broad consensus of those political forces that are willing and able to share in the codification of the state’s interests, in strengthening our statehood and ensuring the integrity of the SR.

Our goal is to bring people together, not to divide them. We present our program theses, which form a unity of three liberties—political, economic, and moral. Those three values cannot be separated from each other. They must be applied together. As to how and at what cost, we give our answers in the individual specific programs: economic, health care and social, cultural, foreign policy, ecological, and community.
Draft Law on Radio, Television Proposed  
93BA1035B Ljubljana DELO in Slovene  
15 May 93 p 21

[Article by Slavko Splichal: "For Enlightened Dualism"]

[Text] The law on Slovene RTV [Radio-Television] was one of the last legislative actions by the former delegate Republic Assembly in the spring of 1990. The first multiparty parliament, when it was barely established, expedited the amendment of the part of it which specifies the method of the management of Slovene RTV. It is now apparent that the first parliament established under the new constitution will also soon adopt a new law on Slovene RTV, and if one can judge by its provisions, it will once again radically change the management structure.

The law's provisions specify that the new council that will manage Slovene public radio and television will consist of members, a minority of whom (seven) are to be appointed by the State Assembly from the ranks of party activists (but not deputies), while a majority of the members (nine) are to be appointed by the State Council from the ranks of public workers who are to promote the interests of the groups represented in the State Council. The remaining eight members are to be directly elected by Slovene RTV employees (five), and one member each by the Italian and Hungarian minorities and by the religious communities in Slovenia.

There is no doubt that the proposed structure of the RTV council represents a radical departure from the present system, when the council's composition is determined to a great extent by the parties, so that party interests definitely predominate over the interests of developing national radio and television. There is also no doubt that it is a radical shift from a paternalistic toward a democratic structure of the management system, which, in regulating the affairs of national radio broadcasting, recognizes the legitimacy of not only political (party and state) interests, but also others, i.e., the interests of civil society and its participants.

It is therefore to be hoped that national public radio and television will shake off parliament's political dictatorship. This hope is associated not only with the altered method of appointing the council's members and the elimination of the deputy privilege possessed by the current (and former) deputies, i.e., they simultaneously have active and passive rights in the appointment of council members. The hope is also based on other proposed changes which, if implemented, would mean national public radio and television's achievement of adulthood:

—On its right to the independent and final appointment of chief editors, without asking parliament for its consent prior to the appointment, as in the past;

—On the right of minorities and Slovene RTV employees to elect their own representatives directly, without, as in the past, merely proposing them to parliament, which appoints them (or does not).

To date, parliament has been (and still is) playing the role of a sort of enlightened absolutist, which only gives the council enough rights that its members can live in the illusion that they are actually managing, while actually all the key decisions (through the right of veto) are firmly and exclusively in the hands of parliament (now the State Assembly). Through the provisions of the law on Slovene RTV, parliament is acquiring the role that belongs to it in democratic communications systems: the role of an overseer—through the majority portion of the members of the oversight committee—over the use of subscription money from taxpayers, instead of the role of a political overseer that it has played to date. At least two things indicate that the current political domination by the parties in the RTV council has not been effective: the short time that the "political" directors succeeded in surviving in their positions and that they wanted to survive in them, and the chronic decisionmaking problems in the RTV council because of party polarization. Everyone can determine for himself how this sort of "beheading" of RTV's professional leadership is affecting radio and television programs.

If one cannot deny the modern and democratically planned system of managing national public television that is being introduced by the law's provisions, at the same time one cannot avoid observing that the law on Slovene RTV only regulates one part of the Slovene radio broadcasting and cable distribution system. Modern communications systems are becoming typical dual ones, with overlapping activity by public and private radio and TV stations (either broadcasting or cable ones). The new dual system that started to be developed intensively in Western Europe in the 1980's is primarily "conflict regulation," as Wolfgang Clement, minister in North Rhine-Westphalia, has written. Specifically, public and private radio and television differ fundamentally in their goals, tasks, organizational forms, and method of financing, but they are equal in that both are appearing in the same markets and encountering the same "partners" (commercial, financial, and advertising enterprises, and viewers and listeners). It is precisely in the method of regulating the conflicts between them that the extent of the communications system's democratic structure is reflected. Consequently, it is naturally by no means sufficient to regulate national public radio and television, and completely leave out private radio and television (broadcasting or cable) stations. That is precisely what is obviously happening in Slovenia.

The exaggerated one-sided concern about public radio and television and the legislative neglect of private radio and television can be particularly fatal, since modern
studies have determined that with the development of the private telecommunications sector throughout all of Western Europe, public radio and television systems have entered an already chronic identity and legitimacy crisis. In the final analysis, the most important thing in this regard is certainly that private radio and television dictate program changes and that a convergence occurs in the area of programming, which logically calls into question the legitimacy of subscription financing. The solution, of course, is not in the elimination of the public sector, but rather in its "individualization," i.e., in the (re)determination of specific goals that will be fulfilled in the programs. From the standpoint of the democratization of the communications system, the basic advantages of public radio and television lie in the possibilities for producing programs not only for the majority, but also for the most diverse minorities, more complete and nonpartisan reporting and commentary, the diversity of genres, the setting of demanding quality standards and ethical principles for communication, the introduction and testing of innovations and experiments—in short, in the production of broadcasts that are not subordinate to the iron law of earning a profit. In order to be able to promote the specific features of public radio and television, however, the position and significance of private radio and television must also be (legally) defined—and that is precisely what can prove to be a fatal shortcoming here.

Just as the nature of the management system (such as the Slovene RTV council) is of fundamental significance for national public radio and television, the basic regulatory mechanism—the mechanism that regulates conflicts between private and public radio and television—is of fundamental significance for regulating conflicts in modern dual systems. At the same time, such a regulatory mechanism thereby helps to go beyond the traditional "public institutes" in the area of radio and television, which have been characterized by quite close ties with the state. New regulatory mechanisms like the communications or radio broadcasting councils in various forms in Western and also in Central and Eastern Europe (in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), just by virtue of their autonomous position and role in the communications system, can prevent political control by the state (the government or parliament) over public radio and television (unless, of course, they are planned precisely as control mechanisms).

In regard to the announced changes in the management of Slovene RTV, it is therefore necessary to note that these changes are nevertheless only the first step toward the comprehensive (and, let us hope, democratic) regulation of the Slovene communications field. Unless the next steps soon follow the first one, "Italy may happen" to us (again?). The present dual system in Italy, in fact, arose through the definitely uncontrolled development of the private sector, which was a consequence of the almost complete absence of any sort of regulation and which in the end produced a worse monopoly than the state one (could be). So that here as well party interests, for example, do not start to be promoted through the uncontrolled expansion of private radio and television (broadcast or cable—e.g., through the clientele division of frequencies, or cable monopolies), and so that commercial pressures do not completely halt the development of public radio and television (in the sense described above, i.e., with an emphasis on diversification, etc.), it is high time for the legislators to deal with the comprehensive (re)regulation of radio and television. In this regard, the fact that many former socialist states in Eastern Europe have already outpaced us can be a reminder to us.
Federal

Reconsideration of Serbs’ Role in Conflict Urged
LD0106153793 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in
Serbo-Croatian 1032 GMT 1 Jun 93

[Text] Belgrade, 1 June (TANJUG)—Under the conditions of sanctions and complete isolation, Yugoslav foreign policy activities in the classic sense cannot be carried out normally. All these activities are exclusively linked with the resolution of the entire Yugoslav crisis. Other former Yugoslav republics are in a similar position—the domestic policy of the former SFRY is now the most important part of foreign policy.

This assessment of Yugoslav foreign policy was presented today by Vladislav Jovanovic, vice prime minister of the federal government and minister of foreign affairs, at a joint session of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, which are discussing the international position of Yugoslavia. The federal government had sent deputies an extensive report called The Main characteristics of the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and fundamental orientations for foreign policy activities.

As expected, Vladislav Jovanovic devoted the largest part of his introductory address to the UN Security Council sanctions imposed a year ago against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the chances for their abolition. He recalled that the sanctions and their abolition are largely linked with the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its end.

“According to UN Security Council Resolutions 752 and 757 we were obliged to fulfill a series of conditions,” Jovanovic stressed, adding that some of these conditions were within the scope of our abilities, but some were not. As he said, all feasible conditions envisaged in the resolutions have been fulfilled.

“We could not fulfill two conditions for objective reasons. One being to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to restore peace in the former Yugoslavia. However, the entire international community has not been successful in that either,” Jovanovic said.

The Yugoslav foreign minister said that the second condition which has not been fulfilled was the disbanding and disarmament of all irregular units in Bosnia. He recalled that it was back in May last year when the last soldier of the Yugoslav Army left the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as regards some individuals from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who are currently fighting within volunteer units under the command of the army of the Serb Republic, nobody can hold Yugoslavia responsible for that. After all, Jovanovic said, what about thousands of mujahedin and tens of thousands of regular Croatian Army soldiers in Bosnia?

Despite devastating sanctions and a total blockade, Yugoslavia’s foreign policy nevertheless managed to accomplish significant breakthroughs in the international community. According to Vladislav Jovanovic, the most important achievements of these breakthroughs lie in the abandonment of the premise that Yugoslavia is the aggressor and that it is responsible for the continuation of the war in Bosnia.

Jovanovic stressed that the world is slowly realizing that the war in Bosnia is a civil war and that Yugoslavia is not in the position to exert influence on all the belligerents in that former Yugoslav republic to cease hostilities. This change in the international community’s stand regarding the conflict in Bosnia, as well as towards Yugoslavia, was illustrated by Jovanovic who cited several examples, including two statements made by the U.S. president over the past month. He also emphasized that there is growing awareness in the world that Yugoslavia has been punished unjustly and has been treated in a one-sided and biased way.

“The world is increasingly viewing us as a partner, not as a potential opponent, which provides the international community with a greater possibility to acquire a more realistic insight into the Bosnian conflict and the Yugoslav crisis,” Jovanovic said.

In spite of this, certain new conditions, outside the scope of those determined by the Security Council resolutions, are being imposed on Yugoslavia. Jovanovic recalled the conditions prescribed by the London Conference last August, which Yugoslavia should meet so as to “deserve” the lifting of the sanctions.

“Objectively speaking, these conditions were not particularly demanding, and we have met them all,” Jovanovic said. He specified that this pertained to the consent to negotiate on the Yugoslav crisis, to cooperation with the co-chairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, to refraining from all forms of meddling in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from that former Yugoslav republic.

In reference to an increasing number of additional conditions imposed on Yugoslavia, Jovanovic mentioned the “joint action plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina” adopted in Washington by the five foreign ministers of Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Spain. Jovanovic said that this plan was positive above all because it abandons the dual option and clearly supports a political and negotiating process for solving the Bosnian conflict.

Jovanovic also mentioned several negative elements unacceptable for Yugoslavia, above all the demand for the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs from allegedly occupied territories as a condition for lifting the sanctions against Yugoslavia.

“We cannot accept this condition. We are not the masters of the Serbs in Bosnia and it is not even clear which territories are in question,” Jovanovic said.
Jovanovic mentioned some other unacceptable elements: total closure of the border with Bosnia and deployment of monitors on the Yugoslav side of the border. Yugoslavia also does not accept the proposal to increase the number of monitors in Kosovo.

Jovanovic then informed the deputies at the joint session about the future course of the federal government policy directed at lifting the sanctions.

—The government will energetically work toward an urgent cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

—The government will be very active and even aggressive in its effort to make urgent progress in the negotiating process in the Bosnian conflict.

—The government will support the continuation and the successful completion of the negotiating process in all areas of the former Yugoslavia.

—Jointly with the Republic of Serbia the government will support all efforts for the normalization of life in Kosovo.

—The government will launch action to normalize relations with former Yugoslav republics, particularly with Macedonia but also with Croatia.

Jovanovic said that contacts have already been established with Croatia but that everything was frozen when this former Yugoslav Republic committed aggression against the Republic of Serb Krajina, i.e. the territory under UN control. When Croatia fulfills UN conditions, withdraws its troops from Krajina, and stops engaging in provocations even in some parts of Yugoslavia, as it has been doing in the Prevlaka area, minimal conditions will be created for the continuation of contacts, Jovanovic said.

Jovanovic said that Slovenia had rejected “hasty Yugoslav recognition.” When a solution is found for Bosnia-Herzegovina, based on a consensus of its three constituent nations, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will try to cooperate with these entities.

Bank Closes, Law on Bank Control Prepared
93BA1025D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
11 May 93 p 11

[Article by B. Dumić: "Who Attacked Aleksandar Banksa"]

[Text] Savings banks, which have proclaimed themselves banks, have been closing their doors one after another. Yesterday, depositors in Aleksandar Banka were informed in a half-page announcement in our newspaper that that savings bank would not be open from 10 May until 1 July, that is, nearly two months, because, so it states, of an armed attack carried out on 30 April at 1400 hours, and that an investigation is under way.

We tried to learn something more about yet another case of an “attack” on a savings bank. We first called Aleksandar Banka, but all we heard there was the voice on the answering machine, so we left a message. No one returned the call in the next several hours. Then we turned to the city MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to see if they could tell us something more about the armed attack. However, in the crime-fighting administration they told us that they have no information at all that there was an armed attack that day on Aleksandar Banka!

What really happened to that savings bank, who is the owner, how many depositors there are, and we believe they were numerous, because the interest on foreign exchange savings was among the highest, still remain, then, an enigma. Nor were we able to obtain an answer to that question in the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBi]. They referred us to the National Bank of Serbia. But even in the republic central bank there was no reply that inspectors had ever gone to that savings bank, and so there was no detailed information whatsoever.

Questions Without Answers

"An inspection that would involve about 120 people from the National Banks of Yugoslavia and Serbia, with the help of inspectors from the Settlement Agency was supposed to begin soon," was the confirmation we received yesterday from those two central banks of what had been announced a few months ago. When asked why they had not done that earlier, those responsible in the central banks added that it had not been easy for them to track down all the unlawful financial skulduggery. "For six months, we tried with the help of the police just to get into Jugoskandik, but we were not successful," they said in the National Bank of Serbia.

The owners of various "financial organizations" have been trying in every way, given the universal chaos, to outwit the monetary authorities. Although they advertise that they conduct transactions with foreign exchange, when the inspectors show up, and the people in the National Bank of Serbia refer to the case of the savings bank Ineks-Banka in Paracin, they say they handle only dinars. There is no written evidence of the prohibited transactions.

They say in the National Bank of Serbia that a supplement to the Law on Banks will bring the savings banks under the oversight of the two central banks and that the announced action was supposed to implement that power. However, it remains to be seen how much consolation this will be to all those who do not know if they will ever get their money back from the savings banks which have already closed their doors.

Perpetrator Unknown

Who in all of this charmed circle is more to blame—the owners of the savings banks that have been conducting foreign exchange transactions when they were prohibited to do so, the monetary authorities which did not correct
regulations in good time and thus allowed shrewd people to find a "loophole in the law," the government which has pretended to be blind, or, above all, the individuals themselves, because they were lured by the high interest rates to deposit money where they were not certain they would get it back?

The most accurate answer would be that they are all to blame. But who will get the worst of it? That is well-known: those who deposited their money in order to earn money quickly and without working, although they knew they were gambling. In an article in our paper a few months ago entitled "Stay Clear of the Quasi-Bank," we tried to point out to all those who were chasing the high interest rate never before recorded in the world that the savings banks have no right to engage in foreign exchange transactions. This obviously was not a sufficient signal for them not to gamble with their savings.

What in the end is still more tragic is that the savings banks have not been closed by the inspectorate or the financial police. Instead, the padlock has been put on the door by a force majeure—bombs, armed attacks, robberies.... And when a force majeure is involved, it is well-known, no one is to blame.

Effects of Sanctions on Trade Sector, Tourism
93BA1025E Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 May 93 p 24

[Article by Dj. Djindjinovic: "It Was Disastrous Even Before"]

[Text] The impact of the international sanctions which have lasted for 11 months now has been a serious blow to the entire economy of Bar, which for years has been oriented toward the international market and the laws which prevail on it. The tightening of the sanctions, whose application has already begun, will certainly be disastrous, particularly for firms such as Prekookeanska Plovdiva, the Port of Bar, Rumijatrans, but also for firms in the trade sector and tourist industry.

Even before this, members of the United Nations have prohibited entry into their ports of vessels arriving from our ports. It is not just the basic activity of Prekookeanska Plovdiva that is threatened, but even its survival. Under the threat of application of the new and tighter sanctions, the shipping company in Bar is for all practical purposes placed in an inextricable situation, because it places in jeopardy survival of a fleet worth more than $150 million.

And then as for the Port of Bar, the firm that operates the port itself, which recently has been visited only by vessels with a cargo that has passed a strict inspection, the stricter measures mean a tighter seal and a more difficult position for its work force of 2,000. It means shutting down entirely, because the effect of the embargo was disastrous even before. For the port, this means being sealed off entirely and remaining under a bell jar.

What is more, it also affects the sizable amounts of foreign exchange abroad which were intended for the purchase of equipment.

The empty docks of the port also put in a serious position other firms and agencies which depend directly on the work handled by the port. Thus, Bar's only highway carrier, Rumijatrans, has been without work for months now or only occasionally has been able to use a portion of its fleet.

Much the same is true of the tourist firms, which for two or three years now have not operated at full capacity even at the height of the tourist season, and a foreign visitor is a true rarity. With the tourist traffic down and no vessels coming to the Port of Bar and no possibility of going abroad on commercial business, the trade sector, which not so long ago was very highly developed in Bar, has been badly hurt. The stores of the large commercial firms have been half-empty for a long time, and the few goods that can be found there are harder and harder to sell.

The uncertainty that prevails concerning application of the tighter sanctions is particularly painful. There are few businessmen and politicians who believed that even the previous sanctions would last this long or that the economy of Bar could withstand it. A further tightening of the international sanctions is still a great unknown, but even now it is certain that their application will signify a further deterioration and still more difficult position for an economy that is already discouraged.

Macedonia

* Legislative Program of Government Reviewed
93BA0812C Skopje VECER in Macedonian 11 Mar 93 p 8

[Article by V. V. A.: "The Longest Economic List"]

[Text] The government has scheduled 186 laws and other acts that it is to finish drafting and submit to the Assembly. The majority of them are laws and regulations in the economic and financial area, but the dilemma persists of whether the government will be preoccupied with them this year or whether the ones in the political arena will predominate again.

In its work program for 1993 the Macedonian government has included 186 laws and other acts to be prepared and forwarded to the National Assembly for consideration. The majority, 94, are in the economic and financial area; then come 49 relating to public activities and 43 dealing with the political system.

This may in a way be interpreted as an indication that in 1993 the executive will be preoccupied mostly with questions relating to the economic system and economic policy. On the other hand, this will not necessarily be the case. Examination of the regulations that are to be drafted in the political arena shows that there are also in
this area laws that because of their “delicate” nature may be shunted onto an entirely different track.

They include primarily the laws on personal names, local self-government, and the territorial organization of Macedonia, some versions of which have already been enacted by the Assembly but have bogged down at the first step because of opposition by some deputies and by expert opinions. While no opposition is expected for the law on political parties, the atmosphere will almost certainly become heated for those on election of deputies and election of the President of the Republic, which the government has scheduled to begin in May and end in December 1993. It will be no surprise if these deadlines, which the government has only tentatively set, are exceeded.

The government intends to concern itself this year with the organization and operation of government administrative agencies, a subject it has long avoided, leaving it in limbo. The government has plans to complete the three stages of drafting of this law between April and December.

Also on the list of laws in this area are the laws on referendum, internal affairs, the investigation and research agency, security personnel training, the law on the government, and others.

The government plans to complete this month the last stage of the most hotly disputed law, on conversion of public property. At the same time, this is the most highly desired law, in that it represents a turning point. Directly linked to it is drafting of the laws on denationalization and on public enterprises, set for the May-June or April-September period in the timetable. In the economic and financial area the government plans to draft laws on foreign exchange operations, foreign credit operations, payment transactions, accountancy, and financial transactions, while the laws on the tax on profits and the value added tax will in effect mark the beginning of application of the new tax system model. These two laws, however, are two of the few for which the government has set specific completion deadlines.

The truly long list of laws in this area includes among others laws on standardization, housing relationships, administration, public revenue, public services, property relationships, and inspections, the law on prohibition and construction of nuclear power plants in Macedonia, responsibility for nuclear damage, and others.

Although the list of laws relating to public activities is somewhat shorter than the economic list, it includes laws of fundamental importance which it would certainly be a good idea for the government to take extra pains with. They are laws on labor relationships, employment, and social welfare, and, of course, the law on pension and disability insurance. Also included is a package of laws for all levels of education, ones which will provide qualitatively new decisions in keeping with the new relationships being established in society. The government has scheduled their passage through three stages over the February-June period.

* Islamic Sect’s Ties to Beirut Explored

93BA0950B Skopje PULS in Macedonian 8 Apr 93 pp 12-13

[Article by Sinisa Stankovic: “Piecemeal Islam”]

[Text] While the secretariat of the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia reminds us of Beirut, denying recognition to the newly-organized Islamic religious communities with ethnic or pro-Shiite leanings, the Muslim Macedonians have announced their own religious institution: the leader of the Gypsy Dervish order demands to be represented in the Republic’s protocol; the Bektashi Dervishes demand that Arabati Baba Tetje be returned to them. What is the connection between Tetovo and Tehran?

Viewing religious banners as similar to political banners has always been dangerous in terms of interfaith communications and cooperation. The war in Bosnia has demonstrated, among others, the entire shortsightedness of those who, ignoring the sacred nature of religious symbols, have introduced them into the political arena. In our land, the elimination of ideological single-mindedness has brought about a return of the “opium of the people” to the political stage and the 13 registered religious communities in Macedonia have assumed a new specific significance. And while relations among the three largest confessions in the Republic could be assessed as, generally speaking, firm (the break of relations between the Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia and the Macedonian Orthodox Church, caused by the Bitola-Prilep crosses mounted on clock towers is being slowly eliminated), and the animosity of the Orthodox clergy toward the so-called minor, essentially Protestant, religious communities and the “uniate danger” has resulted in their lack of expansion among the believers; problems are piling up in the interethnic relations of the believers in Islam that could have far-reaching consequences. Bearing in mind the fact that in our country religious communities are not only religious but also constitute significant political factors, any worsening of relations among believers is inevitably reflected in politics.

Insufficient understanding of the organizational ways of acting of Muslims in Macedonia is particularly significant also because no other religion as Islam regulates to such an extent the overall life of its followers in all of its aspect and on all levels. No other religion includes such a high share of the social life of the believers, and no sacred book of other religions contains so many recommendations, instructions, and orders pertaining to daily life. That is precisely why the firmness of views is an invariable aspect of the Islamic clergy (the ulamas), while the establishment of new Islamic communities and their
registration arouses suspicion of the IVZ [Islamic Religious Community] Mesihat [leadership] in terms of the final objectives of the founders. The divisions and splintering of the Islamic community in Macedonia, according to the Mesihat, are due to the activities of anti-Islamic forces that distort religious standards and are guilty of major deviations in interpreting the tenets of religious law and also the fact that not very many members join newly-established communities as a result of Mesihat’s warning against sectarianism.

Following the September organizational meeting, last October, according to the stipulations of the very controversial Law on the Legal Status of Religious Communities of 1977 (according to which the communities enjoy the rights of civil juridical persons) the Islamic Tarikat Religious Community of Macedonia (ITVZM) was registered. The community which grew from the Tarikat Union and which includes four of the 20 Dervish orders, has 80 members who are ethnic Gypsies. The founders of the ITVZM explain their “withdrawal” from the Mesihat of the Dervish orders, controlled by the IVZ committee, with differences in religious doctrine and neglect of the interests of the Gypsies by the IVZ. It has already started to look for ways of building a new religious house in Suto Orizari and becoming part of religious-political life: A request was addressed to the Republic Protocol to consider Sheik Efendi Serbez Fazli the only official Dervish leader of all contemplated groups and another request was filed for a meeting with Prime Minister Crvenkovski.

Being of the opinion that the founders of the new community do not deserve any attention, the IVZ Mesihat, governed exclusively by consideration for the Commission for Relations with Religious Communities, notified it in writing that it opposed the registration of the ITVZM on the basis of Article 5 and 25 of its statutes. The Mesihat counters all attacks of ignoring the Gypsies by the IVZ with the explanation that the founding of the new community is a consequence of the political confrontations between the two Gypsy parties, the PCER [Party for the Full Emancipation of Romanies] and the DPRM [Democratic Progressive Party of Romanies in Macedonia], which are vying for political power and seeking the “services” of “people who are insincere in terms of their faith, and the theologically ignorant founders of the ITVZM who are hoping to benefit from some material advantages” (the Mesihat has ironically reacted to the large number of titles assumed by the head of the ITVZM Fazli, who calls himself “his majesty Ali-ul-evljug-Sejh ul ulema-Es-sejh-effeni Serbez Fazli”).

As it condemns such abuses of religion in the service of politics, the Mesihat also reacts to the announcement of the establishment of a new community, mentioned in the interview which Dzevder Djulioski, acting chairman of the religious community of the Cultural-Scientific Manifestations of Macedonian Muslims, in an interview granted to NOVA MAKEDONIJA: “As long as improper use is made of the Mesihat for political purposes, our population (the Macedonian Muslims—editors) will seek a proper institution within Macedonia that will be concerned with its religious feelings and total loyalty to the state.” Zenum Berisa, the secretary of the Macedonian IVZ, answered the question of what would be the significance of a division of Muslims within Macedonia on the basis of ethnicity as follows:

“Internal divisions are the most dangerous. The IVZ is in favor of a multi-ethnic community and if there is an insistence of promoting national division, which is inconsistent with Islamic doctrine, into communities of Muslim Gypsies and communities of Macedonian Muslims, although I do not believe that this will last long, in the final account this may result in interethnic quarrels. We in the IVZ maintain a proportional representation of all ethnic groups and so far no one has been deprived of his rights, neither the Macedonians nor the Gypsies who, so far, had shown no interest in attending religious schools. It is clear who benefits from the splintering of the Islamic community. However, even those who rely on this should realize that the ethnic stratification of the Muslims leads to catastrophe.”

Whereas the exaggerated politicization of relations between the newly established ITVZM and the IVZ and between the Religious Community of Cultural and Scientific Manifestations of Macedonian Muslims and the IVZ is obvious, the confrontation between the still unregistered Islamic Bektasi Community, centered in Tetovo, and the IVZ Mesihat, although essentially of a religious nature, raise a number of questions concerning religious propaganda in our country. Although last December the Bektasi held the constituent meeting of their new religious community, to this day they have not been registered, for which reason the Tetovo Internal Affairs Administration has asked them to consult precisely the IVZ Mesihat in Skopje. A similar view on the question of new Islamic religious communities is shared by the Commission for Relations With Religious Communities. It has called for coordinating the views. Disagreements between Sunni and Shia that have lasted several centuries may not be known to the Tetovo MVR officials. However, once the Islamic Tarikat Religious Community has been registered, the new interpretation of that same law stops being clear.

Perhaps the answer may be found in the fact that in both Tetovo and Skopje there has been an increased number of statements concerning the huge amounts of dollars transferred from abroad to support the Dervish orders. The road to the source of the funds most frequently lead to Iran and its diplomatic missions throughout the world. Religious propaganda materials are being distributed throughout western Macedonia. According to Zenum Berisa, the interference of a foreign factor in the functioning of the Bektasi in Macedonia is unquestionable:

“Sects have existed and will continue to exist and this does not frighten us. The people know that the highest
percentage of Muslims in Macedonia have a proper concept of Islam and that the highest share of the intellectuals and the religious cadre support the efforts of the Mesihat to preserve a single IVZ that will take into consideration the age-old traditions and the essence of Islam. True Muslims do not join sects which do not honor Islamic doctrine. However, the IVZ cannot do everything by itself while the state remains uninterested, as a result of which all sorts of propaganda is being spread. The final objective is clear: As a result of the establishment of groups and sects, forces that are materially assisted from the outside will make new enemies among the remaining confessions. Beirut is an example! Aware of the fact that it cannot penetrate the IVZ clergy, Iranian propaganda is concentrating on those with insufficient theological training, who easily become mercenaries of foreign powers. Such an attempt at promoting divisions is a historical shame. Why is it that no one is reacting to the dissemination of the newspaper NURI ('LIGHT') which is officially published in the Albanian language by the Iranian embassy in Belgrade, although we have found out that it is being printed in Skopje and is distributed in the Republic, promoting the ideas of Khomeini?"

In waiting for their registration, the Tetovo Bektasi are carrying out their charitable actions and opposing all attacks against them. Tair Eminu, senior member of the Initiative Committee of the Islamic Bektasi Community of Macedonia, does not understand the opposition of the IVZ to the Bektasi:

“We are not some kind of new sect. It must be pointed out that Islam arrived in the former Yugoslavia through Bektasism. Its religious schools precede the mosques! The IVZ Mesihat has no right to keep all believers under a single umbrella. We shall cooperate with everyone, with the IVZ, the Macedonian Orthodox Church, and the Catholics, but we shall choose our own path to follow. We are linked to the World Bektasi Community which is centered in Albania, and, unlike the other Dervish orders, we are coordinated on the global level. Why should there not be a Bektasi community in Macedonia, as is the case of Albania, which has both an Islamic community and a Bektasi community? Whatever is being said about some kind of financial support from the outside is a lie and Sunni propaganda. The $20,000 you mentioned is the aid which the community in Detroit sent, not to us but to Albania, to finance the holding of the First Bektasi Congress. What kind of mercenaries are you talking about? The Bektasi over there collected about 7,000 German marks in voluntary contributions to house the delegates to this congress. As to some kind of involvement of Iran, it should be known that it is true that Iran is Shia but not Bektasi. It has Rufai and others. We respect all Dervish orders but we are totally independent of Iran or other Islamic countries and we do not receive funds! There is a separate Bektasi literature in Arabic and Persian and a few writings in Turkish and no propaganda whatsoever.”

A special problem in the clash between the IVZ and the Bektasi, if its community is registered, will be recovering from the state the nationalized Arabati Baba Tejte. According to the Bektasi, they own all the religious houses (near Baba Tair Gasi, in Gostivar, and in Djakovica), and that they would like to regain this religious house that was unfairly taken from them in the past (after nationalization, they held their religious ceremonies in Kicevo and Djakovica), so that they could use it as their house of prayer, and that it is inconceivable to honor the request of the IVZ for the house of prayers to be ambulatory. A statement that the person who created the religious house was a Dervish and not a Hodza was presented by a delegation of the elders of the World Bektasi Organization from Tirana to the government of the Republic of Macedonia, precisely for this reason.

“All that we are waiting for is for the law on Denationalization itself and we have already submitted a request for this site,” we were told by the Reverend Berisa, IVZ secretary. “The IVZ has proofs of ownership for the more significant Islamic sites in Skopje. However, what is most likely is that after the law has been passed, court rulings will be required. It is nonsense that we intend to change the name of the site. It will be used for religious ceremonies but under IVZ control. The IVZ will see to it that there are no negative influences on the part of the sects.... As to the amulatory project, this applies to an entirely different building which has already been purchased.”

There is no God but Allah. Is that so? The deep division within the Islamic Religious Community in Macedonia has both religious and political reasons. A final judgment would require several centuries, as long as the division between the Sunni and Shia concerning the accuracy of their own views, including everyone’s right to a free choice. However, the question remains open of the syndrome of division and profit from it, both to the confessions and the believers, as well as the state. Is there a danger for Macedonia to become the promised land of propaganda wars by big and small religious communities? Rumors have been and will remain an element accompanying religious considerations. However, the further worsening of relations among Muslim believers and the reminders of Beirut, at a time when the Republic has all too many problems as it were, both domestic and foreign, worries every sober resident of Macedonia, whether believer or atheist. When the devils start dancing, as confirmed by foreign Yugoslavia, appeals for love among people bring no results.

[Box, pp 12-13]

Who Are the Dervishes?

_Spiritual versus official Islam_:

The Dervish orders are mystical movements within the Islamic community. According to some views, they are different from official Islam in both its variants, Sunni and Shia. In Islamic theory mysticism is known as

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tasawwuf; according to Dr. Dzemal Cehaic, who has lectured on "Dervish Orders in Yugoslav Land," this name implies "special movement and a special way of thinking in Islam, which could be defined as a particular experimental method coming closer to Reality (God) and merging and uniting with God, with the help of intuitive and emotional-spiritual capabilities that are latent and that must be trained and developed in order to raise the curtain and the veil which hides the subjective (or the soul) from the Real (from God)." According to Dr. Miroljub Jeftic, the tasawwuf or Sufism is an attempt on the part of spiritual Islam to oppose the rationalization of Islam in religious law and although in the course of time it has been subject to a number of influences, making it today a heterodoxal doctrine, the strongest influence on it has been that of Shia dogmas. Hence the clash between it and orthodox Sunni Islam.

After the activities of the Dervish Tarikats were banned in Turkey, in 1925 the Bektasi leadership moved to Tirana. After World War II, the Bektasi center was to move to Kosovo and western Macedonia, where orthodox Sunni at that time was not at all that popular. And whereas with the separation of the Islamic community of Yugoslavia in 1952 the Dervish orders were disbanded, bearing in mind the lack of interest shown by the state, they continued their semi-legal activities until 1974, when the Community of Dervish Orders of Yugoslavia—ZIDRA—was formed, with headquarters in Prizren and with its own publications and the newspaper HU. It included Dervish orders with Shia tendencies, such as the Ruffai, Mevlevi, Helveti, Sinani, Bedevi, Saaidi, Sahzili, Bektasi, and others. The number of Dervishes is estimated at about 50,000. Although the ZIDRA did not allow the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia to have the final word in the interpretation of the faith, silently, for the sake of peace among believers, it allowed the latter to be considered the patron of the Dervishes, most commonly explained by the fact that the problem lies in some deviations rather than in the foundations of the faith.

According to the Reverend Tair Emini, today in Macedonia the Bektasi are the more widespread in Tetovo, Gostivar, Kicevo, and the Prilep area villages:

"The Bektasi seek and find God within themselves, within man himself, for which reason the way of our prayers is different. The Mesihat does not support mysticism and maintains rigid standards. We consider men and women equal and they participate jointly in the (ajnidzem). We do not promote bigamy and women do not wear the veil. We have a different way of fasting and we consume alcohol. We believe in the reincarnation of the soul. We do not practice falling into a trance, which those who do not know the Dervishes believe about them. We accept new members in a special way and in the public square, where the religious house is located, after we are certain of the strength of their faith and, mandatorily, with a sacrifice."

* Ethnic Breakdown of Unemployed Discussed

*93BA09504 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 17 Apr 93 p 5

[Article by K.C.: "Macedonians Account for Most Unemployed"]

[Text] Unemployed by ethnic group; Macedonians, 126,594; Albanians, 26,388; Gypsies, 7,723; Turks, 6,409; Muslims, 3,539; Serbs, 2,535; Montenegrians, 406; Croats, 279; Vlachs, 93. The percentage of unemployed with higher education is rising. A total of 9,874 households or a total of 31,675 individuals are exercising their social protection rights.

The number of unemployed in the Republic is increasing steadily. The changes which have taken place in political and socioeconomic life, reduced production and investment activities, and the increased number of coincidental factors prevented the creation of the necessary conditions for increasing capacities and opening new jobs. By the end of last year, there were 173,350 unemployed. Of these, 79 percent were looking for jobs for the first time; 52.2 percent were skilled cadres; 49.5 percent were women, and 66.4 percent were under 30.

Based on educational level, the structure of the unemployed is as follows: higher education [equivalent to graduate school], 4.2 percent; higher education, 3.1 percent; secondary, 26.2 percent; skilled and highly skilled individuals, 18.7 percent; and semi-skilled and unskilled, 47.8 percent. According to the answer given by the government to a query by representative Faik Abdi, the highest increase was noted among unemployed with completed university education. Last year it reached 10.1 percent; the previous year it was 8.8 percent; in 1990, it was 7.7 percent. The representative was interested in the ethnic breakdown of the unemployed. By the end of February it was as follows: Macedonians, 126,594 or 72.4 percent; Albanians, 26,388 or 15.1 percent; Gypsies, 7,723 or 4.4 percent; Turks, 6,409 or 3.7 percent; Muslims, 3,539 or two percent; Serbs, 2,535 or 1.5 percent; Montenegrians, 406 or 0.2 percent; Croats, 279 or 0.2 percent; Vlachs, 93 or 0.1 percent; others, 0.4 percent.

For these reasons, in accordance with the macroeconomic policy for the year, the government drafted a program for the protection of the socially threatened for 1993. It includes steps to secure the standard of the lowest paid workers, the recipients of the lowest pensions, those entitled to social and child and veteran-disability benefits, and secondary and university students, including the unemployed. This social protection level was adopted, on a differentiated basis, for the January-March period of this year for households with include employed members, who earned 25 percent of the average monthly wage per worker in the preceding quarter or 26,000 denars. In the case of households with no employed member and which include pensioners, the social protection level is 20 percent per member or 20,800 denars, whereas for all others, unemployed
farmers, those entitled to social benefits, and others, it is 15 percent or 15,600 denars per family member.

Households whose quarterly average monthly income per member was below the social protection level may apply for aid up to the established level. Such funds have been paid out by the employment services of the Republic Employment Institute since May of last year. In the last eight months of last year, the number of households which exercised this right grew steadily, reaching 9,874 or about 21,801 family members in December, or a total of 31,675 registered beneficiaries.

* Heroin, Other Drugs Threaten Youth

93WD0519A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 13 Apr 93

[Article by M. Ivanova: "Heroin in School Clubs"]

[Text] Nicotine addiction, alcoholism, and drug addiction are spreading so fast that they are assuming alarming proportions, chiefly among school-age children. According to official data in Macedonia, there are around 600 drug addicts, but in the opinion of persons thoroughly familiar with this problem area, this number is far from the true one. It seems that the government has completely given up the fight against these diseases and the campaign against them is being waged by humanitarian organizations.

The dependency diseases—nicotine addiction, alcoholism, drug addiction, and recently also AIDS—generally spread more widely in countries with a lower standard of living. Hence the geometric proportion of increase in these diseases in Macedonia should come as no great surprise. What is surprising, though, is the government's nonchalant attitude toward preventing their spread. This is especially true because nicotine addiction, alcoholism, and drug addiction are widespread among minors in highly advanced form, even in elementary schools.

In the absence of organized government action to prevent these diseases, a private ecological association, Opstakan [Existence], a forum of young ecologists, and the Alliance for Prevention of Dependency Diseases, are trying to do something. These organizations recently launched a campaign against the spread of these diseases, beginning with the holding of two forums that evoked an enormous amount of interest.

Children Drug Addicts

As Djordji Hadz Vaskov, engineer and president of the Alliance for Prevention of Dependency Diseases, pointed out at the first of the forums, cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs are now common even in elementary schools in Macedonia. Children smoke even during classes and drink alcohol during recess in the presence of supervisors. Children also smoke marijuana, but abuse heroin and hashish as well. And all this takes place in the presence of their parents and teachers, who seem to be powerless to stop them.

According to official data, there are around 600 drug addicts (undergoing treatment) in Macedonia. But according to persons who concern themselves with this problem, this number is far from the actual figure.

"The number is at least ten times greater than the official figures," states Filip Filipovski, head of the Illicit Trade Division of the GUVR [Central Administration of Internal Affairs]. The number of drug addicts is increasing at a faster pace, especially now that the channels through which drugs were distributed in the former Yugoslavia and the West have been closed. We have recently been witnessing the phenomenon of drug addicts who are simultaneously dealers, and since they require at least 1,500 German marks for their monthly needs (in Skopje one gram costs 80 to 100 marks), they engage in drug dealing and other forms of criminal activity, such as theft and prostitution. In Macedonia around 90 percent of drugs arrive by way of Turkey (mostly heroin), and marijuana is cultivated even in homes, in ordinary flower pots.

Dr. Silcovl Veljanovski of the Security College says that only one-third of the drugs brought into Macedonia is seized. As for the other two-thirds, most of which remains in Macedonia, efforts are made to expand the market and to draw as many young people as possible into the underworld of drugs.

"We warn young people not to accept the cigarettes they are offered, and in cafes even not to drink fruit juices or soft drinks unless the waiter opens the bottle in their presence. There could be a small amount of a drug in fruit juice or a cigarette. If administered over a certain period of time, this small amount could cause dependency, after which the young person himself looks for and buys drugs. The stage of total dependency is reached in only two weeks. Unfortunately, there are many legal inconsistencies in this area in Macedonia. According to the law, use of a drug is not punished, only distribution of drugs. This must be changed immediately," says Veljanovski.

Government Not Organized

As soon as a young person becomes an addict, the road to recovery is agonizing, and most often impossible. According to Dr. Donco Donev of the National Health Care Institute, only one to two percent of drug addicts who undergo treatment manage to escape this evil. As was pointed out at the last forum by the dean of the fight against drug addiction, Dr Jordan Jovev, 90 percent of all drug addicts in Macedonia are in Skopje. In recent years drugs have also been spreading in Tetovo, Ohrid, and Struga. The drug addicts are young people 14 to 25 years of various kinds. The more disoriented and poorer among them manage by sniffing glue or hanging around gas pumps and inhaling gasoline vapors. However, a large amount of heroin has been distributed in Skopje recently. Essentially, according to Dr. Jovev, all four groups of narcotics (stimulants, opiates, and hallucinogens: marijuana,
cocaine, heroin, LCD) are available. As sociologist Mile Ginovski points out, the drug that is currently the most dangerous one in the world, crack, is present near us but fortunately has not been brought into Macedonia, at least not for the time being.

Dr. Predrag Kirovski, director of the hospital for nervous and mental diseases in Bardovci, states that the public health care system is no longer able to fight by itself against the increase in drug addiction. An increasing number of young people are coming to outpatient clinics, and the hospital in Bardovci no longer is capable of treating them. There are neither drugs nor funds; there are only personnel, who are virtually powerless to do anything under these conditions.

As for smoking, specialists think that it is inseparably linked to drugs. Every drug addict is a smoker who started with tobacco but went on to marijuana and then entered the endless tunnel.

"I regard smoking as an introduction to other dependency diseases," says Dr. Miroslav Gavrilovski of the Pulmonology Clinic. "Among the approximately 2,000 lung cancer patients at our clinic, I know only one who has not been a smoker. What is particularly alarming is the free sale of several types of medications that can be used as narcotics, items sold freely both in privately owned pharmacies and in self-service stores. The legal regulations in this area should also be reinstalled for privately owned pharmacies."

In the opinion of Dr. Ivan Tulevski of the hospital in Bardovci, all government institutions should be involved in the campaign against dependency diseases. Action should begin with the family and continue with education, criminal investigation agencies, the mass media, and the public health care system. The government must decide either to give up part of the profit it earns from the sale of alcohol and tobacco products and initiate an organized campaign against dependency diseases or abandon the young people of the country.

* Tuberculosis Cases, Prevention Examined
93WE0394A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 26 Apr 93 p 7

[Article by Tj. Vasilevska: "Tuberculosis in the Chains of Prevention"]

[Text] The steady and strict implementation of steps to prevent the spreading of tuberculosis, according to the experts, is the only guarantee for eliminating the threat of an eventual epidemic outbreak; the annual program is still awaiting the government's "go-ahead."

The program for preventive measures to stop the spreading of tuberculosis among the population this year will cost about 770 million denars. That is, perhaps, the most important reason for which, along with the other preventive programs suggested by the Ministry of Public Health (a total of 11.2 billion denars are needed), this program has not been adopted by the government. The purpose of the program, bearing in mind that this contagious disease will not be eliminated throughout the world and in our country in the next few decades, is to ensure the steady reduction in the number of people affected and those already sick, the results of which will be felt by future generations as well.

We proceed from the fact that there are cases of tuberculosis in this country. The statistical view is that, unless discovered and treated, a single person suffering from tuberculosis could contaminate as many as 2,100 individuals! Therefore, according to Dr. Vasil Jovcev, chief of the epidemiological sector at the Institute of Pulmonary Diseases and Tuberculosis of the Skopje School of Medicine, the strict implementation of programmatic measures is the only guarantee for lifting the threat of an eventual outbreak of an epidemic of primary tuberculosis.

Continued Mobility

According to the data gathered by the institute (statistically processed only up to 1991) last year the number of tuberculosis cases had somewhat declined compared to 1991 (1,602 as compared to 1,613, of which 1,498 suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis as compared to 1,551 in 1991) this should not mean that we could reduce our efforts. On the contrary, the worrisome fact pointed out by Dr. Jovcev concerning the number of newly detected cases (618 last year and 674 in 1991), and the fact that this disease attacks mainly people between the ages of 15 and 34 (last year as many as 662 cases) should be taken as a warning of the continuing mobility of the disease.

According to Dr. Jovcev, on the one hand, the fact that the number of individuals contaminated with the bacillus of tuberculosis remains virtually the same indicates, so far, a weakness in the taking of preventive measures, as well as the possibility that such blocked centers of infection could become active under certain social or immunological conditions. Actually, that is the reason for which eradication (the uprooting of the disease) is proceeding more slowly. The initial criterion of success would be to have one child per 100 people infected with tuberculosis.

Koch, who discovered the bacillus of tuberculosis, proved that a previously infected individual cannot be infected a second time. As Dr. Jovcev explained, successful BCG vaccination is a controlled prime infection that excludes the possibility of catching the disease. Hence the importance of this step, as well as of revaccination, should the tuberculin test indicate that the first vaccine did not take. This includes the actual problem of securing the availability of BCG vaccines and of tuberculin. According to Dr. Jovcev, this problem can be resolved above all with the help of UNICEF (vaccines).
Everyone's Duty

Very important in terms of preventing the spreading of tuberculosis is the early detection of the disease in its asymptomatic phase, which is achieved with pulmonary x-rays. This applies to all individuals over the age of 18 and is performed once every four years. However, here as well there are problems: one of the two available x-ray buses is now entirely amortized, and so is the x-ray apparatus installed in the buses. Because of their frequent breakdowns and the delayed transfer of the necessary funds, the seventh x-ray campaign in the Republic, which was initiated in 1989, has still not been completed.

Finally, Dr. Jovcev discussed the significance of outpatient services that are steadily provided in this area, as well as the guaranteed treatment of the patients, without any legal or administrative barriers. Nor should we ignore “self-treatment;” asking the advice of the physician concerning any “prolonged” coughing (more than 15 days), for example, in cases of influenza, and monitoring during cytostatic or corticotherapy lasting more than one month, of diabetic patients whose immunological status has been disturbed, and so on. Obviously, this imposes an obligation to many individuals but, above all, to the state.

Box, p 7

Immunization

On the basis of the tuberculin index (the number of contaminated individuals) it has been determined that after the liberation of Macedonia there were between 25,000 to 30,000 people infected with tuberculosis. In 1961 mandatory immunization was performed but a number of weaknesses in providing universal coverage occurred. For all practical purposes permanent immunization was started in 1965 (at that point there were 13,000 carriers), when the outpatient anti-tuberculosis network was organized. According to Dr. Jovcev, some weaknesses in immunization remain. They should be eliminated in order to prevent cases of some rather difficult forms of tuberculosis among the newly detected victims (some remain undetected), considered are more difficult to treat and acting as sources of contamination.

Montenegro

Two Montenegrin Generals Involuntarily Retired

93BA1026E Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 10 May 93 p 5

[Article by Branko Jokic: “Difficulties of Montenegrin Generals”]

[Text] The retirement of high-level Yugoslav Army generals Boskovic and Domazetovic is quite mysterious, but allegedly they participated in preparations for a coup d’etat in Montenegro; is it just the beginning?

From our correspondent.

Podgorica, 9 May—The (un)expected retirement of two high-level Yugoslav Army generals, Nedeljko Boskovic and Dr. Ljubomir Domazetovic, is still accompanied by several unclear elements. The question is what the real reason was for such a decision. As we have learned, the generals are still sitting in their offices and do not want to carry out the Supreme Command’s order.

Both of the above-mentioned generals are Montenegrin by nationality. General Boskovic was retired years ago with the rank of colonel. When his close relative, Dr. Branko Kostic (he replaced Stjepan Mesić), became a member of the Presidency of (the former) Yugoslavia, General Boskovic became active again, and at the same time was promoted to major general. He became chief of the counterintelligence service, and performed that duty until his recent retirement. It is also said that even earlier (as a retiree), through a certain number of his people in the counterintelligence service he headed a sort of private spy network “on behalf of Dr. Kostic.” It is also said that during the Yugoslav army’s withdrawal from Sarajevo he ordered several suspicious things (abuses are also mentioned). He was also very active during the period when Dr. Kostic became a candidate for Montenegrin president. As they claim in Montenegro, Boskovic established Dr. Kostic’s campaign headquarters, most of whose members belonged to the counterintelligence service, but he did not succeed in putting his candidate at the head of Montenegro. Allegedly he could not reconcile himself to this. He continued to try to bring Kostic to Montenegro by having his people prepare a “popular demonstration” aimed at removing M.A. Momir Bulatovic and the present state leadership of Montenegro (it was supposed to take place according to the same scenario by which Vidoje Zarkovic and Veselin Djuranovic were removed in 1989). This conspiracy was discovered by the Montenegrin Ministry of Internal Affairs. M.A. Bulatovic decisively demanded that the Yugoslav army’s military command dismiss Boskovic and Domazetovic.

In fact, from the very beginning Domazetovic, who until recently was the deputy of Zivota Panic, chief of the Yugoslav Army’s General Staff, was also involved in the preparations for a “coup d’etat” in Montenegro. It is said that at the JLA building in Belgrade Domazetovic was recently the main organizer of a conference behind closed doors at which only one topic was discussed: what the Yugoslav army would do if Montenegro tried to secede from Yugoslavia. Clearly in that case the armed operation that Vojislav Seselj is now also calling for would be launched.

The general opinion is that Boskovic “did something” in connection with Dr. Kostic. Although Dr. Kostic is now an “ordinary citizen,” he travels on military aircraft on the route between Podgorica and Belgrade (where he still has a residence). It is said that recently, he has traveled in that direction several times. It has also been heard that this general is not out of favor just because he tried to remove the Montenegrin leadership. Part of the public and the authorities in Belgrade would even approve of
that. He is being criticized for too much ambition: allegedly he also planned to remove Dobrica Cosic (together with Seselj, of whom he is reportedly a friend), and furthermore, in an interview that DELO published at the beginning of March, he is also supposed to have slandered the Yugoslav president.

It is predicted that it will soon already be the turn of several other generals, and even that "extremely important things" are happening in the Yugoslav Army's General Staff, where Boskovic and Domazetovic have barricaded themselves. It is also said that those two generals are not alone.

Serbia

Sanctions To Strengthen Serb Decisiveness
93BA1045B Banja Luka GLAS SRPSKI in Serbo-Croatian 29 Apr 93 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Troubles Are Increasing Determination"]

[Text] The international economic sanctions against the FRY have turned the Yugoslav economy into a "hard nut" that is not showing any signs of cracking. The Serbian economy can hold out at least another six months, diplomatic circles and economists in Belgrade estimate. The new and even harsher sanctions that have just been imposed are supposed to punish Serbia and Yugoslavia for their "role in the civil war in Bosnia."

The sanctions, however, will make the lives of 10.5 million citizens even more miserable. REUTERS cited experts' assessments that if they are rigorously applied, the sanctions will only strengthen Serbs' determination to persist against what they consider to be improper international pressure.

Serbia is suffering from hyperinflation, which has drastically devalued the dinar. At the beginning of April, the federal government devalued the dinar by 98.4 percent. Industrial production is half of what it was before the UN embargo was imposed on oil deliveries and trade. Unemployment is growing constantly because the enterprises affected by the sanctions are either dismissing workers or closing factories. Foreign observers estimate that the sanctions have affected about a million of the 2.3 million employees in the FRY.

REUTERS comments that experts from the Economic Institute in Belgrade estimate that per capita GNP has dropped from $3,000 in 1989 to $500-700. In addition to the sanctions, the disintegration of Yugoslavia is another reason for the lower GNP.

The new sanctions provide for a ban on the transportation of goods through Yugoslavia, a freeze on financial property abroad, a blockade of maritime routes in the vicinity of the Adriatic coast, and strict penalties for violators of the blockade.

A majority of the people believe that the Serbs have been unjustly singled out and punished, and they blame the sanctions for their economic problems, not Serbian President Milosevic.

So far the economy has functioned and companies have been working, thanks to violation of the sanctions and the abilities of individuals in the firms. Negligible amounts of oil have arrived by barges through the Danube, or tankers that traveled in one direction to the Bar port. The Bar port is the area that will probably be most seriously affected by the sanctions.

The black market, which the authorities tolerate, is flourishing, and it is estimated that it currently constitutes 40 percent of the national economy. Street sellers of foreign exchange, usually employed on behalf of some bank and indirectly the government as well, are squeezing foreign exchange reserves from citizens.

The government is trying to preserve the dinar's role at the same time. When necessary the government prints new dinars and sends them to those parts of the country where the economy has completely collapsed and where social unrest is threatened.

The authorities allow the black market to cover the demand for many products, but diplomatic circles estimate that the authorities could use their broader powers and intervene by freezing wages and prices, or, if necessary, rationing the consumption of basic necessities.

As early as next year, the Yugoslav economy could experience a complete collapse, diplomats expect. Most of the budget is going for housing and feeding the 700,000 refugees. It is estimated that the present sanctions are restricting Yugoslavia's foreign trade to 10 percent of the economy's capabilities at this time. The new sanctions will also jeopardize even that little trade, and the harmful consequences will last for a long time to come after the sanctions are lifted.

View of Women in Serbian Politics
93BA1036A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 10 May 93 pp 33-36

[Article by Nenad Lj. Stefanovic: "Empresses, Ladies, Comrades..."]

[Text] In our traditional political milieu, which assumes that men serve the "mother-nation" at the front, and women in the background, women who have left some sort of trace on the political scene usually break through by means of radicalism and attempts to be more manly than the men.

With the exception of the political prostitution and mimicry in connection with the attempt to persuade Radovan Karadzic to sign the Vance-Owen plan (prostitution in politics is usually a male business), in the last 10 days or so in Serbian politics people have mostly been talking about women, for different reasons. In a society
in which the crowning principle of life and the meaning of existence long ago became the “mother nation” (i.e., of feminine gender), it was, after all, high time for the influence of women to start to be felt to a somewhat more significant extent on the political scene.

The selection of women in Serbian politics is admittedly still quite modest, but on the other hand the range of their political involvement is quite broad. What they have in common in this regard (and something that is not our experience alone) is that in contrast to men, women in politics often have a more developed awareness of what they are doing, and they often act incomparably more courageously and more readily in response to daily turns of events and “sailing with the wind.” In our traditional political milieu, which assumes that men serve the “mother nation” at the front, and women in the background, women who have left some sort of trace on the political scene usually break through by means of radicalism and attempts to be more manly than men. In this area a “female Micunovic,” a politician willing to compromise at any time, is simply not possible.

Serbian Empress

The woman whose name has been most frequently mentioned in recent days, of course, is Dr. Biljana Plavsic, officially the vice president of the Serbian Republic, and unofficially the “Serbian empress,” as the fighters on the front also started to call her after Arkan. In many interviews at the beginning of the war, Dr. Plavsic emphasized as the sole goal of the Serbian struggle the necessity that in the end, “Serbs should be their own masters on their own territory, with as few casualties as possible.” Recently, however, she became famous for her political “uncompromising approach” and her assertion that in a war against the whole world, the possible death of 6 million Serbs would not mean much, since another 6 million would be lost. According to some opinions, this kind of assertion is part of “political biology,” a new orientation for a woman who at one time studied pure biology in Zagreb, and engaged in graduate studies in Prague and later in the United States, where she spent 14 months as a Fulbright scholar, and today is responsible within the Serbian Republic’s presidency for humanitarian activities and stories about the impossibility of coexistence with the former Bosnian neighbors. Last week in Athens, when Karadzic conditionally signed the Vance-Owen plan, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, convinced that everything else was just a matter of technique and determined to “clip the wings” of Serbian “hawks” like Biljana Plavsic, mentioned the thesis of “6 million dead Serbs” and said that the representative of such views belonged in a hospital, and not in politics. Obviously not impressed by what Milosevic thought, the “Serbian empress,” on the eve of the historic meeting of the Serbian Republic Assembly in Pale, refused to shake hands with the president of Serbia, and thus made it onto the front pages again.

Danica Draskovic has not left the front pages either for several weeks now. By stating that her husband, SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] leader Vuk Draskovic, would go to war in Bosnia only after Milosevic, and that he would defend Muslims from the crimes of the Serbs in Gack, Danila Draskovic brought down on herself the odium not only of the public that is shaped every day by Serbian Radio-Television, but also of some members of the party to whose leadership she belongs. Because of that statement, a meeting of the SPO’s Main Committee was even scheduled, at which it was decided at the last minute, however, not to “try” Danica Draskovic for an opinion stated in a TV interview. In her public statements, Mrs. Draskovic always maintains a considerable amount of aggressiveness and combative ness, and thus it will be remembered that on one occasion, in a bitter discussion, she even used a wine bottle. Like her husband, from her political beginnings until the present day she has experienced considerable metamorphosis (mostly for the better). The claim that “she will get the communists out of power at the cost of her own life” remains a common element of her policy, however. What is new in her statements and what is also upsetting many SPO members, and creating problems for her husband, is her unreserved sympathies for a civil political option. The assertion about defending the Muslims in Gack also upset and infuriated many SPO members at least as much as Danica Draskovic’s regret that the civil option headed by Vesna Pesic would not win in Serbia.

Another woman who has been talked about for weeks is Mirjana Markovic, Serbia’s “first lady” (because of her party membership, perhaps Serbia’s “first comrade” instead). The reason for this is not her statements in the party to which she belongs (the LC-Movement for Yugoslavia), but rather her articles in DUGA, with which many political opponents of her husband are also agreeing more and more. Just like Danica Draskovic, Dr. Mirjana Markovic also, at least at first glance, is sometimes acting like a “troublemaker” for her husband, and also upsetting his political followers, who cannot yet completely figure out whether Milosevic does not read DUGA, or whether he reads it after several months’ delay. This is because a lot of what the Serbian president is saying today was written by his wife in DUGA three or four months ago. Even then, for example, she said that some of Karadzic’s statements were neither nonsense, nor falsehood, nor a mistake, nor a blunder at all, but simply insanity, for which the Serbs in Bosnia would have to pay the price. In writing about the role of women in this war, Dr. Markovic wrote back in January that any endocrinological examination would show that the women who lobbied for war were among those patients whose sex was actually undetermined. Several months later, Slobodan Milosevic is beginning to follow his wife’s peacemaking orientation, and talking about how the female advocates of war and new casualties belong in the hospital instead of in politics.

These days the name of Dr. Vesna Pesic, leader of the Civil Alliance and president of the Belgrade Center for
Antiwar Actions, has also been mentioned in public, quite quietly but not quite without being observed. In the Washington Hilton, she was recently handed the international award for democracy that is awarded by the American National Foundation for Democracy. The ceremony was also attended by U.S. President Bill Clinton. For some media, which otherwise record every invitation from Romania or Bulgaria to our wrestlers or table tennis players, the news that the leader of a party here received international recognition and spoke with the U.S. President was not worthy of publication. Regardless of the fact that awards coming from America are not appreciated too much here, because they do not fit into the current propaganda molds, at a time when even the former masters of war in this region are suddenly becoming peace activists, it is worth recalling that the energetic Vesna Pescic and her peace activists were raising their voices against the war back at the time when tanks leaving Belgrade were seen off with flowers. They were the first ones to warn that Serbian youth needed to have some other path to the future ensured for it than the one leading to barracks, trenches, hospitals, and cemeteries—or courts-martial. From then until today, when peace-making is ceasing to be treason and is becoming a political obsession (we will see a lot more miracles in Serbia), Vesna Pescic has constantly been condemned by public opinion because of that orientation, usually as a “Serbian woman of poor quality” and a traitor.

“Successful as Women”

With the exception of Dr. Biljana Plavsic’s political orientation, most of the women playing any significant role on the political scene of Serbia and the Serbian Krajinas differ considerably from what is implied by the proverb attributed to the Serbian national heritage, which says, “A women in politics means war.” This proverb does not have any rational roots even in Serbian history, in which very few women have been remembered for politics, but on the other hand it has considerable connections with the time when significant roles were played on the world scene by Margaret Thatcher, Golda Meir, and Indira Gandhi. All three conducted wars, and moreover quite successfully. Indira Gandhi not only ruled almost half a billion people, but also won a war that was sharply opposed at that time by the United States and China. “She knows how to wear the pants,” was the saying by which patriarchal Indian men recognized Indira Gandhi as knowing how to do “typical man’s” work like engaging in politics.

The father of today’s Israel, Ben Gurion, claimed at one time that Golda Meir was “the most capable person in his government.” During Margaret Thatcher’s rule in Britain, it was said of successful politicians that they were “successful as women,” and “Iron Maggie” proved herself, among other things, through the fighting for the Falkland Islands.

“In modern Serbian history, there are no women who have played any prominent role in political life, much less ruled and marked an epoch as revered rulers,” Vreme was told by Dr. Ljubinka Trgovic from the SANU [Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts] Institute for History. “The British, for example, had two queens, Elizabeth and Victoria, for whom entire historical periods are known today. In our country, in a certain sense the only one to leave a trace was Queen Natalija, and that was not as a significant factor in a policy, but rather through the fact that her expulsion from Serbia caused political divisions.”

Women’s bashful entrance into Serbian politics coincided with the 1870’s, when some of them left to be educated in Switzerland and encountered modern political ideas for the first time. Up until the end of World War II, in Serbian politics women were mostly on the margins, when they entered the scene as heroes and war veterans in fairly large numbers. According to Ljubinka Trgovic, the traditional patriarchal concept, suppressed during the first years after the war, very quickly came into its own again, and many women in the top ranks of politics were soon pushed aside and forced to assume traditional female roles—in education, culture, and humanitarian organizations. Ljubinka Trgovic singled out two women as a unique phenomenon in postwar politics: Latinka Perovic and Savka Dabic-v-Kucar. “Both of them,” our interlocutor said, “appeared at a time of serious social crisis, and in contrast to their predecessors, they are also creators of a certain policy, and not just mere executors of it. After their removal, women were pushed out of politics again, and to the present day they only receive one-time roles.”

In the opinion of many people, Latinka Perovic is probably also the most capable politician that Serbia has ever had. Her ability to predict events and express her position has not been surpassed in this region to date, and her disassociation from politics today also says a lot about her greatness. Her only serious shortcoming, cynics say, is her liberal orientation, because liberalism in Serbia, which apparently only knows about various forms of collectivism and nationalism, is sheer utopia.

Thatcher-Plavsic

In spite of the strong individuality possessed by Dr. Mirjana Markovic and Danica Draskovic, in the eyes of many people they nevertheless play a role that is defined in every patriarchal milieu by the well-known stereotype that behind every successful man there is a woman. In politics, it is the role of women who are fellow fighters? and colleagues, who often can assist their husbands more than their party leaderships. Whole books have been written about that role for women in politics. Sociologist Zarana Papić from the Philosophy School in Belgrade, who is working on cultural models of masculinity and femininity, views this phenomenon as a very interesting dynamic of couples who have power, or oppose it in some way. In both cases (the Milosevic and Draskovic couples), what is involved is a sort of political complementing and mutual influences, as well as an exchange of light and weak arguments. When one yields, the other
YUGOSLAVIA

The more widespread entry of women into politics and their access to the circles of power do not mean that politics will automatically be essentially changed for the better, especially if the ruling political concepts remain the same," Zaran Papic said. "That kind of feminist position—that women by themselves, through their persistence, stubbornness, combativeness, and many other qualities, will make politics better—was destroyed once and for all by Margaret Thatcher in her time. She is the symbolic figure who attracted to herself all media and other attention, who had absolute power, and furthermore acted in an exaggeratedly masculine way. Thatcher introduced a purely political travesty—masculine power in a feminine appearance. A full coiffure, a suit, and a brooch, on one hand, and masculine power on the other, with the extremely pragmatic achievement of political goals. That Thatcher type of travesty can also be recognized in Biljana Plavsic's appearance. A warlike option that does not care about casualties is also packaged in a select coiffure, a brooch, and a cultivated complexion, instead of in some bearded edition."

According to Zaran Papic, in the prevailing political environment, a woman is only desirable in politics when she serves some purpose. She is asked to agree and not to think with her own head. As an example of this, our interlocutor mentioned the persistent political demonization of Vesna Pestic, whose civil and dialogue-based political orientation was discredited by the ruling media from the start as something repulsive, foreign to our national identity, and almost witchlike. At the same time, as long as it sails downstream in accordance with what the authorities want, even the most sinister political orientation deserves the epithet of an "empress."

Last Sunday, the president of Serbia characterized that woman, who until recently bore the title of "empress," and the political positions that she advocates as "politically sick" and thereby undesirable in Serbian politics. Dr. Biljana Plavsic's refusal after that to shake hands with Slobodan Milosevic makes her political elimination, at least from the territory controlled by the president of Serbia, quite certain. Precisely this fact could be taken as proof that the president of Serbia is also an advocate of typical male chauvinism, and that in fact only an episodic role is intended for women in the Serbian political milieu. Of all the pathological and crazy political ideas and actions that could be heard and seen on the Serbian political scene in recent years and months, he only pointed the finger at one uttered by a woman, and furthermore said that the representatives of such ideas belonged in a hospital.

If those same standards were also applied to many people who have been stubbornly pushing us into war with the whole world for months now and gambling with hundreds of thousands of human lives, our hospitals would have been full a long time ago.

If the president of Serbia had had the courage to tell the male protagonists of that policy in time what he thought, as he did recently in Athens, today there would be incomparably more of such patients than of the wounded.

Drought Threatens To Decimate Wheat, Other Crops
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[Text] Belgrade, June 3 (TANJUG)—Month-long drought threatens to decimate wheat and other field crops in some parts of Serbia. The drought and temperatures of over 30 degrees Celsius have caused the premature ripening of wheat, said agrometeorologist Dobrivoje Zivkovic. Heavy drought last summer reduced the value of the crop in Vojvodina by 452 million dollars.

This spring, Yugoslav farmers have sown the planned 2.5 million hectares of land in the conditions of drastic shortages of fuel, fertilizers and spare parts. Experts say the inadequate application of agrotechnical measures will cut the yield 30-50 percent.

This year's harvest will literally determine the fate of around 10.5 million inhabitants of Yugoslavia and over 700,000 refugees from the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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