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THE ARMY AND THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD SEPARATED BY A COMMON GOAL

BY

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THE ARMY AND THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
SEPARATED BY A COMMON GOAL

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Abstract

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This paper examines the infrastructure of the Army and to a lesser extent, the Air National Guard in light of the assets that are available to DOD. There is substantial opportunity for the Army to integrate these assets into mutually beneficial programs for the defense of the nation. Four specific programs are examined as opportunities for innovative use of the Army National Guard.

The reduction of the Army budget and the increased requirements can allow for better integration of infrastructure. This will foster better relations between the active component and the Army National Guard. The isolation of the two forces has created two entities that are cultures separated by a common goal— the defense of our nation.

Aspects of this paper look at potential cures for the antipathy that exists between the two components. This antipathy has recently broken into open warfare and is to the benefit of neither the Army nor the Army National Guard. Multicompo units are a beginning step at a cure for this malaise. There are additional means and methods to cure this problem.
# UNCLASSIFIED

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“We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly.”
—Gen. George C. Marshall, 1945

America's Investment

The American public has a capital investment in the capabilities and effectiveness of the American Armed Forces. A similar investment in the Army National Guard and Air National Guard should be evaluated so that it can be used to the advantage of the Army and Air Force. The infrastructure, the training, and the quality men and women who serve in these organizations are a great asset to the Country.

The Army is in an excellent position to take advantage of the National Guard assets. This can be done so that both parties get a “win—win” solution to a difficult problem. Innovation in the use of this force is advantageous to the Army through the multipliers the Army National Guard can offer to the Active Component and through the effectiveness in getting its story heard by Congress. The rift between the Army and the Army National Guard has helped to distance the Army from the citizens of the country. Citizen voters are a key to assistance with the Army’s budget problem. It is these citizen soldiers in the National Guard who are active in their communities and States. This activism has proved to be a boon to the National Guard and is capable of being a boon to the Army.

In an all volunteer military it is the National Guard and Reserves with the most community contact. The Army should use this relationship to increase visibility and contact with the community. The polarization of the Army and the
National Guard is a disservice to the United States. The perpetuation of this rift is indefensible.

A Plan for Further Integration of the Army and the Army National Guard.

The Army and the National Guard should be integrated into a close working partnership. That this has not happened with any rapidity is a measure of the distrust the Army has toward the National Guard. The feelings are mutual and have become an ingrained defense that has become cultural. The Army Staff must address this issue and correct it.

The citizen soldier\(^1\) is an active participant in the defense of the country. This concept was reaffirmed by General Creighton Abrams when the National Guard was incorporated into the war fight.\(^2\) The lessons that General Abrams saw in the failure to include America’s citizen’s soldier in any military action should not be lost on our leadership. It is the Army Staff that has failed to capitalize upon the strengths of true integration that could be used to its advantage. Advantages of use of staff, lobbying efforts and contacts in the community and states are presently wasted. To cement a good relationship together with a sensible restructure of the force can only have positive policy results.

The Army National Guard has 3,222 armories in 2,700 communities.\(^3\) Guardsmen are influential in their communities and are active voting citizens. These National Guardsmen are interested in the defense of this Nation. They speak to Congressmen and Senators to voice their concerns regularly. Add-ons
in the National Guard budget are because of close relationships these citizen soldiers establish by their visibility and accessibility to their elected representatives. In many instances, elected and appointed representatives of the state governments serve in the National Guard.

The Army and the Army National Guard are two cultures separated by a common goal. The common goal of defense of this Nation is not in question. It is the integration of the two forces that creates turmoil. The cultures of each organization serve to create great mistrust. The Army was patterned and has historical roots in the Militia. Institutionally, the Army does not like to be reminded that the modern Militia is the National Guard. Further exacerbation of the strained relationship results when active component officers in the Army believe that they are better trained and better qualified that the National Guard officer. National Guard officers know that they are held to the same military and civilian education, and physical standards as their active component counterparts. Additionally, they are often more competent in their jobs, since they spend longer in assignments and learn the aspects of it well. This adds greatly to the stability of the unit.

When recently in conversation with a senior National Guard officer, he remarked that being an officer in the National Guard made him very “humble”. He was referring to the condescending treatment that he receives on a daily basis from our “Active Component friends”. Significant cultural differences are impediments to a joining of forces. Differences can only be overcome by better
understanding between the components. Specifically, the cultures of each organization will be changed only from the top down.

Management studies indicate that the only effective way to change the culture of a large organization is to do it from the top down. There must be a commitment for change and there must be a “buy-in” by management. Until this happens, the organization will not change. It is the CEO who “must take…responsibility to achieve quality in any organization”. The change in quality is a significant cultural change that can be equated to the change necessary to implement a more profound integration.

Operationally, there are great strides taking place with integrating active and reserve component soldiers. The problems occur at the staff levels. The impediments can be illustrated by a ruling from Army Judge Advocate General that will not allow AC soldiers to be rated by a National Guard Officer. These hurdles have been overcome by simply ignoring the opinion. Similarly, funding problems with pay and allowances between the components could be more easily solved if the goal were to mesh both organizations into a unified force. This initiative is not to make the Army National Guard an Active Component. The assets can be used to better support the AC through smarter training and use of imbedded assets. This can only happen when the Army recognizes that it needs the National Guard instead of viewing it as a competitor.
If you find yourself in a hole the first thing to do is stop diggin'.

"Don't Squat with Yer Spurs On: A Cowboy's Guide to Life" by Texas Bix Bender.

History

It is impossible to tread this path without a framework. The following is to put context into the discussion. Since the National Guard is a different structure than the Army, one is puzzled why more active component officers aren't educated about the structure and origin of the National Guard. Certainly if the Army is sincere in its attempts to mend fences, this education process must be and could be initiated with little cost or effort.

State Organization

The National Guard is an organization owned by the State government. The soldiers are bound to the Governor by oath. It is the State that grants the authority to exist. The Adjutant General (TAG) is appointed by the Governor of the State. He is the head of two organizations in most States: The Air National Guard that trains to U.S. Air Force standards and the Army National Guard that trains to U.S. Army standards.

The TAG is in the position of holding authority from two governmental entities. He holds his State position by appointment of the Governor. In much of his daily capacity he acts in a State capacity. As an example, many of the
training facilities within a State are owned by that State-not the Federal
government. The TAG also has Federal recognition from either the Army or the
Air Force as a General Officer. This position allows him to direct the training of
soldiers and airmen to federal standards. As the person primarily responsible for
mobilization of Federal troops, the TAG acts in a Federal capacity.

In most instances, the TAG, whose office is at the State Area Command
(STARC), acts in a State capacity. As an appointee of the Governor he collects
his salary from the State and acts on behalf of the State when dealing with the
federal government-usually the National Guard Bureau. The nature of the job
requires the TAGs to enter duty under federal orders periodically.

TAGs are in charge of organizations that vary considerably in size. Each
has a staff that has a primary purpose of mobilization. Soldiers that are
activated receive most briefings, initial medical care, and issue of special
equipment from the action of the STARC staffs. To activate these soldiers or
airmen is not an easy task. Employers, families and creditors have to be dealt
with on a regular basis by the STARC. Increasingly, employers are resisting their
employees’ participation in the military. This has been exacerbated due to the
more frequent call-ups.

TAGs coordinate their use of federal equipment, training dollars,
administration of troops and other federal functions with the federal government
through the National Guard Bureau. Each of the 54 jurisdictions has a
representative of the Chief, National Guard Bureau. This representative is the
United States Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) who is a Colonel on Title 10 orders.

The USPFO accounts to NGB for the use all federal dollars and accounts. He has a pay branch and maintains the federal contracting function. This coordination provides a tested and important link to the Army and Air Force. Without this link, the State would quickly become confused and overwhelmed by the flow of information. Presently there are many instances of Army MACOMS and Armies (1st and 5th) dealing directly with various State National Guards. This is in violation of statute and can only lead to further confusion between the components.

\textit{Federal Connection}

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is an active component organization. The \textit{statutory charter of NGB} is to be the “\textit{channel of communication between the active components and the states}”\textsuperscript{12}. All soldiers—enlisted and officer alike at the National Guard Bureau are on Title 10 orders. Statute requires the officers assigned to NGB must be 60% active component soldiers and 40% National Guard soldiers.

NGB performs a joint function, because it incorporates the Air National Guard as well as the Army National Guard. NGB is truly a purple organization. As the channel of communication between the active component and the States, it often serves as a mediator. While it is not a MACOM, it often acts like a MACOM. The Chief, National Guard Bureau may be either an Air Force or an
Army Lieutenant General. The Deputy then is appointed from the other service. The unusual mission of NGB has been and is a cause of misunderstandings and ill feeling at the Army staff levels.

Funding is also a major difference between the Army and the National Guard Bureau. The Army National Guard receives federal fundings. These funds, limited to one year, include money of pay and allowances (NGPA), parts and equipment purchase, supplies, training, maintenance, support, etc (OMNG). When an Army staff initiative requires spending over more than one year problems arise. This is often a source of aggravation and misunderstanding, and a problem that should be addressed with other fiscal issues. Once dollars are transferred to NGB accounts they become fenced National Guard funds. With the change in perspective and use of the reserve forces, the fiscal restraints should also be altered.

The Force

Army National Guard soldiers owe their allegiance to the Governor of the State. They take an oath when joining the organization that they will obey the orders of the Governor. This allegiance is transferred only when the soldier is federalized. Even the Title 10 officers at NGB serve at the direction of their Governors with the individual's consent while focusing on national level issues.

Soldiers train (officially) one weekend per month and two weeks usually during the summer. However, the reality is that soldiers who are E-5 and above put in substantially more time than this. Much of this service is without pay or
any other compensation. This service is in addition to working a full-time job with employers who increasingly frown upon such commitments.

Many soldiers conduct military business within the confines of their own business. The additional hours and unexpected requirements thrust upon them becomes an irritant to employers. These circumstances were “understood” by employers during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. They are not looked upon favorably in the current deployments. Use of business equipment and time for United States government business and frequent absences of key employees can have a very adverse affect on small business.

The Army National Guard contributed approximately 1,024,861 man--days in over 70 countries toward the Army’s worldwide deployments in 1997. This is in addition to the over 280,000 man--days of emergency response missions supported by the National Guards of the 54 jurisdictions.  

**Remembered History**

National Guard soldiers keenly feel intentional or unintentional statements about the lack of “professionalism” or lack of “patriotism”. It is unfortunate that (from a Guardsman’s point of view) ignorance generates unthinking statements. In some cases, however, they are intended. It is this attitude that can only be stopped by education started at the top. It is a problem that Juran’s writings address.  

The CEO—in this case the Chief of Staff of the Army—must set the tone of the cultural change.
Most National Guard soldiers are highly dedicated, very motivated and stressed. This is particularly true at a Company, Battalion, or Brigade level. The enormous work necessary to properly plan and organize, by officers and senior NCOs wreaks havoc with job and business. It should be no surprise therefore, that when an AC Officer jokes or sometimes states seriously, within earshot saying that the Guard is not competent—or words to that effect, that it creates bad feelings.

The refusal to include the 48th Infantry Brigade from deploying to Desert Storm, created pervasive ill feelings and mistrust of the AC. Most Army Guardsmen have read or heard of the GAO report that Army action was arbitrary and without justification. The continuing falsehood that creates the impression the 48th was not fit to be activated is a stain upon the honor of the Army. This is still very current and within memory to the soldiers of the National Guard and in fact is a source of derogatory comment by AC officers even today when discussing readiness of the National Guard.

Actions speak louder than words. Present policy leads to an increasing use of the reserve components, and particularly the Army National Guard in meeting the commitments of our Army around the world. Repeats of the problems of the 48th could be solved if the Army had objective criteria for measuring readiness. Without standards that can be applied across active and reserve components fairly, there will be continued problems.
The Solution: Use of In Place Training Resources:

There are 3,166 National Guard Armories nationwide. The National Guard is connected to the citizens of the United States as no other service within the Department of Defense. Most of these armories are owned by the various State governments and are located within fifty miles of each other. These armories are being provided a link to a distance learning network for military training.

A fiber optic communication backbone is being established by the Army National Guard to support distance learning. The use of this technology will provide the Army with an effective method of training individual soldiers. This concept will cut travel time and cost, cut family separations and use scarce training funds for specific training.¹⁸

This network could be available to the AC and the Reserves with the proper coordination. Certainly, the accessibility makes this potentially a most cost efficient method of instruction that the Army has yet devised. Innovation to training could substantially cut costs for the AC.

There are 24,766 National Guard facilities. These include maintenance facilities, small and large posts, armories and other training facilities. Almost all of these maintenance facilities are managed by the State. Of all those facilities 6,677 are owned by the State and dedicated to support the National Guard. In some cases the National Guard manages large tracts of State land dedicated to
training, maintenance facilities and storage of equipment. States have made this land available to the AC for training and maintenance assistance.

Installations—however small—give the United States Army a military presence in the communities of America. Men and women in uniform are seen every day at these locations. This gives the population a view of the military that they do not have anywhere else. The Army and Air National Guard are the American military that most of the population sees.

In addition, there are large tracts of land removed from the population. Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) provided installations to the National Guard for training. Substantial increases in acreage have accrued in the BRAC actions. These installations, once used extensively by the Army, Marines and Air Force, can still be used. They are under different management, however.

There are 868 surface maintenance facilities in the 54 jurisdictions. Each of these locations is staffed by federal technicians in the excepted service. These civilian technicians are dual status employees. The Army funds these OMS and MATES with 55% of authorized strength. There is great potential for support to the Army’s maintenance at these locations.

Fort State

With the infrastructure already in place, and an ability to hire workers as state employees, the National Guard Bureau has initiated a concept that can make use of this infrastructure. The argument that these facilities be used as an asset of DOD is strong. Fort State is a concept begun by MG David Gay, TAG
Connecticut. Through the imagination and diligence of COL Ray Crocker, the concept has become workable.

Fort State expanded to include the State National Guard installations in all 54 jurisdictions. The concept uses of the structure of the National Guard Bureau as a support base servicing the Active Component. In some cases the concept has been successful. In others it has been thwarted as will be addressed later in this paper. Notwithstanding the rejections, the concept is one that could unite the Army as it has never been before.

Many of the surface maintenance facilities in various States now support the active component in small ways. Some MACOMs have even entered into Inter-Service Support Agreements with the National Guard Bureau\textsuperscript{21} to enable the States to perform work cheaper, faster and better.

Integration of Active and National Guard goals is incorporated into the Fort State concept. Use of existing infrastructure with units that can train to standards while supporting the active component is the purpose and result. It is this concept that will allow for a seamless Army. The following are examples of successes and non-starters in integration of Active and National Guard soldiers.

B Company, 193\textsuperscript{rd} Aviation Regiment, Wheeler Army Airfield, Hawaii Army National Guard.

Company B, 193\textsuperscript{rd} Aviation Regiment is an aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) unit. The 266 personnel of this unit are Hawaii Army National Guardsmen supplemented with Active Component soldiers. These are full and part-time soldiers who realize the utility of full integration in the force.
This unit is capable of aircraft maintenance component and supply support to divisional and non-divisional aviation units within the Corps area.

Because of the unique needs for Army aviation in Hawaii the Army has allowed the AVIM active component augmentation. That is to say that active component soldiers work at the National Guard facility. Company B, 193rd Aviation Regiment provides full-time supply and maintenance support for non-divisional aviation units in Hawaii. This is the first National Guard unit to provide such support. Both Active Component units and National Guard units benefit from this combination. At the same time it is one model of successful integration of active and National Guard soldiers.

Operational Support Airlift Agency/Joint Operational Support Airlift Center

In 1995 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Army National Guard assumed responsibility for the Total Army Operational Support Airlift (OSA) program and management. This was in part due to findings of the Committee on Roles and Missions (CORM) to avoid duplication of missions in DoD. The OSA program management was transferred to the ARNG called the Operational Support Airlift Command (OSACOM). In 1997, OSACOM was reorganized into the Operational Support Airlift Agency (OSAA) forming a TDA structure with OSACOM remaining as a subordinate element. The Office of the Secretary of Defense decided that there was still duplication of services and required the creation of a single service scheduler for all DoD
Operational Support Airlifts. In 1998, the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center was established under the Air Force US Transportation Command.

Joint Operational Support Airlift Center (JOSAC) is the 60 personnel at Transportation Command; Scott AFB that schedules all OSA missions for the entire Department of Defense. Imbedded in those 60 people there is a 15 member Army cell that is composed of National Guard, Title 10 Active Guard Reserve (AGR) soldiers who rotate into and out of this assignment from OSSAA. This cell is a unique use of AGR soldiers that has proven very successful for the entire DoD.

The Operational Support Airlift Agency Command is a Department of the Army Field Operating Agency under the National Guard Bureau. This is a TDA organization composed of Army, Army National Guard, and Department of the Army Civilians who manage, train, coordinate and resource Army fixed wing airlift assets within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii and select territories. The flight elements under OSACOM provide fixed wing transportation for Army and Department of Defense (DOD) personnel traveling on official business as scheduled by JOSAC. In addition, the OSAA serves as the proponent for all fixed wing issues for the Army National Guard.

The OSAA Commander is an AGR Colonel (O-6) who is rated or supervised by the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG), a Major General. The OSAA Commander is also senior rated by the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS) a Lieutenant General. This unique rating
arrangement requires the OSAA Commander to lead a program that is in the best interests of the Total Army.

In OSACOM, a subordinate element of OSAA, there are active component soldiers and National Guard soldiers aviators working side by side and flying support mission throughout the 50 states, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands as a composite unit to meet the needs of the DOD. The direct integration of Active Component soldiers into this National Guard organization created the CONUS rotation base for fixed wing rated warrant officers, providing them a stateside assignment. This has been an Army success maintaining wartime training readiness while supporting federal DoD customers and state contingency requirements.

As a secondary benefit of maintaining wartime readiness, OSAA historically provides $42M or more in TDY cost avoidance each fiscal year. Ironically, The OSAA has recently come under the scrutiny of the Senate Armed Services Committee because the use of the full time AGR soldiers for OSA was perceived to be contrary to the Senate’s definition and purpose for full time support. This is again, ironic because the Navy and Air Force Operational Support Airlift Programs rely heavily on AGR/full time support personnel to sustain their respective programs in support of DoD. After testimony and evidence, there has been a tacit approval for the operation pending Senate review during the Spring of 1999. This success is one that could be used as a model for further cooperation between the ARNG and the Active Component.
The Prepositioned Float Ships located at Charleston South Carolina present a unique problem for the Army and an opportunity for fence mending.

Since the beginning of this concept the Army has been using private contractors at union wage scale to maintain and service the ships and the equipment on those ships. Contractors at union scale are expensive. The Army has had experience with contractors who don't show up for war-or leave when the shooting starts, as learned in Desert Storm.²⁴

The National Guard Bureau in conjunction with the South Carolina National Guard saw an opportunity. The ARNG together with the encouragement of the Commander, Army Materiel Command (AMC) has put together a proposal to support this effort. A proposal was put together for NGB to enter into an Inter-Service Support Agreement (ISSA) with AMC. NGB would then amend an existing cooperative agreement with the State of South Carolina that would give funding to State employees. State employees²⁵ hired under this agreement would provide maintenance to the equipment on the ships.

This concept is a seminal opportunity for the Army to incorporate some of the best concepts that the Army National Guard has to offer. South Carolina would require each of these State employees to be members of an Army National Guard. The National Guard Bureau would coordinate the establishment of a maintenance battalion that would be assigned to the South Carolina Army
National Guard. This unit would then be available for mobilization in the event that one or more of the ships deployed.

It is unfortunate that this idea was both acceptable and not acceptable within the ranks of the AMC staff. Opposition of the concept by AMC as "unworkable" made the ultimate rejection of the idea a bitter pill for The Adjutant General of South Carolina. AMC's study indicates that the National Guard should not be selected for several—as viewed by South Carolina—spurious and insubstantial reasons.

The Army maintains 5 container ships filled with war fighting equipment in Charleston, South Carolina that could be shipped to the point of crises in the event troops are needed. These ships contain equipment that would be necessary to supply a force at their initial landing. The concept is that these ships can be sent to any location with this equipment ready to go at all times.

After approximately two years study and planning with AMC, a proposal was submitted. The South Carolina National Guard would hire state employees to maintain the equipment. This would be accomplished by an Intergovernmental Support Agreement between the National Guard Bureau and AMC. In turn, NGB would enter into a cooperative agreement with the state of South Carolina to maintain the ships.

All of this was begun and proceeded with the tacit approval of AMC. That Command encouraged the submittal, but early on was not certain how to treat the proposal. There were many in AMC that opposed the participation by NGB from the initial steps of the process. NGB took the position that in the contracting
process under rules of Office of Management and Budget\textsuperscript{27}, that AMC could choose to keep the work within DOD without competition. AMC chose not to proceed in this way. \textit{It required that NGB compete with private contractors}.\textsuperscript{28} This position is contrary to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 that allows a function to remain within DOD if it can be done at the same or lower cost. In this case the South Carolina National Guard’s figures were substantially lower than the contractors.

This requirement for competition with private contractors was met with incredulity by NGB. That competition would be required with private contractors was unreasonable to South Carolina. The OMB Circular A-76 process clearly set forth the requirements for this set of circumstances. That AMC required additional competition under their rules, made many in the Army National Guard believe that the deck was being stacked against them.

South Carolina is able, under State law, to require that the employees also be members of the National Guard. It is prepared to do this. The National Guard Bureau, at the same time, is working an issue that would allow a maintenance battalion to be at Charleston harbor. The cost of using a National Guardsman on active duty for training would substantially offset the costs of maintenance of the equipment in the AWR. The National Guard could accomplish this with year round training. That is using only those individuals necessary to supplement the state employees at peak periods.

AMC rejected this concept as too expensive and unreliable. If military trained mechanics are indeed unreliable, then the Army should continue to build
its shadow Army with vigor. The concept that private contractors must be more efficient and cheaper may be true in some cases. However to discount that the infrastructure of an Army National Guard maintenance battalion would support such a concept and that it would be too expensive and unreliable is not a credible observation. If Army training is adequate for wartime support, then how can it not be adequate for peacetime support?

This decision represents a lost opportunity for the Army. A perfect circumstance for the Active Component and the National Guard to partnership has been lost.\textsuperscript{29} The unmitigated alteration of verified figures submitted by the TAG South Carolina and the National Guard Bureau has members of the National Guard angry and cynical. "They (AMC) got the result that they wanted from the beginning (use of private contractors)-and it wasn't Guard participation."\textsuperscript{30}

The National Guard's arguments for use of this method of support is that it is more dependable (civilians who can be activated if necessary and who are trained to military standards) and at lower cost than civilians. State employees in South Carolina are less costly than union workers on the docks in South Carolina. The unilateral addition of costs to the overhead of the South Carolina National Guard was not justified in the opinion of all the National Guardsmen who worked on the project.
Army National Guard Truck Rebuild Initiative

The last example is one in which a series of decisions have been made that are on the surface good decisions without taking into account that there is no money to implement them. This specific decision was made because of the great deal prior dealings that colors relations between the Army National Guard and the Active Component. The response to a question why the Army is not allowing a rebuild of trucks was “the Army is going to give the National Guard new trucks”. The response begs the question.

The fleet of 2 ½ ton and 5 ton trucks is aging. The National Guard Bureau, being perceptive, realized that the current Army building program would not provide the Army National Guard with trucks able to replace the existing fleet. The only viable solution is to keep 20+ year old trucks and refurbish them. A logical and practical conclusion that along with readiness imperatives led the National Guard to embark upon a program for revitalization of those trucks.

After extensive study, presentation of proposals and evaluation two states were selected to perform this work. In a “study” by Army Materiel Command the concept was determined to be not acceptable. This result has left frustration within the Army National Guard ranks. The decision by the Army—not well publicized within the Army National Guard—was to allow use of the funds scheduled for this overhaul of old trucks to purchase new ones. It is now estimated that the monies will purchase about two-thirds of a truck as opposed to overhauling one old truck.
The *Austin American Statesman*, February 17, 1999 reported that GAO was highly critical of the U.S. Army's purchase of a replacement fleet. Huge cost over runs and a time frame of 32 years for replacement of the Army's aging fleet as reported by GAO does not seem realistic. This program is estimated to be one that costs $15.7 billion dollars.

The real problem is that the old fleet cannot be replaced soon enough to aid in the demands of the force now. This decision is not a decision that will be a solution to the problem. Trucks are at a premium now. No war fight can take place without the ability to be mobile. Trucks are key to that mobility.

The Future

These are examples how the Active Component can and cannot work together with the National Guard. Each has its lesson for the attentive reader. Each holds a promise of cooperation without acrimony. Too often bias and acrimony has tainted the relationships between the components. This bias is somewhat cultural. Notwithstanding the cultural basis, failure to take advantage of resources in this country's defense structure perpetuates the problem.

The National Guard Association of the United States is a potent lobbying organization and is very effective. The Army continues to lose ground in its attempts to get a budget that will protect its force. It is the Army that must make the overtures.

The Army controls the effectiveness of the National Guard through the use of training dollars. If a National Guard unit is not trained properly, it is a direct
reflection upon the Army's ability to manage the dollars and the force. A strong
desire to become partners will make a stronger voice. It will make the Nation
stronger.

More contact between the components is necessary to educate both
components. Only the Army Staff can make this idea work. The Army National
Guard is willing to be a part of the "seamless Army". It is the Army that is
reluctant to incorporate the National Guard into its ranks. Without a commitment
from the Army Staff, the continued cooperation will not occur.

The Means

The concept of Fort State is one that has interested many. It is a different
concept in doing business, and is growing. This is real innovation that is
beneficial to all concerned. Use of interservice support agreements and
cooperative agreements to leverage integral elements of the National Guard and
support the Active Component with cheaper solutions to its needs. At the same
time this trains key personnel for mobilization.

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is part of the Department of Defense
(DOD). It may enter into agreements with other entities within DOD. These
agreements are Interservice Support Agreements. ISAs are part of the way the
Armed Forces does business on a daily basis. The agreements allow
temporarily unused personnel and facilities to employee intra-DOD efficiencies to
meet needs.
Because NGB is a joint staff, both an Army and an Air Force, many different kinds of assets are available to it. The organization also has the ability to see efficiencies in a different light than others may. The Air National Guard has a great expertise in turbine engines, for example. These maintenance assets could be used to assist in the repair of Active Component turbine engines owned by the Army.

The cost saving to DOD in the use of these facilities is not evident unless one looks at the vehicle that NGB uses to fund the work. This requires an explanation of the United States Property and Fiscal Officer. The USPFO is eyes and ears of the Chief, National Guard Bureau in the States. He is responsible for accounting and proper use of all Federal equipment.

NGB conducts its business with the various states and territories through the use of cooperative agreements. All federal dollars are sent to the States through carefully crafted cooperative agreements. These are written agreements by which the State agrees to perform work and the Federal government (NGB) agrees to spend money to support the mission of the Federal government. The document is sometimes quite long and incorporates numerous agreements that are supervised by the USP&FO.

This method of operation is the sole method of operation between the States and the National Guard Bureau. This method can be used as a vehicle for further support of DOD's needs. It has proven very successful in implementation for the past 40 years by NGB.
Active Component and the National Guard as Partners.

Despite all of the obstacles, the Army National Guard has devoted significant effort to mending fences and being part of the team as reflected in some of the examples herein. With the tools and training, the National Guard is an extremely valuable asset. It could be even more of an asset. When resources were greater and training was at a much higher level the significance of this was reflected in President Gorbachav’s comment to President Regan prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. He said that he wished that he could have an asset like our National Guard.

There are enormous assets available to DoD for the asking. Much of the funding for the National Guard is from the federal government. The States also contribute. In some cases the National Guard manages substantial State assets. The States have made these available to the AC for training and maintenance assistance.

National Guard facilities include: federal and state land available for training (two million acres); surface maintenance facilities (12,377); aviation maintenance facilities (125); United States Property and Fiscal Officer has a minimum of one contracting office, this means that a (54+) contracting offices with fully trained contracting officers available; and a newly developing distance learning structure.

The Army National Guard has a total of 24,766 facilities. These are spread out among the 54 jurisdictions, giving a military presence in the
communities of America. There are large tracts of land removed from the population such as the Base Realignment and Closure Act (BRAC) installations turned over to the National Guard. There are also smaller installations. Often the 3,166 armories are located in the middle of the cities and towns. This gives the population a view of the military that they do not have anywhere else. The Army and Air National Guard are the view of the American military that most of the population sees. Substantial increases in acreage have accrued in the BRAC actions. With new rounds scheduled, logic would indicate that further increases will occur.

There are 868 surface maintenance facilities in the 54 jurisdictions. Each of these is manned by excepted service federal technicians. These civilian technicians are dual status employees. Since the Army only funds these shops with 55% of authorized strength, there are vast possibilities for support to the Army’s maintenance problems. With the infrastructure already in place, and an ability to hire workers as state employees, the arguments for use of these facilities are strong.

Many of these surface maintenance facilities now support the active component in small ways. Some MACOMs have even entered into Inter-Service Support Agreements with the National Guard Bureau to enable the States to perform work cheaper, faster and better.

Conclusion

The Army must integrate the Army National Guard into its force and stop the rancor. The concept of the “Seamless Army” is one of simplicity that merits achieving. Thus the number of divisions in the Army is 18 and not 10. The
perspective is different and does not lessen the arguments to be made for force structure. Indeed, the arguments become stronger, because we are one Army.
Endnotes

1 The Supreme Court has identified the National Guard as the “militia”. It is the Militia that is identified in Article 18, Section 35 of the Constitution.
2 General Abrams recognized that one of the fatal flaws of the Vietnam policy was the decision not to mobilize the National Guard.
3 Army National Guard Vision 2010.
4 Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.
6 Ibid. Juran discusses what must occur to create a drastic change in quality management within an organization. His point is well taken that any change that involves drastic movement from one cultural point of view to another must be started and managed by the CEO. If this does not occur, change will not happen.
7 But note that operational requirements have driven other results in AASF in Hawaii and in OSACOM. These issues will be dealt with later in this paper.
8 South Carolina is the only State to elect a TAG.
9 Vermont’s TAG is the first woman to hold that position.
10 One State elects the TAG. This is South Carolina.
11 After Desert Storm a veteran of that conflict shared with the author that his employer’s comment was “Well, now that you’ve done your duty, you need to resign your commission and get back to work.”
12 Title 10 United States Code, Section 10503. This lists 16 functions for which the Chief, National Guard Bureau is responsible, as designated by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force.
13 Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 1999 Posture Statement. Major General William A. Navas, Jr., Director
16 The 48th had just returned from the NTC nine days prior to the Army declining to ask for mobilization where it performed admirably. See Joint Reserve Component Strategic Plan: Partnership for Defense Through Effective Total Force Integration, Science Applications International Corporation, 29 February 1996
17 Post-mobilization standards of readiness were changed during Desert Storm to exclude the Army National Guard from participation. This created double standards and hurt credibility of the Army. See Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War by Robert L Goldich, October 22, 1991.
19 Fort Chaffee, Fort Pickett, Dallas Naval Air Station and Ravenna are among the more recent BRAC acquisitions
20 Employed under United States Code 32 Section 709. These employees must maintain their status as active participants in an Army National Guard unit to maintain their civilian job. They wear a uniform to work each day and maintain military courtesy.
NGB is the channel of communication between the active component and the 54 National Guard entities (this is statutory). An ISSA allows money to pass between the AC and NGB. NGB then uses cooperative agreements with the states, to hire state employees to perform the work-under the supervision of the federal technician. In 1998 NGB administered close to $1 Billion in cooperative agreements.

Active Guard Reserve, Title 10 duty usually describes duty in the National Guard Bureau. TJAG has rendered an opinion that allows this service in an operational setting as “training”. Training is, of course, one of the imperatives for use of an AGR soldier. See Title 32 Section

Since the National Guard Bureau is the Active Component organization that “is the channel of communication between the active component and the states. NGB and OSA direct and control those assets on a day to day basis. OSA directs TRANSCOM requests to the individual states for action.

As recited by a Senior Officer in a session with SSC Fellows. Comments were for non-attribution.

The Federal government cannot require membership in the National Guard under the terms of a cooperative agreement. However, the State of South Carolina can require such membership under statutes. This proposal required that all employees are members of the South Carolina Army National Guard. This insures that State employees could be placed on Title 10 orders as soldiers to support this effort.

AMC reviewed the proposals and required that NGB compete against contractors. A concept that is not in the A-76 rules (the rules allow for the work to be performed within DOD so long as the government can do the work for no more than 15% more than the contractors). The determination by AMC, however, required that the proposal would be compared to the private contractors.

OMB circular A-76 sets forth the rules by which contracting to private contractors must take place. AMC chose to ignore the provision that would allow the function to remain in DOD under rules cited above.

This was a completely new requirement without basis in law or regulation.

This opportunity will be lost if the Adjutant General of South Carolina is unsuccessful in his appeal to the Federal District Court.

Only one of the comments upon announcement of the AMC decision to use private contractors.

Statutory duties of the USP&FO are set forth in 32 USC 508. These enumerated duties have been greatly expanded by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. This Title 10 Officer operates the payroll for each State, much of the automation (telephones and computers), and the Federal contracting functions.

Army National Guard Installations Division figures as of 7 July 1998

Ibid.

Fort Chaffee, Fort Pickett, Dallas Naval Air Station and Ravenna are among the more recent BRAC acquisitions.

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United States Code, Title 10, Section 10503.
United States Code, Title 32, Section 508.

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8 and Article 18, Section 35.