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REAGAN'S 'INCOMPETENCE' CITED AS POSSIBLE ELECTION ISSUE

LD310920 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1848 GMT 30 Aug 84

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valentin Zorin]

[Text] An event that happened some days ago in Ronald Reagan's estate in California reached the pages of some U.S. newspapers. The president and his wife decided to pose for cameramen specially invited to the president's ranch for this purpose. During the election campaign Reagan would not pass by an opportunity for self-advertisement. As it was a case of merely posing for the photographers Reagan came to meet the press without his habitual press conference notes and entourage of advisers. He was accompanied only by his wife. And this is where the scandal broke out. Quite unexpectedly, one of the correspondents went beyond the photographs and asked Reagan a question, concerning none other but one of the fundamental problems of Washington's policy: What do you plan to do, he asked, in connection with the problems of the American-Soviet talks on space armaments? The president, clearly taken unawares by such a question, was caught at a loss. A long and painful pause ensued. And at this point, as the story is told by journalists who were present at the session, the president's wife rushed to the aid of her husband. Leaning toward him, she whispered: Answer: We are doing everything possible. However, insofar as Reagan suffers from diminished hearing, the whisper of the president's wife was sufficiently loud for all those present to hear. With a sigh of relief, the president obediently repeated after his wife: We are doing everything possible.

At another time probably this incident would not have gained publicity. But now, in the heat of the election campaign, one of the witnesses of this scene provided the information to Reagans political rivals, and the story was taken up by the U.S. press.

This incident would not have merited special mention—Reagan's incompetence not infrequently reaching anecdotal proportions is well-known—had it not been for the face that rather plentiful material has been appearing of late in the U.S. press exposing the political and professional standards of the head of the U.S. administration. The reason behind all this is always the same: the acute election struggle which is being fought on the U.S. political arena.

1
Thus, wide publicity was given to a careless admission made by Michael Deaver, one of the president's closest assistants and leader of the White House staff, who mentioned in conversation with acquaintances that Reagan often nods off during meetings of the government he leads. The WALL STREET JOURNAL recently published a special article devoted to the problem of the U.S. president's professional qualifications. Abstaining from any personal comment, I shall only quote the view of this influential organ of the bourgeois press: Noting that Ronald Reagan never possessed a creative brain or abilities, the paper finds that Reagan's thinking is a mish-mash of details, dogmas and cheap anecdotes. He collects bits of information, churns out anecdotes regardless of appropriateness, and this makes up his style.

The U.S. press gives not a few examples of occasions showing that Ronald Reagan, mildly speaking, does not stick too strictly to the boundaries of truth, including on matters concerning his own biography. Thus it is reported that in conversation with the Israeli prime minister, Reagan talked for a long time about the days when he worked as a film cameraman in a special division of the U.S. Army making a film about Nazi death camps. I still have a copy of the film I shot, the president said. However, when the journalists present as the White House boss said this decided to unravel the story of Reagan making a film in Nazi concentration camps, without much difficulty they found out that Reagan's tale had nothing in common with reality, and he never made any films as a cameraman, and during the war he never left Hollywood. Discovering the lie, the journalists turned to the White House press office for clarification. Again they heard that the president has no recollection of ever having spoken to anyone about working as a cameraman.

Examples of this kind, showing the limited knowledge of the White House boss and his tendency towards, mildly speaking, invention, forgetfulness, absent-mindedness or simply lack of knowledge concerning problems within the competence of a U.S. president, have been appearing with increasing frequency in the U.S. press over the last few weeks. I have quoted to you only a small part of what is reported. The reason for the increased attention to this side of Reagan's personality is explained again by the WALL STREET JOURNAL which says: These qualities of the president are so clear and unmistakeable, that Walter Mondale's closest advisers are very hopeful that Reagan's limited mind can still become a major issue in the election campaign.

CSO: 1807/309
PRAVDA MOCKS REAGAN EFFORT TO WIN WOMEN'S VOTE

LD261110 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0335 GMT 26 Aug 84

[Excerpts] Moscow, 26 Aug (TASS)—"Much ado about nothing" would be an apt description of the recent White House proclamation in which the U.S. president declared 26 August "Women's Equality Day," says PRAVDA today.

The point is that American women have for many years been waging a campaign for equal rights with men.

U.S. progressive circles rightly believe that in order to change the situation it is above all necessary to amend the country's constitution so that it guarantees American women equal rights with fellow citizens of the male sex.

It is the Reagan administration, however, the paper points out, which has definitively blocked the adoption of this amendment, effectively burying it. And a decisive role in this was played by the negative stance of the president himself. The present government has not taken a single practical step to meet the demands of women. The women's issue is not mentioned at all in the new Republican Party platform.

But in the election scramble for votes, they have "remembered" women; after all, they constitute 53 percent of the electorate. And so, the idea was conceived in the president's camp of declaring a "Women's Equality Day," in order to compensate for the inaction in this sphere with a noisy stunt. The idea being to melt the hearts of members of the fair sex...and prompt them to cast their votes for a president thirsting to remain in the White House for a second term.

CSO: 1807/317
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Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGDNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 p 1

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11499
CSO: 1807/268
INTERNATIONAL

BLOC SCHOLARLY CONFERENCE ON NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84, pp 12-13

[Report by Candidate of Economic Sciences G. Kolykhalova and Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Khazanov: "An Important Factor in International Relations"]

[Text]: Scholars from the socialist nations took part in an international symposium in Moscow on the subject "Current Problems of the Nonaligned Movement Today."

They focused attention on the matter of defining the nonaligned movement's place and role in the world system of international relations. It received considerable attention in the report presented by Academician Ye.M. Primakov, director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The speaker described the nonaligned movement as "an important, positive and independent factor in international life." The nonaligned movement, which grew out of the anticolonial struggle of the oppressed peoples, could not be and has not been neutral with respect to imperialism. From the very beginning it has functioned as an anti-imperialist force. Anti-imperialism is still the basic principle underlying its work.

Assessing the place and role of the nonaligned movement within the system of contemporary international relations, F. Vychodyl of Czechoslovakia has concluded that during the years of its existence the nonaligned movement has matured as a force which is influencing the world situation in a positive way. He has noted that "the developing nations have taken shape as a relatively autonomous subsystem of contemporary international relations. The most obvious expression of this 'third dimension' of international relations today is the activeness of the nonaligned movement."

Pointing to the quantitative growth and the qualitative development of the nonaligned movement, N. Calina of the Socialist Republic of Romania underscored the fact that "the dynamics of the international situation, of the trends and processes shaping the future world, should be taken into account for assessing the importance of this movement in the world system of international relations."

The symposium participants devoted an especially large amount of attention to reviewing the nonaligned movement's position on the most important problems of our time—matters of war and peace.
In his report, S. Goranov of Bulgaria stated that "mankind has one of its enormous potential reserves of forces for peace in the nonaligned movement. Understanding their own political being more and more thoroughly, the nonaligned nations regard themselves as a peace factor and are engaging more and more actively in the battle for peace."

Speaking on this matter, R. Wunsche of the GDR expressed the idea that today "the question of peace is a more significant integrating factor for the movement than ever before. The struggle to avert a nuclear catastrophe has become the foundation for further consolidation of the nations making up the nonaligned movement. With a weakening trend in the former integrating factor of anti-colonialism, the matter of peace has become a sort of stabilizer, a factor uniting and solidifying the movement."

(M. Tot Nad') of Hungary stated that we should regard as a reason for this the fact that "participants in the movement have become aware of their responsibility for eliminating international tensions. No less important is their awareness of the fact that it is impossible in a situation of international tensions either to resolve major problems of the world economy or to settle the conflicts existing in the developing world."

An attempt was made at the symposium to reveal unrealized possibilities in the nonaligned movement for the young states to influence the world situation—possibilities which could be used more purposefully to secure peace, to help control the arms race, eliminate and prevent conflicts among states in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In this connection the symposium participants stressed the growing importance of cooperation among the nations making up the nonalignment movement with other progressive forces of the contemporary era. The symposium analyzed the concept of "equidistance" widespread in nations of the so-called centerist group of the nonaligned movement. Soviet scholar Ya. Etinger stated that this concept, which stresses the necessity of maintaining an equal distance from the two military-political blocs, actually plays into the hands of the imperialist and reactionary forces.

It is highly important to develop ties between the nonaligned movement and the world of real socialism. (Pam Dyk Zyong) of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam expressed this idea in his speech. The Vietnamese scholar stated that "the possibilities of such cooperation are very great, since it is based on principles held in common by the socialist states and nations of the nonaligned movement in the area of South East Asia: struggle against colonialism and imperialism, and the striving to establish peace."

M.M. Zeynalov spoke at the symposium on some additional possibilities and reserves which could be utilized by the nonaligned movement for implementing their decisions. We see these reserves, he said, outside the official structures, in the area of the mass social and political forces and the organizations of the Afro-Asian nations themselves. There are numerous national and regional nongovernmental organizations—trade union, religious, youth and other organizations—functioning in the states of the nonaligned movement, which act
in support of the program provisions and principles of the nonaligned movement. Increasing the interaction between the nonaligned movement and broad social forces in the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America will increase the positive contribution made by the developing nations to the resolution of important problems of our time.

The nonaligned movement's position on various problems pertaining to the nations of Asia was thoroughly analyzed in speeches by (Fam Dyk Zyong), D. Weideman of the GDR, V.I. Kiselev, V.I. Danilov, M.R. Arunova, Sh.A. Niyazmatov and L.V. Val'kova.

The speeches by Ye.A. Tarabrin, Ye.M. Sharapova, A.M. Khazanov and M. Malinowski (Polish People's Republic) dealt with the role and place of the African nations in the nonaligned movement.

In their speeches S.G. Castedo of Cuba, A.N. Glinkin, A.A. Matlina and F.N. Boyko stressed the growing attention being given by the nonaligned movement to the problems of Latin America, particularly the expansionist policy of the USA in that region.

Consideration of the political and economic aspects of the nonaligned movement provided for a thorough analysis. This comprehensive approach made it possible to come close to creating a more or less integral picture of the nonaligned movement's development, to describe its general political and economic outlines and to disclose the nature of conflicts within the nonaligned movement and prospects for overcoming them.

Particular attention was given to the thorough analysis of correlations of political and socioeconomic differentiation among the nations in the nonaligned movement, on the one hand, and factors contributing to their unity, the commonality of their interests, and their joint actions, on the other. Discussing this problem, N.A. Simoniya emphasized the fact that the objective basis for the movement's unity now exists. All of the developing nations are in the early stage of structural development and have a composite social structure. In other words, three elements--national and colonial synthesis and traditional--can be identified in the economic and spiritual areas of the social structure in those nations. These elements vary greatly in the different nations both qualitatively and quantitatively. This structure thereby contains the objective basis for differentiating the liberated nations.

The ideological aspects of the nonaligned movement were thoroughly reviewed in the discussion at the symposium. A number of talks dealt with the influence of nationalist concepts upon the foreign policy of the nonaligned states.

A.I. Chicherov devoted attention to the transformation of nationalism occurring in the nonaligned movement, which is losing its former anti-imperialist nature in many cases. The "new" nationalism has a number of features and characteristics which are replacing previously established, stereotyped ideas about this phenomenon. In general, it is intensifying centrifugal trends in the nonaligned movement and the element of internal conflict which exists in it.
Questions having to do with the nonaligned movement's struggle for a new world economic order occupied an important place in the work of the international symposium. Various aspects of this problem were thoroughly analyzed by G.K. Shirokov, S.A. Bylindyak, A. Ye. Granovskiy, L.I. Chernorutskaya, N.A. Gnevushev, P. Petkov of Bulgaria, and T. Sadzikowski of Poland.

M.S. Pankin stated that the internal development of the nonaligned movement has constantly increasing attention to economic problems on part of the developing nations. Conferences of heads of states and governments of the nonaligned states in Havana and Delhi have demonstrated that economic problems have become firmly established among the main tasks which the nonaligned movement has to accomplish. Overcoming the growing gap between the tasks proclaimed by the nonaligned states and their ability to strive for their accomplishment is an important problem in the movement's economic work at the contemporary stage.

G.K. Shirokov commented that the effect of centrifugal and centripetal forces in the nonaligned movement can be observed also in processes occurring in the area of economic problems. In general, however, centripetal factors dominate over the centrifugal forces, which shows that there is a basis for coordinated action by the nonaligned nations on a number of economic problems within the framework of the struggle for a new world economic order.

Bulgarian scholar P. Petkov emphasized the fact "that if a new international economic order based on equality and justice is not established, this can have serious, negative economic and political consequences for everyone."

From the standpoint of prospects for the nonaligned movement's development and possibilities for increasing its role in international relations, the symposium also discussed the specific features of the nonaligned movement's organizational structure and its international legal formalization. Yu.I Alimov, who analyzed this matter in his talk, pointed out as a precisely defined trend of development in the nonaligned movement, processes of institutionalization manifested in a search for and the creation of new internal structures. One of the most important conclusions drawn by the symposium participants was that the role of the nonaligned movement is unquestionably growing in the contemporary international situation which has been drastically exacerbated through the fault of imperialism. This movement, in which the vast majority of the world's states are participating, is making a productive contribution to the resolution of important international problems.

Summing up the results of the symposium, G.F. Kim stated that it had thoroughly discussed a number of important problems not just of theoretical scientific importance, but of practical political importance as well. He underscored the fact that the interests of the nonaligned movement and those of the world socialist commonwealth objectively coincide both in the area of the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and imperialism and in the area of resolving problems of economic and political development for the liberated nations.


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CSO: 1807/268

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CAUSES OF PAKISTANI 'EXPLOSION OF UNREST' VIEWED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 14-17

[Article by V. Nikolayev and V. Ovlev: "Pakistan: An Explosion of Unrest"]

[Excerpts] An acute political crisis erupted in Pakistan in mid-August, 1983, which placed General Zia-ul-Haq's ruling military regime into an exceptionally difficult situation. This turn of events took many people by surprise. The regime had appeared too stable for that to happen. First of all, it is supported by the army, which has various advantages in a state of martial law. Support by the armed forces means that the current government has on its side not only the well armed and well trained army of almost half a million, but also several million other people--family members and relatives of the servicemen, etc.--whose material situation depends directly or indirectly upon it.

The course of the military leadership is supported by the main groups of dominant classes, since it conforms to their interests. Exceptionally favorable conditions have been created in the nation for private capitalist enterprise. The Pakistani bourgeoisie welcomes the suppression by the authorities of freedom of action for the trade unions, particularly the progressive ones, which act resolutely and consistently in defense of the rights of blue- and white-collar workers. The government's policy in the area of agriculture, particularly its rejection of agrarian reforms, has the approval of landowning groups.

The role of "defender of islam," which the regime assumed from the very beginning, won over to its side the orthodox traditionalists, who were dissatisfied with attempts made to modernize the society by Z.A. Bhutto (1972-1977). The role of the ulemas (Muslim theologians) grew as the military authorities islamized various areas of the society's life. They began to become extensively involved in the work of state agencies and to help with the drafting of various official acts and decrees.

The policy of islamization inside the nation and its role as the "Islamic world's" assault force against the "atheistic Afghan regime" and the course of developing cooperation with conservative regimes of the Near Eastern Muslim nations assured Pakistan considerable revenues also from the states rich in "petrodollars."
Economic conditions were also favorable for the military regime. Good weather conditions contributed to a marked increase in yields of the main agricultural crops and increased growth rates for agriculture, the leading sector of Pakistan's economy, during the period 1978-1983. With respect to industry, it should be borne in mind that Z.A. Bhutto's government, aware of the urgent need to rearrange its structure, took steps to develop the key branches. This cost a great deal, of course, and created a great financial burden on the nation. The main difficulties involved in restructuring industry had mostly been overcome when the military came to power, and Zia-ul-Haq's government could take advantage of the results of the previous efforts.

Naturally, the aforementioned benevolent attitude toward Islamabad on the part of the Western powers and conservative Near Eastern states also benefited Pakistan's financial and economic situation. Finally, the nation had substantial financial support in the form of revenues from Pakistanis working abroad. The migration, begun earlier, of Pakistanis to Persian Gulf nations which had grown rich from oil exports increased sharply at the end of the seventies. Approximately a half million people from Pakistan presently work there. Earning ten to fifteen times as much as they would receive for the same work in the homeland, the emigrants send considerable amounts of money home--3 billion dollars in 1982/83.

The government's domestic policy played a certain role in the preservation of the military dictatorship. From the very beginning it severely repressed every sign of opposition. The cutting edge of the repressions was turned against progressive forces, democratic organizations and militant trade unions, as well as against the former ruling Pakistani People's Party, which still held a fairly strong position in the Pakistani society. Zia-ul-Haq's government simultaneously conducted a policy of intensive maneuvering, social demagoguery, individual concessions, divisiveness, and the isolation and discrediting of its foes. The policy of islamization was of particular significance. It was accompanied by a massive propaganda campaign to create in the population the illusion that a "true Islamic society" was being built in Pakistan, a society of "universal prosperity and equality."

All of this taken together accounts for the lengthy existence of this, Pakistan's third military regime. It does not mean, of course, that the military have had smooth sailing ever since they came to power. Strikes by blue- and white-collar workers have flared up fairly frequently in various areas of the nation, and there have been demonstrations by students, various groups of the intelligentsia and the middle urban strata for better living conditions, for the restoration of civilian government and abolition of the military regime. Using the "carrot and whip" method, however, the authorities have coped fairly rapidly with these undesirable developments. The acute and prolonged political crisis which erupted in Pakistan in the summer of 1983 was therefore fairly unexpected.

It was preceded by the following events. Knowing that the openly military regime could not last for ever, Pakistan's leaders decided to accept its slow transformation, totally under their control, into a military-civilian regime under the shelter of constitutional and parliamentary institutions.
On 12 August Zia-ul-Haq announced that parliamentary elections would be held before March of 1985 and that martial law would not be lifted until then. He stressed the fact that Pakistan's future state and political structure would include broad authority for the president, as well as a National Security Council. All of this meant that the army and its leaders would retain actual power even if the military regime were abolished, that the army would retain the right to interfere in politics and to serve as arbitrator in the nation's political life. Finally, the constitution of 1973, which had not been officially abolished (one demonstration of the military regime's political maneuvering), should be "imbued with a spirit of Islam." In the opinion of progressive groups, this means that the people's democratic rights will be infringed upon under the cloak of Islam, and specifically that the right to vote and the right to run for election will be extended only to "truly orthodox muslims." This will provide the authorities with broad possibilities for getting rid of undesirable candidates and electors.

These plans of the government, which it formally called "a program for the restoration of democracy," were assessed by the opposition as an attempt to extend the existence of the military regime for a considerable length of time and then retain it under a bourgeois parliamentary guise. On 14 August, the 36th anniversary of Pakistan's independence, a campaign of civil disobedience to the ruling regime was begun as a protest against those plans. It immediately became a mass protest. It was led by the "Movement for the Restoration of Democracy" (MRD), a bloc of opposition parties, whose main demands were the immediate lifting of martial law, restoration of the 1973 constitution, and the holding of universal elections based on the constitution.* The MRD also advocates an independent foreign policy and strict adherence to the nonalignment principles. Despite certain differences among its members, the movement as a whole advocates the normalization of Pakistani-Afghan relations through talks with B. Karmal's government and the halting of Pakistan's use by the United States in its aggressive policy.

Initially, the anti-government actions consisted of peaceful demonstrations and meetings, as well as voluntary surrender to the authorities for imprisonment. Severe acts of repression by the government, however, the dispersal of peaceful demonstrations with clubs and tear-gas grenades, as well as plastic bullets of American make, harsh punishment for the participants (public floggings and strict prison terms with hard labor, and large fines), and mass arrests of political leaders, trade-union and student activists and popular public figures have made the movement violent (attacks on state institutions, the burning of police stations, etc.). The government has used not only the police, security forces and border units, but also the regular army, against participants in the movement. Hundreds of people have died as a result of the bloody encounters. Material losses have been great, and transport communications have deteriorated. The effects from the disruption of communications between Karachi, the nation's main commercial center and naval port, and Pakistan's other regions have been especially serious.

* This extensive bloc of nine parties with various orientations was formed in February of 1981. The former ruling Pakistani People's Party (PPP), formed by Z.A. Bhutto, had the leading role in it.
There have been actions against the regime throughout the nation—in Sind; in Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Sargodha and other cities of the Punjab; and in a number of populated areas in the North-west Frontier Province. The city of Quetpa, administrative center of Baluchistan, was caught up in a universal strike. Several parties and organizations, including the Pakistani National Party headed by prominent political figure G.B. Bizenjo, have joined the MRD since the movement started. Anti-American sentiments have grown in the nation since the anti-government campaign has developed. Many demonstrations have been carried out with slogans demanding that the Pakistani-American military collaboration be halted.

The nation's working class has consistently and resolutely advocated abolish-
ment of the military regime. Democratic-minded groups of the intelligentsia and the students have taken an active part in the anti-government movement. They have protested against the acts of repression and political persecution, despotism toward the individual, and the corruption and bribery which are eroding the management system. In addition, various groups of the intelli-
gentsia whose existence depends upon political activities (journalists, workers in the publishing field, etc.), have suffered directly or indirectly from the drastic limitation of those activities by the military.

Various professional groups making up the middle strata (lawyers, for example) have spoken out against the authorities. As the result of the islamization carried out by Zia-ul-Haq's government and its establishment of legal procedure based on the shari' a, a considerable portion of the cases have been removed from the jurisdiction of the lawyers, and they have suffered no less from the functioning of the military courts. Women's organizations have been active in the opposition movement, because the policy of islamization is oriented toward the restriction of women's participation in social and political and economic activities. The lower urban strata, whose situation continued to deteriorate in the conditions of increasing prices for essential goods, were the main force taking action in the street.

The most extensive and acute kind of struggle in the anti-government movement took place in Sind, where around one quarter of the nation's population (more than 20 million of the almost 90 million people) live. In addition, approx-
imately one third of the province's population is concentrated in Karachi, Pakistan's largest city. Mass anti-government demonstrations took place in Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, Dadu and other cities of Sind Province, and in rural areas. Thousands of people blocked the highway linking Karachi with the nation's interior regions. Several dozen other democratic and national-demo-
cratic parties and organizations took part in the movement along with parties in the MRD. Practically all the society's strata—blue-collar workers, trades-
men, the petite bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, white-collar workers, the lower urban strata and peasants, as well as various groups of landowners—took part in it. The latter participated in the opposition struggle mainly because the assumption of power by the military had reduced the possibilities which had formerly existed under the government of Z.A. Bhutto, who came from the large landowners of Sind Province, or the upper circles of Sind Province to influence the situation in the nation, as well as their access to state loans, subsidies and licenses.
In general, the fact that the movement was developed with general democratic slogans contributed to the fact that various groups of the population, including the propertyed strata, took part in it. Social and class demands were not moved to the fore, although each of the participants naturally linked his own aspirations with the elimination of the military regime and the establishment of a civilian government. When the workers rose to the struggle, for example, they were hoping that their living conditions would improve, should it be victorious.

The military authorities were not counting on suppressing the anti-government movement with acts of suppression alone, and they resorted to political maneuvering, social demagogy and individual concessions. Several generals were removed on charges of corruption, for example, a fact which the official propaganda naturally depicted as a demonstration of the administration's desire to eliminate that evil. The authorities announced an increase in allocations for economic development programs in Sind Province. Elections to local agencies of authority were held in September of 1983, and government circles described this "as an important step toward democracy." Government leaders announced that general elections could take place ahead of the stated schedule.

Zia-ul-Haq held a series of meetings with the leaders of parties which were not members of the MRD in an attempt to isolate it. Attempts were also made by the authorities to establish connections with right-wing and centerist elements of the MRD, in order to weaken and divide the movement. In addition, the authorities attempted to organize "a movement in defense of Zia" as a counterbalance to the MRD. Finally, a large-scale propaganda campaign was launched with charges to the effect that the opposition movement in Pakistan is "anti-patriotic," is directed against the nation's interests and is inspired by "outside forces." India was accused of interfering in Pakistan's internal affairs. In order to compromise the mass movement in Sind Province, it was depicted as a separatist movement, which allegedly had the objective of separating Sind Province from Pakistan.

Just the list of steps taken by the government indicates the scope of the opposition movement. The events occurring in Pakistan have revealed the extensive social and political isolation of the ruling regime. Some members of the dominant classes fear that continued retention of the undisguised military dictatorship could cause the opposition movement to develop a social and class orientation. They feel that it is therefore time to establish a civilian form of government to replace the military regime, which has already exhausted its potential to a significant degree. In other words, objectively speaking, it is a matter of concluding the current phase in the cyclical development of Pakistan's state-political structure: civilian government, military regime, civilian government again, etc.

Orthodox elements are accusing Zia-ul-Haq's government of deviating from "true islam" and are dissatisfied with the nature and the pace of its islamization. Many ulemas indicate dissatisfaction with the fact that the islamization process is being carried out by secular authorities, while they are involved only as advisers, and with the fact that the process itself does not have the objective of creating a theocratic system of government— that is, of transferring
power to the Muslim theologians. Practically all of the political parties demand that elections be held as soon as possible. This was the cause of the breakdown in talks between the government and the leaders of a number of them. Even in the army, the chief support of the ruling regime, there were fairly substantial disagreements during the period of the events we are discussing.

The foreign policy of Zia-ul-Haq's government, which is closely linked with the aggressive plans and actions of the USA in Southwest Asia, is causing universal dissatisfaction in the nation. Pakistan's conversion into a staging area for conducting the undeclared war unleashed by imperialist forces against the Afghan people holds danger for Pakistan itself, and is negatively affecting its foreign political functioning and relations with its neighbors.

The presence of a considerable number of so-called refugees on its territory is hurting the local population in an immediate sense; conflicts over plots of land, pastures and sources of water are not infrequent; and the already difficult problem of employment is being exacerbated. Well-off groups of the "refugees," who have significant advantages (they do not pay taxes, for example), are competing with local entrepreneurs, establishing themselves in business and buying up real estate, including land. In some industries (rug production, for example) they are competing successfully and creating pressure on the local entrepreneurs and tradesmen. Finally, the problem of drug smuggling has intensified along with the "refugee" problem. Pakistan has now become an important producer of drugs, which has developed into a real tragedy for it—drug addiction is now a real disaster.

A distinguishing feature of this acute political crisis in Pakistan lies in the fact that it erupted not as a result of some extraordinary circumstance such as a drastic deterioration of the economic situation, outside instigation or the like, but in an "ordinary" outwardly untroubled situation. One is struck by the fact that thousands and tens of thousands of simple people, who comprise the main force of the movement and who took to the streets despite the clubs and bullets of the punitive forces, were roused for the struggle by slogans which generally did not reflect their vital needs at all. This is due to the fact that broad popular masses in the nation continued to be in an extremely difficult situation despite advances made in the economic situation and the growth of macroeconomic indices. Not only has all of this not had a positive effect on the living conditions of the simple people, but it has been achieved to a significant degree at their expense, with an increase in exploitation and unemployment, increased inflation and rising prices for essential goods. The accelerated development of capitalism and the flow of "petrodollars" from the Near East are increasing social inequality and inequality with respect to property.

The difficult material situation of the bulk of the population and life on the brink of starvation are creating the constant possibility of a political upheaval. Broad, generally democratic slogans are turning this possibility into a reality, since they pose the specific and precisely defined task of eliminating the ruling regime, which the workers believe will improve their lives. Furthermore, participation in the movement by propertied groups, who are
naturally pursuing their own goals, is also drawing certain groups of workers into the movement as a result of traditional ties which have been preserved.

The future of Zia-ul-Haq's regime is still an open question. It is clear, however, that the broad democratic opposition movement is undermining its foundations and making a change in Pakistan's internal political life inevitable.


11499
CSO: 1807/268
INTERNATIONAL

KABUL PDPA FIRST SECRETARY PROFILED

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 30-32

[Article by L. Mitrokhin: "Afghanistan: The Gorkom Secretary"]

[Text] Six years---this is the age of the April revolution, which opened up the path of renewal for Afghanistan. In the time which has passed since 27 April 1978 the history of this nation and its people, headed by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, has accelerated its pace, as it were, bringing the Afghan society something new each day, each month. The changes occurring in the nation are especially perceptible in Kabul, capital of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

One immediately likes this person. It would be difficult to say what is most pleasing in him---his brilliant smile, his youthful enthusiasm or his special, soft pronunciation of the Russian language. He learned Russian here in Kabul. He also studied Hindustani and English here. In his 30 years Zuhur Razmjo, first secretary of the Kabul City Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, has mastered a large number of likeable qualities. What completely won me over, however, was the outstanding efficiency of the leader of the Kabul party members, his ability to calculate his time down to the minute and to respect the time of others, his ability to convince people, to explain the essence and the main direction of party policy, to encourage and to support one who is tired or has doubts about his own capabilities.

I had the opportunity to observe the gorkom secretary in the most diverse situations: addressing a meeting attended by 300,000 people to protest the imperialist military threat; taking part in a demonstration by 100,000 Kabul residents at the American embassy, conducted with signs reading "Hands off democratic Afghanistan!"; talking with the workers of Kabul enterprises; concentrated and collected while studying the barbarous acts of the counterrevolutionary underground; speaking with inspiration to a group of a half million muslims on the occasion of the religious holiday of Nouruz; and finally, resting in the family circle.
...I recall when I was just beginning to get to know Kabul. The day I arrived there a jirga (rally) of members of many of Afghanistan's numerous small ethnic groups and tribes was being held in Babur Park, the favorite site of relaxation for the city residents. At the center of the park, which dominates the city, stands the tomb of Babur, founder of the powerful muslim dynasty of the Great Moguls and important enlightener of the medieval East.

Words in keeping with the spirit of the time were heard that day at the pilgrimage site. Haji Kandagari, president of the National Patriotic Front of Paktia Province, stated in the name of representatives at the jirga: "We valorous and noble ethnic groups of Paktia are aware of our responsibility to the homeland and the revolution. We can clearly see who is our friend and who is our enemy. Therefore, no one can fool us. We shall defend our land to the last man. While such a sincere friend as the USSR is with us, imperialism and its allies will not succeed in implementing their criminal plans with respect to Afghanistan."

When the rally ended Razmoj and I sat down at the base of the Babur tomb.

"Tell me about yourself, Comrade Zuhur," I asked him.

...Abdul Zuhur Razmoj, who comes from the family of a middle-level state official, is of Bashko origin. He was born in the city of Laghman in 1952. He completed the lyceee there. He was not yet fifteen years old when he became a member of the PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan] and was soon in charge of a primary party organization. He then headed the provincial committee in Laghman. In 1976 he graduated from the Kabul Polytechnic Institute as a construction engineer for water engineering installations. He later worked as an associate there. He served in the army two years. He was an active participant in the April revolution. For some time after that—until 27 December 1979 (when Amin's anti-popular regime fell)—he was in the underground. During the first days of the new phase of the revolution he became a member of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]. From 2 December 1980 to the present he has served as first secretary of the Kabul Gorkom of the PDPA. He has been a member of the PDPA Central Committee since 1979 and a candidate member of the Politburo of the PDPA Central Committee since 1982.

"Amin's criminal group," Zuhur says, "focused its efforts on breaking up the party, destroying it, and all precisely at that time when, after completing the revolution, the PDPA was having to resolve extremely difficult problems in an extremely difficult political situation."

It became possible to change all of this only in the new and progressive phase of the revolution, when Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the Central Committee, assigned the nucleus of the PDPA the main task of restoring the unity of its ranks, reviving the climate of trust and mutual assistance and returning to the implementation of the agrarian reform (that is, practically implementing it anew), as well as implementing other democratic reforms, creating representative social organizations, etc.
"For those whom the people have trusted with power, to whom the people come and say: 'you make the decision!',' Comrade Zuhur says, "the experience of Great October, the Soviet experience, is an inexhaustable source of inspiration. We used that inspiration as we began to establish and build up party organizations and enterprises and in the villages, when we began perfecting the party work-style.

"In other areas as well assistance is derived from the revolutionary experience of the Soviet Nation, from Lenin's works, which teach us that the accomplishment of the revolution is only the beginning, that a people, especially a people such as the Afghan people, suppressed by feudal-communal and other prejudices, need real action and not declarations. In the beginning, to tell the truth, we thought that the most important thing was to convene a representative meeting, but it turned out that this is too little. It is far more important and more difficult, after all, to arrange for the city to be supplied with fuel and food, to resolve the acute housing problem, to have the factories, plants and cottage-industry enterprises.

"Some of the comrades who had experienced the tortures of the Daoud and Amin secret police did not understand that revolution is the enormous job of transforming the society, that all our strength, our will and abilities must be devoted to it. The romantic feeling of revolutionary struggle was also not alien to me, but the harsh, everyday, post-revolutionary reality proved to be far more difficult, although no less romantic, I would say.

"Difficult questions pertaining to the social and economic reforms, the fulfillment and surpassing of plans, mobilization of the workers to perform labor feats, defense of their interests and protecting the revolutionary gains are being raised and resolved today at gorkom plenums and at plenums of 11 Kabul district committees of the PDPA."

...On 8 March of last year I attended the formal opening of the kindergarten in one of the Kabul districts. Zuhur Razmjo cut the ribbon. He and the party activists had given many personal days-off (Friday is the nonworking day in the DRA) to take part in mass work Sundays to build that kindergarten.

At its opening the secretary of the Kabul gorkom made the following statement:

"Today, at a time when the flunkies of American imperialism are killing our mothers and children and burning mosques, schools, hospitals and medreses, we note with satisfaction that there is a powerful revolutionary party in the nation, which, despite the undeclared war against our nation, is putting forth an enormous effort to create a future for a happy and flourishing society."

As he showed us the new kindergarten, Zuhur said:

"This is a fine facility. Five buildings have been erected on an area of one hectare. A total of 250 little children will be taught here. Numerous workers, engineers, architects and artists voluntarily devoted long months of work to build this complex! In the next few months we shall build kindergartens like this on a volunteer basis in Harhana-menah and in the districts of Bulizharhi and Yakotot."
"In your opinion, Comrade Zuhur, what is the clearest sign of the times in the DRA today?" I asked.

"The people are squaring their shoulders," he answered, "and beginning to be aware of their strength. The party is increasingly gaining the trust of the workers.

"The prestige of the Kabul Gorkom of the PDPA has grown remarkably during the past year, and it enjoys particularly great influence at the industrial enterprises."

This fact is one manifestation of the overall enhancement of the PDPA's role in the life of the Afghan people. Speaking at the Military Academy of Afghanistan last year, Babrak Karmal, president of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, made the following statement:

"Our party now has 30 provincial, 2 (okruzhnyy), 70 city and (rayonnyy) committees, 114 (yuyezdnyy) and (bolostnoy) committees and more than 2000 lower organizations. You may recall that when the Afghan revolution triumphed our party had around 18,000 members. The number of party members and candidate members now exceeds 100,000. This is a powerful force."

The party has markedly increased and strengthened its ties with the people throughout the nation as it has in Kabul. This has clearly affected its composition. It has been transformed from an organization of professional revolutionaries into a mass vanguard of the people. Comrade Babrak Karmal emphasized the fact that workers and peasants accounted for 47.7 percent of the party candidates requesting to be accepted into its ranks during the first half of last year. The figure is as much as 50 percent in Badakhshan, Balkh, Herat and a number of other provinces.

...The regular weekly meeting begins at nine o'clock in the morning on Saturday, first day of the Afghan workweek, in the Kabul Gorkom of the PDPA. It is attended as usual by the secretaries of the capital's eleven (rayonnyy) committees and the directors of city departments and public organizations. Each of them reports on the situation in his sector, briefly, within a matter of minutes. The focus is on the main tasks facing both the nation and the Kabul workers—to improve the economy and the performance of industry.

Not all of the capital's enterprises are fulfilling their production plans yet. The plans themselves are something new for the Afghans. In order to organize production well on a planned basis, a great deal of organizational work is needed, and it is necessary to explain to each worker the importance of increasing labor productivity and fulfilling the planned assignments both for the state and for the worker himself.

The painstaking organizational and indoctrinational work performed by the Kabul party gorkom is already producing results. The gorkom's role was demonstrated especially clearly when counterrevolutionary bands put electric power lines in Kabul out of operation with sabotage and the city of more than a half million people was left without electric power. Under the personal supervision of Comrade Zuhur special detachments were rapidly formed to clear up the effects of the sabotage and to protect the electric power lines. The population was skillfully provided with an uninterrupted supply of water, food and fuel.
There are some new things in the work of the gorkom—meetings with Kabul's workers, "question-and-answer evenings" and visits to various districts in the city by gorkom workers. Many of the wishes expressed by the workers and their suggestions are discussed at meetings in the gorkom, and some of them are carried out.

Kabul is the capital of the republic and should set an example for the entire nation in the building of a new life—this is the main theme in the work of the Kabul City Committee of the PDPA. Kabul's revolutionary routine is a good example for the republic's other cities.


11499
CSO: 1807/268
ROLE OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN ARAB GULF STATES' INDUSTRIALIZATION

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84 pp 50-52

[Article by Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Yakovlev: "The Working Class of the Oil Monarchies"]

[Text] The press frequently provides reports on the development of industry in the oil-producing Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The populations of those countries are small, however. Who is building the industrial enterprises there, and who will work at them? Is there a working class in those countries? The following article provides answers to these questions, which were submitted by V. Nikolayev, a reader from Kursk.

The rapid economic development of oil-producing nations of the Arabian Peninsula has produced fundamental social changes there as a result of the oil revenues. Perceptible changes are occurring in the situation of the working class, which has grown appreciably and the national composition of which has been developed by the influx of foreign workers.

The rapidly growing working class in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Quatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates are still in the formation process. In Kuwait, which has advanced beyond its neighbors along the path of capitalist development, the first groups of skilled workers came into being in the forties. In the United Arab Emirates, where the 20th century actually began in the seventies, small groups of workers came into being only a few years ago in the modern sectors of the economy.

In our opinion, the main objective factors determining the specific features of the composition, the structure and the level of political maturity of the working class taking shape in nations of the Arabian Peninsula include, in the first place, the existence of oil, that valuable energy raw material, the development of which is producing considerable revenues; and in the second place, the speed and brevity of the class-formation process. The first enterprises of the Western oil companies were established in Arabia in the thirties and forties, and today the foundation of a national industry is being created there. The traditional factor is also of considerable importance. Its influence is indicated by the preponderance of medieval views and standards of conduct in the Arab workers.

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We should also mention such factors as the operations of Western oil companies in those nations and the implementation of a policy of industrialization and accelerated national economic development conducted by the national governments in recent years. The former has contributed to the birth of an Arab proletariat, the latter, to its development.

The workers in nations of the Arabian Peninsula do not yet form a single entity. G.F. Kim's description of the Eastern proletariat "as a broad, unconsolidated social stratum united mainly by its relationship to the means of production" is fully applicable to them.1

The contemporary state of the Arab working class is determined in great part by the nature of the economic development of the oil monarchies. There is every indication that their national economies will continue to be based on oil to the end of this century. Revenues from oil exports account for more than 80-90 percent of the national income.

The rulers of the Arab monarchies are spending a certain portion of the funds obtained from the sale of oil to develop the national economy, and since the second half of the sixties they have been making an extensive effort to diversify the economy and reduce their dependence upon the sale of crude oil. I would point out, for example, that in Arabia neither oil extraction nor oil refining or the petrochemical industry requires a large number of workers. The realization of social and economic development plans will most likely result in the formation of a relatively small, highly skilled proletariat. At the present time, however, an enormous number of workers is required in the Arab monarchies to complete the first phase of industrial development, and this is creating a problem with respect to workers.

The populations of the Arab nations increased considerably in the seventies, mainly the result of an influx of foreign workers. Native residents have been and continue to be in the majority only in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In Kuwait, however, they do not account for more than a third of the population even today.

Economic development in the Arab nations, induced until recently by the oil boom, has been accompanied by an increase in the size of the economically active population (Table 1).

The growth of the state and private sectors and the operations of Western companies in the seventies increased the influx of the local population, as well as the foreign work force, into the cities on the peninsula. None the less, the economic boom produced an acute shortage of workers in construction, and by the beginning of the eighties, in industry as well. The problem of workers in the oil monarchies involves primarily a shortage of skilled workers. It is being resolved primarily by using foreign workers under contract.

Until the seventies the Arab proletariat consisted mainly of oil workers in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Oil began to be extracted there in the thirties. By the beginning of the forties there were 3000 people working in the oil fields, while the number had increased to more than 7000 at the
beginning of the sixties. Most of the local workers were seasonal workers, however. They maintained close contacts with their tribes and regarded work for hire as a temporary job and a source of supplementary earnings. They would therefore work several months in the oil fields and then return to their former jobs. Nomads were frequently sent to the oil fields by the tribal sheiks, who would receive part of their wages. The nature of the hired labor in the oil fields of ARAMCO, BAPCO and other Western monopolies had a certain influence on the nomads, however. The regular wages, the acquisition of a skill and the sense of being a small part of the large team of a modern enterprise—all of this helped to erase the foundations of the traditional outlook and to establish new value orientations in the local population.

Personnel turnover in the oil industry dropped sharply in the sixties. The average length of service for a Saudi worker in ARAMCO was 14 years in 1965, for example. The former nomads, fishermen, pearl divers, peasants and tradesmen were becoming regular proletarians.

The reorganization of the oil extraction industry and the start-up of large new oil pipelines and modern refining enterprises will obviously result in an increase in the number of skilled workers employed in these branches of industry in the eighties. While more than 30,000 people were employed in Saudi Arabia's oil industry at the beginning of this decade, for example, it is estimated that the number will grow by another 10,000 by 1985.

Since the Saudi rulers attempt to employ primarily citizens of their own nation in this branch, this group of the working class is and will remain the nucleus of the Saudi proletariat, its most highly skilled and organized group.

The working class of nations on the peninsula is not being created at oil enterprises alone, of course. It includes such groups as construction workers, transport workers and workers in the oil and refining industries (Table 2). The number of construction workers has grown most rapidly in recent years. In Saudi Arabia they accounted for 12.8 percent of all the hired workers in 1970, 20.6 percent in 1975 and almost 30 percent in 1980. The government has even issued regulations forbidding the changing of jobs "unnecessarily," since many private construction companies were luring workers with higher wages.

The number of workers in transportation and in industry serving the domestic market (automatic assembly, food, paper) etc., is steadily growing. The proportion of people employed in the nonproduction branches (workers in the service field and municipal services) has been increasing sharply in recent years.

Until recently approximately one fourth of the Arab workers were employed in small and family-owned shops employing up to five workers or at small factories and plants in the state sector. Today, as large state industrial facilities are placed into operation and the national bourgeoisie is expanding its activities, the number of modern enterprises with a work force of 50 people or more is growing.
### Table 1. Populations of Arab Nations of the Persian Gulf (thousands of people)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saud.</td>
<td>8074 (2130) *</td>
<td>1500 (590)</td>
<td>7258 (2606)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1385 (391)</td>
<td>242 (177)</td>
<td>1007 (531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>716 (38)</td>
<td>60 (32)</td>
<td>295 (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>111 (66)</td>
<td>48 (40) **</td>
<td>128 (58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA (8)</td>
<td>150 (66)</td>
<td>78 (44) **</td>
<td>655 (456)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* Number of foreigners indicated in parentheses.
** V. Ozolins' estimate.


### Table 2. The Size and Structure of the Working Class in Arab Nations of the Persian Gulf in the mid-'70s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Saud. Arabia</th>
<th>Kuwait</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>Qatar</th>
<th>OA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extraction</td>
<td>28 000</td>
<td>4 500</td>
<td>1 800</td>
<td>7 000</td>
<td>6 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refining</td>
<td>113 000</td>
<td>22 000</td>
<td>13 400</td>
<td>16 000</td>
<td>6 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Services</td>
<td>100 000</td>
<td>6 800</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>90 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>236 000</td>
<td>30 000</td>
<td>15 300</td>
<td>7 400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>102 000</td>
<td>15 000</td>
<td>5 100</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>579 000</td>
<td>79 300</td>
<td>39 600</td>
<td>17 300</td>
<td>141 800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including foreign workers.


Foreign workers from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan are having a perceptible affect on the shaping of the Arab proletariat. Along with people from Palestine, the Yemen Arab Republic, Jordan, the People's Democratic Republic of the Yemen, Egypt, Syria and certain African nations, they presently comprise the majority and in many cases, the vast majority, of workers in Arab industry, construction and transportation.

The Arab states do not have a simple policy in this matter. In 1977 and 1978 most of them officially legalized the status of immigrants with a "long term of service," so to speak, but enacted strict measures to restrict the influx of new workers. The national and Western companies operating in Arabia were charged with assuring the departure of foreign workers from the state when the construction of a project has been completed and it has been placed into operation. The governments of Saudi Arabia and Oman have ordered local entrepreneurs to give jobs to foreigners only if they are unable to find local residents willing to take the jobs. The government of Dubai, one of the emirates of the United Arab Emirates, however, continues to keep its "doors" open and does not prevent the hiring of illegal immigrants. Qatar's Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has agreements on the use of workers with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan and is engaged in talks on this matter with Somalia. The government of Kuwait was the first to institute a policy of meeting the needs of national industry for workers mainly with foreigners, giving the native Kuwaitis the right to work in the more prestigious areas of the economy.

With a total population of 8.6 million for Saudi Arabia, the nation has more than 3 million foreigners, including more than 600,000 from Northern Yemen, 250,000 Egyptians, 200,000 Pakistanis, 80,000 South Koreans and 70,000 Philippines. Only 20.7 percent of the 1.3 million residents in the United Arab Emirates are citizens, while Indians make up 25.2 percent of the population, Pakistanis 19.8, Bangladesh citizens 0.8, Iranians 18.1, and Arabs 11.1 percent.

The extensive recruitment of workers from the Asian and African nations is due not only to economic necessity; Indians or Pakistanis are less politically dangerous for the Arab rulers. They ordinarily come for a period of 3 to 5 years and live in special camps separated from the local population. The desire for good wages (although four or five times less than those of the local workers), as well as linguistic, national and religious distinctions should, in the opinion of the government, totally isolate the foreign workers from the local residents, thereby eliminating their danger as a political force. In 1980 Indians and Pakistanis comprised more than 50 percent of the workers arriving in Kuwait. The portion of Arab workers (not local) was reduced to 38.3 percent, compared with 63.7 percent in 1977. The government intends to reduce that figure to 20 percent.

For the most part this reckoning has justified itself. The living conditions of the Asian and African workers are somewhat more difficult than those of the local population, however, and they disregard the danger of being deported and resort to organized protest. Pakistani workers staged strikes in Dubai (the United Arab Emirates) in 1977, and the Indians did so in Bahrain in 1974 and in Oman in 1978. There were disturbances by Turkish and Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia in 1976 and by South Korean workers in 1977. Although the authorities agreed to some concessions, they subsequently deported the organizers of the strikes. There have been no such protests in recent years.
In our opinion, the hundreds of thousands of foreign workers arriving under contract can hardly be considered a part of the Arab working class proper at the present time. For now the rulers of the monarchies are employing the method of regularly replacing certain skilled workers with others. They thus have a proletariat as a part of their productive forces, but have weakened it as much as possible as a political force and essentially excluded it from the Arab society's political life. Time will tell whether they will be able to retain this method in the future.

It is extremely difficult for foreigners not working under contract to be naturalized. In the United Arab Emirates, for example, citizenship is granted only to certain Arabs from nations of the Persian Gulf. Emigrants who arrived in the past, however, and have lived and worked in the nations of Arabia for a long time actually become a part of the Arabian society, comprising the society's lower level. A new language, so-called "Araburdia," has even developed out of the Arabic and Urdu languages.

In all likelihood this situation will continue during the decades immediately ahead. After all, a considerable portion of the Arab nomads and urban dwellers have no desire to engage in the physical labor which they consider to be "dirty" and "degrading." One can become a taxi driver, a guard or a soldier; one can go into business with the help of state subsidies; and finally, one can simply exist on state aid. "All of the Saudis have money and none of them wants to perform dirty work," one can hear people say in the oil kingdom.

At the same time it should be pointed out that certain Saudi and Kuwaiti businessmen (like Western businessmen operating in nations of the Arabian Peninsula) deliberately avoid hiring local residents. This is due to financial considerations. Labor laws apply to local residents, and it is therefore necessary to pay them the minimum wage, to build a mosque for them, etc. It is far more advantageous to use Somalis or emigrants from Bangladesh or other nations, who are practically without rights, since the laws do not apply to them.

The rulers of the oil monarchies, forced by circumstances to help create a working class, also understand the potential significance of an increase in its political role in the Arabian society. Oil workers were already playing a perceptible role in political life in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain in the fifties and sixties. They conducted mass protests and staged demonstrations and strikes with political as well as economic slogans. In the situation of overall growth of the national liberation movement they were able to achieve a certain improvement in working conditions, an increase in wages and in the passage of labor laws. Kuwait's workers succeeded in forming the Worker's Federation, the only trade union organization in that group of nations.

In an attempt to diminish the fervor of the worker's movement, Western oil-extracting companies and local governments sharply expanded their social programs aimed primarily at increasing wages and improving working conditions for Arabian workers.
The social status and standard of living of local skilled workers is relatively high at the present time—higher than that of the petite bourgeoisie, for example. At the same time, the skilled Arabian workers—yesterday's shopowners and tradesmen—ordinarily do not break completely with their "business." They frequently enlarge it, using the funds and knowledge obtained in modern, large-scale production.

The feudal rulers of the monarchies are employing a paternalistic policy in an attempt to convert most of the national proletariat into "a worker aristocracy," into a new base of social support. The situation of the ruling families in nations of Arabia in the immediate future will depend upon whether the economic and social plans are realized. They therefore do not spare the means to preserve "social peace" and "social harmony," using islamic slogans, among other things, for that purpose. All of this is making it possible to neutralize the political activeness of the proletariat to a significant degree.

The specific features in the development of the Arabian nations have made it possible for the workers there to obtain far more rapidly that which the Western proletariat achieved through decades of long and persistent struggle (an 8 hour workday, paid vacation, transportation to the job, monetary compensation in cases of injuries, etc.). The Arabian proletariat thus lacks many of the goals the struggle for which united and matured the working class in the developed capitalist nations.

In the decades immediately ahead the young Arabian proletariat will have to acquire new social values, become fully aware of itself as a social community, and gain an understanding of its class interests.

The situation of the working class basically reflects the conflicting, transitional state of the Arabian society itself as it follows the path of capitalist development.

**FOOTNOTES**

1. G.F. Kim, "Ot natsional'nogo osvobozhdeniya k sotsializmu" [From National Liberation to Socialism], Moscow, 1982, p 70.

2. MEED, 14 December 1982, p46


5. MEED, May 1982, Special Supplement, p3


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OLD CHINESE POLITICAL USE OF HISTORY, CULT OF PAST RULERS

Moscow AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA in Russian No 4, Apr 84, pp54-57

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Vasil'yev: "China: The Cult of the Wise, Ancient Rulers"]

[Text] It is a well known fact that a real cult of ancient, wise rulers was formed in ancient China. All of the most important aspirations of the people are supposed to have been fulfilled so successfully, so completely and perfectly and such a level of flawless functioning of the administration is supposed to have been achieved through their efforts that subsequent generations needed only to duplicate and, most importantly, not to alter that high standard. The di-dao ("path of the di-rulers") ideal was even formulated at the end of the Zhou period (11th-3rd Century B.C.), which was perceived as the golden age. It was later replaced by the wang-dao age ("path of the wang-rulers," something like a silver age). Legendary wise men Yao, Shun and Yu came to be regarded as model di-dao rulers.

There would appear to be nothing surprising in this. Just about every ancient civilization is well acquainted with such concepts and ideals, not to speak of the so-called cultural heroes, reverence for which is known to practically every ethnic community. This includes the most backward groups, which are being carefully studied by anthropologists today. There is something unusual in this case, however. One of the first to spot it was Chinese investigator Gu Jiegang, who noticed that neither in the Yin oracular inscriptions nor in the Early Zhou inscriptions on bronze is there any mention of Yao, Shun or Yu. The first information on them is contained in the Shu-Jing history book. With respect to the legendary prototypes of the cultural heroes (Huangdi, Shennong, Fuxi and others), who came before Yao, Shun and Yu, their names appeared in Chinese texts even later. This is a paradox. The further removed from events, the greater the detail and the more brilliant the embellishments used for recounting the past. Why is this?

The unusual thing about Chinese mythology lies in the fact that while the ancient Chinese myths developed, as they always do, at the level of ordinary consciousness of people and their traditions, at a certain time they began to be subjected to a vigorous and purposive transformation process, which amounted to the didactic historicizing of the legendary traditions of antiquity. This process began fairly early and was carried out extremely systematically. This
is why so few nonhistoricized myths were preserved in pre-Han (that is, Zhou) texts, whereas during the Han era, when there was an extensive inflow into the ancient Chinese tradition of that of many neighboring peoples taken into the empire, everything changed. There appeared numerous cultural heroes, sometimes part animal and part human, with incredible transformations, wizardry, etc. In short, mythology is represented only in Han and post-Han texts, whereas the principle of didactic historicizing was absolutely dominant in the Zhou texts. The latter is what resulted in the formation, based on concepts of the mythical ancestor-heroes and vague legends of the tribes making up Zhou China, of the cult of wise, ancient rulers.

The emergence and the vigorous implementation of the process of historicizing the Zhou myths goes back to the time of the Zhou conquest, when the administrative principles were formulated by Zhou-gong.* They include two in particular, the undeviating adherence to which in time became the foundation of China's political culture. One is the practice of making a cult of the lessons of history and the wisdom of ancient rulers, and the second involves the use of historical precedent almost as the decisive argument in political theory and practice. Both principles, of course, are based on the thesis introduced by Zhou-gong on the ethical determinant as the fundamental principle for the successful functioning of a political administration and on the necessary interpretation of history. The interpretation of any historical event may be strained or distorted, the event may even be rewritten or artificially altered until no longer recognizable, but it must be interpreted in a manner whereby it will serve the political tasks of the present day to the optimal degree. It was the task of the day in early-Zhou China to create idealized images of wise rulers of the past, who skillfully realized their sacred virtue of de.

The vague legends about real events of the past gradually began to converge and then to merge with mythical associations with that past and concepts of it, and this marked the beginning of the aforementioned process of historicizing myths and the closely related process of creating a linear chain of ruling wise men. In the traditions of early-Zhou China, as they are recorded in "Shujing," that chain began with Yao. The first chapter of that canonical book, "Yao dian," describes his deeds. This is what it says.

Yao was so respectful, brilliant, educated, sincere and peaceloving that word of his merits spread throughout the land. Possessed of remarkable abilities and virtues, he brought first his relatives and then the people, and later the entire world, into a state of harmony, as a result of which an era of prosperity and harmony set in. After ruling for 70 years Yao began looking for a successor. When it was suggested that he make his son his successor, he refused (Zhu is insincere and cantankerous. How would he ever cope with the responsibilities?!). Nor was Gun a suitable choice. He had failed in an assignment to control flooding and was rejected. Finally, Yao announced that only Shun,

a commoner, was worthy of taking the ruler's place. Although his father was
stupid, his stepmother a liar and his stepbrother arrogant, Shun himself was
restrained and had not become embittered, and he managed to live in harmony
with them. Yao agreed to test Shun, for which purpose he gave Shun two of his
daughters as wives, ordering them to be respectful.

The results of that experiment are described somewhat more extensively in the
second chapter of "Shujing," which is entitled "Shun dian." In brief, this is
what it says.

After justifying the expectations—among other things, by having good social
and family behavior—Shun became the regent. He continued to concern himself
with observations of the heavenly bodies and with chronology, made sacrifices
to original ancestor Shangdi and the other deities, and regularly inspected
the land on all four sides of the world (he visited them all in five years,
and the governors of those territories came to see him four times). Shun
established 12 provinces, wrote the code on sentences (those who accidentally
stumbled were forgiven, while those who persisted were severely punished), and
punished the improvident—and everyone acknowledged his authority. Yao died
in the 28th year of Shun's regency, and the entire nation remained in mourning
for 3 years. Shun then officially assumed the functions of head of state in
the temple of his ancestors and appealed to the governors of the 12 provinces
to be kind, magnanimous and patient, and to respect the gifted and the virtuous.
He also asked for the names of those who could help him. Upon receiving the
recommendations, he appointed Yu to be in charge of flood control, Qi to handle
agricultural problems, Xie to oversee relations among people, etc. Typically,
at least a fourth of the newly appointed officials felt it necessary to refuse
their positions, to give them to other candidates, more deserving in their
opinion. Orders were then issued to include the latter in the group of official
responsible for the corresponding area of administration. The chapter ends with the statement that Shun himself inspected the work of his assistants
once every three years, demoting or promoting them in accordance with their
success.

Both chapters contain very extensive information. Let us try to analyze it
from the standpoint of our subject. The great Yao came to head the world
because of his outstanding abilities and virtues, which were, in turn, essen-
tially the function of his de. It was de which permitted him first to bring
those close to him, then those more remote and finally, everyone, into a state
of harmony (notice the structure of the sequence of logic, subsequently so
typical of the ancient Chinese thinkers). De, or bliss, is not inherited, and
Yao himself chose a successor from among the worthy candidates after first test-
ing him and even making him a relative. Shun, who demonstrated the correctness
of his selection with his successful performance while Yao was still alive, used
similar methods: His retinue of assistants was made up only of people recom-
mended by the council of elders. The candidates sometimes considered it their
duty to recommend more worthy individuals in place of themselves. In addition
to the central administration, Shun also had assistants in the provinces and
regularly checked on the state of affairs in the localities, while the regional
al governors in turn traveled to the center—and four times as frequently—to
make reports (obviously, also bearing gifts).
At the end of Shun's almost 80 years of rule, he began seeking a successor just as Yao once had, and found him in Yu, his first assistant, who had achieved considerable success in flood control and with land development projects by that time.

"Shujing" does not contain a chapter which describes Yu's rule in detail. This gap is filled in by the second chapter of Sim Qian's work "Shi ji" [History Notes], written in the 2nd and 1st centuries B.C. It states that Yu tried to decline the honored appointment, but Shun remained firm in his decision. Yu then ruled the world with skill and vigor. When it came time for him to step down he attempted to hand over power to his assistant Yi. Following the three years of mourning, however, the latter withdrew, leaving power in the hands of Yu's son Qi, whom the world already knew and had come to love. Thus the Xia Dynasty began with Qi, or more precisely with Yu himself. Its first rulers were conspicuous for their de, whereas the last ruler, Jie, lacked it entirely, as a result of which he was overthrown by the virtuous Yin Cheng Tang. The latter founded a new dynasty, the dynamics of which took approximately the same turn: Cheng Tang's last virtuous descendant lost his rule. Heaven once more passed on its mandate to rule in the world to one who possessed de. These were the Zhou leaders Wen-wang and Wu-wang.

There can be no doubt that the entire historiographic concept, from Yao to Wen-wang, was basically formulated during the first Zhou centuries, following Zhou-gong and up to the time of Confucius. The latter's teachings precisely describe many details in that pattern and give all the names of the great rulers. "Oh what a great ruler Yao was!" Confucius exclaimed. "How grand he was! Heaven is great, and only Yao measured up to it!" One might assume that the entire plot was introduced into the ancient Chinese tradition by Confucius himself, who is considered to be the editor and compiler of all the early texts, including the Shujing. This would appear to be all the more logical, since all of the legends referred to are literally replete with Confucian principles—in any case those which later came to be considered just that, Confucian (this will be discussed in greater detail later in the article). We have to reject this assumption, however.

Information contained in many ancient Chinese texts convinces us that the concept of the existence of great, ancient wise men was advanced and thoroughly elaborated before the middle of the first millennium B.C. and that the accounts of Yao, Shun and Yu were accepted after that by all the Chinese as legends long-known and well-known to each of them, as an indisputable national treasure, as that cultural tradition which was expected to unite all those involved in it, setting them apart from foreigners. If this is the case, however, then who created those legends, when were they created, and on what basis?

With respect to authorship, we know that the position of historiographer always existed at the courts of the rulers—and not just that of the Zhou wang, but also at the courts of the individual princes, or gongs—throughout the entire Zhou era, including the early period. His duties included that of recording the most important events in the kingdom, and highly important speeches and conversations of the ruler and his assistants. These historiographers ordinarily handled their job with seriousness and responsibility and attempted
particularly to describe the truth—the truth as they perceived it, of course. They sometimes paid dearly for this. For example, when Qi, ruler of the kingdom, was killed by his minister in the year 548 B.C., the historiographer recorded: "Cui Zhu killed his lord." The official was executed, and his younger brother took his place. The latter made the same entry in the record—and was also executed. Yet another brother followed their example—and with the same result. It was not until the same entry had been made in the record by yet another brother of the executed men that Cui Zhu backed down. That episode and others like it make it possible to determine the authors of the records, most of which, to be sure, have not survived to to the present. It also helps us to see that there were officials—and professionals at the Zhou courts, whose duties included the writing of accounts of current events.

We are entitled to assume that some of the people whose hereditary profession was that of keeping the records might have attempted to recreate those glorious deeds of the past, the oral legends of which still lived in their time. Brought up in the spirit of those principles of political culture, which were established by Zhou-gong and eventually became the standard for all of Zhou China, the official historiographers would have had to be loyal to that interpretation of the events of early history, which stemmed from those standards and principles. They simply could not write past history—precisely because of their honesty and sincerity and their devotion to a cause in which they believed—other than in a form conforming to the accepted views. In other words, they could not create that kind of integration of events in their records (information about which was vague or contradictory, based on oral legends generously alternating with mythical concepts, totemic associations, etc.), which conformed to their conviction that everything was and had to be exactly as it was, and not any other way. It is possible that these records were reviewed from generation to generation, that certain changes and additions were made in accordance with the dynamics of the concepts which had developed.

And so, the officials we have been discussing were apparently the ones who, during the first centuries of Zhou (from Zhou-gong to Confucius), shaped the written historiographic tradition in the spirit of existing standards of political culture and, following that tradition, elaborated and interpreted the legends of antiquity and myths from the distant past correspondingly. This was not an easy task, of course. The legends had to be densely entangled with totemic images and motifs. It was necessary to "purify" them, to give them a reasonable, historicized appearance and then to describe them in that image, free of mythical overlays, as the deeds of wise men and rulers who actually existed. A familiarity with later Chinese texts (Han and post-Han), in which information on the great wisemen of antiquity is presented in its original form, convinces one that the job was most likely precisely that, and that the task of sober-minded historiographers describing actual events involved, first and foremost, precisely the "purification" of oral legends of the mythological web in which they were entangled.

These texts have been assembled in the book "Mify drevenago Kitaya" [Myths of Ancient China] by Yuan Ke (Moscow, 1965), and one can learn many interesting things from them. For example, a magic tree grew from a step of Yao's stone stairs. A pod grew on it each day during the first half of the month, which fell off one a day during the second half, and one only had to look at the tree
to know what day of the month it was. Gao Yao, in charge of court cases, had a magical ram which would always attack only the guilty person, and this made it considerably easier for his master to perform his duties. At the end of the century of rule by Yao, an old man gave him the seeds of a magic pine, upon eating which one could live to 200-300 years. Yao was so busy with his work, however, that he simply did not find the time to eat the seeds. With respect to Shun, his eyes were not like the eyes of everyone else. They had double pupils. His wives, Yao's daughters, were sorceresses and more than once saved their spouse from the intrigues of his brother Xiang (possibly an elephant or having certain features of an elephant—a trunk, for example), who wanted to destroy Shun.

There is hardly any need to go on with this. Certain colorful details striking in their relationship to mythology could, of course, be a result of later overlays or even borrowings (Xiang-the-elephant, for example). It is doubtful that all of this was newly thought up, however, or that the Han writers did nothing but "contaminate" legends about the nation's wise rulers. This could have appeared as nothing but blasphemy in China at that time. It therefore seems most likely, as already mentioned, that original or poorly developed mythological tales of those very legendary heroes who were turned into real, successive historical figures, into a model of the wise ruler, were reflected in the oral legends recorded in the Han. Strictly speaking, this is precisely what the process of historicizing the ancient Chinese myths amounted to: While acknowledging the supreme will of Heaven, the rationalistic Zhou political culture always had a negative regard for myths, sorcery, superstitions, spirits etc., a fact stated extremely unequivocally by Confucius, among others.

It was not merely a matter of re-examining the ancient myths at all, of course. This was only one aspect of the process. There was also an attempt "to link" the legendary heroes to a specific time and place, to fit them into some newly devised line of ancient, wise rulers, the very existence of which was to give additional weight to the early-Zhou compositions on the course of history and the role of the ethical determinant in it. It is only natural that ancient legends with any degree of suitability were used for that purpose. Neither the Yin nor the Zhou listed these wise men as among their ancestors, and their names are therefore not even mentioned in authentic sources (inscriptions on bone and bronze of the Yin and the beginning of the Zhou). Just where did they come from? It is most likely that these were the semi-legendary leaders of tribal groups allied with the Zhou, legends about which, embellished with patterns of magic, were well known in the oral tradition of the beginning of the Zhou. It was they who ultimately became the great wise leaders of the world in deep antiquity. Why did this occur? Who needed it, and for what? What contributed to it?

When Zhou-gong advanced his concept of the historical process with his idea on the mandate from Heaven and his replacement, and on the ethical determinant (the presence or the absence of de) as the basis for betraying the will of Heaven, he gave as his argument the dynamics of two dynastic cycles—the Yin cycle (from the great Cheng Tang to the insignificant Zhou Xin) and the semi-legendary Xia cycle which preceded him (from the great founders of the dynasty, the names of which were not mentioned, to the insignificant Jie). The argument
carried weight and was apparently adequately convincing. With all its convinc-
ingness for the contemporaries of Zhou-gong, however, the system of argumenta-
tion was clearly imperfect and incomplete. An extremely significant link was
missing—the name of Xia's ancestor, with praise for his merits and virtues.
Finally, the beginning of the process was missing: just what had come before
the hereditary dynasties? After all, the principle of hereditary power was an
novation of extremely recent origin at that time. Other standards had previ-
ously prevailed, specifically, the election of headmen and leaders on the basis
of personal merits and abilities. All of these voids had to be filled. The
complete and precise, strictly linear pattern. Such a pattern was created
(most likely the first such pattern, which laid the foundation for many similar
patterns so extensively represented in the ancient Chinese texts). This histor-
ical pattern goes from the legendary, wise and virtuous Yao through the unrelated
Shun, and the line then passed through Yu, unrelated to Shun, to the Xia
Dynasty, after which the principle of inheritance of the ruler's power prevailed.
The pattern was complete, and its completeness reinforced the arguments once
formulated by Zhou-gong, which gave his name and his actions additional import-
ance. This is not all, though.

A far more important element contributing to the emergence and establishment of
the pattern was the didactic stress on the exultation of the ancient, wise
rulers. The creation of such a cult was certainly not just a matter of the
need to consolidate and sanctify the ruler's power. Both the one and the other
had long since become a fact of China's political culture. The glorification
of the wisdom and the virtues of the ancients was designed to create the stand-
ard of proper administration, adherence to which assured success and prosperity
for the nation and the people, whereas any deviations were fraught with fail-
ures and even the collapse of the structure. What did that standard consist of?

The world was to be governed by great and wise rulers possessing both virtue,
or de, and the abilities required for bringing the nation and the people into
a state of harmony.

The method by which power is transferred (a hereditary dynasty or the selection
of a worthy individual) is not as important as the "throne-to-the-worthy" prin-
ciple itself.

The worthy ruler works without respite for the common cause. He is required
to look after everything: calculation of the calendar, agriculture, public
works, music, ceremonies, dissemination of information, etc. In all these
areas the ruler is assisted by people advanced on the basis of their abilities.

Both the rulers and their assistants must soberly assess their capabilities and
in case of doubt or uncertainty (sometimes due to modesty), recommend others to
take their place.

The ruler is required to establish strict control over the management of the
nation, personally visit the regional centers and reward or punish those in
charge on the basis of their merits.
The ruler is the father of his people. Beginning with those closest to him, he then exerts his influence on those remote and then on everyone. This is why everyone observes a three-year period of mourning at this death (as for a father).

Within the system of social, moral and even spiritual values which arose in Zhou China, the wise ruler of antiquity became the center, as it were, the pinnacle, the normative model, the universal ideal. This became all the more important beginning with the Western Zhou (beginning in the year 771 B.C.), when the ba-dao (path of rule by those who have strength) principle became established, and the administrative praxis in the independent kingdoms which arose out of the independent early-Zhou principalities, was a long way from the ideal described. It was only natural that in this situation at least part of the educated upper circles of the Zhou society began to develop something of the order of nostalgia for times long past, when the world seemed to be in proper order, its rulers were wise and virtuous, their assistants were altruistic and capable, and the people prospered. This longing for the idealized past did even more to promote the cult of the wise, ancient rulers, during the life of which the world, it seemed in retrospect, had been one big family, virtue was rewarded, and vices brought punishment.

The foundations of political culture thus developed and took shape in approximately the situation described in ancient China, which in time began to develop preferentially in the stream of Confucianism and therefore acquired a corresponding image.
DEVELOPMENT OF SANDINISTA STRATEGY, ORGANIZATION, IDEOLOGY

Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian, No 5, May 84 (signed to press 26 Apr 84) pp 83-95

[Article by Candidate of History N.Yu. Smirnova, under the rubric: "The CPSU and the World Communist Movement": "The Shaping of the Party of the Nicaraguan Revolution"]

[Text] American imperialism is the chief oppressor of downtrodden peoples and the main military, ideological-political and economic center of international reaction. Socio-economic and political conflicts and antagonism between the working classes and strata, on the one hand, and imperialism and the oligarchy, on the other, are becoming increasingly potent in the nations of Latin America. A revolutionary situation is emerging in many nations of that continent, and the peoples are rising up for a liberation struggle against imperialism and its henchmen.

Not all of the efforts will produce success, V.I. Lenin wrote, "until the struggle is directed by a strong organization of revolutionaries." 1 This has been borne out by all the experience in history.

The anti-imperialist, popular revolution in Nicaragua laid the foundation for profound socio-economic and political changes when it destroyed the Somoza dictatorship in July of 1979. One of the central tasks facing the revolutionaries who came to power was that of organizing a party of Nicaraguan workers capable of leading the revolutionary process in the nation at the democratic stage of development and of creating the conditions necessary for its further expansion.

The process of forming a revolutionary party in Nicaragua was a difficult one and has actually not yet been completed. However, we can already see that definite successes have been achieved in the creation of the party, despite the extremely difficult internal and external conditions for developing the revolution in the nation.

The uniqueness of Nicaragua's social and political structure, which began to develop with the establishment of the Somoza regime in the nation in the thirties, has produced a number of specific features in the national revolutionary process. One of these was the formation of a revolutionary front prior to 19 July 1979 and the gradual creation of a workers' party by the Sandinistas
after they gained power. The Nicaraguan experience in this area of revolutionary creativity is of value to other peoples fighting for their total liberation. This has made it necessary and urgent to study that experience.

This article is an attempt to analyze the history of the creation and development of Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front and to review the efforts of the Sandinistas to strengthen the role of the SNLF [Sandinista National Liberation Front] in the nation's social and political life today and ultimately, to build a party of the workers in the situation of a victorious revolution.

Nicaragua's history has been marked by repeated popular demonstrations against imperialist domination, particularly that of the USA. This has given the people experience in combating foreign and local oppressors and has developed the forms and methods of the popular, anti-imperialist movement. Participants in the national liberation war of 1927-1933 led by Augusto Cesar Sandino, Nicaragua's national hero, revolutionary and patriot, made a special contribution to this experience. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of that war. The main task of the revolutionaries in Nicaragua in the twenties and thirties was accomplished. The American invaders were driven from the nation. Experience was acquired in conducting armed, anti-imperialist warfare and the partisan movement, and this experience influenced subsequent development of the anti-Somoza actions. Sandino and his fellow fighters chose armed warfare as the main form of struggle. This was understandable in the situation of American occupation of the nation. The Sandinistas considered the partisan movement, with broad participation by the popular masses, to be the main element in the anti-imperialist war. It was precisely due to their active popular support that Nicaragua's patriots succeeded in liberating the territory from the presence of U.S. armed forces.

The first period of the liberation movement in Nicaragua ended with the defeat of the Sandinistas and A.S. Sandino's murder, which was carried out in 1934 at the order of A. Somoza Senior. After the establishment of the Somoza dictatorship everything possible was done to erase the names and the feats of the Sandinistas from the people's memory with overt terror and to destroy the combat and literary legacy of A.S. Sandino and his fellow-fighters.

The anti-imperialist, anti-dictator struggle in Nicaragua, which was halted for a time, was gradually stepped up once again at the end of the thirties and especially in the fifties. Demonstrations against the dictatorship were renewed, and attempts began to be made to organize armed actions against Somoza.

In the mid-fifties a new generation of Nicaraguan revolutionaries began the systematic study of the traditions of anti-imperialist movements, particularly of the period when A.S. Sandino was active, in a quest for effective ways to combat the Somoza clan. The young revolutionaries also began a critical study of the work of the Nicaraguan communists, who united into the Nicaraguan Socialist Party [NSP] in 1944. First of all they concluded that Sandino's experience had demonstrated the possibility of conducting a successful armed struggle in Nicaragua over a long period of time. In the situation of military and political dictatorship it was decided to pursue the struggle by armed means.
This decision was supported also by the unsuccessful anti-dictatorial efforts of the NSP members, who were falling back in the economic struggle.

Nicaragua at that time was an agrarian nation with a backward economy. The working masses, concentrated mainly in agriculture, were employed in the cities at enterprises turning out semi-finished goods. In general, the working class had not yet developed in the nation. The Nicaraguan proletarians had a low level of class awareness. They were fertile soil for the spread of reformist ideas and sentiments.

By the mid-fifties, for these and other reasons, the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement was faced with the task of creating a military-political organization capable of mobilizing the masses to combat the Somoza regime and of leading them in the overthrow of the dictatorship. The matter of forming one of the main elements of the subjective factor for the future revolution in Nicaragua was added to the agenda.

The example of the Cuban revolution, which was victorious in January of 1959 and which reconfirmed the fact that armed struggle comes to the fore in a situation of military-political regimes, also influenced the decision of the Nicaraguan revolutionaries to organize a military-political association.

In 1961 a group of young fighters consisting of Carlos Fonseca, Silvio Majorga, Jorge Mavarro, Jose Benito Escobar, Tomas Borge and others, together with A.S.Sandino's comrade-in-arms Santos Lopes, founded the National Liberation Front. It was given Sandino's name in 1963 as though to symbolize the linkage and succession of the old and the new guard of revolutionaries in Nicaragua. "I believe it is our duty to take action," Carlos Fonseca wrote, "but there can be no action without organization." 2

During the first years of the Sandinista Front's existence the main stress was on preparing for and conducting armed actions against the Somoza regime. During the period from 1961 to 1967 the Sandinista actions were mainly carried out in the form of attacks and incursions into Nicaraguan territory from across the border. The following must be mentioned among the conquests of the initial period of the SNLF's operations: elimination of the disunited nature of anti-dictatorial, armed actions of previous years, which were isolated operations by various anti-Somoza groups; the practical combining of the anti-imperialist, democratic traditions and forms used for Sandino's struggle with the demands of Nicaragua's revolutionary movement in the sixties; and the systematic, gradual uniting of revolutionary elements round the SNLF. Furthermore, the experience of the first years of armed struggle met with the broad political response within the nation. It demonstrated once again the possibility of conducting a guerrilla--that is, a partisan struggle--in Nicaragua itself.

The period of the SNLF's development coincided with the years of increasingly severe methods of control in Nicaragua by the Somoza dictatorship. This was manifested in the employment, with the support of imperialist circles of the USA, of such forms of aggression against the people as murder, torture, the persecution of trade union organizations and rigid censorship. It was also linked with the assumption of power by Anastasio Somoza Junior and even more
thorough concentration of the controls of the state and military machine in the dictator's hands.

The actions against the dictatorship continued, however, despite the unleashing of overt terror to suppress any expression of popular dissatisfaction. A number of anti-Somoza actions by various social groups were crowned with success at the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies. Several groups of political prisoners were freed as a result of mass protests by students, blue- and white-collar workers. Teachers organized an extremely long strike in 1970, and in 1972 residents of a number of the nation's regions rose up to protest the hiking of prices. The years 1973 and 1974 were marked by mass strikes by city workers and actions by the peasants in various of Nicaragua's departments in defense of their land holdings.

Events of 1972, when an earthquake occurred in Nicaragua with the epicenter in Managua, the capital, also did a great deal to strengthen anti-dictatorial sentiments and to create the conditions necessary for organizing extensive opposition in the nation. Residents of the urban regions suffered as a result of this disaster, and most of the production enterprises were demolished. There began unprecedented speculation in housing construction and the sale of parcels of land for development. The dictator and his nearest relatives were the main participants in these machinations. The general misfortune of the people brought them enormous profits. This resulted in even greater exacerbation of conflicts not only between Somoza and the laboring people, but also between the Somoza clan and various groups of the propertied classes.

While A. Somoza's first term as president ended at the end of 1971 in a situation of worsening economic and political conditions in the nation, the situation deteriorated even further in 1972. All this produced the conditions necessary for the gradual formation of an extensive anti-Somoza coalition of various social forces. The Sandinistas also had specific tasks to perform in this respect, the main one being to reinforce the SNLF's position among the population and to strengthen its internal structure, which would make it possible for the Front gradually gain the role of military-political vanguard of the anti-dictatorial forces in Nicaragua.

As early as 1969 the SNLF prepared and adopted its first program, which formulated the goals of the struggle at the democratic stage of the revolution in Nicaragua. The program defined the Front "as a military-political organization, the strategic mission of which is to take over political power by destroying the military-bureaucratic machine of the dictatorship and to establish a Revolutionary Government based on an alliance of workers and peasants and uniting all the nation's anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchical, patriotic forces." 3

In subsequent documents the Sandinista leaders developed the idea that the "SNLF should gain strength as Nicaragua's first popular and proletarian political force," which differs from the others in its understanding of the historical role of the proletariat and its faith in a proletarian military-political organization. 4
During that period the Sandinistas were devoting a great deal of attention to the work performed among the urban workers and those in the rural areas. Many of the leaders and cadres at the middle and lower levels in the Sandinista Front came out of the worker milieu. Furthermore, part of the founders of the Front were linked with the Nicaraguan Socialist Party and possessed skills and experience in dealing with the workers, which helped the SNLF members to strengthen their influence among the latter.

Despite Nicaragua's poor economic development and its small proletariat, the SNLF leadership constantly demanded that the Front members devote special attention to the workers at the factories and outside the factories, in the residential areas. Carlos Fonseca repeatedly stated that the workers have to be given an understanding of their historical role. This brought about participation by the Sandinistas in the trade union movement and in the organization of city trade unions and various committees for the struggle.

In the meantime reality was creating the task of forming a broad anti-dictatorial alliance, that is, of enlisting workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, the petite bourgeoisie and the local bourgeoisie as a whole for the struggle against the Somoza forces. Fonseca called that alliance of anti-dictatorial forces "an underground political front." In order to accomplish the task it was necessary to enlarge and strengthen the Front's organizational structure. Fonseca wrote the following "An Appeal to the Nicaraguan People" in 1970: "We call upon you to organize underground Sandinista committees capable of heading the partisan struggle in the social and political sense in the rural areas, in the mountains and in the cities. An underground Sandinista committee must be formed at every factory, in each block, at every training center, in every office and church." 6

Beginning in 1970, and especially following the events of 1972, the Sandinistas launched a vigorous effort to create a network of its cells throughout the territory and increased its influence in each department. During those years regional, zonal, district and primary Front committees under the supervision of the SNLF's highest body, the National Directorate were being organized.

The SNLF was created to perform the tasks involved in an armed struggle against the dictatorship. It therefore had no duplicate structures, military and political, but only a single military-political structure. The process of building up the Front's forces - cadres, weapons and so forth - developed especially intensively during the period from 1970 to 1974. The Sandinistas would not only have to engage in a prolonged partisan war, but also to create the conditions necessary for uniting all the nation's anti-dictatorial forces round the Front.

One of the first actions carried out after the Front had built up its forces was the operation conducted by the Sandinistas on 27 December 1974. It was code-named "Juan Jose Quesada." 7 It was an aggressive propagandistic, military-political operation and was to accomplish a number of tasks. It was directed against A.Somoza's second assumption of the position of national president as a result of a rigged election. It also helped the Front to achieve satisfaction of a certain portion of the demands it had set for the dictator - the release of some of the Sandinistas from prison, the publishing of some of the aims
of its program in the press, and others. In general, the operation resulted in strengthened positions for the Sandinistas among the masses.

Frightened by the scope of the Sandinista movement, Somoza established a fascist regime in Nicaragua after usurping presidential power in the nation. The militarization of the regime and its adoption of a fascist orientation further increased Nicaragua's dependency on North American imperialism, because after that the USA's economic aid was extended primarily for reinforcing the military machine of tyranny. Martial law and military tribunals were established in Nicaragua, and a campaign of persecution was launched against the progressive press, progressive forces in the Catholic church and religious sects criticizing the regime, not to speak of the working masses which did not agree with the legalized policy of genocide. The physical extermination of the Sandinistas began. The dictator made it the task to totally destroy the SNLF.

Events following the December operation in 1974, right up to the armed actions by the SNLF in October of 1977, demonstrated that the Sandinistas' hopes for a general national upsurge in the revolutionary movement and the rapid overthrow of the dictatorship had not been justified. Acts of repression against the Sandinistas had prevented the partisan movement from becoming aggressive and made it difficult to develop the armed struggle of the Sandinistas.

In general, a revolutionary situation with its characteristic features of which V.I.Lenin spoke had not developed in the nation. The subjective factor in the revolution was still weak, and the resolve of the masses to back up the Sandinistas for overthrowing the dictatorial regime had not come to fruition. The SNLF had not yet become the military and political vanguard of all the anti-Somoza forces. This task became absolutely urgent for the Front after 1974, when the dictatorship was spurning no effort to destroy the Sandinista Front.

All of this forced the Sandinistas to thoroughly analyze their work and the forms and methods of their struggle against the dictatorship. This resulted in a demarcation of views on a number of tactical issues within the leadership of the Sandinista Front.

However, the SNLF's experience indicated precisely that they should accept as correct those principles of the Front which had comprised the basis for its activities prior to the split in the Sandinista ranks: The general line of the anti-Somoza movement must be one of constant armed struggle with broad participation by the popular masses. Precise organization of the armed struggle itself at the general, national level and active work by the revolutionaries among the masses were essential in order to launch such a struggle. The accomplishment of these two tasks was progressing only gradually, however, and many objective and subjective difficulties were being encountered on the way. "It would not be reasonable," wrote Eduardo Contreras, one of the SNLF leaders, "to think that the Sandinista revolution is the result of the abilities and the art of a small group of people. Our revolution is something greater than that.... The deprived classes are the true agent of our liberation."
By the mid-seventies the SNLF on the whole was a military-political organization with a precisely defined structure, with military subdivisions and an ideological and political platform expressed in the SNLF's program documents.

Commenting on the various viewpoints which existed in the Front at that time, Fonseca characteristically made the following statement in one of his works written in the last year of his life (1976): "Let us consider the linkage between the party and the partisan struggle.... Any real revolutionary party is born in battle, and while Cuba is the best-known example for us, this does not mean that it was the first. The parties also came into being in battle in Russia, Vietnam, China, Korea and Algeria.... Let us not forget that we are not just taking the first step. There is a minimum of 15-20 years of work behind us. ...Although we do not yet have a party with a central committee and congresses, newspapers and theoretical journals, it is essential to accomplish certain party tasks right now. We need to study national problems at a higher level than we previously have, especially in the zones of combat operations; to combine the military training more thoroughly with the political training; to strengthen our ties with the exploited masses; to avert an ideological split in the SNLF; to step up our political work without detriment to the military work.... Would it therefore not be more correct to say it is still early to call ourselves a party as we accomplish all of these modest tasks"? 10

In 1977 the Sandinistas began permanent combat operations against the dictatorial regime, relatively isolated from the masses in the beginning but growing into united actions by all the nation's anti-dictatorial forces somewhat later.

As a result of those operations in 1977 and 1978 it became obvious that it was essential to unite the political and military efforts of the Sandinistas and to work out a common plan for the offensive against the dictatorship. In March of 1979 representatives of the three trends signed a declaration restoring the Front's unity. R.Arismendi stated in an analysis of the Nicaraguan revolution that "the results were soon in evidence in both the political respect and with respect to unitary program and tactical operations." 11 This permitted the SNLF to unite all the anti-Somoza organizations and groups more closely round itself.

The Somoza dictatorship was overthrown on 19 July 1979. The Sandinistas came to power in an alliance with the nation's anti-dictatorial forces.

When the Sandinistas and their allies came into power they faced the tasks involved in the democratic stage of the revolution as defined in the program of Nicaragua's Government of National Reconstruction and based on the previous program demands of the Sandinistas.

When they defined the main directions for developing revolutionary reforms, the SNLF indicated "the two main forces: the mass organizations and the state system." 12 The most important tasks of the SNLF, which the Sandinistas regarded as an integrated whole, were therefore those of organizing the working masses into unions and conducting a state policy conforming to the interests of all the laboring people. In addition, the Sandinista Front had to have its own cadres
both in the mass organizations and in the state system for accomplishing those tasks. The matter of organizing a revolutionary party out of the SNLF as the nucleus of the political system for the Nicaraguan society therefore assumed prime importance in the democratic stage of the revolution.

The Sandinista leaders have repeatedly stated that "in the difficult and complicated stage of national reconstruction it is the SNLF's main objective to eliminate the remains of exploitation and create a new society.... It is essential to direct attention to the highest organization, the only organization capable of leading the revolution through to its ultimate goals, the only one capable of leading the mass organizations and all of the people to total liberation.... This is why it is important to have a revolutionary party in Nicaragua...." 13

After coming into power and directing the first democratic reforms as a military and political organization, the SNLF set itself the task of reorganizing the Front structure as soon as possible to permit it to head the state system and mobilize the masses to implement the democratic program. The Front's organizational restructuring was begun. The SNLF's military functions were turned over to the revolutionary armed forces, and the Front's highest organs and its middle element of control were formed in the capital and in the nation's departments. The regrouping of the Sandinista cadres in the different areas of work had been completed and the main structure of the SNLF had been formed by the end of 1979.

In 1980, however, the Sandinistas were forced to admit that the existing structure did not measure up to the essential demands, that the small organizationally established number of revolutionaries was not adequate for the Front to perform the role of political vanguard of the revolution. The need to organize a revolutionary party was officially raised at the 3rd Assembly of the SNLF in September of 1980. The problem of creating "a new type of revolutionary party" began to be discussed in organs of the SNLF's press. This was the beginning of the active preparation of public opinion for the establishment of a progressive party of the Nicaraguan workers. The Assembly also approved changes in the Front's organizational structure, which were to bring the system of directing and other bodies of the SNLF into closer conformity with the party structure. 14

For one thing, it was decided to establish the Sandinista Assembly as a consultative and auxiliary level of the SNLF's National Junta for making important decisions pertaining to the Front's charter and program, to the policy of the class and political alliances within the nation, to questions of international relations and to the development of main directions and forms of work to be performed with the masses.

The SNLF also established the Political Commission of the SNLF, consisting of three members of the Front's National Junta. It replaced the former Executive Committee. Bajardo Arse Castano became its coordinator. This commission was required to represent the National Junta in the intervals between its working sessions and to handle all questions of the National Junta of the SNLF, specifically coordination of the work of the State Commission and the Commission for Defence and Security, which were formed along with the Political Commission.
The State Commission was encharged with monitoring the fulfillment of plans for Nicaragua's economic and social development and the functioning of state institutions. The other commission had the same sort of functions, but in the area of national defense and security.

The National Secretariat, the Front's main executive body, was reinforced by adding to its membership two members of the National Junta. Responsible for the implementation of SNLF decisions and for the implementation of its political line, the National Secretariat had a number of sections for those purposes, which were reorganized in September of 1980 into Front departments for the various areas of work.

The National Junta with its former make-up continued to be the Front's chief directing body. One of the specific features of the revolution, collective leadership of the SNLF, was thereby established.

Along with establishing the new Front organs the Assembly also stressed the importance of building up the middle management level. The creation of organizations at the lower level was regarded as an extremely important task. The Front was represented in the departments by departmental management committees, and zonal management committees operated in the zones. The structure at the lower level was to be formed of primary Sandinista committees. It was their chief task not just to implement SNLF policy, but especially to involve the broad masses in the implementation of the national restoration program and plans, and to develop their evolutionary creativity and initiative. 15

These basic organizational reforms outlined at the September 1980 Assembly of the SNLF marked the beginning of the process of shaping a revolutionary party and helped to strengthen the Front's organizational structure and to reinforce its ideological positions.

The first Session of the Sandinista Assembly in February of 1981 was an important landmark in the process of creating the new party. It discussed economic and military matters and the Front's links with mass organizations. A great deal of attention was also given to matters of party organizational development.

By decision of the Assembly, two commissions were established: one to write the charter for the Sandinista Front and one to study the role of the Nicaraguan working class in the revolution. Honored Sandinistas were accepted into the Sandinista Front. In general, the first Session of the Sandinista Assembly of the SNLF played an important role in the founding of the party. The establishment of the two aforementioned commissions was also highly important.

It is important to note that in 1981 the Sandinistas were already underscoring the fact that the SNLF was "the vanguard of the working class and of the entire Nicaraguan people," since in addition to workers, the Front ranks also included representatives of the peasants, blue-collar workers and the intelligentsia. 16
At the same time the Sandinistas continued to devote a great deal of attention to the work performed among urban and rural workers and to the advancement of revolutionary elements of the working class to positions of leadership and the middle and lower levels of the SNLF.

By performing the directing role in the process of the democratic reforms, by uniting the more consistent revolutionaries and by setting the goal of building a new society free of exploitation in Nicaragua, the Sandinista National Liberation Front itself thereby served as the foundation for the establishment of the revolutionary party.

The party's organizational development also involved the uniting of revolutionary elements round the SNLF and their gradual integration into the Front. A group of members of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party headed by A.Ramirez joined the Front in January of 1981, for example. The founding of the Patriotic Revolutionary Front served the same purpose.

A number of factors simplified the establishment of a revolutionary party in Nicaragua after 19 July 1979, despite the fact that the process had not been completed. In the first place, the Sandinista Front was in power, permitting it to mobilize all available resources for the achievement of that specific objective. In the second place, in matters of building a revolutionary party in Nicaragua's situation the Sandinistas had guidelines in the form of the legacy left by the founders and leaders of the SNLF, who died in the seventies. In the third place, the international experience of the liberation movement and its assistance to the SNLF were highly important for the accomplishment of the task. In addition to this, the functions of a political organization were established in the Front when it was founded and had been performed by it along with the military functions throughout the period of struggle against the dictatorship.

An example of the initial phase in the formation of a Nicaraguan revolutionary party by the Sandinistas against the background of general patterns in the building of a revolutionary party makes it possible to identify certain specific features characteristic of the given period. The SNLF was used as the basis for beginning the organization of a revolutionary party in Nicaragua. The proletarian party is being organized in a nation with a poorly developed working class with an inadequate class awareness, and this will undoubtedly be one of the difficulties which the Sandinistas will have to overcome. Finally, the Sandinistas intend to create the party by gradually integrating into it the more revolutionary elements of the leftist parties, particularly the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. This can also be identified as a specific feature of the Nicaraguan experience.

As it organized the revolutionary party the SNLF devoted a great deal of attention to strengthening its leading role in the revolutionary process. As the nucleus of the Nicaraguan society's political system, the work of the SNLF required strengthening the Sandinista positions and reinforcing the Front's leading role in the area of state and political relations in the process of creating mass revolutionary organizations on which the Sandinistas could rely in the performance of their work.
The Sandinistas set for themselves the task of establishing precisely defined and correct relations between the Front and state agencies, believing that the "SNLF does not take the place of the state, that its objective is to assure the functioning of the state as the administrative and executive body, and to give it a political orientation." 17

The political activities of the Sandinistas embraced all aspects of state life. The Directing Council of the Government, the Government Council, the State Commission of the SNLF, primary Sandinista committees, the State Council and certain other bodies were created during the first two years, which assured the Sandinistas a leading position in the society and the state.

From the very beginning of its functioning the Directing Council was the chief legislative body in Nicaragua. By July of 1981 the Sandinista Front was represented in it by one member of the National Directorate of the SNLF, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, and by SNLF member Sergio Ramirez Mercado. In directing the work of that agency, the SNLF exercised its influence primarily through D. Ortega, coordinator of the Directing Council.

The Government Council was formed for purposes of providing the centralized system of control over the expanded state management structure, including various state institutions, ministries and so forth. Directors of the main centers of the economy, including ministers-and-members of the National Directorate of the SNLF, were members of the Government Council.

The State Commission of the SNLF was formed in September of 1980 to strengthen control in the state system. Front leaders stated that "it does not dominate the ministers and does not displace them, but endeavors to support the revolutionary work in the ministries and departments through the primary Sandinista committees." 18 Defining the most important tasks of the Sandinista committees, the National Directorate of the SNLF in turn underscored the fact that the committees "are to see to it that all the workers and the ministries receive revolutionary political indoctrination." 19

Along with the primary Sandinista committees, which perform the functions of the Front's primary party organizations, the SNLF also used the State Council, as the nation's most representative legislative body, for that purpose. The State Council actively contributed to the implementation of national reconstruction plans and involved the masses 'in the new type of political work to make it possible for them to protect their interests and take part in the political administration of the state." 20

Joint work by state and mass organizations under the leadership of the Sandinistas was therefore a characteristic feature of national life.

Another distinguishing feature in the work of the Sandinistas involved the discussion of their plans with various groups of the population prior to effecting highly important measures in the nation. "Face the People" meetings, in which members of the Directing Council discussed current and long-range tasks of the revolution together with various groups of the workers, were one method
of seeking solutions to the problems facing the revolutionaries. Letters from readers, their criticisms and suggestions were printed in BARRICAĐA, official press organ of the SNLF, under the rubric: "The People's Mailbox." These and other measures carried out by the Sandinistas helped to stimulate participation by the masses in the revolutionary process and to implement a common and specific policy with a good knowledge of the situation and with broad reliance on the workers.

Another extremely important element in the work of the Sandinista Front, as the nucleus of the society's political system, was its relations with Nicaragua's political organizations.

The founding of the Patriotic Revolutionary Front in July of 1980, which united the leftist revolutionary parties--Nicaraguan Socialist Party, the Independent Liberal Party and the Popular Social Christian Party--was an important accomplishment for the Sandinistas. The Patriotic Front formed the initiative of the SNLF, became a coalition of revolutionary political alliances with influence among blue-collar workers, the anti-bourgeois, the intelligentsia and white-collar workers. However, the fact that the Nicaraguan Socialist Party had frequently held dogmatic positions, while the two others were petit bourgeois parties and vacillated on certain revolutionary measures, had a negative effect upon the work of the Patriotic Front and weakened the revolutionary forces as a whole. The work performed by the Front during the first two years was recognized as inadequately effective by all its members. None the less, in July of 1981 both the Sandinistas and the leaders of the other leftist parties underscored the fact that "the Patriotic Revolutionary Front is an example of the unity essential to Nicaragua." Despite its shortcomings, the Patriotic Front could become the basic system for strengthening the bloc of revolutionary forces and uniting all the democratic class and social groups. Activities of the Patriotic Front such as supporting the SNLF programs of economic reform, mobilizing the masses and agitating for them to join the Sandinista People's Militia, implementing specific measures to unite the working class, participating in the forum on national problems, and so forth, increased the influence of the revolutionary forces, particularly that of the Sandinistas, in the masses and by July of 1981 had established a trend toward a stepped-up activity by the Patriotic Revolutionary Front.

Proceeding from Lenin's tenet that "you cannot win with the vanguard alone," the Sandinistas endeavored to create mass revolutionary organizations and to reinforce existing Sandinista associations of various groups of the population. The Sandinistas defined the main task of the mass organizations as that of "strengthening the political plan for the revolution" and its democratic stage. The Front leaders assigned the mass organizations the following tasks in addition to that: "...To bring all social strata into the organizations; to express the political, economic and social demands of the masses; to help achieve the tasks outlined for the economy; to take part in the reforming of the state; to reinforce the work of establishing a militia; to take an active part in the campaign to wipe out illiteracy; and to work among the members of the organizations to enhance their political awareness."
The revolutionary authorities established the right of the working masses to organize. In 1981, 85 percent of the workers belonged to trade unions, 80 percent of which were members of the Sandinista Central Trade Union of Workers. 28

The Sandinistas devoted a great deal of attention to organizing a single central trade union of blue-collar workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and white-collar workers. The establishment of the National Coordinating Trade Union Center in November of 1980 was the most important achievement in this area. It included all of the main, mass Sandinista organizations and became the organizational foundation for an alliance of the broad popular masses.

All of the Sandinista trade unions were represented in the State Council. Their performance in the council is a further demonstration of the correctness and the importance of Lenin's tenet: "Do not fear the initiative or the independence of the masses. Trust the revolutionary organizations of the masses, and you will see in all areas of state life... the strength, grandeur and invincibility of the workers and peasants...." 29

Despite the fact that the process of involving the workers in the mass organizations developed rapidly, it was not singularly successful.

Noting the difficulty of organizing the masses, the Sandinistas identified three main elements: "...The limited possibilities of the mass organizations due to the brevity of their development, the limited possibilities of the revolutionary state, and the difficult international situation." 30

In order to overcome these difficulties the Sandinistas are constantly working with the masses, carefully studying their problems advancing activists devoted to the revolution.

The experience in performing economic, political and social tasks over a period of two years has shown that it would have been impossible to develop and protect the revolution without increasing support of it by the masses. And so, the influence of the revolution is expanding. The ever-increasing role of the mass revolutionary alliances has demonstrated this. The results of the work performed by the Sandinistas and leftist parties allied with them to organize and consolidate the masses on the side of the revolution permit us to conclude that they succeeded in organizing the popular masses within a historically brief period of time.

Neither in the struggle against the military-political tyranny of the Somoza family nor following the establishment of revolutionary-democratic power on 19 July 1979, has the Sandinista movement ever attempted to "export the revolution" to neighboring nations as the present Washington politicians unceasingly assert. National with respect to its tasks and its historical heritage, and popular because of the social forces making it up, it has always personified the most profound and progressive aspirations of the Nicaraguan people. Founded by such revolutionaries-and-nationalists as Carlos Fonseca and his fellow-fighters and born under the influence of the achievements of the world revolutionary process, it has also always had a profound class meaning. In this respect the Sandinista movement has developed and continued to develop as a part of the world revolutionary process, particularly the revolutionary
events occurring in Latin America. This is confirmed not only by all the
domestic democratic reforms carried out by the new authorities during the four
years of the revolution. The foreign policy course of the Nicaraguan government
is also important proof of this. Nicaragua's active stance in the UN in defence
of states struggling against imperialism, racism and reaction, in defence of the
Arab people of Palestine, on the matter of settling the conflict in Central
America, which arose as a result of the Reagan Administration's hardened aggres-
sive policy, and other aspects of Nicaragua's actions in the world arena are
clear proof of the fact that the Nicaraguan people are advancing along the path
of progress and democracy not only for the sake of their own interests, but for
the good of the world's other peoples as well. Fidel Castro's statement that
the Nicaraguan revolution has managed to unite around it a great liberating,
democratic, anti-imperialist alliance of revolutionary forces has therefore
become even more valid today. 31

This quality of the revolution has continued to develop since the overthrow of
the dictatorship. Many nations are increasing their cooperation with and assist-
tance to the young republic. The socialist states, particularly the USSR, have
an important place in this process. When the Nicaraguans gained their historic
victory the Soviet government immediately sent a telegram to the patriotic and
democratic forces of the nation, wishing them success in the building of a new
Nicaragua. From the first days of creative revolutionary work by the Nicaraguan
brothers, friends from the socialist nations have proceeded hand in hand with
them. Aid is being provided by the socialist nations in the fields of power
engineering, mining, the textile industry, the fishing industry, geology, public
health, culture, and the training of national cadres. In many cases metal
blanks from the USSR, synthetic materials from the GDR and components for the
production of soft drinks from Czechoslovakia are being successfully used in
place of those previously received from the capitalist nations.

"This year," Daniel Ortego, coordinator of the Junta of Nicaragua's Government
of National Reconstruction, has said, "we shall be commemorating the Fiftieth
Anniversary of the death of Hero Sandino. His ideas served as the basis for
establishing fraternal friendship between the people of Nicaragua and the
soviet people. These fraternal relations are manifested at all levels, in
relations between the parties and in state relations." 32

FOOTNOTES


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14. Information on changes made in the organizational structure was taken from the SNLF journal PATRIA LIBRE, No 7, 1980, pp 52-55.


17. Ibid., p 55.

18. Ibid., p 55.

19. Ibid., pp 55-56.


27. Ibid., p 12.


29. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 34, p 204.


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CSO: 1807/260
REGIONAL MEETING OF ASIAN, PACIFIC YOUTH IN ULAANBAATAR

[Editorial Report] Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 16 August carried on page 3 a 300-word article by correspondents O. Kulish and S. Uyanayev on the opening of the regional meeting of the youth of Asia and Oceania in Ulaanbaatar. The Soviet delegation was headed by V. Aksenov, chairman of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations.

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 August publishes a 300-word article on page 3 which reports on the conference "The Youth of Asia and Oceania in the Struggle for Peace, Security, and Cooperation" held under the auspices of the regional meeting of Asian and Oceanian youth in Ulaanbaatar. The participants were greeted by General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Republic and Chairman of the People's Great Hural Yu. Tsedenbal. Speakers at the conference included V. Aksenov, chairman of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations and L. Tudev, first secretary of the USSR Committee of the Mongolian Revolutionary Union of Youth. [Cueto Abelardo], representative of the Cuban Union of Youth, spoke with correspondents O. Kulish and S. Uyanayev about the common concerns of youth.

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 18 August carries on page 3 another 500-word report from correspondents Kulish and Uyanayev on the youth meeting. They head from Valid Masri, president of the World Federation of Democratic Youth who was present at the meeting in Ulaanbaatar.

Moscow KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA in Russian on 19 August carries on page 3 a 700-word report by Kulish and Uyanayev on the closing session of the regional meeting of Asian and Oceanian Youth in Ulaanbaatar. Speakers at that session were Binoy Bishvam, chairman of the Commission of Asia and Oceania at the Buro of the World federation of Democratic Youth and a French member of the World Federation of Democratic Youth delegation Jean Claude Kennedy.

CSO: 1807/320
INTERNATIONAL

BRIEFS

FRENCH CP OFFICIAL IN UZBEKISTAN—(UzTAG) Mirey Bertran, a member of the French Communist Party Politburo, has spent several days in the republic. [Excerpt] [Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 21 Aug 84 p 1]

FRENCH ARTISTS' DELEGATION IN BAKU—(AzerINFORM) A delegation of the Association of French Artists is visiting Azerbaijan. It is in the USSR at the invitation of the USSR Ministry of Culture and Union of Artists and is headed by Arnaud d'Autronie, member of the French Academy and president of the association. The delegation visited the Azerbaijan Union of Artists and met with its chairman of the board, Yu. I. Guseynov. It also visited the Azerbaijan Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and met with its presidium chairman, Nabi Khazri. [Summary] [Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 9 Aug 84 p 3]

FRENCH CP OFFICIAL IN AZERBAIJAN—(AzerINFORM) Louis Vianne, a member of the French Communist Party Politburo who is visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, has spent 3 days in Azerbaijan. Louis Vianne was received by R. E. Mekhtiyev, Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee secretary. On 10 August Louis Vianne will leave for Simferopol. [Excerpts] [Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 10 Aug 84 p 2]

FINNISH COMMUNIST IN BAKU—(AzerINFORM) Erkki Kivimaki, general secretary of the Finland-Soviet Union Society and head of the Finnish Communist Party's Cooperation Publishing House, is visiting Azerbaijan. He is visiting the Soviet Union as a guest of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. He visited the Azerbaijan Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and met with its presidium chairman, Nabi Khazri. [Summary] [Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 22 Aug 84 p 3]

FRENCH CP OFFICIAL IN BAKU—(AzerINFORM) Andre LaJoinie, Politburo member and Central Committee secretary of the French Communist Party, who is in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, has spent 3 days in Baku. On 18 August Andre LaJoinie left for Simferopol. [Excerpts] [Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 19 Aug 84 p 1]

ITALIAN CP AIDES IN AZERBAIJAN—(AzerINFORM) A group of responsible workers of the Italian Communist Party [ICP], who are in the Soviet Union at the
invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, have spent 4 days in Azerbaijan. The Italian guests made a trip to Sumgait, where they had a meeting in the party gorkom. The ICP responsible workers were received in the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee Foreign Relations Department. On 11 August the guests will leave for Simferopol. [Excerpts] [Baku BAKINSKIIY RABOCHIY in Russian 11 Aug 84 p 3]

WEST BERLIN CP AIDE IN BAKU--(AzerINFORM) Rudiger Kusserov, assistant to the chairman of the West Berlin Socialist Unity Party, who is in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee, has spent 3 days in Baku. R. Kusserov was received in the Foreign Relations Department of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. On 31 August the guest will leave for Moscow. [Excerpts] [Baku BAKINSKIIY RABOCHIY in Russian 31 Aug 84 p 4]

INDIAN MUSLIMS IN UZBEKISTAN--A delegation of Indian Muslims, headed by Dr Said Asrarul Haq, president of the committee of national unity and a member of parliament, has arrived in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The guests from India will visit, besides Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Tashkent and other cities in Uzbekistan. [Excerpts] [Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 15 Jul 84 p 2]

FRENCH CP OFFICIAL IN TASHKENT--(UzTAG) Roland Leroi, French Communist Party Politburo member and L'HUMANITE political director, is acquainting himself with the life of Uzbekistan. On 10 July Roland Leroi was received by R. Kh. Abdullayeva, Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee secretary. [Excerpts] [Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 11 Jul 84 p 1]

INDIAN COMMUNISTS IN UZBEKISTAN--(UzTAG) A group of Indian Communist Party [CPI] members, headed by Choudhuri, party national council member and first secretary of the Orissa state CPI organization, has visited Uzbekistan. The CPI members were received in the Tashkent Obkom. [Excerpts] [Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 7 Jul 84 p 1]

ANDERSON ENDORSEMENT REPORTED--The election tussle in America is becoming increasingly acute. Reagan and Mondale are trying their utmost to vary their reciprocal accusations, attacks and reproofs. Both of them are trying to make allies out of well-known political and public figures. From this angle Mondale's success in getting a politician of such prestige as John Anderson on to his side may be noted. Four years ago he stood as an independent candidate in the presidential election, and now Anderson has come out in support of Mondale. According to the American press, in his statement of support for Mondale Anderson said that he is most of all concerned about the threat of a continuation of Reagan's foreign policy for another 4 years, and his decision to support Mondale by the problem of Soviet-American relations and the arms race. In Anderson's view the continuation of the arms race and the lack of talks are a tragedy for mankind. [From "The World Today" program presented by Igor Fesunenko] [Text] [LD292319 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1855 GMT 29 Aug 84]

CSO: 1807/309
MISTAKEN AMNESTY, ITS CONSEQUENCES

Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 11 Jul 84 p 13


[Text] The man was given amnesty and released.

He returned home to his family and work and began to put into order a life shattered by disaster. He lived with the feeling that he had been born again. One evening, 9 months after his release, with no explanation, they took him away from his home.

They later explained to him and his wife that he had been released by mistake; in processing the documents, one of the officials had made a mistake in the dates.

He was returned to the prison colony. And in the colony they announced that he will also have to serve at the place of confinement those 9 months when he was able to enjoy some happiness illegally, because the "legal clock" had stopped, as it were, during that time. And now it has started again, counting off long months, weeks, days, minutes....

In a few lines, I stated the plot of the event. Now let us delve into it more deeply to extract a social-moral lesson.

For a quarter of a century after graduation from the electromechanical department of an aviation institute, the person about whom we are talking (I am not giving his last name so as not to cause him further trauma, especially since he is now in the hospital in serious condition) worked conscientiously and honestly at a large airport as an engineer. His wife is a kindergarten teacher and he has a 14-year-old daughter. No longer young, he was thinking about graduate study. It is worth mentioning that one of his passions is cars. He did not have his own car, because the family budget amounted to hundreds rather than thousands of rubles. But in the summer, when he visited relatives in the south, he was empowered to drive an automobile.

And disaster struck because of this car. (I hope that the lawyers will forgive me for treating with poetic license an event belonging in the stern bed of one of
the articles in the Penal Code.) Disaster. Sitting behind the wheel, he drove along a winding southern road. A relative sat next to him. On one of the turns, he lost control of the vehicle, it rolled over, and the relative was killed.

The person behind the wheel lived but was seriously injured. He was unconscious for several days. He was treated and later tried and sentenced to 6 years.

The convicted person and his lawyer wrote countless appeals: there was no expert opinion of an automotive technician showing that the driver was at fault rather than defects in the steering mechanism, there were no analyses confirming that the person behind the wheel was intoxicated, etc. I will not enumerate all of the arguments of the defense, not because they are unworthy of confidence but because his guilt or innocence is irrelevant to the subject that concerns me.

He was released not after 6 but after 2 years by a commission looking into the cases of convicted persons subject to an amnesty declared in honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. And, as the reader already knows, he was released by mistake, that is, illegally, in the strict juridical language.

What was the mistake made by the official in processing the documents? The director of the medical department of the institution where our convict was serving his sentence got some dates mixed up. He wrote that a disability (under which this person was included in the corresponding article of the amnesty) had been ascertained for him on 29 January 1982, whereas in reality this disability had been determined on 29 January 1983 rather than 1982, that is, not before the ukase on the amnesty, which was issued at the end of December 1982, but afterwards.

The amnesty commission that looked into his case and released him made its decision in March 1983. It is possible that an overly emotional reader will cry out impatiently: what a formality! For he already had the disability corresponding to that particular article of the ukase prior to the time of the work of the commission for prisoner release. Does it play any role if the disability was established a month earlier or a month later? For they released a truly seriously ill person, which was attested to by authoritative documents. And that is all that matters, the rest being merely deference to the letter of the law.

But we are not going to give free rein to our emotions, let us leave them for "afterwards." The letter of the law is not at all void and empty or just a rhetorical "figure." This is the foundation upon which the normal social life of the society is built, without respect for the letter of the law there can be no respect for the spirit of the law.

We will proceed from the fact that this person was released illegally. I will make this concession, which may be offensive to overly emotional adherents of justice, with a light heart, because even this important aspect of the matter is irrelevant to the subject that concerns me.

And what concerns me is the subject of amnesty.

Amnesty is an act of strength, magnanimity and wisdom on the part of the state. It pardons the guilty, as though forgetting their guilt in the hope, of course,
that they themselves will not forget about that guilt. Amnesty is mercy (in the old days in Russia, there was no concept of amnesty, it being replaced by partial or full pardon, whereby the punishment was usually set aside but was mitigated depending upon the crime committed and the degree of repentance by the convict).

In the foregoing, I allowed myself the liberty of giving the automobile accident the by no means juridical designation of disaster. In the same "nonjuridical" spirit perhaps, I view amnesty as mercy. But it is indeed mercy in the understanding of the people, which does not lessen but even exalts this state act morally.

And "mercy" (according to V. Dalyu) is "...love; a kindly disposition, a desire that good will come to someone in practice; forgiveness, pardon; favor, generosity; distinguishing someone; reward...."

Favor, generosity, reward.

Great and wise is the language of the people.

But can one really take away a pardon, "generosity" or a reward already given?

It is clear that in the translation from state and social concepts to the concepts of everyday life this is the same thing as taking back a present.

Now, to understand all of this not just with our minds but to feel it from within, to understand it in our hearts, let us put ourselves in the place of the person about whom we are talking. You (or I) returned home after experiencing an automobile accident, prison hospitals and confinement, you had a chance to rest and thaw out, you seemed to be born again, having learned the value and the measure of things, and you already began to forget--as people forget a nightmare--what had happened. And suddenly, on one of the peaceful family evenings, they again take you from your home, not even giving you time to gather your things, and they again put you behind bars, sending you back to where you were when freed by the mercy of the state.

To understand the situation better, it is worth while to introduce into our text a small quotation, some lines from a letter that the editor's office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA received from the administration of the colony after the return there of the "hero" of this sad history.

"On 3 November 1983, (so-and-so) was arrested in the city of (name), where he had gone for permanent residence, and he was sent to the institution...to continue to serve out his sentence, where he has been held from 20 December 1983 until the present time (signature of the responsible official)."

The person released by amnesty was "arrested" (!), as though he had made a daring and reckless escape and was detected, after a tireless search by the police organs, for "shipment back to prison" and the serving of the rest of his term.

He was arrested while drinking tea with his wife and daughter before going to sleep.
The history of his illnesses at that time was probably several pages long. When his wife finally found the institution the next morning (imagine the night that she lived through) where he had been brought and began to implore them, as if for mercy, to give her husband some warm bedclothes and an inhalator (he has a severe form of asthma), they did not grant her this small favor and mercy, although the law and charity justified her intercession, even if it were a matter of a person who actually had escaped.

When you read the documents, the impression is created that they were now taking revenge on this person and his family.

For what?

Because someone confused some dates in processing his release (the person confusing them got off much lighter; he was reprimanded).

Mercy turned into revenge.

We often speak of the wisdom of the law, but this wisdom is real and effective only when the law is carried out by people up to its high level.

The wisdom of the law--not in theory but in practice, that is, involving the fate of people--is the wisdom of those carrying it out.

How did our story end? This man, freed by amnesty and then returned to the colony, and his wife appealed to a court of high instance, which made a clear judgment on the "inexpediency" of such a return after he had been freed under amnesty, even though illegally.

The letter and the spirit of the law were joined together in the form of the court of high instance. State expediency became inseparable from humaneness. And humaneness from state expediency.

Late one evening, his wife called me at home. Because of the distance, I could not hear her distinctly at first. She repeated everything more clearly: "Hello, hello, hello." And I understood from her voice, which was full of joy, that he had returned.

"Do you want to talk with him?"

I answered that I did, and I heard his voice.

I heard a dead voice, in which there was neither joy nor pain but a feeling of immense weariness, perhaps a weariness for the entire rest of his life. And I thought how little this second return resembled the first. The first was like a resurrection. Can one be revived twice?

Right now, as I wrote above, he is in the hospital.

Because of some unwise executors, an act of magnanimity and mercy by the state turned into an act of human tragedy.
ANMESTY....

Anatoliy Pavlovich Andreyev also returned home under amnesty. Readers may remem-
ber him from the judicial essay "Two" published in TITERATURNAYA GAZETA 21 July
1982.

Marina Berezuyeva, a student in the first course of the physical education
department of Leningrad University, was arrested by employees of Store No 47,
accused of stealing some goods, which she had purchased in the neighborhood, as
the court later established (there were five court hearings). Anatoliy Pavlovich
Andreyev was store manager.

The court established that insults to human dignity were not the exception but
the rule in this store. Victimized customers, mostly women, were prominently
exhibited, as if in a pillory. They humiliated them, brought them to hysteria,
and then made them pay five times the value of the stolen goods--the supposedly
stolen goods.

Andreyev threatened Marina Berezuyeva, saying that he would get her expelled from
the university as a thief. The 18-year-old girl stood before him on her knees,
begging for mercy. But she, although in no way guilty, got neither mercy nor
compassion. In response to her question: "What should I do now, hang myself?"
Andreyev answered: "Hang yourself, do you think I care?" Two hours later, she
hurled herself from the ninth floor of the neighboring house.

The judicial essay "Two" ended with a postscript, which I will now reproduce in
full:

"Just before this issue of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA was published, I found out that
until now, more than 2 months after the appeal in the RSFSR Supreme Court, which
left the punishment in force, Andreyev has still not been brought into custody.
And what is more, he is again working in the commercial system."

As it later turned out, at the time of the publication of the essay "Two," Andre-
vey--no longer a defendant but a convict!--was quietly working as a trade expert
at Self-Service Department Store No 32.

After the appearance of the essay (we remind you: 21 July 1982), he disappeared
and not until 4 August was he taken into custody.

Beginning 19 October 1982, Andreyev was at one of the colonies in Amursk Oblast,
and on 28 February 1983, that is, within a little more than 4 months, he was
sent--in accordance with the ukase on amnesty--to a construction project for the
national economy, where he had a small but leading position in finance. On
7 September 1983, one of the people's courts of Amursk Oblast released him from
his remaining unserved sentence (1 year, 10 months, 18 days).*

*The article of the ukase on amnesty that affects Andreyev does not imply an
unconditional release from punishment (as in our first story) but commutation of
the loss of freedom to work at construction projects for the national economy
with a subsequent decision by the court on the question of conditional premature
release in the event of good conduct and an honest attitude toward labor.
Andreyev returned to that same Self-Service Department Store No 32 in Leningrad as senior commodity expert.

Immediately after the issuance of the ukase on amnesty, Yurii Andreveyich Berezuyev, Marina’s father, sent a letter to the competent authorities in Amursk Oblast, informing them that Andreyev twice violated the requirement of permanent residence during the time of the court hearings, when he was repeatedly being arrested and released. He once struck a television operator in the courtroom, and he disappeared days before his arrest, trying to avoid punishment.

They answered Yu. A. Berezuyev by saying that all of his arguments lack legal force. Berezuyev was truly surprised, if not shaken, by this.

But if the reader has concluded from the foregoing that Andreyev was released illegally, then he is mistaken. Yes, with the most careful examination of the documents, we will search in vain for an error; all of the juridical norms were observed, because....

...violation of the requirement of permanent residence cannot be treated as a violation of the system in the colony. He was not serving a sentence during the court proceedings, for his guilt has still not been proven by the court.

Yurii Andreveyich Berezuyev (as well as most of our readers) cannot, of course, be familiar with these subtleties, but lawyers understand them well.

In the colony and later at the construction trust, according to the data on him, Andreyev did not violate the regime. Beyond that, he—I quote the determination of the session of the people's court—"presented himself from the positive side only, was conscientious in fulfilling the obligations placed upon him, did not violate labor discipline and the rules of conduct, enjoys well-deserved authority in the collective, and has a positive influence on the retraining of those released conditionally. He was repeatedly given incentives by the administration of the construction project."

That is, in a few months they not only reeducated Andreyev, but he himself became a teacher, a sover of good.

(I assume that the USSR VIII MVD [All-Union Scientific-Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] would be interested in learning about the positive experience of a colony in which in 4 months they can so radically reeducate a person who committed a most dangerous act.)

In the documents involved in Andreyev’s release (from the support in the colony and later in general—conditional—premature release from further punishment), note is made of his "participation in social life."

No, the difference between this story and the first one with the poor asthma sufferer is in the fact that you cannot call Andreyev’s release illegal.

But why do we not experience the natural feeling of satisfaction when the law triumphs and even, with a little less pathos, when the law does not triumph but is carried out in its usual strict and precise way?
We do not experience that feeling not only because of the purely emotional rejection of evil or the thirst for full punishment, revenge. We do not experience it for more fundamental and objective reasons.

The paradox nature of the situation sketched above is seen in the fact that all legal norms were observed but the law does not triumph. We spoke above of the fact that without respect for the letter of the law there can be no understanding of its spirit, but conversely: without an understanding of the spirit of the law there is no genuine respect for its letter.

Strangely, not one of the documents that positively characterized Andreyev had a single word to say about his current attitude toward his own guilt. Has he acknowledged it? Does he feel remorse?

I have absolutely no intention of shifting the conversation from the realm of precise juridical categories to the area of more vague and more subjective moral values.

There is one moral value that has a place in the juridical values.

Sincere remorse.

In the legal codes of all the union republics, sincere remorse is treated not only as a moral but also as a juridical "circumstance" mitigating guilt.

This means that the moral aspect of a personality determines its juridical fate. And precisely therein is the wisdom of the law, which does not triumph in our story. We have no basis to suppose that Andreyev's moral qualities influenced his fate. I do not know whether or not they asked Andreyev at the colony, in the observation committee of the ispolkom, at his place of work or in the people's court the essential question about his attitude toward his own guilt today.

(At all court proceedings 2 or 3 years ago, he not only completely denied his own guilt but allowed himself to slander the memory of the dead Marina.)

People carrying out the law and performing the will of the state must think as the state. The indifference of all the officials who contributed to the release of Andreyev toward his moral qualities is obvious. In the most careful examination of all of the documents, we do not find in them a single juridical inaccuracy, but the moral side of the matter is not reflected in them.

But perhaps he realized it all, did feel remorse and only the dry "cloth" language of the legal documents does not permit us to speak of the depths of his mental life?

No, no and again no.... Here is a live recording of the conversation that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent P. Il'yashenko had with A. Andreyev after his release:
"The fact that Marina took her own life is not my fault. I met Berezuyev in Leningrad and I hoped that he, as a grown person, would grasp this situation, but he is making all sorts of appeals and he even saw to it that they did not release me from confinement. He has a grudge against me."

"But after all, his daughter died!"

"Marina was not brought up right in the family. She should have known better than to confuse her own handbag with the store's mesh bag."

Andreyev said further:

"The store employees and I involved ourselves in educating Marina."

(That, apparently, was when the girl was kneeling before him imploring him "to be human"!)

What Andreyev later said about the young being in whose death he is guilty is so blasphemous that I am unable to reproduce it.

Andreyev terminated the conversation abruptly and harshly: "It is too late to be sorry and there is no need."

This is so important that it deserves repeating:

"It is too late to be sorry and there is no need."

And indeed, what need is there to be remorseful if you have already been released and nothing is threatening you? But previously as well, there was no need for remorse. The need was for protectors. Protectors are a force more real than moral values.

He understood nothing.

Having taken away a human life and been released under state amnesty, he understood nothing.

And this person, if one is to believe the documents signed by the administrators of the competent authorities of Amursk Oblast, made a positive contribution to the reeducation of convicts. A great social pedagogue!

Who bears the blame for the fact that Andreyev did not acknowledge his own guilt? He alone? I do not think so....

He was helped in that by all those who had to do with his release or previously helped him avoid punishment.

In their indifference to Andreyev's moral character, the administrators of the colony, the members of the observation commission, the judges and the administration of the construction committee hardly contributed to his comprehension of his own guilt.
I personally find it rather strange that a person serving a sentence and having the legal status of a convict was occupying a modest but nonetheless responsible position as one of the administrators of an accounting office. It may be that the juridical norms were observed here as well. For there was no decision forbidding Andreyev to work in an administrative position and to deal with finances. But more than just legal norms decide the fates of people.

By the way, the fact that Andreyev knows how to handle finances skillfully was demonstrated by him several years ago in his job as director of rayon commerce.

He managed to have delivered to his office six imported leather coats with fur linings valued at more than four thousand rubles. He sold them right away to useful people and relatives, leaving the receipts in his pocket as if nothing had happened. (It was not a matter of hundreds, as in the case of our automobile, but of thousands.) And only a month later, when the story became widely known, did he find the strength to part with the four thousand, but it was already too late and Andreyev was relieved of his high position. Afterwards, he became director of Store No 47, where Marina Berezueva once had the misfortune to go.

Today he accuses Marina's parents of not teaching her "not to confuse her own handbag with the store's mesh bag." And that bag contained goods worth 2 rubles 33 kopecks, and they were purchased honestly, I repeat, in the neighborhood.

But could it be that the people at Self-Service Department Store No 32 are now trying to help him to understand something that he could not comprehend before?

No, no and again no. The manager of the orders department of the self-service store S. Marchenko, the personnel inspector G. Makisheva and even acting director T. Vishkel'skaya claim that Andreyev is "a find and a gift" for the store, being a good employee, smart and sensible, whose employment record is flawless. As a particular merit of Andreyev, it is noted that he "does not smoke and does not use alcohol."

It is clear that there is an esprit de corps in action here, something that is especially dangerous in the area of commerce and especially viable there.

It is even asserted at the self-service store that the judicial essay "Two" was discussed by the store's employees after its publication (in July 1982) and was refuted. That seemed very interesting to me, for the essay was based upon material investigated in five court proceedings and it did not contain a single fact that was not established and affirmed by the authority of the court. That means that the self-service store was wiser than all court instances from the people's rayon court to the RSFSR Supreme Court. I would be pleased to introduce into this article that refutation, now 2 years old, but the letter from the self-service store could not be located in the archives of the editor's office, despite a scrupulous and careful search.

On the other hand, we found and looked through thousands of letters from veterans of war and labor, from pensioners and students, from workers and scientists, from soldiers and writers, from builders and sailors.... These letters severely
criticized Andreyev and his protectors and expressed regret that he got off so lightly: 4 years (in reality, he did not even serve 2 years). There were quite a number of letters expressing condolence for the loss suffered by the Berezuyev family.

Was it possible to ignore the opinions and feelings expressed in thousands of letters (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA made known the fact of their existence) in deciding the question of whether or not to release Andreyev? Does this not speak of the inability of people carrying out the will of the state to think in social and state terms?

What are officials worth if they do not value public opinion?

What am I trying to do in this article?

Is it my wish that some evening, when Andreyev is sitting behind the family table, they would come for him, take him away and return him to the place from which he returned with observance of all legal norms?

I do not hope for that. They will not take Andreyev away. And I...do not even want them to take him away.

Yes! Even if there were a mistake in his release—oh! how much more subtle than in our first story, where there were simply some dates mixed up—I am not in favor of having them return Andreyev to serve his sentence.

State mercy is a high norm of social ethics. They are not taking it away. Any exception to that norm conceals in itself the temptation to repeat it and is therefore dangerous. For no one knows whom it will affect next time. And we saw what happens when the will of the state is performed by people not knowing how to think in social and state terms.

I only want him to understand what he took away (a human life!) and what was given to him—indeed, given to him.

But will he understand?

But how much longer, how much longer will the Andreyevs, like the wind, keep going back to their ways?

How much longer....

9746
CSO: 1830/625
ZURICH-BASED INTERFAITH CENTER ATTACKED

[Editorial Report] Kiev LXYDNA I SVIT in Ukrainian No 7, July 1984, carries on pages 39-41 an article by Petro Yarots'kyy entitled "Under the Mask of Pious Concern." The article attacks Western propaganda on religion in the USSR, especially such "myths" as that of a "religious renaissance" there. It zeroes in on the organization "Faith in the Second World," a Zurich-based organization founded in 1972 as an interfaith center to study the situation of religion, churches and believers in the Soviet Union. Yarots'kyy claims that the center "fulfills the function of coordinator of antisocialist propaganda. A special 'soucnicl' with that purpose works there. It is comprised of representatives of 20 different 'institutes' and editorial boards (18 European and 2 from the United States) which carry out the 'study of problems of religion' in socialist countries." According to Yarots'kyy, the center represents an attempt to disseminate propaganda and create "ideological diversions" among catholics, orthodox, protestants, Jews and Muslims alike. Yarots'kyy points out that organizations such as Faith in the Second World" are "very closely tied to the intelligence services of imperialist countries" and thus do not truly care about believers, but rather "under the mask of pious solicitude for believers in the USSR...seek to incite antisocial acts." This article also appears in a slightly abridged version on page 3 of Kiev RADYANS'KA UKRAYINA 25 July.

CSO: 1811/74
REGIONAL

VAYNO ADDRESS AT PLENUM

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 Aug 84 pp 1-2

[ETA article: text of report given by CPSU Central Committee member and First Secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee K.G. Vayno: "Tasks of the Republic Party Organization in Fulfilling the CPSU Central Committee decree 'Participation of Estonian Leadership Cadres in Political-Indoctrinal Work Among the Working People'"

[Text] In July of this year, the CPSU Central Committee listened to the Estonian CP Central Committee report "Participation of Estonian leadership cadres in political-indoctrinal work among the working people."

To make a report in the CPSU Central Committee is a responsible and honored thing. In this we see evidence of the attention and concern of the Central Committee and CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko personally for our affairs. At the same time there is the vast help of the republic party organization.

The CPSU Central Committee held an extensive, thorough, party-principled discussion of central problems of ideological work in the republic, the place and role of leadership cadres, and their responsibility for the state of affairs in the area of indoctrination. The decree passed on this issue precisely determines ways to resolve the tasks facing us.

The CPSU Central Committee decree is a document of vast practical value for us, by which we will be guided for many years. It contains tasks not only for party organizations, but also for soviets, trade unions, the Komsomol, state organs, and social organizations. The decree will help us to take a correct, critical approach toward evaluating our own work, better discover shortcomings, and find ways to eliminate them.

The examination of this issue in the CPSU Central Committee was not provoked by some special circumstances. It was a routine, planned question, since in recent years the CPSU Central Committee has been handling local reports extensively. In examining the question of participation by leadership cadres of the republic in political-indoctrinal work among the working people, the CPSU Central Committee gave a high evaluation to the efforts of republic party organizations in all lines of economic, ideological, and indoctrinal work, and the persistence with which the party's policies are brought to life.
Patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of the population is being pur-
posely carried out. Our contribution to the cause of strengthening the country's
economy was appreciated at its true value.

This evaluation from the Central Committee should inspire us to new efforts to
make the work of today and tomorrow better and more satisfactory than that of
yesterday. Everything depends on us, on our ability to direct labor collectives
to resolve the tasks before them, and to put to use in the necessary direction
that great, highly qualified, authoritative, politically prepared contingent
which is the republic's leadership cadres.

The decisions of the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, and the
report given there by Comrade K.U. Chernenko, have prompted many leaders to
take a different look at their role as political educators of the working
people, and more deeply recognize the need to reinforce the unity of ideological,
organizational, and economic work.

The decree now passed by the CPSU Central Committee directs us to further
strengthen and expand party leadership in that key sector which is the partici-
pation of leadership cadres in political-indoctrinational work with people.

We must be more perseverent in forming the qualities of a true political leader
in cadres. The importance of this task is due to the fact leadership activity
is above all bringing to life the party's policies and decisions. It is because
some of our leadership cadres have an insufficient understanding of this funda-
mental proposition that we still encounter a narrowly departmental, regional-
istic approach to the effort. This often holds the seeds of formalism and
bureaucratic administration, a passion for unnecessary meetings and papers,
explanation of one's shortcomings by so-called objective factors, and so forth.

Only a politically mature and prepared individual can carry out productive
political work, so we face the task of constantly teaching, informing, and
raising the responsibility of cadres.

A special role in this effort belongs to the system of political education.
Frankly, our statistical indicators are also not bad. Almost 90 percent of
nomenklatura workers have had various forms of political education, and more
than 40 percent are propagandists. Thus, we might be satisfied with these
figures. But the point is not the figures, but the content, quality, and
eff ctiveness of studies. And that is what we have to talk about.

The main form of studies for high officials of labor collectives are schools
of the party-business and ideological aktiv. More than a third of our leaders
study in them. But the potential of this tested form is far from being fully
exploited. The classes do not delve deeply enough into the topic or have enough
connection with real life, first sources are not adequately studied, and many
students do not make outlines. This is especially characteristic for the towns
of Tartu and Kokhtla-Yarve, and Rakvereskiy, Raplaskiy, Kharyuskiy, and several
other rayon schools. Frequently, key issues of economics and ideological work
are raised not by secretaries of the party committees, who know the local state
of affairs, but by lecturers invited from outside, who examine the issues, as
a rule, on an all-theoretical plane, without analyzing the practical factors of
the specific city or rayon. And this approach, naturally, cannot satisfy the
listeners, among whom 70 percent have higher education and almost 30 percent
have had training in a Marxist-Leninist university. The work of the schools
must be improved, and the people responsible for this, as pointed out by the
CPSU Central Committee decree, are the first secretaries of gorkms and raykms.

Now about the Marxist-Leninist university. I must emphasize immediately that
the university should become the main form of political studies for leadership
cadres at the republic, city, and rayon level. It was a very correct thing to
do when more than 70 deputy ministers and chairmen of state committees went
through studies in the university. The comrades speak highly of the organi-
ization of the learning process and the quality of the knowledge acquired al-
though, the first time, not all of them went there with great enthusiasm. We
must see to it that the overwhelming majority of management workers go into the
university as early as this academic year.

In the future the university should turn greater attention to organizing cor-
respondence education so that as many management workers as possible from rural
regions of the republic can get a university education. The work experience of
the RAPO department of managers testifies to the usefulness of this form of
studies; consequently, we must expand it.

Party committees should raise the responsibility of management workers for po-
litical education. The demands made on the quality of studies are clearly not
yet adequate. Last year the university struck 48 administrative workers from
the list of students for non-attendance. In the group of management workers
in the Narva and Kokhtla-Yarve branches of the university, class attendance
remained at the level of 50 percent. But in most cases party committees did
not react to these situations.

A substantial number of leaders study on individual plans. The quality and
effectiveness of this form depends largely on how party committees subsequently
check the official's studies, and how principled they are in evaluating the
knowledge he has acquired. But here there is still much liberalism and non-
exactness.

All this testifies that party committees must have a precise system of accounting
for personnel and checking the quality of studies of each nomenklatura worker,
and the knowledge he has acquired.

A great contingent of our management workers are carrying out an important party
mission—these are the propagandists themselves. This is a serious burden and
responsibility. And without constant special training and improvement of their
knowledge, no progress can be made. The propagandists must be helped by various
types of seminars, courses, and consultations.

But analysis shows that many administrators—propagandists come to the monthly
seminars held by raykoms and gorkoms only 1-2 times a year. There are also
few of them at the bi-weekly courses. So it is no accident that some turn the
taking of classes over to others. Of course, the so-called "doublers" cannot
always fully substitute for the official in studying a difficult program. It is perfectly clear that now, in the period of preparing for the new academic year, party committees, ministries, and departments will have to carry out thorough work both in selecting for propagandistic work trained comrades from the number of officials, and in intensifying the demands on propagandists to raise the level of their knowledge.

I would also like to talk about the great contingent of the ideological aktiv--the middle link, so to speak. We have more than 30,000 political information specialists and agitators. Arranging genuine work with these people is our vast reserve. Unfortunately, part of this aktiv in some places is still only on paper, and no actual work is being done, while a large number are working in the old fashion, evading the urgent issues of today and problems of counter-propaganda. Certain party committees have dragged out the attestation of this aktiv, giving it little methodological aid. The task, in light of the CPSU Central Committee decree, is to maximally activize the work of this category of ideological cadres, improve their qualified staff, and constantly raise their role and place in ideological work to the level of the requirements now placed on leaders engaged in political indoctrination work among the working people.

"The Leninist tradition of direct links with the people of labor," said Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko at a meeting with metallurgy workers of Moscow, "is always alive in our party." This thought is also precisely fixed in the CPSU Central Committee decree.

In the list of qualities which a good leader should possess, there is one basic one without which all the rest are of little benefit. This is the ability to persuade people, to bring them along with you.

Our republic, in the opinion of the Estonian CP Central Committee, has formed effective ways of communication between the party and the masses. These include political education days, letter-opening days, and speeches by management workers in the press, television forums, and radio.

The quantitative indicators here are fairly impressive. Judge for yourselves. On 8 August the 60th republic-wide political education day was held. That means we have been using this form for five years now. On the last political education day alone, there were more than 10,000 appearances by management workers. People turned their attention to tens of thousands of issues, and came up with specific suggestions. This testifies that we have an extensive "two-way communication." Is this good? Absolutely! In our time we have acted correctly in turning away from the large-crowd audience. The brigade, the farm, the student group--these are an entirely "solid" audience for a leader of any rank. Today as many as half of the speeches are made directly in work places.

In the last one and a half years, the creative and scientific-technical intelligentsia, and workers of the press, radio, and television have heard speeches from all members and candidates for membership in the Buro of the Estonian CP Central Committee, 20 ministers and chairmen of state committees, and other responsible party and soviet workers, for a total of about 250 meetings with
these collectives. This is also a very good thing! The Tallin, Pyarnu, Narva, and Kokhtla-Yarve gorkoms are arranging meetings of party and soviet officials with schoolteachers and educators in children’s pre-school establishments. Last year alone there were more than 250 appearances by speakers from the Estonian CP Central Committee in educational establishments. And our appearances are very necessary here. The CPSU Central Committee decree also perfectly justly notes that officials still make infrequent appearances to young audiences and collectives of trade enterprises, public food service, consumer service, and health care establishments—that is, collectives whose work determines to a large degree people's mood, and frequently also their evaluation of the performance of organs of Soviet rule. There are practically no appearances by members of propagandistic groups of the Estonian CP Central Committee in residential areas, or to pensioners, who are no longer connected with labor collectives but manifest a lively interest in our efforts and concerns.

The Buro of the Estonian CP Central Committee has emphasized more than once that the main link in organizing political education days are gorkoms and raykoms. It is their attitude toward the effort that largely determines the success of political education days locally, and the effectiveness of the speeches. Kokhtla-Yarveskiy, Paydeskiy, Khiyumaaskiy, and certain other raykoms are doing the right thing in arranging prior meetings with visiting comrades in the raykom, acquainting them with the situation in the rayon, the problems which must be resolved, and the difficulties and questions most often encountered in collectives.

But at the same time there are party committees which, instead of painstaking organizational work, have reduced their role to the level of a kind of information-transfer link between the Central Committee and the labor collective. Thus, in Vilyandiskiy Rayon there have been instances when the collective learned about a meeting on political education day only when the speaker from the Estonian CP Central Committee arrived on the spot. These phenomena are not merely organizational-technical rought spots. They reflect a formalistic attitude toward this important form of political work. These occurences are not intolerable for every occasion, but in organizing unified political education days which include thousands of people they are absolutely impermissible.

The success and vitality of political education days is largely determined by the central figure of this event—the leader appearing before people on a mission from the party committee. And today we must above all take an interest in what kind of impression his appearance has left in people's minds and how it it reflected in the affairs of the labor collective. That is the task set today by the Central Committee, and that is the way working people understand the sense of political education day.

A speech on political education day is a sort of report made by a leader to the working people about his work. That is why it is important on political education day to speak not only to one's own departmental collectives. The broad public nature of our work and accountability to the working people are an important element of socialist democracy and communication between the party and the masses. This is a truism of Marxism-Leninism. So it is even a little embarrassing today to talk about the necessity for active participation by leaders
in political education days. The second Wednesday of each month is not called the common political education day for nothing. It is proposed that all management workers use this day to go out to people, in labor collectives. All of them! As for members and candidates for membership in the Central Committee, in the last two and a half years A. Kaldma, V. Lind, I. Lott, E. Myandmaa, Kh. Teder, and several others spoke more than 40 times. At the same time, there are speakers of the Central Committee who have missed more than half of the political education days. These include R. Butel', O. Kaldre, V. Konstantinov, R. Nittim, and others. This clearly indicates that they underestimate the important of political-indoctrinational work among the working people.

We still have the sort of officials who try to dictate to raykoms and gorkoms the time periods of their short visit and plan to resolve a host of other problems on that day. As a result it turns out that the meeting with the labor collective seems rather incidental, secondary, and as for getting acquainted with the collective, talking with people, not to mention seeing individuals for personal problems, there is simply no time left. It is typical that these officials, as a rule, appear only in their own departmental organizations.

As for letter-opening days and speeches by administrative workers in the press, television, and radio--here also there are many unused possibilities. Not all editorial staffs have become equally active in this cause. Why? One answer. These efforts are very exacting--they demand thorough preparation, deep study of the topic, selection of competent authors, and knowledge of the local situation. Only in this case can one guarantee the topicality and significance of speeches, and, consequently, their effectiveness.

The CPSU Central Committee decree points out that the most important task of the republic party organization is to reinforce the class education of the working people. In our propaganda we must better and more fully use the glorious revolutionary history of the Estonian working class and its proletarian struggle (in cooperation with the Russians) against tsarist autocracy and for Soviet rule in Estonia. Class education today is the sacred memory of those who gave their lives 40 years ago to free Estonia from the German-fascist invaders--it is gratitude to the great Russian people and all the fraternal peoples for selfless aid in the post-war rebuilding of the economy, turning Estonia into a highly developed industrial republic.

The main content of class education of the population in our republic under current conditions is making the population aware of the advantages of socialism, patriotic internationalist education, and strengthening the friendship between Soviet peoples.

This set of issues throws into sharp relief the relative newness of Soviet rule in Estonia and a certain lag in some people's awareness of rapidly developing life. Indeed, 40 years of building socialism is a historically short time to form a new social consciousness. And this is not just a theoretical problem. We frequently encounter this in our practical activities. We cannot neglect to take into account also the large-scale "psychological war" from outside against the countries of socialism, especially the USSR, and in particular the Estonian SSR--attempts to influence the minds and hearts of our people.
What can we set against all this? More systematic, differentiated, and varied organizational, political, and indoctrinational work, of course. And the more difficult the problem, the more persistently we must act. A harmonious combination of the international and the national does not come about by itself even at the stage of developed socialism. Internationalists even now are not born, but made. Under our conditions, a communist's attitude toward problems of internationalism is an indicator of his true party-mindedness.

The speaker then touched on certain issues of internationalist education, in particular, improving the teaching of Russian in republic educational institutions, forming national working-class contingents in the leading sectors of industry, and enhancing the role of science in studying problems of national relations under conditions of developed socialism.

The speaker went on to mention the organization and perfection of counter-propagandistic work, developing an aggressive, uncompromising attitude toward ideologically alien manifestations, and increasing the role of primary party organizations in the struggle against the penetration of bourgeois ideology.

The Central Committee of the party, continued Comrade Vayno, is uneasy about the high level of crime and drunkenness in the republic. Frankly, the measures taken so far have not had any substantial result.

These questions have just been discussed in the republic party aktiv, and specific measures have been worked out for the fight against these phenomena.

Drunkenness is a difficult, complex problem. A multi-faceted approach to this problem is needed. Our efforts, as a rule, are directed at eliminating only its individual causes; we are usually struggling against something that has already happened, we are not able to organize true preventive work.

Leaders of administrative organs are too slowly restructuring their work in the necessary direction. But that is not the only point; the issue cannot be resolved through isolated administrative measures. If we cannot raise responsibility, especially the labor collectives, there will not be any substantial result. So our basic efforts must be concentrated here. In the meantime, many officials and party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations are currently not psychologically prepared for this. It is necessary to be resolute in reorganizing. Even on the personal level, it is necessary to look at oneself somewhat critically. There are, unfortunately, officials who overindulge in alcohol. They appear in public drunk, or worse, get behind the wheel of an automobile while intoxicated. Recently the former director of Kuremaaskiy sovkhoz-tekhnikum, E. Seet, was dropped from the party and brought to criminal charges for running over a person while drunk. There are also many evening parties in service areas, and cases of alcohol consumption there and even in work places. It is hardly necessary to say that this is completely impermissible.

In organizing the implementation of the CPSU Central Committee decree, we must strongly step up the struggle against hooliganism, drunkenness, misappropriations of social property, acquisitiveness, and other offenses. And we all must take up this cause without delay.
An important factor in improving communication of the party with the masses, reinforcing the people's trust for the party, and enhancing the social-political unity of society is the ideological-moral aspect of a leader, his personal example. As observed in the CPSU Central Committee decree, a leader is seen as a trusted person of the party and state. A leader is always in view. Every hour life tests him—whether the individual has the moral right to hold a leadership post.

In the republic there are many leadership cadres which are competent, able to attract people to them, and have combined true party principles with delicacy. It is important that many of them provide an example of a conscientious attitude toward the cause, have concern for improving the conditions of people's lives, and constantly associate with them not only at work, but also in communities, at various mass-cultural functions, sports competitions, on duty in people's patrols, and on family holidays. And they always remember that they are representatives of the party, political workers. Every leader, as the 26th CPSU Congress observed, must constantly remember his lofty responsibility—the responsibility to the people whom he is entrusted to lead, and to the party and the nation.

The following people are acknowledged commanders of industry and capable teachers of what is right: L. Allika, director of Sewing Association imeni V. Klement, V. Veskiyali, minister of local industry, O. Klushin, director of Krengolmskiy Manufacturers; A. Koop, rector of Tartu State University, E. Liiberg, chairman of 9 Maya Kolkhoz in Paydeskiy Rayon, Kh. Parik, director of Tartu Base-Model [oporny-pokazatel'nyy] Sovkhoz, V. Roosmaa, first secretary of Paydeskiy Raykom, V. Chernyshev, minister of timber, pulp and paper, and wood-processing industry, and many others.

Most leaders have a high analytic faculty in working, they can make decisions, support the initiative of the working people, and pay careful attention to the word from below. And, most important, along with party organizations, they develop in people a striving to overcome difficulties, work with high self-fulfillment, and carry through to the end the work that has been started.

But unfortunately, not all of them can combine the authority of the office with personal authority, correctly balance their privileges and duties, and be an example of moral purity and honesty. There are cases where leaders misuse their positions of service, trying to fix up their apartments at state expense, or violate the order of distribution of living space.

The Buro of the Estonian CP Central Committee is taking a principled and strict attitude toward such violations. A number of leaders have been called to strict party responsibility for this.

Along with important leadership qualities such as high principles and integrity, one may cite many other necessary qualities which a person must have to head a labor collective. I would like to single out one very important leadership quality. That is modesty. Modesty is always becoming to an individual, and that especially applies to a leader. Unfortunately, we have many leaders who chase after prestige in life. Most often these leaders manifest both conceit and arrogance.
An enormous role in forming a leader, and in his growth, should be played by the primary party organization. It is these which should be the first to point out a leader's mistakes, if necessary, even publicly, and demand in the name of the party that he answer for his faults.

It is necessary to reject unconditionally the vicious practice, sometimes observed, where leaders' personal problems are examined in the gorkom and raykoms, let alone the primary party organization. It is unnecessary to say that this contradicts the Charter and principles of democratic centralism in our party.

It is self-evident that higher demands should be made on leadership cadres, and they should be evaluated on a higher ideological-moral scale. A leader is obligated to confirm the Leninist style and way of life. Contempt for people's opinion, arrogance, and an anything-goes attitude are incompatible with a leader's office. That is how our party's Central Committee puts the issue today.

In a meeting with voters, Comrade K.U. Chernenko said "a leader can be demanding towards others, but most of all he is demanding towards himself. That gives him, besides the official right, the moral right to be firm, when it is appropriate, 'not to waste words when power must be used,' so to speak."

Of course, party organs must not simply make demands. Their duty is to energetically support useful undertakings of leaders and to be concerned for their authority. Practice testifies: a new thing is never confirmed by itself, automatically. That is why it is very important to give timely support to a leader who is boldly trying an experiment, a calculated risk, who is not satisfied with what has been achieved, but seeks and finds new opportunities for resolving the tasks facing a collective.

This is especially important when you consider that serious tasks have been set for us by the CPSU Central Committee decree to develop the republic's economy. And in this connection I would like to say a few words about what we are to do in the immediate future.

On the whole, all sectors of the republic's economy are operating stably and successfully coping with fulfilling planned targets and socialist obligations. The party's additional target of raising productivity and lowering the prime cost of labor is also being covered. The number of enterprises and organizations failing to meet the plan and fulfill contract obligations has decreased compared to last year.

But we still have many complex and responsible tasks to resolve before the end of the year, which is no longer so far away. And we cannot relax the work effort in any way.

Which questions should get the most attention? First, economizing on material resources. The CPSU Central Committee decree points out directly that we are not performing satisfactorily in this area. This especially applies to construction organizations, many union industrial enterprises, and the systems of the Ministry of Gas Industry and Ministry of Automotive Transport and Highways. Serious uneasiness is provoked by the performance in fulfilling obligations to save boiler fuel, cement, lumber, and gasoline. It seems that the Republic
Commission for Saving Resources must take specific additional measures to improve the situation in the remaining months. Both gorkoms and raykoms of the party must more precisely define their place in this important work, so that every enterprise and organization, rayon and city, fully meets its obligations to economize.

Second, which should get special attention—the construction and start-up provisioning of all planned projects and capacities. The progress being made on the plan for total volume of construction-installation projects is arousing serious concern. We have not begun the construction of five schools which are supposed to go into operation next year. Efforts are extremely poor in the construction of hospitals and polyclinics, and projects of the municipal economy.

The situation is worsened by the fact that in the first half-year along, the number of construction workers in the republic has significantly decreased, as a result of which we have lost not only people, but a volume of work worth 10 million rubles. This loss is particularly noticeable in Tallinn, in the Tallinstroy Trust. It is necessary to launch decisive measures, seek new approaches to strengthening construction cadres, effectively improve their labor conditions and living conditions, and to give special attention to young workers who come into construction organizations after finishing vocational and technical schools. If we do not do this, the situation may become critical.

Third—concern for the harvest and fodder. It is a busy time in the countryside now, when much is being decided. The weather conditions this year have been more difficult than last year. This means that kolkhozes and sovkhozes will need more help from the city, particularly in feed stocks. Feed stores from grasses are now 7 percent below the plan. But there are possibilities for replenishing the stocks, and they must be used to the maximum. I mean mowing the after-grass, and the supply of straw. We expect a greater gross yield of potatoes than last year. All we have to do is completely harvest what has grown and store it. The agricultural industry and managers of farms must now be especially bold in deploying forces and funds, and ensure the precise interaction of all links and services of the harvesting line. And it is very important for each disturbance to be detected in time, so effective measures can be taken immediately.

As for livestock breeding, it is developing reliably. During the seven months which have passed since the beginning of the year, we have obtained 62 more kilograms of milk per cow than for the same period last year. The sale of milk has increased by 5 percent, and cattle by 17 percent. Now it is important to maintain the rapid tempos, and not permit a slump during the transition to the stall period.

There is one more issue I would like to focus attention on. That is the development of auxiliary facilities. The CPSU Central Committee decree observed that we are still being extremely slow to develop these. We have the capacity to carry on this effort more actively, more energetically. But, frankly, it appears that certain comrades are undervaluing this important work. The Council of Ministers, gorkoms, and raykoms must now examine specifically the state of affairs in this area, and manifest greater persistence and consistency in carrying out the decisions we have made.
There are also other, more long-term issues of the development of the economy, which should be at the center of our concern. These are the intensification of production, acceleration of scientific-technical progress, further increases of meat and milk production, reinforcing collective forms of organizing and providing incentives to labor, and increasing the production of consumer goods. We must determine ways of resolving these issues before the end of the year in the Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee while examining plans for next year.

In conclusion, Comrade K. Vayno, on behalf of the plenum participants, assured the CPSU Central Committee, and Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko personally, that the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and all communists in the republic, taking steady guidance from the CPSU Central Committee decree, will do everything possible so that we can come to the 27th Party Congress with new successes in developing the economy and culture, and political-indoctrinational work among the working people.

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INFORMATION REPORT ON 15TH PLENUM OF ESTONIAN CP

Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 Aug 84 p 1

[ETA article: "Information Report on the Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee"]

[Text] The 15th Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee was held on 21 August in Tallinn.

The following people participated in the work of the plenum: first secretaries of raykoms, chairmen of gorispolkoms and rayispolkoms, leaders of ministries and departments which do not belong to the Estonian CP Central Committee, gorkom and raykom secretaries in charge of questions of ideological work, first secretaries of Komsomol gorkoms and raykoms, chairmen of sectorial republic trade union committees, directors and secretaries of party organizations of major industrial enterprises and associations, a group of leaders of ideological establishments and creative unions, rectors of VUZes, secretaries of party organizations of ministries and departments, responsible workers of the Estonian CP Central Committee apparatus, the Presidium of the Estonian Supreme Soviet, Estonian Council of Ministers, Estonian Republic Council of Trade Unions, the Central Committee of the Estonian Komsomol, the Estonian People's Control Committee, and representatives of the press, television, and radio.

The plenum examined the following questions:

1. Tasks of the republic party organization to fulfill the CPSU Central Committee decree "Participation of Estonian leadership cadres in political-indoctrinal work among the working people."

2. The work of the Tallinn Gorkom in perfecting the style and methods of operation of party organizations in light of the CPSU Central Committee decree, and the statements and directions of CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade K.U. Chernenko.

A report on the first item of the agenda was given by CPSU Central Committee member and First Secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee K. Vayno.

The report was discussed by Tallinn Gorkom Secretary A. Vellamaa, Tartu Gorkom First Secretary E.-A. Sillari, Head of the plasterers' brigade of Construction
Administration No 4 of Tallinstroy Trust V. Mynzu, Chairman of Paydeskiy Rayon "9 Maya" Kolkhoz E. Liyeber, Narva Gorkom First Secretary V. Chetvergov, Chairman of the Estonian State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting A. Kullaste, Estonian CP Central Committee Buro member and Chairman of the Estonian Republic Council of Trade Unions N. Yuganson, Secretary of the party committee of the Norma Production Association Kh.-M. Ul'vik, Director of the Krengol'mskaya Manufaktura Cotton Combine O. Klushin, First Secretary of the Estonian Union of Cinematographers board of directors K. Kiysk, Estonian Minister of Education E. Grechkind, Khaapsaluskiy Raykom First Secretary E. Peek, First Secretary of the Tallinn Oktyabr'skiy Raykom A. Ingerman, and candidate for Estonian CP Central Committee Buro membership and First Secretary of the Estonian Komsomol Central Committee D. Visnapuu.

The second item on the agenda was reported on by candidate for Estonian CP Central Committee Buro membership and First Secretary of the Tallinn Gorkom M. Pedak.

The report was debated by First Secretary of Leninskiy Raykom in Tallinn S.-A Villo, lathe operators' brigade leader of the Tallinn excavating plant of the Talleks Production Association V. Lioy, Estonian Minister of Local Industry V. Vesikvyali, and Chairman of the Estonian State Committee on Labor V. Konstantinov.

The concluding speech was given by Comrade K. Vayno.

The plenum passed appropriate decrees on the issues discussed.

Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department of Propaganda P. Slezko participated in the plenum's work and made a speech.

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UZBEK BOOK LOVER SOCIETY'S FUNCTION MAINLY POLITICAL

[Editorial Report] Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian on 31 August carries on page 3 a 1,000-word article by G. Pulatov, first deputy chairman of the Uzbek Book Lover's Society Administration. The article, titled "A Book's Good Friends," marks the opening of the republic's third conference of book lovers.

Pulatov traces the growth since the second conference by a figure of six thousand new primary organizations, bringing the republic membership in the society to 1,700,000 individuals. "We have 620 book lover clubs, 626 people's stores and kiosks, and 317 school cooperatives."

"The society's members never set themselves the goal of filling bookshelves. Their main principle is that books should have a function; they should be in view as it were, should serve to form a communist world view, should serve people. Basic attention is given to propagandizing social and political literature, the works of V. I. Lenin, the materials of the 26th CPSU Congress, and the plenums of our party's Central Committee. An important place in the society's activity belongs to the lecture method of propagandizing."

Pulatov notes that together with the republic Komsomol the society has charge of distributing books to workers on the BAM, in the non black earth zone, ships' crews, animal herders in remote pastures, children's homes, boarding schools, hospitals and to pensions for veterans of war and labyr, as well as to families with many children. Oblast organizations in Bukhara, Kashkadar'ya, Samarkand, Navoi, Namangan and elsewhere constantly conduct meetings with "front-soldier" authors and exhibitions within the framework of the 10-day festival "Youth and Military Patriotic Books."

The author comments on a movement which has become widespread in recent years toward drawing private libraries into public use. Home subscription [domashniy abonement] has become widespread, especially in rural areas. An important role in this development was played by the "All-Union Public Review for the Best Private Library Placed at the Disposal of the Public." Nearly 2,000 book owners participated, and another 500 private libraries were brought into public use as a result.

An account of the Book Lover's Society's work was given at the 6th Plenum of the Central Administration of the All-Union Society of Book Lovers at the beginning of this year. The owrk of the republic society was approved. "But,"
says Pulantov, "we consider what has been done only the first steps toward completion of our tasks. We must seriously analyze and sternly criticize such facts as finance violations at the Samarkand Experimental Production Enterprise. It is vital to establish strict control over the fulfillment of production plans, and to take decisive measures to prevent all instances of violating financial discipline as demanded at the 16th Plenum of the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee."

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GAPUROV AT AWARDS CEREMONY HONORING ASHKHABAD FARMERS

[Editorial Report] Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian on 15 September carries on page 1 a 200-word report of an awards ceremony which took place on 14 September in Ashkhabad. The first secretary of the Turkmen SSR, M. G. Gapurov, awarded the farmers of Ashkhabad with the Red Banner for achieving "high results in the republic socialist competition of collecting and selling cotton to the state in the first 10 days of September, 1984"; in the first 10 days, the farmers of Ashkhabad sold about 11 tons of cotton to the state.

Gapurov warmly congratulated the farmers of Ashkhabad and wished them health and new succession in labor.

The first secretary of Ashkhabad Obkom, P. Annaorazov, warmly thanked the party and assured it that all strengths would be used in order to fulfill the socialist obligation of selling "white gold," grapes and other agricultural produce to the state.

Also taking part in the ceremony were members of Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, A.S. Boiko, G. S. Mishchenko and M. A. Charyev.

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