Command in NATO after the Cold War:
Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations

Edited by Thomas-Durell Young
COMMAND IN NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR:
ALLIANCE, NATIONAL, AND MULTINATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS

Edited by Thomas-Durell Young

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4
A Strategic Studies Institute Publication

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5244, USA

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), co-located with the U.S. Army War College, is the strategic level study agent for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army. The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on: strategy, planning and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces; the nature of land warfare; matters affecting the Army’s future; the concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Unless otherwise noted, SSI publications are not copyrighted and may be quoted or reprinted without permission. Please give full publication credit.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This publication is cleared for public release with unlimited distribution.

First printing, June 1997

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Command in NATO after the Cold War: alliance, national, and multinational considerations / Thomas-Durell Young, Editor.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.


UA646.3.C617 1996

335'031091821—dc20 96-19471

CIP
For Adrien and Julien
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapters</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charts and Maps</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreword by General H. Hansen</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>xxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Thomas-Durell Young</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Reorganizing NATO Command and Control Structures: More Work in the Augean Stables?</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>William T. Johnsen</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Charles L. Barry</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Command Authorities and Multinationality in NATO: The Response of the Central Region’s Armies</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Canadian Forces in Europe: The End-game?</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Douglas Bland</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 France’s Military Command Structures in the 1990s</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Diego Ruiz Palmer</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Centralizing German Operational Command and Control Structures</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Thomas-Durell Young</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Italy’s Command Structure</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Andreas Corti and Alessandro Politi</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Portugal’s Defense Structures and NATO</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Thomas C. Bruneau</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Present and Future Command Structure: A Danish View</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Michael H. Clemmesen</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
11 NATO Restructuring and Enlargement: The Dual Challenge

John Borawski

About the Contributors

Index
## Charts and Maps

### Charts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. NATO Reaction Forces</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ACE Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) Command and Control Structure</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Allied Command Europe (ACE) Command and Control Structure</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) Command and Control Structure</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) Command and Control Structure</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. LANDCENT Force and Command and Control Structure</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Command and Control Structure</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Definitions of NATO Command Authorities</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Comparison of NATO Command Authorities</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Comparison of NATO and U.S. Command Authority Definitions</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. “OPCON” Compared</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Command Authorities of NATO Land Multinational Formations</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Tasks Associated with Article V Operations</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Tasks Associated with Non-Article V Operations</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Tasks Related to a Particular Mission, Non-Article V</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

It gives me great, and poignant, pleasure to be asked to write the forward to this compendium on Command in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Cold War. I say poignant because over the last five years, in both national and NATO appointments, I have been closely involved in the reorganisation of NATO’s command structures. That process is still not complete. Hence the publication of this compendium could not be more timely as a contribution to the debate which continues in NATO capitals.

I will begin by endorsing Dr. Thomas Young’s conclusions in his introduction. I do not, however, wish to enter the debate on the approaches of various nations to changes to the command structure: NATO is an alliance based on consensus, and we must accept that. It is also the most effective military alliance in history; this is largely due to the existence of its integrated and multinational command structure. That command structure, the cement of the Alliance as it were, derives from the mutual obligations contained in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. This contractual obligation, which does not exist for the other missions which have arisen since 1990, means that the defence of NATO territory must be the basis of any restructuring. If we were to move away from this and thus weaken the command structure, even with the best intentions, then it is my firm conviction that we would do serious harm to the Alliance and its future. On the other hand, a modified command structure, still based on the Article V contractual obligation, provides a firm basis, as well as flexibility, versatility, and availability for any non-contractual, namely out-of-area, requirement.

Command structures do not exist of their own accord. They come into being, change, and develop, to permit commanders at the appropriate level, from top to bottom, to orchestrate the application of military force at sea, in the air, and on land. There is, however, a limit to which one can impose responsibilities on commanders, who after all are personally responsible for the conduct of operations, and a limit to the amount of specialisation and detail with which they can cope. This is why we have hierarchical command structures with each commander dealing with the appropriate level of competence. It is why at certain levels command should be joint and at others purely functional. How many levels of command are needed will be dictated
by the operations factors of time, forces, and space. One must be flexible, and on this basis I fundamentally disagree with categorical statements such as those made by Colonel Clemmesen in Chapter 10; for example, “All headquarters with a wartime mission at the operational level must be combined and joint.” Equally, I must ask why establishing or keeping “functional” NATO Headquarters at the operational level of command can no longer be justified when such a structure has been adopted for the Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment (as it was in the Gulf War).

A further point is that one cannot simply create command structures which work, especially multinational ones, from scratch. NATO therefore needs, in the absence of any specific threat or contingency, to retain the capability to conduct operations which ensure three cascading levels in the spectrum of operational command:

1. Strategic/Operational;
2. Joint Operational;

These three levels of command have nothing to do with the existing structure of Major NATO Commander (MNC), Major Subordinate Commander (MSC), and Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC), although these three levels do in fact meet these requirements. It is the principle which counts, not the current number or size of headquarters at each level. All three levels of command may not be needed for every operation, but history tells us that without such capabilities in place and functioning, disaster will beckon.

I have been somewhat franker in this Foreword than is usual. However, I have no hesitation in using the privilege which retirement offers. I should like to express my thanks to Dr. Young, and all contributors, for their participation in this vital debate. Let us hope that it permits conclusions to be drawn which will guarantee the long-term future of our Alliance.

H. Hansen
General, German Army
Outgoing Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Central Europe
March 1996
Abbreviations

ACCHAN
Allied Command Channel

ACCS
Air Command and Control System

ACE
Allied Command Europe

ACLANT
Allied Command Atlantic

ADT XXI
Armée de Terre du 21ème siècle

AFCENT
Allied Forces Central Europe

AFMED
Allied Forces Mediterranean

AFNORTH
Allied Forces Northern Europe

AFNORTHWEST
Allied Forces Northwest Europe

AFSOUTH
Allied Forces Southern Europe

AIRCENT
Allied Air Forces Central Europe

AIRNORTHWEST
Allied Air Forces Northwest Europe

ALESCLANT
Amiral, commandant l’escadre de l’Atlantique

ALESCLMED
Amiral, commandant l’escadre de la Méditerranée

ALFAN
Amiral, commandant la Force d’Action Navale

ALGASM
Amiral, commandant le Groupe d’Action Sous-Marine

ALINDIEN
Amiral, commandant les Forces maritimes de l’océan Indien

ALMINES
Amiral, commandant la Force de guerre des Mines

ALPACI
Amiral, commandant les forces maritimes de l’océan Pacifique
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMF-A</td>
<td>ACE Mobile Force-Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF-L</td>
<td>ACE Mobile Force-Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAF</td>
<td>Allied Tactical Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>Air Tasking Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTAP</td>
<td>Allied Forces Baltic Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALTBAT</td>
<td>Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAOR</td>
<td>British Army of the Rhine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMVg</td>
<td>Bundesministerium der Verteidigung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRGE</td>
<td>Brigade de Renseignement et de Guerre Electronique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C³I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C⁴ISR</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFDA</td>
<td>Commandement “Air” des Forces de Défense Aérienne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>Combined Air Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFMED</td>
<td>Combined Amphibious Force, Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASSIC</td>
<td>Commandement “Air” des Systèmes de Surveillance, d’Information et de Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATac</td>
<td>Commandement aérien tactique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Capabilities Coordination Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDAOA</td>
<td>Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDE</td>
<td>Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Entrainement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECLANT</td>
<td>Commandant-en-Chef pour l'Atlantique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CECMED</td>
<td>Commandant-en-Chef pour la Méditerranée</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMA</td>
<td>Chef d'Etat-Major des Armées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEMGFA</td>
<td>Chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CeMiSS</td>
<td>Centro Militare di Studi Strategici</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTAG</td>
<td>Central Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CESIS</td>
<td>Comitato Esecutivo Servizi Informazione e Sicurezza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAC</td>
<td>Commandement de la Force Aérienne de Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFAP</td>
<td>Commandement de la Force Aérienne de Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFE</td>
<td>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (1990)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFHQ</td>
<td>Canadian Forces Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHOD</td>
<td>Chief of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCEASTLANT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Eastern Atlantic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCENT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCHAN</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Command Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCIBERLANT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIPE</td>
<td>Comitato Interministeriale Programmazione Economica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiPS</td>
<td>Comitato Interministeriale Politico Strategico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJPS</td>
<td>Combined Joint Planning Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COC</td>
<td>Centro de Operações Conjunto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFAR</td>
<td>Centro de Operações das Forças Armadas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COFT</td>
<td>Commandement Opérationnel des Forces Terrestres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMAIRBALTAP</td>
<td>Commander Allied Air Forces Baltic Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMBALTAP</td>
<td>Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVBALTAP</td>
<td>Commander Allied Naval Forces Baltic Approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVNORTHWEST</td>
<td>Commander Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComEleF</td>
<td>Commandant des Eléments Français</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComFor</td>
<td>Commandant des Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPOAIR</td>
<td>Commander Portuguese Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMSTRIKFLTLAN</td>
<td>Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoPS</td>
<td>Comitato Politico Strategico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps LANDJUT</td>
<td>Headquarters Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Commandement des Opérations Spéciales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoTAM</td>
<td>Commandement du Transport Aérien Militaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPFH</td>
<td>Centre Principal Français Hélios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPX</td>
<td>command post exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR-CAST</td>
<td>Central Region-Chiefs of Army Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSAR</td>
<td>combat search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDN</td>
<td>Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Conselho Superior Militar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSMD</td>
<td>Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTAA</td>
<td>Commandement des Systèmes de Télécommunications de l'Armée de l'Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTFs</td>
<td>Combined Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIMS</td>
<td>Director of the International Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPC</td>
<td>Defense Planning Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Direction du Renseignement Militaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASTLANT</td>
<td>Allied Forces Eastern Atlantic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMA</td>
<td>Etat-Major des Armées</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB</td>
<td>Etat-Major de Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMCC</td>
<td>Estado-Maior Coordenador Conjunto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMGFA</td>
<td>Estado-Maior General das Forças Armada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMIA</td>
<td>Etat-Major Interarmées de Planification Opérationnelle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMT</td>
<td>Etat-Major de Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Force d'Action Navale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Force d'Action Rapide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Fuerza de Accion Rapida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAS</td>
<td>Forces Aériennes Stratégiques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAT</td>
<td>Force d'Action Terrestre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATac</td>
<td>Force Aérienne Tactique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>Forza d'Intervento Rapido</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFA</td>
<td>Forces Françaises en Allemagne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOST</td>
<td>Force Océanique Stratégique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTX</td>
<td>field exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fü H</td>
<td>Führungsstab Heer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fü L</td>
<td>Führungsstab Luftwaffe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fü M</td>
<td>Führungsstab Marine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fü S</td>
<td>Führungsstab der Streitkräfte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FüZBW</td>
<td>Führungszentrum der Bundeswehr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBERLANT</td>
<td>Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>NATO Implementation Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>International Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>Immediate Reaction Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Forces Air Component Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTFs</td>
<td>Joint Task Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLK</td>
<td>Kommando Luftbewegliche Kräfte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDCENT</td>
<td>Allied Land Forces Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDSOUTHCENT</td>
<td>Allied Land Forces South-Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTS</td>
<td>Long Term Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNC</td>
<td>Major NATO Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNFC</td>
<td>multinational force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Major Subordinate Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>Allied Naval Forces Central Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVNORTHWEST</td>
<td>Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDHQ</td>
<td>National Defence Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDM</td>
<td>(Italian) New Defense Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NICS</td>
<td>NATO Integrated Communications System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHAG</td>
<td>Northern Army Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPG</td>
<td>Nuclear Planning Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCOM</td>
<td>Operational Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Operational Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Partnership Coordination Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCG</td>
<td>Policy Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCIAT</td>
<td><em>Poste de Commandement Interarmées de Théâtre</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMWG</td>
<td>WEU Political-Military Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POACCS</td>
<td>Portuguese Air Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POADS</td>
<td>Portuguese Air Defense System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POMBAL</td>
<td>Portuguese Maritime Buffer and AEW Link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Principal Subordinate Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>Partido Social Democrata</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Obrero Español</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCN</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMA</td>
<td>Revolution in Military Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACLANT</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SG/DNA</td>
<td>Segretario Generale della Difesa/ Direttore Nazionale degli Armamenti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOCS</td>
<td>sea lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Sector Operations Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPD</strong></td>
<td><em>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SRC</strong></td>
<td>Sub-Regional Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STANAGS</strong></td>
<td>Standardization Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STANAVFORCHAN</strong></td>
<td>Standing Allied Naval Force Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STANAVFORLANT</strong></td>
<td>Standing Allied Naval Force Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STANAVFORMED</strong></td>
<td>Standing Allied Naval Force Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRIKEFLTLANT</strong></td>
<td>Striking Fleet Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOA</strong></td>
<td>transfer of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TACOM</strong></td>
<td>Tactical Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TACON</strong></td>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOMM</strong></td>
<td><em>Théâtre d'Opérations Métropole-Méditerranée</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UKAIR</strong></td>
<td>United Kingdom Air Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.N.</strong></td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>USCENTCOM</strong></td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VPR</strong></td>
<td><em>Verteidigungspolitische Richlinien</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WESTLANT</strong></td>
<td>Allied Forces Western Atlantic Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEU</strong></td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgements

This compendium was initially the idea of my friend and colleague, Colonel John Auger (Ret), then Director of the Strategic Outreach Office, the U.S. Army War College. John strongly encouraged me to pursue this project and assisted me in its initial development. Major General William A. Stofft (Ret), Major General Richard A. Chilcoat, Brigadier General Jack Mountcastle, Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon, Colonel William Allen, and Dr. Earl J. Tilford provided substantial encouragement, support, and, most importantly, patience, during the long process of producing this volume. LTC Diane Smith and Ms. Marianne Cowling masterfully edited the draft and prepared it for publication. Mrs. Kay Williams, my long-suffering secretary, provided superb administrative support in this endeavor. Finally, I am indebted to Ms. Roberta Hill and Mrs. Mary Jane Semple who cheerfully rose to the task of producing the many charts and maps which appear in this work.

Neither this volume, nor the individual essays in it, should be construed as reflecting the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. I alone remain responsible for any errors of fact.

*Thomas-Durell Young*
COMMAND IN NATO AFTER THE COLD WAR:
ALLIANCE, NATIONAL,
AND MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
INTRODUCTION

Thomas-Durell Young

That the end of the Cold War has resulted in a massive sea change in Europe’s security environment is a fact. Notwithstanding the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) appears to be as politically active and institutionally viable, if not more so, than it was before autumn 1989. Since 1990, the NATO Alliance has undertaken major reform initiatives that prepared it for the emerging European security landscape. For instance, at the London Summit of July 1990, the Alliance declared an end of the Cold War.¹ At the Rome Summit (November 1991), NATO released the “Alliance’s New Strategic Concept” to be implemented by the Alliance.² More recently, at the January 1994 Brussels Summit, the heads of government and state announced, inter alia, the creation of the Partnership for Peace program and approved the concept for the subsequent creation of Alliance Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).³ Hence, contrary to the views of some critics, the Alliance has clearly demonstrated its intent to reform itself to meet the challenges of the new European security system.⁴

While the events outlined above are generally well-known, the concomitant reorganization of NATO military structures has gone largely unnoticed. Significantly, the Alliance eliminated one (of three) Major NATO Commanders (MNC) and overhauled a second, i.e., Allied Command Europe (ACE). The Central Region of ACE alone has seen a reduction in its force structure by some 40 percent.⁵ Gone is the old familiar Cold War “layer cake” of eight national corps stationed in that region. These national formations have been replaced by four binational corps, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (which contains, inter alia, multinational divisions), and the EUROCORPS.⁶
Moreover, following the decision by foreign ministers at the Oslo Ministerials in June 1992, Alliance military forces have assumed key new missions, i.e., peace support operations. Thus, reorganized and smaller NATO forces must now be prepared to conduct traditional Article V missions (i.e., collective defense), as well as to contribute to what is now referred to as non-Article V missions.

The end of the Cold War and the reorganization of a reduced NATO force structure and inclusion of new missions have profoundly affected command and control of Alliance forces in Europe. Simply put, command in the Alliance has changed, and perhaps fundamentally so, in three different, but interrelated, areas:

1. Although the NATO integrated command structure was reduced and reorganized in 1991, subsequent events indicate that efforts to date are incomplete to meet future needs. The ongoing NATO Long Term Study may result in a more fundamental reorganization of this structure (e.g., the creation of a European pillar in the integrated command structure and the need to reorganize the structure to admit new members). Indeed, already in November 1996, the NATO Chiefs of Staff meeting endorsed modifying the NATO command structure. Two Major NATO Commanders are to remain, but renamed Strategic Commanders (SCs). The Major Supporting Commanders (MSCs) are to be reduced and renamed Regional Commanders (RC), while the existing Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSCs) are to be consolidated and renamed Sub-Regional Commanders (SRCs).

2. The growing reliance on multinational formations below the army corps level has forced Alliance members to confront directly the politically-charged issue of granting sufficient command authorities to commanders of these formations.

3. A number of key European NATO members have made important changes to their respective national command structures aimed at improving their ability to deploy forces outside of Western Europe.

The essays that follow address these important changes in command and control as they relate to NATO. Whereas these works do not purport to represent a comprehensive review of this complex subject, in totality they provide the reader with a better understanding of the changes, implications, and outlook for future command and control arrangements in the Alliance.
The examination of the first major issue begins with William Johnsen’s general assessment of the reorganization of NATO’s integrated command and control structures that have taken place since 1991. He provides a description of how this reorganization has affected the two remaining major NATO Commands: Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) and ACE. His analyses focus in particular detail on ACE. The author also provides brief assessments of the proposed Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, ACE Reaction Forces, and multinational forces in general. From this basis, Johnsen identifies a number of organizational reforms that NATO should consider that would improve its ability to exercise command and control of Allied forces.

Charles Barry addresses the issue of the CJTF concept in greater detail. Unfortunately, the CJTF proposal has not progressed as initially anticipated and has been overshadowed by the successful Partnership for Peace program (PfP), both of which were announced at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. Unlike PfP, however, CJTF has yet to be implemented in large part due to opposition by France. France’s opposition has de facto diminished as it has become involved in planning for NATO peace support operations in Bosnia and participation in the Alliance’s Implementation Force (IFOR). Barry analyzes the proposed CJTF structures and explains the many nuances which have plagued the concept’s progress in the Alliance and inhibited its early implementation.

The second issue, command authorities, is addressed in Chapter 4, co-authored by Jon Whitford and myself. We became involved with this subject through our participation in a Central Region’s Chiefs of Army Staff working group convened in 1994 to examine the command authorities required by multinational force commanders. Multinational force commanders must now plan to conduct Article V and non-Article V operations with their formations, often in the face of national opposition to granting them sufficient command authorities to accomplish their directed missions. Our essay assesses the problems surrounding multinational command authorities and explains some of the subtle nuances influencing the subject. We also describe the methodology the working group developed to determine the command authorities required by multinational force commanders in the conduct of Article V and non-Article V missions.
How some NATO nations have altered their own national command structures as a result of the end of the Cold War is the third and final issue addressed in this work. This important subject deserves study for several reasons. At the practical level, altered national command structures will factor into Alliance efforts to reorganize the integrated command structure. The more widely known the details of these national reorganizations are, the less likely misunderstandings will develop concerning national intentions and subsequent effects on Alliance command and control structures. For example, enhanced national command structures might indicate greater nationalization of defense structures. However, in some key cases European nations have reorganized their national command structures to increase their ability to participate in NATO (e.g., France) or to take part in multinational operations (e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany).

Douglas Bland in Chapter 5 addresses the question of the future of Canadian forces in Europe and their present undefined command arrangements within NATO. Bland argues that historically Ottawa never fully addressed the question of exercising national command of its forces within NATO. Consequently, the decision to withdraw its forces from the Federal Republic of Germany has resulted in a major unknown: how will Ottawa exercise national command and control of its forces under the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept. This is a particularly insightful question given that the new Liberal federal government intends to shift more emphasis away from NATO to United Nations (U.N.) missions.

Nor is Canada alone in its special command and control relationship. France and Germany long have had unique command relationships in the Alliance even though they were diametrically opposed. In the case of France, Diego Ruiz Palmer provides in Charter 6 an important contribution to our understanding of French motives and policies toward the reorganization of its national command structure with particular attention given to Paris’s attitudes toward future command relations with NATO. The author provides an extensive review of post-war French command arrangements and their reorganization following the Gulf War. He argues that recent changes have been made as part of France’s “internationalization” of its security policy.

In the essay on Germany in Chapter 7, I detail the evolution of official German thinking since unification concerning the need to
create a central national operational control capability. This essay attempts to provide the most detailed examination of the difficulties which have confronted German defense planners as they have attempted to create a modest centralized operational control structure. A review of this laboriously difficult and bureaucratically painful experience has led to tense civil-military relations in Germany that inhibit development of centralized capability in the Ministry of Defense sufficient to exercise control over Bundeswehr forces in less-than-war situations.

In Chapter 8, Andreas Corti and Alessandro Politi have written one of the very few essays in the English language which addresses Italian command organizations. In addition to explaining the post-war evolution of the Italian national command structure, they have provided an explanation of recent legislation which, if enacted, would effect a significant reorganization. In this respect, Rome is following the lead of many of its allies by giving its Chief of Defense (CHOD) greater authority to direct the Italian military in non-Article V missions, in addition to restructuring its national command structure.

Thomas Bruneau in Chapter 9 has written a fascinating explanation of Portugal's national command structure. He pays particular attention to Lisbon’s unique position in NATO’s integrated command structure (i.e., belonging to ACLANT and ACE) and its possession of the post Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIBERLAND). Bruneau also describes efforts to reform Portugal’s national command structure, to include the unsuccessful proposal to bring the country under ACE, as well as the strong influence its command of IBERLAND has had over this process.

In Chapter 10, Michael Clemmensen examines the efforts made during the early 1990s to reorganize Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) and the subsequent creation of Allied Forces North West Europe (AFNORTHWEST). Through a review of the interests and objectives of the principal parties in this command (i.e., United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and Norway), Clemmensen argues that AFNORTHWEST remains plagued by a number of unresolved command problems. By using this effort at command reorganization as a base point, Clemmensen argues that new European security conditions require a radical reorganization of existing command
structures. He proposes a novel command structure that would be more supportive of the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.

Finally, John Borawski concludes this compendium with an assessment of NATO’s ongoing Long Term Study of its military structures and how it relates to efforts to enlarge the Alliance’s membership. Initially, the Long Term study did not receive the press that it deserved although the “creative” proposals offered by General John Sheehan, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), have focused some public attention on the Alliance’s efforts to reorganize the integrated command structure. However, now that membership enlargement has become the most pressing political issue confronting the Alliance, the Long Term Study has new relevance as NATO struggles with the task of adapting its structures for new members.

The analysis contained in the various essays lead to three overarching, concluding observations. First, the ability of the Alliance leadership to reform the existing structure is severely hampered by national interests and positions. Command positions equate to national influence and prestige. Therefore, further efforts to reorganize and restructure, by definition, will be limited by prevailing political exigencies and can proceed only within the Alliance’s consensus-building process. This point may appear to be self-evident to most, yet many restructuring proposals apparently fail to take political realities into consideration.

Second, in addressing future reorganization of the integrated military command structure, the Alliance and its members need to realize that command has changed fundamentally in NATO. Specifically, the creation of multinational formations, which require the surrender of a greater degree of national sovereignty than national formations, necessitates a redefinition of our collective understanding of command. The failure to address the issue of the command authorities required by multinational commanders has the potential to undermine the military effectiveness of the Alliance’s newest manifestation of political commitment.

Third, some key nations in Europe have reorganized their national command structures better to respond to missions outside their own region in Europe and beyond. A wider appreciation of the intentions and new capabilities of some allies’ national command reorganizations could facilitate NATO’s attempt to create a more streamlined and flexible command structure and organization.
Admittedly, many of the issues related to command, addressed by contributors to this compendium do not lend themselves to easy resolution since they fall within what many Alliance members have often considered to be strictly sovereign prerogatives. And, this is as it should be. As an alliance of democracies, national political interests, objectives, and sensitivities must influence the development of a new consensus on "command" in NATO. A better understanding of many of these issues, some of which are presented in this work, will make a positive contribution to the early achievement of such a consensus.

Notes

Author’s note: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Department of the Army.


5. One result of the force structure “free fall” in Allied Command Europe was a force structure review conducted by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 1993. For details on this subject see, William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, Preparing for the NATO Summit: What are the Pivotal Issues?, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993.

6. For an informative assessment of these formations, see Assembly of the Western European Union, European Armed Forces, Document 1468, Paris, June 12, 1995.

REORGANIZING NATO COMMAND AND
CONTROL STRUCTURES:
MORE WORK IN THE AUGEAN STABLES?

William T. Johnsen

In November 1991 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) published “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” intending to position NATO for the demands of the 21st century.\(^1\) While the New Strategic Concept did not provide detailed guidance for revamping NATO command and control structures, it called for establishing flexible command and control arrangements that would facilitate the new emphasis on crisis management and conflict prevention.\(^2\) One month later, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) announced the first major steps in reorganizing NATO command and control structures.\(^3\) These efforts, as well as a number of additional initiatives,\(^4\) have led to a substantial reorganization of Alliance command and control arrangements.

Whether those arrangements have sufficiently prepared the Alliance to meet the rigors of the changed European security environment is a more open-ended question. Certainly, as will be argued below, existing structures represent the limits of what was politically possible at the time. But that fact does not necessarily indicate that the current organizations will suit NATO’s political and military needs as the Alliance enters the 21st century. The purpose of this essay, therefore, is threefold: first, to describe the changes in NATO command and control structures that have taken place in the last five years; second, to analyze and assess the implications of this reorganization; and, third, to offer recommendations for additional initiatives that will better prepare the Alliance for the future.

Before examining the details of the command and control restructuring, it might prove useful to outline the general NATO
command organization. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) occupies the pinnacle of NATO’s command and control structure and ensures ultimate civil control of Alliance military forces. The NAC can be composed of the 16 Heads of State and Government, their Foreign Ministers, or the Permanent Representatives to NATO, who hold ambassadorial rank. Permanent Representatives also normally meet weekly as the DPC to address primarily defense-related issues and to provide guidance to NATO military authorities. At least twice per year, the DPC meets at the level of Defense Ministers. All NATO members, to include France as of December 1995, belong to the DPC.

The NATO Military Committee (MC), the highest military body in the Alliance, operates under the authority of the NAC and DPC, or, if nuclear matters are involved, under the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The MC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of each member country except Iceland which is represented by a civilian. While the Chiefs of Defence Staff meet in session at least twice a year, the MC normally meets with National Military Representatives located at NATO Headquarters. Below the MC fall the Major NATO Commanders (MNC), which are further divided into the following hierarchy: Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC), Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSC), and sub-PSCs. This latter system is also known as the integrated military structure. It is to the reorganization of the command and control arrangements of this integrated military structure that the discussion now turns.

ACE (Allied Command Europe) Reaction Forces

In accordance with the Strategic Concept, Alliance forces have been divided into reaction forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction forces are composed of active duty formations maintained at high levels of readiness, that give Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) the capability to respond quickly and flexibly to crisis developments on land, in the air, and on the sea. Reaction forces consist of immediate reaction forces (IRF) and rapid reaction forces (RRF). Immediate reaction forces include the ACE Mobile Force (AMF)—Land and Air (longstanding NATO forces, but augmented from their past structures) and Standing Allied Naval Forces: Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Channel
Chart 1.
NATO Reaction Forces.

(STANAVFORCHAN), and Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), a new standing organization. 12 (Chart 1)

Rapid reaction forces also contain air, sea, and land elements. Air and maritime components needed beyond those available in the IRF will be provided by nations on an as-required basis. Land rapid reaction forces in Allied Command Europe (ACE) will come from the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) (Chart 2). Commander, ARRC, can draw from a pool of national units (up to ten divisions), but current plans anticipate that no more than four divisions plus corps troops would be deployed at any one time. The composition of the deployed force would depend upon the mission, the geographic area for deployment, and the forces that nations make available. 13

MNCs: The Demise of Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN)

Reorganization of NATO’s command and control structures began at the top. Effective July 1, 1994, the Alliance eliminated ACCHAN, reducing the number of MNCs from three to two. 14 But, while ACCHAN was eliminated as an MNC, its subordinate elements largely remained in existence, if somewhat reshuffled. Most headquarters and their responsibilities were absorbed within ACE, particularly within Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST). These are more than mere cosmetic changes, however. In many cases, these headquarters went from being MSCs to PSCs and, in some cases, to sub-PSCs. These actions resulted in a loss of prestige and influence as general officer and flag rank billets were lost or reduced in grade, and manning levels were diminished.
Equally important, sub-PSC headquarters throughout the Alliance are no longer eligible for NATO funding, and individual nations must now shoulder those responsibilities—no mean change.  

**MNC: Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)**

Given the distinct geographic and operational conditions of ACLANT and current security conditions, there may be little need for major adjustments to its existing command and control arrangements. That said, consideration should be given to NATO command and control of Portuguese forces. Currently, Portuguese naval forces intended to defend mainland Portugal and the Madeira Islands are assigned to Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (IBERLANT), an MSC of ACLANT. Defense of the Azores falls to Allied Forces Western Atlantic Area (WESTLANT), another MSC of ACLANT (see Map 1 and Chart 3). Conversely, Commander Portuguese Air (COMPOAIR) reports as a sub-PSC to the SACEUR (Map 2). To complicate matters further, the land defense of continental Portugal is a national responsibility. Finally, the Separate Mixed Brigade and the Airborne Brigade are designated to assist in the ground defense of allies.

These conditions complicate matters for national leaders and NATO commanders. During the Cold War, these issues were largely patched over, but because of the changed security conditions,
long-standing debates over the extent of Alliance command and control of Portuguese forces and how it should be exercised best to support Portuguese interests have been rekindled. While these decisions will remain finally in Portuguese hands, consideration should be given to consolidating the defense of all Portuguese territory under the command and control of one MNC. From a military perspective, the ability to coordinate the defense of the Straits of Gibraltar under one MNC could tip the scales in favor of SACEUR.

Chart 3.
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT)
Command and Control Structure.
who is already responsible for the western Mediterranean. Adoption of such an option would likely require redrawing the boundaries between IBERLANT and the remainder of ACLANT to ensure a coherent defense of the Atlantic Ocean area.

**MNC: Allied Command Europe (ACE) (Chart 4)**

The most significant changes in command and control arrangements have occurred within ACE, which has reduced its MSCs from four to three by eliminating United Kingdom Air Forces Command (UKAIR). Concomitantly, Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) was inactivated, and a new MSC, Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) (Chart 5), was created by merging forces previously assigned to ACCHAN, UKAIR, and portions of the former AFNORTH. Additionally, as will be seen below, significant reorganizations have occurred within the remaining ACE MSCs.
Chart 4.
Allied Command Europe (ACE)
Command and Control Structure.

Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST).
Within AFNORTHWEST, the Alliance created functional commands for the air and maritime defense of Northwest Europe: AIRNORTHWEST (the former UKAIR) and NAVNORTHWEST (the former ACCHAN, but with expanded geographic responsibilities, respectively). The Alliance also established a joint command at Jatta, Norway, for the defense of Northern Europe (i.e., Norway). Finally, eliminating a long-standing anomaly,

Chart 5.
Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST)
Command and Control Structure.

*CinC Allied Forces Northwest Europe
CINCNORTHWEST

** Commands transferred from ACCHAN or UKAIR when those latter commands were deactivated
** Transferred from AFNORTH when that command was deactivated
responsibility for the land defense of the United Kingdom came under ACE on July 1, 1994, when Commander, United Kingdom Land Forces (through CINCNORTHWEST) became responsible to SACEUR for the defense of the United Kingdom in war, as well as war planning and exercises in peace (Chart 5). 20

Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) (Chart 6).

Significant reorganization also occurred in AFCENT. Effective July 1, 1993, the five existing PSCs—Northern Army Group, Central Army Group, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, and the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAFs)—were consolidated into two functional PSCs: LANDCENT (Allied Land Forces Central Europe) (Chart 7) and AIRCENT (Allied Air Forces Central Europe) (Chart 6). 21

Additionally, AFCENT absorbed the geographically-based command Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) from the former AFNORTH (essentially Denmark and Germany, north of the Elbe River). Commander, BALTAP is responsible for the joint defense of Danish territory, Danish air and sea space, the northern region of Germany, and the air defense of the entire Baltic Sea. He does not, however, control maritime operations (to include naval aviation) in the Baltic and Kattegat, which must be coordinated with CINCNORTHWEST through Commander Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe (COMNAVNORTHWEST) 22 (see Map 2). Moreover, command and control arrangements for air defense and

Chart 6.
Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)
Command and Control Structure.
Chart 7.
LANDCENT Force and
Command and Control Structure.

offensive air operations need to be ironed out between BALTAP and AIRCENT.

Political and military rationales drove this decision. Politically, Denmark wished to be considered an integral part of Central Europe, and Germany wanted all of its territory located within one MSC. Militarily, the unification of Germany had greatly extended the AFCENT area of responsibility eastward, and the defense of a unified Germany under one MSC made good sense. At the time, eliminating the two Army Group headquarters and the two ATAFs and consolidating them into LANDCENT and AIRCENT, respectively, also made sense—at least until such time that the dust had settled from the changes in the security situation and reductions in the force structure.

That time has come, and the Alliance should undertake more sweeping changes in the command and control structures of the Central Region. First, AFCENT should be organized strictly along functional lines. AIRCENT and LANDCENT would be retained as functional commands, but would be streamlined and some responsibilities and personnel transferred to AFCENT. Second, a naval component command for AFCENT should be created: Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (NAVCENT). Third, sole responsibility for the defense of the Baltic Sea area would fall to Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT). Fourth, BALTAP would be eliminated as a geographic-based
command. National commanders within the current BALTAP organization (e.g., Commander, German Fleet; Admiral Danish Fleet; Commander, Land Forces Zealand) would report directly to their respective functional commander. Fifth, headquarters AFCENT would have to be expanded—personnel, equipment, and resources—to the degree necessary to carry out its increased responsibilities.

Implementing such an option has numerous military benefits. First, it makes little sense to constrain CINCENT’s ability to plan for a unified defense of his area of responsibility. Establishing a naval component at AFCENT, in conjunction with a redefinition of maritime responsibilities between AFCENT and AFNORTHWEST (e.g., between the Skagerrak and Kattegat), would eliminate the existing, and confusing, command and control arrangements for the defense of the Baltic Sea. Moreover, such a functional organization would simplify the planning and conduct of operations along the northern littoral of the Central Region.

Second, the days of a limited security horizon, clear and distinct threats, and detailed geographic planning parameters have passed. CINCENT must have the ability to command and control operations outside the Central Region. Augmentation of the AFCENT headquarters would provide, for the first time, the capability for AFCENT to provide sustained command and control of joint operations throughout Central Europe in support of operations in other ACE regions or in support of “out of NATO area” missions. Moreover, CINCENT must continue to develop effective functional PSCs capable of being employed outside the Central Region instead of being artificially tied to less militarily significant geographic areas. Certainly, forces in these countries must be able to perform their main defense missions, but they also must develop capabilities necessary to assist in the reinforcement of other regions.

Third, this option would bring command and control arrangements in AFCENT at the PSC and, particularly, sub-PSC levels into line with their counterparts in the remainder of ACE (e.g., at the PSC level, Allied Forces Northern Europe in AFNORTHWEST; at the sub-PSC level, Commander Joint Task Force North Norway). Finally, this proposal would streamline command and control functions, thus saving money, for individual nations and the Alliance.
Undoubtedly, this alternative will prove politically difficult, particularly for Denmark. That having been said, this arrangement makes military and fiscal sense. To ease Danish concerns, Headquarters, NAVCENT could be located at the current BALTAP headquarters at Karup and could be commanded by a Danish flag officer. Moreover, if the Danish government saw the need to retain a joint defense of BALTAP, they could follow the Norwegian example of Commander, Joint Task Force North Norway. In this case, Danish commanders in the Baltic Approaches would be “double-hatted,” reporting to both their national and NATO component commanders.

**Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH).**

Changes also are necessary in AFSOUTH, where political circumstances have severely circumscribed the Alliance’s ability to revamp its command and control organization. Even under the best of political circumstances such changes will not be easy. AFSOUTH must provide for the defense of the entire Mediterranean Sea and Italy, Greece, and Turkey; three detached and expansive peninsulas. The immense geographic area, with its distinct cultural, political, and physical subregions, argues against a more functional organization of its numerous PSC and sub-PSC structures (Chart 8). Moreover, two key NATO regional countries, Spain and France, do not formally

---

**Chart 8.**

**Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH)**

**Command and Control Structure.**

![Diagram](image)
fall within AFSOUTH command and control structures, although they maintain bilateral operational agreements with SACEUR and CINCSOUTH for certain missions.\(^{28}\)

Despite the difficulties, efforts to improve command and control arrangements in the Southern Region must continue. One important step would be for Greece to make good on its 1980 agreement with the SACEUR to reestablish sub-PSC headquarters for 7th ATAF and Allied Land Forces South-Central Europe (LANDSOUTHCENT) at Larissa and for Turkey to stop erecting obstacles to such efforts.\(^{29}\) The Alliance also should insist that PSC headquarters throughout the Southern Region have the largest possible representation of international staff members. Third, notwithstanding these obvious difficulties, the Alliance should establish the headquarters of the Multinational Division South (which is to comprise Italian, Greek, and Turkish brigades) and form the planning staff as soon as possible. Such actions would help break down cultural and political barriers, encourage higher levels of competency, defuse tensions, and could be used to effect closer ties with French and Spanish forces.\(^{30}\)

Additionally, more NATO resources need to be devoted to developing the command and control infrastructure not only in the countries that make up the Southern Region (i.e., Italy, Greece, and Turkey) but throughout NATO’s southern tier (i.e., France, Spain, and Portugal). This recommendation obviously is fraught with difficulties as France and Spain do not belong to the integrated military structure, and as discussed earlier, Portuguese territory and forces fall under multiple NATO headquarters. Nonetheless, action should be taken to improve existing command and control capabilities if NATO is to be able to control operations throughout this vital region. A partial solution may be found in the acquisition of mobile command and control systems (e.g., air transportable satellite tracking facilities, ground stations, computer links, etc.) that could be pooled and then deployed in the event of crisis. This would allow NATO to reduce the number of systems required, and costs could be apportioned throughout the Alliance.

A final issue deserves serious consideration. Alliance political and military authorities should examine whether AFSOUTH should be elevated to the status of a MNC.\(^{31}\) Certainly, such a shift would not be without controversy. For over 40 years NATO’s attention focused, rightly, on the overwhelming threat posed to Central Europe by the Warsaw Pact. This resulted in the majority of forces, resources,
infrastructure, and planning being devoted to the Central Region, usually at the expense of other areas in the Alliance. Habits of such duration will not be broken easily, particularly among Central European nations used to receiving the lion’s share of NATO largesse. If, however, one accepts the proposition that Southern Europe faces the greatest potential risks, then prudence dictates a greater integration of command and control arrangements along NATO’s southern tier.

**Multinational Forces**

Multinational formations play an important role in Alliance force structures. In the case of reaction forces, multinational formations promote cohesion, reinforce transatlantic links, and demonstrate Alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defense. For main defense forces, NATO leaders envisaged that the establishment of standing multinational formations would manifest continued Alliance solidarity. Moreover, they hoped to demonstrate that the Alliance had moved away from the Cold War alignment of national corps along the now defunct Inter-German Border. Finally, an unstated but fervent hope of many NATO planners was that reliance on multinational forces might impede the “force structure free fall” already underway, particularly in the Central Region, as nations sought to maximize the peace dividend.

The Alliance has made considerable headway in its use of multinational formations. Multinational formations within ACE’s Immediate Reaction Forces (AMF-Land, AMF-Air, and Standing Allied Naval Forces (STANAVFORLANT, STANAVFORMED, and STANAVFORCHAN)) continue to demonstrate Alliance cohesion and resolve. Within the new Rapid Reaction Forces, multinational forces are the norm. For example, the ARRC can call upon forces from ten different nations (see Chart 2). Of special note, two multinational divisions (Multinational Division Center and Multinational Division South) are envisaged for the ARRC. Finally, multinational formations form the core of the main defense land forces of the Central Region, which are organized into five bi- or multinational and one German national corps (see Chart 7).

While the merits of multinationality are appealing, one should not forget the difficulties inherent in transforming political initiatives into military reality. Differing languages, force structures, doctrines,
readiness requirements, training standards, and organizational cultures can severely complicate the role of the multinational commander and his subordinates. Moreover, reliance on multinational formations will only exacerbate the nettlesome problem of interoperability of procedures, equipment, communications, repair parts, and ammunition that has long plagued NATO. Finally, the always sensitive issue of command and control arrangements—particularly the differences between Article V and non-Article V missions—will require resolution. This is not to argue against the use of multinational formations. The intent is simply to ensure that NATO authorities understand the time, energy, and resources that will be required to ensure such units are fully integrated in the Alliance’s military structure and that adequate command and control arrangements, at all levels, are fully in place.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Efforts to streamline and rationalize NATO’s command and control structures have been substantial, but much remains to be accomplished. Indeed, if the Alliance is to be able to execute its traditional missions of defending Alliance territory and political independence most effectively—whether in terms of political, fiscal, or military rationality—command and control structures must be reorganized. But, perhaps more importantly for NATO’s future relevance, command and control arrangements must be overhauled if the Alliance is to be able to carry out the mandates laid out in its New Strategic Concept: crisis management and conflict prevention; defense of NATO interests, as well as territory; support of OSCE and U.N. operations, operations outside the traditional territorial boundaries of the Alliance; cooperation with new partners in Central and Eastern Europe.

Unfortunately, efforts to effect such change will face considerable challenges. NATO command and control structures represent important manifestations of political and military prestige, status, and influence in the Alliance. Thus, the already difficult task of developing militarily sound structures will be complicated by the considerable acrimony likely to result from the requirement to achieve political consensus to enact these reforms. But, if Alliance command and control structures are to meet the challenges of the 21st century, dramatic steps must be taken—and soon.
Given the number and magnitude of changes required, the Alliance should undertake a comprehensive reexamination of its current command and control structures to ensure that these changes are fully integrated and position NATO command and control structures for the demands of the 21st century. In assessing the reforms to be undertaken, the Alliance should consider carefully the following options:

1. Raise the status of Allied Forces Southern Europe to a Major NATO Command.
2. Consolidate all Portuguese forces under the command and control of ACE.
3. Within the Central Region of ACE:
   a) eliminate BALTAP as a geographically-based command;
   b) establish a naval functional command, NAVCENT;
   c) augment personnel and increase resources within Headquarters, AFCENT to provide the capability to conduct sustained command and control of operations outside the Central Region. Create similar capabilities in LANDCENT and AIRCENT.
4. Within ACE's Southern Region:
   a) pressure Greece and Turkey to remove the obstacles to the creation of LANDSOUTHCENT and 7 ATAF;
   b) establish the headquarters of Multinational Division South.
5. Create mobile capabilities needed to command and control operations, not only throughout ACE, but outside traditional NATO boundaries.

Notes

Author's note: The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

2. Ibid., paragraph 53.


8. NATO Handbook, p. 98. "The [NPG] is the principal forum for consultation on all matters pertaining to the role of nuclear forces in NATO’s security policy." All nations, save France, participate, though Iceland participates as an observer. Ibid., p. 96.

9. Ibid., p. 98.

10. For a discussion of the integrated military structure, see Ibid., pp. 98-99 and 155-184.

12. The force posture was originally announced in NATO Press Service, “Final Communiqué,” Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38, Bruxelles, May 29, 1991, paragraph 9. The Alliance formed AMF Air and Land in 1960. STANAVFORMIN is the former STANAVFORCHAN. STANAVFORLANT (1967) and STANAVFORCHAN (1973) had long existed, but had not been part of any reaction forces. STANAVFORMED replaced the On Call Naval Forces Mediterranean that had existed since 1969. For a brief synopsis of these forces, see *NATO Handbook*, pp. 111-113.


24. AFCENT currently cannot provide such a capability without considerable augmentation from LANDCENT and AIRCENT, or sub-PSC headquarters. Robbing Peter to pay Paul, however, only degrades the ability of those headquarters to carry out their assigned tasks.

25. This requirement, alone, argues against standing down LANDCENT and AIRCENT as "redundant" headquarters in a threat-benign region of ACE. These headquarters are ideally suited for this important mission.

26. For background on this subject, see Gordon Ferguson, "NATO's New Concept of Reinforcement," NATO Review, Vol. 40, No. 5, October 1992, pp. 31-34.


28. For example, air defense and maritime operations. Bruce George, ed., Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990, Coulson, Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, 1989, p. 133. One should note that numerous allied countries not bordering the Mediterranean have seconded liaison personnel to HQ, AFOUTH, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and the Netherlands.


30. French policy, albeit at glacial speed, is adopting a more constructive approach to NATO in general. For an assessment of French intentions, see William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young, French Policy Toward NATO: Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994.
Whether this will be translated into action in the Southern Region, however, remains to be seen.


33. Strategic Concept, paragraph 54.


35. The newly-created Multinational Division Center (MND [C]) is composed of brigade-sized airborne or air mobile units from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Multinational Division South (MND[S]), to be composed of brigade-sized units from Greece, Italy, and Turkey, has yet to be created, largely due to Greek-Turkish political differences.

36. For example, the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff have grappled with this thorny issue and produced The Multinational Force Commanders Command Authority Report, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, August 1994. However, a variety of command and control arrangements were developed to accommodate national positions (i.e., the United States and the nations participating in the
Multinational Division Center (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and United Kingdom).
THE NATO CJTF COMMAND AND CONTROL CONCEPT

Charles L. Barry

Over three years ago, in January, 1994, NATO political leaders approved an initiative to give the Alliance’s decades-old integrated military structure strikingly different capabilities for the future. Alliance military authorities were directed to adopt a command and control concept known as the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), the method used so successfully in the 1991 Gulf War. The intent of the CJTF initiative was to re-vamp NATO’s military in order to keep it relevant in a new era wherein a ready capability for crisis response would be in greater demand than the need for territorial defense.

Of course, much has already been done to streamline NATO’s military apparatus. Both the number and size of military headquarters has shrunk since the end of the Cold War. However, the command structure that remains is still optimized for NATO’s core task of collective territorial defense—it is both too rigid and too cumbersome for crisis response. Flexible command mechanisms to address the crisis response missions called for by the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, and for peacekeeping, are lacking. As a result, some NATO commands are having to improvise in places such as Bosnia.

The CJTF concept is intended to give NATO military forces mobility and flexibility and make them better suited for crisis response across a spectrum of new peacetime operations. Just as important, CJTF capabilities are to be acquired without adding structure, they will be created primarily by “dual-hatting” selected personnel within existing organizations, by modifying procedures, and by different employment concepts. To be sure, there will be some costs—largely to improve mobility and to acquire modern automation equipment in the related information management areas of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance, or “CISR.” Nevertheless, strict
guidance to keep investment to a minimum should translate into
modest new costs for CJTFs.

Although NATO remains, at its core, an alliance for collective
defense, its immediate tasks have changed. The two-hour reaction
criteria for corps-sized formations to meet a Soviet attack and prepare
a static defense on Western Europe’s borders are gone. Military
structures must now be able to provide a different type of security
capability for NATO’s members. That security—what members
expect from the alliance—lies in having a military option to respond
to any crisis that threatens the collective interests of NATO members.
U.S. Senator Richard Lugar referred to this change in focus when he
challenged NATO either to develop the wherewithal to operate
“out-of-area” or to go out-of-business.¹ NATO’s decision to establish
CJTF (proposed by the United States not long after Lugar’s remarks)
is an assertion that the alliance will be relevant and “in business” in
the coming era.

What is unique about NATO’s CJTF initiative—and
unprecedented in military doctrine—is that it will permanently
institutionalize the multinational task force concept, which has
always been a temporary command and control arrangement
employed for crisis response by ad hoc coalitions. In fact, deploying
CJTFs will become the primary modus operandi of standing alliance
in peacetime.² That is analogous to organizing and training a
professional football team among players accustomed to playing
infrequently and with little practice as a team. For more than 40 years
NATO’s strength has been its robust, highly integrated but static
military structures, prepared to execute the broad, enduring mission
of territorial defense. In contrast, task forces are formed rapidly,
employed for specific short-term contingencies, and then disbanded.
With the CJTF concept, NATO hopes to invent a unique, hybrid
capability that combines the best attributes of both coalition and
alliance forces, i.e., rapid crisis response by highly ready
multinational forces, backed by pre-established political terms of
reference, standardized procedures, regular exercises, and in-place
infrastructure. CJTF will give the allies an always-ready capability
for peacekeeping, peace enforcement and other operations called for
under the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept. Of course, CJTFs must
also be available for collective defense, if required. To realize those
capabilities, NATO will have to approve a new command and control
concept, new common procedures and a regime of exercises. Regular CJTF exercises, like the large annual maneuvers undertaken during the Cold War, will gradually yield a valuable reservoir of staffs, units, and service members experienced in NATO contingency operations and procedures; only now the lessons learned will relate to crisis response. In short, NATO will have the same highly-capable forces for use in crises beyond its borders that it has always maintained for defense of its borders.  

For Americans the task force concept is hardly new. It was a staple of U.S. doctrine even before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 directed the Services to place greater emphasis on joint and combined operations. NATO allies, too, have employed the task force concept in such places as Zaire (1991), the Persian Gulf (1991), and the Falkland Islands (1982). In fact, if a Soviet attack against the West had materialized, NATO would have relied heavily on joint and combined doctrine for its collective territorial defense.

Yet, U.S. officers will find some aspects of NATO CJTFs quite different from the U.S.-dominated task forces to which they have been accustomed. Grafting a rapid response technique like CJTF onto a consensus-driven alliance will be neither fast nor easy. It is one thing to develop contingency plans, operational concepts, and doctrine for one nation; it is quite another to harmonize the rapid deployment of forces by 16 or more nations. Successful implementation will depend upon both innovative thinking and a genuine commitment to adapt much more completely for what lies ahead. Therefore, as the CJTF concept gradually gains form and substance, it is worth examining its implications for NATO doctrine, force structure, and operations planning.

**NATO Adapts**

NATO's CJTF concept was not conceived in isolation; rather, it is one of the latest in a series of adaptations invoked by the Alliance in its fight to keep up with change and remain relevant in a fundamentally different security environment. Broadly speaking, NATO has pursued three main objectives in its reform efforts. First, the Alliance is adjusting its political and military structure to new missions, the most important of which is crisis management. If NATO cannot cope with regional crises, it cannot meet the needs of
its members, and public support will certainly erode. Crisis management in future calls for smaller multinational forces with the flexibility to respond to contingencies over a wide geographical area. Second, the Alliance is attempting to extend security and stability beyond its borders, especially to the new democracies in Eastern Europe and troubled areas in the South, both regions where crises are likely to occur. Third, NATO has embraced fully its European members’ resolve to create a collective defense capability of their own, known broadly as the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI).

Consistent with these themes, the United States proposed the CJTF concept at Travemünde, Germany, in the fall of 1993. At their summit meeting in January 1994 (as noted earlier), NATO heads of state directed that it be developed. The stated aims were: to adapt NATO’s force structure for new missions; to project security and stability toward the East by giving partner states a way to join NATO in crisis response; and, to support ESDI by offering the Western European Union (WEU) a “separable but not separate” military capability, one that would not be a costly duplication of NATO’s structure.

**Defining the CJTF Concept.**

What exactly is a CJTF? U.S. joint forces doctrine describes a “task force” as a temporary force for carrying out a specific mission, normally operational (versus strategic or tactical) in nature. Joint task forces (JTFs) involve components from two or more services while combined task forces (CTFs) include forces from two or more nations. Although U.S. doctrine does not define a “CJTF” *per se*, its character can be derived easily from these related definitions.

An early goal in any innovative undertaking is to agree on definitions, as an unambiguous lexicon is critical to arriving at any sound conceptual framework. Still, agreement on an official NATO definition of CJTF was long delayed by political differences. However, in light of the CJTF Headquarters Concept proposed by NATO’s military authorities in mid-1994 and a subsequent definition developed for the Provisional Policy Coordination Group (formed in May 1994), a future NATO CJTF can be described as: a multinational, multi-service, task-tailored force, consisting of forces from NATO and possibly non-NATO nations capable of rapid deployment, to conduct limited duration peace operations beyond alliance borders, under the command and control of either NATO’s
integrated military structure or the WEU. Presumably, the CJTF headquarters NATO approves will be tailored and sized similar to the task force itself, with command, staff and liaison representation reflective of participating national forces.  

The size of a CJTF headquarters will be determined by the mission, as well as by the size and composition of the force to be controlled. U.S. experience supports building a task force at an organizational level that is appropriate-sized for the mission. For example, an army brigade task force is organized around a brigade commander and his staff for smaller operations (even as a joint-combined force in given scenarios), but larger operations may call for a task force organized around a division or corps headquarters.

NATO staffs working on CJTF are following a different theory. Rather than call upon several echelons to add the capability to deploy a CJTF headquarters (largely out of existing resources), NATO is establishing CJTF headquarters only under some Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs). Each MSC designated to incorporate a CJTF command and control staff would do so by designating a small, dual-hatted CJTF nucleus staff from within its own resources, and then augmenting the nucleus with additional “staff modules” from its own or other headquarters in order to meet each CJTF contingency plan’s command and control requirement. The innovative staff module concept is promising and warrants serious evaluation. Nonetheless, it will pose training and oversight challenges, at least initially, in order to ensure crucial staff effectiveness is not at risk during a critical phase of the operation, e.g., just as the headquarters is being assembled on eve of deployment. Once these challenges are addressed, the staff module concept should fulfill expectations for improved organizational flexibility and responsiveness.

Consensus Building: Limited Success and Brighter Prospects.

The initial focus of CJTF planners has been to agree on a CJTF concept that modifies existing headquarters in a way that allows then to incorporate a CJTF command and control capability. Work on this plan began in early 1994 on two levels. First, at the Military Committee (MC) level and above, the political aspects of definitions, terms of reference, and oversight were addressed. The resolution of political issues always moves slowly; however CJTF has proved particularly nettlesome because it touches on deeply held U.S. and French differences over the future of NATO. Second, at the Major NATO Commander (MNC) level, a tri-MNC (later, a bi-MNC)
working group, under the executive agency of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), completed a draft operational concept for CJTF command and control in March 1994. However, the CJTF concept soon fell hostage to the struggle for consensus at the political level—a struggle rooted in deep trans-Atlantic differences over the future role of the Alliance. Meanwhile, Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) undertook 13 follow-up studies to define in greater detail many aspects of the headquarters concept, including operating procedures, training, and equipment requirements. The results of most studies were presented to the MC in September, 1994. Subsequently, work at the military level had to wait for political progress to catch up. The CJTF initiative languished in a state of glacially slow progress until December 1995 when France decided to move closer to the military institutions of the Alliance. Now, in December 1996, although France remains formally outside the military structure, there is hope of speedier progress ahead. Nonetheless, the allies’ military authorities are more interested in getting CJTF right than in a rush to closure; therefore, expect implementation to go forward at a controlled, deliberate pace in 1997.

The central political issues that frustrated the CJTF initiative from mid-1994 until June 1996 revolved around the role of the MNCs in the planning and conduct of so-called “non-Article V” operations. The French-dominated view resists extending the MNCs’ authority to non-Article V tasks, at least not without increased oversight in the form of additional staffs at NATO headquarters in Brussels, either formal or ad hoc. France insisted on more political input earlier in the planning process to preclude dominance of NATO crisis response by the MNCs, particularly SACEUR. France perceived that the American commander in Mons had enjoyed far too much influence in Alliance affairs throughout the Cold War. The U.S.-led position was that the North Atlantic Council (NAC), under current arrangements, exercised adequate political control over NATO military commanders. In any case, the United States held it would be a mistake for political oversight to occur down at the operational level of the MNCs. Most importantly, the United States wanted to ensure NATO did not end up with two chains of command, one for Article V and another for non-Article V.

In light of the Balkans crisis, where only NATO’s military structure has the capacity to respond, it seems clear that MNCs must
have a role in non-Article V operations. While U.S.-French
differences about the need for additional staff oversight are real
enough, solutions incorporating dual staffs (albeit expensive) have
been used in the past to break a political impasse. The preservation
of a single chain of command, however, must be absolute. Any
deployed CJTF, even if WEU-led, is vulnerable to attack; this would
create an Article V situation and become the immediate responsibility
of the appropriate MNC. Other contentious issues included defining
the support role of NATO commanders during WEU-led operations,
the potential for the WEU to select its own headquarters (including
national commands and the new EUROCORPS headquarters) to
function as a CJTF, and the WEU’s access to NATO assets and
capabilities.

The French government’s decision in December, 1995 to end 28
years of non-participation in NATO military staffs was reason for
encouragement. In June, 1996, the Berlin communiqué signaled
broad resolution of all these issues, although many details remain to
be worked out. In December, 1996, the NAC approved the MC’s
CJTF implementation plan, which will commence in 1997. At last,
CJTF will be on its way to reality. Yet, how the CJTF concept will
be worked into NATO doctrine remains to be seen.

From an outside perspective, it seems the role of a supporting
command, or CINC, for a deployed CJTF should rest on U.S.
doctrine, which already elaborates this relationship as a proven
concept. Another impasse will be resolved if NATO and the WEU
can agree on certain WEU-appointed national commands for a
WEU-led CJTF, although a common set of operating procedures and
transfer of authority (TOA) procedures are essential. The modalities
for WEU access to NATO assets and capabilities still must be agreed
upon, and presumably will require the categorization of assets—at
least into those routinely available, such as intelligence—and those
necessarily provided on a mission-by-mission basis, such as strategic
airlift. Other challenges will be: the cost accounting of assets
provided from nations and from one organization to another;
procedures for NATO monitoring of assets under WEU control; and,
procedures for the return of assets to NATO when necessary. In any
case, the critical matter of adapting the NATO integrated military
structure—both the realization of the CJTF concept and the broader
task of revamping the Cold War integrated military structure in
total—must be moved forward without delay.
In addition to building consensus on command arrangements, NATO staffs have analyzed the deployability profiles and composition of potential CJTF forces as an unofficial objective of otherwise scheduled NATO exercises by both land and maritime forces. For practical reasons this process has been less pressing, because—as demonstrated by NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) operations in Bosnia throughout 1996, and by its Stabilization Force (SFOR) since then—if a crisis erupts, forces can be quickly assembled in improvised CJTFs, as was illustrated by Operation Desert Storm. Although short of what CJTF’s proponents promise and imposing serious strain on current structures, IFOR and SFOR work. They include forces from NATO members and other contributing states, and an effective command and control arrangement is in place. Ultimately, CJTFs will offer much greater prospects of success than present ad hoc crisis response arrangements. CJTFs will make NATO forces and cadres more capable because of regularly conducted multinational planning, training and exercises.

Breaking the Logjam at Berlin

At Berlin, in spring 1996, NATO ministers welcomed the completion by NATO military staffs of the CJTF concept begun in January 1994. The allies had finally reached consensus on the means to achieve a more flexible and mobile force deployment capability for NATO’s new missions and on “separable but not separate” military capabilities in operations led by the WEU. The Berlin ministerial session charged the MC to come up with CJTF implementing procedures for approval in December 1996 and further implementation in 1997. As noted above, those procedures were approved on schedule and are being implemented. The tasks for 1997 are to conduct trials to develop and refine the CJTF concept, including determination of: what comprises a CJTF nucleus staff; its size; what staff modules are required for each CJTF contingency; the size and composition of staff modules, and many other questions. Henceforth, most (if not all) NATO exercises will include CJTF-related objectives. NATO military authorities are intent on developing a sound concept and taking the time to get it right. Simulations and command post exercises (CPX), in addition to field exercises (FTX), will be employed to train many NATO forces which are unfamiliar
with the task of deploying and sustaining a force with little or no host
nation support.

The one standing component of the CJTF concept approved at
Berlin is the Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS). The CJPS will
be located with ACE and the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at
Mons, Belgium. It has been aptly referred to as the "linchpin" of the
entire CJTF enterprise. The CJPS is tasked to provide coordinated
advice to NATO military authorities, to the WEU, and to states not
participating in the military structure on CJTF matters. It must also
develop and coordinate concepts and plans for CJTF operations,
training and exercises. The CJPS is responsible to both MNCs for
contingency planning for CJTF operations. In order to execute its
functions, the CJTF will maintain a data base of manpower,
resources, and forces available for each planned CJTF contingency.
For the WEU Planning Cell, the CJPS is its primary link to NATO
military counterparts. The CJPS will accomplish planning for the
WEU based on illustrative scenarios provided to NATO by the WEU.

Also at Berlin, the NAC approved establishment of the Policy
Coordination Group (PCG), dropping the term "Provisional" that had
been the status of the Group since its creation in 1994. The PCG’s
function is to advise the NAC especially on new missions (i.e.,
non-Article V CJTF-related missions) and to provide close
political-military coordination. The PCG also serves as the primary
interface with its counterpart in the WEU, the WEU’s
Political-Military Working Group (PMWG).

Pursuant to decisions taken at Berlin, terms of reference were
agreed on the role of a Capabilities Coordination Cell (CCC) to be
appended to the International Military Staff (IMS). The CCC advises
the MC on guidance to the NAC on non-Article V missions, and for
proposal of military guidance from the MC downward to the MNCs
on CJTF-related mission planning and operations. The CCC, a field
grade-level staff section reporting directly to the Director of the IMS
(DIMS), came into operation on October 1, 1996. The PCG and the
CCC are new staff elements above the military structure created to
provide greater political-military oversight of NATO military
commanders by NATO headquarters. This is perhaps the most
significant and yet least noticed change in the way NATO will
approach new missions—there will be a lot more political
engagement in Alliance military affairs, not only during
pre-deployment decision making, but throughout the conduct of the
operation. Notably, the PCG and the CCC are structures France sought to see installed before contemplating rejoining the military structure.

**CJTF Structural/Operational Issues**

*The Headquarters.*

The essential underpinnings of CJTF command structures are few but important. The scheme adopted:

1. Supports the three main objectives of the NATO transformation process mentioned earlier (respond to new missions, reach out to new members and non-members, and provide support for WEU operations);

2. Ensures that collective defense requirements can take priority if they arise;

3. Preserves both the transatlantic nature of the Alliance and a single integrated military structure;

4. Should be accomplished with minimum added cost.

These criteria dictate that CJTFs be organized within NATO's integrated military structure and that they rely primarily upon the resources of their parent MSCs. Whatever headquarters organization is eventually adopted, it must be capable of a timely, effective response to crises beyond NATO borders; be able to coordinate between the Alliance and the WEU; and be able to accommodate participation in staff planning by non-NATO nations (especially Central and East European) both during pre-deployment activities and actual task force operations.

The functional requirements of CJTF headquarters will include assimilating and disseminating intelligence; receiving and committing forces; and maintaining communications among subordinate, higher, and lateral elements such as humanitarian agencies, local civil authorities, or even other militaries. The conduct of logistical sustainment and the management and control of airspace are other features that must be designed into the CJTF headquarters.

The concept of dual-hatting staff members of select ACE and ACLANT MSCs in order to form CJTF nucleus staffs will limit costs and avoid creating additional structure. As a minimum, the nucleus staff will include relatively senior representatives from all principal staff sections of the parent headquarters. The nucleus will be developed into a complete headquarters by drawing initially from the
personnel and equipment assets of the host MSC. Additional resources will come from subordinate commands and from other MSCs. When not involved in operations or exercises, the CJTF's activities are guided by the one non-dual hatted member of the CJTF staff, the parent MSC's Assistant Chief of Staff for CJTF Matters (ACOS for CJTF Matters). Prior to activation for a mission or exercise, the ACOS for CJTF Matters, possibly a general or flag officer, will direct the small nucleus staff in CJTF-related information management, administration, operational planning, training, and exercises. When the CJTF is activated, the ACOS for CJTF Matters is likely to be designated as the CJTF's Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff or Assistant Chief of Staff in order to preserve staff continuity. The CJTF commander will be designated only when the CJTF is activated.

Which of NATO's MSCs would establish nucleus staffs remained undecided until late 1996. As with all important decisions, NATO had to consider more than just military factors in its command arrangements, although the Alliance has held to the premise that military effectiveness must never be impinged for political accommodation. For both political and geographic reasons, the Alliance leaders had to consider the necessity for multiple CJTF options, even in a given theater. In addition, NATO does not want to restrict its future military capabilities to only one crisis response at a time. Balancing these factors with cost concerns, NATO military authorities identified three CJTFs for trials and exercises, beginning in 1997. The headquarters of Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRIKFLT), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) have been designated as the initial parent headquarters for CJTF nuclei. Additional CJTFs could be identified later.

A crucial element of CJTF planning will be to determine acceptable response times. For obvious reasons, actual response times will always remain part of classified planning; however, usually once an operation is approved politically, an immediate military response is expected. Thus, an initial deployment time of less than 30 days should be anticipated.11 When alerted for either an exercise or actual contingency operation, a CJTF headquarters will come up to full strength by drawing on the assets of the host MSC as well as other staffs to augment its nucleus staff. The nucleus staff will have trained as a close working team and will remain generally
constant from one operation to the next. However, the actual size of the headquarters will be tailored by the addition of staff modules, either functional staffs as a whole, or additional core elements to strengthen the nucleus itself. The ultimate size of the headquarters will be determined by the nature of the operation, the size of the force it will employ, and requirements for special staffs, such as civil-military coordination or chemical operations. A fully augmented CJTF could be quite large and provide command and control for sizable multinational forces drawn from all services and many outside agencies. Conversely, a much smaller CJTF might be deployed to command a small contingent of only land and air forces.

It is critical that the task force lines of command lead clearly back to the MNC responsible for Article V defense in the region concerned, since a CJTF operation could escalate unexpectedly into a defense of Alliance territory or forces. For WEU-led CJTFs, procedures to recall a force (including a national headquarters should that eventually be agreed upon), to NATO control must be developed and exercised. This is because territorial defense is considered, even by the WEU, to be executed under Article V of the Washington Treaty. Once deployed, a CJTF under NATO would report either directly to the regional MNC or through an MSC, based on factors such as geography and overall mission profile. One factor in determining the role of the MSC is whether the CJTF is land-based or sea-based. The benefits of an intervening headquarters generally increases for land-based operations, while maritime forces tend to operate over greater distances without additional command and control echelons.

The CJTF will operate under agreed NATO standing operating procedures (SOPs) and Standardization Agreements (STANAGS). Non-NATO nations engaging in CJTF operations must be proficient in these procedures to participate successfully in contingencies. When a headquarters is activated, national approval to allow all assigned personnel to deploy will be needed to avoid degrading command and staff efficiency on the brink of deployment. In addition to the NATO staff, non-NATO nations contributing forces to a CJTF will augment the headquarters with essential liaisons and staffs. This is an area where NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) will play a crucial role by developing the capability for non-NATO states to integrate smoothly into CJTFs. The capacity to operate together with NATO, and respond to crises that are affecting their own
regions, will be a tangible extension of security and stability to partner states.

Since CJTFs can anticipate extended deployments, a personnel rotation plan will be required for continuity in headquarters staff performance and in the tempo of force operations. U.N. peacekeeping forces generally follow a six-month rotation plan, while historically peace operations tend to extend over long periods. It is thus possible that a CJTF will have to operate (perhaps in a hostile environment) for a number of years. Conversely, over time, long running operations such as peacekeeping must necessarily be converted to more permanent arrangements than a task force comprised of resources borrowed from other headquarters and agencies. This is an issue that CJTF planners have yet to address.

*Mission Profiles.*

Another key factor in designing CJTFs is the limited purposes for which they will be employed, that is, to conduct peace operations outside the NATO area as defined in Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty. Peace operations (non-Article V operations) are defined in NATO’s MC 327, “NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations,” and encompass conflict prevention, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and peace enforcement. The missions for CJTFs will fall into these four categories. At the operational level, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has drafted separate military doctrine for peace operations.¹⁴ WEU military missions, found in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, are akin to NATO’s MC 327 and include humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and peacemaking.¹⁵

The geographical areas into which NATO (or the WEU) may agree to deploy a CJTF are, ultimately, a political question, although military capabilities and limitations must be considered. In contemplating geographic regions where a CJTF might be deployed, it can be assumed that any mission will aim to protect collective Alliance interests—interests that are likely to include preservation of peace in the lands and waters immediately adjacent to NATO territory. Security interests might also extend to distant areas where conflict could threaten European security and stability. An often asked question is, “how far from NATO territory will the Alliance consider deploying a CJTF?” The answer lies in whatever consensus can be reached on where the allies’ collective interests lie, and that answer will evolve only slowly.
The accumulation of a ready reservoir of military personnel experienced in collective crisis response will be a significant by-product of CJTF planning, procedural agreements, exercises, and training. An experienced cadre is a crucial factor in any military undertaking, both inside NATO and, as was demonstrated in the Gulf War, in ad hoc coalitions. Some urgent missions, such as noncombatant evacuation, initial disaster relief, and search and rescue, will have to be executed on the spot as there will be no time for the political decisions and assembly required for CJTF. Nonetheless, such immediate situations will benefit from the availability of veterans of CJTF planning and training.

_Logistical Support._

CJTF logistical support will be a major challenge for an alliance that is used to the luxuries of interior lines of communication, fixed bases, and a wealth of host nation support. NATO's infrastructure, logistics planning and support must meet the challenges of rapid deployments, long and potentially unsecured lines of communication and remote, bare-base operations. While NATO will probably adhere to the principle of national responsibility for supplies and services for CJTF support, there will be unique transport and distribution requirements that demand a multinational capability. Depending on the operational environment and the size of the task force, logistics coordination might be handled by either an integral logistics staff or, in more demanding situations, by an independent combined-joint logistics command.

In addition to support for national forces, support must be planned for headquarters and support elements assigned directly from NATO. Service support for these elements will be another responsibility of the logistics coordination staff. When a CJTF is detached to the WEU, NATO's logistics concepts and infrastructure system will follow and provide the same measure of support as if the CJTF were NATO-led. Host nation support, another historic staple of NATO logistics, will be unreliable or unavailable in most out-of-area crises, and in humanitarian aid operations it will be self-defeating for the CJTF to rely upon (or compete for) the meager resources available to the population being assisted. In sum, a comprehensive logistics concept will have to provide for task force self-sustainment, a factor unknown to NATO planners.

_Communications and Information._
A crucial task will be to create the necessary communications and information system architecture to support a radically new operational concept. A deployed CJTF headquarters must be able to communicate not only through traditional rearward, lateral, and forward military linkages, but with local governmental, nongovernmental, and international agencies. In this regard, the experience of IFOR was unprecedented in both the proliferation of civilian agencies and institutions with which the military headquarters had to coordinate, and by the extensive degree of civil-military interaction required to complete the military mission.

Early lessons learned from Operation Joint Endeavor have identified the absence of deployable long-range, multiple-user communications systems as a critical shortcoming. Lack of interoperable systems is a second critical deficiency. Although the NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS) is sophisticated, it is essentially fixed-based and is non-deployable. Moreover, NICS is not designed for connectivity with non-NATO forces (such as East European partners). Operational level NATO-WEU links are also absent.

In the near- to mid-term at least, CJTFs will be heavily dependent on the United States and one or two other nations for strategic and operational communications and intelligence systems. In this regard, space-based systems will be particularly helpful in extending the existing NICS network to deployed CJTFs, either afloat or ashore. Some Europeans have voiced the goal of acquiring their own command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities, to be resident in the WEU. Current levels of defense spending, however, militate against the quick replacement of national capabilities.

**Employment Options**

Military planners envisage three CJTF employment scenarios. The basic scenario, the one that satisfies the most urgent requirement to modify the existing military structure for new missions, is the deployment of a CJTF comprised of forces solely from NATO member countries. However, in order to design a CJTF headquarters concept suitable for command and control of non-NATO forces, as well as for operating under the WEU, the initial tri-MNC planners considered two additional scenarios: a “NATO-plus” CJTF (including some non-NATO states) and a WEU-led CJTF. A CJTF
headquarters could be deployed under any of these options, depending upon NATO political decisions and the nations actually involved.

**NATO-Only CJTF.**

A NATO-only CJTF might involve forces from up to 15 allied members (the sixteenth member, Iceland, has no military forces), although even if NATO agrees to act, some allies may elect not to contribute forces. Since CJTF forces must be ready on short notice, the forces which nations might offer to a CJTF are likely to be NATO reaction forces, particularly the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC); the Multinational Division (Central); or the standing naval forces in the Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED).¹⁶

Forces earmarked for CJTF contingencies will have to concentrate their planning on peace operations, and engage in significantly different training and exercise regimens than those they undertook during the Cold War. Some of the greatest challenges for NATO military staffs are likely to be strategic deployment and sustainment requirements. Units previously accustomed to a single mission close to fixed support bases will find themselves in scenarios more closely resembling those of the U.S. Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, a unit devoted almost exclusively to contingency operations.

**NATO-Plus CJTF.**

Because CJTFs might be employed in crises of concern to PfP partner states as well as to NATO, the Alliance hopes PfP partners will join a NATO-plus CJTF operation. NATO-plus is a particularly desirable aspect of the CJTF initiative and is accorded high priority by both CJTF and PfP planners. The capability to operate together with NATO militarily is a central objective of PfP activities. As shown by the intense effort being made by partner states participating in IFOR and SFOR, being part of a CJTF operation is seen as a demonstration of military compatibility with NATO. Thus far, 27 states have accepted the invitation to join and 22 Individual Partnership Programs have been agreed to by NATO.¹⁷

Under PfP’s Partnership Work Plans, partner militaries are exposed to NATO procedures and standards, and they participate in peace operations planning and exercises. In a crisis, skills honed under the PfP program can be used in a CJTF response, effectively extending NATO’s stabilizing role beyond its members’ territory. Even if not actually called on to deploy, the planning and capability
developed under PfP and through CJTF exercises can be expected to foster a greater sense of security to partner states, especially as military-to-military contacts deepen and the pool of personnel with NATO-plus CJTF experience grows.

In the near term, there will be formidable obstacles to overcome, especially language (the official NATO languages are French and English, but the working language in the NATO military structure is English), and, in some cases, cultural differences. There will also be doctrinal discrepancies in all manner of military operations. In the short term, equipment incompatibility will not be an insurmountable obstacle, as NATO has long managed a wide variety of different items in all its major (and not-so-major) equipment categories. To succeed in fast-moving contingency operations, however, NATO must revive efforts at standardization and interoperability, especially in the area of command and control. Some logistics standards, such as those for fuel and ammunition, must also be given priority. These concerns aside, the capability exists today to operate together in a crisis.

**WEU-Led Operations.**

On a case-by-case basis, NATO members may, by decision in the NAC, provide a CJTF headquarters and related support assets to the WEU to conduct a WEU-led CJTF operation. The forces themselves would be solicited by WEU from its members, associates, observers, and associate partners—28 nations in all. Under this option, a NATO military command (MNC or MSC) would probably assume a support role. In June 1994, the WEU provided NATO with a concept paper outlining broad operational requirements for a CJTF, but direct staff-to-staff participation was only agreed to in April 1995. Since then, the pace of collaboration between NATO and the WEU has steadily improved in both the political and military arenas. Although all the detail are far from settled, some observations can be made on how a CJTF might operate under WEU and what challenges will be faced.

Once a decision is taken in the NAC, NATO would direct one of its MSCs to stand up a CJTF and prepare for deployment. During the stand-up process, the CJTF headquarters will be mission- and force-tailored. At an appropriate point, command of the CJTF would be transferred to the WEU. It is possible that, as negotiations between the WEU and NATO on the concept for a European-led (WEU) CJTF unfold, the way may open for the employment of a national headquarters from a WEU member state as a CJTF headquarters, in
lieu of a NATO-provided headquarters. The prospect of national headquarters has aroused concerns that NATO might be weakened, or that Europe could see a shift back to national (as opposed to multinational) militaries. In addition to the option of using a national headquarters, another potential candidate for a WEU-led CJTF is the EUROCORPS, a five-nation corps\textsuperscript{19} also responsive to NATO, but outside NATO’s integrated military structure. So far as the WEU is concerned, either of these options is more desirable than “borrowing” part of NATO.

The size of a WEU-controlled operation, and hence the composition of the CJTF headquarters and forces deployed, is expected to be smaller than NATO-led operations. This is based on an unstated assumption that, if a crisis is large enough to concern all of the allies (not just European members), NATO would direct the operation. Another factor is that, while WEU missions under the Petersberg Declaration are essentially the same as NATO’s, WEU is only in the initial stages of adapting to its new role and has no formal military command structure similar to NATO. In sum, the WEU will be incapable of conducting large scale operations for the foreseeable future.

In developing NATO-WEU agreements on CJTF, a central issue will be to agree on the role and responsibilities of the SACEUR, or, where appropriate, those of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). As noted earlier, one view is that either SACEUR or SACLANT be designated as the supporting commander to the WEU operational commander. Because these are, conveniently, also U.S. national commanders, they can provide NATO resources as well as agreed U.S. support assets. The supporting commander concept is borrowed from U.S. doctrine, and whether it can stand the test of Alliance scrutiny, particularly on the political side, will take time to assess. Another issue is the adequacy of a WEU political-military structure for directing a CJTF operation, especially where operational and strategic organizations must coordinate smoothly and engage in rapid decision making. The WEU has few structures in place to match the robustness of the NATO MC, IMS, or the MNCs. The WEU is studying this problem, but wants to avoid creating duplicative structures. Instead, it may strengthen its operations headquarters concept or have the state providing the headquarters act as go-between for the WEU Council and the CJTF or force commander.\textsuperscript{20}
Conclusions: Realizing an Operational Capability

CJTF is far from an operational reality. Indeed, the concept itself is just now getting off the drawing board as a result of two and a half years of political impasse in the NAC as well as in the WEU. There are formidable problems to solve before the concept’s minimum requirements are met. National doctrines on techniques such as task force employment, defining the command and control linkages between commands, airspace control, and the use of technologies (especially for information processing and decision support systems) must be harmonized by the Alliance and adapted for multinational uses. One positive note is the existence of numerous STANAGS that have been refined over 40 years for collective defense operations—these will be a valuable foundation for new procedures.

A particularly important issue for NATO to address is the impact of potential national decisions not to permit deployment of personnel assigned to a CJTF headquarters that has been activated for an operation. Answers to this question will require a firm grasp not only of the aims of the CJTF initiative, but also the multinational political and military context in which a solution must be devised. Other issues will require more time to solve, among them the dearth of English-speaking commanders and staff officers in East European militaries. No doubt language will be a barrier to interoperability for some time. On the institutional side, a long-term investment will be needed to develop the modalities for close WEU-NATO cooperation in crisis response. These two organizations are just beginning to establish the transparency and reciprocity necessary for effective coordination.

Further questions, such as the divisions of labor among the MNC, the MSC, and a CJTF during operations; the interoperability of national, NATO and WEU communications and intelligence systems; the nature of training and exercises; and the assessment of deployment requirements are all virgin territory for NATO military planners. In addition, NATO’s venture into completely new command and control, logistics and force employment concepts coincides with the much-heralded revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA is a forward-looking phenomenon drawing on the impact of information technologies on warfare and other military affairs, particularly peace operations. RMA refers to the ongoing transformation of military operations and organizations aimed at
gaining and maintaining strategic, operational and tactical information dominance. Whether NATO’s concept for the future, CJTF, can harness the fruits of this revolution will be a huge factor in its operational success. Yet, practically speaking, if NATO’s military structure is to remain relevant it has no choice but to place itself at the leading edge of RMA concepts and technologies. This means reversing years of declining investment in modernization, especially in communications and information systems. Fortunately, NATO commanders understand the gravity of these issues and are beginning to address them.

Regardless of the intent to minimize costs, some modernization expenses associated with the CJTF initiative will be unavoidable, such as capital investment in CJTF-specific equipment, training and exercises, and operations and maintenance. The call to spend resources on CJTF will have to overcome the recent tide in defense spending cuts, which has not yet begun to subside.

CJTF project officers within NATO and WEU staffs have made modest headway over the past two and one half years, in spite of slow progress on political issues. With cautious optimism, NATO now looks toward accelerated progress in 1997; that progress will come none too soon. The allies are acutely aware that unless NATO can solve crises that threaten their interests, the Alliance’s utility will wither and fall into disuse even as security problems multiply. They also know that Central and Eastern Europe, where the most unstable areas of Europe are found, must be drawn closer to NATO in order to achieve a permanent peace in Europe. They know, too, that the EU’s fledgling ESDI needs help to grow stronger and, perhaps eventually, become free-standing in some regional crisis situations. That will lead to an improved balance in the trans-Atlantic partnership which many believe is essential to keep NATO strong. CJTF, more than any other initiative since the Cold War, offers hope that these objectives can be achieved.

Despite the enduring challenges in command and control, logistics, and communications, both ACE and ACLANT have the capability to respond to crises now. This is most evident in the planning for peace operations in the former Yugoslavia. The final CJTF concept may, in fact, reflect much of what was learned daily by AF SOUTH in Operations Deny Flight, Sharp Guard, and Joint Endeavor, and is now being refined in Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia. What this portends for the future of the Alliance is a
completely new capability that addresses the security concerns of its members and partners while preserving the nature of the most successful security and defense alliance in history. In our efforts to secure peace for the future, all of that is well worth pursuing.

Notes

Author’s note: The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. An earlier version of this chapter was published by the author as “NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice,” *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1, Spring 1996, pp. 81-97.


2. Peacetime for NATO is essentially anything short of collective defense under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. In future, NATO intends to rely primarily on the CJTF concept to provide a military response to crisis in non-Article V situations.

3. The point here must not be lost: NATO needs to exercise common procedures in order to be successful in multinational operations. Exercises also expose militaries to each other’s unique methods and make battlefield success more likely with fewer casualties. Most of the forces of NATO allies that joined the Gulf War coalition had experienced working with the United States through NATO (except the French, with predictable results). Similarly, CJTF provides a set of techniques for working together in future conflicts. NATO’s investment in teamwork should be seen as wise for the future just as in the past.


6. Competing definitions dog the broad doctrine of peace support operations, a NATO term which is identical to the US term “peace operations.” More confusion surrounds the category of “peacemaking,” which in both UN and NATO parlance is a strictly diplomatic undertaking while WEU gives it the meaning that the United Nations and NATO reserve for “peace enforcement” which involves combat operations. The meaning of peace enforcement can also be misleading; the best examples of which are said to be the Korean and Gulf Wars.
7. The issue of “proportionality,” i.e., determining the level of headquarters staff representation based on national contributions, including the allocation of key staff positions, is a sensitive political issue. Although important, proportionality will have to be controlled carefully in order to keep the highest emphasis on deploying the most cohesive and militarily competent staff. It would be folly to engage in political substitution of trained personnel just as a force is preparing to deploy.

8. In November, 1996, NATO Chiefs of Staff, meeting as the Military Committee, approved modifications to the Alliance military structure that included name changes. The two Major NATO Commands (MNCs) will be retained, but are to be called “Strategic Commands” (SCs). The eight Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) are to be reduced to five or six, and will be called “Regional Commands” (RCs). More than 30 Principal Subordinate Commands (PSCs) will be consolidated into fewer commands and be called “Sub-Regional Commands” (SRCs). SRCs will be either single-service, multinational Component Commands (CC), or multi-service combined commands called Joint SRCs (JSRCs). As of this writing, there is some question as to whether these changes will be given final approval by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in December, 1996. Political impasse on the future nationality of the AFSOUTH Commander could forestall agreement on all of the new military structure’s features, although eventual approval of the new terminology appears certain. In this chapter, the old terms of MNC, MSC and PSC are used for clarity.

9. CJTF work was begun by NATO’s three MNCs: ACE, ACLANT, and ACCHAN. But in July 1994 Allied Command Channel was phased out, leaving only Allied Command Europe and Allied Command Atlantic. Work continues in a bi-MNC working group.

10. France left the integrated military structure in 1966 in order to operate independently except in the event of an actual attack on NATO territory. Ever since, France has sought to increase layers of political oversight on the activities of the major NATO Commanders and to limit their role in non-Article V scenarios. In December 1995, France announced that it would rejoin the Military Committee, but as of this writing, has not committed to rejoin the Alliance military structure as a fully participating member of NATO.

11. As an indicator of expected response times, NATO’s ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), alerted to cover the potential withdrawal of UN forces in Bosnia, and a prime force for CJTF operations, planned to deploy its headquarters to the theater in seven to 15 days, according to the ARRC Commander, Lt. Gen. Mike Walker, British Army. See Charles Miller, “Reaction Corps is Set to Cover U.N. Pullout,” Defense News, Vol. 10, No. 17, May 1-7, 1995, p. 8.

12. With the signing of the Washington Treaty in 1949, the exercise of military responsibilities for collective defense under the 1948 Brussels Treaty was transferred from the Western Union (forerunner to the WEU) to NATO. See NATO Handbook, Bruxelles: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995, pp. 196-197.
Nonetheless, recent commentators on the WEU’s re-activation correctly observe that the Brussels Treaty remains a collective defense treaty, suggesting, at least in this author’s view, that some see a future WEU role in collective defense as well as in crisis response.

13. Nations with representatives assigned to CJTF headquarters staff positions will be asked to agree to deploying them even if they do not provide forces. However, the nature of a voluntary alliance is that deploying individual staff personnel as well as forces remains a national prerogative.

14. Excluding peace enforcement, which includes conventional combat operations which are addressed adequately in existing NATO military doctrine.

15. See Section II, “On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role.” Note that the WEU uses the term “peacemaking” to mean peace enforcement in U.N. parlance. For the U.N., peacemaking is entirely a diplomatic undertaking. The Petersberg Declaration (June 1992) was intended to commence implementation of the 1991 Maastricht Declaration on the WEU, which sought to have the WEU develop a defense identity for the European Union. In conjunction with creating a military planning staff, the Petersberg Declaration designated the above missions and directed the staff to conduct contingency planning.

16. The ARRC is the principal reaction corps of NATO. It was fully operational in 1995, and has up to 10 divisions and additional corps level resources to call upon, including the two multinational divisions. The Multinational Division (Central), or MND(C), is fully operational and includes Belgian, German, Dutch, and British forces. Multinational Division (South), or MND(S) will include Greek, Italian and Turkish unit, but is not yet operational. STANAVFORLANT has been fully operational since 1967 and is comprised of destroyers and frigates. Its permanent members are Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. STANAVFORMED has been operational since 1992 and is also comprised of destroyers and frigates. Its permanent members are Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Both naval forces are joined by other NATO ships from time to time.

17. Theoretically, PfP is open to all 53 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

18. In addition to ten full members, there are three associate members and ten associate partners. The full members are Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The associate members are NATO members who are not in the EU: Iceland, Norway and Turkey; however, Iceland has no armed forces. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, the countries who have reached “Europe Agreements” with the EU, are associate partners. All of these nations, and more recently, all five Observer nations (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) may provide forces to a WEU operation.
19. The EUROCORPS is presently comprised of forces from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain.

20. The WEU command and control concept for operations is principally *ad hoc*, with each operation's command arrangement being unique. Political authorities designate an Operation Headquarters, typically an existing national headquarters of a member state, and a Force Headquarters/force commander. The command and control structures are usually chosen based upon national contributions. The document that covers these procedures is *Organization and Operation of WEU in Time of Crisis*, WEU C (93) 38, April 28, 1993.
COMMAND AUTHORITIES AND MULTINATIONALITY IN NATO:
THE RESPONSE OF THE CENTRAL REGION’S ARMS

Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young

In May 1991, the decision was taken by the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), meeting in Brussels, to create multinational corps formations. Eventually, NATO established four multinational main defense corps, the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and two multinational divisions. Additionally, the EUROCORPS, consisting of a division from Belgium, France, Germany, and Spain, can be made available to SACEUR. Interestingly, the decision to create these formations opened a forgotten Pandora’s box of “command authorities” challenges. One may recall that disagreements over the creation of a European Army in the early 1950s failed, in part, over the question of the role of national command authorities within this multinational army. As NATO’s integrated command structure was created and evolved, member nations found that the most efficacious means of dealing with Alliance command and control over land forces was to arrange allied forces within national corps formations. Such arrangements conveniently avoided politically and legally nettlesome issues, which were designated as “national responsibilities.” By not pushing “multinationality” below the corps level (excepting, of course, ACE Mobile Force-Land and Corps LANDJUT), the Alliance conveniently avoided contentious debates over these exceedingly sensitive and complicated issues.

Following the Alliance’s decision to create multinational corps and divisions, however, experience was to demonstrate major command problems in their envisaged employment. For instance, in May 1994 at the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff Talks
(CR-CAST) 1/94, General M. J. Wilmink, RNLA, Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (COMLANDCENT), related a recent exercise experience. He directed a subordinate force to reallocate forces to another national force to react to the battlefield situation. The time required for the subordinate commander to gain approval from his national authorities nearly cost COMLANDCENT the battle. Experiences of Commander ARRC highlighted limitations of his authority to direct and task organize his forces to maintain control of his operational situation. Simply put, the two commanders did not possess the necessary command authorities to direct and organize subordinate national forces to accomplish their missions and react to changing circumstances.

At CR-CAST 1/94, General Wilmink raised the issue of future multinational force commanders’ authorities and responsibilities. He urged careful consideration of command status and operational flexibility of multinational forces. He encouraged deliberation of shared concerns and solicited proposals for solving such thorny matters as NATO’s definition of command authorities. The members of the CR-CAST agreed to form a working group to study the command authority requirements for a multinational force commander (MINFC). Members of Central Region armies which participated in the working group were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States. Observers were present from SHAPE, AFCENT, BALTAP, and LANDCENT. A key task for the working group was to investigate command authority requirements for Article V (traditional defense of the Alliance) and non-Article V missions (peace support operations). The working group, in which the current authors participated, met during the summer of 1994 and its findings were delivered at CR-CAST 2/94 in September.

The purpose of this essay is to explain the results, and the rationale supporting them, of the Phase I findings of the CR-CAST Working Group on Command Authorities Required by a Multinational Force Commander. While the group has surely not addressed all the problems surrounding command authority requirements, it did endeavor to establish a systematic methodology whereby military and defense officials can ascertain the appropriate command authorities for a multinational force commander. And, as will be argued later in the paper, the findings of this group could have
long-term positive implications for the Alliance in terms of improving land force multinationality.

Command Authorities

Definitions and Complications.

Command authorities, as a subject, must be one of the most ignored and widely misunderstood of military subjects. While there has been a plethora of essays and books written on "command and control," command authorities are rarely defined, let alone analyzed from the perspective of a commander's requirements as determined by his missions. Indeed, otherwise ground breaking essays dealing with multinational military operations often deal superficially with this subject. For example, while many authors recognize the obvious need for "unity of command" in multinational operations, a systematic process for determining the specific command authorities required for a particular mission assigned to a commander has been largely lacking in the literature of security studies.

In NATO-agreed usage, there are four levels of command authorities. These are:

1. Operational Command (OPCOM)
2. Operational Control (OPCON)
3. Tactical Command (TACOM)
4. Tactical Control (TACON)

At Chart 9, the official definitions of the terms are presented as these appear in AAP-6. A comparison of the four terms is presented in Chart 10. As seen in the latter chart, OPCOM provides to a commander the greatest degree of control over his assigned forces while TACON provides the least. For the purposes of the findings of the working group, an important distinction must be made between OPCOM and OPCON. The principal distinguishing factor between these two levels of command authority is that OPCOM allows a commander to (re)assign missions, as well as task organize (or fragment) subordinate units, in addition to those authorities found in OPCON. TACOM and TACON provide the least level of authority to a commander by allowing him only to exercise tactical command or control such as assigning tasks, deploying forces, and directing movements and maneuver for a short or specified duration, or in a limited specific area. Given that the working group defined an MNFC
Chart 9.
Definitions of NATO Command Authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Command:</th>
<th>The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational Control:</td>
<td>The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control to those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Command:</td>
<td>The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Control</td>
<td>The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


as a corps commander, TACOM and TACON were not accepted as providing the necessary command authority for a commander at this level.

To complicate this otherwise straightforward description of NATO command authorities, it must be understood that there are distinctions between national and NATO definitions of command authorities. For example, the United States does not have doctrinal definitions for OPCOM or TACOM, but (gratefully) its U.S. definition for TACON is identical to NATO’s definition. However, the U.S. definition of OPCON substantially differs from the NATO definition. (See Chart 11 for a comparison of NATO and U.S. definitions.) This is despite the fact that the United States
Chart 10.
Comparison of NATO Command Authorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>OPCOM</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>TACOM</th>
<th>TACON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assign Mission</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign Tasks</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign Forces</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granted to a Commander</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ Unit Components Separately</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign OPCOM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain OPCOM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate OPCOM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES with Aprvl</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to a Commander</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior to TACOM</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign TACOM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain TACOM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate TACOM</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy Forces</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Direction &amp; Control of Movements and Maneuver</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Command</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-Day Direction</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Control</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support/Command</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Control</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Agreed to the NATO definitions by virtue of Washington's acceding to AAP-6, "NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions."

These differences, as recognized in FM 100-7, Decisive Force, resulted in some not inconsequential difficulties for NATO forces (despite their long history of cooperation) operating together during Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Even a key U.S. policy document dealing with command authorities does not strictly adhere to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Most Control</th>
<th>OPCOM</th>
<th>OPCON</th>
<th>TACOM</th>
<th>TACON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Granted to a Commander</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign OPCOM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain OPCOM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate OPCOM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO with Aprv/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to a Commander</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior to TACOM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign TACOM</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain TACON</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate TACON</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign Mission</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign Tasks</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Forces (Give Orders)</td>
<td>NATO/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign Forces</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy Forces</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NATO/US</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Direction &amp; Control of Movements &amp; Maneuver</td>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ Unit Components Separately</td>
<td>NATO-NO US-YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Command</td>
<td>NATO-NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-Day Direction</td>
<td>NATO-NO</td>
<td>NATO/US</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Control</td>
<td>NATO-NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Support/Command</td>
<td>NATO-NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Control</td>
<td>NATO-NO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full Command* (NATO ONLY): No NATO Commander has full command over forces assigned to him because nations assign only OPCOM or OPCON
*Combatant Command (COCOM)* (US ONLY): Title 10 USC, SEC 154. Given only to unified Commanders.

**KEY:**
- "NATO" - Specifically permitted in a NATO Publication
- "NATO-NO" - Specifically prohibited in a NATO Publication
- "US" - Authorized in US Doctrine
- BLANK - Not mentioned in any NATO or US Publication
- NATO/US - Definitions for TACON are identical
established definitions. President Clinton’s Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, which explicitly addresses U.S. policy toward multilateral peace operations, uses a definition of OPCON which does not conform to that established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces. Rather, it resembles the JCS’s definition of TACON or the NATO definition of OPCON. One could question whether there are now two U.S. definitions of “OPCON.” Indeed, although not official, an initial draft Joint Pub 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, uses the definition as given by PDD-25, vice that which is officially sanctioned by the JCS (see Chart 12). In short, there is no end in sight (particularly in the United States) to the lack of agreed definitions to these important terms.

The key differences between the U.S. and NATO definitions of OPCON are:

1. NATO OPCON does not allow for the assignment of missions (the providing nation accepts the mission and assigns forces to execute the mission); U.S. OPCON does allow for the assignment and change of mission.

2. NATO OPCON does not allow for the task organization (also referred to as “fragmentation”) of subordinate forces; U.S. OPCON does allow for task organization of forces.

3. NATO OPCON can only be delegated with national approval; U.S. OPCON can be delegated.

NATO OPCOM, therefore, more closely approximates the U.S. definition of OPCON. A commander with NATO OPCOM can assign missions and task organize forces. Although he cannot delegate NATO OPCOM to subordinate commanders, he can delegate NATO OPCON. The United States has agreed to use the NATO definitions when its forces are provided to NATO. The U.S. commander loses U.S. OPCON of his forces when they are transferred to NATO under NATO OPCOM or OPCON although he retains certain national commander responsibilities and authorities which cannot be delegated. Other NATO countries have similar dilemmas when reconciling national definitions of command authority with concurrent legal restrictions when providing their forces to international operations.

Applications and Nuances.

Five key points are fundamental to understanding the general issue of NATO command authorities. First, and foremost, no nation
Chart 12.
“OPCON” Compared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>DOD</th>
<th>PDD-25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assign Mission</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign Tasks</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassign Tasks</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ Unit Components Separately</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Mission Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain OPCON</td>
<td></td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate OPCON</td>
<td>YES with Aprv1</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate to CDR</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior to TACOM/TACON</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assign TACOM/TACON</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retain TACOM/TACON</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate TACOM/TACON</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Forces</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deploy Forces</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Command</td>
<td></td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-to-Day Direction</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin Control</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics SPT/CMD</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Control</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In NATO surrenders national command of their forces (“Full Command” as defined in NATO) within the integrated command structure. Important matters of discipline, pay, promotion, etc., remain solely within national command channels as inherent manifestations of national sovereignty. Thus, one must distinguish between national command and the possible operational employment of armed forces. Addressing the issue of operational employment of the U.S. armed forces, the Clinton administration’s PDD-25 makes the point quite clear that “American forces have served under the
operational control of foreign commanders since the Revolutionary War, including in World War I, World War II, Operation Desert Storm, and in NATO since its inception.” Conversely, the document stresses, “The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over U.S. forces.”

Second, it is a truism that nations and politicians are, nevertheless, loath to give their national forces over to foreign commanders. Military forces are a sine qua non of a state’s most basic manifestation of sovereignty and, not surprisingly, are not lightly delegated to an external institution. As a consequence, it is often the case that instead of ascertaining what levels of command the MNFC requires to accomplish his mission, national authorities attempt to relinquish the least amount of authority thereby retaining as much control over their forces as possible. Moreover, once authority has been delegated to a NATO commander, national authorities have been reluctant to reexamine and expand these authorities. This extreme political sensitivity over placing forces under a foreign commander was noted by the working group; it was unable to find an instance where a multinational force commander, engaged in peace support operations, had his command authorities changed when his mission changed, consciously or as a result of “mission creep.” Thus, it is safe to assume that the command authorities an MNFC begins with are what he will have throughout his command. This was an important consideration in the group’s endeavor and will be discussed below.

Third, a combination of these two important national sensitivities has resulted in a reluctance on the part of some NATO states to place their national forces under OPCOM of allied MNFCs, particularly in peacetime. This is despite the fact that the CR-CAST working group was unable to identify any constitutional or legal impediments in Central Region countries to placing their forces under the OPCOM of an MNFC. The key sensitivity among many allied officials is the fear that they will be unable to control mission assignments and that their forces will be fragmented. However, a strong case can be made of the operational requirement for land MNFCs to require OPCOM.

Unlike their naval and air counterpart, armies have their own sui generis characteristics when assigning them to a non-national commander. Land forces are a combined arms team made up of various subset formations, each of which may have different mission-essential tasks assigned to them. Ships and aircraft, on the other hand, can be thought of as integral platforms of weapons and
capabilities which can be delegated in their entirety to non-national commanders to carry out specified tasks.\textsuperscript{24} Hence, for navies and air forces, TACOM and TACON are entirely appropriate.\textsuperscript{25} Depending upon the missions and mission-essential tasks, a land MNFC could well require a wide-range of command authorities in order to accomplish his assigned objectives with formations located over a wide area.\textsuperscript{26} For instance, he may need to assign new missions and tasks, reassign forces, or task organize subordinate forces. These conditions dictate that MNFCs must possess command authorities that permit them to perform such tasks, i.e., OPCOM.

Fourth, perhaps as a result of this reluctance on the part of nations to cede command authorities to foreign commanders, there is a problem of the delegation of command authorities. Under current provisions, OPCOM can only be returned to its originating source and cannot be delegated by an MNFC to a subordinate commander. An MNFC possessing OPCOM can only delegate OPCON to a subordinate commander. Conversely, an MNFC with OPCON can only delegate OPCON after obtaining national consent and is able to grant TACOM or TACON to a subordinate commander without approval. At present, only the SACEUR has OPCOM of land forces in peacetime, but he has no effective means of delegating this authority to Subordinate NATO Commanders (e.g., CINCENT), let alone an MNFC. In consequence, where MNFCs possess OPCOM, this is a result of agreements among the participating nations.

Fifth, when assessing the various definitions of NATO command authorities, two distinct and competing schools of thought exist concerning what is, or is not, allowed to be done by a NATO commander. One school interprets these definitions in a strictly catholic sense (i.e., unless specifically stipulated, a NATO commander cannot exercise other authorities, stated or implied, (e.g., under OPCOM, an MNFC can assign missions). The other school interprets command authorities as allowing the NATO commander to exercise command unless it is explicitly stated otherwise (e.g., under OPCON, an MNFC cannot employ unit components separately). While no unified interpretation exists, the first school appears to be more frequently accepted.

\textit{Central Region Challenges.}

At present in the Central Region, there is no uniformity of command authorities after transfer of authority (TOA) among
multinational formations. Moreover, some command authority arrangements include “caveats” (see Chart 13).

It should be stressed that these command authorities are only effected after TOA to the MNFC by the contributing nation. In some cases, for instance, for peacetime planning purposes the MNFC has OPCON but would have OPCOM during wartime.

Given that there is now only one national corps remaining in the Central Region, GE IV Korps in Potsdam, important operational-related matters which were once left to national authorities (e.g., training, readiness, etc.) are now directly or indirectly matters of extreme import to Central Region MNFCs. Indeed, if an MNFC is incapable of influencing the peacetime preparedness of his force because of inadequate command authorities, then the military rationale for having (and political value derived from) multinational forces is placed in serious question. One might suspect that the solution to the MNFC command authorities conundrum would be to give all MNFCs OPCOM (the highest level of command authority in all cases) in peace and war. Even if this were politically possible, and the explanation above makes the case why this is so difficult, this would not solve a crucial problem that OPCOM cannot be delegated to a subordinate commander.

**Chart 13.**

**Command Authorities of NATO Land Multinational Formations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps / Land Units</th>
<th>Command Authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corps LANDJUT (DA/GE)</td>
<td>OPCON/OPCOM²⁷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL/GE bi-national Corps</td>
<td>OPCON (in peacetime) OPCOM (when employed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROCORPS (FR, GE, BE, SP, LU)</td>
<td>OPCOM (when deployed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US/GE Corps</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GE/US Corps</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Divisions</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Divisions HQs²⁸</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>OPCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>OPCOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63
During the Cold War, the problem of the delegation of OPCOM in the Central Region was solved by nations granting OPCOM to all NATO command levels from SACEUR through Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs), e.g., AFCENT to Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSCs), e.g., NORTHAG and CENTAG. Now, however, the issue of command delegation is compounded by two different factors. First, in view of the May 1992 decision by the North Atlantic Council to allow the Alliance to participate in peace support operations, it is not unlikely that a Combined Joint Task Force could be delayed in its deployment due to the need to find agreement over the command authorities given to the MNFC. As it now stands, the MNFC could be granted OPCON, but only after a potentially laborious process as it is delegated from the SACEUR, conceivably via a MSC and PCS. And, recall that OPCON itself can only be delegated with national approval. Second, even where corps level MNFCs have wartime OPCOM, there is presently no mechanism to delegate this authority to subordinate commanders. As it now stands, without OPCOM, an MNFC cannot assign missions to subordinate units, nor can he task organize them. In short, prerogatives formally within the realm of national decisionmaking are now justifiably a concern of an MNFC.

Thus, in an era where the preponderance of Central Region land force assets are assigned to multinational corps and divisions, there are major impediments to their effective full employment by their designated MNFCs. It was with this understanding of the above impediments and definitional complications that the working group attempted to find solutions.

**Defining Command Authority Requirements**

The CR-CAST working group’s approach to defining command authority requirements in both Article V and non-Article V missions was to identify potential missions and then examine the mission-essential tasks required to fulfill them. After much discussion and debate, it was felt that this would provide the strongest methodology to determining systematically command authority requirements.

*Article V Missions.*

Notwithstanding the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the missions associated with the defense of NATO
they have not changed significantly. They include the entire range of military operations (save those which are non-Article V) that the Alliance could be required to undertake within the geographic area as defined by Article VI. The phases of the mission identified are:

Phase O: Planning and Preparation (N.B.: NATO MNFCs have key planning roles but no authority over their assigned forces.)

Phase 1: Deployment
Phase 2: Employment
Phase 3: Operations
Phase 4: Redeployment

When examining these missions (see Chart 14 for greater detail), an interesting aspect became obvious to the working group. That is, despite the end of the Cold War the “missions,” which Allied forces need to be prepared to accomplish, have not changed; rather, what has changed are some key mission-essential tasks. For example, whereas the mission of defending NATO territory has remained unchanged, the tasks associated with inter-regional reinforcements have changed and, in some cases, dramatically so.

Upon close examination of these mission-essential tasks, the working group concluded that an MNFC would have to be prepared to direct mission-essential tasks that would include combat operations (i.e., Phases 2 and 3). Consequently, the working group concluded that in order to accomplish these potentially difficult operations, an MNFC would require OPCOM as national corps commanders had during the Cold War. The possession of OPCOM would enable him to task organize units, if required, and reassign missions. Moreover, it would give him the necessary flexibility to delegate OPCON to subordinate commanders without having to obtain national approval at what could be rather inopportune times.

Non-Article V Missions.

The lack of agreement within the Alliance on what exactly constitutes non-Article V missions hampers the identification of non-Article V command authorities required by an MNFC. For instance, British and American doctrine differ over which missions fall under peace support operations. Moreover, even NATO documents do not agree completely on this subject. Given the Military Committee’s (MC) authority in matters of NATO military policy, the most authoritative extant documentation on this subject
Chart 14.
Tasks Associated with Article V Operations.

**Phase 0 (Planning and Preparation)**
- Receipt of planning authority
- Development of plans, deployment plans, areas of operations
- Reconnaissance into the area of operation
- Strategic and operational intelligence gathering
- Task organizing of units
- Training

**Phase 1 (Deployment)**
- Preparation
- Establish and/or control ports of debarkation
- Receive forces assigned to the specific mission and reinforcements
- Transfer of Authority request

**Phase 2 (Employment)**
- Forcible entry, if necessary
- Occupy area of operations
- Increase readiness status of own forces
- Employ forces to “show the flag”
- Concentrate forces to achieve the operational aim
- Collect information
- Safeguard own troops
- Deploy reserves
- Establish C2/C3I
- Establish lines of communications
- Coordination of HNS (if available)
- Logistical build-up

**Phase 3 (Operations)**
- Movement operations
- Reconnaissance
- Liaison
- Electronic warfare
- Crossing of waterways
- Airmobility
- Mobility and countermobility
- Rear area protection
- Personnel replacement and logistics
- Medical service
- Offensive/defensive operations
- Delaying operations
- POW handling
- NBC defense

**Phase 4 (Redeployment)**
- Planning
- Closing down of logistical base
- Hand-off to HN/MSC
currently is MC 327, "Peace Support Operations."\textsuperscript{37} This document identifies six peace support operational missions:

1. Conflict Prevention
2. Peacemaking
3. Peacekeeping
4. Humanitarian Aid
5. Peace Enforcement
6. Peacebuilding\textsuperscript{38}

From this starting point, the working group was able to develop a list of tasks associated with peace-support operations (see Chart 15), as well as a list of tasks related to each of the six peace-support missions (see Chart 16). An examination of common tasks and, more importantly, a review of tasks related to specific non-Article V missions reveal the need for an MNFC to be prepared to conduct a wide array of military operations. Additional considerations in deriving required command authorities included:

1. Composition of national forces under the MNFC's command;
2. Well-defined Rules of Engagement (ROE); N.B.: NATO lacks standing land ROE except for ACE Mobile Force-Land;\textsuperscript{39}
3. Potential for "mission creep";
4. Requirement to task organize and further delegate command authority;
5. Employment of NATO's integrated command structure;
6. The likelihood of combat operations.\textsuperscript{40}

The working group initially contemplated that given these considerations and the six peace support missions, an MNFC could require command authorities ranging from TACOM to OPCOM. TACOM was only required for Humanitarian Aid because the required mission-essential tasks did not require a high degree of centralized command. Peace Enforcement could, for instance, require the conduct of combat operations to restore peace, thereby necessitating a high degree of centralized command authority. An MNFC conducting such mission-essential tasks as this would justifiably require OPCOM.\textsuperscript{41} As it turned out, the working group did not recommend TACOM for Humanitarian Aid. Rather, the group concluded with the general principle that an MNFC's command authorities in peace support operations necessitate OPCON except for Peace Enforcement, which requires OPCOM.
**Chart 15.**
Tasks Associated with Non-Article V Operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 0 (Planning and Preparation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipt of planning authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development of plans, areas of operations, ROE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force packaging/contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance into the area of operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence gathering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA negotiations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1 (Deployment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and/or control of ports of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receive forces assigned to the specific mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of Authority request</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 2 (Employment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase and decrease readiness status of own forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employ forces to “show the flag”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrate forces to achieve the operational aim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguard own troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish C2/C31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish lines of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordination of HNS and NGO (if present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistical build-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupy sector/areas of operation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 3 (Operations)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic control (including check points, road blocks)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organize transfer of personnel, equipment, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public information (enhanced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military community relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical assistance/evacuation (enhanced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowd control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance (enhanced)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaise/negotiate with local parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian police/UN civilian police liaison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer tasks (restore facilities, bridging, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect threatened minorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 4 (Replayment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plan for redeployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close down of logistical base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-operation activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand-off to HN/NGO/observers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The reason for this conclusion relates to the difficulty of changing command authorities.

**Changing Command Authorities**

A key question posed to the working group was to identify those events which could necessitate a change in the command authority for an MNFC and how changes in his authority could be affected. The working group identified the following events which would cause a change in an MNFC’s command authorities:

1. “Mission creep”;
2. A change in the political mandate under which the operation is taking place;
3. A determination by the MNFC that command authorities are insufficient to accomplish the mission;
4. The withdrawal of consent by participating nations for continued support of the operation;
5. Initial planning assumptions are proven invalid;
6. Threat of attack requiring MNFC to defend the force;
7. A change in the domestic situation of contributing forces necessitating the withdrawal of deployed forces.⁴²

The working group next had to confront the question of whether command authorities could change as the mission of the MNF changed. If nations are generally loath to grant a foreign commander command over their national forces,⁴³ then they are even less disposed to giving carte blanche authority to that commander to change his command authorities, notwithstanding the most altruistic rationales. And, in fact, there are well-established constitutional and legal limitations to NATO governments relinquishing such responsibilities. Yet, notwithstanding the need for an MNFC to obtain national approval for a change in his command authorities, the working group was unable to determine one instance where an MNFC, conducting peace support operations, had his command authorities increased to enable him to respond effectively to the altered situation.

In view of these political realities and legal limitations, the working group concluded that prudent military planning required proposing higher command authorities than perhaps initially appeared necessary. Consequently, TACOM, even for Humanitarian Aid missions, was not recommended by the working group out of
Chart 16.
Tasks Related to a Particular Mission,
Non-Article V.

1. Conflict Prevention:
• Act as interpositional force to forestall violence
• Assist authorities to protect and offer security to threatened minorities
• Enforce sanctions
• Patrol and secure a border or demarcation line
• Present a show of force in order to dissuade a potential aggressor
• Preventative deployment
• Prevent outbreak of hostilities
• Monitor and report
• Conduct exercises/show of force as a Flexible Deterrent Option
• Establish indicator/warning system before conflict

2. Peacemaking: (The WG did not indentify any tasks solely associated with Peacemaking, as defined by MC 327.)

3. Peacekeeping:
• Monitor withdrawal of forces
• Verify treaty compliance
• Collect weapons
• Patrol area
• Establish and operate check points
• Escort convoys
• Establish and operate observation posts
• Conduct mine clearing operations
• Resolve disputes
• Separate adversaries
• Monitor elections
• Report human rights abuses
• Observe/supervise ceasefire/demarcation lines
• Cooperate with relief agencies as an impartial observer force
• Supervise demilitarization

• Assist in handling displaced persons
• Provide law enforcement
• Provide or restore civil administration
• Establish control of key terrain
• Supervise free elections

4. Humanitarian Aid:
• Search and rescue
• Coordinate refugee/displaced person movement
• Conduct relief operation: assist with food distribution accomplish critical construction projects
• Distribute life essential supplies, services and equipment

5. Peace Enforcement:
• Conduct combat operations to restore peace
• Conduct forcible entry, if necessary
• Monitor and report actions
• Verify treaty compliance
• Collect weapons
• Patrol area of operations
• Resolve disputes
• Separate adversaries
• Enforce sanctions

6. Peacebuilding: Peacebuilding may include any combination of those tasks identified for peacekeeping missions as well as the following specific tasks:
• Identify and support structures which support peace
• Tailor force package to undertake possible Civil Affairs/Psychs activities
• Rebuild critical infrastructure facilities and transportation nets
• Support positive military reconstruction
concern that an MNFC would be unable to respond effectively to (for instance) “mission creep”, even to defend the force.

Mechanisms for Change.

There are no legal provisions within the Alliance or among Central Region countries for command authorities to change automatically as missions shift. Indeed, once implemented, the new NATO Precautionary System will eliminate the automatic change in command authorities contained in the old NATO Alert System. While recognizing this basic factor of civil control over the military in democratic societies, the fact remains that an MNFC, particularly in non-Article V operations, may be faced with a rapid change in mission. However, changes in command authorities can only now be effected through a potentially long chain of command between the MNFC and the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/MC. At this senior politico-military level, changes in command authorities must be directed except when delegating TACOM.

The working group recognized that political sensitivity over the granting of command authorities to an MNFC and the legal/constitutional stipulations will make suggestions for improvement very difficult to implement. However, the use of the NATO integrated command structure would provide both an established structure and procedures for conducting military operations and dealing with altered military realities on the ground. Employment of these structures in non-Article V missions might provide to nations needed assurances, thereby facilitating the granting of OPCON and OPCOM to the MNFC when militarily required.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The results and advice of the CR-CAST Working Group on Command Authorities Required by an MNFC represent the consensus of the Central Region’s armies. If nothing else, the results provide a starting point from which the Alliance, at the MNC level, can begin the search for comprehensive solutions to the large issue of NATO command and control over MNFs. The principal conclusions reached by the working group are as follows.

First, an assessment of Article V and non-Article V missions (and mission-essential tasks) of the Alliance’s new force structure, and of the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, indicates that an MNFC has a
clear requirement for OPCON for five of the six non-Article V missions and for OPCOM for Peacemaking and Article V missions.

Second, while there are no legal or constitutional proscriptions in any of the Central Region countries to prevent granting OPCOM to an MNFC, political sensitivities may preclude such a decision.

Third, the use of the standing integrated command structure in non-Article V missions may well encourage participating states granting OPCOM. In this established command structure every nation has the ability to influence decisions in the NAC and DPC, which should provide added reassurance to countries granting OPCOM to an MNFC.

Fourth, national ROE must be harmonized with those of the MNFCs prior to TOA. The ROE of participating forces and those of the MNFC must be compatible.

Fifth, and finally, significant differences in doctrine and terminology exist in NATO and leading allied forces regarding peace support operations, which could inhibit the successful execution of a NATO non-Article V operation.

The key recommendations for action by the working group were the following. 47

First, there is a clear requirement for the Alliance to overcome restrictions placed by nations on the granting of OPCOM to a NATO MNFC. Such an initiative should be a high priority for the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staffs. Implicit in this recommendation is the need for the Alliance to make possible delegating OPCOM to a subordinate commander.

Second, albeit outside the formal terms of reference of the working group, given the complexity of mission-essential tasks for both Article V and non-Article V missions, training the force by the MNFC is essential. Therefore, an MNFC may require additional command authorities in order to do so.

Third, SHAPE needs to ensure that there is clear agreement in peace support operations terminology in its doctrinal efforts and existing MC documents.

Fourth, SHAPE needs to develop and the MC approve standing ROE for land operations. These ROE would be applicable for both Article V and non-Article V operations.

Fifth, given the lack of agreement among armies concerning non-Article V nomenclature, nations must agree to employ
established NATO definitions (e.g., AAP-6 and MC 327) when engaging in peace support operations.\textsuperscript{48}

The working group’s efforts should be assessed in a positive light for three reasons. First, the working group attempted to develop a methodology that would allow defense and military officials to determine the required command authorities for an MNFC which consider his mission requirements in light of political and legal realities. Second, the findings of the group represent a consensus of what must surely be seen as the largest, if not most sophisticated, armies in the Alliance. The fact that problems and proposed solutions have been identified and agreed to by the Central Region armies is a not inconsequential achievement in itself, particularly given the inherent difficulties of the problems the group had to address. Lastly, given that all of the papers produced by the working group were endorsed by CR-CAST 1/95 and have been forwarded to the SACEUR for his command’s action and/or further study, it is not at all improbable that the findings of this group will serve as the bases for future Alliance-wide agreements.

Notes

Authors’ note: We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the members of the CR-CAST Working Group on Command Authorities Required by a Multinational Force Commander for their dedicated work on this challenging subject, as well as to Dr. William T. Johnsen, COL Phil Mock (Ret) and COL Jack Ellerton for their insightful comments made on an earlier draft of this essay.


2. For an assessment of these formations, see Rafael Estrella and Jaime Gama, The Future of the Armed Forces, AI 244, DSC/AF (91) 6, Bruxelles: North Atlantic Assembly, October 1991, pp. 1-14; Rafael Estrella, After the NATO Summit: New Structures and Modalities for Military Cooperation, AL 205, DSC (94) 8, Bruxelles: North Atlantic Assembly, November 1994, pp. 1-8; and Assembly of Western European Union, Defence Committee, European Armed Forces, Report, Document 1468, Paris, June 12, 1995, pp. 6-18.


5. Corps LANDJUT was established in 1970 to defend the German state of Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark’s Jutland peninsula. Geography (the region north of Elbe River and the westernmost bridge over the Elbe were only 45 kilometers from the Inter-German border) and the short warning time were the key factors which forced Bonn and Copenhagen to create these operational and support arrangements.


11. Two examples of this shortcoming are found in Martha Maurer, Coalition Command and Control, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, particularly pp. 15-28; and David S. Alberts and Richard Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 1995. Albeit about coalition command and control and
peace support operations, "command authorities" is not addressed in these otherwise informative works. A partial exception to this general observation is found in Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995, pp. 55-61. To the author's credit, on page 61, he briefly lists a series of key questions that need to be addressed concerning command structures (and indirectly command authorities) when planning peace support operations.


16. "Operational control is a subset of command. It is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to U.S. forces already deployed by the President, and assign tasks to U.S. units led by U.S. officers. Within the limits of operational control, a foreign U.N. commander cannot: change the mission or deploy U.S. forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President, separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization." *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, PDD-25, May 1994, p. 10. Compare this definition of OPCON with that found in *Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994, pp. 274-275. The key point is that the administration's directive proscribes assigning new missions to U.S. forces as well as their fragmentation.


18. For an excellent analysis of the differences in these definitions, see *FM 100-7, Decisive Force*, pp. 2-10 to 2-11.


24. See Palin, Multinational Military Forces, pp. 52-54.


26. For a discussion of some of the considerations an MNFC must face when forming his force, see Palin, Multinational Military Forces, pp. 31-51.

27. By national agreement, Commander, LANDJUT has OPCON of forces under his command. However, in exercises, it has been the tradition for 30 years for COMLANDJUT to exercise OPCOM.

28. Multinational Division headquarters are OPCOM to the ARRC in peacetime. Their assigned brigades are under OPCON to Commander ARRC in peacetime.


32. Ibid., point 2.3.2.1.

33. Ibid., point 2.7.2.1.

34. “Any lesser command authority [than OPCOM] will place constraints on the MNFC that will increase risk.” Ibid.


41. *Ibid.*, points 2.7.2.2ff.

42. *Ibid.*, points 2.9.2ff.

43. The working group identified the following political conditions and restrictions that nations have over placing their forces under the command of an MNFC. These limitations include: concern over loss of sovereignty; national ROE may be different from that of the MNFC’s; fear of fragmentation; inadequately trained forces (to include Combat Support and Combat Service Support formations) for the specified tasks; and, lack of financial resources. *Ibid.*, points 2.10.2ff.

44. *Ibid.*, points 2.11.2ff. For details of this system, see Stares, *Command Performance*, pp. 114-121.


48. Despite the findings of the working group that its recommendations be forwarded to SHAPE for implementation, CR-CAST 2/94 determined that it was not a propitious time to do so. “CINCENT’s Closing Remarks,” CR-CAST 2/94 (NU), Copenhagen, September 15, 1994, pp. 3-4. Instead, it was decided that additional issues should be addressed by the working group. These were: Relationship between NATO and non-NATO command authorities; Transfer of
Authority to an MNFC; Confronting “Mission Creep” by an MNFC; Task Organization; Rules of Engagement for NATO Land Forces in the Central Region. Papers on these subjects were subsequently developed by the working group and briefed at CR-CAST 1/95. The Phase II papers developed by the working group can be found in *Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook*, Part II. The papers were accepted at that meeting, and it was decided that they, along with the initial paper on command authorities, would be forwarded to the SACEUR for further study and implementation.
CANADIAN FORCES IN EUROPE:
THE END-GAME?
Douglas Bland

In October 1951 Canadian troops returned to Europe only six years after the end of the Second World War. There was no great enthusiasm in Parliament or in the country for this deployment, but it was the price Canada felt obliged to pay as a founding member of the North Atlantic Alliance. Forty-two years later the last members of these same units closed out Canada’s military bases in Germany and left for home. To some, these separate events marked the beginning and end of a distinct era, the Cold War, and not a change in Canada's relationship with Europe. But as the flag came down, others saw an irreversable step and poignant confirmation that Canada’s military presence in Europe was over. And yet, away to the southeast amid the distant agonies of Yugoslavia and across the new German border, a familiar siren calls again.

Today, more than 1,000 Canadian service persons are deployed within NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. Other Canadian Armed Forces (CF) personnel and units remain on standby status to meet commitments the Canadian government has made to NATO. There are, however, signs that Canadians are becoming disenchanted with their peacekeeping role in the Balkans and suspicious of European policies in Eastern Europe. Canadian politicians and opinion makers accept the assumption that stability in Europe is critical to Canadian security, yet few support plans to commit military forces to the continent because they believe such a policy to be too expensive and essentially irrelevant. The problem for Canadian politicians, therefore, is to find a policy that will allow Canada to remain enmeshed in European security deliberations but free from Europe’s conflicts and expensive military commitments to NATO.
The Liberal government elected in October 1993 conducted a public review of foreign and defense policies which included a fundamental reassessment of Canada's relationship with Europe. Many observers expected the reviews to recommend an end to Canadian military commitments to NATO Europe and the redirection of defense efforts instead to other international missions, and they did.

The CF, in the meantime, is attempting to reestablish a new mission for itself within NATO's evolving military structure, and in many respects it is the same one some had hoped they would fill when the Alliance was founded—that is, to form part of a North American strategic reserve ready to reinforce a unified European command. The military question, therefore, is: in what missions and under what command arrangements would the CF return to Europe? Finding an answer is complicated by the history of the command of Canada's armed forces in NATO, a particularly divisive experience and by the unique single-service, unified command structure of the CF. In many important respects these two factors have run counter to each other, but the contradictions must be resolved before any new commitments can be undertaken and before the future relationship between NATO's evolving command structure and the CF can be settled.

The Early Years

Canada has always hoped for a stable Europe, but it also has tried to avoid any involvement in old world conflicts. Few Canadians in 1949 expected that signing the Washington Treaty would require Canada to send soldiers to Europe, much less to station them there permanently. More than a year after the Treaty was signed, in June 1950, the Minister of Defence declared in Parliament that he had no expectation that Canada would have to make a military contribution to the Alliance.

Nevertheless, in 1949 some politicians and senior diplomats where caught in the same dilemma that haunts Canadian defense policy planners today. They were worried because they believed that if Canada accepted a key position in Alliance command organizations, the country would then be committed to increase its defense expenditures and to deploy troops in Europe. However, if they did not accept some close involvement in the command structure, then they feared that should hostilities break out "we would
find ourselves in almost exactly the same position as we were in during the last war when we were not consulted on questions of policy and when decisions were taken by individuals and bodies who had received no authority from us."³

The war in Korea dramatically changed Canadian defense policy but not its attitude toward deploying troops in Europe.⁴ Canadian officials tried to make the point that Canada could not provide an efficient contribution to NATO if it sent soldiers to Europe. They argued that it was unrealistic to believe that Canada would send a large force to Europe and that the cost of maintaining a small force there would be too great to make the effort worthwhile.⁵ It is an argument that Canadians have made ever since, but it has never overcome the demands of foreign policy. Canadians soon realized that if Canada wished to have "a seat at the table"⁶ with her Alliance partners, then she would have to make a visible contribution to the defense of Western Europe no matter how inefficient that commitment might be.

Since 1949, Canada’s policies toward NATO have been caught between a military logic that demands a withdrawal of small forces from Europe and a stoutly diplomatic argument to keep forces there. Successive governments have twisted around this dilemma since the earliest days of the Alliance. Politicians, because they could never resolve the problem, were usually content to maintain a military commitment, but privately they were not interested in setting a standard in NATO for military effectiveness or efficiency.⁷ This ambivalence and laissez-faire attitude meant, among other things, that detailed questions of command and control of the CF in NATO rarely penetrated the cabinet agenda. Therefore, military leaders, especially those with command responsibilities for forces in Europe, have had to make command arrangements that suited military and not necessarily political realities.

The contest between a viable military contribution in Europe and military tokenism created significant dislocations in Canadian defense policy throughout the Cold War era. NATO’s force planning process, in particular the “challenges to nations” issued by Major NATO Commanders (MNC), was an irritation to most governments as they had other domestic and international priorities.⁸ In these circumstances, military officers realized that so long as they did not ask for too much at once and the troops performed adequately, then they could design strategies and organizations much as they liked.
Nevertheless, although few Defence Ministers were concerned with the details of command arrangements in Europe, governments, ministers, and military leaders did from time to time attempt to resolve the contradictions between Canada's diverse commitments to NATO and its need for unity at home.

**Command and Control in Europe**

Canadians have always been sensitive about who commands their sons (and today, their daughters) in the field. Yet when the CF returned to Europe in 1951, any thought of reinforcing national command by grouping Canadian army and air units within one sector or under one commander was dismissed almost out of hand. During the Second World War, the services had grown within distinct roles and had become powerful institutions generally unfamiliar with, and uninterested in, one another. The first post-war defence minister, Brooke Claxton, was dismayed to discover that the Canadian forces had no unified strategic view and no way to develop one if they had considered it necessary (which they did not). He, therefore, began a series of reforms aimed at streamlining defense policy making and administration. He disbanded the separate naval army and air ministries and amalgamated them into one Department of National Defence. Claxton brought the service chiefs together in a Chiefs of Staff Committee, and he named one officer as Chairman of the Committee although without giving him any executive authority over his peers. Thus, on the eve of deploying to Europe, Canada had a unified ministry and a nascent joint military staff, but the incremental and separately developing missions in Korea and in NATO encouraged the service chiefs of staff to go their own ways.

By the end of 1963, the CF had taken on significant responsibilities in Europe and in the Atlantic. More than 10,000 soldiers were deployed in the 4th Mechanized Brigade Group in the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR). The brigade was large by most standards and occupied a front line position flanked by British and Belgian divisions. It was one of the few professional forces in Europe and, significantly for a brigade, it was equipped with Honest John nuclear missiles. The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) had organized an air division based in Germany and France. Its eight squadrons of CF104s, two in reconnaissance and six in nuclear strike roles, were an important and relatively large part of Allied Forces
Central Europe's (AFCENT) air-deliverable nuclear capability. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), meanwhile, was quietly settling into an anti-submarine role under Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT).

These forces each had two reporting channels, one to NATO commanders and another to the national service chief of staff in Ottawa. The NATO commanders met the need for operational command but the unified Department of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa were simply not thought of as having any real command authority. No single officer had complete responsibility for the national command of Canada's NATO force and, in fact, no one thought of it as a single force. Consequently, there was no Canadian strategy to direct defense planning in NATO; there were three strategies. That is not to say that national sensitivities about foreign command had disappeared, but rather that they had been soothed somewhat by the integrated nature of Eisenhower's system of command. Generally, Canadian commanders in Europe wanted to cooperate with their allied commanders, and planning their missions consumed all their time and efforts. Pleasing their operational commanders became more important and relevant than worrying in peacetime about abstract national sensitivities.

**Command of The Unified Service**

When a new Liberal government took office in 1963 the defense minister, Paul Hellyer, found plenty of space in which to exercise his reforming zeal. The minister found: a defense policy that tried to serve three uncoordinated service strategies; a confusion of overlapping tasks, responsibilities, and organizations; and a policy process based on a committee system that simply added to delays and bureaucratic infighting. Hellyer, like other ministers before him, was expected to decide issues the services could not settle, and they often approached him individually in what Hellyer thought were deliberate attempts to outflank their service rivals.

Hellyer concluded that the government had but two choices. "We must greatly increase defence spending or reorganize our forces. The decision was to reorganize." Hellyer's administrative and operational ideas had a significant impact on defense policy in Canada, but his most famous and radical notion was to unify the three separate services into a single unified armed force. The story of that
traumatic experience is well told elsewhere, but the effect of the reforms on Canada’s NATO force was curious and is not well understood.

In August 1964 the minister abolished the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the three service chiefs and in their place appointed a Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) who was to be the government’s sole uniformed advisor on military matters. He was also made responsible for all aspects of national command and operational control of the CF. The CDS was strengthened also by the formation of the Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) that was to provide the staff support that would enable the CDS to perform his duties. CFHQ was a unified headquarters organized traditionally into military intelligence, operations, logistics, and personnel branches.

In Europe there were few changes in the organization or the command of either of the army or air force formations as a result of unification. Changing the command arrangement was complicated by the separate missions of the brigade and the air division and by their earlier integration into other nations’ and NATO’s command structures. Before the forces could be unified under one command in Europe, Canada would have had to negotiate a unified role for the two forces. No one, including Hellyer, who was embroiled in a bitter political battle over his single force idea, was prepared to undertake this complicated task, mainly because “Full Command” as defined in NATO was poorly understood in Ottawa.

Command relationships and the accountability of Canadian commanders in Europe remained obscure for many years and was complicated in 1972 by a decision to amalgamate the civil Department of National Defence and CFHQ into one National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). This increasingly tended to redirect the defense agenda from operational matters to administrative issues and to strip the CDS of his own headquarters.

It has taken the CF nearly 25 years to rediscover that Canadian troops deployed outside Canada need an unambiguous national chain of command to link them to political authority at home. It may be acceptable in peacetime for Canadian commanders of small formations to shape their plans to meet the needs of more powerful allied commanders, but as soon as the first shot is fired, Parliament would have demanded to know precisely how “our boys” and interests were being protected in these types of arrangements.
Since the 1964 reforms other governments and military leaders have tried to bring Canada's defense strategy under some type of unified policy and structure, but the diverse commitments have usually blocked these attempts. Hellyer proposed a strategy that would have deployed the CF "in and around Canada" from where they would have been kept ready to reinforce Europe. The strategy never came close to being realized, mainly because it might have required the cabinet to overhaul foreign policy merely to obtain a more rational military structure; that was something cabinet members were not prepared to contemplate. The unification of the command structure went forward anyway and left the CF with an incompatible strategy and structure.

The Trudeau government in 1968-1970 unilaterally reduced the size of Canada's commitment to Europe, but it could not eliminate it entirely as some cabinet ministers proposed. Command and control of the CF were never major considerations of this policy, but it had the effect of forcing the army and air force component of Canada's European force into one camp. By the end of 1971, the CF in Europe were reduced to a rump of 5,000 soldiers and airmen, collocated in southern Germany. The government announced that all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn from the forces and that they would act as the general reserve of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

One would have thought that the collocation of the two formations in the same area would have prompted the development of a unified command in Europe. A single force headquarters was established in Germany, but its command function in wartime was not clear; the formation commanders, therefore, continued to act as independent operational leaders. Besides, Canada had been accumulating other unrelated NATO missions. In addition to the forces stationed in Germany, Canada had agreed to send a battalion group and two fighter squadrons to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force and a brigade to northern Norway in emergencies. National command of these dispersed forces remained in the hands of each contingent commander, but the need for a unified national command over these units was never obvious to officers whose first priority was to be helpful to allies. In effect, SACEUR might have had to consult with five different Canadian officers to understand Canada's national position in each area.
The CDS did establish a command headquarters under a major general, Commander of Canadian Forces Europe (CFE), but this officer’s operational responsibilities were never clearly enunciated. The need for a national commander, however, became obvious through exercises which demonstrated that the CDS in Ottawa would be too busy to exercise detailed national command in Europe. Eventually, it became obvious that in an emergency that would be necessary; therefore, the CDS established a separate national command headquarters in Europe. It was not until 1977 that a coherent operational rationale for CFE was put in place and then only over the strenuous opposition of army and air force officers in Europe and Ottawa. Their objections were cloaked in operational jargon, but their intention was to maintain the independence of the local commanders.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1985, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the CF, General Gerald Theriault, attempted to rationalize Canada’s defense commitments and its unified structure by recommending that the commitments on NATO’s Central Front be concentrated with the commitments to the north flank in Norway. He proposed that the CF in Europe be withdrawn to Canada where they would be trained and readied for dispatch to Norway in an emergency. His plan, however, was quashed by the Defence Minister once he was convinced that it might entail “unfortunate political consequences.”\textsuperscript{20}

Ironically, the collapse of the Soviet Union came just in time to save the CF in Europe from the collapse of the government’s purse. Canadians’ support for a traditional defense policy based on NATO was eroding rapidly. Although in 1984 the Progressive Conservatives were elected on a platform that included a strong rearmament plank, they met stout opposition when they tried to implement it.\textsuperscript{21} By 1989 there was no call for rearmament but rather a wide appeal for a “peace dividend.” In 1992 the government declared that most of the CF would be withdrawn from Europe by 1994, and then in early 1993 it decided to withdraw the entire contingent that year.

The government was not abandoning the Alliance. It maintained steadfast loyalty to Alliance aims and to the need to participate in the integrated military structure, but the troops would be stationed in Canada, nonetheless. Canada’s defense policy for this new order was set forth in April 1992 and promised NATO a battalion group for the ACE Mobile Force, ships for the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, a reserve composed of a brigade group, and two CF18 fighter
squadrons in case of war, plus officers and other ranks for NATO units and staffs.

The withdrawal, however, changed every aspect of the command and control of the CF. Where previously command was tied directly to allied organizations and strategies, the withdrawal of the CF to Canada highlighted the role of the CDS as commander. However, before there was time or incentive to develop this new system entirely, foreign incidents provoked change again.

The Gulf War was a sharp point in the evolution of a Canadian system of command and control. The war emphasized important factors that some officers had forgotten in their NATO experience. Once war seemed inevitable, the Canadian government became acutely interested in where and how the CF would be employed. Diplomats tried first to find an appropriate place for the country within the gathering allied consensus which would somehow associate Canada with the Western position but allow it to remain distant enough to be able to act as a “helpful fixer” after the war was over. It was an unrealistic objective. True to Canadian traditions, the government then searched for some role that would be worthwhile in the public eye (and in George Bush’s) but one that would not risk high casualties. They settled on a naval contribution and later dispatched two CF18 fighter squadrons to the theater. Unlike in NATO, there was no readily available international command structure for this force to join, and placing the CF under the direct authority of a subordinate American commander would never have been supported in Parliament. So, in 1990, nearly 30 years after the unification of the CF, Canada formed its first truly unified combat headquarters under the command of a naval rear admiral. The experience prompted the CDS to continue the development of a “joint” command and control concept for the CF. Henceforth, Canadian military units would be deployed overseas as discrete national formations under tight national command and with a direct link to the CDS at the national headquarters in Ottawa.

**Defence Review 1994**

Canadian defense planners are adjusting to the outcome of the 1994 Defence White Paper with its emphasis on multinational operations, centered on the United Nation, as opposed to operations focused on NATO Europe. As predicted, the Liberal government’s
new defense policy directs the CF toward three traditional missions. These include that CF should maintain the capability to defend Canada, to participate in the defense of North America in cooperation with the United States, and to participate in international cooperative security operations.\textsuperscript{22}

NATO commitments have been “renegotiated” to make them compatible with a force that could be tasked simultaneously for other roles, for instance in peacekeeping operations under the U.N. The types of forces Canada develops will be conditioned by a national consensus about the operational scenarios Canada will face in the future, and the Defence Review confirmed it. The command and control system it will establish over these forces will probably evolve into some type of fully integrated task force. HQ and deployed forces will be expected to operate together under one officer who will hold both national command and operational command.

The CF that may result from a review conducted with these missions and scenarios in mind will be greatly changed from the present force. It will certainly be more lightly armed than standard NATO formations. Today, the air force has been substantially reduced in favor of improving army capabilities. The navy is reaching the end of an ambitious ship building program and had hoped to add even more vessels and aircraft to its inventory. There is not much chance that this will happen soon. If the navy does get any more ships, they are likely to be some type of multipurpose support units that could assist army formations in remote areas of the world.

\textbf{Canada in NATO’s New Commands}

Despite the long history of the CF in the Alliance, there is still no clear understanding of how command and control of the CF should be exercised within NATO’s new strategic concept. However, the withdrawal of the CF from Europe and its Gulf War experience have convinced many senior officers that command and control issues must be confronted directly. These officers believe that the main members of a new military command and control structure must include a reconstruction of the CFHQ separate from the Department of National Defence, a “joint” staff to serve the needs of the CDS, a reduction in the number of command headquarters in Canada, and the establishment of some type of task force headquarters ready to be dispatched in whole, or in part, to command Canadian formations
deployed in NATO and elsewhere. This structure will be shaped partly by NATO’s ongoing command structure review but only insofar as the Alliance plan is seen by Canadian political and military leaders to be relevant to Canada’s evolving defense policy.23

Defense officials anticipate that the primary role of the CF in NATO will be to reinforce the multinational formations that the SACEUR has formed in Central Europe. Canadian officers expect that the CF would operate as a dedicated force in one area and that the land and air units deployed to Europe would be directed by a single Canadian commander within the Combined Joint Task Force concept. Planning now is being directed toward the development of units and systems that would allow this force to meet SACEUR’s standards for deployment and interoperability. This planning effort, however, is overshadowed by the fact that the government has already directed a major reallocation of forces and resources to international missions and roles outside NATO.

In any case, Canada will remain removed from the military structure of the North Atlantic Alliance while professing allegiance to the Treaty. In the process, the CF will become an entirely different force from the one that stood ready in Europe for so long. That is not to say that if called to a new emergency, Canada would not come. The country has always answered calls from the old world. Only this time the CF would be a different force and a more independent force as well.

Notes


2. Marilyn Eustace, Canada’s European Force 1946-71: Canada’s Commitment To Europe, National Security Series No. 4/82, Kingston, Ontario: The Centre For International Relations, Queen’s University, 1982, p. 5.


4. Ibid., pp. 190-205.

5. Ibid., p. 204.


11. The previous government had suffered under the propensities of the services to promote their own interests and to act as though allied and not national interests commanded their first attention. The air force's insistence on acquiring nuclear weapons for use in Europe and North America, the Navy's decision to sail without national orders during the Cuban missile crisis, and the sense that the armed forces had "tricked" the government into signing the NORAD agreement combined to break the trust that had existed between governments and the CF immediately after the Second World War. See, for example, Eayrs, *Growing up Allied*, pp. 278-283; Joseph Jockel, *No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987; *idem*, "The Military Establishment and the Creation of NORAD," in B. D. Hunt and R. G. Haycock, eds., *Canada's Defence: Perspectives on Policy in the Twentieth Century*, Toronto: Copp, Clark, Pitman, Ltd., 1993, pp. 163-178; and Peter Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993.


19. Canadian former ministers, chiefs of defence, and defence officials, interviews by author, Ottawa, 1992-93.

20. General Gerald Theriault (Chief of the Defence Staff 1983-86), interviews by author, January-March 1992. Theriault’s plan was endorsed by SACEUR, General Bernard Rogers, but it met strong opposition from British and German defense ministers and from the General Theriault’s own subordinate army and air force commanders who considered the AFCENT commitments as constituting training opportunities, even if they agreed that its missions were strategically irrelevant. See Middlemiss and Sokolsky, *Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants*, pp. 188-194.


National sovereignty in defense planning and decision making and in the use of the armed forces has been a well known tenet of France’s security policy since the early days of the Fifth Republic. It has manifested itself most visibly in France’s withdrawal from the integrated military structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1966 and her long-standing reluctance since then to place her forces under “foreign” command. The historical, political, and strategic roots of France’s policy of “national independence” in defense matters have been well documented elsewhere and need not be addressed in this paper.\(^1\) Instead, this essay concentrates on France’s military command structures and attempts to shed light on what recent reforms of higher level command arrangements reveal about the direction of French defense planning.

The study of command structures can help shed light on a nation’s security policy and defense planning. In the particular case of France, command structures have assumed particular salience over the last thirty years as a visible symbol of that nation’s “recovered” sovereignty over its defense posture and military forces. Unlike all other NATO member nations, with the exception of Spain, France has not been willing to participate during peacetime in the Alliance’s integrated military structure or in wartime to place her forces under NATO’s “integrated” command. However, France’s acceptance of the military principle of unity of command, as well as growing recognition of the meshing of her security interests with those of her NATO Alliance partners both within and beyond Europe, has meant that her policy on the subject of command arrangements is at once more complex and more pragmatic than would be apparent from a superficial assessment.
Recently, a number of decisions point to a greater readiness by France to accept multilateral command arrangements. During the Gulf War French land and air forces operating in the Arabian peninsula were placed under the Tactical Control (TACON) of the U.S. theater commander, General Norman Schwarzkopf, and the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC), Lieutenant General Charles A. Horner. Subsequently, Paris placed French combat aircraft, operating from Turkey during Provide Comfort and Saudi Arabia in Southern Watch, under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the local Combined/Joint Task Force commander. During Operations Deny Flight, Deliberate Force and Deliberate Guard, French combat aircraft, flying from Italian air bases to enforce the United Nations “no-fly zone” over Bosnia-Hercegovina and in support of the United Nations (U.N.) Protection Force as well as NATO’s Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR), were under the OPCON of the commander of NATO’s Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force, headquartered in Vicenza, Italy. France participated in the creation of the “EUROCORPS” at Strasbourg, France, and with it in the establishment for the first time since 1966 of a multinational headquarters on French territory. Further, Paris agreed to place its forces assigned to the EUROCORPS under the Operational Command—OPCOM (and not merely under OPCON) of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in Alliance contingencies. Finally, France has provided military personnel for the Western European Union (WEU) Planning Cell. These decisions, while unprecedented in their scope since 1966, build upon a pattern dating from the mid-1970s of ever greater French flexibility regarding command arrangements with NATO as well as with individual allies, both for peacetime exercises and wartime operations.

This essay is organized in five parts. First, the paper reviews the evolution of France’s higher-level command arrangements from the inception of General Charles de Gaulle’s “new defense model” in 1959 through 1989 and assesses the impact of this legacy on future French command structures.

Second, the paper describes the revised command structures associated with the Armées 2000 Plan launched in June 1989 with the aim of reorganizing in depth the French armed forces and preparing them for the challenges of the post-Cold War era. This plan
set in motion the most important reform of the command and force structures inherited from the 1960s and is therefore, from an analytical standpoint, a critical milestone.

Third, the paper considers the “lessons learned,” that senior French defense and military officials derived from the Gulf War and from the comparative performance of U.S. and French forces in it regarding command structures. It is clear that in the view of many of these officials the Coalition’s extraordinarily successful campaign against Iraq was the result of not only exemplary leadership and superior technology, but of the unrivaled capability of the United States for planning and conducting large-scale joint and combined operations in distant theaters. Though the Armées 2000 Plan provided the necessary organizational framework for initiating the current process of reform of French command structures, it is the Gulf War that has given this process its full impetus.

Fourth, the paper describes how the post-Gulf War emphasis in French defense planning on intelligence-gathering capabilities, power-projection operations, and force packaging is reflected in the many changes to French command structures which are still underway. The outcome of these reforms is a higher command organization bearing little resemblance to the command structure established in the 1960s.

Finally, the paper considers the future evolution of French higher-level command structures as NATO and the WEU consider new, innovative, command arrangements and “force packages” as part of the Alliance’s “Combined Joint Task Force” concept.

The Legacy from the “Cold War Era” (1959-1989)

When General Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, the French armed forces were in a state of moral and organizational disarray. Having barely recovered from their defeat and hasty withdrawal from Indochina, they were fighting a deeply emotional civil war in Algeria. There were then essentially two sets of forces:

1. Those assigned to NATO, comprising primarily the Mediterranean and Atlantic fleets, the Second French Corps (II(FR)Corps) stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany as part of the Forces Françaises en Allemagne (FFA), and the First Tactical Air Command (1er Commandement aérien tactique—1er CATac)

95
with combat aircraft and surface-to-air missiles deployed at air bases in northeast France and West Germany;  

2. Those operating in Algeria, representing the bulk of French military strength.  

Forces in France not assigned to NATO performed essentially logistical, depot, and training duties in support of the war effort in Algeria. But NATO-assigned forces were not immune to events in North Africa and the FFA rotated several of their armored and mechanized units to Algeria.

Establishment of national command structures.

With his goal of regaining for France full sovereignty over her defense policy and military forces utmost in his mind, de Gaulle set out to withdraw, in phases, French forces from NATO integration and establish major operational commands able to function in concert with, but also independently from, NATO. In 1959, the French Mediterranean fleet was withdrawn from NATO’s Malta-based Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) command. A three-service theater command was eventually established, the Théâtre d’Opérations Métropole-Méditerranée (TOMM), with an area of operational responsibility extending over France (except for northeast France), the Mediterranean basin, and French-speaking Africa. A contingency planning staff in peacetime, TOMM would have been activated in a crisis as a tri-service operational command to manage non-NATO contingencies.

With the war in Algeria over in 1962, the need to organize returning French forces into coherent formations capable of supporting TOMM-directed operations became pressing. De Gaulle had apparently no intention of assigning those forces to NATO. In 1963, a First French Corps (I(FR)Corps) was established at Nancy to take command of Army units stationed in France and not assigned to NATO. A year later, a Second Tactical Air Command (2e CATac) was created, also at Nancy, with the same purpose. Both staffs were to work closely in developing doctrine, procedures, and plans for joint operations under national command. Starting in 1962, the Air Force was reorganized into four so-called “specialized” commands: Air Transport Command (Commandement du Transport Aérien Militaire or CoTAM); Air Defense Command (Commandement “Air” des Forces de Défense Aérienne or CAFDA); Strategic Air Command (Forces Aériennes Stratégiques or FAS); and Tactical Air Command (Force Aérienne Tactique or FATac). The FAS was France’s first
nuclear command. In 1964, it took control of the *Mirage* IVA strategic bombers and C-135F tankers, adding the silo-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM)s on the Plateau d’Albion in southeastern France in 1971.

In 1965, *FATac* took command of the Second *CATac* and then, in 1966, of the First *CATac* after the latter had ceased to report to SACEUR as part of France’s highly publicized withdrawal from the integrated military structure of NATO. The First *CATac* kept its European orientation while its sister command was given the responsibility to prepare “out-of-area” Air Force deployments within the TOMM area of responsibility. In 1969, the I(FR)Corps in northeast France and the II(FR)Corps in West Germany were brought together under a reborn 1(FR)Army, a measure which mirrored what had taken place within the *FATac* three years earlier. The end of the process of reorganizing and bringing French forces together under a new coherent and versatile command structure, launched by de Gaulle ten years earlier, was nearing completion.

In 1971, a final set of reorganization measures was approved. The operational responsibilities of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (*Chef d'Etat-Major des Armées* or CEMA) were considerably expanded. He became at once the Government’s senior military adviser and the designated wartime joint “generalissimo.” To reflect the enhanced status of the Chief of Staff, the TOMM was disbanded and its planning responsibilities for the Mediterranean theater were transferred to the admiral in Toulon who became Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean (*CECMED*). His counterpart in Brest (*CECLANT*) already had similar responsibilities for the Atlantic. Finally, also in 1971, a second nuclear command, the *Force Océanique Stratégique* or FOST, was activated alongside the FAS to control the Navy’s new fleet of ballistic missile submarines. By the early 1970s, therefore, the complete “constellation” of commands envisaged by de Gaulle to sustain France’s independent military posture was in place (see Chart 17).


Until the major reforms introduced by the *Armées 2000* Plan in 1989-1991 and follow-on reorganization measures, this command “architecture” inherited from de Gaulle underwent no major change with the notable exceptions of the establishment of a Third French Corps headquarters in 1979 and a Rapid Action Force headquarters (*Force d’Action Rapide* or FAR) in 1983. Originally an independent
Chart 17.

(a) Two strategic nuclear commands: FAS and FOST

(b) One major Army theater command: The first French Army, with three subordinate corps and a theater logistics command (1er COMLOG).

(c) Four major Navy theater commands:
   - CECLANT (Atlantic Ocean)
   - CECMED (Mediterranean Sea)
   - ALINDIEN (Indian Ocean) and
   - ALPACI (Pacific Ocean)
Backed-up by five functional commands:
   - ALESCLANT (Atlantic fleet)
   - ALESCMED (Mediterranean fleet)
   - ALPA (Aircraft carriers and carrier aviation)
   - ALPATMAR (land-based maritime patrol aviation)
   - ALSOUIMATT (attack submarines)

(d) Three major Air Force specialized commands:
   - FATac, with two subordinate CATac’s
   - CAFDA
   - CoTAM

formation, the III(FR)Corps was eventually subordinated to the 1(FR)Army in 1984 and oriented toward operations in the northern half of NATO’s Central Region in co-operation with the Alliance’s Northern Army Group.  

From the start, the FAR was given the status of a major Army command, co-equal with the First Army, although for operations in Europe the latter considered itself the senior command. The FAR was given two major missions. First, in Central Europe, to act as the “lead echelon” of the First French Army in a way which would demonstrate France’s commitment to participate in the forward defense of West Germany together with the other NATO allies. This mission was rehearsed in Bavaria in September 1987 during the Kecker Spatz-Moineau Hardi exercise. Second, for overseas mission, the
FAR provides the nucleus of the land component of a joint intervention force.

From the mid-1970s onwards, while institutionally fixed, French command structures underwent a gradual evolution in two separate directions: toward greater interaction with the Alliance’s integrated military structure, reflecting a cautious but resolute policy to expand France’s political and military role in European defense; and toward the use of flexible, *ad hoc* command arrangements for overseas intervention, principally in French-speaking Africa.

**The NATO Area**

A key dimension of France’s drive to enhance her military contribution to the collective defense of the Alliance, while remaining outside of the NATO integrated military structure, was the attention given by French military authorities at various levels of command to achieve the highest possible degree of *interoperability* between French and allied forces, notably through effective command and control arrangements. The key principle underpinning these arrangements has been that while French commanders would maintain at all times *OPCOM* over French land, air, and maritime forces, *OPCON* could be temporarily assigned to allied commanders. Conversely, while maintaining OPCOM over their own forces, the Major NATO Commanders could assign OPCON to their French counterparts. Thus, during the *Kecker Spatz* exercise, the FAR was deployed to West Germany under the OPCOM of the 1(FR)Army and placed under the OPCON of the II(GE)Corps. In return, a *Panzerbrigade* was placed OPCON to the FAR.10 For the *Champagne 89* and *Protée 93* exercises, a brigade of the German army was deployed to France and was placed under the OPCON of a French corps.11 In regard to air forces, emphasis was placed on the participation of French land and carrier-based combat aircraft in multinational “joint/combined air raids” under the OPCON of the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Allied Tactical Air Forces.

Pragmatic cooperation between French and other Alliance forces has helped overcome the lesser exposure of the French officer corps to NATO procedures and to the routine use of the English language, in comparison with most of its allied counterparts.12 For example, during operations *Desert Shield/Storm*, bilateral Field Standing Operating Procedures (agreed between the II(FR)Corps and the
VII(US)Corps for combined operations in Central Europe) contributed to improving command and control arrangements between the XVIII(US) Airborne Corps and the FAR’s 6th Light French Armored Division which was placed under its Tactical Control (TACON)—despite the fact that the XVIII Corps and the FAR had never exercised together before. Likewise, regular French Air Force participation in NATO-sponsored air exercises, competitions, and training programs (*Central Enterprise*, *Cold Fire*, *Elder Forest*, Tactical Air Meet, Tactical Leadership Program, etc.) and deployments to North American ranges at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada (*Red Flag*) and the Canadian Forces Base at Cold Lake, Alberta (*Maple Flag*) has all but erased, from an operational standpoint, the distinction between France’s “non-integrated” status and that of other allies in operations *Provide Comfort*, *Southern Watch*, *Deny Flight*, *Deliberate Force*, and *Deliberate Guard*.13

Today, such cooperation is becoming routine as a result of French participation in NATO and other multinational operations in support of the United Nations as well as the increased emphasis within the Alliance and the Western European Union on multinational formations.

*Overseas Contingencies*

Upon becoming independent, most former French colonies in Africa signed bilateral security agreements with France. These provided for a permanent French military presence on their soil and/or for immediate military intervention on their behalf in case of a threat to their security and territorial integrity. Because of these commitments, reflecting deep-rooted and enduring strategic and economic interests in Africa, French forces have been involved intermittently in relatively small-scale power-projection operations over the past three decades. They have protected or evacuated French citizens and other foreigners, defended external borders in cooperation with indigenous forces, restored civil order, or helped provide humanitarian relief. Contingency operations have been supplemented with regular power-projection exercises involving the deployment of the French Army (company size or even battalion-strength units), naval combatants and amphibious assault ships, combat and transport aircraft, and occasionally mobile air defense radars and missiles.14
Although France maintains a local "garrison" commander in several African nations, most overseas contingency operations and exercises have been headed by an ad hoc joint forces commander, invariably designated as Commandant des Forces (ComFor) when conducted strictly on a national basis or as Commandant des Eléments Français (ComEleF) if undertaken with other nations. This ad hoc commander of flag officer rank generally has been drawn from the Armed Forces Joint Staff (Etat-Major des Armées or EMA) or from the headquarters of the FAR and the FATac, both of which have had overseas responsibilities. In all cases, the ComFor or ComEleF has been subordinated directly to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in Paris without any intermediate command echelons.

Overtime, both France’s absence from the Alliance’s integrated military structure as well as her involvement in “out-of-area” operations on a level unmatched among European nations—with the exception of the United Kingdom—produced a rather distinctive modus operandi. The command structure inherited from the 1960s, while oriented to general war in Europe and its immediate periphery, offered enough flexibility to conduct small-scale power-projection operations into French-speaking Africa. However, the relentless quest for operational flexibility in meeting an expanding number of military missions with a limited set of general-purpose forces, gradually resulted in a dispersion of assets and an increasingly fragmented command structure. To make matters worse, this fragmentation occurred along individual service lines. By the mid-1980s, Army divisions were distributed amongst three corps headquarters and the FAR, combat aircraft between two Air Force "specialized" commands (FATac and CAFDA), and surface ships between the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets and the Indian Ocean naval squadron.

In 1984-85, Operation Manta in Chad (a much larger scale power-projection operation into Africa than customary) exposed some of the operational and logistical weaknesses of France’s military posture, which two successive reorganizations of the Army in 1977 and 1984 had not overcome. In 1990, the Gulf War revealed in a much starker manner the various shortfalls of French conventional forces, including the inadequacy of France’s command structures for planning and deploying a well-rounded tri-service capability and for conducting operations once deployed in the theater.
The Armées 2000 Plan

The Armées 2000 Plan was unveiled before the French National Assembly in June 1989 by then-Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevènement. It was his blueprint for a wide-ranging process to adapt the French Armed Forces to the end of the Cold War. The Armées 2000 Plan is an important milestone because it marks the beginning of the first large-scale reform of the command “constellation” inherited from the 1960s and 1970s. Further, the plan has provided a convenient, politically-blessed organizational framework for carrying additional changes to French command arrangements beyond those envisaged in the original Armées 2000 blueprint.

In its original form, it began to be implemented by the French Army on an experimental basis in September 1990 and came formally into effect in July 1991. The key aims of the plan were threefold. First, the plan was to rationalize an excessively fragmented territorial command structure around the concept of three geographically-oriented “theaters.” These included Northeast France (adjacent to Central Europe), the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. Second, it was to consolidate support functions and free force commanders from their logistical and administrative responsibilities. Third, the plan was conceived to promote interservice cooperation. In parallel with the rationalization of territorial structures initiated by the Armées 2000 Plan and as part of a plan to reduce its peacetime establishment, the Army began undertaking yet another major reorganization of both its command and force structures. In 1990, the I(FR)Corps in Metz was disbanded and its component divisions resubordinated to the other two corps. At the same time, the First French Army moved its headquarters from Strasbourg to Metz in order to facilitate joint planning with the FATac. Further steps in adapting command structures, however, were placed on hold until after the Gulf War.

The Gulf War and French Command Structures

Participation in the United Nations Coalition arrayed to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation represented France’s largest “out-of-area” operation since the end of the Algerian War. In an unprecedented move, for what would be an unprecedented coalition operation, the commander of the FAR, Lieutenant-General Michel Roquejeoffre, deployed to the Arabian peninsula as the French Daguet joint forces commander, marking the first time since the
establishment of the FAR in 1983 that its commander had personally taken command of an out-of-area operation. Once in the theater, General Roquejeoffre assumed OPCON over the land and air operations run by France from Saudi Arabia in conjunction or in parallel with other Coalition forces. General Roquejeoffre, however, did not have command over French army and air force units deployed in the United Arab Emirates and in Qatar nor over French naval vessels operating in the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, which came under the OPCON of the Flag Officer, Indian Ocean (ALINDIEN). Albeit nominally the senior French officer involved in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, General Roquejeoffre was, in fact, only partially a joint theater commander.

Unlike British land and air forces, which were promptly placed under the OPCON of General Norman Schwarzkopf and fought virtually as an integral part of the American war effort, French forces were retained under French OPCON throughout the campaign. Eventually, France accepted the Air Tasking Order (ATO) issued by the Joint Forces Air Component Commander to guide the Coalition’s air effort, but the French Air Force had to contend with many restrictions on its operational flexibility, which considerably constrained its contribution to the Coalition’s air campaign.68 Regarding ground forces, it was only with the expiration of the United Nations ultimatum on January 15, 1991, that the French Daguet Division was placed under the TACON of the XVIII(US)Corps. General Roquejeoffre, however, had been planning with General Schwarzkopf the engagement of the division well in advance of the start of the ground offensive, in a way which capitalized on the French unit’s mobility and avoided exposing its lightly armored wheeled vehicles to the very demanding frontal clashes with Iraqi forces that were (mistakenly) anticipated.19

With hindsight, it is apparent that France’s military involvement in the international coalition which liberated Kuwait caught its diplomatic and military establishments by surprise. This “strategic” surprise had deep political roots, including France’s self-image as a traditional friend of the Arab world. Few in Paris would have guessed or found it conceivable as late as the Spring of 1990, when the Soviet empire was already crumbling, that French forces would find themselves less than a year later fighting in the Middle East alongside Arab forces, under de facto American command, against a common Arab foe which had been a close trading partner and arms client. The
virtual impossibility of such a “scenario” meant that French forces were ill-prepared to deploy a multi-divisional ground force along with associated command and control, logistical, naval, and air force support to Southwest Asia. The last time France had attempted a large-scale power-projection operation was in Suez in 1956. Although the French military was familiar with the U.S. Army’s “AirLand Battle” doctrine, the French Army and Air Force were not equipped to fight a maneuver-oriented theater campaign on the scale and at the level of intensity contemplated by “AirLand Battle.” The immediate result was the disappointing size of the French military presence on the ground and in the air (a 10,000-man reinforced brigade—the division *Daguet*—and some 70 combat and support aircraft) although French forces were given an important and difficult screening mission on the Coalition’s left flank, a mission which they performed commendably.20

The longer-term implications of the Gulf War “strategic” surprise and of France’s participation in it are more positive.21 By a process of intellectual “reverse engineering,” the French military establishment quickly came to the conclusion that U.S. military performance in the Gulf War was, in part, the product of particularly effective, and innovative, command structures and procedures. Emulating U.S. military performance meant adopting its higher command arrangements as a model and adapting them to French circumstances. Hence, it is no surprise that several of France’s joint and single service commands and Ministry of Defense agencies created after the Gulf War are patterned after their U.S. counterparts. These include: the *Commandement des Opérations Spéciales* (*COS*) after the U.S. Special Operations Command; the Army’s *Commandement de la Doctrine et de l’Entrainement* (*CDE*) after the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command; the Air Force’s *Commandements de la Force Aérienne de Combat* (*CFAC*) and *Force Aérienne de Projection* after the U.S. Air Force’s Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command, respectively; and the *Direction du Renseignement Militaire* (*DRM*) after the Defense Intelligence Agency.

An important finding from the Gulf War experience was that, in the absence of tri-service commands, “force packaging” could only take place at the level of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. This imposed on the Armed Forces Joint Staff, the *EMA*, a heavy planning and coordination burden for which it was not well-prepared and
which could better be dealt with at lower command echelons. The result has been the establishment of a tri-service operational planning staff (Etat-Major Interarmées de Planification Opérationnelle or EM/IA) immediately below the Armed Forces Joint Staff.

French performance in the Gulf War also showed that the execution of power-projection operations on a joint and often combined basis, at a considerable distance from home territory, was undermined by the lack of a deployable, tri-service theater command and control structure akin to the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), although on a smaller scale. During Operations Desert Shield/Storm, USCENTCOM relocated from its peacetime headquarters at McDill Air Force Base, Florida, to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The White Paper on Defense issued by Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in February 1994 identifies the capability to "stand-up" a deployable, joint theater command and control structure (which the French military refer to as Poste de Commandement Interarmées de Théâtre or PCIAT) as a key defense planning goal for this decade. The White Paper envisages that the PCIAT must be configured to provide the nucleus of a French-led, multinational, coalition command able to orchestrate the engagement of a land force larger in size than a corps, naval task forces, and several air force combat squadrons.

Drawing the lesson from the Gulf War, the White Paper sets for the French Army the target of a strategic deployment capability equivalent to two to three divisions (i.e., a total of some 40,000 men) from a pool of some 120,000 to 130,000 men. If one of the divisions were an armored division, it would mean moving by sea upwards of 150 Leclerc main battle tanks. Given that the combat-loaded weight of the new Leclerc tank stands at some 54 tons, compared to the AMX-30's 37 tons, acquiring the lift capability to deploy a two to three division-strong land force to an overseas theater represents an extremely ambitious—and perhaps unattainable—objective. The White Paper also contemplates the deployment of six to nine Air Force squadrons, or some 120 to 180 combat aircraft, which, in light of France's limited airlift and air-to-air refuelling capabilities, represents a very challenging goal. To illustrate the scope of this challenge, France presently has some 50 combat aircraft deployed on a permanent or temporary basis outside of France at Djibouti, in the Central African Republic, in Italy (Deny Flight, Deliberate Force and Deliberate Guard), in Turkey (Provide Comfort) and in Saudi Arabia.
(Southern Watch). This relatively limited force, deployed at five geographically dispersed locations, already has been taxing the French Air Force's manpower, logistical, and airlift resources. These objectives, however, provide a useful planning benchmark for determining the size and characteristics of the command and control structure necessary to lead such a force.

It is thus clear that, more than any other factor, the shortcomings revealed by France's mixed military performance in the Gulf War have helped shape the wide-ranging reform of French command structures which has been spearheaded by Chevènement's two successors as Minister of Defense, Pierre Joze and François Leotard, and by the previous Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Admiral Jacques Lanxade. If the Gulf War was the catalyst, Admiral Lanxade has been the "brain" behind the reorganization of French command structures. He has, in effect, taken the various, often outspoken criticisms directed at French defense planning in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War as a mandate to undertake a sweeping reform of the French military establishment.²⁸

Beyond Armées 2000

Armées 2000 was developed to anticipate the defense planning implications of the momentous changes in the European security environment already visible in 1989, even before the fall of the Berlin Wall. It had, therefore, a mostly European orientation. In contrast, many of the subsequent adaptations to French command structures from 1991 to 1994 reflect a new awareness about the emergence of new risks to international security on the periphery of and beyond Europe. This was best exemplified by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the attendant need the better to prepare French forces to conduct power-projection operations on a joint and combined basis.

No blueprint equivalent to Armées 2000 exists, however, to describe the various changes in French command structures which have occurred since 1991. As in the 1960s, many of these changes have taken place in steps that reflect different service perspectives and planning timetables, shifting resource considerations and institutional resistance. These have also been influenced by evolving international circumstances. The French Air Force's reorganization of command structures, for instance, reflects the experience derived from its participation in multinational operations.
over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia and the insights gained from assessing the U.S. Air Force’s approach to command structures after the Gulf War.

A review of these changes, however, reveals a common pattern, which might be labelled the “Lanxade footprint”. Its key features are as follows:

1. A consolidation of operational responsibilities within a small number of commands and staffs located at three key sites in relatively close proximity (Paris, Taverny, and Creil);

2. The strengthening of intelligence collection and production capabilities and of operational planning capabilities in support of the Armed Forces Joint Staff and subordinate operational commands;

3. The separation of formerly merged command functions into three types: “operational command,” “organic command,” and “territorial command”—the latter encompassing primarily administrative duties;

4. The reconfiguration and consolidation of major combat formations (army corps; air force wings; and navy task forces) into “pools of forces” from which specific capabilities, tailored to meet the requirements of a given contingency, could be drawn to constitute a joint task force or to contribute to a combined/joint task force.

The end result of these measures will be a radically altered command “constellation” organized around the concept of a division-of-labor between “organic commands” (in effect, “supporting commands”) which prepare and provide “force packages” and operational commands (the “supported or combatant commands”) which direct their engagement (see Chart 18). At the center of this constellation are the Armed Forces Joint Staff (the EMA) in Paris and the new Joint Operational Planning Staff (the EMIA) at Creil that on behalf of the EMA develops generic and contingency plans, identifies and tailors the required force capabilities from the individual services, and, on demand, provides the nucleus of a deployable, tri-service, theater command post (the PCIAT). Part of the headquarters staff of this PCIAT, when activated, would be manned by personnel drawn from the EMIA to ensure continuity between the planning and execution of a theater campaign.

Where France is acting alone or as the leader of an international coalition, the PCIAT and its associated communications assets would provide the theater commander with the means to direct joint and combined operations. Where France contributes forces to a coalition
led by another nation, the *ComEleF* would act as the on-site representative of the French National Command Authorities (designated "*Haut Commandement National*") to the theater commander. His role would be to participate in the overall campaign planning and ensure that the missions contemplated for French forces are in conformity with U.N. mandates and with higher political guidance from Paris.²⁹

Supporting the *EMA* and the *EMIA*, are the new joint *COS* at Taverny and the new *DRM* at Paris and Creil. The *COS* was created in June 1992 to fill a void in French military capabilities revealed by the scale and sophistication of U.S. and British special operations conducted deep behind Iraqi lines during the Gulf War. This command does not "own" any units, but special operations forces (SOF) belonging to the three Services have been earmarked for employment under *COS* command. In addition, the *COS* has been given responsibility for identifying specialized defense equipment requirements for special operations, including combat search and rescue missions (CSAR), based in part on information exchanged with U.S. and British SOF. As an example, a number of transport aircraft and helicopters have recently been reconfigured to support the insertion and exfiltration of SOF and the recovery of pilots downed inside hostile territory. French Air Force *Puma* CSAR
helicopters are presently stationed at an airbase near Brindisi in southern Italy, alongside U.S. Special Operations Forces, in support of Operations Deny Flight, Provide Promise, Deliberate Force, and Deliberate Guard.30

Official statements and assessments of France’s performance in the Gulf War have focused on France’s dependence on U.S. intelligence at the strategic and operational levels as a key “lesson learned.” They draw attention to the pivotal role played by all-source intelligence in guiding both political decision-making in Washington and campaign planning in Riyadh. French authorities have attributed the remarkable performance of U.S. intelligence during Operation Desert Storm to the coordinating authority exercised by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on behalf of the USCENTCOM across the entire U.S. intelligence community. The DRM has been established to provide France with a comparable defense intelligence capability.31

The cumulative effect of locating the EMIA and the DRM, in addition to the Helios imagery satellite’s processing station (Centre Principal Français Hélios or CPFH) and the staff of France’s arms-control verification unit (Unité Française de Verification) at Creil—a former fighter air base—has led commentators to refer to this expanding military facility as “France’s Pentagon.”32 More accurately, the geographic as well as functional concentration of France’s higher military command organs at Paris, Creil, and Taverny—with their associated C3I means—represents a significant departure from the more dispersed “command constellation” of the Cold War and a quantum leap toward greater “jointness” (see Chart 19).

In parallel with the creation of the EMIA, COS, and DRM as joint agencies, each of the services has been undertaking an in-depth reorganization of its command structures, extending well beyond the measures envisaged in the Armées 2000 Plan, to reflect the new reliance on tailored force packages and the division of responsibilities between operational, organic, and territorial command.

Army Command Structures.

In 1989, the Armées 2000 Plan had assumed that a vanishing Warsaw Pact invasion threat could rapidly give way to unpredictable and thus dangerous crises in Central Europe. This could mean that French forces might need to be engaged in a matter of days rather than after a protracted build-up of East-West tensions extending
possibly over several weeks or months. This view militated in favor of keeping Metz as the hub of French military capabilities in Central Europe.

With the successive collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, with the unification of Germany, and with the emancipation of the former Soviet satellite nations of Central and Eastern Europe, by 1993 the risk of a major crisis at the center of Europe had considerably receded. The new situation called into question the need to keep the bulk of the French Army oriented towards Central Europe, including a theater-level headquarters above the corps. Accordingly, the 1(FR)Army in Metz—the French Army’s senior operational command for nearly a quarter of a century—was deactivated in 1993 despite apparent opposition from its commander, General Jean Cot, who disagreed with Admiral Lanxade’s plan to consolidate planning functions on a tri-service basis within the EMIA at Creil.\(^{33}\) Replacing the 1(FR)Army staff in Metz are the new CDE, largely inspired from the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in spirit and purpose, and a new army intelligence and electronic warfare (EW) brigade (Brigade de Renseignement et de Guerre Electronique or BRGE) that bring together various long-range reconnaissance patrol, drone, and EW units.\(^{34}\) In principle, the DRM—a joint agency—should have tasking authority over the BRGE for purposes of intelligence collection, but lines of command have yet to be clarified to that end.
The Second French Corps was also disbanded in 1993 in order to bring France's military presence in Germany in line with the creation of the EUROCORPS. Thereafter, all remaining French Army units on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany (an armored division, corps-level units, and the French contribution to the Franco-German Brigade) were reassigned to the headquarters of the EUROCORPS in Strasbourg. It is noteworthy that, in peacetime, French units assigned to the EUROCORPS are not subordinated, in terms of OPCOM, to the French High Command but to the commander of the EUROCORPS and, through him, to a five nation (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Spain) so-called politico-military "common committee." This marks the first time since 1966 that French forces are placed in such a status. Further, in January 1993, the Chiefs of Defense of France and Germany and the SACEUR signed an accord, known as the Lanxade-Naumann-Shalikashvili agreement, setting out the conditions and circumstances under which the EUROCORPS would be placed under the OPCOM command of SACEUR to perform Alliance missions.

The deactivation of the headquarters of the I(FR)Corps in 1990 and of the I(FR)Army and II(FR)Corps in 1993 has not been without consequence. It is rather clear that with the creation of the EUROCORPS and the ever increasing defense cooperation among WEU nations, the employment of French ground forces in Central Europe other than within the framework of the Alliance is no longer envisaged. This is especially so since the French Army is no longer equipped with the Pluton nuclear surface-to-surface missile. Therefore, at least part of the contingency planning and command functions formerly exercised by the First French Army on behalf of its three subordinate corps can henceforth be performed by Headquarters, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) vis-à-vis the only remaining French corps, the Lille-based III (FR) Corps, as well as vis-à-vis the EUROCORPS. Ensuring proper liaison with HQ LANDCENT and with other corps-size allied formations in Central Europe in the absence of a parent French headquarters, however, has placed a heavy burden on the staff of the Third Corps.

The 1995-2000 military program law (Loi de programmation militaire) presented to Parliament by then-Prime Minister Balladur in April 1994 envisaged that by 1997 the French Army would have decreased in size to eight divisions. These would have been
allocated as follows: one armored division in the EUROCORPS; two armored and one motorized mountain infantry divisions in the Third French Corps; and two light armored, one airborne and one airmobile divisions in the FAR (see Chart 20). The III Corps and the FAR would have had a field artillery brigade, a signals brigade, and a logistics brigade. In this scheme the FAR lost the 27th Mountain Infantry Division to the III Corps. The new emphasis on force modularity, however, offers the possibility of resubordinating an armored division from the III Corps to the FAR in a particular contingency as a means to strengthen it.

With this issue as well others in mind, the French Army Staff undertook in 1994 a long-term study of its future missions and strength, labeled Armée de Terre du 21ème siècle or ADT XXI. The outcome of this study has been a series of decisions on command and force structures, to be implemented, starting in 1997, alongside the decision by President Jacques Chirac of February 1996 to suspend conscription and convert the French Armed Forces into an all-professional force. The Army’s peacetime active strength will decrease from 236,600 men and women in 1996 to 136,000 in 2002—almost a 45 percent reduction in strength—and from 129 to 85 combat and combat support battalions. At the top of the structure, the headquarters of the FAR and the III (FR) Corps will be abolished and merged in 1998 into a single Army operations command, which

---

**Chart 20.**
The French Army in Transition.
will be called either *Commandement Opérationnel des Forces Terrestres* (COFT) or *Force d’Action Terrestre* (FAT). The creation of this command mirrors similar decisions recently taken by the British (Land Command) and German armies (*Heeresführungskommando*) to establish a single higher operations headquarters.

The new COFT or FAT headquarters will have planning and operational command responsibilities only, and could provide the nucleus of either a French or a multinational, single-service, corps-level headquarters, or be the mounting headquarters for the standing-up of a joint forces theater-level headquarters (PCIAT), as part of a French-led multinational coalition. It will be located in Lille, to take advantage of the existence of a state-of-the-art bunker, built in the mid-1980’s for the III Corps in the context of a hypothetical East-West conflict, as well as of Lille’s geographic proximity to SHAPE in Mons and the NATO and WEU headquarters in Brussels. Liaison will be established with the 1(German/Netherlands) Binational Corps, the III Italian Corps/Division, the EUROPCORPS, the V(US/German) Binational Corps, the 1st Spanish Mechanized Division, and the IV German Corps.

The COFT or FAT will be able to rely on the forces provided, on demand, by four “Forces” headquarters (*Etat-Major de Force* or *EMF*): an Armored Force; a Mechanized Force; an Armored Rapid Intervention Force; and an Infantry Force. These four Forces will replace the existing nine divisions which are smaller than a typical NATO division. Each Force will be roughly of NATO division size and strength, and will control one or several brigade headquarters (*Etat-Major de Brigade* or *EMB*). This new structure reflects the new division-of-labor between “operational” (supported command) and “organic” (supporting command) headquarters, as well as the principle of modularity (from battalion upwards to brigade, division and corps), both of which have been hallmarks of the reorganization of French command and force structures initiated in 1989. It also marks the return of the brigade, as an intermediate level of organization and command between the battalion and the division, which the French Army had abandoned in 1977. The reintroduction of the brigade level takes into account the need to “package” forces as the magnitude of a particular contingency warrants, but also the need to make the French Army’s contribution to a NATO operation.
compatible with the land force structures of other Allies, as demonstrated in recent exercises, as well as during the NATO-led Intervention Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In addition, the FAR’s 4th Airmobile Division and the 3rd Airmobile Brigade of the III Corps will be merged into a new airmobile brigade, in line with the declining size of the French Army’s helicopter fleet (from 340 to 180 rotary-wing aircraft). In contrast, the strength of the BRGE will be expanded by the addition of an armored cavalry battalion specialized in fast-moving scout operations and of a helicopter battalion equipped with Horizon heliborne ground surveillance radars. Further, the long-standing 1er COMLOG, oriented to general war in Central Europe, will give way to a new, more versatile “Land Logistics Force” headquarters (Force Logistique Terrestre). Lastly, with the disbandment of the 1st Armored Division (France’s main contribution to the EUROCORPS), the French Army’s presence in Germany will be reduced solely to the French component of the Franco-German Brigade (itself also part of the EUROCORPS).

\textit{Navy Command Structures.}

As part of its own post-Cold War restructuring process, labeled Optimar 95, the French Navy has undertaken a major reform of its command structures oriented toward the establishment of three “reservoirs” of surface combatants: surface warfare, antisubmarine warfare, and mine counter-measures. These “pools of forces,” each under the organic command of a flag officer, will provide ships and associated capabilities to the four area operational commanders (CECLANT, CECMED, ALINDIEN, and ALPACI) and to \textit{ad hoc} joint and joint/combined commands.

The former Flag Officers, Atlantic Fleet (ALESLANT) and Mediterranean Fleet (ALESCMED) have been replaced by a Flag Officer, Antisubmarine Warfare Group (ALGASM) and a Flag Officer, Naval Action Force (ALFAN), respectively. The \textit{Force d’Action Navale} (FAN) is made up of the aircraft carriers Foch and Clemenceau and their associated surface escorts and represents the core of the French Navy’s surface strike capability. In addition to ALGASM and ALFAN, there is also a new Flag Officer, Mine Counter-Measures Force (ALMINES). ALFAN is based in Toulon, while ALGASM and ALMINES are both stationed in Brest.

\textit{Air Force Command Structures.}
The Air Force initiated a wholesale reorganization of its command structure to comply with the new division of responsibilities between operational and organic command, in September 1991. This process started with the simultaneous resubordination from the FATac to the FAS of “non-strategic” nuclear strike squadrons and from the CAFDA to the FATac of air defense interceptor squadrons; thereby all nuclear air force assets, both strategic and non-strategic were consolidated in FAS and all non-nuclear air force assets whether oriented toward air defense, attack, or tactical reconnaissance were consolidated in FATac. This important measure was designed to give the commander of FATac the necessary means and authority to direct all non-nuclear air operations although for the defense of French airspace, OPCON of dedicated FATac assets could be temporarily transferred to the commander of CAFDA, who commands the French Air Force’s ground-based radar stations and four airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.53

In a related move, in 1992, all air force C3I systems were consolidated in a new communications command (Commandement des Systèmes de Télécommunications de l’Armée de l’Air or CSTAA), which was subordinated to the Air Defense Command as a means to rationalize C3I resources and operations and to achieve greater connectivity and synergy with early warning sensors.

These initial steps were only the harbinger of more radical changes, brought about by the need to reorient the French Air Force away from the protection of French territory and airspace and from their immediate approaches against a large-scale Soviet air threat and toward long-distance power-projection operations. Three of the four “specialized” commands established three decades ago (CAFDA, FATac, CoTAM) have been substantially reconfigured. Only the FAS has remained essentially unchanged because of its nuclear status.54

In June 1994, the FATac and CoTAM were superseded by the Commandement de la Force Aérienne de Combat (CFAC) and the Commandement de la Force Aérienne de Projection (CFAP), respectively. These closely resemble, although on a much smaller scale, the U.S. Air Force’s new Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. For its part, also in June 1994, the CAFDA was substituted by an Air Defense and Air Operations Command (Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes or CDAOA) that, henceforth, will be the French Air Force’s
only operational command with responsibility for all non-nuclear air operations, defensive and offensive, inside French airspace and beyond. The CFAC and CFAP will be "supporting commands," providing assets and resources to the CDAOA on demand. The decision to create a single Air Force operational command mirrors similar measures taken by other West European nations as early as 1968 by the United Kingdom with the establishment of the Royal Air Force Strike Command and, as recently as 1991, by Spain with the creation of the Mando Operativo Aéreo. For air defense purposes, the CDAOA operates through two Sector Operations Centers (SOC), SOC North at Cinq-Mars-la-Pile near the city of Tours in the Loire Valley and SOC South at Mont Verdun in the vicinity of Lyon. It is planned that the bunker at Mont Verdun will be the test bed for the transition of France's existing air defense ground environment (STRIDA, which is tied into NATO's Europe-wide NADGE system) to the Système de Contrôle et de Conduite des Opérations Aériennes, which will be the French segment of NATO's future Air Command and Control System (ACCS). One of the important innovations of ACCS is that the command and control of offensive and defensive air operations will be merged in a single Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Once operational, the CAOC at Mont Verdun, together with similar facilities in Italy and Spain, will give France and the Alliance at large a much greater capability to manage air operations throughout the western Mediterranean region.

As part of this wide-ranging reform of Air Force command structures, the two year old CSTAA was also replaced in June 1994 by yet a new Surveillance, Communications, and Information Systems command, named CASSIC (Commandement "Air" des Systèmes de Surveillance, d'Information et de Communications). Under CASSIC authority are not only all French Air Force fixed and mobile command and control, communications and information systems, but also all ground-based and AWACS early warning sensors formerly operated by the now defunct CAFDA. Like CFAC and CFAP, CASSIC will be an "organic" command, which may be called upon to contribute assets to the CDAOA. With CASSIC, the French Air Force has taken an important step forward on the path toward acquiring a well-rounded C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) capability, on the model of the U.S. Air Force.
Command Structures and the Internationalization of French Security Policy

With the latest reorganization of the French Army now well underway, the wide-ranging reform of French command structures initiated in 1989 and pursued with added impetus after the Gulf War is nearly completed. French forces have been engaged in northern and southern Iraq, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and most recently in Albania in the kind of joint/combined "coalition" and Alliance operations postulated by the reform. Furthermore, the internationalization of France's security policy, reflected notably in her new readiness to participate fully in a renovated NATO command structure, is well in hand, even though long-standing reservations about "integration" and relinquishing command to multilateral entities still exert a powerful influence on French policy-making. The direction which this process will now take in the realm of command structures will depend on at least three inter-related factors:

1. The visible manifestation of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance and in NATO’s new Command Structure, particularly at the "Regional Command" level in Europe;

2. The implementation of NATO’s CJTF Concept, including the use of Alliance CJTF headquarters under the command of the WEU for WEU-led operations;

3. The development of a French deployable, tri-service theater command capability, the PCIAT, including the option of using it as the backbone of a French-led coalition operation.

Starting with the participation of French officials in the drafting of NATO’s new Strategic Concept agreed at the Summit meeting of Alliance Heads of State and Government held in Rome in November 1991, France has been gradually revising her policy of semi-estrangement from NATO.60 In March 1993, the Chief of the French Military Mission to the NATO Military Committee—NATO’s senior military body—was allowed to participate in Military Committee deliberations on peacekeeping-related matters with full voting rights, and in October 1994, for the first time, the French Defense Minister attended an informal meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Seville, Spain.61 The election of President Jacques Chirac accelerated France’s full-blown reassessment of her military relationship with the Alliance. In December 1995, on the occasion of
the traditional autumn meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, France announced her decision to participate again in several senior NATO defense and military bodies.

The French Defence Minister would henceforth participate with his allied colleagues in formal meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in “Defense Ministers’ session” (to distinguish such meetings from those held by allied Foreign Ministers), but would not attend ministerial meetings of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) which would continue to bring together Defense Ministers of Alliance nations which participate in collective defense planning (all but France). Nor would the French Defense Minister participate in meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), although France indicated in January 1996 its readiness to exchange views with her Allies in the NAC forum on the concept of dissuasion concertée, the first time since 1966 that France has indicated a willingness to consult inside NATO on nuclear matters. Further, in 1996 France became again a full member of the NATO Military Committee, being represented on a permanent basis by a Military Representative (and not merely by a Liaison Mission) and, at regular Chief of Defense Staff meetings, by her Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. For the first time, French officers have been posted on the NATO International Military Staff (IMS), which provides staff support to the Military Committee, and the IMS’s Assistant Director for Partnership for Peace matters is presently a French general officer.

While these various steps—in themselves an indicator of an important shift in French attitudes and policy vis-à-vis NATO—fell short of full French military reintegration into the NATO integrated military structure, France has indicated a readiness to participate fully in NATO’s future Command Structure presently under elaboration with French participation. But France has set out some important conditions for her full return into NATO.

First and foremost, Alliance structures and procedures would have to reflect visibly the keystone decision taken by Allies in Berlin in June 1996 to build the ESDI within NATO, what President Chirac has called “a new partnership between Europe and the United States” inside the Alliance. Later in 1996, France let it be known that the “Europeanization” of the Alliance meant, among other things, that new, so-called “Regional Commands” in Europe (placed below US-led “Strategic Commands”) would have to be headed by Europeans. Because one of the two future Regional Commands in
Europe is already headed by a European general officer (AFCENT in Brunssum, the Netherlands), acceptance of the French demand would imply that, AFSOUTH, in Naples, Italy, a command traditionally held by a US admiral, would be headed in the future by a European. As of the writing of this chapter (Spring 1997), no consensus had yet been reached in NATO on whether, as demanded by France, AFSOUTH should be headed by a European in the new command structure.

In the absence of a full military return of France into NATO, French force contributions to CJTFs and staff participation in CJTF headquarters raise the issues of France’s relationship to NATO’s integrated military structure in Alliance operations other than collective defense and of the WEU’s use of Alliance CJTFs under its own command. Arguably, France’s endorsement of the CJTF Concept at the NATO Summit meeting in Brussels in January 1994 was an indicator at that time of her readiness to contemplate full French military participation in Alliance operations while remaining outside of the integrated military structure. In effect, in NATO-led CJTF operations, the formal distinction between “integrated” and currently “non-integrated” (French and Spanish) Alliance forces would become irrelevant, which to a great degree has been the case in Alliance land, air and maritime operations in and around the Former Yugoslavia and in many NATO and multinational live exercises. Furthermore, if French military personnel were to be assigned to CJTF staffs in a full and not merely in a liaison capacity, France’s absence from the Alliance’s integrated military structure would in practice have been overtaken by a new NATO military reality, half-way between non-integration and full integration, arguably not a fully satisfactory solution.

A decision by France not to participate in NATO’s emerging command structure would be a grave setback for the Alliance, given France’s singular willingness and expanding ability to contribute forces to multinational operations beyond the NATO area. It would bring into question the ability of the Alliance to reflect within its own structures and procedures the European Security and Defense Identity, and would reinforce the view that the WEU stills offers an alternative to NATO for developing the ESDI. At the same time, attempting to implement the CJTF Concept for both NATO and WEU-led operations without full French military participation in NATO would be problematical given the agreement to pursue
“separable but not separate” military capabilities (i.e. the provision of Alliance military assets and capabilities to the WEU for WEU-led operations) and to entrust the Deputy SACEUR with dedicated responsibilities to this effect. Further, full French military participation in peacetime in Alliance CJTF staffs without concurrent French participation in NATO’s new Command Structure (including, therefore, the “parent” headquarters of CJTF staffs) would artificially create an undesirable distingtion between command arrangements for non-Article V and for collective defense (Article V) contingencies.

WEU employment of Alliance CJTFs in WEU-led operations essentially revolves around the ability of the WEU to assume the strategic direction of such operations with the support of the requisite NATO C³I assets. The multinational live exercises Farfadet 92, Ardente 93, Tramontana 94 and Eolo 96, as well as the WEU’s Crisex 96 command post exercise, tested the command and control arrangements of what in effect was the nucleus of a European CJTF, but on home territory. Deploying a CJTF under WEU command beyond Alliance borders, particularly to a distant theater of operations, would represent a much more formidable challenge. Neither France nor the other WEU member nations have a command and control ship with the dedicated capabilities of the USS Mount Whitney, flagship of the U.S. Second Fleet and NATO’s Striking Fleet, Atlantic, or an airborne battlefield command-and-control center such as the U.S. Air Force’s EC-130. Some French fleet oilers have a secondary command and control capability, but it would be patently insufficient to command a relatively large CJTF in a power-projection operation. The future Charles de Gaulle nuclear-powered aircraft carrier might be able to perform such a command and control function if equipped with the appropriate communications means. This is why, WEU nations have had to limit their ambitions for the WEU to so-called “Petersberg tasks” (which focus on humanitarian assistance and peace support operations, but fall short of deploying a large combat force to prevent or terminate a regional conflict) and to accept to rely on the Alliance’s CJTF Concept as a means to prepare and conduct WEU-led operations.

As a result of these developments, it is likely that French staffs will become increasingly involved in multilateral planning within NATO (e.g. development of the Operations Plans for IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia) and with other WEU nations (e.g. exercise Crisex 96). Already, the EMIA has established bilateral relationships with
comparable joint planning staffs in Germany, Italy, Spain and the
United Kingdom, and these nations have liaison officers assigned to
the EMIA at Creil.71 Given that establishing a WEU military
headquarters is neither desirable nor affordable, a selected number of
major national headquarters within WEU nations might assume a
secondary WEU role of providing a headquarters to the operation
commander of a WEU-led operation.72 For instance, the staffs of the
EMIA, CDAOA, COFT/FAT, CECLANT and CECMED could be
augmented on an ad hoc basis by personnel from other WEU nations
to direct combined, joint, air or maritime operations. Staff
arrangements might even take a permanent feature, as this has been
the case with the establishment in November 1994 at High Wycombe
–headquarters of the RAF Strike Command–of the Anglo-French
“Euro Air Group” open to other WEU nations.73 Whether the EMIA
and the planned PCIAT could provide the WEU with the nucleus of
a strategic-level joint/combined operations headquarters and force
headquarters, respectively, remains to be seen. France’s intent that
they should do so, however, is clear.

The establishment of the EMIA and the development of a
command and control capability, in the form of the PCIAT, to lead a
joint and combined campaign in a distant theater of operations
ultimately raise the issues of France’s military ambitions in the new
security environment and of her willingness and ability to cooperate
militarily with the United States, particularly beyond Europe. Not the
least of many paradoxes in the complex Franco-American strategic
relationship is the likelihood of a growing impetus for mutual
rapprochement between Washington and Paris in the defense field.
On the one hand, France’s dependence on U.S. military cooperation
grows exponentially as the locus of French military engagement
moves further away from mainland Europe into Africa and the
Middle East, a cooperation that may extend from airlift and logistical
support, as this was the case in Zaire (1977), Chad (1986) and
Rwanda (1994), to full teamwork on the ground as during the Gulf
War. A recent head of the Armed Forces Joint Staff College (Collège
Interarmées de Défense) has acknowledged, in this respect, that “(...) Because of the limited capabilities of individual European nations,
beyond some level these (force) projection operations will be possible
only through a coalition, probably under the United Nations banner
and U.S. leadership.”74 On the other hand, U.S. willingness to lead
international war-prevention exercises, including the formation of ad
hoc military coalitions, may increasingly become dependent on the political readiness and military capability of European and Asian allies to contribute forces and resources to a common endeavor. France is among a small number of allied nations that has demonstrated in the past such a political readiness and which—as this essay has noted—is now taking the measures necessary to acquire such a military capability. Thus, for two military establishments that have not enjoyed an intimate working relationship since France’s withdrawal from the Alliance’s integrated military structure (in comparison with the patterns of routine cooperation between the U.S. armed forces and their British and German counterparts), the post-Cold War era offers both challenges and opportunities.

Conclusion

On the heels of the Armées 2000 plan, France has undertaken the most comprehensive and ambitious reform of her armed forces in three decades, including command and force structures. The command structure inherited from the 1960’s was self-standing, designed to allow French fighting formations—corps, air wings, naval task forces—to fight alongside integrated NATO forces but under their own command. Wartime commanders were predesignated in peacetime, forces were preassigned, missions were preplanned. Whatever could be known in peacetime about future war was planned and exercised. In contrast, the new command organization is oriented to flexible, multi-purpose operational planning and tailored force-packaging, to facilitate the engagement of French forces in joint and joint/combined operations in a variety of configurations, ranging from unilateral employment to operations within the framework of NATO, the WEU or the United Nations. Conceptually, no longer are there two command structures standing side-by-side—one NATO, the other French—but a French command structure which can either contribute forces to a multinational command structure, whether formal such as NATO or ad hoc, or itself provide the backbone of a particular operation’s command structure.

The conversion of the French armed forces into an all-volunteer force as well as the measures announced in the new 1995-2000 Loi de programmation militaire or already taken—in particular, the establishment of the EMIA, the COS, the DRM and the CDAOA—should have a salutary impact on the ability of France to field toward
the end of the 1990s a deployable, joint forces capability to wage a campaign in a distant theater of operations. It is, however, the unprecedented doctrinal emphasis on "jointness", force modularity, interoperability and combined operations which is the most striking feature of the "Lanxade reform" of French command structures. Perhaps more than any other West European nation, France has been emulating since the Gulf War many of the innovative U.S. operational concepts and command and force structures successfully put to the test during operation Desert Storm. Further, the reconfiguration of French forces into adaptable force packages in many respects mirrors the joint force integration concepts being developed and exercised by the reformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM).

On these grounds alone, recent reforms of French command and force structures should elicit the interest of the U.S. military establishment. More broadly, as the United States considers new ways of sharing responsibility among the Allies for preserving Western security interests around the world, this convergence of purpose in preparing American and French forces for the new security environment should be welcomed in Washington.

Notes

Author's note: This paper was written in a private capacity. Therefore, the views expressed are the author's own and should not be construed as representing those of NATO or of Alliance member nations. An earlier version of this chapter was published, in French, in the form of a monograph, as Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, *De Metz à Creil: Les structures de commandement françaises de l'après-guerre froide*, Palaiseau, France: CREST/Ecole Polytechnique, October 1995. The author wishes to thank for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this text, senior officers assigned to the French Military Representative on the NATO Military Committee in Brussels and the French Military Mission to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, as well as General Alain Baer (French Air Force, retired) and David Yost of the Naval Postgraduate School.

2. In wartime, French forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO would have been placed under the OPCOM of the Alliance's three Major NATO Commanders and the OPCON of their subordinates. As an example, the commander of the II(FR) Corps would have reported upwards to SACEUR through the commander of the First French Army (1(FR)Army), the Commander, Central Army Group (COMCENTAG), the Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (COMLANDCENT), and lastly the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe (CINCENT). Until France's withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated military structure in 1966, the CINCENT position was held by a French general officer who had at Fontainebleau, France, under his immediate command two Principal Subordinate Commanders: COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCEN. Until 1962 he also had a naval subordinate commander, COMNAVCENT, but that position was disestablished with the creation of Commander, Allied Naval Forces, Baltic Approaches. From 1957 through 1966, COMLANDCENT was a West German general officer also headquartered in Fontainebleau (which underscores the very early ties established between the French armed forces and the Bundeswehr at flag level and helps place the participation of German forces assigned to the EUROCORPS in the 14 Juillet parade on the Champs-Elysées in 1994 in its proper historical context). The positions of COMLANDCENT and COMAIRCEN were disbanded in 1966 and their responsibilities transferred to CINCENT when a West German general officer took over as CINCENT and moved his headquarters from Fontainebleau to Brunssum, the Netherlands. In 1974, the position of Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (designated COMAAFCE), was reestablished under CINCENT. As part of NATO's new command structure, in 1993 COMAAFCE was redesignated COMAIRCEN and the position of COMLANDCENT was reestablished. Thus, the recent reform of NATO's command structure has little-known historical roots which few would suspect. On the organization of French forces in the early 1960s, see France and its Armed Forces, New York: Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information, December 1964.


8. From the date of its creation in 1979 through 1984, the mission of the III French Corps seems to have been that of a rear-echelon operational headquarters to spearhead a French nuclear counter-offensive from behind NATO’s lines if and when the cohesion of the Alliance’s conventional forward defense in Central Europe had faltered under the weight of a Warsaw Pact theater-wide attack. For a detailed discussion of the evolution of France’s strategy for the defense of Central Europe, see Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France and the Conventional Defense of Central Europe,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 4, Fall 1987, pp. 471-512.


22. For the best French assessment by far of the implications of the Gulf War and, more broadly, of the new strategic context for French defense planning, see Alain Baur, Réflexions sur la nature des futurs systèmes de défense, Paris: Les Cahiers du CREST, No. 12, November 1993.

23. Initially, Defense Minister Pierre Joxe and Admiral Lanxade favored creating two operational-planning joint staffs, one at Metz oriented toward European contingencies in replacement of the First Army headquarters, the other


25. Ibid., p. 92.


February 16, 1993; and "La première armée dissoute," *Le Figaro* (Paris), September 1, 1993. See also endnote 23 above.


35. In July 1990, anticipating Germany’s unification, President François Mitterrand had indicated that he envisaged that all French forces stationed on German soil under a 1966 bilateral agreement between Paris and Bonn would eventually be withdrawn. The creation of the EUROCORPS, however, has provided a convenient political framework and military vehicle for maintaining a substantive French military presence in Germany in a way which is congenial with the Alliance’s security interests and core functions. See “La 1re division blindée française restera outre-Rhin,” *Le Monde* (Paris), November 4, 1991; “Nouveau stationnement pour la 1re division blindée française en Allemagne,” *Le Monde* (Paris), February 22, 1993; and Jacques Isnard, “Le PC de l’Eurocorps est installé à Strasbourg,” *Le Monde* (Paris), November 7-8, 1993.


39. See *Terre Information*, No. 233, October 1994, p. 6. One of the FAR’s two light armored divisions, the 9th Marine Division, has been trained to conduct amphibious landing operations.

40. The idea of transferring the 27th Alpine Division, a predominantly foot infantry unit specially trained for mountain warfare, from the FAR to the III (FR) Corps was originally developed. Ruiz Palmer, *French Strategic Options in the 1990s*, p. 65. It was eventually endorsed in France. See Patrice-Henry Desaubiaux, “Le général Schmitt suggère une FAR plus ‘disponible,’” *Le Figaro* (Paris), April 7, 1993. On July 1, 1994, the 27th Alpine Division was redesignated 27th Mountain Infantry Division upon its transfer from the FAR to the III (FR) Corps, and became motorized. See Jacques Isnard, “Deux divisions d’infanterie vont fusionner,” *Le


43. The decision to “suspend” compulsory military service (it could be reinstated in case of a national emergency) was announced by President Chirac in a televised speech to the nation on February 22, 1996, together with several other wide-ranging reforms of France’s defense posture. See “M. Chirac annonce la suppression du service militaire dans six ans,” Le Monde (Paris), February 24, 1996.


45. The disbandment of the FAR and III Corps headquarters, together with many other reorganization measures, was announced by the Ministry of Defense to the media on 17 July 1996. This announcement referred to the Army’s new operations command as the COFT. See, for example, Rafaelle Rivais, “La restructuration de l’armée de terre affectera toutes les régions,” Le Monde (Paris), July 18, 1996; Jean-Dominique Merchet, “Une gigantesque force d’action rapide,” Libération (Paris), July 18, 1996; and “Lille accueillera le COFT avant l’an 2000,” La Voix du nord, September 26, 1996; however, an official publication of the French Army, Terre Information, in its February 1997 issue, referred to the new headquarters as FAT.


51. It would appear that, in the future, the French contribution to the EUROCORPS will be provided by one of the four new Forces to be established by the French Army starting in 1997.


55. The choice of CAFDA over FATac to provide the nucleus of the new CDAOA is revealing of current French planning in regard to command structures. The transfer in 1991 of all non-nuclear combat aircraft to the operational command of the FATac had given the impression that FATac’s expanding emphasis on power-projection operations had given it an edge over CAFDA’s traditional focus on homeland air defense, a mission which had seemingly lost some urgency with the disappearance of the former Soviet air threat to Western Europe. The location of FATac’s underground operations center (COFATAC) near Metz, however, was less than optimal at a time when France was attempting to consolidate all higher operational command functions at a few key sites in and around Paris (Taverny and Creil, principally). Furthermore, with the disbandment of the headquarters of the First French Army at Metz in 1993, which for nearly a quarter of a century had been FATac’s land force partner, keeping the center of gravity of Air Force operations at Metz had no enduring rationale. Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, CAFDA’s own underground operations center (CODA) at Taverny probably has better C3I connectivity with France’s and NATO’s early warning networks and with the Joint Armed Forces Staff operations center (COIA) underneath the Ministry of Defense in Paris than COFATAC. Hence, considerations such as location and connectivity were probably key factors. See Gilbert Mayer, “Metz perd la dimension opérationnelle,” Le Républicain Lorrain, March 30, 1994.


57. The CAFDA operated in the past through four Sector Operation Centers (SOCs). The fact that neither of the two remaining SOCs are near France’s northeastern borders is an unmistakable indicator of the reorientation of France’s air defense priorities away from Central Europe toward Southern Europe in the wake of the end of the Cold War. “Restructuration des zones aériennes de défense,” Air Actualités, No. 469, February 1994, p. 9.


68. On these exercises, see Alfredo Florensa, "El necesario y constante adiestramiento," Revista Española de Defensa, No. 64, Juno 1993, p. 10; Victor Hernandez, "Maniobras de la UEO en el Mediterraneo," Revista Española de Defensa, No. 69, November 1993, pp. 6-11; Alfredo Florensa "Tramontana 94, aliados en acción," Revista Española de Defensa, No. 82, December 1994, pp. 6-13; France had planned to host exercise Mistral 95 but the exercise was cancelled because of the demands, in terms of force contributions, placed on France, Italy and Spain by NATO's Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. The next live exercise in the series will be Iles d'Or 97 which will be hosted by France.


72. Apparently, the United Kingdom has already designated its Fleet headquarters at Northwood as “answerable” to the WEU for purposes of conducting a combined operation under WEU command. Further, in November 1994 the headquarters hosted a WEU command post exercise code-named Purple Nova. See Sir Keith Speed, An Operational Organization for WEU: Naval and


75. Admiral Lanxade has noted that, in the Former Yugoslavia, French forces deployed on the ground as part of the United Nations Protection Force were placed under United Nations command, French aircraft enforcing the _Deny Flight_ no-fly zone were under NATO command, French warships enforcing the _Sharp Guard_ trade embargo were under WEU command, and the French naval task force in the Adriatic Sea was under French command. In his opinion, this was proof of the new adaptability of French command and force structures of which he was, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, the key promoter. See Admiral Jacques Lanxade, “Le Livre Blanc et l’emploi des forces,” _Défense Nationale_, July 1994, p. 26.

CENTRALIZING GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES

Thomas-Durell Young

In her seminal analysis of the Federal Ministry of Defense (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung—BMVg), Catherine Kelleher wrote that the Federal Republic had probably the “least to offer in terms of lessons that can be generalized for the organization of a central defense establishment” largely because it was organized with the explicit aim of not providing operational command and control over its standing national forces.¹ The Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) was created without the capability to exercise operational command and control over joint national military operations of any size or of any significant duration.² This unusual condition was due to anxieties of a country suspicious of past militaristic, cultural proclivities in German armies, combined with the “influential” presence of a very apprehensive group of new allies. The general consensus between German politicians and allies in 1954 was that there would never again be a Generalstab (General Staff).

As a result, within the BMVg, the Führungsstab der Streitkräfte—Fü S (“Joint” or “Central Staff” of the Armed Forces) was not established with the capability (i.e., a “J-3” operations directorate in U.S. parlance) of exercising operational command and control over all Bundeswehr services and individual units. This sui generis state of affairs was accepted as appropriate by Germany until unification in October 1990. It was at this point that the need to centralize operational command and control became necessary. The question then, which still remains to be completely addressed, is to what degree will centralization occur and in what form.

At the crux of the operational command and control deficiencies in the BMVg and the Bundeswehr lies the sensitive issue of
civil-military relations. As a result of this organizational deficiency, it has long been assumed that wartime operational command and control of most of the Bundeswehr would be exercised through the NATO integrated command structure. Following the promulgation of a state of defense by the Federal Government, operational command and control over the Bundeswehr with some exceptions (e.g., Territorial Army) would be transferred to NATO commanders. And, for the purpose of the contemporary defense of Germany, this command arrangement remains sufficient. Albeit a major manifestation of singularization and not without criticism, it is a long-standing constant in German security policy that NATO is essential to national security. Consequently, there is currently no pressing military requirement to create a German wartime, national operational command and control structure.

However, as regards military operations short of war, which Germany’s allies have strongly urged Bonn to undertake, there is a clear need to improve significantly the BMVg’s capability of exercising centralized operational command and control, as well as providing a national command linkage to Bundeswehr units deployed outside of the Central Region. This need for reform was initially made patently clear during the conduct of Bundeswehr humanitarian relief operations carried out in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey in Spring 1991. According to one German press report, during this deployment of 500 Bundeswehr personnel, the command channels of the commanding officer, Major General Georg Bernhardt, had to be routed through 23 offices in the BMVg and other ministries. Even within the BMVg there was confusion. For instance, Fü S III 6 (political-military affairs) was responsible for operations in Turkey and Iran, while Fü L III 3 (operational division of the Air Force Staff) controlled Luftwaffe missions in Iraq within the framework of the United Nations.

As recognized in recent key defense planning documents, the Bundeswehr will increasingly be restructured to participate in these types of missions and, therefore, will require improved national command and operational command and control structures. Hence, from the previous situation where the Bundeswehr was structured almost exclusively for wartime operations in the Central Region, the BMVg must now have the capability to exercise independent national command and operational command and control within what NATO now refers to as peace, crisis, war. The principal obstacle to effecting
this logical reorganization, however, is overcoming deep political suspicions in a Germany still very cognizant of its recent history.

**Military Command: The Legal Parameters**

Given the fact that civil-military relations are delineated in the German Constitution (*Grundgesetz* or Basic Law), an understanding of its relevant provisions regarding national command over, and the operational command and control of, the *Bundeswehr* is essential. An appropriate starting point is perhaps the “defining” article concerning civil-military relations. The *Grundgesetz* makes very clear the principle of civilian control over the military. Article 65(a) invests the power of peacetime national command (“Befehls-und Kommandogewalt”) in the Federal Minister of Defense. Article 115 defines how a state of defense is enacted by the *Bundestag* (Lower House) and *Bundesrat* (Upper House) and establishes the legal parameters for the defense of the Federal Republic. Article 115(b) stipulates that, upon the promulgation of a state of defense, national command of the *Bundeswehr* is transferred from the Federal Minister of Defense to the Federal Chancellor.

As regards operational command and control of the *Bundeswehr*, the *Grundgesetz* is vague, which has lead to some misunderstandings. Article 24 states that the Federal Republic may enter into a system of collective security and transfer sovereign powers to intergovernmental institutions (i.e., participating in the NATO integrated command structure). This particular article is often cited by some informed commentators and some in the Social Democratic Party of Germany (*SPD*) to claim that the creation of a national operational command and control structure is constitutionally proscribed. The facts state otherwise. Nowhere does the *Grundgesetz* proscribe the creation of a national military command structure. There are constitutional proscriptions in regard to the creation of a central military organization. Often overlooked is Article 87(b) which states that, in effect, the *BMVg* shall be a civilian, vice military, administered ministry.

These constitutional provisions establishing the parameters for national command and the operational command and control of the *Bundeswehr* are actually not onerous or unusual. Civilian control over the military in a democracy presupposes that national command is invested in senior political leadership whereas responsibility for
the operational command and/or control of forces is delegated to military authorities with requisite political oversight. Thus, one could conclude that far from being a constitutionally-driven controversy, domestic sensitivities to such a sign of national military independence and partisan political agendas have impeded efforts at centralizing operational command and control in the BMVg.

Problems and Challenges

Efforts to restructure the BMVg and Bundeswehr with the aim of creating a centralized operational command and control structure is hindered by two major organizational and political challenges. First, and probably most important to overcome, is the need to effect change at that sensitive nexus where there is convergence of civilian national command authority and senior military officials invested with responsibility for operational command and control. In other words, the relationship between the Federal Chancellor/Federal Minister of Defense and the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr (Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces) needs to be revisited. Second, existing operational command and control structures of the three services, as well as the roles played by the three service Inspektur (Chiefs of Staff), vis-à-vis the Federal Minister of Defense, also require review.

Concerning the Generalinspekteur, he is the senior military advisor to the Federal Minister of Defense and the Federal Chancellor and is a non-voting member of the cabinet’s Bundessicherheitsrat (“Federal Security Council”). He has neither national command nor operational command and control authority over Bundeswehr forces. However, he does have the independent right of inspecting all units of the Bundeswehr. Thus, his position has largely been confined to advising the government on military matters and is responsible for the development and implementation of force planning in the Bundeswehr. Additionally, he chairs the Militärische Führungsrat (“Federal Armed Forces Defense Council”), where he exercises “executive authority.” The Council consists of the Stellvertreter des Generalinspekturs der Bundeswehr (Deputy Chief of Staff of the Federal Armed Forces) and the three service Inspektur.10

Peacetime operational command and control over Bundeswehr forces has been invested in the three service Inspektur. The three Inspektur report directly to the Federal Minister of Defense and are responsible for the combat readiness and exercise of discipline over
their individual services.\textsuperscript{11} Interestingly, for many years following the establishment of the \textit{Bundeswehr}, the issue of exactly who (military or civilian) was ultimately responsible for the discipline and readiness of the armed forces went unresolved. This issue was only settled on March 21, 1970, with the issuance of the important \textit{Blankeneser Erlass} (decree). This ministerial decree was issued by then-Federal Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt, who acted solely upon his own authority. The decree established “the formal specification of interacting responsibilities of the political and military leadership in ministerial and governmental affairs.”\textsuperscript{12} In effect, this ruling established the preeminence of the \textit{Inspekteure} in exercising discipline and ensuring the combat readiness of their services.

In light of these legal, political, and organizational conditions, developing a solution that balances all of these important factors has not been a simple task. First, the \textit{BMVg} itself must be reorganized to enable it to exercise extended national command and centralized operational command and control over deployed \textit{Bundeswehr} forces. The current Federal Minister of Defense, Volker Rühe, has announced that the ministry will be restructured and will be reduced from its current unwieldy size of 5,000 military and civilian personnel to a more manageable size (approximately 3,300) by the end of the 1990s.\textsuperscript{13}

While it is relatively simple to reduce military offices and personnel by transfers to organizations administratively located outside of the \textit{BMVg}, effecting redundancies of civil servants is proving to be extremely difficult given German labor laws. This has raised the possibility of removing service components from the \textit{BMVg}. One such proposal is to collocate organizationally and physically the service headquarters, i.e., \textit{Fü H} (Army Staff), \textit{Fü L} and \textit{Fü M} (Navy Staff), and the \textit{Inspekteure} together with their respective operational command headquarters. It has even been suggested that the \textit{Inspekteure} and operational commanders of the three services be merged into one position.\textsuperscript{14} Although this has been a very unpopular proposal with the services, it demonstrates the possible degree of change the \textit{BMVg} may undergo in the near future.

Second, efforts to centralize operational command and control capabilities in the \textit{BMVg} or to alter the responsibilities of the \textit{Generalinspekteur} in this area are likely to result in charges that a \textit{Generalstab} is being recreated. Given the emotional character of this
issue, a misunderstanding of the intentions of the BMVg could present difficulties, resulting in proposals not being judged upon their merits. Indeed, the mere titles Generalstab and General Staff Officer have pejorative connotations to Germans. While it appears to be a minor semantic matter, the terminology of the issue in essence only serves to complicate finding a politically-acceptable solution but has produced some “interesting” and creative nomenclature.

Thirdly, just as there is domestic political sensitivity surrounding these issues, so, too, must German defense officials be careful not to send signals to their NATO allies that Bonn is disinterested in maintaining existing integrated military command structures. As, for instance, established by the Verteidigungs-politische Richtlinien—VPR (Defense Policy Guidelines) and the Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr—KLL (Conceptual Guideline for the Future Development of the Federal Armed Forces) NATO remains indispensable to German security, and the integrated NATO military command structure, at least in German eyes, is essential. Thus, the efforts of the BMVg to centralize operational command and control capabilities have been modest and fall well short of a wartime command structure, let alone creating a new Generalstab.

First Efforts

The initial formal recognition of the need to reform operational command and control structures appeared on the eve of German unification in former-Federal Minister of Defense Gerhard Stoltenberg’s August 31, 1990, directive regarding Bundeswehr planning. The first public discussion of the need for improved national command and operational command and control capabilities came to light in the initial draft of the VPR, floated by Federal Minister of Defense Stoltenberg and Generalinspekteur General Klaus Naumann in early 1992. This paper recognized the need to establish national operational command and control structures to support the new missions outlined in the paper. This was later reiterated in Rühe’s published version of the VPR. What is not widely known is that preliminary conceptual planning was already underway to ascertain the most appropriate structure in view of prevailing political realities.
One early model was to create a *Streitkräfteführungskommando* (Armed Forces Command Headquarters) in Koblenz. The standing complement of the *Streitkräfteführungskommando* was envisaged to be approximately 80 to 100 individuals. This small joint headquarters would limit itself to planning national joint operations. From the perspective of the *BMVg*, this proposed joint headquarters would be capable of supporting a wide range of military operations, including crisis management. As an interim measure, until the *Streitkräfteführungskommando* was created, existing *Führungsbereitschaften* (readiness command groups) in the *BMVg* would be expanded. These modest staffs would be augmented with personnel as needed to manage crisis situations.22

Press reports indicated that upon replacing Stoltenberg, Federal Minister of Defense Rühe rejected this proposal.23 In reality, the senior *Bundeswehr* leadership chose not to endorse the concept, believing that existing political conditions would not allow for its acceptance, and directed the appropriate *Fü S* staff to develop alternative proposals. One of the key problems to be resolved concerned how this reorganization would affect the responsibilities of the *Generalinspekteur* and his relationship to the Federal Defense Minister. The (predictable) response of *Der Spiegel* to the proposal to create an expanded national command and operational command and control structures was to typify it as *Größenzwang* (megalomania) on the part of the generals, especially Naumann.24 Shortly after taking office in April, Federal Defense Minister Rühe stated that he would not support upgrading the position of the *Generalinspekteur* and would not approve the creation of a new expanded national command authority.25 He has subsequently softened this imprudent public démarche.26

The Solution: Part 1—The Armed Services

Given these numerous political obstacles, the *BMVg* has taken an incremental approach to solving this command challenge and has implemented an “interim solution.”27 This has been effected at two levels. First, the operational command headquarters of the individual services (which, bureaucratically, are located outside of the *BMVg*) have been expanded to provide improved national operational command and control over *Bundeswehr* deployments. In the case of the *Luftwaffe* (see Chart 21) and *Bundesmarine* (Federal Navy—see
Chart 21.
Air Force Command Structure.

* ACE Reaction Forces (Air) Staff

Chart 22), these two services have long possessed operational command and control headquarters. They are currently being modestly expanded: *Luftwaffennführungskommando* in Köln-Wahn and *Flottenkommando* in Glücksburg, respectively.

In the Army’s case, however, since the creation of the *Bundeswehr* there has been no army operational command headquarters above the army corps level. It was planned that the three corps commanders would implement NATO General Defense Plans at the direction of their respective Army Group headquarters (NORTHAG and CENTAG) in wartime. An army operational command and control headquarters, similar to those of its sister services, is now required. Consequently, the *Heeresführungskommando* (“German Army Forces Command”) has been established at the previous home of *III Korps* in Koblenz (see Chart 23). This headquarters consists of approximately 250 personnel and is commanded by a three-star general. It has four important tasks:

1. Exercises operational command and control over the three army corps, on behalf of the *Inspekteur des Heeres*, and the two other service operational commands for Article V missions;

2. Ensures operational readiness of the major combined arms units of the army;
3. Plans for and controls the employment of army forces in national and multinational formations;

4. Coordinates, as stipulated by MC 36-2, all NATO issues concerning the German Army in Germany (e.g., exercises on German soil).\(^{31}\)

The creation of this headquarters has had a significant impact on current and future operations of the Germany Army. For instance, as German army corps increasingly become more multinational (see Chart 24), this command will assume responsibility for providing national input into the operation of German Army divisions and brigades.\(^{32}\) Moreover, contrary to the initial planning for the headquarters as expressed in *Heeresstruktur 5* (Army Structure Plan 5), the Territorial Army headquarters will not be fused to the three army corps but rather will fall under the responsibility of the *Heeresführungskommando*.\(^{33}\) Finally, under the *Heeresführungskommando* a new mobile subcommand, *Kommando Luftbewegliche Kräfte* (“Air Mobile Forces Command”—KLK) is being established. The KLK headquarters has been established in Regensburg to command and represent German national interests\(^{34}\) in the deployment of airmobile/airmechanized task forces as reaction forces.\(^{35}\) However, both the *Heeresführungskommando* and the KLK have significant limitations. It is estimated by defense officials that the former is capable of effecting a span of operational command and
control over only a two brigade-size task force up to approximately 20,000.

All three service headquarters were activated on April 1, 1994, and assumed full command authority over all German forces and territory on September 30, 1994, the day following the final withdrawal of Russian forces from eastern Germany. These service headquarters will be increasingly important as they are intended not only to improve operational command and control over their service formations but also to support the exercise of national command by the Federal Minister of Defense. Given that the reorganization of the BMVg and the final redefinition of the role of the Generalinspekteur may not be resolved in the near term, the BMVg envisages possibly employing the service operational headquarters outside the Central Region, to provide national command linkage with the BMVg in the case of small deployments. As such they are being developed with the ability to be mobile.

To ensure an adequate degree of “jointness,” a small number of liaison officers are exchanged amongst the headquarters. The choice of which headquarters will be used to exercise operational command and control over German forces will be decided by the type of mission. Hence, the embryonic Heeresführungskommando has provided, not without some difficulties, to Bundeswehr forces deployed to Somalia, including Luftwaffe units. The Heeresführungskommando also has commanded
Bundeswehr contributions to the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in the former Yugoslavia. The Flottenkommando has provided operational command and control over the Bundesmarine participation in enforcing sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic, and the Luftwaffenführungskommando has exercised operational command and control over Luftwaffe humanitarian flights in the former Yugoslavia.

The Solution: Part 2—The BMVg

Leaving aside for a moment the responsibilities of the Generalinspekteur, the BMVg itself requires reorganization if it is effectively to direct national command and coordinate operational
command and control over Bundeswehr forces in cases of less-than-war missions. Notwithstanding the existence of three service operational commands, there still remains the need for a central office within the BMVg to coordinate national command responsibilities in less-than-war operations, provide options to the Federal Defense Minister and ensure execution of the Minister’s intent. For all of the reasons above, it is not feasible to create a large standing Abteilung to support the Minister. To date, the organization of a centralized command capability has been a two-phase process, the implementation of which has revealed the degree to which civil-military relations in Germany remain very sensitive.

First, on April 1, 1993, the Central/Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, Fü S IV (Organization) was directed to create a small operational staff (see Chart 25). Named Einsatzführung der Bundeswehr (Operational Command of the Federal Armed Forces), and organizationally referred to as Fü S IV 4, the office became the operations center of the BMVg for less-than-war missions. While very small (approximately ten officers), a planning cell and supporting personnel, taken from the Streitkräfteamt (Armed Forces Office) and the Bundesamt für Wehrverwaltung (Federal Office for Defense Administration), support the office. That this support staff is located

Chart 25.

**Peacetime German National Command and Control Organization: Current Structures.**

- Federal Ministry of Defense
  - Federal Defense Minister
  - State Secretaries
  - CofS, Bundeswehr
  - Military Command Council**
  - "Coordination Staff for Operational Tasks"***
  - German Army Forces Command, Koblenz
  - Planning Cell****
  - Navy Fleet Command, Glückstadt
  - Air Force Command, Körhr-Wahn
  - Medical and Health Services

* E.g., legal, finance, social departments
** Includes CofS, Bundeswehr, Dept CofS, Bundeswehr, and CofS of the individual services
*** Includes representatives of principal departments of the Armed Forces Staff and Federal Ministry of Defense
**** Personnel provided by the Armed Forces Office and the Federal Office for Defense Administration

146
organizationally outside of the BMVg is due to the drive to reduce the manning level of the ministry. One of the more significant implications of this organizational development was that while the services have increased their ability to exercise operational command and control over their forces, national command over these operations became the responsibility of Fü S IV 4. This is the first time Fü S has possessed such a capability. At this point in its development, this office enhanced the power of Fü S in the direction of these operations at the expense of the three services and their Inspekteure.

As part of this new responsibility, Fü S IV was given the important task of coordinating the activities of the military and civilian Abteilungen of the BMVg, which support external Bundeswehr deployments. An internal BMVg directive of February 1993 expanded the responsibilities of Fü S IV by creating the Koordinierungsstab für Einsatzaufgaben der Bundeswehr ("Coordination Staff for Operational Missions of the Federal Armed Forces"). This staff originally came under the direction of the departmental staff chief of Fü S IV. When directed to support a "deployment," this staff:

1. Prepares a chain of command;
2. Coordinates all BMVg activities supporting the deployment;
3. Develops the position of the BMVg for coordinating efforts with other ministries;
4. Briefs senior BMVg leaders on the results of decisions;
5. Oversees the conduct of the mission.

The directive of February 9, 1993, creating these structures also had a defining influence upon the responsibilities of the Generalinspekteur. Within the context of less-than-war situations, the Generalinspekteur was delegated the following new powers:

The Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr assumes, on the basis of his command authority and in conjunction with the Inspekteure, responsibility for all requisite measures for the preparation, culmination and control of deployments. He also assumes, on the presentation of an appropriate decree (Erlass), the central administration of humanitarian aid-work of the Bundeswehr overseas.

Important, the Koordinierungsstab is subordinated to the Generalinspekteur. The implication of this directive is to make the Generalinspekteur the key military officer responsible for
coordinating less-than-war operations as well as providing the military's linkage with the Federal Minister of Defense.

This is a significant development. For the first time, the Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr has been placed in the direct line of responsibility for operational command and control over forces between the Federal Minister of Defense and the service operational commands. This, in effect, diminishes the influence of the Inspektoren from exercising operational command and control over their services' deployed units in peacetime operations. Thus, while there has not been a reformulation of the important Blankeneser Erlass, as reported in the press, the relationship between the Generalinspekteur and the Inspektoren has been fundamentally altered de facto by the issuance of this directive. Moreover, as the civilian Abteilungen continue to report administratively to their respective State Secretaries while participating in the mission of the Koodinierungsstab, the issue of civilian control over military activities remains inviolate.

Second, in keeping with the incremental approach to reforming command structures in the BMVg and tempered by experience, on August 31, 1994, the Führungssturz der Bundeswehr—FüZBW (Federal Armed Forces Operations Center) was established, effective January 1, 1995. The FüZBW is headed simultaneously by the Director of the Koodinierungsstab. The responsibility of the FüZBW consists of:

1. Operational planning;
2. Operational command and control;
3. Acting as the BMVg's coordination center during operations.

In essence, the FüZBW was established to manage some of the most fundamental activities of the BMVg and will serve as the permanent core for the Koordinierungsstab. However, given its modest size, it will be dependent upon the staff work of the service operational headquarters. A major issue, yet to be resolved, is whether the FüZBW will issue orders directly to deployed units or via the service operational headquarters.

An interesting aspect from the perspective of civil-military relations of this reorganization, however, is its impact upon FüS and the Federal Minister of Defense's relationship with that staff. In establishing the FüZBW, the assets of FüS IV 4 (Einsatzführung der Bundeswehr) and FüS IV 7 (Bereitschaftszentrum der Bundeswehr) have been transferred to the FüZBW, and these offices have been
disbanded. Furthermore, the Director of the FüZBW, a one-star, has the status of a "special minister" and reports directly to the Federal Minister of Defense and not the Generalinspekteur. It would appear, therefore, that while the Generalinspekteur will have responsibility for the coordination of the BMVg's efforts, the execution of less-than-war missions will firmly be in the hands of the Federal Ministry of Defense.

The key implication of this reorganization has been to place national command and operational command and control of the Bundeswehr in less-than-war operations more directly under the Federal Minister of Defense's control; but, this is at the expense of Fü S. While one could debate the merits or demerits of this reorganization, the extent to which Rühle has gone to isolate national command and operational command and control from the joint/central staff of the BMVg in less-than-war operations is revealing. Whether this reorganization is operationally "valid" remains to be seen and proven. However, this reorganization speaks volumes to the continued anxiety in Bonn to creating anything close to a true "J-3" operations staff in Fü S.

Conclusion

The Federal Republic of Germany has determined that it requires a modest national command structure and operational command and control organization. That such a body needs to be limited in size is due primarily to domestic political sensitivities and budgetary constraints. Given current German defense policy principles, Bonn neither desires nor requires the capability to command wartime operations in the Central Region. This will be provided by NATO structures. There is no reason then for Bonn's allies to be concerned either that this restructuring is a manifestation of nationalization of defense structures or that Germany no longer feels NATO's integrated command organization is necessary. Even though German officials have stated that they would not engage unilaterally in humanitarian operations, the need to exercise national command, as well as operational command and control over Bundeswehr forces participating in such missions, remains.45

Consequently, although the above outlined structure is claimed by German officials to be an interim solution to a long term problem of centralizing operational command and control, it could be many.
years before a more capable and independent structure is proposed, let alone created. Yet, the implementation of this “interim” proposal could not have come at a more opportune time. The decision at the 1994 NATO summit to establish CJTFs underscores the need for Bonn to develop flexible and deployable headquarters to participate in these ad hoc formations. Moreover, as these task forces are envisaged for non-Article V missions under the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, the change in the responsibilities of the Generalinspekteur will ensure that the Federal Minister of Defense will have one uniformed official responsible for coordinating German participation; however, its execution will remain with the Federal Minister of Defense. Whether this division of command responsibilities is both workable and conceptually valid remains to be seen.

There is, however, one key area in the command organization debate that portends to be problematic. Although the organizational structures to facilitate the exercise of national command and operational command and control have been changed, the senior government officials collectively have little experience in conducting these types of operations. As recent experience has shown, peace support operations can place civil-military relations in a new and complicated context. Thus, the delicate and critical link in the civil-military relationship in the ruling structures of the Federal Republic faces new challenges. It would appear that procedures for executing these operations have been developed, exercised, and validated in the midst of German participation in both IFOR and SFOR. It speaks legions of the Bundeswehr to make there arrangements work in an operation, without causing a crisis in civil-military relations.

In the final analysis, whether the German interim command structure will be sufficient for envisaged tasks remains to be seen. The mere fact that great pains have been taken to “invent” new nomenclature (e.g., Koordinierungsstab für Einsatzaufgaben), vice simply employing the generic term Generalstab, manifests the extreme domestic political sensitivity surrounding the issue. While perhaps a premature observation, one could reasonably predict where efforts to validate this structure through exercises and simulations could well be circumscribed by defense officials out of fear of causing misperceptions of its mission on the part of the media and public. Thus, whereas this interim structure might be appropriate for the
operational command and control of Bundeswehr deployments in peace support operations up to 20,000 troops (i.e., IFOR and SFOR), commanding operations at a higher level of intensity and scope remains well beyond its capabilities. Given political realities in the Federal Republic, this is simply a predicament that the BMVg and Bundeswehr will have to overcome in their effort to ensure that government policy is efficiently executed during a future deployment of the Bundeswehr.

Notes

Author note: I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. William T. Johnsen, David Harding, and Colonel Phil Mock (Ret) for their constructive and insightful comments made on earlier drafts of this essay. Donald Abenheim and LTC Jack Houchouer (Ret) provided considerable encouragement and assistance. Numerous officials in the BMVg and serving Bundeswehr officers provided essential assistance while conducting field work throughout Germany.


2. Discussing “command and control” is confusing at best, due in large part to misunderstandings concerning the nomenclature surrounding command authorities. For the purpose of this essay, I choose to define “national command” as distinguishing that supreme level of command that constitutes the authority to issue orders covering all aspects of military operations and administration, i.e., that basic aspect of national sovereignty. “Operational command and control” is used here to distinguish the operational employment of military forces. This is usually carried out by national commanders but can be transferred to an allied and/or foreign commander if so decided by a government. In the particular case of the Federal Republic of Germany, “national command” is not the issue currently facing defense officials. Rather, it is the manner by which the operational command and control of the Bundeswehr will be centralized in the BMVg. For authoritative U.S. definitions, see Office of the Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-01, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

3. Note, however, that it has been claimed that in the past due to the lack of an adequate operational department within the BMVg, senior defense officials and Bundeswehr officers have not been well prepared in assessing NATO war plans. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), August 29, 1993.

5. The Bundeswehr’s deployment to the Middle East was criticized for poor planning and execution by its Ombudsman. See Kölnner Stadt-Anzeiger, March 13, 1992.

6. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), March 1, 1992.


11. “The Chiefs of Staff of the Services are directly responsible also to the Minister, as the authority vested with the power of command, for the operational readiness of their force components. Thus, the Service Chiefs of Staff have dual functions: in respect of the task of the Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces, to develop and implement an overall concept of military defence, they are as ministerial heads of division subordinated to him in the hierarchy of the Federal Ministry of Defence. With regard to their responsibility of assuring the operational readiness of their Services, they are immediately subordinate to the Minister, without any intermediate authority in between. Accordingly, their respective staffs accomplish the functions of both a ministerial division and a Service command.” Federal Minister of Defence, White Paper 1985: The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces, Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defence, 1985, point 376, p. 168.

13. See KKL, p. 11.

14. See ibid., and Der Spiegel (Hamburg), August 2, 1993, p. 16.

15. Cf.: “... the working method of the Prussian-German General Staff has been adopted in the German language as an idiom. A very accurately prepared and successfully executed project is frequently rated ‘general staff-like’ (generalstabsmäßig).” See Christian O. E. Millotat, Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992, p. 7.

16. This, in itself, is but a manifestation of Germans’ misunderstanding of their own history. Kelleher makes the persuasive argument that German civil-military relations since the 1870s are terribly misunderstood. A comparison of civil-military relations with, say France, shows that the influence of the Generalstab was not all that different from its continental counterparts. Indeed, during the Nazi era, it was the Nazi’s principal aim to ensure “civilian” control over the Wehrmacht and it was General Staff Officers in 1938 and 1944 who attempted to assassinate the dictator Adolph Hitler. See Kelleher, “Defense Organization in Germany,” pp. 85-86.

17. One suggestion that was floated in 1993 was to create a Gemeinsamer Führungsstab der Streitkräfte (Joint Command Staff of the Armed Forces) “... to achieve tighter decisionmaking structures of the BMVg.” See Süddeutsche Zeitung (München), July 2, 1993.

18. See VPR, point 8, pp. 4-5; and KLL, pp. 4-5.

19. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), March 1, 1992.


21. See VPR, point 48, p. 31.

22. Führungsbereitschaften exist in each of the civilian and military Abteilungen, including Fü S, and Führungsbereitschaft BMVg. The latter comprises personnel from all Abteilungen of the BMVg.


25. See Der Spiegel (Hamburg), April 20, 1992, p. 93.

27. The phrase "kleine Lösung," is used by the well-informed defense correspondent Michael Inacker. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), August 29, 1993.

28. For an excellent overview of the army command structure, see Fü H IV 1, "Das deutsche Heer," Bonn, June 12, 1995, Chapter IV. I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Jack Houchouer, USA (Ret.) for providing me with a copy of this document.


32. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), October 2, 1994.


37. See Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), January 10, 1993.


40. The Koordinierungsstab consists of one-star general officer representatives from Fü S staff divisions I (Personnel), II (Military Intelligence), III (Political-Military Affairs), V (Logistics), and VII (Communications/Electronics), staff departmental directors from the three service staffs (Fü H, Fü L and Fü M), the deputy director of medical services, the staff departmental heads from the civilian Abteilungen, to include administration and law, armament, finance, social services, and the deputy head of the powerful Planungsstab (Planning Staff). Other section and department representatives are consulted, as required.

42. See KLL, p. 5.

43. See Sts/Org 1 - Az 10-02-01 vom 31.08.94, “Entscheidungsbläufe im Ministerium für die Einsatzzführungs der Bundeswehr im Frieden,” BMVg, Bonn, August 31, 1994; and Welt am Sonntag (Hamburg), October 9, 1994.


46. The exceptionally accurate defense reporter, Karl Feldmeyer, wrote that the term FüZBW was explicitly chosen so as to avoid any connotation to a Generalstab. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 3, 1995.
ITALY’S COMMAND STRUCTURE

Andreas Corti
and
Alessandro Politi

The current debate on Italian defense command and control structures is dominated by the discussion on reforming the highest levels of the command structure of the military.¹ This particular aspect, however, is only part of the wider subject which includes the issue of the highest political authority and national command over the Armed Forces. Even though there exists consensus on basic principles for change, the matter in Italy is far from resolved due to:

1. The lack of detailed implementation of the general framework established by the Italian constitution;

2. Inconsistencies in the body of legislation dealing with national defense;

3. A certain lack of interest in the matter, with few exceptions, among the Italian political leadership.

These factors have led to a privileged civil-military relationship (i.e., the Defense Minister-Chiefs of Staff relationship) relationship while exploiting less the means available to the President of the Republic and other parties whose role in the field of defense is established in the constitution. Thus, it is logical that the emphasis in the debate on reforming command and control should concentrate on military structures at the expense of the politically sensitive issue of the highest levels of the military command and control structure. This essay will attempt to present both sides of this debate in order to provide a balanced study of this increasingly important subject.
Political Command Authority

To understand the Italian military command structure, one must first appreciate how command is addressed at the national level. Here command and control reflects the Italian political decisionmaking process, which is imbedded in a rapidly changing political landscape. In sum, Italy has a complex political decisionmaking process based on the cooperation of different constitutional powers (the President of the Republic, Parliament, and the Government). This process is the product of the complex internal political structure of the country established after the Second World War and of its subsequent ossification.

Because Italy was split politically during the post-war era between the most powerful communist party in Western Europe and a number of coalition governments dominated by the Christian Democrat Party, careful bipartisan consideration was given to the need of avoiding an excessive concentration of power within the government even at the expense of its effectiveness. In fact, the government is led by a cabinet whose chairman, Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri (Chairman of the Ministers Council) does not enjoy the same powers as do his German, French, or British colleagues. Essentially, decisions traditionally have been made collectively, and the subordination of the single ministers to the Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri ranges from weak to almost nonexistent. In this consensus-driven forum, the single minister is de facto responsible for his decisions to the Parliament while the Presidente del Consiglio has to ensure the coordination of the different ministerial policies in the overall framework of the government program.

Nevertheless, in January 1993 the government then lead by Giuliano Amato established for the first time an important precedent, diminishing by decree the competence of the Ministry of Industry over the privatization of the state holdings. The move came very near to a practical dismissal of the Minister of Industry. In a two day sharp public debate, some jurists maintained that, while the Italian constitution does not explicitly allow for the firing of a Minister by the Council Chairman, neither does the constitution rule it out.

In practice, the decisionmaking process pivots around the Presidenza del Consiglio (the Council Chairman and his staff). In the Anglo-Saxon practice, he is referred to as the Premier, and we shall
adopt this word with the already mentioned caveats. The Premier in the Italian constitution also has the responsibility of representing the government before the Parliament and formulating guidelines for the government.

From the perspective of exercising national command, the Premier needs:

1. An effective down-up information flow;
2. A staff capable of analyzing situations and assessing associated decision making ramifications;
3. An assured real-time communication system with ministers, ministries, etc.

A first level of coordination between constitutional powers is the Consiglio Supremo di Difesa (Supreme Defense Council), established by the constitution and instituted by law in 1950. It is chaired by the President of the Republic and is comprised of the Premier (acting as vice-chairman) and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defense, Budget, Treasury, and Industry, plus the Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa—CSMD (Chief of Defense). The council considers problems, determines actions, and issues directives pertaining to national defense.

The law did not determine clearly the political weight and competencies of the council so ambiguities lingered until 1987. By that period the Paladin report (see below) formulated specific recommendations on the issue of higher command in instances of war and crisis. One year later an exchange of letters between the President of the Republic and the Premier determined the respective spheres of influence. The President, who constitutionally is the supreme commander of the armed services, "commands," of course, in name only. The Supreme Defense Council is now widely considered a forum of preventive consultation among constitutional powers, facilitating a better understanding of the tasks entrusted to each power.

The means actually available to the government for crisis management are the Comitato Politico Strategico (Political Strategic Committee (CoPS)) and an associated national command center. The CoPS was created by governmental decree in 1979 and is chaired by the Premier in any situation of perceived emergency or crisis concerning national defense. It has the task to monitor and evaluate crises and to formulate proposals for their resolution. In cases of exceptional urgency, it has the power to make decisions.
In addition to the Premier, the CoPS is composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Interior. It is supported by its own secretariat. Also taking part in the meetings are the Premier’s Under Secretary, the General Secretary of the Premier’s office, the CSMD, the General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and the Premier’s Under Secretary for the Intelligence Services (if appointed). Advisors to the CoPS can also include the three Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, the General Secretary of the Defense Ministry, the Director General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, the Police Chief, the Commanding General of the Carabinieri (the powerful military police), the Commanding General of the Gardia di Finanzia (Finance Police) the General Secretary of the Comitato Esecutivo Servizi Informazione e Sicurezza—CESIS (Executive Committee for Intelligence and Security Services), and representatives of other ministries. The CoPS is supported by a dedicated command center set up in 1980 and equipped with all the communication means necessary for the committee’s activity. This center can be activated following different alert situations and is connected with NATO centers.

Besides these organizational solutions, the government has always had in store so-called decreti cassetto (“drawer decrees”). These emergency decrees, generally classified, are ready-to-use bills that can be directly enforced by the government with the provision that they have to be ratified by the Parliament within 30 days. They have never been used because their constitutionality is problematic and, therefore, politically they are very sensitive.

Military Command and Control Structures

The current structure of the Italian military’s command and control is basically still the same as established by a series of bills passed from 1965 to 1972. This body of legislation had been prompted, at the time, by the need to define the command structure outlined in the first post-war reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces, which took place in 1947. That process, started in 1965, was dominated by two important and closely linked issues:

1. The roles, characteristics, and powers of the CSMD as opposed to the Chiefs of Staff of the services;
2. The roles of joint-services structures, planning, and command as opposed to those of the single services.
The end result of the process was the creation of a "weak" CSMD, allowing the services to maintain separate force planning and operational frameworks.

Since 1972, the whole reform process of military command and control has tried to reverse this approach, to strengthen the role and power of the CSMD and to create truly joint Armed Forces. So far, the results have been limited to a large body of proposals and studies circulated within the Armed Forces themselves and the Parliament. The studies were commissioned mainly from these two actors while proposals from the opposition were consistently brushed aside. Nevertheless, these governmental and parliamentary studies have not been turned into actual laws and have had no practical, comprehensive impact, notwithstanding some changes due more to practical improvements than to changes in rules and procedures.

The body of laws passed during the 1960s and 1970s is dominated by an evident, if at times glaring, inconsistency. The first group of bills passed in 1965 (specifically Bills 1477 and 1478) established a relatively clear superiority of the CSMD over the Chiefs of Staff. This superiority, though not complete, was meant to promote gradually a more streamlined and centralized command structure. The CSMD was directly responsible to the Defense Minister without any competing intermediate body or collective command structure. He had a relatively dominating role in the financial and operational planning of the individual armed services and had the authority to issue specific technical and operational instructions to implement the guidelines agreed upon by the Defense Minister. Such authority could be exercised not only over the Chiefs of Staff but also down the hierarchic line of command. Moreover the CSMD had to be consulted by the Defense Minister on the appointment of the Chiefs of Staff of the individual services although his was not a binding opinion. Bill 1477 regulated and strengthened the organization of the Central Defense Staff. The individual Chiefs of Staff had the task of ensuring the readiness, mobilization, and deployment of troops but not their actual employment in operations.

The command and control structure outlined above was reversed by a second group of laws and ministerial decrees passed from 1968 to 1972 (most notably Bill 200/1968 and Bill 781/1972). The effective superiority and preeminence of the CSMD outlined by Bills 1477 and 1478 were all but terminated in favor of a collective higher command structure. This structure was characterized by a substantial
dispersing of powers, and its net effect was to strengthen the independent role and autonomy of the Chiefs of Staff of the individual services and dilute the CSMD's responsibilities.

At the time there were three basic reasons for this turnaround. First, the resistance of the services to the powerful role of the CSMD. (This was compounded by the presence of two strong personalities in the posts of CSMD and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Aloja and General DeLorenzo, respectively. Their clashes, starting right after the 1965 bills, immediately placed a shadow on the new command and control framework). Second, a cultural climate in the second half of the 1960s which favored decentralization, vis-à-vis complex organizations, especially in politically sensitive bodies. Third, widespread rumors, few of which were ever proven in court or even substantiated, about a possible coup d'état in some sectors of the armed forces.

The political leadership chose to address reforming command and control by creating a system of built-in checks and balances based on a decentralized control principle. This line of conduct was chosen over the more obvious one of eventually providing stronger political supervision over the armed forces because Italy was politically split between a powerful communist opposition and non-communist staunchly pro-Atlantic political parties.

The pillar of the new system is the Comitato dei Capi (Chiefs of Staff Committee), created by Bill 200/1968. It is the highest advisory body of the Defense Minister. The committee effectively replaced the relatively monocratic high command structure with a collective one. While it took away many of the powers of the CSMD, the committee did not evolve into a limiting factor on the responsibilities of the Chiefs of Staff whose role was thus strengthened. The permanent members of this Committee are the CSMD, the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services, and the Segretario Generale della Difesa/Direttore Nazionale degli Armamenti—SG/DNA (Secretary General of Defense/National Armaments Director). The DNA is responsible for the technical-administrative defense sector and for directing the technical development and procurement processes.

The CSMD, who presides over the Chiefs of Staff Committee, has a certain degree of preeminence but is certainly not hierarchically superior. The service Chiefs of Staff, vis-à-vis the CSMD, are less senior but not subordinate. In this respect the CSMD is a simple primus inter pares. He can only convey to the Defense Minister the
proposals agreed upon within the committee. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, and not the Defense Chief, has become the main interface between the military organization and the Minister of Defense. The Chiefs of Staff Committee is charged with dealing with the most pressing military issues and problems, and it has primary responsibility in operational planning and in determining the general organization and structure of the Services and the inter-service sector.

Despite these powers, the committee, due to its collective structure, has become more of a coordinating body (or a "compensation chamber") and less of a center for autonomous decisions. This is also due to the fact that financial planning is determined with an a priori quota system among the services, depriving the CSMD and the committee of most of their latitude in shaping effectively the structure of the armed forces. Thus, the CSMD basically brings together into a single proposal the financial planning programs prepared by the services.

The Chiefs of Staff of the individual services are directly subordinated to the Defense Minister but not through the CSMD. This applies also to NATO emergency command arrangements which are actually linked to the political leadership through the Service Chiefs and not the CSMD. The Service Chiefs are responsible for the peacetime planning of their service. The CSMD can issue guidelines to the services but only within the narrow limits of his powers, and each of the Service Chiefs is the CSMD's consultant in the activity regarding the individual service. The CSMD can use his powers of direction toward the Chiefs only within the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Reform Proposals

National Command Authority.

Until now, the debate on national command during crisis contingencies has seen two proposals: one forwarded by the Paladin Committee and one by a study sponsored by the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici—CeMiSS (Military Center for Strategic Studies). Both proposals resulted from a tasking from the government but have not been published until recently. However, they are known inside the Italian strategic community at least in terms of their principal concepts.
The Paladin Committee, besides being instrumental in defining competencies between the Premier and the President of the Republic (as already mentioned) recommended a wide ranging reform of the then existing law on war and neutrality which dated back to 1938. This reform had the objective of defining juridically the state of crisis and of regulating relationships between government and Parliament. Currently, the complex internal political situation in Italy and the emphasis placed by government officials and members of Parliament on electoral reform and on ending the deep economic recession have put on the back burner a debate on any significant military and crisis management reform.

The *CeMiSS* research project begins from the Paladin Committee proposal to redefine by law the situations of war, neutrality, and crisis but contains a package of measures which are not purely juridical. Legislation should be introduced which should:

1. Modify and update the old pre-war legislation;
2. Define the scope and the limits of the application of the military penal code during out-of-area missions;
3. Diminish the power of the “drawer decrees” through a better definition of the Government-Parliament relationship during crisis contingencies;
4. Modify the legislation on the Supreme Defense Council;
5. Set up a dedicated situation center to support governmental decisionmaking.

At the governmental level the old *CoPS* should be replaced by the *Comitato Interministeriale Politico Strategico—CiPS* (Interministerial Political Strategic Committee), which should have the same membership as the Supreme Defense Council and, in some cases, be called together in the same time and place. This measure should largely defuse any potential conflict between the President and the Premier.

A problem jeopardizing this solution could be posed by the Cassese Reform that has proscribed any interministerial committee except the *Comitato Interministeriale Programmazione Economica—CIPE* (Interministerial Committee on Economic Planning). This reform, launched in December 1993 by the Minister for Civil Service, Sabino Cassese, has the aim to simplify coordination among ministries through abolishing unnecessary and redundant consultation fora. On the other hand, the *CIPE* should be conceived as a variable-geometry organ, capable of changing its
configuration according to the governmental agenda. More pragmatically, some exceptions could still be allowed for interministerial committees that are especially connected with national security issues. At the parliamentary level there exists the ability to coordinate the CiPS with the Committee on Information and Security as well as ad hoc parliamentary committees, e.g., the Chairmen of House and Senate or the chairmen of specific standing committees. In any case, Parliament should be involved in the early stage of a crisis and should be capable of blocking controversial governmental decisions.

Finally, the CeMiSS report proposes to create a situation center as an essential permanent tool for the political management of a crisis. This situation center should be easily accessible by the Premier and his ministers and would be managed by a National Situation Official, directly responsible to the Premier. The situation center must be connected with all the ministries, government organs, media, and countries relevant for the compilation of an around-the-clock situation report for the Premier. This continuous monitoring activity would be enhanced and focused when an emergency or a crisis begins to take shape. In this case personnel would be reinforced, and the information flow rapidly augmented to support decisionmaking. The information flow would be thoroughly managed not only in its collection but also in its dissemination among political authorities and in its public diffusion. Special support would also be available for immediate consultation with foreign political authorities, both in terms of secure communications and translation.

Military Command and Control.

The debate over the reform of the higher military command organization started almost immediately after its consolidation in the 1970s. Since then, one of the main features of the many attempts to set a reform timetable for the armed forces has been the drive to reverse the current situation by reinforcing the role of the CSMD and strengthening joint planning and joint operational capabilities. This process continued throughout the 1980s and resulted in a wealth of studies and proposals that paved the way to the comprehensive approach to the issue of the New Defense Model (NDM).3

The NDM has been the response of Italy’s Armed Forces and of the Italian defense establishment to the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolar confrontation. By Italian standards it was a document of unprecedented and unparalleled breadth and scope.
Presented to Parliament in November 1991 by then Defense Minister Virginio Rognoni, it was never approved, nor rejected, nor even voted upon. The NDM recommended major, if at times radical, changes in the Italian Armed Forces. For instance, the NDM envisaged radically improving the Italian Armed Forces joint capabilities, which is one of the document’s principal conceptual pillars. Much amended since, especially after heavy budget cuts and an ever-dwindling financial base for infrastructure and materiel, its guidelines are still used for reforming the armed forces.

The NDM establishes as one of its highest priorities the reform of the higher military command structure, which it considers a sine qua non to the reform and reorganization of the Italian Armed Forces. To accomplish this task, it outlined a two-stage process with the aim of strengthening the power of the CSMD over the Chiefs of Staff of the individual services and Chiefs of Staff Committee for the purpose of achieving greater jointness in the armed forces.

The first stage was a moderate reform that would basically bring the system back to its pre-1968 higher national command organization. The CSMD would be given hierarchical superiority over the other members of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, whose role would be reduced to that of advisory body. He would be responsible for the general planning of the services and would have command of the armed forces but only in emergency contingencies.

The second stage envisaged a more radical reform whereby the CSMD would be given permanent and complete command responsibility over the armed forces. The Chiefs would be directly subordinated to him and their responsibility limited to the readiness and deployment of forces and troops. Moreover, the DNA would be subordinated to the CSMD (currently the former is subordinated to the Defense Minister). Both stages provided for the strengthening of the Central General Staff.

A half-hearted attempt to implement the guidelines of the NDM was tried unsuccessfully by Defense Minister Andò. His proposed bill was a modest version of the first stage of the NDM’s command reform. Under his proposal the CSMD would become the highest advisor to the Minister (and not, as is currently the case, the Chiefs of Staff Committee), and the Chiefs would be subordinated to the CSMD. But the CSMD was not assigned supreme command in emergency contingencies.
Subsequent to the submission of the Andò bill, the pressure for reform has been growing dramatically, and this mainly for two sets of reasons:

1. The unprecedented number of foreign peacekeeping commitments of the Italian Armed Forces. (These operations overwhelmingly have a joint character and have brought home to even the most reluctant sectors of the services the need to strengthen joint capabilities and the need for CSMD to exercise national command over these operations.)

2. Heavy budget cuts which have hurt an already limited defense capabilities base.

These efforts at reform have compelled the armed forces to improve their overall integration and to avoid duplications in order to maintain existing capabilities. Moreover, the relative lack of a unified planning approach (a consequence of the collective character of the higher military command organization) is becoming a liability that far outweighs any benefit derived from antagonistic strategies in the competition for funds. On one side, the Parliament decides to make cuts, unpredictably and often without rational criteria. On the other, a comprehensive military reform plan is still lacking due to the Parliament’s inertia. Caught between the hammer and the anvil, the military services see that their lack of a “united front” is also being exploited by a political leadership faced with an extremely serious budget crisis. Hence, there is renewed interest in the reform of the higher military command structure.

In November 1993, the Senate passed a bill to restructure the higher military command organization. The bill is most notable because it was the product of a consensus achieved between the government and the armed forces and because it outlined, in some cases, a more radical approach to the issue, similar to the second phase of the NDM. Specifically, the bill strengthens the Defense Minister-CSMD relationship at the expense of the Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Services. The service chiefs and the DNA would be subordinated to the CSMD and not to the Minister. Thus, the CSMD would be the only member of the higher military command to have a direct relationship to the Defense Minister. The CSMD would have overall responsibility for planning, including financial planning. However, the bill did not clear up the ambiguities surrounding actual command. It did state that the CSMD had the “overall responsibility for the use of the Armed Forces.” But, unfortunately, it does not affect
the Chiefs of Staff control of the services’ command responsibilities, even in emergency contingencies.

The November 1993 bill has not been approved by the Lower House. It has nevertheless set an important precedent for the previous coalition government led by Silvio Berlusconi. The most important subsequent development in the process of reforming Italy’s higher military command structure has been the approval of Bill 1157 by the Defense Committee in the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the Parliament). Sponsored by the then Dini government, Bill 1157 includes many, if not most of, the demands that have been traditionally part of the “radical” reform platform. If approved by the Upper House (Senate), Bill 1157 will redraw the powers and role of both the military and political leadership, including the Minister of Defense.

The reform of the higher command structures is becoming the centerpiece of the strategy by which the Italian military is being forced to deal with an ever-shrinking budget and with the possibility of drastic changes to the fundamental structure of the Armed Forces themselves. Such is the case, for instance, concerning the bill on conscientious objectors approved in March 1995 by the Senate. As is expected with good reason, it would entail the demise of the draft system, still the mainstay of the Italian Armed Forces (especially the army). This is all the more worrisome for the military as there is no political consensus, so far, to initiate a structural reorganization of the armed forces to suit it for essentially a mostly volunteer force. The need to strengthen the effectiveness of the existing structures, and therefore streamline and reform higher command structures, is perceived as a fundamental step to ending a period of turmoil and uncertainty.

Nonetheless, the instability in the Italian political system, makes it impossible to predict whether this legislation will become law. In any case, for perhaps the first time in recent years and in particular after the presentation of the NDM, there seems to be real momentum in this long-awaited reform process.

Conclusion

For the time being, it is particularly difficult to foresee if the Prodi government will undertake the necessary steps to modernize the Italian national command and operational control structures and
organizations. The main parameters for evaluating the probability for reform are not necessarily linked to the political ideology of the coalition winning the elections. Probably the main factor to be taken into account is the influence of consolidated and intrinsically conservative lobbies inside the new government. This factor alone, in varying degrees and forms, cuts across the whole political spectrum. If these lobbies are influential enough, they will succeed in diverting the government's attention from foreign policy to the more mundane and urgent needs of unemployment, taxes, and institutional reform. Actually, most Italian political observers do not foresee a stable and strong government in the near future so the chances for a swift and comprehensive reform of the top command and control structure are quite dim. It is more probable that changes will be introduced piecemeal in critical sectors, leaving the solution of possible conflicts and contradictions to the political power play.

Notes


PORTUGAL'S DEFENSE STRUCTURES AND NATO

Thomas C. Bruneau

Portugal is concurrently undertaking or confronting change in all important aspects of her internal and external security and defense policies and structures. Internally, Lisbon redefined civil/military relations to assert civilian control of the armed forces. This has allowed the government to transform national command structures for the first time since the inception of democracy in 1976. Externally, the Portuguese have successfully negotiated with the United States an umbrella agreement that departs from all previous agreements and should result in a broader and more stable bilateral relationship with positive implications for Portuguese security. The Portuguese are currently responding to changes in NATO and their unique relationship within the integrated command structure, particularly regarding Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIBERLANT). The challenges are great because the Portuguese must deal not only with the implications of the end of the Cold War on NATO and their bilateral relationship with the United States, but also with the conclusion of their five hundred year colonial era and the military sponsored revolution that brought it to an end.

Portuguese Civil-Military Relations

Following the military coup of April 25, 1974, and the subsequent revolution, NATO allies worked closely with Portuguese officers and civilians to ensure the transition to democracy. Featured prominently in this cooperation was support for equipment and training programs to help the professionalization of the Portuguese Armed Forces, most of which were provided under separate base access agreements with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1982
NATO also supported the upgrading of Commander Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area, which had been established in 1967 as a Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC) under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), to Major Subordinate Commander (MSC) status, with a Portuguese vice admiral as the Commander-in-Chief (CINC). The upgrading and allocation of the top position (which had previously been filled by an American rear admiral who was also the head of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Lisbon) to a Portuguese flag officer was due to an initiative by the Portuguese and recognition by the allies of democratic consolidation, increasing professionalization of the armed forces and Lisbon’s greater involvement in NATO.

By the early 1980s, Portugal was a newly consolidated democracy. It was, however, unstable due to frequent changes in government and personalized political parties. In this context, and because the armed forces made the coup which allowed for the creation of the democratic regime, the civilian politicians were unwilling to confront the legacy of the armed forces and assert control. Even in 1990, the result was that the armed forces, whose role had been to fight the guerrilla wars in Africa (but from which Portugal withdrew by 1975), were bloated with 93,000 men. Moreover, 72 percent of the defense budget went for personnel costs, and the armed forces equipment was either obsolete or in short supply. The government had been unable to focus on the problem, and the services were unwilling to downsize and restructure themselves. The ranks were extremely top-heavy, and frustration was evident in the middle officer ranks due to poor prospects for promotion. In the early 1980s, there was no Ministry of Defense, and civilians lacked both the knowledge and instruments to exert control over the military. This situation began to change only in 1982 with the revision of the Constitution of 1976 that abolished the Council of the Revolution which was self-appointed, composed exclusively of officers, and, until that time, had exclusive jurisdiction over military affairs. In that same year the Law of National Defense and of the Armed Forces was passed providing the legal basis for restructuring and establishing civilian control. Finally, in 1986, the legal charter for the creation of the Ministry of Defense was approved.1

It was only after 1987, however, that significant changes in civil-military relations became possible. In the parliamentary elections of that year, the Partido Social Democrata (Social
Democratic Party—*PSD*) received sufficient votes to form the first majority government since the Revolution. It repeated its success in the 1991 elections. The *PSD* began to modernize Portugal in all areas with the greatest emphasis on the economy, which would inevitably change since Portugal joined the European Community (EC) in 1986 and thus became eligible to receive substantial funds for a wide variety of modernization projects. (The funds are to assist Portugal to meet the standards and levels of competition in a European economy without national borders. Unless Portugal modernizes and quickly, it will be marginal to the development dynamic of the European Union.) Modernization in the areas of security and defense lagged behind economic change and began with vigor only following the appointment of Dr. Fernando Nogueira as Minister of Defense in March of 1990. Nogueira was the second most powerful figure in the *PSD* with his own base of political support as well as holding the position of Minister of the Presidency. With a stable majority government and with Nogueira in charge, the *PSD* began to confront the legacy of the post-colonial and post-revolution armed forces.

**Reorganization of the Armed Forces and Command Structures**

The strategy employed by Nogueira between 1991 and 1994 became encapsulated in the three Rs of “Redimensioning” (or Resizing), Restructuring, and Reequipping.² The first refers to shrinking the size of the armed forces to a scale appropriate to the size of the country, its location, likely threats, and resources. The second refers to the institutions which would define policy and control the forces. The third concerns the need for equipment adequate for the roles and missions the forces were likely to undertake. The manner in which Nogueira pursued his plan to modernize the armed forces and defense policy is notable. He encouraged a national debate on the future of these issues by involving officers and the more informed civilians in a broad discussion on all aspects of Portuguese security policy. This resulted in public seminars and conferences, much debate in the media, and extensive publications from both military and civilian institutions. The civilians and officers interacted at a very high level with obvious benefits of mutual education. Nogueira sought to develop consensus on the future of Portugal’s armed forces and defense policy and thereby made the hard decisions due to the shortage of resources at
least comprehensible, if not popular, to the officers who were forced to retire or be unable to obtain new equipment. (This strategy is very different from Spain’s where there was no debate and no effort to achieve consensus.)

The results of the first R of Nogueira’s strategy, are as follows. The armed forces have been reduced from 93,000 in 1990 to a planned 42,000 in 1996, of which 20,000 will be career officers and enlisted men and women; a major decrease in the numbers of higher ranking officers with an initial 2,300 excess ranking officers and NCOs being retired or transferred to the reserves; and a decrease in the draft from eighteen to four months.³

The second R, Restructuring, has now been completed. Control has clearly and unequivocally shifted from the armed forces to civilians. Gradually, the legal and political bases of civilian control were established through the following actions:

1. Revision of the Constitution in 1982;

Based on these organic laws, the roles and powers of the Ministry of Defense (MoD), General Staff of the Armed Forces, the services, and other organizations have been defined. They also define the national command structure.⁴

These laws rationalized and reduced the structure of the armed forces, improved their joint integrated operational command and resources, and thereby should save money. Of key importance, these laws emphasize the operational structure of the armed forces. For instance, the law regarding the Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces General Staff—EMGFA) transfers all its roles not directly related to operations and war planning to the MoD, thereby cutting its staff in half. These transfers include political-military, financial, personnel, procurement, and promotion responsibilities. The staff of the Ministry expanded accordingly. The ministry now defines and executes Portugal’s defense policy. Previously, since the revolution, the EMGFA and the services had assumed very large roles in all aspects of defense policy.⁵ The Minister of Defense has two consultative bodies to draw upon, the Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacional (Higher Council for National
Defense—CSDN) and the Conselho Superior Militar (Higher Military Council—CSN), which together include key civilian and military officials. For an outside observer, who periodically visits Portugal, the shift in political power from the EMGFA to the MoD is not only defined legally but is also visually obvious. The seven story building, which originally housed the Overseas Ministry before 1974, was fully occupied by the EMGFA in the late 1980s. The MoD had an office or two there. Gradually, the MoD has taken over one floor and then another, and they now are spread throughout the whole building.

The law transformed the EMGFA into an operational command headquarters. There is now a chain of command headed by the Chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas (Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces—CEMGFA), or CHOD, who is supported by the EMGFA. The chain of command down from the CHOD includes the three service chiefs. The functions of the EMGFA are defined and elaborated in two main areas: planning (including decisionmaking support to the CHOD) and operations. These two functions are furnished respectively by the Estado-Maior Coordenador Conjunto (Joint Coordinating Staff—EMCC), which is similar to the U.S. Joint Staff, and the Centro de Operações das Forças Armadas (Armed Forces Operations Center—COFAR), which is analogous to the U.S. National Military Command Center. The COFAR normally has a small staff, but in the case of war it can be expanded to constitute a joint headquarters with a full staff. It draws upon intelligence and operations support and includes the Centro de Operações Conjunto (Joint Operations Center—COC).

In the old regime the services operated as autonomous ministries, and despite the revolution this continued until the late 1980s. The CEMGFA was primus inter pares in relation to his fellow chiefs of service staffs. All of this has now changed and the service chiefs’ autonomy is extremely circumscribed. Their roles are specifically defined in three of the organic laws of February 1993, which (together with the other two) allow no leeway for independent political roles. In the Portuguese parliamentary system there is virtually no room for the services to work independently to lobby parliament. Roles and procedures are clearly defined, the personnel in the MoD are acutely aware of their newly gained powers, and the number of actors is small enough so that little escapes the government’s attention.
The third R, Reequipping, is very problematic due to a severe lack of resources for defense. Portugal receives important funding from the EU for a variety of economic modernization projects. These funds are not for national security; with the requirement for domestic matching funds, the overall state budget is that much more constrained, allowing little leeway for funds for defense modernization. Portugal relied on funds provided through bilateral agreements with the United States and Germany for base access or through cascading arrangements under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The bilateral agreements have now been revised, and Portugal will no longer be able to count on these resources in the future. In the meantime, however, Portugal has received 50 Alpha Jets (training) from Germany; 20 F-16 Falcons from the United States bought with grant and loan funds; three MEKO-class frigates and five Lynx helicopters with national funds and some support from a group of donors; and M-60 tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers under cascading. In many cases NATO funded the infrastructure to support the new equipment.

Portugal and the Importance of CINCIBERLANT

Portugal joined NATO as a charter member, largely in recognition of her allowing Great Britain and the United States access to facilities in the Azores during the Second World War. She did not initially play an active role, for between 1961 and 1974 her focus was exclusively on fighting guerrilla wars in her African colonies of Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique. After the revolution and decolonization, with support and encouragement from NATO allies, Portugal began to increase its participation in NATO. The country lacked appropriate military assets, however, until very recently. Portugal’s main role in NATO consisted of providing access to facilities for specific allies or to NATO in general, including air bases, fuel and ammunition bunkers, communications networks, and the Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area Headquarters (IBERLANT). Her role was, then, as a provider of facilities. Nonetheless, Portugal’s role in NATO emerged larger than it might have as Spain (dominating most of the Iberian Peninsula and with four times Portugal’s population) did not join until 1982 and her membership at that time remained contested until the referendum in 1986. Even then, and in accord with the terms of the referendum, Spain’s membership did not
include full participation in the integrated military command structure.

The most enduring and concrete manifestation of Portugal's relationship with NATO is the location of IBERLANT in a prominent location on the outskirts of Lisbon and the fact that a Portuguese vice admiral is the Cinc. Holding the position of CINCIBERLANT is extremely important for Portugal, a point agreed upon by virtually all relevant military officers and civilian officials. Since neither France nor Spain is in the integrated military structure, IBERLANT is the only NATO headquarters in Southwest Europe.

CINCIBERLANT is important for Portugal for a number of different reasons. Even with the three Meko-class frigates, 20 F-16 Falcons, six P-3 Orions, and the like, the Portuguese are relatively short of modern military assets. Rather, through the location and command of IBERLANT, Lisbon has greater influence in NATO than it would otherwise. With the IBERLANT position the Portuguese can participate in a wider set of fora to increase their influence in Brussels. They have a seat at more tables and more involvement in NATO exercises in the region since they are run by CINCIBERLANT. Also, the Portuguese just recently collocated at IBERLANT their naval command to take advantage of the location and the modern communications systems. Significantly, CINCIBERLANT is dual-hatted as the Portuguese fleet commander. With the collocation, not only does the CINC save time in not moving between commands, but the Portuguese have improved and upgraded command and control facilities.

There are two anomalies concerning Portugal and IBERLANT. First, Portugal is the only MSC in Europe not under Allied Command Europe (ACE), but rather it falls under Atlantic Command (ACLANT). This is because the main role for IBERLANT has been defending the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) both north and south and into and out of the Mediterranean. Early on, the area of responsibility (AOR) of IBERLANT did not include a key element of Portugal's Strategic Triangle, the Azores, which were within the AOR of Allied Forces Western Atlantic Area (WESTLANT) under a U.S. admiral based in Norfolk (see Map 3). This was due to the importance of the Azores and the need to monitor Soviet ballistic missile submarines in the western Atlantic. Rather, the AOR extended from the north of Portugal to the Tropic of Cancer and from
Map 3.
IBERLANT and Portugal’s Strategic Triangle.

the Portuguese border to a line approximately 500 nautical miles seaward, but excluding mainland Portugal and coastal waters.

Portugal was long keen to have the IBERLANT AOR include the country’s Strategic Triangle. Consequently, Lisbon began discussing the inclusion of the Azores at the time that IBERLANT became an MSC and a Portuguese became the CINC in 1982. Finally, in response to repeated Portuguese requests, in 1988 IBERLANT’s AOR was reconfigured to include the Azores and the ocean around them out to twelve nautical miles. Some observers noted at the time that the Portuguese initiative was due to Spain’s decision to remain in NATO following the 1986 referendum.

Second, Portugal is not only the sole European country in the integrated military structure not within ACE, but its territory does not
fall under ACLANT. Rather, the continental territory of Portugal has an "associated" status with SACLAN. While Portugal’s most intense and concrete link with the integrated military command is via ACLANT, there will also be a link to ACE. The Portuguese Air Force will eventually be linked via IBERLAN to ACE for European air defense under the Portuguese Air Command and Control System (POACCS) and the Portuguese Maritime Buffer and AEW Link (POMBAL). This link will provide for the air defense of the land area under Commander, Portuguese Air (COMPOAIR—a sub-PSC) who will report through CINCIBERN to the SACEUR. The Portuguese Army has a mechanized brigade which had a NATO Cold War commitment in northern Italy and has formed an air-transportable brigade which will be Portugal’s contribution to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

The importance of IBERLAN to Portugal is highlighted by an intense debate which took place during 1993-1994 over the future of the headquarters as an MSC. The issue was already being discussed in 1992 but became particularly heated when threats were perceived to increase in 1993. The context at that time was one of discussions on the future of NATO, including: flat or declining budgets; command realignments eliminating one Major NATO Commander (MNC), Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), and one MSC (UKAIR); the possible implications of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) proposal for this headquarters; and the NATO Long Term Study on the future of alliance structures which some sensed would result in the disappearance of some MSCs.

There was also real concern in Lisbon that the United States in the post-Cold War era would be less interested in Europe and that SACLAN would become mainly U.S.-oriented to the detriment of the IBERLAN. In this context, the Portuguese Army, by far the largest service, lobbied for a position which would put Portugal and CINCIBERN under the SACEUR in order to increase the territorial (versus maritime) responsibility and presumably its missions. In their arguments they stressed the anomalies of Portugal being, first, the only European member of NATO in the integrated military structure not having its principal NATO connection to SHAPE and, second, her unique status in NATO as the only European nation whose land mass is not incorporated into the NATO command structure. Presumably these anomalies hold negative implications for the country’s security.
Portugal and Realigning IBERLANT

In response to the altered strategic environment and growing internal debate over Portugal's command relationships with NATO, the government created in early 1994 three high level study groups to review Portuguese interests vis-à-vis IBERLANT and report back to the MoD. One was based in the Ministry of Foreign Relations, another in the EMGFA with the services, and the third in the MoD. The results of these groups' efforts produced a decision in August 1994 to leave the situation as it was. In other words, to take no initiative within Portugal which might result in a change regarding IBERLANT. Rather, the government decided to continue monitoring domestic and international factors which could impinge on its interests in the Alliance.  

There are several reasons for the decision. Internally, it was impossible to achieve agreement among the services for change. The approach followed by the MoD in all important issues was to establish consensus before taking action, and that was not possible in this affair. Specifically, the Navy and Air Force opposed the Army. Externally, the NATO Long Term Study continued, and it was thought to be premature to support serious change until all the possible implications of this study were known. There is also much more involved in the overall issue of Portugal, IBERLANT, and NATO than the simple location of an MSC. It involves Portugal's overall strategy to maximize its room for maneuver and influence in a world of bigger and more powerful states. The Portuguese approach to issues of this nature is explicitly from a strategic perspective whereby they evaluate the prospects of gain and loss for their long term national interests.

Portugal has three principal issues it must monitor and balance in its approach to potential changes to NATO's integrated military structure. These are: 1) the implications for its relationship with the United States via the link with SACLANT; 2) the integration of the Azores in IBERLANT's AOR and Portugal's Strategic Triangle; and 3) the implications for Spain's status in the integrated military structure should there be a change in IBERLANT.

First, for the Portuguese, the link with the United States to the West is fundamental to balancing off the increasing weight of the East with European integration and NATO expansion, and particularly the growing economic and diplomatic strength of
Germany. During the Cold War, even though the Alliance's focus was on the Central Region, there was still considerable concern over the Alliance's vulnerable Atlantic sealines of communication to provide sufficient attention to IBERLANT's AOR and the Azores. With the end of the Cold War, and possible decreased interest by the United States in Europe, there could be little to balance the Alliance's focus on the East.

Thus, if the security spectrum, or stage, does not stop at the Atlantic but extends across it to North America, then Portugal is in the middle of the stage and not a small country on the distant western edge of Europe. Portugal is clearly in Europe, and her future is there. However, in terms of security, the Portuguese perceive that the country holds more value and attraction to Europe if she provides some kind of unique link with the United States. The Portuguese describe themselves as playing a "hinge" role through their geographical location between the United States and the rest of Europe. This "hinge" role is important for Portugal in attracting support both for leverage in achieving recognition for itself as relevant and for obtaining guarantees over the Atlantic islands of Madeira and the Azores. Should there be a military threat to the islands, the Portuguese with their limited assets could do little. SACLANT, therefore, could provide important support.

Concomitantly, the Portuguese perceive that the relationship with the United States is also reasonably valuable to Washington, in part because of the islands. In this regard, it is very important to note that the Portuguese and U.S. governments signed on June 1, 1995, an umbrella agreement to replace the series of agreements originating in the 1951 accord for base access. The new agreement includes base access, defense modernization, and the like, but is broader than all prior agreements and recognizes that the bilateral relationship should be grounded on more than a fairly limited security relationship.

In sum, the Portuguese put the relationship with the United States in terms of their "Euro-Atlantic" vocation. It is both pragmatic in terms of engaging the United States and also cultural and historical with the country's maritime (versus territorial) vocation. The Portuguese historically controlled much territory (Brazil, Angola, Mozambique, and enclaves on the Indian subcontinent, etc.) due to their maritime role while controlling no land (beyond their own small territory) whatsoever in Europe. Indeed, historically, the country survived largely because of its alliance with England. Following the
end of the Second World War, its relationship with the United States has replaced the earlier link with Britain. Consequently, it is fundamental to Portuguese security interests to keep the United States involved in as many ways as possible. One way is via CINCIBERLANT remaining under SACLANT (of necessity, an American), which promotes U.S. involvement. As a result of this concern, in the government’s white paper, the Portuguese government places emphasis on NATO, especially “. . . to preserve the transatlantic links.”

Second, Portuguese defense officials and strategists frequently refer to their “Strategic Triangle” which includes the mainland and the two island archipelagoes. The Portuguese define the islands as integral to the nation, and today there is no question on the islands themselves that they are part of Portugal. Also, they constitute a central element of the nation’s Atlantic orientation. As CINCIBERLANT is an MSC under SACLANT, there is currently no doubt that the Azores are included under IBERLANT’s AOR, pursuant to the aforementioned 1988 agreement. If CINCIBERLANT became an MSC or a PSC under the SACEUR, it is unlikely that the Azores would be included. Rather, it is logical that they would be reincluded under WESTLANT, thereby negating a Portuguese priority on integration of the country and IBERLANT’s AOR.

Third, Portugal’s role in NATO was greater than it might have been had Spain been allowed to join early on, or upon joining in 1982, had entered the integrated military command structure. Recent bilateral relations between Madrid and Lisbon are good, if somewhat distant in the defense and security area. Or, as one high ranking Portuguese officer put it: “We have good formal relations with the Spanish, but there is no content.” To raise the issue of IBERLANT, and particularly to focus on territorial missions, would perforce raise the polemic issue (for the Portuguese) of an integrated Iberian command. By mere fact of geography, not to mention military assets, Spain could justifiably claim the leadership role in this command, which would be totally unacceptable to Portugal. Whenever the issue of Spain and NATO surfaces, as at the time of joining in 1982 and the Spanish referendum in 1986, there have been a flurry of declarations in Portugal on the unacceptability of an Iberian command under Spain. When the Spanish joined NATO, it was reported that Portugal demanded that one of the conditions be that
Portugal remain linked to ACLANT and Spain be integrated to ACE.  

Yet, Spain is currently the largest contributor of forces to NATO exercises in IBERLANT's AOR. Their participation in NATO is increasingly similar to other members in the integrated military structure, and they increasingly occupy staff positions throughout the Alliance. Under the Spanish political party, Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), which initially opposed Spanish entry into NATO and held the referendum in 1986, formal entry into the integrated military structure did not occur. There was growing interest for greater integration among Spanish diplomats and officers, many of whom developed their expertise in security and defense by serving in NATO at Brussels and in liaison positions at SAACLANT and elsewhere. At this stage, some ten years after the referendum, there is little opposition from public opinion in Spain. Following the success of the opposition Partido Popular in the elections in early 1996, and the multiple changes in NATO, including its role in the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia the Spanish government decided in late November 1996, to negotiate joining the military structure of NATO. The Spanish want to have their own NATO headquarters in the Mediterranean, and also want to include the Canary Islands in its AOR.

In retrospect, the Portuguese pursued the most secure path in this nebulous and potentially risky political environment. It was concluded by Lisbon, following the three studies, that it was safer to leave things as they are and to monitor trends at NATO and elsewhere. In the report by the EMGFA the paper noted that it would be out of character for Portugal to take the initiative on this type of issue. That is not how the country historically operates. Considering its scarce resources in many areas and their resulting vulnerability, Portugal has been slow, conservative, and even reactive in international behavior. Further, it was necessary for the Portuguese to think strategically to emerge and mainly to survive as one of the first European nation states, occupying a small piece of territory in a part of Europe where centralizing tendencies resulted in large states such as Spain and France. Therefore, Portuguese officials are averse to taking needless risks especially when, as in the case of the future shape of NATO, the parameters surrounding an issue are unclear and changing. This sense is conveyed in a newspaper article on the topic of NATO commands. It is significant in itself that a national
newspaper publishes articles on topics as arcane as NATO command structures,

But the big objection that can be raised against Portugal's integration into SACEUR [sic] is strategic in nature. Since its foundation as a nation-state, Portugal has always looked to the sea for protection of its sovereignty. To resist Spanish appetites, our rulers have had to seek strategic strength beyond the mainland territory—in Madeira, the Azores, North Africa, and so on. . . . [T]he Atlantic border was therefore necessarily an open door to the world, and at the same time it provided the opportunity to offset the pressure from the mainland through alliance with the maritime power. 13

The direction that Portugal would take, and continues to take, regarding the future of CINCIBERLANG is highlighted by the statement of Fernando Nogueira on Mediterranean security at the informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Seville, Spain, September 28-30, 1994. The Minister highlighted problem areas in the Mediterranean region, noted Portugal's increasing interest and involvement there, and encouraged consideration of implementing the concept of CJTF through IBERLANG. As he stated, "Portugal has kept close attention to the development of this concept [CJTF] and we believe that the CINCIBERLANG should be seen as a potential and active participant." 14 Thus, rather than throwing open the whole issue of IBERLANG, ACLANT, ACE, and all that is involved in these areas, the Portuguese government decided to leave things as they were, work with NATO in general and IBERLANG in particular on new roles and missions within the current command structure, and participate in the larger debate in NATO on future roles and missions. This approach—to utilize institutional membership in security organizations to exercise political influence in foreign policy—is more explicit now than was previously the case. 15

**IBERLANG's New Orientation and Activities**

The staff at IBERLANG have been innovative and are working closely with the Portuguese government on future roles and missions for the MSC. 16 CINCIBERLANG has also been directly involved, which facilitates communications with the EMGFA as he is also dual-hatted as the Portuguese fleet commander. Since early 1994 the leadership at IBERLANG has continued to upgrade the operational capacity of the headquarters and develop a regional perspective on its future roles and missions. They have followed closely the
emerging themes in NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) and have focused particular emphasis on combined and joint operations, non-Article V missions, and the Mediterranean. They have sought to respond to the new and changing strategic reality with the emphasis on some of the key themes including “crisis response” and “stability enhancement.” As a result of these new activities, the command, rather than facing almost exclusively toward the West, is now oriented East as well in defining a regional perspective for southwest Europe.

The headquarters has elaborated a position statement on NATO and southwest Europe which it has promoted in Madrid, ACLANT, ACE, and NATO headquarters. With the overwhelming focus of NATO still to the east, IBERLANT seeks to direct attention of ACE to the southwest and of ACLANT to the southeast. IBERLANT officials argue that, as the only NATO headquarters in the region between Italy and the United States, they have unique capabilities to provide the core of a CJTF prior to deployment, and are including CJTF elements in their exercises. The headquarters staff has operational capacity honed through annual exercises and local knowledge, modern communications facilities, and they increasingly have had participation by more forces and services (i.e., it is increasingly combined and joint). They already have air defense capability through the POACCS and are making progress on the other capabilities.

The Spanish, who until recently had only one liaison officer (who was also the naval attaché) at IBERLANT, now have two liaison officers, and there are discussions in Madrid concerning future involvement. The United States has already seconded an army officer and the Portuguese are trying to increase the presence of Portuguese army and marines at IBERLANT. Currently, the headquarters consists of 63 officers and 150 enlisted, of which approximately 50 percent are Portuguese, 25 percent each U.S. and British, plus two German officers. The French liaison officer is also the naval attaché. The Deputy CINC and Chief of Staff is an American rear admiral and the Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Operations, and Intelligence is a British commodore. With the addition of the army officers, the staff is currently studying the addition of land operations for the command.

The staff has recently had meetings with officials from non-NATO and non-WEU countries, including from North Africa. Through these efforts (i.e., seminars and briefings), the headquarters
has assumed a much higher profile than it had previously. Obviously, the future of IBERLANT will depend upon the results of the NATO Long Term Study and developments with security implications in the region and beyond. However, at the minimum, IBERLANT has assumed a pro-active role which begins to answer a number of concerns including the following:

1. Potential roles and missions for the MSC when, as NATO in general, its founding purpose disappears;
2. A possible response to security problems in the region;
3. Involvement of the Spanish in a manner that recognizes their interests and assets without causing undue concern for the Portuguese;
4. Gradual evolution into a more joint command with the support of the Portuguese Navy.

There are many remaining outstanding issues, e.g., the relations with a possible new NATO headquarters in Spain and its AOR, the involvement of the French, relations with the WEU-sponsored EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, especially if the Portuguese dual-hatted fleet commander is in command, and the final agreement in NATO on CJTF. Nonetheless, at least there is innovative thinking and it is interactive with the command’s host country.

Conclusion

The Portuguese have recently completed a long process to structure civil-military relations similar to other European democracies. They have also revamped their national command structures to give the EMGFA a clearer and more operational role. As a small and relatively underdeveloped European country, the Portuguese lack resources to purchase much modern equipment. They seek to maximize their influence, and their security, through relationships with other countries and organizations, the most important of which has been NATO.

Portugal currently has a privileged relationship with NATO in that IBERLANT is located in Portugal and the CINC is a Portuguese flag officer. The Portuguese are not eager to risk the change implied in a shift of IBERLANT from ACLANT to ACE and are focused instead on new roles and missions for the command. In this, they are in accord with the innovative tendencies within IBERLANT itself which seek to upgrade their capabilities and define new roles and
missions in line with its regional location and security threats in the current environment.

Notes

Author's note: This chapter is based upon research conducted by the author between 1992 and 1996 on the topic of Portuguese security and defense policies with support from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, and the Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Most of the information is derived from interviews in the United States and Europe. The views presented here are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Navy or the U.S. Government.


3. Ibid.

4. The five organizational or "organic" laws were published in the Diario da Republica, February 26, 1993.

5. In The Portuguese Military and the State, pp. 71-73, Graham recognizes and discusses this fact. The contrast between the recent past and today is clear. For example, in the 1983 negotiation and 1988 renegotiation with the United States on the Lajes agreement, the EMGFA was prominently involved in all aspects. In the negotiations leading up to the June 1995 agreement, the prominent roles were taken by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense.


7. For details on this argument see Admiral Antonio Egidio de Sousa Leitao, "The Portuguese Strategic Triangle," NATO's Sixteen Nations, Vol. 31, No. 1, February-March, 1986, pp. 87-88. Admiral Sousa Leitao was chief of the Portuguese Navy.

8. Portuguese officials, interview with author.
9. Portuguese and American officials, interviews with author.


16. The information in this section is drawn from “NATO & SOUTH WEST EUROPE: A CINCIBERLANT PERSPECTIVE,” presented at a workshop at IBERLANT headquarters, Lisbon, December 5-6, 1994. The author also participated in this workshop.
PRESENT AND FUTURE COMMAND STRUCTURE:
A DANISH VIEW*

Michael H. Clemmesen

This essay covers the near past and a possible future. It attempts to hit two targets, one of which is fixed and therefore easy to kill with logic and pen, whereas the other is mobile and diffuse. Firstly, it outlines the background behind the part of the present NATO command structure that is relevant for Denmark. This analysis is done in a critical way in order to identify elements that should be changed in the coming round of command organization adjustments. Secondly, while not ignoring NATO's plans to create Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), this essay sketches a possible solution, not only for northern Europe, but for the whole of NATO Europe. The solution will mirror geostrategic conditions and possible missions rather than present arrangements. Thus, it can be seen as attempting to modernize the present NATO structure or as a new Western European Union—WEU (i.e., European) command arrangement for Europe.

Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP) Today

The headquarters of Commander Allied Command Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP), a Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC), was reconstructed as a truly joint and combined organization (see Chart 26). The previous collocated sub-PSC headquarters,

* Editor's note: This essay was written in late 1993. While aspects of the work may appear to some as anachronistic, the author's prescient analysis of NATO command structures and creative recommendations should be carefully studied.
Commander Allied Naval Forces BALTAP (COMNAVBALTAP), and Commander Allied Air Forces BALTAP (COMAIRBALTAP) were abolished as a result of the ongoing restructuring of the Alliance’s command structure. Their functions have been integrated into the BALTAP headquarters. As a result of this reorganization, the manning level of BALTAP was reduced by 32 percent, 7 percent more than the reduction goal for all NATO headquarters. The new headquarters has Operational Command (OPCOM) of all land, sea, and air operations in the Baltic Sea and Baltic Approaches area. Naval and naval air forces are allocated through Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) to COMBALTAP whereas the land and air forces are allocated through Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT).

Chart 26.
Present Command Relationships.

The current structure is the product of a major compromise effected within the Alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany demanded early-on in the reorganization process that all of its territory fall within one Major Subordinate Commander (MSC). This would, in effect, shift command responsibility for the defense of North Germany away from Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) to AFCENT. This demand was eventually accepted by the Alliance, but under special conditions. The compromise stipulates that AFCENT and AFNORTHWEST will coordinate their operational planning for the area with, however, the overall responsibility for conducting joint operations given to AFCENT.

190
In times of “deep peace” this double command chain from COMBALTAP is just another intriguing topic for discussion during meetings underlining politicians’ general lack of understanding of sound military organizational principles. This is, however, a simplification because each of the two MSCs is likely to find a model that suits the other as militarily unsound as was the political compromise. If the arrangement is to work in reality (and not just look awkward on paper), the inconsistencies resulting from the compromise must be confronted and reformulated.

The degree of likely friction arising from the arrangement depends upon, of course, the kind of challenge to the Alliance in the Baltic area and how far to the east military operations must be controlled. If operations took place in the traditional BALTAP area of operations at the Approaches, it is likely that everything would take place without problems. The responsible headquarters would be limited in their freedom of action by the routines worked out by more than thirty years of cooperation between Danish forces and the German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), especially between the two navies and the Corps LANDJUT. The local naval and air forces are more than sufficient to counter any likely threat. There is only a very limited need for land forces in the area of operations. The distance of the COMBALTAP area from any foreseeable land threat is likely to be considerable. The now reduced Danish and German territorial ground forces, backed-up by a couple of field army formations of brigade size, are probably sufficient to counter all realistic rear area threats and protect key national assets. In view of the fact that the number of field army formations available for operations between the Alps and the Baltic Sea is still falling, the LANDJUT’s army corps use in an operational reserve role east or southeast of the river Elbe is much more likely than employment in Denmark or northwest Germany.

The command structure, however, left several potential problem areas unresolved. One was the less than full acceptance by the United Kingdom, and especially by Commander Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe (COMNAVNORTHWEST), of COMBALTAP’s OPCOM of naval and naval air operations in the Baltic. The point of view competing with the argument for joint control of all forces was that all naval and supporting naval air forces should be directly controlled by one (i.e., naval) headquarters with the appropriate expertise. The fact that Danish and German naval officers manning
the naval portion of COMBALTAP have a extensive experience (compared to their allied colleagues) with operations in the complex maritime geography and potentially high air and missile threat conditions of the Baltic Sea was not considered as a weighty argument in the United Kingdom.

Even if this particular problem were settled (i.e., accepting a joint solution), another problem is likely to create friction. The control of operations along the Baltic coastal areas east of Schleswig-Holstein could lead to a fight over turf and result in reduced efficiency. Further east, the routines from the Cold War period are less relevant. If NATO faced a crisis in that part of the Baltic Sea, the two MSCs could experience complications providing guidance to their common PSC in the area. They could also find it difficult to find suitable forces for the operations. Even if a proper directive and a force allocation were worked out, it could complicate finding a working structure for the close control of the forces. For example, the naval and naval air operations as well as the air operations over the Baltic Sea, will be commanded by BALTAP. In the case of the naval and naval air forces this would take place through the Danish and German national maritime headquarters. The air operations over land will be commanded by Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), a PSC of AFCENT.

As this forward zone is a more likely area of operations than the Baltic Approaches, the lack of clarity is unfortunate in peacetime training and would be inexcusable during war since it could lead to a disaster. The only way to ensure the necessary degree of close coordination and control would be to have a “Coastal Front” joint organization similar to the former Warsaw Pact arrangement of the same name. At a minimum there should be one headquarters controlling all air and naval air operations.

Background to the Present Regional Command Arrangement

The present command structure forms the starting point for any further development. Therefore, it is useful to understand the aims and priorities of the four NATO states either involved in, or effected by, BALTAP. The national positions are not available in open sources. The following picture mirrors the author’s conversations with some of the national witnesses.
Denmark's principal objective was to maintain a decisive influence over planning for the defense of its national territory. In this respect, Denmark is like any other state. If this influence were undermined, transfer of authority (TOA) to NATO in crisis or war would likely be delayed and more forces would be kept under national headquarters. Danish representatives also wanted to underline the fact that Denmark, together with Schleswig-Holstein, constitutes one military-geographical entity and consequently controls access to the Baltic through the Danish Straits and the Kiel Canal.

Therefore it was seen as an illogical and strategically harmful solution to establish a command area boundary at the Danish-German border. According to the Danish point of view, the best solution would have been to maintain the previous structure. An additional motive was Denmark's support of Norway. Copenhagen wanted to keep its Nordic neighbor linked, in a command sense, to Central Europe. As the Germans rejected the proposition of leaving the MSC-boundary dividing its territory, this goal was impossible to attain. Therefore, all of BALTAP had to go to the same MSC as Schleswig-Holstein, i.e., AFCENT.

Copenhagen also wanted to maintain the joint character of the command structure. The archipelagic character of the country's geography made any loosening of the common direct control of involved units from the three services a significant step backward and away from efficiency. The need for good mutual operational understanding is so evident to the Danish armed services that general staff training has been carried out in joint courses since 1977. Besides these general interests, the Danish Navy wished to maintain its role outside the Baltic Sea.

Norway sought to protect national influence over the defense of its territory. Oslo also wanted to avoid being isolated from continental Europe by being grouped alone with the United Kingdom with the certain result that Norway would be dominated by that country. That could be avoided by keeping Denmark within the same MSC as Norway. As is the case with Denmark, Norway insisted on keeping national control at the PSC-level and on maintaining a joint headquarters.

Germany's position was linked to its newly gained full sovereignty. One logical consequence was the removal of the only MSC-boundary on the territory of any Alliance country, that which divided northern Germany between AFNORTH and AFCENT. In
addition to dividing effectively in an operational sense the German Army's defense of its northern territory, this MSC boundary was one Cold War manifestation of the singularization of Germany, which Bonn was intent upon rectifying. Perhaps more parochially, the 
Bundesmarine (German Federal Navy) wanted to maintain or extend its role in "blue water" operations.

The United Kingdom, for its part, sought to maintain its relatively strong participation and consequently to influence within the Alliance's command structure. London also sought a continuation of the high degree of NATO financing of her national service headquarters. The then prevailing trend toward service, so-called "functional" headquarters, was not resisted by London. London put strong pressure on Denmark to accept a move of the MSC boundary to the German-Danish border.

The compromise command reorganization gave the Germans what they wanted. The United Kingdom obtained command of AFNORTHWEST and maintained NATO financial support of both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force headquarters, even if both an MNC/MSC (i.e., Commander-in-Chief Allied Command Channel (CINCHAN)/Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Eastern Atlantic Area (CINCEASTLANT)) and an MSC (UKAIR) headquarters were forfeited. London did not, however, succeed in obtaining full AFNORTHWEST control of all naval and naval air operations in the area. Denmark got most of what it wanted, but its persistence irritated the British. The double command links from BALTAG to MSC-level were not very sound from a military point of view, and consequently part of the arrangement is still challenged. But the lack of clarity has resulted in some advantages. Norway is able to maintain a link to continental Europe via AFNORTHWEST's responsibility in the Baltic Sea, and the Danish Navy strengthened its links to "blue water" operations. Only Norway failed in attaining one of its primary objectives.

Current Strategic Environment and the Command Structure

When the present command structure was agreed to, the one unifying objective shared by all countries was to save resources and thereby prove to their respective publics and politicians that NATO had realized and accepted the change in the international situation. When changes in strategy and command structure were decided and
implemented, the commonly accepted threat perception in the Alliance was of the then existing Soviet Union returning to a policy of confrontation and possible aggression against the West but only with the capability of launching operations along one axis due to Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) reductions.

Thus, the “reformed” command structure of NATO in Europe does not address the situation following the break-up of the Soviet Union, the gradually deeper cooperation between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and the organizational need related to creating a European Defense and Security Identity. Additionally, there is growing recognition of the real demands of post-cold war crisis management with its different formalized military “body language.” Rather, what the Alliance retains is the ability to control a quick build-up of land and air forces, well-suited to face down a sudden massive presence of tank-heavy forces just outside alliance territory, and thereby manage a good old Cuban-type crisis at the same time as we maintain a forward presence in the Norwegian Sea. If the Warsaw Pact-type land forces invade anyway, we stand ready after mobilization of Main Defense Forces to meet and defeat the invaders by counter-concentration at the same time as we defeat the ex-Soviet Northern Navy and defend Northern Scandinavia.

In order to be able to control this completely anachronistic worst-case scenario, NATO keeps two levels of well staffed headquarters below the European MNC, i.e., Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), as well as its reaction force headquarters. Very few of these headquarters are truly joint even if recent war experience reconfirms that all likely military challenges must be controlled in a joint and combined framework at both operational and higher tactical levels. Establishing “functional” commands today must not be seen as just “new speak” for the establishment of comfortable, international, exclusive one-service clubs. Organizational theory explains convincingly why such things happen despite professional experience.

This is the reason why we have an Alliance strategy underlining crisis management that attempts to be equally effective across the buffer of states that border the crisis areas (states NATO is reluctant to admit because it does not want to have to react to each and every crisis). At the same time, we are left with an operational doctrine that mirrors what we should have done when we had a threat against
Western Europe because that doctrine expresses German 1944 experience on the Eastern Front even if it has now been given the "new speak" name of counter-concentration. On top of that, we have a command structure that tries to rationalize the lowest common denominator of the Alliance.

Reexamining the Command Structure: *Tabula Rase*

The challenge facing the Alliance is that of changing and reducing the command structure in size to a level where it still can:

1. Control low-level military operations in the Alliance area, including the maintenance of forward presence;
2. Control peace support operations at the periphery of the alliance area;
3. Support the maintenance of member states forces' ability to work together in a joint setting and thereby help obviate moves to renationalize defense policies in the Alliance;
4. Produce a skeleton NATO staff to support an expansion in Alliance forces involved in a worst case scenario where forces can be effectively controlled;
5. Form the framework under which WEU forces and France can be brought under NATO command arrangements.

A first analysis of the events of the latest couple of years and current international trends has led the author to the following criteria and conclusions about a future NATO command structure.

1. *All headquarters with a wartime mission at the operational level must be combined and joint.* Depending on their particular geographic and operational environment, NATO headquarters must be organized to control either the forces of two services (land and air) or of all three services (land, naval, and air). Establishing or even keeping "functional" NATO headquarters at the operational level of war can no longer be justified. No matter whether the mission is expanded peacekeeping, crisis management involving a substantial military capability, peace enforcement, or defense against an invasion, the Alliance will inevitably respond jointly. Only traditional peacekeeping operations are likely to give examples of operations dominated by the forces of one service, the army. Thus, a multinational corps or division headquarters should be sufficient to control the military element of such missions.
2. Not all parts of the European NATO area have to be covered by operational NATO headquarters with the present risks and challenges facing the Alliance. The Alliance area can now be divided into a clearly delineated rear area including the West-European Atlantic littoral and other areas that are joined geographically and otherwise to the periphery. The territories of the United Kingdom, France, and Portugal could be covered by base area commands. The forces and personnel of the United Kingdom and France would still be linked to forward operational command areas.

3. In the areas adjoining the periphery, there should be a joint headquarters for each “sub-area” in the Alliance with a well-defined mission in any war or crisis in that particular “operational direction.” The missions would be, to a high degree, defined by the geographic singularity of the area and the derived suitable mix of communications, intelligence, tactical, and logistical routines, equipment, and organization involved in operations in the area. These NATO headquarters would be responsible for the Alliance’s military cooperation with the new non-member partners so that they could familiarize themselves with their counterparts and develop the basis for future possible combined operations.

4. The boundaries of responsibility between these new NATO commands and the forces actually allocated to them would not be decided before an actual crisis made it necessary and possible. A significant overlap of interests would lead to enhanced flexibility and efficiency as well as to a better understanding of the situation and problems in the neighboring command areas.

5. Under a reformed command structure, these headquarters would also plan for their employment in peace support operations. Said operations could be in other areas along the periphery or farther away where the mission area demands the same sort of professional-military geographical profile as the normal missions in and from its “home” area.

Political-geographic brainstorming could lead to the following possible and well defined missions in the SHAPE area (see Map 4):

1. The North Scandinavian, Norwegian Sea, Kola Peninsular area. The geography and Arctic climate make the headquarters and involved forces suited for operations in any coastal, mountainous area. This headquarters would be responsible for implementing partnership cooperation with the Russian forces in the area and possibly with Finland and Sweden if these countries decided to
participate. The "geographic singularity" makes the headquarters potentially useful in contributing with expertise to peace support operations in mountainous areas, e.g. along and beyond the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea coasts.

2. The area of the Baltic Littoral from the Approaches to the Aland Islands. Geography would give this headquarters and involved forces routine knowledge of joint operations in shallow waters (mine warfare, air and naval air, coastal surface, amphibious and submarine forces, close tactical joint cooperation), influenced by the close functional connection to any operations inland to the south or east. It would be responsible for the realization of partnership cooperation with Polish, Baltic, and Russian forces in the area as well as with
Finland and Sweden. The “geographic singularity” makes the headquarters potentially useful in contributing expertise to peace support operations, e.g., along and beyond the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea coasts.

3. The area of the North European Plain. Geography dictates giving this headquarters and involved forces routine expertise in deep, mobile, potentially high intensity, air-land operations. It would be responsible for the realization of partnership cooperation with Polish and Belarus forces in the area. The “geographic singularity” makes the headquarters potentially useful for the control of crisis management and peace enforcement operations in relatively open areas with a well developed infrastructure.

4. The Central/Eastern European Mountains Area. Geography would require this headquarters and involved forces to be well-versed in deep, potentially high intensity, air-land operations in mountain areas. It would be responsible for the realization of partnership cooperation with Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Ukrainian land and air forces in the area. Its “geographic singularity” makes the headquarters potentially useful for the control of crisis management and peace support operations in mountain areas with a relatively well developed infrastructure.

5. The North Italian, Danube Basin Area. The geographic conditions of this region would give the headquarters and involved forces routine experience in deep, potentially high intensity, air-land operations in a mixture of mountains and plains. It would be responsible for the realization of partnership cooperation with Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian forces in the area and possibly with Austria and Slovenia if these countries decided to participate. Its “geographic singularity” makes the headquarters potentially useful for the control of crisis management and peace support operations in mountain areas with a relatively well developed infrastructure.

6. The South Italian, Central Mediterranean Area. Geography would provide this headquarters and involved forces with expertise in joint sea control and amphibious operations. The area controls the central Mediterranean and the entrance to the Adriatic Sea. It is the natural base area for any peace support and crisis management operations related to Albania and the Eastern Maghreb.

7. The Aegean, Black Sea Littoral Area. Geography provides the headquarters and involved forces with routine joint operations in
coastal and archipelagic waters. It would be responsible for the realization of partnership cooperation with Bulgarian, Romanian, Ukrainian, Russian, and possibly Georgian forces in the area. It is, however, unlikely that any changes in this area can take place with the continuing strained Greek-Turkish relations and potential conflict.

8. The Eastern Turkey, Caucasus Area. Geography gives this headquarters and involved forces detailed experience in air-land operations in mountain areas with weak infrastructure. It could be responsible for the realization of partnership cooperation with forces of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. With the present Russian politics in the area, it is unlikely that this local NATO headquarters would be accepted in a peace support role beyond the NATO area itself. On the other hand, the crucial role of such a headquarters in NATO crisis management was underlined in the Gulf War.

9. The Western Mediterranean Area. Geography gives this headquarters and involved forces routine knowledge of joint sea control and amphibious operations. The area controls the Western Mediterranean, including the Strait of Gibraltar. It is the natural base area for any peace-support and crisis management operations related to the Western Maghreb.

Derived from the above outlined model of a future Alliance command structure, the following consequences regarding the current organization become apparent:

First, NATO does not need more than one level of headquarters between SHAPE and the highest service headquarters level. This means that the present MSCs, PSCs, and probably the reaction force headquarters could be replaced by one, geographically defined, level of “three/four star” headquarters. In view of the very deep cuts made in the military forces from the Atlantic to the Urals area, NATO is not likely to face an immediate threat it cannot control properly with one level of joint/operational level headquarters. Neither the threat/challenge nor the span of control of own forces will be as demanding as was the case during the comparatively rich time of the Cold War confrontation.

This does not mean, however, that all these headquarters would have the same role and level of command and control of their forces. In any situation where NATO has a crisis in East-Central Europe whereby it is necessary to give missions to more than one of the above suggested headquarters, only one of these should be given operational
command of all tactical forces involved (including relevant naval air assets allocated to the area). Exactly which one would depend on the actual situation. The best suited and situated should be used.

Having only one level of subordinate headquarters makes it necessary to adjust and strengthen the MNC level. In order to support continued interoperability of member forces in a situation where the subordinate headquarters maintain or deepen their geographical expertise, common tactical doctrines and procedures for land and air operations should be developed in staff elements adjacent to SHAPE. The tactical doctrines for different types of naval operations could be developed in a cooperation between SHAPE and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Other adjacent elements could specialize in developing expertise, techniques, and procedures for crisis management and peace support operations. Having the elements linked only to the MNCs makes it easier for the French to participate and thereby enhances the uniting of WEU and NATO structures.

Second, all headquarters should be both combined and joint. They should, however, not be manned for the worst case but be seen as cadre staffs with a high degree of professional knowledge about all types of likely operations and practical possibilities and limitations within their areas and other similar geographical areas. Thus, they should be able to control crisis management operations of limited duration within their own area without reinforcement or be deployed fully or with part of the headquarters for peacekeeping operations elsewhere.

For longer or more demanding missions, they would be reinforced by NATO members, other states, or possibly with elements from the MNC level, United Nations aid organizations, etc. The limited peacetime strength of headquarters could contribute to a greater capability for mobility and less reaction time if properly tailored. The need for mobility and flexibility is apparent since missions cannot always be foreseen. Consequently, headquarters cannot be sure to have the support of such fixed installations as the existing command bunkers. This will mean new demands for common NATO investment in modern mobile communications systems for the headquarters or plans for substantial support by U.S. means. There is no way to avoid these changes in structures and attitudes if the command structure is to develop capabilities relevant to the new security environment. The old, fixed system with the one
controlling scenario is only relevant for the arrangement of rear area functions.

*Third,* the new headquarters should not only have physical flexibility, but they must mirror political and military reality. One part of that aspect of reality is that the officers of the major military powers of the Alliance (the United States, Britain, France, and to some extent even Germany) do not trust the levels of professionalism of the officers of the smaller nations enough to accept them as Commanders-in-Chief. They may prove themselves brilliant staff officers, but the lack of combat command experience of their forces and the very limited chances they have of getting any relevant experience in their small, mission-specialized defense forces make it unlikely that they can produce qualified commanders suitable for higher levels.

This justifiable lack of confidence could be ignored during the Cold War period. All important commands were in the hands of major powers even if a few PSCs (like BALTAP) had small power commanders. Yet, they could only be responsible for the defense of their own countries or some part of Germany, but they would take their guidance from the great power professionals. In the new situation where the command structure will have a wider spectrum of missions, some of which include risking the lives of great power soldiers in time of peace. This means that all commanders of headquarters with a potential role in crisis management outside the NATO area and peace enforcement should come from the United States, Britain, France, or Germany.

With the newly decided *modus vivendi* in NATO-WEU relations, France now has a politically palpable means of dealing more openly with NATO and exerting positive influence. The lack of confidence in small-state officers, however, has to be balanced against the fact that even small states must have a decisive influence on their own future. This means that a state covered by a command area must be given real influence in the headquarters of that command. Consequently, the relationship between commander, deputy, and chief of staff will have to be defined in a way that reflects both the need to honor professional reality and the need of small countries to be able to have influence over their fate.

*Fourth,* the composition of the headquarters also has to mirror another aspect of the new situation. If it is used for crisis management outside its normal area or for peace support operations, it is likely
that it has to adjust its manning because some member states do not want to participate even with staff officers. On the other hand, it is likely that officers from other participating states will have to be integrated. In a situation where the size of the headquarters is strictly curtailed this is only possible if all staff officers are very well trained and screened for the task.

Conclusion

The objective of this essay has been to argue that the current NATO integrated command and operational control structure desperately needs to be reformed. Too many resources are being locked into structures which are ill-suited to the current security environment. Given declining resources available for defense in the Alliance, these “fossils” could effectively inhibit the implementation of the Partnership for Peace and the CJTF programs. To be sure, there is no question or argument concerning the consensus within the Alliance to maintain its collective defense capabilities to support Article V operations should the need arise. Thus, the Alliance needs to reform its command and control structures to support both Article V and non-Article V missions. While difficult, it is not impossible.

The work on building CJTFs is still in progress. At the present time it is likely to be an ad hoc organization. Personnel and equipment from MSCs and PSCs in support of these task forces will only be used in support of controlling peace keeping operations. Thus, from a professional point of view this is a less satisfactory solution than it may be from a political. What is suggested in this essay is the creation of a number of headquarters that could be augmented to serve as CJTFs while retaining their capability to exercise operational control over Alliance formations in Article V operations. As such, they would all have a cadre with routine expertise in working together and with well-established knowledge of the demands of the geographical singularity of the area and would not be specialized in one type of operation. The facts of the matter dictate that a flexible structure of this type, if not exactly as outlined above, is appropriate, as it is impossible to foresee the demands of future peace support and crisis management missions.
NATO RESTRUCTURING AND ENLARGEMENT: THE DUAL CHALLENGE

John Borawski

The process of enlargement is on track and we are convinced that the overall adaptation of the Alliance will facilitate this process.¹

North Atlantic Council
Berlin, June 3, 1996

U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry portrayed the June 1996 North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin as a “truly historic change” for NATO, ensuring its “stronger and more united future.”² From the face of this communiqué, his characterization was entirely appropriate. The longstanding, contentious debate over the proper role of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) had ostensibly reached a final verdict: ESDI would henceforth be shaped within the Alliance. The alternative of an autonomous ESDI role—which, in any event, none of the European allies sought or could afford to provide, imaginative political declarations extolling the potential of the Western European Union (WEU) notwithstanding—was no longer even an agreed theoretical option.

Even further, however, the Berlin decisions indirectly cast doubt upon the need, if any, for the WEU. This is particularly questionable since the ministers recognized that not only all 14 NATO European allies, but all 27 NATO Partners, under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, may seek to participate in CJTF planning and execution. Nevertheless, NATO or NATO nations, principally the United States, would offer communications, strategic lift, installations, intelligence, and other assets to coalitions of the willing through Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) serving under WEU “strategic control” and “political direction,” either at WEU initiative
or in response to a request from the European Union (EU). Beyond CJTFs, the restructuring of the Alliance being examined in the Long Term Study (LTS) launched in June 1992, and flowing from the new strategy implementation directive, MC-400/1, adopted in May 1996, would enhance the European character of the Alliance, including more European representation in a streamlined command structure to "allow our European allies to take on even greater responsibilities."³

Of course, when the fruits will fully ripen remains to be witnessed. President Bill Clinton suggested on September 6, 1996, that a 1997 NATO Summit should "finalize work in adapting the NATO military structure to provide a more distinctive European role with full Allied participation."⁴ NATO accepted the challenge on December 10, 1996, and set the date for July 8-9, 1997, in Madrid. Yet, clearing a common path through the political minefield of Alliance restructuring may obviously prove prolonged and fractious. How will France, seeking a closer relationship with NATO after almost 30 years, or Spain, after 14 years, be accommodated? What does greater "European responsibility" really mean, given the preponderance of only France and the United Kingdom among the NATO European contribution to the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia? How can a new structure introduce a greater measure of reposes in the Eastern Mediterranean? Which nation will willingly forfeit headquarters and senior officer billets?

Restructuring is hardly a novel challenge for the Alliance. What is new in this revisited exercise is the prospect of NATO enlargement to Central Europe. The first new members—assumed to be the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia—are expected to be invited to begin accession negotiations in 1997 with a view to membership on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of NATO on 4 April 1999. Beyond these initial four nations, as many as seven other countries—Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia—are standing in the queue, and in principle NATO enlargement is open to any qualified European state. Enlargement will, hence, not prove a short term task under foreseeable circumstances, and new NATO warriors will join a NATO quite different in character and function from that which still stood when Communism imploded.

This brief and very preliminary contribution identifies seven interrelated political and military areas, in no particular hierarchical
order, that capture the inevitable link between NATO command restructuring and Alliance widening:

1. Buttressing the transatlantic relationship, the bedrock of NATO;
2. Reassuring Russia without conceding even de facto veto power by Moscow;
3. Intra-alliance bargaining;
4. Tailoring the conditions for new NATO membership;
5. Avoiding structural disruption when absorbing new allies;
6. Enhancing the PfP program to reassure those nations not admitted in the first wave, and to continue to attract the interest of Partners not seeking membership to participate in NATO outreach and collective security operations such as IFOR;
7. Addressing the challenges of assigning priorities for the Alliance.

The Transatlantic Relationship

NATO’s command and decisionmaking structure is still geared for the challenges and the battlefields of the past. The time has come to streamline and modernize NATO, recognizing that our challenge is no longer simply to execute a known plan with already designated forces, as it was during the Cold War. . . . These kinds of internal changes will ready NATO for enlargement, and will allow us to better respond to the future challenges to European security and stability.5

U.S. Secretary of Defense
William Perry
Munich, February 4, 1996

Secretary Perry’s remarks speak for themselves. Although engagement in Europe is a permanently operating factor of U.S. national security (and that of Europe as a whole, Russia included), the Clinton Administration’s “comprehensive strategy for European security”6 envisages a package outcome combining an enlarging NATO, a transformed command structure able to perform new missions efficiently, the “super PfP,” and partnership with Russia and Ukraine.

Despite sharp transatlantic disputes since the demise of the Cold War over trade, sanctions, anti-terrorism, and Bosnia, there remains no substitute for American leadership in NATO. Even though, out of
“mission creep” concerns, the Administration did not intervene with ground forces as 200,000 fatalities resulted in Bosnia leaving the diplomatic initiative to an inefficntual Europe and “peacekeeping” to the prolonged disaster so cynically termed UNPROFOR, it was, in the end, only the combination of the Dayton Peace Agreement and the IFOR—both U.S. led—that made the difference. However, despite the American-led drive to reform the Alliance, the United States may not wish to replay this kind of scenario again, wherever it might occur, and thus wants to ensure that the NATO structures permit the European allies and NATO Partners to assume their responsibilities at an early stage with effective means. Should they ever choose to do so and under what circumstances are entirely different questions, but any major military operation will invariably demand a direct U.S. role, as Bosnia belatedly demonstrated.

Likewise, it is the Clinton Administration which, despite preceived phases of temporizing and attachment to the abstract catchphrase “no new lines,” has been at the forefront of NATO discovering détente—liaison with the Warsaw Pact countries in 1990, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council with the former Warsaw Pact and former Soviet republics in 1991, and PfP and the “perspective” of enlargement in 1994. By contrast, in Europe, apart from German Defense Minister Volker Rühe and Danish Defense Minister Hans Haekkerup, pro-active governmental voices seem to have taken a sabbatical. As a result, there being no alternative to U.S. leadership of the Alliance, a transatlantic consensus can only be sustained if adaptation and enlargement go forward together.

Reassurance

Wearisome and emotionally-charged to some, ever open-ended to others, since at least 1993 the debate has persisted within governments, parliaments, and policy elites on whether and under what circumstances NATO should enlarge. There will always be those who view NATO enlargement as natural history. There will likewise always be those who place Russia above all else, either arguing that Russia will never accept enlargement and should it go forward the post-Cold War cooperation gains will deteriorate, or that enlargement should only occur if Russia becomes a new threat. Although these Russia-first variations with respect to both NATO and its enlargement are flatly ahistorical, no discussion of
enlargement can ignore the Russia factor—even if Moscow has no "veto" on a decision that only the 16 allies can make. NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated after the informal NATO Defense Ministerial in Bergen, Norway, on September 25-26, 1996, that "NATO wants a strong, frank and open relationship with Russia. NATO does not threaten either Russia or anyone else. NATO has no adversaries nowadays." 8

True, Russian planners are fully aware that NATO has been moving away from an exclusive Article V collective defense orientation toward contributing to peace support operations "Beyond the Area of Responsibility." They also know that planned peacetime Alliance force levels have fallen since 1990 by 25 percent with more to come, that NATO Europe has eliminated 80 percent of its substrategic systems, that the infrastructure (now "Security Investment Program") budget has been halved, and that the average NATO European defense expenditure is a mere 2.2 percent of GDP. This percentage of defense spending of GDP is just over half of the 3.9 percent U.S. figure, and, in any case, many allies have had difficulties in maintaining even modest contributions to IFOR.

Yet, the SHAPE mission retains, wisely, that of "strategic balance," which the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept stated had to take into account Soviet military capability as the "most significant factor." Russia inherited that attention. If NATO enlarges then the "strategic balance," already disrupted by the effect of the dissolution of the Soviet Union on the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), would tilt further in NATO's favor, despite the absence of "adversaries."

Nothing precludes a number of confidence-building measures being applied to a new ally akin to German unification in NATO, such as adapting the CFE Treaty, banning the peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons or stationed forces, and strengthening other institutions where Russia has a full voice, viz. the 55-State Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) which was permitted to establish a presence in Chechnya in 1995 to assist in a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and which, apart from its election, human rights, and arms control role in the former Yugoslavia, has also established its good offices in many parts of the former Soviet Union.

Also helpful would be a "new look" for NATO, albeit not its dissolution into an undefined political organization Russian
diplomacy routinely if not convincingly (including to Moscow itself) exhorts. Indeed, commenting on the military arrangements for Russian participation in IFOR, then Defense Minister Pavel Grachev described them as “the groundwork for this new system of European security.” Russian considerations have not been a major military factor in the restructuring study. Moreover, the resulting changes will no doubt be distorted by certain Russian circles as somehow setting the groundwork for NATO acting as “global policeman.” Nevertheless, politically the initial NATO Military Committee recommendations to have the new Major Subordinate Commanders (MSCs) termed “North” and “South” nicely project a non-West vs. East orientation. An updated “Strategic Concept” should also be more seriously considered, taking into account the peace support missions and Partnership activities not foreseen when the 1991 Concept was drafted.

Intra-Alliance Bargaining

Although President Clinton proposed and NATO endorsed parallel resolution of restructuring and inviting the first new NATO members, unless restructuring executed properly, all other issues before the Alliance could in principle be put on hold. For example, in Bergen French Foreign Minister Charles Millon reiterated that “If a number of conditions are not met, France will retain its current [still not integrated] position” with respect to the Alliance, whereas French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette has argued that a decision on principles of and directions for NATO reform should precede enlargement. Restructuring could, therefore, exercise leverage on enlargement. Concerns have even been raised as to how new Members might be obligated not to block future members, notwithstanding that admission decisions are the inherent right of every ally.

Conditions of Membership

The September 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement foresees that “NATO headquarters may be required on the territory of new Members to cover the revised tasks and AORs [areas of responsibility] resulting from their accession.” The Study assumes that new Members will probably seek to join the integrated military structure, and requires that they “will also have to be represented as
appropriate at major headquarters (MSC and above), support elements, commonly-funded NATO agencies, and on the International Military Staff. Enlargement would therefore probably require a review of the size of staffs.”\textsuperscript{12} The Study does \textit{not} insist \textit{a priori} upon the stationing of nuclear or conventional forces on the territory of new members.

The U.S. Department of Defense perspective holds, nevertheless, that the Alliance must “reserve the right to dispose forces as necessary in the event of crisis or war.”\textsuperscript{13} Yet, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov has repeatedly argued that among the conditions for tacit Russian “acceptance” of limited enlargement would be no NATO infrastructure on the territory of new Members adjoining Russian territory, citing C\textsuperscript{3}I and rear supplies. He has asked: “Can you guarantee that the enlargement of NATO will not lead to the installation of military infrastructures? If your answer is yes, I too will give you a positive response.”\textsuperscript{14}

It is believed that Russia seeks to have its sought-after assurances enshrined in a treaty, adopted by all OSCE participating States or between NATO and Russia, \textit{prior} to enlargement. Minister Primakov and other high-level Russian officials have claimed that verbal assurances were given by Western leaders at the time of German unification within NATO that the Alliance would not enlarge further eastward. Because constraints on foreign forces and nuclear weapons (but not integration) were obtained during the “Two-plus-Four” negotiations in a binding treaty, no doubt Russia seeks to emulate this precedent in some form. Ukraine has also advocated a nuclear-free status for new NATO members, concerned that nuclear deployments would entrench it as a buffer zone between NATO and Russia, although Kiev is not seeking NATO membership, at least for the present.

Although no NATO aspirant has demanded the forward basing of nuclear weapons, NATO headquarters and some level of stationed forces are another matter. Poland, for example, will not accept any preconditions prior to the accession negotiations. A possible dilemma for NATO might be that if a new member who had adopted a Norwegian-type membership invoked Article IV (threat consultations) or Article V (collective defense) NATO crisis management response measures could decrease rather than increase \textit{crisis stability} to a greater extent than were Allied forces permanently stationed and regularly exercised on the territory of new Members,
despite the fact that the Norwegian model has also been applied
mutatis mutandis to Denmark, France, the former German
Democratic Republic, and Spain.

It has, however, been argued that a limited NATO presence in a
new Allied territory coupled with enhanced power projection
capability (rather than substantial forward presence) could promote
NATO’s new and most likely missions while still meeting collective
defense core obligations. An agile projection capability could lead to
“a substantial upgrading of the Alliance’s projection capabilities to
help compensate for NATO’s currently limited crisis-management
capabilities,”15 i.e., enlargement could serve as the trigger for
prodding all NATO allies to get their new mission act together. And
the sooner NATO enlarges the better: “it is Membership alone that
will provide the full interoperability standards for at least the bulk of
a nation’s armed forces,”16 allowing present Partners the better to
contribute to NATO’s new missions both before and after
enlargement.

The Open Door

We directed the Military Committee to continue its work on the Long
Term Study on the basis of decisions taken in Berlin. This further work
should also take account of...the need to be able to absorb enlargement
without major restructuring.17

NATO Defense Ministers
Berlin, 13 June 1996

The most important element for military planners is an outcome
comprising a flexible command structure enabling new members to
ten with minimum disruption. Indeed, “many” allies would even
favor settling structures before enlargement occurs, for various
reasons: to facilitate enlargement, clarify what kind of organization
new Members will join; and settle structures beforehand within a
relatively smaller circle of the present sixteen allies. As already noted,
sequencing both processes could constitute a factor in intra-alliance
bargaining.
Enhanced Partnership

During 1996 a conviction matured within the Alliance that as enlargement proceeded something "extra" would have to be offered to those not admitted in the first wave to avoid a possible sense of isolation, or even exclusion for those who fear that once Russia is restored as a Great Power NATO enlargement would grind to a halt. It was also viewed as important to keep Partners with no present intention to join NATO, former Soviet republics and neutral states alike, interested in the PfP. In Berlin the Ministers suggested that this "PfP plus" should entail closer Partner involvement in shaping PfP and CJTF programs (including inside different NATO command levels), and greater emphasis on regionalization, such as the engagement of Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States in supporting the formation by 1997 of a Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT) among Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In September 1996, a NATO Senior Level Group was established to explore PfP enhancement directions.

Denmark took the lead by proposing Partnership coordination elements in commands such as the Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), a Principal Subordinate Command (PSC). Portugal did the same with respect to Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (IBERLANT), a MSC, with a view also to the possible extension of PfP-type measures to the Southern Mediterranean nations in pursuit of the NATO "Mediterranean Initiative." According to Danish Defense Minister Hans Hackkerup:

The development of a new command structure and the implementation of the CJTF concept must be seen in the context of increased cooperation with Partners and the opening of the Alliance to new Members... the possibility for Partner participation will be much better if they participate directly at lower levels... [and] let relevant NATO headquarters have a larger role to play... Within a specific region the headquarters has the advantage of special knowledge of its partners and the geographical area itself.

However entirely sensible this already ongoing objective may be, the enhanced Partnership role for existing commands too could figure in intra-alliance bargaining as the tough decisions approach on what remains, restructures, or is eliminated. Another issue might well concern accommodating both "PfP plus" and drawing identified future Members closer to the Alliance: if the goal is to make the
difference between being a Partner and an ally as small as possible, will NATO be able to differentiate its cooperation menu among incoming allies and other Partners, and, if not, by its own action possibly delay decisions on admission?

Priorities

A final challenge concerns assigning priorities to enhanced Partnership, preparing for enlargement, and the other directions before NATO. The United Kingdom's Ambassador to NATO, Sir John Goulden, minced no words on this score a few days after the 1996 Bergen Defense Ministers' meeting:

More money and personnel need to be shaken out if we are to cover the new priorities. . . . We have too little money for partnership, and none allocated yet for the costs of enlargement [nor had NATO produced a formal study on the question by that date]. Meanwhile, a fifth of the Civil Budget goes on science programs, some of which are pretty removed from NATO's core tasks in life . . . What is needed is not more money, but hard decisions on priorities. Unfortunately, the [North Atlantic] Council performs its 'management board' function poorly.

We all agree that NATO's policy towards Central Europe is not one of expansion for its own sake, but a response to the desire of democracies to join a Western, democratic, security club. That is fine as far as it goes. But it does not free NATO from the need to chart a course, to work out how an Alliance of 20 or 25—with perhaps 20 Partners as well—can function effectively. Is there a limit to membership, beyond which we would cease to be a serious defense alliance?39

This is not to say that enlargement will not stay on track, even if there may be many stops along the way. Enlargement will, nevertheless, serve as but one of many challenges competing for limited resources and subject to the very questions Ambassador Goulden raised about what kind of NATO will ultimately emerge.
Toward 1999

The creation of a united Europe brings us nearer by making it possible for America and Europe to act as partners on an equal footing. 21

Jean Monnet
June 11, 1961

The salience of enlargement in the NATO restructuring debate is difficult to measure but tangible and intertwined all the same. The phased entry of new NATO warriors will prolong the issues raised by this interrelationship, and Russian objections, whether theatrically paranoid or geostrategically justifiable, will no doubt be recycled at every opportunity. The challenge is to avoid the new Euro-Atlantic partnership succumbing to paralysis, and to ensure a meaningful command structure finely tuned to absorbing new Members, looking after all Partners, and ensuring NATO’s relevance into the 21st century.

Notes

Author’s note: I am indebted to Rear Admiral Merrill Ruck (USN), Chief of Staff, SACLANT, Professors Thomas-Durell Young and Dr. William Johnsen, U.S. Army War College, and Colonel Gerd Kemmler and Group Captain David Shannon, International Military Staff, NATO, for the benefit of many a discussion over the years. Views expressed are solely attributable to the author.


14. *Le Figaro* (Paris), August 1, 1996. It has been argued that no constraints on the territory of new NATO members should be accepted absent explicit Russian consent to abandon its anti-NATO propaganda or intimidation and that comparable constraints apply to adjoining CIS countries. Remarks by Senator John McCain (R-AZ), at the SACLANT Seminar, Norfolk, Virginia, June 17, 1996.


About the Contributors

Charles Barry has been a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies since 1993. Prior to that was Chief of the Strategy Branch, U.S. European Command. He retired as a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Army, and consults and publishes extensively on Western European security issues.

Douglas Bland holds the Chair in the Management Studies Program at Queen’s University at Kingston, Canada. He retired from the Canadian Armed Forces as a lieutenant colonel in 1990 after more than 30 years of service.

John Borawski has served since 1987 as director of the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, the NATO Parliamentarians’ organization. He is also an advisor to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

Thomas Bruneau is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

Michael H. Clemmesen is a colonel in Danish Army and is currently Defence Attaché to the Baltic States. Prior to this appointment he was Director, Joint Senior Staff Course and Strategic Studies Department, Royal Danish Defense College.

Andreas Corti was Chief of Staff (Secretario Particolare) to the Under-Secretary of Defense, Ministry of Defense, Italy. Previously, he was a Political and Policy Analyst in the Analysis and Assessment Unit in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for former Yugoslavia at the Headquarters of UNPROFOR, the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia.

William T. Johnsen joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991 where he serves as an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He has held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994.

Diego Ruiz Palmer is the Head of the Armaments Planning Section on NATO’s International Staff, Brussels, Belgium. Prior to joining NATO in 1991, Mr. Ruiz Palmer was Director of the NATO Studies
Center of BDM International, Inc., McLean, Virginia, a large professional service corporation.

Alessandro Politi is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union, Paris. He has previously held appointments in Rome at the Centro Militare di Studi Strategici and Istituto Affari Internazionali.

Jon Whitford is Chief, Policy Branch, Plans Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army Europe. A U.S. Army Reserve Lieutenant Colonel, he serves on the staff of the II (GE/US) Binational Corps.

Thomas-Durell Young is a Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. During 1994-1995, he was Executive Committee Chairman, Working Group on Command Authorities required by a Multinational Force Commander, Central Region-Chiefs of Army Staff Talks.
Index

ACCHAN. See Allied Command Channel
ACE. See Allied Command Europe
ACE Immediate Reaction Forces, 21
Mobile Force (AMF), 85, 86-87
Air, 10
Land, 10, 53, 67
Standing Allied Naval Forces, 21. See also Standing Allied Naval Force
Atlantic; Standing Allied Naval Force Channel; Standing Allied Naval
Force Mediterranean
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). See multinational corps
ACLAN. See Allied Command Atlantic
AFCENT. See Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH. See Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFNORTHWEST. See Allied Forces Northwest Europe
AFSOUTH. See Allied Forces Southern Europe
AIRCENT. See Allied Air Forces Central Europe
AIRNORTHWEST. See Allied Air Forces Northwest Europe
Albania, 199, 206
Allied Air Forces Central Europe
(AIRCENT), 16-17, 23, 192
Allied Air Forces Northwest Europe
(AIRNORTHWEST), 15
Allied Command Atlantic (ACLAN), 3, 5, 12-14, 34, 38, 48, 177, 179, 183-186
Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN), 11-12, 14, 15, 179
Combined and Joint Task Force, 39
Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area
(IBERLANT), 5, 12-14
Portugal, 176-187, 213
Allied Forces Mediterranean, 96
Allied Forces Northern Europe
(AFNORTH), 5, 14, 16, 18, 190, 193
Allied Forces Northwest Europe
(AFNORTHWEST), 1, 5, 14-16, 190, 194
Allied Forces Southern Europe
(AFPSOUTH), 19-21, 23, 119
Combined and Joint Task Force, 39, 48
Allied Forces Western Atlantic Area
(WESTLANT), 12, 177, 182
Allied Land Forces Central Europe
(LANDCENT), 16, 17, 23, 54, 111
Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein
and Jutland (Corps LANDJUT), See multinational corps
Allied Land Forces South-Central Europe
(LANDSOUTHCENT), 20, 23
Allied Naval Forces Central Europe
(NAVCENT), 17, 19, 23, 26n.23
Allied Naval Forces Northwestern Europe
(NAVNORTHWEST), 15
Allied Tactical Air Forces (ATAF), 16
2 ATAF, 99
4 ATAF, 99
5 ATAF, 94, 99
7 ATAF, 20, 23
Anglo-French “Euro Air Group,” 121
Armée de Terre du 21ème siècle (ADT XXI), 112-114
Armées 2000, 94, 95, 97, 102, 106,
109-110, 122
Armenia, 200
ATAF. See Allied Tactical Air Forces
Austria, 199
Azerbaijan, 200
BALTAP. See Allied Forces Baltic
Approaches
Belarus, 199
Belgium, 53, 54, 82
Blankeneser Erlast, 139, 148
Bosnia, 29, 48, 94, 114, 120, 183, 206,
207, 208
Brigade de Renseignement et de Guerre
Electronique (BRGE), 110, 114
Bulgaria, 199, 200
Bundesamt für Wehrverwaltung, 146
Bundesmarine, 141-142, 191-192, 194
Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), 5, 135-137, 138, 139-140, 141, 144, 145-149, 151
Bundeswehr, 5, 135-139, 141, 142, 145-146, 149-150, 191, 202
force planning, 140
Canada, 4, 54
Chief of Defence Staff, 84, 86-87
command authorities over forces in Europe, 80-83
Desert Shield/Storm, 87, 88
joint task force headquarters, 87-89
unification of services, 83-86, 90n.11
withdrawal of forces from Europe, 87
Canadian Forces Headquarters, 84, 88
Capabilities Coordination Cell (CCC), 37-38
Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa (CSMD), 159, 160-163, 165-167
CENTAG. See Central Army Group
Central Army Group (CENTAG), 16, 64, 142
Central Region. See Allied Forces Central Europe
Central Region-Army Chiefs of Staff (CR-CAST), 3, 53-55, 71-73
Centre Principal Français Hélicos (CPFH), 109
Cento Militare di Studi Strategici (CeMISS), 163-165
Centro de Operações Conjunto (COC), 175
Centro de Operações das Forças Armadas (COFAR), 175
Chef d’Etat-Major des Armées (CEMA), 97, 101, 104
Chefe do Estado-Maior-General das Forças Armadas (CEMGFA), 175
Chirac, Jacques, 112, 117
Chevènement, Jean-Pierre, 102, 106
CINCENT. See Commander-in-Chief Central Europe
CINCHAN. See Commander-in-Chief Allied Command Channel
CINCIBERLAND. See Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area
CINCNORTHWEST. See Commander-in-Chief Northwest Europe
CJTF. See Combined and Joint Task Force
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), 116
Combined and Joint Task Force (CJTF), 1, 3, 29-49, 64, 89, 150, 179, 184, 185, 186, 189, 203, 205, 206, 213
Assistant Chief of Staff for CJTF Matters, 39
communications, 43, 47
doctrine, 30-31, 32, 45-47
employment options, 43-46
exercises, 36-37, 39, 43, 49n.3
French policy toward, 95, 117-122
Headquarters Concept, 32-36, 38-41, 50n.7
logistics, 38, 42, 45
Major Subordinate Commanders, 33
mission profile, 41-42
national headquarters, 40, 45-46
non-NATO participants, 38, 40, 43
Combined Joint Planning Staff (CJPS), 37
Comitato dei Capi, 162-163, 166
Comitato Esecutivo Servizi Informazione e Sicurezza (CESI), 160
Comitato Interministeriale Politico Strategico (CIPS), 164-165
Comitato Politico Strategico (CoPS), 159-160, 164
command authorities, 2, 3, 6, 22, 45, 108, 151n.2. See also Full Command; Operational Command; Operational Control; Tactical Command; Tactical Control
caveated, 63
changing, 67, 69, 71
defining requirements, 64-69
delegation, 60-65
land forces, 61-62
mission (re)assignment, 55, 57, 58, 59-62, 64-69, 71
NATO definitions, 55-59, 62. See also specific authorities
NATO multinational forces, 53-55
task organization, 55, 57, 58, 59-62, 64, 67, 77n.48
training, 72
command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C²IC), 116
command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C²ISR), 29-30
Commandant des Eléments Français (Com.EleF), 101, 107-108
Commandant des Forces (ComFor), 101
Commandement aérien tactique (CAtac), 95-97
Commandement "Air" des Forces de Défense Aérienne (CAFDA), 96, 101, 115, 116
Commandement "Air" des Systèmes de Surveillance, d'Information et de Communications (CASSIC), 116
Commandement de la Défense Aérienne et des Opérations Aériennes (CDAOA), 115-116, 121, 122
Commandement de la Doctrine et de l'Entraînement (CDE), 104, 110
Commandement de la Force Aérienne de Combat (CFAC), 104, 115-116
Commandement de la Force Aérienne de Projection (CFAP), 115-116
Commandement Opérationnel des Forces Terrestres (COFT), 113, 121
Commandement des Opérations Spéciales (COS), 104, 108-109, 122
Commandement des Systèmes de Télécommunications de l'Armée de l'Air (CSTA), 115
Commandement du Transport Aérien Militaire (CoTAM), 96, 115
Commander-in-Chief Allied Command Channel (CINCHAN), 194
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (CINCIERLAN), 5, 171, 172, 177-179, 182, 184
Commander-in-Chief Central Europe (CINCENT), 17-18, 62
Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic Area (CINCEASTLANT), 194
Commander-in-Chief Northwest Europe (CINCNORTHWEST), 16
Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH), 19
Commander Allied Air Forces BALTAP (COMAIRBALTAP), 190
Commander Allied Command Baltic Approaches (COMBALTAP), 189-194
command authorities, 190-191
Commander Allied Naval Forces BALTAP (COMNAV BALTAP), 190
Commander Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe (COMNAV NORTHWEST), 191
Commander of Canadian Forces Europe, 86
Commander Joint Task Force North Norway, 18-19
Commander Portuguese Air (COMPOAIR), 12, 179
COMPOAIR. See Commander Portuguese Air
Conselho Superior de Defesa Nacional (CSDN), 174-175
Conselho Superior Militar (CSN), 175
Consiglio Supremo di Difesa, 159, 164
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), 176, 195, 209
Corps LANDJUT. See multinational corps, Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland
cree Czech Republic, 199, 206
de Gaulle, Charles, 94, 95-97
Deliberate Force, 94, 100, 105, 109
Deliberate Guard, 94, 100, 105, 109
Denmark, 5, 16-19, 54, 189, 212, 213
BALTAP, 191-192, 193, 194
Deny Flight, 48, 94, 100, 105, 109
Desert Shield/Storm, 4, 29, 31, 36, 57, 61, 87, 94, 200
France, 95, 99-100, 101, 102-106, 123
Direction du Renseignement Militaire (DRM), 104, 108, 109, 122
Einsatzführung der Bundeswehr, 146-149
Estado-Maior Coordenador Conjunto (EMCC), 175
Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas (EMGFA), 174-175, 180, 183, 184, 186
Etat-Major des Armées (EMA), 101, 104-105, 107, 108
Estonia, 206, 213
Etat-Major de Brigade (EMB), 113
Etat-Major de Force (EMF), 113
Etat-Major Interarmées de Planification Opérationnelle (EMIA), 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 120-121, 122, 126n.23
EUROCORPS. See multinational corps, European Corps
EUROFOR, 186
EUROMFOR, 186
European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), 32, 48, 117, 118, 119-120, 195, 205, 206
European Union (EU), 206
Finland, 197, 199, 213
Flottenkommando, 142, 145, 148
Force d’Action Navale (FAN), 114
Force d’Action Rapide (FAR), 97-104, 112, 114
Force d’Action Terrestre (FAT), 113, 121
Force Aérienne Tactique (FATac), 96-97, 101, 102, 115
Force Logistique Terrestre, 114
Force Océanique Stratégique (FOST), 97
Forces Aériennes Stratégiques (FAS), 96-97, 115
Forces Françaises en Allemagne (FFA), 95-96
fragmentation of forces. See command authorities, task organization
France, 3, 4, 5, 50n.10, 53, 54, 185, 196, 197, 202, 212, 213. See also Combined Joint Task Force; Desert Shield/Storm; United States Air Force, 94, 100, 103, 104-107, 108-109, 114-116
Allied Forces Southern Europe, 19-21,
Army, 95-98, 99-105, 109-114, 125n.8
Cold War command structures, 95-102, 124n.2
Combined and Joint Task Forces, 33-35, 38,
emerging command relationship with NATO, 117-121, 201, 202, 206, 210
emerging service command structures, 106-116
Livre blanc de Défense, 105-106
Loi de programmation militaire, 111-112, 122
Navy, 103, 104, 114
nuclear strategy, 118
out-of-area operations, 100-102
Führungsbereitschaften, 141
Führungsstab Heer (Fü H), 139
Führungsstab Luftwaffe (Fü L), 136, 139
Führungsstab Marine (Fü M), 139
Führungsstab der Streitkräfte (Fü S), 135, 136, 141, 146-149
Führungszentrum der Bundeswehr (FüZBW), 148-149
Full Command, 60-61, 64, 69, 75n.19, 76n.20, 84, 87, 108, 138
Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145-146, 147-150
Generalsstab, 135, 139-140, 150, 153n.15
Georgia, 200
Germany, Federal Republic of, 4-5, 15, 21, 22, 53, 54, 99, 111, 121, 171, 176, 181, 185, 202, 213
Air Force. See Luftwaffe
Army, 142-145
BALTAP, 190, 193-194
civil-military relations, 5, 138, 146, 148-151, 153n.16
Grundgesetz (Basic Law), 137
national command structures, 140-149
NATO command relationships, 136, 140, 143, 149
Navy. See Bundesmarine
unification, 209, 211, 212
Greece, 19-21, 23, 200
Gulf War. See Desert Shield/Storm
Haakkerup, Hans, 208, 213
Heeresführungskommando, 113, 142-145, 148
Hungary, 199, 206
IBERLAN. See Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area
Iceland, 10
immediate reaction force (IRF), 10-11
Implementation Force (IFOR), 3, 36, 43, 44, 94, 114, 120, 145, 150, 183, 206, 207, 208, 210
Inspekteur, 138-139, 147, 148, 152n.11
Inspekteur des Heeres, 142
interoperability, 21-22
Italy, 5, 19-21, 121, 185
civil-military relations, 157-160, 162-163, 164-165, 167
decreti cassetto, 160, 164
legislation and national command, 160-162, 164-168
New Defense Model, 165-168
Paladin Committee report, 159, 163-164
Joint Endeavor, 48
Joint Guard, 48
Kommando Luftbewegliches Kräfte (KLK), 143
Konzeptionelle Leitlinie zur Weiterentwicklung der Bundeswehr (KLL), 140
Koordinationssstab für Einsatzaufgaben der Bundeswehr, 147-148, 150
LANDCENT. See Allied Land Forces Central Europe
LANDSOUTHCENT. See Allied Land Forces South-Central Europe
Lanxade, Jacques, 106, 107, 108, 111, 123, 133n.75
Latvia, 206, 213
Leotard, François, 106
Lithuania, 206, 213
Long Term Study. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Long Term Study
Luftwaffe, 141, 142, 144, 145
LuftwaffenführungsKommando, 142, 145, 148
Macedonia, 206
Major NATO Commander (MNC), 1, 2, 10, 11-14, 20-21, 23, 71, 99, 179, 194, 195, 201
Bi/Tri-MNC Combined and Joint Task Force Working Groups, 33-34, 43, 50n.9
Combined and Joint Task Force, 34, 37, 40, 45-47
Major NATO Subordinate Commander (MSC), 2, 10, 11, 17, 81, 172, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 200, 203, 210, 211, 213
Combined and Joint Task Force, 33-35, 38-40, 45, 47
within Allied Command Europe, 14-21, 64
Militärische Führungsrat, 138
mission (re)Assignment. See command authorities
mission creep, 61, 67, 69, 71, 77n.48, 207-208
multinational corps, 21, 53, 196
ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), 1, 3, 11, 21, 44, 25, n.11, 51n.16, 53-54, 63, 179
Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland (Corps LANJUT), 53, 63, 74n.5, 76n.27, 191
European Corps (EUROCORPS), 1, 35, 45, 53, 94, 111-114, 130n.51
I German/Netherlands, 63, 113
II German/U.S., 63, 113
IV German, 63, 113
V U.S./German, 63, 113
multinational divisions, 76n.28
Central, 21, 27n.35, 44, 63
South, 20, 21, 23, 28n.35, 63
multinational force commander (MNFC), 6, 40,
command authorities, 53-56, 61-73, 77n.43
mission (re)Assignment, 65-69
National Command. See Full Command
National Defence Headquarters, 84
NATO Integrated Communications System (NICS), 43
NATO Precautionary System, 71
Naumann, Klaus, 140, 141
NAVCENT. See Allied Naval Forces Central Europe
NAVNORTHWEST. See Allied Naval Forces Northwestern Europe
Netherlands, 54, 213
New Defense Model. See Italy, New Defense Model
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 113. See also Combined and Joint Task Force; multinational divisions; multinational corps
Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, 1, 4, 5, 9-10, 22, 29, 30, 71-72, 88, 117, 206, 209, 210
command structure reorganization options, 196-203
Defense Planning Committee (DPC), 9, 24n.4, 34, 53, 72, 118, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214
defense spending, 209
International Military Staff (IMS), 37-38, 46, 118, 211
Long Term Study (LTS), 2, 5, 179, 180, 186, 206, 212
Membership Enlargement, 6, 180, 205-215
Military Committee (MC), 10, 33, 34, 35, 36-37, 46, 65-66, 71, 72, 118, 210, 212
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 208
North Atlantic Council (NAC), 2, 10, 35-37, 45, 47, 64, 71, 72, 118, 205, 214
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), 10, 25n.8, 118
Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC), 37
Partnership for Peace (PfP), 1, 3, 40-41, 44-45, 118, 203, 205, 207, 208, 210, 212, 213-214
Provisional Policy Coordination Group, 32
Study on NATO Enlargement, 210-211
Summits, 1, 3, 32, 117, 118, 206
NORTHAG. See Northern Army Group
Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), 16, 64, 98, 142
Norway, 5, 15-19, 211-212, 213
BALTAG, 193, 194
Canadian commitment, 85, 86, 91n.20
Operational Command (OPCOM), 190, 191
definition, 55-59, 67
French forces, 94, 99, 111
multinational force commander, 61-65, 67, 71-72
Operational Control (OPCON),
definitions, 55-60, 67
French forces, 94, 99, 103, 115
multinational force commander, 62-64, 71-72
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 22, 209, 211
out-of-area operations, 18
Paladin Committee report. See, Italy, Paladin report
Partido Social Democrata (PSD), 172-173
Partnership for Peace. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Partnership for Peace
Peace Operations. See Peace Support Operations
Peace Support Operations, 2, 29, 30, 44, 47, 49n.2,n.6, 64, 167, 196, 201, 203, 208, 209
MC 327, 41, 65, 67, 72-73
multinational force commanders, 54, 59, 65, 67-69, 71-73
Poland, 198, 199, 206, 211
Policy Coordination Group (PCG), 37-38
Portugal, 5, 12-14, 20, 23, 197, 213. See also Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area; Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area; air force, 176, 179, 180
army, 176, 179, 180
Ministry of Defense, 172, 174-175, 180
navy, 176, 177, 180, 186
role of NATO in national strategy, 171-172, 176-184
“Strategic Triangle,” 177-178, 180, 182
three “Rs” of defense reorganization, 173-176
United States, 171-172, 176, 180-182, 185
Portuguese Air Command and Control System (POACCS), 179, 185
Portuguese Maritime Buffer and AEW Link (POMBAL), 179
Poste de Commandement Intermédiées de Théâtre (PCHIP), 105, 107-108, 113, 117, 121
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, 158
Presidenza del Consiglio, 158-159
Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC), 2, 10, 11, 16-18, 19-21, 64, 172, 182, 192, 200, 202, 203, 213
Provide Comfort, 94, 100, 105
Prove Promise. 109
rapid reaction force (RRF), 10
Regional Commander (RC), 2, 50n.8, 117, 118-119
Revolution in Military Affairs, 47-48
Romania, 199, 220, 206
Royal Air Force Strike Command, 121
Rühe, Volker, 139, 140, 141, 149, 208
Rules of Engagement (ROE), 67, 72, 77n.48
Russia, 197, 198, 200, 207, 208-210, 211, 213
SACEUR. See Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT. See Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Segretario Generale della Difesa/ Direttore Nazionale degli Armamenti (SG/DNA), 162, 166, 167
Sharp Guard, 48
Slovak Republic, 199, 206
Slovenia, 199, 206
Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), 137

224
Southern Region. See Allied Forces Southern Europe
Southern Watch, 94, 100, 106
Spain, 53, 93, 113, 119, 121, 174, 176-177, 178, 180, 182-183, 184, 185, 186, 206, 212
Allied Forces Southern Europe, 19-21
Stabilization Force (SFOR), 36, 44, 79, 94, 114, 120, 145, 150
STANAVFORCHAN. See Standing Allied Naval Force Channel
STANAVFORLANT. See Standing Allied Naval Force Atlantic
STANAVFORMED. See Standing Allied Naval Force Mediterranean
Standardization Agreements (STANAGS), 40, 47
Standing Allied Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), 10, 21, 44, 86
Standing Allied Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN), 11, 21
Standing Allied Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), 11, 21, 44
Stellvertreter des Generalinspektors der Bundeswehr, 138
Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 140, 141
Strategic Commanders (SC), 2, 50n.8, 118
Streitkräfteteam, 146
Streitkräfteführungskommando, 141
Striking Fleet Atlantic (STRIKFLTLAN), 120
Combined and Joint Task Force, 39
Sub-Principal Subordinate Commander (Sub-PSC), 10-12, 18, 19-20, 189-190
Sub-Regional Commander (SRC), 2, 50n.8
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), 6, 10, 46, 83, 172, 179, 181, 182, 183, 201
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 10, 13-14, 16, 19-20, 34, 46, 53, 64, 73, 85, 89, 94, 97, 179, 182, 184, 197;
command authorities, 62, 111
Deputy SACEUR, 120
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), 41, 54, 113, 179, 195, 200, 201, 209
Sweden, 197, 199, 213
Tactical Command (TACOM), 62, 67, 69, 71
definition, 55-59
Tactical Control (TACON), 62
definition, 55-59
French forces, 94, 100, 103
task organization. See command authorities
Théâtre d’Opérations Métropole-Méditerranée (TOMM), 96-97
transfer of authority (TOA), 35, 62-63, 72, 193
Turkey, 19-21, 23, 200
UKAIR. See United Kingdom Air Forces Command
Ukraine, 199, 200, 207, 211
Unité Française de Verification, 109
United Kingdom, 5, 15, 54, 65, 82, 101, 103, 121, 181-182, 185, 197, 202, 206, 213, 214
BALTAP, 192, 193, 194
United Kingdom Air Forces Command (UKAIR), 14, 15, 179, 194
Desert Shield/Storm, 102-103
U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 208
United States, 54, 88, 201, 202, 205, 207-208, 211, 213
Combined and Joint Task Force, 33-34, 43, 46
command authorities, 56-59
command structures, 103-105
France, 117-123
Portugal, 171-172, 176, 180-182, 185
U.S. Army, 44, 65, 100, 103, 104
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien (VPR), 140
Warsaw Pact, 1, 20-21, 64
Western European Union (WEU), 41, 111, 113, 185, 186, 189, 196, 201, 202, 205
Combined and Joint Task Force, 32, 33-34, 37-38, 40, 42-43, 45-48, 117-122
Planning Cell, 37, 94
Political-Military Working Group, 37
WESTLANT. See Allied Forces Western Atlantic Area
Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations

Edited by Thomas-Durell Young

[NATO] is the most effective military alliance in history; this is largely due to the existence of its integrated and multinational command structure. That command structure, the cement of the Alliance as it were, derives from the mutual obligations contained in Article V the North Atlantic Treaty. This contractual obligation, which does not exist for the other missions which have arisen since 1990, means that the defence of NATO territory must be the basis of any restructuring. If we were to move away from this and thus weaken the command structure, even with the best intentions, then it is my firm conviction that we would do serious harm to the Alliance and its future. On the other hand, a modified command structure, still based on the Article V contractual obligation, provides a firm basis, as well as flexibility, versatility, and availability for any non-contractual, namely out-of-area, requirement.

Foreword by General H. Hansen, German Army, Former Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe

The end of the Cold War has profoundly affected command of Alliance forces in Europe. Controversy is growing in the Alliance as it attempts to come to terms with new factors which will affect how NATO will restructure its command structure and how command will be effected in future. The essays in this compendium address developments and issues which relate to the Alliance’s ongoing effort to restructure its integrated military command structure through the Long Term Study. These include, recent attempts to reform the integrated command structure, the development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept, multinational force commanders and their command authority requirements, changes nations have made to their national command structures, and the implications of membership expansion on the integrated command structure.

Contributors include: Charles L. Barry, Douglas Bland, John Borawski, Thomas C. Bruneau, Michael H. Clemmesen, Andreas Corti, William T. Johnsen, Alessandro Politi, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Jon Whitford, Thomas-Durell Young

Strategic Studies Institute  U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA