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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

COMMANDER'S ROLE IN SERVICEMEN'S MORAL EDUCATION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Aug 83 pp 2-3

[Article by Col I. Volkov, lecturer, Political Directorate, Red Banner Urals Military District, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Moral Indoctrination"]

[Text] Attention to the use of active forms for the political training of the personnel has intensified noticeably for some time in the large unit where the chief of the political department is Colonel F. Dmitruk. Among such forms are the problem method of giving lectures, the organization of creative discussions and the accomplishment of practical assignments, the preparation and discussion of papers on seminars and lessons, and so forth. All this develops the men's creative activity, raises their interest in the material being studied, generates the ability to analyze and intelligently master knowledge independently, and accelerates its conversion to profound inner convictions of people.

Also noteworthy is the fact that the best propagandists of this large unit, in achieving a great practical direction in political training, organically link it with the moral indoctrination of people. This most important goal is attained by the creation of problem situations on lessons and seminars and the use of a well thought out system of moral tasks, the accomplishment of which teaches a person the correct moral selection and behavior.

Such an approach is a requirement of the times. Speaking at the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov stressed: "...The party is seeing that we bring up a person not simply as the bearer of a certain sum of knowledge, but first of all—as a citizen of a socialist society and an active builder of communism, and with the ideological aims, morals and interests, and high style of labor and behavior inherent in him."

The role of the moral indoctrination of people is great in the molding of such qualities.

The significance of moral indoctrination in molding the personality and in social being is determined by the fact that it helps to generate in people an active life's position and a conscientious attitude toward civic duty. Moral indoctrination has as its goal the prevention and eradication of relapses of a narrow-minded, consumer psychology. The struggle against such phenomena requires the purposeful molding, in Soviet people, of reasonable requirements,
lofty spiritual interests, ethical and aesthetic standards of conduct, and a rational approach to the use of free time, that is, the molding of much of that which, in its totality, is befittingly called the socialist state of civilization.

Mature socialism creates more and more favorable conditions for the moral improvement of people and for the development of a person's varied abilities. But at the same time, it also imposes higher requirements on the moral aspect of the personality and behavior of each member of society. These requirements have been formulated with all specificity in the materials and decisions of the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. They discuss both a rise in the political consciousness as well as the social and labor activity of the masses, the priority of public interests, and the comprehensive strengthening of organization, discipline, and order. That frank talk which took place with party veterans at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee was also permeated with the spirit of such requirements.

Naturally, these requirements also pertain in full measure to the Soviet Armed Forces, to military cadres, and to all personnel. The most important task in the moral indoctrination of the men is molding in them such a life's position, such moral qualities, and such grounds for behavior as a conscientious attitude toward military duty and its irreplaceable accomplishment, and a readiness to step forth at any moment for the defense of their socialist motherland and withstand any tests in the name of preserving its freedom and independence. To withstand and not lose the will for struggle, for victory. In this connection, tremendous significance is acquired by such of the men's qualities as selflessness, courage, steadfastness, and discipline. The generation and development of such moral grounds for behavior is furthered, along with ideological-political and military indoctrination, by moral indoctrination in close unity with it.

Moral criteria of military activity are inseparable from legal criteria. The attitude of Soviet citizens to military service and their behavior in the ranks of the Armed Forces are determined first of all by state laws, regulations, directives, and orders. But this by no means belittles the significance of moral criteria and moral standards of behavior. On the contrary, many of them are consolidated in military-legal documents and, therefore, have the force of law. It is also obvious that the area of action of moral standards as a means for regulating the behavior and mutual relations of servicemen is broader than the area of operation of legal standards. In essence, in the life and service of the men there are no areas to which moral requirements would not be extended.

Now questions of the moral improvement of the men occupy an ever larger place in indoctrinational practice, which is caused by a number of factors and circumstances. First, this is caused by the increase in the role of the moral factor in military affairs. The previously unprecedented destructive power of weapons, the decisiveness and dynamism of combat operations, the increased danger of a surprise attack by aggressive imperialist forces—all this imposes exceptionally high demands on the moral—combat qualities of the Soviet servicemen.

The strong moral tempering of the personnel stands out as the most important factor in raising the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces and for
the attainment of victory in war. Indestructible morale is an organic part of that strong alloy which determines the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces and stands out as a necessary and most important condition for its successful realization.

The growing significance of moral tempering is caused, second, by that indoctrinal role of the Soviet Armed Forces which they play in our society, and to the necessity for the further comprehensive raising of which the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed. Our Armed Forces were and remain a school of courage, industriousness, and lofty morals.

Third, the moral indoctrination of the men acquires great significance in connection with the social changes which are occurring in society and, consequently, in the Armed Forces in connection with the improvement of social relations.

It is known that our commanders and chiefs use both the method of conviction as well as the method of compulsion in their disciplinary practice. Experience confirms that the well thought out, correct employment of these methods provides the necessary indoctrinal effect. However, it is also obvious that as social relations improve their maturity is ever higher and as there is a growth in the education and culture of people the role of conviction and social influence on the behavior of a person increases and the framework of such influence expands. By the way, this also found its reflection in the new general military regulations. For example, the Disciplinary Regulation orders commanders and chiefs to employ a number of such measures of moral influence, which formerly were not mandatory, on subordinates.

Finally, the increasing significance of moral indoctrination and the moral tempering of the Soviet servicemen is explained by the sharp aggravation of the struggle of two diametrically opposite world outlooks and of two political courses—socialism and imperialism—unprecedented for the entire postwar period. Today we are dealing with attempts at organizing genuine information-propaganda intervention against us and converting radio and television channels into a weapon of interference in the internal affairs of states and the conduct of subversive acts. Also envisioned here is the undermining of the moral principles of a socialist society and our Armed Forces. In such a situation, the observance of moral standards stands out as the direct expression of the communist upbringing of the Soviet servicemen and an indicator of their moral maturity and ideological steadfastness.

Thus, the necessity for the decisive improvement of moral indoctrination is objectively conditioned. The more closely it is linked with a specific historical situation, with the internal and external conditions for the contemporary development of our society, and with the tasks for strengthening the defensive capability of the Soviet state and raising the combat readiness of its Armed Forces, the higher will its effectiveness be.

The lofty moral qualities of the Soviet person and, consequently, of the Soviet serviceman are molded by the social manner and our socialist way of life. However, this does not occur automatically, but as a result of purposeful, constantly improving indoctrinal work.
Just as in society as a whole, so in our Armed Forces the core of such work consists of the molding of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist world outlook of people. It is precisely this which forms the basis of the ever increasing political consciousness of the Soviet servicemen and makes them capable of independently evaluating social phenomena, seeing the social role of military service, and having a better understanding of their place in the overall struggle for the strengthening of the motherland's might.

The self-education of a person and his deeper mastery of the standards of communist morals, their meaning, wisdom, and expediency, and the necessity for their strict and precise accomplishment also occur on such a firm foundation. All this is extremely important, for a person's lack of understanding of the essence and significance of individual moral standards may gradually develop into a negative attitude toward them. In addition, their thoughtless accomplishment takes place with the external performance of the serviceman which, without reliance on internal convictions, is not very suitable under the severe conditions of contemporary war.

Of course, in moral indoctrination one cannot be limited only to the propaganda of moral knowledge. Experience shows that a person may master the theory of ethics to perfection, have excellent knowledge of moral standards, and fight for their implementation; however, this does not always guarantee lofty moral behavior.

The goal of the moral indoctrination of Soviet servicemen is the generation, in them, of profound personal convictions in the firmness of the standards of communist morals, the laws and rules of the socialist society, and the requirements of the oath, regulations, and orders, that is, of those convictions which internally direct the actions of a military person, make him a conscientious executor of his constitutional duty, and mobilize him for irreplaceable service and for the struggle to raise the combat readiness of the unit, ship, and subunit.

A good means for moral indoctrination is the propagandizing of the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of our people, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Armed Forces. Meetings of the personnel with veterans of the war and labor, evenings of combat glory, and excursions to military museums and the places of historic battles arm the youth with the moral example of the older generation. The social significance of such an example and of the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth as applicable to contemporary tasks received a high evaluation at a meeting with party veterans in the CPSU Central Committee.

In indoctrinational work, noted V. I. Lenin, "we should consider attained only that which has become a part of culture, of life, and custom." Therefore, an important path for strengthening the moral state of discipline is the molding of firm favorable moral habits in the personnel. Active forms of political indoctrination, which were discussed at the beginning of the article, serve the development of such habits well. Facing the necessity to accomplish difficult tasks of a moral order regularly in the course of lessons and to look for a way out of a moral problem situation, a person acquires those skills which guarantee against possible errors in service activity and on his life's path.
Enrichment with life's experience is also furthered by active forms of political-indoctrinational work with the personnel: debates, readers' conferences, question and answer evenings, the discussion of books and motion picture films, meetings at which questions of the personnel's observance of moral standards are discussed, and so forth.

Strict order as prescribed by the regulations, a clear daily routine, and the correct organization of the combat and political training, mode of life, and rest for the personnel exert a beneficial influence on the molding of favorable moral qualities. They stimulate each serviceman daily and hourly, everywhere and in everything, to accomplish the moral standards which are consolidated in the military regulations. And conversely, any shortcomings in the organization of service, life, and training and even more, violations of prescribed order inhibit the process of moral improvement. Why? Well, because the views and attitudes of people are molded, as was noted at the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, not only under the influence of our achievements, but also of shortcomings and difficulties.

Well organized soldierly labor has tremendous indoctrinating significance. In the course of it the serviceman not only acquires knowledge and skill and makes a personal contribution to the matter of combat readiness, but he also develops his best abilities, confirming himself as an armed defender of the socialist motherland. In this sense, in the sense of the moral tempering of the personnel, the role of field lessons, exercises, flights, cruises, and the performance of combat alert duty is great. In the course of them, the men receive moral tempering which is necessary to overcome the difficulties and obstacles which are typical of contemporary battle.

In the matter of molding lofty moral qualities in the men and the generation and spreading of examples of moral behavior, an important role is played by socialist competition. Our leading commanders organize the competition in such a way that the active struggle for the strict observance of the standards of communist morals and military ethics become its integral content, and on this basis new successes are attained.

The effectiveness of moral indoctrination is determined by its activity, aggressiveness, and combat vitality. This is all the more obvious in that in our army and navy medium at times individual phenomena are encountered which are incompatible with the requirements of communist ethics. Up to now, for example, instances of eyewash, exaggeration, and attempts against socialist property have not been completely overcome. At times, these negative phenomena acquire the forms of various types of presents for officials who are inspectors and gaining their favor in every possible way. Is it necessary to state how foreign such actions are to the requirements of our laws and the standards of communist morals?

The nonmilitary attitudes of servicemen which exist in some places are incompatible with these requirements and standards. Especially great harm in inflicted on our common cause when commanders and chiefs have recourse to such attitudes. Any, even the slightest, instances of arbitrariness must receive the strictest condemnation and be stopped in the most decisive manner.
The great force of the moral example of the communist, especially of a communist-leader, was stressed at the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. He can always be seen among the masses, and the higher the post which he occupies, the greater the responsibility which rests on him. Clearly, this conclusion also pertains completely to command and political personnel and to all military leaders. Personal example contains within itself a moral ideal and steps forth as the standard of behavior.

Experience proves that officers who are examples of high morals enjoy indisputable authority among the personnel. With such officers, words do not diverge from deeds; they are uncompromising in demandingness toward themselves as well as toward their subordinates.

Commander's demandingness, being a reliable barrier in the path of violation of moral standards, has nothing in common with coarseness and with a disrespectful attitude toward subordinates. Meanwhile, such a vicious, impermissible practice nevertheless makes itself felt once in a while. Unquestionably, officers who adhere to such methods of treating subordinates clearly violate both the standards of our socialist society and the standards of our military ethics.

And what personal example can be provided by an officer who does not see in a subordinate a person with his joys and sorrows, successes and failures? Such officers forget that the subordinate has his "fine days"—his birthday and day of entry into the party and Komsomol. They do not know how their subordinates are living, rarely meet with them, as they say, "out of formation," do not have heart-to-heart talks with people, and are indifferent to their requirements, health, and family well-being.

Indoctrinational work is effective when it is structured on the profound and comprehensive knowledge of people, knowledge of those factors which influence their attitude and behavior. In fact, experienced commanders proceed in just this way. For example, in the excellent company which is commanded by Captain O. Nikolayev, weekly conferences of the noncommissioned officers begin with listening to the reports of squad leaders about the behavior and attitude of subordinates. These reports and the evaluations which follow from them are supplemented by deputy platoon commanders and the company first sergeant. Such listenings to reports and the collective discussion of the state of affairs in the subunits raise the responsibility of the noncommissioned officers and equip the officers with additional information about each serviceman, which permits them better to forecast their behavior and determine more precisely the most effective measures for influencing each person, conduct individual indoctrinational work more fruitfully, and ensure a healthy moral atmosphere in the military collective.

The creation of such an atmosphere and the molding of the correct public opinion in the collective and its unity are a task of primary importance. Its successful accomplishment depends to a great extent on work with the noncommissioned officers and the party and Komsomol activists and on ensuring their example in training and discipline and interested participation in the discussion of the state of affairs in the subunit and in the struggle against violators of the moral standards and military regulations, including against those
who are devoted to alcohol and against false authorities who are trying to establish their "order" in the collective. Work on eradicating such phenomena and on strengthening discipline provides the greatest effect when not only commanders, but all members of the military collective become its direct participants and when the commander and the collective function in a coordinated manner.

Further strengthening of the moral state of the troops and naval forces and the moral tempering of the personnel require an integrated approach to this matter and the unity of ideological–indoctrinational and organizational work of commanders, staffs, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations. Work which is well thought out and clearly planned, which considers the conditions, special features, and tasks of a given military collective, and which encompasses all aspects of the vital activity of people including their way of life, leisure time, aesthetic interests, and sphere of family relations.

The materials and decisions of the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee direct us namely toward such work.

6367
CSO: 1801/472
WATER-CROSSING ASSAULT TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow Krasnaya Zvezda in Russian 24 Aug 83 p 1

[Report by Lt Col M. Lishniy and Lt Col V. Seledkin, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "The Battle for the Bridgehead"]

[Text] The regiment reached the river at dawn, after a night march. It was to force the water barrier and capture a bridgehead on the opposite bank. It was unable to perform the mission directly from the march, however. The "enemy" had managed to fortify himself securely at an advantageous position and greeted the attackers with a dense blanket of fire....

The regimental commander heard a report from Major V. Gerashchenko, commander of a motorized rifle battalion engaged in battle with the "enemy's" security subunits, and then bent over his map again.

"I think that the battalion will breach the defense within a half-hour and reach the river at this point," he said, and his pencil point stopped at a bend in the river. "At that time we shall switch artillery fire to the support points on the opposite bank. We need to make the 'enemy' think that we are planning to begin forcing the river at this point. In fact, we shall cross to the left of this point, there where the woods almost reach the water's edge."

Major A. Rada listened carefully to the commander, and he kept finding himself thinking that the latter was at the position of the tank battalion, which was preparing itself at this narrow clearing in the woods to set out across the river bottom, for a good reason. And he was not wrong.

The regimental commander thought for a second, as though weighing all of the pros and cons, and then he resolutely ordered:

"Comrade Rada, your battalion will be the first into the water."

Somewhere ahead, beyond the woods, fighting had broken out and was gathering force. The regimental commander received a report that the "enemy" was regrouping his forces, preparing a counterattack against the battalion commanded by Major Gerashchenko.
"Well now, we can consider that everything is going according to our plan right now," the commander said, smiling faintly. When helicopters with a tactical landing group on board swept into the rear of the defenders, he nodded to Major Rada:

"Advance, battalion commander"!

This was not the first day of the tactical exercise. During the entire time the helicopter pilots, operating for the attackers, had been living under the tension of combat. As the motorized riflemen, tankmen, artillerymen and support subunits were moving up to their designated positions, the rotary-wing aircraft had been soaring into the air to conduct reconnaissance and carry out fire strikes against known communication centers, equipment concentrations, command posts and other important targets. The helicopter pilots were assigned a special mission during the forcing of the river, however. The staffs of the attackers understood perfectly well that when the march was started from the area of concentration, the opposing side would detect the movement of the subunits and try to reinforce its defenses on convenient approaches to the river. Just try to take a barrier such as this from the march! It was therefore decided to land a tactical airborne assault group in the "enemy's" rear area when the forward detachments reached the water.

...The winding river was visible in the distance, faintly covered by a light haze. The formation of helicopters was approaching the defenders' forward edge. A few minutes prior to this their strongpoints had been "worked over" by fighter-bombers and fire-support helicopters. The rotary-wing aircraft carrying the landing group now rushed into the corridor which had been cleared.

The lead helicopter was flown by Captain V. Katunin, military pilot 2nd class. He had been trusted to lead the helicopters with good reason: The officer has been awarded the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd degree, and has extensive flying experience in the most difficult situations. He was assigned the task of leading the helicopters to the landing area. The attack against the "enemy" from the rear had to be unexpected and coordinated with the operations of the subunits advancing from the front.

Finally a clearing in the pine forest appeared ahead of them, which looked like the site designated for the landing. The helicopters descended toward the ground, one after the other, hovered for a minute and then swept into the sky again. Now their mission was one of covering the landed forces with fire from the air.

The smooth surface of the river sparkled in the tank's viewing instruments in the tank of Senior Lieutenant F. Miniakhmetov, a company commander, in which one of us was riding.

"Turn on the directional gyro!" the officer gave the command over the tank intercom. He then automatically tore himself away from the triplex glass and glanced at the crew members, frozen in place and straining at their battle stations.
Most of the company tankmen had entered the water only three times before. They had no special fear of this body of water, however. Back on the bank Junior Sergeant A. Korol'kov, Private First Class S. Radchenko and the other soldiers had performed calmly and at the same time, skilfully and competently, as they sealed the combat vehicles and installed the air intakes. It was fully apparent that the tankmen had confidence in the equipment. During the summer combat training, fighting for the title of excellent company, they had acquired solid skills in servicing and operating it.

The fightingmen were especially excited by the fact that they were to force the river in the area in which their regiment had routed the enemy in 1945. They would have the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the traditions of courage and military valor established on the frontline by former members of their regiment.

Senior Lieutenant Miniakhmetov's tank entered the water, cautiously, as though feeling out the bottom with the tracks. The other vehicles followed at even intervals of time. Covered by fire from the men in the company commanded by Captain V. Devyatikhi, they moved toward the opposite bank, strictly maintaining the prescribed direction. On the other bank, on ground mutilated by explosions, they threw off the air intakes and rushed forward, without losing a second.

The defenders were having a difficult time of it, but they still attempted to carry out a counterattack against Major Rada's battalion. The tankmen showed their very best side in this situation as well, however. Taking cover behind a dam, the attacking tankmen opened accurate fire upon the "enemy's" antitank weapons. When the landing forces entered the battle in the defensive depth, it became clear that the defenders would not be able to hold their positions.

A wave of combat equipment soon swept across a bridge erected by the pontoniers. The main forces were crossing the river.

11499
CS0: 1801/502
COMMODORE TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by Lt Col N. Fedoseyev: "A Text at the Range"]

[Text] Test exercises are one sign that the training year is coming to an end. Lieutenant Colonel Nikolay Gregor'evich Fedoseyev, who had been appointed permanent KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent for the Red Banner Siberian Military District, tells how these exercises are conducted in tank regiment "X."

Anyone you talk to in the regiment recalls the recent firing exercise.

"The fact is that we had not had to fire under those conditions in a long time," the regimental commander explained. "You know that area...."

I knew well the area where the tankmen had performed the firing exercise. It is bare steppe, over which the wind blows nonstop, almost the year round. In the winter it drives up the snow; in the summer it raises clouds of dust and sand. The ground there, like that on any range, has been thoroughly plowed up by tracked vehicles. Because of this, even a slight breeze creates a thick cloud of gray dust, which hangs over the field. Try to get your bearings in such a mess! Try to figure out where there are obstacles and where the targets are.

In a certain sense this firing range was "foreign" to the tankmen. Higher headquarters had decided, however, that they were to perform the firing exercise with TOE shells precisely here, on the unfamiliar terrain.

In general, the regiment was ready for the test exercises. The tankmen had done everything necessary to prepare for it while back in their own unit. One could feel that they were concerned, however.

It was not difficult to understand their feelings. For 2 years in a row the regiment had taken first place in the competition among the district units.

The unit Komsomol organization was recently awarded the Challenge Red Banner of the Komsomol Central Committee, and three of the officers—Lieutenant Colonel V. Kryuchkov and Majors O. Kucherenko and V. Kosov—received the order "For Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," 3rd degree. There are
other holders of orders in the unit—Captain V. Polunin and Senior Lieutenants V. Shevchenko and I. Pozdnyakov. They have been awarded the Order of the Red Star. That is a fairly large number for a regiment. Many of them have advanced in the service. Major O. Kuchereno has been appointed assistant chief for Komsomol work in the district political directorate. Major V. Zalygin, a battalion commander, has entered an academy. Captain V. Kostromin, former chief of staff in a subunit, has moved up a notch on the service ladder. Senior Lieutenants A. Volkov, V. Ichetkin and V. Kutilin, recently considered "green" platoon commanders, now command companies....

Another fact which describes the unit: The personnel are replaced fairly frequently, but the unit's reputation in the district as an outstanding one remains unshakable. Young officers replace the veterans, but the quality of the training process does not suffer from this. The new personnel rapidly gain experience. Today, for example, all of the officers fire and operate the tanks expertly and skilfully train and indoctrinate their subordinates. What factors contribute to their rapid development?

We know that the class rating describes any specialist's level of skill best of all: The higher the rating, the greater the skill. They never forget this in the regiment. There is a good reason why most of the officers and warrant officers have a first- or second-class rating. There are also experts in the unit—Captain V. Grishchenko, battalion chief of staff, Captain D. Zudin, company commander, and Warrant Officer V. Zhigalov, company technician.

A great deal depends upon the regimental commander, of course. It is easier for the officers and warrant officers to keep their word, when constant concern is shown for the improvement of their training.

The regimental staff keeps a close eye on the quality of the classes in the officer training system. The matter of training the officers called up from the reserve was especially urgent at the beginning of the training year. An extra class was conducted for them. Each of them was tested on the subjects studied.

The officers' practical skills are also improved during the daily training of the personnel. Not all of them work with persistence in this area, to be sure, but a "key" is found for reaching the lethargic individuals. The regimental commander recalled the following incident to illustrate this:

"I once visited the vehicle pool and saw that everybody was working except for Lieutenant Novikov, who was standing on the side. I asked him why he was not with his platoon. Do you know what he said? 'I don't know very much about the equipment. I might do the wrong thing....' I advised him to follow the example of Lieutenants Kostrov and Zalogin, who had joined the regiment with him but had already become real tankmen. What was the reason for the difference? It was the fact they are not afraid to get their hands dirty and work right along with all the others. I looked at Novikov. He had turned red. He was ashamed.... This was how they were trained. First one and then the other. You wouldn't recognize many of them now."

Yes, many of the young officers have markedly improved in their job skills within a relatively short time. Defects in their training do not go unnoticed by the regimental party bureau.
Major V. Karkushin, a battalion commander, committed a number of serious methodological errors in one of the test exercises. There was only one reason: the officer had stopped working to improve himself. Communist Karkushin's report was heard at an expanded session of the party bureau. He acknowledged the criticism and promised to correct the shortcomings. Subsequent events proved that these were just empty words, however. Stricter measures had to be applied to Karkushin.

"There is no other way," Major V. Kosov, secretary of the party bureau, says. "If an officer has stopped developing as a commander, what is he going to teach his men? He must always be first—both in the classroom and at the range."

The wind still raged over the entire range, when a red flag was raised over the roof at the command post. This was the signal that all was ready for the firing. The wind blew from the side. The tank became enveloped in a cloud of dust as it moved.

"Then you're ready to fire?" the senior chief asked, looking over the formation of officers. "Isn't it going to be difficult?"

That's OK. We are used to selecting the steepest path," the regimental commander answered with spirit.

"Very well, but here is another little task for you...."

And the senior chief further complicated the already difficult situation. In accordance with the hypothetical situation, many of the targets were to be fired upon from maximum range.

The men conferred and decided that the tanks would move in echelon-right formation so as not to blind one another with their dust.

They tried it and found that they could do it, although it was as though they were operating blindfolded.

The regimental commander, his deputy for political affairs and one of the battalion officers were the first to take over the sights.

Later, one of the officers had this to say:

"We fired two rounds at the last target. They did not hit the target. I had very few shells left. I got ready and fired another round—the last. It hit the target. I believe that we should practice firing at machine-gun targets with less ammunition. There is a psychological factor, so to speak, at work here. When you know that you don't have many shells left, you automatically force yourself to perform with maximum self-control and precision...."

Despite the difficult conditions, the first run on the targets was successful. This gave the men courage. Each of them tried to do his very best.

Subsequent calculations showed that 92 percent of the targets had been destroyed.
One would have thought that they would have been happy, but the men in the regiment were not satisfied: There had been too few hits on the distant targets. This meant that they had to practice even more persistently. After all, the final, summation tests were still ahead.

11499
CSO: 1801/502
LETTERS TO EDITOR

Engineers, Technicians Avoid Indoctrinational Work

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Senior Lieutenant V. Yes'kov, deputy commander for political affairs in a military construction company, Red Banner Far East Military District: "As Long As There Is a Plan..."

[Text] Saturday is a special day for the military construction workers. On that day they engage in combat and political training and expand their specialized knowledge. The military construction workers had assembled for their classes on that Saturday as well. They were waiting for Engineer-Senior Lieutenant V. Kubik, work superintendent for the construction sector. They waited in vain, however. The director of the technical training classes simply did not show up. It turned out that he had decided it was not part of his duties to conduct the classes with the fightingmen.

Unfortunately, such instances of disruptions in the training are not isolated ones. A political day was recently held in our detachment. Many of the communists in charge presented lectures and reports to the military construction men and conducted talks. Engineer-Major V. Frolov, chief mechanic for the work supervisor's section, refused to take part in the political day, however. His excuse was that this is not his job.

Some engineering and technical personnel are of the opinion that indoctrinational work with the personnel is exclusively the job of officers in the military construction detachment. This is frankly stated, as an example, by Engineer-Senior Lieutenant V. Skulovets, work superintendent, and Engineer-Captain S. Pogorelyi, chief of the construction sector. More than once we officers in the detachment have tried to convince them that by ignoring the indoctrination of the fightingmen they are harming not only the state of military and labor discipline, but also the work production process, of which they are in charge. All such attempts were in vain. "The important thing for us is to fulfill the plan," they answer. But aren't firm military and labor discipline and an aware attitude toward the work on the part of each soldier not extremely important factors in the successful accomplishment of assignments?

Experience has taught us that they are. The collective of the construction detachment headed by Engineer-Captain A. Cheburakov, for example, successfully
fulfills the plans month after month. This is probably not just because the officer knows his job well. He also devotes a great deal of attention to the training and indoctrination of the military construction workers in his sector, considers their concerns and needs and does not ignore violations of military discipline.

The specific nature of the work performed by the military construction workers is frequently such that they come together only in the barracks. Most of the time they are at the construction sites, separated from one another. Sometimes it is simply impossible to visit all the sites where one's subordinates are working in a day. The engineers and technicians are constantly there with the fightingmen at the construction sites, however. Naturally, they have more opportunities for conducting indoctrinational work with the personnel. How can we assure that these opportunities are fully utilized? After all, this is a considerable reserve for the strengthening of military and labor discipline.

Initial Military Training Neglected

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Lt Col (Reserve) A. Zapisochnyy, worker in the Sovietskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Kishinev: "Given No Attention"]

[Text] A teachers' conference was held in Sovietskiy Rayon in the city of Kishinev just before the new academic year began. It discussed the tasks of the teaching staffs with respect to further improving the training and the communist indoctrination of the students in light of decisions coming out of the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

A report presented by Comrade G. Kostash, head of the rayon public education department, and the speeches provided a study of the schools' performance for the past academic year, revealed shortcomings and outlined ways to correct them. In short, the discussion was serious and to the point. For some reason, however, it totally omitted the matter of initial military training. It is absolutely clear that workers in the rayon public education department committed a serious error by remaining silent about this area of the work.

We know how imperialism has presently exacerbated the international situation and the enormous effort being made by the party and the Soviet government to normalize the situation and prevent a nuclear world war. In this situation the CPSU is devoting increasing attention to the ideological and mass political work, the military-patriotic indoctrination of the youth and their preparation for defending the homeland. Not only do the schools of a single rayon not have the right to avoid this task of enormous state importance, but not even a single Soviet teacher has the right to do so.

The failing of the public education department cannot be justified also for the following reason. The rayon military commissariat has constantly informed the rono[rayon public education department] of certain shortcomings in the initial military training. How can we accept a situation in which almost 17 percent of the students at Secondary School No. 30 earned poor marks in this important
field? Students at Secondary School No. 30 performed poorly in the firing of small-caliber rifles, the throwing of hand grenades and chinning on the horizontal bar. They were tested by a commission from the Odessa Military District.

The training materials base at a number of schools does not measure up to today's requirements. Almost a third of the rayon's secondary schools have no indoor ranges for firing small-caliber rifles. The educational institutions are not provided with all the specified means for engineering preparation and chemical defense, literature or visual aids.

The initial military training needed to be discussed at the August teachers' conference in Sovetskiy Rayon. And the military leaders were very disappointed that their work was not appreciated or even given any attention.

Residential Outskirts Ignored

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 83 p 4

[Letter to editors and follow-up: "The Forgotten Outskirts"]

[Text] Dear Editors! We live in one of the Baltic Fleet's air garrisons. Our street is on the very edge of the military post. You might say that the homes are in the woods. It is a nice place, but our street has been forgotten and neglected by everyone for several years now.

The district road which links us with the garrison and with the "outside world" in general is in extremely poor condition. In the fall we get no "first-aid," city gas service or taxis at all. There is no lighting on our street and no playgrounds for the children. Some changes for the better were outlined for us 8 years ago, it is true, but after metal poles were set up along the street and the cable was laid, nothing further was done. -- G. Degtyar'

Colonel P. Pankov comments on this letter at the request of Captain 2nd Rank V. Shirokov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent:

"Unfortunately, everything stated in the letter from Galina Mikhaylovna is true. The main cause of this situation is the fact that we have focused all our efforts and attention on the central streets and the new homes. We should not have forgotten the improvements begun on the outskirts, of course. Specialists of the services involved have now specified a certain amount of work to be performed there and have compiled a plan. It is to be implemented by 1 October 1983.

The situation with respect to building playgrounds for the children is somewhat more complicated. The rules for allocating land were not observed on the post, and where the author of the letter now lives all of the land is taken up with personal gardens and orchards. The residents have also built several garages next to their homes. It would therefore be impossible to find a spot for playgrounds without detriment to the other citizens. In order to resolve this matter we obviously need a more clear-cut stand on the part of the garrison chief, the housing committees and the entire community on the street. It would be a good thing for them to meet and decide what has priority."
Training Vessel Little Used

Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Sep 83 p 2

[Article: "'Only One Request'..."]

[Text] A report from Captain 3rd Rank A. Zlydnev was published under the above headline on 3 August. It stated that the training vessel in one of the units was poorly utilized. The editors received official replies from Rear Admiral D. Komarov and Captain 1st Rank L. Knut. They reported that Captain 1st Rank M. Khromtsov and Captain 3rd Rank R. Dashevski have been disciplined for the poor organization of the training and that Engineer-Captain 2nd Rank Yu. Khallilulin has been strictly admonished for his poor control over the use of the training vessel.

A competitive review of training materials bases will be held in the fleet in October and November. Special attention will be devoted to the matter of enhancing the effectiveness with which the training facilities are used for preparing the personnel to perform damage-control work on the ships.

Delay In Repair Of Officers' Club Criticized

Moscow KRAASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by E. Izmaylov, correspondent for the newspaper SOVETSKY VOIN, Red Banner Siberian Military District: "Long-Lasting Red Tape"]

[Text] This matter has now been dragged out for almost 10 years. The garrison officers' club of which Major T. Plotskii is now in charge is located in an old building. And 10 years ago a commission which inspected the building concluded that it was in need of major repairs.

In 1974 specialists of the district billeting directorate were assigned the job of working out a plan. Only a fairy tale can be told rapidly, however, as they say... They were in no hurry to sit down with the blueprints in the billeting directorate. They waited another 2 years, until they had received additional basic information. The planning work was not begun until 1977. It lasted another whole 3 years.

The actual work had not been started, however. The district political directorate received a letter: "The building has urgently needed repairs for a long time. A commission from the rayon billeting unit inspected the physical state of the premises. It found that the wooden ceilings in the unit history room were in urgent need of repairs, the ends of the beams had rotted, there were large cracks in them and they sagged. The main inside wall, made of brick, was cracked and leaned from the vertical... 30 percent of the roof should be replaced. It has been forbidden to conduct mass activities, to show films, to dance or play musical instruments on the stage in the auditorium."

The garrison officers' club was closed and locked. The situation could no longer be tolerated. In the district political directorate an official statement by
the commission contained the following: "For almost 2 years, perhaps longer, they have been talking about this garrison officers' club, but no progress has been made. Give some thought to what might be done there." They thought for a whole month in the billeting directorate, until incensed Engineer-Colonel G. Klimov, directorate chief, demanded in fairly strong terms from his subordinates: "V.G. Skryabin: You have still not prepared your letter of reply. This is a blatant case of inefficiency. Prepare a reply."

It was ordered, and it was done: "The planning and estimate documentation for repair of the garrison officers' club will be prepared in March/April 1980. The itemized list of the capital repairs for 1980 includes the beginning of repair work on the garrison officers' club by personnel of the district construction directorate. In view of the complexity of the job and the large amount of manual labor which cannot be mechanized, it is realistic to expect completion of the repair work on the garrison officers' club in 1983."

If everything stated in that document had been done, our story would now be coming to an end. When the itemized list for 1980 was coordinated, the garrison officers' club was removed from it for some unknown reason, and the project was simply forgotten. The matter of including the project on the itemized list was not mentioned in 1981, the next or in 1983. And of course the completion of the work this year is out of the question. Before speaking about completing the work, it should at least be started....

"They don't know how to maintain buildings here," I was told by Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel V. Skryabin, section chief in the billeting directorate. "The snow should be removed from the roof by a specialist, a forth- or fifth-grade sheet-metal worker, and only with wooden shovels. Ice should be knocked off with wooden mallets. They use crowbars here, however, and knock holes in the roof. This is why it leaks and the ceilings are rotten. I've seen that building. It could have lasted another 100 years without repairs, if they had not ruined the roof themselves...."

And so that is how it is. The workers with the billeting directorate have taken an advantageous position, no getting around it. Only the "advantage" is a doubtful one. It is first of all an indicator of the harmful work style obviously employed by the people involved, by those bound by their service duty to see that the cultural centers are preserved and function normally.
ROLE OF REGIMENTAL, BATTALION CHIEFS OF STAFF DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Lt Col G. Kruglov, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "How the Staff Officer Develops--Comments On Work Style"]

[Text] My service duties frequently require working in close contact with regimental and battalion chiefs of staff, during exercises for one thing. When the staff is performing in an atmosphere approaching actual combat, the "pluses" and "minuses" in the work of its chief are especially apparent. One sees more and more proof of how important it is for him to be not just the agent of the commander's will, but also one of the commander's closest assistants, a creator in the combat, prepared to assume command should this be necessary.

I recall the following incident. During a tactical exercise, in accordance with a hypothetical problem assigned by the director, the battalion had suffered considerable "casualties," control had broken down, and the commander "had been put of action." And all of this took place at a critical time, so to speak, when the "enemy" was attacking on one of the battalion's flanks with considerable forces. In actual combat each lost minute in such a situation could result in defeat.

This is where Captain V. D'yakov, battalion chief of staff, stood out. He assumed command of the battalion, rapidly regrouped the personnel and equipment and transferred the fire from attached artillery. The counterattack was thwarted.

There are many such incidents in the practical training. And it is good that Captain D"yakov performed the way a chief of staff, the commander's first deputy, is supposed to perform, in accordance with regulation. He is the only individual, after all, to whom the regulations grant authority to issue orders and instructions to individuals subordinate to the commander in the commander's name, when this is necessary during the implementation of the commander's decisions. Nonetheless, I would like to discuss this incident, to underscore the fact that success in such situations, as experience has taught us, depends to a crucial degree upon the officer's preparedness to perform with a rigid time limitation and under great moral-psychological and physical stress, both in his own position and the position a level above his. Captain D"yakov proved to be capable of this. This means that the officer had good schooling in staff work. He received this schooling while serving in the position of battalion chief of staff.
The battalion (batal'on, divizion) staff is a very important level in the officer's development. This is where he develops the fundamentals of staff sophistication and acquires his initial skills in performing staff work. No matter how the officer's career subsequently develops, these skills will always have a positive effect. Any commander who has received the schooling provided by staff work in a battalion will agree with this.

As a rule, young officers serve on the battalion staffs. This is also true of the regiment in which Captain D'yakov serves. Most of the battalion chiefs of staff there have occupied their positions around a year. Do we need to say how important it is for them to feel, from their very first steps in the service, that they are real assistants to the commanders and for them to love their work. A great deal depends upon the climate which reigns among the administrative officers and upon the kind of relationships which exist between the commanders and chiefs of staff.

I once heard a conversation between two captains. One of them had just been appointed battalion commander, and the other, a chief of staff, was congratulating him. He said with envy:

"Now you won't have to do all that scribbling or make up all those reports. A commander is a commander. And so...."

"You know, I am grateful that I have become familiar with staff work," the officer answered. "It has taught me a great deal. It is even easier somehow for me and the chief of staff to understand each other. We've only been working together a very short time, but we have already harmonized our work, you might say."

That discussion reminded me of yet another incident during an exercise in a different unit.

The situation on the regiment's right flank suddenly became acute, because the "enemy" had undertaken a counterattack with tanks. The regimental commander decided to use a battalion from the second echelon. Upon receiving the combat order, Major V. Rakushev, the battalion commander, immediately assigned the missions to the subunits. They were to move up to the flank of the counterattacking tanks and destroy them, interacting with subunits operating from the front. At the designated time, however, only one of the companies had reached the position indicated.

The mission was still accomplished, however. Fire support helicopters came to the rescue of the motorized riflemen. Their attack against the "enemy's" combat orders gained for the battalion those few minutes it needed for organizing its entry into the battle. What might have been the price of those minutes in actual combat, however....?

In the critique the exercise director gave special attention to this incident. The delay in reaching the designated position, as it turned out, was due to an error made by the battalion commander in the control of the subunits. This error might never have occurred, had Senior Lieutenant V. Tkachev, battalion chief...
of staff, performed his duties precisely and with initiative. He had accurately relayed the commander's instructions, reacted rapidly to the commander's every comment and accurately kept up the necessary paperwork.... This proved to be too little, however. The chief of staff's role on the battlefield is immeasurably greater than that. He must keep his finger on the pulse of the battle, as they say, foresee the development of events and be prepared for the most unexpected turn of those events.

Senior Lieutenant Tkachev was not prepared for this. He had made one error after another. First, he had incorrectly reported the location of two companies to the battalion commander. This resulted in the incorrect timing. Later, when the subunits encountered a swampy area on their way to the designated area and the company commanders had to change the route, they reported this to headquarters. Tkachev did not attach any importance to their reports, however.... In short, the chief of staff spent more time on all sorts of paperwork than on vital organizational work.

It is possible that this was the work style of one of the captains mentioned above, the one who spoke of staff work as of something boring and uninteresting.

This attitude toward the job, unfortunately, is not so very rare. The basic cause is to be found in the officer himself, of course. A great deal also depends upon how much attention the senior chiefs devote to problems of developing the staff workers. We have no special educational institutions for training battalion chiefs of staff, of course. Former platoon, company and battery commanders become chiefs of staff. And they encounter many difficulties along the way. Naturally, a young officer in the process of developing the art of staff work is greatly in need of the advice, the assistance and the support of his superior and more experienced comrade. Does he always get it, though?

One frequently sees a young chief of staff stewing in his juice. Unfortunately, the performance of the subunit chiefs of staff in training battles on a regimental level is not often thoroughly studied. In the critique of the exercise it is frequently only stated that the regimental staff has not taken full advantage of the capabilities of the lower staffs. The work of the chiefs of those staffs is sometimes not even evaluated. Experience has convinced us that this needs to be done, however. And it needs to be done thoroughly.

It has been noted that the battalion staffs ordinarily perform fairly smoothly in the organization and the initial stages of a training battle. Failings in their work appear later, when the situation is more complicated. Following is an example of this.

The exercise had begun. Senior Lieutenant V. Pushchin, chief of staff of the motorized rifle battalion, had performed well in the organization of combat operations. He understood the commander's instructions immediately and had all the information necessary for the adoption of a well-based decision. When the battalion was unable to penetrate the defense from the march, however, and the situation worsened drastically, the chief of staff was unable to provide the commander with additional information on the "enemy." Reconnaissance, which had performed effectively before the offensive began, had slacked off in its work because the chief of staff was essentially no longer directing it.
We could give the excuse, of course, that Senior Lieutenant Pushchin lacked experience in staff work (he had quite recently still been a company commander). Such examples, however, are additional proof of the need for painstaking individual work with staff officers at the battalion level.

This is not always taken into account in the commander training, however. All of the duty battalion commanders attend assemblies in the regiment mentioned above at the same time, as an example. The chiefs of staff are simply lost in this fairly large group of officers. Their training is not focused. Its "field," if I may, is once again command or technical. When is the officer to improve his skills in staff work?

A great deal depends upon the commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Shiryayev, battalion commander, skilfully organizes his work with the chief of staff. In the heat of a battle, he still always finds time to explain his plan in detail to Senior Lieutenant M. Levin. Nor does the battalion commander omit an opportunity to praise the chief of staff when this is justified. It is easier to work in an atmosphere of demandingness and trust, of course. In the exercises Lieutenant Colonel Shiryayev does not have to waste time issuing instructions for reconnaissance, communications, protection against weapons of mass destruction or on other special matters. All of this is done by the chief of staff, without extra reminders.

Complete mutual understanding and coordination in the work of the commander and the chief of staff constitute an important condition for achieving success in combat. Their value is also great in the subunit's daily life. Battalion chiefs of staff develop more rapidly when they receive the constant attention of their superior chiefs.

Especially intensive combat training is presently underway in the forces. The training year is coming to an end. Its results will depend upon how the staffs organize their work. Concern for their development is one of the important conditions for the successful accomplishment of the tasks facing the subunits.

11499
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WARRANT OFFICER USES POSITION TO PEDDLE SUPPLIES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Sep 83 p 2

[Article by Maj S. Kulikov: "The Peddler From the Food Depot"]

[Text] The news that there was to be a complete inspection of the unit rear services upset the accustomed life style of Warrant Officer A. Meleshkevich, chief of the storage facility. He was the only one thoroughly familiar with the state of affairs in his operation. It was not without his participation, for example, that an entire corner of the storehouse, recently containing boxes of canned meat, had been emptied. Soon after that Meleshkevich went to the warehouse of a neighboring unit.

"Help me out, my friend!" he said to Warrant Officer V. Pashayev as he jumped out of the truck. "As soon as the commission leaves I'll return it to you."

"OK, take what you need," Pashayev said with a wave of his hand, after thinking about for only a minute. He watched with some surprise as his colleague carried a sizable number of boxes to the truck. Where does a person get so much energy when he is trying to cover his own tracks?

Meleshkevich's efforts, quite frankly, were in vain, however. As soon as they arrived the inspectors sealed both storehouses. They figured out where the missing boxes were and where they had come from. This surprised not just the unlucky chiefs of the storage facilities but other officials as well.

"The shortage could not be that large!" Lieutenant Colonel V. Lebedev announced when he had seen the official report on the inspection. "Meleshkevich has only been at the storehouse 4 months. Furthermore, he is a diligent worker. I picked him out from among the subunit sergeants major myself.

This fact could not be denied. The officer was directly involved in Warrant Officer Meleshkevich's transfer to the storage facility. Furthermore, he had even clashed with the former company sergeant major's superiors in the process. Major A. Kovalenko, the battalion commander, you see, felt that the tippler should not be given access to the supplies. The latter, who did not even pass the test in the subunit, still ended up in close proximity to all sorts of tasty items.
"How can this be?" personnel in the battalion had asked, and attempted to protest the action. "We were planning to discuss the warrant officer's dismissal from the Armed Forces, and we signed no requests for his transfer...."

"I signed them, though," Lieutenant Colonel Lebedev said. He said it in a tone which discouraged anyone from arguing.

Warrant Officer Meleshkevich's new duties were certainly not a burden to him. At any rate, he began to be designated vehicle commander fairly frequently. This meant that he could bypass the KPP [traffic regulating point], do anything he wanted to do and go wherever he wanted to go. One day, the storage facility chief got the idea of taking several boxes of canned meat along.

News of the traveling "peddler" spread throughout the district in time. It was as though a shadow had come over the unit officials, however. They saw nothing, heard nothing and suspected nothing.

"Not exactly. We did see Meleshkevich under the influence, of course," Lieutenant A. Kuznetsov, chief of the unit food service, now explained. "We attached no great importance to this, however."

"There was no special reason for sounding the alarm," Lieutenant Colonel Lebedev said, seconding the lieutenant. "The state of the rear services was regularly checked. Everything was completely in order."

How could that be? The inspectors found excess supplies totalling more than 3,000 rubles at the food issuing depot alone!

"Just a mix-up," Lieutenant Colonel Lebedev said. He was still not giving up. "They have fouled things up in the reports. This can be corrected, however. Surpluses don't have to be made up. We can debit them, and that will be the end of it!"

Further commentary would be superfluous, as they say. We want to believe that the facts we have been discussing will be assessed from a standpoint of principle. After all, as long as complacency and gullibility flourish, as long as "rescuers" such as the above-mentioned Pashayev can be found, there will continue to be fertile soil for pilferage, for new peddlers like the one who thrived for a time at the food storehouse.
CONTRIBUTION OF MILITARY COLLECTIVE, AUXILIARY FARMS NOTED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 9 Jun 83) pp 6-7

[Article by Colonel General I. Isayenko: "The Armed Forces' Contribution"]

[Text] The decisions of the May (1982) CPSU Central Committee plenum, which approved the USSR Food Program for the period extending to 1990 are a clear demonstration of the concern of the Communist Party for the welfare of the Soviet people and of its desire to raise its material and cultural standard of living and create conditions best conducive to all-around individual development on the basis of increases in the efficiency of social production, higher labor productivity and greater social and political involvement on the part of the working masses. Our Armed Forces, too, are making their contribution to the campaign for successful implementation of the Food Program. Every year finds our military personnel helping to bring in and then transport the grain harvest.

Regardless of the specific nature of the problems involved, the organization of food supplies for the Armed Forces is closely linked to efforts to find a general solution to the country's food problem, which in turn depend upon our level of economic development, above all in the agricultural sector. Food supplies to the armed forces have been improving rapidly and since the mid-1960's have, on the whole, been established upon an entirely new plane. Making its own impact felt in this effort has been the fact that the USSR Ministry of Defense has undertaken an extensive program of agricultural development.

We now have a considerable number of sovkhozes and special dairy farms located primarily in our more remote areas and in regions with poor soils and adverse climates, particularly in the Far North, Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Transbaykal and the Far East. Military units (chast') have their own subsidiary (unit welfare) [podsobnoye (prikukhonnoye)] farms, and these are now being created for cost-accounting-based enterprises, organizations and institutions. The average annual gross production on these farms over the course of the Tenth-Five-Year-Plan period doubled the figures for 1965, while grain production was up 2.6, potatoes and vegetables 1.5, milk 1.4, meat 1.8 and eggs 5-fold for the same period.

Now on the agendas of all USSR Ministry of Defense agricultural enterprises are the important tasks of doing everything possible to increase crop and livestock production, raise labor productivity, cut production costs and increase farm
profitability. The Eleventh Five-Year Plan calls for military sovkhozes and subsidiary (unit welfare) farms to increase production of basic products 1.5-fold over Tenth Five-Year-Plan levels and then to double these figures by 1990.

Depending upon the particular features of the region in which a farm is located and the military needs in the area, each farm will also be assigned specific production tasks. In addition to their livestock-raising operations, for example, sovkhozes in the Far East, Transbaykal and Central Asia are specializing in potatoes and vegetable crops. Sovkhozes in the northern part of the country are responsible primarily for milk, egg and hothouse vegetable production, while operations in the central regions are providing us with early potatoes, meat, eggs and milk.

Most military sovkhozes are successfully accomplishing their assigned tasks. The military sovkhoz directed by V. Ivanovskiy turned in good production figures last year, for example. Despite the unfavorable weather conditions, this collective was able to fulfill its plan for meat and other production.

Military sovkhozes in the Red Banner Odessa Military District have been working in close cooperation with a number of scientific research institutes for several years now. In accordance with recommendations by the scientists here, they are now sowing such winter wheat varieties as Eritrospernum-127 and Odessa Polukarylkovaya [semidwarf], which are yielding 40-60 quintals per hectare. These farms are for the most part cultivating winter crops, whose yields are up to 30 per cent higher than spring crops. The Tenth Five-Year-Plan period saw district sovkhozes achieve an overall increase in grain yields of from 20 to 31 quintals per hectare.

A solid grain base has been a factor in our sovkhoz's success in developing their animal husbandry operations. It is gratifying to be able to point out that last year saw this district's sovkhoz collectives overfulfill their plan for animal products to be supplied to military units in all categories and in the process net over 4 million rubles.

The collective of Burnenskiy sovkhoz (Red Banner Central Asian Military District) has been running a successful operation for several years in a row now. This is a well-developed, highly diversified farm. The managers and supervisory personnel here, the party organization and the workers all had to work enormously hard to force the heavy soil to be generous in its yields of good potatoes, grains, vegetables and a variety of perennial grass and feed crops. It all began here with a concern for the soil and its fertility and an effort to increase the yields obtained from each hectare. The collective took a series of steps to improve the fertility of the soil and introduced a six-field crop rotation with required application of organic fertilizer. Then they began to work the soil in a different way and launched a program of mineral fertilization and irrigation.

The best potato growers here are now getting up to 300-330 quintals of potatoes per hectare. A school to give instruction to personnel specializing in potato growing has been organized around the operation run here by the best link [zveno] with the objective of making its innovative procedures accessible to all. The farm is trying to exploit its own internal resources to the maximum and take the greatest possible advantage of the successful experience of other operations to
the end of increasing both their crop yields and the overall efficiency of their own operation. Last year, 1982, saw the sovkhoz earn profits of 1.4 million rubles.

Workers on Mikhailovskiy military sovkhoz, an operation under the direction of I. Gorbachev, have the difficult conditions of the Primorskiy Kray to contend with. The collective here has been able to achieve sharp increases in all types of production in only a short period of time. It has been concentrating on the production of early potatoes and vegetables; it has introduced some promising varieties, particularly the Filatovskiy, which yields up to 300 quintals of potatoes per hectare, and the Primorskiy-86 barley with yields of 40 quintals per hectare. Increases in vegetable production here are due to the introduction of irrigation in some areas and the adoption of advanced agricultural methods. Also important has been the fact that the farm is growing low-cost vegetable plants, but what is most important is that they are plants particularly suitable for the local conditions.

Milk production in the Far North is a highly valued and at the same time arduous undertaking. Dairy farming is the primary production operation on military sovkhozes belonging to the Red Banner Northern Fleet. Each milker here tries to get high yields from her own group of cows. A balanced feeding program, good care and maintenance and increasing milk yields are the most important conditions for success in efforts to raise productivity, while the two-shift system is improving production standards and working conditions. The old-timers, the experts in the animal husbandry operations here have been in the forefront of the drive to insure successful fulfillment of targets for the third year of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan. Among these are milkers N. Gunik and N. Sorikh, who tend a herd of zebu-hybrid cattle. Last year they got as much as 4486 kg of 4 per cent-fat milk from each one of their animals.

Poultry raisers on Red Banner Northern Fleet sovkhozes have also achieved marked success. M. Sharapov's poultry workers and operator V. Volochnev, for example, gathered as many as 283 eggs from each one of their laying hens last year. This doubled their production over the first year of the Tenth Five-Year-Plan period.

Our unit subsidiary (unit welfare) farms are also making an important contribution to the effort to improve military food supplies. Using food scraps from the messes, organizing regular scrap collections on military posts and growing feed on land available in our training areas, these farms are now raising cattle, swine, poultry, sheep and rabbits, building ponds to raise fish in and maintaining bee hives, greenhouses, gardens and orchards. Many of these operations are now supplying half of an annual meat requirement, or in some instances even an entire year's supply, without drawing on state resources at all. The military units in which officers M. Danyutin, V. Ravlin, M. Krutskikh, N. Bordzhaliyev and G. Katvitskiy are stationed have now been able to establish themselves on this basis. The subsidiary farm officer Borovikov is responsible for has shown itself to be a well-run operation. Farms here are producing up to 23 kg of meat, 27 kg of milk and 15 kg of garden and hothouse vegetables each year per service member drawing rations.

Subsidiary (unit welfare) farms have now been organized as successful operations in the Order of Lenin Moscow and Red Banner Far Eastern, Central Asian, Northern Caucasus, Siberian, Volga and Odessa Military Districts, the Order of Lenin
Moscow Air Defense District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Air Defense Forces and the Strategic Rocket Forces. A good deal of attention is also being given to the cultivation of private plots on the part of workers and employees of agricultural enterprises. The last three years have seen the population of cattle and poultry belonging to individual owners grow 1.3-fold with increases as well in the swine population.

Implementing decisions of the 26th Congress of the CPSU and the May and November (1982) plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the collectives and party and trade union organizations of our agricultural enterprises are filled with resolve to meet Eleventh Five-Year-Plan targets set with the objective of implementing the Food Program. Efficient, expert exploitation of all available resources and means of increasing the level of agricultural production all the while with an eye to the requirements of the state is now very important.

Much has been accomplished in recent years on all military unit sovkhozes and welfare farms to improve the material-technical base of their crop and animal husbandry programs, tighten discipline, improve organizational efficiency, raise wages, increase residential construction and train qualified personnel. Some of the less profitable farms have now as a result become some of our most profitable operations. And as is pointed out in the USSR Food Program, this constitutes the most critical aspect of the whole effort to increase the efficiency of our social production.

This program to bring about radical improvement in the country's food production operations is, as we know, designed for implementation over the course of two five-year-plan periods. It cannot be forgotten, however, that we are laying the foundations of future success today. Our most immediate task is to do everything necessary to be able in 1983 to achieve substantial increases in the productivity of our crop-raising and animal husbandry operations and to fulfill and over fulfill our plan targets. In the construction of production and cultural and personal services facilities, our agricultural enterprises should allocate financial resources in greater amounts, resources earmarked primarily for the development of specialized farms concentrating on the production of meat, milk, eggs, potatoes and vegetables. We should see the construction of more vegetable and grain storage facilities, cattle barns, sties, poultry houses and other production facilities. Particular attention is being given to the construction of housing with well-organized and maintained settlements. Resources allocated are being used to procure local construction materials, lumber, stone, gravel etc.

When we speak about our successes we should always keep in mind that there is potential available that remains to be tapped, a fact to which particular attention was given in the decisions of the November (1982) party central committee plenum as well as by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the speech which he delivered at the plenum. He pointed, among other things, to the need to create conditions—both the economic and organizational conditions—which will stimulate good-quality, productive, efficient work performance, initiative and enterprise.

Socialist competition should be enlisted for the contribution it can make to the accomplishment of these tasks. It was launched this year at the initiative of the collective of Prokhladnoye military sovkhoz in the Red Banner North Caucasus
Military District under the slogan "For increased production and a better quality agricultural product." Workers and employees of all farms are participating in this effort. They are filled with resolve honorably to fulfill their plans and obligations for 1983 as well as for the Eleventh Five-Year-Plan period as a whole.

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8963
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GROUND FORCES

IMPORTANCE OF PHYSICAL TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by Maj G. D udenko: "The Exercises Are Conducted By Experts"]

[Text] It was already dark when Lieutenant Yu. Mordov-anets, commander of the motorized rifle company, gave the order to search.

...It seemed to Sergeant I. Karepa, commander of the "snatch" group, that an eternity had passed since the beginning of the operation. He looked anxiously into the night. The "enemy's" trenches should appear at any moment. When Karepa understood that the group was almost at the objective, however, the motorized riflemen began to move with even greater caution.

The "enemy" gave away his presence by stepping on a branch, which cracked under his feet. The rest took only seconds. Private S. Piganov, candidate sportsmaster in unarmed combat, made his move like lightning. His subordinates shot forward at the same time. The order had been carried out on time....

There are many ways of developing in the fightingmen such qualities as resolve, will-power and boldness. Systematic exercises at the tank training area or the firing range, the training ground or the artillery training facility help a great deal in this area. There is a discipline, however, which contributes to the greatest degree to the development of good volitional qualities in the fightingmen--physical training.

The indoctrinational possibilities of this discipline are fully utilized in the motorized rifle company commanded by Lieutenant Yu. Mordovanets. Systematic physical exercises, concomitant drills and sports tournaments there are subordinated to the single goal of effectively helping the fightingmen to master their specialty well.

Sports masters from the district SKA[army sports club] have made a perceptible contribution to the improvement of physical training in this company and certain other subunits in the Sevastopol Order of Aleksandr Nevskiy Motorized Rifle Regiment. They teach the personnel techniques in hand-to-hand combat. It was with good reason that the company commander made Private S. Piganov a member of the "snatch" group. Aside from the fact that the sportsman was assigned the main
role in the search, his presence also gave the other soldiers self-confidence. They got another demonstration of how effective the attack procedures are when they are mastered.

The fightingmen also take their example from Privates A. Vishnevskiy, A. Chirkin and B. Yamnoy, candidate sportsmasters in unarmed combat. Each of them conducts classes for the soldiers in the field, teaching them to perform forcefully.

This method of teaching the personnel close-combat procedures is becoming more and more widespread in the Siberian Military District. The district sports committee and the army sports club, together with the unit and subunit commanders, are doing a great deal to develop in the fightingmen of various specialties the ability to operate calmly in any situation, to stoically withstand the emotional stress.

"The program actually allocates adequate time for learning the basic techniques for conducting hand-to-hand combat," Colonel A. Slepchenko, district chief of physical training and sports, said. "We need to enlist the rated sportsmen in this important work, however, in order to teach the techniques more effectively."

The first thing they did there was to decide to train supernumerary instructors in hand-to-hand combat from among the veteran masters and send them into the forces to conduct classes. Classes on instructional methods were held for this purpose at a seminar at the army sports club. They were directed by Senior Lieutenant A. Matveyev, senior trainer for the district team, and other veteran instructors.

In the army sports club they did not limit the work to teaching the fightingmen techniques of attack and self-defense. The club's specialists also did a great deal during the winter to improve the skiing abilities of personnel in the district units and military schools. Warrant Officer M. Postnikov, for example, a sportmaster in ski racing, repeatedly visited the classes and helped the commanders.

Possibilities for the master-sportsmen's participation in the physical training of the personnel have not been exhausted, however. The district riflemen are still remaining on the sideline and have not yet accustomed themselves to the tested system of conducting classes in the forces. And they are in a very good position to do so. The army sports club's indoor rifle range is located at a training center, where the combat training of the fightingmen in various specialties goes on day and night. If they had the will, I believe that it would be perfectly possible through joint efforts to set up classes involving the veteran sharp-shooters there.
AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

GUARDS REGIMENT COMMANDER PROFILED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Aug 83 p 1

[Article by Maj S. Levitskiy: "The Commander of a Guards Regiment—Outstanding People in the Army and Navy"]

[Text] A crystal-clear spring gushes from the ground near the airfield of the Guards fighter regiment. Its icy water is carried to the control shack. Guards Colonel V. Bobrikov, regimental commander, offers me a generously full cup of it: "Drink it. Don't be afraid." he says. "No one has caught a cold from it yet." There is a good-natured smile on Viktor Mikhailovich's ordinarily stern face.

I can understand his good mood. A few days ago he brought a formation of fighters from a distant airfield. He was first to land. "Imeni twice Hero of the Soviet Union A. Smirnov" is painted on the MiG fuselage. Soon after the aircraft landed Bobrikov reported: "The missile launchings at the radio-controlled targets were successful."

For 10 years now the Guards airmen have earned only good or excellent ratings for the combat employment. Judging from everything, Viktor Mikhailovich is satisfied with how his subordinates have begun working together. He tells about a complex tactical situation which developed in the air one night for Guards Major V. Serov. The latter did not lose his head, however. He shot down the target. He was awarded a watch with his name inscribed on it for his courageous and calm performance. Bobrikov himself did not fly out for the intercept that day. He was busy organizing a smooth flight schedule. He, a military sniper-pilot, was not needed, however. "It's a pity I didn't get to fly that day," Viktor Mikhailovich says, and one senses a tireless thirst to fly in his words. "We have to let the youth develop themselves at the range first, however. They did very well; they coped with the mission. They left no target for me."

Bobrikov recalls how he read a letter from Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel (Reserve) A. Kislyakov, who served in the regiment, to the silent airmen prior to the tactical exercise. He recalls the excited Guards Major Serov, when the latter heard the taped voices of his three daughters here in this burning desert. "This is Nadya Serova, and I love my daddy!" one of the twins chattered. The fighters then fought the "enemy" on MiG's with the names and numbers of frontline Guards aces inscribed on the sides. The targets shot down burned in the fiery mirage.
The Guards title is a proud one. The sacredness of the combat traditions.... "The most important thing is to inspire the men, to orient them," Bobrik says with conviction. "I cannot imagine successfully organized combat training, responsibility or firm discipline without a good moral example."

The famous former fliers of the regiment, whose names, at Bobrikov's initiative, are carried into the air by the fliers, serve as a moral example for the regiment's airmen. The commander himself sets such an example—with his demandingness of himself and of others, with his devotion to flying. Leading the Guards regiment, he was the first to master the unfamiliar fighter. He has been awarded the Order of the Red Star for this and for his successes in the training.

Communist Bobrikov, firm and uncompromising, is respected in the regiment for his sensitivity. Not so long ago Guards Major S. Tyutenkov was taken off flight work for reasons of illness. Viktor Mikhaylovich did everything possible to encourage the pilot and the doctors to combat the illness. Could Tyutenkov ever forget his return to the winged formation?! Or take the following incident. The commander grounded Guards Major B. Ryaguzov for what some people considered to be a trifling matter. Bobrikov knew that his decision would be supported by the regiment's communists, however. With this harsh punishment he "shot down" the conceit of others besides Ryaguzov. Along with this strictness, he is sensitive, and the main aspect of his sensitivity is his attention to the individual, his concern for the individual's future.

There is no such thing as trifling matters in the flight work. Once, Viktor Mikhaylovich was not afraid of a "high and mighty tone" of an inspector, and absolutely refused to do what the inspector demanded and wake up the squadron commander, who was resting up for a flight. Incidentally, even on the regimental airfield no one walks where he wants to, but only along designated "paths."

The Guards fighter regiment headed by Guards Colonel V. Bobrikov has operated for a long time without accidents, and this fact speaks for itself.

...The roar of the afterburners on the fighters taking off does not diminish over the green expanse of the airfield. On the eve of USSR Air Force Day the airmen are working even more persistently to add to the regiment's Guards glory. Viktor Mikhaylovich rushes to explain: "Today we have two birthday boys flying: Lieutenant Colonel Buslayev, a product of the regiment and senior flight inspector, and Guards Lieutenant Colonel Slyshchenko, commander of an excellent squadron. We need to which them a happy birthday."

I drink the spring water. Its sharp coldness perks one up, while at the same time warming one in a special way.

11499
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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

YEFIMOV EXTOLS AIR FORCES ON AIR FORCE DAY

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 83 p 2

[Article by Mar Avn A. Yefimov, first deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces: "Powerful Wings"]

[Text] Today the Soviet people and their armed defenders are formally commemo-
rating USSR Air Force Day. Established 50 years ago by decree of the Council
of People's Commissars, this holiday has become one of the favorite holidays in
our nation. The homeland is honoring the creators and builders of the modern
aircraft and equipment, the winged defenders of our native skies, Aeroflot work-
ers, DOSAAF sportsmen-pilots and aviation veterans, honoring all those who are
adding to the socialist nation's air strength with their selfless labor.

USSR Air Force Day is being commemorated in an atmosphere of great political and
labor enthusiasm on the part of the Soviet people, who are fulfilling the his-
toric decisions coming out of the 26th party congress, the plans for the 11th
five-year period and the large-scale tasks set at the June 1983 Plenum of the
CPSU Central Committee.

The creation and development of Soviet aviation is directly linked with the name
Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. The
basic initiatives resulting in the organization of the Red Air Fleet, in which
he wisely saw a new and progressive form of transportation and communications
and one of the powerful combat means of protecting the Soviet Nation against the
aggression of imperialist powers, were his.

The first Soviet air detachment was formed and a temporary control agency—the
Office of Commissars of Aviation and Aeronautics—was created by decision of the
Soviet government on the 3rd day of the revolution. Lenin and the party con-
cerned themselves constantly with providing aviation with material and technical
support and training cadres for it. During the years 1918 and 1919 alone the
Council of Labor and Defense issued more than 200 decisions on these matters.

During the years of civil war Soviet pilots made assaults against concentrations
of enemy troops and equipment and provided air cover for Red Army units. One of
the orders issued by the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, which
expresses appreciation for the selfless performance of Soviet airmen and for
their good moral-political qualities, states, among other things: "...understand-
ing the difficult conditions under which the Red pilots, aeronauts and other
workers of the Air Fleet had to build, to live and work, the Revolutionary Mili-
tary Council expresses the republic's gratitude for their selfless combat work
and notes their special service to the revolution."

Our nation created its own aviation industry during the first five-year periods.
Soviet pilots have made a number of outstanding long-range flights and estab-
lished more than a third of the world air records in Soviet aircraft. The na-
tion has become a great air power. Young volunteer-enthusiasts joined the home-
land's air fleet in response to an appeal from the party and the Komsomol. So-

viet air fighters demonstrated courage and heroism and great military skill in
the performance of their international duty in the skies over Spain, China and
Mongolia, at Lake Khasan and over the Khalkhin-Gol River.

Soviet aviation made a worthy contribution to the achievement of our historic
victory over German fascism during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic
War. Despite heavy losses during the initial period of the fighting, it retained
its capability for active operations. Supporting the ground forces and making
continuous strikes against the fascist aviation in the air and at the airfields,
our pilots gradually deprived the enemy of its temporary superiority.

The struggle for strategic air superiority developed in the battles fought at
Moscow and Leningrad, the fighting for the Caucasus, the fighting in the Kuban
and at Kursk. Those fierce battles are especially memorable to me, a partici-
pant in the battle on the Kursk salient. There were more than 4,000 aircraft
operating simultaneously on the two sides. Senior Lieutenant A. Gorovets per-
formed an unprecedented feat at that time. He shot down nine enemy bombers in
a single battle on 6 July, but was himself killed in an unequal air battle as
he was returning to his airfield. He was posthumously awarded the title Hero
of the Soviet Union. Officers S. Luganskiy, M. Tokarev, V. Andrianov, A.
Mares'yev, N. Gulayev and many others distinguished themselves in the fighting
on the Kursk salient.

Our famous ace I. Kozhedub, who became thrice Hero of the Soviet Union at the
age of 24, after personally shooting down 62 enemy aircraft, received his
christening combat there.

The Communist Party and the Soviet government greatly appreciated the airmen's
part in the victory at Kursk: the Guards title was conferred upon 27 air
units and formations, and eight of them were awarded the names Belgorod, Orel
and Kharkov.

During the war years Soviet aircraft performed more than 3 million combat sor-
ties. Soviet pilots destroyed 57,000 German fascist aircraft in air battles and
in strikes against airfields, and three fourths of the Hitlerites' aircraft
losses occurred on the Soviet-German front. Our naval aviation sank hundreds
of fascist combat and auxiliary ships. Soviet airmen provided numerous brilliant
examples of selfless steadfastness, valor and heroism. More than 500 times So-
viet pilots rammed enemy aircraft in the air; 17 of them employed the ramming
technique twice; A. Khlobystov did so three times, and B. Kovzan four times.
More than 350 times the winged knights performed rammings with burning aircraft,
repeating N. Castello's feat.
The jet aircraft have developed rapidly since the war. The backbone of the modern Soviet Air Forces is made up of supersonic, high-altitude, all-weather missile-carriers outfitted with the latest weapons, means of detection and fire control and the latest in navigational and sighting equipment. The Soviet aviation is highly mobile and maneuverable, is capable of employing various types of weapons and engaging in radioelectronic warfare in any kind of weather, at any time of the year, day or night.

The powerful airborne combat equipment is in reliable hands. The air fighters persistently perfect their air training and make skillful and full use of the enormous combat capabilities of the aircraft systems, created by scientists and designers and with the labor of the aircraft builders. Commanders, staffs and political organs work each day to enhance the combat readiness of the units and subunits, to work out the most effective methods of combat employment and tactical procedures, to organize interaction with other branches of troops and to prepare the pilots and all the crew members to perform boldly and resolutely in modern combat.

The training level of the flight personnel fully measures up to the demands of modern combat. This was demonstrated once again in recent exercises by troops and naval forces in the Baltic area and Western Belorussia. They were directed by Marshal of the Soviet Union D.F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense. The military airmen demonstrated tactical maturity and the ability to effectively accomplish their assigned missions, interacting closely with units and subunits of the Ground Forces and the Navy. They confirmed with their performance their thorough understanding of their personal responsibility for the fate of peace and their readiness to defend the socialist homeland, our friends and allies.

Having taken over the baton from the veterans of the Air Forces, today's generation of airmen are adding to the glorious heroic traditions with their selfless service to the homeland. They have added numerous brilliant pages to the history of the Air Forces in the fulfillment of their patriotic and international duty. The names of officers and Heroes of the Soviet Union G. Yeliseyev, B. Gaynutdinov, V. Shcherbakov, Ye. Zel'nyakov, V. Kot, V. Pavlov and others are in the same ranks with the names of the famous frontline aces. Many people in our nation, especially the youth, are very familiar with the names B. Ryabtsev, B. Kapustin, Yu. Yanov, Yu. Solopov, P. Shklyaruk, V. Kubrakov, V. Perevedentsev and other valorous pilots, officers and cadets at flight schools, who have demonstrated self-control, resourcefulness, valor and good flight skill in extremely difficult air situations. Cadet Sergey Dronov, a delegate to the 19th Komsomol Congress, was awarded the Order of the Red Star by an ukase issued by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet for courage and skill demonstrated in an emergency situation in the air, in which he save the expensive equipment.

The nation is rightly proud of its winged knights. They are capable both of protecting our homeland's sacred borders and of achieving world air records. Service in the Air Forces shapes the character of real air fighters-and-patriots.

Commemorating the national holiday, USSR Air Force Day, Soviet airmen are summing up their achievements and concentrating their efforts on achieving better fulfillment of training plans and socialist commitments. Competing with the slogan
"Enhance Vigilance and Reliably Assure the Homeland's Security!" personnel of the units and subunits in which officers V. Demidov, G. Lebedev, V. Vorob'ev, V. Ivanov, A. Pavlenko, V. Rebrov, A. Tsar'kov, V. Malyshov, A. Derbenev and B. Belokon' serve as commanders and political workers, and others, have made new achievements. The successes are based on the effective use of the aircraft equipment and weapons, smooth flight scheduling, strict and precise observance of documents governing flight safety.

The reliable assurance of flight safety is a task of state importance. It is constantly at the center of attention and an objective of special concern on the part of commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations of the air units and VUZ's. Fulfilling decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress and the instructions issued by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, for thoroughly enhancing work effectiveness and quality, discipline and organization, commanders and political workers of the Air Forces are mastering the Leninist work style and focusing their attention on the fulfillment of combat training plans and socialist commitments with respect to quality indicators, the study and dissemination of progressive know-how in the combat employment of the aircraft, the development of creative initiative in the personnel and the maintaining of precise regulation order.

Decisions coming out of the June 1983 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the speech delivered to the party veterans by Comrade Yu.V. Andropov have been received in the Air Force units as a combat program of ideological-political conditioning for the airmen and their mobilization for the accomplishment of the assigned tasks. Commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations are focusing their efforts on the development in the military airmen of a Marxist-Leninist outlook, communist conviction, pride in their socialist homeland, burning hatred for the enemies of socialism and constant readiness to resolutely repel aggression, wherever it might originate.

Taking into account the increased danger of war in the world, the arms race, the all-out preparations for nuclear war by imperialism's aggressive circles and the unprecedented psychological intervention launched by them against the USSR and the other socialist commonwealth nations, the military airmen are rallying ever more closely round the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, enhancing their vigilance and making a fitting contribution to the continued strengthening of combat readiness for the Soviet Armed Forces.

Loyal sons of the socialist homeland, the military airmen, like all the personnel of our army and navy, are vigilantly following the intrigues of the enemies of peace and mankind and are always prepared to fly out to engage in combat to defend the homeland and the other socialist nations, to honorably fulfill their patriotic and international duty.
AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

AIR REGIMENT TACTICAL TRAINING EXERCISE

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Aug 83 p 1

[Article by Guards Lt Col V. Zhuravkov, deputy air regiment commander for flight training: "Changing Formation in the Air"]

[Text] We attached special importance to this regimental tactical flight exercise. The task was one of thoroughly testing the airmen's flight and tactical training. This first summer exercise had another, no less important, objective, however. Following some major failures in the winter combat training, we wanted to give the men the opportunity to gain some self-confidence, to rouse themselves, as they say, to reform their combat formation and move forward to take the new goals by storm.

For the last exercise of the winter we had received perhaps the lowest rating the regiment had ever received in its entire existence. And this certainly was not because our Guardsmen had suddenly absolutely forgotten how to fly the missile-carriers on long-range flights or had lost their skill in making strikes against targets with a sniper's skill—all those things which were the pride and the glory of the Guards air regiment. They were all let down by a single crew, which lost its bearings on an important flight. It happened because of the negligence of Guards Senior Lieutenant S. Drozdetskiy, the navigator on the crew, because of his lack of discipline and inefficiency. He had not readied the navigational system prior to the flight. Guards Major M. Chizhov, aircraft commander, had trusted the navigator. He had not even attempted to monitor his subordinate, either on the ground or in the air, demonstrating carelessness and lack of responsibility.

It was a perturbing occurrence, thoroughly disgraceful. A study of all the information on the incident showed that it was no accident, however. Carelessness and lack of control existed to one degree or another in the other crews as well. Errors were also revealed in the flight supervision and control of the groups in the air. In general, there was a lowering of demandingness with respect to the strict and precise observance of flight regulations and a trend toward relaxation of control over the quality of the performance of missions.

This was all the more regretful, since the personnel had not yet gotten over a gross precondition for a flight accident committed by officer V. Shcherbina. We can now say definitely that the personnel did not benefit from the lesson
only because the import of what had happened had not been understood not just by every pilot and navigator, but even by every communist in charge. Frankly, many of them considered this incident to be a regretful blunder, an error committed by the pilot. They closed their eyes to the fact that connivance had led to the incident. And what they could have expected happened....

Self-critically, fully admitting our own responsibility, we did not proceed in the party manner and were hesitant to tell one another the truth, to call a spade a spade in a principled and straightforward manner. This had to be done, even though it was late in coming. Strict penalties, both party and disciplinary, were imposed upon all those to blame. It was not just a matter of punishment, however; we had to reorient ourselves in our work with determination. This reorientation had to thoroughly embrace all areas of the work performed by the regimental personnel and even more—-it had to internally reorient each individual in his work, so that there could be no place for disorganization or carelessness, formalism or complacency. We had to eliminate attempts by certain commanders to base their work on the pursuit of good ratings, forgetting about quality. The regiment’s commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol committees seriously and thoroughly reviewed their work methods for directing the men, the entire gamut of political and indoctrinational work. The personnel also demonstrated a thorough readiness for improvement. One could feel how sharply the regiment’s unusually low evaluation, only satisfactory, for the entire training period had wounded the pride of each.

We began our campaign first by combatting idle talk, empty words, laxity in any form, and by creating an atmosphere of genuine party intolerance of shortcomings.

I should explain, however, that despite the fact that each individual was quite prepared to fundamentally alter his attitude toward the job, it was not easy for some of us to break ourselves of the old ways. We had foreseen this and since we had already decided to conduct an uncompromising campaign, we started "from the top," with those in charge. We checked on the commanders, without making any sort of allowances, to see what conclusion they had derived for themselves from the scandalous case of the lost bearings. And this is what we learned. Guards Major A. Yerusenko, aircraft commander, and Guards Major G. Gorshkov, aircraft navigator, were violating the rules for verifying the direction taken on a flight. This is the same thing which had happened on Chizhov's crew, but there had not yet been any negative consequences in this case. It would be difficult to find a more eloquent example of inertia in sticking to the accustomed ways, especially when we consider the fact that Yerusenko is a squadron commander and Gorshkov a subunit navigator. This meant nothing. The higher the position of those communists, the stricter the accountability. The squadron commander was forced to render account at a meeting of the party committee, the squadron navigator at a meeting of the party bureau.

We did more than simply take such drastic measures, however. This was for those who had sufficient experience but were making it easy and simplifying things for themselves. Many of the personnel, especially the young ones, had to be re-equipped with the new methods and taught to perform each flight mission well. Aircraft commander day was established in the unit. This consisted of training, of testing on the vast range of duties not just of those who sit in the
missile-carrier cockpits but of all the crew members, and the adjusting of interrelations among them in the air and on the ground. There had been a time when a great deal of effort had put forth to instil complete trust among the crew members. Some of them had now begun abusing this trust. In this case, however, one could not reproach a certain aircraft commander for not having faith in his subordinates; he had too much trust in them, accepting everything they said without verifying it. And if the officers did verify what their subordinates told them, it was only done on a formal and superficial level.

The stress in the work was laid on the enhancement of each individual's sense of personal responsibility for the quality of the combat training, for the strengthening of discipline and efficiency on the ground and in the air, on organization and the undeviating observance of general service and flight regulations.

In June we took a great step forward in the fulfillment of our training plans and socialist commitments, overcoming a significant lag behind the air regiment with which the personnel of our unit are competing. We gave a quality performance in the exercise mentioned at the beginning of the article.

This was unquestionably an important stage of the summer training period. Even the successful completion of that stage did not liquidate the regiment's "indebtedness" accumulated during the winter period. In addition to the planned schedule, we also had to rapidly help officers Yu. Vasilenko and V. Bolovintsev, new pilots in the regiment, to fit into the formation, and to train several aircraft commanders as instructors. There was an enormous amount of work. At the recommendation of higher headquarters and political organs and with their assistance we switched to a double flight shift. The flight intensity increased drastically. Our new officers are already flying for combat employment in difficult weather in the daytime and in good weather, at night. The aircraft commanders have completed their program of instructor training.

We have now reached the finish line, figuratively speaking. We still have a lot to do in this, the final phase of the training year, in order to justify the great title of initiators of the competition in the Air Forces. This will not be easy, but we are now confident that we will achieve the goals we have set.

11499
CSO: 1801/502
HEICOPTER PILOTS NEGLECT TACTICS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by Maj. A. Petrov, Central Group of Forces: "The Helicopters are Firing"]

[Text] The vast panorama of the range spread out before the observation tower, located on a hill. The morning mist had not entirely dissipated, but one could already make out the tree-covered hills on the horizon. Thick green grass grew at their foot. Dark shades were predominant only on the target field, in a small valley—the marks of exploding bombs and shells.

"Today the helicopters will be operating against armored targets. Look over near the woods," the flight operation officer at the range said. "We classify that group of targets as among the most difficult. They are not easily detected."

The tank-targets were indeed well camouflaged. It was difficult to spot them even in the calm atmosphere at the tower. It would be even more difficult from the air, in flight.

We saw the fire support helicopters as soon as Captain O. Kalinin, the group leader, requested permission to begin the firing run. At first we could barely see the helicopters against the background of the woods, but later we were able to "lead" them without difficulty up to the very point at which they would launch the antitank guided missiles.

The missile sustainer engine started with a magnesium flash. The black arrow of the missile separated from the launching rack, leaving a wavy train of smoke behind. A moment later the missile's flight stabilized. The tracking was flawless, ending with a direct hit.

Captain B. Pukhov, flight commander, Captain A. Luchinskiy and Senior Lieutenant V. Shkarednyy, helicopter commanders, fired accurately.

Some time later, after crossing the roadless range, our "uazik" stopped at the first tank-target. A hole through the side armor of the hull and a smashed crawler belt were the best proof of the helicopter pilots' firing skill. The "autographs" of the airborne fighters were also visible on the other targets.

I recalled the tactical briefing held in the squadron the day before the firing exercise. During the briefing one felt a sense not of a training battle but of
real combat. Every pilot carefully studied the flight route, the disposition of the "enemy's" air defense facilities and their tactical and technical data, and modeled several alternative procedures for attacking the targets and for the combat maneuvering.

Major V. Galushka, deputy squadron commander, Captain V. Pukhov, a flight commander, and Senior Lieutenant V. Mamanov, pilot-operator and holder of the Order of the Red Star, told their colleagues about the specific characteristics of a search for small targets and shared with them their experience in flying for combat employment in mountains and woods. In short, the briefing put the helicopter pilots in a mood to perform in the tactical exercise as though as in combat, to make effective use of the equipment and weapons.

At the range the airmen skillfully destroyed the targets, but one was struck by the unimaginative nature of their performance, the absence of basic mental acuteness and creativity. The crews did not even attempt to simulate combat maneuvering during the search for the targets and the attack. Nor did they try to take advantage of the terrain for approaching the targets undetected. What was the cause of this tactical weakness on the part of the helicopter pilots?

"On the flights we have concentrated mainly on the search for the targets. We wanted to find the objects of our strike as rapidly as possible. We did not give any thought to concealment on the flights," Captain G. Grekov, a helicopter commander, frankly admitted.

It should be noted that a self-critical and demanding approach was taken in the squadron in the critique of the airmen's combat performance. I believe that such a discussion based on principle will help each of the crews to derive the proper lesson.

11499
CSO: 1801/476
AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 83 p 1

[Article, by Captain V. Aron: "Precise Launch"]

[Text] The sun seemed to have stopped at its zenith and the steppe firing range breathed intense heat. It was not easy for the missilemen, even without that, because of the hard military work which grew more strenuous with every minute. The flight of "enemy" aircraft which preceded the practice combat firing ended. The antiaircraft missile battalion successfully repelled it. The subunit, whose actions were directed by Specialist First Class Guards Major V. Savin, immediately was given the mission of detecting new targets. The crew joined the target surveillance and designation stations in the search.

Savin experienced a natural excitement. He had four practice combat firings behind him. On those memorable trips to the firing range he fulfilled the duties of the fire control officer; now he was faced with taking an examination in another capacity—that of a gunner.

The missilemen's battle with the aerial "enemy" lasts for a short time. But the preparation for it is calculated in weeks and months. In length, intense work preceded that trip to the firing range.

Everything did not immediately go smoothly for the specialists. When the preparations for the trip to the firing range became more intense, it became clear that cooperation between the command post and the crews of the target surveillance and designation stations needed improvement. The reasons were explained. It turned out, in particular, that Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Shishov was oriented insufficiently confidently in the aerial situation and his subordinates did not always accurately provide information on aerial targets.

On the recommendation of the battalion commander, Shishov changed the method of special preparation of his subordinates and objectively began to concern himself with each of them in training. Things went better.

Conditions on the firing range became more strenuous. Guards Major Savin, intently observing the remote display plan-position indicator screen first
detected the target and determined that it had a small effective reflective surface. It was necessary, to look at both in order to conduct the missile-target without failures, and accurately to determine all necessary data.

"Azimuth... Range..." the information was received at the battalion CP.

The fire control officer Specialist 1st Class Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Starikov, having received the command of firing on the raid, quickly detected the target. Immediately manual tracking operators were included in the work. After several seconds a report of Guards Private First Class A. Lychin filled the cabin.

"It is a target!"

The speed of the target was considerable. But the manual tracking operators did not fail. Prior to the firing range they twice had visited the practice training point. The first time an appraisal of their actions, in conditions close to battle was not given higher than satisfactory. Insufficiently completed coordination and miscalculations in cooperation with the firers and the fire control officer brought down the specialists.

Then the officers Savin and Starikov came to the conclusion that integrated training in aerial targets should be conducted in another methodological sequence: separately for low-flying, fast, and high-altitude. In such conditions the operators quickly and soundly mastered the combat model for that or another type of target. When the operational features of various targets were firmly mastered, the training became still more strenuous. Their tactical background became more complex, the dynamics of aerial conditions increased, and suddenly-arising critical situations became the rule.

Now, on the firing range, all the specialists acted confidently and coolly. The aerial target swiftly approached. It seemed that it was just about to begin to dive on the defended object. At that moment the manual tracking operators shifted to an automatic tracking mode. The loudspeaker communications carried the report of the firing battery commander, Guards Captain G. Pavlenko, on the readiness of the missile for firing. And then--fire!

Guards Senior Lieutenant Starikov pressed the button. Thunder shook the cabin—the missile fired. Its strike on the diving target was precise.

12198
CSO: 1801/501
NAVY EXERCISE SIMULATES NUCLEAR ATTACK

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Aug 83 p 1

[Article by Capt 3d Rank Yu. Shevchuk: "Through the Flame"]

[Text] The bursts echoed one after the other. Fire blazed immediately in several places and puffs of smoke which enveloped everything around in a dense and pungent film began to pour out in clouds....

This is how a regular exercise of the fleet fire-fighting crew which is headed by Senior Lieutenant P. Lepilov began. This is a subunit of a special type. And the missions which it must accomplish are especially important. In launching a "nuclear strike" against the naval base, the "enemy" selected as a target its vitally important center—the area for the storage and filling of ammunition and for the storage of explosives. The reliability of supplying the ships and units with everything necessary for battle and the combat effectiveness of the entire complex fleet organism depend to a great extent on how rapidly the fleet firefighters are able to eliminate the aftereffects of a "nuclear burst" and centers of combustion.

Primarily the accomplishment of one function—extinguishing fire—has always been required of any firefighter. The revolution in military affairs and the necessity to train the personnel for actions under conditions of contemporary combat complicated significantly the nature of the military firefighters' activity. In addition to the ability to fight fires directly, now they cannot get by without firm skills in the conduct of radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance, mastery of the means and methods of protection against weapons of mass destruction, and the rendering of medical assistance to victims as well. Lepilov's subordinates were to demonstrate all these and other qualities on the exercise, too.

The combat crews of the fleet firefighters arrive at the site. Senior Lieutenant Lepilov makes a rapid estimate of the situation and makes his decision—without losing time on eliminating the blazing field on the approaches to the main centers of the fire, to break through to the ammunition storehouse and to knock down the fire and eliminate the danger of new explosions by the method of the combined feeding of a foam jet, water, and carbon dioxide.

"We will go through the flame in the direction of the mockups of burning equipment," and the officer points out the movement reference points.
The exercise takes place on a specially equipped area which is called "psychological" here. Using various working displays and mockups all possible situations which the firefighters may encounter in actual combat are simulated on it.

The first position is the smoke chamber. Here, skills in moving with the complete absence of visibility are worked out. The fighters of the fire-fighting crew disappear in curling clouds of smoke one after the other. Senior Lieutenant Lepilov is moving up ahead. Behind him are Junior Sergeant Yu. Dukin, Senior Seaman V. Pavlov, and others.

The difficult obstacle was overcome successfully. But the most difficult one was still ahead. The path of the firefighters is constantly blocked by combat equipment and various accessories which have been overturned by the shock wave and by burning objects. It is necessary to walk through a wall of flame in the full meaning of the word. The firefighters in their fire-protective equipment look like knights from a fairytale through the fiery tongues. Each step and each movement requires of them proper alignment, endurance, tempering, and firm practical skills.

Not so long ago, Lepilov's subordinates participated in garrison competitions of fire-fighting crews. They won first place. And now, in the course of an important exercise it is confirmed that this success was not by chance. Despite the paucity of paths and approaches to the most dangerous centers of the fire, the men made their way to them quickly. Hose lines were laid. A skillful maneuver follows—and the water nozzles are concentrated in the place where the development of the fire may cause an explosion.

Meanwhile, the crew of Junior Sergeant O. Kondrashov, which followed behind the main group of firefighters, also arrives in time. Kondrashov is an extremely experienced specialist. Prior to being called up to the Navy, he worked as a fireman in the city of Plesetsk, Arkhangelsk Oblast. He loves this profession; he always has a creative attitude toward it and tries to find nonstandard ways for the accomplishment of each task. And so now it was namely he who was the first to propose using the fixed fire-fighting equipment which had survived in the storehouse to extinguish the fire. This ensured final success. The fire was extinguished in the shortest time.

The exercise was concluded. For the naval firefighters it became one more check of courage and skill and permitted them to take a new step forward in mastering their difficult specialty.

6367
CSO: 1801/459
NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL INFANTRY TRAIN FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Aug 83 p 1

[Article, by Captain 2nd Rank V. Shirikov, twice-decorated with the Red Banner of the Baltic Fleet: "Naval Assault"]

[Text] Amphibious tanks and armored personnel carriers, leaving a thick train of dust behind them, rushed to the side of the sea. The garrison and the dense vista of green trees were long since hidden from view. The naval infantrymen, awakened by the sudden signal, sat in fixed silence. What awaited ahead of them?

Embarkation on the assault craft awaited them, crossing the sea and storming the bank occupied by the "enemy". In this battle there would be, of course, inevitable conventions, but realistic efforts, military skill, endurance and physical toughness would be demanded. Fatigue, salty sweat, and the joy of victory will be realistic in this battle.

And here are the large landing craft (BDK). They await the naval infantrymen. The ramps are open already—tanks and armored personnel carriers disappear inside the craft. In just another instant the mooring lines are returned. The BDK depart the base, setting course for the open sea. This time it was restless. And when is the Baltic ever calm? A dark leaden wave rushed to meet the craft, from minute to minute the rolling intensified. This time it worried the battalion commander, Guards Major V. Tugov. Among the naval infantrymen were those who, in crossing the sea, were participating for the first time.

It is true that on land each of them had prepared for this in advance, from the first days finding strength and endurance. Not without reason nearly 70 percent of the troops in the battalion were badgeholders of the VSK (Military Sports Complex), and more than half had first and second class athletic ratings. Every naval infantryman participates in weightlifting, track and field, and wrestling.

In the garrison were all means for the pursuit of physical conditioning. There was special athletic equipment in it which would not be found in other towns. Thus, for example, tank driver-mechanics willingly work out on an original training apparatus for developing strength and strengthening various sets of muscles.
On days off—militarized relay races in which a whole series of exercises were included to help the troops develop the dexterity and sharpness that is necessary in battle. And of course first and foremost for the naval infantrymen is cross-country training. Guards Major V. Tugov and the company and platoon commanders applied no small effort to prepare their subordinates for the stormy conditions of the sea.

The officers allotted no less important role to psychological toughening of the naval infantrymen, striving for all study of weapons and tactical preparation to be conducted in conditions similar to a landing against an opposing "enemy".

The craft secretly approached the place of the assault landing. With great precision they were led out by the commanders. Neither the storm nor poor visibility upset them in this. The seconds were counted, and the naval infantrymen were ready for the landing. They did not give way to the pitching, retained their spirits, and bravely strode from the waves to the shore, ready for any surprises.

The "enemy", of course, was not asleep. Having detected the assault, they immediately undertook an effort to repel it in the sea. Machineguns chattered, bursts of automatic weapons crackled, gun salvos thundered. It seemed that the attack was just about to bog down.

In this situation the battalion commander decided to move the grenade throwers quickly forward to neutralize the "enemy's" weapons emplacements. Success in battle depended on the actions of only several men. They proved ready to fulfill the mission not only professionally, but also physically and psychologically. Particularly effective was the fire of grenadier Guards Seaman A. Betin. Having displayed enviable endurance and presence of mind, and not making a single miscue, he silenced the detected weapons emplacements.

The attack received a new development. Now the next experience in turn awaited the naval infantrymen—forcing a fire zone. A solid wall of fire bellowed, smoke and soot flew to meet them. Having caught a moment, the "enemy" once again intensified their fire, noticing the flashing figures of the attackers in the reflections of the fire.

"How can I get my novices there?" Guards Major V. Tugov thought anxiously. The battalion had almost completely overcome the fire zone. The solid figure of Guards Junior Sergeant S. Fomin appeared ahead. Behind him, trailing by a meter or two, and firing submachineguns, his comrades were doing battle.

The armored personnel carriers "picked up" the naval infantrymen. The attack again found a great swiftness. But suddenly—another halt. A swamp appeared ahead. Hurrying, the troops immediately made a corduroy road and forward, pressing the retreating "enemy". To speed up the tempo of the attack, they put out a smoke screen. After these actions, Guards major Tugov foresaw another. He realized that the "enemy" was preparing a counterattack.
"If we move straight ahead, we might encounter prepared machinegun fire. Maneuver is needed," the battalion commander thought. He ordered them to skirt the smoke screen to the left. There, [words obliterated] scouts, the "enemy" would not expect an attack.

The maneuver succeeded. The swiftness with which the naval infantrymen threw themselves into the attack utterly stunned the "enemy". The battalion commander saw how the naval infantrymen, led by Guards Senior Lieutenant G. Parasyuk, went into battle.

The battalion commander was pleased with this officer. Parasyuk strived not to overlook anything in his studies and training, paying attention to everything—physical preparation as well as weapons—following them so that every fighting man would fulfill the norms. And above all, in his subunit such a rule became permanent—know it yourself, teach it to your comrade. This precept helps the naval infantrymen act bravely, boldly, and steadfastly in battle.

The battle calmed. The "enemy", caught in a tight semi-ring, retreated. The moment was near, a long-awaited victory. The victory, for which so much sweat was poured out in training, in the athletic village, on the field.

Guards Major Tugov noticed that some of his young troops were tired. Several, however, did not have sufficient endurance. It would be necessary to organize additional physical conditioning exercises for them. Many more strenuous tasks lay ahead. The summer training period continues and there will be still additional landings and sea crossings for the naval infantrymen.

12198
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ADMIRAL MIZIN EXTOLS NAVY

Moscow SEL'SKAYA ZHIZN' in Russian 31 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Adm. L. Mizin, Deputy Commander of the Navy for Rear Services--Navy Chief of Rear Services: "On Sea Boundaries"]

[Text] On this day, our motherland sincerely honors the Soviet seamen and all those who, by their tireless labor, are creating formidable warships and powerful nuclear submarines, equipping them with the most modern combat equipment.

Our fleet has travelled a glorious combat path. Together with the fighting men of the Red Army, the military seamen steadfastly defended the achievements of the October Revolution, displaying examples of bravery and heroism. The Great Patriotic War was a severe test for the personnel of the Navy just as for the entire Soviet people. The Soviet seamen made a significant contribution to the winning of the victory over the enemy: 520 were awarded the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union and seven of them—B. Safonov, A. Shabalin, V. Rakov, N. Stepanyan, A. Mazurenko, V. Leonov, and N. Chelnokov—were awarded this title twice. For combat distinction 350,000 men were awarded orders and medals and 78 ships, units, and large units became Guards elements.

The postwar decades were years of great deeds and achievements, of the further comprehensive progress and development of Soviet society, of the strengthening of the Soviet state's international positions and authority, and of the struggle for the preservation of peace on Earth. The necessity for the further strengthening of our state's defensive capability was dictated by the fact that the imperialists, first of all the United States and its allies in the NATO bloc, constantly aggravated the international situation during all this time, heading for the attainment of military superiority over the USSR. It is namely for this purpose that they have undertaken the speeding up of the arms race, including naval armaments, and are counting on the preparation of a nuclear war with the launching of preventive nuclear strikes against the territory of the USSR and its allies.

Under these conditions, the CPSU and the Soviet government undertook a number of effective measures to strengthen the country's defensive capability and increase the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. Important work has been accomplished in the country on the creation of a powerful ocean-going nuclear missile fleet, the building of nuclear submarines and contemporary surface ships, and the arming of the Navy with long-range aviation. The fleet received
improved electronic and automation equipment to control weapons and combat equipment and reliable communication and navigation equipment.

Nuclear submarines and naval aviation have become the main arms of our Navy and various types of missiles have become its main weapons. Helicopters and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft give the ships new qualities; they expand the ship's zone of visibility and provide the best possibility for the conduct of combat operations against the naval enemy. The following have become the typical features of our contemporary ocean-going fleet: large spatial scale of operations and the ability to deploy its forces rapidly and launch destructive strikes against objectives at sea and on land, in so doing maintaining high combat readiness.

Day after day, on long cruises and ocean voyages the Navy personnel increase their military and sea ability and improve control of the latest combat equipment and weapons.

A good tradition has evolved on the escort ship "Arkhangelsk komsomolets" where the Mamonov brothers from Ust'yanskiy rayon of Arkhangelsk Oblast have been serving for more than six years. Accepting the baton from his older brother, Seaman Yurii Mamonov is serving here excellently. His successes have been noted with the badge of the Komsomol Central Committee, "Military Valor." And recently, a Komsomol pass of the Arkhangelsk Komsomol obkom was awarded to a third Mamonov brother, Boris, in a ceremonial situation for service on this same ship.

It is with deep satisfaction that our seamen are accomplishing the international mission which was assigned to them by the party and the state—the mission of strengthening the friendship of the Soviet people with the peoples of other countries. We cannot fail to be proud of the fact that during the entire history of the Navy not one of our ships went to sea with aggressive goals and never had intentions to attack foreign ships and shores, interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, or frighten their peoples using formidable weapons. Our fleet, as a part of the country's Armed Forces, being an important instrument of its peace-loving policy, exclusively serves the goals of defending the motherland's sea boundaries and guarding its state interests.

Combat training in the fleet is now taking place under the sign of socialist competition for the attainment of high indices in combat and political training under the slogan: "Raise vigilance, reliably ensure the security of the motherland." Stepping forth as the initiator of this competition in the Navy was the crew of a nuclear submarine of the Pacific Fleet (commander Captain 1st Rank A. Samokhvalov) which, assuming increased socialist obligations, turned to all naval personnel with the call to rally even more closely around the Leninist CPSU Central Committee and to be ready to accomplish any order of the motherland. And it should be said that the seamen of this missile-carrying nuclear submarine are accomplishing successfully the obligations which have been assumed. On the ship 70 percent of the first- and second-class specialists are masters of military affairs. Following this patriotic example, the crews of many ships have achieved stable successes in training and service, having high grades in combat and political training. Captain 2d Rank S. Shkabara, the commander of the missile submarine which was the initiator of socialist competition
in the Blatic Fleet, was awarded the order, "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces," 3d class.

The role of purposeful party-political work which is conducted on the ships and in the units is clearly evident in all the successes and results attained. Military councils, commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations are directing their efforts toward instilling in the personnel ideological conviction, boundless devotion to their people, and constant readiness to defend the motherland.

The inexhaustible source of the strength and might of the Soviet Armed Forces is their inseparable unity with the people which is growing stronger. Patronies of the ships and naval units with local party, Soviet, and Komsomol organizations have become a good tradition.

The seamen see one of the important directions in their activity for accomplishing the USSR Food Program in shock labor in rendering assistance to the workers of the village in gathering the harvest. Thus, a large quantity of agricultural produce is transported annually on the motor transport of the fleet. In addition, the Navy assists agriculture in the procurement of potatoes and vegetables, sending transportation and personnel to the procurement areas. Fleet agricultural enterprises and kitchen farms provide a substantial savings in state food resources.

Our Navy represents the Soviet power in a worthy manner on the expanses of the world ocean. Freedom-loving people see in it a symbol of peace and friendship between peoples and a reliable factor in restraining the aggressive aspirations of reactionary imperialist circles.

The friendship of the Soviet seamen with the seamen of fleets of the Warsaw Pact participants is strengthening from day to day. The exchange of leading experience is accomplished on joint exercises, on cruises, and during meetings of fraternal fleets, and close coordination is worked out. Many seamen are greeting Navy Day far from their native shores, being on cruises on the ocean latitudes and standing vigilant guard over the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people.

6367
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SPECIAL TROOPS

CONTENTS OF TYL I SNABZHENIYE SOVETSKIH VOORUZHENNYKH SIL NO 8, AUGUST 1983

Moscow TYL I SNABZHENIYE SOVETSKIH VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 8, Aug 83
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11499
CSO: 1801/010
POLICY OF REPROACHING LOSERS IN CIVIL DEFENSE COMPETITION QUESTIONED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 83 (signed to press 9 Jun 83) pp 26-27

[Review of correspondence: "Not for Demonstration Only"]

[Text] In the "Invitation to a Discussion" section of our No. 11, 1982 issue we published a letter from G. Cholokov, an assistant facility CD chief of staff in Tashkent. Referring to his own personal experience, the author expressed the view that in rating performances in rayon competition we should take note not only of the medical aid teams finishing in first, second and third places, but of all the other participants as well. In his opinion, everyone who puts forth a conscientious effort and who makes a contribution to the effort to increase the readiness of his formation deserves at least a favorable mention; this shouldn't be the privilege of the winners alone. So we printed the letter under the title "No Winners."

Some readers obviously had not heard about this letter, as can be seen from the fact that here on the editor's desk another one turned up, this time from I. Yefimov of Omsk. The reader in this instance is speaking out against the practice to be seen in some places whereby teams placing down around last place are subjected to criticism, while those which didn't even bother to enter the competition are not even mentioned. "Which is better," comrade Yefimov asks, "not even to enter a competition and still keep your good reputation or to enter and then have to expect a reprimand in some directive or other?" This is clearly a rhetorical question and so requires no direct reply, considering the fact that there is no question in the author's mind, that he feels that teams should participate in competitions no matter what.

The editors have accordingly turned to their readers with the suggestion that they express their views on this subject, but not to limit themselves to the subject of competition for medical aid teams alone. For the fact is, of course, that awards and reprimands are also employed in other situations as means of guiding the efforts and thinking of formation personnel. The question, though, is: how effectively and competently is this being done, what educational effect are these devices having?
Readers responded readily and quickly to our invitation to participate in this discussion, which goes to prove that objective evaluation of competition performance is a matter of interest to everyone who wants to see further improvement of our civil defense program and steps taken to heighten the enthusiasm of those participating in civil defense activities.

"Our medical aid team and reconnaissance group," writes N. Moiseyenko, chief of the CD staff of a plant in Tashkent, "are always participating in rayon competitions, and, as a rule, taking one of the prize-winning places. The 1981 competitions were held in 38-degree heat. The formation took second place, and all members received an award. But now if they hadn't placed in one of the prize-winning positions, wouldn't people who had demonstrated great powers of will and endurance and an awareness of the importance of the activities they were engaged in still deserve some kind of recognition?"

It is by no means necessary, the author of this letter believes, for this kind of award always to be in the form of a money prize. There are other kinds of recognition as well—gratitude expressed in a directive, free passes to vacation resorts and so forth. The main thing, though, is not totally to ignore people who deserve some kind of honor in recognition of their efforts and their selfless attitudes toward the civil defense program. So it comes as no surprise that the plant management here and the party and trade union committees attach a great deal of importance to the recognition of people who are conscientiously fulfilling their civil defense obligations. In their hands this is an effective lever, a means of influencing behavior expertly employed with the objective of increasing the level of collective activity when it comes to civil defense activities.

N. Grigor'yev, now, another chief of CD staff, this time from a plant in Kurgan, wrote to the editors about an entirely different situation, one just about the opposite of the state of affairs in Tashkent which we have just looked at. He wrote this letter with such emotion and in such mental anguish that we wanted to publish as much as possible of it just the way he wrote it.

"I wanted to write somebody a long time ago," comrade Grigor'yev says, "but I just kept putting it off. In 1979 our medical aid team placed last in rayon competition, 16th place. What a horror show! The girls cried, some actually sobbing. They were all criticizing one another and blaming their instructor. They didn't have the nerve to look me in the eye. You should have heard them—what a disgrace! The chief of staff of the medical service called me and the medical aid team leader "on the carpet", reprimanded us and wanted to punish us. Many of these girls were missing the next year. But as things turned out, we actually had a strong, well-trained medical aid team. A number of circumstances then did us in. For reasons that didn't have anything at all to do with us, a number of girls on the team quit right before the competition; we didn't have enough substitutes, so we had to recruit some new people right at the last minute. They got us a lot of penalty points, and so when the whole thing was over we were in last place."

We could, of course, criticize this chief of facility CD staff from Kurgan for not trying, or more correctly, for being unable to persuade his girls not to waste time trying to allocate blame for their poor performance, but rather to bear up bravely under this failure, undertake an objective analysis of the reasons
for it and then press on with the effort to train the new members and weld together a cohesive new team.

In this case, though, we're talking about something else: the question here is whether after one unsuccessful performance it was proper for people to then proceed hastily with evaluations of the preparation and training of the team as a whole and draw organizational conclusions with all their attendant consequences. Did this really contribute to the objective in view? We don't think so, if a person (and there are more than one of them!) is going to harbor wounded feelings so long that even a year after the events in question took place he will still write to the editors of this magazine.

We cannot lose sight of the fact that with even the best of organization, all competition is fraught with some degree of contingency. Competitions between medical aid teams will, of course, help establish the degree of readiness of a formation, but they aren't the only way we can check this. There is hardly any advantage to be derived from evaluating an entire effort on the basis of competition results alone. Moreover, criticism without analysis of the root causes of deficiencies, without a positive program, has never yielded positive results. And in cases like the ones we're dealing with here, where so much rides on individual enthusiasm, it is positively harmful.

"Is it really necessary," argues N. Mikhaylov, chief of CD staff for Slonimskiy Rayon and Slonim city, "to be abusive and come out with official reprimands to those of our people who have finished last? I don't think so. This certainly isn't the way we do things. Those who end up in last place will get over it, they'll survive. When they get back home they'll be able all by themselves to identify all their deficiencies, what they should have given more attention to and what they need to do to be able to turn in a substantially improved performance in the next year's competition."

I. Kuznetsov, CD engineer at the Gukovskaya (Rostovskaya Oblast) industrial clothing sewing and repair factory, shares this view. He is expressing a collective opinion here, what with the fact that G. Cholokov's remarks in "No Winners" were discussed at the factory with the trade union aktiv and medical aid team members.

P. Rapeko, chief of CD staff at the Diesel Works imeni S. M. Kirov (Tokmak, Zaporozhskaya Oblast), writes that among medical aid teams placing below the prize-winning places there will surely be some which could be praised, for example, for the large number of blood donors on the team, for being well-equipped, for their poise during competition performances etc. To these teams this will be an incentive, and it will help focus the attention of others on what is in fact the highest level of performance against which they should measure themselves.

It is absolutely true, emphasizes retired colonel G. P'yanykh of Kreting in the Lithuanian SSR, that the success of many civil defense activities will to a great extent depend upon the enthusiasm of the participants. And it is important to maintain this enthusiasm despite any failures or shortcomings. He goes on to cite a specific example from his own experience, when in rating competition performances the rayon CD staff, the rayon Red Cross Society committee and the rayon CD chief do not neglect to refer to the contribution made by all conscientious working ladies on a medical aid team, as well as by their leaders and political instructors. One small example. The medical aid team from the Akmena enterprise
won prizes in competition for three years in a row, but then this year failed to place high enough to win a prize. But it was still presented a certificate for outstanding performance in rendering medical first aid to potential drowning victims. It is comrade P'yan ykh's view that this helped keep the girls' spirits up, prevented them from developing attitude problems and helped them maintain their confidence in their abilities.

At the same time, however, readers are expressing their firm belief that erring on the side of egalitarianism in rating competition performances, overstating the particular merits of one performance or another and unwarranted or exaggerated praise can be just as detrimental to an effort as groundless criticism. D. Fen'ko of Ufa declares that moral and material incentives should be awarded in proportion to the contribution of each individual. In no case should everyone receive an award on the same occasion. This approach can only be detrimental and runs counter to the principles of socialist competition to boot.

Also drawing harsh condemnation from readers have been instances of nonobjective judgement, when places have been distributed not on the basis of performance results, but rather, for example, in accordance with the merits or reputation of the production facility a particular team represents. This thought was given expression in responses from, among others, D. Voronin, a Great Patriotic War veteran from Chuguyev in Kharkovskaya Oblast, and M. Strizhak, CD engineer at the Orlovskiy reinforced concrete products plant.

One cannot but be distressed to read letters like this. It would be difficult to conceive of anything else that would more readily discourage participation in civil defense competition than prejudiced, nonobjective judgements. Unfortunately, however, the editors all too frequently receive complaints of nonobjective judgements or judgements rendered by unqualified people. Complaints like this have turned up among responses to the statements of G. Cholokov and I. Yefimov as well.

As being among factors negatively affecting the quality of competition organization and hence the preparation and training of medical aid teams, M. Velikiy, CD chief of staff at a facility in Sumy, points directly to the selection of unqualified judges and judges who have not developed thorough knowledge of regulations governing competition. He refers particularly to the fact that individuals are frequently permitted to serve as judges who have also played a role in preparing a team for competition and suggests in this connection that judges be brought in from another rayon.

This is, of course, one possible solution to the problem. It should be pointed out at the same time, however, that to name people who have trained a medical aid team for a competition members of the judging committee for that competition is the grossest violation of established procedure. This creates the basis for conflicts of interest, even when a judge is rigorously fair and so cannot be permitted. It is also entirely inadmissible to exploit the high position of competition judge or any official position of authority to predesignate a team for a prize or in any way to influence competition results. Any instance of this should be investigated most thoroughly and rigorously analyzed.

Neither do situations which are made overly simple or poorly simulated centers of destruction add to the reputation of civil defense competition. "What are our
rayon medical aid team competitions usually like?" writes M. Strizhak from Orel. "Organizers will rope off a small area in some woods outside of town and position some simulated casualties around on special boards, while the judges sit on stools nearby. No equipment, no tools, no attempt to simulate a situation. This kind of organization isn't going to get you much. It is rather a pointless waste of time.

"I know from my own personal experience," he continues, "that wartime conditions require the most you can give in the way of physical effort and mental ability. So we shouldn't be creating oversimplified situations to train our civil defense formations in. Formation members should be testing themselves under the most difficult conditions possible. Then everybody—from the rank-and-file to any among the senior personnel you'd mention—would develop greater respect for what's involved in the civil defense mission. People know very well when a serious effort is being made to teach them something and when they're 'playing soldiers.'"

It hard not to agree with this. It is no coincidence that none of the responses the editors have received contain complaints that the demands made of competition participants are too rigorous or that the conditions under which competition is held are too difficult. Quite the contrary, most readers would like to see more consistent adherence to requirements contained in the existing regulations; they suggest, among other things, that competitions be held not only in the summer, but in winter as well, and not just during the day, but at night, too. They also want to see participating organizations go together to build the training facilities that would make this possible.

Readers in their letters are entirely correctly linking the questions raised by G. Cholokov and I. Yefimov with a much broader problem, that is, the problem of increasing the effectiveness and quality of the training and instruction given our nonmilitary formations. For the fact is that competition is not an end in itself, but rather, only one form of training, only one way to test it, only one step in the process. Training neither begins nor ends with it.

People unfortunately forget about this sometimes. This is why we have this unhealthy clamoring about the distribution of prize-winning positions, echoes of which then reach the editors in the form of letters from readers, and then the phenomenon of "mixed" teams. You can call them by different names—combined teams, mixed teams, demonstration teams, but they all represent essentially the same thing: they're the "cream" skimmed off a number of different formations, selected individuals assembled into a new teams especially for competition or to participate in some ceremony or demonstration.

Ya. Skachkov of Moscow sent us a curious and very angry letter in this connection. "I'm surprised at the way the magazine has handled this," he writes. "I've been reading it over 10 years now, and not once have you called attention to the fact that it is teams which have taken first place in their individual facility competitions that are supposed to participate in rayon competition. I know that there are facilities which hold competitions for medical aid teams. You'll find them organized differently. Sometimes teams will compete without having all members present; competition situations are occasionally oversimplified. Then after competitions like this they'll put together a combined team to send to the rayon-level competition. I've been working in the civil defense more than 10 years now, but I have yet to see a team entered in rayon competition which has actually won a 1st in facility competition."

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The editors accept this criticism, and they hope with the help of their readers to plug this gap. For our purposes here, we can refer once again to the experience of the diesel works mentioned above. According to its chief of CD staff, the plant holds competitions for its medical aid teams and units each year regardless of whether or not city-level competition is also scheduled. Plant medical aid teams prepare for this competition thoroughly and with great enthusiasm. A great deal, he concludes, depends upon the attitudes demonstrated by the city and rayon Red Cross Society committees and the medical personnel who are directly involved in training and preparing medical aid team and unit personnel.

This survey has not by any means touched upon all the questions our readers have raised, and we have mentioned only a few of the names. The editors would like to express their gratitude to all who have accepted their invitation to participate in this discussion and have sent in letters. They have suggested no small number of new questions which deserve our attention.

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