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PROVIDING PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT TO A PEACE OPERATIONS FORCE: WHAT IS THE RIGHT RECIPE?

BY

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Providing Personnel Service Support To a Peace Operations Force: What is the Right Recipe?

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The paper examines the personnel community's efforts to provide sustained personnel service support within the context of the ongoing peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. It looks at the force mix between reserve and active soldiers and units within a personnel services battalion (PSB), and the current doctrinal guidance of operating in multiple (split based) versus one location (duel based). The paper provides special focus on all of the critical tasks and missions performed by personnel service support units operating at the tactical and operational levels, and the impact of those missions on the supported and supporting units. It concludes by offering nine recommendations for providing personnel service support in future peacekeeping missions.
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PROVIDING PERSONNEL SERVICE SUPPORT TO A PEACE OPERATIONS FORCE: WHAT IS THE RIGHT RECIPE?

Whether committed to a forward presence or OOTW mission, personnel support must be tailored to satisfy the tactical and operational requirements of the commander, either alone or in concert with a joint or combined force.1

—FM 12-6

INTRODUCTION

As the United States Army moves out of its cold war footing and into the uncertain world of operations other than war (OOTW), has the Adjutant General Corps adapted its personnel service support methods to meet this new environment? Can the Personnel Services Battalion (PSB) continue to provide the same support to the OOTW commander in the field, as doctrine would dictate for a major conflict? How does the PSB provide sustained support for those units and families in the rear during extended operations? What is the right mix of reserve and active component elements that would comprise a PSB within the peacekeeping operation context, and how should reserve component units be integrated, both in the deployed theater and in the rear? What individual support missions should personnel support units provide the deployed commander, and should those missions differ from what is provided in a garrison environment or mirror
what doctrine says is to be provided during wartime, or something in between?

As these questions and the title of this paper suggest, the Adjutant General Corps has not yet reached a consensus on doctrine which supports units deployed on peacekeeping operations. To assist in this effort it is essential to first examine the current personnel doctrine for its adaptability to OOTW realities. Does it take into account the peculiarities of forward based split operations and the span of control challenges currently facing the Personnel Services Battalion commander in Europe? Is the personnel community asking too much of these multifunctional organizations given current expectations to provide support simultaneously in both forward and rear locations, in what is referred to as split based operations? Just what are the essential personnel services the PSB commander should provide, and does the OOTW mission dictate a different set of services from those outlined in our doctrine for wartime support?

Secondly, an examination of the initial Bosnia mission is appropriate to gain a clearer understanding of the challenges facing the PSB commander today. Operation Joint Endeavor involved over 25,000 U.S. soldiers from throughout United States Army Europe (USAREUR), both reserve and active duty selected units from the continental United States (CONUS), and individual augmentees from various locations throughout the world. The 1st
Armored Division, led by its two maneuver brigades, spearheaded the effort. The division was joined by four separate V Corps brigades, creating a ten-brigade task force that remained in Bosnia for just over eleven months before turning the mission over to the 1st Infantry Division in November 1996.

USAREUR’s personnel command, the 1st Personnel Command (1st PERSCOM) was assigned the mission of providing all personnel service support to this task force, known as Task Force Eagle. 1st PERSCOM in turn tasked a subordinate unit, the 90th Personnel Services Battalion, headquartered in Baumholder, Germany, as the direct support element to provide the day to day personnel support for the task force. The 90th PSB had a habitual support relationship with 1AD.

Did 1st PERSCOM provide the kind of support that the Task Force Eagle Commander needed over that eleven-month deployment time line? What were the limitations imposed on those providing support, and how were they overcome? How did the personnel community plan to support the operation and what impact did those decisions have on future such operations?

The reserve component, which now comprises over 50% of the combat service support community in the Total Army today was a big part of the overall support plan for Operation Joint Endeavor. How they were added into the support equation and what competencies they brought to the table will also be examined. What missions can the reserve components do more effectively than
the active component? Are there any mission areas from which they should be withheld? What role should reserve component units play in supporting those units and families that stay behind? How does the active component prepare them to operate when their basic personnel systems are different from many of those commonly used by the active component?

If the Adjutant General Corps can improve its understanding of the peacekeeping mission, then we, as the personnel community, can better prepare our units, leaders and soldiers for success in this environment. This paper will provide a starting point for the process, by making nine recommendations on developing the right recipe for supporting future peacekeeping missions.

PERSONNEL DOCTRINE

The Army's personnel doctrine is outlined in FM 12-6, last updated on 9 September 1994. Since 1989, when the Warsaw Pact began to implode, soldiers have deployed more often, with the number of deployments increasing by 300%.

Current personnel doctrine however continues to focus exclusively on wartime functions and makes little reference to supporting peacekeeping operations. For example outside of all out combat, personnel units are depicted as critical only during pre-crisis, and redeployment activities.

Support for peacekeeping operations missions is not mentioned.
For any contingency, getting personnel soldiers and their data base capabilities into theater remains paramount to the success of the planned operational personnel support scheme. This is especially important during peacekeeping operations when personnel units will likely compete for early deployment seats on aircraft with other critical combat service support units.

In its war time support capacity, the personnel community focuses on eight critical elements when supporting the ground commander. These functions have not changed significantly since personnel doctrine was first published. These functions are: (1) Personnel Readiness, (2) Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting, (3) Casualty Operations, (4) Replacement Operations, (5) Personnel Information Management, (6) Postal Operations, (7) Moral, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), (8) Essential Personnel Services.\(^4\) When discussing the Personnel community’s support for peacekeeping operations, this paper will only concentrate on replacement operations, postal operations, and essential personnel services, since that is what the personnel services battalion commander is primarily focused on. Limiting the scope to these three areas should not detract from the importance of the other five areas in which other members of the personnel community are engaged.

The doctrine is pretty straightforward in its discussion of these eight areas of support. However, it makes little distinction between providing support in a wartime scenario
versus a peacekeeping operation. There are some significant
differences between the two, differences that if ignored will
cause the supporting commander’s plan to fail to meet the
supported commander’s expectation of personnel service support
provided during the operation.

REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS.

At the strategic level, personnel support involves the
mechanics of reserve mobilization and national manpower
acquisition, integration, deployment and demobilization. It
links the nation’s personnel resources to military operations at
the theater level. With the entry of manpower replacements into
the theater, responsibility passes through the operational to the
tactical level. Unfortunately, the current process excludes the
one person with potentially the most impact on replacement
operations...the PSB commander. At the theater level, the
Personnel Command (PERSCOM) has that mission, and doctrinally
this is where the responsibility ends. At both the operational
and tactical levels those functions are assigned to the Corps
Adjutant General and the Division Assistant Chief of Staff,
Personnel (G1) and their respective Strength Management Offices.5
This arrangement attempts to tie the strength accounting function
of these organizations with the replacement operation during any
deployed scenario. On paper, that makes perfect sense, but as
will be discussed later, it does not always work.
POSTAL OPERATIONS.

Postal platoons provide all postal services to the forward-deployed forces currently operating in Germany and Korea. These organizations are small but tremendously flexible in providing support to deployed forces in any type of operation. They provide both general and direct support, and normally one company is designed to sustain a force of 25,000 soldiers. Doctrinally, in order for the forward deployed postal unit to provide support to the deployed peacekeeping force, reserve units from the continental United States (CONUS) are necessary. The timing of this backfill is critical in any operation, particularly when a presidential call-up is required to initiate the process. In the short term, civilian augmentation is the best fix for personnel shortfalls until the reserve units arrive.

ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL SERVICES.

A deployed Personnel Detachment will provide only essential services/functions in contingency operations. During the Force XXI test conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, the personnel community focused on limiting the footprint in theater, maximizing technological advances and, on balance, supporting deployed forces from the rear. Individual personnel functions will be performed at the highest level practical, using a split based operational design. Thus there is no plan then to provide a full range of personnel services in theater via a dual based system where the capability to perform the function also exists
in the forward deployed elements of the unit. The structure and methods of providing support will not be compatible with the realities of long-term peacekeeping operations, where the emphasis remains focused on providing services at the lowest possible level. The deployed soldier ultimately pays the price for this disconnect and is disadvantaged regarding future promotion, awards, reassignments, and evaluations. For example, the ability to update the soldier's personnel file in the deployed location will be non-existent. Most importantly, perhaps those personnel organizations deployed in support of a peacekeeping force are unable to quickly translate and implement HQDA personnel policy changes to existing procedures and policies that always accompany any deployment.⁹

OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Operation Joint Endeavor is an excellent case study of why the current personnel doctrine does not fit developing realities of the peacekeeping mission.

Many factors contributed to the uniqueness of this particular mission, including a lack of in-country infrastructure, and geographical dispersion of the base camps which increased equipment and communication requirements.¹⁰ Weather, land mines, and the projected duration of the mission were also critical factors impacting on the planning process and eventual execution of the mission.
Senior leaders within the European personnel community, however, were not caught completely by surprise and during the months of August and September 1995 developed a Personnel Service Support (PSS) Matrix. This matrix was refined during the month-long Mountain Eagle Exercise in Grafenwour, Germany in October. The matrix provided the Task Force Eagle Commander with a list of functions deployed personnel service support units would provide for his force as well as a timeline of service availability. The plan’s concept, although sound, lacked necessary flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances on the ground.11

The matrix also reinforced the original intent of the personnel community in concert with available doctrine, to provide most services commanders were accustomed to receiving in garrison from the rear (i.e. essential personnel services) in a split based mode. Only those functions (postal, replacement, Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR), strength management, and casualty operations) as dictated by the doctrine for wartime support were to be provided forward.

Finally, the major problem with the matrix was its failure to reflect the realities of Task Force Eagle’s long term peacekeeping mission. Consequently neither the Task Force Commander nor his supporting PSB commander truly adhered to the plan outlined by the matrix. Ironically, the matrix was followed quite closely back in the central region of Germany by the three remaining PSBs. As a result as the deployment developed, a great
deal of duplicate work and confusion permeated throughout the 1st Personnel Command.

The forward PSB expanded its services beyond those core functions prescribed by doctrine and into the essential services area as the theater stabilized. It was able to do so with focusing available resources on the needs of those commanders in theater, and disregarding much of what was initially planned during the months preceding the deployment. Systems such as The Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS) and the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) were as easily accessed with communications equipment in theater as if the individual personnel detachments were operating from any U.S. Army installation worldwide. Access to EDAS allowed updating promotion points in the deployed location rather than sending information to the rear for processing. Connectivity with TOPMIS allowed the battalion’s subordinate units, the personnel detachments (PDS) to update Officer Record Briefs (ORB) on site and provide a copy to the officer. This was a big success considering the number of centralized promotion boards conducted throughout the year. Providing this service to task force officers prevented any disadvantage in the promotion process, since the Army made no special allowances for those deployed.

As communications links became more developed, e-mail allowed personnel soldiers greater access to critical points of contact in Germany and CONUS. Access to the Local Area Network (LAN) was
key in overcoming the large dispersion of the personnel support assets throughout the 15 separate base camps and 3 different country locations.

The need for senior commanders to access current unit and individual strength accounts in a fluid theater by location prompted the introduction of the Personnel Accountability System (PAS). This relatively new system allowed a soldier to be tracked from one location to another using his ID card. As the theater matured PAS became the system of choice by finance personnel relying on its information in determining individual entitlements. Entitlements varied depending on country location. In addition, there were two other important spinoffs of this system. First it functioned as a quasi post locator as the postal system matured in theater. Secondly, PAS was extremely helpful in locating soldiers for Red Cross emergencies. The system, however, was very labor intensive and caused the PSB to divert critical manpower in order to maintain the three major ports of embarkation (APOE) 24 hours a day.\textsuperscript{12}

As the operation developed, other essential personnel services were introduced. The decentralized promotion process saw many successes and failures during the operation but was deemed by the senior non commissioned officer leadership of the task force as necessary for extended deployments. Verifying promotion points against often incomplete promotion packets, entering those points into EDAS to recognize promotions,
inputting the new grades into the Standard Installation Database Personnel System (SIDPERS), and most importantly paying soldiers at the correct grade, all contributed to the many opportunities for mission failure.

The Army’s promotion system is not sufficiently flexible to account for connectivity and other situational failures which may slow down the data entry process. As a result many soldiers were not promoted on time, despite the PSB and its PDs’ best efforts. Recomputations and Non-Commissioned Officers Education System (NCOES) waivers were also processed as the theater matured. Most of the point verification for soldiers was accomplished over the phone between deployed and rear PD soldiers. On many occasions promotion orders were produced in both locations, adding to the confusion. This problem was overcome in time, as support methods were refined.

Another example of providing the full range of services to the deployed force and reducing the reliance on a split based support model was the fielding of two deployable Regional Army Personnel Identification System (RAPIDS) machines. This capability eliminated the need for temporary ID cards to be issued within the theater.

SIDPERS continued to be the Army’s personnel management tool for strength accounting and strength management. The system, although antiquated, performed well throughout the deployment and provided the commanders with the necessary personnel reports to
take care of their soldiers. There was no linkage between EDAS and SIDPERS however, which required the individual PDs to input two systems for every one soldier transaction, whether that transaction involved a reassignment action or a promotion. Reassignment sections began producing orders on redeploying soldiers within the theater about half way through the deployment period, and eliminated yet another rear detachment split based function.

As time went on other PSS functions were introduced in support of the deployed force. Identification tags, IFOR ID cards (which were made for the entire force, not just U.S. personnel), good conduct medals, personnel history updates, and officer and non-commissioned officer evaluation reports were routinely accomplished by the four deployed personnel detachments. In all, by the end of the eleven month IFOR mission in November 1996, over 58,000 SIDPERS transactions, 8,500 evaluation reports, 24,000 IFOR ID Cards, 2,500 ORB updates, 4,500 'good conduct medals, and 3,500 2-1s were completed.'

All of these functions were intended to be accomplished in the central region of Germany for the duration of the operation. The impact of providing those services forward on the soldier and unit are difficult to measure. However, based on the raw numbers of actions accomplished and the related number of customers over the 11-month period, the efforts to provide those services were
well received. It is also difficult to imagine the impact on the overall force had these services not been provided in theater.

Aside from feeding the force, mail is the single most important morale issue of a soldier during any deployment. This was also the case during Operation Joint Endeavor. Postal operations also attracted a great deal of command interest that began early in the operation and continued throughout. Without that interest however, the PSB would not have been able to overcome some of the glaring shortfalls in equipment, manpower, and transportation to accomplish this high profile mission. When the mission was turned over to the Stabilization Forces (SFOR) in November 1996, over 9.5 million pounds of mail had been handled in theater by deployed postal units.15

The success of the postal operation was due in large part to the overlap of Temporary Change of Station (TCS) soldiers arriving into the PSB from various locations in Germany and the United States mixed with Reserve Component (RC) soldiers from CONUS. Reserve soldiers deployed both into the forward and rear areas and supplemented the AC force operating in both locations. However, a considerable amount of training was required once those soldiers arrived in Bosnia and Hungary, since most were not prepared to operate and sustain a division level postal operation. Specifically, they lacked a common understanding of the general support mission and its critical link with the Air Force’s Airmail Terminal operation.
In CONUS the postal mission is run exclusively by the United States Postal System, not the military.\textsuperscript{16} Outside of CONUS it is the responsibility of the United States Military Postal System (USMPS). Once the in-country training was accomplished, Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE) demonstrated that a postal company could successfully accomplish both its operational mission and its service mission with the current configuration of a postal operations platoon and postal services platoons.

The main APO located in Tuzla originally required 4,500 square feet to separate and sort mail to each of the battalions and separate units of Task Force Eagle. The space requirement was based on the number of units, locations, and the strength of the task force. The initial lack of space was solved almost immediately with the purchase of a large fest tent. The operation itself ran 7 days a week, 24-hours a day, and was adjacent to the 2,500 square foot airmail terminal run by the Air Force. Conveyor belts, heaters, fans, sorting bins and x-ray machines augmented the normal Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) list to round out the final equipment needs.

Force Protection requirements, consisting of a four-vehicle convoy with two crew served weapons, a combat lifesaver and two radios, inhibited the postal company’s ability to move mail. Internal task force transportation assets were not reliable enough to ensure routine delivery to the eight outlying post offices established within the first 30 days of the operation.
The transportation issue was resolved about two months into the operation when Brown and Root, a U.S. civilian contractor assumed much of the task force’s support mission, including moving the mail within the AOR. From Christmas Day 1995 through the end of the operation some eleven months later, postal service was interrupted only on two occasions, both for periods of less than 24 hours. The postal company provided the full spectrum of services throughout the operation to include all incoming and outgoing mail processing, post locator service, redirect mail, all finance services to include regular postage, and money orders, postal claims, inspection of unit mail rooms, training of mail clerks and casualty mail. Additionally, postal units in Germany augmented by RC soldiers continued to provide uninterrupted postal support to soldiers and family members throughout the deployment period.

A reserve replacement battalion was mobilized and deployed to Germany in support of the operation. Their mission was to provide all replacement support for the operation, since the 21st Replacement Company, USAREUR’s only active replacement unit, was neither manned nor equipped for the additional workload this mission required. The battalion collocated with the 21st Replacement Company at Rhine Main Air Base and stayed at that location for the duration of the operation. Sub-elements from this RC unit were also sent to Hungary and Tuzla to run those
operations since the 1st Armored Division did not have the resources to accomplish that mission.

Command and control of the replacement assets remained an issue throughout the deployment. The unit’s leadership argued successfully that the battalion headquarters should retain command and control over all subordinate elements, even those deployed with the forward PSB, which was providing the daily operational direction and sustainment. In addition to processing individual replacements, providing life support, and scheduling onward transportation, replacement detachment soldiers were also tasked to run the R&R program initiated in late March of 1996. Soldiers from the personnel detachments were also detailed to work alongside the RC replacement soldiers at bus and air terminals performing daily PAS functions. Although attempts were made to train these soldiers on the PAS system, their other daily requirements precluded full assumption of that mission.

Split based operations and the contributions of the reserve components in providing quality PSS support during this operation were intricately linked. To begin with, split based operations are practiced daily in Europe, unlike CONUS where the PSBs primarily are functionally aligned and located on one installation. In Europe personnel detachments and the postal companies are geographically separated from the battalion headquarters. In addition, in many cases the PDs themselves are
broken down in many areas with squads and teams operating away from the detachment or postal platoon.  

When the execute order for Operation Joint Endeavor was issued, all personnel service support participants understood that the central region of Germany’s PSS mission would continue uninterrupted. Further splitting of an already split based operation did not result in an equal split of mission requirements. The result of this additional split is depicted at figure 1. Command and control challenges alone for this organization were daunting and the drain on already scarce resources stretched the PSB beyond its capabilities.

Figure 1. Cmd & Cntl for a forward-deployed operation.

A partial solution to the tremendous drain of personnel resources came with the announcement of a Presidential Select Reserve Callup (PSRC). Reserve units were identified and
mobilized appropriately by postal platoons and personnel detachments. Upon arrival in Europe, they were divided among four European based PSBs or targeted for duty in Hungary, Croatia, or Bosnia. Only one-third of the deployed soldiers were backfilled by RC soldiers in the central region during this 11-month timeframe.

Most reserve postal units were well prepared and following brief in-country training provided a very positive impact on postal operations both in the central region of Germany and the deployed theater. Many of these soldiers possessed deployment experience and had a very good understanding of their mission and responsibilities. From a technical standpoint they were better prepared than the Active Component CONUS Temporary Change of Station (TCS) soldiers since many worked for USPS in their civilian careers.

Unfortunately, reserve personnel detachment soldiers and units were not as successful. Most were not prepared to assume the rear support mission from the deployed active units, due to insufficient training on key active personnel systems. Systems such as EDAS, SIDPERS, TOPMIS, and PAS were foreign concepts to most newly arriving RC soldiers. This problem was compounded by very few capable AC soldiers remaining in rear detachments to provide training. In most cases the AC soldiers had already deployed before the RC soldiers arrival. This created tremendous challenges during the redeployment phase of the operation.
The lack of system exposure was also a problem in the deployed theater, but in time was overcome with very intensive training. Due to the urgent need in Europe, training time to prepare RC units for mission support was almost non-existent. For the RC postal soldier this was not a significant problem, but for the RC PD soldier it was a major factor.

RECOMMENDATIONS

If the personnel community is to remain relevant in this new peacekeeping environment, it must be prepared to provide the task force commander the same level and variety of support during deployments that is provided on a daily basis in garrison. If existing personnel resources can not be focused towards that end, these units will not be viewed as the combat multiplier they are and be relegated to the sidelines of any future peacekeeping operation. During Operation Joint Endeavor and those iterations that followed necessary PSS support was provided despite shortcomings in doctrinal guidance and planning shortfalls at the beginning of the operation. Such adjustments cannot be sustained in multiple or prolonged peacekeeping operations.

Now is clearly the time for the Adjutant General community to take a hard look at the way peacekeeping missions are supported. Our eventual goal should be either a substantial rewrite of FM 12-6, or the creation of a related field manual specially devoted to peacekeeping missions. This paper offers nine specific recommendations towards developing the right recipe for future
PSS operations in the areas of postal support, replacement operations, the use of reserve soldiers, split-based operations, and essential PSS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Recommendation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Postal</td>
<td>• Maintain current operational equipment in POMCUS configuration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Replacement Operations</td>
<td>• F5 designation authorization to Korea and Germany Postal Directorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split-Based Operations and Reserve Component PSS soldiers and units</td>
<td>• Eliminate CONUS based active component postal units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Essential Personnel Services</td>
<td>• Shift replacement operation mission below theater level to the PSB</td>
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<td>• Add replacement regulating cell of 10 soldiers to PSB MTOE within the SIDPERS section</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rotate entire reserve PSB to backfill deployed active component unit for deployments over 6 months</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Train reserve component units on core active systems</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Incorporate reserve postal units into future peacekeeping missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop a flexible support matrix for peacekeeping missions</td>
</tr>
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Table 1 - Recommendations

POSTAL.

Planners should expect vast geographical dispersion for any future peacekeeping operation. They should insist that postal units arrive early in the operation. It can also be expected that transportation requirements will quickly overwhelm capacity. Establishing of the main postal operation at the main

21
airfield in conjunction with the Air Terminal Operations personnel of the air force will ensure that postal soldiers will have immediate access to inbound mail. The current postal operation in Tuzla should be maintained in its entirety once the operation is complete, to include the retaining of all non-MTOE equipment. Recommend that the equipment be stored and maintained in the European Theater for future contingencies. The shortage of qualified personnel throughout the Army in both the AC and RC has been perpetuated by the insistence of the Adjutant General School that they be the only organization that can award the F5 designator (skill identifier for postal).

In order to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of trained postal soldiers the Adjutant General School should grant the two postal directorates in Korea and Germany the authority to award the F5 identifier. That skill identifier is awarded currently only by the Adjutant General School after successfully completing a self paced curriculum. The school has never produced sufficient numbers of soldiers necessary to perform postal missions. However, adequate training can be accomplished by existing units. Without the ability to award the identifier, personnel units responsible for postal operations will constantly be playing catch-up with other Battlefield Operating Systems (BOSS) upon deployment. Finally, give the Army Reserves the deployed postal mission. They will excel. As the most recent deployment clearly proved, the reserves are as well, if not
better prepared to accomplish that mission. They practice providing postal support year round, and many deploy to either Europe or Korea for their Active Duty for Training (ADT) periods. CONUS postal units do not get that opportunity and consequently, are not as well prepared for a contingency operation. With the exception of the one postal company assigned to support the contingency corps, the need for active duty postal units within CONUS is not justified.

REPLACEMENT OPERATIONS.

Replacement Operations involves the care of and accounting for individual soldiers moving in and out of a theater of operations. PSBs account for soldiers as part of their day to day garrison function and in the deployed environment. Replacement Operations below the theater level, where reserve component replacement battalions focus, should be shifted to the PSBs. A 10-soldier cell (the number is the minimum number needed to support a division size task force) should be added to the PSB TOE in the SIDPERS section for replacement regulating. It is much easier to account for soldiers when those entrusted to do the accounting are also the ones that house, feed and arrange transportation. There is nothing scientific about replacement operations and those functions clearly could and should be incorporated into the overall PSB mission. The replacement mission goes hand in hand with personnel accountability, and one
that could be adopted with little or no major outside training impact.\(^23\)

**SPLIT BASED OPERATIONS AND RESERVE COMPONENT PSS SOLDIERS AND UNITS.**

Regardless of the rhetoric, split based operations over an extended period of time degrade a unit’s capability to provide sustained and standardized service to the deployed force and those units and families left behind. More often than not, the commander’s decision is to take his best soldiers leaving the least trained behind. Compounding this problem, without sufficient backfill those left behind are often woefully undermanned to accomplish even the basic daily missions. The best answer lies in the reserve component PSB. For long term (6 months or more) deployments, entire reserve units should be activated to backfill the deploying PSB. To piece meal parts of units without their senior leaders is not a satisfactory solution, and one that caused a myriad of personnel problems in previous operations. Allowing an entire unit to move in behind the deploying PSB relieves the deployed commander of both the unrealistic responsibility of providing PSS support to the rear and focusing on deploying his unit and establishing support in a deployed theater. The finance community deployed an entire reserve finance battalion during Operation Joint Endeavor and
although it experienced some growing pains, the decision paid off in the long run.

In addition, the Army's senior personnel leaders should insist that key personnel systems for deployments are trained in the reserve schools, during monthly drills, and during annual two week ADTs. As a start, systems such as SIDPERS 3, EDAS, TOPMIS, and PAS should be immediately incorporated into the training plans. Doing so now will ensure that future activated units can provide the necessary personnel support required to sustain the deployed force over an extended period of time. It will also help to minimize the training requirements of AC personnel units who receive RC augmentation.

**ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL SERVICES.**

"Essential personnel services" are often determined by the person or persons receiving the service. Essential can then be explained as any personnel service outside those core competencies outlined earlier in this paper that the deployed commander requires to sustain his force. These services are always provided in a peacetime garrison environment but seldom provided with any regularity during combat. As this paper has addressed, there is plenty of room between a garrison environment and all out war when determining what services are in deed essential. Our personnel doctrine does not address in sufficient detail the necessity to provide these services in a deployed theater.
As a start point for development and integration into our basic doctrine is what I would refer to as a flexible support matrix. It will outline all of the non-core services routinely provided to soldiers when a personnel organization plans for an extended peacekeeping mission. The matrix itself should be flexible enough to phase in the particular levels of support required as the operational environment develops. In doing so, personnel organizations will initially continue to concentrate on their core competencies, but also take with them the necessary capability to expand services as circumstances allow. This flexibility will help alleviate command frustration at the user level and duplication of effort by other participating personnel units.

CONCLUSION

These recommendations are not a comprehensive formula for streamlining personnel support in peacekeeping missions. However they do offer a start point for more discussion and analysis. As the personnel community moves into the next century, peacekeeping operations will become more the norm instead of the exception. The personnel community must change the way it provides support. Addressing the many associated issues offers alot of exciting challenges for the Adjutant Generals Corps. Failure to adapt our doctrine and practices to these new circumstances will seriously undermine long term sustainability of peacekeeping deployments.

WORD COUNT = 5539
ENDNOTES

1Department of the Army, FM 12-6, Personnel Doctrine, (Washington, D.C., 1994), I-2.


3FM 12-6, I3.

4Ibid., 1-2.

5Ibid.

6Ibid., 15-4.


8Ibid., 2.

9FM 12-6, 8-2.


12Center for Army Lessons Learned, 8.

13Ibid., 21.

14Steve M. Poet, “The 90th PSB in Bosnia, What We Did and What We Learned,” 1775 8 (Spring 1997): 11.


16Center For Army Lessons Learned, Personnel Service Support To Operation Joint Endeavor, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center For Army Lessons Learned, April 1997), 22.

17Maude, 8.


22Allen Pegg <pegga@hq.1perscom.heidelberg.army.mil>, “Operation Joint Guard Postal Staffing,” electronic mail message to Mr. Anthony Perry <perrya@ftmcpshn-emh1.army.mil>, 17 March 1998.

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