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A NEW MILLENNIUM:
A NEW ARMY-Congress RELATIONSHIP

BY

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A New Millennium: A New Army-Congress Relationship

by

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ABSTRACT

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The Army's current budget is not adequate to sustain its modest force structure and prepare for the future. Its budget has been locked at a 24 percent share of the DoD budget since the end of WWII, even though the Army has shouldered the load in contingency forces and casualties. The Army's senior leadership's lack of political acumen with Congress is in large part responsible for the Army's mouse's share of the DoD budget pie. Further, an underfunded Army has troubling implications for national security interests in the chaotic post Cold War era. If the Army doesn't change its corporate approach to Congress the warfighting capability and institutional integrity of the Army will be in mortal peril. This study attempts to place the Army's relationship with Congress in a larger context, one that must be understood if the Army is to attain the capabilities it needs to win in the future. The study begins with an analysis of the Army culture and values that drives the Army today and then examines Congress' perception of the Army and the Army's perception of Congress. It concludes with recommendations on how the Army must adapt to effectively engage Congress.
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PREFACE

During one of the required assignments in the strategy phase of the Army War College curriculum I ran across Dr. Stephen Scroggs' Ph.D. dissertation "Army Relations with Congress: The Impact of Culture and Organization". Upon reading the entire dissertation, I concluded that this single document encapsulated the Army's problems with the legislative branch of government that has the power of the purse. Further, Scroggs provided sound solutions to those problems. While I had been considering it as the subject of my Strategy Research Paper I became concerned that this dissertation had about covered the subject with its 586 pages of detail, it would be difficult for me to add to the "body of knowledge," even though there is very little more written on this subject. Fortunately, Dr. Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute suggested that I might provide another point of view; he persuaded me that the issue needed to be examined from varying perspectives. Throughout the preparation of this SRP, Dr. Scroggs' dissertation has been my basic reference and I hope that I have done it justice. It factually and accurately represents my own experience with the Army staff. I want to thank Dr. Scroggs for his lengthy communications with me from Japan. I look forward to his book that will be published in 1999 Army Relations with Congress: Thick Armor, Dull Sword, Slow Horse. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Doug Johnson and Dr. Rich Yarger for their sage guidance and patience.
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A NEW MILLENNIUM: A NEW ARMY-CONGRESS RELATIONSHIP

The US Army has not been “prepared” for any war in this century except the Gulf War. The Gulf War demonstrated that a prepared US Army can ensure victory and minimize casualties.¹ Why then is the US Army not successful in getting the resources it needs to maintain current readiness and prepare for future conflicts? Why have the Navy, Air Force, and Marines continually outmaneuvered the Army in the halls of Congress in the struggle for defense resources? Are there institutional reasons the Army doesn’t get the resources it needs?

The Army has been locked into a 24% share of the DoD budget since the end of World War II. With the mouse’s share of less than ¼ of the DoD pie, the Army has shouldered most of the load of casualties and resource commitments in recent conflicts and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The American people spent more on wine and beer last year than they did on the US Army.² Does the Office of Secretary of Defense favor sea and air power at the expense of landpower? Or, are the President and Congress simply not providing enough funds to adequately resource DoD? Such queries may lead to partial explanations. But in the final analysis the Army must turn inward to find the real reason for its lack of success on the resource front.

This study analyzes how Army culture keeps it from effectively representing Army interests to outside agencies, especially to the Congress. Five Army cultural dimensions or assumptions influence the Army-Hill relations.³ Most significant of these is the Army’s internal fixation on its own institutional culture. This is manifested in its self-perceived role as the “obedient servant” of the nation and the tactical unit level “can-do” attitude. These inhibit external activism and the Army’s corporate quest for adequate resourcing. The Army’s strategic
leaders must identify the dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and manage cultural evolution to assure the Army’s preparedness in changing environments.\textsuperscript{4}

After examining Army culture, the study analyzes how Congress views the Army and attempts to put doing business on the hill into political context. Further, it discusses how the Army sees itself in relation to the Congress and explores the question of whether real Army warriors can effectively communicate with Congress. The study concludes with recommendations on how the Army should approach Congress. The corporate Army’s lack of political acumen with Congress has handicapped present and future forces to the point of endangering warfighting capability and institutional integrity. Thus, the Army should plan and conduct its approach to Congress with the same Clausewitzian mantra that guides Army strategic thought – war is an extension of policy by other means. In the short term, corporate culture can not be changed. But acknowledging the problem and launching a campaign plan for change is an appropriate first step. This study attempts to place the Army’s relationship with Congress in a larger context, one that must be understood if the Army is to maintain the capabilities and resources to accomplish its mission against current and future threats. The Army should prepare for Congress with the same elan and thoroughness that it prepares for war. Army senior leaders must adapt to the political environment in which the Army operates. Military decisions reflect the political and social environment in which they are made. Military policy is not made in a vacuum

\textbf{ARMY RESOURCES AND ETHOS}

\textbf{NUMBERS MATTER}

In terms of organizational mission success, the Army has provided over 60 percent of the forces committed to 28 contingency operations since Operation Just Cause, but has received less
than 25 percent of the DoD budget. The Army shoulders the load and does the heavy lifting in places like Haiti and Bosnia with the smallest service budget. The Army must maintain a high tempo of current operations while it tries to modernize its forces for the future. The Army has not been able to do both within its current budget; the effects are now evident in the Army’s questionable readiness and slow down in modernization. The Army’s readiness is important because history shows us that unprepared forces initially suffer higher casualties. In American Wars, the Army bears the brunt of these casualties. The 1990s are not the first time the Army has operated without enough resources.

The Army’s lack of resources and correlation to casualties can be illustrated by looking back to WWII. During WWII, in periods of continuous combat in northwest Europe after 6 June 1944, an infantry division could expect casualties of about 85 percent among its combat riflemen for every six weeks of fighting. Once an American division was committed to combat, it had to stay in the fight until the end of the war, virtually without respite. The Roosevelt administration rejected the Industrial Mobilization Plan; thus the Army had to settle for much less than the desired levels of men and equipment to fight the war. Was it fair to ask any group of men to fight and become casualties 85 percent of the time when this sacrifice wasn’t shared? Even the Germans found a way to rotate their divisions. The Army’s lack of preparedness for other conflicts like Korea and Vietnam is well documented. And this lack of preparedness’ effect on policy has been profound. Army Cold War preparedness was generally inadequate except for the Reagan build-up. Operation Desert Storm is one of the few occasions that found the Army ready from the start to conduct combat operations for the war it was ordered to fight. Despite the Desert Storm example, the Army’s readiness for the future is in question in view of current
funding levels. While contributing 60 percent of the forces with 24 percent of the budget, the Army has gained no ground since 1989 based on the Army budget share in figure 1.

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Figure 1. Share of DoD Budget by Component

Regardless of world events, the Army seems trapped in a fixed budget equation despite constantly changing policies and world situations. Even though the Army has transitioned into a high technology force, it is culturally challenged to compete effectively for resources. Former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor expressed this circumstance in The Uncertain Trumpet:

The maintenance of the rigid percentage distribution by service of the budgets since 1953 is clear proof of the absence of flexibility in our military preparation. The frozen pattern could only be justified if the world had stood still since 1953 and I doubt that anyone would say that it has.

What is even more disturbing from a national military strategic standpoint is that since 1986, budget apportionment for the services has flatlined. This indicates that major changes in strategy are not effecting budget allocations, no matter what the mission is! The current contribution of landpower to the national military strategy must be reevaluated. The events of the past year and
the latest National Military Strategy make it clear that landpower requirements are increasing (Kosovo, Southwest Asia, WMD proliferation, and Asian Financial flu/regional instability).

Given the Army’s increasing contingency missions around the world, the Army needs a substantial funding increase to maintain a ready and adequate force structure.

HISTORICAL BUDGETS

Another way to view funding and resources is to look at service outlays back to 1953 to get an appreciation for the Army’s predicament. Figure 2 illustrates DoD outlays by service since 1953 in FY99 constant dollars. Outlays generally represent the cash payments for the fiscal year; indicating outlays in constant dollars facilitates comparisons across the years. The Clausewitzian

![Figure 2. DoD Outlays by Service in FY99 Constant Dollars](image)
perspective on this straight line budgeting would be that political attitudes, national priorities, and budgetary constraints exert a dominating influence on the development of strategic doctrine and the size and structure of the Army. The lack of strategic options caused by insufficient resources and the declining state of Army modernization and readiness impose significant limits on the military options the political leadership will be able to call upon in the future. In a future where the threat is vague, but wherein potential hostile asymmetrical capabilities are abundant, budget apportionment today inevitably determines or circumscribes policy decisions tomorrow. The long lead times required for military-unique technology and dual-use nature of today’s technology reduce policy-maker autonomy once the budget decisions have been made. Limited options potentially lead to predetermined and reflexive ends and ways, because constricted means don’t allow for a full array of strategies. Simply put, budget numbers matter because the correlation between money invested and success is high. Military success is realized in quick victories and low casualties. The Army and the Congress must acknowledge the price of maintaining a high technology Army, and the Army is now a high technology force. The WWII image of “Private Ryan” is no longer viable. The average soldier today needs the capabilities of the men who flew planes in WWII, to perform his or her duties in our high technology Army. As the futurist Arthur C. Clarke said, “The future isn’t what it used to be.”

MADISONIAN CONCERNS

Currently, the Army is having trouble shaping its future. Its culture prevents it from seeking effective legislative influence and representing itself appropriately to Congress and the American people. The Army’s weakness in communicating with the external world is primarily a function of its culture. Unfortunately, the Army’s inability to get its message across in the
national debate over service roles significantly weakens national security. Congress assumes that within DoD the services are competing on a level field. From the Congressional perspective, each service is equally equipped and capable of representing their respective needs to resource the national military strategy. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Army participates with serious handicaps.

The father of our Constitution and fourth President James Madison noted as part of the Virginia Plan to the Constitutional Convention in 1787, “That the institutions of government be arranged in such a way that the ‘interests and factions’ so prevalent in humans be turned to support of liberty and Republican government.” Madison was convinced that in a large republic one faction would not stay in place long enough, or grow large enough, to pose a threat . . . other factions would be created and they would all “check each other.” In this case Madison was not prophetic. The Army has persistently failed to adequately represent its – and the nations – interests to Congress. As Stephen Scroggs observes in Army Relations with Congress: the Impact of Culture and Organization, the Army’s ineffective congressional relationship has invalidated this Madisonian assumption, Scroggs believes this shortcoming has serious consequences for national security in the future.

CULTURE AND VALUES

The Army ethos consists of the guiding beliefs, standards, values, and ideals that characterize and motivate the Army. These values more than anything else are the glue that binds an effective fighting force together, whether it is deployed in Bosnia or serving in the halls of the Pentagon. Army ethos has changed little since it was inculcated into Washington’s Revolutionary Army. For the Army war is intense, close, and brutal. These eternal qualities of combat change little for soldiers. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-1, The Army is the capstone
manual for the US Army and the foundation for Army doctrine. It describes Army values in the value-centered profession of arms. FM 100-1 and soldiers summarize the Army ethos up in one word – duty. 11 “Duty is the behavior required by moral obligation, demanded by custom, or enjoined by the soldier’s sense of rightness. Residing within the concept of duty are the values of integrity and selfless service, which give moral foundation to the qualities the Army ethos demands from privates to generals. The concept of duty binds soldiers within their units and instills an implied trust within the chain-of-command; it enables soldiers to accomplish dangerous tasks while enduring extreme physical hardships.” Devotion of duty is essential to the success of the field Army.

The application of the concept of duty and the value of selfless service must, however, be viewed in a broader context when applied to the corporate Army as it deals with such outside agencies as Congress, Office of Secretary of Defense, other executive agencies, and American society. The Army corporate application of duty has, in many cases, hindered the Army’s competition for resources within the DoD.12 For the Army to execute the National Military Strategy, it must have adequate resources. Doctrine and ethos alone do not get the job done. The Army must have the means to accomplish the ends. The means for the military services are measured in absolute and relative terms of organizational success, reflected in the size of their budgets.13 Using this budget scorecard, the Army has not fared well.

To reverse this trend and ensure effective Army corporate advocacy, senior leadership must understand how Army culture and values can impede the Army’s representation on the Hill. An organization’s culture defines the upper and lower limits of what will be tolerated and what will not be tolerated. In Organizational Culture and Leadership, E.H. Schein offers a useful definition: Culture is a “. . . pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it
solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.\textsuperscript{14} Thus problem-solving and decision-making become culturally pre-determined, because what was perceived to work in the past will then logically be assumed to work in the future. Over time, however, this habitual approach will eventually limit the options leaders consider in solving a problem, so solutions become prescriptive rather than descriptive. If such shared assumptions, or cultural dimensions, are seen as the path to success, then they become the cultural lenses through which behavior is influenced. Decisions made within the cultural context sometimes make little sense to the outsider. Such is the case with the Army, which rewards internal performance and focus rather than external focus.

The Army predisposition for internal focus and behavior can be tracked through history. The Army’s unique role among the services was noted by Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal work \textit{The Soldier and the State}:

\textit{The Army participated in a diversity of tasks—Southern reconstruction, Indian fighting, labor disorders, the Spanish War, Cuban occupation, Philippine pacification, construction and operation of the Panama Canal, and the Mexican punitive expedition. Accordingly, the Army developed an image of itself as the government’s obedient handyman performing without question or hesitation the jobs assigned to it . . . By following all orders literally the Army attempted to divest itself of political responsibility and political controversy despite the political nature of the tasks it was frequently called upon to perform.}\textsuperscript{15}

Carl Builder’s \textit{Masks of War} characterizes the Army’s personality as “the nation’s obedient and loyal military servant.” Consequently, this obedient servant’s attitude, combined with a sense of duty, led to the Army’s abridgement of legalities in performing some of the above civil functions. Criticized and unappreciated, the Army turned inward to maintain a professional military focus. The Navy did not develop this type of focus because its role had been limited to
enforcing the national will in foreign affairs. It did not become involved in many of these untidy domestic affairs.

The historical underpinnings of this curious professionalization mentioned above and the inward focus of the American Army following the Civil War can be traced to General William T. Sherman and Emory Upton. Following the Civil War, both the legislative and executive branch were fraught with what today is termed fraud, waste, and abuse. The corruption in the Grant administration is well known. To distance the Army from Washington’s corruption, the Commanding General of the Army, William T. Sherman, moved Army headquarters to St. Louis. He preferred to concentrate on Indian fighting rather than dealing with political Washington. Having reluctantly accepted the office of Commanding General of the Army after arm-twisting by his old friend President Grant, Sherman also had to preside over the continuing demobilization of the Army following the Civil War.

Sherman learned how to make do with less – a continuing Army tradition. In 1871, one-third of the Army deserted.\(^\text{16}\) Congressional appropriations declined through the early 1870s. By 1877 there was no appropriation whatever for support of the Army until November 30; soldiers had to get loans from usurious bankers to survive.\(^\text{17}\) Despite all of these problems, Sherman set the Army on a slow but deliberate course of professional change. The discouraging quality of life at frontier garrisons, combined with little help from Congress, prompted many Army officers to look inward for motivation because there was little encouragement to serve from other sources.

During Sherman’s fifteen-year tenure as Commanding General of the Army, he instituted a series of sweeping educational reforms and set the tone for the post-Civil War Army. As long as these changes did not require new appropriations, Congress had little interest in them. Sherman
believed that civilian control was essential and that soldiers should remain out of politics. He also objected to the Army being used as a police force. He urged that the Army should be "organized and governed on true military principles" in order to preserve in peacetime the "habits and usages of war." These values were indeed inculcated into the organization that he commanded for fifteen years. One of his chief architects for reform was a decorated Civil War veteran, Emory Upton.

Upton served as the Superintendent of West Point and as Commandant of the Artillery School and left an enduring impact on the Army. However, Emory Upton's greatest legacy was a work published after his death in 1904 by the Secretary of War Elihu Root, The Military Policy of the United States. This work led to some major reforms in both the organization of the War Department and the United States Army. It reflected Upton's bloody experiences during the Civil War and his study and interpretation of the history of the US Army and its wars. Upton believed American military policy had been corrupted by legislative neglect, irrational antimilitary prejudices, and micromanagement of military affairs. Most of the focus on Upton has been on his avocation of a regular Army at the expense of the National Guard, but Upton introduced the Army to another concept. This other Uptonian legacy has been described as the Uptonian Hunker. To hunker is to squat or reduce one's profile and thus make the squatter less vulnerable to detection and attack. The Uptonian Hunker reflected a deep mistrust of politicians' willingness to fund the armed forces and desire to control it; it promoted a turn inward to hone professional skills and avoid political entanglements. Even more important, it instilled the belief that it is better not to interface with Congress and thus accept the risk of inadequate resources—rather than to engage the Congress and thus become involved in the "dirty business" of politics.
Upton believed that if Congress had provided for a proper force structure and level of readiness, the Northern Army could have won the Civil War quickly. But he realistically acknowledged that the Army would probably never get the proper resources to prepare for war. He argued that a fundamental flaw in the American military system was excessive civilian control of the military. This argument, however, undid Upton, because it focused debate on national institutions instead of military needs. Upton entertained little hope that many of his prescriptions for change would be accepted. Lacking hope for national institutional change, he and his fellow officers dedicated themselves to training and improving the Army. These coping mechanisms of turning inward and concentrating on the professionalism of the Army bridged the gap through the demobilization after the Civil War and the post-war decline of the Army. After the Civil War, officers unanimously believed that politics and officership did not mix. Not one officer in five hundred, it was estimated, ever cast a ballot.20 This reluctance to vote and affiliate with political parties remained strong into the 1950s. The ideal of the “apolitical” officer, who avoids political entanglements regardless of the party in power and serves the Army and chain-of-command remains deeply embedded in Army culture.

In the Army culture the chain of command extends from the President as Commander and Chief to the lowest enlisted man. It is all soldiers’ duty to obey strictly the President. Since soldiers are constitutionally obedient servants of the nation, duty has become the Army’s highest law. The Army does not perceive any place for Congress in this chain of command. This corporate application of duty, which does not acknowledge the separation of powers, has led directly to the Army’s lack of engagement with Congress, which can be seen today and which reflects a misunderstanding of our WWII heritage. Indeed, many senior officers still fail to
appreciate General George C. Marshall’s legacy of non-political involvement and apolitical relations with Congress.

Today, many Army officers eschew the fact that the “giants who walked the earth” in WWII, who didn’t vote because voting was not proper for “apolitical officers” to do so. George C. Marshall did not vote as a matter of principle because he did not want to be seen as having his political views potentially compromise his military advice. What if he voted for one candidate but had to work for the one that he did not vote for? General Marshall was, however, one of the Army’s most astute soldiers in getting Congress to understand the needs of the Army. He gained this legislative expertise over many years. After WWI, as General Pershing’s aide-de-camp, Marshall prepared the General for testimony before Congress on the Army’s needs. General Marshall learned early not to take political sides when testifying before Congress – to remain strictly bi-partisan and working with the Cabinet in support of the President’s position. His absolute refusal to be considered as a possible presidential candidate won him respect from the President, Congress, and the American people. His non-partisan, apolitical stance enabled him to avoid appearing before congressional committees or at news conferences in defense of administration proposals unless they specifically concerned the Army.²¹ Strongly committed to the principle of civilian leadership in the making of national policy, Marshall sought, if at all possible, to follow the President’s lead in military matters. Despite his discomfort with the administration’s parsimonious policy on Army appropriations, Marshall supported it in public. But he vigorously advocated the Army’s needs at White House conferences. But when overridden by the President, he supported the President’s decision.²²

General Marshall knew through experience how to walk the fine line between an administration and Congressional position. Further he realized the Army’s peril in peacetime.
He believed that the Army was obliged to win the trust of Congress and the nation at large. He sought their support and confidence in frank discussions with the committees before which he appeared, in expert briefings of congressional representatives and of the press and in candid revelations to investigating committees. Prior to the critical vote on extending selective service in 1941, General Marshall arranged with his old friend Representative Wadsworth to get forty Republican Congressmen together at the Army and Navy Club for a discussion. Many of the Republicans were opposed to the extension because of personal hatred of Democratic President, Franklin Roosevelt. Many of the Congressmen present said that if they voted for the measure, it would cost them reelection. General Marshall remarked that if his help was needed, he would go on the platform when they ran in 1942 and defends their patriotism. The margin of victory for the extension in the House of Representatives was one vote. General Marshall’s personal standing had provided the margin of victory. He clearly understood the difference in being apolitical in an election year and the proper advocacy of Army needs. General Marshall constructively engaged the Congress on a regular basis. He refused to relegate this function only to legislative liaisons. Marshall’s denouncement of partisan politics was not a rejection of the need for senior leaders to interact with the political process, but a demonstration of how to do it most effectively. But, currently the Army has ceded the field of Congress to the other services. Culturally, Army leaders prefer the Uptonian inward focus; they believe that the Army should avoid political issues and the political processes all together. Many of the beliefs, values, and norms that emerged in the Army following the Civil War, WWII, and Cold War have atrophied into basic assumptions that underlie to varying degrees Army behavior toward Congress and other external agencies. The Uptonian Hunker, along with the Army’s failure to appreciate Marshall’s genius impedes Army success today.
HOW VALUES AND CULTURE CAN IMPEDE SUCCESS

The Army, more than the other services, prefers and rewards internal performance over external performance. This internal focus represents the continuing Uptonian response to reward internal performance in the field Army over external performance in the Pentagon or Washington. In fact, the Army directs its most valuable agency resources on this internal fixation. The Army always looks inward to address and resolve the challenges of maintaining or improving its professional warfighting competence, though may times the problems can be fixed only with assistance from external agencies. The Army’s cultural dimension of looking inward, with little concern for external audiences, seems justified because the Army’s and soldiers’ contributions to the nation and dedication to duty are assumed to be self-evident. These self-evident contributions are common sense in the Army’s view and should not need further explanation. But to many external audiences with a different cultural background, these contributions are not readily apparent. One would think that corporate senior leaders would change the way they do business if the main customer was not buying. But Army leadership remains in the current version of the Uptonian Hunker and bemoans the fact that Congress just doesn’t get it. The facts beg the question, who does get it? Congress remains a constitutionally empowered external audience with its big checkbook and budget scorecard, Congress reveals indisputably for which armed services it is willing to write the biggest checks.

Despite being a loser on the budget scorecard, the Army senior leadership continues to focus on and reward internal activities directly related to warfighting competence, combat readiness, doctrine, and, on the margins, materiel acquisition. Missions considered essential are enthusiastically pursued, but others are inadequately resourced. External activities relating to agencies outside of the Army (such as OSD, Congress, and the American people) simply do not
get first-string attention. External activities like communicating with Congress are left too much to the Army Congressional Liaison Office and to the Public Affairs Office. This neglect of external affairs clearly reflects the Army’s “muddy boot” culture because the senior leaders approach budget problems from an operational perspective, not from a strategic or political one. As long as these civilian external agencies stay out of the Army’s operational matters, the Army seems content to ignore them and accept the inadequate funding. The situation is particularly difficult to understand in light of the fact that the Army’s expressed strategic thought does not ignore external agencies. Army capstone field manuals and strategic writings acknowledge the Clausewitzian theory, as the altar of strategic thought – war is an extension of policy by other means. Liddell Hart further defined Clausewitzian strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” Without adequate means, the Army simply cannot fulfill policy. Why then hasn’t the Army taken up the Clausewitzian mantra and developed a campaign plan for this external battlefield?

First and foremost, the Army senior leadership does not widely acknowledge that there is a problem with external agencies. There is little effort to institute compensating mechanisms that will over time help the Army direct more consistent and greater agency resources to the problem, as is currently being done by other services. But even if these leaders acknowledged the problem, they would not have to transform the entire Army to solve it constructively. Only the corporate Army senior leaders need to transcend the culture, to get out of the “box.” During the research for Army Relations with Congress: the Impact of Culture and Organization, Stephen Scroggs conducted extensive interviews with current and former Army senior officers, as well as members of Congress and OSD. He concluded that the Army’s senior leadership, more than that of the other services, places much less value and effort in communicating with external
audiences. A former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) acknowledged to Scroggs the problem of representing Army interests to external audiences:

Except for selected cases, we [the Army] do focus internally. That is because our core concern is our warfighting competence. As Chief of Staff of the Army, it took a great deal of energy for me to push issues with external audiences. I had no problem with getting the [Army's] internal constituency behind a problem; the problems were with the external constituencies.29

At the Army's premier training facility, the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California, Army brigades regularly confront an aggressive and lethal opposing force. The lesson commanders learn first is to concentrate their efforts on the opposing external enemy force and environment; then they must synchronize their internal forces to defeat this external force. Failure to do so results in spectacular training disasters, which are then examined in what can be embarrassing after-action reviews. A commander who continually makes the same mistakes at the NTC would not be around long. However, these lessons have not been applied to the Washington battlefield.30

The Washington battlefield is about resources and how they are doled out. External audiences that do not understand Army culture and style fail to appreciate landpower. The Army as an institution does not understand its own internalized style. This style can be found if one takes the time. The Army's resourcing and communications style to external audiences is self-evident in the Army's 1) unique sense of professionalism; 2) "merit of the Army cause speaks for itself" (institutional naïve arrogance) attitude and 3) discounting of assignments dealing with external audiences.31 The Army's unique sense of professionalism and concept of duty were addressed earlier. When the Army is faced with very difficult issues, it spends a lot of time obtaining consensus within the Army, in developing a course of action. Once a course of action is endorsed internally, many senior leaders assume the merit of the Army position speaks for itself and do not expend a comparable level of effort and skill in advocating the position to OSD
or Congress. A recent article in the Army Times speculating about the qualifications of a new Army Chief of Staff illustrates the point. Several retired senior generals said, "the chief must have a clear vision of where he wants to take the Army, and be able to articulate that vision clearly and concisely to the field." There is no mention of articulating a vision to Congress or OSD. The external audience is an afterthought. Communication techniques and staff papers don’t work the same for the internal and external audiences. The Army’s glossy and abstruse charts are well known. This indifference to audience in advocating the Army position is not surprising, since the “currency of the Army officer” is “muddy boot” time. Indeed, assignments in Washington are not the ‘junior officers’ ticket to command and general officer. Scroggs’ statistical data shows that the Army does not groom its senior leaders for Washington service like the other services do and this figure is worsening. Figure 3 shows the time that senior leaders in each service currently have spent in Washington. The other services value and reward time spent understanding and addressing external audiences like Congress. The correlation between the time senior leaders serve in Washington, the clarity of their message, and the budget scorecard are strong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Months</th>
<th>Years</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>30.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>23.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>21.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (1995)</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>15.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army (1981)</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>29.08</td>
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Figure 3. Cumulative Months of Washington Area Service
This disparity in time spent in Washington certainly puts the Army senior leaders at a disadvantage. Indeed, soldiers who prove effective in Washington have not pursued conventional careers: "...It has been those men whose unconventional careers have involved them in politico-military assignments that display the most sustained political consciousness." The Army’s current implementation of a new Officer Personnel Management System - OPMS XXI - provides for new alternate career patterns. However, it will be years before the fruits of OPMS XXI emerge. By then, the Army will have been through three or four bi-annual Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycles and Army XXI will be locked in the budget. Army After Next (AAN) will start firming up. However, without more resources from the Congressional external audience, the Army will not be able to afford much real change. A lack of Pentagon experience as one retired four-star general pointed out can lead to problems, "You wake up in the middle of a bear trap and not even know the damn thing was there."[35]

ARMY VIEW OF RELATIONS ON THE HILL

_The average Army flag officer would rather go to the dentist than come to the hill._
Professional Staff Member, SASC[36]

The Army does not place a lot of institutional value on assignments that directly communicate with Congress. If it did, then assignments in the Office of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) would be considered plum assignments for career advancement. OCLL is the Army’s primary agency for conducting business with Congress on a daily basis. According to Scroggs, the senior flag officers he interviewed, both retired and active duty attest, that the Army experiences problems in communicating to external audiences like Congress. Scroggs also ferreted out some explanations for the Army’s failure: 1) It fails to assign its most competitive junior and senior officers to those positions, 2) Army combat arms officers assigned to OCLL are
less likely to command a battalion, brigade or division, and hence to get promoted to Colonel or flag rank. 3) As a service, the Army fails to appreciate and provide its officer corps with the skills and experience needed to effectively work with Congress and other external audiences.\textsuperscript{37}

OCLL formerly served as a path to the stars for promising officers. Two previous Army Chief of Staffs served there in the 1960s and 1970s. Officers who work in OCLL learn to understand Congress as they develop and cultivate personal contacts with both staffers and members that last for a lifetime. However, working now in legislative liaison has been anything but career-enhancing; in many cases, it becomes a dead-end assignment. Congress knows this. The late General Maxwell Thurman, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army from 1983-1987 bluntly observed that, “OCLL is a half-assed outfit and operation. The Army doesn’t put its best officers in the OCLL game like it did in the past. If you are not going to put your best officers in it, you are not going to get to first base.”\textsuperscript{38} Putting officers with the greatest career potential into OCLL would prepare these fast-trackers for future assignments as general officers in the Pentagon. But currently Army general officers have little or no experience in Washington and with the Congress. This inexperience shows when Army generals report in to Washington for the first time and confront the budget veterans leading the other armed services.

The Army would never let anyone command an Army Division who had not commanded a Brigade equivalent. But many Army general officers’ first engagement with the Congress is as general officers. They simply do not know the terrain. Since many current Congressmen and their staff have no military experience, communicating with and understanding Congress becomes even more important. The Marine’s skill in handling Congress is legendary. Both the corporate and fleet Marine Corps understand the importance of representing the Corps well to external audiences. A retired senior general in the Marine Corps put it this way:
Marines who demonstrate skills and develop a political acumen in the areas of legislative liaison and public affairs are not viewed skeptically by the senior flag officers in the Corps because many of these same senior officers possess these same skills and have shared these same type of assignments. Marine generals and junior officers alike have witnessed and experienced the benefits of engagement with external audiences and recognize that it is ludicrous to think these external audiences will go away do not have an impact on the interests of the Corps. Our goal is to make it a positive impact.\textsuperscript{39}

Senior Army officers don’t understand the Hill because they haven’t walked the terrain. Consequently their responses to engagements on the Hill tend to be reactive rather than proactive. And reactionary behavior signals lack of a real, dynamic strategy. One senior Army officer talking about the Army’s less effective approach on the Hill observed, “… It explains why Army generals choose to rely more on formal hearings and posture statements to communicate their message than the other services.”\textsuperscript{40} This then affirms the Army’s naïve assumption that its internal communication products work well with external audiences.\textsuperscript{41} For example, the Army senior-general consensus that redesigned the Army’s heavy division from the outside of the Army looks like trimming troops and armor vehicles is in reality a big step with the networking digitization efforts required. But to Army critics who think the Army is moving too slowly, and clinging to old ways, the new name said it all: the Conservative Heavy Division (CHD).\textsuperscript{42} In other words, calling the redesigned Army division ‘conservative’ works well within the Army, but does not sound very progressive to external agencies who pay for it at budget time. With name changes to the Army’s defining formation like CHD and major legislative efforts timed for hearings and conferences, one is already behind the proverbial power curve. Likewise, in an effort to protect the Army’s FY99 budget, the Army mounted a full-court press to get its story out. This effort was certainly more focused than previous efforts, but waiting until summer already made timing tenuous. An “Inside the Army” article (22 June 1998) illuminates the point:
An Army official said "a couple hundred" individual meetings are in the works between the Army's top brass and pivotal members of the House and Senate authorization and appropriations committees. Late last week, the office of the congressional legislative liaison was fine-tuning the Army's "conference strategy," deciding which generals would visit which lawmakers. Certain "key members," such as the chairmen of the various defense committees, will be visited on a number of separate occasions by different Army leaders, each bringing a different part of the message, a service official said. So far, the source said, the lawmakers have been receptive to the meetings.  

But Congress was in recess from June 25 to July 5. As the author of the article perceptively noted, "... the Army will have its hands full calling on lawmakers before the defense bills go to conference." The Army has been doing a better job with Congress under the current CSA, but the more successful recent processes have not been institutionalized. At the Army's premier institute for landpower, the Army War College offers only an eight-hour mandatory lesson directed at the study of Congress. This provides little insight for the Army's future top echelon of military and civilian leaders and can only be construed as a start. In the budget battlefield, Washington DC is the key terrain and Congress is the center-of-gravity. In Washington, perception is reality.

**CONGRESS**

*If I were to characterize the Army it would be thick armor with a dull sword on a slow horse.*

Lidell Hart

What the Army perceives in terms of its relationship with Congress and what the Congress perceives are totally different. The Army's relationship with Congress should begin with the acknowledgement that Congress sets the tone and that the Constitution frames the relationship. On the Hill, you can not tell the score unless you have a scorecard. That scorecard is the US Constitution. Article I, Section 8 grants Congress extraordinary powers:

To declare War, grant Letters of Marquee and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to the Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years,

To make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces; . . . And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Executing the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

The framers of the Constitution didn’t want the purse and the sword in the same hand—either that of the legislative branch or the executive branch. The broad powers of the Congress go beyond just that of the purse. Many officers do not recognize this when dealing with Congress. In many instances, officers believe Congress is micro-managing the Army. But this close management falls within the purview of the executive branch. Nothing could be less true.

The Constitution mandates Members of Congress to be privy to Army concerns, priorities, and interests. The Congress, and not the administration, has the constitutional authority to raise, support, and regulate the Army. But many senior leaders fail to understand the implications of this; they perceive Congress as an irritant or obstacle as opposed to a responsible partner. Representative Ike Skelton, a senior Democrat and well-known supporter of Defense issues, declared that “Those who understand the Constitution, get along with us [Congress].”46

Most members of Congress conscientiously serve the people according to the Constitution. However, in some cases, they reflect constituency interests and pork-barreling at the expense of efficient defense. Yet even this must be understood in the context of the Constitutional prerogatives of members. Many in the Army fail to understand Congress as an institution, even though they respect Congress as an institution.
THE MYTH OF DECLINING MILITARY EXPERIENCE IN CONGRESS

In an institution made up of members that are elected periodically, the changing demographics of legislators have many implications. A lot of ink has been spilled in military periodicals and books on the growing lack of military service among members of Congress, especially newly elected Representatives and Senators. The demographic trend is toward declining military service (see Figure 4). Far from unusual, this is a reflection of the American history as a whole. The farther away in time from previous foreign wars the country becomes, the smaller the military gets and the less chance citizens will have served in the military. Congressmen are representatives of the people, not the military. Previous military service is not a good litmus test for Congress or for to determining how a legislator will vote on defense issues. Members with no military service may try to compensate for lack of service by being pro-military.

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<tr>
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<td>60%</td>
<td>56%</td>
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<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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**Figure 4. Military Service Congress**

In fact non-veterans are among defense's strongest supporters on the Hill. And some that have advocated cutbacks and opposed Army programs have served in the military with great distinction.

Congressman John Spratt (D-SC), a HNSC member and Army veteran, said that former Army experience for many members now serving may not be positive for the Army since many were probably not volunteers. As draftees, they orient on the hassles of another era, rather than
adhering to any strong fraternal allegiance to the Army. On the other hand, the chances are good that the veterans of the Marines, Navy, or Air Force were volunteers. This may change over time as members get elected who served in the current volunteer Army. Figure 5 provides a breakout of the Service affiliations among the veterans of the 106th Congress (in some cases, a member served in more than one uniformed service):

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<th>USAF</th>
<th>USMC</th>
<th>USCG</th>
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<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
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Figure 5. Congressional Service Affiliations

These changing demographics illustrate an educational opportunity that must be seized by the senior leadership to educate new members of Congress about the Army and on the role of landpower. We can also logically assume that many of the newer staffers will not have extensive military knowledge. Current lack of military knowledge simply means that more time and resources must be devoted to educating members and staffers on the Army's role, missions, and needs. Briefings and personal contacts must be tailored to the audience, but senior leadership participation and time are key to success. The myth of obligatory support should not blind leadership to the real need to educate. One could say that there is a lack of experience in the Army in congressional affairs, rather than the reverse of a lack of military experience in Congress.
CONGRESS'S VIEW OF THE ARMY

The key perspective in Army-Congressional relations is that of Congress. Congress writes the checks and has the Constitutional imperative to do so. Just how does Congress view the Army? Up to this point, this study has provided some clues. However, seven patterns of Army-Congressional behavior offer evidence of how the Army is viewed on the Hill.51 These seven patterns all point to one thing: the Army is the most reluctant and least knowledgeable of the services that participate in the Washington policy-making process. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), subcommittee chairman of the House National Security Subcommittee for Research, Development, and Procurement, acknowledged recently that the inequity in the budget between the Army (which "bears the load," ) and the other services "is caused by maybe the Army not being aggressive enough on the Hill to make its case." The other services, he noted, do it much better.52 A statement in a 3 January 1998 article in the Congressional Quarterly reiterates this reality: "The Army, by contrast [to the National Guard], is the least politically adept of the armed services, an assessment that some Army officers ruefully concede."53 Others say that the Army isn't inept; rather it is simply reluctant to play the game.

In playing the game, the first of seven patterns of perceived congressional relations is the only one where the Army comes out on top and is better than the other services. Congressional interviewees judged the Army to be the most honest, straightforward, and credible of the four services in reacting to and responding to Congressional requests.54 In fact, the Army sometimes overreacts and provides too much information. General opinions among the interviewers were, "You always expect the Army to tell the truth . . . The Air Force always lies. You always expect the Navy not to return your phone call and simply ignore you."55 The Army's reputation for the
truth and a more expanded application of its values applied in the Washington environment could certainly help the Army tell its story.

Second, the legislators believe the Army sees Congress more as a hindrance than a help; dealing with Congress is seen as a burden to bear rather than as a target of opportunity. Thus Army senior leaders are perceived as uncomfortable working with the Hill. The Army body language telegraphs this disdain; many on the Hill hope this will change. Given the Army’s lack of understanding and appreciation of Congress’s constitutional role in defense policymaking, this phenomenon comes as no surprise. But without the rise of a peer competitor with the US in the near future, Congress’s role in defense policymaking will only get larger and the Army must develop an effective working relationship with Congress.

Third, Congressional interviewees summarized the senior Army generals as the least represented and engaged on Capitol Hill. Army leaders have an extraordinary advantage in getting the Army message out on the hill because of their “warrior” persona, professionalism, and objectivity. Three and four star generals exude a “gee whiz” factor from many members and staffers. Senior leaders input is valued because it comes with a lot of experience and isn’t the result of a political appointment. But unfortunately, Army senior leaders are the least visible and do not approach many members of Congress except in times of crisis. The Army senior leadership should drop by more often to develop trust that leads to dialogue on more substantial issues. If the Hill is viewed as part of the team, senior Army Generals and the Army staff should not see flag officers needing force protection from the fog and friction of the legislative battlefield. Again, the Navy and Marine Corps provide the best example.

Fourth, congressional interviews view the Army’s reactive strategy in representing their institutional interests and budget problems as a lack of a strategy. Proactive engagement on the
Hill is crucial to ensuring members understand Army concerns and can carry out their constitutional responsibilities. Shaping the legislative battlefield ahead of time is key, because congressional members need to know what is important early in the process before a particular position has become solidified. Speculation over the Army’s reactive pattern has been judged to be a result of a concern over improper lobbying. Indeed lobbying in accordance with the norms of Hill is not only proper, but is also expected and legal.

Fifth, the Army outreach efforts to Congress were also assessed to be the least apparent and sophisticated of the military services. The Army relies too heavily on the same small group of members of Congress for continued support. By limiting contacts with members of Congress to only certain senior officers, the Army does not have enough senior officer resources to cast the net wider to reach others with the keys to the bank. Unfortunately, the Army recently provided a “comic book” example of its unsophisticated approach to reaching Congress when an internal Army memorandum analyzing the new Speaker-of-the-House found its way to the press. The writer of one newspaper article provides some external insight, “If I were Dennis Hastert, I’d insist this idiotic practice of keeping him under surveillance by Army officers stop immediately and that the Army divert its vast psychological capabilities and the time and skill of its two-star generals [writer of the memorandum to the CSA] to figuring out what makes the North Korean generals nuts.” Other factors contributing to the Army’s unsophisticated outreach effort include not using travel and social resources effectively to orient staffers and members to the Army. Innovative trip planning would entice staffers and members to get out and see the Army. Then they would see that the Army has capabilities the other services can’t provide.
Sixth, the congressional audience perceives the Army as least effective in communicating both near- and long-term priorities and the rationale for the Army force structure.\textsuperscript{61} The cumulative effect of the previously mentioned perceptions, combined with the Army’s penchant for communicating effectively with only internal Army audiences, leaves Congress with a “murky” message they don’t understand. Such vagary confuses Congress about the Army’s fundamental priorities.

Finally, the congressional staff and members don’t necessarily see the Army’s brightest young officers on a daily basis as legislative liaisons.\textsuperscript{62} This sends a clear signal that the Army doesn’t assign congressional relations the level of importance the other services do. The knowledge, skills, and relationships developed in these assignments are skill sets that future Army senior leaders won’t have because they haven’t walked the terrain. If Army senior leaders had the experience the other service chiefs do, they would better understand what Congress expects from the Army senior leaders.

CONGRESSIONAL VIEW FOR ARMY SENIOR LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITY

Congress wants and expects senior Army officers to communicate with them on matters of national security, and Army requirements in particular.\textsuperscript{63} If Congressmen are to execute their duties as defined by the Constitution they need information and assessments that only senior military leaders can render. As mentioned earlier Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution makes clear Congress’ power to declare war, raise and support Armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces. The problem is that both the executive and legislative branches of government have a constitutional basis for making contradictory demands on senior military leaders. One of the long-standing continuities in American domestic policies is the separation of power between Congress and the President,
which often generates disagreement among executive and legislative leadership, and puts the senior military leaders in a tenuous position. Executive political leaders expect the military to argue their case inside the Pentagon, and then to support the final decision made by OSD and the President. Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution, underline the significance of the President as Commander-in-Chief, who “shall commission all officers of the United States”, shall appoint all flag officers for advancement and “shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures he shall judge necessary and expedient.” But it is extremely difficult to draw the line between the soldier giving professional advice to Congress about what the country needs for its defense and the soldier lobbying with Congress for the administration.64

The differing interests of Congress and the President make the senior military officer position difficult, Congress in executing its Constitutional duties expects senior officers to provide independent and professional judgments, regardless of the administration’s position.65 From Congress’ point of view, senior flag officers have a professional and moral responsibility to voice their opinions as long as they do so responsibly and according to the establish congressional (and Washington acknowledged) “rules of the game.” Advocacy, conducted properly and under the right conditions by senior military professionals, is an important way to provide information and defend a service program or budget.66 Advocacy is critical to Congress’ ability to gain insightful information for their decisions, but it is counter to much of the Army culture.

Congress has both formal and informal ways to get the information they need from the Army. The “rules of the game” are the established norms that dictate acceptable behavior. The expertise provided by the senior officer and needed by the Congress is best provided by the
uniformed military. Civilian appointees in DoD are expected to support the administration’s position and generally provide only formal testimony.\textsuperscript{67} While it is generally assumed that flag officers support administration positions when initially asked, this does not mean that flag officers agree with positions. When a member of Congress asks a military officer for his personal opinion on an issue, the member expects a candid response. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA), House National Security Procurement Subcommittee Chairman, advises “My recommendation to every uniformed officer is to be candid.”\textsuperscript{68} The evidence suggests the fine line to walk here is to be candid, not look like a free-lancer, or an administration hack.

Knowledgeable candidness is the best way stay out of trouble with both the congressional members and senior political appointees. If the senior military officer has been able to build up quality personal relationships and understands the Washington policy-making process based on repeated assignment in Washington, he or she is able to survive this political minefield. Unfortunately as noted earlier, many of the Army senior leaders do not have extensive Washington experience. As a consequence they play it safe and repeat the party line -- and the Army budget remains fixed at 24 percent of the DoD budget.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbf{ARMY SENIOR LEADERS ON THE HILL}

The separation of powers made it impossible for American officers ever to be at ease in their professionalism.\textsuperscript{70} The Constitution sometimes provides a dilemma for the senior Army officer. If we imagine a continuum running between efficient policy (a military that can win) and accountable policy (a military that always does what civilians want), the standard would be somewhere in the middle -- a balance between two equally worthy, but sometimes contradictory, goals.\textsuperscript{71} These contradictory goals can best be illustrated by the actions of a former Army Chief of Staff.
In Prodigal Soldiers, James Kitfield tells the story of General "Shy" Meyer and his famous statement declaring a "hollow Army." In 1979, the Army and the military in general were in much worse shape than was acknowledged in the media, at the White House, or on the hill. General Meyer, an officer with repeated assignments in Washington and a Vietnam veteran, knew that a failure to accurately portray the relationship between the military and the strategic environment had failed the interests of the nation in Vietnam. He could see this "lack of telling it like it is" coming full circle again as the other services provided much more upbeat readiness briefings to the President and Congress. Sometimes the very nature of the military man had led the leaders to salute and say "Can do," even when they clearly could not do or knew they should not do. Admirable in battle, this heroic stoicism served them poorly in critical councils with civilian leadership and Meyer was convinced that the fundamental failure to communicate had cost the country dearly during Vietnam and its aftermath. \(^{72}\) In his congressional testimony the next year he revealed the Army's weaknesses, which brought him into direct conflict with the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary wanted him to rescind his statements, but General Meyer was willing to resign rather than do so. Meyer told Alexander, "I'm certainly willing to hand in my resignation, but I took my oath to the Constitution, not the president or this administration." \(^{73}\) In order to carry out his duties under the Constitution as he saw it, General Meyer had to oppose the wishes of his civilian masters. Eventually the message of the Army as a "hollow force" got out and the path to an Army that won Desert Storm was set. The balance of professional integrity and civilian control is never easy, as the military leaders always want to safe side success. It is particularly difficult during resource constrained eras when political priorities conflict. Here the senior leader must act responsibly and follow his conscience. What is remarkable about Meyer is not that was a man of conscience but that he was able to surmount the
institutional culture against going directly to Congress and effectively influence the hill for a proper defense. Not a decision to be taken lightly, it is nonetheless a legitimate option at the senior level.

LOBBYING

Of the many tools available to the Army, the least understood is lobbying. Lobbying comes in many forms and the forms available to the Army are specified in law and the informal rules of Congress. Within the Army “lobbying” is a dirty word and is something that apolitical soldiers do not get involved in. Army policy is that the Army doesn’t lobby Congress. Because of this, a new term is needed for what the Army ought to be doing when communicating with Congress. Stephen Scroggs suggests the word “liaise,” should refer to legitimate Army efforts to influence Congress. A look at the definition of lobbying and at what is legal under US Code for the Army to get its positions before Congress is important in understanding the changes needed.

With the recurring lobbying scandals in both the executive and legislative branches of government it is a term not even professional lobbyists are happy. The most concise definition of lobby is “any legal means used to try to influence government.”[75] Private lobbyists attempt to influence Congress on behalf of a third party for many reasons, usually resulting in policy or monetary gain. Army goals are to enhance national defense through a trained and ready Army. Senior leaders pursue this by ensuring Congress has the right information to execute their Constitutional responsibilities. Effectively communicating the right information depends greatly on the experience of the senior Army officer. It requires them to walk a fine line between formal laws and informal norms of the Congress.

The laws or acts, like the Anti-lobbying Act, have been around for over 70 years. It is significant that there have been no criminal prosecutions under the act. No one has served any
jail time or been fined since the statute went into effect in 1919. However, when government employee activities have been called into question, there have been consequences when perceived formal or informal laws have been violated. Congress is extremely protective of their Constitutional prerogatives and reacts negatively to improper or condescending manipulation. The Department of Justice summarized that government employees’ are allowed to: 1) communicate directly with members of Congress and their staffs in support of Administration or department positions; 2) communicate with the public through public speeches, appearances, and published writings, to support administration positions, including such public forum to call on the public to contact members of Congress in support of or opposition to legislation; 3) communicate privately with members of the public to inform them of administration positions and to promote those positions – but only to the extent that such communication do not contravene the limitations listed below and 4) lobby Congress and the public (without any restriction imposed by the Anti-Lobbying Act) to support Administration positions on nominations, treaties, or any non-legislative, non-appropriations issues. The Act applies only to legislation or appropriations.\textsuperscript{76} Also each year defense appropriations include provisions that prohibit the use of appropriated funds to directly or indirectly to influence legislation or appropriations before Congress. The Congress is extremely serious about not using appropriated funds for any form of grass roots lobbying.

The lobbying and anti-lobbying laws are clearly expressed and Congress has kept the definition and interpretation narrow to ensure that there will be no roadblocks to getting the information needed to carry out their responsibilities. While the detailed legal ramifications are better explicated elsewhere, it is clear from Scroggs research that the other services’ culture allow for a much more expanded definition of lobbying and exploit it to its fullest potential,
especially in the areas of appropriations. As the executive-legislative competition in the national security environment become more competitive and entrepreneurial, communicating with Congress will become more critical.

It is important that the Army re-thinks its corporate position and start liaising to improve its effectiveness with Congress, especially since the influence of Congress on defense is growing. Since the end of the Cold War, Congress has been returning to its traditional role of counter-balancing Presidential Power. The anti-Communist consensus achieved during the Cold War did not reflect either the founding fathers’ intent or Congress’ own perception of their political powers and responsibilities. The Vietnam experience damaged public consensus regarding the ends, ways, and means of US foreign and defense policy. However, Congress’ control of the purse and defense policy will only grow until the US is placed in mortal danger by another peer competitor. Figure 6 shows the framework for Post-World War II defense budgeting. The President dominated the institution context of defense budgeting no matter which party was in power until the end of Vietnam. The end of presidential domination can be attributed to the Nixon administration’s implosion, the end of the Cold War, and the verity that Congress always reasserts its authority after every war. It should be obvious that Congress will now challenge the dominance of the President in national security and dominate the discretionary arena of defense budgeting and they have prepared themselves to do this.

Congress’ expertise in defense policy making rivals that of the Pentagon. One analyst has characterized the growth of the congressional staff as the “Congressional Defense Department.” Since the Congress and its staff are not tied to the complex and bureaucratic DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, they have a faster decision cycle than DoD and the Army. The corporate Army must acknowledge this paradigm shift and prepare to compete in
the reality of the new resource environment. Lobbying, or liaising, is the key for ensuring that proper defense of the US and its interests.

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Figure 6. Framework for Defense Budgeting

LIAISING

A major step in realizing the paradigm shift is to find a new definition and a new cultural perspective for representing the Army's interests before Congress. Since "lobbying" has many
negative connotations attached to it, Scroggs suggests an expanded definition of the word "liaise" to designate military service legislative activity. Communicating directly to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an agency and Congress is liaising activity.\textsuperscript{81} Senior Army leaders are public servants who have a moral obligation to articulate a proper defense. Consequently they must become more comfortable and engaging on the hill. The Navy and USMC provide a good starting point for expanding the boundaries of Army legislative activity.

CAN REAL WARRIORS EFFECTIVELY LIAISE CONGRESS?

In a strategic environment of uncertainty and a budget environment characterized by declining defense spending and domestic transfers, can an Army senior leader be both a "heroic leader" and articulate the Army's role and needed resources to an external audience like Congress? The "heroic leader" culture, which springs from the heroic traditions of the American fighting man, is most pervasive in the active duty army and to a certain extent affects every facet of army life.\textsuperscript{82} On the other hand the political effectiveness of the corporate army is required for landpower to be decisive and relevant. But as mentioned earlier, the domination of the "muddy boots" career pattern, combined with a growing anti-intellectualism has not helped the Army develop senior leaders prepared for Washington. Intellectual pursuits and too much Pentagon staff time run counter to the "heroic leader" culture that dominates in the Army's promotion system. Nonetheless, Army senior leaders today must know how the corporate army really runs, and be astute and knowledgeable in regard to political imperatives. To protest the danger of a soldier becoming a politician misses the point.\textsuperscript{83} The martial sprit gives the soldier in the profession of arms a distinctive outlook. While civilians write policy, in an organization whose fundamental purpose is killing, "heroic leaders" are fundamental. The Army just has to look
back to Marshall, Eisenhower, and Bradley to find leaders who didn’t have traditional “muddy boots” career patterns. Whether fighting or avoiding wars, the Army “heroic leaders can succeed in Washington given they have the aptitude and experience. The Army must recognize the need for officers with aptitude to excel in the Washington environment and must nurture them with repeated assignments in that arena.

Can all real warriors effectively liaise Congress and operate in the political environment of Washington? The answer is no. Not everyone can play golf, tennis, basketball, chess, or many other sports to a high level of proficiency. It would be too much to expect every officer to be equally adept in political-military affairs and at communicating with external audiences. The policy-making environment is complex and ambiguous. The Army needs leaders prepared to operate in an environment where relationships between organizations and governments lack clarity. The conventional Army career pattern, oriented on tactical operations, doesn’t necessarily prepare officers for this environment. The strategic leader is concerned with the ends and ways, while the tactical military leader is mainly concerned with the means. Military expertise is not constant; it is contingent and relative. It varies depending on what is required by the policies of the state. Effective strategic leaders must now fuse the roles of heroic leader and manager with a broad variety of skills along the full range of the political-military spectrum. If the leader does not have the skills required at the strategic level he or she must not be assigned key positions at the Pentagon. Senior corporate leaders must fulfill a broader role and develop the skills and expertise to operate in Washington. The skills required at the strategic level are much different than those required at the tactical level. Knowing how to use force and knowing how to fund, develop, equip, and sustain a force are much different. The dominant and overriding metric for the evolution of the Army must be in its contribution to the national
military strategy – is it ready for combat. The Army headquarters exists to support the field Army, but it must assure the means for the field Army to win on the battlefield.

To win, personnel policies must be changed if the Army is to develop senior leaders who can effectively communicate and liaise with Congress. The skills needed for Washington can not be developed late in an officer’s career. These skills must be honed over a career. We must acknowledge that not all officers will be generals. But these skilled officers will provide a knowledge-based staff that understands Washington and that can provide useful input to the decision-making process that senior leaders use. Early in an officer’s career (somewhere around eight to ten years), officers identified by the chain-of-command with aptitude for Washington should be identified and assigned to the Pentagon. When they rotate back to an operational assignment, they will have an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) that assists personnel officers in tracking them for repeated assignments in Washington. Identified officers should be afforded the opportunity for higher level civilian education at prominent universities to learn how to communicate with the other future senior leaders of American government and industry. Higher military education needs to stress political-military affairs within the officer’s corps and increase professional tolerance for those officers whose career paths follow another road. The great strategic leaders of the past prepared themselves through personal initiative for emerging tasks and roles, not by merely following a narrowly prescribed career path.
CONCLUSIONS

*Progress occurs when courageous, skillful leaders seize the opportunity to change things for the better.*

Harry S. Truman

The corporate Army’s inability to effectively represent its institutional interest in Congress and OSD poses troubling questions about national security interests in the chaotic post-Cold War environment. If the Army doesn’t change its corporate approach to Congress and learn to communicate effectively with external audiences, the warfighting capability and institutional integrity of the Army is in peril. The strains are evident now in modernization, readiness, and personnel. With the Army considered to be the most troubled of the services and the one with the most difficulty adjusting to the post-Cold War era, the selection of a new Army Chief-of-Staff is critical. A new team and a new millennium provide an unprecedented opportunity to change the Army’s corporate culture and improve the budget scorecard. The Army as a culture has problems communicating with Congress and external agencies. Its culture precludes it from proper and essential participation with Congress in the Constitutional process. Breaching this culture is the proper role for Army senior leadership. In order to breach Army culture, this study makes four major recommendations.

First, re-think the proper role of Army senior leaders and re-invent their engagement with Congress. Develop a campaign plan that dramatically increases the engagement of Army senior leaders with the Congress. This includes having senior Army leaders spend frequent and quality time with members of Congress and their staff’s. Establish metrics, institutionalize it, and ensure follow through. This leadership by example will eventually be emulated by the rest of the officer
corps and establish a new way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to the hill and external audiences.

Second, establish an external focus that incorporates the Washington arena. Expand the corporate Army’s definition of values and clarify the differences between service in Washington and in the field. This distinction will enhance congressional interaction. Army values are the most important constant of all, but leaders must be sensitive to the context they are operating in. The Army’s “can-do” attitude works against itself as illustrated in the seven patterns of perceived Army-Congressional relations. “Changing the Army Approach to Congress Using Army Culture and Values” appendix E in Stephen Scroggs dissertations provides an excellent start.

Third, interact and liaise the hill more effectively. Make better use of Army resources to strengthen the Army’s position on the Hill and in Washington. Upgrade the rank structure of OCLL, ensure all other Army agencies enthusiastically support Congressional travel and outreach events and accommodate Congressional travel to key Army facilities. Strengthen the legislative liaison operation by stabilizing tours and providing the best upwardly mobile officers. Service in legislative liaison shouldn’t be a transition skill tour. Develop and implement a long-term legislative strategy combined with an annual legislative battle drill that gets Army leaders out front early to ensure the Army is proactive and not reactive. The Army’s reactivity leaves an impression of no strategy. Seek external consultants to the Army to help develop a clear, understandable message.

Fourth, prepare future Army generals to serve more effectively in Washington. Identify fast-track officers early in their career who have aptitude for Washington and provide them with repeated opportunities to serve there. This includes specialties like public affairs, acquisition, legislative affairs, and other related activities. Additional skill identifiers (ASI) could be
assigned that would help the Army track and manage this professional development. Congress will certainly notice this change in quality and priority, so the Army’s message will be more favorably received. The first time an officer serves in Washington shouldn’t be as a general officer or as an officer with nineteen years of service.

The Army is one of the nation’s oldest institutions and its survival is not at risk. The Army in some form will continue to exist. What is at risk is the proper defense of the nation.

WORD COUNT = 13,505
ENDNOTES

1 At this time the Army was funded and sized for the Cold War, and since the Cold War had just ended the Army had not yet downsized. If Saddam Hussein had waited to attack Kuwait until the Army had downsized, the same overwhelming force would have been available.


12 My definition of the term corporate Army includes HQDA, Secretary of the Army, and three and four-star general officers and their interface with other government agencies. For another definition of corporate Army see David McCormick, The Downsized Warrior: America’s Army in Transition, (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 21. He describes the corporate army as “scrupulously groomed generals in pressed uniforms and spit-shined shoes ready themselves for battles over budgets and end-strength on Capitol Hill.

14 Schein, 12.


17 Ibid, 271.

18 Huntington, 231.


20 Huntington, 258.


25 Scroggs, 249-250.

26 Scroggs, 249-250.

27 This has the negative consequence of making senior Army officers believe falsely that the conclusions that they arrive upon based on their internal studies and discussions will be self-evident and obvious to other rational external audiences.


29 Scroggs, 250, senior flag officer interviewee #32, interviews by author, Washington, DC, 12 April and 4 October 1995.

30 There is no intent here to compare Congress to an enemy force. Congress and other external agencies are compared to things external to the Army in the field like weather and terrain. They are a fact of the political environment.
31 Scroggs, 252.


33 Scroggs, 296, Table 8-8, Cumulative months of Washington Area Service for CSA, VCSA, DCSOPS, CLL compared with 1979-1983 ERA Leadership sample.


35 Naylor, 8.

36 Scroggs, 137.

37 Scroggs, 267.

38 Scroggs, 268.

39 Scroggs, 275.

40 Scroggs, 260.

41 Scroggs, 260.


44 One elective in the last term on Congress and military officer is offered for a maximum of 18 students.

45 Member of Congress, HNSC quoted this, Scroggs, 137.

46 Scroggs, 100.

47 Lauri W <LauriW@troa.org>, "TROA’s Legislative Update: Declining Military Experience in Congress," Electronic mail message to TROA Membership <TROAmember@troa.org>, 25 November 1998.

48 Ibid.

49 Scroggs, 142.
Scroggs, 137-233, The seven perceived patterns of Army-congressional relations were identified by Scroggs in interviews with three different subgroups of Congress: members of Congress, professional staff members (PSM), and military legislative assistants (MLAs). These perceived patterns combined with the five cultural dimensions that are the basic cultural assumptions provide the most detailed anthropological analyses that is long overdue.


Scroggs, 145.

Scroggs, 147.

Scroggs, 149.

Scroggs, 157.

Scroggs, 178.

Scroggs, 187.

Robert Reno, “The Army Wants You, Mr. Speaker,” Long Island Newsday, 7 March 1999, F7. This article also provides other interesting insights and the writer served in the Army.

Scroggs, 220.

Scroggs, 226.

Scroggs, 114.

Huntington, 180.

Scroggs, 99.

Scroggs, 97.
67 “Darts and Laurels,” Armed Forces Journal, April 1999, 64. “A dart was given to the former Army Secretary and now VA Secretary Togo West for singing an all-too-familiar tune. While West doesn’t shoulder all the blame for the fiscal woes of the Army or the VA, he certainly didn’t rise to the challenge of reversing funding shortfalls in either organization. Every ready to parrot the Administrations “no problems here” song, West wasn’t what the Army needed . . .”


69 Scroggs, 328-329 discusses the risk aversion of most Army officers in the Washington environment. Naylor, 8, interviews show that most close observers of the Army think that a thorough grounding in Washington is fundamental, but there are a few who feel that a new CSA with little Pentagon experience could be offset by a VSCA with multiple Pentagon tours. Myers, argues in his article, “is that bureaucracy, tradition and history have bound the Army to the status quo.” He also says that the Army is having the most difficult time making the transition from the Cold War . . . In the same article, he quotes Stephen Peter Rosen Harvard professor, “The Army is having a nervous breakdown . . .”

70 Huntington, 184.


73 James Kitfield, 205.

74 Scroggs 12.


77 Scroggs, 160.

78 James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of US Foreign Policy, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 12.


81 Scroggs, 13.


83 McCormick, 193.

84 Janowitz, 426.


86 Scroggs, 486.
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