A THEORY FOR HUMAN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

BY

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A Theory For Human Intelligence Operations

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The effectiveness of national military strategy or military campaigns are often evaluated in terms of intelligence success or failure. Examples of intelligence “failures” include the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and terrorist attacks - most recently in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998. A critical, analytic theory and principles of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations may permit a comparison between what constitutes success or failure of HUMINT operations; however, such a theory and principles are not openly available today in adequate detail. The goal of this project is to better understand how to plan and execute intelligence operations. This study proposes a theory of HUMINT operations that helps explain why and how intelligence operations are successful. This project will show that through the use of certain principles of intelligence operations, HUMINT operators can reduce what Carl Von Clausewitz called the fog of war.
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I want to especially recognize Captain Bill McRaven, USN, and his outstanding work SPEC OPS, Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. In 1996 I attended a lecture presented by Capt. McRaven in which he outlined his Theory of Special Operations. His work served as an inspiration for me to use a similar approach for intelligence operations. I learned a great deal from his lecture and book.

Finally, I want to acknowledge my wife, Fran, and children, Maureen and Pete, and recognize their support and encouragement in my year, as a geographical bachelor, living and studying at the U.S. Army War College. Without them this would be a futile effort.
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A THEORY FOR HUMAN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

"We have to get back into the business of having deep long-term penetration of intelligence problems, of having a strategic look into the future."
—John Mills, Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence, 5 October, 1998

An essential element of the United States National Security Strategy and military campaigns is timely, accurate intelligence. Strategic- and operational-level military operations are often evaluated in terms of intelligence success or failure. Examples of intelligence "failures" include the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and terrorist attacks, most recently in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998. To carry out our "Shape, Respond, Prepare Now" National Military Strategy, intelligence efforts must provide national decision-makers with the best, most complete information available.

A critical, analytical theory of intelligence operations and its supporting principles allow a thorough evaluation of what constitutes success or failure of these operations; however, such a theory and principles are not openly available in sufficient detail today. The goal of this project is to better understand how to plan and execute intelligence operations. This research project will show that a theory of intelligence operations and supporting principles can reduce the "frictions of war to a manageable level."
THEORY: CONSISTENT ACCESS

Intelligence operations must be based on a valid theory composed of sound principles. Current U.S. Army doctrine does not provide an effective principle-based theory of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations for use in the planning, collection, and evaluation of information. If such a theory of HUMINT operations can be developed and proved valid, there is every likelihood that the same or similar principles will be effective for other intelligence disciplines. A valid theory will help explain how and why successful HUMINT operations are critical to military campaigns in the broadest terms of planning and execution.

Human Intelligence is the oldest, most elementary source of information for a commander. Of all the intelligence disciplines, HUMINT is the best source to derive the adversary's "intent."2 Intelligence from HUMINT sources can be predictive; HUMINT can generate "actionable" intelligence, cues for the commander's decision-making process. Ideally, HUMINT operators collect their information secretly, without their adversary's knowledge.

Access, the ability to get to a source or obtain information from a source, is the fundamental element of HUMINT operations. Consistent or repetitive access is the goal. A HUMINT collector must have access to people, places, and things; without access,
there is no Human Intelligence. Consistent access is a vital element to all forms of intelligence. Therefore, consistent access is the overarching theory for Human Intelligence operations.

HUMINT PRINCIPLES

A theory of HUMINT operations must contain a set of rules or principles. These principles are basic guidelines that, if not violated, should result in a successful operation. Seven principles for HUMINT operations support the theory of consistent access. The traditional principles of war provide a basis for all theories and subsequent principles; yet refined principles serve as a guide for the commander and military planner. There are overlaps between the principles of war and the principles of HUMINT. The HUMINT principles include purpose, security, veracity, simplicity, control, reporting, and time.

1. Every HUMINT undertaking demands the principle of purpose or objective. The ultimate goal of a mission must be stated clearly and in the simplest terms to ensure complete understanding by all participants.

2. The principle of security serves to protect the operation and is indispensable for success. Security is the safety net for all HUMINT operations.

3. Commanders must rely on the veracity of the HUMINT information. Veracity demands accurate, complete, and factual information.

The principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of war at all levels: Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity, FM 100-5 Operations, June 1993.
4. Operational simplicity enhances the probability of success by reducing the complexity of movement and personal interactions, which is tied back to the purpose of the operation.

5. Control is perhaps more important in HUMINT operations than most military activities. Control implies a unity of effort among all elements of a HUMINT operation. Control is also based on the professionalism and trust of all involved. HUMINT operatives or agents often work at the end of tenuous links back to their superiors or support base.

6. The product of every HUMINT operation is the information gained, the report rendered to the commander. Reporting is the conveyance of information, either in person or via communications links. HUMINT operations only succeed when the information is delivered.

7. Time is the most precious principle in HUMINT operations. Intelligence planners must prepare before the need is identified. Planning, preparation, execution, and recovery are all time-sensitive. HUMINT operations, because of the time required, are long-term activities. Lead-time is essential to successful HUMINT.

This research examines three historical intelligence operations, from World War II, the Vietnam War, and the United States' Iran hostage rescue mission. These operational vignettes embody a diversity of time, location, and mission. The recurring similarities between these intelligence operations serve to validate the theory of consistent access for Human Intelligence.

This study is limited to historical examples of HUMINT simply to narrow the scope of the project. Further, this study
uses only unclassified source materials in order to provide unrestricted access for all readers. The limitation of using only unclassified materials does not diminish the goal of presenting a theory for HUMINT operations. Section One is a review of current U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and Joint Services doctrine concerning theory and principles of intelligence operations. Section Two contains the three historical mission summaries. Section Three provides an analysis of the selected operations, illustrating the theory of consistent access and its attending principles. Section Four assesses the validity of the proposed theory of HUMINT operations and provides recommendations for further study and doctrinal changes.
SECTION ONE

REVIEW OF DOCTRINE AND LITERATURE

A review of current doctrine will establish a baseline from which to evaluate the theory of consistent access. For the purposes of this study, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and Joint Service manuals have been reviewed. Selections from academic literature are also addressed to offer other perspectives regarding intelligence principles and theory.

The Army’s basic resource is Field Manual (FM) 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare. It presents a wide range of concepts and ideas. Many intelligence concepts refer to elements contained in the theory of consistent access, but are not presented as a single overarching theory for HUMINT operations. The principle of time is mentioned in a variety of contexts. “Sound doctrine and training which focuses intelligence downwardly . . . [must] deliver intelligence on time, every time.” FM 34-1 also states that “the intelligence effort [must] begin long before that first day. Focus intelligence on the tactical and operational needs early.” Time and timing are critical for HUMINT operations: The timeliness of information has a major impact on the decisions made by a military commander or policy maker.

Field Manual 34-36, Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations echoes FM 34-1 with regard to
time as a factor for intelligence operations. "Commanders need properly executed and timely collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence and combat information across the operational continuum."5 FM 34-36 also addresses the need for accuracy: "timely and accurate intelligence permit forces to achieve their objectives."6 Both of these sources address HUMINT operations in general terms, more as a capability than an operational element conducting missions in support of the commander. They provide general guidance for planning and executing intelligence operations.

U.S. Marine Corps intelligence doctrine is built on a principle-based general theory for intelligence. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 2, Intelligence articulates principles that, when taken in aggregate, form a theory of intelligence. MCDP-2 lists "Characteristics of Good Intelligence" that include objective, thorough, accurate, timely, usable, relevant, and available.7 These characteristics aptly define good intelligence. MCDP-2, like its Army counterpart, describes intelligence so a commander can understand and evaluate incoming intelligence reports. Both Services emphasize what intelligence is; however, they do not adequately address how to conduct intelligence operations.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Publication 2-0 Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations offers a good
introduction to military intelligence for commanders and staff officers. "Intelligence operations are organized efforts of a commander to gather and analyze information on the environment of operations and the adversary." Joint Pub-2-0 describes "Seven Attributes of Intelligence Quality: timeliness, usability, completeness, objectivity, readiness, accuracy, and relevance." These attributes function as principles, but Joint Pub 2-0 goes on to state that "the principles of war are the basis of intelligence for Joint Operations. The principles of intelligence are developed from Joint and Service doctrines, theory, history, and the lessons learned from the successes and failures of wars and operations." Joint Pub 2-0 further states that the "Central [Intelligence] Principle [is] Know the Adversary." Lastly, Joint Pub 2-0 details seven "Basic Intelligence Principles" and 17 supporting principles for the Joint intelligence staff officer. "The Joint Force Commander (JFC) is responsible; Synchronize Intelligence with Operations; Use the same approach for peacetime, Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW), and war; The J-2 should participate from the outset; Ensure unity of intelligence effort; Recognize Counterintelligence as a source of information; Prioritize component intelligence requirements." Joint Publication 2-01 Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations was written for the joint intelligence staff
officer. It provides guidance for Collection Managers and Commanders. The "principles" listed in Joint Pub 2-01 focus more on the management of intelligence operations than the operations themselves. These principles include: early identification of [intelligence] requirements; prioritization of requirements; multidiscipline approach; task organic assets."^{13}

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict published a White Paper in 1994 entitled "Intelligence Support to Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)." Although limited to MOOTW, it does address important concepts for HUMINT operations. The White Paper lists four intelligence fundamentals: "plan early; know the situation, then move forces; early warning requires new indicators; plan early for requirements for potentially mid- to long-term operations."^{14}

The military Services and the Department of Defense treat HUMINT and the larger intelligence operations with varying degrees of detail and scope. Generally, military doctrine provides broad guidelines for commanders and staff. Specific operational know-how is achieved through training and experience.

PROFESSIONAL/ACADEMIC SOURCES

There is a great deal of professional and academic literature available on intelligence. Much of the writing views intelligence from political and foreign policy perspectives,
dealing with questions about the use of intelligence capabilities, their aims, how national intelligence should be controlled, and who should control it. There is a substantial amount of information concerning Human Intelligence. In some works it is labeled as espionage, covert action (CA), clandestine operations, and "black" programs.

Among the wealth of information about intelligence, there is little that addresses principles of HUMINT operations. Roy Godson writes that the 'first' principle of CA "should be one part of a policy that has been well thought out. Ends, with means reasonably calculated to achieve them, must be thought through." He uses the Ends-Ways-Means analytical model. Godson focuses on the necessity to justify the use of CA as a viable course of action to achieve national or military goals. Godson's other central principle is that "covert action must usually be coordinated with and supported by diplomatic, military, and economic means." He states that CA is not a "magic bullet," but only one of several tools available to achieve the objective, or end.

Much of the literature is critical of the intelligence services. Ernst Volkman is a consistent critic of U.S. intelligence. His assessment of the intelligence performance of the Office of Strategic Services, the Central Intelligence Agency and the "rest of American intelligence was equally
poor."\textsuperscript{17} Volkman sees America's poor intelligence performance in terms of an end product. He believes U.S. intelligence services, except for cryptographic successes, are distracted from true intelligence collection. Volkman sees that "real intelligence" is learning the capabilities and intentions of a belligerent. He gives limited credit to Richard Helms and Allen Dulles for their efforts against the Soviet Union early in the Cold War. Volkman lists time and patience as essential ingredients necessary to build agent networks.\textsuperscript{18} Both, in his opinion, the United States does not have, or make use of.

Additional criticism against Human Intelligence, its use and value, comes from Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, former Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEB). Regarding "spies," or HUMINT, he "always had doubts about the usefulness of secret services and secret agents, especially in the military field."\textsuperscript{19} General Strong goes on to point out that significant lead time is required to place an agent "in the top echelons of another nation's bureaucratic hierarchy" to acquire crucial information.\textsuperscript{20} Time, then, becomes a recurring theme for Human Intelligence operations. Lead-time, patience, planning ahead and thorough planning all take on the status of HUMINT principles.
SECTION TWO

HISTORICAL SUMMARIES

I. Operation SUSSEX 1944

This World War II operation summary centers on an intelligence agent tasked to collect information on German forces defending northern France before the Normandy Invasion on 6 June 1944. Jacques Voyer joined the French Army in July 1940 in England at the age of 17. By 1943 he was an experienced intelligence operative, having served for 18 months in Project BROADWAY as a wireless-telephone (W/T-radio) operator and "agent de liaison" with the French Resistance. Jacques Voyer volunteered for the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in October 1943. On June 27th 1944, near Chartres, France, the German Geheimstaatspolizei (GESTAPO) executed him for espionage. Jacques Voyer was a part of the U.S. Intelligence operation known as Operation SUSSEX.

General Situation

In the spring of 1943 the Allied forces in the Mediterranean were preparing to invade Sicily, after having defeated the German Afrika Korps in Tunisia. On the Eastern Front the Russian Army was slowly pushing the Germans west into central Europe. Joseph Stalin was pressuring President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill to open a second front against Germany in the west. In the Pacific, General
MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz continued their relentless campaigns against the Japanese. In Washington, D.C. the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued Directive 155/11/D directing the creation of OSS as an operating agency in the War Department. President Roosevelt appointed William J. Donovan, a decorated World War I veteran, to head America's newest intelligence service. The OSS was authorized to collect secret intelligence and conduct operations in enemy occupied or controlled countries, including sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and support to resistance groups. The OSS leadership relied heavily on the experience of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). It was this long-standing relationship that resulted in several successful combined intelligence operations. Operation SUSSEX was the first.

**Operation SUSSEX**

Operation SUSSEX was a tripartite operation planned and conducted by American, British and French secret intelligence services to collect and report strategic and tactical military intelligence prior to and after the Normandy Invasion. The SUSSEX operation included 96 agents organized in 48 two-man teams, each with an observer and a radio operator. The agents were recruited from the French Army, trained in England, and then parachuted into France. The first operational teams deployed on 9 April 1944. SUSSEX agents deployed to the
American and British military sectors of Operation NEPTUNE, the actual code word for the Normandy invasion; the Germans compromised the code word OVERLORD by penetrating the British Embassy in Ankara, Turkey in late 1943. The Secret Intelligence (SI) Branch of OSS, London Bureau, controlled the teams in the American sector. These teams were code-named OSSEX. The British SIS-controlled teams were code-named BRISSEX. The last SUSSEX team was recovered in September 1944 as Allied armies in France attacked east toward Germany.

Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) received all intelligence messages transmitted by the SUSSEX teams. These reports were then disseminated to the allied armies in the field. SUSSEX teams transmitted nearly 600 intelligence messages during the operation. The SUSSEX operation marked the beginning of U.S. intelligence collection by its own HUMINT agents in Europe. Prior to the SUSSEX operation, most intelligence reports disseminated by OSS, London, were obtained from British and other allied intelligence services or from other OSS outposts around the world. As well as being the first, SUSSEX represents the greatest contribution made by OSS London to Operation NEPTUNE.

The OSSEX Plan

In the fall of 1942, discussions between OSS, London, British SIS, and the French intelligence service, Bureau Central
de Renseignements et d’Action (BCRA) considered tripartite operations. An American goal was an independent intelligence system on the continent. On 29 May 1943 Colonel D.K.E. Bruce, OSS Chief of Mission London, received a tentative proposal by British SIS for a joint mission to conduct intelligence operations during the Normandy invasion. This proposal involved pooling potential French recruits in England for "joint training and management." OSS Headquarters, Washington, D.C. approved this tentative project and discussions began between SI and SIS to formulate a definite plan.

On 19 June 1943, Lieutenant Colonel "D" of SIS submitted a draft of the "SUSSEX Plan" to Colonel Bruce. It described the project "in general terms to recruit a special unit consisting of French nationals with knowledge of particular areas and localities, and preferably with military experience." Teams would infiltrate France two months before D-Day. On 5 July 1943 the Commanding General, European Theater, United States Army (ETOUSA) approved the "SUSSEX Joint Training Program." The American-British training school started its first classes on 30 November 1943. Prospective agents received extensive training that lasted from nine to ten weeks. The recruits were taught military vehicle and aircraft identification, the principles of observation and reporting, tradecraft, map reading, encryption-

1 The OSS War Diary refers to all British Intelligence officers by the initial of their last names to protect their identities.
decryption codes, armed and unarmed combat, and parachute training. The radio operators learned how to use and maintain their equipment. Field training exercises followed the instruction course.

An American radio station, known as "Station VICTOR," was established at Hurley, England, to communicate with the American-controlled OSSEX teams after their infiltration into France. Air insertion for agents was arranged with the Air Dispatch Section of Special Operations (SO) Branch of OSS London, SIS, and the United States Eighth Air Force.

Team VITRAIL

Following a pre-arranged time schedule, the SUSSEX teams parachuted onto their selected Drop Zones (DZs) in France. From there they made their way to their respective target areas. One American-controlled OSSEX team and two British-controlled BRISSEX teams successfully infiltrated into France on the night of Sunday, 9 April 1944. On the following night, two OSSEX teams and one BRISSEX team were dropped in. The American target areas were Le Mans, Chartres, and Orleans.

The first radio message received came from OSSEX team code-named VITRAIL on 10 May. Jacques Voyer was the observer for
Team VITRAIL. The first intelligence information came from OSSEX Team JEANNE on 16 May. It contained five items of intelligence including map coordinates of two munitions dumps, the location of a German demolition school, a report of the forced evacuation of civilians from a village, and confirmation that another munitions dump in a specific location did not exist. By May 31st, of thirteen SUSSEX teams, six were known to be at their planned destinations with their equipment and had established radio contact with their control stations.

By D-day, June 6th, OSSEX teams at Chartres, Orleans, and Melun transmitted fifteen intelligence messages. These teams identified German units, reported troop movements, the location of enemy air bases, fuel and munitions dumps, and described the results of allied bombing attacks. All messages were received by Station VICTOR, decoded, and passed on to SHAEF and to the OSS Field Detachments located with the Field Army G-2s. Copies of OSSEX messages in their original form, after decoding were also sent to the SIS and the BCRA.

OSSEX Team VITRAIL deployed on 10 April and operated near Chartres. The team was very active; it established an efficient civilian reporting network, and sent 14 intelligence messages during the month of its active operation. Jacques Voyer was the first agent to locate and report the movements of the Panzer Lehr Division on 8 June. This Division was part of the German
armored reserve force that counter-attacked the Allied invasion armies. "The value of this piece of information alone was sufficient to justify all the work that had been put into the SUSSEX project." 33 "Major General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, SHAEF commended the exceptionally able and useful series of reports received from team VITRAIL in Chartres." 34 Team VITRAIL's mission ended on 10 June when the GESTAPO arrested Jacques Voyer. He was trying to identify German units moving in a convoy near Chartres when he was arrested. He was later executed on 27 June. Voyer's radio operator joined another OSSEX team for the remainder of the operation.

The success of Operation SUSSEX led to follow-on OSS missions in France and Germany. The OSS achieved significant distinction in gathering and reporting vital intelligence to the U.S. Army in Europe. The success of the OSS set the stage for future U.S. Human Intelligence operations.
II. PHOENIX Project 1971

This operational summary is set in the Vietnam War. In 1971 efforts by the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and its U.S. advisors to "pacify" the Vietnamese countryside reached their peak. Captain (CPT) Stuart A. Herrington served as an advisor to the GVN PHOENIX Program. His success as a PHOENIX Project Advisor in Duc Hue District was due in large part to his intuitive understanding of the principles of Human Intelligence operations. His assessment, analysis, and plan of action significantly reduced the strength and power of Vietcong infrastructure (VCI) in Duc Hue, a long-time Vietcong stronghold.

The General Situation

By 1967 President Lyndon Johnson was looking for any meaningful way to win the war. In that same year he appointed Robert W. Komer as an ambassador to head U.S. support to the GVN's pacification programs. Ambassador Komer served as General William Westmoreland's civilian deputy. He coordinated all American pacification efforts, both civilian and military, in support of the GVN; but in actuality, Bob Komer ran the show.\(^{35}\)

\(^{1}\) General William Westmoreland was Commanding General, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) from 1964 to 1968.
Bob Komer enumerated three key guidelines that directed pacification efforts:

- Pacification was first and foremost a Vietnamese problem.
- The American advisory program to support the Vietnamese pacification efforts would have a single manager at each level, representing a single official voice, and each level would be responsible for integrated military/civil planning, programming, and operations.
- The [U.S.] deputy for pacification was not a political adviser or mere coordinator; he was instead to operate as a “component commander.”

Komer’s newly re-organized program was called Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS). Komer had General Westmoreland’s complete assistance. “With few exceptions, all American [pacification] programs outside of Saigon, came under operational control of CORDS.”

The PHOENIX Program

Robert Komer also created the controversial PHOENIX Program, aimed at identifying and eliminating the Vietcong underground infrastructure. “The name PHOENIX was a translation of Phung Hoang, a mythical Vietnamese bird of omnipotent powers.” This was a “massive and sophisticated intelligence” operation designed to identify and locate the VC political underground organization. It was a nation-wide operation conducted at the local level by GVN military, police, and civilian officials. American advisors assisted at every level.
William Colby, Robert Komer's successor in Vietnam, stated that the PHOENIX program brought "better systems of intelligence, better systems of treatment of the people we did capture, as well as a better systems of behavior on the part of the forces of the government the Vietnam fighting the secret enemy apparatus."\textsuperscript{41} The reality of the PHOENIX program was often sloppy execution by the national police and local militia units. There were also periodic abuses; American anti-war protesters labeled the PHOENIX Project an "assassination program."

Nevertheless, its most noteworthy success was synchronizing both U.S. and Vietnamese intelligence efforts.\textsuperscript{42}

According to Herrington, the PHOENIX program made good sense conceptually.

"Since the Vietnamese government had several organizations in each district that where engaged in gathering information on the VC, why not open a central office in which all of these organizations would be represented? Each organization would then be responsible for funneling all of its information on the Vietcong insurgents into this office. As the information on hand about a given individual accumulated, a file or dossier could be opened up on them. Eventually, the amount of information on the "target" would assume such proportions that the police or the military would be able to capture, kill, or recruit him (to defect or to remain in place as an informant).\textsuperscript{43}

The planned endstate of the PHOENIX Program was the 'neutralization' of the Vietcong.
Tan My Village

Tan My Village included six outlying hamlets and numbered about 4,000 people in Duc Hue District. From information gathered by CPT Herrington and his small PHOENIX staff, they estimated that ten percent of the Tan My villagers were Vietcong sympathizers. Another twenty percent were deemed loyal to the government of South Vietnam. These villagers lived close to the main road or near the government outpost in Tan My. The rest were neutral; people who could not be counted on to assist either side. It was against these people that the VC targeted their proselytizing, indoctrination, and terror tactics. Captured VC documents described Tan My as a "model revolutionary village." Tan My was a good location for communist revolutionary forces. Swamps surrounding the village on three sides were ideal for VC hideouts. There was one only one road into the village-hamlet complex that simplified security for the VC. The GVN 58th Regional Forces Group which operated in Tan My was very careful to avoid contact with the
VC. Their ambush patrols and security sweeps avoided the mined and booby-trapped VC bunker complexes.\textsuperscript{47}

In January 1971 CPT Stuart Herrington was assigned to Team 43, Hau Nghia Province, as the PHOENIX advisor for Duc Hue District. His efforts in the spring and summer of 1971 crippled the VCI in Tan My village. He went on to revitalize the PHOENIX program in Duc Hue and the larger Hau Nghia area.

\textbf{The Intelligence Campaign}

CPT Herrington quickly assessed that the GVN PHOENIX Program in Duc Hue was largely ineffective. With the urging of the senior U.S. advisor for Hau Nghia Province, Colonel (COL) Jack Wessinger, CPT Herrington began an intelligence operation designed to identify members of the VC infrastructure in Tan My village. Operating more as a police detective than Army intelligence officer, he learned as much as he could about the VC in Duc Hue. His primary source was a VC defector named Nguyen van Dung, better known by his communist party alias, "Hai Chua."\textsuperscript{48} After nearly two months of debriefings, CPT Herrington had a good picture of the Vietcong infrastructure and why young men and women joined the revolutionary cause.

CPT Herrington exploited the VC defectors who had turned themselves in to the GVN under its Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. The GVN kept rallied VC for several months at Chieu Hoi Centers for "vocational training and resettlement as loyal
'citizens' of South Vietnam. Neither the CIA nor the U.S. Army counter-intelligence teams operating in South Vietnam used heavy-handed interrogation techniques (brutality is often wrongly associated with the term 'interrogation'). Their interview style of debriefing defectors, placing the defector in a safe, discrete environment, garnered far more reliable information than the abusive interrogations of less sophisticated intelligence services.

After developing an in-depth understanding of the VC, CPT Herrington began a consistent program of recruiting defectors to serve as intelligence agents operating against their former comrades. The first recruit for Herrington's Tan My project was a former Executive Officer of a Vietcong Local Force company, Nguyen van Phich. Phich surrendered to the GVN authorities in February 1971. He was recruited by COL Weissinger to work against the VC in Hau Nghia. CPT Herrington gained Phich's confidence, and planned an intelligence collection operation to identify the VC in Tan My. Phich was related, through his extended family, to nearly half the population in Tan My. His service to the revolution was well known in the village. Now as an agent of the GVN, many villagers confided in "Uncle Phich" and he developed a reliable network of informants.

South Vietnamese Army Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Nguyen van Thanh, Province Chief for Hai Nghia Province, organized
offensive operations based on the intelligence developed by CPT Herrington through Phich. LTC Thanh moved the 305th Regional Force Battalion into Duc Hue and assumed responsibility for the security of Tan My. LTC Thanh also employed the Armed Propaganda Team; a platoon-sized force composed entirely of ex-VC guerrillas, to begin a systematic attack against the Tan My VC. Within days of their arrival, elements of the 305th made contact with the VC in Tan My. LTC Thanh's units began to uncover the large VC network. The VC fought back, but against overwhelming strength, gave ground and withdrew west across the Vam Co Dung River. By July 1971 Phich's network of informants reported that the VC in Tan My were in complete disarray.53

After nearly two months of successful operations in and around Tan My, the GVN had gained the initiative and was in effective control of Duc Hue District. But on 8 August, the VC struck back and killed Phich as he slept in a hamlet near the GVN's Tan My outpost. Although operations in Tan My would continue, Phich's death pointed out to all that the VC could still inflict "revolutionary justice."54 Even so, CPT Herrington had demonstrated that the PHOENIX concept was effective, given the interagency cooperation as envisioned by Ambassador Robert Komer.
III. Operation Eagle Claw 1980

This operational summary concerns the U.S. attempt to rescue the American hostages held by militant Iranians from 1979 until 1981. In its investigation after the failed attempt on 25 April 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's commission reviewing events surrounding Operation EAGLE CLAW stated that the "Commander, Joint Task Force (COMJTF), his staff, and subordinate commanders were fully aware that successful mission accomplishment would be critically dependent on precise and timely intelligence and, moreover, that intelligence would tend to drive the operation from conception to execution." Integral to this operation was an intelligence effort by both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) to provide information and support for mission planning and execution. This intelligence operation clearly illustrates the principles of human intelligence necessary for a successful military endeavor.

General Situation

On 16 January 1979 a yearlong popular revolution succeeded in forcing the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to leave Iran, ending his 38-year rule. Later that year, in an attempt to force the extradition of the Shah from the United States, 500 militant 'students' seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 4 November, taking 65 Americans hostage. The Iranians demanded that the Shah be returned to Iran to stand trial for repression,
mishandling of funds, and embezzlement. The U.S. government refused the Iranian demands. The events that followed pushed U.S. Special Operations forces beyond their capabilities.

**Operation EAGLE CLAW**

A brief synopsis of the overall plan will provide the necessary background to understand the magnitude of the intelligence operation that preceded the rescue attempt. The plan for the rescue mission was bold and extremely complex. On the first night the plan called for two airborne forces, a helicopter force launched from the Aircraft Carrier USS Nimitz, and six C-130 transport planes taking off from the island of Masirah in the Arabian Sea, to land at an isolated air strip designated as Desert I. There RH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters would refuel for the next leg of the mission. The assault force, flown in on the C-130s, would trans-load into the helicopters. From there the heliborne assault force was to fly to a remote hide site sixty miles outside Tehran designated as Desert II; this was all to be accomplished before sunrise of the second day. The assault force planned to hide at Desert II until the following nightfall.
During the second night, several units were in motion at the same time. A Ranger company was to launch from Egypt in C-130s, and seize an airfield south of Tehran. This was to serve as a transload-extraction site for the assault forces and the rescued hostages. The Delta assault force was to be driven into Tehran guided by U.S. clandestine agents already there. A convoy of six trucks and two vans would ferry the assault force to the American Embassy. The assault was scheduled to begin at 2300 hours Iranian time. The primary assault force planned to attack the Embassy, find the hostages, and move them across the street to a soccer stadium where the helicopters would land and fly them to the extraction airfield secured earlier by the Rangers. Simultaneously, a smaller assault team planned to break into the Iranian Foreign Ministry building and rescue the three State Department officials there. A helicopter was to land in a nearby park and then fly to meet the Rangers. At the extraction airfield, Air Force C-141 Starlifter jets were to land and take the hostages, helicopter crews, and assault force to safety in Europe. The Rangers were to return to Egypt via their C-130s.

The Intelligence Operation Plan

On 4 November, 1979 General David C. Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), appointed Major General James B. Vaught to command a Joint Task Force (JTF) tasked with rescuing
the American hostages from Tehran. The JTF faced a number of difficult intelligence tasks, including:

- Finding a remote landing strip for six C-130 transport planes and eight helicopters (Desert I).
- Insertion of U.S. agents into Tehran and arranging their communication with Washington.
- Locating a hide site within two hours driving time from Tehran to shield the rescue force during fourteen hours of daylight (Desert II).
- Finding out exactly, from agent reports and satellite photography, where the hostages were being held within the 27-acre Embassy compound.57

Each of these intelligence tasks required collection, analysis, and collation of data and photo interpretation.58 Although small in size, the intelligence operation was vital for mission success. The CJCS “described [the mission] as a surgical operation, with a small team assaulting the embassy and getting our hostages out.” The JTF had to develop the capability for a rapid clandestine insertion into Tehran, conduct a surprise assault into the Embassy with as little violence and loss of life as possible.59 Before the launch of the rescue mission, the JTF planners needed to confirm details of their assault plan. More importantly, they needed to know in which building the hostages were held. The operation also depended heavily on clandestine support from agents operating in Tehran.

The HUMINT collection plan that was executed involved agents from both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). The CIA recalled to duty a retired
clandestine agent for the mission into Tehran. His mission was to collect information about where the hostages were imprisoned. Further, this agent was to observe the American Embassy, noting the security posture of the guards, their routine, weapons, and report any other useful information. He was to locate a helicopter landing-zone outside of the city, and a place for the assault force to hide during daylight hours. He was to procure indigenous trucks to move the assault force from Desert II to the Embassy. Finally, he was to find the best routes through the city to the Embassy.\textsuperscript{60}

The assault force commander levied a controversial requirement on the intelligence planners. COL Charlie Beckwith wanted Delta operators to verify the CIA intelligence. Based on the knowledge that the hostages were kept in two distinct locations, two DoD teams prepared for deployment into Tehran. The first team supported the primary assault force, COL Beckwith’s Delta Force, targeted against Embassy compound. Retired Army Major Richard Meadows, a Delta Force instructor, led this four-man team. The second team supported the rescue at the Iranian Foreign Ministry building where Bruce Laingen, the Chargé d’Affaires, and two others were held. The second team consisted of three operatives; two with Special Operations backgrounds who spoke fluent German and the third was an Air
Force sergeant, who had been born and raised in Tehran and spoke the language flawlessly.

The two DoD teams planned to infiltrate into Tehran two weeks before the rescue mission was launched. They were to keep the U.S. Embassy and the Iranian Foreign Ministry under observation. They were to verify also the primary and alternate routes into the city. On signal they were to serve as guides from Desert II to the Embassy. Finally they were to maintain radio contact with Washington D.C.

Prior to infiltration, the DoD HUMINT teams conducted training including learning Iranian customs and rudimentary language skills. They also memorized city maps. Lastly, they developed cover stories for their presence in Tehran. These clandestine operatives presented themselves as European businessmen using necessary documents provided by the CIA.

Into Tehran

The most sensitive and dangerous element in the intelligence collection operation was infiltrating the agents in Tehran. The CIA agent first traveled to Tehran in January 1980. While there, he found and surveyed every site considered by the JTF planners. “He drove to each site . . . and evaluated them as to suitability for their intended use.” Through a second Iranian asset, the CIA agent purchased six trucks and two vans for use by the assault force. The Iranian asset also rented a
warehouse to store the vehicles until the operation was launched. This was all accomplished by 28 February 1980.

The DoD teams left for Iran after President Jimmy Carter approved the mission on 11 April 1980. MAJ Meadows and the Air Force Sergeant arrived in Tehran on 21 April. Once inserted, they moved freely in the city and reported to JTF Headquarters, then located in Egypt, regarding the security situation and the routine of the guards at the Embassy. They were unable, however, to find out the exact locations of the hostages within the Embassy compound. On 25 April upon receiving the abort signal from Washington, all U.S. agents made their way to safety.\footnote{The last agents left Iran by 29 April.}

With the mechanical breakdown of three of the original eight helicopters and the tragic accident that befell the rescuers at Desert I, the ill-fated mission ended. In the mission post-mortem that followed, it is often overlooked that the HUMINT operation to collect information and support the rescue operation succeeded in every respect. The CIA and military intelligence capabilities, incorporating the principles of HUMINT, reinforced the idea that intelligence activities often drive the course of military undertakings.
SECTION THREE

ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL SUMMARIES

Similarities

The principles of the consistent access theory serve as a framework in which to evaluate each operation. These principles provide links between each vignette used to compare and contrast each operation. This evaluation provides a measure for determining success or failure.

There are many similarities among the three historical examples. Each operation was focused on a single objective. The primary mission of all the agents was to observe and report. The primary objective for each mission remained constant. Team VITRAIL, the Duc Hue PHOENIX Project, and the intelligence operatives of EAGLE CLAW successfully accomplished their primary objectives.

Security for each mission was paramount. Each mission entailed extreme risk, and operatives died in two of the three cases. Although there is a difference between operational security (OPSEC) and personal security, breeches of either can be catastrophic to a HUMINT operative.

The information collected during each mission proved completely reliable. In each case the HUMINT reports were the
primary means of acquiring the information gained. Reliable information drove the commanders' decision process.

Each intelligence operation was not overly complex. The techniques for infiltration, observation, and reporting were simple and direct. Risk and simplicity are not synonymous. The simplest plan may contain elements of extreme risk; however, complexity generally increases the chances of failure.

Each operation was well controlled via dedicated command and control structures. These missions were not 'solo' attempts to achieve their objectives; they were part of a larger operations designed, prepared, and executed according to a definitive plan. Most HUMINT plans undergo intense scrutiny prior to launch. The SUSSEX operation was approved by the JCS; Ambassadors Komer and Colby supervised the PHOENIX Program; and President Carter approved Operation EAGLE CLAW.

Each intelligence operation was planned well in advance, and functioned for a considerable length of time in contrast to its supported operation. HUMINT operations require a long lead-time to be effective and to reduce the risk for the operatives. The SUSSEX teams launched nearly sixty days before D-Day. The collection effort from the PHOENIX account took more than four months before the first combat patrols entered Tan My village. The first intelligence agent arrived in Tehran in January 1980, nearly four months before the planned operation.
Finally, each intelligence team or agent had access to the target area. This was the common denominator among the three operations. Repeatedly getting to the objective, and once there remaining effective to collect the needed information were the keys to success for Team VITRAIL, Phich, and the U.S. intelligence teams in Tehran. Without consistent access these missions would have failed.

**Differences**

These three operations differed in only a few respects. SUSSEX and EAGLE CLAW were traditional penetration missions into a denied area, German-occupied France, and Islamic fundamentalist Iran. The PHOENIX operation was, in effect, a counter-intelligence operation. The PHOENIX agents looked for an elusive enemy, an underground shadow government. Although dangerous, the environment in Tan My was semi-permissive for GVN agents. The VC remained out of sight in the presence of GVN forces.

The other significant difference lay in the security measures employed to protect each operation. Again SUSSEX and EAGLE CLAW were very close-hold operations; very few outside the immediate units knew of their planned activities. Security is a safety measure. It protects agents, the operation, and the sponsoring organization or nation. The PHOENIX project operated in the open. The VC was well aware of its objective. PHOENIX
forced the VC deeper underground. For the VC it became a matter of survival; PHOENIX stripped away their layers of security. Either one by one or in small groups, the VC in Tan My were uncovered. PHOENIX pushed the VC into an operational retreat in 1971.
SECTION FOUR

RECOMMENDATIONS

The theory for HUMINT Operations serves as a guiding concept. *Consistent access*, though not necessarily quantifiable, is the basic element of HUMINT operations. Without access to sources of information the HUMINT agent cannot accomplish the mission. The attending principles provide a framework to both plan and evaluate an intelligence operation—its success or failure.

The relevance of this research is tied to intelligence doctrine. Constant evaluation and re-examination of doctrine permit improvements and refinement. Doctrine based on valid theory is vital for success. The Air-Land Battle Doctrine of the 1980s was the key to victory in the 1991 Gulf War. Intelligence doctrine will be critical to success in future conflicts. Intelligence doctrine, in some respects, must precede the development of doctrine for the lethal forces of the Army and the other services.

There are tenuous intelligence doctrinal links between the services and Joint forces. The *consistent access* theory for HUMINT operations may provide a commonality for all intelligence operations among the services and at Joint headquarters. The temporal, geographic, and operational differences of the SUSSEX,
PHOENIX, and EAGLE CLAW operations do not diminish the validity of the consistent access theory and its supporting principles; they, in fact, serve to reinforce its doctrinal strength.

The recommendation from this research is that the consistent access theory becomes an essential element of intelligence doctrine. Its principles should be used to guide commanders and intelligence planners in the preparation of intelligence operations. At times, intelligence operations will be independent of combat or peacetime missions. Yet the information collected, regardless of the sensor or collection methods, ultimately increases the commander's knowledge and is a crucial step in the decision-making process.

Recommendations for further study include expanding the depth of historical research in an effort to continue the validation process of the suggested principles and the theory of consistent access. Another avenue is to test the theory in simulations and exercises. Analyzing how the Army trains its intelligence commanders and staff officers should be integrated into the development of an effective doctrine. Ultimately, well-developed doctrine is proof of a valid theory, which in turn generates success.

Word Count = 7,356
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