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A PHOENIX EVENT: RESPONDING WITH UNITY OF EFFORT?

BY

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A Phoenix Event: Responding with Unity of Effort?

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Dale DeKinder, Lt Col, Department of the Air Force
TITLE: A Phoenix Event: Responding with Unity of Effort?
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 7 April 1999 AGES: 40 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS) repeatedly describes an ever growing terrorist threat, emphasizing the need to protect U.S. vital infrastructure from such threats. Such actions, not if but when they happen, have strategic national and military importance. Terrorist actions are addressed under the rubric of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW doctrine specifies guiding principles for combating these actions. One principle in particular, Unity of Effort, is historically elusive. Further, the NSS lists transportation as part of our vital infrastructure. This study examines MOOTW principles, primarily Unity of Effort, as they apply to countering a terrorist strike targeting a vital component of U.S. national infrastructure: air transportation.
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PREFACE

The Army War College’s curriculum has served to increase this author’s concern for national security. This study reflects a growing concern about possible implications of a terrorist attack on a vital infrastructure—air transportation. Many hypothetical terrorist scenarios could include such an attack, since a strike could occur as part of a hostile nation state’s war plan, as a rogue terrorist’s “statement,” or even a disgruntled U.S. citizen. Among the myriad of possibilities, consider the following scenario.

Once upon a time, the U.S. is a superpower during a promising worldwide period of democratic enlargement fostered in part by continuing U.S. global engagement. The Korean peninsula unified following the “implosion” or collapse of North Korea. The U.S. has emerged from the Y2K computer and information highway scare unscathed. The future appears increasingly secure. So decision-makers elected to further reduce military force structure for seemingly practical reasons: With Korea’s instability eliminated, only one MTW now seems likely. Fewer forces are needed in the ever-increasing success story in Bosnia. The U.S. economy is heeding calls for universal health insurance and retirement funding. Yeltsin’s socialistic minded replacement has been unable to turn Russia very far towards
old communist ways. U.S. forces in SWA, fewer than at any time, seem capable of sustaining a “containment” deterrence posture. Except for humanitarian concerns in Africa and South America, the world is dramatically “democratizing.”

But history begins to repeat itself. A DIA area officer reports a massing of Iraqi forces for a possible offensive to capture oil fields. In the CIA, a lone analyst predicts an impending Russian military action to retake Ukraine and several other previously strategic satellite countries. But leaders in respective compartments of the DIA and CIA have rationalized these troubling predictions.

In the past seventy-two hours, two major DOD civilian air carriers have been shut down by an inexplicable computer glitch; Charleston AFB flight line, aircraft, aircrews, and support personnel, have been incapacitated by possibly an unknown agent. Only a few hours ago, the elite and rapid reaction advance personnel aboard a contract carrier were “destroyed.” Fully loaded, the carrier began to taxi out at a major airport when it exploded. Hundreds died. Other aircraft were destroyed. The air terminal was rendered inoperable. As national media broadcasts detailed these catastrophes, terrorists threatened further strikes at other air facilities.

This study examines applying unity of effort in combating a plausible terrorist attack.
A Phoenix Event: Responding with Unity of Effort?

Adversaries that cannot win against America or her allies on the battlefield can turn to terrorism as an alternate means to advance their cause.

—General William W. Hartzog, (29:II)

Terrorism poses a very real threat. Impending asymmetrical terrorist strikes against our national infrastructure, especially air transportation, could spell economic or military disaster. Consider the U.S. economic impact. Commercial aviation generates revenues of over $300 billion annually; it accounts for close to one million jobs and will transport over a billion passengers in 1999. (35:1)

But a successful terrorist strike (similar to the one described in the preface) on the U.S. aviation industry could spell disaster for U.S. national security by compromising rapid global reach of home-based troops. Ninety-nine percent of the personnel for Desert Shield/Desert Storm moved by airlift. (19:13) Our nation's military is increasingly dependent on this kind of rapid global response. Even military and civilian responders supporting other agencies during a terrorist incident are dependent on air transportation. This study examines a principle of the Military Operations for Other Than War (MOOTW), Unity of Effort, as it applies to combating a terrorist strike targeting a U.S. national infrastructure—air transportation.
THE ENDS

A National Security Strategy for a New Century (NSS) addresses terrorism throughout, but primarily in the category of transnational threats. As such, terrorism transcends established borders. "Globalization of transportation and communication has allowed international terrorists and criminals to operate without geographic constraints, while individual governments and their law enforcement agencies remain limited by national boundaries." (4:7)

NSS policy specifies "protection of our critical infrastructures as a vital interest, which are defined as those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation." (4:5) The NSS then warns that "We must also guard against threats to our other critical national infrastructures—such as electrical power and transportation." (4:6)

To combat terrorism, the NSS emphasizes an overriding objective: "Protecting our citizens and critical infrastructures at home is an essential element of our strategy." (4:iv) The U.S. policy for combating terrorism, as summarized, follows:

America will act in concert with other nations, and unilaterally when necessary, to resist terrorism by any legal means available. Our Government will not make concessions to terrorists, including ransoms, prisoner releases or exchanges, or policy changes. Terrorism is
considered a potential threat to our national security and other nations that practice or support terrorism will not do so without consequence. (32:12)

Terrorist adversaries will, nonetheless, be tempted to disrupt our critical infrastructures. (4:iv) To protect our infrastructure, we need close cooperation across all levels of government--federal, state and local--as well as across a wide range of agencies.

So unity of effort begins with communication of a common and clearly understood objective at all levels. A catalyst for interagency action to address terrorist attacks on air transportation infrastructure security was the mysterious, explosive crash of TWA Flight 800.

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (WHCASS) quickly convened on 22 August 1996 following the 17 July explosion of TWA Flight 800 shortly after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport. Officials initially suspected the jet was brought down by a terrorist act.

Terrorists know that airlines are often seen as national symbols. The WHCASS advocated the following strategy:

When terrorist attack an American airliner, they are attacking the U.S. This can not be tolerated, or allowed to intimidate free societies. So we must be willing to apply sustained economic, political and commercial pressure on countries sponsoring terrorists. We must make an unwavering
commitment to pursue terrorists and bring them to justice. We must resolve to punish those who choose to violate sanctions imposed against terrorist states. (4:23)

The success of the U.S. government in arresting, prosecuting, and convicting perpetrators of past domestic and international terrorist acts may, however, spark terrorist reprisals against citizens and property in the U.S. (6:intro) Thus we are pursuing a concerted strategy against terrorism on three fronts: First, we are working more closely than ever with our allies to build a coalition with zero tolerance for terrorism, Second, we are giving our own law enforcement officials the most powerful [CbT] tools available, Third, we are increasing security in our airports and on our airplanes. (9:2)

At War

If someone can kill an American Soldier, it is better than wasting his time on some other matter.

-Bin Laden.

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently declared that the U.S. is at war with terrorists, which she designated as “the war of the future.” (27:16) But this war is occurring now, and it is surely expected to extend into the future. Between 1949 and 1989 more than 95 explosions aboard commercial airlines around the world resulted in the deaths of 2,217 people. The 1988 bomb aboard Pan Am Flight
103 killed 270 people, 11 of them on the ground. If the explosion aboard TWA 800 was also a deliberate attack, then 500 people traveling to and from JFK Airport alone were murdered in those two events. (9:1)

Threat Analysis

Some argue there is only a small risk of attack on the U.S. homeland because of the overwhelming response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor over fifty years ago. Yet intelligence reveals that Saddam Hussein ordered 200 terrorists to fan out across the globe and murder Americans in 1990. Air terminals and aircraft could easily have been among their targets. Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.) offers a disconcerting observation on the war of terrorism: “It certainly seems to me that we’re in for something we’re not ready for as a nation.” (36:1A)

The 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania have been attributed to Osama Bin Laden, who is said to have financed and supported the terrorists. He was previously exiled from Saudi Arabia for extreme militant behavior and has proclaimed war on the U.S. There are strong indicators Bin Laden now has nuclear capability. In November 1998 Air Force General John Gordon, the CIA’s deputy director, warned, “A clear danger in the months ahead
is that Bin Laden, his allies, or his sympathizers will strike again." (12:1)

Likewise, terrorists are not rooted to any given haven, community or nation. Armed with increasingly sophisticated materials of destruction, they often move through air terminals and aboard aircraft. The congestion of air terminals and the vulnerabilities of air "capsules" carrying hundreds of people make air travel a lucrative terrorist target, capable of creating potential crises and quickly arousing national concern—if not panic.

Aircraft and airports have offered high-profile targets to terrorist groups throughout the years. Airports, by their very nature and design, present attractive targets to terrorists, a place where they inflict mass casualties quickly. Historically "in the vicinity of main operating bases, the most threatening weapon available to terrorists is the hand-held surface to air missile (SAM)." (26:28) This remains a very real threat.

For example, consider the vulnerability of aircraft in approach and departure profiles. These approaches and departures are routinely specific for approximately sixty miles around an airfield, flown at low altitudes and slow airs speeds. Most major airport controllers seek only to increase efficiency. This is done through sequencing with minimum spacing for maximizing the flow of departing and
arriving aircraft. Such efficiency increases revenues—and vulnerability.

The terrorist threat is changing and growing. We are well aware that terrorists use explosives. But it is important to improve security by assessing and countering emerging threats, such as the use of biological or chemical agents, or the use of missiles. (35:24)

As terrorist groups gain greater levels of lethality and increase their sophistication and planning, risk escalates. Such escalation erodes traditional restraints on WMD to which they have increasing access. The growing number of groups, the multiplicity of terrorists’ intentions and motivations, the potential of organized crime to traffic in illicit NBC materials, the vulnerabilities of so many targets, the access to varying tools of WMD, and the variety of delivery methods all serve to dramatize the growing terrorist risk.

The rational combating terrorism (CbT) approach is to identify the greatest vulnerabilities and critical infrastructures to protect. We then must assess risks, rather than despair at the number, range and complexity of risks. Adherence to MOOTW principles enables us to analyze risks to increase security.
But without unity of effort, we remain vulnerable to haphazard, ad hoc decision making and uncoordinated, slow responses to the threat.

**SOME WAYS**

To think that the power of the genetic code is not being bent toward weapons is to ignore the growing body of evidence, the lessons of history, and the reality of nature. As Thucydides pointed out, hope is an expensive commodity. It makes better sense to be prepared.

—Cobra Event: (23:421)

Our nation's strategy in the war on terrorism focuses predominantly on antiterrorism (AT), with selective Counterterrorism (CT) elements. AT provides a sustained approach for collective security while judicious CT "bares teeth" in our resolve to combat the threat. This consistent and judicious approach, reflecting NSS concepts, serves the U.S. well.

Improvement of aviation security falls predominantly under the AT strategy. U.S. agencies have accordingly designed ways to prevent and avoid terrorist operations before they occur.

Our NSS emphasizes the need for homeland security. It refers to recent advances in developing guidance and structure for Cbt. AT programs dealing with aviation security call for joint efforts from many U.S. agencies: Department of State (DoS); Department of Justice (DoJ)---
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Department of Transportation (DoT)—Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); National Security Agency (NSA); Department of Defense (DoD)—United States Atlantic Command (USACOM); Forces Command (FORSCOM); Guard and Reserve forces; Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA); and many local, county, state and private first-responder organizations, such as law enforcement and fire protection personnel, and many others. These U.S. agencies sometimes coordinate their efforts with their international counterparts, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Through the Department of State (DoS), nine major multilateral conventions related to states' responsibilities for combating terrorism operate internationally. The U.S. is a party to all of these. Four of the nine conventions focus on aircraft and civil aviation. (28:1) DoS should coordinate frequently with DoJ on national CbT policy.

DoJ, primarily through the FBI, supports CbT by means of AT practices: verifying terrorist incidents, immediately enforcing appropriate laws, and relentless pursuit resulting in apprehension of suspects and prosecution. When an incident occurs, the FBI becomes lead agent for crisis management. The FBI has overall jurisdiction at the scene
of a terrorist incident wherever it occurs, including military installations. (31:3-3)

One example of federal law enforcement verification efforts in combating the terrorist threat is FBI participation in the Critical Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG). The CIWG serves to review “the vulnerability to terrorism of...critical national infrastructure and [make] recommendations to [the president] and the appropriate Cabinet member or Agency head” as required by Presidential mandate. (6:19)

DoJ's lead unit for crisis management is the FBI, which uses cooperative measures to verify and counter the broad array of terrorist threats. The FBI participates in a group representing the world’s leading industrialized countries, known as The Eight (formerly G-8). Its member nations have pledged to strengthen the ability of the international community to stop terrorism before it happens and to respond more effectively if it does occur. (6:20)

The FBI works to combat terrorism on the domestic front through its participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), the first of which was initiated in 1980 in New York. In 1996, there were fourteen formalized JTTFs operating in FBI field divisions throughout the country. Several additional JTTFs are being established. (6:21) JTTFs strive to increase the effectiveness and productivity of
scarce personnel and to allocate logistical resources to avoid duplication of investigative effort. They also seek to expand cooperation and liaison among federal, state and local law enforcement. (6:21)

The FBI’s relentless pursuit of terrorist suspects continues. The FBI legally offered $5 million for bin Laden’s capture. Further, the FBI successfully prevented five planned acts of domestic terrorism in 1996, thereby thwarting attacks on and halting plots to destroy domestic transportation infrastructure. (6:intro) We are continually stepping up our law enforcement efforts by hiring more agents and more prosecutors, thus sending the message to terrorists that they will pay the full price for their deeds. (9:3)

The FBI has been aided in the CbT mission by the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 and, more recently, by the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996. “These initiatives have resulted in security enhancements at U.S. airports to ensure...expanded cooperative measures and coordination between federal agencies.” (6:24)

Federal law enforcement efforts received a significant boost with the passage of The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132). This new law includes several new measures aimed at countering domestic
and international terrorism. However, all suspected terrorists placed under arrest are provided access to legal counsel and normal judicial procedure, including Fifth Amendment privileges and a fair trial by judge and jury. (6:3)

Success in fighting terrorists was notably achieved in 1996 courtrooms. Using the machinery of the criminal justice system, the U.S. Government oversaw the successful prosecution and conviction of a number of major terrorist leaders. (6:5) Of note was the conviction of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef for conspiracy to bomb U.S. airliners in the Far East, the sentencing of Shaykh Omar Abdel Rahman for terrorist acts intended to create chaos and disrupt life in New York City, and the conviction and sentencing of Mohammed Ali Rezaq for air piracy in the matter of hijacking Egypt Air Flight 648 in 1985. (6:9)

The host government, in this instance the U.S., by using legally proper efforts wins the trust of American people and of other nations. National trust lays an air transportation security foundation for the DoT to build on.

DoT, primarily through the FAA, supports CbT by AT practices, particularly by providing air transportation security. The WHCASS contends that, because of its extensive interactions with airlines and airports, the FAA is the appropriate agency for regulating aviation security,
with the following qualifications: First, the FAA must improve the way it carries out its mission; second, the roles of intelligence and law enforcement agencies in supporting the FAA must be more clearly defined and coordinated. (35:24)

Most cooperating agencies work with the FAA on aviation security mission matters. For aviation security, WHCASS recommends doubling the FAA’s security force by adding 600 positions over three years. Our reliance on AT requires staying ahead of terrorists in security technologies. FAA would receive over $157 million for technology for the nation’s airports. Further, the FAA oversees the installation of hundreds of state-of-the-art bomb detection scanners in our major airports to examine checked and carry-on luggage. (9:2) Other measures include adding 140 inspectors and agents to the Customs Service and expanding Customs’ authority to search travelers. (10:1)

Beyond our efforts to improve aviation security, other new measures will also strengthen America’s intelligence capabilities worldwide so that we can stop terrorists before they strike. (9:3) Intelligence agencies funnel indications and warnings for airports through the FAA. Intelligence at all levels, especially Human Intelligence (HUMINT) sources, is paramount. It should receive high strategic priority. DIA classifies terrorism as an elusive target, the “single
most difficult area" of intelligence. The recent CIA budget increase is a start, but HUMINT takes time to develop before we realize its benefits. Aviation security is best enhanced through keeping terrorist suspects under surveillance. Sharing accurate information and planning is a strong deterrent to terrorism. Effective intelligence efforts will include the chain of command, interagency and geographic CINC at the appropriate levels. (20:para 4.9.1)

DoD components may not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary—and then only on a temporary basis under conditions of Immediate Response. (30:5) Legal civil authority strictly restrains using our military force to perform police duties—especially in homeland defense. Also, state governors control National Guard activities until Guardsmen are federalized. Therefore the DoD supports DoJ and FEMA in their functional leadership.

Regardless of the intensity of the threat, we must be very prudent in our prosecution CbT. For instance, the NSS policy of relentless pursuit through DoJ capabilities must be legally and democratically just. Otherwise the U.S. becomes the villain and ironically the terrorists have literally "terrorized" our cherished democratic traditions of liberty, fair play and justice by causing us to abandon them.
With NCA approval, DoD can establish boundaries for CINC support of home defense. DoD's Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) resources for supporting CbT are defined by regions. USCINCACOM is the principal DoD planning agent and supported commander for CONUS, the District of Colombia, and U.S. territorial waters. USCINCACOM validates all requests for military assistance in the U.S. Atlantic Command AOR. USCINCSOUTH and USCINCPAC have similar responsibilities for their respective AORs. COMFORSCOM divides the Continental U.S. (CONUS) into Fifth and First Armies by dividing the CONUS into west and east responsibilities, respectively. Fifth and First Armies each have five federal regions. USN and USMC likewise divide the CONUS into east and west responsibilities, but different federal regions. Unfortunately, the dividing lines of the Departments of Army and Navy are not congruent. The Air Force conducts its principal and regional planning over one continuous region for all states. Fortunately, the same states in the ten FEMA regions are the same states under the ten Defense Coordinating Officers in First and Fifth Armies.

DoD supports CbT by AT and, when the NCA deems prudent, by carrying out some CT missions. DoD AT support is increasing through a multitude of capabilities ranging from training to detection. The DoD link with the National Command Authority (NCA) for homeland defense is the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and USACOM. This link then branches down to several DoD activities, even down to the local National Guard supporting first responder efforts. Also, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO-LIC) provides policy oversight, guidance, and DoD instruction. Further, OASD/SO-LIC coordinates physical security reviews and physical security equipment steering groups. (20:para 3.2)

The JCS and USACOM have an embedded AT/Force Protection (FP) staff cell, but FORSCOM serves as the lead agent. USACOM’s AT/FP mission is to oversee the CbT program with the goal of preventing terrorist acts against U.S. interests, assets and citizens within USACOM’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). Also, the SECARMY serves as the DoD executive agent for Military Support to Civil Authorities and Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. (30:27) DoD offers increasing technical support for domestic preparedness to the many lead agencies. These increases range from the Marine’s Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) to the National Guard’s Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) teams.

The U.S. is also demonstrating perseverance for the long haul by committing resources through DoD education, training and exercises, within and outside the DoD. The National Guard is supporting interagency efforts in the
Domestic Preparedness Program. To date, civilian responders from initially 49 of 120 targeted U.S. cities have undergone training in accessing DoD capabilities that support terrorist crisis management and consequence management.

DoD's efforts support the domestic preparedness program: DoD assisted the National Fire Academy in writing the First Responders Awareness to WMD Response; DoD participated in the 120 City Domestic Preparedness Tabletop Field Exercises; DoD conducted AT exercises in Wilmington, NC; Philadelphia, PA; and New York, NY. (20:brief) The RAID teams are working with DOMS to develop the organization and training for the National Guard RAID Teams and with industry on technological improvements. (20:brief)

The recent establishment and strategic locations of ten RAID teams offers another capability. Each RAID team consists of 22 highly skilled, full-time National Guard personnel who will act as the tip of our military response spear. Teams are to be fully operational by 2000.

Complementing and supporting these rapid-response teams will be up to 170 specially trained and equipped decontamination and reconnaissance units, drawn from within the existing Reserve Component force structure. (7:12) DoD is heavily supporting these interagency efforts through the US Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command.
Military assistance does not seek to supplant, but to support, local authorities. The men and women of our National Guard and Reserve are ideally suited for this critical mission. They live and work in nearly four thousand communities across the country; they are familiar with local emergency response plans; and they have well-established relations with fire, police and emergency medical personnel who are first responders to any incident. (7:12).

In aviation, the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) reviews the AT/FP status of all missions and mission support activities of DoD air missions. (20:para3.4) A USTRANSCOM component, the Air Mobility Command (AMC), supports this effort in numerous ways, such as the Threat Working Group (TWG) chaired by AMC/Intel. The TWG includes members from the Tanker Airlift Control Cell (TACC), Office of Special Investigation, the intelligence staffs, AMC’s Security Forces, and National Intel Representatives of the CIA, DIA, NSA, National Reconnaissance Office and others. However, the CJCS serves as the principal advisor and focal point for all FP issues and is directly responsible to the SECDEF. (20:para 3.3)

FEMA leads consequence management when the president directs federal consequence action. When FEMA activates a Federal Response Plan (FRP), even more agencies can support
an incident through Emergency Support Functions (ESF) (see ESF appendix). Some additional agencies supporting specific needs are the Department of Energy (DoE), the Surgeon General and other medical agencies, depending on whether the incident is designated as a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack.

The senior official of Emergency Services varies by state. (30:9) Interstate Compacts enable one state to call upon other states for help. Several compacts are currently active. Within states are multiple local cooperative consortiums and first responders. These local first responders may enter into mutual aid compacts.

**A MEANS: THE ELUSIVE PRINCIPLE**

Because so many agencies and such a multifaceted, complex process will respond to an air transportation terrorist incident, the need for unity of effort becomes all the more critical.

Lack of unity of effort degrades an operation, as witnessed earlier in this decade. In 1992, 13,000 reserve component (RC) and active component (AC) military personnel were employed in efforts to restore order in the Los Angeles metropolitan area during the riots following a not-guilty finding in the trial of policemen charged with using undue force in the celebrated videotaped arrest of Rodney King.
Response to the rioting at all levels was fragmented and totally lacking unity of effort. "Ad hocism was rampant, as senior agency officials ignored established protocols and circumvented systems that were in place to ensure unity of effort." Our nation can ill afford relearning this same lesson during a homeland security emergency involving a terrorist incident, especially one targeting a vital interest.

Seek unity of effort in every operation: Derived from unity of command in war, unity of effort assures that all means and resources are directed to a common purpose. Such unity comes from designated directors of operations who rely heavily on consensus-building. Military command resides in a preset protocol observed by all military members. But command arrangements among many participants may be less well-defined and may not include full command authority. Lead agents must establish protocols for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort. (24:X6).

Much progress is underway in combating a terrorist strike against a U.S. national infrastructure such as air transportation. However, our failure to observe the principle of unity of effort at various levels, from the top down, indicates our strategy is flawed. Perhaps much of the friction is caused when profit margins outweigh security concerns. From the formulation of our strategy down to our
detailed capabilities to respond, we can detect lack of unity of effort.

To begin, the common purpose from top to bottom is not succinctly and clearly communicated. Obviously, an implied strategic objective is to protect American citizens from becoming terrorist war veterans. This objective should transcend all organizations, from the NSS through the myriad of responsible agencies down to the first responders and incident commander. The first responder needs to know the articulated common purpose. But, even the White House has muddled unity of effort.

The WHCASS, chaired by Vice President Gore as directed by Executive Order 13015, made thirty-one recommendations. The FAA was assigned the lead in implementing twenty-one recommendations, while eight other federal agencies were assigned the lead in implementing the ten remaining recommendations. These recommendations sought to improve airport security by greatly increasing security primarily through detection, automation, and training. The Department of Transportation's Office of the Secretary provides quarterly reports to the Vice President, but neither the Security Council nor any other agency is responsible for monitoring all of the agencies' implementation efforts or for coordinating efforts among the agencies. (33:2) Not surprisingly, of the three recommendations that the FAA
planned to complete in FY 1997, it totally implemented only one. This shortfall is but one example of fragmented unity of effort by unclear leadership or ineffective use of resources. The overall failure to effectively secure our air travel industry from terrorist attacks must be attributed to lack of unity of effort.

As the NSS asserts, responding to terrorist acts “cannot be limited exclusively to any one agency within the U.S. Government. The threats and their consequences cross agency lines, requiring close cooperation among Federal agencies, state and local governments, the industries that own and operate critical national infrastructures, non-governmental organizations and others in the private sector.” (4:8) But this multitude of agencies, layers of organizations and participating personnel countermands unity of effort.

Such diversity of involvement degrades any systematic approach to preclude a repeat of the “Khobar Tower” incident. Intelligence information was available on this incident, but it was stove-piped. While conscientious people were working hard in their own lanes, the whole picture was not assessed...and tragedy ensued.

Furthermore, judicious and timely release of intelligence information is vital to public education on CbT. However, too much information or untimely information
may cause public panic and chaos. Too little information makes the air traveler and the air transportation system complacent and thereby more susceptible to terrorist acts.

Should the gag rule apply to the media broadcasts of terrorists information? Frank Brenchley observed that, "Without the oxygen of publicity terrorists would not so often bother to breathe the outside air." (3:5) However, our Constitution supports a free press. So it is legally very difficult to control news agencies. Yet effective leadership and a team approach might elicit more cooperation from the media to bolster unity of effort in this critical matter.

Beyond the strategy, political efforts to address the threat require time and attention--they are not expedient. The U.S. government may provide AT assistance to foreign countries under the provisions of Chapter II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (24:III-2) But many people around the world resent past U.S. actions. This distrust too impedes international unity of effort.

Congruent organizational boundaries contribute to unity of effort; disparity in boundaries create seams in unity of effort. For instance, the CBIRF command line runs from USACOM to MARFORLANT to II MEF to CBIRF. (20:brief) CBIRF operates through interagency MOUs and depends on organic transportation for Mission Essential Equipment for an Initial Response Force of 76 personnel or Full Force of 250-
350 personnel. Ironically, intensive air transportation by C-17 or C-5 is required. (20:brief)

FORSCOM’s Principles of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities reveal DOD’s complex unity of effort dilemma. A recent CINCUSACOM described DoD’s support to civilian response and management efforts as “convoluted and confused.” This description geometrically increases across the many interagency efforts. Time and again, unity of effort is a casualty.

As we have noted, DoJ leads response efforts while FEMA leads efforts on consequence. However, the incident commander assumes overall responsibility, with the two lead federal agencies pressuring the incident commander in the conduct of their responsibilities. Then several other agencies support DoJ and FEMA efforts. This complexity only increases when crisis management transfers to consequence management. Add to this that in aviation security, airports have their own first responders, such as fire and security personnel or law enforcement staffs with local ties.

Further, interstate compacts enable one state to call upon other states for help. These compacts overlap and cut across state, municipal, and National Guard boundaries. Consider the following current compacts: (30:13)

-Mutual Aid Compact (1952) PA, NY, NJ
-Southern Governors (SREM) (1993) AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, MO, NC, OK, PR, SC, TN, TX, VI, VA, WV
-Southwest Governors compact (Amended) CA, NV, AZ, NM, CO, UT

-Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) AR, DE, FL, GA, IA, LA, MD, MS, MO, NC, ND, OK, PR, SC, SD, TN, TX, VA, WV

Combine this with the twelve ESFs and it should be apparent then that the functions of crisis management and consequence management are complex. Some functions are parallel, some overlap. Many questions should be clarified to assume unity of effort: Who is in charge during the functional overlap? How does the National Guard of one state operate in the state compacts? Or in support of RAID teams? How do the agencies work together when they are regionally separated by different geographical boundaries? When the incident involves a vital infrastructure of air transportation, how are the supporting capabilities to be deployed rapidly? These obvious concerns—and many, many more—need clarification so that all the participating “crews” can unify their efforts to respond to a terrorist incident.

However, a major detractor in unity of effort during response to the LA civil disturbance was misunderstanding of legal implications of using military force to respond to
this domestic urban crisis. This poorly understood issue included federalizing the National Guard (Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, title 10) and responsibility for legal reimbursements for DoD resources supporting the response.

All requests by civil authorities for DoD military assistance are evaluated by DoD approval authorities against the following criteria: Legality (compliance with laws), Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD forces), Risk (safety of DoD forces), Cost (who pays, impact on DoD budget), Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the interest of the Department), and Readiness (impact on the DoD's ability to perform its primary mission). (30:5) Leaders in all agencies should possess a basic understanding of the legal complexities of their response roles to maximize unity of effort. However, the system is too complex and confusing for leaders to act promptly with assurance of the legality of their actions, which again impedes unity of effort.

CONCLUSION

The world community is air-reliant. National aviation resources—commercial, state, and military—are emblematic of national identity. The U.S. is the world's leading aerospace power for civilian profit and military purposes, which underscores its strategic importance. Further, the
Army Plan for the 21st Century places increasing reliance on our current and future need for responsive lift mobility. This plan acknowledges our increasing dependence on the private sector for air mobility.

But there is a dramatic dichotomy between our national security interest and our commercial profit interest. Improvements in aviation security have been complicated because government and industry often find themselves at odds, unable to resolve disputes over financing, effectiveness, technology and potential impacts on operations and passengers. (35:23) The federal government should continue considering aviation security as a national security issue, and provide substantial leadership in building unity of effort in the war against terrorism.

Nationally, combating terrorism requires readiness, cooperation, and approval—unity of effort. Since force protection is a top priority and since most troops travel via civilian aviation, military support in combating terrorism is essential to national security.

Improving aviation security has thus become an indisputable national security interest. Improvements to aviation security come in a variety of ways and are transferable between civil and military sectors. WHCASS, headed by Vice President Gore, said the report’s recommendations represented "a combination of approaches—
some high-tech, some low-tech, even some no-tech.” (5:1,2)

Our U.S. government continues making strides in working high-tech and low-tech improvements to safeguard the aviation infrastructure.

This study advocates a no-tech solution: Use the MOOTW principle unity of effort in the aviation interagency process to improve security. First, identify the overall leadership. This leadership could be a cabinet level position or even the Vice President. Second, the leadership sets a common, clearly understood objective. Tie the objective from NSS through lead agencies to first responders. Then the leadership works on the elusive principle, unity of effort, while adhering to all other MOOTW principles and concepts. This requires on-going and close working relationships among agencies and representatives of our air transport industry. Merely having those representatives at the same table will bolster unity of effort.

Stronger unity of effort increases awareness of each agency’s capabilities and limits besides exposing vulnerabilities and sharing perceptions of terrorist capabilities. In the movie Magnum Force, an overzealous cop tried to kill Dirty Harry and ironically killed himself. Afterward, the calm, cool, and collected and unharmed Dirty Harry said, “Mans got to know his limitations.” Unity of
effort in serving our nation requires that we know our limits and our capabilities, as well as the limits and capabilities of our adversaries.

In summary, U.S. policy on aviation security must rely on antiterrorism as the strategic cornerstone for combating terrorism. U.S. success in leading world efforts requires greater unity of effort among agencies at all levels. We know we have the resources. But it's the intangibles that finally count most. The war to protect aviation passengers, crews, and infrastructure can be won only if democracies have the will and courage to win.

WORD COUNT = 5605
BIBLIOGRAPHY


