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MILITARY AFFAIRS
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COL GEN SOBOLEV ON PARTY MEMBERS' ROLE AT SUBUNIT LEVEL

Moscow SOVETSKY VOIN in Russian No 11, Jun 83 (signed to press 16 May 83) pp 1-3

[Article by Col Gen M. G. Sobolev, deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of Soviet Army and Navy: "Subunit Party Members"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The subunit... We usually connect this word with small Army collectives, whether it be a motorized rifle company or battalion, an artillery or missile battery or battalion, an air squadron or a ship department. These primary cells hold an exceptionally important place in a large and orderly military body.

Subunits usually consist of young people full of energy and creative enthusiasm, people who are undergoing an active development process. Under Army conditions it is in the subunit that the foundations of training and indoctrination are laid down: those valuable bits which later produce good shoots on the long path of life. There are the most favorable opportunities and conditions here for improving the personnel's tactical proficiency and ideological-political and moral-psychological training. Here too are the most favorable conditions for daily individual work with soldiers, and opportunities for satisfying their diverse nonmaterial needs. If these opportunities and conditions are not used or are not used on a planned basis, then the chief connecting chain of the Army collective is threatened with rupture. Then disruptions and mistakes in combat and political training, in discipline and in many important organizational matters are inevitable.

All the subunit's diverse life and the soldiers' combat training and indoctrination occur under the direction of the one-man commander and his political deputy. Party members are their closest assistants in all good deeds and initiatives. Their number usually is small in the small subunits, and the official posts they hold are not high: platoon or squad commanders, company first sergeants or even rank-and-file soldiers. But such is the principle of party life: The strength of party influence is measured and compared not by numbers and not by official position, but above all by activeness, fighting spirit, principle and sincere generosity.

"THE CPSU TRIES TO ENSURE THAT EVERY PARTY MEMBER IS A SELFLESS FIGHTER FOR THE TRIUMPH OF ITS GREAT IDEALS, THAT HE HAS A THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF, UNDERSTANDS AND IMPLEMENTS THE IDEAS OF MARXISM-LENINISM AND PARTY POLICY," states
the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the 2d RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party] Congress." "MEMBERSHIP IN THE PARTY PROVIDES NO PRIVILEGES, BUT SIGNIFIES MERELY A HIGHER RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTY MEMBERS FOR EVERYTHING DONE IN THE COUNTRY AND FOR THE FATE OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS."

There is no higher duty for a party member than to justify the high title of a member of the Leninist party by all deeds and acts and by his entire life. Experience convincingly confirms that even the small party collective is capable of major good deeds if this collective brings together staunch, selfless people who are pure in soul and heart, utterly dedicated to the cause, and genuine party members.

***

The fame of the airborne company of party member Capt V. Osipenko went far beyond the garrison. The collective of brave airborne personnel is the initiator of socialist competition in the combined unit [soyedimeneyle]. Although one cannot call their service easy, the soldiers are diligent and determined in achieving the goal and, in defiance of the difficulties, they are confidently reaching for the heights of military proficiency.

There are five party members in the company: the commander, his deputy Sr Lt N. Ignatov, and platoon commanders lieutenants Yu. Korotkov, A. Osipov and M. Shepilov. Until recently there were several persons among the NCO's and privates in the party organization. They went into the reserve and now new soldiers are preparing to enter the party, among them Pfc A. Kulikov, secretary of the Komsomol organization.

Company party members occupy a vanguard role, in the full sense of this word, in all spheres of military life and service. For example, company commander Capt Osipenko is a first class scout and first class driver-mechanic. He demonstrated outstanding results in all kinds of combat training in the final inspection. The other party members also are the commander's equal. All of them have a high class rating, they are able to replace a comrade and they have a good knowledge of the entrusted equipment. Much deserved success fell to the lot of platoon commander Lt Korotkov. His subordinates were the most capable and sharpest in an exercise and rightly took first place in the combined unit.

As befitting party members, company communists are where it is most difficult and where their experience, knowledge, personal example and comradely support are needed. They contribute in every way to quality fulfillment of training programs and to creating in the subunit a collective of like-thinkers whose actions and thoughts are subordinated to something infinitely important in Army life—indoctrination of reliable defenders of the Motherland. Assistance to the laggards, widely used in the subunit, also is a concern of company party members.

The airborne soldiers live a full-fledged nonmaterial life. Here they find time to broaden their political horizons and to take part in heated debates at theme nights and in comradely discussions. Company personnel also know
how to spend leisure time well: Amateur performers have received prize places in reviews more than once.

The small collective has a sensitive feel for the pulse of the country's life, and it distinctly senses its role and high purpose in today's concerns and affairs of the Army and people. Materials of the November 1982 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, the report by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov entitled "The USSR's 60th Anniversary," the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the 2d RSDRP Congress," and other party documents received a wide response in this company, as in any other Army collective. In conducting diverse ideological and organizational work around these materials, the party members skillfully mobilize company public opinion, the NCO's and all soldiers for successful accomplishment of tasks at hand. Company party members have a good knowledge of the people's needs and moods, and this largely helps to rally the collective and maintain in it firm regulation order and strong military discipline.

It can be said with full substantiation of the company's party members that these are active fighting men of our Leninist party, conductors of its ideas in the Army environment. But it is not mandatory for party activists to act as briefers or lecturers. Political indoctrination work contains numerous varied forms, including agitators' presentations, discussions of new books and films and varied techniques and means of individual work. All of this usually is widely used in the subunits.

Meanwhile the party demand TO RAISE THE QUALITY OFIDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION WORK IN EVERY WAY fully pertains to the party members of subunits. No matter what kind of indoctrinational work they conduct with the personnel, whether it be a theme night, a meeting with veterans or an ordinary talk, it is important that their organizers constantly strive for high ideological content, concreteness and intelligibility, and that the activities conducted always be tied in closely with the subunit's life and be interesting both in content and format.

The general educational level of the Army collective has risen incomparably in recent times. The fact that the overwhelming majority of personnel in the subunit have a secondary or secondary technical education now is taken as commonplace and customary. The constantly rising general educational and spiritual level of soldiers also requires a creative approach of initiative toward satisfying their needs. As experience shows, there are many opportunities and reserves for this in the subunit.

Young party members and Komsomol leaders in a signal battalion of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany suggested assembling the people briefly after dinner and together sharing the news brought by the soldiers' mail. How much there was that was new, interesting and instructive in these letters! The simple but very warm and confidential lines of those near and dear did not leave the soldiers indifferent. Each of them found himself mentally next to those with whom he had studied or worked prior to service. This personal feeling developed into something greater. It was as if the entire country was conversing with the soldiers in those minutes. There is probably no exaggeration in this, as subunit personnel represent nine union republics and five autonomous republics of our boundless Motherland.
Letters from home have become a great help in indoctrinational work. From the fragmentary and strictly personal facts and examples of these letters, skillfully connected and generalized by subunit party members together with the Komsomol activists, there came an impressive picture of Soviet citizens' struggle for implementing resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and of the May and November 1982 party Central Committee plenums, and of the indestructible and close ties of our soldiers with their people.

This example also is instructive on another plane. THE SUCCESS OF INDOCTRINATIONAL WORK BY SUBUNIT PARTY MEMBERS IS THE MORE PONDERABLE, THE FIRMER ARE THEIR CONTACTS AND COORDINATION WITH KOMSOMOL MEMBERS. The youth organization is an irreplaceable assistant of subunit party members. It was noted long ago that Komsomol life pulses more strongly if it constantly senses lively, concrete assistance on the part of the commander, political officer and all party members. And if this is businesslike help, and not a semblance of it or petty coddling, then Komsomol members unfold a broad program of interesting, vivid activities which catch hold of the young people.

All ideological and political indoctrination work carried on by party members of subunits together with Komsomol activists pursues the goal of developing in soldiers a clear, precise understanding of the complexity of the present-day international situation and developing in them the will and readiness to come to the defense of the great cause of socialism. This work in the subunit retains its significance constantly and does not lose its current nature--new generations of young people enter subunit life periodically. More and more new pupils arrive in the Army school of life. The growing attacks of our class enemy on the ideological and moral principles of socialism also cannot be discounted. Its attempts to exert a disintegrating influence on the awareness of our citizens and our soldiers and to defame and discredit the immortal Marxist-Leninist ideas are becoming more and more refined.

"WE SOVIET PARTY MEMBERS ARE PROUD OF OUR BELONGING TO THE MOST INFLUENTIAL IDEOLOGICAL CURRENT IN ALL THE HISTORY OF WORLD CIVILIZATION--MARXISM-LENINISM," writes CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in the article entitled "The Teaching of Karl Marx and Certain Issues of Socialist Construction in the USSR." "OPEN TO ALL THE BEST AND FOREMOST THAT IS IN MODERN SCIENCE AND CULTURE, IT IS TODAY AT THE CENTER OF THE WORLD'S SPIRITUAL LIFE AND CONTROLS THE MINDS OF MILLIONS ON MILLIONS OF PEOPLE. THIS IS THE IDEOLOGICAL CREDO OF AN ASCENDING CLASS WHICH IS LIBERATING ALL MANKIND. THIS IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL OPTIMISM, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE."

Party members of subunits see the meaning of their party activity in a persistent mastery of this teaching, a constant improvement in the ideological level and perfection of proficiency in working with people.

***

It stands to reason that all ideological indoctrination work does not reduce to conducting separate agitprop and cultural activities. POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IS A CONTINUOUS, DAILY PROCESS. IT IS CARRIED ON NOT ONLY, AND EVEN NOT SO MUCH, IN LECTURES AND POLITICAL CLASSES AS IN THE PROCESS OF COMBAT TRAINING AND IMMEDIATE CONTACT WITH SOLDIERS.
Subunit party members are in the very thick of the masses of servicemen. They naturally proclaim and defend their convictions and views not just in the classroom and from the rostrum of a meeting or rally. When the need for this arises, in addition to offensive agitprop work they rebuff unhealthy sentiments and erroneous opinions and they keep a comrade from taking a false step.

The ability to persuade and, if necessary, change the minds of soldiers, to shape a healthy public opinion and to lead nonparty comrades is of very great importance for subunit party members. Some of them are with the personnel not only during the day, when training activities are in progress or work is being conducted, but also in the evening in the barracks, when supervision on the officers' part noticeably is reduced to a considerable extent or even is entirely absent.

Of course life in a modern Soviet barracks has nothing in common with that about which noteworthy Russian writer A. Kuprin told so truthfully and vividly in his story entitled "Night Shift." There is no mention of those "long through rooms barely lit by the reddish light of tin night-lamps." There is not the unbearable barracks atmosphere in which "the air is permeated with heavy human exhalations and the acrid smoke of makhorka."

The present-day soldier barracks is equipped with everything inherent in a well-planned home: spacious, bright sleeping rooms, warmth, hot water, and personal services rooms. Radio, television, newspapers, journals, amateur concerts, and sports make the leisure time of enlisted men both interesting and useful.

Excessive drilling and the belittling of human dignity which dulled Czarist Army soldiers were swept away once and for all with the victory of the revolution. From the first days of the Red Army's existence the Soviet barracks set different, directly opposite goals: not to brainwash soldiers, but indoctrinate and enlighten them. During those two years a soldier now spends in the barracks he gains vast knowledge, firm skills and such very important qualities as love for organization and discipline. In short a new recruit comes into the barracks as a green youth and leaves it as a mature man ready for labor and exploit.

But even the present-day barracks remains a barracks. This is not a contemporary parents' apartment and not a student dormitory where you can do what you want. The purpose of the barracks is not exhausted in giving soldiers healthy, well-arranged housing. Service continues there even after a strenuous military day and, as before, all life is regulated by the daily routine and regulations. All order in the barracks is subordinated to the chief principle of military service to be in high readiness always.

Restrictions are inevitable for the sake of this chief principle. They make themselves known especially to those who have just crossed the threshold of the barracks. It is not so simple for some new recruits to become accustomed to the new living conditions and it is not easy to enter the strenuous rhythm of soldier routine, to get used to the new situation and learn to overcome difficulties. And who if not a party member, before whose eyes the
development of young soldiers takes place, should help them join the military formation faster; help them with good advice, with a caution, or even by his decisiveness and principle if facts appear which lead to a disruption of order and military discipline, which go at cross-purposes with the interests of all subunit personnel, and which reduce its level of combat readiness? Such prompt and principled reaction of the party members is extremely important.

The following incident occurred in one of the combat engineer companies of the Transbaikal Military District. Some old-time soldiers took a disrespectful attitude toward young privates. Although this was done under the guise of a joke and not without its share of humor, a haughtiness clearly showed in the opinions and actions of the old-timers and claims could be seen to some kind of special, privileged position.

CPSU Candidate Member Sgt V. Petrov was first to act resolutely against such conduct by individual soldiers. Thanks to the young party member's principle, supported by the commander, party members and Komsomol activists, the instances of noncomradely attitude and distortion of the very substance of troop fraternity and mutual help were stopped immediately. The moral climate in the company improved noticeably, which subsequently permitted the personnel to achieve new, higher successes in service and training.

It became a good tradition for people of the older generation and for party members in particular always to help junior comrades paternally by word and deed. That is how the majority of experienced soldiers act even now. They tirelessly see to it that new recruits keep in step with them and succeed in combat training, service and discipline. In such collectives the party members pose acute, principled questions on the indoctrination of each soldier in a spirit of collectivism and communist attitude toward those with whom he has to share the joys and hardships of Army life side by side.

One of the most pressing issues of today is the STRICTEST OBSERVANCE OF STATE AND LABOR DISCIPLINE AND THE DISCIPLINE OF EXECUTION. It stands to reason that this is one of the primary concerns of every party member, and especially those military party members whose service takes place in the subunits.

The subunit usually is a small collective. Here everyone is in full view and everyone knows everyone else both in service and daily routine. In a number of cases this circumstance may play a dual role. It is easier to exercise party influence in such a collective and unite it, but the reverse effect of human proximity also is not precluded, where preconditions appear which "erase" fundamental, regulation relationships and give rise to an atmosphere of all-forgivingness, false comradeship and the slurring over of mistakes. What is most dangerous is that some NCO's and even some officers become accustomed to this behavior. They react only on occasion to the negative instances in the conduct of some servicemen, or entirely ignore them.

Meanwhile it is absolutely indisputable that even the slightest deviation from regulation requirements is the first crack capable of developing to
dangerous proportions. It is very important to perceive it and react in time and perhaps direct the attention of an NCO, warrant officer or commander to it. It is not said for nothing that when you sow a misdeed you reap a habit, and when you sow a habit you reap a character.

Each party member's position must be vigorous and principled in creating an atmosphere of intolerance toward the slightest disruptions. Being himself a worthy example of conscientious discipline and intolerable attitude toward its violators, the party member also inspires such an attitude in other comrades. He achieves this by the method of persuasion, the force of the party word and the authority of those ideas which he implements.

The overwhelming majority of subunit party members assist commanders and political workers actively and energetically in shaping in collectives an atmosphere of each soldier's high exactingness toward himself and comrades, and they persistently and skillfully instil a conscientious attitude toward observing the requirements of military regulations and the laws of military service.

It can be seen that the arsenal of means and techniques of party members' influence in their subunits is broad and varied, but their PERSONAL EXAMPLE probably is the most effective indoctrinal means. A party word will be authoritative and mobilizing only when it is confirmed by action and when a party member leads colleagues by an example worthy of emulation. And of course the most resounding appeals prove to have an empty sound if the party member himself is not a model in life and service.

Subunit party members usually always proceed in the ranks of foremost. People strive to equal them, the example is taken from them, and people try to emulate them. Take WO A. Dubrovskiy. He is a master of communications, the soldier's mentor and a skilled indoctrinator. It is not by chance that the level of his subordinates' schooling is higher than in other subunits of the regiment.

But a party member's example does not reduce merely to his personal high indicators in combat and political training or to exemplary performance of official duties. This is important and mandatory, but this is not enough. A party member's personal example, the facets of which are defined in the CPSU Bylaws as well as in Instructions to Army and Navy Party Organizations, is a broader concept. It encompasses all qualities of party members: political, professional and moral. His authority and the persuasiveness of his words and acts depend on how he appears before comrades and what his moral make-up, organizing qualities, political activeness and maturity are like. It is no accident that there are such high demands today on a party member's moral make-up, inner integrity and richness of personality, moral purity, beauty and strength of soul, and ability to indoctrinate people with high models of troop comradeship and a unity of word and deed.

It is also necessary to speak about this because some collectives show a one-sided approach to instilling personal example in subunit party members. This is a result of a somewhat narrow, grounded understanding of a party member's role and personal example: Serve well, don't violate discipline and that's
it. Here such a trait of the genuine party member as his initiative and organizing activity remains to one side. The party member is an organizer of useful deeds in the subunit, and this quality of his is manifested not only in good service and high discipline, but without fail also in initiative, a pioneer undertaking, unity of the collective, an uncompromising, irreconcilable attitude toward any deficiencies, and a desire to eliminate them and prevent their repetition.

All these qualities are developed in subunit party members in their company and equivalent organizations, but this does not at all mean that their indoctrination is limited to this party collective. Subunit party members require constant attention and concern on the part of the party bureaus, party committees and political entities. The activeness, initiative, and political and organizing qualities of subunit party members will depend directly on the effectiveness and efficiency of such help.

***

A party war cry "Communists, Forward!" originated in subunits of the young Red Army, which had entered a clash against superior forces of the White Guards and interventionists. It resounded like a combat alarm on fields of battle against Hitler's hordes in the Great Patriotic War. Then, in the days of the most severe ordeals, the primary burden of struggle against fascist invaders fell on Army and Navy party members. The example was taken from them, they were emulated, and they were followed into combat. Party members were the basic force of any Army element.

And today party members are the leading force of the subunit. By personal example and by force of ideological persuasion they draw colleagues to the struggle for steadfast strengthening of combat readiness and a growth of military proficiency. Their active position in life permits being at the point of today's missions.

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ARMED FORCES

IVANOV ON BATTLE OF KURSK

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 83 pp 13-17

[Forth years ago one of the greatest and decisive battles of the Second World War — the Battle of Kursk (July 5-August 23, 1943) took place on the expanses of the Central European Russia and Left-Bank Ukraine. The victory at Kursk and the subsequent approach of the Soviet forces to the Dnieper had completed the radical turnabout in the course of the war begun by the battle of Stalingrad.

"Soviet Military Review" Correspondent Lieutenant-Colonel V. Mikhailov has interviewed General of the Army S. P. Ivanov, a participant in the Kursk battle and Hero of the Soviet Union. At that time General Ivanov was chief of Staff of the Voronezh Front.

Semyon Pavlovich Ivanov was born on September 13, 1907. He began his service in the Soviet Army in 1926. During the Great Patriotic War he was chief of staff of several armies and fronts. He made a great contribution to preparing and carrying out many large-scale operations, including the Stalingrad offensive. As the Chief of Staff of the Main Command of the Soviet forces in the Far East, he participated in planning and fulfilling operations aimed at routing the Japanese Kwantung Army in August 1945.

From 1946 he held different command and staff posts in the central apparatus of the USSR Ministry of Defence. From April 1968 he was the Chief of the Soviet Army General Staff Military Academy. Since 1973 General of the Army S. Ivanov has been an Inspector-Adviser of the USSR Ministry of Defence.

Comrade General of the Army, could you describe the situation on the Soviet-German front prior to the Battle of Kursk?

The defeats of the Nazi troops in the Battle of Stalingrad and during the offensive of the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942-43 had broken the military might and morale of the Nazi army and the German population and that country's prestige in the satellite nations. In order to improve the domestic situation and to prevent the collapse of the nazi bloc, Germany's leadership decided to carry out a large summer offensive in 1943. It hoped to take revenge for the winter defeats and to regain the strategic initiative.

Operation Citadel, during which the Nazi Command intended to deliver blows at the flanks of the Soviet grouping on the Kursk Bulge, to surround and to destroy it, was elaborated. By doing so the Nazi leadership was intent on achieving a radical change in the military-political situation.

To carry out this operation the enemy concentrated his best forces — some 50 top divisions in-
cluding 16 tank and motorised ones. This grouping comprised over 900,000 officers and men, nearly 10,000 artillery pieces and mortars, up to 2,700 tanks and assault guns, over 2,000 aircraft. The Nazi Command pinned great hopes on a new combat equipment — heavy Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand assault guns possessing a powerful armour plating and a strong cannon armament. The Command in its order of the day to the forces underscored that the forthcoming offensive was of "decisive importance."

The friendly forces also were preparing for the battle. The Soviet Command decided to take the premeditated defensive temporarily on the Kursk Bulge, to bleed the enemy white in the defensive battles and then to defeat him during our counteroffensive.

The enemy grouping faced the forces of the Central and Voronezh fronts commanded by Generals K. K. Rokossovsky and N. F. Vatutin respectively. Representatives of the Supreme Command GHQ Marshals of the Soviet Union G. K. Zhukov and A. M. Vasilevsky co-ordinated the actions of the Central and Voronezh fronts respectively. By the beginning of the Kursk Battle these fronts numbered over 1,330,000 officers and men, more than 19,000 artillery pieces and mortars, 3,444 tanks and self-propelled guns and over 2,700 combat planes.

The Soviet Command set up a deeply echeloned defence (its depth reached 250-300 km). This defence was saturated with antitank fire weapons and organised with antitank obstacles and mine fields. The massing of men and equipment in the directions of probable enemy blows and also deep operational formation of the fronts' forces was a decisive condition for organising a stable defence.

The enemy postponed the time of his offensive several times. From GHQ's directive we knew that it might begin somewhere between 3 and 6 of July. On the night of July 4, prisoners of war taken by our recce men informed our Command that the strike enemy groupings would pass over to the offensive at 0300 hrs on July 5. In conformity with the plan elaborated beforehand the front commanders issued orders to carry out the artillery counterpreparation. A surprise artillery blow inflicted heavy losses on the Nazis in manpower and materiel, and disrupted their troop control. As a result the enemy offensive began several hours later.

**How was the battle fought and what was characteristic of the enemy actions?**

At 0530 hrs on July 5, an armada of enemy tanks rushed on positions of the Central Front and at 0600 hrs on positions of the Voronezh Front. Tigers and Panthers moved in front, followed by medium and light tanks. They were protected by hundreds of aircraft. On the very first day, the enemy, desperately trying to approach Kursk, committed to action his main forces intended for operation Citadel. The enemy counted chiefly on powerful tank blows along a narrow sector of the front. The fighting men of the 13th Army under General N. P. Pukhov fought courageously in the zone of the Central Front. They absorbed the main blow of the enemy advancing in the direction of Olkhovatka and beat off his numerous and fierce attacks.

Great help to rifle formations of the 13th Army was rendered by the fire of the 4th Artillery Breakthrough Corps and a number of artillery brigades and regiments of the GHQ Reserve North-West of Olkhovatka, where the enemy threw in nearly 300 tanks, the fighting men of the 3rd Tank Destroyer Brigade stood to the death. The artillerymen of Captain G. Igishchev's battery particularly distinguished
themselves. During one day they destroyed 19 enemy tanks.

Bloody battles were going on for several days. The enemy spared no pains to break through the friendly defences. But all his attempts did not yield the desired result. On the Central Front on July 10, the nazi units which had penetrated into the Soviet defences along a small sector to a depth of up to 12 km were stopped. The forces of the front began the preparation for the offensive.

On the Voronezh Front the nazi troops, advancing towards Oboyan, delivered the main blow at the 6th Guards Army of General I. M. Chistyakov. Groups of the enemy tanks from 70 to 200 armoured vehicles with mounted infantry continuously attacked the forward edge of our defences. In the first day up to 700 enemy fighting vehicles took part in battle. An avalanche of steel was literally rolling down on our positions. But the fighting men did not flinch. Everywhere the hitlers came under the well-aimed fire of guns and mortars, rocket artillery and all types of small arms. On July 5, the enemy at the cost of great losses managed to penetrate the positions of the friendly forces only along two narrow sectors to a depth of several kilometres.

In order to reinforce the 6th Guards Army on the night of July 5 we decided to advance to the second defensive zone the 1st Tank Army under General M. Ye. Katukov and two tank corps. The tankmen were ordered to dig in their armoured fighting vehicles and to hit the attacking enemy tanks from the halt. In these battles high combat skill was displayed by the crew of Lieutenant G. Bessarabov's tank. It destroyed several Tigers in one day.

Having lost hundreds of tanks the enemy realised that he would not succeed in breaking through to Kursk through Oboyan. He decided to direct the blow at Prokhorovka
and Korocha. After assessing the situation the Soviet Command decided to deliver a counterblow. With this aim the forces of the Voronezh Front were reinforced with GHQ reserves.

On July 12, our units rushed into the attack. This day, in the area of Prokhorovka, a meeting engagement with the participation of 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns from both sides took place. Particularly fierce battles were fought by the formations of the 5th Guards Tank Army under General P. A. Rotmistrov and the 5th Guards Army of General A. S. Zhavoronkov. Till late at night a never-ceasing din of motors, clank of tracks, roar of bursting shells and bombs were heard on the battlefield. Hundreds of tanks were burning. The sky was clouded with dust and smoke. We won the battle. By July 23 the nazi forces were thrown back to the line of departure they occupied before the engagement. The greatest advance of the enemy on the Voronezh Front was some 35 km.

Defensive battles were still being fought on the southern wing of the Kursk Bulge when on July 12 the counteroffensive on the left wing of the Western and the main forces of the Bryansk fronts ensued. On July 15, the Central Front struck the enemy. These fronts were to rout the enemy grouping in defence in the area of Orel. On the morning of August 3 the forces of the Voronezh and Stepnaya fronts passed over to the offensive.

The counteroffensive of the Soviet forces was a complete surprise for the nazi Command who thought we were unable to advance after such tough battles.

The zone of the Soviet offensive embraced hundreds of kilometres in frontage. On August 5 Orel and Belgorod were liberated. That evening the first artillery salute in honour of the forces who liberated these cities was fired in Moscow. On August 23 Kharkov was liberated and that was the end of the Battle of Kursk. The nazi Wehrmacht suffered a shattering defeat.

At Kursk the Soviet fighting men displayed high morale and combat skill. Please comment.

Well-organised Party-political work played a great role in successful combat actions of the Soviet forces in the Battle of Kursk. Commanders and political workers did much to ensure the high morale of the fighting men. Prior to the battle the political bodies, Party and Komsomol organisations directed their work at explaining to every soldier, sergeant and officer the missions confronting them and at fostering a determination to fulfill them at any cost. Methods of fighting the enemy tanks were constantly improved in the forces. Subunits of tank destroyers were reinforced with Communists and Komsomol members. I should like to note that we attached great significance to various aspects of the servicemen's life: how well was a soldier dressed, fed, etc. Party-political work in the forces did not stop during hostilities either.

During the Battle of Kursk the Soviet fighting men displayed mass heroism. Over 180 of them were honoured with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union and over 100,000 were awarded Orders and medals. Many formations and units were named Guards.

Please discuss the military-political significance and the main results of the Battle of Kursk.

The victory at Kursk was of great military-political significance. Both sides engaged in this battle over 4,000,000 men, up to 12,000 combat planes, more than 13,000 tanks and self-propelled gun mounts, over 69,000 artillery pieces and mortars. During the Battle of Kursk the enemy lost over 500,000 officers and men, 1,500 tanks, several thousand combat planes and artillery pieces. Thirty crack enemy divisions were defeated.

The Battle of Kursk had led to a further change in the correlation of forces on the Soviet-German front; it completely consolidated the strategic initiative in the hands of the Soviet Command and created conditions for mounting a general offensive of the Soviet Army. Germany and its satellites were forced to assume the defensive on all theatres of the Second World War.
The German defeat in the Battle of Kursk compelled the nazi Command to transport in July and September 1943 14 divisions and large forces of aviation from the West to the Soviet-German front. These circumstances facilitated the landing of the Anglo-American forces in Italy and ultimately predetermined its withdrawal from the war on the side of nazi Germany. The victory in the Battle of Kursk inspired the peoples of nazi-occupied countries to a more vigorous struggle against fascism.

The Battle of Kursk demonstrated the superiority of the Soviet military art over the military art of nazi Germany. The Soviet Command exercised firm and flexible control over combat actions of the forces; it thoroughly estimated the given situation and correlation of forces, and on the basis of this elaborated the plans of carrying out the armed struggle.

In the Battle of Kursk the Soviet forces had more tanks, artillery pieces and aircraft than in previous operations. That was a great merit of the rear which managed to supply the Soviet Army with the necessary quantity of the first-class materiel, armament and ammunition.

The victory at Kursk was a natural result of the labour exploit and efforts of the Soviet people guided by the Communist Party.


CSO: 1812/239
ARMED FORCES

TANK ENGAGEMENT AT PROKHOROVKA

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 83 pp 18-19

[Text]

The culmination of the defensive battle of the Soviet forces on the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge was the tank engagement at Prokhorovka on July 12, 1943. Nearly 1,200 armoured vehicles were committed to action from both sides. These extracts from the book “The Tank Engagement at Prokhorovka” by Chief Marshal of the Armoured Forces P. A. Rotmistrov shed light on the course and the results of this engagement.

On the first day of the Battle of Kursk, July 5, 1943, our 5th Guards Tank Army of which I happened to be in command at that time, was in the concentration area some 400 km from the front line. At 2300 hours on July 6, Army Headquarters received an operations order instructing the army to march towards the southern flank of the Kursk Bulge. The army's advanced detachment started movement 15 minutes later. The main forces set out at 0130 hours on July 7.

On July 9, units of the army reached the Prokhorovka area. All the armoured equipment was thoroughly inspected right away. The vehicles were refuelled and brought into a state of combat readiness. The commanders and political workers held talks with the men. Missions were specified, on-the-spot reconnaissance carried out and the terrain studied — intensive preparations for a big clash of arms was under way.

The Soviet Command closely followed the enemy's actions. After assessing the situation, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevsky, representative of General Headquarters, and General N. Vatutin, the Voronezh Front Commander, arrived at the conclusion that a crisis was developing in the enemy's offensive, the latter committing all his forces to the engagement on the Prokhorovka line of advance. Consequently, the frustration of the contemplated blow would lead to the ultimate failure of the Nazis' attempts to break through to Kursk from the south. The enemy grouping that had wedged through could only be routed by a powerful counter-blow by the main forces of the Voronezh Front reinforced by strategic reserves of General Headquarters. It was decided to deliver this counter-blow on the morning of July 12.

The 5th Guards Tank Army, which after arriving in the Prokhorovka area had been (in addition to its two tank and one mechanised corps) reinforced with two tank corps of Generals A. Burdeiny and A. Popov, was ordered to deliver a blow somewhat to the west and southwest of Prokhorovka over a 15 km wide zone.

Late on July 11, while the 5th Guards Tank Army was completing preparations for a counter-blow, the enemy pressed back our two infantry divisions holding the defences on the Prokhorovka line of advance and reached the approaches to
Prokhorovka. Two tank brigades had to be brought up in haste to meet the enemy. His advance was halted. By dawn on July 12, all the main measures in preparation for hostilities had been completed.

From the morning of July 12 I was with a group of officers at the army's observation post located on a small hill to the south-west of Prokhorovka. We closely studied the field of the forthcoming action. By 0600 hours the corps commanders reported that their respective formations and units had taken up lines of departure and were ready for action.

The tank corps of the first echelon delivered the main blow on a narrow sector of the front. To enable the tanks to better cooperate with one another, their battle formations in the corps were organised in several lines. The depth of the battle formations of tanks together with self-propelled guns reached 4 km. We also had a strong second echelon — the 5th Guards Mechanised Corps.

At 0830 hours, following fifteen minutes' artillery fire attack the tank army launched a blow with its first echelon, supported by the air force. The enemy responded with artillery fire, an attack of heavy tanks and a massive air strike. Two avalanches of tanks moved towards each other. The sun was at our backs. It brightly illuminated the contours of the German tanks and blinded the enemy. The first echelon of the Soviet tanks cut into the battle formations of the nazi troops at full speed. The attack was so rapid that the front ranks of our tanks passed through the enemy formation. The appearance of such a large number of Soviet tanks came as a complete surprise to the enemy. He soon lost control of his advance units.

The fighting in the Prokhorovka area was exceptionally bitter. It was hard to make out who was attacking and who was defending. Hundreds of tanks were moving on the battlefield. There was no room for manoeuvring. Tankmen had to fire at point-blank range. Populated localities and dominating hills passed from hand to hand several times.

As is known, the nazi Command staked mainly on the Panther and Tiger heavy tanks and the Ferdinand assault guns whose thick armour and 88-mm guns gave them a certain superiority in armour and fire power over the Soviet T-34 tanks. But having imposed on the enemy close combat tactics, we deprived him of this superiority. Now the more manoeuvrable Soviet T-34 tanks could successfully fight the enemy tanks. This enabled our tankmen to take advantageous positions for delivering fire in the shortest possible time.

By noon on July 12, it became clear that the first echelon of the 5th Guards Tank Army was winning the engagement, slowly but steadily pressing the enemy westwards and inflicting him heavy losses in men and materiel. By 1400 hours the 18th Tank Corps had liberated several populated localities after fierce fighting with enemy tanks. The 29th Tank Corps, having routed the main forces of the Adolf Hitler and Totenkopf SS tank divisions in a counterengagement, had advanced 1.5-2 km by 1300 hours. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps was equally successful in a meeting engagement with the Reich SS tank division. Some army units and formations had advanced up to six kilometres by the evening.

On the afternoon of July 12, the nazi Command committed its second echelons and reserves against the main grouping of the 5th Guards Tank Army. The engagement was still more fierce and lasted till late evening. When darkness fell both sides went over to the defensive. Soviet tankmen displayed exceptional staunchness, courage and initiative in this engagement. The commanders and staffs of units and formations controlled the troops firmly and confidently. Junior officers and soldiers selflessly fulfilled their duty. Not infrequently, their will-power, skill and high morale decided the outcome of a clash. Carrying out the operations order, they fought to the death. Communists and YCL members fought in the front ranks, showing an example of courage, daring and tenacity.

In a counterblow at the SS tank divisions which constituted the elite of the nazi Wehrmacht in both training and equipment, the 5th Guards Tank Army won an important victory. The point of the enemy tank wedge, already blunted during the defensive fighting in the area of the Oboyan highway, was finally broken at Prokhorovka. During one day alone, July 12, the tankmen of the 5th Guards Tank Army destroyed and damaged up to 400 tanks.

During the fighting at Prokhorovka the nazi Command committed to action a large number of Tiger and Panther tanks and Ferdinand assault guns. It hoped that its strike forces would meet nothing but Soviet infantry formations weakened in previous fighting. The skillful regrouping of the 5th Guards Tank Army and its rapid concentration at Prokhorovka were a total surprise for him. According to the enemy's own admission, he lost the meeting tank engagement completely. And although the 5th Guards Tank Army lost nearly 300 tanks burnt and hit it retained its striking power. Several days later, jointly with other formations, it knocked out the enemy, who had assumed the defensive, and put him to flight.

It was the courage and skill of the Soviet fighting men defending their native land, the freedom and independence of the Socialist Motherland, that won this engagement.


CSO: 1812/239
DISCUSSION ON T-34 TANK VERSUS TIGER

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 83 pp 21-22

[Article by Colonel N. Yelshin]

[Text]

The very first battles of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) revealed the superiority of the Soviet T-34 tank over the German T-III and T-IV, whose armour thickness and calibre were under 50 mm. German General Schneider was forced to admit: "The T-34 made a sensation. This 26-ton Russian tank was armed with a 76.2-mm gun whose projectiles pierced the armour of German tanks from a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 m, whereas German tanks could hit Russian machines at a maximum of 500 m, and this provided the shells struck the T-34's side or rear." A higher-ranking military leader, Field Marshal General von Kleist, also conceded: "Their T-34s were the best in the world."

Certain bourgeois students of the Second World War ascribe the German tank-building industry's loss in the rivalry with the Soviet industry to the mistakes made by the Wehrmacht's General Staff and intelligence agencies, which ostensibly overlooked the emergence of Soviet machines superior to the T-III and T-IV. This is in fact none other than an attempt to veil the adventurism of Hitler's strategy, which could not but affect the tank-building industry.

Designing tanks more powerful than the T-III and T-IV started as early as in 1937-38, i.e., long before the German invasion of the USSR. However, Hitler's top brass, whose heads were turned by the initial victories, were in no hurry to reequip their army with more costly machines. The T-III and T-IV being superior to armoured vehicles of other capitalist states, the Wehrmacht was counting on a lightning victory in the war against the Soviet Union, believing that those tanks would suffice. But when the miscalculations of nazi Germany's designers became obvious, the Wehrmacht launched the urgent modernisation of the T-III and T-IV and the development of a new medium T-V (Panther) tank. Attempts made at copying the T-34 were a complete failure, for its manufacture proved beyond the German industry's powers. On the other hand, the Germans made maximum use of the Soviet tanks' best qualities. The creation of a new heavy tank was made top priority, for none of the hitherto developed experimental machines satisfied the demands made on them.

To fulfill a rush order, the Henschel firm submitted for tests in March 1942 a tank designed by E. Anders, which was armed with an 88-mm AA gun. Another tank developed by Austrian designer F. Porsche also took part in the tests. The Anders-designed vehicle, designated T-VIH (Tiger), was found the best, and went into production on an urgent basis. A total of 1,354 T-VIH tanks were put out between August 1942 and August 1944.

Though the Tiger could not boast a rational armour slope, its 88 to 110 mm thick armour was quite reliable protection. The armament of the T-VIH was also powerful enough, its AA gun being provided with a system for scavenging the bore after a salvo had been fired, and an electric trigger. The armour-piercing projectile was capable of piercing an up to 115-mm armour from a distance of 1,000 m. In addition, the tank had two 7.92-mm machine guns.

Thus, the Wehrmacht's designers took into account two of the three basic requirements of a tank, i.e., it had a strong armour and effective armament. However, they ignored the third requirement, namely, high manoeuvrability. That is why the resultant tank was bulky and heavy, it weighed 55 tons and its specific ground pressure was 1.03 kg/cm² against the T-34's 0.83 kgf/cm² and KV's 0.8 kgf/cm². Moreover, it was almost unsteerable on soft ground. Neglecting an important rule of tank building — a rational combination of fire power, armour protection and manoeuvrability — impaired the tank's combat qualities, rendering it vulnerable to fire of the tanks having less powerful armament. This was confirmed by the very first battles in which the Tigers were engaged.

Thus, on August 29, 1942 several Tigers taking part in the attack in the area of Mga near Leningrad got bogged down on marshy terrain. On January 14, 1943 during a fight
on the Volkhov Front the crew of a disabled Tiger fled for
their lives, abandoning their vehicle. The Soviet tankmen
towed it to friendly positions, considered most thoroughly
its merits and demerits, and worked out recommendations
on fighting it. These recommendations were duly taken into
account in designing the Soviet JS-1, JS-2 and JS-3 heavy
tanks, and also in modernising the medium T-34 tank. There-
fore, the Tigers on the Kursk Bulge came as no surprise
whateversoever for the Soviet tankmen or artillerymen.

When improving the T-34, Soviet specialists (unlike Ger-
man designers) firmly adhered to the rule that any improve-
ment must not upset the balance between fire power, ar-
mour protection and manoeuvrability. As compared with the
weight of the T-34 produced in 1941, that of the 1943 make
increased by 4 tons to top 31 tons, whereas its speed
(55 km/h) remained the same. On the other hand, its endur-
ance grew from 370 km to 430 km. Incidentally, the Ti-
ger's maximum speed was only 38 km/h, and its endurance
did not exceed 120 km.

In July 1943 the Soviet forces holding the defences be-
 tween Orel and Kursk were confronted by 2,700 German
tanks, including the widely advertised Tigers and Panthers.
In the Yakovlevo-Prokhorovka area alone the nazi Com-
mand hurled as many as 700 vehicles, including 100 Tigers,
against the Soviet fighting men. Being perfectly aware of
the Tigers' and Panthers' strong and weak points, the So-
viet tankmen developed a special tactics of fighting them.
Manoeuvring behind the reverse slopes of heights, hiding
in woods and bushes and behind buildings, they emerged
unexpectedly from behind covers, fired several aimed
rounds from short distances and went on manoeuvring,
seeking to hit the side or rear. The less manoeuvrable, and
heavier and bulkier Tigers and Panthers were invariably the
losers in close combat.

The feat of arms performed by Lieutenant Shalandin's
crew was inscribed for ever in the annals of the Great Pa-
triotic War. After knocking out two German tanks, he en-
gaged a Tiger. When the gun got jammed, the Soviet tank-
men rammed the German. As a result of the explosion which
followed both the Soviet crew and the nazi perished. For
this feat V. Shalandin was posthumously awarded the title
of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The advantages of Soviet tanks vividly manifested them-
sewes during the greatest tank battle of the Second World
War, at Prokhorovka, in July 1943, when more than 1,200
vehicles clashed in a meeting engagement. The Soviet tank-
men fired at the less manoeuvrable Tigers and Panthers
from short distances.

After the Battle of Kursk Soviet designers provided the
T-34 with a nearly 90-mm thick armour to fit an 85-mm gun
with a barrel length of 51.5 calibres. Its 9.2-kg armour-pierc-
ing projectile had a muzzle velocity of 792 m/s, and pierce-
ed a 111-mm and 102-mm armour at 500 and 1,000 m res-
pectively; a hollow-charge projectile penetrated a 138-mm
armour at a distance of half a kilometre.

The Tiger could not hold out against this tank, which,
incidentally, was designated T-34-85. Moreover, the latter
took successfully the Royal Tigers (T-VIBs) provided with
an up to 150-mm armour, weighing 68 tons and armed with
an 88-mm gun and two machine guns.

Perfectly confident of the invulnerability of his new ma-
chine, designer F. Porsche decided to test it personally in
battle. On August 12, 1944 he headed a column of 14 Royal
Tigers in the area of Ogledow on the Sandomier sector
of the front. Three T-34-85s ambushed the column, setting
three tanks on fire and hitting several more. As a result of
the attack, the designer was killed in one of the burning
vehicles.

The T-34 developed by M. I. Koshkin's design bureau
became the world's most famous tank. It was rightly called
the classic model of a medium tank, whose design under-
lies that of modern machines and still determines the
ways for the development of the tank-building industry not
only in the USSR but in other countries as well. Today, too,
many of its design features remain as original as before.

At the final stage of the war the nazi tried to set up the
production of mammoth machines — the 180-ton Mousy.
However, the Soviet JS-2 and JS-3 heavy tanks carrying
122-mm guns with a muzzle energy exceeding by half that
of the Tiger's 88-mm gun, and also the T-122-mm and 152-mm
self-propelled guns, frustrated for ever the Wehrmacht's
hopes for revenge.

Western propaganda tends to explain away the reason
for nazi Germany's defeat in its rivalry with the Soviet tank-
building industry by minor things. Thus, it is said (and
with good reason, too) that Germany failed to work out a mul-
tipurpose tank engine which could have served faithfully
on the majority of armoured vehicles, as was the case with
the Soviet B-2 engine.

Mention is also frequently made of another miscalcu-
lalion, i.e., Germany unleashing a war against the USSR
with high-speed (but not high cross-country capacity) tanks
provided with bullet-proof armour and weak armament, and
then going to the other extreme — hurriedly building a sup-
ertank.

Though many other reasons are cited, nothing is said
about the main thing — the advantage of the socialist eco-
omy, which created the conditions for the complete ma-
terial and technical support of the front. Along with this,
nazi Germany had no common approach to the problems
of developing armoured equipment, which is fully borne
out by the fact that the country had well over 200 models
of tanks and self-propelled guns. The Wehrmacht's tank-
building industry proved totally powerless to solve the
complicated engineering tasks of evolving new models of
tanks proceeding from contemporary trends of military de-
velopment, which was due to adventurism, haste and
voluntarism in adopting decisions. In the final analysis this
was the reason that German industry produced half the
number of tanks manufactured by the Soviet industry.

Drawing on the wealth of experience accumulated during
the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet tank-building industry
today is successfully providing the Soviet Armed Forces
with combat equipment meeting the requirements of mod-
ern warfare.


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LACK OF ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT FOR WARRANT OFFICER TRAINING NOTED

Moscow ZNAMENOSTS in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed to press 25 May 83) pp 12-13

[Article by ZNAMENOSTS correspondent Engr-Lt Col A. Doronin: "In Warrant Officer Schools: But Experience is Nearby"]

[Text] Considerable changes concerning specialist training, and above all for command and technical positions, have occurred in recent years in warrant officer [praporshchik] schools. A significant replacement of these subunits' training facilities was required in this connection.

A special document determined that responsibility for creating and improving a training facility rests with the commanders of training units under which the schools are set up. Their duties also include making the necessary tactical fields and ranges available to the cadets. This of course does not at all mean that the heads of warrant officer schools can fail to display initiative and rely only on the commander of the adjacent unit. That same document provides instructions to form training methods councils in each school from among the best methods specialists. In addition, warrant officers who are senior platoon instructors must take an active part in the work to improve training classrooms.

Classrooms equipped with functioning models, various simulators, electrified displays and so on have been set up in a majority of the schools in a short period of time. It is for this reason that high effectiveness of specialist training is being achieved here.

But this matter is not being resolved successfully everywhere. Take for example the warrant officer school of the Kiev Military District. It prepares future commanders of machinegun and antitank machinegun platoons, motorized rifle company first sergeants, and specialists in a number of other military professions.

The meager nature of gear available in the classrooms is striking at the first acquaintance with the training facility. They are enlarged diagrams hung on the walls and two miniature ranges which actually repeat each other. There are no functioning mechanisms, no models of small arms or combat equipment, and no training equipment of any kind. The creative thought of unit rationalizers obviously made no attempt to find proper application. But
perhaps this is not required, since the training process is supported by available equipment of the adjacent military unit to which the school is assigned? Let's look into this.

As a matter of fact the neighbors do have well equipped classrooms: five technical and two weapons classrooms in which there is the hardware of vehicles and weapons and even functioning models of combat vehicles. But the demand of the proprietors themselves is so great on them that at times they cannot allocate class time to cadets of the warrant officer school. And overlaps occur when both cadets and subunit soldiers arrive in the classroom at the scheduled hour. Perhaps this is why officers of the warrant officer school try not to wear out the welcome of their sponsors and submit requests to lease the classrooms most often when preparing for exams.

We determined from the class log, for example, that during the first 1½ months of training only three platoons used the unit classrooms once each. During this period cadets fully completed the topic "BMP [Infantry Fighting Vehicle] Power Plant." It turns out they learned the hardware basically from posters. The level of knowledge received from the instructor's dictation, without studying the operating principles of machinery on the hardware, hardly can be termed high.

It is true that the warrant officer school is attempting to find a solution to the difficult situation. Platoon commander Lt V. Pavlov said:

"To keep training quality from suffering we attempt to hold a majority of the classes in the adjacent unit's motor pool, although to do this a great deal of time must be spent going there and back."

Company commander Capt V. Solov'yev clarified that with the help of specially developed operation charts it is possible to have an effective practice of the topic of servicing weapons, running gear and electrical equipment of the combat equipment in the motor pool. It is of course better to study the design of the power plant and other units and systems in a classroom where the basic components of hardware not only are graphically seen on functioning models, but their operating principle also is understandable. Unfortunately the cadets do not yet have such an opportunity.

The inference is that the warrant officer school needs its own well equipped classrooms, but in order to outfit the weapons and technical training classrooms with everything necessary there must be training sets of the infantry fighting vehicle and APC. Only then would there be real conditions both for theoretical classes and for working many practical norms. But representatives of the district staff's armored service are responding to all requests of the school's leaders for now with promises.

But these are the external reasons, as it were, hindering effective cadet training. There also are major internal reasons: the poor work of the school's methods council, which specifically is assigned to improve the training facility. Capt V. Perebeynos, chairman of this council, and Lt Col N. Semenov, one of the council members responsible for rationalization and invention work, believe that it is all a matter of a lack of supplies inasmuch as money is not being allocated to the warrant officer school for rationalization work.
But still, just what has been done by the methods council itself and what specific steps have been taken to solve the problem?

We familiarized ourselves with the school's 1983 plan for rationalization and invention work. It does exist but, as admitted by Lt Col Semenov, it is not being fulfilled. Commission members have not assembled at all on this matter over a four-month period.

Such a situation of course does not contribute to creative initiative from below. And the indifference encouraged from above is acquiring a certain parasitical position among officer-instructors. For example, the school has the only electrified display on submachinegun design, made by Capt V. Krupin. A simple supplementary rigging of it permits cadets to monitor their knowledge: a good initiative which should be continued and developed. But the proposal was given a hostile reception at once by several officers:

"Electrified diagrams are pretty, but inexpedient. The key factor is a 'living part'," one remarked.

"There must be more operating, moving mechanisms," continued another officer. "The training classroom of the adjacent unit has a cutaway model of the BMP and next to it is another functioning model. A cadet looks at them and everything becomes clear to him."

There is no question that well equipped classrooms are a reliable support for the instructor in training specialists, but every officer and warrant officer must do his bit to develop it and not wait for the necessary equipment to be brought in.

Let's recall, by the way, that in accordance with the document's requirements senior platoon instructors (and these positions are held by warrant officers) also are obligated to take part in improving the training facility.

The school has formed its own opinion on this score: These specialists cannot engage in rationalization work; they are not trained. Questions immediately arise as to who is not trained and why.

Obviously if the warrant officers were given specific work and given assignments they would be able to prove themselves. It is not necessary to go far for an example. In the adjacent unit WO V. Panchenko designed a simulator for training gunner-operators. The simulator is so effective in training gunners that Panchenko submitted an application for an invention with full right. Don't the very same kind of people serve in the warrant officer school?

The reason for the passiveness of senior platoon instructors is a different one: the attitude of the school's leaders toward them. For example, while the journal correspondent was working in the unit only one warrant officer, P. Matyushenko, was in the position of senior platoon instructor in the company commanded by Sr Lt N. Shepelenko. Two others, M. Veligosba and N. Kazyuchits, were performing duties of messhall chief and clothing property depot chief respectively. It was of course temporary while the T/O6E chiefs were on
leave... But this fact speaks for itself. The specialists are subject to being snapped up in the school, while they could be doing a great deal to resolve the very important problem of developing the training facility.

Yes, many problems requiring immediate resolution have accumulated in the school. It is obvious that both the school's leadership headed by Lt Col Yu. Demidov and the unit command element running this training institution must change their attitude toward the important problem. The staff of the Red Banner Kiev Military District also should give careful attention to such an important question, for preparation of warrant officer specialists for troop units is a serious task and must be accomplished together at all levels.

Concrete assistance from above is needed in outfitting classes with functioning and cutaway models and the necessary literature. It is also necessary to find forms and methods for activating the creative thought of unit rationalizers and for including not only officer-instructors, but also warrant officers who are senior platoon instructors (i.e., those whose duty it is to work on improving training classrooms) in this important activity. Let's recall that the guidance document stated precisely specifically which of the appointed persons is called upon to ensure development of the training facility. It remains only to carry out the order's requirements.

The party and Komsomol organizations must give serious concern to the problem which has arisen. Their task is to raise people's sense of responsibility for performing an assigned job and correcting the situation at hand by adopting the experience of foremost schools.

And positive experience which can be emulated does exist. Another school is located not very far from this school. It is true that it is subordinate to the Red Banner Carpathian Military District. Over the last two years it was necessary to re-equip the training facility here, and successes achieved by the school leadership simply are astounding. Seventeen classrooms were created through the efforts of the methods council and rationalizers: six for technical training, three for tactical training, one weapons classroom, one for tank weapons and so on. But it is not their abundance, but their technical outfitting that is astounding.

Everything is there, from the simplest device permitting objective monitoring of trainee knowledge to training hardware and components, combat equipment parts as well as several functioning displays of tanks and BMP's.

Having enlisted the support of the district staff, the leadership succeeded in having operational training tanks and BMP's placed at its disposal and setting them up at sites for practicing combat norms.

In saturating and developing the training facility the school command element encountered the problem of a lack of spaces. A solution was found to the difficult situation by deepening the basement of the building and there setting up several more classrooms.

The school's chief technical resource consists of dozens of very interesting electrified displays, miniature ranges, all kinds of operating models and
simulators, and various devices made by officer-instructors and cadets. Sr Lt V. Yermakov and senior platoon instructor WO M. Nasonov designed an "electro-mechanical miniature tank training area." With its help the cadets study fundamentals and rules of driving equipment and they can not only become familiar with the route and features of negotiating obstacles, but also, by operating the simulator's controls, they can develop skills in orientation on the terrain as the tank approaches and negotiates the obstacle. Rationalizers needed only two small electric motors (written off and repaired by their own resources) and a rheostat for making the simulator. The innovators made all the rest themselves. Their other discoveries also did not require special additional inputs...

In the opinion of Lt Col A. Gopt, chief of the warrant officer school, every commander has capabilities to set up a firm training facility, which means to improve the effectiveness of training the future warrant officers. One only has to have a sense of personal responsibility and activate the work of the methods council by encouraging initiative and creative exploration.

It would appear that others also should adopt the positive experience. While it is difficult for some to study foremost practice located thousands of kilometers from this subunit, how can one understand those leaders who take no interest in what is occurring under their noses and who ward off everything new with a wall of indifference?

It is time to achieve a situation in which all warrant officer school chiefs are knowledgeable of what is being done in related subunits. Then they will have someone on whom to orient themselves and from whom to take the example. Higher staffs are called upon to help solve this problem and find the most suitable forms of contact for school leaders for the purpose of propagandizing foremost experience and the achievements of rationalizers and inventors.

Experience shows that each school must have its own well developed training facility equipped with modern technical means in order to improve the quality of specialist training.

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6904
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ARMS FORCES

PENSION RULES AND REGULATIONS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed to press 25 May 83) p 19

[Article by Lt Gen Intend Serv A. Kotlyar, deputy chief of Ministry of
Defense Central Finance Directorate: "School of Legal Knowledge: On Pension
Support"]


Warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] and extended-term servicemen
released to the reserve or retired have the right to a pension for service or
disability in conformity with existing legislation. If the released service-
man has the right to pensions for service and disability at the same time he
is granted the one of his choice.

Pensions are computed from the salary paid to the serviceman immediately
prior to release from active military duty, based on the pay for the last
T/O&E position with an increase of 20 rubles in place of the food ration, and
warrant officers' pensions are computed also from the pay for military rank.
Other payments of monetary allowances, including those of a permanent nature
(the increment for special conditions of service and qualification pay) are
not considered in computing a pension. Servicemen who were receiving higher
salaries for service in a remote location prior to their release have their
pensions computed based on the basic unincremented T/O&E salaries. Service
and disability pensions cannot exceed the established maximum amount or be
below the established minimum amounts.

Service Pensions

Depending on length of service in the USSR Armed Forces, the time and reason
for release from active military duty, and age as of the day released, war-
rant officers and extended-term servicemen have the right to pensions as
follows: for service from 20 to 25 years; for service of 25 years or more;
for service under conditions and norms established for supervisory and rank-
and-file personnel in organs of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The right to a pension for service of from 20 to 25 years is acquired by
those who have at least 20 years' service, with release from active military
duty on serving the term of service prescribed by the obligation (signed
promise), or for age, illness, limited state of health or organizational
measures if they have reached the age of 40 years or more on the day released. This pension is granted to servicemen released directly from flight duty, submarines and minesweepers regardless of age on the day released. In this case the pension rate is as follows: 30 percent of the rate of pay for servicemen who have not reached the age of 50 by the day released, and 40 percent for those who have reached this age.

As of 1 January 1983 warrant officers and extended-term servicemen released from the Armed Forces for one of the reasons given and for whom the service pension will be less than 120 rubles will have the pension rate increased 20 rubles, but on the condition that the pension with increase will not exceed 120 rubles per month.

A pension for service of 25 years or more (with consideration of the preferential computation of individual periods of service) is granted at the rate of 50 percent of pay and three percent of pay for each year of service above 25 years, but for a total of no more than 75 percent of the rate of pay. The right to this pension is not made dependent on the serviceman's age by the day released from active military duty or on the time or reason for release.

The service pension can be granted, under conditions and norms established for supervisory and rank-and-file personnel of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs entities, to warrant officers and extended-term servicemen released from active military duty who previously served in internal affairs entities (for example, in the militia) if their total period of service including service in internal affairs organs is at least 25 years. Not taken into account in computing this kind of pension is the pay for military rank inasmuch as such pay has not been established for the given category of persons in internal affairs entities. In addition, this pension cannot exceed the maximum rate established for junior supervisory personnel of internal affairs entities.

Disability Pensions

They are granted to servicemen who are declared disabled after release to the reserve or retirement if their disability began during the period of military duty or no later than three months after release, or later than three months after release but as a result of a wound, concussion, mutilation or illness which occurred during the period of military service.

Group I, II or III disability may be established depending in the degree of loss of working capacity. All questions involving determination of disability are resolved by disability review boards (VTEK) which are under the purview of appropriate social security organs. Decisions on the connection of disability with military duty are made by the VTEK on the basis of available military medical documents (certificates of illness issued by the VVK [military medical boards], wound certificates and so on) and other data confirming the cause of illness which led to disability.

The rates of disability pensions depend on the group and cause of disability.
Both higher norms for pension computation and higher minimum rates of these pensions are established for servicemen whose disability was the result of defense of the USSR or performance of other duties of military service, or the result of an illness at the front, in comparison with servicemen whose disability is unconnected with the performance of duties of military service.

Granting and Payment of Pensions

Warrant officers and extended-term servicemen released to the reserve or retirement go to rayon or city military commissariats at their place of residence with requests for the granting of pensions, and where necessary these commissariats give them assistance in making out appropriate documents. They are granted pensions by oblast (krai, republic) military commissariats and, in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev, also by city military commissariats. Payment of the granted pensions is made by Gosbank establishments on behalf of these military commissariats.

Pensions for group I and II disability are paid at the full rate regardless of whether or not the pensioner has earnings or other income. Pensions for service and for Group III disability are paid to working pensioners who are servicemen with consideration for earnings, i.e., at such a rate that the pension and earnings together do not exceed the amount of pay from which their pension was computed. In all cases at least half of the granted pension is preserved for pensioners with any earnings, and for Group III disabled persons whose disability is connected with the performance of duties of military service it is additionally no less than the established minimum pension rate.

In the payment of pensions for service and Group III disability for servicemen who served in areas of the Far North and equivalent locations and who remained immediately after release to work in those areas and locations, consideration is given to pay actually being received prior to release, incremented for service in a remote location, together with the percentage increment for continuous service in remote locations.

The pension is paid without consideration of earnings for pensioners employed permanently as workers in sovkhozes and in other agricultural enterprises, as well as those brought in to work at enterprises of the meat processing industry and seasonal sectors of the food industry in periods of mass processing of cattle and highly perishable agricultural raw materials. Pensioners who are kolkhoz members are paid the pension at the full rate regardless of incomes received from work on the kolkhoz.

In addition, working pensioners who are servicemen and who receive service pensions receive additional benefits—under certain conditions they are paid pensions at the full rate if the amount of pension and earnings does not exceed 300 rubles per month. This is the right of pensioners working in positions named in the List approved by the USSR Council of Ministers. For example, those working in positions of workers, junior servicing personnel and foremen have this right regardless of the place of work. Pensioners engaged in underground work, in hot shops and certain other shops with difficult and harmful working conditions are paid the service pension at the full
rate regardless of the amount of wages being received. When the sum of pension and earnings is up to 150 rubles per month the service pension is paid at the full rate regardless of the pensioner's work location or position he holds.

Along with an improvement in pension support, the numerous benefits and advantages established for servicemen released from active military duty, especially in recent years, are of great importance.

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6904
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MEASURES GIVEN FOR PREVENTION OF INFECTIOUS HEPATITIS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 83 (signed to press 25 May 83) p 30


[Text] A desert exercise... Sand burning hot from the sun and the hot armor of combat vehicles. Salt has appeared on the soldiers' clothing, the thirst is tormenting, but canteens are already empty. Suddenly the transparent streams of an irrigation ditch gleam silver.

"Don't drink this water!" warns the company first sergeant.

The privates heeded him; all but several persons. They still furtively scooped up some water and slaked their thirst.

It was only timely measures that averted an outbreak of hepatitis, an acute infectious disease caused by a virus and primarily affecting the liver.

Usually from 14 to 45 days pass from the moment of infection until the beginning of illness. Initially poor health and weakness and some other symptoms are noted: belching, nausea, a heavy feeling in the right hypochondrium and epigastric area, and sometimes increased temperature. A yellowish tint appears in the whites of the eyes and then in the skin on the 7th or 8th day. Urine takes on a dark color and feces are decolorized. In some patients the jaundice may be short-lived or fully absent (the nonjaundiced form).

The illness lasts an average of three or four weeks and usually ends with clinical recovery, but the morbid changes in the liver disappear somewhat later than external manifestations of the disease. For this reason those who have had hepatitis still must undergo a final phase of treatment in rehabilitation sections or centers after being released from the hospital.

The infectious hepatitis pathogen is very stable in the environment. It withstands drying and freezing well and is preserved a long while in food products, water, the contents of lavatories, the soil and on various articles. The only source of contamination by infectious hepatitis is a sick person who excretes the virus in feces and urine.
What explains the higher danger of this illness? First of all, under certain conditions it may be spread widely. Secondly, victims require lengthy hospital treatment and are disabled for a long while. All this in the final account has a negative effect on combat effectiveness of the subunit or unit as a whole. Finally, in serious cases the illness may have irreversible consequences for servicemen's health.

The prevention of infectious hepatitis as well as of other infectious intestinal diseases, depends directly on general military living conditions and on medical and hygienic measures. One can understand what a great responsibility in this matter rests with officers' closest assistants, the warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] holding such positions as subunit first sergeant, chief of a messhall or food depot, and others.

An exemplary sanitary condition of food service facilities, especially messhall spaces, quality washing of messhall dishware and kitchen utensils, observance of technical conditions for culinary processing of food products and for storing prepared food, and the cooks' fulfillment of personal hygiene rules—these are the basic elements of a unified system which places a barrier in the path of the virus.

It is very important for food to be prepared no earlier than 20 minutes before it is eaten, otherwise, in addition to losing aroma, appearance and food value, it may attract flies, which carry diseases.

The overall set of preventive measures also includes those which concern the unit's food depot chief to a greater extent. He must not allow even the accidental contamination of products when they are stored and distributed, especially those which later do not undergo heat treatment: sugar, butter, bread. The depot chief does not distribute products in random containers or in plant packaging, bags or boxes. Food products must be delivered to the messhall without fail in special containers: metal boxes or containers with the appropriate marking: "Meat," "Fish," "Grauds," "Fats," "Vegetables." They are allowed to be distributed only in the presence of the messhall duty NCO. This not only helps reinforce supervision over quality and quantity of the products received, but also helps prevent their contamination.

The messhall chief and food depot chief must take constant steps to fight flies. One of the most effective measures is to place screens on windows. Dipterex baits, insecticidal aerosols, a two-percent solution of Dipterex and other means can be used against flies on the premises, but success in fighting these carriers of diseases is achieved only if the grounds of military posts are kept in exemplary sanitary condition. It is therefore very important to clean up the grounds and toilets, especially outside toilets assigned to the subunits. Arrangements for such a clean-up are assigned by regulation to the subunit first sergeants.

During the hot time of year good-quality drinking water is one of the chief conditions for epidemic welfare. It is very important to remember this in organizing water supply on military posts when water is trucked in and when providing water to personnel under field conditions. In such cases the subunit first sergeants usually arrange its delivery to the subunits, and
messhall chiefs do the same for messhall needs. For this reason they must have a good knowledge of medical and hygienic requirements imposed on the organization of the delivery of water for drinking and housekeeping purposes.

I would like to give a reminder of how important it is to fulfill the regulation requirement for setting up water fountains in living spaces. Unfortunately the subunit first sergeants sometimes do not give this proper attention.

You are drinking water... Among the medical rules there is one that is the strictest: Never use water for drinking purposes from unchecked, chance sources.

Never forget for a single day about hygiene indoctrination of soldiers and developing in them such skills as neatness and cleanliness in everyday life and the unconditional observance of basic sanitation rules.

Experience shows that the conduct of comprehensive steps for preventing infectious hepatitis reliably precludes an outbreak of this dangerous disease among the troops.

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6904
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GROUND FORCES

IFVS ON THE OFFENSIVE

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 83 pp 30-31

[Article by Colonel L. Merzlyak]

[Text]

When the enemy on the forward edge is not neutralised reliably, the battalion generally breaks through the defences on foot. This is explained by the fact that modern defence is saturated with great numbers of antitank facilities and engineer obstacles, and is highly resistant to artillery fire and aviation strikes. That is why one can hardly count on reliable neutralisation of all or the majority of those facilities if the attack is mounted on IFVs. Unhit antitank weapons can inflict heavy blows at the attacking vehicles.

The personnel normally dismount after the tanks and motorised infantry have deployed into combat formation on the assault position, chosen preferably as close as possible to the enemy forward edge.

The infantry fighting vehicles advance at considerable distance behind the skirmish line.

It should be borne in mind that whether or not the attack will succeed largely depends on the troops' prompt and correct dismounting. This fact is sometimes overlooked in combat training. On receiving the command, "Platoon, get ready for dismounting" infantry fighting vehicles sometimes continue to move at a great distance behind the tanks instead of making a dash and closely approaching them. While the platoon is dismounting the distance separating the tanks from the IFVs increases to 600-700 m. As a result the former have to attack the forward edge without infantry support. Should this occur in real battle, the tanks will be destroyed by short-range antitank weapons, and motorised infantry platoon will also suffer serious losses, thus failing to fulfil their mission.

Of equal importance is that the attackers negotiate the enemy's minefields. This is usually done when the artillery taking part in the fire support of the attack shifts fire to the depth of the defences in order not to hit the friendly troops. The enemy immediately takes advantage of this, concentrating the fire of all his weapons on the tanks and motorised infantry advancing on the minefields through the lanes made in them by the sappers, thereby striving to inflict maximum losses on the attackers. Consequently, quick detection and destruction of surviving enemy fire weapons is a task of primary importance. The fulfilment of this task is largely dependent on the use of fire power of infantry fighting vehicles. Therefore, after the personnel have dismounted from the IFVs, the latter must timely take advantageous positions and, using the accidents of the terrain, leapfrog after their sub-units from line to line. On the platoon leader's command (signal) they must provide fire support for the attackers both during obstacle crossing and in the course of the attack.

Having destroyed the enemy at strong points on the forward edge of the battle area, the IFVs advance to their sub-units and support them by fire, moving from cover to cover.

Combination of fire and movement as well as uninterrupted cooperation between the attacking tanks,
motorised infantry and IFVs plays an exceptionally important role. Experience has shown that when the IFVs advance within the motorised infantry formations, the enemy will have no difficulty in destroying them with antitank weapons.

As the enemy resistance grows weaker, the motorised infantry platoon attacking on foot mounts the vehicles. To this end, the platoon leader orders the IFVs to overtake their sections, after which the vehicles slow down or make a short halt for the personnel to mount and get ready to fire on the move. In the meantime the ATGM controllers observe the enemy and destroy the detected targets.

When attacking from the position of close contact with the enemy, the motorised infantry subunits mounted on IFVs take an initial position in close proximity of the enemy, with the troops taking cover in the trenches and the vehicles stationed on the fire positions in a manner permitting ATGM and gun fire support of friendly subunits. During fire preparation the IFVs destroy targets on the forward edge and in the immediate depth of the defences. In attacking from the position of close contact with the enemy the vehicles' actions are similar to those of the attack on the move.

An attack on IFVs will not succeed unless the enemy defences are reliably neutralised and the bulk of his antitank weapons is destroyed. The personnel load the vehicles after fire preparation. To diminish losses from the fire of surviving antitank weapons, particularly in close combat, the attack is carried out at a fast pace and at great speeds. The IFVs closely follow the tanks and penetrate jointly with them into the depth of the enemy defences.

Carrying out active reconnaissance, subunit commanders ascertain the nature of the enemy defences on the immediate lines, the degree of engineer organisation of strong points, his strength and composition, and, proceeding from this, take decisions on the methods of further actions. If the enemy occupies organised defence positions, the subunit commander orders the troops to attack on foot, without waiting for the senior commander's instructions.

Attack of an intermediate line with the troops mounted on IFVs is practicable in the event the enemy defences and fire systems are not organised, and there are no mine fields before the forward edge.

When pursuing a retreating enemy, IFV-mounted motorised infantry subunits forestall him in approaching the most important lines, capturing road junctions, mountain passes and other crossings to prevent him from consolidating and checking the attackers' advance.

Motorised infantry's actions in the mountains depend on the relief. If the terrain is inaccessible to tanks and IFVs, motorised infantry subunits advance on foot independently, tanks and IFVs supporting them by fire from stationary positions. After negotiating difficult sectors of the terrain the motorised infantry move forward and advance within combat formations of the tanks or in front of them.

On a mountain plateau or in a valley, i.e., on open level ground, the attack proceeds as in ordinary conditions.

When attacking from a height with a multi-tier arrangement of positions, the enemy's fire weapons and manpower are neutralised on all tiers at the same time. It is most important to see that IFVs and tanks keep close fire contact with the artillery and antitank facilities.

When acting in a desert, motorised infantry subunits take advantage of the gaps and exposed flanks in the enemy defences so as to advance swiftly into the depth and resolutely attack the strong points from the rear.

Movement to the assault line is carried out on a road, a trail or in the most accessible sector. A column of IFVs proceeds at greater distances between individual vehicles, because sand and dust raised by them hamper observation and orientation for the drivers and the remaining personnel.

Depending on the terrain conditions, motorised infantry can attack either in conjunction with the tanks and IFVs or independently. On sectors where enemy strong points are not sufficiently neutralised motorised infantry subunits attack following the tanks on foot, and IFVs, moving behind the skirmish line. On difficult ground (salines, quicksands, a ramified network of irrigation ditches and canals) motorised infantry subunits attack independently on foot, whereas tanks and IFVs move on roads in a column.

Dry salt marshes are usually crossed on foot. When encountering an obstacle, tanks, IFVs and artillery come to a halt, firing at the enemy to support the attacking subunits. Having destroyed the enemy, tanks and IFVs bypass hardly accessible sectors of the terrain and move on.

Such are the main principles of using IFVs on an offensive.


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ENGAGING LOW-FLYING TARGETS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 83 pp 34-35

[Article by Major G. Belostotsky]

During a tactical exercise the air “enemy” tried to break through to the defended objective. Single and multiple targets were approaching it at various altitudes employing active and passive jamming and using different manoeuvres and other methods to penetrate the air defence system. But the missilemen were on the alert. Every time the “enemy” tried to approach the objective he was met with accurate training launchings of missiles.

However, during one of the raids a critical situation suddenly arose. While tracking a target, operator Private R. Gostiyev detected one more hardly visible but characteristic target blip. The experienced soldier instantly assessed the situation and understood that it was an “enemy” aircraft. The plane was flying at an extremely low altitude and therefore the reconnaissance means were unable to detect it in time. Such a case had been provided for and mastered by practice many times in the training of the command post crew. Therefore, it did not take the missilemen unawares. Having heard the report of Private Gostiyev, Captain A. Shuludko redirected the AD missile system and informed the commander about it. The latter approved the decision of the guidance control officer. As a result the “enemy’s” plan was foiled. The actions of the missilemen during this tactical exercise were rightly praised by the command.

To successfully engage low-flying targets every specialist should possess excellent training standards. If the operator had failed to notice the new blip or had doubts as to its identity, and if the guidance control officer had hesitated, the time required to prepare exact data would have been lost and, as a result, the kill probability would have decreased.

Such situations arise when “enemy” aircraft “press” to the ground and therefore remain for a long time outside the field of view of target designation radars. It is not an easy task to lock on such targets because their blips on radar scopes are hardly visible. Besides, additional interferences result in multiple ground clutters on the scope. One more fact should be taken into consideration. According to
foreign press reports, during combat operations in Vietnam and the Middle East attempts to break through the air defence system were usually preceded by diversionary air attacks and manoeuvres performed at medium and high altitudes. The case we have just considered is rather instructive. Experience has proven that to be able to timely destroy a surprise low-flying target the crew must always be psychologically ready to fulfill such a complicated task. That is why lessons and drills should be organised with due regard for this factor.

In the AD missile unit where Captain Sheludko serves it became a rule to plan the surprise appearance of low-flying aircraft when preparing for any routine training. As the crew's tactical training level rises, the tactical situation in which the air raid takes place is gradually made more complicated while the time allotted for the engagement of air targets is reduced. It should be noted that none of the crew members, the fire control officer included, knows when the next "raid" will begin and how it will develop. Thus, during the lessons every crew member experiences a high psychological stress and learns how to operate in complicated situations.

As the time during which a low-flying target stays within the field of fire may be extremely short, the preliminary (prior to detecting the enemy) preparation for firing becomes especially significant. The -preparation procedure includes such elements as positioning missile guidance station aerials in the direction of a probable target approach, switching over various equipment assemblies into a corresponding mode of operation, preliminary preparation of initial data for various tracking and firing techniques, etc. Special responsibility rests with fire and guidance control officers who should be well versed in modern air attack weapons and probable methods of using them, as well as in the capabilities of an AD missile system to fight them with due regard for the position occupied. Before starting to train specialists, those who act as fire and guidance control officers should study on the map probable flight routes of low-flying targets, and the influence of the accidents of terrain and echo signals from terrain features on their detection and tracking. This promotes objective evaluation of one's own capabilities and permits prognostication of enemy actions. Skillful use of warning data, correct organisation of target searching and analysis of air situation data are also of great importance.

Much attention is paid in the unit to the training of manual tracking operators. They are taught to track a target with a high degree of accuracy, process target designation data without delay and quickly respond to commands received. If the training standard of the manual tracking operator is not high enough, he will not be able to follow the dynamics of combat, correctly assess the air situation ob-
served on the screen, collect himself to the utmost, act resolutely and display initiative.

In order to cultivate the necessary combat and psychological qualities in his men Captain Sheludko, master of combat qualification, tries from the very first lessons to make his men aware of their actions. He never accelerates the process of attaining automatism in the actions of his subordinates while tracking targets of different types, as some less experienced officers sometimes attempt to do. Such haste may result in inadequately accurate and correct actions by radar operators in complicated and fluid air situations. As a result, they make mistakes if unforeseen situations occur. Before beginning to train his soldiers to acquire stable habits in handling the controls, Captain Sheludko familiarises them with the specifics of crew members' actions in repelling enemy attempts to break through at low altitudes to the objective they are defending and other types of air attacks, and explains to every operator his role and place in such combat. He directs their attention to the fact that low-flying targets should always be given particular consideration and that timely reporting about their appearance is instrumental to the success of the missions assigned. Besides, the blips of such targets on the screen as a rule change their shape and sometimes disappear entirely. In this situation much depends on the operator's self-control and his ability to anticipate the target flight course. To make his explanations more convincing, the guidance control officer backs them with concrete examples taken from tactical exercises and shooting practice on gunnery ranges where similar situations have occurred.

Elucidation of the peculiarities of engaging low-flying targets combined with explanations of the sequence of actions during air attacks of various types and everyday practice yield good results. Within a short period of time Captain Sheludko's subordinates learn their jobs.

Before every training lesson the guidance officer carefully adjusts imitators and elaborates corresponding narratives. As a result every training session contains instructive situations. The operators improve their target tracking habits while simultaneously solving various tactical problems. The servicemen's attention is always strained; they learn to be always ready to counter surprise actions of the enemy, this factor being of great importance in modern combat. Immediately after training the captain makes a critique during which he analyses the causes of mistakes and gives recommendations how to eliminate them.

The experience of this subunit proves once again that maximum efficiency of drills and lessons is achieved when two interconnected problems are solved at a time, namely, the problem of achieving a high level of the individual training of each specialist and the problem of ensuring the CP crew's team-work.


CSO: 1812/239
NAVAL FORCES

NAVAL AIR DEFENSE UNIT EXERCISE DESCRIBED

Kiev PATRIOT BAT'KIVSHCHYNY in Ukrainian 12 Jun 83 p 3

[Article by WO A. Tambovtsev: Missile Autograph]

[Text] The ship's crew had the mission of entering the designated area undetected, finding a low-flying, high-speed target, and destroying it. The anti-aircraft missile battery commander, Sr Lt V. Kulikov, gathered his men for a short briefing session. He related the conditions of the firing exercise, warned the radar operators that it would be difficult to spot the target, and called upon them to display a high degree of alertness on watch.

The battery commander's words evoked enthusiastic response in the men's hearts. Intensive work was in smooth progress at the action stations and in the ship's spaces. The missile crewmen inspected the weapons and electronics strictly according to procedures, checked to make sure that equipment was operating continuously and in a stable manner, and rehearsed different variants of "aggressor" actions.

Officer Kulikov was also working in a purposeful manner. Profoundly convinced that success in battle depends on each and every crew member, he toured the departments. Engine-room personnel, damage-control personnel, electrician's mates, radiotelegraph operators and helmsman-signalmen assured him that they would do their part to ensure successful performance of the mock engagement.

Senior Lieutenant Kulikov is an outstanding officer. Recently he has improved appreciably in his tactical, weapon and specialized skills, and has shown himself to be a good organizer and indoctrinator of his men. A friendly individual, he can quickly establish contact with others and is able to inspire them to good performances. This has gained him deserved respect among the crew. Weapons department Communists elected him their secretary.

The ship weighed anchor and put out to sea. The ship was met by gale-force winds, which then began to abate. The horizon was obscured by rain clouds. In spite of the adverse weather conditions, work at the various stations did not stop for a single moment. The men were making final preparations, readying the missile system for combat. NCO in charge WO A. Myronenko had a lot to do at this moment. He displays an example in all things. And how could it be otherwise! For he, just as he had pledged in honor of Victory Day,
had earned a master proficiency rating and had mastered a related MOS. PO 1st Class V. Remizov and Sn Yu. Zlenko, emulating him, are achieving excellent performances in their training.

The successes in the combat performance improvement of the missile crewmen are obvious. Officer Kulikov clearly understands, however, that it is not easy to win victory in today's conditions, when the adversary is equipped with the most modern weapons and detection gear. This is why the men worked on learning smooth coordination of actions at drills and training sessions in base and at sea, while practicing the component element of a missile attack, acquiring the skills of searching for targets in conditions of jamming, with a considerable worsening of radar surveillance capability.

Of course things did not always go smoothly. For example, ranging radar operator PO 1st Class Remizov, formerly a launcher technician, was able to detect targets fairly easily in uncomplicated conditions. But as soon as three or four blips appeared on the scope, Viktor would become confused and mix up his sequence of actions. He was unable precisely to determine which blip was the actual target and which were spurious targets.

At the advice of the battery commander, Warrant Officer Myronenko began working with Remizov. A simulator was employed in order rapidly to pinpoint his weak areas. As training progressed, Myronenko explained to his subordinate how a target is classified, how to overcome jamming while tracking a target, and required that Remizov perform with smoothness and precision, and that he report the movement parameters of the simulated adversary promptly and without error. This practical training continued until Remizov learned to perform search, target detection and classification with proficiency.

The ship was approaching the area of operations of "aggressor" air forces. The alarm sounded. Senior Lieutenant Kulikov, Petty Officer 1st Class Remizov, and Seaman Zlenko quickly took their places in the weapons control area. Warrant Officer Myronenko took his station at the radar. There at the very edge of the screen he saw three blips. Two of them were weak returns, while the third was brighter, and was noticeably altering its movement parameters. Displaying a high degree of alertness, he was doing a good job. The experience he had acquired at the practice sessions, which were conducted in a situation approximating actual combat, told the operator that he should track the third blip.

Myronenko instructed Remizov to bring the blip into the range strobe, and he pushed a button. The target was now being automatically tracked. Officer Kulikov, who was at the fire control console, took readings from the instrument dials and reported the movement parameters of the detected "aggressor" to the ship's commanding officer on the bridge. The latter made the decision that the target being tracked should be brought down with a missile.

What was going through Senior Lieutenant Kulikov's mind during these tense moments? Perhaps he was remembering the letter from his parents which he had received the previous day. In that letter Vladimir Mikhaylovich, a mechanical engineer at the ZaporozhTransformer Association, and Mariya Ivanovna, an engineer at a design institute, wrote Valeriy: "Dear son! We
remember how enthusiastically you studied at DOSAAF school, learning the rudiments of military affairs. We imagine that all this has come in useful to you in the navy."

Or perhaps Kulikov was thinking about how he had taken part in earlier mock engagements, which had earned him unquestioned respect and the title of commander of the ship's best missile battery.

Missile attack!

The ship executed a maneuver, and then took its attack course. The culmination moment of the engagement was nearing -- launch. Things were proceeding smoothly and with precision in the weapons control area. The men flawlessly executed every order by their battery commander. Myronenko, Remizov, and Zlenko were holding the target firm in the "grip" of an electromagnetic beam. And no matter how hard the "aggressor" attempted to conceal his position with jamming, he was unable to do so.

Warrant Officer Myronenko reported that the target was rapidly closing. Lights on the weapon control panel flashed on: "Stand by," "Target in Range," "Launcher Ready." The battery commander of course was a bit nervous, but he was performing with decisiveness and precision. He was filled with a single desire -- to engage and defeat the enemy. Selecting the most effective variant, he pushed the firing button. The ship shuddered slightly. It was enveloped in a cloud of exhaust smoke. The missile shot from the launcher and headed for the target. The missile showed clearly on the radar screen. Kulikov watched the target and missile blips swiftly approach one another. A flash was recorded on the winking cathode-ray tube.

"Target hit!" Senior Lieutenant Kulikov reported to the commanding officer.

He then went over to Warrant Officer Myronenko, Petty Officer 1st Class Remizov, and Seaman Zlenko, firmly shook their hand and warmly thanked them for a job well done. They had done an excellent job of firing a missile at a high-speed, low-level target.

...The ship continued its combat training mission, while the victorious missile trail could still be seen in the sky overhead. Officer Kulikov's men had left their signature in the blue sky.

This is the kind of job being done by our navymen, advancing toward an important date -- the 200th anniversary of establishment of the Black Sea Fleet and the famed naval city of Sevastopol.

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CSO: 1811/52
NAVAL FORCES

SIDOROV ON PACIFIC FLEET

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 7, Jul 83 pp 26-28

[Text]

Vladimir Vasilyevich Sidorov began his service in the Soviet Navy in 1942 as a cadet. He fought in the war against imperialist Japan, was a commanding officer of a destroyer, a brigade, a division of fighting ships and a large command; held the post of the Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet and was the Deputy Commander and the Commander of the twice Order of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Since February 1981 he has been the Commander of the Order of the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. Admiral V. Sidorov is a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee, and was a delegate to the 24th and 26th CPSU congresses.

The Far East territory is rich in events that have gone down in the annals of the revolutionary struggle of the Soviet people. Such were the mass armed actions of the sailors of the Siberian Flotilla during the 1st Russian Revolution of 1905-07.

The sailors firmly followed the Bolsheviks. In the spring of 1917 the Flotilla's Central Committee was organised. Bolshevik cells were formed on many ships. They became a reliable support of the Vladivostok RSDLP(B) Committee in the struggle for Soviet power.

Together with all the working people the sailors enthusiastically met the news about the victory of the October Armed Uprising in Petrograd, and the formation of the Workers' and Peasants' Government with V. I. Lenin at the head. The history of the struggle against counterrevolution and for the victory of Soviet power and the building of the navy in the Far East is inseparably linked with the name of the great leader of proletariat.

Imperialists of the USA, Japan and Britain who had long nurtured plans for capturing the Far East and Siberia, passed in 1918 from support of the White Guard troops to open intervention. They landed their troops in Vladivostok and tried to use the captured spring-board for attacking the central areas of Russia. The sailors of the Siberian and Amur flotillas were active in battles against the White Guard troops and interventionists.

In 1922, after the White Guard troops were routed, and interventionists expelled the Soviet Naval Forces of the Far East were activated. They played a great role in liquidating White Guard bands on the coast of the Sea of Okhotsk and in guarding the USSR state frontier.

In the late 1920s-early 1930s the situation in the Far East deteriorated sharply. After the capture of Manchuria in 1931 the Japanese militarists began to systematically stage provocations in the areas bordering upon the USSR. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government, while carrying out a number of measures aimed at consolidating the defence of the Far East lines, took a decision in 1932 to beef up the navy. These forces were subsequently renamed the Pacific Fleet. Submarines, motor torpedo boats, coastal artillery and other materiel were transported by rail from the west of the country to the Far East coast. In a short time aerodromes and coastal fortifications were built there. Vladivostok, the main naval base of the Pacific Fleet, was being built up.

Persistently mastering combat equipment and armament coming into military service and study-
ing a large and complicated theatre of naval operations the seamen of the Pacific Fleet vigilantly watched the aggressors’ schemes. When the Japanese military clique tried to test the strength of the Soviet frontiers in the area of Lake Hassan, the ships covered the land forces from blows from the sea and ensured sea communications. Airmen, too, coped with their mission. They dropped bombs on the enemy invading Soviet territory. The defeat of the Japanese at Lake Hassan was a serious blow to their predatory plans in the Far East spearheaded against the USSR.

During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) the Pacific Fleet was in constant combat readiness to repulse the Japanese aggression. Its units and formations in cooperation with the forces of the Soviet Army improved antilanding coast defence. Simultaneously the fleet protected sea communications in the Far East. Part of its fighting ships and of the naval air arm was turned over to the active fleets of the Soviet Navy.

The fleet’s submarines carried out an unexampled sea passage from Vladivostok to Polyarnoye through the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Having left nearly 17,000 miles astern they arrived in the spring of 1943 to the Northern Fleet where they engaged the naval forces of nazi Germany.

Remarkable, for example, is the history of the S-56 submarine (commanding officer G. I. Shchedrin, subsequently Hero of the Soviet Union, Vice Admiral (ret.). The submarine began its road to glory in October 1942 from the Pacific coasts. On April 10, 1943 its crew in the very first engagement sank with an accurate salvo a large enemy transport ship and a vessel. Later on the submariners performed quite a few heroic exploits and their submarine became one of the most celebrated in the Soviet Navy. Today the S-56 is mounted on a pedestal in Vladivostok as a symbol of the seamen’s combat glory. Its compartments house a branch of the Fleet’s Museum.

Over 152,000 seamen of the Pacific Fleet fought on the land fronts. Jointly with the fighting men of the Soviet Army they routed the nazis at Moscow and Leningrad, on the Volga and the Dnieper, and stormed Berlin — the lair of naziism.

The war in the west was over with the rout of nazi Germany. But its second hotbed remained in the east. Faithful to its allied obligations, the USSR entered the war against militarist Japan. While liberating North Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands and Port Arthur, the seamen of the Pacific Fleet displayed high combat skill and selfless courage.

For courage and staunchness showed in battles many thousands of seamen were awarded Orders and medals. In 1965, on the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War the Pacific Fleet was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

Youth piously revere and augment the feats of combat glory accomplished by the seamen of the older generation. Those who today keep watch at missile launcher control panels are always ready to go to sea. The naval service is rich in numerous examples of true patriotism, devotion to military duty, the sacred laws of friendship and comradeship. Keeping a vigilant eye on the intrigues of those who have not yet abandoned their claims to the Far-Eastern territories of the Soviet Union, the seamen of the Pacific Fleet are enhancing from one day to the next the combat readiness of the fleet.

Among the right-flank seamen — winners of socialist emulation — are the crew of a nuclear missile carrier commanded by Captain 1st Rank A. Samokhvalov. The initiators’ motto: “To enhance vigilance, reliably secure safety of the Motherland!” has been supported by all seamen: submariners and crews of surface ships, airmen and marines, military builders and personnel of naval establishments.

Great attention is paid in the fleet to heightening the effectiveness of combat training. One of the ways of handling assigned tasks more efficiently is their comprehensive working out. During an exercise, for example, in the anti-submarine training each arm of the fleet (surface ships, submarines, and naval air arm) tackles also other single and joint missions.

When putting out to sea the personnel are thoroughly prepared at the base on simulators, and tactical briefings and group exercises are carried out. The exercise director and officers of the staff comprehensively prepare for the exercises. The quality of the personnel’s training standard depends on their skill in planning, organising and carrying out with the utmost effectiveness these
or those combat training exercises. The commanders make optimal use of any cruise working up a large number of exercises and fire and course missions. Here the weather forecast is comprehensively analysed and the tactical situation is well considered. In case of a change in the situation, reserve plans of actions are drawn up.

Demonstration exercises and navy championships are widely used in upgrading the combat standards of the seamen. Many combat skills, including damage control are being worked up on simulator complexes and in specialised training studies and classes.

As is known, the fleet is one of the main consumers of the fuel and energy resources in the USSR Armed Forces. The constant increase in consumption of fuel, lubrication oils and electric energy is directly due to the growth of the power available per man on modern ships. Naturally, one of the priority tasks is to save the nation's resources and use them rationally. Here the measures of an educational character are of paramount importance because the solution of this question hinges, first of all, on technical skill of the personnel and their ability competently to handle and maintain materiel and armament in various conditions.

A considerable saving of power resources is achieved by a correct organisation of the all-round supply of the fleet's entire diverse activity. Worthy of attention here is our experience in the annual distribution of fuel limits. Limit books determining the issue of fuel and lubricants for every ship are a particularly useful undertaking. Norms of fuel and power consumption ensuring overall combat training and economic activity are worked up and approved by a competent commission for each consumer.

The working out of combat training elements when ships are at anchorage at their bases, combination of cruises for support with the execution of battle exercises, training cruises with a smaller number of ships, etc., are widely practised in the fleet.

The specific character of service in the Pacific Fleet, to my mind, is that our fighting ships proudly wear the national flag of the Soviet state in the arctic and equatorial latitudes. The seamen work at a tense pace. Naturally they must possess a particular skill and courage, and be in top physical condition. Despite the fact that our fleet has such powerful ships as the anti-submarine cruiser 'Minsk' with aircraft and helicopters aboard and as nuclear powered submarines capable, just as Jules Verne's 'Nautilus,' of cruising around the world under water, the ocean is still the ocean — a formidable element, and only strong and courageous men can cope with it. The men of the Pacific Fleet possess these qualities.

The seamen are piously carrying out the internationalist duty. Many facts testify to this.

In 1972, at the request of the Government of Bangladesh a large group of seamen of the Pacific Fleet was sent to help this young republic in demining port Chittagong. For the first time in practice, in conditions of zero visibility and a strong current, Soviet divers cut over 300 running metres of metal by the electro-oxygen method and set off nearly 200 explosions. Twenty six ships were raised from the bottom.

In 1974 the seamen of the Pacific Fleet carried out mine-sweeping in the Gulf of Suez. Complications of a military-political character, provocative actions by Israel created in the sweeping area the situation of a front-line zone. The tropical heat, sand storms and frequent heavy gales made their work very difficult. In spite of this the detachment of ships swept over 17,000 miles from July to November.

The seamen of the cruiser Dmitry Pozharsky rendered great assistance to the inhabitants of Mauritius in February 1975, when they were victims of the powerful tropical cyclone. During 12 days the seamen of the Pacific Fleet restored 232 km of power lines, supplied hundreds of houses with electricity and put telephone communications into service, repaired a hospital and carried out other restoration works. The people of Mauritius have really come to know and grown fond of the Soviet seamen who worthy represent their great country.

The militant circles of the USA and other NATO countries have taken a course aimed at undermining the established military-strategic equilibrium. They are striving to achieve military superiority, impose on the socialist countries a state of siege, and throw back the forces of national and social liberation. Ignoring the lessons of its own history, the USA is encouraging the rebirth of the Japanese militarism. That is why the 26th CPSU Congress, having contemplated ambitious plans of progress along the road to communism, undertook as one of the main tasks to enhance the country's defensive capacity and strengthen the combat might of its Armed Forces.

The seamen of the Pacific Fleet well understand the entire complexity of the international situation. Unanimously supporting and approving the peaceful foreign policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, they are displaying high vigilance, upgrading their combat training standard and are ever prepared to fulfil their patriotic and internationalist duty.
NAVAL FORCES

ROLE OF TORPEDO CRAFT DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 4, Apr 83 (signed to press 11 Mar 83) p 27

[Article by Captain 1st Rank S. Rodionov: "The Torpedo Boat"]

[Text] Small, fast and deadly—these are words one could use to provide a nutshell description of the torpedo boat, the Soviet Navy's smallest vessel, one designed to destroy enemy merchant and combat ships with torpedoes.

Why have we needed vessels like this, how are they designed and armed and wherein lies the secret of their effectiveness?

The torpedo, the primary weapon in the torpedo boat's arsenal, is a frightening and powerful weapon. Of 498 large surface ships lost during World War I, 154 were sunk by torpedoes, this figure including 14 battleships and 26 cruisers. Of 429 large American, English and Japanese combat ships sunk during World War II, 158 were lost to torpedoes, including 3 battleships and 20 aircraft carriers. The success our torpedo boat crews achieved in attacks during the Great Patriotic War can be illustrated by the following figures. Torpedo boats from all our active fleets carried out 2656 missions against sea lines of communication, launched 378 torpedo attacks and sunk or damaged more than 250 enemy combat and merchant ships.

The first Soviet torpedo boat, designated the "Pervenets" [Firstborn], was the child of young specialists at the TsAGI (Central Institute of Aerohydrodynamics) working in 1927 under the direction of the gifted aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev. It fired a 450-mm torpedo and developed speeds of 54 knots (99.9 km/h). A. N. Tupolev's group subsequently developed a number of other variously modified torpedo boats, to include the G-4, G-5 and G-6. They had planing-step duralumin hulls. We know that duralumin is one of the lightest and strongest of metals. These are very important properties for torpedo boats, because their hulls had to be light yet very strong at the same time. Travelling at high speeds, they strike against even small waves with enormous force. When they attained these high speeds, their aircraft engines imparted to the flat-bottom boats a particular type of movement—hydroplaning, that is, skimming over the surface of the water. This means that at high speeds the boats lift their bow out of the water as if rising slightly to the surface and then rise out of the water. It proved in practice, however, that a broad, flat bottom alone was not enough to achieve the high speeds desired. Designers finally arrived at the hull shape they needed. In the center of the bottom they cut out a special stepped surface we refer to as a planing step. As the boat skims over the water, this planing step gives the bottom less contact with the water and so cuts down on resistance from the water.

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The first torpedo boats fired their torpedoes not forward, but aft. This involved mounting a torpedo in a track running down the center of the boat; all that was then required, put simply, was to exert a powerful force against the nose of the torpedo, thus ejecting it into the water astern. Once the propellers were activated, the torpedo raced toward its target as the boat turned off out of its path.

Tracked torpedo launchers were mounted in the G-5, the first series-produced torpedo boat, which was larger than boats of the original design, more seaworthy and more heavily machine-gun armed. They had a displacement of 17 t and a speed of 48 knots (88.8 km/h); they carried a crew of 7 and were armed with two 533-mm torpedoes and two 12.7-mm machine guns.

Subsequent years saw the design of the large wooden D-3 torpedo boat; the prototype was turned over for trials in 1939. Here now was a boat with an extended range of operation; it could go 366 miles (660 km) from its base. It had a displacement of 31.1 t and a speed of 32 knots (57.6 km/h) and carried a crew of 9. The D-3 carried the same armament as the G-5 but employed a different torpedo firing system, the boat being fitted with side launching tubes. This system functioned by simply releasing the torpedoes from their attachments prior to firing; the torpedoes fell into the water and sped toward the enemy.

The period immediately preceding the outbreak of war saw trials under way of the "Komsomolets"-class torpedo boat, which was also fitted with side launching tubes. As opposed to the tracked and side-mounted torpedo release devices, where the torpedoes lay about uncovered, these launching devices provided secure protection for the weapons. Now mounted on the deck of the boat were two thin-walled tubes with hermetically sealing rear covers. They contained torpedoes which were always ready to be fired; they were fired in the direction the boat was moving, launched from the tube by compressed air or powder gas from a small cartridge.

By 1941 the Soviet Navy had 269 torpedo boats in its inventory, 135 of them assigned to the Pacific Fleet. Combat operations would find torpedo boats, whose primary mission, of course, was to launch torpedo attacks against enemy combat and merchant ships, performing a multitude of other functions as well. They were employed on reconnaissance missions, for landing amphibious assault forces and reconnaissance groups, for patrolling and as covering forces for minesweeping operations.

The difficult testing time of the war years saw Soviet torpedo boat crews perform many heroic feats. They displayed courage, ability and mutual tactical understanding in the combat situation. On July 13, 1941, for example, four torpedo boats of the Baltic Fleet under the command of V. Gumanenko attacked an enemy convoy of 35 combat ships and 13 transports. Maneuvering among the countless shell explosions, the boats fearlessly closed in on the convoy, cut through it, sunk a destroyer and two troop transports with torpedoes and dispatched a barge carrying tanks to the bottom with artillery fire. The war years saw Baltic torpedo boat commander V. Gumanenko, Hero of the Soviet Union, sink a total of 33 combat ships and merchant vessels; torpedo boats under the command of Captain 2d Rank, now Admiral, Hero of the Soviet Union V. Alekseyev of the Northern Fleet sent 26 fascist combat ships and merchantmen to the bottom.

The valiant torpedo boat crewmen A. Shabalin was among seven seamen who were twice awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union. Altogether 36 torpedo boat crew members became Heroes of the Soviet Union, while thousands were decorated with orders and medals.
Our navy's fleet inventories now include a new generation of torpedo boats. They have new combat and seaworthiness characteristics as well as different dimensions and external appearance. In addition to their torpedo tubes, of which there will ordinarily be from two to four, they are armed with rapid-firing automatic guns. Powerful engines permit them to achieve high speeds. Torpedo boats are now capable of undertaking long-range cruises (and, from the point of view of seaworthiness, doing it safely as well). Hydrofoil torpedo boats are capable of achieving particularly high speeds. Then finally, the combat capabilities of today's torpedo boats have also been enhanced by the employment of long-range torpedoes.

Despite their small dimensions, the modern-day torpedo boats have everything one would expect to find on a ship: watertight bulkheads dividing the boat into compartments, crew accommodations with two levels of bunks and small cabins for officers and warrant officers. The tiny galley is located in a passageway. The largest compartment is the engine room, where will be found the engines, compressed air tanks and storage batteries. There is a radio room with equipment for maintaining communication with both the shore and other ships at sea. Located amidships and slightly forward is the conning tower. Here will be found the control station, from where the commander controls the movement of his ship and directs torpedo attacks. To accommodate these purposes the tower is equipped with numerous instruments, toggle switches and all sorts of other switches and a variety of devices and indicators. Torpedo boats are also provided with radar for observing their situation and supporting the employment of their armament.

Service aboard a torpedo boat requires good health and physical endurance. Most importantly, however, it requires thorough knowledge of one's specialty and a high degree of interchangeability among crew members. Torpedo boat crews are not large. It is therefore very important for each crew member not only to be able to perform his own duties skillfully and confidently, but also to be prepared to take a comrade's place at his battle station.

True to our navy's fighting traditions, Soviet torpedo boat crews in performing their patriotic duty are adding their own contribution to the fame and glory their fathers and elder brothers have won in battles for the motherland and keep continually in mind the instructions of the Communist Party and Soviet Government concerning the need to increase vigilance and combat readiness by every possible means and to work constantly at learning everything they need to know to insure victory over an aggressor in modern-day naval warfare.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

METHODOLOGY FOR CIVIL DEFENSE INSTRUCTION, EXAMINATION

Methodology for Instruction

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 8 Apr 83) pp 28-29


[Text] The topic "Giving self-help and mutual help for wounds, fractures and burns" is studied in two practical classes of two hours each. The basic methods for conducting them are an explanation of the techniques of first aid, a demonstration of these techniques on extras (trainees) and practice of the norms. The objective of the classes is to teach trainees to give help to themselves and to others in stopping the flow of blood, bandaging wounds and burns, giving artificial respiration and indirect heart massage, and carrying victims.

Theoretical material is presented only to the extent necessary for intelligent performance of practical techniques. Both T/O&E and improvised bandaging materials, hemostatic tourniquets, material for applying artery clamps, trouser [bryuchnyye] belts, improvised means of immobilization and syringe tubes must be readied for class in advance. Posters and slides can be used for graphic effect (also see inside back cover [cover not reproduced]).

The first class studies kinds of bleeding and methods of stopping it, and the rules and techniques of applying dressings to wounds and burns. Initially the importance of first aid must be emphasized in particular. The simplest measures accessible to everyone, taken in time, are capable of saving a victim's life, preventing the development of possible complications, and reducing the seriousness of an injury or sudden illness. The earlier first aid is given, especially with bleeding and injuries from electrical shock, the more effective it is.

In a number of cases a victim can help himself, and in the shortest possible time after receiving an injury. It is beneficial to direct attention to those techniques performed as self-help.

After revealing the importance of first aid, one then should give a definition of the concept of a "wound" and explain that every wound is dangerous not only because of a loss of blood, but also for the reason of its infection. The
greatest danger immediately after an injury, however, when first aid is given, is that of bleeding. The loss of 1-1.5 liters of blood can lead to serious consequences and in a number of cases to a fatality.

Depending on the kind of injured blood vessels (arteries, veins or capillaries) we differentiate arterial, venous or capillary bleeding, which can be external or internal. The most dangerous is arterial bleeding, which requires immediate measures. The basic method of halting it temporarily is pressure (compression) of the injured vessel above the wound. One must show on the poster the points of pressure on the arteries (and the position of the fingers), and the trainees will locate them on themselves.

After applying pressure to an artery with the fingers, a tourniquet or artery clamp then is applied (on the shoulder, forearm, thigh, shin). A soft lining of fabric is made so as not to pinch the skin. The extremity must not be overtightened. It is enough to compress it until the disappearance of a pulse, and under actual conditions until the disappearance of bleeding. A loosely applied tourniquet where the veins are constricted but the damaged artery is not pressed will merely increase bleeding from the wound.

A note states the time of application of a tourniquet or artery clamp, which can be kept on no more than two hours (in winter 1-1.5 hours). It is placed in a prominent place under the last turn of the tourniquet. The extremity constricted by a tourniquet or artery clamp is protected from getting cold, and is covered warmly (but must not be surrounded by heating pads). It should be noted that the procedure for constricting an extremity with a tourniquet or with improvised means is very painful and is viewed as a forced measure. After this the victim is given a painkiller from a syringe tube.

There may be internal bleeding with closed injuries of the skull, chest, abdomen and pelvis. The symptoms in this case are pain, dizziness, nausea, pronounced asthenia, skin pallor, and a weak pulse, which at times can hardly be detected. An ice bag is placed on the assumed injured area of such a victim, then he is immediately taken to the physician.

The class instructor uses extras to show by the numbers how to apply a tourniquet on the shoulder and forearm, how to apply and secure an artery clamp, and how to use a trouser belt (in the form of a double loop) as an improvised means.

Arterial bleeding also can be halted by excessive flexion (extension) of the extremity (it is desirable to demonstrate this on the extras).

Venous and capillary bleeding is halted with a pressure bandage. There should be an explanation of how it is applied.

Moving on to the second lesson, one must emphasize that any wound, except that from an operation, has primary infection (contaminated by microbes). To prevent its further contamination, apply a sterile dressing—napkin or bandage—to the wound after stopping the bleeding. The dressing is held by bandaging or by sticking it to the skin with a special adhesive or adhesive plaster. Trainees must learn basic rules of applying primary sterile bandages. Never
touch a wound with the hands, remove fragments from it (bleeding may open up), or peel off the clothing adhering to it. Never handle that side of the bandaging material which comes in contact with the wound's surface.

In demonstrating T/06E bandaging materials—bandages, napkins, medical dressing packets, triangular bandages and adhesive tape—the class instructor shows how to apply them correctly so as not to disturb sterility. For example, the bandage must be held in the right hand and the left used to hold the dressing and smooth out each subsequent turn of the bandage. The bandage is rolled out from left to right without separating it from the dressing and each new turn covers the previous one halfway.

There are many methods of applying dressings depending on the location of the wound, but the primary ones must be taught. In particular, show the technique of applying a dressing on the head in the form of a cap, slings on the forehead, nose and chin, spiral and cross bandages on the chest with an open pneumothorax, and bandages on the joints and wrist. Attention should be directed to the fact that a wound is sealed with an open pneumothorax. The pouch of a dressing kit and an adhesive bandage are used as sealing material. The inside of the pouch is placed directly on the wound, then on it a sterile napkin (bandage), and a layer of cotton, and all this is bandaged tightly.

During the class one also must tell about first aid with such a serious injury as a penetrating wound to the stomach. In this case the wound is covered with a sterile napkin, a cotton-gauze ring applied to it (around the internal organs which have fallen out) and it is bandaged loosely. It should be recalled that internal organs which have fallen out must not be replaced in the wound. The victim is given nothing to drink; only his lips can be moistened with water.

Triangular bandages also are used to apply dressings, especially for burns. First the wound or burn is covered with a sterile napkin (or two or three layers of sterile bandage), then secured with the triangular bandage. Triangular bandages are applied to the head, chest, stomach, perineum and the extremities. Sheets or other undyed fabric (cotton is best) are used as improvised means. The Mashtafarov technique of applying a dressing, shown on the inside back cover [not reproduced], should be demonstrated.

At the end of the class it is advisable to explain the procedure for fulfilling norms No 9-11, then break the trainees into pairs and give each pair an assignment. It should be borne in mind that Norm No 9 contains several assignments for applying dressings and each pair performs one of them. In summing up results the instructor points out mistakes made in fulfilling the norms and recommends practicing at home.

The second class practices the following lessons: the concept of fractures, contusions and dislocations and methods of giving first aid for them; first aid for burns and frostbite, for accidents and sudden illnesses; and methods of carrying victims.

It can be seen that the class contains a broad range of lessons and requires precise organization. Initially a brief definition must be given for
fractures, contusions and dislocations and it must be emphasized that it is at times difficult to distinguish a fracture from a contusion. In this case first aid is given as for a fracture.

First aid for a fracture consists of assuring the immobility of the two contiguous joints. For open fractures initially stop the bleeding, apply a sterile dressing to the wound, administer a painkiller and only then apply the splint. The instructor tells how to attain immobilization for fractures of bones of the skull, clavicle, ribs, spine and pelvis, and the extremities. He demonstrates methods of applying splints and improvised means for immobilization with fractures of the shoulder, bones of the forearm, a rib and the wrist. To save time it is not at all mandatory to perform the technique fully each time. It is enough to direct the trainees' attention to features of immobilization for various fractures and to the position of the extremity when this is done.

A tight bandage is applied as first aid for contusions and dislocations. Only a physician is authorized to set a dislocation. It must be demonstrated in the class how to suspend the arm in a triangular bandage and secure it.

Proceeding to the second lesson, the instructor explains that burns can result from thermal radiation, fires and chemical substances. He dwells in particular on napalm burns, inasmuch as the burning of napalm and white phosphorus can be stopped only by plunging the entire burned sector in water or applying wet clay to it.

Blisters must not be opened at the location of a burn or frostbite as a first aid measure. The adhering clothing is cut off and a sterile bandage applied to the burn (frostbite) location. Painkiller is administered to the victim and he is given abundant amounts of warm liquids to drink.

Shock may arise in serious cases with burns as well as fractures. First aid for shock consists of eliminating its causes, administering painkillers, keeping the victim warm and transporting him carefully.

With an electrical shock injury it is necessary above all to "de-energize" the victim by disconnecting the knife switch, unscrewing the fuses, or throwing off the electrical wire which has fallen on him (but not with bare hands). It should be remembered that until the victim is "de-energized" he himself is a conductor of electricity. If a person is not breathing, give him artificial respiration and, if his heart has stopped, give him indirect massage.

A person who has drowned must be removed from the water quickly, mouth and nose cleared of mud and slime and, after he has been placed with his stomach over your knee, try to force the water from respiratory passages and stomach. Then begin immediate artificial respiration and indirect heart massage.

Using an extra from among the trainees, the instructor demonstrates practically the methods of "mouth-to-mouth" and "mouth-to-nose" artificial respiration. Here it is important to arrange the victim properly: Place a cylinder beneath his shoulder blades and move his head back to straighten the air-bearing passages. Blow air into the mouth (with nostrils closed with the
hand) rhythmically, 16-18 times a minute. Indirect heart massage is a rhythm-
ic pressure (50-60 times a minute) on the left side of the sternum. After
each thrust, remove the hands from the chest to allow it to expand. With
simultaneous artificial respiration and indirect massage one breathe-in of air
is alternated with 4-5 presses on the heart area at the time of exhalation.
These techniques are practiced in the class.

Then a brief explanation should be given about reasons for the appearance of
heat and sun strokes, measures for preventing them, and first aid. With a
heat stroke there is a general overheating of the body, while a sun stroke
arises from the direct effect of solar rays on an unprotected person.

In giving first aid one must halt the influence of these factors, remove con-
stricting clothing from the person, place something cold on the head and the
heart area, and let him smell some ammonium hydroxide on a piece of cotton.

A faint is characterized by general asthenia, dizziness, dim vision and brief
loss of consciousness. When first aid is given the patient is placed with
legs elevated slightly, his collar is unbuttoned, his face is wiped with cold
water and his temples rubbed with ammonium hydroxide.

The last lesson is that of leading out and carrying victims. Trainees must
master various methods of carrying--on medical and improvised stretchers
(using a blanket, sheet or coat and two poles), they must be able to use
stretcher slings for carrying a victim with one or two carriers, and they
must be able to carry him in their arms. After demonstrating each of the
methods the instructor explains basic rules for carrying with various inju-
ries. For example, he directs attention to the fact that with a fracture of
the spine and pelvis victims are transported lying on a firm panel, and for
an open pneumothorax, in a half-sitting position.

The class ends with an explanation of conditions for fulfilling norms No 12
and 13 and with their practice. After this the instructor summarizes results
and gives recommendations for reinforcing the skills obtained and for pre-
paring for the next class.

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Methodology for Examination

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 5, May 83 (signed to press 8 Apr 83)
pp 29-30

[Article by Col A. Zaytsev: "How to Conduct the Final Class: A Test for Every-
one"]

[Text] The training year for preparing workers, employees and kolkhoz members
in Civil Defense is coming to a close. According to the new program, it must
conclude with a final class which is a kind of test. This class is held not
only to test and determine the degree to which training material has been
assimilated, but also to reinforce the knowledge and practical skills obtained.
As shown by the experience of training under the program previously in operation, training at national economic sites usually concludes during March-April. Therefore final classes are best planned during May-June and not during September-November as done at some sites.

Staffs are obligated to plan them carefully, considering the certain amount of organizational complexity of holding such classes and the considerable scope of practical activities. A special planning chart must be drawn up for this purpose at each site with consideration of specific production features of each shop and department and the work of the kolkhoz, with a determination in this planning chart as to which structural subunits hold classes and when, and who takes this unique test and where. It is desirable that it be preceded by broadcasts over the plant radio, articles in the large-circulation and wall newspapers, meetings of the civil defense aktiv, consultations for workers, employees and kolkhoz members and, if necessary, supplementary classes.

Thought also should be given to organizing competition among shops, departments and sectors for detailed assimilation of the material and for best grades.

Constant information about the progress itself of final classes at the site and in the rayon is of great indoctrinational significance. It is recommended that photo newspapers, special leaflets and express leaflets be published for this purpose in addition to local radio broadcasts and the large-circulation newspapers.

Another feature of the present final classes is that representatives of the administration and the public take an active part in them along with training group instructors. It is extremely necessary to include medical workers as well, inasmuch as considerable emphasis is placed in the new program on lessons of self-help and mutual help for various injuries.

It is best to hold the class in a training compound (at training stations) or at a CD training point. If there is none of this at the site it is also possible to hold it in the facilities of other sites. Under all conditions, however, the class must be supported completely with training aids, visual aids, gear and equipment.

In order to make best use of training time, three training stations (points) are prepared in advance where it would be possible to give tests simultaneously on corresponding sections of the program and to pass the norms. For example, Point No 1 is set up in the training compound, at a CD training point, in a classroom, or another place which has been prepared for this is set aside. Here trainees' knowledge and skills are tested under topics 1-5 and 7, and norms No 1, 2 and 3 are taken accordingly (Norm No 4 is practiced in an exercise or during special drills).

Training Station No 2 is a protective structure and adjoining grounds in a training compound, in a residential area or at the site. Topics 6, 8 and 9 are practiced here and norms No 5-8 are taken. A sector in the training compound, one of the CD training point rooms, a medical training classroom or other space suitable for this is prepared for the third training station,
where each person can demonstrate his knowledge and skills in giving self-help and mutual help (under topic No 10) and fulfill norms No 9-13.

The training stations (points) are prepared with consideration of specific production features, features of the protective measures, capabilities of the site and availability of a training facility. With this set-up the class at the first point is best headed by the instructor himself, at the second point by his assistant (or an instructor of another training group), and at the third by a medical worker. The training group is subdivided accordingly into three subgroups of 8-10 persons each.

Three hours is set aside for the class, which means trainees will spend approximately one hour at each point, and each subject will spend a total of 12-15 minutes at each of the three training stations. This is quite sufficient to determine thoroughly and in detail the extent of each person's knowledge and what practical skills he has. It is important to remember that all 13 norms are worked during the first training year. In subsequent years they are repeated, perfected and reinforced.

It is advisable for CD staffs of the sites together with training group instructors to develop questionnaires or, even better, papers which would fully cover an appropriate section of the program in preparing the final classes. Their variants may differ, but the essence is the same: to test the trainees' knowledge thoroughly and comprehensively and see that they have acquired the necessary practical skills. Therefore the paper may contain 2-3 questions and the requirement to pass 1-2 norms. Questions must not be abstract, but concrete, with consideration of the features of one's own site.

There also can be a variant where a trainee takes a card at each point, answers the questions and performs certain practical actions and one of the norms.

It has to be considered that in previous training years the population gained certain knowledge and skills, and so questions must not be of basic simplicity as was previously the case. The fact is that now a new population training phase has begun, based on the already existing foundation of knowledge and skills.

Such questions for Topic No 1, for example, can be: Your site's civil defense missions; your civil defense duties; what knowledge and practical skills in protection against mass destruction weapons you must have, and so on. For Topic No 2: What are the most typical injuries that may occur at a site (in a shop) in case the enemy uses nuclear weapons; methods of protection against enemy nuclear weapons being used at your site (in your shop); how will you ensure reliable protection against a neutron flux? For Topic No 6: In which shelter will you take cover, where is it located and how can you get to it the quickest? How is this shelter used in peacetime? What must be done to prepare the shelter to receive occupants? What will you take along when you head for the shelter? What rules of conduct in the shelter must you follow strictly? How do you get out of the shelter if it is damaged or obstructed? and so on. For Topic No 7: What size facepiece of the protective mask do you need? Determine the size of the facepiece of the protective mask (respirator) for your neighbor. Show how to put on the protective mask correctly. Put on a cotton-gauze
bandage. Put a protective mask on a "victim." Decontaminate your protective
mask. For Topic No 8: What is the procedure for evacuating your shop's work-
ers? Where is the evacuation assembly point (SEP) located and what are the
rules of conduct in it? What will you take along in case of an evacuation?
and so on.

Approximately the very same kind of questions must be developed for the
remaining topics. It is desirable to consider what a training group
assimilated poorly and what requires further improvement.

In beginning the class the instructor announces its objective and the commis-
sion's composition, and he points out the training stations and what will be
practiced at each of them. Then he divides the training group into three
subgroups, assigns persons to be in charge and announces the sequence for
holding the class and passing the norms.

After giving answers to questions the trainees fulfill the norms simultane-
ously at all those training stations at which the subgroups work in succes-
sion, with one replacing another. Prior to this the class or subgroup
instructor reminds trainees of the procedure for fulfilling them and he points
out typical mistakes. A norm is considered passed if all conditions for ful-
filling it have been observed. Mistakes are considered without fail in the
grade. If for example a mistake has been made which may lead to an injury or
the malfunction of protective means or equipment, further fulfillment of the
norm is halted. The instructor or his assistant points it out and gives the
trainee time to prepare for taking it again.

Before summing up results of the class commission members give each trainee
an overall grade for the first year. It is added up from grades received for
each question and for norm fulfillment.

After this the instructor assembles the entire training group, announces the
extent to which the section for the first training year has been mastered,
takes note of successes, analyzes deficiencies in detail, points out ways to
remedy them, announces an overall grade for each trainee and names the best
and the laggards. He sets a date for another test for those who received an
unsatisfactory grade.

Results of study of the "Program for Civil Defense Training of Workers,
Employees and Kolkhoz Members" should be announced in an order of the site
civil defense chief.

In mastering techniques and methods of protection, the workers, employees and
kolkhoz members become convinced of its reliability. If they have mastered
program material firmly and keep within the time given by the norms in per-
forming practical actions, then under difficult conditions they will be able
to act confidently and will display high moral-political and psychological
qualities fully.
For the readers' attention.

The editors will begin to publish methods articles under the rubric "For Those Who Teach" under topics of the second training year of the Program for Civil Defense Training of Workers, Employees and Kolkhoz Members beginning with the September (1983) issue of the journal.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

REPUBLIC CONFERENCE STRESSES NEED TO IMPROVE PRE-CONSCRIPTS' RUSSIAN LANGUAGE

Moscow SOVETSkiY PATRIOT in Russian 12 Jun 83 p 1

[Report by E. Avanesov, Samarkand: "The Language of Fraternity"]

[Text] A republic scientific and practical conference on the study of the Russian language was held in Samarkand.

In all the fraternal Union republics, including the Uzbek SSR, most of the indigenous population consider the great Russian language to be their second native tongue. And this is a profoundly natural phenomenon. History has made it the language of the world's first international socialist state, the first historical community of people who say with pride: "We are Soviet people!"

The Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party and the government of the Uzbek SSR work constantly to improve the teaching of the Russian language in the republic. It is not surprising that in recent years Uzbekistan has become the site of scientific and practical conferences on the Russian language, including interrepublic and All-Union conferences. An international symposium on this subject was held in Tashkent in 1972.

A scientific and practical conference on problems of perfecting the teaching of the Russian language at educational institutions of the Uzbek SSR and the improvement of Russian language instruction for the pre-draft and draft-age youth, which recently ended in Samarkand, was valuable and interesting.

Sh.R. Rashidov, candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, spoke at the opening of the conference. He noted that the establishment in the minds of the workers, primarily the young generation, of the concepts of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism, pride in the Soviet Nation, in our homeland, and the development of a readiness to come to the defense of socialism's conquests has been and remains one of the party's most important tasks.

Russian, Sh. R. Rashidov stressed, is the means of communication for the multinational personnel of our Armed Forces, the means by which the servicemen master the modern combat equipment and the difficult military work, a means of enhancing the strength and the moral and political unity of the army and navy. The better the youth of the various nationalities know the Russian language, the greater the
contribution they can make to the strengthening of the Soviet homeland's economy and the enhancement of its defense capability.

The task is one of improving the quality of this work, of achieving not only the further spread of the Russian language "in scope," but mainly of intensifying its study so that our youth have a perfect command of the Russian language in all its richness, so that the study of the Russian language becomes an inner need for each individual.

This must be the foundation upon which we improve the preparation of specialists and workers who will be working in various areas in the building of communism and indoctrinate them as patriots of the socialist homeland. We need, Sh.R. Rashidov said, to persistently perfect both the basic military training at general education schools, vocational and technical schools, and purposively prepare the youth to serve in the Armed Forces. The reports "Russian--a Powerful Means of Strengthening the Soviet Society's Unity and Developing the New Man" and "The Study of the Russian Language by the Pre-Draft Youth--an Extremely Important Condition for Their Preparation to Serve in the Soviet Army" were presented at the conference by A. Salimov, secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party, and Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander of the Red Banner Turkistan Military District.

These reports and the talks and speeches by Lieutenant General B. Utkin, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; first secretaries of party obkoms R. Ashuraliyev (Samarkand), A. Karimov (Surkhan-Darya) and S. Mamarasulov (Andizhan); S. Shermukhamedov, minister of education of the Uzbek SSR; B. Allamuradov, first secretary of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee, and others noted that our state has outfitted the Armed Forces with the most modern of weapons and combat equipment, that the Soviet fightingmen are assigned the task of skilfully mastering these weapons and equipment and learning to make full use of their combat capabilities. A knowledge of the Russian language and its study by the youth in the general education schools, vocational and technical schools and the DOSAAF educational organizations constitute an important factor in the preparation of the youth to serve in the army and navy.

Responsible workers of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Komsomol Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party and the republic's council of ministers took part in the conference.