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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 2224

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BROADENING, IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH U.S. DETAILED

Budapest MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 23 Sep 83 p 6

[Unattributed article: "The Vice President's Visit; Hungarian-American Relations"]

[Text] In Budapest and in Washington; Relationship Between Economy and Politics

The visit of American Vice President Bush in Budapest was another important station in the history of bilateral relationship between the United States and Hungary. This was one of the indications that it is possible to maintain the level of bilateral relations and to preserve the possibility of political and economic contacts even in the extremely unfavorable international political and economic atmosphere. This fundamental value judgement is supported by the fact that simultaneously with the Budapest visit of [Vice President] Bush, official Hungarian-American negotiations were taking place in Washington for the first time at the foreign minister's level.

(There had already been an official meeting of foreign ministers in Budapest when William Rogers visited the Hungarian capital in 1972. So far the Hungarian foreign minister has been in the United States on the occasion of the UN's general session. A visit not qualified as official negotiation with the American foreign minister took place in 1978 when Vance, the American foreign minister, led the American delegation which returned the crown and coronation regalia.)

Difficult Inheritance

This year of 1978 was also a significant stage in a process which began in the early 1970s and could be characterized as the stage of normalization of the bilateral relations. A stage in which—as a result of efforts by the two governments—solution of the unresolved questions accumulated in the bilateral relations had begun—of course, on the basis of equality and mutual advantages.

It is undeniable that from political as well as economic viewpoint the burden of extremely serious and difficult inheritance had to be put in order. Hungarian-American relations were at their low point in the years of the
cold war, then after a very brief "lull in the storm" which produced no significant results, again in the time period that followed the defeat of the counterrevolution. Beyond the well known political actions of the United States this long time period naturally left its imprint also on the economic and trade relations between the two countries.

Within the process of the cold war the United States cancelled the 1925 trade agreement which provided most favored nation treatment. Beginning with 1952, maximum import duties were levied against Hungarian products (together with the products of other socialist countries). Quantitatively the discrimination further deepened when during the course of the so-called Kennedy round discussions tariffs were generally reduced towards other capitalist partners.

For 2 decades, measured by world trade standards, this practically "annihilated" trade between the United States and the socialist world, and within this between the United States and Hungary. (It is typical that 20 years after the discrimination started the socialist countries represented a total of only 1.4 percent in the total foreign trade traffic of the United States.) In 1960 when the Hungarian trade office was opened in the United States, Hungarian export was only $2.8 million and import $1.9 million. Even in 1970—that is, even at the beginning of the already mentioned normalization process—the Hungarian export is barely over $10 million and import is just a little over $26 million—that is, the foreign trade relations were characterized by extremely low volume.

Beginning with 1972 the rate of trade increased somewhat. Hungary's deputy prime minister visited the United States for the first time in 1973 (since that time the Hungarian deputy prime minister has visited Washington on a total of four occasions to date).

Key Year: 1978

Technical and scientific agreements were born in this process between the two countries, then in December 1976 the outstanding financial and credit loans were settled. The result of this latter was that the so-called Johnson law was no longer in force with respect to Hungary, which until then made it impossible for the banks of the two countries to cooperate in credit operations.

The Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States negotiated an agreement in 1974. As a result of this the "Hungarian-American Economic Council" was formed which systematically and with a very positive approach discussed the problems of economic relations between the two countries. Following this, in 1977 the Hungarian National Bank [MNB] opened an office to represent it in New York.

The events of the already mentioned year of 1978 which brought about a favorable turn took place after these preliminaries. The return of the crown was an outstanding and politically noticeable indication that normalization of
the relations has reached a definite level. Signing the trade agreement which mutually guarantees most favored status also took place in the same year.

In his statement to the NEW YORK TIMES at that time--mid-1978--Janos Kadar analyzed and evaluated the relationship of the two countries: "I consider our relations with the United States basically in order today. This is the result of having solved the problems which hindered the growth of these relations. In recent years we have put in order the outstanding financial questions, and the American people have returned the Hungarian crown and coronation regalia, the historical symbols of our thousand years of statehood, to our people. Earlier we have already made international cultural, educational, and technological-scientific agreements, and most recently we have signed a trade agreement.... Of course, the two countries--due to the great geographic distance, differences in size, and the differences which exist in social systems and in other areas--can not be brought onto a common denominator. In spite of this it is my opinion that realistic and good opportunities exist for developing our economic, political, technological-scientific, and cultural relations. Our peoples are not nurturing feelings of animosity against each other, and the agreements negotiated provide a good framework for cooperation. I am also confident that we can use this for the mutual benefit of both parties."

The changes implemented in 1978 closed an era laden with severe discrimination of 30 years in economic and trade relations. Immediately after this the economic relations understandably enlivened. Foreign trade gradually approached, then exceeded $300 million, and the efforts aimed at establishing cooperative contracts conditioned on long range cooperation between interested enterprises of the two countries increased in strength on both sides.

When the new process of sharpening international conditions began and then accelerated, significant efforts were made to preserve the achieved level of bilateral relations. Visits also indicated this effort. For example, in 1982 Deputy Prime Minister Jozsef Marjai conducted negotiations with several representatives of the American political, economic, and financial life; he also met with President Reagan and Vice President Bush. In this same year several groups of the American legislature's members visited Hungary (one of the senate delegations was led by Laxalt, Republican senator from Nevada, who is known to have close ties to President Reagan).

Preserving the Level

In general, 1983 has been characterized so far by preservation of the level of the bilateral relations. In the given situation this is a very significant achievement. That is, there are fundamental differences between the two countries not only with respect to social system and political belonging as well as order of magnitude of sizes, but the positions of the two governments also differ from each other in numerous important—in some cases decisive—questions of international life. And the effect of these differences
has increased corresponding to the general development of the international situation. In the light of this successfully maintaining so far the level of political relations must be valued highly.

This is of course valid also for the economic relations. Three years after signing the trade agreement assuring most favored status, the United States is in seventh place in export in our country's trade with the developed capitalist countries, and it was our fifth-place trading partner in import. Annual trade at this time varies around $350 million. But there are still plenty of unexploited opportunities both in economic relations and in the development of industrial cooperative projects. It is a factor of uncertainty and hindrance for the enterprises of both countries that the American legislature continues to review each year whether the trade relations of the two countries can continue to be granted within the framework determined in 1978.

On the occasion of his visit to Budapest, the American vice president discussed all these issues with the Hungarian leaders and at his press conference prior to his departure he made several interesting references that further progress is possible in certain important—especially economic—questions. Thus, for example, he expressed his opinion that there is hope for reviewing the principle of most favored conditions at longer time intervals rather than yearly. It is obvious that the Washington visit of Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Varkonyi, during the course of which he met not only with Secretary of State Shultz but also with the United States' minister of trade, organically complements the Budapest discussions of Vice President Bush. By the way, the visitor himself characterized the atmosphere of this latter by saying that he now understands better than before the interests of Hungary and its people, and his opinion is that both parties are striving to contribute to the peace and security of Europe and the world through further improvement of the bilateral relations and by active participation in broader international questions.
BRIEFS

CARDIN BOUTIQUE OPENS--A Pierre Cardin boutique opened on Friday at Tanacs korut 8 in downtown Budapest, in the presence of the great French designer himself. To be sold in store, set up by foreign traders Hungarotex and the trading company Modi, are products made in Hungary to Cardin designs, which are also to be exported. Two Cardin fashion parades were held at the Atrium Hyatt hotel in the afternoon. [Budapest DAILY NEWS in English 10-11 Sep 83 p 7]

CSO: 2020/9
UNITED STATES EMBARGO CRITICIZED IN DAILY PRESS

Daily Comments on Economic Embargo

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOŚCI in Polish No 222, 19 Sep 83 p 4

[Article by Włodzimierz Kozłowicz: "Wild West Rhetoric and Gangster Methods"]

[Text] One of the most brutal styles of unarmed combat, where no holds are barred and the concept of fair play is totally alien, is known in Poland as "American freestyle" wrestling. "American freestyle" is in fact a primitive and inhumane way of achieving certain objectives by any means necessary. Unfortunately, some politicians from the country which has lent its name to this style of wrestling are also restoring to similar methods, even applying them in the field of international relations.

The economic restrictions against Poland introduced by President Reagan's administration are proof of this. Their purpose is to prolong Poland's sociopolitical crisis and increase the country's economic problems, thereby destabilizing the internal situation and weakening Poland's important position in the socialist community.

These restrictions include such unilateral and unlawful measures as the withdrawal of Poland's most-favored-nation status, the freezing of all credits for imports of production supplies, the obstruction of technology transfer and exports of equipment, the cancellation of Polish fishing rights within U.S. territorial waters and the suspension of flights between Poland and the United States.

It is quite obvious that these moves were not dictated by considerations of trade, but were intended as a brutal interference by means of economic blackmail—in Poland's internal affairs, one that would involve Poland in considerable losses and undermine its international credibility and its political position in the world.

A Blow Below the Belt

When demagogic lecturing and Wild West threats proved to be of no avail, the United States reached into its "economic armoury." This was a deliberate and treacherous move—to continue the sporting analogy—it was a blow below the belt, calculated to knock out Poland's entire food production sector. While
scaring the world with Pershing missiles, the U.S. administration decided to use chickens to attack Poland. Ancient Rome was supposedly once saved by geese, so perhaps Washington's experts thought that Poland could be brought to its knees with chickens. Polish poultry production was based on battery farms using American equipment and technology, so supplies of grain and feed additives were halted. This led to a dramatic slump in Polish poultry production, which fell by 340,000 tons (74 percent), while production of porkers dropped by 83,000 tons (17 percent). In Layman's terms, this meant that, to compound the existing shortage, the average Pole was deprived of a further 10 kilograms of meat.

Fish are another source of the protein so necessary in the human diet. So the United States suspended Poland's fishing rights within America's 200 mile limit. This had been a traditionally important fishing ground for the Polish fleet, and the fishing rights had been specified in official agreements—they were not just a kind gesture on the part of the generous U.S. administration. For the Polish fishing fleet, this move meant the loss of catches that would have totaled 40,000-50,000 tons. Poland's fishmongers received 10,000 tons less fish, and there were 21,000 tons less fish meal for producing animal feed. The modest diet of Poles during the crisis was thus worsened as filleted and canned fish became unavailable, while the total loss incurred by the Polish economy has exceeded 1.5 billion zlotys. In addition, the smaller amounts of fish that finally reached the Polish market cost more, due to the expense involved in deploying Polish vessels to other regions, including the remote Falkland Islands.

The restrictions on supplies of animal feed stuffs also led to a drop in egg production— output fell by 20 percent, i.e., there were 340 million fewer eggs. Also worth mentioning is the drop in the production of chocolate (down 50.8 percent) and chocolate products (down 37.7 percent) which resulted from Poland's difficulties in importing cocoa beans. However, this is perhaps of less importance, as children receive chocolate rations and grown-ups just have to learn to make do without. The restrictions imposed on Polish imports caused considerable problems in other branches of agriculture and food production. Although these difficulties were only temporary, subsequently being overcome by using substitute materials or ingredients or changing the product range, they nevertheless demonstrate very clearly the whole ruthlessness and inhumane character of the U.S. sanctions, allegedly imposed "for the good of the Polish nation."

It Is Not a Question of Charity

The fact that the U.S. administration suspended Poland's most-favored-nation status, has often been misunderstood or misinterpreted by the Polish public, as it sounds as if Poland has enjoyed special privileges in its trade with the United States, some sort of preferential treatment which denoted a special affection for Poland. The United States gladly lent its support to these opinions, since this was tantamount to saying, "look how much Poland has lost because of the restrictions..." In reality, no special favors were involved whatsoever. All 88 countries which are contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GAAT] automatically enjoy most-favored-nation
status and are protected from discriminatory practices. There are 88 of these countries, including Poland, which acceded to GATT in 1967. Poland's MFN status in trade with the United States was therefore a natural consequence of the fact that both countries are signatories to GATT—it had nothing to do with any good will or whim on the part of the U.S. Government.

The U.S. suspension of Poland's MFN status because of the given political situation was therefore a unilateral and unlawful decision which violated the fundamental principals of GATT and meant that the United States was reneging on both its own general obligations to this international organization and its specific trade obligations regarding Poland. This is a clear case of economic blackmail being used to attain political objectives. These methods are particularly scandalous since they are being used by a superpower which calls itself a defender of human rights, against another country which is in the grip of a deep economic crisis, taking advantage of the latter's weaker economic and political position. This not only conflicts with established legal norms, but also runs contrary to humanitarian principles. Despite U.S. pressures, no other capitalist country has suspended Poland's MFN status, although they have introduced other restrictions and this move was discussed at the European Economic Commission in Brussels.

Meanwhile, these dangerous U.S. moves have set a precedent, demonstrating to many developing countries the risks involved in accepting American aid and cooperation.

They Forecast a 'Multiplier Effect'

In the 1970's Poland developed various branches of industry and food production which were based on Western machinery and raw materials, as it expected economic cooperation with the United States to be lasting and stable. Thus, despite numerous warnings, Poland fell into a cunning credit trap whose consequences go far beyond the matter of repaying the country's foreign debt. According to American politicians, the "credit weapon" used against Poland has a multiplier effect which greatly exceeds the value of a particular component or machine, since the lack of such producer's goods may bring an assembly line to a halt or even close down a whole factory, thus enormously increasing the economic losses of the country in question. In fact, a chain reaction is often produced, involving several factories or even entire branches of industry dependent on Western supplies.

The 'Stick' Was Too Small

The problem of Polish coal is a special case. The temporary difficulties in maintaining regular Polish coal exports caused by our internal situation were immediately exploited by America to elbow Poland out of its traditional markets. The current growth of coal exports proves that Poland is regaining some of its lost ground, despite the continuing partial boycott of Polish goods, some 35 to 38 million tons of coal will be exported this year, an increase of 7-8 million tons over last year.

The U.S. withdrawal of Poland's MFN status costs the Polish economy between 70 and 80 million dollars annually. The economic restrictions have led to a cutback in imports which means that less is being produced for the domestic market, while Poland's exports have fallen because of the high import tariffs on Polish goods.
If the U.S. restrictions had been imposed on materials for the armaments industry, on munitions and military equipment, then this would be understandable. But it turns out that for the Washington administration even trade has become an economic battlefield, where the weapons are chickens, fish, powdered milk, canned meat and fats for the manufacture of soap.... Even family contacts are evidently considered dangerous, since the bonds Americans of Polish descent have with their homeland have been severed by the suspension of Polish Airlines' flights to the United States.... Thus, the United States has attempted to use the basic needs of the Polish population as an instrument of blackmail, exploiting and even aggravating Poland's existing internal and external problems. Trade agreements have been used to exert political pressure. Disregarding Poland's interests, and ignoring its own obligations, this Western superpower first erected a scaffold of credits, then tightened the noose around Poland's neck, hoping that the hungry Poles would trade their ideals and national dignity for some illusory Reaganite version of the Marshall Plan. But the "carrot" failed to attract anyone, and the "stick" proved to be too small.

There Is Also Another America

One can hardly believe that the president of the American superpower is trying to make political capital out of Poland's misery, having no qualms about imposing an economic blockade and resorting to propaganda aggression. Of course, all this is being done in the name of Western "freedom and democracy," while the billion dollar cost of American restrictions will have to be borne by every single Pole. Anyone who tries to profit from another person's misfortune must bear the legal and moral consequences. Superpowers are not exempt from this. That is why Poland is preparing a detailed list of these unlawful restrictions, for we are not the only ones who have a debt to pay....

No one denies that Polish nation is now going through hard times. The U.S. blackmail proves the wisdom of the old Polish saying about a friend in need. The substantial and immediate assistance Poland has received from the USSR and other COMECON countries has blunted the effect of U.S. restrictions and allowed Poland to step up its cooperation with the socialist countries—with partners who guarantee their reliability, stability and respect for the interests of other nations. It is this integration and consolidation of the socialist countries which is the unplanned result of President Reagan's policy of restrictions toward Poland. In all honesty, it has to be admitted that Reagan himself provided irrefutable arguments in favor of this process.

The Polish people would like to believe that the America of blackmail, threats and restrictions is not the real America, a country of excellent organizational skills, industry and big business. Industry and trade are synonymous with reliability and honesty, but President Reagan has replaced these attributes—valued not only in the world of business—with tricks learned from gangster movies. Even an actor should not confuse the cinema with reality, especially if he has had bestowed on him the dignity of being head of state. That dignity is the symbol of America that Poles retain in their memory, the symbol of a country which is a second homeland to many Poles, a country which Poles still want to trust and respect, expecting America to do the same in return. But we won't forget the lesson we have been given in American freestyle wrestling!
Restrictions on LOT Attacked

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish No 219, 15 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Tomasz Bartoszewicz: "American Restrictions: Clipping Polish Wings"]

[Text] The United States Government's unilateral breach of the Polish-American air traffic agreement (which was to expire on 31 March 1982) and its suspension of Polish Airlines LOT's landing rights in U.S. airports in a flagrant violation of international law within the framework of restrictions against Poland after 13 December 1981.

This agreement contained no clause providing for instant termination or suspension, except for cases of jeopardized national security of its signatories. Yet, even the most ferocious mercenaries operating under the Radio Free Europe banner would not, without making fools of themselves, argue that Poland jeopardized America's national security.

Western subversive centers have recently been playing down the impact of the restrictions, arguing that they were only "symbolic" all along. In maintaining this, they do not seem bothered by their own arguments made only a brief time ago that "the sanctions will force the regime in Warsaw to make concessions."

Another trick in this brainwash campaign is the repeated claim that the restrictions were not incompatible with international law. In an 1 August commentary on a Polish television broadcast on the impact of restrictions, RFE contended, "In its barrage of charges against America [the Polish authorities] failed to mention the most important thing, namely that the United States has no obligation to treat the Polish authorities favorably all the time, to give them special advantages, such as granting most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. This title alone implies this is privilege, and it should be realized that Hungary and Romania are the only socialist countries to enjoy MFN treatment. So, the United States does not have to [grant MFN status to anyone], it only may [do so], and this is something Poland's communist leaders must realize."

The only thing which is true in this statement is that the United States is indeed not obliged to do anything of this sort, because international law provides no possibility for exacting even the most justified claims. The present U.S. administration's superpower arrogance implies, among other things, precisely that international law may be trampled. However, it is hard to withstand a feeling that such a policy may easily rebound against American interests. Besides, history books abound with names of politicians who thought international treaties were worth no more than the paper on which they were written. What their fate was is well known, too.

RFE's example of MFN status is an extremely flagrant violation not only of the Reagan administration's bilateral but also of its multilateral obligations. Poland's MFN status is by no means a special "distinction" or proof of America's "goodwill." It is a simple consequence of Poland's joining the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GAAT) and the U.S. Government's unqualified signature under the Protocol on Poland's Access to GATT.
This is why the GATT Session, which is the organization's supreme body, did not endorse Poland's MFN status suspension; in 1951, the United States succeeded in forcing GATT to adopt an analogous discriminatory measure against Czechoslovakia. Today, however, it is a different world, so the United States has not even tried to legitimize its move [against Poland].

The RFE mercenaries, however, believe that Polish listeners can be duped on every issue, especially if it is involved and requires familiarity with international law. Or, perhaps Krzysztof Banasik, the author of the RFE commentary, was too lazy to check the facts? If so, he will surely be docked a part of his pay.

To return to the effects the U.S. Government's unilateral breach of the air traffic agreement had, these definitely amount to more than just the 1.5 billion zlotys plus 1.3 million dollars LOT had to write off as losses due to the closing of the Warsaw-New York air route. Clipping LOT's wings has had other effects, too, even though they are more difficult to express in zloty or dollars terms.

First, some 25,000 people holding valid air tickets to or from Poland were left stranded. Next, the only traffic route between Poland and the United States—a country with more than 10 million people with various ties to Poland—was thereby liquidated. This hampers personal contact, even between relatives, which is a flagrant violation of the CSCE Final Act's "third basket," which America's ruling circles are so fond of invoking.

Moreover, under U.S. pressure, Canada refused to increase the frequency of flights between Warsaw and Montreal, and recently the Canadian Government even cut the number of previously arranged charter flights by half. In effect, passengers traveling from Poland to the United States are facing more difficulties in transit through Canada. A glance at the extremely long list of reservations for trans-Atlantic flights from Poland will suffice for a commentary.

So, what is the real purpose of all this? The Reagan administration argues that the restrictions were intended as "punishment" of the Polish Government. Yet, government members can hardly be said to be visiting the United States in great numbers recently. So the punishment, in reality, dealt a blow to Polish-Americans and Poles wishing to visit their relatives in the United States. But, perhaps this is precisely the point?

CSO: 2600/87
AUTHOR LISTS WESTERN AID TO SOLIDARITY

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 224, 21 Sep 83 p 4

[Article by Alicja Bilska: "Recollections of a Recent Past What Did the West Pay For"]

[Text] From Solidarity's emergence until December 1981, a period of 16 months, Western suppliers sent 18 complete printing facilities, 182 state-of-the-art duplicating machines [each worth over $10,000 on average], 61 typewriters, tape-recorders, turntables, bulk loads of printing stencils, ink, magnetic tape and other technical equipment for propaganda purposes. These data comprise only what was sent officially and was inspected by customs officers.

Most gifts (including money) were brought over personally by Solidarity members returning from the West, and, therefore, were not registered as Solidarity property. Technical facilities came mostly from the FRG, France, Sweden and other Western countries, with right-wing trade union federations acting as go-betweens.

The quantity of printing and other technical equipment to be used in propaganda campaigns, as well as the financial assets supplied to Solidarity, indicate that the Western benefactors wanted to make Solidarity an organized anti-socialist propaganda network subordinated to them.

This Western aid had begun coming in much before Solidarity's official registration or even the August 1980 worker protests. Since the beginning, it never had anything to do with trade union needs, but was dictated by political considerations.

They Paid and Demanded

Assets for illegal union structures had been reaching Poland from different sources and through different channels ever since the KSS-KOR [Committee for Social Self-Defense-Committee for the Defense of Workers] started creating so-called independent trade unions. Coordinated aid actions for opposition trade unions began late in July 1980, one month before the August accords were signed.
The Swedish trade union federation undertook to coordinate the whole project. Funds and equipment were to go to unions that the right-wing leaders of the Brussels-based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU] would find suitable. As early as July 1978, the ICFTU had reacted to a complaint sent by KSS-KOR requesting that the [UN] International Labor Office intervene on behalf of the trade unions operating then outside existing legal union structures.

After Solidarity was registered, its leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the Swedish union federation's services. They decided to entrust somebody from Poland, a KSS-KOR member, with supervision of the gift action. In November 1980, Lech Walesa wrote a letter on this to the ICFTU.

Despite ICFTU's support for this proposal, the Swedish union federation refused to accept it and promptly appointed its own man instead of the proposed candidate to handle the job.

Solidarity leaders were unhappy with what they regarded as too meticulous instructions concerning money transfers to a Fund of International Solidarity of Workers Movements created by the Swedish federation at the time. Controversy arose, among other things, over the location of a modern, fully equipped printing office (this project was never realized) and over ways of utilizing funds transferred for purchases of printing equipment. Those responsible for Solidarity's propaganda preferred more, smaller printing facilities for use by local and factory union organizations than large, high-output facilities.

Emigre journals in the West criticized the Swedes for failing to inform Solidarity leaders about funds transferred to them from the West. "What was resented was that, because of their state's neutrality and their desire to keep good relations with the Soviet Union, the Swedes refused to divulge their role as go-between in supplying Solidarity with equipment and funds," said A. Karazewski, head of Solidarity's Foreign Department, in an interview with the Paris-based KULTURA monthly.

Tons of Printed Matter

While it satisfied the KSS-KOR and the Solidarity leadership, this aid from the West had nothing in common with the statutory tasks of trade unions or with the expectations of Polish workers. Both before and after Solidarity's registration, Western sponsors made this aid conditional on using it for anti-socialist propaganda.

Solidarity extremists had no difficulty in accepting this proviso. The condition and structure of property left by the former trade unions is one indicator of what particular lines of activity each of them had followed.
While the former branch unions left mainly sanatoriums, vacation homes and centers, entertainment clubs and various recreation facilities as the bulk of their property, Solidarity property was composed chiefly of communications equipment, printing facilities, amplifying equipment and huge quantities of anti-socialist propaganda leaflets.

Publications are the largest item of Solidarity property. Only 10 percent of them concern trade union problems. The bulk are political propaganda publications attacking the state and its constitutional provisions.

Of the nine illegal publishing offices operating before 1980, the KOR-sponsored NOW—a lone used some five tons of printing paper every month, printing some 30 books yearly in addition to periodicals, dailies, recorded cassettes, and occasional leaflets.

After Solidarity's registration, these quantities virtually soared. Legal transfers of equipment and enormous amounts of money from the West were of great help in this.

Overt and Clandestine Sources

Data released by the Commission for Administration of Trade Union Property indicate that the former CRZZ [official union federation] and branch unions had a total of $436,800 and 3,147,000 rubles in their bank accounts; this money came mostly from their employees working abroad. In contrast, Solidarity's accounts (which were heavily burdened with liabilities) amounted to a mere $53,800. This happened because most of the funds coming in from the West were transferred through illegal channels and were not properly registered in books. The commission has shown that Solidarity was disarmingly careless in property administration and bookkeeping.

The inclination to give priority to political rather than union activities was growing inside Solidarity as its political image became increasingly distorted. Generous gifts from the West strongly encouraged this process.

CSO: 2600/89
AUTHOR PROCLAIMS SANCTITY OF RUSSO-POLISH ALLIANCE

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish No 226, 23 Sep 83 p 6

[Article by Ignacy Krasicki: "Poland's Alliances Historical Significance and Contemporary Importance"]

[Text] For centuries, Polish history has been determined by geopolitics, or, to put it more precisely, by certain longstanding orientations justified on the basis of geopolitics.

The pro-Western orientation is the most deeply rooted in Polish tradition, and has at various times been resurrected in various forms.

This orientation is based on the unity of Europe's Christian and Latin civilization, with Poland's main enemy being the East, the East of Tartars, Turks, and later Russians. It is responsible for various pages in Poland's history, pages that are both glorious and tragic.

Prussian Guarantees

One example of the glory is the Relief of Vienna, whose 300th anniversary was recently celebrated.

This was Poland's last great military triumph, but it also began the decomposition of the Polish state, a process which was to last another one hundred years.

An example of the tragedy is the Battle of Varna [where the Polish and Hungarian armies were defeated by the Turks in 1444—ed. note] during which the unfortunate Polish King Wladyslaw III fell. A further example is the notorious set of Prussian guarantees for Poland's May 3 Constitution of 1791, which sealed the tragic fate of the Polish state. The Prussian guarantees and the concept of Poland being "the bulwark of Christianity" constitute the concrete forms taken by a geopolitical orientation which saw Poland's only hope of salvation in the West.

This orientation received a new lease of life in Poland's bourgeois second republic, resulting in the adventurist march on Kiev and the illusions of Poland as a great power. It also led to the theory of two enemies, which was proved
totally bankrupt by the events of September 1939, but was nevertheless
continued during the war by the Polish Government-in-exile in London, which
cherished the pious hope that Poland's two enemies would bleed each other to
death.

The victory of the Red Army, the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the fact that
the reins of power in Poland were taken by patriotic and leftist forces—all
these factors combined to put a stop to the pathetic pro-Western orientation
that had proved disastrous for Poland's national interests.

The breakthrough that took place in Poland's political system 40 years ago
indirectly posed the question of what geopolitics means nowadays. This
question was a justified one and still is, especially if one recalls that
throughout Polish history the term has not been associated with respect for
the existing situation in this part of the world, but has represented an
entirely different tendency—a desire to overcome this situation and change it.

It is not only in Poland that the term "geopolitics" has been used to negate
the existing status quo rather than accepting it in a reasonable and creative
manner.

The term was coined during World War I by a Swedish advocate of pan-Germanism,
R. Kjellen, who used it to refer to the alleged necessity of expanding the
living space of the Germanic peoples. This idea was later used by the Nazi
racists, who justified their expansionism in terms of the geographic situation
of their state. The nations of Europe became acquainted with the term when
they suffered the effects of the lunatic concept of Lebensraum.

But as a result of the defeat of the Third Reich and the changes on the socio-
political map of Europe, the term "geopolitics" acquired a fundamentally
different meaning.

In Polish political thought, born out of socialism and in the service of socialism,
the new meaning of geopolitics was linked to the class nature of People's Poland
and its alliances.

What had been Poland's curse and nightmare for centuries, namely, its immediate
neighbors, now became, in the new revolutionary conditions, Poland's blessing
and the basic guarantee of its security.

After 50 years, it seems tragicomic that the government of pre-war Poland
dismissed the existing balance of forces in Central and Eastern Europe so light-
heartedly, and that it considered its Utopian alliances with France and England
to be a realistic guarantee of Poland's independence!

A Secure Place

In these new conditions created by the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, People's
Poland acquired just borders, security based on the defensive alliance of the
Warsaw Pact, and the historic chance of joining its own economic potential to
that of the other socialist countries, which constitute a gigantic market, one
that is extremely important for the future of the whole world, and even now is
very attractive to the West.
The permanent and secure place occupied by Poland in the East has presented the Polish nation with a new and previously unknown image of geopolitics. This is the historic process which is currently underway, a process of putting into practice friendly relations of partnership between Poland and its neighbors, something which is only possible within a community of socialist states with a homogenous class basis and political system.

That new, absolutely positive and constructive geopolitics is called socialism. It is only socialism that creates the incentives for the comprehensive integration in which Poland, an important and dynamic component of the socialist East, receives stable support from its allies, at the same time gaining a position respected both in the West and among Third World countries.

The events of the past 3 years have once again proved these obvious truths. This is not only because the beginning of the eighth decade of the 20th century has witnessed an enormous increase in the dangers facing Europe and the world including the possibility of nuclear holocaust, but especially because of the concrete dimension and form of the dangers posed to Poland by this situation.

Ominous Echoes

During the Polish crisis, we have seen a revival of the old and ominous form of geopolitics, a form that seemed to have been tossed into the dustbin of history long ago.

It was this form of geopolitics that Jan Jozef Lipski was advocating when he proposed a "bridge of friendship" between the Teutonic knights of today—the revisionists in the Federal Republic—and the opponents of socialism in Poland.

It was in the name of this form of geopolitics that the Paris-based periodical KULTURA recently wrote, "The Polish National Agreement [an opposition organization—ed. note] correctly supports the future reunification of Germany. This reunification is historically inevitable and is to Poland's advantage."

Other supporters of these old geopolitics include Michnik and Kuron, who put forward the general line of the United States and NATO in their attacks on the USSR and the socialist countries.

They even dreamed of liquidating the DDR and creating a capitalist German state on Poland's western borders, going so far as to agree to a "limited" nuclear conflict in Europe if this was necessary to achieve their aims.

It is a similar concept of geopolitics which inclines certain circles to call for "a new Soviet policy to the west of the river Bug" and the "Finlandization" of Poland, which although formally remaining a member of the Warsaw Pact, would gradually change its political system.

More devious, although still transparent, are the plans of those who try to capitalize on the fact that the bulk of the Polish nation is Roman Catholic to link this religion to their own ideology. (They used the 300th anniversary of the Relief of Vienna for this same purpose.) In promoting their ideology they use different terms. Poland ceases to be the "bulwark of Christianity," becoming "a bridge between East and West," or even "a Western country among the Slavs and a Slavonic one within the West."
This ideology, although hiding under the label of "Christianity," has no future in front of it if one considers the present balance of forces. Regardless of subjective intentions, it objectively questions Poland's class alliances, thereby attacking the very basis of rational geopolitics.

The significance of the lessons provided by history and by Poland's contemporary situation is absolutely clear. The road to a powerful, just and sovereign Poland leads through the socialist East. There, and only there, can Poland be secure.

This is a Poland which, under the leadership of the party and all Polish patriots, draws the necessary conclusions from its long, difficult and painful history.

CS0: 2600/88
COMMENTATOR URGES EMIGRES TO FORGET HOMELAND

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 40, 1 Oct 83 p 16

[Article by KTT]

[Text] From time to time, I receive letters addressed to POLITYKA from Poles who have left the country recently or somewhat earlier and have settled abroad. Therefore, these are letters from so-called emigres. They vary greatly in their content: some are sentimental, some spiteful, others describe disappointment or satisfaction in having left Poland. One lady, who expressed strong skepticism in the prospects and capabilities of the current "renewal," wrote bluntly that she had left Poland not for any specific political or financial reasons but simply because she is "tired of Poland" and its cyclic and at the same time ineffective efforts at renewal--this is an attitude which I can understand. However, one question comes to mind: Why would someone who is in such a mood pick up a pen at all and write a letter to a personally unknown Polish journalist who has been unrelentlessly taking part in successive "renewals," though too not without moments of weariness?

It is worth giving, I would think, some consideration to the phenomenon of so-called emigration. I would like to stress that I am not concerned here with the issue of Polonia and related matters, which constitutes an entirely different phenomenon suited for sociological research to which, incidentally, several eminent minds have devoted themselves, including that of Prof Jozef Chalasinski, among others. Polonia lives the life of its new homelands and it is there that it tries to be successful, while the rise or fall of its attachment to the "old country" takes on a secondary characteristic as the uncovering or obliterating of one's own roots. However, I consider emigrants to be those groups of people who in living abroad see their reason for being and the meaning of their existence in relation to the homeland which they have left. This is expressed, for example, by writing in Polish and to Poles in the homeland, by organizing political activity with the intention of helping or hindering that which is happening in the homeland from which they have emigrated--briefly speaking, by fostering hope that their activity has some sort of influence on the fate of Poles who live in Poland.

Thus, when I think about emigration in such terms, I sometimes ask myself a seemingly paradoxical question: Is it at all possible? This question is
paradoxical because such emigration does exist and is even quite large, while its political views, which are disseminated by radio broadcasts and various printed matter, are quite extensively known in Poland. I am not talking about the material fact but rather about a certain moral status, a mental attitude more than about a political attitude—about an intellectual perspective.

In Polish cultural tradition, the idea of the Great Emigration lives on and continues to function; this is the emigration as described by Lelewel, Mickiewicz and Slowacki which was born on a mass scale as a result of the fall of the November Uprising and subsequently fed by successive failed uprisings attempts and subsequent exoduses of Poles into the depths of Europe. The role of the Great Emigration in the development of spiritual life in Poland cannot be questioned. However, a question does arise: Why was it capable of playing the role that it did in our culture and history?

Thus, I believe that it happened the way it did for two reasons. First of all, despite the fact that Poland was at that time subjugated and deprived of statehood, as a society, however, it was more or less similar to those European societies within which the emigres of that time had come to live. Especially in view of the fact that the activities of the emigres were directed toward classes which were privileged in one way or another—the nobility [szlachta] and the intelligentsia—it was then possible to assume that a bright Polish nobleman or educated person more or less resembled his European counterpart and what is more, that their living conditions were similar. Thus, in observing the latter it was possible to write to and about the former. The phenomenon of extreme departure from the reality of the homeland did not particularly threaten the emigre of that time and in any case, it did not determine his fate or his mentality and creativity. A second factor which contributed to the endurance of the Great Emigration was its messianic belief of returning to the homeland someday. Various configurations, methods, legions were tried, including the "great peoples' war" [wielka wojna ludow] just to be able to return to Poland. Without the myth of returning, it would be impossible to endure life abroad or to assume control of national longings.

I believe that neither of these factors pertain to the emigration of today. Life in Poland, a socialist country which belongs to the great bloc of socialist nations of Eastern Europe and Asia, in no way resembles life in those countries in which major emigre centers are clustered. Simply put, this is a totally different kind of life which is based on different realities, on different value hierarchies and on different moral evaluations than life in France, the FRG or the United States. The residents of Warsaw and of Budapest are capable, despite language difficulties, of communicating with each other often much better than Poles living in Poland with a Pole who has spent several or a dozen or so years abroad without any contact with his homeland. The former speak of the same thing, although in different languages, while the latter, although speaking in Polish, speak about totally different things. This is reflected in the manner of thinking and even in the way in which information is related by the emigres. In a recently
published book entitled "Bloody Italian Delicacies," Jacek Bochenski—a writer who is presently not among those of the "regime"—wrote as follows in conjuring up hypothetical information related by a Polish-language broadcasting medium on the subject of a hypothetical incident in our country: "It would exaggerate seeming enigmas over which no one in Poland would lose any sleep while at the same time leaving out important issues totally overlooked by the foreign broadcaster. The style of the broadcast would seem strange and even funny in relation to the realistic situation in Poland. This information would include categories which would seem to come from another world and which would be discordant with common experience, habits and already established myths." And this is true. This common experience which is so different here and over there places a psychological barrier between the homeland and the emigres, thus making it impossible for the latter to become "great."

And besides this, today's emigration does not cultivate the myth of returning to the homeland—it simply does not wish to return. Let us add that this is not because of fear of imprisonment or torture.

This reluctance to return has given rise to the ephemeral, though effective, concept of "Poles in diaspora" which I heard being uttered by one of the emigre intellectual authorities. "Poles in diaspora" applies to Poles who do not want to return (as not all Jews in diaspora wanted or want to go to Israel) but who at the same time are Poles forever. This is utopia. The Jewish diaspora was and is sustained by religion, tradition and the customs which are associated with it. It is also supported by an ethnic bond, though often illusory; however, the Polish Catholic who has emigrated will receive religious service from an Irish, Spanish or any other priest of his faith and will celebrate Christmas and Easter together with the given congregation, and once he learns the language he will in no way differ from a German, an Englishman or Frenchman. There can be no "Polish diaspora"; it is an improvised notion without any prospects. Frankly speaking, it is an excuse for not returning.

However, someone will tell me that despite all these considerations, Polish emigre creative works were being produced and perhaps continue to be produced—works which have a significance for all of us, such as those of Gombrowicz, Mrozek, Milosz, etc. This is true. I myself have been and continue to be a supporter of the theory that Polish literature is indivisible and cannot be partitioned according to a particular author's home address. However, I cannot help but also notice that what lives and pulsates in the work of these and other writers is, above all, that which constitutes memories, the recollection of realities acquired from direct experiences within the homeland, from retrospection. The more that this image becomes obliterated, the more this literature becomes rhetorical and generalized. At times it can also become European or universal, just as every verse or novel written in French, Romanian or Norwegian can become European or universal. However, this no longer has anything in common with the phenomenon of Polish emigration which is being discussed here.
I have a friend in Sweden who was swept from Poland by the wave of 1968—this is often the most painful emigration. He once said to me: "Now I have to worry in three places at once: in Stockholm, in Warsaw and in Tel Aviv"... For him, emigration is simply an acute state of suffering and anxiety. Without a doubt, this is the same state in which a number of my correspondents from abroad find themselves, and it would be a shame not to sympathize with them. However, if I am to be frank, then I would advise all those who have gone to the FRG, France, England or the United States and who have no intention of returning to Poland and who confide their troubles to me, that the sooner they tell themselves: I am German, French, English or American, the better off they will be. This will spare them bitterness and frequently ridicule if they should want to judge us who live here. The status of the emigre is today no longer a situation in which one sees further and knows more about Warsaw, Krakow or Wroclaw. Such an emigration is no longer possible, despite the fact that we have so many emigres.
PROVINCIAL TRADE UNION DEVELOPMENTS REPORTED

Party, Trade Unions as Partners

Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 8 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Lucjan Pracki: "The Party and Trade Unions: A Genuine Partnership"]

[Text] On the third anniversary of the August 1980 agreements with the working class, the party has once again affirmed its position on the most large-scale worker organization constituted by the restored trade unions. At an all-Polish meeting with unionists at the Baildon Steel Mill in Katowice, First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Wojciech Jaruzelski emphasized that the party wants strong, independent, partner trade unions that are able to speak out effectively for worker and public interests.

This is not a new position at all since it has been already formulated by the Ninth Congress and further developed by the PZPR Central Committee's 10th Plenum. However, the fact that the first secretary has mentioned the unions on the third anniversary of the August 1980 agreements in the new situation brought about by the advanced stages of establishing the trade unions has its own particular significance. The statements made by the unionists as well as the first secretary's responses to them show that no one wants compliant unions obedient to the authorities nor do they want for the unions to become an instrument of social and economic disruption. They are to be spokesmen for worker interests and worker democracy. This is what the workers and the workers' party want.

"The trade unions being formed," stressed Wojciech Jaruzelski, "are the inheritors of all of the best elements in the long history of the Polish union movement and of all that was healthy and creative in the worker protest against the distortion of socialism. This protest was a timely warning. The present union movement finds itself in the process of forming a new model of cooperation with the party organizations, worker self-management as well as state and economic administration. This is not only a question of interpretation or of defining rules but more than anything a matter of the people that must implement them."
"It will be easier to arrive at the proper solutions," said Wojciech Jaruzelski, "when everyone tries to achieve a genuine partnership, show mutual respect and understanding and negotiate not only humbly, but with raised heads. It is not formal rules that are the greatest hindrance here but human fault owing to lack of experience, bad habits or ambitious oversensitivity. In some cases, there may have even been bad will. Those cases will be dealt with most severely."

The Katowice meeting is an undisputable step toward practical establishment of a partnership between the trade unions and the political and state authorities. The present tendency to unite the union movement in a powerful national organization has met broad support. Thanks to this support, there is now a real possibility of systematic cooperation as partners. Accordingly, the expressed view that proper union demands may not be treated lightly has its own constructive course and results. "In consideration of this," said the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, "the recommendations made at this meeting will be referred to one of the upcoming sessions of the Council of Ministers and one of the assessments of the administration and its representatives will be concerning the relationship with the trade unions and the capacity for interaction with them."

This is an important statement. The attitude of the administration to the demands of the unions is of key importance for their realization and therefore for the position and authority of the unions themselves. A good climate for cooperative partnership in implementing union demands has been created by the feeling, strongly expressed by unionists, of responsibility for not only favorable disposal of worker needs but also a feeling of duty toward "one's own firm, in other words, one's plant and nation," as the chairman of the Steel Workers' Federation expressed it.

"The party hopes that such unions will continue to grow. We see in them a serious, genuine and powerful partner," said the first secretary at the Katowice meeting. "We want strong trade unions because we believe that they are truly patriotic, wise and responsible unions. Having the power to act constructively rather than disrupt society, they point out evils and will always be able to signal in time the dissatisfactions of the workers and prevent another crisis. For this reason, the party so much appreciates and counts upon the trade unions and charges their members to be active in union activities in order to make an example and model of their own attitudes."

The Katowice meeting is the beginning of a new stage in union partnership with the political and administration authorities of the nation.

Federation Solves Transport Workers' Problems

Warsaw EXPRESS WIECZORNY in Polish 8 Sep 83 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Wieslaw Stompor, chairman of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of the Automotive Transport Enterprise Number One in Warsaw, by
(ws): "We Want to Be a 'Wanted' Child of the Department: A Federation Alone Can Solve Transport Workers' Problems"; date and place not given.]

[Text] The abbreviation PTSL stands for Automotive Transport Enterprise. There are 12 of these and they are part of the Ministry of Transportation. The unionists active within these enterprises have called up an initiative commission to form the Federation of Socialist Independent Self-Governing Transport Workers' Trade Unions.

We are discussing the subject of the Federation with Wieslaw Stompor, a member of the Initiating Commission and chairman of the administration of the NSZZPTS [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union of Automotive Transport Enterprises] at the Warsaw Automotive Transport Enterprise Number One.

[Answer] Why do we want a federation of transport workers? It would be better, you see, if all transport workers were concentrated in one union regardless of what ministry they are employed by. This is because this group has the same concerns and interests. Since it isn't possible at this time to set up such a union, we are doing what we can.

[Question] You could form a federation with all of the unions active within your ministry...

[Answer] That isn't the way. For many years there was one trade union and then two, when Solidarity came into being, but we, as a trade group, did not have the so-called push. The postal workers' and telephone operators' problems always dominated. For years, our problems have demanded prudent action and solutions. The situation with us is that we are working with a thousand other groups under the same ministry but we are treated as if we belonged to another ministry.

[Question] I don't understand. Could you elaborate?

[Answer] We do not, for example, enjoy any of the compensation or privileges common to this ministry. We don't get any time off on the Communications Workers' Holiday because we are in transportation. Transport Workers' Holiday comes and again we don't get the day off. Then they say we are communications workers. It's the same ministry but very different authorities.

We deliver mail, distribute newspapers, and provide transportation services for telephone operations, telecommunications, radio stations and construction. We could, for example, carry potatoes or coal for other agencies. That is, after all, the nature of automotive transport. However, if we work for that department, we belong to it and we don't see any reason why we should have it so much worse than other drivers in the country.

We feel that we will become stronger as a professional group by forming a federation. Then we will be able to handle our problems within the Communications Ministry but we must also bring into this the health, transportation and other departments.
[Question] You can solve your problems, negotiate and consult within a section in one federation of communications workers...

[Answer] Theoretically, yes. We do fear, however, that as in past years, we will again accomplish nothing or very little. Section activity limits the possibilities of going beyond our own ministry. People want to work in good conditions and earn what they deserve... We feel that we need to have negotiators. In our opinion, we are going about things the best way.

From my own experience and that of my colleagues, I know that a driver has to "wring out" 300 hours of work a month to earn 12,000 zlotys and, moreover, he has to be an escort and porter for the delivered goods. We receive about 2,700 zlotys monthly for these extracurricular services. Someone escorting shipments full-time earns 10,000-12,000 zlotys per month.

We are driving vehicles that have for a long time ceased to meet international standards. In these vehicles, the driver is exposed to excessive noise, vibration, exhaust, etc. Under such conditions, occupational diseases such as stomach disorders, respiratory infections, neuralgia and spinal ailments develop more quickly. Up to now, no one has seriously talked with us about these matters, so we want to deal with this as a federation. No one has consulted with us about standards for using fuels, nor have any proper psychotechnical studies been made. Psychotechnics now exist in order to retire someone who has ruined his health as a driver. He lost his health at work. That is the sad truth of the matter.

[Question] Establishing a separate federation for yourselves is going to add to your problems. You will have to divide union property, vacation facilities and sanatoria...

[Answer] We have paid for this property for years. Does it have to be completely divided? The most important thing is for it to be fairly disposed and that hasn't been done up to now. In dividing vacation homes and sanatoria, we were always treated like unwanted children. Besides, we are not leaving the ministry, so let's not create artificial problems.

By means of a federation, we want to handle our problems within the ministry. If conditions permit, we want to take up transport workers' problems that have been generally neglected.

[Interviewer] Thank you for the conversation.

On 6 September, a congress of PTSL unionists and employees from all of Poland took place. Nine enterprises announced that they would join the federation being formed. The initiative commission was reformed as a founding committee and was empowered to take up activity to have the federation legally registered.
Unions, Unionists' Relationships

Opołe TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 9 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Jan Widawski: "After the Meeting in Katowice: Unions and Unionists"]

[Text] The Katowice meeting between several hundred trade union activists and government representatives on the occasion of the third anniversary of the August 1980 agreements made in Gdańsk, Szczecin and Jastrzebie continues to attract much interest.

This gathering was the first of its kind in nearly 2 years and was important, especially because this is the first meeting in Katowice of representatives from the trade unions created by the 8 October 1982 decision by the Sejm that established the current union organization and the determining principles for restoring the independent yet socialist trade union movement in Poland.

Much is being said about the new unions in the press and on television but the most varied types of opinions are also being whispered and shouted. On one hand, there is a lot of information about the growing support for them and their first accomplishments and, on the other hand, there are complaints about their party and regime affiliations, their subordination to all forms of authority, that they are a facade, and, in general, everything bad that can be said is being said about the unions.

The Katowice meeting has shown what sort of unions they really are but it has above all shown the union activists. One does not have to agree with everything that was said in the Baildon Hall but no one can deny the unionists' social passion and commitment to today's difficult problems. The unionists have simply shown that they are willing to be partners with whomever desires the well-being of Poland and Poles but they have also made it understood that they will not be easy partners and that they will not be only applauding decisions made by others.

Forty-three unionists spoke during the discussions in Katowice and over 20 more voted on the protocol. They took up a large number of problems. This article cannot summarize all of the speeches nor can it discuss all of the matters that were handled. We have chosen just a few threads from the union debate which, in our opinion, characterize the climate of the meeting and above all, the current situation of the new union movement and the directions that it will be taking.

What Are the Views?

The ideological and program declarations of certain unions came out in many statements. Most generally speaking, these declarations differ from the "phraseology" of the pre-August "union" organization last represented by Solidarity and stand instead "on the defense of the actual interests of the working class." Henryk Goliszewski of the Borynia Mine in Jastrzebie presented
this quite clearly: "The Polish Peoples' Army guards our borders so that the nation may work and live in peace. We, the unionists, are guarding the workers' interests."

What is this "guard duty"? This question was posed by at least a score or more speakers and Boguslaw Banaszyk of the Dozamet Lower Silesia Metallurgical Works in Nowa Sola spoke for all: "A union should determine the workers' efforts in a manner based on economic reasoning. We will have to learn how to talk in negotiations where philosophical concepts and viewpoints on the matter at hand are worked over and where the strength of argument should prevail." Mr Banaszyk did, however, add (and several other unionists expressed a similar thought) that, regardless of how much it may be right, "a strong union alone will be able properly to negotiate and achieve. A weak union will have no success."

In the discussions, the actual number of 3,200,000 unionists at the end of August was repeatedly mentioned. This number was pointed out with pride because, only a few months ago, different Polish and foreign soothsayers predicted that the new unions would be able to attract no more than 100,000 members in 10 years and those would only become union members under pressure from the authorities. The augurs have already suffered defeat but the unionists are not predicting victory. Along with "already 3.2 million," there has very often been "when there are 3.2 million." The unionists look at this realistically: "We want to represent the entire working class, but at the present time we do not." For this reason, there has been resentment toward fellow workers, as well as resentment over lost time and the lack of faith in those losing and often risking their necks for the common good.

This element of risk comes from stubborn consistency. Alfred Miodowicz, chairman of the Federation of Steel Workers' Trade Unions, said: "We will consistently implement the decisions we have made. We will thus be a hard partner to the government and departments working with us. We will be a hard partner because that is our character as unions and most of all because this is what the workers need. In our demands we most often come out for what is most important to the workers. But, and we must be aware of this since it is characteristic of the attitudes of a majority of unionists, in order to not be one-sided, we must think about the firm we represent. That firm is our country—Poland. In our everyday activities we must always think about the future, about what the effects of our action will be in a year, in two years."

Stanislaw Bar, representing the Federation of Construction Workers' Trade Unions added: "Our unions should be a school for mature persons, a school without teachers and students, without textbooks, a leadership school teaching good, fair-minded management."

A Place in the Landscape

No sooner had the trade union law been announced than it received the following judgment: superficial independence and autonomy limited to what the party permits. Of course, this really was expressed more "colorfully" and emphatically and it was also said that the new unions, if they do emerge, will be as docile as lambs. What are the unions really like? Here are some statements:
Andrzej Dudewicz of the Ursus Mechanical Works: "The management's attitude toward the trade union at Ursus is inappropriate. The engineering and technical management deals with us unwillingly."

Wojciech Obarski, chairman of the Federation of Agricultural Workers' Trade Unions: "Some directors and managers are not taking into consideration the union organizations and are trying to act without them. There have been some cases in which they have set up social commission on worker affairs outside of the union organization. Those commissions were to be de facto replacements of the unions."

Ryszard Florcyzkowski from the Diora Radio Works in Dzierzoniow: "We don't really have any social or wage problems. The problems we have are on the level of higher administration."

Wladyslaw Stepień of the Siarkopol Plant in Tarnobrzeg: "In presenting the problem of union credibility, I must say that many aspects of that problem are the government's responsibility. It's not an allowable fact that the union must wait several months for a meeting or a position on its proposals. We feel that the organization and operation of some state and territorial organs have become more bureaucratic."

Stanislaw Bar said: "No one loves us, no one in the various levels of administration, the worker self-management bodies, nor the basic party organizations. It has somehow turned out that we also have low public esteem."

Rajmund Moric from the Wujek Mine in Katowice: "I would like to look at the union activities in the context of their contacts with the state administration and the thorny road, as I call it... The thing that frets the workers is the registration and structure of the supra-plant federation. A resolution concerning this was adopted in May but we still haven't moved beyond the problem because we are not lawyers. We are workers and we make our living from coal. We don't know whether a comma or a signature should be on the left or right side. No one is helping us overcome the barrier of bureaucracy and they actually hinder us... Let's do away with fluffing up the unions: 'What fine fellows you are. You are right but we can't do anything about it.'"

From what has been quoted, one could confirm the accusation that the unions are facades without any influence over government decisions and that the authorities are turning them into their own tool. The accusation would be just if the unionists let this happen. Union authenticity is attested by their assurance of partnership to the administration but, on the other hand, there are categorical demands being made and sharp protests against any violation of the principle of partnership. Consultation is the best example of this.

Against Fiction

Consultation with the unions was the subject most frequently discussed at the Katowice meeting. Every other speaker spoke about this and no one at all had a good word to say about previous "consultation." The unionists speak:
Walerian Kasprzycki of the Polcom Plant in Kobylka: "Consultations were taken in the plants but there were about 100 plant-potentates represented. Poland has large plants like these, and also medium and small plants. I feel that there should be some sort of cross-section of plants at these consultations in which plants of all sizes might be represented. The government would then have a definite picture of the situation."

Jozef Blaszczyk from the Zabrze Mine: "We feel that the social and political situation has matured to a point that there can be conducted public consultation on legislation and rules regulating social and trade problems. In our opinion, these consultations should be conducted with pertinent trade groups and in their own community rather than in Warsaw with persons already detached from that community."

Zdzislaw Tusznynski of the Cegielski Plant in Poznan: "Despite earlier declarations, there have not been consultations made on important problems for the union. For example, the director of a firm should not be able to call off a free Saturday without the agreement of the union."

Wlodzimierz Dudkiewicz, chairman of the organizational committee of the Federation of Workers' Trade Unions in the Paneling, Plywood and Match Industry: "We are discussing the principles of the Council of Ministers bill on wages for workers employed in socialized work establishments. These principles were published in RZECZPOSPOLITA. As it has meanwhile turned out, we already have the prepared government bill which was consulted by the respective department. This is excessive haste. This hurts everyone, especially us unionists, because if our colleagues ask us, we have to answer and what can we say when we are contradicted by the very author of Council of Ministers resolution No 23 of 4 March 1983 on the principles, range and procedures for consultation with the trade unions?"

Ryszard Golebiewski of the Petrobudowa Plant in Plock: "I feel that there is nothing that concerns working conditions, pay and life that can be handled in our country without union participation. Let me quote something from Premier Rakowski's speech at a meeting with the party aktiv from Pabianice: 'If the trade unions do not agree on some sort of a draft decision by the state or economic administration on wages, work hours and conditions and standard of living, then the decision cannot be made....'

The unionists did, however, have concrete examples showing that practice is quite different from theory and the intentions of the government leadership. The statement by Kazimierz Milner of the Jaworzno Mine is an example, and a sad one at that, of this topic at the Katowice discussions: "Comrade Premier, please do not hold this irony against me, but I wish you health and stamina in your struggle with the administration."

What Are the Unions Struggling For?

If one were to admit that the trade unions are just dealing with the problems discussed at the meeting at Baildon, the list would have to be such a long one. Here are some of those problems, but their order does not indicate the
importance attached to them by the various unions. First, there is the problem of wages. Everyone says that they are too low. This circumstance also revealed our common illness which has also managed to affect our unions—particularism. Studying the statements made by the unionists brings one to a very interesting observation: every Pole earns less than all the other Poles. How can this be? This is a secret or maybe the ability to convince oneself of one's own misfortune. Anyway, all (even if we discount earnings made on free Saturdays and mining income) professions earn less than the national average in the socialized economy. If this is the case, who is raising the average wages? No one has figured that out. Workers are leaving all branches of the economy for those that pay better. For that reason, mining, the steel industry, light industry, agriculture, communications industries and others are having cadre problems. Helena Medynska of the Frotex Cotton Plants in Prudnik, who also voted on the protocol, said: "If we take under consideration the fact that in the first half of this year the average earnings in our plant were 9000 zlotys per month, they are 11,500 to 12,000 zlotys per month now. On the other hand, in other plants in our region such as ceramics plants, furniture factories and cooperatives, their earnings are higher than ours by 4000-5000 zlotys per month and this means that we do not have any way to stem the flood of workers to other plants."

Several speakers brought up worker holidays (longer holidays, better organization, more attractive management) and free Saturdays. Several score speakers bombarded the premier and his colleagues with information about the hopeless housing situation and appeals that it be quickly improved. A streamlining of commerce was repeatedly demanded. There was exceptionally small (no more than three speakers) mention made of cultural problems, whereas many more persons called out for new regulations for appropriation of social funds and ways to spend them. There was still more discussion devoted to health care and protection, occupational diseases, hospital and sanatorium resources and work safety and hygiene. Neglect in this field is very disturbing and the trade unions are very properly trying to eliminate these enormous shortcomings.

There was a particular group of statements concerning retired persons and pensioners. The government also came under criticism for its pricing policy and half-measures taken on environmental problems and many others.

Social justice can be regarded separately. It has been repeatedly emphasized that the new trade unions base their programs on the social agreement of 1980 and will with all their power consistently demand from the government and territorial administration the preservation of their spirit and their current commitments in concluded agreements.

To conclude, the new trade unions are not avoiding responsibility for production results. They will not, of course, be involved with the organization of production but they will want to take part in setting a proper atmosphere and conditions for good production results. The sole representative of the Opole region, Joachim Korzeniski, chairman of the trade union of the Zdziechowice Coking Plant, spoke about this and pointed out the many barriers that his firm must overcome in order to obtain a suitable amount of coke and to provide its workers bearable pay and social conditions.

12261
CSO: 2600/1335

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AKTIV PARTY MEETING WITH STEFAN OLSZOWSKI SUMMARIZED

Rzeszow NOWINY in Polish 16 Sep 83 pp 1, 2

[Article by reb: "Normalization of Life in the Country to Help Bolster Poland's Position in the World; Minister Stefan Olszowski Meets Podcarpathian Party Activists"]

[Text] (From our own sources) Yesterday PZPR Politburo member, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stefan Olszowski, went to the Podcarpathian area, meeting with a group of 300 voivodship party activists. Then, accompanied by Henryk Wojtala, first secretary of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Krosno, he visited the Krosno Glassworks (KHS), which recently celebrated its 60th anniversary. He saw some of the firm's installations, such as plant no 2, a design center, and the paint shop, and then learned about the processes of working household glass by hand. Winding up his visit to the KHS, he met with party and economic activists of the glassworks.

In the course of both meetings Stefan Olszowski gave a broad overview of the international situation at present, and against this backdrop he discussed the development of Poland's relations with other countries. He emphasized that there is a direct link between the general situation in the world and the development of Poland's domestic situation and its position in the international arena.

The open rejection of the policy of detente and the adoption of a confrontation course by the present U.S. administration have been manifested both in the political sphere (interference in the internal affairs of other countries, talking from the position of strength, ideological-propaganda aggression), in the economic sphere (breaking off economic cooperation and replacing it with a policy of sanctions and protectionism), and in the strategic-military sphere. This last aspect of sharpening the international situation is especially dangerous and disturbing.

Referring to numerous instances of disarmament initiative on the part of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries and Yuri Andropov's latest proposal, Minister Olszowski emphasized that unfortunately this initiative is
being rejected, ignored, or unnoticed by the West. NATO forces' clear
dominance in Western Europe would be the result of the end-of-year place-
ment of new medium-range rockets planned for Western Europe this year,
rockets which would carry nuclear radiation. These plans are being op-
pposed by all the peace movements and the societies of many countries.
In order to destroy and weaken these voices of protest and turn public
opinion around, the American administration is making various provocative
moves. The South Korean airplane incident was the last obvious example of
this.

Attempts to question the post-war order in Europe and undermine the Yalta
and Potsdam agreements are another dangerous phenomenon in international
relations which Min Olszowski pointed out. This is particularly dangerous
for the Polish situation.

Poland's deep sociopolitical and economic crisis has caused the country's
internal weakening, according to Olszowski, but it has also led to our
country's weakened position in the international arena. The progressive
stabilization of the domestic situation and the failure of underground
attempts have created the foundation for rebuilding our place and role in
international contacts. This process is going forward, but not without
barriers. Some of the Western countries are expressing interest in
restoring trade. Progress has been made in talks about refinancing the
Polish debt. Some of the Western central union organizations are show-
ing the desire to establish contacts with the reviving Polish trade union
movement.

Min Olszowski described in detail the differences in the state of rela-
tions with the various Western countries and developing countries too.
He emphasized the international significance of the Pope's June visit
to Poland, including his visit to our Western territories.

Multilateral meetings are an important plane of Poland's international
activity. The talks in Madrid were the last occasion for this sort of
talks with representatives of governments of other countries. The deci-
sions of the Madrid forum of KBWE are a positive step forward and are
cause for new hopes for detente and normalization of cooperation on the
European continent.

Minister Olszowski explained the course of his Madrid talks with his
fellow ministers of foreign affairs from nine countries. Talks and
meetings of this sort help, for example, to break down the NATO policy
of isolating our country and provide advantageous chances to restore
Poland's position in the international dialogue. Undertakings in this
direction are complicated and long, but the effects already gained in
this realm on the basis of the positive development of Poland's internal
situation allow us to entertain the conviction that Poland will shortly
gain its due position and place in international life, according to
Olszowski.

Responding to questions, the guest also mentioned problems concerning
the events in the Middle East, among others, and described the situa-
tion in the international communist movement.

10790
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OPINION POLL ON AUGUST CRISIS CONDUCTED

Warsaw T U I TERAZ in Polish No 39, 28 Sep 83 pp 3, 8

[Article by Stanislaw Bucholc: "Shipyard Workers on Causes of the Crisis"]

[Text] The PZPR Voivodship Committee in Gdansk operates an Opinion Polling Center, which started probing the opinions of shipyard workers and other social groups of the Gdansk region in the 1970's. The purpose was to uncover people's appraisals of their own social position and elements and values constituting their political consciousness.

It then turned out that the polls embraced mainly people who declared their social positions had failed to improve or had even deteriorated. This group's "sense of social security" had steadily deteriorated during those years, as answers to questions concerning Poland's top socioeconomic problems of the 1970's clearly showed. To judge directly—and thus perhaps not quite reliably—from respondents' answers, they were a social group aspiring to a change in their social positions in keeping with their needs, class interests or even social ideals.

Most of the polled shipyard workers—as, incidentally, most shipyard workers in the Gdansk region—took their jobs in the 1970's. Their general and vocational training levels were higher, as were their aspirations. They had no personal experiences of wartime or of the period of struggle for socialism to prevail in Poland. Most had moved to cities from villages when the policy of intensive job creation opened many opportunities in urban areas. They were young in the demographic, social and political meanings of the word. They were hardly "susceptible" to the official media, perhaps downright mistrustful. Throughout the 1970's, their "social frustration" made them increasingly resent people they regarded to be better off. Their answers to poll questions indicated the social gap between the governed and the governing was widening. They believed they have little influence on public matters. Most of them described themselves as workers.

To judge from polls taken in 1977, 1979 and other probes, it should be said this lack of improvement or more exactly, this deterioration of social position was the most general, "spiritual" cause of the August crisis. Constituent elements of this "consciousness syndrome" gradually strengthened among shipyard workers in the 1970's and new ones emerged. This was due to long-standing social processes of change and, on the other hand, to specific policies pursued at the time.
Sources of the August Crisis

In a December 1980 poll conducted in the Gdansk-Sopot-Gdynia tri-city area, respondents were asked what they thought had caused the August crisis.

As many as 25.9 percent of the 548 people who returned the questionnaires mentioned candidly "hypocrisy and mendacious propaganda" as the chief cause. This was followed by (a) dishonesty on the part of decision-makers, corruption, economic offenses [24.8 percent], (b) wrong economic policies, mistaken investment ventures, wasteful use of resources [22.6 percent], (c) bad consumer goods deliveries [21 percent], (d) incompetence of officials, their lack of a sense of reality [19.5 percent], (e) economic crisis, economic depression, foreign debt [17 percent], (f) price increases, rising cost of living, too low wages [17 percent], (g) lack of honest information, stifling criticism, defiance of public opinion [15.9 percent], (h) existence of privileged groups, social injustice and inequality [13.3 percent].

Disdain for society and its aspirations [12.2 percent] completed, together with the above factors, the picture of a chief source of crisis which I propose to call discord, or mutual mistrust, between authorities and society. Respondents charged the authorities with many mistakes, with socioeconomic policies being the most consequential of all.

Participation in Political Decision-Making

A respondent's own workplant is the most important element of the structure of authority. It is in a workplant that an employee has a possibility to participate in the process of decision-making from its preparatory through its implemention and control phases. A workplant is also the most obvious place in which people can pursue their employee, group and class interests.

One question of the 1977 poll was, "Has a worker any practical possibility for submitting critical remarks on his workplant's operation officially to any agency?" Affirmative answers were supplied by 77 percent of all respondents, of which 82 percent were less than 35 years of age.

In 1979, a majority [70.4 percent] of the polled shipyard workers said, when asked if they have any influence on what is going on in their workplants, that their influence is negligible or non-existent. Asked if workers have any possibility for participating in decision-making at their workplants, as many as 62.8 percent gave negative answers, while a mere 3.1 percent said they did have such possibilities. This was a very alarming sign of declining participation in political and social life.

Trade unions were regarded as the basic form and institution representing their interests. In the 1977 poll, the shipyard workers were asked about the goals trade unions were pursuing. The prevailing view was that trade unions were primarily concerned with material and welfare problems [46 percent] and that these should be their priority goals [57 percent].
The 1977 poll disclosed a definite "ideal" trade union on the part of the polled workers. Trade unions should, above all, represent their employee opinions and engage themselves in realizing employee needs [58 percent], but up to then they primarily sought to carry out economic and political tasks set for them by the authorities [36 percent]. This particular trade union model was recognized as "ideal" by only 3 percent of all shipyard workers in the 1977 poll.

Respondents in the 1979 poll, most of whom were union members, had firm and similar views on a trade union's shape and purpose. While 50.5 percent of all polled workers said trade unions had been realizing tasks given them by the state administration, only 8.3 percent said trade unions represented employee interests. Representing employee interests was recognized as a trade union's fundamental task and goal by 71.6 percent of all respondents.[...]

The 1979 poll further disclosed that workers regarded it as their self-evident right to manifest their displeasure at decisions made by the factory management, because there were no possibilities of participating in the management of their factories.

This pointed to the shipyard workers' determination to take advantage of existing structures and institutions at the factory level to possibly stage protests. As many as 75.7 percent of all respondents said the Workers' Self-Management Conference [KSR] was the most suitable forum for staging protests, whereas 68.5 percent believed intervention with management boards was more appropriate. A third widely accepted means of protest was sympathetic participation in work stoppages in protest [46.5 percent].

Needless to say, both in 1977 and in 1979, respondents were asked if they regarded themselves as co-owners of this Polish state, and, if so, if they had any influence on what was going on in Poland. In both polls (that is, even one year before the August events) an overwhelming majority of them said they had no or hardly any influence on developments in Poland.

In both polls, too, answers were negative to a question about their intention of taking a post with great political significance. In 1977, 69 percent said they wanted no such post, and 61.8 percent in 1979. But those willing to take such posts accounted for 11 percent of all 1977 answers and 7.5 percent of all 1979 answers. This indicates that in 1979, workers more firmly rejected the idea of active participation in Poland's political life while also believing their influence on developments in their workplants and in Poland was virtually non-existent.

Toward the end of the decade, then, answers indicated a deterioration of workers' social position and their political frustration, which consequently deepened differences between the governing and the governed. This frustration clashed with the official propaganda of the working class as the nation's leading force and reinforced the dissonance between reality and propaganda. Exploiting this frustration for political and social purposes, "restoring the balance," was, therefore, just a question of time and of the operation of workers' own or alien political forces.
Rank in Social Structure

Consequences of the then official socioeconomic policies, which the polled tri-city inhabitants recognized as a fundamental cause of the subsequent crisis, "manifested themselves" in the social structure and opinions on its advanced by different social groups and classes.

Answers to a 1977 question about the existence or non-existence of social classes in Poland were widely varied. Three divisions dominated—(a) rich vs. poor, (b) working class vs. intelligentsia, (c) working people vs. "others." Equally frequent was the "workers-intelligentsia-peasants" trichotomy, which was mentioned in 18.9 percent of all answers. Some 12.9 percent preferred a "workers vs. non-workers" division. But, about 50 percent of all had no opinion on the matter or mentioned divisions other than those included in the question. This precisely was the most alarming fact. Whatever social groups, classes or strata they named, the polled shipyard workers always [word indistinct] them within a definite social hierarchy.

Asked in 1977 which social group was best off, some 40 percent mentioned private craftsmen and traders as well as fruit and vegetable growers around cities. One in five shipyard workers polled said managerial personnel were better off. In the 1979 poll, they repeated their previous belief that private firm owners and small-scale producers commanded the best social position (34 percent). Mentions of other social groups and strata were few and widely scattered.

Class divisions had different causes, the polled workers said. One question was if they perceived the conflict-generating role of (a) differences between office and manual work, (b) income level differences, (c) differences in level of education, (d) differences in participation in power structures. In 1977, 52.3 percent said income level differences were most likely to generate conflicts, followed by differences between office and manual work (32.7 percent).

This tendency was reaffirmed in the 1979 poll. Income level differences and differences between office and manual work were recognized as the chief conflict-generating factors by 73.3 and 42.3 percent of all respondents, respectively. More significantly, 57.3 percent of all polled workers said that participation in power structures differentiated and divided Polish society.

Only 14.4 percent of them said this created no conflicts or resentment in society.

The polled shipyard workers believed the mode of receiving and the level of incomes were the most significant cause of social divisions and conflicts. Other factors, such as participation in power structures, educational level, or rank in social division of work, were mentioned in more or less similar proportions of answers as causes of social divisions and conflicts.

In this connection, it was important to probe their opinions on their own social positions. Pertinent questions were asked both in the 1977 and 1979 polls. In 1977, asked which social class a respondent thought he belonged to, as many as two in three named the working class or the working people. In 1979, 31.8 percent of the polled workers from the Lenin shipyard said they
belonged to the working class or the working people, while 38.7 percent of shipyard workers from the whole tri-city area described themselves as workers. However, a large proportion of respondents (33.5 percent) made no class reference at all in their answers.

So, quite frequently, shipyard workers polled in 1977 and 1979 identified themselves with the working class. A vast majority believed a dichotomous or trichotomous division of society persisted. National income redistribution patterns were the most significant source of discrimination in their eyes. Groups receiving the largest slice of national income were regarded as holding the best social positions. The polled workers did not regard themselves as members of such groups. Often they described themselves as members of the "poor" class, as living at the bottom of social hierarchy. This prevalent belief can be recognized as yet another consequence of the official socioeconomic policies of the time.

On Prospects for Overcoming the Crisis

What barriers and prospects are there to overcoming the crisis? In the December 1980 poll, tri-city inhabitants were asked about (a) obstacles, dangers and threats to resolving Poland's crisis, (b) their optimism or pessimism with a view to further developments in Poland, and (c) their influence on what is happening both in Poland and in their workplants.

As for dangers or obstacles to overcoming the difficult situation in Poland, 51.2 percent of all polled workers believed the structure of authority, the policies and activities it launched at the time, were the main barrier to Poland's propitious development. Obstacles such as falling productivity rates or abuse of the right to strike were scarcely mentioned. This is yet another sign of a crisis of public confidence in the administration.

Optimism over resolving the crisis or prospects for Poland's future development found only wary and diversified expression.

As for prospects for social development, 58.9 percent of all polled shipyard workers believed the situation would improve, and only 7.8 percent thought it would deteriorate. In the area of politics and political life, 30.8 percent of the answers indicated a belief that things are brightening, while 40.7 percent indicated that nothing would improve. The least optimism was expressed on the economy's prospects, because 40.7 percent of the polled workers said things would worsen, while 13.1 percent said nothing would change in the Polish economy.

This is how the polled tri-city residents assessed Poland's socioeconomic situation—60.9 percent believed they had no influence on developments in Poland against 28.1 percent who believed the contrary. The percentage of those who believed they had no influence in their own workplant was similar, 53.6 percent. However, as many as 43.6 percent of the polled tri-city inhabitants believed they did have some influence on what happened at their workplants. Open presentation of their views and opinions was regarded as the chief form of exercising such influence.
Rather than closing with a recapitulation of these findings, it is perhaps more useful to point out that in the 1980 poll, 56.2 percent of all respondents said the August events had changed their lives, but as many as 42.7 percent believed these events affected their lives in no way. It is surprising that very many respondents [42.2 percent], were unable to state how specifically the August events changed in their lives. Answers such as "I believe things will be better now" or "I have regained faith in people" were frequent.

CSO: 2600/93
CRITIC DISPUTES SCHAFF'S POSITION ON CHURCH-STATE DIALOGUE

Warsaw TU I TERAŻ in Polish No 23, 8 Jun 83 p 14

[Article by Florian Lakowski: " Polemics With Adam Schaff: Without Insinuations?"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Adam Schaff in his article "Cooperation--dialogue in action" (TU I TERAŻ No 13) takes the view that dialogue is an indispensable need for contemporary Poland if the situation in the country is to develop in a positive direction for the nation and for society./

In Poland--maintains Schaff--it is not, however, a question of a dialogue between believers and nonbelievers. For the absolute majority of society are believers. The dialogue here is therefore in the main conducted between believers, who differ from each other only in their sociopolitical outlooks, which does not signify, however, that they differ in their views on socialism (which are fundamentally positive). They differ--according to Schaff--solely in their views on the various aspects of socialism.

Schaff sees the need and the reality of dialogue on the line between the sociopolitical authorities and the church. Thus, if the dialogue in Poland is one between believers differing from each other solely with regard to sociopolitical outlooks, then--it would appear--a dialogue between authorities and the church is involved here as well.

It is necessary to consider that the episcopate and the government along with the Politburo differ from each other yet further with regard to their outlook on life. Thus, the dialogue does not revolve around the subject of differences in their philosophies and their outlooks on life but around the subject of the differences and the points of contact between them in the sociopolitical sphere--nevertheless, this is not a dialogue between believers.

Contrary to Schaff's statement that every dialogue in Poland is a dialogue between believers only sociopolitically at variance, one can establish with some probability that at the summit of a dialogue--for example, between the government and the episcopate--not all representatives of the government share their religious views with the representatives of the episcopate, and vice versa. Besides, Schaff uses the term "the church" interchangeably, at
one time meaning by it an institution in the sense of a church hierarchy, at another the believing public.

But since, as he affirms, even in the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, in spite of the great progressivism of those Catholics, only one believing and practicing Catholic has been a member of this echelon, one can suppose that in the Polish PZPR Politburo there is not yet any strongly believing and practicing Catholic (all the more so if one refers to Schaff's information that the Polish church is among the most conservative in the world).

Therefore, the dialogue between the authorities and the church in Poland, even if it revolves only around sociopolitical subjects, is conducted by believers and nonbelievers, and not exclusively by believers differing only in their outlooks on social and political affairs.

Schaff regards the dialogue of cooperation in Poland between the authorities and the church not only as indispensable but also--more importantly—as possible. But he does not refer to Polish examples. To be sure, he does not explicitly state that there has been no dialogue in Poland, yet this can be inferred from the lack of examples.

To bolster the conviction that a dialogue is likewise possible in the PRL, Schaff cites the Latin American countries and Spain. In truth, he does not refer to the dialogue between the authorities and the church among the Latins, which would—as I believe—occasionally be difficult, but to the cooperation of Catholics with radical social movements. This is not a convincing example. Father Camilo Torres did, truly, participate even in the Columbian underground army, but he acted contrary to the stand of his superior, the archbishop of Bogota. Besides, before committing himself to the battle, he himself made a request for secularization. The Vatican, indeed, recommended a dialogue, but Cardinal Concha y Cordobes had exempted Torres from his vows earlier already; on the other hand, Torres was discharged from the post of university chaplain and stopped being a professor in the sociology faculty as a result of the intervention of the church authorities.

The Conference of the Latin-American Episcopate in Medellin in 1968 took the following position on its affairs: "...temporal progress must not be confused with God's kingdom. Nevertheless, he who is first in the sphere where he can better organize the human community has an essential connection with God's kingdom."

The disapproved cooperation of Torres with the Marxist movement therefore does not make for a positive example, nor does it relate to dialogical relations between the authorities and the church. Schaff offers examples of the marxist—in the social sense—commitment of priests in Spain and Italy. One cannot acknowledge these as contemporary events. Such facts, especially in Italy, have been known already from the period of the Second World War, i.e., as of the 1940's. To this day there have been no revelations in this sphere.
A Latin-American example which Schaff does not cite is the cooperation of Catholic priests with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. But precisely here the reservations of the Vatican have been expressed unambiguously. When Father Ernest Cardenal, the Sandinista minister of culture, a Trappist, the friend of Thomas Merton, knelt before the pope and kissed his ring, John Paul II called for a regulation of his relations with the church.

Of course, the church does not negate dialogue, on the contrary, it advocates it, but the church does not consider an active, political commitment on its part to the work of the marxist government to be possible. John Paul II spoke about this in a sermon during mass in the capital of Nicaragua, Managua, in March 1983.

In referring to Spanish, Italian and Latin American examples, Schaff wanted to indicate the contrast which emerges, in that case, to the "detriment" of the Polish church, since, as he reminds us, the Polish church is /"among the most conservative in the world."/ Note that it is unclear whether this relates to the church as a hierarchical institution, or likewise to the church as God's people, or to believers. But this second meaning would be synonymous with a statement that almost the whole Polish society is conservative. But, after all, Schaff has written that in principle the society accepts socialism. In that case, when he says "the church," he therefore has in mind the clergy and the hierarchy. The term "the church" in Schaff's article, then--in spite of his declaration that when he says "the church" he has in mind the institution and believers--requires a triple interpretation depending on the context (the church at one time signifying the hierarchy, at other times signifying the hierarchy and believers, at yet others only believers).

Schaff writes that--in offering examples of Italy or Spain--he is not concerned that priests in Poland begin acceding to marxism. In his opinion this is out of the question for two reasons: the actual "marxist crisis" in the country as well as the conservatism of the church (in this case meaning, undoubtedly, the priests and the hierarchies).

For the sake of building confidence in the soundness of a dialogue of cooperation between the authorities and the church in Poland, he refers, therefore, to two encyclicals, authored throughout, as he writes, by a Polish pope: "Redemptor hominis" and "Laborem exercens." Schaff offers them as a pro-dialogue resolution. He cites them as proof that the initiative for a dialogue of cooperation has issued also from the church itself.

This observation strikes the reader as surprising for the reason that these are, after all, successive Vatican encyclicals on the subject of a dialogue. The initiative for dialogue emerging from the church is associated with the 1960's, with the Vatican Council II (1962-1965), with the encyclical "Pacem in terris" of John XXIII (1963), and with the encyclical "Ecclesiam suam" of Paul VI (1966). The encyclicals mentioned by Schaff are, on the other hand, the first pro-dialogue encyclicals written by a Polish pope.
Valuable from the point of view of the possibility that a genuine dialogue of cooperation might arise in Poland are Schaff's final formulations: "Its (that is, the dialogue's) success--he writes--depends, however, on an honest partnership on both sides. This dialogue cannot be conducted in make-believe, with the intention of deceiving one's partner. A breakdown will immediately delight those ill-disposed to such a venture, of whom there is no shortage on both sides equally."

Here we find, surely, the heart of the matter.

But next Schaff determines the common area of the dialogue and of cooperation. In his opinion, the area comprises the interest of the nation (understood concretely), in the sense of what threatens national development or existence. And further: it comprises the economic crisis, such demoralizations of society as theft, bribery, alcoholism, and so on, absenteeism from worthwhile work, rampant bureaucracy, matters of educating youth. And so on, and so on--as he writes.

Given a common area of problems defined in this way, what, in my opinion, are the words "authenticity of dialogue" and "honest partnership" to mean?

The problems mentioned above, if they were to be authentically discussed by both sides, would require that--alongside of national authorities--the Catholic partner (the church) have a substantial voice in matters of the sociopolitical and economical structures of the country, in matters of culture and knowledge--for the possibility of reform depends on the means of these spheres.

But in Poland there exist no institutions--or if they exist, they are not sufficiently plentiful--which are in the service of such a dialogue. In order for the responsible and professional representatives of both sides to conduct a substantially significant dialogue of cooperation, pertaining to the social and political conditions of the calamities oppressing the society, that dialogue would have to have an institutionally trustworthy character.

Matters of the demoralization of society, the educating of youth, are in the succession of problems which cannot--if they are to be discussed in an authentic dialogue--dispense with discussions on the subject of ethics, of moral education and of an outlook on life--and therefore on the subject of problems which for Schaff are too philosophical. For these, according to him, threaten the dialogue with barrenness, since it would then have to decide on matters which, in the final analysis, operate for both partners only on the basis of faith.

And meanwhile, if one examines more closely the list of problems delineated by Schaff, their solution is not possible without a dialogue on subjects from the philosophical sphere, on the subjects of ethics and outlook on life. After all, ethical problems have their philosophical roots.
So, if in the interest of the nation—as Schaff suggests—we cannot conduct a dialogue abstractly—because it thus becomes a domain of differences, but must conduct it concretely, since only in that way can we serve progress—then we need to demand this concreteness in the sphere of institutional establishment of social mechanisms for the dialogue between the authorities and the church.

If one does not write about this, then in fact one is not writing seriously. One remains then in the sphere of abstract generalities. One cannot yield to the illusion that the dialogue between the authorities and the church in Poland—if it were an authentic dialogue—could indulge in an avoidance of problems of structure, ethics and outlook on life—even if the dialogue centered only on how to conquer drunkenness. But every dialogue is a dialogue of differences, of conflicting opinions, views, concepts. Just so with a dialogue of cooperation. Every dialogue, without any qualification. It will not do to make an idyll out of a dialogue between partners treating each other honestly. This will always be a path filled with tribulations. And only such a path can be beneficial socially. For its difficulties will prove that the partners are trustworthy representatives of their social groups and that they deal with each other seriously.

It appears that Schaff's tendency towards evasion of the ups and downs of dialogue does not allow him to imagine a dialogue between the government and society. How will discussions be held properly, he asks, and by whom? By the isolated Council of Ministers and the Politburo? And with which society? With which part of it?

The answer to this question was imparted to the author on the day on which his article appeared in TU I TERAZ. On 30 March 1983 the Politburo and the Council of Ministers, as representatives of the /authorities/, organized and carried out together with workers—as representatives of a part of /society/—the National Conference of the Workers' Aktiv.

It is necessary to appraise fully Adam Schaff's positive effort, which aims at establishing a dialogue between the authorities and the church. But one cannot stop halfway if one wants to know that authentic dialogue.