JOINT TARGETING, ARE JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES ADEQUATE?

BY

COLONEL EDWARD L. FLINN
United States Army

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Joint Targeting, Are Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures Adequate?

by

COL Edward L. Flinn
U.S. Army

COL Nate Bard
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL Edward L. Flinn

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Targeting is an important process that assists commanders in allocating scarce resources and synchronizing fires to assist the commander in accomplishing his mission. Targeting has received much attention since Operation Desert Storm; the result is an effort to develop Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs) for targeting. However, the focus of efforts to develop joint procedures for targeting has been on targeting and attack of Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs). The result is that current JTTPs for targeting are adequate for synchronizing targeting and attacks against time sensitive targets but, are inadequate in helping component commanders synchronize targeting throughout the Joint Operational Area (JOA) and particularly inside a surface component commander's AO where targeting responsibilities may overlap.
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JOINT TARGETING, ARE JOINT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES ADEQUATE

The Army's AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine of the 1980s described an Army with a significantly increased operational reach compared to its previous doctrine. Fighting the massive Warsaw Pact threat in central Europe was the reason the ALB doctrine was adopted. In order to successfully defend against a Warsaw Pact attack, the Army's doctrine had a vision of ground commanders being able to strike the attacking enemy, deep and often, in order to set conditions for a successful decisive close fight. As a result of this doctrine the Army developed and acquired systems that enabled ground commanders to attack targets at operational depths.

The Army now has the ability with AH-64 helicopters and the MLRS platform firing ATACMS missiles, to provide Army commanders the ability to strike operationally significant targets located at greater depths with organic capabilities. Current Army doctrine challenges commanders to shape the deep battle to set success for the decisive close battle.¹ The Army's capability is substantial and will become even more capable as it acquires new weapons with greater range and lethality able to attack operational targets. However, the Army's deeper reach with
operational fires needs to fit into the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) overall concept for his conduct of combat operations.

The deep battle has been the natural mission for the US Air Force and is clearly articulated in Air Force doctrine. The Air Force has always been able to provide the Joint Force Commander the ability to strike operational targets throughout the Joint Force Commander's Area of Operation (AO). Providing a significant amount of combat power, the Air Force has been the force of choice for attacking important operational and strategic targets, which before development of its ALB doctrine and deep attack systems, were beyond the range of the land commander's weapons.

Joint doctrine has come a long way since the 1986 Goldwater Nichols legislation. Joint doctrine seeks to integrate the capabilities of each service into a coherent fighting force under the command and control of a single commander. Joint doctrine provides the Joint Force Commander the framework for how to organize and synchronize his forces for strategic and operational missions. Since multiple component commanders now have the means to attack enemy targets at operational depths, how does the Joint Force Commander control and synchronize the component commander's efforts? The effort provided by the components in the operational fight is predominately fires. Although doctrine does provide a big picture method of
deconflicting fires, in areas of overlap between component commanders, doctrine does not articulate the specifics on how to synchronize and deconflict fires. The nexus of the issue is joint targeting.

Targeting is an important process that assists commanders in allocating scarce resources and synchronizing fires to assist the commander in accomplishing his mission. Targeting has received much attention since Operation Desert Storm; the result is an effort to develop Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures (JTTPs) for targeting. The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA) Center published, in July 1997, the first jointly accepted JTTP for joint targeting. However, the focus of this publication and the draft of Joint Publication 3-60, *Doctrine for Joint Targeting*, has been on targeting and attack of Time Sensitive Targets (TSTs). The result is that current JTTPs for targeting are adequate for synchronizing targeting and attacks against time sensitive targets but, are inadequate in helping component commanders synchronize targeting throughout the Joint Operational Area (JOA) and particularly inside a surface component commander's AO where targeting responsibilities may overlap.

Starting with the key doctrinal concepts from capstone joint publications, especially Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint
Interdiction Operations, and Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, to highlight the doctrinal imperatives to synchronize combat operations, I will address the gap between doctrine and procedures. The aforementioned documents provide the doctrinal basis on how to organize forces to achieve unity of effort and synchronize combat operations but do not provide the specifics on how to synchronize targeting between component commanders. A Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures manual needs to be written to codify essential JTTPs for targeting.

Developing comprehensive JTTPs for all targeting occurring in a commander's AO is necessary to ensure unity of effort and that scarce resources are not wasted. Overcoming this synchronization issue is important. As resources become more expensive and there are fewer available, we can ill-afford to waste fires and get surprised by a failure to effectively coordinate. Ensuring there are procedures to deconflict and synchronize the complementary capabilities each service provides the Joint Force Commander will go a long way towards achieving unity of effort during joint operations.
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK

JOINT FORCE COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITIES

Joint doctrine provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) the guidance needed to organize his forces and his theater of operation. Typically, a Joint Force Commander will establish areas of operation for land and naval forces from his joint operation area. Establishing command and control relationships is also essential for a joint force commander. An efficient command structure and well-organized operational area helps JFCs create conditions for effective use of his assigned forces.

Theater Design

The JFC is responsible for all activities, which take place in his territory, usually a theater or Joint Operations Area (JOA). "A theater/JOA is an area of land, sea and airspace in which a JFC normally conducts military operations."2 Within his theater/JOA the JFC will have air forces, land forces, sea forces and special operations forces operating to help him accomplish his mission. Normally, to deconflict combat actions of the component forces, the joint force commander divides his joint operational area into separate areas of operations for his surface component commanders.

Typically, the JFC will provide surface commanders, land and naval, separate operation areas.
The size, shape and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander's requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.Using this guidance to design his theater, only land and naval commanders get an area they can call their own from the Joint Force Commander. They are responsible for all that takes place within their AO. Any other component commander who provides forces or fires inside an AO is a supporting commander, whose actions must be synchronized by the commander who owns the territory.

To describe an AO the JFC will normally use boundaries. "Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. JFCs may use lateral, rear and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces." Boundaries aid the employment of tactical forces by giving specific geographical dimensions and orientation to the component commanders AO. Within his boundaries, the land or naval commander has complete freedom, within the guidance given by the JFC, to conduct combat operations as he sees necessary to accomplish his mission. Any action by an adjacent or supporting
commander inside another commander's boundary requires coordination.

Another JFC responsibility is to establish appropriate command and control arrangements to create an efficient joint force. Next I will develop how command and control arrangements affect the synchronization of fires and targeting.

**Command and Control**

The ultimate goal of command relationships is to ensure there is unity of effort throughout the joint force. From Joint Publication 3-0, component commanders will normally have OPCON or TACON over the forces assigned to them. Although there are differences in the command relationships, both give the commander the authority to give direction and provide control necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. Joint Force Commanders can establish support relationships between subordinate commanders. "A support relationship is established between subordinate organizations when one organization should aid, protect, complement or sustain another force." The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks." It is clear the supporting commander must assist the supported commander in accomplishing the supported commander's mission, however the way
in which the supporting commander "ascertains" the needs of the supported commander is an issue in how it affects synchronization problems. Adequate JTTPs for targeting should provide a mechanism for assisting both the supporting and supported commander in synchronizing targeting and attack efforts.

The supporting commander may be unable to assist the supported commander because of too many requirements. How then, does the supported commander learn the supporting commander is over-tasked and unable to provide support? What is the method or mechanism that provides this transparency for both commanders? Although, current joint doctrine does not provide a solution or specific mechanism to solve this issue, suitable JTTPs for targeting could.

By organizing his joint operations area, using appropriate coordination measures and establishing proper command relationships, JFCs "organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning and decentralized execution are key considerations."

Having addressed the JFC level issues pertaining to targeting, I will develop key aspects of targeting from a component or operational commander's perspective to show where areas of overlap occur in targeting.
AREAS OF OVERLAPPING RESPONSIBILITY

The Army's Air Land Battle Doctrine prescribed an operational framework whereby the operational level commander focused his attention on the enemy well before the enemy was within the reach of friendly tactical fires. ALB doctrine charged the operational commander to decide when and where he wanted to fight the decisive close battle and to set conditions for a favorable friendly outcome by shaping the enemy while distant from friendly enemy tactical forces. Central to the ALB doctrine was for the operational commander to "see" the enemy even when the enemy was outside his AO.

Although a commander is mostly focused on activities inside his AO, forward thinking commanders conceptualize beyond their boundaries. A commander's Area of Interest (AI) is used to "...monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations." Lines on a map do not identify the AI; it has no specific geographical boundaries, but is used by commanders to orient on enemy capabilities that are distant and some time away from friendly forces. The Area of Interest is important for a surface commander because he may want to target and attack an enemy capability that is outside his AO. Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for targeting should
address how a commander looking beyond his AO can target and coordinate the attack of those targets with adjacent commanders. Joint procedures should also help commanders maintain visibility on the efforts other commanders may or may not be taking against an enemy target in his area of interest but outside his AO.

Fire support coordination measures (FSCM) are a means which surface commanders can use to protect forces while helping to coordinate fires.

Joint fire support coordination measures and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the C2 of joint forces. Within their AOs, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordination measures to enhance the expeditious attack of targets ... and set the stage for future operations.¹⁰

Although, use of these measures is completely optional, using them does provide a reliable means to rapidly coordinate and deconflict indirect fires, including fires at operational depths.

The most significant fire support coordination measure pertaining to operational fires is the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL). Its role in the ground commander's control of fires is significant; because it gives supporting commanders an opportunity to rapidly coordinate the attack of targets beyond it.

FSCLs are permissive fire support coordination measures. They are established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within
their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting and affected commanders. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide.  

The FSCL is part of the calculus associated with true synchronization of joint operations. Placement of the FSCL by the land commander becomes critical to ensure the enemy does not have a sanctuary from attack. By employing an FSCL the ground commander has given supporting commanders the ability to target inside his AO. However, the ground commander is still responsible for all activities taking place within his AO. Consequently, by employing a FSCL, the ground commander creates an area where multiple components can conduct targeting; this creates an area of potential overlap where more than one commander could be targeting against the same enemy capability. This situation could result in multiple attacks against the same target, leading to an inefficient use of assets.

Even though the FSCL is by definition a permissive measure, the requirement to inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, means there must be coordination between supporting and supported commanders. The issue is, are JTTPs for targeting adequate to ensure the supported commander understands all targeting being conducted inside his AO, and do the JTTPs ensure all operations are synchronized with the ground commanders intent for combat.
action inside his AO? By employing an FSCL the ground commander creates the opportunity for quick coordination of attacks occurring beyond it, but "the requirement to inform" all affected commanders of attacks beyond the FSCL supports the need for some joint procedures to make rapid coordination possible. Unless the target being attacked is a JFC identified TST, there are currently no JTTPs that support rapid coordination.

Planning can help alleviate some the procedural gaps that exist with joint targeting. Let's look at how suitable C2 systems can help bridge the gap and see what the current state of compatibility is with key joint targeting systems.

**PLANNING**

**SITUATIONAL AWARENESS**

Planning joint operations, or any military operation, is the process where commanders attempt to maximize combat effects while minimizing risk to friendly forces to achieve a desired end state. Synchronizing all available resources in concert with a coordinated plan creates the opportunity for operations to achieve decisive results while minimizing friendly casualties. Planning provides commanders a common understanding on how to achieve success. A look at some of the key planning considerations pertaining to operational fires and joint
interdiction operations will illustrate the need for a common means to coordinate operational fires.

The application of force throughout the area of operation, by functional component commanders all working in harmony "enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that present no seams or vulnerabilities to an enemy to exploit."12 This implies there must be a coherent organization that coordinates decisive combat power that can be continuously applied throughout the JFC's AO. In other words, the JFC "should not allow the enemy a sanctuary or respite"13 from attack. When planning, the JFC should ensure that the design of his theater and command relationships do not create a seam that may become exposed and exploited by the enemy.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The synergistic application of combat power throughout the force can create conditions that the enemy will be unable to respond to. "The synergy of the joint force depends in large part on a shared understanding of the operational situation."14 Having a shared understanding among the component commanders is necessary in order to apply synchronized combat power to achieve decisive results. How then do the component commanders get and maintain a shared understanding of the operational situation? The concept is critical but joint doctrine does not provide a
concrete method on how to maintain common situational awareness among commanders. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of interoperability amongst the service's Command and Control (C2) systems. In light of this problem and until the U.S. military has joint systems that are truly interoperable; we need doctrinal procedures to help maintain a common picture among components.

Simultaneity and depth are two key concepts of deep operations that can be applied to the use of operational fires. "Simultaneity in joint force operations contributes directly to an enemy's collapse by placing more demands on the enemy forces and functions than can be handled."\textsuperscript{15} Attacking the enemy throughout his depth and attacking important targets that expose his center of gravity are the essence of simultaneity and depth. In joint operations being able to realize these deep operations concepts means using the resources of multiple component commanders in an orchestrated application of combat power. C2 systems assist commanders in being able to achieve the type of results envisioned in joint doctrine but since current C2 systems are not completely interoperable, we need procedures to overcome current C2 problems.

Our need for complete targeting JTPPs is great. In today's joint operations we would think the component commanders would have a common picture of their battlespace but that is not true.
"The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) cannot transmit the land/amphibious component's view of the battlespace to the air component's Theater Integrated Situation Display (TISD). As a result, each component views the battlespace from their unique perspective."\textsuperscript{16} Ideally, a common "picture" of the battlefield shared by all commanders focuses the targeting effort, especially if near-real-time (NRT) information is available. National and operational area sensors, data links, and C2 systems provide the information on which the joint force and component commanders are able to make decisions and exercise control over their forces. However, current JTF C2 systems do not allow unified, real-time coordination and deconfliction of all forces. Likewise, national and in-theater sensors do not necessarily provide all components with a "common picture" of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{17}

The problem of not having a common picture is not the only issue that affects targeting. The Air Force's Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS) and the Army's Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) are automated systems that are essential in each service's targeting process. These systems, that facilitate planning the use of and the command and control of attack assets, are not interconnected. "Presently, only verbal coordination and
deconfliction occurs between the air component and land component commanders."\textsuperscript{18}

Overcoming these problems of battlefield interconnectivity is important so component commanders can have a better common picture of the battle and are able to better coordinate and synchronize operational fires. Ultimately, we will have joint systems that are connected and which will make planning and coordinating operations much easier but, until then we need comprehensive procedures for joint targeting.

INTERDICATION

Interdiction operations are significant in joint force operations. Joint interdiction provides the JFC the ability to strike targets to affect the enemy's ability to fight. There are many target sets that can be included in interdiction but the effects determine if the attack is interdiction. Interdiction objectives are to divert, delay, disrupt and destroy enemy capabilities.\textsuperscript{19} These objectives can be achieved by ground or air forces or a combination of the two. Although each component commander has the capability to conduct interdiction, joint interdiction has the potential to be much more effective, a coordinated and synchronized application of combat power that is synergistically decisive. The need is for a method to coordinate and synchronize interdiction to be
effective and achieve unity of effort. "The JFC structures the joint force to ensure that diverse component capabilities, operations, and forces complement each other to achieve the desired results effectively and efficiency."20 By establishing his command arrangements, geographical orientation of his theater and initial guidance, the JFC establishes unity of effort.

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) will most likely be in charge of the theater-wide interdiction effort and directly responsible for the air interdiction mission.21 Ground commanders have their own capability to conduct interdiction but may also nominate interdiction targets to the JFACC. The target nominations can be part of the JFC’s overall theater interdiction mission, or may be targets important to the ground component commander’s interdiction effort. However, with a theater-wide focus, and other priority missions assigned by the JFC, the JFACC is not obligated to include nominated targets as part of his operation. Part of the problem for the JFACC is there are normally more targets than he has assets available to attack them. However, to synchronize interdiction operations with the JFACC, the ground commander needs to know which targets, if any, were included in the JFACC’s Air Tasking Order (ATO). Knowing the status of his interdiction target nominations gives the ground commander the information he needs
to make decisions about his own interdiction missions. To be more effective a system needs to be in place that makes this information transparent to each commander.

Currently, the only doctrinally supported mechanism for resolving targeting issues is the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB). The JTCB is a JFC level coordination effort in which theater-wide decisions are made regarding targeting and interdiction priorities. From this macro-level board the CINC makes apportionment decisions to the JPACC for weight of effort for air assets throughout the theater. If used, the JTCB seems to be a satisfactory method for synchronizing the big picture for the JFC. However, there is no other decision mechanism mentioned in joint doctrine to help adjudicate competing demands for scare resources as the operational and tactical situation changes.

Operational commanders are likely to have areas of overlapping responsibilities for targeting. Incompatible C2 and targeting systems justify the need for some doctrinal procedures to help alleviate this problem. Next I will explore the current state of joint doctrine/procedures pertaining to targeting.
CURRENT STATUS OF JTTPS FOR TARGETING

I have highlighted the lack of specifics in joint doctrine on how to coordinate and synchronize operational fires and how it relates to operational areas of overlap. The Air Land Sea Application pamphlet, Targeting: The Joint Targeting Process and Procedures For Targeting Time-Critical Targets states, "Joint doctrine addresses the need for target coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization between components. Unfortunately, it does not adequately explain "how" to rapidly conduct this coordination." The need for addressing the "how to" is paramount. Current "how to" procedures are found in the ALSA publication and are currently being incorporated into Joint Publication 3-60, Doctrine for Joint Targeting. Now is time for the joint community to develop the specifics on how to synchronize targeting, because the initial effort is incomplete. Both the ALSA pub and the draft JP 3-60 address the JTTPs for targeting and attacking time sensitive targets, but are inadequate in providing commanders total visibility of all targeting being done in their AO.

The ALSA publication is purposefully focused on procedures for targeting JFC designated TSTs. The draft of Joint Publication 3-60 has one chapter devoted to JTTPs, and those are only for TSTs. Although a good start, the draft 3-60 goes no
farther than the ALSA publication and consequently is incomplete with regards to joint targeting procedures.

Why are current JTTPs for targeting focused on only TSTs? Because TSTs present the most challenging targeting problem for the Joint Force Commander. Examples used in the ALSA publication are targeting and attack against mobile Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), mobile launchers that can deliver weapons of mass destruction, mobile rocket launchers and mobile command and control facilities. These types of targets present unique challenges because of their short dwell time and potential for having adverse affects against friendly forces. What the ALSA publication states is these are targets, which have been approved by the JFC as critical targets that need to be destroyed when acquired. The ALSA publication "provides additional operational warfighting procedures, guidance and information but does not address JTTPs for operational centers of gravity or vulnerabilities leading to the operational centers of gravity."23 The ALSA publication is not doctrine but has filled a void in procedures in this area and is evolving into JТTPs. However, the draft of JP 3-60 does not take the targeting problem any farther, it is focused only on JТTPs for time sensitive targets.

The development of JТTPs for the attack of TSTs is understandable. The challenge for attacking targets of this
nature is the initial guidance needed to decide what targets constitute TSTs for the JFC, and then establishing procedures to target and attack. SCUD hunting during Desert Storm and the efforts taking place today with attack operations against theater surface to surface missiles, potentially delivering a warhead with a WMD capability, make JTTPs for attacking TSTs important. Unfortunately, targeting and attack of TSTs is a subset of the entire targeting effort occurring in a theater. We need our doctrinal JTTPs to encompass procedures beyond just those for TSTs.

Joint Publication 3-60 needs to identify and resolve the procedures for the total joint targeting effort. The ALSA publication provides a basis for targeting and attack procedures, but our joint doctrine needs to be more comprehensive than a rewrite of a manual which has adequate procedures for those TST specific targets. The development of the joint doctrine needs to be a joint effort. The first draft had an Air Force focus, which is not surprising, since the Air Force's doctrine writers were tasked to develop the targeting procedures.

Joint targeting procedures are needed. The ALSA publication and the draft of JP 3-60 do a good job of resolving the different targeting processes; the Army's Decide Detect Deliver Assess (D3A) methodology against the six-step process joint
doctrinal advocates. The differences are mostly semantic, the ALSA publication has adequately demonstrated the two processes are the same. Therefore, our JTPPs should easily be able to bridge the differences and develop common JTPPs.

Targeting is an important process in today's military operations. The Army's Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC) is an effort to help army commanders, division level and up, synchronize targeting and coordinate employment of deep attack assets inside the ground commander's AO. The Air Operations Center (AOC) performs the same function for air operations. "Targeting is complicated by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other components of the joint force."24 Until we have interoperable systems, JTPPs for targeting are necessary.

CONCLUSION

The twenty-first century is just around the corner. The Army is moving forward with digitized units and force XXI operations. In its concept document for how the Army will fight in the early twenty-first century, TRADOC stated,

Using the ABCS (Army Battle Command System) to integrate battlefield information, twenty-first century commanders will have the capability to see the entire battlefield in depth, identify key targets--particularly moving and short-dwell targets--and attack with a wide choice of joint, as well as Army systems, whenever and wherever the commander desires.
Depth and simultaneous attack means will vary greatly. They will include air, Army aviation and ground maneuver units, joint precision fires, psychological operations, information operations, and employment of special operations forces. These various means of attack and others, will be horizontally and vertically integrated by a fully digitized joint and combined arms target-acquisition, hand-off, and strike system—a component network of ABCS.25

This concept describes a seamless capability for Army, and other component commanders, to be able to seamlessly target and use any available joint asset to attack targets important to the Army commander. Obviously, this concept is predicated on some sophisticated C2 systems, which are not yet fielded, but the concept is still valid today. If today, the U.S. military had more complete JTPPs for targeting, we could translate those procedures into the processes for automated systems of the force XXI Army. The other image this concept invokes is one of total visibility of all targeting occurring in a ground commander's AO. The problem is we don't have any JTPPs for targeting other than those developed by ALSA for TSTS.

The challenge of being able to synchronize operational fires is reason to question whether joint doctrine is adequate on this topic. Although the importance of applying combat power in a coordinated and synchronized manner while eliminating redundant attacks on the same target, is obvious, the problem is how to ensure targeting occurring throughout the joint force is efficient. When applied constantly throughout the depth of the
JFC's area of operation, the synergistic effect of each component's operational fires to the overall theater mission can be decisive.

The mechanism for how operational fires are synchronized is not covered in detail in any of the three key joint documents, Joint Pub 3-0, Joint Pub 3-03 or Joint Pub 3-09. Although each recognizes the importance of synchronizing operations and fires, there is no mention of a specific procedure for how this is to be accomplished during operations. However, because of the importance of operational fires, it seems this void will continue to create friction in how to plan and synchronize operational fires.

The only mechanism which joint doctrine addresses to help with the synchronization of operational fires is the Joint Targeting Coordination Board. For the joint commander this is probably sufficient, but this macro-level coordination effort is not sufficient when coordinating the details of adjudicating specific operational needs of component commanders. The BCD is one means of coordinating these details; between the ground commander and the air component commander, but the BCD must do face-to-face coordination and deconfliction of targeting with their Air Force counterparts. The lack of joint, interoperable C2 and intelligence systems makes the effort more difficult. Joint TTPs for targeting would make the process better.
What are needed are procedures for ground and air commanders to improve situational awareness between each other. Improved transparency between supported and supporting commanders can help improve synchronization and work toward applying combat power to achieve the synergistic effects that Joint Pub 3-0 says are desirable. Targeting is the process; we need JTTPs to provide targeteers a common method to target across the services.

No matter what specific procedures are adopted, it is important to ensure transparency in all operations taking place in the joint operations area. If commanders are to synchronize limited assets, having the knowledge of what the other commanders are doing is essential. As we think about fighting in a dispersed battlefield the need for this capability will be even more pressing. Comprehensive JTTPs for targeting can fill the void.

The targeting processes we have today are adequate for component commanders inside their AO or for functional commanders. However, in high-tempo operations our JTTPs for attack of interdiction targets and coordinating targeting between components are not well developed. The JTTPs developed by ALSA for targeting and attack of TSTs are a good starting point for JP 3-60 Doctrine for Joint Targeting.
Although the ALSA JTTPs for targeting are focused at the JFC level, the procedures in the document are a good start for a complete set of targeting JTTPs. The effort to write the JTTPs needs to be a joint effort so our doctrine addresses each service's specific needs. There are people who every day perform targeting in joint organizations and who can provide operational experience on what are appropriate JTTPs. Our targeting doctrine needs to capture their expertise and develop a document that provides procedures for targeting between the components as well as procedures for time sensitive targets.

Word Count 5215
ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., IV-15.

4 Ibid., III-33.

5 Ibid., II-9.

6 Ibid., II-8.

7 Ibid., II-9.

8 Ibid., II-11.

9 Ibid., II-19.

10 Ibid., III-33.

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