REEXAMINING U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA

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Reexamining U.S. Nonproliferation Policy In South Asia

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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The goal of U.S. policy toward South Asia has been to preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. In support of these policies, the U.S. Congress enacted a series of legislation to provide automatic sanctions against nation states that violated nuclear proliferation protocols. In May 1998, first India and then Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold by conducting tests of nuclear weapons, and then declaring themselves nuclear weapon states. These tests brought automatic sanctions from the U.S. government as well as condemnation from the UN Security Council. In the wake of this development, U.S. policy requires reassessment with an eye toward the short-term need to lessen the likelihood of conflict in South Asia, and with a long-term goal of implementation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Several options exist, but the policy option with the greatest likelihood for success is increased engagement by the U.S. in South Asia by using both inducements and sanctions to move India and Pakistan back into compliance with current international nuclear
conventions. Resolution of this challenge to the NPT will require a multinational, long-term approach.
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REEXAMINING U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA

The 1998 U.S. National Security Strategy clearly identifies the spread of weapons of mass destruction as posing the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. In concert with this, the U.S. has been forced to reevaluate its policies toward nonproliferation in South Asia since the May 1998 testing of nuclear explosive devices by both the governments of India and Pakistan. Current U.S. policy efforts have focused on the use of diplomacy, and particularly sanctions, to move both India and Pakistan toward compliance with current international nuclear conventions. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott outlined the U.S. key policy positions in an address to the Brookings Institute on November 12, 1998. In his address he stated,

"two principles have guided the American side of this (nonproliferation) effort: First, we remain committed to the common position of the P-5, G-8, and South Asia Task Force, notably including on the long-range goal of universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We do not and will not concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear-weapons states under the NPT. Unless and until they disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities, they will continue to forfeit the full recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the NPT. This is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy, not least because otherwise, we would break faith with the states that forswore a capability they could have acquired—and we would inadvertently provide an incentive for any country to blast its way into the ranks of the nuclear-weapons states. Our second principle applies
to the near and medium term, and to the practice of diplomacy as the art of the possible. We recognize that any progress toward a lasting solution must be based on India’s and Pakistan’s conceptions of their own national interests."³

U.S. policy toward both India and Pakistan has remained firm toward nonproliferation. In the 1997 U.S. National Security Strategy, "The United States has urged India and Pakistan to take steps to reduce the risk of conflict and to bring their nuclear and missile programs into conformity with international standards."⁴ More recently, the 1998 version of the U.S. National Security Strategy emphatically restated this position while adding, "The Indian and Pakistani nuclear test explosions (in May 1998) were unjustified and threaten to spark a dangerous nuclear arms race in Asia. As a result of those tests and in accordance with our laws the U.S. imposed sanctions against India and Pakistan...India and Pakistan are contributing to a self-defeating cycle of escalation that does not add to the security of either country."⁵

Diplomatic efforts have been intensified by the State Department since the May 1998 testing and have led to some movement by both India and Pakistan toward compliance with at least the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by September of 1999—but not the NPT, and both have been generally receptive to adopting internationally accepted controls to block export of
technology related to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{6} It should be noted that the economic sanctions imposed as a result of the U.S. 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act (NPPA) were eased by President Clinton on November 7, 1998 in response to positive steps taken by India and Pakistan to address U.S. nonproliferation concerns.\textsuperscript{7}

India has indicated that it will not sign or adhere to the NPT. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee stated, "India will define its own requirements for its nuclear deterrent on its own assessment of the security environment."\textsuperscript{8} Pakistan has chosen to reflect Indian policy in these areas in the past, and will probably continue to do so in the future.

Clearly this leaves the U.S. in the unenviable position of needing to quickly reevaluate interests, future goals, and policies to pursue in South Asia. The purpose of this paper is to examine U.S. options for stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia and to recommend a course of action to pursue for future policy.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND INFLUENCES.

Analyzing all the factors that have contributed to five decades of hostility between the modern states of India and Pakistan would require a book-length treatment in itself. Here, treatment of the subject is confined to a brief background
history and an exploration of the probable issues causing India and Pakistan to test nuclear weapons in May 1998. Both Pakistan and India saw themselves as victims during British colonialism which tended to lessen the natural religious conflict found between the Muslims of Pakistan and the Hindus of India. As colonization ended, up to 500,000 people were killed in the fighting during the process of partitioning the British colony. Within two months of independence India and Pakistan were at war over Kashmir, one of the formerly "princely states" (with a Muslim majority population) that had acceded to India while under pressure from Islamic tribal invaders from Pakistan. The Cold War continued this friction as India sought to maintain a "natural" regional balance of power that by any measurement favored India, while Pakistan sought to disrupt this strategy by involving the U.S., China, and influential nations in its rivalry with India. Two wars have been fought between the two nations within the last three decades: the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War over Kashmir, and the 1971 War resulting in the birth of Bangladesh as a nation separate from Pakistan. Other regional concerns have also tended to escalate tension in the region. In particular the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought U.S. aid to Pakistan to assist in stopping Soviet advances.

In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear explosion. Although it is impossible to accurately ascertain Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi's intentions with her approval to test, it was probably related to a growing concern in India that a U.S.-China-Pakistani alliance threatened India's security; an alternative argument focused on India's internal political problems and the use of the test as a diversion. India then suspended overt development or testing of nuclear weapons until the May 1998 tests.

Dr. A.Q. Khan, head of Islamabad's uranium enrichment program, provided much of Pakistan's posturing over the ability to produce nuclear weapons. As early as 1984, Dr. Khan indicated that Pakistan had achieved the ability to efficiently enrich uranium. He created additional consternation on January 28, 1987 when he reportedly told Indian reporter, Kuldip Nayar that "what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct..." Ultimately Pakistan's government denied these claims; however, they were undoubtedly a source of concern to the Indian government and helped to prod India to continue its program of nuclear weapon development.

No discussion of how we arrived at the current situation in the region would be complete without mentioning India's huge neighbor to the north, China. Although initially India enjoyed good relations with China a border dispute in the early 1960's led the two to become regional adversaries. In 1962 the Indian Army moved into a contested border area between the two, leading
to a Chinese offensive deep into Indian territory.\textsuperscript{12} Eventually, China unilaterally proclaimed a cease-fire and returned to positions it had held in the east before the conflict (except that China retained the disputed area of Askia Chin). Since the 1960’s, China has been more closely allied with Pakistan as evidenced by China’s provision of economic, military, and technical assistance (including assistance for Pakistani nuclear and missile programs).\textsuperscript{13} This has also contributed to India’s feelings of concern over security.

The precise motives for testing by either India or Pakistan cannot be discerned from published statements, or the rhetoric of either government after the May 1998 testing. Leading policy analysts have encountered difficulty in determining the exact cause of testing, as published in After the Tests, “India’s precise motives for testing nuclear devices on May 11 and 13 remain unclear, but they apparently ranged from the political to the strategic. Relevant factors included the orientation of India’s new government, the end of the Cold War, and the dilution of New Delhi’s ties with Moscow, concerns over China and its conventional and nuclear forces, and India’s desire to be treated as a great power.”\textsuperscript{14} The ascension to power of the ultra-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in early 1998 brought a powerful political call for developing India’s own nuclear capability. As early as 1996, the BJP had stated it
would deploy nuclear weapons, and that it would refuse to sign any international nonproliferation agreements.\footnote{15}

In Pakistan's case, nuclear testing appears to be clearly a reaction to India's nuclear testing in an attempt to maintain a regional security balance that is no less favorable. Pakistan's ambassador to the U.S. seemed to confirm this when he stated, "We never denied our nuclear capability; we just never wanted to come out of the closet. But once India exploded nuclear devices some 30 miles from our border, everything changed. At that point, we had no choice. It became a national security imperative."\footnote{16} Although their leaders considered Pakistan's testing necessary, it was probably executed reluctantly because of the debilitating effects of U.S. sanctions on Pakistan's externally indebted economy.\footnote{17}

POTENTIAL U.S. POLICY OPTIONS.

Potential U.S. policy options are perhaps as numerous as there are opinions on "what future U.S. policy in South Asia should be" or perhaps they would equal the number of experts in the field of foreign relations. Even so, four major potential policy options should be adequate for examination. The first policy for examination is for the U.S. to continue its current policy of nonproliferation through the pursuit of direct diplomacy and the use of sanctions as a penalty for
noncompliance. A second potential U.S. policy option is for the U.S. to allow (in conjunction with other nations) India and Pakistan to join the recognized nuclear community of nations (U.S., Great Britain, France, Russia, and China). A third potential option is for the U.S. to develop compelling developmental economic packages for nations that comply with the NPT and CTBT, while imposing harsh penalties in the form of strict economic sanctions on those that fail to comply. A fourth policy option is to pursue a hard line policy with increasing penalties, up to and including the use of force to stop proliferation. The benefits, risk, likelihood of success, and the need for other nations cooperation for ultimate success will be examined for each policy option.

Continuing Current U.S. Policy Toward South Asia.

The dominant emphasis of current U.S. policy is the prevention of the proliferation and deployment of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Congressional actions have subordinated other aspects of both bilateral relationships to the nuclear issue, most notably in the case of Pakistan. Current U.S. policy toward nonproliferation in South Asia is contained in legislation that automatically imposes broad economic sanctions for an indefinite period as called for by the Symington, Pressler, and Glenn amendments. These sanctions include requiring that no funds be made available for the
purpose of providing economic assistance, or providing military assistance or grant military education and training to nations that possess or test nuclear weapons in violation of the Symington, Pressler (deals specifically with Pakistan), and Glenn amendments.\textsuperscript{20} It should be noted that Congress provided the President with some leverage to modify U.S. policy contained in the above amendments by enacting the India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-277). President Clinton used these powers to waive most sanctions until October 21, 1999 against both India and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{21}

The possible benefits of the U.S. current policy is that it sends a clear signal to all potential proliferators that the U.S. will impose significant sanctions on any country that violates current U.S. Congressional mandates. Additionally, following current policy does not require the administration or Congress to attempt to find new ways of dealing with nuclear proliferation. Already, current policies have shown some benefit in the wake of the May 1998 nuclear testing; Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers have both declared a moratorium on further nuclear testing and publicly committed at the United Nations General Assembly to move toward adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by September 1999.\textsuperscript{22}

There are risks associated with continuing the current U.S. policy. First and foremost, current policies did not prevent
proliferation in South Asia, and they are unlikely to cause either India or Pakistan to "un-proliferate." There are a variety of reasons for this, but both India and Pakistan link nuclear weapons to their security; perhaps, even more importantly, India links nuclear weapons to its need to be perceived as a "world power." Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's statement to the Indian Parliament on May 27, 1998 in explaining India's nuclear testing echoed these sentiments: "India is now a nuclear weapon state. This is a reality that cannot be denied. It is not a conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and our engineers. It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of humankind."23 Continuing current policy also invites the risk of other nation's with the capability to proliferate to do so, and may undermine important treaty agreements to include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the CTBT, and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott said in his November 12, 1998 address at the Brookings Institute, "(Adherence to the NPT) is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy, not least because otherwise, we would break the faith with the states that forswore a capability they could have acquired—we would inadvertently provide an incentive for any country to
blast its way into the ranks of the nuclear-weapons states."\textsuperscript{24}

An additional risk in this area is that economic sanctions could have an unintended consequence of destabilizing Pakistan because of its dependence on foreign aid and investment. A stable Pakistan in possession of nuclear weapons is reason enough to worry; an unstable Pakistan would be that much worse.\textsuperscript{25}

The likelihood of current U.S. policy succeeding in gaining the adherence by India and Pakistan to the NPT is remote. Clearly India is the lead nation in this endeavor as Pakistan has already stated that it will sign both conventions "when India does."\textsuperscript{26} Given that sanctions (primarily economic) have a much greater impact on Pakistan than on India, it would seem that in regard to these two nations in particular—they will have little positive effect in achieving adherence to the NPT by either India or Pakistan. Current policy does have the positive impact of sending a signal to other potential proliferators that the U.S. will punish proliferation.

As with nearly any policy, world cooperation enhances significantly the impact of sanctions on a given country. However, as Elliot Abrams recently noted, "The argument against unilateral sanctions is an argument against American leadership and suggests that if we cannot get some sort of majority vote from other traders and investors, we must set our scruples aside."\textsuperscript{27}
Shift Policy to Allow India and Pakistan into the Accepted Nuclear Community.

This policy requires abandonment of the current U.S. policy position. Substantiating Indian and Pakistani claims as nuclear weapons states would require the U.S. to reexamine and explain its future position on the NPT. First, the administration would have to convince a Congress that has been aggressive in the past in specifying sanctions on most nation states (except Israel) that have even covertly developed nuclear weapons that this is sound policy. It would also require significant diplomatic effort on the part of the U.S. to mold world opinion to accept that India and Pakistan represent an exceptional case, one where the proliferation of nuclear weapons has enhanced regional stability and should therefore be endorsed.

The benefits of this dramatic shift in U.S. policy is primarily associated with our ability to focus efforts in South Asia on the control of proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons, and on the control of nuclear weapons themselves on the subcontinent. By accepting both India and Pakistan into the nuclear community (and amending the NPT), the U.S. would be in a position to dialogue with India and Pakistan in a non-confrontational manner and assist these newly "proliferated" nations in establishing physical and procedural safety measures, and physical and procedural security measures as outlined in
"Proliferation Management in the Third Nuclear Age: A Strategy and Rules of Engagement." The provision of these measures would assist both nations in establishing and executing programs designed to prevent the loss or unauthorized use of these weapons—preventing a "war by accident" which has long been a concern of U.S. policy. This also enhances the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons possessed by both nations, by lessening the danger of one nation to execute a preemptive strike on the other. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is one of the widely held and strong beliefs of proponents of nuclear weapons. As Devin T. Hagerty concluded, "The key to future Indo-Pakistani nuclear arms control will be the continued robustness of deterrence. Although New Delhi and Islamabad each had its own particular combination of motivations for going nuclear, both share—along with other nuclear powers—the fundamental belief that nuclear weapons deter aggression." The U.S. should also consider providing intelligence and selective technology to India and Pakistan in support of specific confidence building measures to dispel rumors or dispel false assessments that could stimulate "unnecessary" arms competition or unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. Intuitively, it seems likely that the U.S. may also be able to wield more influence in South Asia to cause both India and
Pakistan to comply with other treaties in this area, specifically the CTBT, MTCR, and the FMCT.

The most far reaching danger in need of policy attention is that India’s defiance of the NPT regime, unless stemmed, will start a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation, prompting weak NPT adherents and "problem" states not only to step up their own efforts to acquire nuclear weapons but to leave the NPT, or threaten to, arguing the treaty and regime enforcement mechanisms are no longer viable. 32 As pointed out earlier by Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, allowing either India or Pakistan to "blast its way into the ranks of nuclear-weapons states" inadvertently provides an incentive for other nations to proliferate. Proliferation could also lead to an expanding arms race in not only India, and Pakistan, but with China. Additionally, the prevailing view of many experts is that, "Whatever the cause or causes of either country’s actions (in testing nuclear weapons)... the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests have made South Asia and the world a more dangerous place. The presence of nuclear forces in the arsenals of two adjacent and often quarreling countries increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons could be used in a conflict—and dramatically raises the human and financial costs of any armed confrontation should deterrence fail." 33 Significant risks, but the likelihood of the use nuclear weapons in South Asia is a subject of great
debate, with many voices echoing the nuclear deterrence argument, and many voices espousing the dangers of proliferation.

Although this policy carries with it a significant risk of future proliferation, the likelihood of its success and acceptance by India and Pakistan is high. It would grant India the recognition it has sought as one of the world's great powers. As Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee put it, "Millions of Indians have viewed this occasion (the tests) as the beginning of the rise of a strong and self-confident India. I fully share this assessment and this dream..."34 For the senior elected officials and a larger domestic constituency, the motives for India's nuclear, space, and missile development have arisen more from status than security needs. Developing India's scientific and technological capacity—civilian and military—is seen as the means of demonstrating India's world-class leadership potential and of satisfying India's pressing need to have advanced technology to modernize the nation's still underdeveloped infrastructure and economy.35 In terms of both India and Pakistan, both are likely to welcome U.S. assistance in developing stable nuclear weapons programs in hopes that it will also lead to increased U.S. economic aid and ties.

Allowing India and Pakistan to join the nuclear weapons accepted nations would require significant cooperation from the
world community. Not only would this shift in policy require radical modification of the NPT, but it would also require an acceptance of a shift in the overt balance of power of India and Pakistan within the world community—one disproportionate with their economic power status. This sort of agreement would be difficult to obtain.

Increased Engagement--Offer Compelling Developmental Economic Packages for Compliance with the NPT and CTBT with Harsh Penalties for Noncompliance.

This policy option is not a radical departure from current administration policy; however, it does seek to broaden the incentives for both India and Pakistan to comply with the NPT and CTBT by moving beyond sanctions to provide positive reinforcement for compliance. Providing incentives seeks to reverse a failure of sanctions to preclude proliferation, "In the new situation that has arisen, and given the failure of automatic U.S. sanctions to deter this outcome (nuclear proliferation), a new, more robust combination of incentives and disincentives will have to be designed."36 One of the most important components of national security for the states in South Asia involves the need to create continued economic growth and industrial development.37 These incentives would be designed to assist both India and Pakistan in modernizing their economic base and ultimately in stabilizing their respective governments.
This is a unique approach, applied because; "India and Pakistan are not typical cases." At the time they detonated their bombs, neither had signed the NPT or the CTBT. India already had developed a nuclear capacity in the 1970s and Pakistan in the 1980s." Economic incentives would be tied to specific compliance with the CTBT, MTCR, and the FMCT with an ultimate long-term goal of compliance with the NPT.

The primary benefits of this program are that it provides positive inducements for compliance, penalties for noncompliance (as we currently have with the Symington, Pressler, and Glenn Amendments), and will help to stabilize South Asia—while potentially creating economic benefit long-term for all participants. It is important to remember "that the U.S. has important interests in both India and Pakistan in addition to discouraging further nuclear proliferation in the region...These regional interests include preventing war of any sort in South Asia; promoting democracy and internal stability; expanding economic growth, trade, and investment; and developing political and where applicable, military cooperation on a host of regional and global challenges." Stabilizing South Asia is also an important policy goal enhanced by providing positive incentives to both India and Pakistan. Incentives should also improve prospects for avoiding a nuclear arms race in South Asia that would clearly undermine stability.
There are risks associated with a policy of providing incentives to India and Pakistan after their nuclear testing in May. First and foremost is the danger that other countries may see this as a reward for noncompliance with the NPT and CTBT, which could inadvertently provide an incentive for other countries to proliferate, and then "deal from a position of strength" in negotiating compliance. As The Economist of London depicted on a recent cover, the 1998 detonations on the Subcontinent may lead to "a bomb in every back yard." A second risk associated with this policy is that "bait and switch has often been the rule in India's positioning on international non-proliferation treaties." This exposes the U.S. to the risk of supplying India (and Pakistan) with economic development, and strengthened governments and militaries, while not relieving either the underlying causes of proliferation or proliferation itself. A final risk is that the U.S. may inadvertently reinforce more pro-proliferation regimes in India (and Pakistan) by offering incentives post nuclear testing. As BJP Party President Thakre stated in 1998, "(The Vajpayee government) unlike previous regimes, will not give in to international pressure...It is a reassertion of our sovereign right to decide for ourselves how best to meet our security concerns and it is a repudiation of the nuclear apartheid that the West has sought to impose on us."
The likelihood of success of this policy is reasonably high, over the long term, if the U.S. can successfully link incentives and the threat of sanctions to progress on the NPT, CTBT, MCTR, and FMCT. Both India and Pakistan have already indicated a willingness to comply with the CTBT by September of 1999, to strengthening controls on the export of nuclear and missile technology, are now participating in the FMCT negotiations, and have again begun a dialogue on Kashmir.\textsuperscript{44} Long term policy will have to recognize the strategic importance of South Asia in the post Cold War environment, and be committed to solving it—long term. "The fact that India tested (nuclear weapons in May 1998), and that this test caught U.S. policymakers by surprise, was as much a long-term policy failure as a near-term intelligence failure. U.S. interests in South Asia have been increasing for years; so, too, now are the threats to those interests."\textsuperscript{45}

World cooperation is necessary in this endeavor, but particularly China must be involved in the success of moving India and Pakistan back from a regional nuclear arms race and eventually back across the nuclear threshold. The report After the Tests describes China's role as, "China bears some responsibility for the situation in South Asia, given its own nuclear and missile programs that concern India and the assistance it has provided over the years to Pakistan’s nuclear
and missile programs. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to stabilize the situation in South Asia without China's constructive participation." It must also be noted that doubt exists that China will be a positive influence in nonproliferation in South Asia, "China's irresponsible assistance to Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs, however, defeat the promise of any such partnership (with the U.S.). To the contrary, China's nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan has ratcheted up tensions across the subcontinent, sparked a dangerous arms race, and increased the prospect of a nuclear war." Incentives coupled with confidence building measures involving China, India, Pakistan, and the U.S. will be necessary if long term success is to result in a non-nuclear South Asia. It must be emphasized that this is a long-term policy solution, as at present there is little hope that India or Pakistan will sign and comply with the NPT. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee reiterated this position in December, 1998, "India will define its own requirements for its nuclear deterrent on its own assess of the security environment." A Hard Line Policy of Sanctions Up to and Including the use of Armed Force.

Pursuit of this policy is an expansion of the current U.S. policy of sanctions as provided for by the Symington, Pressler, and Glenn amendments. It is a dramatic increase in the level of
severity of U.S. policy but is not without precedent. In 1962, the Soviet Union's attempt to install nuclear capable ballistic missiles in Cuba resulted in the most serious American-Soviet crisis of the Cold War. President Kennedy and his NSC met this deployment of nuclear capable ballistic missiles with a naval blockade and the threat of additional force, ultimately resulting in the removal of the threat. Obviously, the circumstances surrounding these two events involve different nations and the current situation will not affect the strategic balance of world super powers. However, the use of force is not without precedent in enforcing U.S. interests in the nuclear arena. An excellent example of this is the continued attacks in recent months of Iraq in an attempt to enforce UN mandated inspections of suspected Iraqi weapons of mass destruction production facilities.

The major benefit of this policy is that is sends a clear and strong signal to potential proliferators that the U.S. will not tolerate noncompliance with the NPT—even for nonsignatories. It is also the only policy that realistically offers the potential for a near term reversal of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Perhaps this is necessary, "Since the Kashmir issue is still unresolved, the India-Pakistan nuclear arms competition brings the Subcontinent closer to the edge of a nuclear catastrophe." Most experts agree that India's
and Pakistan’s May 1998 nuclear tests have made South Asia and the world a more dangerous place.\textsuperscript{51}

The risks associated with this policy are great. First, the ability of the U.S. to galvanize world opinion in favor of the use of force to gain India’s and Pakistan’s compliance with the NPT (or other nonproliferation agendas) is extremely unlikely—given the U.S.’s past challenges in galvanizing world opinion to enforce UN sanctioned inspections of Iraq’s NBC programs. Second, the U.S. must realize that “India has the potential to be a major power in Asia as the next century opens; Pakistan can have a significant impact in both Central Asia and the Gulf.”\textsuperscript{52} The threat of force or actual use of force would undoubtedly, in the long term, cause both India and Pakistan to turn to other nations for alliance and economic ties—ultimately resulting in a loss of influence with these two countries by the U.S. Finally, although neither India nor Pakistan could militarily match the might of the U.S. either would be a costly foe.

Likelihood of success of this policy is marginal at best. Its success, over the long term, would depend on U.S. ability to motivate the world community to condemn India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests—which has happened\textsuperscript{53}; and endorse the use of force to counter their proliferation efforts—which has not happened and is extremely unlikely.
Implementation of this policy is not dependent on support by the world community. The U.S. possesses the military capability to enforce the policy; however, without the backing of the UN and significant support from the world community—long term the policy could be costly.

CONCLUSION

The immediate objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to encourage India and Pakistan to adopt policies that will help stabilize the situation in South Asia by capping their nuclear capabilities at their current levels and reinforcing the global effort to stem the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems.\textsuperscript{54} There is little disagreement that this should be the U.S. near term policy position. Ultimately, U.S. long-term policy should be “to explore ways in which India and Pakistan may yet be able to join non-proliferation undertakings and step back from the nuclear and missile arms race that their actions have greatly accelerated.”\textsuperscript{55} The ultimate issue is how should U.S. policy be formulated to meet these goals, and that is a much more difficult question to answer. Obviously, if the U.S. long-term goal is returning India and Pakistan to non-nuclear nation states, then the use of sanctions alone appears to have failed.
The strongest argument is for increased engagement—while providing both positive incentives for compliance and sanctions for failure to comply with non-proliferation agendas. To execute this policy requires the U.S. to reassess the strategic importance of South Asia and to focus some of its post Cold War efforts in cultivating political, economic, and military ties to this important region. Until May 1998 the U.S. had failed at this critical task.\textsuperscript{56} The current administration’s ability to refocus foreign policy in this important region remains to be seen—particularly over the long term. Congress has also provided challenges for the administration in developing and executing a cohesive foreign policy by requiring automatic sanctions without providing the president with broad waiver authority to support U.S. diplomacy rather than thwart it.\textsuperscript{57}

To be successful the U.S. policy approach must be proactive, long-term, and multinational in its approach. Particularly, it must involve China in bringing about a solution. China’s influence in the region is perceived as a threat by India, and coupled with China’s past assistance to Pakistan in both nuclear and missile programs undoubtedly will require the institution of trilateral confidence building measures among these three regionally linked states.

Finally achievement of U.S. policy goals will require the devotion of significant political, economic, and diplomatic
resources over a sustained period of time. Future U.S. policy will also be subject to great debate on its utility, whether it in fact rewards states for proliferating nuclear weapons, and whether it can ultimately achieve the goal of "un-proliferation" for India and Pakistan.

WORD COUNT: 5,397
ENDNOTES

8 Cooper, sec D, p. 3.
10 Ibid., p. 82, 83.
11 Ibid., p. 102.
13 Ibid., p. 10.
17 Jones et al., 138.
18 Haass, and Rose, 20, 21.
20 Ibid., 33-40.


26 Ibid., 20.


29 Ibid., 14.

30 Hagerty, 194.

31 Haass and Halperin, After the Tests, 5.

32 Jones et al., 119.

33 Ibid., 2-3.


35 Jones et al., 111.

36 Jones et al., 138.

41 The Economist, June 6-12, 1998; quoted in Jones et al., 119.
42 Jones et al., 119.
46 Ibid., 11.
48 Cooper, sec. D, p. 3.
49 Frketic, et al., 35.
50 Jones et al., 118.
52 Ibid., 14.
53 Ibid., 57-60.
54 Ibid., 7.
55 Jones, et al., 138.
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