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CONSERVATIVE HEAVY DIVISION:
A DESIGN FOR DISASTER?

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The US Army recently adopted the Conservative Heavy Division design as the force structure for its heavy divisions. The process appears to have been rushed and may not have thoroughly considered the results of the Advanced Warfighting Experiment, historical and doctrinal considerations. The overriding issues appear to have been a 15,000 cap on personnel and opportunities to decrease OPTEMPO funding. This paper will explore division designs, experimental results and doctrine to identify potentially disastrous implications that may adversely impact the Army’s ability to fight and win a one or two Major Theaters of War scenario without the digital enablers that are expected to make the division successful.
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Conservative Heavy Division: A Design For Disaster?

We cannot expect the enemy to oblige by planning his wars to suit our weapons; we must plan our weapons to fight war where, when, and how the enemy chooses.¹

The US Army recently adopted the Conservative Heavy Division design as the force structure for its heavy divisions. The process appears to have been rushed and may not have thoroughly considered the results of the Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE), historical and doctrinal considerations. The overriding issues appear to have been a 15,000 cap on personnel and opportunities to decrease Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) funding. Unless the design is validated completely, with all of the enablers, we may be on a collision course with disaster.

The National Security Strategy

The White House has defined a National Security Strategy for the Armed Forces of the United States. The strategy calls for us to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of enemy objectives in two theaters, in close succession. Second, we must plan and prepare to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means against us while exploiting
our vulnerabilities. Finally, the military must be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement ... as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingencies. The strategy is very ambitious and seems to ignore the amount of assets allocated to achieve that endstate. We have drawn down the military so fast and have not adequately defined an enemy to replace the cold war threat that we appear to have an Army that may have inadequate resources to support our national strategy.

Department of Defense’s (DoD) fundamental challenge is to ensure that we can effectively shape and respond to enemy threats through at least 2015. This means that even as we maintain ready, versatile forces to meet the challenges of the near term, we must transform our forces, capabilities and support structures to be able to shape and respond effectively in the future. We have to effectively identify our “worst case” adversaries and define their potential coalitions so as to be prepared to meet the two Major Theaters of War (MTW) strategy outlined by the President. Only at that time can we begin to assess risk.

One significant risk is that both MTWs could erupt at the same moment, not a few weeks apart. This development could strain the U.S. airlift and sealift capacity in the initial stages and could result in early shortages of specialized
capabilities. The delay could be more pronounced if some forces were already committed to operations outside the two MTWs when a conflict erupts. Global engagement at today's pace only exacerbates this problem. The impact of having to update the deployment plans for every contingency as well as retraining soldiers as they transition from Peace Keeping Operations to War during crises with minimal notice has the potential to lead the youth of America into a Korean War "Task Force Smith" like scenario.

Inherent in the acceptance of the two MTW force-sizing requirement is the recognition that the United States will not be able to conduct sizable contingency operations at the same time it is fighting in two MTWs. Immediately upon commitment into other theaters, we may be challenged with having to deal with hostile disengagement criteria that could damage our ability to rapidly mass troops in their new Theater of Operations. A good example of this could come if both Iraq and North Korea initiated attacks while the Serbians take advantage of an opportunity to cut our lines of communications (LOCs) in Bosnia in order to achieve their military objectives; or if refugee flow increased and clogged our departure due to fear of impending chaos.

DoD's 1996 Annual Report to Congress attacked many of the concerns raised above. "Contrary to much misperception, the
United States does not have a "two MTW strategy." This defense strategy calls for military forces to be able to protect and advance U.S. interests by carrying out the full range of military tasks enumerated in the National Security Strategy. In addition to deterring and defeating regional powers (fighting MTWs), U.S. forces are needed to provide stability via overseas presence, to deter and prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, and to conduct a wide range of smaller scale contingency operations." It is amazing that we can acknowledge that we don't have a two MTW strategy in 1996, yet drastically cut both manpower and equipment in three years and believe that we can fight and win two near simultaneous MTWs in 1999.

A Historical Perspective of MTW Warfare

All too often, however, we tend to underestimate opponents from disadvantaged nations even though there are many instances in history—Vietnam and Somalia being clear illustrations—where low-tech opponents successfully dealt with advanced technology wielded by well-trained troops of highly developed nations. Our national strategy only accounts for five Army Divisions in each of two MTWs. We also make some very significant assumptions like the one in the DoD 1997 Annual Report to Congress; "U.S. forces fighting alongside their regional allies are capable of
fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts today." It is clear that we are making force structure cuts predicated upon coalition support and does not appear to recognize the potential for enemy coalitions.

Before addressing the problems with a two MTW scenario, it is important to draw some analogies from our last MTW, Operation Desert Storm. The U.S. Army committed more than seven divisions to ground operations. The Marines committed the equivalent of two of their three active divisions, while the coalition provided another six divisions. The bottom line is that there were over 15 divisions committed to ground combat operations in the Iraqi Theater of Operations. Although Iraq has fewer forces than in 1990, its posture of 23 divisions and 316 combat aircraft provides enough strength for a well-focused attack, assuming readiness is adequate. Our two MTW scenario is only viable if we can assemble sufficient coalition forces to match enemy capability.

According to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, another political risk more prevalent in the Persian Gulf, is that Iraq might recruit allies to its side and that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries might not respond adequately. A coalition among Iraq, Syria and Iran could be formidable. The same "experts" that believed that the "wall" would never come down in Europe are still standing in disbelief as a Russian
Brigade is supporting Peace Keeping Operations in Bosnia under Task Force Eagle - A U.S. Division Headquarters supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the National Strategy only commits five Army divisions and one from the Marine Corps to each MTW, these do not have the combat power to unilaterally defeat a coalition of the magnitude described above.

None of the strategies mentioned above effectively deal with the fact that Iraq and the other nations of the world have learned some very significant lessons from Desert Storm as well. MG Robert Scales, the Commandant of the U.S. Army War College cites the example that, our

"most dangerous future opponent will heed the lessons from the Gulf War and will subsequently design a strategy that avoids our strength and uses indirect means to erode our national will. This opponent will exploit perceived American weaknesses such as an over-reliance on technology, an aversion to casualties and collateral damage, a lack of commitment for sustained campaigns and sensitivity to world opinions."

The analysis above should give us concern, but fails to mention another lesson that is every bit as important. We should not expect to have another uncontested build-up of combat power. A strategic assessment from the National Defense University states that: "Iraq presumably would seek to rush southward, to defeat outnumbered U.S. and allied forces before U.S. reinforcements
could arrive in strength, and thereby attempt to set the stage for a political settlement favorable to itself."\textsuperscript{12}

Understanding the larger picture, COL (Ret.) Harry Summers, a Distinguished Fellow of the Army War College, notes that, "American force structure is inadequate for two MTWs; the United States is not only bluffing - a most dangerous thing to do - but even worse, is kidding itself into a false sense of security."\textsuperscript{13}

This is especially true when considering the likelihood of having to fight two MTWs. The historical evidence in support of the two MTW requirement is much stronger than detractors are willing to acknowledge. There have been, for instance, 22 nearly simultaneous crises, requiring the deployment and use of military force from 1946 to 1991.\textsuperscript{14} The likelihood of such occurrences has increased in the absence of the Cold War superpower restraints.\textsuperscript{15}

A recent example of where competing interests in two Theaters caused the National Command Authority (NCA) concern was described by the Secretary of the Defense, William Perry. "In 1994, while in the process of reinforcing those forces in Korea in response to the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis, the United States sent the deterrent portion of the second MTW force to Kuwait to deter a recalcitrant Saddam Hussein. Since then, a similar deterrent package has been dispatched several times to Kuwait. In each case, the lack of a two MTW force might have
entailed the sacrifice of U.S. personnel or the compromise of U.S. interests." Even if our leadership believed that we have the combat power to support two MTWs, the former Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney indicated that although he supported the two MTW concept, he was concerned that we lacked the requisite logistics capabilities to support it.\textsuperscript{17}

The skepticism at senior levels about whether we have sufficient combat power or support to fight and win two MTWs should send chills down our spine, especially in light of the fact that these comments were made before the additional attrition of combat power from forward deployed divisions. The combat power is being reduced because of the belief that technology and digitization can compensate for the loss of combat power. The only problem with that thinking is that much of the technology has not been fielded yet and the true depth of the digitization has not been "load tested" or subjected to hostile electronic attack. The world is changing and the potential for global conflict is as ripe now as it ever has been. To attrite combat power without ensuring the enablers are available to soldiers in the field may be tantamount to disaster. Our Armed Forces deserve the best equipment and full spectrum of capability as they look future adversaries in the face.
Potential Threats to Security and Ignoring Capability

Stratfor, Inc., a private company that provides intelligence services to businesses, organizations, and individuals has published what it considers the most likely challenges facing the United States in 1999 as we leave the Post-Cold War era.

The U.S. faces three maybe four challenges (Serbia, Kosovo, Iraq and Korea).

- Russia will begin the process of recreating old Soviet empire in 1999. Spawned by Russian consensus that they have been victimized both by Western investors and by the United States.
- Russia and China will be moving into a closer, primarily anti-American alliance in 1999. (to insulate themselves from U.S. political, economic and military pressure).
- The Serbs, supported by the Russians, will test the United States in Kosovo. (After watching failed foreign policy in action in Iraq).
- There is increasing danger of a simultaneous challenge from Serbia and Iraq, straining U.S. capabilities dramatically.\textsuperscript{18}

The 1998 assessment from the National Defense University for Korea is no less bleak. They predict that in Korea, a war could explode after a warning of only a few hours or days, not weeks. It would probably be accompanied by massed artillery fire, commando raids, and chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{19} The lack of reaction time and lost capability will not make this process any easier. In fact, any MTW could pose serious challenges that would stress U.S. responsiveness. If initial enemy attacks were halted without serious losses, success might be attained
quickly. It not, these MTWs might prove prolonged and difficult. 20

The aforementioned examples are only provided as illustrative examples of challenges that have to be considered legitimate security concerns as we develop national strategy. One of the reasons we don’t seriously address these threats is that we sometimes overlook the obvious. Charles Dunlap Jr. expertly discusses reasons why in a recent Parameters magazine article about the four dangerous myths described below:

- **Our most likely future adversaries will be like us** — future opponents would not hesitate to use brutality openly to exploit the growing aversion to casualties that more and more shapes the political and military decisions of Western-style democracies.

- **We can safely downsize our military in favor of smaller, highly trained forces equipped with high-technology weapons** — The United states and other First World nations are becoming ever more dependent upon commercial, off-the-shelf technology. Consequently, we should expect that our adversaries will be buying much the same technology.

- **We can achieve information superiority and even dominance in future conflicts** — Future adversaries will also be able to buy high-resolution commercial satellite products on the open market. Given all these information sources, a goal of seeking information “superiority”, let alone “dominance” on the 21st-century battlefields is unrealistic, even quixotic.

- **Modern technology will make future war more humane if not bloodless** — Technologies will become so inexpensive that even relatively poor nations will be able to afford redundancies that would eliminate, the likelihood of success in cyber-attacks. The enemy might even develop a veil of operators who are equally adept, perhaps trained in American universities, and who might beat us to the punch? 21
Adversaries around the world are addressing the myths that Dunlap presents. Even the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Dennis Reimer has stated that "there are several disquieting trends that require close attention. Potential foes are far more likely to seek out asymmetrical responses, avoiding our strengths, assessing our weaknesses and attacking our vulnerabilities."²²

One of our strongest assets is our ability to develop technological weapons as demonstrated routinely in the country of Iraq. Russian generals in fact fear that, in general war, Western nations could employ such "smart weapons" to degrade Russian strategic forces, without ever having to go nuclear themselves. Consequently, a Russian General Officer stated that Russia "should enjoy the right to consider the first (enemy) use of precision weapons as the beginning of unrestricted nuclear war against it."²³ It is apparent that the consequences of our actions may not be fully understood by our policy makers as evidenced by the design of the Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment (DAWE). The design appeared to be predicated on the fact that each of the myths is fallacious.
The Division Advanced Warfighting Experiment

The Division XXI AWE was designed to be the culminating experiment that would validate the Force XXI division design. It would do so by assessing the Division XXI hypothesis which states that

"if the division organizational and operational concept (to include the CSS components) is designed and implemented to enable information dominance and information-age battle command capabilities/connectivity across all battlefield operating systems within and to a division, then enhancements in lethality, survivability, sustainability, and tempo will be achieved." 

The experiment was structured to allow Blue forces to use the Force XXI experimental division design, employing a full suite of digitized equipment (e.g., Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), Combat Service Support (CSS) enablers, etc.) and predominately equipped with weapons systems and munitions available in 2003. Red force composition reflected similar weapon systems capabilities. The reality of the experiment had the division using equipment that may not be fielded until long after 2003. Some of the most significant combat multipliers that were used were Commanche, ATACMs Block II, MSTARs munitions, Crusader with SADARM munitions, Future Scout
Cavalry Vehicle, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles organic to maneuver brigades, and Raptor just to name a few.

The experiment was an unqualified success. Never before in the history of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) had there been so many enemy killed. Nor had the enemy been destroyed in such a devastating manor, clearing the way to rip force structure out of the division and reduce ground combat power by 25 percent. There was also the added benefit that they could declare a resulting dividend in OPTEMPO dollars savings as well. The official line from General William Hartzog, the Commanding General - Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as he described the announcement of the redesign was, “The suite of computers (digitization) embedded in vehicles is the basis for this division.” He added that by the year 2000, the new division -- with about 15,300 troops versus 18,000 -- will be in place. A battalion will have three companies versus four as in the current division. “The changes the Army is introducing are designed to make a gradual, cautious, transition into the next century.” The goal says Hartzog is to “model today something that will be good enough in 2010.”

Without being too presumptuous, there appears to be little of anything either gradual or cautious about the redesign decision. The risk analysis has to be significant and relevant to actual threats. TRADOC’s Analysis Center (TRAC) prepared an
Initial Insights Report describing DAWE results. Some of their findings should provide some interesting thought.

One of the more interesting findings was the fact that the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) identified fire support the Experimental Force's (EXFOR) center of gravity. The OPFOR commander was losing most of his combat forces at distances of 60km and greater. EXFOR's improved munitions virtually ensured the lack of a "red zone" fight (for purposes of this paper red zone is defined as the area in which an infantry or armor battalion commander can influence with cannon artillery and direct fire weapons) with the OPFOR. The enemy commander was forced to focus on attacking the fires complex and not brigade combat teams. He also committed more human intelligence (HUMINT) assets to track the EXFOR and locate the fires complex. In turn the friendly commander had to allocate significantly more combat power to force protection, which in turn reduced the maneuver commanders flexibility to deal with changing enemy threats along the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT).28

There were many post AWE comments on the reduction of one company's combat power in each armor and infantry battalion. Many understood the implications of losing 25% of a battalions ground combat power, however many of the more enlightening comments addressed concerns over the lack of doctrine to support the elimination of a company in each battalion, as well as lost
flexibility in maneuver. Major General George Harmeyer, the Commandant of the U.S. Army's Armor Center summarized the major concern succinctly. "At task force level, tactics became more difficult. No reserve was created at task force level and usually not at brigade level. Because the task force lacked a reserve, the tempo of the task force suffered. On more than one occasion, the brigades could not capitalize on opportunities to seize the initiative." 29

Other ramifications of lost force structure had to do with having to yank forces to support force protection missions only to have to return them to the close fight when enemy forces penetrated the red zone. "In reality, this would have been a true challenge to execute - contacting units that were generally beyond current communication ranges, moving them, and committing them to the fight when they had probably never seen the plan, inevitably resulting in a piecemeal commitment of forces. Given that these security requirements will probably not diminish in the near future, doctrine needs to address techniques for conducting these force protection missions, how to achieve security through positioning assets near combat forces, and related techniques." 30 In spite of comments like this, we still managed to eliminate the force structure.

One concept that received only minimal attention during the DAWE was logistical support. According to the TRAC report, "the
Force XXI CSS information systems, concepts, and structure enhanced the CSS command and control processes in support of Division XXI operations and provided the division commander with the capability to execute his mission."³¹ Most of this capability came from the digital enablers that provide the logistician the "situational awareness" to succeed in this new environment. Enablers are the keys to success in Force XXI CSS. Some enablers, such as Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS), are currently developed only partially and require additional funding. Without the enablers, the battlefield distribution system cannot be maximized and support requirements cannot be anticipated to the optimum extent."³² An Army official who spoke to Army Times on the condition of anonymity said, "The intent was to have the (digital) enablers in place ... and we don't have the enablers in place. The concern (for fielding a combat capable digitized force) is a fair one."³³

Many of other enablers are not mature enough for fielding either and may not become available until sometime after 2003. The multi-capable maintainers have yet to be identified and trained, many of the satellites supporting the movement tracking system are owned by multinational organizations, and the diagnostic/prognostic sensors have yet to be installed on all combat vehicles. In spite of this, distribution-based logistics resulted in the reduction of 1,442 CSS soldiers from the current
Army of Excellence division structure.\textsuperscript{34} The TRAC report also acknowledges that the doctrine and TTPs to support this new distribution system have yet to be developed.

Although I have only mentioned a few of the DAWE insights, many seemed to have been ignored in the redesign process. The Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, recently discussed the Quadrennial Defense Review process. He stated that the "U.S. defense strategy for the near and long term must continue to shape the strategic environment to advance U.S. interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats, and beyond now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond."\textsuperscript{35} This strategy has to become the benchmark for the redesign process.

\textbf{The Division Redesign Process}

There have been many discussions on the actual redesign process. The most hotly contested issue has been whether digitization efficiencies created a personnel savings or whether Army leadership was forced to cut force structure to achieve sufficient dollar savings to preclude the elimination of two additional divisions. The bottom line to this discussion will be focused on the core planning guidance that was distributed to
each Headquarters that would participate in the Heavy Division redesign. Each proposal was required to achieve the goals below:

- Design a heavy division with a TOE 15K end strength
- Design the engineer C4I without an engineer brigade headquarters.
- Design the combat service support for the combat battalions with a Forward Support Company organic to the Forward Support Battalion in direct support of the combat battalion.
- Design the tank and mechanized battalions with 45 combat systems, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.\(^{36}\)

The process was acrimonious as each proponent came to the meeting to defend its parochial turf. The base document to support all decisions surrounding the redesign was the Conservative Heavy Design (CHD) Division O&O Concept. This document was the only authorization to justify increases or decreases in personnel and equipment. To achieve the aforementioned goals, the O&O was continuously revised to achieve each proponents desired end state. Specifically, when force structure cuts were made by the initial Council of Colonels recommendations, the proponent schools worked around
the clock to lobby for a rewrite of the O&O. A single example of this process (although it applied to every proponent in attendance), was the Infantry School's assertion that the 2 X 9 + 5 concept (two 9-man infantry rifle squads and one 5-man machine gun squad per platoon), which was acclaimed a critical success during the Task Force XXI (TF XXI) AWE at Fort Irwin, was insufficient to support ground operations. The O&O was rewritten to support a requirement to be able to support Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) in a small city of approximately 50,000 inhabitants. They were very open in their justification to retain the infantry positions lost in the elimination of an infantry company in each battalion. After the "refinement" of the O&O, they justified/rationalized an additional rifle squad (3 infantry squads x 9 riflemen) in each platoon in spite of the fact that the four Bradley's in each platoon can not accommodate the 3 X 9 concept.

Similar fights centered around the elimination of the Engineer Brigade Headquarters (in spite of no real empirical data to support its elimination); reduction of CSS personnel in spite of the fact that the logistical enablers would not be available for some time to come; the elimination of one company per ground maneuver brigade in view of only minimal red zone fighting during the division simulations (the TF XXI AWE had to deal with a "live" red zone enemy that caused significantly
greater attrition than demonstrated in division level simulation), and "pass backs" (missions passed back to corps without a corresponding pass back of personnel or equipment) to the Corps structure. In the end, the division has been redesigned and implementing instructions were to follow almost immediately; even in the absence of the "experimental equipment" that made the DAWE successful. At the end of the process, the O&O had been rewritten numerous times and active force structure had been reduced to below 15 thousand active personnel.

One fight that was attributed to the redesign process was the requirement to deploy a heavy division to a given theater faster than the Army of Excellence design. This major task was to retain as much combat capability as possible, but in a smaller, more deployable package. As a result, the redesigned division will be 10% more deployable by air and 14% more deployable by sea then our current structure.37 At issue though, is that we give up 25% of the available ground combat power in trade for the perceived savings in deployability. Even this trade-off seems to adversely skew against our desired end state. A thorough deployment plan could have easily accomplished the same goal without adversely impacting the strength we will need for larger contingencies.
Reserve Component Integration

The Army unveiled its new division design in November 1998. The new division design actually calls for adding reserve soldiers to the force structure. The redesigned division now comprises both individuals and units from all three components. The structure includes 285 Army Reserve and 227 Army National Guard spaces. The division design, which will be applied across the six active component heavy divisions in the years ahead, personifies the current trend in designing new Army organizations. In fact, the Chief of Staff of the Army believes that these organizations have proven to be winners and tremendous potential for multicomponent units. The role of the reserve components in these positions was not fully stressed during the AWE, however the slots were integrated into the redesign as a result of significant dialogue at the Army's most senior ranks. The roles that have been added are largely liaison, combat support and combat service support.

The new roles will be welcomed into the force structure, especially as missions increase and resources decrease. One currently untapped resource is still the combat arms capability of the reserve component. These combat units may be able to compensate for the what appears to be the greatest drawback of the redesign. The current force design does not adequately
support the division’s requirement for the force protection of its High Value Assets (HVAs). Commanders must strike a balance between force protection and operational tempo. For Force XXI, the co-equals of the force protection system become:

- Protect the force
- Maintain an advantage in operational tempo

The requirement for providing security is valid, because most of the high value assets are critically vulnerable and cannot protect themselves. The impact of this during the DAWE was Brigade Combat Teams fighting with six company teams, or the equivalent of 1.5 task forces in the current structure.

The Force XXI Army cannot afford the disruption and subsequent loss of operational tempo that these threats can impose on unprotected units. Units must continue to operate under these threat conditions, without a significant loss of operational tempo, by employing a synergistic combination of intelligence, information technology, force protection measures (including attack of threat assets), and risk assessment.

Protecting the force is one of the most basic and intuitive responsibilities of command. At the tactical level of war, force protection measures protect soldiers’ lives and critical warfighting equipment. These HVAs in many cases are unique and irreplaceable. A single communications node, sensor or radar
lost could virtually eliminate or severely degrade situational awareness in a very large sector.

The inadequate force protection of these HVAs following the reduction of ground combat power in the division is indefensible. National Guard combat forces may adequately perform this role. It has become increasingly more difficult to train a mechanized or armor unit above the platoon level in reserve component units without compromising their ability to qualify annually. This is an important concern when comparing the semi-annual qualification and maneuver training requirements of their active partners. In spite of this fact, we continue to try to integrate them into war plans during mobilization and hope that they are ready to go when called. The reserve components can only effectively accomplish this task annually, although they may only have the time and budget to support platoon qualification through Table XII gunnery. Arguably, that could be the minimum gate for HVA protect missions.

The loss of nine companies in each division due to the drawdown has not only hampered operational maneuver, but commanders are forced with the dilemma as to where to accept risk (in the red zone or HVA protect). Two or three reserve component battalions per division could easily provide the muscle to support this mission as individual crews and/or teams were
assigned habitual support missions to keep vulnerable systems safe.

To quote the Army's senior leadership, "as we look to additional integration initiatives, we will experiment with programs that allow us to integrate active, National Guard and Army Reserve commands at the small-unit level, enhancing our means to rapidly tailor or reconstitute forces to meet specific operational needs. This fast track deployment concept offers a dual advantage. First, it would allow forces to react more rapidly to meet the dynamic requirements of the post-Cold War. Second, integration at the lowest levels provides our young leaders more exposure to the capabilities of the entire Army." This recommendation should more than adequately achieve the aforementioned end state.

With regard to tackling the many, diverse global missions set out in the national military strategy, the Army (active, guard and reserve) must become a truly seamless force, drawing fully on the strengths of each component. Whatever the military does, it must be trained and ready to fight. Readiness is non-negotiable. The use of reserve component infantry and armor capability to defend HVAs is not only a mission that could be assimilated without a significant increase in training time available or OPTEMPO dollars, but could provide an immediately available deployment package.
Exemptions To The Division Redesign?

Victory in battle has always depended on getting through a cycle of observation, orientation, decision and action quicker than an opponent. The Army has expedited this process using by conducting the DAWE with equipment that may not be fully fielded until 2010. Many leaders in the field understand the inherent risk associated with the process. In spite of this, the Army has announced that it will cut end strength by 5,000 spaces to meet the Department of Defense-mandated goals and yield $5 billion in savings by 2003 to be spent on weapons and readiness. Many organizations are trying to cash in on the draw down now and reap the OPTEMPO dollars savings by converting to the new design early, seeing that the draw down is inevitable.

Other commanders see the risk in the draw down and have lobbied to retain the original structure until all the enablers are in place. Several forward deployed divisions will not have to convert to the conservative heavy design because some senior Army leaders recognize the significant reduction in fire power systems and the lack of digital communications and situational awareness gear intended to offset these losses in the Division XXI design.
The 1st Cavalry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division will not be initially affected by the redesign. The clear implication is that, despite touting the improved deployability of these divisions under the redesign, the Army has decided not to tinker with the design of those heavy units that are arguably the most likely to see combat before the enablers are fielded. But outside the Pentagon, officers in the field are vocal in their displeasure. Speaking when the Division XXI reductions were announced, COL Steve Robinette who gave up command of the 1st Armored Division’s 1st Brigade in 1995 said, “There’s nobody in a unit who much favors this as a design. I can’t tell you a single lieutenant colonel or colonel in the Army that thinks this makes sense.”

The officials that made the decision to allow the two divisions to delay their conversion understand that credible power projection requires the capability to rapidly deploy military forces to terminate conflicts quickly on terms that are favorable to the U.S. and its allies. The ability to terminate conflicts quickly and on our terms will still be made by those leaders and units that can mass the effects of their combat power at decisive points and time on the battlefield. The decision to decrease that capability appears to be short sighted, especially as we consider that fact that it appears to be unacceptable risk in at least two cases.
Conclusion

For the foreseeable future, the United States, in concert with regional allies, must remain able to credibly deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. The ability of this nation to rapidly defeat an enemy coalition in a single MTW is still being debated, let alone two enemy coalitions in two MTWs. The elimination of 25% or our armored combat power and over a thousand logisticians without first validating the concept "in the dirt" at a location like the National Training Center may be completely irresponsible and lead this nation into a much larger version of Task Force Smith when finally confronted by a credible enemy.

Our leadership must commit the assets to validate each change associated with the redesign, both in terms of doctrine and technology. The net effect of a reduction of three thousand soldiers per division, in each of the six heavy divisions, equals a eighteen thousand-person reduction; or the elimination of the equivalent of one current heavy division. A question for the future remains --- Was the reason for the redesign to save two division flags or are we truly trying to leverage the effects of the technology that won't be completely fielded until
2010? In either case, the division design may be a design for disaster unless we implement the plan incrementally as the enablers become available or better integrate the national guard to replace lost maneuver companies.
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