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THE BUNDESWEHR IN MILITARY PEACE OPERATIONS: HAVE CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IMPROVED?

BY

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ABSTRACT

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UN Peace Operations have dramatically increased in the last decade. The UN, NATO and other collective security systems have changed their methods of cooperation in this area.

Since its Unification, Germany has considerably intensified its participation in Military Peace Operations. After a period of unclear constitutional restrictions, missing political consensus within the parliamentary powers and a lack of adequate national military conditions the scene has changed significantly for Out-of-Area Missions for German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr).

In this environment this paper aims to:

- identify the main foreign and domestic factors, which currently determine the participation of German Forces in Military Peace Missions,

- evaluate these factors, whether they have improved the conditions or not, and finally,

- provide personal considerations on further steps for German political and military strategy.
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THE BUNDESWEHR IN MILITARY PEACE OPERATIONS:
HAVE THE CONDITIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IMPROVED?

The search for improvements and critical points for the participation of German Armed Forces in Military Peace Operations leads to a wide span of foreign and domestic factors that need to be taken into consideration. To assist the reader, this investigation of issues is divided into 6 sections; each examining one special field of particular influences:

- UN PEACE OPERATIONS
- NATO SUPPORT FOR OSCE, THE WEU AND PPP
- NATIONAL POLITICAL FACTORS
- BUNDESWEHR - MISSION, STRUCTURE AND FORCE CATEGORIES
- BUNDESWEHR AND MULTINATIONALITY
- NEW NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL MANUALS

To facilitate the logical flow and context, each of these key-issues will be completed by a focused evaluation, as well as reflections and suggestions on probable developments.

Conclusions and final considerations will sum up the inter-relations between the different factors to include a critical outlook for German political and military strategy.
UN PEACE OPERATIONS - A STORY OF CHANGE

At the end of the Cold War, one can note considerable change in the structure and mechanism of international security matters. Their significance is comparable only to the global results of World War II, which led to the inception of the United Nations (UN). According to Article One of its Charter, the UN was founded at that time for the following reasons:

1. To maintain international peace and security;
2. to develop friendly relations among nations;
3. to achieve international co-operation;
4. to be a center of harmonizing the actions of nations.

Throughout the "Post War" years the illusions of a more peaceful attitude of mankind soon were disappointed. Conflicts continued to be solved by military means. The arms race accelerated globally and at every level of technology. New ways had to be found by the UN to prevent the outbreak of military conflicts or at least to limit them. In this case, the restoring of peace and security would be a further step. Some of the actions were of civilian nature, others included military power in order to execute the United Nations’ will and mission.

One example for the complexity of modern conflict-prevention by the UN can be found in the work An Agenda for Peace by former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. He defines terms for UN interventions and political means.
AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: TERMS

- **Preventive Diplomacy**: Prevent the inception of conflicts or their escalations.
- **Peacemaking**: Lead hostile parties to an agreement by diplomatic means.
- **Peacekeeping**: Maintain and monitor peace by military presence of UN forces, including civilian agencies, police etc.
- **Peace Building**: Measures to build up confidence and peaceful cooperation among former hostile parties after a conflict.

This paper will concentrate on UN **Military** Operations. The legal base and the main criteria for the different kinds of missions can be found in the UN Charter under **Pacific Settlement of disputes** (Chapter VI)\(^3\) and **Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression** (Chapter VII)\(^4\) of the UN Charter. In detail, it can be said that variety, complexity and type-mixture of UN operations have increased. During his tenure, Secretary General Dag Hammarskold stated the demand for a hybrid "**Chapter Six and one half missions**" in order to meet the requirements of the time\(^5\).

In fact the UN Peacekeeping Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964 is seen as the turning point to a more
forceful second generation of Peacekeeping. In the nineties the need of robust Peacekeeping became even more relevant in an increasingly "vuca" or belligerent environment. This was true even when the main opposing parties in a theater had agreed to the UN mission. It seems that the mix of ends, ways and means within recent missions has become their most typical characteristic. Generally the spectrum of UN Military Operations can be distinguished as shown in the figures below.

**Figure 2:**

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<th>UN MISSIONS: EXAMPLES AND DATES</th>
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<td><strong>Observation Missions, examples:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1949-Present India / Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</td>
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<td><strong>Traditional Peacekeeping Missions, examples:</strong></td>
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<td>1964-Present Cyprus (UNFICYP)</td>
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<td><strong>Second Generation Peacekeeping Missions, examples:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1960-1964 Congo (ONUC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993 Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1996 Rwanda (UNAMIR)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Peace Enforcement Missions, examples:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1953 Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 Iraq/Kuwait</td>
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The requirements for reliable and fast command/control and intelligence/reconnaissance capabilities in Peace Enforcement Missions, as well as, in Second Generation Peacekeeping Missions overwhelmed the UNs' capabilities. This affected the structural,
procedural, and the equipment sectors. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of simultaneous Peace Missions became another problem. The UN counted 48 Peacekeeping Missions between 1948 and May 1998.

Figure 3:

Simultaneously, 16 were underway on May 1st 1998. This increase is caused mostly by the fact that in the Post Cold War Era decisions of the Security Council are no longer determined by East-West block-thinking and tend to be made more flexibly. Nevertheless, hard lessons had to be learned on the Hudson River. These experiences led not only to a "Lead Nation" approach as in Korea, Haiti or the Persian Gulf, but also to a new attitude to ask Regional Security Systems to execute
respective missions under the mandate of the UN. NATO, OSCE and the WEU are such regional security systems that become more and more important for the conduct of complex military UN missions. This cooperation will be examined further.

- Evaluation/Reflections/Suggestions "UN Peace Operations" -

The changes from a bi-polar world (USA - USSR), to a tri-polar world (USA - USSR - China) and on to multi-polar global power-structures presented significant challenges for the UN. Their own structures originate from a World as it looked at the end of World War II. In spite of this, however, the UN proved more than once its importance for the development of cooperation and international security. This also includes the results of the major part of Peace Operations. Looking at UN Military Operations in particular we see even more successes.

In my estimation, the ongoing changes in global power structures cannot be evaluated as a time of chaos after a normal period of history. From my point of view, it is the other way around: History was abnormal during the fifty years of the Cold War, tending to reduce all relationships to a "friend - foe" pattern with only few exceptions. Now the whole variety of international influences, interests and relations come to bear again, reflecting the diversity of human relations. Peace Operations - either civilian or military - are a meaningful tool
to master these new circumstances. However, they can only be as effective as the deciding authorities and the political goals behind these interventions. For this reason new ways and means to improve the efficiency of Peace Operations are on their way.  

**Figure 4: FUTURE UN-MEANS FOR MILITARY PEACE OPERATIONS**

- Stand by - Arrangements\textsuperscript{11} for rapidly answerable forces;  
- UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters\textsuperscript{12} to shorten preparation and force-deployment;  
- Logistical Base Principle\textsuperscript{13} for refurbishing UN property;  
- UN Planning Data Sheet\textsuperscript{14} to facilitate and combine all resources.

I am convinced that these instruments will soon prove their value to improve the ways and means of ensuring a more rapid Crisis Reaction by the UN. Germany has joined these activities, especially the Stand by Arrangement and the Planning Data Sheet. Undoubtedly this was a big step forward to assure the mutual basis between the UNs’ demands and the available German force contributions. Harmonizing UN standards with NATO concerning Rules of Engagement, Authority of Command\textsuperscript{15} and Transfer of Authority have also improved German participation. This road has to be followed in the future.
It will not be sufficient, however, only to revise the conduct and procedures of UN Operations. A fundamental reform of the UN is necessary to create widely acceptable structures and procedures representing the multi-polar world of the year 2000 and beyond, not the bi- or tri-polar world of the past. I consider the asymmetric representation of the developing countries of the third world and nations like Japan and Germany in the Security Council as most critical. The composition of this key-element in the UNs’ decision-making process is directly related to the will to support UN missions and to the possibil-
ity to practice political influence. In the long term, none of these factors can be considered without the other.

The legitimacy of the "Veto-right" of the permanent members of the Security Council should also be re-examined. As it is, it remains correlated to the status of Victors in World War II and/or the initial status as a Nuclear Power. These criteria have lost their original importance and exclusiveness. There are new criteria and common threats for the community of nations to face which do not fit the old patterns. Some of these include pollution, drugs and terrorism!

My personal evaluation of this issue is as follows: The key UN structures and procedures should no longer stay primarily power-oriented but should become more issue/solution-oriented. This is a line of action that especially Germany should follow in its activities for an overall reform of the UN. A further consideration will be required to balance the political potential of the USA and a "united" European Union in the future Security Council. No nation will give up its privileges easily, but stubborn insistence on the status quo will lead to a paralysis of the UN. This, in turn, would lead back to the blocking of Peace Operations as experienced in the Cold War. In the long run no power, including the USA, can afford the role of a universal policeman alone. Perhaps a new ratio between constant and temporary members, as well as flexible numbers and
periods of membership in the Security Council are keys for a solution of this issue.

NATO’S SUPPORT FOR OSCE, THE WEU AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE PROGRAM (PPP)

- NATO Structures under Development -

NATO, at this time, is going through the most fundamental change in its history. Once the Cold War was “won” there were many voices that called for an end to NATO. However, the history of the last decade has shown that the importance of the Alliance was not only its role as the counterpart to the Warsaw Pact. Currently NATO has proved its significance as a community of values for new independent nation states, which look for integration into a growing Europe.

As the old conventional threat in Europe disappeared, NATO’s internal military structures needed change in order to meet new requirements. This is a process that is not easily dealt with, because different interests need to be considered under the rule of compromise:

- The first step is to “slim-line” the number and the level of NATO Headquarters.

- In contrast to this, the competitive national interests for adequate representation of old and new
member states and France as a re-integrating member at high command levels have to be harmonized.

-The increasing European web of Multinational structures in the political and the military arena is a "fact-building" phenomenon that is not easy to be integrated between living organizations i.e. OSCE, WEU, PfP and NATO itself.

Figure 6: NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE

As mentioned previously, NATO plays an increasingly important role in the conduct of UN Missions. At the Oslo Ministerial Conference of June 1992, as well as, at the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial in December of that same year, the NAC decided to support UN and OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) operations according to its own principles. This shows how all these security-systems depend
on each other. This fact becomes even more important with the NATO East Enlargement of 1999 and the expressed long-term intent to create a Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)\textsuperscript{18}.

- NATO Principles and Conditions for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations -

Before examining NATO’s new ways and means for UN, WEU and OSCE support as a key-factor for German participation in Military Peace Operations, we have to look at the Alliance’s terminology of Peace Support Operations in MC 327/1, as it differs in detail from that of the UN\textsuperscript{19}:

Peace Support Operations (PSO); multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate...

Peacekeeping (PK); generally under Chapter VI of UN Charter...

Peace Enforcement (PE); under Chapter VII ... consent of parties to the conflict has not been achieved/uncertain ...

Conflict Prevention/Preventive Deployment; Chapter VI, covers all political/diplomatic/military activities ...

Peacemaking; mainly diplomatic activities to establish cease-fire / peaceful settlement ...

Peace Building; political/economic/social/military measures to solidify political settlements ...

Humanitarian Operations; alleviate human suffering ...

In the past the transition from one type of PSO to another in the same theater has often caused severe problems. For this
reason, the NATO-MC document covers the topic in an extra paragraph. NATO, as the controlling agency for the respective mission, or as a provider of means and forces for other security systems, has a vital interest in reducing the possible frictions that may lead to additional risks for its own personnel and the noncombatants in the region. For a transition from PK to PE the document states clearly the relationship between mission, force strength, armament and a deliberate policy decision taking account of the risks involved.

The execution of PSOs by NATO follows defined rules that may not be applicable in the same way for every mission. Nevertheless, they should be considered. The principles are as follows: Unity of Command, Unity of Effort, Impartiality, Consent of the Parties, Credibility, Transparency of Operations, Balanced Use of Force (Rules of Engagement, Configuration), Security, Flexibility, Mutual Respect, Freedom of Movement and Civil-Military Coordination and Liaison.

Before deciding to become involved in any PSO, NATO expects overall Political Control and Guidance of the UN, OSCE or a comparable institution. Further conditions are: clear and precise mandates, consent/request of the host nation, voluntary participation by member nations including force contributions, conditions for terminating the operation and legitimacy through UN/OSCE decision-making processes. Although UN/OSCE are the
initiating authorities of the PSO, and the member nations provide forces for it, the NAC retains the ultimate authority to direct the operation. NATO Commanders will develop operational planning and the nations will be involved in the process according to the rules of the Alliance.

*Figure 7: NATO IN KOSOVO CARICATURE*  
![Cartoon Image]

- The NATO Combined Joint Task Force Concept (CJTF) -

The Petersberg Declaration of 1992 raised the first concrete intent to strengthen the role of the West European Union (WEU) as a milestone for a future Common European Foreign and Security Identity for the formerly economically oriented
European Union. Peace Operations were a good way to develop this idea as a practicable means of European politics.

In order to increase NATO's flexibility and mobility for the support of WEU and other security systems' PSOs in Europe, the Alliance decided in 1994 on an improvement of the Cold War oriented Integrated Military Structures. The new challenge for this concept is the multiple capability to meet different current and future requirements:

1. Support three main objectives (respond to new missions, reach out to new members and non-members, and support WEU in particular);

2. Ensure priority for NATO Collective Defense if necessary;

3. Preserve both transatlantic nature of NATO and single integrated military structure;

4. Accomplish the concept at minimum cost.

It is obvious that we will encounter the same difficulties with this issue as have been mentioned previously with NATO's new Regional Command and Control Structure. The first limited experiences with this concept were made in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Complex systems such as CJTF cannot be developed in a single step. However, the intent and initial ideas gained shape and influenced the daily work of the staffs in the field as well as at the higher commands. This in turn focused them in the desired direction of the CJTF-concept.
This model aims to provide a maximum of module-type elements of NATO support for operations of forces with different origin. In the meantime, this concept has gained new significance. It is already one of the main driving factors for the Partnership for Peace Nations to experience common Command and Control with NATO forces during training and operational employment. In the near future some of these Nations will be Allies or closer partners.

- Evaluation/Reflections/Suggestions "NATO-support" -

"Out of Region or out of Business!" This was the way US Senator Lugar\textsuperscript{27} put it, when he described the necessity for
change of NATO after "having lost the old enemy". In my opinion this remarkable sentence has proved to be right. As stated earlier, new threats sometimes have to be fought immediately in the region where they arise. So every advanced Security System has to be able to defend its common interests rapidly beyond its normal area of responsibility. As has the UN, NATO has learned its lessons in this field, too. The new practical attitude of mandating capable Regional Alliances for the conduct of Peace Missions has neutralized many former weaknesses of the UN. NATO's extended will and capability to support OSCE- and WEU-led missions has paved the way for new nations to participate more effectively in future Peace Missions.

This is also most important for Germany. Its foreign policy principles always have been directed towards integration and cooperation. In the past its available resources were not balanced with the military and political possibilities. The new flexibility of the UN, NATO, OSCE etc. opens the gate for more participation "Out of Area" without losing the necessary priority of the defense of the homeland. With the new UN-approaches high standards of legitimacy and public acceptance become combined with higher efficiency. Consistent with this reasoning, Germany as a major NATO-, OSCE-, WEU- and PfP-Nation, has strongly influenced these developments. In my estimation it is necessary to stress this course of action in
the future even more. For its own interests the FRG must create and take advantage of more favorable foreign circumstances and contribute to Peace Missions through deeper integration with its allies and friends - not through national domination. This will aim at the strategic end-state of a Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). For Germany’s interests as a nation with nine direct neighbor-states, creating more than 25% of the entire EU’s GDP and executing the major part of its trade within the EU, there is no better strategic direction that should continue to be followed.

Figure 9: European Atlantic Security Structure
NATIONAL POLITICAL FACTORS AND MILITARY PEACE MISSIONS

Unification, which signified the most favorable result of the "won" Cold War, brought along a critical phase of orientation concerning new roles and the legitimacy of German Armed Forces. Prior to 1994 there was a constitutional uncertainty concerning the participation of Federal Armed Forces in Out of Area Missions. This problem was resolved with the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of Law in Karlsruhe on July 12, 1994. This opened the gate for German participation in the whole spectrum of Peace Operations legalized by international law.

This phase of re-orientation was overshadowed by a lack of political consensus in security-policy matters in the FRG. Thomas-Durell Young correctly states until 1995\textsuperscript{29} that Bonn had not yet overcome the "fashionable" post war attitude of "military non-responsibility" outside of its home-land. Some voices referred to "humanitarian operations" as a new legitimation for the Bundeswehr\textsuperscript{30}. This reasoning covered parts of all political parties and opinion-groups. The causes for this were a limited German sovereignty prior to Unification and a "single-purpose" Bundeswehr which had been founded with only one mission: to contribute to the prevention of a Soviet invasion
into Germany\textsuperscript{31}. In contrast to this the Participation in Military Peace Operations Out of Area is a new form of Power-Projection. This in turn, for many critics stood in direct line with the bitter national experiences of the Third Reich and the Wehrmacht's Power Projection in World War II.

This paralyzing effect\textsuperscript{32} was soon overcome. With the parliamentary decisions for the German participation in the IFOR/SFOR-mission at the end of 1995, we find a growing majority in favor of a deployment even of German combat troops. This "new" consensus includes the now governing Social Democratic Party and the majority of its coalition-partner, the "Greens." This environmentally orientated party, however, traditionally has strong pacific roots. The overall public support for the German Participation is also constantly high\textsuperscript{33}.

- Evaluation/Reflections/Suggestions "National Political factors" -

Despite some internal controversies on NATO's New Strategic Concept (First Use of Nuclear Weapons)\textsuperscript{34} and on the military draft\textsuperscript{35} from parts of the new government, my estimation is that the struggles of the first half of the nineties concerning the new key-points of a national consensus in security and defense matters are over. As far as the contribution to Military Peace Missions is concerned, solid parliamentary and public support
exists. Indications for this are to found in the continuity of the new German Federal Government concerning the support of the OSCE-Operation in Kosovo\textsuperscript{36} with combat troops in case of an evacuation of observer-personnel (Extraction Force) and the surveillance of the air space in that region.\textsuperscript{37} This is a clear improvement of the conditions for the Federal Forces' mission to actively contribute to international crisis prevention and management. This correlates directly to German attempts to become a permanent member in the UN Security Council. My prediction is, that in the familiarization-phase of the new government we will probably hear softer sounds on this issue from Bonn (soon Berlin!). Whenever the badly needed UN-reform will take place and whatever results it may show, one thing is for certain: Germany's role in the UN will change. This is also one of the key-points in US policy. What surely will not change is a strong German reluctance to exceed military activities beyond the respective UN Security Council's mandate for a mission.\textsuperscript{38} The discussion about NATO military actions to end the Serbian suppression and fights in Kosovo serves as an example. This has to be understood in the context of German history and the will not to slip into unreflected mechanisms that lead away from legitimacy.
In the long term, we have to take in account that broad parts of the younger German population have concrete expectations for the new government to push for the abolition of the draft. This issue, for the time being, is supported only by the Green-Party. The necessary parliamentary and public majority for a constitutional change of this scale seems rather unlikely for the foreseeable future. An elimination of the draft would also affect the alternative social service. Further short budgeting and substantial reduction of the Armed Forces after the announced revision around the year 2000 (Struktur-Kommission) could lead to critical limitations for Peace Operations. These factors will have to be re-examined in the future. Finally, it
can be predicted that national interests, as well as, the growing expectations of allies and partners will not give any option to Germany for withdrawal from the European or UN security-community. Given this fact, Germany should continue to develop its balanced but active role in Military Peace Operations.

THE BUNDESWEHR - MISSION, STRUCTURE AND FORCE CATEGORIES

In order to identify and evaluate in more detail the Bundeswehr's progress in meeting the demands of its extended mission spectrum in more detail it is useful to cite its current mission.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Figure 11:}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|}
\hline
\textbf{BUNDESWEHR MISSIONS} \\
- protects Germany and its citizens against political blackmail and external threats; \\
- promotes military stability and European integration; \\
- defends Germany and its allies; \\
- serves world peace and international security in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
This wide mission spectrum called for an overall top-down review of the command structure of the German forces in comparison to the focused Bundeswehr mission during the Cold War. As the Federal Minister of Defense remains the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces in peacetime, the control for Peace Operations is his responsibility. For rapid and secure access to the national HQs in the theater the "Bundeswehr-Fuehrungs-zentrum" (C² - Center for the Federal Armed Forces) was established within the Federal Ministry of Defense (FMoD). This was necessary because considerable national responsibilities have to be covered in this kind of employment that do not occur in the traditional task of NATO/Homeland-Defense.

In addition, the three services of the Army, Air Force and Navy have built up their own Forces Commands. These three national HQs are designed to train, plan, prepare and execute German forces operations of any kind under national responsibility\(^{43}\). As the normal scenarios at that level are of combined and joint nature each of these three HQs is capable to execute this kind of control with ear-marked support from the others. This way the FMoD gains the flexibility to choose one national "Lead" Forces Command on a case by case basis. It also enables the armed forces to delegate national command and control for simultaneous operations in different theaters. These HQs
cooperate on a regular basis with the Alliance's authorities in national and territorial matters as well.

For more limited operations abroad the "Command of Air Mobile Forces" (KLK) and the "Command of Special Forces" (KSK) of the Army are available as national HQs.

Figure 12:44
The new security conditions and the differentiated requirements for readiness under the national political/financial priorities are reflected in the current Force Categories of the Bundeswehr\textsuperscript{45}, too. They are defined as shown in figure 12 below.

Figure 13: BUNDESWERH FORCE CATEGORIES

\begin{quote}
\textit{Present Crisis Reaction Forces (CRF)}; These are forces rapidly available for Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management within the Alliance, as well as, for International Peace Operations. In case of a national threat they contribute immediately to the defense of the Homeland and secure the mobilization of the Main Defense Forces.

\textit{Main Defense Forces}, depending on mobilization to a large extend (MDF); these include the bulk of forces dedicated for NATO/Home- land defense. Their foundation are partly active units. They provide a favorable link with active personnel and reserves.

\textit{Military Basic Organization} of the Armed Forces; this is the third force-category to support the normal business of all services, including training, supply, signal-service and host-nation responsibilities.

These principal categories find their respective specialty within the organizations of the three services Army, Air Force and Navy.
\end{quote}

- Evaluation/Reflections/Suggestions “Mission, Structure and Force Categories” -

As previously mentioned, the Bundeswehr within a short time had to take a big step from a specialized "home-defense" force towards a multiple-task force with wider responsibilities. Many lessons that concerned Out-of-Area employment of forces had to be learned. The previous German experiences in this field were limited mainly to NATO AMF-Units, disaster relief or humanitarian aid missions. These activities did not require the robust
sustainability of Out-of-Area Military Peace Operations. In order not to over-stretch the available means, the reorganization of the higher national C²-structure had to meet the needs of NATO/Homeland-Defense, the cooperation with the UN and the elements of the European security system all at the same time.

The new principal Force Structures and Categories lend themselves for more secured participation in Peace Operations under the current conditions. However, attention must be paid to keep a balance between the desirable and the responsible amount of missions for the forces at their present strength and structure. Lack of quality and military skills for German Out-of-Area employment are neither politically nor militarily affordable.

From my personal experience in the Army Forces Command during the period of the aftermath of UNOSOM (Somalia) and in the preparation of IFOR (former Yugoslavia), the new demands have been sufficiently tested and mark a milestone in improvement.

MULTI-NATIONALITY AND GERMAN ARMED FORCES

Multinational participation is a prominent characteristic of Peace Operations. This has obvious parallels to NATO’s principles. During the Cold War, however, Multi-nationality was
limited to the levels of the Army-Groups and above. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet Forces from East Germany and the other former member-states of the Warsaw Pact, NATO-forces have been reduced to a remarkable degree. Some nations have combined this with the abolition of the conscript system in favor of a professional army. This led to further reductions. Although NATO states were accustomed to an integrated force-structure, a new approach of multi-national cooperation at much lower levels of command as practiced before had to be implemented. The solutions for creating multi-national army corps followed different patterns of national interest or special circumstances, like optional assignments to WEU (FAWEU)\textsuperscript{46}. The models implemented for land-formations with German participation reach from Lead Nation/ Framework to bi-national and multi-national formations. All these hand-tailored structures reflect parts of the diversity of force compositions in UN Military Operations, too. The real challenge is to maintain reliable employment capability for formations with "deep integration" down to brigade/battalion-level. This is practiced as such in the Franco-German brigade belonging to the EURO-CORPS. First experiences during the SFOR employment for these practices are encouraging.
- Evaluation/Reflections/Suggestions “Multi-nationality” -

Deep integration in multi-national formations creates considerable problems for classical military skills within the respective units. However, there is no alternative for it. It is not the most desirable solution, but represents the best compromise achievable with NATO/Homeland-Defense as the main task of the forces.

For Peace Operations it proved to be a valid means to prepare and familiarize HQs and units with formerly unknown UN conditions. Especially in connection with the NATO Combined Joint Task Force Concept I consider it a notable improvement. This advantage, however, will gain more momentum only when leaders and soldiers enhance their personal skills in the field.
of languages and cultural awareness. These are core conditions for acting in a "fair, firm and friendly" way, as required for UN missions. Here is still much room for improvement.

NEW MANUALS FOR LEADERSHIP, COMMAND AND CONTROL PRINCIPLES

The Army, as the main body of the Bundeswehr, has always held the lead-role for the basic manuals concerning "Truppenfuehrung" which includes all matters of Leadership, Command and Control, as well as, principles of Operational Art. These principles, as far as possible, have been adopted by the other services.

In the turbulent early nineties a process of revising the basics of German Operational Principles began. This was done in order not to start into the new era of an extended mission spectrum with basic documents that did not cover all challenges. The result was the publication of a new "Operational Guideline". This document maintains proven principles of German Warfare and Leadership originating from Clausewitz, Moltke and more modern military leaders like Manstein or Rommel. What had to be done was to complete those factors and criteria deriving from tasks "Out-of-Area" or "other than War" which previously had not been covered in German documents. In particular, special manuals on Peace Operations, like US Field
Manual 100-23\textsuperscript{49} were very valid. Every effort was made to create a coordinated new generation of Field Manuals for "Truppenfuehrung" and its accompanying issues. This is for the German Army the eleventh manual on this subject in a continuous flow of predecessors since 1910. Since 1994 the military leadership put no time pressure on the early publication of these manuals. Instead it invested a great deal of manpower (Working Group "Joint and Combined Operations") into their elaboration to ensure "a great hit." The new series of manuals\textsuperscript{50} is available now in final draft form and is used for preparatory work in training and education.\textsuperscript{51}

Let me give some examples of the basic Field Manual 100/100 "Truppenfuehrung (TF)" that cover support of Peace Missions for the first time. Chapter 38 of "TF" 100/100\textsuperscript{52} deals with this specific issue:

3801. **Peace Missions** are international crisis management activities - within the entire spectrum of military forces undertaken by the United Nations and other collective security systems or coalitions.

This chapter adopts generally the allies’ and current NATO-terminology regarding principles, parameters, forces/means, as well as, command and control principles: i.e. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), Terms of Reference (TOR), Rules of Engagements (ROE) etc. Chapter 39 contains the different types of operations in Peace Missions. The clear distinctions between
national and international Command authorities are also clearly defined. This critical point of responsibility in UN Crisis Management is implemented in more detail in the "Handbook for Out of Area Missions".

Figure 15:

- Evaluation/Reflections/Suggestions "New Field Manuals" -

The work of NATO and of Germany on this subject went forward in a parallel manner. In many regards NATO was way ahead because of the Alliance's experiences in this arena. Germany, as the only major member-nation without a profound Out of Area background, took advantage of this situation to catch up with
revised NATO-standards. With the new generation of Leadership/Command and Control-Field Manuals German Forces now act on a much safer common ground in Peace Operations than they had to in the previous transition-period.

The implementation of lessons learned is now based on solid documents that do not only meet the requirements of the current Peace Missions with German participation but give a common understanding to the future generation of leaders at all levels of command. Since Field-Marshall Moltke's days, this common understanding of principles, as well as, of precise terms throughout all levels has always been considered a reliable strength of German leadership. This standard will have to be checked and adjusted to the changing environment constantly.

CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This paper aimed to identify and evaluate the main foreign and domestic factors determining the participation of German Armed Forces in Military Peace Operations. Wherever possible, I intended to provide personal considerations for future German strategic directions.

This search for improvements and critical factors raised a wide span of influences and considerations. Most of these proved to be related to each other. The complexity and interdependence
of the strategically relevant factors exceeded by far the "traditional" military categories. The military, in turn, has to find answers for its new tasks. As evaluated at the end of each chapter most factors that were examined turned out to be 

improved conditions for German Forces in Military Peace Operations. For the Bundeswehr the increasing tension between scarce means and assigned missions within the extended mission spectrum will continue to be a critical factor which must be weighed carefully prior to any new commitment.

The most concrete example of the improved conditions for Peace Mission participation is the German contingent in the SFOR Mission in the former Yugoslavia. With the current mandate in the summer of 1998, it has been increased to 3,000 troops. In comparison to the current US contingent of 7,000 troops this is a remarkable effort, when we take in account the total strength of both armies.

Figure 16:\(^5^4\)
As German Forces' participation in Peace Operations depends directly on Germany's future international role, let me sum up my personal considerations concerning critical points of the past and for the way ahead.

Germany's difficulty to adopt to new tasks on the international stage derived mostly from a deeply felt reluctance to use any German Forces outside the direct defense of its Homeland. On the one hand, this is a result of the long-term memory of the Third Reich in the older generation and the political decision-makers. On the other hand, it seems to have been the total assimilation of Germany's Cold War role as a former looser of World War II, as a divided country between two blocks, as a NATO member with a limited and focused responsibility for its own security, and, last but not least as a nation of limited sovereignty.

In my opinion the journey of accepting these new demands towards an active role was remarkably short. This is especially true, when we take in account that the "World War II and the Cold War generation" had political responsibility. The recent change of the German Federal Government brought not only a swing in political tendencies, but a change of generations. It can be assumed that in the future historic burdens will no longer be felt as limiting factors. As far as the matter of this paper is
concerned, I do not expect disconnects in German Security and Defense Policy that will affect Out-of-Area operations.

For Germany's UN activities, it will be challenging to avoid a political "Two Front War" between the national intent to claim permanent membership in the Security Council of the UN and Germany's dedication to European Integration - including the East-enlargement. Both strategic interests may easily get into conflict when it comes to balance the number of permanent seats between the current members and the new European applicants. Even the USA, supporting the German approach, will not tolerate an overwhelming concentration of EU members in the Council.

Patience and Creative Thinking will be required!

(Word count - 5965)
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