EXPLORING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

BY

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United States Army

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USAWC CLASS OF 1999

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

Exploring the Psychological Contract of the Canadian Forces

by

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Canadian Forces

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Canadian Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, the Canadian Department of National Defence, or any of their agencies.

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Glenn W. Nordick

TITLE: Exploring the Psychological Contract of the Canadian Forces

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 29 March 1999 PAGES: 76 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

After five years of public scrutiny as a result of the ill fated Somalia mission, coupled with significant downsizing of both manpower and budgets, there appears to be a growing disconnect between the members of the Canadian Forces, the military leadership, and the Government of Canada. This paper uses the theory of psychological contracting to explore the culture of the Canadian Forces (CF) as a means of determining what the CF expects from its members and, conversely what CF members expect to give to the CF. The paper also attempts to quantify what CF members expect from the Canadian Forces in return for services rendered. The models of culture and expectation have then been used to examine possible areas of contract breach. Finally, recommendations are made on how to solidify the relationship between the CF and its members.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My thanks to Major Jim Uchiyama at Headquarters Canadian Forces Recruiting and Education System (CFRETS) and Mr. Karl Wenek, A/Director Policy Analysis & Development (HR Mil) for the help rendered in getting this paper started. I also want to thank Doctor John F. Garofano for his valued assistance in structuring and writing this paper.
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EXPLORING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

"The bond between a man and his profession is similar to that which ties him to his country, it is just as complex, often ambivalent, and in general it is understood completely only when it is broken, by exile or emigration in the case of one's country, by retirement in the case of a trade or profession"

— Primo Levi

INTRODUCTION

On 16 March 1993, two soldiers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment, deployed in Belet Huen, Somalia, as part of US led UNITAF (Unified Task Force) Operation, beat to death sixteen-year-old Shidane Arone. The aftermath of this event was a five-year dissection of the Canadian Forces, its leadership and its internal administrative processes through an agonising series of public, political and internal studies. This, coupled with the rush to cash in on the Cold War dividend through radical downsizing of both manpower and military budgets, has had a serious impact on the effectiveness of the CF. This combination of events has also severely strained the relationship between the Canadian Government and the military and between the leadership (both political and military) of the Department of National Defence and the military rank and file.
Unfortunately, five years under the microscope formed a host of internal and external inquiries have brought neither closure nor resolution. The results are evident: difficulties in meeting recruiting targets, higher than normal attrition at virtually all ranks, declining capability, and declining morale among serving members.

There is also a distinct feeling among CF members that the leadership of the CF has been unable to articulate why the military is important to Canada, and to properly stand up for and represent the military under the current environment of intense public scrutiny.

It is, however, important to note that this problem, in the broadest sense, is not unique to Canada. Governments and their militaries across the West are struggling to redefine both the requirement and the place of the military in modern society. In the United States for example, the military is facing similar problems with recruiting, budgets, force structure, and is coping with changing, and often competing, roles and missions.

This paper will seek to assist in resolving this dilemma by first exploring the theory of psychological contracting (Section 1). The theory will then be used to create a model of the culture in use by the CF (Section 2). This model will help explain what the CF expects from its members, and conversely
what CF members expect to give to the organisation. Next the paper will explore what CF members expect from the CF and examine possible areas of contract breach (Section 3). The final part will then offer some recommendations and conclusions (Section 4).

SECTION 1: THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACTING

As Canadian citizens, CF members and their families, are direct beneficiaries and adherents to the overarching and continuously changing social contract between Canada and Canadians. However, unlike many other government and commercial industries, there is no definitive written employment contract between members of the CF and the Government of Canada, represented in this case by the Department of National Defence (DND). Instead, there are terms of service contracts specifying the duration of employment, published pay scales and incentives, volumes of financial entitlements and administrative regulations, books of orders and government acts governing conduct and the disciplinary system, and a large body of International and Canadian Law applicable to CF members. In the main these regulations impose unique restrictions (limited participation in the political process and obedience of lawful authority) or obligations (unlimited liability) on CF members that are not generally applicable to the broader Canadian
society.

The CF, as an institution, is subservient to society at the same time it has a role in protecting society. To pursue the profession of arms and to serve their country, citizens who voluntarily join the CF give up certain rights and become subservient to the society they serve. This implies a mutual trust. Society trusts the military to protect them, to carry out the political direction given, and to effectively represent Canada at home and abroad. The members trust society to use the military properly, to provide the necessary resources, and to properly protect and care for those who become soldiers. This is the basis of the psychological contract that exists between the members of the CF and their country. A fresh approach to determining if there is a gap between the military and society may be to look at the issue from the viewpoint of this powerful but informal contract.

A psychological contract, as expressed by Edgar W. Schein, "is an unwritten set of expectations operating at all times between every member of an organisation and the various managers and others in that organisation"³. This contract is informal, often unwritten and, because the psychological contract is subjective and normally operates at the individual level, it can be difficult to both articulate and explain. Expressed another
way:

Psychological contracts simplify information processing by organizing knowledge about the employment relationship in a meaningful way. ... In simple terms, psychological contracts are the filter through which information pertaining to the employment relationship is processed and the center for guiding an employee’s work attitudes and behaviours.⁴

Pioneers in psychological contracts including Schein, Denise M. Rousseau, and others have given specific guidance on how to build a psychological contract model that should be applicable across the CF.

First, it is important to understand that the psychological contract is a two sided, voluntary agreement between an employee and the employer. No one is forced to join the CF.

Contracts are a product of free societies. Choice underlies the existence and meaning of contracts. Freedom gives new meaning to promises and gives contracts a special significance. Motivationally, having a choice can engender a great personal commitment to carry out a promise.⁵

It is true that CF members are recruited, an argument some have used to say that the CF is not a true volunteer force. However, in the end, each member voluntarily agrees to join the CF and is given multiple opportunities to be released from this contract. A binding commitment occurs only when the employer (CF) is satisfied the potential recruit(employee) has both the intent and ability to serve in the CF. Conversely, each recruit
is given time to ensure he/she really does want to be part of
the CF. The start of obligatory service varies by trade and
enrolment scheme, however, in general a binding contract begins
either after a specified period of time or when a member has
completed basic training.

Second, the member’s contract with the CF is a relational
one, requiring a long term and total commitment by the
individual, as opposed to a transactional fee for service
contract. According to Rousseau, a relational contract is
dynamic and subject to change. It includes emotional
involvement, pervasive conditions, whole person relations, an
open-ended time frame, and written and unwritten terms, some of
which only emerge over time. As well, the relational contract
may be subjective and difficult to explain to a third party.\(^6\) It
is a fact that no one can serve in the military and not be
affected in a profound way (either positively or negatively) by
the experience.

Third, psychological contracts involve reciprocity\(^7\). Both
sides must believe there is a valid exchange that occurs as a
result of the contract. In the CF context, this contract goes
far beyond the simple concept of time and effort in exchange for
money. The military contract is a complex exchange of both
tangible and intangible benefits.
The psychological contract is a living contract and, therefore, cannot be easily fixed in time. It contains an infinite number of variables due to subtle variations in the following factors. First, each CF member understands the original contract differently. This understanding of the contract and individual expectations changes with "time-in" and experience. Second, the conditions of service, and hence the psychological contract, are constantly changing due to amendments to societal, organisational, and government regulations. Hence, generational differences can exist in the contract, related to when an individual entered the CF. Third, the contract can be affected by an individual's degree of "buy-in" to the CF culture, as well as one's current level of satisfaction with military service.

However, despite the difficulties in "pinning down" the exact psychological contract, the overall concept is useful and may give senior leaders a mechanism to better understand and articulate the needs of CF members. It may also provide ideas on how better to explain the effects of on-going changes to the military way of life. Finally, it may prove to be a useful tool for senior leaders to anticipate how members might perceive proposed changes to the CF.
SECTION 2: CULTURE OF THE CANADIAN FORCES AND ORGANIZATIONAL EXPECTATIONS

The first step in understanding the CF psychological contract is to explore and understand the culture of the CF. Capturing a sense of the military, as a unique culture is a difficult task since the "profession of arms" is filled with subjective intangibles. However, in two related models, Schein and Rousseau, offer templates that can be used to build a model of the CF culture. Schein defines culture as:

a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration- that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.\(^8\)

He also outlined three levels of Culture -- Artifacts, Values, and Basic Assumptions -- that interact and form the basis of a group culture (Figure 1)\(^9\). Rousseau, on the other hand, has a simpler definition of culture: "Culture is the shared set of values, beliefs, and behaviours found in a social group."\(^10\) Moreover, building on Schein, she designed what she calls an "onion model of culture"\(^11\) using five layers -- Fundamental Assumptions, Values, Behaviour Norms, Patterns of Behaviour, and Artifacts -- to explain and define culture (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1: TWO MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Schein's Levels of Culture

Rousseau's Layers of Culture and Normative Contract

Now, based primarily on the Rousseau model, an attempt will be made to capture a sense of the CF culture, starting with the Fundamental (Basic) Assumptions.

FUNDAMENTAL (BASIC) ASSUMPTIONS

The fundamental assumptions represent the core of CF culture. Every action taken by a member of the CF is
consciously or unconsciously measured against these assumptions. Often unwritten, the assumptions in use may vary between both individuals and groups within the CF (officers, non-commissioned members, and different trades, for example). However, most are commonly understood beliefs about military life, the way the military functions, and the ultimate purpose of the military. A sampling of the key assumptions applicable to the CF follow:

a. All CF members accept political control of the military;

b. The CF is the Force of Last Resort both in the defence of Canada and for the enforcement of the rule of law. As such, when activated by political authorities, the military cannot afford to lose (this determines the level of violence that must be applied in a given circumstance);

c. CF Members accept the concept of unlimited liability and selfless service and are prepared to give their lives in the service of their country;

d. The primary mission of the CF is Combat or Support to this Combat Capability;

e. Due to the primary requirement for combat, operational occupations have primacy over all others;

f. CF Members are all volunteers;

g. CF Members must be able and willing to serve anywhere, at any time, under the principle of Universality of Service;
h. CF Members must be available for duty on a 24/7 basis;
i. CF Members must be mobile;
j. Service requirements must take precedence over individual desires;
k. The CF is a Unified and Integrated Force;
l. There is a clear hierarchy of command at all times;
m. CF Members are required to obey all lawful commands;
n. Except in emergency situations, decisions are made after discussion (where possible and practical). When a lawful decision has been made, CF members are expected to put their heels together, salute, and get on with implementation;
o. Loyalty is essential up and down the Chain of Command;
p. Commanders at every level are ultimately responsible for the welfare of their subordinates;
q. “People are our Most Important Resource”;
r. Promotion and Advancement are based strictly on merit;
s. Assignment will be done on the basis of the “best person for the job”;
t. CF members injured in the “line of duty” will be cared for by a grateful nation;
u. Pay is tied to the civil service, with a plus up for unique military conditions;
v. The Military is a profession;
w. The CF are important and have a place in Democratic
    Canadian Society; and
x. The CF is a bilingual organisation.

With these fundamental assumptions in mind it is time to
look at the second layer of Rousseau's onion model of culture,
the values of the CF.

VALUES

Values are considered extremely important to any military
organisation and in the CF they are imbued in all members from
the first days of basic training. In his article "Food for
Thought - On Values"\textsuperscript{12}, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Marsh drew a
pyramid to depict the tiers of values at work in the CF (Figure
3). This illustration is useful as it outlines, very simply,
the sometimes complex and competing values evident in a
democratic society. One hopes that these tiers of values are
clear and complementary, however, this is not always the case.
CF members must continuously evaluate and correctly apply values
in their day to day decisions. Some of this application is
instinctive some is learned. However, a critical part of how
values are applied or accepted in any organisation is whether
leaders "walk the talk". Example counts, as CF members will
interpret and apply the organisational values based not only on
what they are taught but also on the examples they see around them.

**FIGURE 2: LCOL MARSH'S PYRAMID OF VALUES:**

For the CF, the top of the pyramid contains the national values of Canada as outlined in the Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms:

Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law, Fundamental Freedoms, Democratic Rights, Mobility Rights, Legal Rights, Equality Rights, Language Rights

The second tier is formed by those values espoused by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces. These can be found in various sources across the CF, however, a
consolidated expression of the basic CF values is contained in
the recent Statement of Defence Ethics:

The three fundamental principles of respecting the
dignity of all people, serving Canada before self, and
obeying and respecting lawful authority; along with
the core defence ethical obligations of loyalty,
honesty, courage, diligence, fairness, and
responsibility, form the basis of the Defence Ethics
Program\textsuperscript{14}.

This Statement of Defence Ethics is complemented by a
quote from a report by the Minister of National Defence to
the Prime Minister on 25 March 1997:

The core traditional values of the Canadian Forces
continue to be not only valid, but essential: love of
country, courage, loyalty, submission to discipline,
duty, honour, the unlimited liability of service and
self-sacrifice.

The next two tiers are those values imposed by a member’s
Branch of Service and perhaps even by individual Occupations.
An example is the values espoused by the ADM (HR) Group:
Commitment, Innovation, Integrity, Respect, Teamwork, and
Communication\textsuperscript{15}. Similar expansions or reinforcements of the
basic values can be found in almost every segment of the CF and
can change depending on a member’s specific employment.

As well, other recognised professions exist within the
military (medical doctors, chaplains, and lawyers) and form sub-
cultures that have clearly defined professional values that are
both recognised and accepted by the military (the Hippocratic
oath for doctors, and the sanctity of the confessional for Roman Catholic priests are two examples).

Finally, the base of the pyramid is formed by one's personal values. Normally these values can be traced to a member's family, religious or ethnic background. These firmly held beliefs often represent basic human ideals. In order to serve in the CF, members must resolve any conflict between their personal values and those imposed by military service. The classic example might be the sanctity of human life. With the sole exception of military chaplains, every member of the CF could conceivably be put in a situation where deadly force is required, either in self-defence, for the protection of others, or to complete a military mission. Failure to adequately understand the combat and violence requirements of military service can put CF members into a conflict of values.

Now, building on the Fundamental Assumptions and Values it is now time to look at the third layer of Rousseau's "onion" composed of the Behavioural Norms common to the CF.

BEHAVIORAL NORMS

Behavioural norms are characteristics that apply across the CF but against which each member of the CF is individually and continuously assessed. Potential recruits are evaluated for their ability to meet the established norms of the CF from their
first contact with the recruiting process. Conformity is then reinforced throughout training and assessed continuously through the CF performance measurement and selection processes. Some primary examples of the behavioural norms within the CF follow:

a. Personal Evaluation Criteria. Many of the behavioural norms required for success in the CF are listed in the Personnel Evaluation Report (the annual performance report prepared on each member). These criteria changed in 1998 and are now included in the new CF Personnel Appraisal System (CFPAS)\textsuperscript{16}. The major change was a clear separation between the assessment of current performance and the evaluation of a member's suitability for promotion to the next rank. The new criteria are listed below (Figure 3):
### FIGURE 3: CANADIAN FORCES PERSONNEL EVALUATION CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT FACTORS</th>
<th>POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT FACTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>Leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervising</td>
<td>Professional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluating</td>
<td>Communication Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing Subordinates</td>
<td>Planning and Organisational Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Building</td>
<td>Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading Change</td>
<td>Dedication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSONAL ABILITIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working with others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem Solving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness under Demanding Circumstances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATION SKILLS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROFESSIONAL ABILITIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applying Job Knowledge/Skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reliability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct On/Off Duty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Physical Attributes required of CF members:

1. Drug free,
2. No alcohol dependency,
3. Physically fit, with a decided bias against obesity,
4. Mentally stable,
5. Growing preference for non-smokers,
6. No permanent medical or dental problems that would preclude effective job performance,

c. Social Attributes:

1. Intelligent,
2. Obedient and respectful of superiors, regulations, and orders,
3. Disciplined and able to control behaviour,
4. Punctual,
(5) Neat dress and appearance, including specific hair and jewellery restrictions,
(6) Able to work as part of a team and co-operate well with others,
(7) Self Starter, capable of pulling one’s share of the load without constant supervision,
(8) Will not display or condone racism or discrimination of any kind,
(9) An acceptance of the fact that sexual relations will not be permitted in the Chain of Command,
(10) “Esprit de Corps” and pride in trade, unit, organisation and country,
(11) A good citizen and representative of Canada both at home and abroad.

d. Restrictions of fundamental liberties. CF members must be prepared to accept certain restrictions of their fundamental liberties including the following:

(1) Limited use of political franchise (cannot run for political office, cannot publicly comment on political issues, and cannot campaign for politicians),

(2) Legally bound by both the National Defence Act and the Canadian Criminal Code, whereby further restricting personal freedoms, and

(3) Restricted contact with the media (specific rules governing contact with the media, cannot write or publish about the military or government policy without permission).
As in most organisations, violations of the CF Behavioural Norms are not accepted. When they occur they can be reflected in periodic and annual performance reports, which, in turn, can affect progression. They are corrected through counselling, mentoring, and the internal CF administrative and/or disciplinary processes. Failure to observe the norms or to correct behaviour results in punishment and/or release (termination of service).

It is now time to move to Rousseau's fourth layer of culture formed by the Patterns of Behaviour.

PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOUR

Rousseau defines these patterns of behaviour as observable and repeated practices often associated with human resource practices[7]. These are essentially group behaviours that can affect both the individual and the organisation as a whole. Some key patterns of behaviour in the CF are as follows:

a. Performance Evaluation Report (PER). A PER is prepared annually by each member's supervisor. In the PER a member's performance is measured against national criteria, norms established in the unit, and performance vis a vis other members of the unit. This report is forwarded to the central human resources agency and, when coupled with past PERs, course reports, and basic
tombstone data, forms the member’s personnel file. The performance measurement process culminates with the annual merit boards. Using the personnel files, a national comparison is done, by rank and occupation, to determine a CF wide merit listing. This merit list is the primary document used in the CF selection process;

b. CF Selection Process. The results of the annual merit boards and other related Boards are used to select members for promotion, additional terms of service, training and education courses, and for command and key appointments. At some rank levels and in certain occupations, boards also determine merit pay entitlements;

c. Career Review Boards. An administrative process used to determine medical fitness or to assess failure to abide by behavioural norms;

d. CF Disciplinary process. This in an internal process made up of Orders Parades, Summary Trials, Courts-Martial, and the Federal Appeals process. Designated Commanders have the authority to fine, demote, and even imprison CF members. They can also impose a range of lesser punishments;
e. CF audit process. This includes internal Commanding Officer’s Investigations, Summary Investigations, Boards of Inquiry, formal audits, and military police investigations. The government can also impose external audits, ministerial inquiries, civilian police investigations, and in extreme cases public inquiries;

f. Right of Redress. All CF members have an inherent right to seek Redress of Grievance on any issue through the CF Chain of Command up to the Chief of Defence Staff and, in some cases, the Minister of National Defence. Members are not permitted to seek redress through the Federal Court system until the internal CF grievance process has been exhausted; and

g. Policy and Business Planning process. This is the annual estimate process by which money is requested, allocated from parliament, and expended within the CF. It is also the formal process by which CF policy on training, operations, capital acquisition, maintenance, and logistics is determined and orders are passed to the CF.

The CF is a large and complex organisation with a multitude of identifiable and interrelated behaviour patterns. A complete study is beyond the scope of this paper. The intent
was to highlight some of the behaviour patterns that directly affect the psychological contract. Now we will look at the last layer of Rousseau's onion by reviewing the artifacts of the CF.

ARTIFACTS

Artifacts are the physical and visible expressions of a culture. Some of the CF artifacts are obvious to the public at large, while others are intended for an internal audience. This is an important part of culture since pride in an organisation is often most openly displayed through artifacts. It is also the face of the CF most evident to the public. CF artifacts can be generally grouped into public and internal categories, as follows:

**FIGURE 4: CF PUBLIC ARTIFACTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Artifacts:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons and Equipment,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bases and Training Areas,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parades and Ceremonies,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displays, Competitions and Demonstration Teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flags, Colours and Pennants,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting Drives,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bands and Military Music,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saluting, drill, and unique forms of address,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/Local Media Coverage,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearances in front of all levels of Government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Historical Legacy and Tradition:**

Museums and Monuments,
Cenotaphs,
Veteran's Pride,
Written and oral accounts of past battles and deeds,
Civic Pride in local units, Bases, and armouries,
Associated organisations (Canadian Legion and various Defence Organisations).

**Slogans:**

Truth-Duty-Valour   (Royal Military College),
There is No Life like It - Recruiting Slogan,
Take the Challenge - Recruiting Slogan,

**Internal Artifacts:**

Internal artifacts are items or issues that have much higher significance to individuals inside the military "family" than those outside it. However, they also play an important role in the pride members have for the CF. Some examples follow:

a. Branch insignia, formation and unit insignia and hat badges, including the process of "badging" when a person completes training and is considered ready to go to his/her first unit;

b. Medals and ribbons as a representation of where a military member has served (operationally), a record of long honourable service, and whether or not they have been considered to have done something extraordinary;
c. Promotions and promotion parties – the celebration of advancement in a merit based system;
d. Retirement and retirement parties – the recognition of faithful service;
e. Farewells and posting parties. Frequent moves are a fact of life in the military and it is customary for employers, colleagues and subordinates to acknowledge the departure of a military member by thanking him/her for the service rendered. This tradition leads to the accumulation of official souvenirs of service (wall plaques, scrolls, gifts) that form part of the memories and bond military members have with locations, specific jobs and people;
f. Messes and mess functions (mess dinners, happy hours etc). Although declining in usage and importance, in many units messes were the instruments of socialising among CF members and played an important role in passing on both experiences and traditions;
g. Visits play an important part in CF military culture. There are many categories, each with its own subtle variation of meaning and preparation and include: Military Icons (Colonels of the Regiment, Colonels in Chief, Past Military Leaders or Heroes), visits by
Civil Authorities, Visits/Inspections by Higher Military Commanders, Visits by the Media, and visits by the general population;

h. Initiation Rites. Abuse has brought this practice into question, however, rights of initiation remain an important tool for bonding diverse individuals together into a coherent group, and

i. Internal media methods including Base newspapers, CF wide journals, routine orders, and professional publications.

From this necessarily abbreviated look CF culture it is, nevertheless, evident that the CF forms a unique segment of Canadian society. The ultimate purpose is to develop trained, motivated and closely-knit combat units that can fight or perform other tasks as ordered by the Government of Canada. The stringent requirements imposed on CF members and the combat skills required of CF members, particularly those in combat occupations, cannot be found in the larger Canadian workforce. CF members are trained, educated, and employed within a relatively closed system. Senior leaders (both officer and non-commissioned officer) are grown internally, and, for the most part, cannot be brought in from external sources. Thus, any
internal breakdown or system failure can have a long term and
devastating impact on a military organisation. The end result
is that the CF must uphold the principles of Canadian Society,
must be part of society, however, at the same time, it forms a
unique and separate part of that society.

SECTION 3: EXPECTATIONS OF CF MEMBERS

The culture of the CF defines two parts of the
psychological contract. First, the CF culture defines what the
CF, and by extension the Government of Canada, expects from its
members. Conversely, by "buying-in" to or adopting the culture
as their own, members of the CF implicitly acknowledge and
accept their obligations to the organisation. Culture then also
identifies what the member expects to give to the organisation.

Now it is time to examine a third part of the contract, what
CF members expect from the organisation in return for their
services. These individual expectations must also be reconciled
with the culture of the CF developed in the last section. There
are so many potential areas of discussion that it is necessary
to break the contract down into broad general categories. A
compendium of applicable ideas from Roosevelt Thomas, Peter
Makin et al, and Schein helps to develop these broad categories.
Thomas gives us the "principle design tools of the Psychological
Contract”\textsuperscript{18}. Peter Makin et al, describe the “Job Descriptive Index”\textsuperscript{19}, while Schein describes the methods by which “leaders imbed and transmit culture”\textsuperscript{20}. There is a great deal of commonality in both terminology and approach, as is evident in the summary table at Figure 4.

**FIGURE 5: PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTRACT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOMAS</th>
<th>MAKIN, COOPER AND COX</th>
<th>SCHEIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Principle Design Tools of the Psychological Contact</td>
<td>JOB DESCRIPTIVE INDEX</td>
<td>How Leaders Imbed and Transmit Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEASUREMENT PRACTICES</td>
<td>PAY</td>
<td>WHAT LEADERS PAY ATTENTION TO, MEASURE AND CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REWARDS (MONEY, CAREER PATH)</td>
<td>THE JOB ITSELF</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOB DESIGN</td>
<td>OPPORTUNITES FOR PROMOTION</td>
<td>CRITERIA FOR RECRUITING, SELECTION, PROMOTION, RETIREMENT, EXCOMMUNICATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELECTION PROCESS</td>
<td>THE SUPERVISOR</td>
<td>SECONDARY ARTICULATION AND REINFORCEMENT MECHANISMS</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>CO-WORKERS</td>
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This compendium is useful in determining the primary elements of the CF psychological contract, from the member's point of view, and can provide some indication of what CF members expect from the organisation.

The following is one interpretation of the CF psychological contract, from a member’s perspective:

a. The job and/or history of jobs performed by the CF member. This segment of the contract includes the
political direction and broad overarching DND/CF policies that drive the CF. It also includes what the member expects from his/her immediate supervisor and the senior political/military leadership of DND. Finally, this part of the contract also addresses the actual working conditions experienced by the member. This may be the most important part of the CF contract;

b. The compensation and reward package. This part of the contract is concerned with pay, direct benefits, promotion opportunities, and Quality of Life issues;

c. The career development process. This piece of the contract is concerned with the career pillars of training, education, opportunities for experience, and command opportunities;

d. Fairness and justice in the selection, disciplinary and administrative processes. This part of the contract identifies each CF members need for equitable treatment in all aspects of the CF; and

e. The performance assessment system. In this part of the contract the member is looking for clear definition of career requirements, a frank and honest evaluation of both performance and potential, and accurate tools to measure performance.
RECOGNIZING CONTRACT VIOLATION

Broken expectations produce feelings of disappointment. Broken obligations, on the other hand, lead to feelings of anger and a reassessment of the individual's relationships with the organization. Because it is unwritten and unofficial, and therefore not legally binding, the motivation for compliance is not, as it is with explicit written contracts, the fear of legal reprisal but, rather, the desire to maintain trust. It, thus, constitutes an essentially emotional bond (which is one reason why when it's broken, people experience deep, long-lasting feelings of betrayal and resentment).

To fully understand psychological contracting it is important to recognise when a contract breach has occurred and how it is manifested. It is also important to understand that a breach of contract does not end the contract. Both employers and employees must continue to seek ways to redress the real or perceived problems.

At the moment there is a multitude of signs that CF members are dissatisfied. These signs also clearly indicate members believe their contract with the CF and Government of Canada has been breached.

First, members are voting with their feet and, in a strong economy, CF members, at all ranks, have technical and managerial skills that are highly prized in the workforce. Voluntary
attrition is high, there is also a decrease in re-enrolment, plus fewer members are accepting new terms of service when they are offered. Many members are buying out or attempting to buy out their obligatory service contracts. More members have resumes on the street and are actively soliciting alternate employment.

Second, there is a lower level of tolerance and commitment to "service requirements". Indications include a significant reduction in voluntary mobility primarily for spousal employment, education of dependants, and due to inequities in the cost of living across Canada and abroad. More individuals are opting out of the career development system by refusing to volunteer for advanced education, turning down career enhancing opportunities, refusing command appointments, and even refusing promotion. It is becoming more and more difficult to fill certain types of jobs (very much occupation and location dependent).

The third, and perhaps most disturbing set of trends, are the open breaches of established Behavioural Norms. Impatience with the system is manifested by the multitude of anonymous "brown" envelopes being sent to investigators, media, and Members of Parliament. The numbers of official redresses continue to increase, challenging disciplinary, selection,
assignment, and administrative actions at every level. There is open defiance of the guidelines restricting access to the media, Members of Parliament and the federal courts. There is an increase in the number of open challenges to the military and government hierarchies over defence policy. This relatively “open revolt” is perhaps the best indication that members have lost confidence in their leaderships' ability to properly represent them.

AREAS OF CONCERN AND POSSIBLE CAUSES OF BREACH

The next part of this paper will examine the each section of the psychological contract with the intent of examining possible areas of concern, in relation to the culture of the CF.

THE JOB

I am convinced that the course our Government charted in the 1994 White Paper is the right one: only through the maintenance of multi-purpose, combat-capable forces will Canada's military be able to retain the degree of flexibility necessary to carry out all of its defence roles... (MND) 23

Combat Force or Constabulary?

There is growing confusion among CF members as to whether the CF is a war fighting combat force or a peacekeeping, disaster relief, and constabulary force. Conviction that the CF must be primarily a combat force is among the key basic assumptions in the CF psychological contract. The requirement
for a general-purpose combat capability is also a key ingredient of current government policy and is continually expounded by senior military leadership as the primary raison d'être for the CF. However, there is a growing chasm between the policy and reality. Compared to our NATO and NORAD allies, there are growing equipment shortfalls, capability shortfalls, and a major credibility gap in both combat training and readiness. This gap was amply demonstrated by Canada's reluctance to send a formed Brigade Group into operations in either the Gulf War or in Bosnia. This has led to some tough and often-embarrassing questions from our allies.

With the current high operational tempo focused on peacekeeping, the CF has virtually stopped all collective combat training above unit level. The CF has also never realistically exercised its ability to deploy alliance committed land forces, in any reasonable period of time, due to known shortages in strategic lift and logistics support. Nor does the CF conduct joint training exercises (army, navy, and airforce) in support of defence of Canada or sovereignty operations. Although the regular force has been significantly reduced, money for the reserve component has been significantly reduced as well. This, coupled with indecision over reserve restructuring, has eliminated the ability of the reserves to train to any effective
standard.

This chasm will only grow as our allies are now poised to take another generational leap forward in doctrine, equipment and lethality. This contradiction in the contract can only be repaired by either a policy change (officially converting the CF to a constabulary force) or by major efforts to restore a true, modern combat capability.

If a general purpose military force is required, then the political and military leadership must articulate realistic guidelines as to what constitutes a general purpose combat capability for the CF that is in-line with our sovereignty requirements, alliance commitments, and the realities of modern warfare. Sufficient money and personnel must be available to equip, train, exercise, and sustain this force to an acceptable standard, in addition to any on-going peacetime commitments. To be truly effective, the CF should maintain a limited expeditionary capability (deployable joint HQ, strategic air and sealift and a logistics capability) for use in both Canada and abroad. As well, the CF should be capable of fighting as a full joint (sea-land-air) team, rather than as disparate parts of a coalition effort.

If Canada does not need or cannot afford a general-purpose capability, then some tough decisions must be made. In the most
dramatic circumstance (the creation of a purely constabulary force), CF policy should be amended accordingly. This policy change would automatically result in a change to the basic assumptions of the CF, thereby, amending the culture and the psychological contract with CF members. Each CF member would then have the option of accepting the revised contract or leaving the CF. There are other options, an enhanced general-purpose combat capability for the navy and air components of the CF, coupled with a constabulary land force, for example.

A decision to abandon all or part of the CF commitment to maintaining a credible combat capability would not be universally accepted by CF members. However, clear policy direction, coupled with a long-term resource commitment, is the only way to resolve the current confusion and unease that exists in the psychological contract.

Mechanism of Voice

One of the dilemmas in the military culture is the search for an effective mechanism of voice. CF members at all levels live within a system that demands both obedience and loyalty. These are key issues recognising that CF members accept absolute subordination to political control and the constant existence of an inviolate hierarchy of command. How then can members
dissent without being either disobedient, disloyal or both?

The CF culture dictates that, except in extreme combat situations, most routine decisions are taken after consultation, at least with key staff. In fact, CF members in staff or advisory positions have a clear duty to participate in the planning process and to provide professional input. However, once staff input has been received, decisions, at every level, remain the prerogative of Command. Obedience and loyalty demand that, once a decision has been taken, everyone in the Chain of Command accept the decision, openly support the decision, and work towards effective implementation.

However, those who remain strongly opposed to a decision do have some options. First, they can individually confront the decision-maker and request that the decision be revisited (this is normally done verbally and in private). In these instances the initiative to change a decision still rests with the decision-maker. Secondly, where they have been personally affected by a decision, individual CF members can submit a Redress of Grievance up the Chain of Command requesting a decision be reviewed. When not resolved to a member's satisfaction, grievances can be forwarded further up the Chain of Command, to include the Chief of Defence Staff and, in some instances, the Minister of National Defence. Recently the
Government of Canada opened a third mechanism of voice, in the form of an independent Ombudsman. Finally, CF members may invoke their ultimate right and request a release from the CF. Taking a release from the CF formally severs both the legal and psychological contracts a member may have with the CF. Normally, release also frees an individual to speak out against a decision, the CF, and even the government (classified issues excluded). Unfortunately, although release may give a member the moral high ground, it usually comes at a financial cost and except in rare circumstances seldom offers an increased ability to sway political or military decisions. Yet, seen from the viewpoint of CF members, it is often the only visible and easily recognisable sign that senior leadership dissents on a policy issue.

The problem then for the senior leadership is how to be both obedient and loyal to the political leadership and yet ensure that the CF and the rank and file are properly cared for. This is particularly difficult when faced with tough fiscal policy. It must also be noted that there are no special rules for senior management in this regard. It is a reality of democratic militaries that all senior military positions and promotions are political appointments. Without question, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and other senior leaders are
consulted extensively by the Minister of National Defence (MND) on a wide variety of policy issues. However, only the Government of Canada approves Defence Policy. Only the Government of Canada determines the financial allocation of the CF and dictates what capital acquisitions will be made. Only the MND speaks for the DND/CF in parliament. Only the MND speaks to the media on policy issues.

As well, the political Chain of Command is not required to disclose dissenting opinions or advice received from the military hierarchy. Conversely, after they have given their advice, the CDS and all other senior officers have an obligation to defend and support CF policy, even policy that appears detrimental to the CF or its members. That is the essence of political control.

If the political leadership is not acutely aware and sensitive to the inherent limitations of voice imposed on the military in a democratic system, problems begin to occur. Without clear indications their concerns are being presented and considered at the highest political levels (even if they are not accepted), the rank and file begin to lose confidence and faith in the military leadership to represent them. This situation can degenerate into charges of careerism and self-interest against the military leadership.
Are People our Most Important Resource?

People will usually listen politely enough to what their boss says. But the way they act will depend on how he or she behaves. Example counts.24

There is increasing concern that the DND/CF leadership is paying lip service to the Basic Assumption that “People are our most Important Resource”. Unfortunately, in these years of public scrutiny and fiscal restraint, the measurement and control of money appears to have gained far more importance than the care and development of CF members. There are a variety of indicators in this area. Leadership and management success in the CF is often measured by the saving achieved in annual budgets (financial and personnel reductions). A whole new subculture, centred on innovative ways to save money and reduce personnel has sprung up in the CF. At the same time, in a desperate attempt to balance growing operations, infrastructure, and personnel costs, within a shrinking budget, human resource systems have been gutted across the CF, with a significant decline in services (medical, dental, psychiatric, fitness facilities, housing, career management, and professional development). The “survivors” of downsizing appear to be a burden to the CF, rather than its key asset. It is ironic, there are now employees bitter about not being offered a Forced
Reduction Plan (FRP) buy-out rather than feeling glad they have been retained.

Zero Defect Mentality

There is a growing intolerance for error in the CF. The search for perfection and focus on negative incidents ignores the fact that combat and leadership are not exact sciences. This is creating a poisonous work environment. Humans make mistakes and the CF is in real danger of creating a "zero defect" mentality where there is no trust, no room for error, and a weakened team building capability. As well, the failure to support the leadership at all levels seriously undermines command authority and further damages both the structure and the culture of the CF.

According to Rousseau, one way that this lack of trust is manifested is by increased monitoring. She gives examples such as increased use of surveillance technologies, attempts to constrain even legal behaviours (smoking, alcohol use), and increased performance measurement. This activity "can focus attention on limited behaviours rather than on flexibility and innovation, signalling a more transactional employment arrangement."

Universality of Service

The ongoing tension between the Charter of Rights and
 Freedoms and the CF's need for a physically fit, universally deployable workforce has created a terrible dichotomy for CF members. Retaining "Universality of Service" as a cornerstone of employment, without challenging the Charter and demonstrating a bone fide requirement for exemption, is having a severe internal impact. The CF has been forced into the situation where it must discard valued and sometimes-irreplaceable employees, suffering from major or minor physical impediments, in the fear that precedence will require the CF to hire personnel with similar impediments off the street. This coupled with a relatively unsympathetic and decidedly ungenerous medical pension system (the CF replacement for the Workman's Compensation system) has led to the situation where members are not seeking proper medical attention for fear of losing their jobs. This situation also makes personnel think twice about providing maximum physical performance in a profession that demands total physical and mental commitment in working conditions that are both hazardous and arduous.

This situation has been compounded by Government Legislation, which prevents pensionable CF members from competing for jobs within the public service. A recent change to this legislation now exempts CF members medically discharged as a result of injuries suffered in operations. However, this
is the only exception and does not, for example, include members injured while training or conducting operations in Canada.

Ironically, the public service itself is now having serious problems filling leadership and management positions, at the same time it has been cut off from a major source of potential candidates. The argument behind this legislation is that no one should be permitted to "double dip" (i.e. draw two government pensions at the same time). This is simply another indicator that CF members are not considered valued employees and implies that CF pensions are neither deserved nor earned.

**COMPENSATION AND REWARDS**

What then is fair compensation for assuming the strictures of unlimited liability? 

Although money is seldom the primary reason that members serve, CF personnel do expect fair compensation for their work. Because the CF does not have the right to negotiate salaries, members must rely on the senior leadership of the CF, DND, and the Government of Canada to do the right thing. Unfortunately, this segment of the psychological contract has been in breach for many years. It is well recognised that CF members have been paid less than their civil service counterparts for at least six years. The Government is committed to eliminating this gap and has embarked on a catch-up programme. However, the catch-up is a long-term effort and does nothing to address the
years of lost income resulting from recent austerity programmes. Government austerity cost CF members at least 6 to 14 percent more in each year of the programme, when compared to members of the civil service (cumulatively, as much as 30 to 70 percent of one year's salary over the five years of the pay freeze). This is one of the root causes of the long-term financial problems encountered, particularly by junior members of the CF. Without some effort to rectify this breach, CF members will continue to be sceptical about the ability of senior management to represent their interests. They will also remain sceptical the Government of Canada truly values their work.

The real change in compensation strategy that has taken place over the last twenty years is that most CF members can no longer live on a single income. Although this is also true across much of Canadian society, there is a subtle discrimination against CF members compared to most other government workers. The mobility required of CF members is non-voluntary and erodes the family's ability to generate and maintain a second (spousal) income. Location changes force many spouses to accept low wage jobs without realistic hope of either advancement or pension. This reality affects both current and potential retirement incomes. The real compensation question is whether or not CF members should be
able to maintain a reasonable standard of living and retirement on a single income. This is becoming even more important as CF members come under increasing societal pressure to effectively balance the needs of career and family. The alternative is for the CF to offer significantly more career and retirement assistance to the spouses of CF members, in order to compensate for mobility requirements. This dilemma is addressed in some detail in the SCONDVA report\textsuperscript{27}.

**CAREER DEVELOPMENT**

A second source of extrinsic reward to the individual employee is a meaningful career path\textsuperscript{28}.

Investment in training and education is the key method by which organisations demonstrate their commitment to the professional development of their employees.

Organizations that support career resilience are committed to working in partnership with their employees. They offer opportunities for professional growth and engage their employees in challenging work\textsuperscript{29}.

The CF, and other militaries, have been continuous learning organisations long before the term gained popular acceptance. Unfortunately, during this period of austerity and downsizing, the CF has significantly reduced its financial and personnel commitments to both professional training and education. At the same time, recognising the importance of education, the standards required for professional advancement continue to grow.
in many occupations. This has created the dichotomy of higher education and training requirements with significantly lower availability.

Some examples of this include the significant reduction in Advanced Training List credits available to send personnel on education or training. The percentage of "surplus" personnel available to undergo full time education and training has been reduced even more than the overall personnel reductions imposed on the CF. This trend is contrary to conventional wisdom that downsizing increases rather than decreases the importance of education and training in the smaller workforce. Commanders are now often forced to decide if individual professional advancement takes precedence over current job requirements. As might be expected, this has resulted in unequal access to existing training and education opportunities.

The Department recently imposed a university requirement for all officers, however, the money available for university entry programmes of all types has been severely reduced. Since a lack of education now affects professional advancement, some Commands have begun funnelling scarce tactical training money into education in order to provide sufficient opportunities for their officers.

Language training is also a key component of professional
advancement in a bilingual force, however, due to manpower and training billets shortfalls, there are insufficient opportunities to become bilingual, particularly for Anglophone members. This reality is a significant source of friction in both the selection and performance measurement parts of the Human Resource system.

Downsizing has also reduced promotion in many occupations. Promotion is important in both career development and as part of the compensation and reward system. Slow-downs in promotion are not unique in or outside of the CF; however, there is a difference in the CF today. Due to cutbacks in the cost move budget there has been a significant reduction in opportunities for lateral progression. Valued, long service members who have worked hard, but who do not reach the promotion quota were traditionally “rewarded” with lateral postings to jobs or locations of their choosing, within the overall CF requirement. However, with cuts of 60 percent and more to the cost move budget, this flexibility has all but vanished, effectively stranding deserving personnel with few employment options. This has also resulted in inequitable access to desirable jobs and locations.
FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE (SELECTION, DISCIPLINE, ADMINISTRATION)

Satisfaction tends to be lowest when perceptions of both distributive justice and procedural justice are low.  

Considerable efforts have been made over the past several years to increase the transparency of the selection process. This has included written and supportable selection criteria and significant changes to the composition of key selection boards. There has been relatively little complaint about the selection process, except a growing concern that the availability of cost moves, rather than merit (the best person for the job) is becoming the deciding factor in selection.

The military justice system is under constant scrutiny. Over the past twenty years it has been under near continuous revision in order to meet key elements of the Charter of Human Rights and changes to the national justice system. To be effective the CF must have an internal justice system that is both fair and swift. Personnel facing disciplinary or administrative procedures stand accused of violating the Norms of Behaviour established in the CF culture, and, as in any profession, there must be an effective means of self-policing. Until decisions are made on the validity of the accusations, the CF member is in limbo and, in may cases, unemployable. Any significant delay in dealing with these cases automatically
penalises the member from both a performance measurement and career development viewpoint.

There is also a growing attempt to equate egalitarianism with fairness. The "cookie cutter" approach to discipline and compensation between personnel of different ranks, different environments, and even different trades is often neither just nor equal. Individuals and organisations have different needs and calcifying the disciplinary and administrative systems through process and precedence removes the flexibility that can be a leaders greatest tool.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

There can be little doubt that the imposition of unit high score controls had a negative impact on the CF Performance Measurement system. This, coupled with a systemic inability to distinguish between current performance and long term potential, created a great deal of dissatisfaction at every level. Leaders were unable to properly acknowledge the efforts of their subordinates, effectively reducing the relative self-worth of solid and effective employees. The new CFPAS system, introduced in 1998, eliminates high score controls and clearly separates performance from potential. This system should go a long ways towards rectifying the mistrust and bitterness often
evident at PER time. Evaluation is hard and there is an absolute need to tell it like it is.

As a result of downsizing and re-engineering, the traditional human resource system of the CF has been gutted in terms of both personnel and money. This when individual Human Resources Management is considered more important than ever. It is ironic that the CF was providing career management advice to other federal government departments and newly independent Eastern European states at the same time the existing CF system was being dismantled due to lack of personnel and money. Commanding Officers and unit staffs do not have the resources, time, and information to explore all career options open to each member of the CF. However, reductions in Career Management staffs have resulted in triage, i.e. prioritising of essential work with longer delays on routine matters. The concept of "managing the best and employing the rest"\textsuperscript{31} rings hollow in any organisation that claims people are its most important resource.

There are four key elements to CF career management - first the member, the member's Commanding Officer, the member's Branch advisor, and finally the Career Management system. Without sufficient access to information or resources at each level, CF members will not be well served.
WHAT CAN BE DONE - RECOMMENDATIONS

Policies need to be established that link business strategies with human-resource strategies and practices.\(^{32}\)

In the theory of psychological contracting, the contract does not end just because it is in breach. This is especially true for an essential service such as the military. Members continue to serve out of loyalty, a sense of duty, and in the hope that things will get better. In the case of the CF there are steps that can be taken to restore or improve the psychological contract between the CF and the members of the CF. Some specific examples follow:

JOB

a. CF leadership must determine what constitutes a realistic general-purpose combat capability. Based on this review, the Government must officially decide if the CF is to be a combat force, a constabulary force, or some combination in-between;

b. CF members expect their leaders to properly represent them and are seeking proof of active and effective representation. There is a need to find more transparent mechanisms of voice, short of resignation, for the senior leadership to voice concerns on behalf of CF members
(periodic personal appearances before Parliament, for example);

c. By both deed and action, the leadership must prove that people, not money, is the most important CF resource. This will be difficult to do. SCONDVA has highlighted many of the problems and some new money may be forthcoming. The key, however, is policy not money. The military leadership needs to commit to: preserving Quality of Life programmes, determining the baseline level of support required by CF members, and working towards uniform access and application of all agreed programmes, wherever CF members are located;

d. DND should seek an exemption from the Charter of Human Rights in order to permit retention of personnel who are below specified medical categories, but still capable of performing essential tasks short of operational deployment. This exception must be requested in such a way as not to jeopardise the intent of the Universality of Service or the need for physically fit personnel in the CF;

e. Completely rework the CF medical pension system to ensure CF members are adequately taken care of when they are released from the CF as a result of injuries or illness.
The on duty/off duty debate must stop. Members are expected to serve 24 hours a day, therefore, except perhaps in the case of negligence, coverage and protection should be the same;

f. DND should challenge the discriminatory hiring practices within the Federal Public Service, particularly for CF members medically released from the CF. If necessary, the pension act should be amended to permit pension porting to ensure all CF personnel have equal access to public service competitions; and

g. Determine the roles and missions of the CF reserves, reorganise to these roles and missions as soon as possible, and ensure personnel, money and equipment is available. Approved reserve unit establishments and stable funding are key to improving movement between the regular force and the reserves.

**COMPENSATION AND REWARDS**

a. Acknowledge that CF members have been mistreated with regards to pay. Catch up what is owed, and compensate CF members for the years of underpayment;

b. Revise the CF pay structure and the negotiation process. The CF should reward mobility, operational service, and superior performance. To reduce attrition, CF should
consider re-enlistment bonuses, as opposed to severance bonuses. This would reduce overall costs and put more money in hands of CF members earlier in their careers;
c. Senior personnel in the CF are not overpaid and in face of growing egalitarianism have very few benefits (none, compared to other parts of Canadian society). Failure to properly compensate them is also a sign of mistrust and undervalues their work on behalf of both the CF and the country;
d. To equitably maintain mobility, set as policy that CF members should be able to maintain a similar standard of living, regardless of location. A determination on whether CF members should be able to live on a single income will be key to this debate. This will also require some movement on the part of Revenue Canada with regards to benefits taxation; and
e. Start to view Quality of Life benefits and services as investments in people. Success should be measured by reduced early attrition that will save recruiting, training, education, severance costs, and the movement costs associated with replacing personnel who release early. Quality care, administered with flexibility and compassion, should also reduce the time and effort spent
in dealing with grievances and ministerial inquiries.

**CAREER DEVELOPMENT**

a. Immediately commit to investing in people by reversing the concept of "managing the best and employing the rest". This can be done by: increasing the percentage of the CF authorised to undertake advanced education and training; increasing the money devoted to paying for education (either direct tuition or repayment of personal advancement); and devising long-term solutions to universal language training (French or English);

b. Supervisors must not be put in the position of having to decide whether personnel will be permitted to take required education upgrading or whether authorised positions will be manned;

c. CF must restore sufficient posting money to ensure there is adequate scope for lateral progression in the CF and that job selection will again be based on "the best person for the job"; and

d. Use innovative and flexible employment techniques to motivate personnel. This may require a fundamental reassessment of what constitutes a career in the CF. The key should be to maintain the maximum number of trained
personnel possible within the dollar envelope allocated. This in turn will require flexibility in the way benefits are allocated and paid. Some examples might include increased access to leave without pay, using the resulting salary offset to call up reserve personnel. More direct interaction in the Career Management system (interactive computer systems to explore posting options, available trade career counselling and mentoring, and increased involvement by the HR triad of Commanding Officer, Branch Advisor, and the Career Manager). Examine ways to make more flexible use of reserves, with an improved ability to move between reserve and regular service during a career in the CF. Give serious consideration to job sharing opportunities in static posts within the CF.

FAIRNESS AND EQUITABILITY

a. continue efforts in increase transparency in all selection procedures; and

b. continue to work on resolving the policies and politics of language, gender and age in the selection processes. Increased operational effectiveness, not social politics, must be the goal of all personnel policies.

PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

a. closely monitor the effectiveness of CFPAS in separating
the measurement of performance versus potential. Continue to assist supervisors in developing effective methods of measuring performance and potential and providing effective counselling and mentoring of subordinates; and b. given the angst it has caused, perhaps the CF should revisit the decision to stop meriting all members of the CF.

CONCLUSION

In-spite of the concerns expressed in this paper, most members of the CF are extremely proud of their work and enjoy serving their country. It is hoped that psychological contracting can be used to improve both understanding and relations between members of the CF, the CF and the government. By continuously reviewing proposed policy against the existing psychological contract it may be possible for senior military and political leaders to anticipate or avoid areas of breach, either through effective explanation (education) to ensure internal revision of the contract, or by providing effective arguments to rethink the proposed changes. In any event, it is abundantly clear that the members of military must once again become the most important resource of the Canadian Forces.
ENDNOTES


2 The Somalia Commission, the Dickson Report on the Military Justice System and Military Police Investigation Services, the Morton and Granatstien Reports on education in the military, the Thomas report on Bakovici, the Davis report on gender integration, the SCONDVA (Senate Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs) hearings and report, and the internal military Quality of Life Study).


6 Ibid.,92

7 Ibid.,13

8 Schein, 9

9 Ibid.,15

10 Rousseau,48

11 Ibid.,49


17 Rousseau, 51


20 Schein,225-237

21 Makin, Cooper, and Cox, 5


23 The Honourable Doug Young, Minister of National Defence, "Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces", 3

25 Rousseau, 211

26 SCONDVA Report, Chapter II, p. 1


28 Rousseau, 477


30 Makin et al, 137

31 General Jean Boyle, ADM PER then CDS 1994 to 1996

32 De Meuse and Tornow, 4
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