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DRAGON IN THE CITY:
JOINT POWER PROJECTION AND JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS-
AN UNAVOIDABLE SITUATION IN THE NEW FUTURE?

BY

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DRAGON IN THE CITY: JOINT POWER PROJECTION AND
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THE NEAR FUTURE?

by

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ABSTRACT

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A compelling hypothesis argues future contingency warfare
must consider urban operations as a necessary and natural
part of the overall force projection strategy. This is
especially true since the battlefield of the 21st Century
will occur near or in major littoral population centers.
However, there is little doctrinal guidance for the
commander confronted with the requirement to execute urban
operations following strategic deployment into theatre.
This monograph examines doctrine, current strategic thought,
and historical examples of urban operations involving large-
scale metropolitan littoral areas. This study outlines the
immediate need for a major overhaul in joint organization,
doctrine, and training to prepare US CONUS-based forces for
strategic power projection into a threatened theatre
dominated by a major urban area.
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Chapter One

A Question of Space and Time: Scenario for Joint Power Projection and Joint Urban Operations

In modern war strategical combinations will generally depend for their successful execution upon questions of time. The army which can mobilize, concentrate, and strike before the other is ready, can, usually, by keeping the initiative, push its strategical combinations to a successful issue, one after the other.

Brevet Major William A. Kobbe, 1896

Local Time: 0445, 31 August 1999, somewhere south of the confluence of the Imjin and Han Rivers on the Korean peninsula

Brigadier General Kim Huong turned to watch as the last two of his twenty strike battalions quietly settled into the assembly area along the riverbank. He quickly glanced at his watch, feeling the dampness of the fog surrounding him, simultaneously catching a whiff of the charcoal fires of early rising Seoul workers. His division's infiltration movement, which began ten days and 275 miles earlier, had not been compromised. Just the night before, advance force messengers had informed him that the clandestine approaches of four more NKPA divisions had gone according to schedule.
30,000 well-trained and disciplined North Korean infantrymen now lay concealed in a rough arc around Seoul. In 15 minutes an ICBM barrage on pinpointed US and South Korean command and control sites and artillery units would signal the commencement of the attack to seize Seoul. Across all of South Korea, port facilities, airfields, bridges, and American ADA sites would be attacked with SCUD rockets and chemical rounds, reminiscent of the Vietnamese Tet Offensive of the 1960s.

BG Houngh heard the first of a series of muffled explosions from the direction of Seoul-North Korean Special Forces teams had initiated their takedown of the city's infrastructure. Overhead, Houngh could hear the rushing sound of the in-bound rockets.

Houngh got to his feet and signaled for his regimental commanders to move forward. The weather was cooperating, and his division would be inside Seoul before the US warplanes emerged or could bring technology to bear against the NKPA. This time, the plan would succeed.

*****

Local Time: 0130, 31 August 1999, somewhere outside Kuwait City.
Lieutenant Colonel Ali Mohamed Serouf peered through his night vision goggles and spotted the Kuwaiti mechanized patrol that nearly stumbled into his forward outpost positioned in the abandoned warehouse on the eastern fringe of Kuwait City. Mouthing a silent prayer, Serouf knew he had to remain hidden for two more hours before his 15 Special Forces teams attacked the unsuspecting Kuwaiti Army headquarters and paralyzed the air defense and communications sites oriented into the Iraq-Kuwait Disputed Zone to the west. In just two more hours the elite Republican Guard, supported by a bristling, mobile array of air defense systems, would abruptly attack south to seize Kuwait City.

LTC Serouf smiled as he thought how the Americans had been so well deceived by the crafty Saddam Hussein. It was like the fable of the boy crying "wolf"—after five or six deployments to the Persian Gulf the US military establishment was now numb to Saddam's saber-rattling. He thought how routine the US satellite photos of static tank formations must now appear, and how the false radio traffic and dummy ADA positions—pointed to the north—were drawing US attention away from the essential targets in Kuwait City.
The extraordinarily professional and deadly US armored regiment had withdrawn after yet another hasty and inconclusive deployment, leaving behind huge stockpiles of equipment and supplies. The naïve American newsmen had even gone back to the United States. Just like Saddam had prophesied, the conditions were set for a decisive Iraqi conquest of its rightful territory.

Serouf's communications officer tapped him on the leg and startled him from his reverie—the code word for the impending attack was heard amidst the normal Radio Baghdad news broadcast. He opened the flap of his gas mask carrier and readied his chemical protective over-garment.

In about 45 minutes, every critical target in Kuwait City would be splattered with non-persistent agents, while a veritable firestorm of SCUD rockets struck US pre-positioned equipment and obliterated the Kuwaiti ADA and C2 sites pinpointed by Serouf's excellent reconnaissance men. The harbor to Kuwait City would be seeded with thousands of mines. Saddam would jam US navigation satellites and implant viruses into Pentagon computers as his most powerful forces sped toward Kuwait City.

Serouf nodded as his nearest team leader gave him the "all go" signal. He heard the first chemical round smash into the Kuwaiti ADA battery three-quarters of a kilometer
from his position. In a matter of hours, Serouf mused, Saddam would own Kuwait—well before any appreciable US response could be mounted.

*****

Local Time: 0800, 30 August 1999, at the National Security Council meeting in the White House, Washington, D.C.

General McCullough's aide swept quickly into the White House Situation Room and handed him yet another report of the grim situation in South Korea. The nervous chatter of the NSC participants ceased as he focused on the latest SITREP.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff hoped that this report would be more expansive than the garbled and confusing information received by the Pentagon over the last hour. The International Dateline and unusual satellite communications problems frustrated attempts at a clear picture of the action. There was little doubt that the entire complexion of the Korean Peninsula had been changed.

It must have been just like this for the Truman administration at the outset of the Korean War in June 1950
thought General McCullough as he analyzed the new information.

This message was from Admiral Howard, CINC PACOM, whose headquarters somehow received a cryptic report from an unidentified staff officer in USFK HQ. Sometime just before dawn, US and Korean forces along the DMZ had been completely routed by well-choreographed night, combined arms infiltration attacks. Survivors were streaming southward in a headlong rush toward Pusan.

Seoul was firmly in the hands of the NKPA. North Korean troops were nearly invisible inside the urban sprawl, and had direct control of the power grid and all governmental service complexes. Hundreds of thousands of refugees clogged every conceivable route of counterattack from Pusan to Seoul. Pusan was devastated by rocket and chemical attacks, the harbor now littered with twisted wreckage of moored vessels.

Headquarters, US Forces Korea, 8th US Army, and 2ID had taken multiple hits from ICBMs and were out of action. SCUD missiles loaded with chemical warheads had hit virtually every South Korean airfield and port. On top of that, the USS Eisenhower had been hit by Exocet missiles and was steaming over the horizon to safety.
The situation was deteriorating at a rapid rate. It was a complete strategic surprise, thought McCullough, not unlike what he experienced as a freshly minted 2LT during the Tet Offensive in Vietnam.

General McCullough and the service chiefs stood when Vice President Bruner strode into the room. Bruner waved them to their seats as the President's voice boomed over a secure speaker-phone.

"OK, Don, give me the low-down; what the hell is going on over there? Give me the facts; it will be at least another six hours before we get home from this African boondoggle! How bad is it, and what can we do about it? What are Russia, China, and Japan doing right now? How badly are we screwed?"

The Vice President shifted uneasily in his seat while the entire National Security Council waited for his reply. Secretary of Defense Williamson came to his rescue.

"Mr. President, this is the worst situation we've seen since Vietnam. We've been completely surprised—this is worse than the Korean War in 1950 because the NKPA have a stranglehold on Seoul. We've taken tremendous casualties, lost our command and control, and don't even have an air or sea port of entry to bring in reinforcements!"
The Vice President cleared his throat. "The SECDEF is right, Sir. We are at risk of losing Korea. All of Asia, not to mention the rest of the world, is waiting to see how we deal with this aggression. The UN Security Council is up and running, but I don't know what they think they can do...this could be World War III."

"Let me give it to you bottom line, Mr. President," said General McCullough as he interrupted the Vice President.

"Our options are limited, but...we can't allow ourselves to be kicked out of Korea. Our 'Two MRC' military strategy-then our 'two MTW' strategy- stipulated we could at least hold our own in Korea, along the DMZ, until we rushed additional forces into theatre. But we never envisioned a surprise attack-We thought forward presence and our technological advantage would give us advance warning."

"Hell, Sir, our fighter and bomber aircraft are running into extremely sophisticated NKPA ADA, and we can't touch Seoul right now because of the civilians. The nearest Carrier Battle Group and Amphibious Ready Group are at least 36 hours out in the Pacific Ocean. We can't even get the 82d Airborne Division Ready Brigade in to take down an airfield for another 48 hours, and that's our quickest
plausible ground reinforcements of any magnitude. And that is going to be an operation as risky as Normandy, or Inchon."

"Even after we get in country with sufficient force to push back the main NKPA elements, liberating Seoul is going to be an enormous problem. A city that size would swallow the entire XVIII Airborne Corps!"

"This is going to be an uphill fight, Mr. President. We are going to have to fight a protracted war in that country, and we'll need..." McCullough's voice trailed off as he read the latest message handed to him by his aide.

"What is it, Rob?" intoned the President as he recognized his senior military leader had stopped in mid-sentence.

"Sir, I have even worse news now," said McCullough as he passed the latest flash message to the SECDEF.

"Remember what I said about our 'Two MTW' strategy? Well, we've just got our second major theatre of war. I've just received an urgent report from CINCCENTCOM-Iraq has seized Kuwait City. I don't know how we'll get there from here—we've got two large-scale urban operations staring us in the face."

*****
Chapter Two

NEW GAME IN TOWN: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS AND
JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS—AN UNAVOIDABLE SITUATION IN THE
NEAR FUTURE?

The airfields and ports upon which we depend for force
projection are located almost exclusively in urban areas.
Should the enemy wish to deny us the facilities for force
projection, he could seize and defend the urban area in
which they are located and force us to conduct an opposed
entry into the urban area. One need only consider the
impact of the Iraqi Army seizing and defending the port
complex at Al Jubail, Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert
Shield to recognize the potentially decisive consequences
of such actions.

MAJ Frank R. Boynton, USMC

Introduction

The US military is a CONUS-based, power projection
force. The bulk of the US force projection land power is
located stateside. By the turn of the century, 93% of Army
units will be located in CONUS.\(^2\) Future military
operations will require the projection of this land power
from CONUS to threatened areas of operations.

Force Projection Operations are the purest form of
joint operations. No contingency deployment operation can
be mounted without the simultaneous application of all
service component capabilities to control the battle space, seize critical entry points and facilities, and sustain military operations in theatre.

The projection of force from CONUS to an area of operations anywhere in the world requires airports and seaports for entry into the theatre and the flow of follow on forces and logistics necessary to conclude the mission. Strategic entry into theatre-forced entry or unopposed entry-requires control of Air and Sea Ports of Debarkation (APOD/SPOD).

The airfields and seaports required for power projection are almost exclusively located in urban areas. The rapidly increasing global urbanization nearly guarantees joint power projection operations into theatres where large cities incorporating APOD/SPOD are political and economic centers of gravity.

US joint task forces deploying to conduct forced entry or unopposed entry to seize/secure air and sea ports must immediately establish and maintain control of these metropolitan areas in order to achieve a secure environment for the continued flow of units, supplies, and equipment into theatre. The preponderance of follow-on troops, supplies and equipment will be transported in extremely vulnerable commercial cargo ships and CRAF airliners whose
interdiction would seriously jeopardize the entire joint operation.

Force projection operations means units, supplies, and equipment will deploy to a given theatre using a combination of airlift and sealift. Airlift will bring personnel into theatre, while sealift will deliver heavy equipment and sustainment packages. (For example, 95% of the heavy equipment for Operation Desert Shield/Storm arrived in-theatre by transport vessels, while over 5000 sorties of military and CRAF airlift delivered personnel and palletized supplies).\(^3\) The common denominator of both types of transport is that a secure arrival infrastructure must exist to offload in-bound troops and materiel. Security of the arrival areas is paramount since both types of entry platforms are extremely vulnerable to interdiction during the approach and off-load stages.

It is the requirement for a combination of existing international-caliber airports and seaports in a specific theatre of operation which dramatically reduces the options for force projection entry sites. An examination of theatre arrival facilities in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southwest Asia is instructive. Kenya has only one seaport and airport combination suitable to receive power projection platforms. Somalia has two sea/airport facilities. Saudi Arabia has

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just three air/sea combinations, and the United Arab Emirates has just three ship facilities and associated airports. Consequently, there are few options for planners for establishing force projection reception facilities in order to accommodate the flow of US forces.

Additionally, each of the sea and air port combinations listed above is incorporated (naturally) within a major national urban center. These port cities are a result of the amazing growth in urban sprawl around the world, and are home to large populations and an intricate web of businesses, governmental agencies, and metropolitan service and support industries. Seoul, Korea and Pusan, Korea are two other significant examples of cities surrounding international-level arrival facilities.

Logically, control and maintenance of the transportation grid emanating from the sea and air ports—through the urban areas to inland assembly areas—is vital to the secure, uninterrupted forward progression of force projection elements into the theatre of operations. This is a major operational undertaking.

It follows, then, that in order to control the SPOD/APOD facilities and the connected transportation network through an urban center, US forces must take steps to secure the urban site. Since the introduction of power
projection elements into theatre is by its very nature a joint operation, it must then fall to joint operations planners to devise feasible, viable, and acceptable methods with which to off-set the vulnerability of the force during arrival and delivery.

Securing the APOD/SPOD amidst urban areas is executed through forced entry operations or unopposed entry operations. In either case, sufficient joint combat power must initially deploy to accomplish the security mission and maintain control as follow-on forces conduct movement into and through the urban area.

**Statement of the Problem**

The objective of this research project is to conduct a critical analysis of multiple, complex issues relating to Joint Power Projection Operations and Joint Urban Operations. This monograph facilitates an in-depth investigation of the thesis question:

How will the US Military conduct Power Projection Operations to a Major Theatre of War, consistent with National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy, where forces must immediately engage in Joint Urban Operations in a large metropolitan site which controls the only feasible air and sea points of entry into the Area of Operation?
The fundamental intent of this study is to conduct a balanced scrutiny of the hypothesis that joint power projection and joint urban operations are unavoidably linked due to global metropolitan sprawl. However, Joint Vision 2010 fails to account for the urban problem and there is no existing joint doctrine addressing strategic forced entry/urban operations. This study will canvass a full spectrum of the problem, beginning with recent strategic thought and historical underpinnings and concluding with recommendations for new doctrine and joint training.

This inquiry is primarily designed to propose a viable and feasible "transformational stage" joint doctrine which suggests how successful joint power projection/urban operations would be conducted if the "alert notification" was received in the near term (1999-2005), not in the year 2010. One corollary product of this study is to identify flaws in the existing JV 2010 concept of joint power projection and urban operations.

**Methodology**

The study will be accomplished by first dividing the research effort into four distinct "groups" in order to "battle focus" the investigation. Group One is the introductory scenario, statement of the thesis problem, and
discussion of the operational and strategic nature of urban warfare (Chapters One, Two, Three, and Four). Group Two is the "Literature Review," or assessment of existing publications and journal articles on power projection and urban operations (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven). Group Three is the "Historical Analysis," or comparative review of selected urban operations case studies (Chapters Eight and Nine). Group Four is the "Doctrine Review," and examines current joint doctrine on power projection and urban operations, leading to the "Summary of Findings" (Chapter Ten), offering conclusions and recommendations for further study.
Chapter Three

THE THREE-BLOCK WAR: THE OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE OF CITIES

"When Marines deploy into urban areas today and in the future, they will need the flexibility to address a wide variety of crises. In one city block, a Marine will provide food, care, and comfort for an emaciated child. In the next block, you will see this Marine with outstretched arms, separating two warring tribes. Then, in the third city block, this same Marine will engage in intense house-to-house fighting with hostile forces."

General C.C. Krulak, USMC

Throughout history, military planners have viewed cities as centers of gravity. Cities are national population focal points, transportation hubs, seats of government, centers of commerce, industry, finance, communication, culture, and history. Military leaders have traditionally viewed urban areas as strategic high-value objectives to be held or critical targets to be taken from enemies. Occupation of a major urban area usually enabled commanders to achieve dominance of the power and resources of a country and decisively determined the outcome of a conflict.

Urban areas often occupy key terrain, enhancing their value as military objectives. Around the globe, cities
developed to exploit or defend valuable geographical chokepoints. Many of today's most modern cities were initially established to dominate land and sea lines of communication. As these cities matured and prospered, their populations and urban areas grew accordingly.

**The Metropolis as a "System of Systems"**

Contemporary military commanders must deal with an urban environment that goes beyond political symbolism and geo-strategic key terrain. Commanders and planners must recognize large metropolitan areas as "a system of systems." The systems within an urban area include its physical composition, supporting utilities and services, and complex social and cultural factors. Each of these elements has direct impact on any joint operations conducted in the urban area. The operational commander and his planners must recognize and comprehend the web of interrelated functions of these systems if success is going to be achieved in joint urban operations.

The operational commander is faced with a two-fold problem in an urban warfare scenario. He must execute operations to remove the hostile threat in the city while simultaneously maintaining a "state of normalcy" for the non-combatants. Contrary to past urban operations, this means conducting "constrained urban warfare."
The operational commander must understand that he may face multiple "adversaries" during an urban operation. Besides the enemy as the premier adversary, other antagonists include collapse of critical life support infrastructure, civil disturbance, disease, famine, or natural disaster. These may occur simultaneous with combat operations to evict the enemy. This "three block war" will require a synchronized approach to these complex threats. Normalcy must be quickly achieved for the inhabitants before the infrastructure problems become distracters and subvert the main effort of defeating the enemy.

**Legitimacy and Normalcy as Endstates**

The actions designed to achieve normalcy for non-combatants and sustain urban infrastructure services must be synchronized with the on-going combat operations. The immediate outcome of these actions within the city is to achieve legitimacy for US military operations in the urban area. Legitimacy is vital to operational and strategic success and is facilitated by the direct interaction of US forces with the civilian populace. By performing life support sustainment tasks, US forces are gaining acceptance by the people or, in the vernacular of the Vietnam War, "winning their hearts and minds."
The simplest approach to winning their hearts and minds is to address the concept of operations in respect to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. The inhabitants of a city are there in the first place because their "lower" basic needs of food, shelter, and safety are fulfilled in the urban environment. Normalcy and legitimacy may be rapidly achieved as US forces work to improve living conditions, utilities, and medical treatment. Security concerns are assuaged as law enforcement activities are reinstated.

To relieve the inevitable tensions associated with combat operations, the needs for information are met with the resurgence of radio, television, and print media services. Finally, activities designed to concentrate on cultural, historic, and religious norms of the society facilitate the accomplishment of the legitimacy task.9

**Battlefield of the 21st Century: Littoral Urban Areas**

Statistics readily support the phenomena known as global urbanization. According to United Nations estimates, the urban population of developing countries increases by about 150,000 per day. At this rate, three-fifths of the world's population will live in urban areas by the year 2015.10 In Asia, there are seventeen major cities with over eight million inhabitants. In the Americas, both Mexico City and Sao Paulo are home to over
eight million people, a population explosion that occurred over the last 25 years.\textsuperscript{11}

The growth of urban areas has literally transformed the face of continents.\textsuperscript{12} Urban expansion in Europe, for example, has created interconnected "patches" of metropolitan sprawl over what had previously been open terrain. Among the Persian Gulf countries, unprecedented population growth has spawned new cities. Recent studies point out that the foremost expansions have occurred in littoral urban areas, historic cities centered around traditional resources and sea lines of communication.\textsuperscript{13}

From the strategic force projection viewpoint, the most important facet of this dynamic increase in large-scale urban centers is the growth of littoral metropolitan sites. In nearly every conceivable conflict scenario, the littoral metropolitan centers of any prospective threatened region are capital cities that dominate the strategic air and seaports necessary for the US power projection platforms. The battlefield of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century will be the site of these littoral "agglomerations."\textsuperscript{14}

Three hundred of the fastest growing cities in the world are traditional port cities with over one million inhabitants. These littoral centers account for 70\% of the world's population, house 80\% of the international
governmental bodies, and over 70% of the planet's nuclear power plants provide power generation for these cities and their suburbs.\textsuperscript{15}

In many countries around the world, these large-scale littoral urban centers are national capitals. Best described as "city-states," control of the capital city is universally seen as control of the country.\textsuperscript{16} Naturally, these national capitals attract political tension, upheaval, and unrest. Key port and capital cities like Beirut, Manila, and Panama City dominate their countries and are the focal point of US interests in the region. US interventions in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century in the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Haiti focused on achieving dominance over the respective governmental centers.\textsuperscript{17} As one writer has so cogently stated, "if trouble is going to happen in a Third World country, it is going to happen in the capital city. If the government changes hands, it doesn't change hands in the bushes."\textsuperscript{18}

Just within the last ten years, US forces have conducted operations in major littoral cities. Interestingly, these past operations provide a glimpse at the spectrum of "three block war" activities. Offensive operations were conducted in Panama City in 1989 and Kuwait City in 1990. Civil Support operations took place in Los
Angeles in 1992. Humanitarian assistance missions occurred in Mogadishu in 1993, with Peace Building operations the focus for US military involvement in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 1994. In all of these missions, US joint task force commanders made deliberate, fundamental decisions to mitigate against collateral damage to civilians in spite of the aggressive nature of the response to the threat at hand.\textsuperscript{19}

"The prospect of US forces operating in urban areas is likely to increase should US national interests continue to dictate that US forces conduct exercises/operations in regions of high urbanization."\textsuperscript{20} It is more than a fair argument to stipulate that we are there now. What is essential is that joint task force commanders headed for the next foray into urban terrain understand the nature of the environment they are about to enter.

**The Large-Scale Urban Environment**

First and foremost, what distinguishes metropolitan environments from other operational situations is the presence of non-combatants. But from the perspective of the joint task force commander, non-combatants are just one segment of the dynamic urban "organism." The people of a city are certainly the nucleus of the organism, but the urban center is composed of a series of interrelated
systems (systems of streets, buildings, administrative locations, communication sites, law enforcement elements, cultural locations, transportation hubs, etc.) which are the life support of the inhabitants. Damage to any one of the interconnected subsystems may cause unintended collateral damage to an adjacent subsystem.

Just as firing a cruise missile into one building among many on a densely packed city precinct, "spill-over" damage is going to be inflicted on other structures in the proximity of the attack. Ideally, what joint task force commanders must be able to accomplish is analogous to the demolition of an old warehouse between two high-rise offices—detonation and destruction accomplished without a pane of glass broken next door.

Any approach to joint urban operations must be built on a foundation that considers the impact of non-combatants and infrastructure on military operations, and vice versa. The Joint Task Force commander must view joint urban operations with the philosophy that views the city as a living entity rather than a battleground to be obliterated. The World War II days of unconstrained destruction of urban areas is over; the military operation must be designed to maintain the viability of the city and protect the inhabitants as much as possible.
Anatomy of the City

The functions of a city are similar to those of the human body. The urban infrastructure is the "skeletal-muscular system," the urban utilities are the "organs," and the urban social factors are the "nervous system."21

The transportation network of the urban area is vital to the "pulse" of the city and the JTF commander must control the transportation nodes. Control of the transportation network facilitates the movement of military supplies and the routine logistics supporting the inhabitants of the city (heating oil, food, medical supplies, etc.). Domination of the transportation hubs enables the JTF commander to minimize hardships on non-combatants while insuring freedom of movement of his own forces within the urban area.

The public utilities of an urban area, the functioning organs of the city, are obviously essential in peacetime, but during adverse or emergency situations, erratic power, light, sewage, and water support has a direct negative affect on the population. Consider the attitude of the inhabitants of many New York City boroughs when the garbage men go on strike. The direct interconnection to health concerns makes maintenance of utilities a top priority.
For the JTF commander, control of the utilities, and of medical services, must be accomplished as soon as possible.

The social factors of a metropolitan area, the nervous system of the population, can be the most important center of gravity to be considered during joint urban operations. At the same time, assessing the fruits of one's labors concerning cultural nuances of the city, recognition of the city's historic treasures, subtleties of religious influence, and the vagaries of local, provincial, and national governmental activities is arguably the most difficult aspect of the JTF commander's approach to urban warfare.

The city must be seen as a home, a place of business, a source of sustainment, a seat of government, a town square, a church center, a commercial area. This places the JTF commander in the position to act as a surgeon: his operational campaign must cut away the cancer without killing the patient. To continue the analogy, the JTF "surgeon" must attend to other patients at the same time he is conducting surgery. Not unlike a general practitioner or family doctor, the aches and pains of the less-critically injured must be attended to as well. Intervention strategies are employed to avoid further complications. The JTF commander must see to all of his
patients in his "round." Baby delivered in one room, inoculation in the next, dying patient in another, surgery to save a life in the last.

**Simultaneous Application of Complimentary Capabilities**

The unique challenge to the JTF commander is to be able to conduct actions *simultaneously*, not sequentially. The JTF commander must identify and take immediate steps to control "less traditional" centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities such as power grids, water supplies, media centers, and transportation networks. Focused psychological operations acknowledge cultural, historic, and religious influences and address noncombatants to influence their behavior and minimize their presence. The JTF commander must integrate and synchronize the simultaneous execution of these various operations in the presence of numbers of noncombatants larger than the joint military forces present.

Traditionally, battles for cities were fought as combat actions first, followed by civil affairs and combat service support after the fighting had concluded. This occurred since metropolitan centers of gravity could not be secured without direct combat action. Enemy forces usually beat the attacker to the punch and occupied key sites in the city and held fast as the attacker lavishly expended

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resources in order to seize essential facilities. In the process, nearly as many civilians as combatants became casualties, and cities became enormous piles of brick rubble.

The Joint Task Force Commander today must protect the infrastructure of the city and safeguard the inhabitants in every type of operation. Whether humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, combat, or the most likely combination of all three, the JTF commander must achieve legitimacy for the involvement of US forces and make the inhabitants of the city, and their service industries, combat multipliers for his own purposes. Callous treatment of innocent bystanders or carelessness in acknowledging important historic, religious, or cultural icons can jeopardize the accomplishment of the entire mission.

The media coverage of the operations of the JTF units in the urban area may unhinge the entire campaign unless the JTF commander is aggressive in establishing a practicable and forthright information warfare campaign plan. The genesis of any information operation, of which television and radio news reports are just a small portion, must begin well before any deployment of forces to the threatened region. In this way the JTF commander shapes
the battlespace and sets the psychological conditions for the insertion of his forces into the urban area.

Getting There

The challenge for the JTF commander is to determine timing and force structure requirements respective of the nature of the urban environment confronting him. He must apply combat power and resources to oust the enemy and safeguard the infrastructure.

The operational commander faced with the complexities of joint power projection and joint urban warfare has little doctrinal guidance to refer to. The next chapters review the state of existing strategy, doctrine and literature on joint power projection and joint urban warfare.
Chapter Four

Denying the Widow-Maker: Is There a Strategy for Joint Power Projection and Joint Urban Operations?

"An urbanizing world means combat in cities, whether we like it or not...We do not want to touch this problem. But we have no choice. The problem is already touching us, with skeletal, infected fingers. The US military must stop preparing for its dream war and get down to the reality of the fractured and ugly world in which we live—a world that lives in cities. We must begin judicious restructuring for urban combat...we must seize the future before the future seizes us."

LTC (RET) Ralph Peters

Current defense strategy proposes that US military forces should be capable of fighting two major theatre wars at almost the same time. This ability to respond to significant operational military contingencies is viewed as "the keystone of American defense policy." Central to this response strategy is the ability of the US to project military power around the globe to threatened theatres.

According to Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, it is imperative that the US military "be able to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant regions," and in "dense urban areas," in order to fulfill America's role as a global superpower. The SECDEF contends that US prestige, standing, and leadership in the global community would fall into serious question if the American
military were to demonstrate it was incapable of fighting and winning simultaneous theatre wars.⁶

But how would the United States really respond to concurrent regional crises where operations in large-scale urban areas are required? Does the strategy articulated in the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review address the probability that expanding global urbanization will dictate future deployments which deal directly with the major cities in a threatened region? Can the US military actually execute strategic force deployment into operational-level joint urban operations? Can the US project military power rapidly enough to achieve decisive victory in one, let alone two large-scale urban operations scenarios? Is there enough force and time?

The fictional scenario seen in the first part of this paper was intended to give a flavor of the omission in current defense strategy concerning the connection between strategic power projection and joint urban operations. Knowledgeable observers maintain that our "ways, means and ends" do not factor in the probability of major urban operations implied in this strategy.⁷ More importantly, current strategy completely neglects discussion of "how we get there from here."
The remainder of this chapter will determine if a strategy exists for the US military to realistically execute joint power projection and joint urban operations.

**President's National Security Strategy: The Imperative of Engagement**

The central phrase of the National Security Strategy is the "Imperative of Engagement." The engagement concept is based on the fundamental assumptions that the US will remain politically and militarily engaged in the world over the next twenty years and will have no peer in military power.8

The NSS establishes that the "US will remain engaged abroad while supporting efforts to enlarge the community of secure, free-market, and democratic nations and create new partners in peace and prosperity."9 This strategy also emphasizes that coalition operations are essential to securing basic US national goals, protecting and promoting US interests, and creating preferred international conditions.10

The price of continued global leadership is that the US must maintain ready and versatile forces capable of conducting a variety of military operations—from deterrence and defeating large-scale aggression, to participating in
smaller-scale contingencies, to dealing with asymmetric threats like terrorism and urban warfare.\textsuperscript{11}

**The Defense Strategy: Major Theatre Wars**

To support the National Security Strategy, the Defense Strategy focuses on three requirements: *shape* the international security environment in ways favorable to US interests, *respond* to the full spectrum of crises when directed, and *prepare* to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. The backstop of this defense strategy is the ability of the US military to respond to crises when "the Department's best efforts to shape the international environment" have been ineffective.\textsuperscript{12}

The most stressing requirement for the US military is fighting and winning major theatre wars.\textsuperscript{13} The Defense Strategy calls for a US military arm that must be capable of overmatching any potential adversary, in the midst of "highly dynamic and uncertain" situations, even after possibly experiencing a sequential ascent through deterrence actions or small-scale contingency operations. This strategy does not stipulate the possibilities of executing operations in a large-scale littoral metropolis, a virtual certainty in any of the theatres of engagement.\textsuperscript{14}
The QDR-mandated Defense Strategy proposes that the US is capable of fighting and winning two regional wars at almost the same time. Examples of plausible threat scenarios are specifically defined as the challenges currently experienced in Korea and in the Persian Gulf. As the NDP points out, our strategy is centered around the "belief that the ability to fight more than one major war at a time deters an enemy from seeking to take advantage of the opportunity to strike while the US is preoccupied in another theatre."\textsuperscript{15}

The National Defense University "Strategic Assessment 1998" further explicates the Administration vision of the MTW scenario by outlining phases of combat in both the Gulf and Korean theatres of war. It is instructive to note that in both cases, the antagonists are able to conduct surprise attacks involving major urban areas and retain the operational initiative as the US un-coils its response mechanism.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{We Can't Get There From Here...}

In his Strategic Studies Institute monograph, "The Creeping Irrelevance of US Force Planning," Jeffrey Record seconds COL Harry Summers' thinly veiled emotionalism when he quotes Summers' observation that the "two wars nonsense is a continuation of the two-and-a-half and one-and-a-half
fandangos of the Cold War." Record then adds Summers' conclusion that by "claiming to do what in fact it is unable to do, the United States is not only bluffing—a most dangerous thing to do—but even worse, is kidding itself into a false sense of security."17

The false sense of security is not just about force structure. As the fictitious introduction was intended to portray, time and space considerations involved in moving large US contingency forces over great distances are largely ignored in the crisis response strategy. Similarly, within the current strategy, there is no explanation of the connection between strategic force projection from CONUS into a theatre dominated by a large-scale urban littoral area. How a substantial joint force gets rapidly into theatre, and then engages in joint urban operations, is left unsaid. The outcome of both campaigns literally hinges on the ability of the US forces to rapidly deploy in sufficient strength, with the appropriate mix of military capabilities, and converge on the scene.

What strategy would be implemented if downtown Seoul were seized by NKPA infiltrators in an attack similar to the opening scenario of this monograph? US forces in Korea, for example, would be fighting a difficult retrograde operation, desperately attempting to save Seoul while
delaying a numerically superior enemy from hammering its way down the length of the Korean peninsula before any US reinforcements could arrive.

A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) afloat off the coast of South Korea would be the nearest ground reinforcements. Depending on the distance to the operational area, this regimental-size combat force, conducting "operational maneuver from the sea," could make an immediate impact, seizing key terrain, conducting raids, and executing non-combatant evacuation operations.

82d Airborne Division Ready Brigade reinforcements would then be the first available strategic response forces capable of arriving in theatre no earlier than thirty six hours after the alert notification. The thirty six hours includes an eighteen-hour deployment sequence followed by approximately another eighteen hours of travel time from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. The Ready Brigade consists of three parachute infantry battalions with minimal artillery support and no organic armored elements. To move this package requires over sixty C-141 equivalent airframes, and this is just for one brigade.

To bring in the normally associated 1st Infantry Division Initial Ready Company of two M1 Abrams and two M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle platoons requires another twelve
sorties of C-17s. To insure the subsequent arrival of the IRC, the lead elements of the DRB must conduct a parachute assault to seize an existing international airfield to accommodate the C-17s loaded with tanks (C-17s cannot land on dirt airstrips as advertised). And this entire operation would be in immediate jeopardy if C-17-capable airfields were destroyed or heavily saturated with ADA by a thinking adversary.

Rapid reinforcement to the Persian Gulf follows the same approach. If Iraqi forces seize Kuwait City in advance of coalition force reaction, a major littoral urban operation will be required. Again, if an Amphibious Ready Group is not in proximity, the first available reinforcements are paratroopers, not armored forces. If combat occurs in Korea before Kuwait, the tenuous airlift capability of the US would be strained to the breaking point.

It should be abundantly clear that the US Defense Strategy touting the capability of the armed forces to engage in two major theatre wars has left a lot unsaid. The "ways" and "means" cannot realistically achieve the "ends." In spite of all intelligence data and country studies to the contrary, it is difficult to uncover any substantive articulation of Seoul-sized urban operations,
or how our reinforcement strategy intends to secure major
urban centers like Kuwait City before attack by an
adversary.

The reactive approach to nearly simultaneous major
theatre war surrenders not only space and time, it concedes
strategic and operational initiative-essential to
successful strategic power projection operations, and also
the pre-eminent underpinning of the MTW concept.¹⁹

If we can't get there from here, what do we do?

A revised Defense Strategy must make the correct
"strategical combinations" to solve the questions of space
and time. Revised joint force organizations are
imperative, as is new doctrine making the linkage between
joint power projection and joint urban operations. New
doctrine is required to address the specific strategic and
operational tasks for joint force projection and joint
urban operations, but there is little evidence of work
going on in the field.

The next chapters will review the influences behind
the resurgence of intellectual debate about the correct
"strategical combinations" for joint power projection and
joint urban operations in the near future.
Chapter Five

LURKING IN THE SHADOWS—THE INFLUENCE OF DR. RUSSELL GLENN ON FUTURE LARGE-SCALE URBAN OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

Few of today's military servicemen and women would argue against the value of history as a teacher. It is a lighthouse that helps to guide the soldier, sailor, marine, and airman in preparing for the future...illuminating yet not fully defining what is real and what is shadow. The military man or woman has to constantly complement these imperfect views with an assessment of present capabilities and future challenges so as to understand the relevance of previous events and be ready for coming operations. The United States military generally does this act of balancing well, but in the case of urban warfare it seems to be overlooking the lessons of history, current readiness shortfalls, and a future that offers not the potential but the assurance of both international and domestic urban operations.

Dr. Russell Glenn, "Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat—A Status Check"

In the course of the review of existing literature on the subject of future urban operations, Russell Glenn stands out as one of very small group of writers producing studies aimed at alerting US officials to shortfalls in the readiness of military forces to engage in 21st Century urban operations. Within the last five years, Glenn published two monographs analyzing urban operations capabilities of US armed forces, making him a recognized figure in the
burgeoning academic debate over future military operations in urban terrain.

Glenn's initial publication, "Combat in Hell: A Consideration of Constrained Urban Warfare," came about as part of the completion of his RAND-Arroyo Fellowship in the 1994. The objectives of this document were:

(1) describe the conditions a ground force would confront during urban combat when constrained by requirements to minimize noncombatant casualties and collateral damage;
(2) provide an overview of current US armed forces capabilities to undertake such missions;
(3) determine current shortfalls in doctrine, training, and equipment and present potential solutions for the same. ²

Glenn maintains that it is the political constraints concerning operations in urban terrain that will have the most serious mitigating effect on US military forces. These limitations will occur because of the attendant American public and moral concerns about the costs of war borne by noncombatants. ³ Bracketed by these governing factors, US military forces will face challenges in urban operations that current doctrine, training, and organization have left them ill-prepared to handle. ⁴

"Historical and much of modern advice is consistent," writes Glenn: "avoid urban warfare if at all possible." Yet, he contends, the guidance that sufficed for military commanders from Sun Tzu to Norman Schwartzkopf is no longer
valid. Increasing global urbanization makes cities the central hubs for influence and control of a country. World demographics ensure that lucrative urban targets will become future battlegrounds.⁵

According to Glenn, the US military is not ready to deal with this problem. The Army's keystone urban warfare doctrine still reflects World War II tactics generally outmoded for constrained environments of the future.⁶ Changes to doctrine, training, and technologies are imperative for systemically improving the capabilities of US forces to operate effectively in the concrete jungles of the future.⁷

Yet the comfort zone of tactical level operations works like a magnet to draw current theorists away from the more difficult issues of operational actions in urban terrain. Even though he postulates the real problem is how to conduct large-scale, constrained urban operations, the thrust of Glenn's study is on urban combat at the tactical level.

Glenn's methodology for his study in "Combat in Hell" reinforces this regression to tactical focus. He conducted over one hundred interviews with veterans of tactical urban operations in Vietnam, Panama, Northern Ireland, and Somalia in an effort to determine how future US forces can
execute contingency missions when damage, casualty, and political limitations directly influence the tactical course of action on the ground.

Glenn cites the "large-scale urban operations" in the battle for Hue in 1968 and in the fighting in Mogadishu in 1993 as harbingers of the future as potential adversaries seek a fight in the cities to negate US technological superiority. He concludes that Hue and Mogadishu are examples of how the tactical results of urban operations can precipitate a drastic US strategic shift toward disengagement or withdrawal from the theatre.⁸

Glenn's argument is the US military has never had to conduct large-scale constrained urban operations in the past, and is unprepared to do so now.⁹ The fight for Hue was a large-scale unconstrained urban operation along the World War II doctrinal model; Mogadishu was an instance of a greatly constrained urban operation, where doctrine and capability were seriously lacking.¹⁰

Glenn proposes that the US will have to execute large-scale constrained urban operations in the future because the tactical results will carry a huge operational and strategic payload. The new reality he describes is this: international and domestic political pressures and, consequently, strategic and operational commanders'
interpretation of those pressures will dictate steps must be taken to minimize subsidiary effects of combat. These steps could take precedence over accomplishment of traditional military missions.\textsuperscript{11}

This seemingly inverse argument that tactics is more critical than operational actions may be the reason behind the Army's doctrinal fixation on tactical considerations in urban operations. He states "while tactical training is limited, preparation for urban operations at the operational level is nearly nonexistent."\textsuperscript{12} Similarly, the role of joint forces in an operational level urban campaign is rarely mentioned.\textsuperscript{13}

"There is little doctrinal guidance for the commander confronted with the need to seize a large city," he writes, "either as an action in and of itself or as part of a larger campaign."\textsuperscript{14} And this campaign may never get off the ground if the airfields and ports located in metropolitan areas are denied to US entry forces.\textsuperscript{15} "History is littered with dead soldiers whose commanders undertook such fighting ill-prepared to do so," warns Glenn, though the efforts to address the known deficiencies has had little impetus.\textsuperscript{16}

but orients more on the need for revised *tactical* doctrine for urban operations. The crux of this RAND-Arroyo Fellowship paper lies in Glenn taking the US Army to task for not revamping its nearly 20 year old urban operations doctrine.

Glenn cites the findings of the 1994 Defense Science Board's Task Force on Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) as a clear indictment of the Army's reluctance to address the question of future urban warfare:

"Our current MOUT capability was developed in large part for a massive, rural war in Central Europe. Since the future looks much different, new capabilities will need to be developed. To do less risks highly visible casualties and a corresponding loss of military credibility and national prestige."

During the intervening five years since the publication of "Combat in Hell," Glenn had the opportunity to influence renewed academic interest in the subject of future urban warfare. During his tenure as an Advanced Operational Studies Fellow at the Army's School for Advanced Military Studies at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas from 1994-95, Glenn served as monograph director and advisor to a number of SAMS students completing research on urban operations. These research projects are notable because they constitute the bulk of the unpublished literature on the subject of future urban operations. Unfortunately,
these papers generally avoid discussion of the relationship of operational actions with the urban problem—a clear sign of Glenn's tactical focus. ¹⁹

The closest Glenn gets to actually detailing any specifics of joint urban operations doctrine is found in "Marching Under Darkening Skies." His recommendation of "service and joint exercises in urban areas of various sizes and character" is on the mark, but is weakened by his failure to provide follow-up suggestions in the context of the large-scale constrained urban operations he writes about in both monographs. ²⁰

Why Russell Glenn never achieves closure on the subject of joint urban operations remains a mystery. In both of his monographs he routinely cites strong rationale for urban warfare doctrine at the operational level. Yet in both documents he seemingly leaves the development of the joint urban operations doctrine to others. He sees the need to address the US Army's shortfalls in combined arms MOUT operations as greater than dealing with his own argument that it is the large-scale constrained urban operations issue we are inexorably marching toward.

An analysis of both of his publications suggests that Glenn's emphasis on tactical concerns is indicative of a notion that future urban operations are really the domain
of the US Army. There is a hint of the attitude the
Marines may have the doctrinal head start but, in reality,
don't have the operational staying power anymore to deal
with urban warfare in cities the size of Hue. Therefore,
since the Army is big enough and can employ new combined
arms approaches, unilateral Army missions are the solution
for these large-scale urban operations.

This interpretation is reinforced by the absence of
investigation by Glenn, in either of his monographs, of
large urban littoral centers. Aside from an inference that
these national centers of gravity must be dealt with, and
that joint forces have capabilities which must be explored,
Glenn unfortunately never sees a need to delve into the
particulars of how the US military should have gone into
Mogadishu.

Even after citing the Marine Corps for its leadership
in MOUT doctrine development, Glenn still points out that
the American military as a whole is moving too slowly
toward readiness in the conduct of MOUT.

Efforts to redress the problem lack the combined arms,
joint, and multi-national robustness essential to success
during future urban operations, especially those
constrained by stringent rules of engagement and the
presence of large numbers of noncombatants. MOUT training
suffers from this lack of effective doctrine and the
failure to emphasize urban operations.21
It would seem, then, that one of the major proponents of revised urban warfare doctrine is captured in the same trap as the US Army doctrine writers he is trying to motivate. Both of Glenn's publications offer great recommendations for improving training and doctrine, but consistently miss the opportunity to examine the problem above the street level.

Perhaps he has been blinded by the arc of illumination from the lighthouse he mentions, and that the sweeping light has passed over the surface, casting his path in darkness. The future challenge of large-scale constrained joint urban operations still lurks in the shadows.
Chapter Six

UNAVOIDABLE COMBINATION: JOINT FORCE PROJECTION AND JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS—START POINT FOR FUTURE STUDY

Future US military operations will demand the projection of power from CONUS to world-wide areas of operation...should an adversary wish to contend our force projection operation...deny us the facilities...the airfields and ports...upon which we depend...he could seize and defend the urban area in which they are located and force us to conduct an opposed entry into the urban area.

MAJ Frank R. Boynton, USMC, "Power Projection Operations and Urban Combat: An Avoidable Combination?"¹

Recent history provides evidence that American participation in future urban military operations is inevitable...however, a review of recent history, service literature, doctrine, training results, and technological development regarding the US Army's preparedness for combat in cities excites little confidence.

Dr. Russell Glenn, "Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat—A Status Check"²

A compelling hypothesis argues future contingency warfare must consider urban operations as a necessary and natural part of the overall force projection strategy.³ Whether or not the arrival of US military forces into a threatened theatre is conducted in an opposed or unopposed manner is not the issue. The fact that the task will involve dealing with a large metropolitan center of gravity
as a logical segment of the overall force projection operation is the important point.⁴

While there has been an encouraging amount of professional interest in the problem of future urban operations, the intellectual outpouring has produced few documents or manuscripts. Similarly, next to none have surfaced on joint power projection. The list is even smaller for papers discussing the essential connection of joint power projection and joint urban operations. The shortage of literature on the topic is clearly indicative of the tremendous complexity of the strategic and operational aspects of the joint power projection-joint urban operations issue.

Aside from general sources describing tactical level combat operations in urban terrain, the body of literature available as primary references for the examination of the thesis question does not instill confidence.⁵ It is nevertheless essential that any examination of joint force projection-joint urban operations issues begin with a glance at extant source materials.

It was the original intention to examine three categories of source material: general published sources; unpublished papers, monographs and theses; and current or emerging doctrinal literature. After further review, this
proposal became "a bridge too far." In the interest of brevity, two points must be stipulated.

First, the concession must be made that the general published works detailing tactical operations in past city battles are limited in application to the thesis question and must be acknowledged in situ. Histories of the fighting in Stalingrad, Berlin, Hue, Seoul, Aachen, Rome, etc. are vital to the understanding of the magnitude of future urban operations, and have been consulted. Undeniably, the lessons learned from these works are inestimable. However, the collective conclusions tend to reinforce the notion long held by US military leadership that combat in urban areas is excessively costly and is to be avoided. A separate monograph will be required to appropriately review this group.

Secondly, there exists no current approved joint doctrine for urban operations. Draft and "bootleg" segments of emerging concepts are available, but a future paper will be required to give these abstracts the attention they deserve.

Consequently, as the bulk of the references employed in the research effort are unpublished documents, this chapter will narrow the focus and highlight several
extraordinary US Army School Of Advanced Military Studies monographs uncovered in the collection of source materials.

The SAMS Monographs

The leading contributors to the literature relating to the elements of joint power projection-joint urban operations are student monographs from the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. These student research projects are remarkable because they seem to constitute the predominate group of unpublished sources on the subject of future urban warfare.

Additionally, the bulk of these monographs were completed in the mid 1990s, suggesting the possibility that the issue of future urban operations made a conspicuous, though brief, excursion into advanced military studies.6 Outside RAND and SAIC studies, these SAMS theses offer the only evidence that the US military has attempted, in this decade, to deal with 21st Century urban warfare.7

Among the group of well-researched student papers investigating urban warfare in the future, several monographs stand out as exemplary sources. The document that comes closest to addressing the research question is MAJ Frank R. Boynton's 1995 SAMS thesis, "Power Projection Operations and Urban Combat: An Avoidable Combination?"
Under monograph director LTC Russell W. Glenn, MAJ Boynton, a US Marine, stipulates:

"There is a conflict between US force projection doctrine, which is based on the use of theatre arrival facilities (typically located in urban areas), and US urban combat doctrine... FM 100-5 goes on to discuss entry operations and divides entry operations into two categories: unopposed and opposed entry. What is left completely unmentioned in the discussion is where the force projection units will enter the area of operations."\(^8\)

He continues the argument noting that it is the requisite combination of airport and seaport which dramatically reduces the options for force projection sites. The location of the existing international airports and seaports within urban areas causes a new set of problems-securing and controlling the urban area to allow unimpeded off-load and build-up of forces and equipment.\(^9\)

The one thing in common about force projection operations, he determines, is that forces will arrive in theatre via a combination of military and commercial airlift and sealift. This further complicates the nature of arrival facilities required to receive commercial-type aircraft and shipping. In spite of this, Boynton recommends avoiding urban combat by executing Logistics Over the Shore (LOTS) operations in lieu of fighting for the airfield and seaport facilities surrounded by the large urban areas.\(^10\)
Other SAMS papers call for the development of planning considerations specific to operational level urban warfare. In his 1995 monograph "MOUT Art: Operational Planning Considerations for MOUT", MAJ Chip Preysler seconds Boynton's premise by stating:

A worldwide trend toward urbanization and a realization that many cities are key or decisive to the attainment of operational or strategic objectives leads one to the conclusion that future military operations will involve the use of force or forces in urban areas.\footnote{11}

Like his fellow SAMS classmates, Preysler finds current US urban operations doctrine to be woefully inadequate. He advocates further study on how the US would employ operational level detailed planning, accurate intelligence, overwhelming superiority, isolation, and surprise to remain centered on seizing operational objectives within large metropolitan areas.\footnote{12}


While "Operational Art and Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain" seems to be a subtle variation of Preysler's essay, its strength lies in the three case
studies of employed to illustrate future urban conflict. Goligowski studies recent urban combat operations in the Dominican Republic (1965-66), the battle of Hue in Vietnam (1968), and British operations in Belfast, Northern Ireland (1965-1985). He attempts to outline "implications of planning a major urban operation" by examining the nuances of conducting combat against conventional forces, executing peacekeeping/peace enforcement, and providing aid to civil authorities in an urban setting.13

One of Goligowski's more notable quotations in this monograph infers the reason behind the US military's difficulty in coming to terms with future urban warfare. He cites Sir Michael Howard's description that the inability of the military to objectively test new ideas about war-without a war in progress-stems from its bureaucracy and hierarchical structure.14 According to Howard, the way to achieve a clear view of the next war is to cultivate the talents of adaptability and flexibility:

In these circumstances when everybody starts wrong, the advantage goes to the side which can most quickly adjust itself to the new and unfamiliar environment and learn from its mistakes...it is this flexibility, both in the minds of the Armed Forces and in their organization, that needs above all to be developed in peacetime.

I am tempted to declare dogmatically that whatever doctrine the Armed Forces are working on now, they have got it wrong. I am also tempted to declare that it does not matter that they have got it wrong. What does matter is their capacity to get it right quickly when the moment
arrives...it is the task of military science in an age of peace to prevent the doctrine from being too badly wrong.¹⁵

Perhaps more importantly, Goligowski endeavors to hone in on the Army's reluctance in developing updated urban operations doctrine. He finds in "Future Combat in Urban Terrain: Is FM 90-10 Still Relevant?" that a significant revision of the Army's only urban warfare doctrine is badly needed before US forces find out the hard way.¹⁶ He also contends that the 1979 doctrinal manual remains preoccupied with Warsaw Pact-style mechanized enemies and does not confront the problem of asymmetric forces.¹⁷

"Standing at the Gates of the City: Operational Level Actions and Urban Warfare," by MAJ Robert E. Everson, is another outstanding monograph. A Russell Glenn protégé, Everson articulates how the operational commander influences the outcome at the urban tactical level by assessing how and why the enemy heads for the urban terrain in the first place.¹⁸ He finds MOUT studies have considered the strategic importance of cities but have routinely moved into the tactical realm without exploring the operational imperatives.

No studies have considered the concerns for urban warfare and the operational level of war, he contends, and
this great emphasis on the complicated tactical problems of urban warfare may be the root cause of military commander and planner myopia.\textsuperscript{19} Perhaps most significantly, he identifies the US Army's preoccupation with the tactical aspects of urban warfare as anathema to the joint operations necessary to handle future urban operations in the midst of a power projection strategy.\textsuperscript{20}

Finally, no examination of the peculiar problems of future urban operations is complete without an analysis of the city itself. Fitting the bill nicely is another SAMS monograph, written in 1995. MAJ Richard M. Francey's "The Urban Anatomy: The Fundamentals of A City" is a strong essay which calls for commanders and planners to see metropolitan areas as "a system of systems."\textsuperscript{21}

This monograph provides an insightful interpretation of how to determine those operational decisive points within a city called for by the collective analysis of MAJs Preysler, Goligowski, and Boynton. "Understanding the fundamentals of the city can be a force multiplier," writes Francey, and our "doctrine must be rewritten to provide an operational vision for urban operations."\textsuperscript{22}

Equally perceptive is Francey's concept of legitimacy in urban operations:
Legitimacy is a critical factor during urban operations due to the constant interaction with the civilian populace. The civilian populace contributes significantly to the perceived legitimacy of the mission. Minimizing the hardships on the populace will promote the mission in a positive way. Attaining this legitimacy requires careful planning and execution.²³

In conjunction with the monographs mentioned earlier in this essay, MAJ Francey calls for an "operational vision of the city" if doctrine is going to be adequate for the 21ˢᵗ Century. Referring to GEN William E. Dupuy's statement that "MOUT is an unclimbed mountain," Francey writes that the dynamics of metropolitan sprawl demands new approaches to the timeless military attributes of terrain.²⁴

The monographs produced by the student class of academic year 1994-95 constitute the sum total of the existing "directed" scholarship oriented on the subject of future urban warfare. These unpublished documents of just a few years ago demonstrated an attempt to move beyond the tactical calculus of urban warfare. Why this "movement" never gathered intellectual and professional momentum is not entirely known.

Even while these student research projects make up the largest contribution to the literature relating to future urban warfare, only MAJ Frank Boynton's thesis comes closest to addressing the topic of joint force projection and joint urban operations. Still, no evidence has been
uncovered in any of the source materials to justify the omission of the crucial connection between the joint force projection and joint urban operations segments of the equation.

But an undercurrent of interest in "impending urban warfare in the 21st Century" has attracted the attention of senior leaders and doctrine developers in the Armed Services. The circumstances that prompted this revival of interest are as much a matter of conjecture as the reasons for its abrupt departure from academia. Yet it remains to be seen if any of the significant findings and opinions of the School for Advanced Military Studies student monographs of the mid-1990s will be incorporated into doctrine for joint power projection-joint urban operations in the 21st Century.
Chapter Seven

INTO THE CONCRETE JUNGLE: THE URBAN WORKING GROUP AND EMERGING JOINT MOUT OPERATIONS DOCTRINE

"To ensure the US military has the ability to effectively operate on the urban battlefield, the CINCs and Services must continue to expand their present efforts of study and understanding of the urban environment and must develop an integrated approach that optimizes key warfighting capabilities for future operations on urban terrain."

Defense Planning Guidance FY 2000-2005\(^1\)

In 1995, having witnessed the poor performance of the Russian Army in Grozny, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inquired about the capabilities and doctrine of the US military for undertaking a joint operation in urban terrain. The Joint Staff "quick look" suggested a joint capability existed since Army and Marine tactical doctrine was "about right." With initial CJCS concerns satisfactorily addressed, the issue lay fallow at the joint staff level for the next two years.\(^2\)

In 1997, however, the interest in joint urban operations reemerged from the shadows. Joint Requirements Oversight Committee and Defense Planning Guidance of that
year called for a Joint Mission Area Analysis and Mission Need Assessment of US joint operational warfighting capabilities in an urban environment. The Joint Staff then began a concentrated effort designed to address the joint requirements for Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT).³

Acknowledging on-going USMC and Army tactical level urban warfare experimentation, the Defense Planning Guidance directed research along the following lines:

(1) Assess alternative approaches for conducting MOUT
(2) Continue to assess and explore Joint MOUT capabilities
(3) Recommend actions to address doctrine
(4) Identify MOUT modeling and simulation (M&S) and training requirements
(5) Identify requirements necessary to achieve dominant MOUT capabilities: include both lethal and non-lethal weapons; build on Service and CINC-sponsored Advanced Concepts and Technology Developments (ACTDs) and warfighting experiments to develop a Roadmap to 2010 to assess the alternative ways and means of conducting MOUT⁴

To fulfill the stated DPG requirements and serve as the Department of Defense focal point for Joint Urban issues, the Urban Working Group (UWG) was established within the J-8 directorate in November 1997. Within the space of two years this study syndicate swelled to more than 90 participants.⁵ The initial UWG plan called for a two-phase research methodology. The UWG studies timeline
would be punctuated by routine in-progress reviews with the JROC and DPG.6

Phase 1 of the UWG assessment consisted of three DoD funded contractor studies on the Joint MOUT doctrine question. The Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) of McLean, Virginia was detailed to study current MOUT doctrine. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) would look at the status of MOUT analysis and training models and simulations (M&S) tools. The firm of Booz-Allen-Hamilton (BAH) was tasked to identify Joint Candidate Mission Needs.7

**Options for Doctrine: The SAIC Findings**

The charter of the SAIC Joint MOUT research project was “to develop a fuller understanding of the gaps and shortfalls in current doctrine, evaluate the requirements to address them, and make recommendations on developing joint doctrine for urban military operations.”8 Authors Cynthia Melugin and William Rosenau employed an extensive literature search, subject matter expert interviews, survey feedback from CINC staffs, and MOUT conference notes to come to the conclusion that the current doctrine does not provide adequate guidance for conducting effective military operations on urbanized terrain.9
Melugin and Rosenau identified eight major shortfalls in MOUT doctrine. This doctrine is confined to two Army publications: FM 90-10, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain* (1979) and FM 90-10-1, *An Infantryman’s Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas* (1993), and USMC publication MCWP 3-35.3, *Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain*. First, they determined these current manuals do not address the likely joint nature of MOUT. The team found no discussion of the role of air power, naval gunfire, or Special Operating Forces; the roles of C4ISR (including space and HUMINT) were also not sufficiently addressed.\(^\text{10}\)

Next, the SAIC researchers found current doctrinal manuals focus almost exclusively on the tactical level of urban warfare. The exception to this is MCWP 3-35.3, which stands out for its explicit acknowledgement of the link between urban battles and operational and strategic objectives, and its use of historical illustrations to demonstrate this linkage.\(^\text{11}\)

The SAIC study uncovered the absence of any discussion on the critical role of the infrastructure of the city. There was no doctrinal guidance found outlining the utilization or the protection of the local infrastructure as a means to achieve operational objectives. Similarly,
the authors found no mention of the importance of stability operations, humanitarian assistance, or law enforcement and aid to civil authorities.12

The next major gap in doctrine was the lack of attention devoted to the challenges of dealing with non-combatants during urban operations. Existing doctrine does not address the importance of winning the support and allegiance of the local populace. Also missing is any treatment of controlling the noncombatants in ways that contribute to accomplishment of the operational objectives. The SAIC study team found that the prevailing thought among the subject matter experts is the omission of attention to civilian populations is the single most glaring weakness of the current MOUT doctrine.13

The next gap the study found was that current MOUT doctrine—especially Army manuals—had a European orientation. This is clearly a reflection of the time the Army doctrine was published (1979). "Although military conflict could occur in Western and Central Europe," explained the authors, "it is far more likely that MOUT will take place in the developing world."14 Whether or not this statement is a fair one in light of the Kosovo and Bosnia developments remains to be seen. What the study
team really points out is the Army doctrine is heavily focused toward defensive operations against a conventional, Soviet-style, maneuver-oriented force.\textsuperscript{15}

These Euro-centric defensive MOUT operations would also be conducted among city patterns and building types found in West Germany in the late 1970s; the manuals obviously fail to capture the range of structures and urban webs found today in Third World countries. The SAIC team cautioned that effectiveness of future MOUT operations will depend on the ability of commanders to understand the collateral damage and casualties brought on by US munitions and systems in the warren-like shantytowns that ring the periphery of the cities in these developing nations.\textsuperscript{16}

SAIC writers see the next doctrinal gap as the heavy combat-orientation of the manuals. Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) receive little attention, says the study team, even though it is these operations that US forces are more likely to perform. More instructive is the SAIC finding that most future MOUT involving US forces—even combat operations—will share many features with MOOTW, including humanitarian assistance, protection of the populace, and inter-agency, international organization
(IO), non-governmental and private voluntary organization (NGO and PVO) participation.\textsuperscript{17}

Closely allied to the MOOTW issue is the gap in Rules of Engagement doctrine—an element the SAIC study concluded was the most complex and politically challenging of conditions. The missing piece in doctrine is any articulation of the uniquely dynamic nature of urban operations in the formulation of ROE: changing conditions and the adaptability of the enemy require an appropriate, "street-wise" balance between well defined, consistent ROE and flexible, adaptable ROE.\textsuperscript{18}

The next gap in doctrine deals with multi-national or coalition operations. The SAIC study found no guidance at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels for cooperation with allies or partners. Considering current military strategy advocacy of future multinational operations, the inclusion and coordination of allies in urban operations requires further elaboration.\textsuperscript{19}

The last of the eight gaps in MOUT doctrine discovered by the SAIC study is called "logistics and other operational concepts." "Current service and joint doctrine fails to adequately address the unique logistical challenges of MOUT," state Melugin and Rosenau, especially
the "security challenges associated with logistics in cities."\textsuperscript{20} The authors see the three-dimensional urban environment as a new threat to US forces: lines of communication are not always secure and the support echelons are just as likely to be engaged in combat as the assault forces.\textsuperscript{21}

The commentary about the logistics challenges of urban operations (casualties, ammunition expenditures, etc.) is no new revelation. More provocative is the identification of the issue of "providing useful operational concepts for seizing and/or managing significant parts of a city that include planning, coordination, and protection of support systems."\textsuperscript{22}

This problem is associated with the protection of the urban infrastructure, the life-support system of the city. In the view of Melugin and Rosenau, the Marine Corps' new concepts of "urban penetration, thrust, and swarm" represent the only step forward in achieving a more operational approach to urban operations. Still missing is more attention on the unique challenges of combat support and combat service support systems for such concepts.\textsuperscript{23}

The SAIC study concluded that with the gaps in existing doctrine, the best course of action was to develop
both a Joint Urban Operations Handbook for Joint Task Force Commanders (short term approach) and Joint Urban Operations Doctrine (more lengthy timeline). The beauty of this recommendation to the UWG was that the handbook provided the heuristic, problem-solving guide to joint operations in urban terrain, and could be issued first. Joint urban operations doctrine would take about two years to sort out, but would ensure DoD visibility of joint urban operations and denote a major commitment of resources to preparation for future urban operations.²⁴

The Urban Working Group seems to hold a more testy and acerbic attitude about the gaps in doctrine than is outlined in the "polite" findings of the Science Applications International Corporation report:

In regard to doctrine, the (SAIC) assessment found current MOUT doctrine to be tactically focused on the ground fight, linear in scope, attrition-based in nature, and not operationally oriented for the conduct of a Grozny-like operation. Furthermore, it did not adequately address the role of combined arms, in affect paying lip-service to the need for coordination of much of the land forces combined arms capabilities. Additionally, it all but totally ignored the role and capabilities of the non-land centric Services thereby excluding essential capabilities and coordination guidance for the use of air power, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection, joint communications, Combat Identification (CID), Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), and sea-based fire support to name a few examples. Additionally, this "about right" doctrine provided no guidance for the use of SOF and did not address in any way shape or form the role of other governmental agencies such as the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), DIA, State Department, etc. Whatever MOUT doctrine was at the time, it certainly was not operational, it was not joint or combined, and it did not address key interagency issues. Indeed it is difficult to understand how it could have been assessed (by the Joint Staff) as "about right." 

The frustration inherent in trying to develop joint doctrine for urban operations is obviously evident in the preceding quotation. It is also indicative of the problems associated with taking an outmoded, 20-year old doctrine and trying to revise it for present application in a radically metamorphosed global environment. Nevertheless, the UWG took the SAIC report and translated it into immediate action.

Determining the need to fill the operational void in the doctrine, the UWG identified the requirements for a Joint Operational Doctrine and a Joint Operational Concept. The UWG was acutely aware of the need for a "near-term product to assist Joint Task Force Commanders."

Consequently, the UWG arranged for the Marine Corps to take the lead in developing Joint MOUT Doctrine, with the Army as the Reviewing Authority and J-8 as the JCS Sponsor. The Marines would also develop a joint MOUT operational concept to form the basis for the doctrine. The Air Force was then assigned the task of developing the JTF Commander's MOUT Handbook. Concurrent with this work, the Institute for
Defense Analysis study on MOUT analysis and training models and simulations—Part 2 of Phase 1—was assessed by the UWG.

**Short-Term Solutions and Long-Term Bridges: the IDA Report**

Not surprisingly, the IDA report found the MOUT analytical tools available to the US military as inadequate. Two existing simulation systems—Joint Warfare System (JWARS) and Joint Simulation System (JSIMS)—do not presently address urban warfare issues and do not appear to be oriented toward including urban scenarios in future stages. Current Service training simulations lack sufficient urban terrain databases to be effective. The results of the IDA work led the UWG to conclude that there is a great need for more sophisticated operational and tactical level analytic and simulation tools.

The only conceivable short-term solution and long-range bridge of the models and simulations gap arrived at by the UWG hinged on the use of the Joint Tactical and Conflict Simulation (JCATS) system as a baseline system for urban operations campaign planning, capabilities assessments, and rehearsals. To make JCATS the most practicable application for the Services, the UWG discovered it would take $500,000 worth of validation, verification, and data base refinement. The UWG gained a
JROC recommendation that OSD fund the necessary adjustments, but it appears "short term" means somewhere between 2001 and 2006. The UWG may have achieved a Pyrrhic victory.30

**Phase 1, Part 3: the Booz-Allen-Hamilton Mission Needs**

**Assessment**

The Booz-Allen-Hamilton (BAH) analysis is perhaps the most interesting of the studies commissioned by the UWG incidental to its Phase 1 approach. 108 Candidate Mission Needs were identified by the BAH researchers. The UWG subsequently "battle-focused" this list to 16 core areas:

- Communications
- Knowledge of Cities
- Threat Detection/Neutralization
- Mobility
- Consequence Management
- Information Control
- Precision Navigation
- CID
- Urban CSAR
- Rapid, Responsive Firepower
- Precision Effects
- Population Control
- JTF Single Common Picture
- Medical
- Logistics
- Training Facilities
- Training Analysis
- Campaign Analysis

The real benefit of the BAH work may be in the "recurring themes" that were identified during the assessment. The first three points refer to an expanded understanding of the anatomy or future urban warfare; the remaining themes deal with terminology and responsibility for solving the complex problem:

(1) The city is a living entity and operating successfully there requires skills similar to that of the surgeon operating on a cancer patient, where
ridding the body of the cancer without killing the host is the challenge;

(2) The lack of analytical tools makes quantitative MOUT analysis almost impossible;

(3) In urban areas, the distinction between tactical and operational concerns is unclear;

(4) There is a need for a single focal point for addressing joint MOUT issues;

(5) The term "MOUT" is confusing-change it to "Urban Operations";

(6) Much more must be done to completely assess Joint Urban Operations capabilities and needs.\textsuperscript{32}

The Urban Working Group took the BAH findings to the JROC and proposed a second phase to the overall assessment scheme. The JROC approved a one-year Phase 2 effort, initiated in November, 1998. This analysis would further examine the Candidate Mission Needs and plot a transition timeline for future MOUT oversight out to 2010 and for institutionalizing Joint Urban Operations Missions Needs into the requirements process. But no sooner had this Phase 2 plan been approved than it was apparent to the UWG that there was wavering unity of effort and insufficient fiscal resources to accomplish the task. In spite of its most heroic attempts to streamline the steps for getting Joint Urban Operations Doctrine and Guidance to the users, the UWG was forced into requesting a Phase 3 year for studying nearly all of the Phase 2 issues.\textsuperscript{23}
The intent of this chapter has been to publicize what is largely unknown even among most military leaders: someone is working on future joint urban operations doctrine. The personnel of the Urban Working Group of the J-8 have done great work and are continuing to move toward the objective of preparing the US military for its most difficult future operational problem. No more appropriate summary exists than the concluding paragraph of the Urban Working Group draft introduction paper:

As one can see, a great deal is being done, but much more remains to be accomplished. Avoiding the issue associated with MOUT will not make it go away...it will simply make it more difficult to meet 21st century challenges and result in the same sad remnants of our recent past...more dead American warriors. We know our National Strategy is one of Engagement, and we know, carrying out our strategy will require operating in urban settings. We have identified some of the new realities, from tolerance for casualties and collateral damage to the CNN factor, which are going to affect our ability to carry out our strategy. Because support for or against US policy in the future may often times be based on hindsight and Monday morning quarterbacking, it is imperative that things are done right the first time. Efforts to build 21st century military capability will require a focus never before achieved if CINCs are going to possess forces which can successfully address both current and future threats within the context of this new political landscape...Why MOUT? Because tomorrow is here now...and now...it is time!\textsuperscript{24}
Chapter Eight

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF URBAN OPERATIONS IN LARGE METROPOLITAN AREAS- CASE STUDY #1: MANILA

Manila had no military significance or value. Turning it into a battleground was an act of nihilism, not a necessity of war.

Geoffrey Perret

Krueger (Sixth Army Commander) explained his approach to difficult problems to his chief of staff, Brigadier General George H. Decker (a future Chief of Staff of the Army): "If you let them rest for a little while, a solution may become clearer to you, or maybe it'll go away".

BG Clovis E. Byers

Historical case studies of urban warfare, and the doctrine that has grown out of the analysis of city fighting, are primarily directed at the tactical level of war. The US military's tactical focus of urban warfare is based on logic and experience. Logically, the compartmented nature of the urban terrain facilitated economic distribution of defenders. Attacking and reducing enemy positions in narrow, constrictive space was, therefore, the domain of small unit combat.

The prevailing American urban warfare experience of WWII was one of tactical organizations executing small unit unrestricted combat. US Army divisions focused tactical
units on destroying the enemy within the city. Confronted with the closed terrain of urban operations, divisions found that command and control necessarily devolved to the lowest possible level. Squads and platoons systematically bludgeoned their way from house to house while defenders doggedly oppose every room and building.⁵

"Fierce and continuous close combat resulted in great material destruction, property damage, and high casualties among combatants and non-combatants alike."⁶ These experiences translated into doctrine. The "American Way of War" regarding urban combat consisted of the strategy of annihilation: the enemy is in the city, and therefore he must be struck.⁷

In nearly every instance of WWII urban battles, the US method for annihilating an enemy in urban combat was executed in an unrestricted manner. Any restrictive tactical operations designed to avoid non-combatant casualties and reduce collateral damage competed with the necessity of gaining and maintaining tactical advantages while closing with and destroying the defenders. Inevitably, the desire to limit destruction was overridden when friendly casualties mounted during the costly, room-by-room clearing operations.⁸ The end result was to destroy the enemy or force his eviction from the city with the
least cost to the attackers. If this meant unrestricted operations would ultimately achieve this objective, yet cause the destruction of the city, it was considered to be a necessary evil.⁹

Few of the historical case studies of urban battles address the nature of the operational decisions that dictated the unrestricted tactical combat in the streets. While commanders acknowledged the need for constrained operations in the metropolitan area, they were largely unable to set the operational conditions for the desired restrictive tactics.

The WWII battle of Manila serves as a model of a classic, large-scale unrestricted urban operation as part of a major campaign in an unlimited war. It demonstrates the US urban warfare doctrine was (and still is) no less attrition based than "open terrain" combat. It also underscores the American concept of urban warfare meant (and still does) high collateral damage in the course of annihilation of the enemy; that it remains tactical rather than operational, even when the outcome of the urban fight has much larger strategic and political consequences.

The fight for Manila is instructive in that it shows how the absence of any operational planning concerning impending urban operations can lead directly to attrition-
style city fighting. This battle provides an example of the inherent tension concerning collateral damage and the destruction of the enemy force occupying the urban area, between constrained and unconstrained tactical operations. Manila demonstrates that the solution for urban warfare difficulties must first be addressed at the operational level; that the problems can't rest for a while and won't go away, as General Krueger hoped.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine a large-scale urban operation and determine to what extent the operational actions and conditions established before tactical operations either facilitated or hampered tactical operations. Manila is a useful case study in that much of the US experience in this battle illustrates the future necessity of sound operational planning and operational actions when confronted with urban warfare. In terms of current US Military Strategy, Manila is a particularly interesting battle to examine since this large-scale urban operation took place within the construct of an army-sized force projection/forced entry campaign.

"Promises to Keep" and Flying Columns

By the summer of 1944, the strategic issue of where to converge the simultaneously advancing pincers of Nimitz and MacArthur for the final push against Japan was decided
by logistics. Sufficient resources existed for an intermediate step into the Philippine Islands in October 1944; an invasion of Formosa, the first choice, would require European Theatre reinforcements and landing craft and would not be executed for at least a year. Strategic tempo, constrained by in-theatre logistics, dictated the Philippine campaign.\(^{10}\)

General Douglas MacArthur's concept of operations was to advance through the Philippine archipelago in the same manner he had secured New Guinea: striking under the cover of secure, land-based air, bypassing enemy strength, giving the Japanese no chance to concentrate against him. He intended to invade the large island of Mindanao first, then jump to Leyte in the central Philippines.\(^{11}\) Covered from Leyte, MacArthur's next bound would be to Luzon. The re-conquest of Luzon, home of the Philippine capital of Manila, would signal the return of the Americans and the end of the humiliating defeat three years earlier.\(^{12}\)

US forces successfully landed on the island of Luzon 9 January 1945. After securing inland crossing sites over the Agno River, the attention of operational commanders was redirected. Instead of capturing airfields and establishing logistics facilities for the next push toward
Japan, the focus shifted to the liberation of Manila, 100 miles to the south.\textsuperscript{13}

Manila's urban sprawl extended 285 square kilometers and counted 1,100,000 inhabitants within its confines. More politically important than militarily necessary for the invasion of the Japanese homeland, the re-capture of Manila and its port facilities took on a magnified symbolic significance to General Douglas MacArthur.\textsuperscript{14}

In spite of MacArthur's enthusiasm for re-taking Manila, no operational approach to seizing the city was devised by his staff. The South West Pacific Area (SWPA) planners knew the battle for Manila would be the first multi-divisional large-scale urban operation against the Japanese in the Pacific Theatre of war. They understood Manila would be an operational level action, executed within the parameters of a larger campaign. Without an appreciation for the Japanese intentions regarding Manila, however, SWPA estimates were uncontrolled and unfocused.\textsuperscript{15} Many of the assumptions of the campaign plan were seriously flawed, thus having direct impact on operational and tactical actions. The most errant assumption was that the Japanese would be eager to treat Manila as an "open city," much like Paris was considered in Europe.\textsuperscript{16}
The US Sixth Army was the maneuver force assigned the task of recapturing the island of Luzon, but also failed to plan for any urban operations against Manila.\textsuperscript{17} LTG Walter Krueger was one of the US Army's most resourceful commanders,\textsuperscript{18} but he was increasingly uneasy about Japanese intentions on the island since there was a complete absence of strong resistance to the initial landings. Paralyzed by his paranoia, Krueger sat on the beachhead for two weeks, allowing the Japanese the opportunity to demolish the two hundred bridges between the landing area and Manila.\textsuperscript{19}

The scheme of maneuver for Japanese General Yamashita was to avoid a pitched battle on the open plains between Manila and the Lingayen Gulf. The course of action left to him was to head for the mountains, dig in, and let the Americans come and try to pry him out. Yamashita posted 150,000 troops into the mountains of northern Luzon, and 80,000 moved into the high hills east of Manila. Manila was garrisoned by 30,000 men, half of them naval troops. The highly prized Clark Airfield lay halfway in between Manila and the Agno River; to deny it to the US Army Air Corps, Yamashita sited 30,000 soldiers into the mountains directly overlooking Clark.\textsuperscript{20}

Even after acknowledging Yamashita's tactics after the landings, both SWPA and Sixth Army intelligence staffs made
grievous errors in not detecting the enemy defending inside Manila until the suburbs of the city were reached.²¹ The Japanese commander in Manila—an admiral not directly under Yamashita's control—ignored the policy of trying to spare the city. He quickly used the 30,000 troops and huge quantities of automatic weapons and ammunition to establish a formidable defensive position inside Manila. Barricades were set up at major intersections, streets were mined, buildings were booby-trapped, and heavy guns from naval vessels in Manila Bay were brought into the city.²²

By 18 January two of Krueger's divisions had succeeded in bridging the Agno River, and the push to Clark Airfield was underway. The 40th Infantry Division reached the northern rim of the airfield on 23 January. However, to secure the huge, 50-square mile facilities at Clark Field, the 40th Division had to drive the 30,000 well-entrenched Japanese out of the mountains west of Clark that dominated the airfield.²³

The follow-on landing of the 1st Cavalry Division gave MacArthur the mobility he so desperately needed for the "horse race" to Manila. Tagged as a "flying column," MacArthur banked on the jeeps, tanks, and trucks of the 1st Cavalry Division to penetrate the defenses of Manila while the Japanese concentrated on the more lethal, slower 37th
Infantry Division moving concurrently toward the capital city. MacArthur especially looked to the 800-man spearhead of the 1st Cavalry Division to puncture through a soft spot in the defenses and secure the release of nearly 1000 POWs being held in Bilibid Prison.\textsuperscript{24}

On 4 February the lightning bolt of the 1st Cavalry Division had not only unshackled the POWs at Bilibid Prison, they had liberated 3500 civilian prisoners from Santo Tomas University. The "flying column" now held fast, as the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 37th Infantry Division closed on Manila. Intelligence problems continued to plague the operation. The extent of Japanese defenses in and around the remainder of Manila was still unknown, as well as the intentions of the defenders.\textsuperscript{25}

MacArthur's next move was to employ MG Joseph Swing's tough 11th Airborne Division as the lower half of a double envelopment of Manila. Fresh from a combination amphibious and parachute assault 35 miles south of Manila, Swing's elite troopers were shifted northward to Manila, where they quickly discovered that the only strong defenses outside the city were on the southern approaches to the metropolis.\textsuperscript{26}

With his maneuver forces in place, MacArthur decided to begin the constriction of the defenders inside Manila.
Detailing the 1st Cavalry Division to clear the eastern suburbs of the city and Swing's paratroopers to continue the pressure from the south, MacArthur assigned the difficult task of cleaning out Manila to MG Robert Beightler's 37th Infantry Division. While there had been no specific plan for the recapture of Manila, key objectives within the city were identified as essential for success. Besides seizing the port facilities and the airport of Manila, gaining control of the water facilities and power grid to sustain over a million noncombatants was deemed imperative.  

MacArthur was in the middle of a huge dilemma. Greatly concerned about impending civilian casualties and collateral damage, he didn't intend Manila to be turned into twisted steel and crushed brick rubble like the cities in Europe. MacArthur's concerns for the Filipino noncombatants would dictate all tactical operations within the city. Strict limitations were imposed on the use of artillery and all close air support missions were banned. In spite of these reservations, though, MacArthur's decision regarding the nature of operations inside the city virtually guaranteed the exhaustive, costly frontal attacks against a determined, well-armed enemy would cause even greater destruction.  

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As a result, it took Beightler's infantrymen several days to fight their way through the northern suburbs and prepare to force a crossing over the Pasig River. The Pasig River constituted the last natural barrier to the heart of downtown Manila and geographically divided the metropolitan area. On 7 February the 37th Infantry successfully assaulted across the river using rubber boats and amphibious tractors. During 9 and 10 February the 1st Cavalry Division passed through the 37th Infantry bridgehead and by 10 February had secured the water facilities in the eastern portion of the city. South of the city, the 11th Airborne Division completed the isolation of Manila by capturing Nichols Airfield. Despite this hard-fought success, the Japanese defenders stubbornly clung to the port area and the center of the capital.29

The ensuing combat was focused on reducing the Japanese strongpoints. These positions consisted of major multi-story buildings surrounded and mutually supported by defenders in clusters of smaller adjacent structures. Key targets included the stadium complex, the Manila Hotel, the New Police Station, the City Hall, the Post Office, and the University-Hospital Complex. Casualties mounted as it took on the average of one week to reduce each strongpoint. Japanese control disintegrated and widespread atrocities
were committed. US forces were pressured to increase the tempo of the attack to secure Manila.\textsuperscript{30}

While the US troops could only use artillery against pinpoint targets, the Japanese indiscriminately employed mortar and artillery fires in the defense. Manila was soon transformed into a spectacular funeral pyre. Huge black clouds of smoke billowed 20,000 feet into the sky over the island of Luzon. After two weeks of non-stop, brutal city fighting, Beightler's troops reached the final Japanese position. The defenders had retreated into the massive 16\textsuperscript{th} Century Spanish citadel of Intramuros, where it would require sustained, precision barrages of US artillery to breach the 20-40 feet thick stone walls. Intramuros was ultimately secured at the price of nearly 2000 Japanese killed and 25 prisoners; US casualties were 25 KIA and 265 WIA. \textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Large-Scale Lessons Learned}

The lessons of the fight for Manila are extremely relevant to future large-scale joint urban operations. This is especially true since Manila is an example of a large-scale littoral urban center, possessing international-calibre force-projection facilities. From the WWII experience, planners can learn what it will take
to successfully execute future joint urban operations involving a national center of gravity, like Manila.

Study of the battle of Manila reveals several salient operational problems. Among them are:

(1) inadequate operational planning;
(2) lack of understanding of the city;
(3) lack of operational surprise;
(4) lack of intelligence dominance;
(5) failure to isolate the urban area;
(6) failure to determine and successfully seize decisive points within the city;
(7) failure to achieve speed in operational action;
(8) failure to set the conditions for transition to follow-on operations.

**Operational Role of the City**

The attack on Manila demonstrated a lack of realistic acknowledgement of the role of the Filipino capital in the entire Luzon campaign. Failing to grasp the reason for going to Manila in the first place spawned false assumptions and inadequate examination of the military problem associated with seizing the capital. Planners and commanders failed to seriously comprehend the size of the city and what forces would be required to seize and secure it.
The purpose for liberating Manila was based more on symbolism and emotionalism, less on military requirements. This resulted in the failure to arrive at essential operational decisions about the impending urban operations. Operational actions reflected the "flying columns"—operational decisions seemed to be dictated by tactical situations, and did not seem to shape the urban battle.

Related to the size of the metropolitan area are the issues of length of time to secure it, and what this security looks like on the streets of the city. There is no outstanding evidence to suggest SWPA or Sixth Army planners conceived a month-long engagement, involving an entire corps.

**Operational Planning**

This examination of the fighting for Manila clearly shows that planning a major urban operation cannot be accomplished "on the fly." Inadequate planning leads to incomplete assessment of the enemy threat and the essence of the decisive points within the metropolis. Inadequate planning drives "discovery learning" instead of reaction to enemy responses. "Attack and let's see what happens," means heavy casualties, as was evident in Manila.

The failure to determine operational guidance for Manila was both a product and producer of poor
reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence. Future joint operations must rely on every element of intelligence collection, to include non-governmental agencies, to establish control of the battlespace and set conditions for urban operations. Manila represents an example of a fairly complete intelligence failure, hard to rationalize given the fact that US forces had been in direct operational and tactical contact with the Japanese for months, and possessed air and naval superiority.

It is extremely difficult to step back from a military problem and examine the state of affairs through fresh, unbiased eyes, but ruinous assumptions are borne out of complacency and familiarity. It is hard to say whether SWPA or Sixth Army operations and intelligence planners were able to see the Luzon-Manila problem through a new prism. If they did, the fault lies with senior commanders for not accepting revised assessments. It is evident, though, that Sixth Army planners realized the necessity for identifying decisive points inside Manila and directing maneuver forces to seize and secure them. Better late than never, indeed. Study of the problem may have indicated to the planners that there is little philosophical difference between the importance of decisive areas in "open terrain" and "closed terrain."
But this is a trap that threatens to capture future joint planners and commanders, as well. The lesson learned is continuous and redundant intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance must be employed to identify decisive points inside the city and shape a realistic picture of the urban battlespace, strategically, operationally, and tactically.

**Intelligence Dominance**

Intelligence dominance enables operational surprise to be achieved. Manila is an instance of the attaining initial operational surprise but then forfeiting advantage by failing to capitalize on it. Sixth Army landed at the place the Japanese did not expect, but then sat idle for two weeks, not even sending out patrols to attempt to find the enemy. Yamashita, on the other hand, took advantage of this intel and maneuver failure and destroyed 200 bridges along the route to Manila and anchored his defenses in key terrain.

Eventually, these errors resulted in the failure to seize the Manila airfield and port facilities intact. Even though Clark Field was the highest payoff strategic objective of the Luzon invasion, the US threw away the additional strategic value of the Manila airport and seaport facilities by not focusing on seizing them as
decisive points of operational significance. This in turn exacerbated the problem of repairing the infrastructure of Manila. Months would go by before the airport and sea port were functional.

The failure of MacArthur's intelligence staff to predict the enemy's most dangerous course of action—defend Manila—stands out as one of the most salient lessons learned from this battle. As was already mentioned, the assumption—seen through American eyes, not determined from the enemy point of view—was that the Japanese would be chivalrous and treat Manila as an open city. This of course neglects to account for the Japanese concerns about the effects of a US victory in the Philippines, and what the loss of Clark Field and the Manila port meant toward an inevitable American attack on the homeland.

The Japanese decision to defend Manila, which included control of the airport and sea port facilities within the confines of the city, automatically drew the US attack response. Bypassing Manila was not an option. Even with the seizure of the Clark Field, clearly the Air Corps' priority objective for the follow-on attack of Japan, the subjugation of Luzon would be incomplete without also having Nichols Field and the Manila Bay port in American hands. Leaving Manila and its strategic projection
facilities to the Japanese was inconsistent with the US moral obligation to liberate the Philippines and eliminate Japanese forces on the islands. The Japanese occupied Manila, and had to be destroyed.

**Determination of Centers of Gravity**

The most intriguing question is why Manila was neglected as a center of gravity in the Luzon campaign. The military and political significance of the capital city of the Philippines was obvious, as well as the symbolism of recapturing the site of the humiliating US surrender of three years earlier. Taking Manila was essential to the tactical success of the campaign for Luzon. The airfield and port facilities of Manila clearly mitigated for its seizure as a requirement for obtaining an international calibre staging base for the push on to the Japanese islands. Thus, Manila was the linchpin of the accomplishment of tactical, operational, and strategic endstates.

**Unrestricted Operations**

The battle for Manila illustrates the tension between the use of overwhelming firepower, casualty avoidance, and time spent securing the city. Small arms, tanks, and direct-fire artillery constituted the US weapons for precision engagement. As both US and Filipino casualties
mounted, MacArthur attempted to relax the restrictions on artillery, but not on attack aircraft. Given the fact that the Japanese did nothing to curb the devastation of the city, the limitations placed on US forces—and the resulting casualties—made little sense.\textsuperscript{33}

US military doctrine, culture, and experience dictated use of overwhelming air and artillery support in support of ground operations. Little distinction was made between a city and a fortified area; both were attacked with the same combination of fire and movement. The US approach to reducing the final Japanese stronghold at Intramuros reinforces this point. The frontal battering ram attack on the old fortress incorporated heavy direct fire artillery volleys. Fortunately, the attack did not result in the bloodbath of friendly troops and civilians that was expected.

**Surprise**

Given the fact that Manila was the operational jewel to be plucked from the midst of the battle for the island of Luzon, operational planners appeared hypnotized by their own assumptions that Manila would fall without a fight. Consequently, the attitude seems to be the landings on Luzon would be the signal for the Japanese to evacuate Manila in a gentlemanly fashion. A coup d' main was not
initially considered for Manila or for the essential strategic prize, Clark Field, even though parachute troops were available for such a task. Given MacArthur’s penchant for "end run" amphibious operations and decisive, unorthodox use of airborne forces, a coup d‘main seems feasible and practicable. Incomplete intelligence, coupled with inadequate operational planning, may be the principal reason this course of action never received serious consideration.

US forces failed to achieve operational surprise even though they landed on opposite side of the island. Coupled with poor understanding of the Japanese dispositions between the landing sites and the capital city, operational commanders conceded the initiative to the enemy as US forces remained static on the beachhead for two weeks. This enabled the Japanese to disperse to key terrain inland and mask their defensive preparations in Manila. In the final analysis, this failure resulted in prolonged combat and extensive casualties. In the space of a month of continuous combat, the Americans lost 1000 KIA and 5500 WIA in the city fighting in Manila, 20% of the Luzon losses and 10% of the total casualties suffered in re-taking the Philippines.³⁴
Isolation and Speed

One major success was the US approach to isolating the city, though it occurred later rather than sooner. There was clear separation achieved between Japanese forces in the mountains of Luzon and the defenders of Manila—no reinforcement of the city took place. However, while speed in isolation is imperative in order to avoid the costly frontal assault method for seizing the urban area, it is also vital to seizing decisive operational facilities inside the city. While MacArthur's flying columns were an example of attempting rapid isolation, it still took several weeks before the southern pincer completed the isolation of Manila.

However, this speed did not translate into rapid seizure of the key facilities in the city, in order to deny enemy attempts to destroy the infrastructure and place the population support burden on the attacker. The inability of the US forces to seize the key operational targets within the city led to the destruction of Nichols Field, Manila Bay port, and severe damage to Manila's power plant, major hospital, and water system. This caused enormous logistics problems for the liberators as they struggled to provide infrastructure support for several hundred thousand Filipinos in the city.
Constrained Approach in Urban Warfare Operational Art

The battle for the city of Manila stands out as an excellent example of the failure to look at impending large-scale urban operations from the operational perspective. While clearing and securing a city is definitely a close fight, all the intense house-to-house fighting is meaningless unless the operational actions guide the purpose for combat. Unrestricted combat in a large-scale metropolitan area is archaic. Future joint urban operations must focus on decisive points in the city and scrupulously avoid indiscriminate damage and catastrophic casualties. Future joint urban operations must be conducted with an eye toward operational art.

The very nature of this problem was not entirely disregarded by commanders and planners during WWII, but the annihilation mind-set gave them few options for an operational solution. It is the operational solution that is essential to understanding the "three block war" of future urban operations.25
Chapter Nine

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF URBAN OPERATIONS IN LARGE METROPOLITAN AREAS—CASE STUDY #2: SANTO DOMINGO

Most of the activity aimed at accomplishing (US objectives in the Dominican Republic) ...would take place in Santo Domingo with its complex of streets, built-up areas, industrial and financial districts, service facilities, and dense population. Militarily, this meant that American forces would engage in city fighting to a degree not experienced since Korea.

MAJ William E. Klein

As the troops arrived in the Dominican Republic, their impressions of the country varied. Some were struck by the "searing sun" and the way it was blotted out virtually every afternoon by torrential rains; others by the "just plain squalor" of the city and the sight of naked children playing in mud puddles; others by the condition of the wartime capital, in which garbage littered the streets, electrical power and telephone service worked sporadically, and food and water were scarce commodities; and still others by the range of emotions with which the noncombatant population greeted a foreign army—emotions ranging from friendly welcome to vulgar hostility.

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates

Until the early Twentieth Century, the United States played a small role in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. From 1905 to 1924, the US applied military, financial, and political assistance to cure the chronic fiscal distress and political unrest that was luring
potential European interventionists. The withdrawal of the US presence in the Dominican Republic in 1924 ushered in thirty years of malevolent dictatorship by strongman Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina.³

The eventual assassination of Trujillo in 1961 initiated a cycle of turbulence and violence that spiraled into civil war. On 25 April 1965, when the US ambassador, his senior staff, and most of the American military advisors were out of town, severe fighting broke out in the capitol city of Santo Domingo.⁴ US President Lyndon B. Johnson, vowing there would not be “a second Cuba” in the western hemisphere, prepared to use military force if necessary to stabilize the situation.⁵

Returning from Camp David that day, President Johnson became absorbed in the Dominican crisis.⁶ Although preoccupied with the US build-up in Vietnam, the President read the deteriorating situation in Santo Domingo as a clear indicator of an attempted Communist takeover of the Dominican Republic.⁷ Johnson and his advisors feared an “irresolute response to the Dominican crisis” would subvert American credibility in Vietnam, subsequently jeopardizing US standing all around the globe.⁸
Strategic Forced Entry Operations

The first step toward US intervention quickly occurred. Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command had ordered Task Group 44.9, the Caribbean Ready Group, to proceed to a position off Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. By Monday morning Commodore James A. Dare's task group lay thirty miles off the Dominican coast, ready to launch air strikes or an amphibious landing if necessary to remove the estimated 1200 Americans from Santo Domingo. When armed rebels threatened the assembling US citizens at the Hotel Embajador in suburban Santo Domingo on Tuesday morning, JCS ordered the evacuation. By early evening on Tuesday, 27 April, the initial Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation was concluded without incident.

Over the next 24 hours the fighting between Loyalists and rebels intensified in Santo Domingo. Ambassador Bennett cabled an urgent request for the immediate landing of the 6th MEU to shore up the besieged Loyalist government. American citizens continued to flow into the Hotel Embajador as Bennett reported the Americans were in grave danger and US military intervention was imperative. The first stage of the landings involved several small Marine units to establish a landing zone for helicopters in
the polo field, help evacuate Americans still gathering at the hotel, and to reinforce the Embassy security detail besieged by armed mobs. This step in the US intervention took place without presidential authority.\textsuperscript{13} By midnight, nearly half of the MEU had landed in Santo Domingo.\textsuperscript{14}

While events were transpiring in Santo Domingo during the period of 26-28 April, XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division staffs were working feverishly to revise outmoded contingency deployment plans for the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{15} MG Robert York, Commanding General of the 82d Airborne Division, was left to his own devices in determining the plan for the initial assault mission. York selected the traditional 82d Airborne Division strategic forced entry airborne operation, designed to seize an airfield for follow-on delivery of additional forces.\textsuperscript{16} Seriously degrading the planning effort was "a critical intelligence vacuum."\textsuperscript{17} Deployment planning was hardly representing a textbook model for joint force projection operations.\textsuperscript{18}

Just after dark on 29 April, the 144 C-130s loaded with paratroopers and heavy equipment took off from Pope Air Force Base, enroute to the Dominican target area. The airfield seizure drop zone selected by York was the San
Isidro Airport in Santo Domingo. Whether the drop zone/airfield was under friendly or enemy control was not yet known. Halfway into the 5-hour flight, MG York, in the lead aircraft of the armada, was informed by JCS that the airfield was assumed to be in friendly hands. JCS instructed him to cancel the forced entry parachute assault and execute an airland operation. York objected on the grounds that transferring from an airborne assault to an airland arrival was “pure lunacy” since there was no heavy equipment on the ground at San Isidro to off-load or de-rig the heavy drop aircraft. However, the change in plans occurred because the President and his cabinet believed a parachute assault in the suburbs of Santo Domingo would appear too belligerent and indicate US invasion instead of intervention.

By first light on 30 April, two Battalion Combat Teams of the 82d Airborne Division and one troop of the division’s cavalry squadron were assembled, prepared for operations. The MEU had already been busy, accomplishing several important tasks about 8 hours before the arrival of the US Army elements. Ordered to establish a protective zone around the US embassy and official residences, 6th MEU had cleared the diplomatic portion of Santo Domingo of rebels by nightfall on 29 April and had instituted the
International Security Zone (ISZ). The fact that 6th MEU had nothing to do with the security of the 82d drop zone is patently indicative of the lack of a coherent, coordinated joint operations plan.

Once on the ground at San Isidro Airport, MG York communicated with Commodore Dare about the next stage of operations beyond the established airhead line. He discovered that rebels, or "Constitutionalists," controlled most of Santo Domingo. Loyalist troops were in small isolated pockets throughout Santo Domingo, demoralized and combat ineffective. He was informed of the ISZ cordon established by the Marines adjacent to the Santo Domingo suburb of Cuidad Nueva. 82d and 6th MEU elements were nearly 18 miles apart. If Santo Domingo was going to be cleared of rebels and if stability were to be restored, it would take US forces to perform the task.

Santo Domingo: Cordon and Corridors

The situation in Santo Domingo at the completion of the 82d Airborne Division’s arrival did not inspire confidence among senior commanders. Virtually nothing was known of the "ancient capital of the Caribbean." In 1965, Santo Domingo was a growing metropolis, consisting of over 150 square kilometers and nearly half a million
inhabitants, but York and his staff were ignorant of the demographics and layout of the city. Since the overthrow of the government on 25 April, the historic city was a nightmare of armed rebels and uneasy civilians. Now MG York and his paratroopers would have to deal directly with several thousand armed insurgents somewhere inside the "first capital of the New World."²⁴

By midday, the immediate 82d Airborne Division tactical situation was improving. San Isidro airfield was strong-pointed by one parachute battalion, thereby securing the existing strategic entry point into the country. Another airborne battalion held Duarte Bridge, which spanned the Ozama River inside Santo Domingo. This "bridgehead" controlled the main eastern exit from downtown Santo Domingo and connected the airfield with the capital. Located within this bridgehead was the main power plant that served most of the city—a decisive facility.²⁵

York was just beginning to understand the essence of the operational problem confronting him. On the western side of Santo Domingo, 18 miles away from the airfield, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines held the International Security Zone. Between the Marines and the paratroopers, however, the heart of Santo Domingo was in rebel hands. The
Constitutionalists were in command of the Presidential Palace, the Dominican television, radio, newspaper, and telecommunications buildings, the business and industrial centers of downtown Santo Domingo, and the main port facilities.²⁶

Imposing immediate constraints on the US military mission were the attempts by the papal nuncio to maintain a cease fire agreement between warring factions. The rebels took advantage of the cease fire terms to consolidate defenses inside Santo Domingo, and to “export arms, ammunition, mob violence, and guerrilla warfare into the countryside.”²⁷ Besides not making political or military sense, the cease fire served to freeze US forces in widely separated positions, unable to exert offensive pressure on the rebels. Commanders on the ground called for permission to “violate” the cease fire, and get on with the military actions.²⁸

However, only President Johnson could authorize US offensive operations. He was now caught in the middle of a dilemma. On the one hand, he feared the people of Santo Domingo would be caught right in the middle of the fighting and the intervention would become “another Hungary.”²⁹ On the other hand, the President could see no other way to get
the job done. Compounding the issue was the JCS request for more combat troops and the difficulty in establishing viable Rules of Engagement for the paratroopers and Marines trying to execute military tasks. The conundrum resulted in Administration officials in Washington and military leaders in Santo Domingo working at "cross-purposes" with each other.\textsuperscript{30}

The arrival of the new XVIII Airborne Corps commander, LTG Bruce Palmer, Jr., on Saturday, 1 May, sparked a resolution. Palmer "refused" to accept the cease-fire agreement and ordered MG York to conduct a reconnaissance in force to effect link-up with the Marines in western Santo Domingo. By mid-afternoon, at the cost of 2 KIA and 5 WIA, Palmer got the results he wanted. A 2.5 kilometer corridor had been secured linking the paratroopers at the Duarte Bridge and the 3/6 Marines in the ISZ, and significant details about the strength and disposition of the rebels in downtown Santo Domingo were confirmed.\textsuperscript{31}

With the link-up of US forces, Palmer's next step was toward consolidating the ground corridor connecting the paratroopers and Marines and establishing a cordon around rebel elements occupying the heart of the city. His visit to the Marines confirmed the importance of such a move:
Unfortunately, the ISZ, which included most of the foreign embassies and the best residential part of the capital, had some serious flaws as initially drawn. The US embassy found itself right on the front line (on Calle Leopoldo M. Navarro) marking the zone’s eastern edge, and a la Berlin the ISZ was an island with no secure overland access route to any other area in friendly hands. Lacking an airfield within its boundaries, it could not be reached except by helicopter or over the beach from the sea.  

Securing the corridor and adjusting the ISZ would contain the rebels and reduce risk to US forces, yet entail leaving critical installations in rebel hands. Palmer was confident this had to be done, and requested additional troops from XVIII Airborne Corps to execute the manpower intensive plan. Most importantly, Palmer was thinking in operational terms, and was planning for actions beyond the combat phase.

The “hot corner” episode pointed up a major weakness in CINCLANT’s contingency plans existing at the time: basically, they went no further than the introduction of US forces into an area for missions involving simply the evacuation of American citizens and the protection of US property. Lacking was an appreciation of the key places—government buildings, foreign embassies, telecommunication centers, TV and radio sites, news media offices, major utilities, and the like—that would have a significant bearing on broader missions involving stability or peacekeeping operations.  

On 2 May LTG Palmer received presidential permission to “turn loose the 82d” and establish the cordon around the southeastern portion of Santo Domingo. At 0001 hours, 3
May, three newly arrived battalions of the 82d Airborne Division’s 2d Brigade leapfrogged their way from the Duarte Bridge to the Marines in the "extended ISZ," making the rendezvous in just over one hour. In spite of problems recognizing friend or foe in the urban darkness, no casualties occurred. Over the next 48 hours, the corridor would be widened to off-set the potential of rebel ambushes. US forces could now provide food, water, and medical attention to noncombatants, "regardless of ideology."\(^{34}\)

To LTG Palmer, it was "abundantly clear that the corridor operation was the key military move in the entire Dominican venture."\(^{35}\) The enhanced "Line of Communication (LOC)" split rebel forces and trapped the Constitutionalist commander, COL Caamano, and up to 80% of his best men downtown in a suburb known as Cuidad Nueva. The ability of the rebels to conduct "future operations" in the northern environs of Santo Domingo was virtually extinguished by the joint checkpoints established at key intersections along the corridor. The rebels were now surrounded and outgunned; the threat of Constitutionalisists taking over the country by force had ended. \(^{36}\)
Stability Operations and Peacekeeping

Military leaders on the ground in Santo Domingo were unaware the opening of the "All American Expressway," or "Battle Alley," had moved the intervention into a new stage. LTG Palmer and MG York originally intended to use the expanded corridor as a jumping-off point for simultaneous and overwhelming ground and helicopter assaults on all sides of the rebel positions in Cuidad Nueva. York anticipated the rebels would be defeated in a matter of hours. But President Johnson never granted permission for the "offensive" by US forces. The Administration had come to the conclusion that since the "Communist" threat of takeover had been contained, further offensive military operations would be counterproductive to American interests.37

Throughout the next ten days, US forces consolidated their gains and began an uneasy transition to peacekeeping operations.38 More restrictive Rules of Engagement were imposed for the corridor and the ISZ. Mortar, artillery, tank, air and naval fires were prohibited. Access to the ISZ and the corridor was severely restricted. Checkpoints funneled a daily average of 22,000 vehicles and 35,000 pedestrians in and out of the corridor and the ISZ, choking
off the flow of contraband and weapons. Interlocking obstacles further incarcerated the rebels besieged in Cuidad Nueva. The Dominican National Police was reconstituted, and authorized to traverse the corridor and ISZ to perform law enforcement tasks.\textsuperscript{39}

The rebels soon turned to psychological warfare in an attempt to stir up the pot. They employed the multitude of studios and transmitter sites of Radio Santo Domingo as their primary weapon in a psychological offensive aimed at the United States, the Dominican leadership, and the Organization of American States (OAS). US ground, air, and sea-based jamming platforms initially attempted to counter the rebel broadcasts, while Dominican and US Special Forces attacked major relay stations outside Santo Domingo, but to no avail. Subsequent attempts at disrupting the ground telephone links of the main radio station and numerous transmitter sites were also not entirely successful, but did manage to cut-off rebel use of the commercial telephone system for tactical communications.\textsuperscript{40}

Following an official visit on 15 May by the national security advisor, McGeorge Bundy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus Vance, a new US policy of neutrality was implemented. Problems occurred instantly as the US
commanders discovered they did not have enough forces to physically restrain the Loyalists and Constitutionalists from sparring with each other all over Santo Domingo. This difficulty soon manifested itself during an unilateral attack against the rebels by the Loyalist forces that the US commanders could not stop. By the night of 15 May, the Dominican Army had captured the much sought after Radio Santo Domingo and had swept the rebels from the northeast portion of the city. US commanders felt like the "ham in the sandwich." 41

A relatively peaceful week followed, allowing OAS dignitaries to conduct a formal ceremony announcing the creation of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). Honduran, Nicaraguan, Paraguayan, Costa Rican, and Brazilian troops now joined the 22,000 US personnel and the Dominican Army in attempting to peacefully resolve the crisis. Within two more weeks, all Marines and most of the 82d Airborne Division had re-deployed to the United States. At this time in early June, US casualties totaled 18 KIA and 117 WIA, "a grim reminder of the perils of peacekeeping." 42

The last gasp of the Constitutionalist forces took place at 0730, 15 June 1965. Fully intending to gain
international sympathy for their besieged position in Cuidad Nueva, and to inflict as many casualties on the newly formed IAPF as possible, the rebels lashed out with heavy attacks against US forces in the corridor. Light tanks, mortars, and heavy machine guns engaged 82d positions while rebels maneuvered to overrun them in the most intense combat of the entire Dominican intervention.\footnote{43}

At dusk, LTG Palmer halted the 82d Airborne Division counterattack, and new defensive positions were consolidated. The action netted the American 56 square city blocks and several key points in Santo Domingo: the power plant, hospital, and the 250-year old Alcazar de Colon (Castle of Columbus), a major landmark of the New World.\footnote{44} Fighting diminished quickly over the next 24 hours, a clear sign that the rebels had been mauled. The attack was the "high water mark" of the rebellion. US units suffered 5 KIA and 36 WIA. Brazilian troops had 5 WIA. Rebel losses were estimated to be at least ten times the combined casualties.\footnote{45}

While it would take another three months of tense negotiations, the rebels finally surrendered their stronghold in Cuidad Nueva and were transported to the Dominican navy base at San Souci to be "repatriated."
"Demilitarizing" Cuidad Nueva, however, required one more tactical operation. On 25 October, three US parachute battalions, the Latin American brigade, and a tank company swept through the former rebel stronghold, meeting scattered, ineffectual resistance. In about an hour, Cuidad Nueva was secured. A few arms caches were uncovered, as well as "a fine haul of incriminating Communist documents." 46

Flare-ups took place occasionally in Santo Domingo, but the situation no longer warranted a large US presence. In January 1966 the US paratroopers re-deployed to Ft. Bragg, NC. By July 1966, the intervention was "officially" concluded. Eager to move on, the Johnson Administration now focused on a larger intervention in South Vietnam.

**Large-Scale Lessons Learned**

The lessons of the fight for Santo Domingo are especially relevant to 21st Century force projection operations. Aside from past major theatre of war operations, US military history is replete with examples of interventions: our "small wars." And in nearly every case a joint force was strategically deployed into the threatened theatre, oriented on securing force projection facilities for follow-on forces.
This infers an unavoidable connection between joint force projection and joint urban operations. 20th Century interventions, from Haiti in the early 1900s to Somalia in the 1990s, all demonstrate the strategic deployment force was oriented on a capital city or major urban center, where the international facilities were located, when it arrived. Santo Domingo in 1965 is a classic example of the logical linkage between strategic force projection and urban operations.

Santo Domingo had been a major Caribbean metropolitan area and regional littoral site since 1496. It had been a geo-political center of gravity since the discovery of the New World. 470 years later, this same national center of gravity incorporated international-level port facilities and airfields that were strategic air and sea ports of debarkation. Consequently, any joint strategic force deployment to the Dominican Republic would necessarily deliver the arrival force directly into proximity of a major urban environment like Santo Domingo. Whether delivered “downtown” or “in the suburbs,” a large-scale joint urban operation would be required to dominate the battlespace. Even an “off set” operation, in a rural area some distance from the city, still meant that the urban
area would have to be dealt with. Strategically and operationally, the urban area cannot be avoided.

The urban operation which took place in Santo Domingo, while small in comparison with Manila and Seoul, continues to show that the lack of operational planning for dealing with the urban center can have a direct and negative affect on the outcome of the entire strategic operation. At a quick glance, the battles of Manila and Santo Domingo appear very similar. In both instances, US forces followed the dictum of "attack first, then see what happens," and became involved in large-scale urban combat without an adequate operational plan.

Study of the battle of Santo Domingo shows how several operational problems yet to be addressed in the decade following Inchon. The recurring themes are:

1) inadequate operational planning;

2) lack of understanding of the city;

3) lack of operational surprise;

4) lack of intelligence dominance;

5) failure to quickly isolate the urban area;

6) failure to determine and successfully seize decisive points within the city;
7) failure to achieve speed in operational action;
8) failure to set the conditions for transition to follow-on operations.

**Operational Role of the City**

Like Manila, operations in and around Santo Domingo demonstrated an inadequate realization of the role of the Dominican capital in the intervention. The old Dominican saying "the Dominican Republic does as Santo Domingo does" sets the tone for the political role of the capitol. Santo Domingo dominated the political landscape in the Dominican Republic. Constitutionalists understood dominating the national urban center meant dominating the nation.

Dominance extended to the key points inside Santo Domingo which controlled the heart of the city and its population. Rebels rapidly seized media stations, hospitals, historic locations, and service infrastructure early in the actual civil war to exert dominance over the political situation in the capitol. Wrestling dominance of the urban center away from the rebels by recovering these critical sites enabled the US and Loyalists to achieve a solution to the crisis.

In spite of a country team and a military assistance and advisory group on the ground in the city, and a
contingency plan designed for the intervention, little serious thought seems to have been given about what to do with Santo Domingo before the landing of Marines and the deployment of paratroopers. There is no suggestion of pre-emptive action to preclude rebels from seizing decisive points inside the city, even though indicators of an impending coup were present.

The disjointed nature of operations during the week following the coup is an example of this poorly focused operation. Planners and commanders failed to seriously comprehend the size of the city, its political role in shaping the outcome of the crisis, and what forces would be required to regain and secure key sites, break the grip of the rebels on the city, and achieve lasting stability in Santo Domingo.

Task Group 44.9 had sufficient force was on station, on time, to execute both a NEO operation and secure vital facilities in Santo Domingo. Given the fact 6th MEU was off-shore several days in advance of the arrival of the paratroopers, a major opportunity was lost for seizing and securing critical terrain inside Santo Domingo. Their employment was piecemeal and narrowly defined. At the time, the primary concerns of US political leaders were the
American citizens in the city who had to be evacuated. Other than "circling the wagons" around the US embassy, essential targets in downtown Santo Domingo were not considered. The 6th MEU was employed in a reactionary, not proactive, fashion. The initiative was surrendered to the rebels. Fortunately, from every standpoint, the Constitutionalists were not "world class opposing force."

As has already been mentioned, rebels captured the hospital, radio station, and port facilities before the US could react. This is also a recurring theme. The rebels clearly saw those key points as operational targets and hastened to seize them. Command of the key facilities and historic sites in the Cuidad Nueva section of Santo Domingo gave the rebels a psychological dominance over the US and Loyalist actions. The propaganda issued by the Constitutionalist through Radio Santo Domingo is a clear example of their understanding of an essential operational, perhaps strategic, site.

The failure to arrive at essential operational decisions about the impending urban operations in general, and the key targets inside Santo Domingo in particular, elongated the timeline of securing the capital city. The deliberate constrained approach to the urban fighting also
stretched the deployment calendar. Long, drawn-out campaigns are anathema to the American psyche about employing contingency forces, but the US seems to find itself mired in these situations. "Home by Christmas" is usually the political leader's rally cry and always the ultimate desire of every deployed rifleman. But the fact of the matter is that without a well-thought out plan for large-scale constrained urban operations, assuming an involvement of about 12 months, no short duration operation is likely to take place.

Related to the size of the metropolitan area are the issues of length of time to secure it, and what this security looks like on the streets of the city. There is no outstanding evidence to suggest JCS, LANTCOM, or XVIII Airborne Corps planners conceived a 12 month-long engagement, involving 30,000 troops. This may be the most important lesson learned about large-scale urban operations: constrained urban operations in a large metropolitan area are going to take time and overwhelming force. This is no hit-and-run raid. Even in a "third world" country, overwhelming force is necessary, as is time.

Operational Planning
Once again, the examination of the fighting in Santo Domingo clearly shows that planning a major urban operation cannot be accomplished "on the fly." Inadequate planning leads to myopic, often dangerous assessment of the enemy threat, even if they are "unconventional" forces like COL Caamano's Constitutionalists. Decisive points within the metropolis are ignored or incorrectly determined. Inadequate planning drives "movement to contact learning" instead of deliberate, planned, aggressive action aimed at securing vital points in the city. "Attack and let's see what happens," means heavy casualties, and massive collateral damage, as was evident in Manila.

Operational planning means determining which decisive points inside the city dominate, or shape, the urban battlespace, strategically, operationally, and tactically. The US had no specific plan for how to achieve dominance over the situation in Santo Domingo following arrival of military forces. While timing is everything in a strategic power projection operation, battlespace dominance must first be achieved to set the conditions for success. Just arriving in country is not the guarantee of successful dominance. Planning for the most innocuous "show of force" must always account for the clear possibility of combat.
operations. Force Deterrence Operations (FDOs) may not influence the target audience.

This may be the reason why the employment of the task group and the Marines appeared hesitant, uncoordinated, and operationally insufficient. The impact of the arrival of JTF 122 off the Dominican shoreline on the Constitutionalist rebels could not be adequately gauged. "Gunboat diplomacy" did not translate into situational dominance. The initial motive for deploying the amphibious task group alongside Santo Domingo was to execute a NEO operation and remove US nationals from harm's way. Company-sized elements of 6th MEU conducted a textbook NEO, and it seemed the rebels barely blinked an eye.

Just how rapidly the situation in Santo Domingo deteriorated is instructive from the operational planning perspective. All of a sudden, evacuation of noncombatants involving a couple hundred Marines became joint strategic force projection of nearly 20,000 troops. It wasn't that the NEO went wrong, the situation changed. Operational plans did not account for a normal change in the situation. This was treating the symptoms, not the disease.

This resulted in a hasty operational plan that oriented on the "movement to the objective" instead of
"actions on the objective," which is always first. Without explicit understanding of the actions on the objective-moving out of the drop zone and airhead line, for example-attention focused on the most detailed segment of the deployment immediately confronting the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82d Airborne Division staffs. The issue of coordinating the onload of troops and equipment on 150 aircraft and getting them into theatre took precedent over what to do once there. Conspicuously absent were operational tasks for seizing and securing Santo Domingo and synchronization of operations with the Marines, Navy, and US government agencies on the ground.

Poor coordination, inadequate communications, and splintered command and control further disrupted the attempts at operational planning for the force projection operation. While the CINCLANT "off-the-shelf" OPLAN listed the number and type of forces necessary to intervene, there was little practical information about the target area itself. These deficiencies were not exclusively confined to unified headquarters. Army and Air Force OPLANS, just recently reviewed, showed major flaws in force projection onload sequencing and post-arrival sequels.
There were also many incidents of the chain of command being bypassed by higher headquarters attempting to interpret guidance or "assist" in planning the operation. While no new phenomena to military operations, it is important to recognize that senior leaders— to include the Commander in Chief—are going to call the shots during politically sensitive military forays. More often than not this "assistance and guidance" is going to occur at the most inopportune time. President Johnson did just that during the Dominican intervention, especially concerned about the status of noncombatants during the intensive fighting in Santo Domingo. Since future force projection/urban operations are going to include operational actions in national centers of gravity, the political ramifications of the lowest tactical action are inevitably going to be scrutinized and second-guessed. The problems become magnified when no operational plan exists for shaping and dominating the urban environment. It is imperative military leaders grasp the political-military significance inherent in large-scale urban operations.

Fighting in Santo Domingo also showed that one of the most important phases of the operations is the transition stage. Transition to stability or peacekeeping operations is the logical extension of urban operations. Commanders
and planners must determine before deployment what the transition strategy for follow-on operations is going to be. They must also establish the essential indicators for the decision to execute transition. In a "three block urban war," this transition may occur simultaneously with combat operations. A seamless transition may be idealistic, but it is a goal that must be planned for, even if not entirely achieved.

One of the biggest problems in the Dominican intervention was what to do after the rebels had been defeated. LTG Palmer, Ambassador Bennett, and the NCA agonized over the timing of the initiation of stability operations, peacekeeping, and hand-over to an international security force. As the rebels continued to hold on to Cuidad Nueva, the political task of defining military success and setting dates for transition became a heavy burden for the US and the Loyalists.

This determination of transition must, of course, track with the political leadership's articulated endstate for the mission. Arguably, the transition phase is encumbered with more political entrapments than the actual combat operation; but, it is absolutely vital to successful conclusion of the urban operation. Infrastructure
rebuilding and repatriation of the populace, not unlike that following a natural disaster, must be planned for in detail. Enhancements of the political institutions of the country in question, from precinct leadership to national level systems, may be necessary. Different forces other than combat troops may be used, requiring additional planning. This might include battle hand-over to Host Nation or Multinational Forces as was accomplished in Santo Domingo.

**Intelligence Dominance**

The failure to determine operational guidance for Santo Domingo occurred due to poor reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence. Not only is this a recurring theme of this monograph, some would insist it is the fundamental flaw of the "American Way of War." Future joint operations must rely on every element of intelligence collection, to include non-governmental agencies, to establish control and dominance of the battlespace and set conditions for urban operations. Given the fact that this operation took place in "our own backyard," with complete air and sea dominance, it is hard to reconcile the failure to achieve intelligence dominance over all aspects of the operational situation.
But this is a trap that threatens to capture future joint planners and commanders, as well. The lesson learned is continuous, redundant, all-source intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance must be employed to identify key urban centers of gravity or decisive points. Assumptions must be proved or discarded. All sources must focus on the enemy and the key points in the city.

At the outset of the intervention, reliable information concerning the enemy in the city was practically non-existent. The rebel Order of Battle (between 2000 and 4000 fighters, operating in 15-20 man commando units; the leader was COL Caamano) was not determined until the 82d Airborne Division staff established in-country liaison with the CIA, Marines, JTF 122, US Embassy, MAAG and Dominicans. For the most part, initial interagency participation in intelligence collection was not good. Embassy studies were outdated and their initial reports of the tactical situation in the city were vague and confusing. For some reason not explained in source material, Military Assistance and Advisory Group information was never counted on. CIA information was usually withheld due to classification restrictions. Twenty four Spanish-speaking FBI agents were eventually sent to Santo Domingo and worked very well during the stability
portion of the mission. When Peace Corps volunteers were located in Santo Domingo, most were reluctant to reveal much due to their sympathetic stand with the rebels.

US technology did not provide an edge. Signals intelligence dominance was never achieved. The US transmission intercept gear employed was designed to work on Soviet radios, not cheap Japanese walkie-talkies used by rebels. Jamming was largely unable to "wash-out" rebel propaganda broadcasts because the equipment was constructed to interfere with tactical radio frequencies, not civilian bandwidths. This lesson about over-reliance on technology should not be lost when future joint urban operations are considered.

Aerial reconnaissance and overhead imagery achieved mixed results. The 82d brought in its own air cavalry troop, but the helicopters were not used for intelligence gathering functions. The USAF 363d Composite Reconnaissance Squadron, which arrived at Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico on 2 May, consisted of 6 RF 101s, 3 RB 66s, and an aerial photo processing cell. This squadron provided the first good photos of key urban terrain features necessary for the operations in Santo Domingo, including detailed city maps issued to US troops after 7 May. USAF recce flights were
available but hampered by weather and the 1500’ minimum altitude restrictions established for Santo Domingo airspace.

HUMINT provided the most up-to-date information of Santo Domingo. The 1 May link-up between paratroopers and Marines yielded the best tactical intelligence about the situation in downtown Santo Domingo. Patrols reported roadblocks, snipers, tanks, rebel dispositions, and the status of civilians inside the city. When POWs turned themselves over to US troops “in bunches,” accelerated efforts by US commanders produced a Detainee Collection Point at San Souci, manned by Counter Intelligence teams. These interrogations at San Souci provided valuable political intelligence, sorely missing during the early days of the intervention.

Local infiltrators, under the supervision of the 7th Special Forces Group, gathered tactical intelligence. SF soldiers stationed at street-side checkpoints insured safe passage for these infiltrators, who provided detailed information on the rebels in Cuidad Nueva. To make sure the intelligence picture accounted for rebel influences outside of Santo Domingo, 7th SF Group conducted “Operation Green Chopper” in the Dominican countryside. Beginning
work on 4 May, SF troopers traveled in civilian clothes with CIA personnel, posing as UN AID representatives, visiting 50 towns outside the capital.

**Civic Action Programs, Civil Affairs, and PSYOPS**

Urban operations in Santo Domingo include several positive accomplishments worth noting for future situations. While US civil affairs and psychological operations do not appear to have been considered during the initial stages of the intervention, they were absolutely critical to re-establishing stability in Santo Domingo.

Civic action-civil affairs program began as soon as Marines and paratroopers established the cordon and corridors in Santo Domingo. The first few days of the urban operation consisted mostly of voluntary handouts of food and medical attention, but by 3 May US troops were distributing rice, powdered milk, cornmeal, beans, cooking oil, water, and clothing to the population. Distribution centers were at first mobbed by crowds of Dominicans until accountability measures were enacted. Medical clinics drew large groups of patients, but there were few problems with the civilians. Eventually, 15,000 tons of food and 15,000 pounds of clothing would reach Dominican citizens.
Garbage and dead bodies littered the streets of Santo Domingo and were adding to the potential of disease among the city's inhabitants. Military engineers quickly took to the task of repairing power generation facilities, water works, incinerators, and reinforcing sanitation efforts.

Civil affairs was "one of the most important missions during these early days" of operations in Santo Domingo, executed extremely well by functional teams of the 42d Civil Affairs Company which arrived in-country between 2-6 May 1965. The most successful teams were the Public Facilities Team and the Public Welfare Team, who picked up from combat troops the responsibilities for restoring garbage collection, food distribution, electricity, and water to the city. At the same time, while these programs were highly successful, problems occurred in civil-military cooperation and coordination when Department of State and AID officials and Civil Affairs teams duplicated efforts and failed to synchronize actions.

One lesson of particularly great utility is that the civic action and civil affairs programs aimed at providing humanitarian aid, promoting stability, and "winning the hearts and minds" of the Dominicans dovetailed with the psychological operations profile for the intervention.
While only a small mobile team of soldiers from the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion (FT. Bragg) had arrived by 2 May, work was initiated immediately in coordination with the United States Information Services director in Santo Domingo.

The remainder of the battalion flowed into country on 7 May. In the space of a few days they were able to conduct a leaflet drop over Santo Domingo and many high-profile truck-mounted broadcasts around the city. Psychological operations would play an important part throughout the rest of the intervention.

Operational planners saw the benefits of trying to win the hearts and minds of the indigenous populace and would employ civil affairs and psychological operations in greater magnitude in Vietnam, especially in villages and cities. While the issue of when to deploy these troops in relation to combat forces was largely unresolved, it was apparent that "information operations" was one more weapon in the arsenal of the US power projection military. It was also evident that information operations would need to be synchronized with combat operations to create a coherent operational effort, particularly during large-scale urban operations.
Chapter Ten

DRAGON IN THE CITY: PROPOSED OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR JOINT POWER PROJECTION AND JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS

Force projection that only gets to the periphery of the area of operations is not successful; a force projection...is irrelevant if the forces cannot be landed...

MAJ Frank R. Boynton, USMC

A prudent general...must always keep an eye on the opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him armed only with an ornamental rapier.

Clausewitz

The commander charged with making decisions needs to understand the operational and strategic implications of a tactical struggle in an urban area.

Marine Corps Warfighting Pub 3-35.3

The indicators of 21st Century conflict are already evident in the joint power projection events of the 1990s. Control of large-scale urban littoral centers of gravity like Panama City, Mogadishu, and Port-au-Prince facilitated attainment of US national strategic objectives. In each of these instances, joint forces were required to execute force projection operations from US bases into theatre arrival facilities dominated by cities with millions of inhabitants.

These recent missions are undeniably the most salient demonstration of the connection between Joint Power
Projection and Joint Urban Operations. Deploying overseas and dealing with national urban centers upon arrival are inevitable consequences of US National Security Strategy.

Joint Force Commanders must understand the connection between strategic deployment and the execution of joint urban operations to secure theatre arrival facilities. Joint commanders must have a thorough appreciation of the three-dimensional nature of urban operations, as well as explicit understanding of the anatomy of large-scale metropolitan areas. To successfully deploy joint forces into theatre—whether opposed or unopposed—the Joint Force Commander must set conditions for success in, above, and around the urban area.⁴

The Joint Force Commander's campaign plans for force projection and joint urban operations must be designed to achieve unity of effort by all Services and US governmental agencies. Yet it is absolutely imperative that the activities of US military forces and governmental agencies, allied and coalition forces, and international, non-governmental, and private voluntary groups are all synchronized to achieve success.
Proposed Functions, Subtasks, and Supporting Joint Operational Tasks

A framework for developing a strategic force projection and joint urban operations campaign plan consists of the following inter-related functions:

Set Conditions/Shape
Prepare/Isolate
Attack/Penetrate
Exploit/Consolidate
Terminate/Transition

Within each of these five functions, proposed Universal Joint Tasks will be displayed that facilitate accomplishment of the supporting subtasks.

Set Conditions/Shape

The Joint Force Commander evaluates the urban battlespace to determine the implications for military operations. This evaluation considers the anatomy of the large-scale urban area and the complex cultural interactions of the inhabitants. The Joint Force Commander must evaluate the prosecution of the three-block war. He must be aware of the existing infrastructure support and how he can capitalize on it as an economy of force measure.

The Joint Force Commander must recognize the details of the time-distance calculations inherent in deploying the
number and type of forces from CONUS into the arrival theatre. This implies plans for either a strategic forced entry or an unopposed entry operation to gain access to critical air and sea craft arrival locations. Location of ports and airfields, and how the city dominates both, is vital to sound planning to get in theatre.

Urban Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (UIPB) must involve agencies in and out of the government. Shaping / Setting the Conditions for Success must be fulfilled before main effort forces are deployed into the threatened theatre. The Joint Force Commander must focus his intelligence collection on enemy positions, key nodes in the city, and other infrastructure facilities that must be controlled to successfully dominate the urban area.

To Shape/Set Conditions requires the Joint Forces Commander to Control the Battlespace by conducting Advance Force Battle Shaping, establishing the Full-Dimensional Force Protection "Umbrella," and achieving Domination of the Battlespace to Transition to the Isolation Phase.

Advance Force Battle Shaping consists of employing every available intelligence collection apparatus and system to provide a clear, unambiguous picture of the situation in theatre, before, during, and after the strategic deployment and joint urban operation. Advance
Forces are special and conventional forces deployed well in advance of intended strategic deployment. These forces initiate the isolation of the operational area by conducting deception operations and "clearing the route" for the main body. In conjunction with a variety of governmental and non-governmental agencies, advance force "humans" conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence assessment on the ground.

Success in Advance Force Battle Shaping is achieved once two subtasks are completed: Achieve Commander's Critical Information Requirements on the Joint Operational Area in preparation for strategic entry operations, and Employ Continuous, Multi-tiered, All-Source Intelligence Collection Effort to identify enemy centers of gravity and monitor status of noncombatants.

Battleshaping means synchronizing strategic and operational intelligence activities such as National assets, HUMINT sources, "reach-back" to National Intelligence System data (road systems, bridges, underground systems, building blue prints, key economic/life support sites, demographics, essential political, historic, religious, cultural data, identification of key nodes and centers of gravity). The endstate is that the Joint Force Commander has achieved
domination over the deployment area, transit area (air and sea LOCs), and operational area (large-scale littoral center and surrounding area) before launching joint forces.

Achieving Domination of the Battlespace consists of achieving access to communications networks and information systems within the Joint Operational Area. This includes protection of friendly information and sources, simultaneously employing offensive information warfare and defensive counter-operations. Accomplishment of this task supports the essential deception effort. Without fulfillment of this task, transition to the isolation phase is jeopardized.

**Prepare/Isolate**

The Prepare/Isolate Phase consists of one subtask:

**Employ Multiple Levels of Isolation.** This task requires both active and passive isolation activities to cut off the enemy from the support he needs and to cut off external support and reinforcement to the enemy inside the urban area. It also describes continuous efforts to isolate key nodes inside the urban area such as airports, sea ports, communications networks, power grids, etc.

Multiple levels means continued intelligence collection and denial operations, concurrent with establishment of electronic, psychological, and physical
"barriers" to separate the combatants from the city-dwellers. It must be understood that physical isolation of a city the size of Manila is impracticable. Consequently, detailed analysis and employment of every conceivable electronic, informational, and psychological platform must occur to achieve redundant coverage on the target to be isolated.

The Joint Force Commander must be able to get his forces into theatre safely, without interdiction, while simultaneously protecting the infrastructure of the large urban area. Without complete preparation—which may take some time—the likelihood of executing "unconstrained" urban warfare increases. Without precision timing— isolation complete, indicators for launch met, launch executed—the full effects of joint power projection and joint urban operations are lost or degraded.

**Penetrate/Attack**

This phase entails *Simultaneous Seizure of Operational Objectives* and *Conduct Continuous Attack*. Joint Forces enroute from CONUS are executing Precision Insertion, oriented on attacking to seize entry facilities, critical nodes, lines of communication under a blanket of deception intended to paralyze enemy reactions to the arrival and minimize civilian interference.
Arrival of forces by air and sea are intended to immediately seize airfields and port facilities and establish lodgment for immediate follow-on airland or maritime delivery of vital Combat Support, Combat Service Support, Allied, and Special Operations Forces to continue the attack and achieve dominance over the urban infrastructure. Full Dimensional Force Protection remains in place during this vulnerable stage of the operation. Precision Engagement occurs with lethal (current inventory of cruise missile and smart bombs) and non-lethal means (continued jamming and intercept operations, interruption of the power grid, etc.).

Concurrent with seizure of entry facilities is the attacks to secure key nodes within the urban area. With Advance Forces in proximity, attack forces can be vectored successfully and immediately informed of changes in developments regarding the target sites. Information warfare operations intensify to establish legitimacy for the insertion of joint forces and degrade the affect of the enemy's propaganda mechanism. Meanwhile, Focused Logistics are occurring as the supplies for the joint forces and the inhabitants of the urban area arrive as soon as facilities are secured.
Conduct Continuous Attack is described as deeper penetration, thrust, swarm, and convergence of joint forces as new centers of gravity emerge or shift. Heavy Civil Affairs, Logistics, Medical, and Psychological Operations elements move inside the urban area to strengthen the grip on the infrastructure and life support systems. Critical cultural, historic, religious, or host nation governmental centers are secured in order to facilitate winning the hearts and minds of the noncombatants.

**Exploit/Consolidate**

The Joint Force Commander continues the application of all capabilities at his disposal to overwhelm enemy forces within the urban area, secure the lodgment, and reinforce the urban life support systems. Two subtasks must be accomplished: **Position Forces for Comprehensive Control** and **Gain Control of the Infrastructure**.

The Joint Forces Commander must now face one of the more nebulous adversaries involved in urban operations—the urban guerrilla. The large urban area is now at its most vulnerable period—the gray period when hostilities are winding down and the internal governmental facilities are still incapable of complete control functions. Looting, repression, assassination, sniping, and crimes against
persons or property are by-products of urban warfare operations.

The Joint Force Commander must now conduct intensive law enforcement, humanitarian, and civil affairs operations while completing the mop-up of enemy pockets of resistance in the big city. He must task organize "911" teams, strategically located at the critical nodes in the city, to respond to guerrilla-type activities. These operations are concurrent with information warfare tasks designed to stabilize the situation.

The Joint Force Commander is now well into the process of achieving the conditions for the termination and transition phase that began even before he arrived in theatre. This is a clear indicator of the inter-relationship of all facets of the joint urban operations campaign plan.

Termination/Transition

The Joint Forces Commander must have had detailed dialogue with his military and political superiors about the termination of conflict determination and the transition to follow-on activities well before the execution of joint military action. If that is not the case, this phase will be fraught with indecision, vacillation, and counter-marching, and could conceivably
unhinge everything heretofore achieved in the joint force projection/joint urban operation.

This is the time when the operation is in its most vulnerable political stage, perhaps even more critical than the decision to deploy in the first place. The US proclivity for quick and decisive victory-the "attention deficit disorder" of American foreign policy-begins to sap the energy of the joint forces deployed in theatre and left uncontrolled, threatens to undermine the long-term implications of the operations. The ripple effect touches the host nation elements and allies lining up for the battle hand-over to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations.

The Joint Forces Commander must begin transition to peacekeeping operations and non-governmental agencies support operations as soon as possible, preferably as soon as lodging facilities are secured. The planning for termination and transition must be as thorough as the deployment concept of operations.

The Joint Forces Commander will be conducting his most vigorous and intensive liaison with allies and non-governmental agencies at this time. The method of synchronization and integration of these elements into the
total termination/transition effort must be explicitly and simply expressed by the Joint Forces Commander.

Essentially, the Joint Forces Commander is moving into the phase of the joint operation inversely related to what he experienced during strategic deployment and lodgment. His attention is now drawn toward arms control operations, combating terrorism, support to counter-drug activities and other law enforcement missions. Additionally, joint forces are involved in enforcement of sanctions and maritime interception efforts, enforcement of air and sea exclusion zones and freedom of navigation rights, legal issues, enhanced humanitarian assistance, interagency support, recovery operations, and peace operations.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this monograph has been to underscore the fact that there is an ever-increasing likelihood that US forces will be required to conduct operations in large-scale urban areas in the near future. More importantly, this paper has attempted to show the inescapable connection between Joint Power Projection and Joint Urban Operations. In the final analysis, how US forces deploy, and in what configuration, has direct impact on the execution of the urban operations in theatre.
Global urbanization has made major littoral urban centers an even more strategically and operationally important aspect of US National Security Strategy. However, as this study has shown, US strategy maintains urban warfare will occur only as a last resort by the adversary in a specific region. The truth of the matter is the urban option will be the first choice for those enemies determined-and trained-to off-set US technological advantages.

The US cannot afford to view urban warfare as an avoidable proposition. Likewise, the US military cannot continue to believe the deployment of force into a theatre with a huge urban area will suffice as a deterrent to the adversary intent on controlling the respective country or region. Getting there is indeed half the problem; but only half. As operations in Manila and Santo Domingo have shown, what is done once in the city determines mission success or failure.

To be successful in future joint urban operations, the joint force commander and his planners must focus on controlling the battlespace around the metropolitan area. It is imperative that the commander set the conditions for the insertion of forces to seize key terrain and critical nodes essential to the simultaneous eviction of the enemy
and the protection of the urban infrastructure.
Unconstrained urban warfare, like in Manila in 1945, is a
thing of the past.

The commander must use all assets available to him.
Future urban operations are joint operations. The
capabilities of joint forces, allies, and interagency
organizations must be synchronized and integrated to
achieve synergistic operational affects. This combat power
must then be applied concurrently, not sequentially.

This study has shown that US doctrine for joint power
projection and joint urban operations is woefully
inadequate for the impending tasks of the immediate future.
New doctrine, more studies, and more exercises are required
to move away from the Euro-centric MOUT techniques of the
late 1970s and the Gulf War build-up schemes of the early
1990s. It's joint warfighting now, not unilateral service
campaigns. It's rapid joint task force projection now, not
leisurely, yearlong build-up of combat power in front of an
accommodating enemy.

The vast array of simulation centers must be recruited
to be the testing grounds for emerging power projection and
large-scale joint urban operations doctrine. Vital to this
initiative is the "work up" of the perplexing issues of
force composition, phasing, and delivery into the Joint
Operational Area. Our Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) rotations involving division and corps staffs does not focus on how the force gets into theatre, or how long it takes to get there. The same can be said for the USACOM UNITED ENDEAVOR series of joint staff exercises. Consequently, the toughest problems are glossed over, and force-on-force combat actions are evaluated with the assumption that the joint force commander can and will get all forces in theatre before he must deal with the enemy. This is not only impractical and unrealistic, it reinforces the wrong lessons.

The Department of Defense must take the lead of the United States Marine Corps and get serious about training joint forces in large US littoral urban areas. DoD must lay the groundwork to enable training events as intended for Monterrey, California to occur. It is essential for joint forces to understand the nuances and complexities of deploying to and executing the three-block war. Obviously, Congressional support will make or break this proposition. Perhaps the idea of fiscal reimbursement for "training land" will make the concept more attractive to large littoral urban centers in the United States.

US Army Combat Training Centers must develop training and evaluation opportunities beyond the battalion-sized
MOUT problems currently available at those respective installations. Rotations at all three Army training sites are confined to no more than three city blocks of urban area, usually without appropriate civilian interface, and normally without any participation by governmental agencies or other service components. No training center evaluates a strategic joint force deployment into a large urban area. The wrong lessons are being learned.

Most importantly, new training opportunities must be joint task force oriented-Marines, Navy, Air Force, Special Operations Forces, and governmental agencies must all participate to achieve the level of intensity required of large-scale urban operations. We have to stop kidding ourselves with ideas that accept minimal participation by two services as the method in which we will execute large-scale joint urban operations in the future. We have to make the strategic deployment of forces an essential element of the overall problem. Services currently conduct unilateral Emergency Deployment Readiness Exercises; imagine joint EDREs into large urban areas.

Can this be done? The answer is yes, but it will take the enthusiastic support and concurrence of senior service leaders, perhaps under the auspices of USACOM, to align budgets and training calendars. The training vehicle best
suited to make this happen is the JTFEX series of joint exercises already scheduled by the Joint Staff and USACOM. All that needs to be done is to incorporate a large-scale joint urban operation within a strategic power projection scenario.

Ultimately, it comes down to US soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who end up paying the price for unpreparedness. The US military has heard the cries of "no more Task Force Smiths" before, but the lessons of history and recent events fail to attract attention. As LTC (Ret) Ralph Peters has concluded:

"An urbanizing world means combat in cities, whether we like it or not. We do not want to touch this problem. But we have no choice. The problem is already touching us with skeletal, infected fingers. The US military must stop preparing for its dream war and get down to the reality of the fractured and ugly world in which we live—a world that lives in cities. We must begin judicious restructuring for urban combat—we must seize the future before the future seizes us."
ENDNOTES

Chapter One

1 Harold W. Nelson, Space and Time in On War, (Michael I. Handel, ed., Clausewitz and Modern Strategy), pg. 146.

Chapter Two

2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.

Chapter Three

4 ibid, p 6
6 ibid, p 2.
7 ibid
8 ibid, p 4.
9 ibid, p 5-6.
13 ibid, p 3.
15 RAND Corporation, "Denying the Widow-maker", p 66.
17 ibid, p 4.
Chapter Four

3 National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, "Strategic Assessment 1998", pg. 137. (Hereafter cited as "Strategic Assessment").
4 op cit., p 33.
6 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 ibid.
12 ibid, pg. 5.
13 ibid, pg. 8.
14 ibid, p. 18.
17 "DNSS Readings", p. 459.

Chapter Five

3 ibid, p 1.
4 ibid, p vii.
5 ibid, p v-vi.
Chapter Six

3 Literature search failed to identify any SAMS monographs before or after the 1994-1996 time frame that are oriented on urban operations. The specific reason for this research void is unknown.
4 At the time of this essay, no evidence has been uncovered detailing the study of urban operations doctrine as a mandatory topic for either one of the two monographs required of SAMS candidates. A matter of conjecture at this time, the influence of LTC Russell Glenn may be at work here.
5 Boynton, p 18. Russell Glenn served as Boynton's monograph director while the former completed the Advanced Operational Fellowship at the School of Advanced Military Studies.
6 ibid.
7 ibid, p 20.
9 ibid, p 44.
Chapter Seven

1 Urban Working Group, J-8, Joint Staff, "Draft Operational Concept for Joint Urban Operations", 27 January 1999, p 1. This document was acquired with the assistance of LTC Steve Lindberg, Center for Strategic Leadership. It is assumed that this document was prepared by LTC Duane Schattle, USMC, J8, Land and Littoral Warfare Assessment Directorate (LLWJCAD), between December 1998 and late January, 1999. Hereafter cited as "Draft Concept".

2 Urban Working Group, J-8, Joint Staff, draft introduction to proposed "Operational Concept for Joint Urban Operations", undated, p 8. This document was also procured from LTC Steve Lindberg, Center for Strategic Leadership. It is assumed that this document was likewise prepared by LTC Duane Schattle, USMC, J8, LLWJ, between December 1998 and late January, 1999. Hereafter cited as "Draft Introduction".

3 ibid, pp 8-9.

4 Urban Working Group, J-8 Land and Littoral Warfare Joint Capabilities Assessment Directorate (LLWJCAD), Information Paper, Subject: Joint Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) Study, p 1. 1997 seems to be the year that Army and Marine programs got off the ground. Strong evidence suggests the Marine Corps was the first service to envision cities as the future battleground and vigorously anticipated the requirements for renewed study of urban operations. The timing of the formal organizational adoption of this mindset in the Marine Corps is a matter of conjecture (see United States Marine Corps Warfighting Lab URBAN WARRIOR Homepage document "Why Urban Warrior", 30 March 1998,
pp 1-2). In any event, the USMC leadership in urban operations studies has been unabashedly conspicuous and enormously successful; the Army seems to be consumed with Advanced Warfighting Experimentation (AWE) concepts of digitized, open-terrain warfare, relegating urban operations studies to a distant second place. Hereafter cited as "Information Paper".

5 op cit, p 5. Participants in the UWG include representatives from OSD, various CINC HQs, Joint Staff, DIA, NIMA, JWAC, NRO, Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, TRADOC, USMC CDDC, GAO, and others.


7 See "Draft Introduction", p 9, and "Information Paper", p 1. None of the actual start dates for these contracts is available. In the absence of other information, it will be assumed that these studies were initiated concurrently. Similarly, no information is available which details study completion deadlines or the dates and times of JROC and DPAG IPRs. Based on the dates of the documents on hand, it is reasonable to conclude that the period of Phase I was 12 months in length (Nov 97-Nov 98).


9 ibid. Research methods included participating in a RAND-sponsored MOUT conference with the US Army Infantry School's Dismounted Battlespace Battle Lab and a 23 April 1998 conference co-hosted by J8 LLWAD and SAIC involving a panel of retired flag officers.

10 ibid, p 3.

11 ibid, p 5.

12 ibid, p 6.

13 ibid.

14 ibid, p 7.

15 ibid.

16 ibid.

17 ibid, p 7n.

18 ibid, p 8.

19 ibid.

20 ibid, p 9.

21 ibid.

22 ibid.

23 ibid, p 9n.

24 ibid, pp 10-17. The options for MOUT doctrine proposed by the researchers is instructive in that it gives a glimpse into the dynamics of doctrine development at the highest echelons of the US military. Inferred heavily are the requisite "turf battles" associated with determination of roles and missions.

The options for doctrine are outlined in a decision matrix on page 10 of the SAIC text. It is interesting to note that the US Air Force is singular in its opinion that no stand-alone joint urban operations doctrine is necessary.

Review of the contentious issues also gives insight into the complexity of future joint urban operations. What to call "urban operations"-MOUT, MOBA, etc-has long been an issue, but this underscores the differing opinions about the nature of urban warfare. MOUT has been used in this portion of the monograph to remain
consistent with the SAIC sources. There appears to be no doctrinal consensus on whether it is "MOUT" or "urban operations".

It is vital to the understanding of this entire process to remember that doctrine is based on existing capabilities. Much of the problem in Army circles is the influence of the Joint Vision 2010 doctrine, quite likely to prove to be inadequate for urban operations when the time comes.


26 ibid, p 10. Convoluted as this may appear, the UWG was at least making things happen. The Marines are recognized for their great work on urban doctrine and get the lead assignment; the Army is in "overwatch", but can concentrate on AWE; the Air Force is appeased for its non-concurrence about a stand-alone joint publication. The role of the Navy is unknown.


28 ibid.

29 ibid.

30 ibid. While it is not the express purpose of this particular essay to dig deeply into the M&S dilemma, it is the opinion of this writer that there are a multitude of less expensive options currently available in the field that would solve the problem. Specifically, the potential of marrying existing simulations like WARSIM, CBS, and JANUS is attractive, and feasible. Off-the-shelf civilian gaming software should not be ruled out. If the Army would simply grant the authority for the Center for Strategic Leadership simulations experts to host a meeting of CONUS installation simulation directors, an interim, high-payoff technical solution would probably be accomplished in record time.

31 ibid, p 2.

32 "Draft Introduction", p 11.

33 ibid. Six issues are on the docket for further review: Urban Terrain database construction; Joint MOUT Center of Excellence/Analysis; Joint MOUT Training and Facilities; Service Studies on Precision Effects, Combined Arms, Airpower, Rotorcraft, Armor, Information, Space, Logistics, etc; and "yet to be identified needs".

34 ibid.

Chapter Eight


2 ibid, p 511 and endnotes p 606.


4 See FM 90-10 (Military Operations in Urban Terrain), 1979, et al.

5 ibid.

Chapter Nine

3 ibid, pp 1-9.
4 ibid, p 24. Yates states in his monograph that the coup was executed right under the noses of the US mission to the Dominican Republic. He
contends this occurred due to the veil of secrecy maintained by the insurgents, even after several key figures of their party were incarcerated, and to the abject US intelligence failure. This complacency of in-country intelligence gatherers stands out as a salient lesson about shaping battle space for force projection operations.

ibid, p 18.

ibid, p 35. Johnson was described as the "Dominican desk officer" for his personal, hands-on approach to direction of the day-to-day policy formulation.

ibid, p 34.

ibid. Johnson is quoted as asking his advisors, "What can we do in Vietnam if we can't clean up the Dominican Republic".

ibid, p 38. Before President Johnson returned from Camp David, State Department Director of Caribbean Affairs Kennedy Crockett acted on a "contingency basis", in accordance with established procedure but without presidential authority, and asked DoD to send ships to Dominican waters in case US citizens should need to be evacuated.

ibid, pp 39-43. Task Group 44.9 consisted of six naval vessels and 6th MEU (3d Battalion, 6th Marines). At noon on Tuesday, Commodore Dare, commander of TG 44.9, ordered two ships into Haina Port to receive the bus loads of evacuees. Approximately one company of non-uniformed Marines assisted in the evacuation of the Americans.

ibid, p 49. The US had "decided" it would back the Loyalists vice the rebels, believed to be Communists. The manner in which this conclusion was reached is an example of how dangerous misinformation and flawed assumptions can poison the best intentions of the NCA.

ibid, p 51. Confusion reigned during this period in Santo Domingo and in Washington. The President and his key advisors were meeting with Congress to outline the extent and rationale for US intervention in the Dominican Republic, based on Bennett's early report that no US citizens were in harm's way. Simultaneously, Ambassador Bennett made a direct request to Commodore Dare for Marines to land.

ibid, p 51.

ibid, pp 52-53. Yates details an instructive lesson of how communications, coordinations, and the "frenzied activities of key decision-makers under stressful conditions" can reveal weaknesses in an administration's crisis management system.

ibid, pp 61-63. Extremely important lessons regarding force projection operations are revealed in Yates' review of what was happening at Ft. Bragg, NC during the last week of April. First, there was great confusion in the alert notification sequence from JCS was abrogated. Next, LANTCOM OPLAN 310/2-65, updated by JCS in early 1965, was disregarded in the execute instructions. This OPLAN stipulated provisions for contingency missions including show of force, blockade, NEO, and all-out intervention. On top of this, neither Corps nor 82d planners had coordinated with the USAF to revise air movement details of this OPLAN. Consequently, strategic airlift to the Dominican Republic turned into a "keystone cops" affair.

ibid, p 62.

ibid, p 64. There was also non-existent communications between intelligence staffs at the higher echelons. Ten intel messages were received at 82d HQ during the 48 hour planning drill, fashioned primarily from newspaper accounts.

ibid.
ibid, p 69. Yates writes that York was incensed at the decision, and requested permission to execute just the heavy drop portion of the assault force. There was absolutely no Material Handling Equipment on the ground capable of off-loading C-130s.

ibid. Turning-off the jump negated any show of force FDO that would have aided in subsequent dealings with rebels in Santo Domingo. US planners would have déjà vu circumstances in Haiti 30 years later.

More problematic were the tight runway conditions of the San Isidro airfield. This severely limited Maximum On-Ground (MOG) capacity for off-loading troops and cargo. York appeared to be aware of this fact (but not much other intelligence) and styled his objections to the airland mission from it. In any event, the 33 paratroop-filled C-130s landed first, followed by 56 equipment loads, while 65 of the 111 heavy drop aircraft flew to Ramey AFB, Puerto Rico and waited for an opportunity to deliver payloads.

Speaking of lunacy, paratroopers had not been issued any ammunition during in-flight rigging for the parachute assault even though the airfield was considered potentially hostile, at best. If York made this call, he had no right braying about the Administration's change in mission.

ibid, pp 76-77.

See both Palmer and Yates. There is no evidence to suggest that initial entry operations vicinity Santo Domingo were ever more than separate navy-marines or army-air force operations. It appears (Yates) that even though LANTCOM OPLAN 310/2-65 stipulated joint marine and airborne operations involving 6 airborne battalions and 4 battalion landing teams, and associated combat support and combat service support elements, the plan was thrown out the window at the first sign of the crisis. A good "what if?" problem to analyze would be the US military response if Commodore Dare's task group had not been in proximity to the Dominican Republic when intervention was directed by the JCS. It would seem fair to assume the US plan would probably have looked quite similar to OPLAN 310/2-65. Clearly, the most important factor in contingency response is the time-distance-space issue.


See Library of Congress Internet Country Study: Dominican Republic and Dominican Republic Press Kit (www.domrep.hotels.com). Santo Domingo was founded in 1496 by Christopher Columbus' brother Bartolome. In the 1960s, 80% of the Dominican population lived in Santo Domingo. The city doubled in population and area every decade from 1920 on. Santo Domingo was home to the first university, hospital, monastery, fort, and palace in the Americas. All of these locations would figure prominently in the ensuing urban fighting in 1965.

ibid, p 35.

ibid, p 36.

ibid.

ibid.

ibid, p 77. President Johnson was referring to the bloody suppression by the Soviets of a popular uprising in Budapest in 1956.

Yates, p 77.

Palmer, p 39.

ibid, p 41.

ibid, p 42.

Yates, p 96.
Palmer, p 51.
36 Yates, p 94. Marines and paratroopers fired on each other several times in the darkness when both parties misunderstood the direction of incoming rebel sniper fires. It took MG York walking into the middle of the street separating the two groups and yelling for them to stop shooting.
37 ibid, p 96.
38 Palmer, p 53.
39 ibid, p 54.
40 ibid, p 55. The combined special forces operations were the most successful. On 5 May a major telecommunications center at Alto Banderay was seized and made non-operational. On 6 May the TV station at El Cumbre was knocked out. On 14 May the alternate radio station and transmitter near the Duarte Bridge were destroyed. The operational importance of these type missions for special forces units would resurface in future US intervention efforts.
41 ibid, p 60.
42 ibid, p 80.
43 ibid, p 82.
44 ibid, p 83. 82d Abn Div troops eventually repaired the external damage on the Alcazar de Colon, earning the gratitude of the Dominican government. Palmer halted the counterattack because of the political sensitivity of "perpetuating the Budapest of the Western Hemisphere" and of decreasing the leverage of the OAS leadership.
45 ibid.
46 Yates, p 164.
47 ibid, p 133.
48 ibid, p 137.

Chapter Ten

2 Harold W. Nelson, Space and Time in On War, (Michael I. Handel, ed., Clausewitz and Modern Strategy), pg. 146
5 Peters, Ralph, LTC, USA, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities", Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly-Spring 1996, p 43
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