ENHANCING DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA: POLICY, POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS

BY

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Enhancing Defense Cooperation with Russia: Policy, Potential and Pitfalls

by

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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This study describes U.S. Department of Defense efforts at engaging Russia in an effective and meaningful defense cooperative relationship. It reviews U.S. motivations for engagement policy with Russia. The paper describes and analyzes the successes and challenges to the policies and programs. Finally, the study examines the impediments in establishing an effective cooperative relationship and suggests strategies for overcoming these pitfalls.
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ENHANCING DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA: POLICY, POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and following the dramatic events in Russia in 1991, 1993 and the near economic collapse of 1998, policy-makers and analysts in the United States have hastened to search for opportunities to build, maintain and enhance cooperative ties with Russia. This project examines U.S. Department of Defense policy, efforts in establishing cooperative programs, the motivation behind engagement policy and potential impediments in achieving our goals. The Department of Defense has a wide range of policy options from which to choose. The key to success would seem to be in choosing the best programs and policies. However, in the course of detailed study, DOD planners might find themselves hampered by their own concept of success and the limits of actual U.S. influence in Russia.

WHY SHOULD WE HELP?

A LEGACY OF HISTORY AND COMMITMENT

"I need not tell you gentlemen that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the
man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments. in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world."1

The text above enjoins Americans to look toward Europe and turn their attention to the impending problems of society there. It was not written in 1999, nor is it from the President’s current National Security Strategy. It is the opening paragraph of George C. Marshall’s famous 1947 speech that heralded the Marshall Plan in Europe. It is possible to hypothesize that the legacy of the destruction of Nazi Germany only ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin wall. Viewed in this way, U.S. involvement with Russia today can be viewed as an extension of promises the United States made to Europe in 1945. On the 50th anniversary of the Marshall plan, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote,

"In fact the point of the Marshall Plan was not to rebuild Europe at all, but to build an entirely new Europe. . . . It is visible in the institutions that ended centuries of European conflict, transcended old ways of thinking, and formed the basis for West European and Trans-Atlantic Unity . . . We must remember that Marshall aid was open to all . . ."2

Today, the President’s National Security Strategy enjoins the United States to engage Russia towards building better ties and reducing the risks presented by instability. This task is
difficult enough among countries when there are no contentious issues or nagging problems. With a Post-Communist Russia in economic decay and political turmoil, the task of building solid relations that help stabilize security is paramount. Given the nature of the mission, success is very difficult. Recent speakers at the Army War College have highlighted the importance of cooperative defense ties as the basis for strengthening the political, economic and diplomatic facets of national security. Likewise, leading political scientists focus on stability of the military as the best indicator of the overall health of a political system. For example, Professor Dale Herspring, Chairman of the Political Science Department at Kansas State University writes, "... the armed forces are usually the strongest, most cohesive, and most disciplined organization in a polity. If they have lost cohesion and discipline, then the outlook for the political system is bleak." Herspring concludes his analysis of the Russian Military by pointing out that some policy-makers fail to recognize the significant "role the military plays in many polities, including Russia. But if the military represents the last barrier against collapse and chaos, then the state of the armed forces is critical. For Russia, the situation is not encouraging."  

Strong and stable defense cooperation is critical for both the United States and Russia. Research for this project
examined U.S. Department of Defense efforts at enhancing engagement with Russia. Since 1991, the United States has undertaken numerous efforts to engage Russia and has enjoyed varying results in its undertakings.

Policy-makers must keep in mind the new realities of the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship when dealing with the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Significant changes have occurred since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the original concepts for cooperation began in 1991. As Glenn E. Schweitzer points out in a recent study, "In Washington DC and Moscow, many of the political architects who designed the original landscape for cooperation in 1991 and 92 have moved on, and their successors are operating in a different political environment with their own personal and professional agendas." There are a number of realities that affect our ability to successfully engage with Russia. For example:

- U.S. bipartisan congressional support has eroded as current events in Russia appear counter to American interests. Schweitzer cites Chechnya and suspicions of the Russian agenda towards Ukraine. Recently however, US thinking is dominated by fears of the ramifications of economic collapse and loss of governmental control over weapons of mass destruction.
- New Congressional budget constraints on governmental agencies working with Russia
- Growing dissent from within Russia as Russian Nationalists gain influence in the Duma.
- Significant opposition to NATO Expansion within the Russian government.
• Economic pressures caused lack of funds to implement the START II agreement which continues to be of paramount importance in the U.S.-Russia relationship.
• Russian deals with Iran for nuclear reactors and strong suspicions that Russia is supporting the Iranian missile development programs could undermine both ongoing and future cooperative programs.⁸

Throughout 1998 and early 1999, the predominant themes in U.S.-Russian national security studies have been “Whither Russia?” and “Who Lost Russia?” Political scientists have focused unrelenting attention upon the potential collapse of the Russian Federation and attempt to ascertain its causes and implications.⁹ As a result of congressional pressure and the Administration’s guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have focused tremendous energy exploring new and potentially more viable avenues for engagement with Russia.

In order to achieve success in engaging Russia, American efforts can not be one sided. Whatever is attempted in Russia will only succeed with Russian concurrence. Many U.S. efforts to improve ties and achieve stability have faltered since the end of the Cold War. Programs and policies, which sounded good as they were briefed in the Pentagon and on the Hill, were stillborn when presented to the Russian side. A second type of failure was encountered with programs that were initially endorsed by the Russian Ministry of Defense but subsequently canceled at the last minute or were not implemented due to lack
of funds, or as a reaction to international events. Any effort at engagement must be bilateral and must be mutually acceptable. Success in enhancing our defense relationship hinges on finding common ground from which to build. This analysis has briefly examined the legacy of DOD in engaging the Russian Ministry of Defense. In order to understand fully the nature of U.S. policy, this analysis will now examine what compels the United States to follow an engagement policy.

THE COMPELLING CAUSE

"How the U.S. Government responds to Russia at this moment of its greatest economic and human distress since World War II is likely to determine relations between the two former cold war rivals for many years to come."\textsuperscript{10}

The United States is indeed compelled to assist Russia to survive this most challenging period in its history. The nature of the threat to U.S. interests from Russia has changed significantly. Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, describes the challenges the United States will face in Russia as perplexing. He states,

"Russia will remain focused on internal political, economic, and social imperatives for at least the next decade. The period of turmoil that has plagued Moscow since the late 1980s will continue. Immature political institutions, economic weakness, organized crime, and corruption will heighten the potential for political instability, particularly during periods of leadership transition. . . . Over the next several years, Moscow will be hard pressed to maintain the modicum of
conventional military capability it now has. Barring a significant increase in Russia's external threat perception, non-military issues will continue to receive priority in terms of national leadership attention, resources, and popular concern. Moreover, other para-military and internal security forces will continue to compete with the Ministry of Defense for scarce security resources."

Pre-eminent Russian Studies scholar, Stephen F. Cohen, argues that the United States should immediately assist Russia to survive the crisis of 1999 by providing medicine, releasing funds through the International Monetary fund, forgiving the $70 billion Soviet debt, assisting Russia to relocate and repatriate more than $150 billion assets secreted out of country during the early 1990's and increasing the amount of aid to secure Russian weapons of mass destruction."

The National Security Strategy recognizes the fast paced changes and uncertainty with which Americans must live as we transition into the 21st Century. Americans are faced with a world which is increasingly smaller as "Globalization - the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration" affects events beyond its borders. For example, transnational threats, such as Russian weapons of mass destruction and organized crime, will become increasingly more risky. Furthermore, the National Security Strategy recognizes that the United States has a vital interest in the security of
Europe and in improving relations with Russia as well as all of the Newly Independent States (NIS).\(^{14}\)

Correspondingly, U.S. policy towards Russia over the past six years has shifted dramatically to a policy of cooperation, free market engagement, and support for democratic institutions. This shift seeks to enhance a secure future for both the United States and Russia. The United States national security policy towards Russia is based on a number of principles. The single most important principal is to reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.\(^{15}\)

In late 1998, US policy toward Russia again shifted as the Administration, troubled by a lack of influence and possibly recognizing the futility of its policies to date, acknowledged that the United States could not be successful in pushing reforms which ignore the vast differences between Russia and America in political and economic cultures. In major speeches in October and November 1998, Secretary of State Albright and Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott recognized the exceptionally broad range of possibilities.\(^{16}\) Talbott discussed a variety of options for the United States including "Optimism" -- a continuation of the existing course of action, "Strategic Pessimism" -- disengagement, and "Realism" -- continued engagement with realistic assessments of the complexity of the issues. Current, U.S. policy towards Russia is the last of
these options or a policy of "strategic patience and persistence" as Talbott called it.

In his Stanford Speech, Talbott identified four essential areas, in which the United States will continue engagement with Russia: Banking, Energy, Exchanges, and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). Arguably, the Department of Defense can most realistically participate in exchange programs and implementation of the CTR Program.

The selection of appropriate courses of action in engaging Russia has often been clouded by the influence of a variety of sources, from the Congress, to academia, to the popular press. The Department of Defense was pressured to engage in Russia for a number of reasons. These include: humanitarian concerns (which ranged from deliveries of food and medical aid to providing housing for Russian officers and a host of other high visibility efforts), defense conversion, arms control support, educational exchanges and others. Not all of DOD’s efforts have been directly in support of military goals however. In 1995 and 96, for example, significant CTR funds were diverted to conduct studies of "radioactive contamination in the Arctic, establishment of a Civilian Research and Development Foundation, and initiatives for promoting safety in the operation of nuclear reactors."17 This example clearly should have been executed by the Department of Energy rather than DOD.
The facts are clear. US National interests should be first. DOD should execute those portions of the National Security Strategy that it can best can handle. . . . other portions should be implemented by other agencies and departments of the government.

By nature, Americans, and in particular members of the Department of Defense, are quick to take on tasks and follow them through with an enthusiastic spirit. While Americans feel compelled to assist in engaging Russia, they should temper enthusiasm with a strong sense of what can realistically be done. Policy planners should also recognize limitations to engagement. One critical facet to this problem is the responsibility of Russia to shape its own destiny. As Celeste Wallander points out, "While the U.S. may have its own sense of the shape of a future Russia it seeks, it cannot aid Russia in getting there in the absence of those difficult national choices on the part of Russia itself." There is an exceptionally broad scope of policy options available. The challenge is to analyze accurately U.S. interests and Russia's needs. Policy planners must balance the two in selecting focused courses of action.

Efforts up to this point have been largely successful; thanks in great part to funding for Nunn-Lugar sponsored Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs. In implementing these many programs, however, the Department of Defense has taken on a
challenge that may be more appropriate for other Departments of the Executive Branch or private businesses.

This analysis will now turn to an examination of existing Engagement policy and areas where improvement can be made.

**U.S. DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT POLICY: A RANGE OF OPTIONS**

This section of the project reviews past DOD efforts to engage Russia. Several years after the shift in relations with Russia, the Department of Defense realized that while it must continue to engage Russia, policy planners must temper goals with recognition that limitations exist. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999 Peacetime Engagement Planning Directive* states...

"Funding and OPTEMPO constraints in both the U.S. and Russia, along with a desire to optimize the results from our limited military contacts with the Russians, have prompted several changes to the way we will develop the military-to-military contacts program with Russia in the future."^{19}

In 1998, the Joint Staff directed military planners to formulate contact plans to achieve specific goals. These goals include:^{20}
In general, these planning goals appear to support our National Security Strategy of “Shape, Respond and Prepare.” Engagement in Russia is a significant tool in shaping the future international environment in which we must operate. The principle limitation of these goals appears to be a lack of an ‘end state’. While these engagement-planning goals support our National Security Strategy, the Joint Staff has not established simple, unambiguous milestones leading to an “end state.”21

By late 1998, these planning goals had been translated into a number of policy objectives and programs. As part of an ongoing study of DOD Engagement Policies in Russia, Dr. Harry Ozeroff inventoried past efforts. Dr. Ozeroff’s study is designed to assist in identifying:
1. Where DOD must engage Russia in order to achieve its objectives.
2. Where cooperation may be counterproductive.
3. Where Russia does not have a legitimate or constructive role to play.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense established three priorities in the broad range of programs and policies available: High, Intermediate and Low. Cases are displayed below. 22

![Engagement in Russia: High Priority Cases](image)

**Figure 2. High Priority Engagement Cases**
Engagement in Russia: Intermediate Priority Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>PROGRAMMATIC</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>START I Negotiations</td>
<td>Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
<td>Export Control Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memorandum of Intent on Cooperation in the Area of Arms Control</td>
<td>Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty</td>
<td>Space Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF)</td>
<td>George C. Marshall Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Accidents Agreement</td>
<td>US NDU-Russian Academy of the General Staff Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Hotline” Direct Communication Link Agreement</td>
<td>Annual Peacekeeper Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea</td>
<td>Plutonium Production Reactor Core Convention (CTR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Minist Group—Nagorno Karabakh</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Destruction (CTR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

SRP: Engagement in Russia

Figure 3. Intermediate Priority Engagement Cases

Engagement in Russia: Low Priority Cases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY</th>
<th>PROGRAMMATIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement</td>
<td>Fissile Materials Disposition Program and Plutonium Disposition Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)</td>
<td>Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)</td>
<td>US-Russia Export Control Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)</td>
<td>First Line of Defense Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seabed Arms Control Treaty</td>
<td>Materials Protection, Control and Accounting (MPOCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</td>
<td>Nuclear Closed Cities Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEVM Vienna Document 90/92/94</td>
<td>Trilateral Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEM Arrangement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conventional Forces in Europe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Outer Space Treaty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antarctic Treaty</td>
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SRP: Engagement in Russia

Figure 4. Low Priority Engagement Cases

For the sake of comparison, these policies and programs may be examined within four functional areas: Traditional Security Relations, European Security Architecture, Proliferation and Counter-proliferation and technical Military to Military Activities.
Engagement in Russia: Traditional Security Relations

- START I Negotiation
- START II Negotiation
- ABM Demarcaton
- Nuclear Accidents Agreement
- Memorandum of Intent on Cooperation in the Area of Arms Control
- Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty
- Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF)
- "Hotline" Direct Communication Line Agreement
- Agreement on Prevention of Incidents at Sea
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
- Sealed Arms Control Treaty
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- Outer Space Treaty
- Antarctic Treaty
- UN Security Council

Figure 5. Traditional Security Relations

Engagement in Russia: European Security Architecture

- NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Commission (PJC)
- Defense Consultative Group (DCG)
- Partnership for Peace (PfP) Working Groups
- Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)
- Dayton Contact Group
- OSCE Minsk Group—Karabakh
- Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)
- CDS/Anna Document 90/5294 CSBM Arrangement

Figure 6. European Security Architecture
Engagement in Russia: Proliferation/Counterproliferation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)</td>
<td>US-Russia Bi-National Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)</td>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT Exporter (Zangger) Committee</td>
<td>Mayak Facility Construction (CTR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Suppliers Group</td>
<td>Plutonium Production Reactor Core Conversion (CTR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassenaar Arrangement</td>
<td>Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Russia Bi-National Commission</td>
<td>International Science and Technology Centers (STO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Consultative Group (DCG)</td>
<td>Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7. Proliferation and Counter-proliferation

Engagement in Russia: Technical/Mil to Mil Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Programmatic</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US-Russia Bi-National Commission</td>
<td>Russia-US Joint TMD Exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Consultative Group (DCG)</td>
<td>US NDIA-Russian Academy of the General Staff Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Staff-Russian General Staff Mil-to-Mil Contacts</td>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM Mil-to-Mil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Space Cooperation Agreement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Technical and Military-to-Military Activities

Special Note: The cases listed in the charts above are not a complete inventory of all Defense Cooperation programs by which the United States hopes to engage Russia. Some programs are not addressed in these OSD prioritized slides. For example,
not addressed are Open Skies Treaty activities, Defense Intelligence exchanges, and biological threat reduction programs to mention a few.

ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS.

As noted above, current polices and programs do support the National Security Strategy in general. The principle shortfall in existing policies is the lack of a sufficiently defined "end state". The National Military Strategy, which should likewise support the National Security Strategy, does not describe how engagement factors into improving the military relationship with Russia. Just what is the desired "end state"?

Likewise, the goals listed by the Joint Staff focus on cooperation with Russian Defense entities and improving both the Russian military image and reputation internally as well as within a NATO context. The linkage to the national military and security strategies is unclear. What appears to be lacking is a vision for what the United States hopes to gain from its engagement process with the Russian military.23

One other significant factor stands out in considering our peacetime engagement planning goals. Most of our policies and programs focus on NATO or NATO-type programs, like Partnership for Peace, as a vehicle for attaining success in the DOD bilateral "Engagement in Russia" program. Rather than a
bilateral, state-to-state or national defense-to-defense establishment, policy planners view success as based upon the success of NATO in the European security context. Yet, in following Euro/NATO-centric strategies, planners may be reinforcing failure instead of exploiting success. There are two significant types of evidence to support this theory.

First, as assessed in the DFI International study, US Defense Engagement programs in the "European Security" category, as listed in the chart above, were statistically less successful than either "Traditional Security" or "Technical and Mil-to-Mil" categories. Of twenty-one high priority cases studied, DOD efforts were generally successful (ten cases were successful, six cases had mixed outcomes, and five cases had failed in total). In the "Traditional Security" category, three of four cases were successful. In the "Technical and Mil-to-Mil" category, there were no failures and four of seven cases were successful. On the other hand, in the "European Security" category, only two of six cases studied were successful. Overall, DFI found only thirty six percent (four of eleven) multilateral high priority programs were successful compared to sixty percent (six of ten) bilateral efforts.24

Second, in a historical and psychological sense, Russia seeks to maintain distance from NATO. Russia is not a member of NATO and, in spite of its signature on the Founding Act, continues to
harbor great distrust of NATO and NATO expansion. Russia feels that it has been betrayed by the West and its role in European security marginalized. In spite of U.S. focus on the importance of the Permanent Joint Council, Russia senses a major loss of prestige and feels, psychologically at least, encircled by the West. Furthermore, NATO expansion has significant military and political implications for Russia.\textsuperscript{25}

Given Russian distrust of western intentions and motives in the European security context, US policy might be better served by shifting policies and programs to a bilateral focus while continuing to support alliance goals. By de-coupling the strategy of engaging Russia away from NATO programs and engaging Russia one-on-one, while continuing to support NATO efforts, the U.S would demonstrate support for NATO but emphasize a special relationship with the Russian defense establishment. For example, instead of stating the goal as "Reduce mutual suspicion and distrust between western and Russian military," a better goal might be "Build strong cooperative ties between US and Russia military establishments." In this case, by building the US-Russian relationship, specifically in an international environment like SFOR operations in Bosnia, operators would achieve the stated US policy goal and, in the course of executing the mission reduce mutual suspicion and distrust. The measure of success in this case might be the number and type of
military to military contacts and the number of successful contact events.

**PITFALLS: WHAT IMPEDIMENTS STAND IN OUR WAY?**

Over the course of the past seven years, it appears that U.S. policy-makers continue to work endlessly toward improving U.S.-Russian defense relations, yet manage to achieve very little in the end. While it is frustrating to deal with intricacies of engagement, there are several variables policy-makers should keep in mind when attempting to remove the numerous impediments, which seemingly stand in the way. This section examines several variables that policy-makers might consider when assessing Russian engagement policy.

**BEWARE OF MIRROR-IMAGING.**

During the Cold War, one of the problems frequently encountered in dealing with the Soviet Union was "Mirror-Imaging."

26 During the period of 1960 through 1980, U.S. leaders believed that the Soviets engaged with the West "in a common effort for shared goals. One major consequence was to nurture the Western tendency to "mirror-image" the USSR -- to view it as
difficult and pushy but essentially a traditional great power, basically pragmatic and opportunistic."27

The problem in assuming that Soviet leaders were just like western policy-makers was the projection of western ways of thinking and value systems onto Soviet leaders. As one former Sovietologist pointed out, "Such mirror-imaging can be disastrous when one is dealing with a society organized as differently as the United States and the Soviet Union are. Soviet leaders are recruited by very different routes, and their frame of reference is unique to their own society."28 Mirror-imaging remains a valid caution for today's policy-makers as well.

As Globalization continues and the world grows smaller and more interdependent, it is particularly important to recognize that today's Russian leaders are essentially from the same mold as yesterday's Soviet leaders. Most of today's Russian Ministry of Defense general officers were already in significant positions ten years ago. As Russian military reform slowly takes root, this trend will change. U.S. policy-makers should note, however, that the rate of change among Russian leaders is much slower than in our own military. It will require a generation of change and growth for a new type of officer to develop in the Russian defense establishment. It is, therefore, critically important that DOD works today at the lowest levels
to develop contacts and relationships with the next generation of leaders.

Policy-makers must recognize that Russia is different. In assessing programs for Russia, one should use models of success in a Russian context. Programs, which would be successful in other former Soviet states, do not necessarily have merit in Russia. As Glenn Schweitzer found in studying Department of Energy and business relations, "Use the Russian experience, and not the American experience in other countries, as the point of departure in designing cooperative programs."²⁹ When dealing with the Ministry of Defense, one should ask, "are we mirror-imaging ourselves?"

BEWARE OF BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS.

This concept applies in both the Russian and American context. The U.S. and Russian Defense establishments have their own unique structures. These structures are very different. The ability to interact with the Russian Ministry of Defense, particularly in technical and military-to-military activities, is "plagued by an absence of parallel organizational structures within the DOD and MOD."³⁰
On the U.S. side, there is a multiplicity of actors at various levels, each who believe that their program is unique and the most important. The actual relationships between these actors do have structure and function in the American context but is very confusing to the Russian. For example, structurally, we would think that Chief of the General Staff Kvashnin's counterpart in the United States is the Chairman of the Joint Staff, General Shelton. Yet, when General Clark, the SACEUR/USCINCEUR visited Moscow in 1998, he referred to himself as General Kvashnin's counterpart. Indeed, in his role as the SACEUR, General Clark may be just that. From the Russian perspective, General Kvashnin probably sees the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee as his counterpart and the SACEUR equivalent to a subordinate level of command.

All of this is very difficult for Russians to comprehend. Misunderstanding is compounded considering the number and variety of U.S. Department of Defense players who have a significant role to play in U.S.-Russian relations. From a Russian perspective, the diagram below lists just the major actors in building cooperative relations.
Engagement in Russia:
U.S. Actors

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Joint Staff
Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EUCOM
PACOM
STRATCOM
CENTCOM
Defense Consultative Group
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Defense Conversion Gp
NATO-PJC; NATO Partnership Coordination
IFOR/SFOR

Figure 9. U.S. Actors in the Engagement Process

To compound the issue, in each of the groups of actors above, there are many related subgroups. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, for example, numerous sub-groups are charged with designing and implementing policy and programs, including:

- OSD/S&TR/Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia
- OSD/S&TR/TRP/FSU Nuclear Affairs
- OSD/S&TR/TRP/Non-Proliferation Policy
- OSD/S&TR/TRP/Non-Nuclear Arms Control
- OSD/S&TR/Forces Policy
- OSD/S&TR/FP/Strategy, Forces and Operations
- OSD/S&TR/TRP/Cooperative Threat Reduction
- OSD/ISA/European and NATO Policy

It is also worth noting that members of groups often cross over to other teams. The Defense Consultative Group consists of members of the Offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff for example. Likewise, members of the EUCOM staff may be
deployed to serve for periods in the SFOR Headquarters or assist in NATO Partnership Coordination.

On the Russian side, the nature of bureaucratic politics can be just as confusing to U.S. players. Unfortunately, with the end of the Cold War, the strict secrecy that shrouded the Ministry of Defense did not necessarily end. There is substantial pessimism about the long-term success of current mil-to-mil engagement programs, because engagement seems to be a one way street. While the DOD aggressively seeks interaction, Russian military officials at the most senior levels seem not to care. At lower levels, specifically activities at individual unit level, engagement events are very successful when they occur. Frequently, however, the Russian Ministry of Defense Foreign Relations Directorate (UVS or Upravleniye Vneshnik Snasheniak) attempts to block interaction or slow the exchange of information. Bureaucratically, all DOD to MOD communication must go through this directorate in order to be official. In reality, the problem is not UVS but at higher levels within in the General Staff and Ministry of Defense. Lacking support from the highest levels, engagement activities between Russian and U.S. entities will not be successful. 31

Another example of the frustration that DOD must endure deals with taxation. As Kevin O’Prey points out, the Russian State is both internally divided and remarkably weak. “In contrast to
the regimes of Brezhnev and his predecessors, the Russian
government today has very little power -- either by coercion or
inducement -- over local governments, enterprises or any other
institutions."\(^{32}\) This is particularly true considering the lack
of influence of the Ministry of Defense.

In developing agreements with the Ministry of Defense, DOD
officials routinely seek and receive exemptions from Russian
taxes and customs. This is particularly true in dealing with
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other forms of
assistance. These forms of assistance are especially attractive
to Russian Tax inspectors, who seek their "fair share" of
foreign funding. Exemptions are granted by the Duma and are
facilitated by written agreements with the MOD. Especially in
light of recent pressure from the International Monetary Fund to
improve tax collection in general, the Russian Tax authorities
relentlessly look for loopholes to get their portion of
assistance programs, whether legally justified or not. The MOD
has little leverage or motivation to fight off the ubiquitous
tax inspector. This severely complicates the administration of
U.S. programs designed to aid the Russians.\(^{33}\)
RUSSIAN LACK OF FULL CONFIDENCE IN US INTENT

“For many Russians, angst about their future is compounded by suspicion about US’s strategic intentions. The Russian Press has carried numerous articles suggesting that under the guise of "partnership" the U.S. is pursuing a hidden agenda not only to keep Russia weak but to bring about its fragmentation.”

Strobe Talbott, Stanford, November 1998

Mr. Talbott’s statement speaks for itself. US Policy-makers must be cautious of statements and attitudes, which might reinforce this suspicion. Fear of encirclement remains in the psyche of the Russian leaders, politicians and soldiers. In real terms, Russians realize the benefits and potential of engagement and cooperation with the United States.

BEWARE OF REACTIONARY POLITICS - WHAT IS SAID ISN’T ALWAYS WHAT IS MEANT

Unlike former times before the fall of the Berlin wall, attempting to anticipate the reaction of Russian leadership is more complex today. Policy-makers should take this into account when attempting to engage Russia. The only way to mitigate this tendency is first to know the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense and then to work closely and consistently with them.
For example, in examining the question of NATO Enlargement, LTC James M. Milano provides a convincing analysis "NATO Enlargement from the Russian Perspective." In his research, Milano found a wide variety of beliefs among Russian decision-makers. Such a wide set of beliefs may have existed in former eras but this multiplicity of views has become much more pronounced in recent years.

Additional evidence can be seen in the Russian reaction and rhetoric over the Kosovo question. In October 1998, Russian Minister of Defense Sergeyev announced that any NATO military intervention in Kosovo would automatically mean an immediate return to the "Cold War." Sergeyev attempted to emphasize this by stating that NATO actions in Kosovo would also mean no ratification of START II, a strengthening of Russian defenses, rejection of the NATO Military Liaison Mission to Moscow and non-cooperation with the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in other areas as well.

Compare the October 1998 position to one announced in February 1999, by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov. Speaking at a conference in Tokyo, Ivanov told the international community that Russia might send troops to join a peacekeeping force in Kosovo if such a force were sanctioned by the UN and accepted by the Yugoslavian government. In this latter case, Ivanov maintained that Russia remained opposed to NATO air
strikes, but was willing to cooperate with and furthermore join
in a ground peacekeeping force with NATO.\textsuperscript{37}

Identical tactics can be seen relating to numerous
contentious issues in U.S.-Russian Defense and bilateral
relations. One very popular issue for Russian policy-makers
remains the START II treaty. The Russian leadership knows that
ratification of the START II treaty is an important policy
agenda item for the United States. Evidence of how it has been
used is clear in a number of instances.

One good example involves the Russian reaction to the U.S.
bombing of Iraq in late December 1998. According to various
press sources, Russia’s Lower House of Parliament had been ready
to vote on START II after years of delay. Reacting to U.S. and
British military operations, Duma political leaders canceled the
vote in protest to the bombing of Iraq. The press reported that
Russia saw this action as an example of American muscle flexing
and disregard for Russian opinion.\textsuperscript{38}

Another good example is Russian reaction to the proposed U.S.
deployment of a National Missile Defense system, which might
require modification of the 1972 ABM treaty. Referring to
Secretary of Defense Cohen’s announcement that the US sought to
modify the ABM Treaty, the New York Times quoted arms-control
expert and director of the Institute of Europe, Sergei
Karamanov.
"The U.S. already wants to change the backbone of the international system -- decision-making by the United Nations -- and now wants to change some of the treaties as well . . . It's unfortunate that it comes during this political situation where relations are not their best. Russia is in a situation now where even virtual threats are considered real."  

Likewise, The New York Times highlighted the Russian view that it was being threatened. It quoted the Chief of the Ministry of Defense Directorate of International Affairs General-Colonel Leonid Ivashov, stating,

"Any military expert understands that these countries do not have and will hardly acquire guaranteed means of reaching U.S. territory . . . the Russian Defense Ministry sees U.S. statements about the cancellation of the ABM Treaty or a revision of its clauses as being aimed against Russia's security interests."

Interestingly, Ivashov was speaking shortly after Krasnaya Zvezda ("Red Star" is the Russian Ministry of Defense newspaper) published an interview with him in early December. At that time Ivashov, emphasized the importance of international ties and strengthening military-to-military relationships with those countries who maintain the capacity to "project military power" (presumably the United States).

Especially in this period of history when Russia feels it has lost a great deal of prestige and influence in the international arena and when its economic power is so weak, any opportunity to gain prestige in the international sphere is welcomed. U.S. Policy-makers should listen and read Russian proclamations with
a critical view toward their true meaning and the implied intent of any statement.

BEWARE OF OVER ANALYSIS.

"Cooperation has achieved far more than could be expected". Russian Science Policy Analyst, March 1996

One final note of caution. U.S. policy-makers are occasionally guilty of failing to step back and look at how far policy has progressed. U.S. analysts and policy-makers tend to become so focused upon achieving the next goal that they fail to consider the success enjoyed to date. The US-Russian relationship today has come a long way from where it was in 1989. Who would have imagined in 1985, when US and Soviet forces were facing each other head to head along the Inner-German border, that we would have Russian Airborne forces deployed along side Americans in Bosnia and working from the same Divisional headquarters? Who would have imagined that the snapshots of feigned cooperation in 1945 at the Elbe River crossing site would someday evolve into true combined operations and intelligence sharing? We have come a long way since 1989. We are truly in a shrinking world where globalization is becoming a way of life for all.
CONCLUSION

This study has examined U.S. Department of Defense efforts at engaging Russia in a meaningful defense cooperative relationship. It reviewed the motivations for DOD policy in engaging Russia and found several challenges. Notably, there is a need to establish a clearer vision and define measurable end states. The Department of Defense has a wide selection of policy options from which to choose. In making these selections, policy-makers should seek solutions which are acceptable to both the United States and Russia and which are unique to Russia’s needs. Likewise, policy-makers should seek to understand the impact of Russian political-military culture on achieving U.S. goals in Russia. Policy-makers should also note the impact of the multiplicity of actors and the complexity of the bureaucratic process. Serious consideration should be given to de-coupling Russian engagement programs from the NATO context.

Finally, American policy and programs in engaging Russia have had remarkable successes considering the scope, intensity and nature of change. We should focus on improving communications and understanding, particularly at the highest levels, keeping in mind that we have a great legacy of commitment and achievement to uphold.

WORD COUNT = 5854
ENDNOTES

1 George C. Marshall, Commencement address at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, as quoted in the International Herald Tribune Wednesday, May 28, 1997, 12.


4 Ibid., 328.


6 Ibid. Examples are adapted from Schweitzer’s work.

7 For examples see: http://www.cdi.org/russia/ or http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/. David Hoffman, the Washington Post’s Moscow Bureau chief conducted extensive research on the subject of lost controls and wrote a series of articles including; David Hoffman, "Russia's Nuclear Force Sinks With the Ruble: Economic Crisis Erodes Strategic Arsenal," The Washington Post, 18 September, 1998, A2.


9 As an example, an entirely new series of publications is beginning to appear that describe the implications of the collapse of Soviet power and the impending disaster should Russian security systems fail. William E. Odom’s The Collapse
of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998) is an excellent chronicle of the significance of this process. Our leading academic institutions and think tanks have also actively sought to provide analysis on the future of Russia and U.S. Russia relations. Notable among these projects is Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, which sponsors the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs' "Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project". This program sponsors writers to examine the "Whither Russia?" question. Stanford University ran a conference in November 1998 on the same topic and has an extensive collection of writings available on the World Wide Web at http://www.stanford.edu/group/Russia20/. The Department of Energy also sponsors a number of analytical efforts, which spin up more business for the Department of Defense. A good example is described in Deborah Yarsike-Ball, "The Second Line of Defense: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Across Russia's Borders", Program on New Approaches to Russian Security Policy Memo Series, Memo No. 50, November 1998; available from http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~ponars/POLICY%20MEMOS/ball150.html; Internet; accessed 8 Jan 1999. In the open media, the debate over lost opportunities and who is to blame continues. Most analysts seem to fault two major parties; the radical reformers in the Russian government and those who supported them in the west -- the Clinton administration and the International Monetary fund. See Fred Hiatt, "Who Lost Russia?", The Washington Post, 20 September 1998, C07; available from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1998-09/20/1261-09201998-idx.html; Internet; accessed 27 September 1998.


12 Cohen and vanden Heuvel.

Ibid, 39.


Ibid, Schweitzer, 28.


Message R 0222452 Mar 98, from Joint Staff Washington D.C./DJS// subject: Call for FY 99 Peacetime Engagement Events for the Independent States, paragraph 5,B.

Ibid.

This is the shared opinion of a number of actors in the process and was an opinion expressed by OSD and U.S. Defense representatives to Russia. Mr. Ed Pusey, OSD/S&TR/Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Interview by the author, 4 December, 1998. Dr. Harry Ozeroff and Sarah Lenti, Associates, DFI International, Interview by the author, 2 February 1998. RUE Project Interviews conducted by Dr. Harry Ozeroff at the Harvard U.S. and Russian Generals Conference 20 January 1999. Ms. Patricia Jacubec, OSD/S&TR/Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, telephone interview by the author, 12 February 1999.
22 Dr. Harry Ozeroff, <hozeroff@dfi-intl.com> “Contact,” electronic mail message to John O’Sullivan <O’SullivanJ@awc.carlisle.army.mil>, 17 December 1998. Provided research proposal and initial study results for “Department of Defense Engagement of Russia: An Assessment of the Record and Recommendations for Future Interaction”.

23 Staff members OSD/S&TR/Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, interview by the author, 4 Dec 1998, Washington DC. Also Dr. Harry Ozeroff also found the same opinion in a number of interviews for “Department of Defense Engagement of Russia: An Assessment of the Record and Recommendations for Future Interaction”.

24 Dr. Harry Ozeroff, DFI-International, interview by the author on 2 February 1999, Washington DC. The DFI study was completed on 26 February 1999 and has yet to be published.


26 This concept is by far not a new idea in Russia-American Relations. Given our urge to understand the motivations of the Russians, it is worth examining the limitations of what happens when we view Russian motivation as the same as our own. Patricia Jacobec, OSD/S&TR/Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia, interview by the author 4 December 1998, Washington D.C.


John Reppert BG (Ret), Former U.S. Defense Attaché, interview by Dr. Harry Ozeroff, 20 January 1999, Boston Ma. The author’s own experience while assigned to U.S. Embassy Moscow from 1996 to 1998 confirms this point. For example, in the United States the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (U.S. NRRC) is a fully functioning operations element of the U.S. Department of State. In the Russian Federation, the Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (RNRRC) is an operations element in the Ministry of Defense. In the U.S. context, the Director of the U.S.NRRC can build messages and initiate contact directly with his counterpart in the Russian Federation. The RNRRC would never think of initiating direct contact without the concurrence of the Director of the RNRRC whose counterpart is now the Director of On-Site Inspection Activities in the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Interviews with U.S. Defense Attaches at the Harvard Generals Program, interviews by Dr. Ozeroff, 20 January 1999, Boston, Ma. Again, the author’s own experience in Moscow substantiates this finding. A principle difference between military-to-military relationships and Nuclear Risk Reduction Center relationships has to do with accreditation details. Military Attaches are accredited to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. State Department and U.S. military officers serving as Arms Control attaches are accredited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which does not strictly limit contacts, as does the MOD.


Schweitzer, 104, Provides excellent examples of tax exemption documentation in the appendixes of his text. Also see Bernard Ellis, “Obstacles to Engaging Russia’s Military-Industrial-Academic Community”, USAWC Strategy Research Project, 15 April 1996.

Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State, Address at Stanford University, Stanford, California, 6 November 1998; available from http://www.state.gov/www/; Internet; accessed 7 November 1998.
35 James M. Milano, LTC, U.S. Army, NATO Enlargement from the Russian Perspective, USAWC Strategy Research Project, 5 Feb. 1998, 7–11. Milano found a wide range of beliefs in his research. They include: A U.S. drive to preserve the viability of the alliance; a goal to maintain the U.S. in European affairs and break a trend toward European autonomy; a search for a new and realistic mission driven by a need to either enlarge the alliance or watch it perish; a source of new markets for U.S. and Western European arms sales; a goal of revising long term neutrality in Finland, Sweden, and Austria; A potential grand strategy focused on the restructuring of the European continent and finally, the potential of a policy of renewed western Encirclement of Russia.


40 Ibid.
41 Oleg Falichev, "Interesii Rossii: Oboronnaya Diplomatiya - eto Bor'ba Vzgladov", Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 December 1998, 1.

42 Schweitzer, 75.
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