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GENERAL HAROLD K. JOHNSON AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The environment of the strategic leader is one marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. General Harold K. Johnson found himself in this unpredictable milieu when he was selected over forty three three-and four-star generals with greater seniority to become Army Chief of Staff in July 1964. This study explores his tenure as CSA and the ambiguities of senior level command during four long and difficult years.
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GENERAL HAROLD K. JOHNSON AND THE AMBIGUITIES OF
STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

On my honor I will do my best to do my duty to God and
my country - that I might be given the strength and the
courage and the wisdom to give a little bit better than
my best in order that I can meet the responsibilities
that are now mine.

—Harold K. Johnson

INTRODUCTION

On 2 July 1964 President Johnson signed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and that morning General Harold K. Johnson appeared
for his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services
Committee. In the midst of a turbulent decade, this would be the
beginning of four difficult years as the new Army Chief of Staff
(CSA). In little more than two weeks racial tensions erupted in
riots and looting in New York City, Chicago and Philadelphia. By
August two US destroyers patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin were
allegedly attacked by North Vietnamese PT boats. In October
Khrushchev was replaced after ten years as premier and Soviet
Party Chief and China announced that it had conducted its first
successful nuclear test. In November communist guerrilla mortar
fire hit the US air base at Bien Hoa, killing four Americans and
wounding 72 while Lyndon B. Johnson scored a landslide victory
over Barry Goldwater. This was the world in which General
Johnson began his new job. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (JCS), Johnson immediately assumed the role of corporate
leadership of the American Army. What qualifications prepared
him for this assignment and why was he selected? In his oral history Johnson states that he felt "overwhelmed", fearing that he did not have the stature, background, breadth of experience, web of contacts, or ease of relations with prominent individuals to succeed in that position. "I resented having been selected as Chief of Staff because I thought that it was too soon, that I simply wasn’t ready for the job." If Johnson felt he wasn’t ready for the job than why did Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara reached far down into the ranks of the Army’s senior officers to appoint him as Chief of Staff?

In 1962, Johnson was tasked with a study on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. McNamara was impressed by Johnson’s thoughtful and nondoctrinaire approach to the topic. Johnson had survived the Bataan Death March and endured three years of deprivation and suffering as a Japanese prisoner of war in World War II. From those experiences he had developed an iron will, extraordinary toughness of mind and spirit, and fierce integrity. As a result, McNamara felt he was the best.

Nearly thirty years later Colin Powell knew there was nothing scientific about the senior officer selection process. He had been at meetings in the Secretary’s office or the White House when someone would mention a single fact about a candidate for a top job—perhaps his status as a "good guy," or that he had the backing of someone important—and it would transfixed the group as it sailed across the table, instantly becoming the basis for his
selection. Often there was nothing even approaching a talent hunt.⁴

Johnson was highly regarded by Congress. His confirmation hearing was scheduled for the morning of the day before he was to be sworn in to office. Total elapsed time for the hearing was eighteen minutes, and confirmation by the full Senate was conferred later the same day.⁵ General Johnson was entering an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA). The four years in which Johnson served as Army Chief of Staff may be remembered by historians as one of the most militarily frustrating periods in U.S. history. And yet it was a time when the Army scored some of its most impressive achievements.⁶ Like many of my fellow Vietnam Veterans, I felt that the senior leadership failed during the Vietnam War. The leadership appeared weak and seemed reluctant to stand up and give an honest analysis of intervention in Vietnam. Quite simply, they appeared to be "yes" men with no backbone. Was Harold K. Johnson the right man in the right job at the right time? This study reveals that his integrity drove him to do his level best to balance his obligations to the Administration and to the Army. If he fell short, it was not for a lack of desire to serve his country well, but as a result of institutional factors outside his control. Harold K. Johnson did his best with impossible circumstances. The political and strategic environment and cast of actors during his tenure as Chief of
Staff provided a tremendous challenge. As 1964 ended, Vietnam would dominate virtually every aspect of his life.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (JCS)

With Johnson’s appointment as Army chief of staff, Earle G. Wheeler moved up as JCS chairmen. Unlike any of his predecessors, Wheeler lacked any combat experience. That Wheeler would have a minor military role as JCS chairman himself was universally accepted; all the important military decisions—or so JCS staff officers said at the time—would be made either in Saigon or in the White House. Wheeler was strictly a manager, an officer who was not only inexperienced at running a war, but actually incapable of doing so. However, he was articulate and especially effective in finding middle ground when the chiefs seemed to be deadlocked over an issue.

John P. McConnell replaced Curtis LeMay as air force chief of staff. The appointment of McConnell, a soft-spoken Arkansan, as replacement for the gruff, cigar-chewing LeMay was seen as symptomatic of the changing of the military guard. He did not have the prestige and combat record of a LeMay or Arleigh Burke but was one of the “new breed” of military leaders whose military expertise was complemented by knowledge of politics, economics, science, and diplomacy.

Admiral David L. McDonald had only served for one year, but his experience as a naval aviator as well as combat commander
gave him clout with the Navy that Wheeler would seemingly never have with the Army. He was a thoughtful, serious man who spoke sparingly but with authority. This position would later be filled by CNO Thomas Moorer, an outspoken McNamara critic who worked behind the scenes to undo many of McNamara's policies. General Wallace Greene, the Marine Corps commandant, who attended JCS meetings when Marine policies were being decided, was widely viewed as having more military influence than Wheeler. The practical Vermont native had been in the front line during a number of particularly violent island battles against the Japanese in World War II, a marked contrast to Wheeler's experience as a trainer of Army recruits during the same period. JCS officers believed that when it came time to send in the Marines, Wheeler would be forced to defer to Greene's judgment.

VIETNAM COMMANDER

William C. Westmoreland, called "the inevitable general" by his West Point classmates, was well trained and self-confident, a welcome change from the more tentative attitudes of his predecessor, Paul Harkins. Nevertheless, the JCS had some doubts about Westmoreland's command ability. They believed that a number of other top officers were more capable of fighting the kind of counterinsurgency war the Vietnam environment demanded but could not change the appointment. They were all painfully aware that Westmoreland had been hand-picked for the assignment by the martyred Kennedy, who had been impressed by Westmoreland
when they first met in June 1962 and had pushed him as Harkin's replacement in the weeks before his assassination.¹⁰

In addition, it was also clear that the chiefs felt uncomfortable with Westmoreland, a feeling they had difficulty putting into words. Generally they felt Westmoreland was aloof, almost distant with his colleagues; he had a difficult time making and keeping friends, and he actually alienated many officers in his own service by surrounding himself with a retinue of public relations-minded aides.¹¹

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Robert S. McNamara was the eighth, and youngest secretary of defense and president of the Ford Motor Company before accepting the appointment from President Kennedy. A campaign issue that Kennedy promoted was that of the need for reform in national defense strategy and the management of the Department of Defense. McNamara had served on the business faculty at Harvard University teaching the application of statistical analysis to management problems. During World War II he became part of a traveling statistical control group that analyzed maintenance, logistics, and operational problems in England, India, China, and the Pacific.¹² He was confident and assertive and wanted free rein over appointments in the Department of Defense.

McNamara expected the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be more than military advisers. He wanted them to include economic criteria
into their military requirements studies. Advice based on purely military experience and judgment was useless in his view. McNamara viewed the JCS as one of many resources available to him to be used as he saw fit. The ability of the chiefs to influence policy was dependent upon the quality of their advice, not upon their position as the principal military advisers to the Secretary of Defense. Once he reached a decision he expected the chiefs to support it even if they opposed the rationale for the decision.

THE PRESIDENT

Following Kennedy's assassination, Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) was sworn in as President of the United States. He had suddenly and unexpectedly realized his lifelong dream. Johnson was a very insecure man who craved and demanded affirmation. He had no sense of loyalty even though he proclaimed it was the quality he valued above all others. He enjoyed tormenting those who had done the most for him and he seemed to take a special delight in humiliating those who had cast in their lot with him. But he was capable of inspiring strong attachments even with people who knew him for what he was.13

Johnson's preoccupation with consensus and unity came from his insecurity and his consequent distrust of his advisers especially his military advisers.14 He kept the military at a distance, usually excluding them from the most important decisions until it was time to obtain their agreement. He was a
forceful president who was intolerant of disagreement. From the beginning of his presidency, Johnson demonstrated a lack of understanding of the war and at times a lack of interest.

THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The environment of Harold K. Johnson’s four years as Army Chief of Staff was set on 3 July 1964. It would be dominated by the personalities and outlooks of three men—Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and General Earle Wheeler. The evolving war in Vietnam would consume the majority of his time. At his confirmation hearing Johnson said “I hold the view that my first obligation is to the defense of my country, that when I appear before this committee or any committee of the Congress, it is incumbent upon me to be completely honest with the Congress and to respond to any questions that I am competent to answer.”15 He knew what he was getting into as Chief of Staff, that the challenges involved would be personal as well as organizational. He told a friend soon after taking on the new assignment “I felt that I walked in here as an honest man and I am going to endeavor to go out the same way.”16 In the next four years his moral character and integrity would be challenged as never before.

In the Spring of 1964, the JCS began work on a paper that considered the options available to the United States with respect to Vietnam. Several options were considered but the one that was chosen was that of a “graduated response.” Even though
there was concern that the American public would become
disenchanted and there would be a loss of support for the effort
once the commitment was made there were no military challenges
made to the policy. Johnson acknowledged that this could have
been the fatal error.17

The senior military leadership had all been schooled in the
professional ethic "that you argue your case to the point of
decision. Having been given a decision, you carry it out with
all the force that you can, put all your effort behind carrying
it out."18 Sadly, they did not recommend the total force they
believed would ultimately be required in Vietnam. After the war,
Johnson observed that "there was no way that we could be
successful in Vietnam in light of the policies that we had."19 In
his oral history Johnson speaks of the culture that influenced
the advisory actions "we're just captives of our own upbringing
and captives of the environment in which we mature. The man in
uniform has been taught to try to take it silently and grit his
teeth and carry the load."20 The JCS had the "can-do" spirit and
could not bring themselves to make any negative statement or to
appear to be disloyal.

In March 1965, President Lyndon Johnson sent General Johnson
to Vietnam to make a personal assessment of the situation. It
was his personal and individual responsibility to report his
findings to the President. Prior to his departure, he joined the
president and others for breakfast at the White House. LBJ made
it clear that he wanted to stabilize the situation in Vietnam, and he was not going to be the only president to lose a war. Afterward, going down in the elevator, the President bored his finger into Johnson's chest and told him, "Get things bubbling, General!" He was given permission to start the buildup and do whatever necessary to win the war in spite of his growing hesitation over American policy.

Shortly after Johnson's return from Vietnam, the President brought the JCS, along with McNamara to the White House for an Oval Office meeting. "You're all graduates of the Military Academy and you should be able to give me an answer," the President said. "I want you to come back here next Tuesday and tell me how we are going to kill more Viet Cong." This was typical of the type of guidance from the commander-in-chief.

Through the end of March and into April, Johnson tried to get the President's agreement to a full-scale mobilization and directed his staff to draw up a proposal for him to take to the White House. This was a political tactic as much as a military necessity since Johnson felt that the war could not be won without calling up the reserves. It would demonstrate the will of the American people. In May, Johnson's plan was quickly endorsed by the chiefs and they immediately asked for a private meeting with the President. LBJ listened to the argument and then leaned across the table to Johnson and said, "General, you leave the
American people to me. I know more about the American people than anyone in this room.\textsuperscript{23}

General Wheeler and the rest of the chiefs continued to argue for mobilization but the President's subsequent refusal to call reserve forces surprised Army planners because all contingency plans for a large operation, like Vietnam, had been based on the ability to call-up the reserves. Initially all the preparations had been made for a call-up. The JCS had recommended a call-up, as had the Secretary of Defense. It was understood that the President was in agreement but at the last minute the President went ahead with the buildup and deployment without reserve forces. In his oral history, General Johnson concluded that the greatest single mistake was not using the reserves. It would have created a degree of disruption in the domestic economy that simply was not to be tolerated. However he goes on to say that if the use of the reserves would have created consensus, that would have been the overriding consideration.

According to one account, the President "met again at the White House with his key military and civil advisers." "He announced he now favored a graduated military escalation that fell short of a decisive mobilization and proclamation of an emergency. McNamara made it clear he backed the President. General Johnson and the other chiefs sat through this meeting in shocked silence. They realized their civilian superior, Robert McNamara had abandoned them."\textsuperscript{24}
In addition, LBJ also declined to extend the tours of duty of those soldiers currently serving. The shortage of qualified noncommissioned officers was a particular problem especially when they realized that repeat tours to Vietnam would become a necessity. Many of them chose to leave the Army in large numbers.

In November 1965, after McNamara refused a package of recommendations on basic U.S. strategy for Vietnam, the JCS exercised their right to go to the President directly. It was a critical meeting to determine whether the military would continue its buildup or take measures to bring the war to an early end. At the meeting the President did not offer them seats but instead they stood around a map. General Wheeler, Admiral McDonald and General McConnell all made their comments which took only a few minutes. LBJ asked Generals Johnson and Greene if they agreed with what was said and they did. LBJ turned away for a moment, then whirled on the assembled senior military leadership and attacked them in the most vile and despicable terms, cursing them personally, ridiculing their advice, using the crudest and filthiest language. He told the JCS that “he was not going to let some military idiots talk him into World War III” and ordered them to “get the hell out of my office.” This humiliation was just the beginning of the President’s treatment of the JCS. This indeed was a very difficult environment in which to provide advice to the commander-in-chief.
In contrast to previous administrations, the JCS meant infrequently with the President and Secretary of Defense during the massive buildup. General Wheeler was the only member who saw the President with any regularity. In Johnson’s oral history he felt that for “a group who by law are supposed to be military advisors we saw him with a dreadful infrequency, particularly when you figure that there was a war going on for three of the years that I served.\textsuperscript{26}

As time went on, Johnson was convinced that General Westmoreland’s approach to fighting in Vietnam would not work. His views came from a study he commissioned after returning from Vietnam in the spring of 1965. It’s title “A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam” known as PROVN, was completed in March 1966.\textsuperscript{27} The study was conducted by a talented and diverse group of officers with superb credentials and experience.

When the study was briefed at the Pentagon the JCS were fascinated with it but they were more concerned with limitations on the larger war—bombing restrictions, prohibition of attacks on enemy sanctuaries and mining of enemy harbors, restrictive rules of engagement—than they were with war inside South Vietnam. General Wheeler was clearly more interested in those matters than he was in pacification.\textsuperscript{28} He also was reluctant to push PROVN’s findings to McNamara because of how critical PROVN was of the way the war was being fought. The PROVN
recommendations were subsequently put on hold until 1968 when General Creighton Abrams would become the new commander in Vietnam.

Harold K. Johnson found himself caught in a moral dilemma. He was convinced that Westmoreland's tactics were not working and he was unable to get them changed. Publicly he had to support what Westmoreland was doing if he wanted to remain in office. He had to praise an effort that he felt was completely incompetent. Throughout his tenure as CSA, he contemplated resigning in protest over and over again on several issues that he felt strongly about. However, he always reached the conclusion that he could do more good by continuing in office.

The most damaging confrontation between the JCS and their civilians superiors took place in public in August 1967. Senator John Stennis, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, had decided to hold hearings on the war that would feature testimony from the JCS. The JCS believed the hearings would provide a public forum for military doubts on conduct of the war. Senator Stennis respected the JCS and had valued their opinions and approved of their programs. Praising the JCS for its opposition to what he called "the doctrine of gradualism," in the hearing's opening days, Stennis listened closely as the JCS publicly castigated the administration for failing to listen to its advice. The criticism was pointed. General Wheeler told the subcommittee that the war wasn't being won and couldn't be won
until North Vietnam’s support of the southern insurgency was broken. Moreover, the Johnson-McNamara policy was doomed to failure unless the military was allowed to “go to the source,” to stop the flow of supplies to North Vietnam.29

McNamara attacked the JCS claim that an expanded air offensive against North Vietnam could help bring an end to the war. He reviewed the military’s target list, arguing that most targets had already been bombed. Halfway through his testimony he paused and then said “there can be no question that the bombing campaign has and is hurting North Vietnam’s war-making capability.” A selective, carefully targeted bombing campaign, such as we are presently conducting can be directed toward reasonable and realizable goals. This discriminating use of air power can and does render the infiltration of men and supplies more difficult and more costly.”30 In essence he was saying that while President Johnson’s policy might be debatable, its impact wasn’t. The North Vietnamese were buckling. America was winning the war in Vietnam.

The JCS could not believe what they were hearing. McNamara ignored the most important point they were trying to make: that a successful conclusion could only be gained by shutting off supplies to the North, not to the South. Their boss had lied. They knew the U.S. strategy wasn’t working and America couldn’t win with gradual escalation. McNamara’s testimony broke the unofficial contract between civilian leaders and military
officers in which members of the military pledge they will obey civilian authorities without question and civilian leaders pledge that those orders will not lead to the useless sacrifice of military life.\^{31}

The JCS now believed that they had been betrayed by their civilian leaders. More lives would be lost and there was little reason to hope for an eventual American victory. This was a turning point for the JCS because they were convinced that the military needed a greater voice in determining U.S. policy. General Wheeler felt that this was the time to convince the American people to pressure the President to make an unambiguous stand in Vietnam or to get out.

Wheeler met with the rest of the JSC and said he believed they should resign "en masse" during a press conference to be held the next morning. They had talk about resigning before but now they were serious. This unofficial meeting lasted from late in the afternoon into the very late evening. General Johnson was the most outspoken proponent of resignation, saying that the military was being blamed for a conflict over which it had little control. The discussion went on for three hours before agreement was reached.\^{32}

The next morning Wheeler had a change of heart. He had spent a sleepless night over his sense of loyalty and his military oath. He had pushed the other chiefs to resign now he had to convince them that it was the wrong thing to do. Wheeler told
them "we can't do it. It's mutiny." 33 Johnson felt strongly arguing that the they should resign because it was apparent to him that "no one was really paying any attention" to their recommendations. "If we're going to go to war, then we had better be honest with the American people," 34 Wheeler added that "all our lives we've been told to obey orders, we've been schooled in it. We've been told to give our lives for our country. Now, we're going to throw all that away." He pleaded with Johnson to "give it some time." "You never know, maybe we can pull it out." 35

Before General Johnson died he sat down with a close friend and told him about the incident. He added "I made the typical mistake of believing I could do more for my country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out. I am now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage." 36

CONCLUSION

Despite the fact that most of the JCS recommendations were eventually adopted, the Vietnam War was a frustrating experience for those chiefs who tried to conduct it from Washington. They were under constant time pressure and stress. The President's advisory system was structured to achieve consensus and to prevent potentially damaging leaks. Insecure and distrustful of anyone but his closest advisers, President Johnson viewed the JCS with suspicion. When the situation in Vietnam seemed to demand
military action, Johnson failed to turn to his military advisers for solutions. In hindsight it is easy to criticize the senior leadership for their performance, but under the same circumstances, could the current generation have performed as well?

Harold K. Johnson's experience as a survivor of the Bataan Death March in World War II and his profound sense of loyalty led him to accept conditions outside his direct personal control and to work as best he could within the constraints of a difficult situation. He would never advocate the military's stepping beyond its constitutional place in the American political system, but he was acutely aware of the dangers posed by President Johnson's excessive dependence on McNamara and other civilian experts in pursuing the war.

The JCS can only advise their civilian superiors on the strategic implications of the international scene and make recommendations as to the kind of military action needed to protect U.S. interests. Having the right people in the right jobs at the right time is in many ways more important than the organization in which they work, however the President's administration was an organizational shambles. There was absence of regular meetings and routine procedures. Ad hoc advocacy groups were assembled in place of mandatory advisory groups like the JCS. This lead to difficulties in rigorous policy analysis and ultimately a flawed strategy. The threatened JSC resignation
in 1967 did reinforce its commitment to winning a major role in
determining just when and where the American government would use
military power.

General Johnson knew that the Army had reached down into the
ranks to make him Chief of Staff. That job proved to be the most
challenging of his career. For four difficult years he struggled
with a series of practical and ethical challenges and at times
found himself close to resignation. He held himself to extremely
demanding standards, and sometimes felt he had not measured up.
Although the political and strategic environment and
personalities of the principle advisers were unprecedented during
his tenure, Harold K. Johnson worked tirelessly within this
environment of volatility, uncertainty, and ambiguity (VUCA) to
do the best job he could. WORD COUNT = 4501.
ENDNOTES

1 Harold K. Johnson, Oral History Interview, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
5 Sorley, 176.
9 Perry, 135.
10 Ibid., 136.
11 Ibid., 136-137.
14 McMaster, 50.
15 Sorley, 175.
16 Ibid., 178.
17 Ibid., 189.
18 Ibid., 189.
19 Ibid., 190.
21 Sorley, 195.
22 Ibid., 201.
23 Perry, 152.
25 Sorley, 223.
26 Ibid., 225.
27 Ibid., 227.
28 Ibid., 235.
29 Perry, 161.
30 Perry, 162.
31 Ibid., 163.
32 Ibid., 164.
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34 Ibid., 164.
35 Ibid., 164.
36 Sorley, 304.
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