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EAST EUROPE REPORT
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CONTENTS

ALBANIA

Role of Youth Organizations in Solving Social Problems
(Muharrem Xhafa; ZERI I RINISE, 30 Mar 83).............. 1

BULGARIA

Review of Military Concepts Held by U.S., NATO
(Docent Nesho Neshev; ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST, No 4,
1983)................................................. 6

HUNGARY

Kadarism, Analysis of a Man, Political System
(Pierre Kende; INTERVENTION, Mar-Apr 83)............... 12

Nation Searches To Find Own Way
(Gyorgy Konrad; MAGYAR FUZETEK, No 12, 1983)......... 24

Opposition's Role in Reform Judged Threatening
(Heiko Flottau; SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, 6 May 83)...... 41

Life Among Youth Seen
(Aliz Hida; KOZNEVELES, 6 May 83)....................... 45

Lack of Morality, Purpose in Youth Discussed
(Csaba Gombar; KOZNEVELES, 6 May 83)................... 48

- a -

[III - EE - 63]
ROLE OF YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS IN SOLVING SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Tirana ZERI I RINISE in Albanian 30 Mar 83 pp 2-3

[Article by Muharrem Xhafa: "We Must Also Make Progress in Regard to Social Problems"]

[Text] The Albanian Union of Working Youth, in its multilateral political-ideological and educational activity for the execution of the tasks assigned by the Eighth Party Congress and analyzed by the Eighth Youth Congress, always keeps ignited the spirit of ideological actions and movements for the eradication of vestiges of the old and the consolidation of new socialist norms and practices, in important events in the life of man such as births, engagements, marriages, etc. It is no accident that these are among the major objectives in the revolutionary youth movement "Where we are, may everything advance."

As our socialist reality attests, many old customs and practices on happy and sad occasions inherited from the past have already undergone profound changes in their content. Retaining everything good that they had, they have been divested of many of their excesses and especially of the conservative content which they conveyed in the substance and forms of their performance. Others have been entirely eliminated and in their place new norms and practices which reflect contemporary social and economic reality, the educational and cultural development of the workers, the new socialist relations in society and in the family, and generally the new outlook and socialist way of life of our people are being widely consolidated. It is a very positive fact that we find changes in the conception and treatment of such important events in man's life in all categories of youth and especially among working youth, who are distinguished as fighters for the embracing and consolidation of the new.

Changes have occurred in all the conventional practices which accompany engagements, marriages, etc. and in their place have entered and are being widely used new practices which, from the standpoint of social content, express, above all, the ever-increasing affirmation of the personality of girls and of youth in general. They are seen in a healthy social light which accepts and supports, ever more widely, engagements and marriages based on love, taking into account the opinion of the girl and boy and the creation of conditions for them to meet, even in cases when the engagement is contracted through the intermediary of parents or relatives; and on the active participation of the girl in the joyful ceremonies of engagement and marriage and in political and social activity.
times due to the special characteristics of a district, a zone, categories of youth and even certain individuals in the struggle which the youth organizations develop against such negative factors which feed the old and cause it to survive. This is an indispensable requirement because the backward mentalities and customs do not have the same appearance everywhere. In the country, for example, it happens that engagements are still made under the influence of conservative concepts, always disregarding the legitimate desires of youth, especially girls; there are cases of continuing the custom of great expenditures from the bridegroom's family for the preparation of the bride's trousseau, etc. But such manifestations and others, such as those of having a sensational wedding with much expenditure, sending the most expensive gifts, etc., also occur in the city. These phenomena make the wedding a burden and affect the enjoyment of these occasions.

The old customs are not attacked openly and with the same intensity everywhere as they once were. This cannot be justified simply by the growth in economic conditions and the standard of living, by the enlargement of the social circle and that of friends, etc., as has been said in some cases. Behind these manifestations stand conservative concepts, petit-bourgeois turpitude, a mania to make a sensation, to appear as a family "with a name" or "not to be indebted to people." It is necessary that the youth organizations, their cadres and activists recognize these concepts and foreign manifestations, and carry on skilled educational work with the concrete objective of not submitting to them. The experience of many youth organizations in the districts of Korce, Shkoder, etc. indicates that, when they are interested and learn in advance, if one of their male or female comrades has occasion to become engaged or get married and has thought that they should organize and celebrate, when they have not been satisfied merely to participate in these events, but are active in the application of norms of communist morality, then no place remains for old customs or liberal manifestations which make the beauty, the values and healthy content of such events pale. It is the appreciation of society, of young men and women themselves for these occasions, for the work and life of the couple who are engaged and married which is more valuable to the family and the social circle, to all participants in the celebration, which fills them with optimism.

The process of consolidation and triumph of the new is a broad and complicated process in which, not infrequently, the old exists and lives, appearing as the new. In evaluating, supporting and generalizing it, therefore, it is necessary that it should be viewed on the basis of its content and not merely on the basis of the form of its appearance, that it should be assessed in a dialectic manner, not denying everything inherited from the past, but avoiding what is backward; everything good that must be preserved, enriching the new with its content, should be supported. This deserves to be properly understood by the youth organizations, because our people have many good customs, in practices which they exercise on occasions of joy and sorrow, whose essence consists of optimism, love, solidarity, readiness to be near to one another, etc. "Joy and sorrow," Comrade Enver Hoxha teaches us "are social phenomena related to people's feelings, to love and solidarity among people. These and other things are the good sides of customs. The party has as its aim to strengthen these positive social sides, but at the same time it has as its aim also to correctly explain and interpret bad customs which have become mixed with good ones."
It happens that Comrade Enver Hoxha stresses that, "From a time when young people did not meet and were not known to each other at all before the marriage, now they work together, are good comrades and, in the process of work and acquaintance, they keep company, become friends, and may fall in love and marry, thus creating a new socialist family where love, sincerity and mutual respect reign."

As a direct reflection of the new relations and associations among young people, gatherings to enjoy occasions of engagements, marriages, birthday celebrations, conferring of decorations, etc. have taken on everywhere a broad social character. In these, aside from members of the family and relatives, male and female friends from work, from school, from the army or from campaigns also take part as an expression of these feelings of socialist unity and solidarity, of the strengthening of political and revolutionary enthusiasm in the ranks of youth, of the continuation of our people's good traditions. A beautiful phenomenon, too, is the fact that, on the aforementioned occasions, there is an effort to better unite and organize on political-social, national, local and traditional holidays, such as those of 28-29 November, 1 May, New Year, etc., which has made their content richer. The increasing impetus and development of this activity, the return to solid tradition, as well as the propagation of values related to the younger generation, promote and make more effective the work of the organization.

The achievements in practices which are utilized on the occasion of such events, even if they are obvious, leave no place for self-satisfaction and even less for euphoria. In this field, therefore, as the Eighth Congress of the Albanian Workers Party stressed, the struggle against old mentalities and customs, whether patriarchal, conservative or "neo-" liberal, must be considered as an important objective of educational work.

Old traditions and customs inculcated over centuries continue to exist and exercise influence on the people and, consequently, also on youth, even after the socioeconomic foundation which gave birth to them has disappeared. This happens because, as a known fact, social awareness always remains relatively behind the development of social existence and also because a series of other internal and external factors influence their preservation. Among these influences are the psychology of private property, of narrow personal interests, the sick pride of the petit-bourgeoisie, and others which, in one degree or another, continue to be retained even among some young men and women. But there is also influence from the ideological pressure of the bourgeois and revisionist world which is interested in and works to obstruct the consolidation of the new in our land. We cannot immunize ourselves against this pressure because, as Comrade Enver Hoxha teaches us, "We cannot live isolated from the outside world whose influences, by means of various tools of information and propaganda which are of a more massive and perfected character than ever before, as well as through contacts which cannot be avoided, infiltrate our land and people via many channels."

These factors are seen and known on a general level and, generally, work is executed in all directions to prevent and fight against their negative effect. Nevertheless, experience shows that this is not sustained everywhere and at all
In this direction, some youth organizations have done good work, those of Tropoja, Librazhd, Skrapar, etc., for example. They have gained the richest experience, but again there is room for youth organizations to considerably broaden their knowledge and increase the effectiveness of all their activities by means of studies which are carried out and ideological discussions and debates which are developed in order that, through scientific arguments, the youthful masses may better penetrate into the content of our traditions and customs, and fully reject foreign customs and manifestations whether conservative or liberal.

In practice there is sometimes a certain tendency to place emphasis on the criticism or disavowal of an old custom or tradition. This is necessary to do, but in this ideological struggle it is desirable that its good sides be preserved and revealed, and conditions created for the development of positive contemporary social phenomena in order that they be established and given a mass character to form new traditions and customs. This is a matter of importance to be appreciated here, and there is another thing: for this question it would not be correct to seek some sort of codification or giving of readymade prescriptions, but advice and instructions even for such occasions are required. It is also necessary that opinions on these social problems be discussed and stated, as is occurring lately in the execution of tasks of the movement "Where we are, may everything advance," in many youth organizations, in their forums and free discussions which young men and women have in their free time. Such a thing must be further encouraged and stimulated, because the exchange of views and debates in a healthy spirit can make it possible for things to be clarified theoretically and practically, and lead to the correct solution of social problems.

In all these activities it is necessary that every spontaneous and indifferent opinion be combatted in the struggle against the old and the work for the consolidation of the new. It happens that some people think that our socioeconomic development, the raising of the people's educational and cultural level, etc., may lead to the disappearance of old mentalities and customs and to the consolidation of new norms. Certainly material, economic and social conditions constitute the basis for the birth of new norms and customs and for their return to tradition, but this transformation is not made spontaneously and immediately, without continual struggle and effort for the destruction of the old and the inculcation of the revolutionary new into the awareness of the youth. It is also a fact that the old, as and when it is replaced by the new, resists and can return if vigilance is lowered and the class-ideological struggle is not always maintained, as has happened with several old practices and customs in the districts of Diber, Durres, Kruje, Albasan, etc. In addition, the opinion has not ceased that people's joys and sorrows, being private matters, may not be interfered with by youth organizations and their activists. Experience shows that whenever the youth organizations and social activists have performed thoughtful educational work well and have acted appropriately with regard to concrete occasions and phenomena, they have intervened with prudence and warmth without intruding on the people's feelings, and the results have been positive.

The problems of the consolidation of new socialist norms and customs in the future require that they take the place in life and in the activities of the
youth organizations that belongs to them. On the basis of achievements and of
experience gained, under the leadership of the party, they must increase the
organization of discussions and analyses, carry out generalized studies and
qualified propaganda, agitation, educational and explanatory work in order to
launch young men and women into concrete action to deepen initiatives and revo-
lutionary movements which they have undertaken for the education of youth and
the consolidation everywhere of new socialist customs and norms.

12249
CSO: 2100/42
REVIEW OF MILITARY CONCEPTS HELD BY U.S., NATO

Sofia ARMEYSKI KOMUNIST in Bulgarian No 4, 1983 pp 92-96

[Article by Maj Gen Docent Nesho Neshev, candidate of military sciences: "U.S. and NATO Military Strategy Concepts"]

[Text] U.S. military doctrine has covered a long way in its development since World War II. Until 1953 it relied on war-time experience and the idea of waging a nuclear war. Between then and 1961 it reflected the tempestuous development of nuclear weapons and the theory of nuclear war. Subsequently -- until 1971 -- under the influence of the increased danger of a general nuclear conflict in which the United States would suffer heavy damage, the idea of a variety of wars was adopted, such as the "flexible reaction strategy." Starting with the 1970s, the U.S. doctrine was reorganized on the basis of the strategies of "realistic threat" and "direct confrontation" with the USSR and the members of the socialist comity." From the military-technical viewpoint, the U.S. doctrine rests on the idea of using nuclear weapons as the principal means of armed struggle. In their pursuit of global military policy objectives aimed at world domination and ruling other nations, the imperialist strategists do not rely on means and methods for attaining them other than nuclear weapons and nuclear war. Since the USSR and the Warsaw Pact are the main obstacle on the way to world domination by U.S. imperialism, this doctrine is profoundly imbued with anti-Sovietism and anticommunism.

The strategic nuclear parity reached between the United States and the USSR during the last decade forced the U.S. militaristic circles to change their views on preparing for and waging nuclear warfare. Based on the means and scale of armed struggle, three types of war were considered possible: Strategic (general), involving unlimited use of all nuclear means; war on theaters of military operations, in Europe above all, involving operative-tactical nuclear weapons; and limited nuclear war ("mininuclear war"), in the course of which nuclear weapons would be selectively used mainly for striking at military targets and government control centers.

Several concepts were developed within the framework of the "realistic threat" concept: "Strategic sufficiency," "triad," "one-and-a-half war," "strategic mobility," "oceanic strategy," and others.

The "strategic sufficiency" concept calls for maintaining strategic nuclear means on a "sufficient" level, which could make it possible for the United
States to pursue a military policy course "from a position of strength" and retain a wide set of options for the "guaranteed destruction" of the enemy country or coalition by dealing a "preemptive" and "retaliatory" nuclear strike. Some military personalities, such as former U.S. Secretary of Defense M. Laird, believe that "the concept of 'strategic sufficiency' is being continually revised in the light of the changing strategic situation." The concept skillfully conceals the formula of "attaining superiority." Since the SALT Treaty limits their quantity, superiority is assigned to quality improvements of strategic offensive forces. As early as October 1981, U.S. President Reagan announced the expanded nuclear rearmament program. It includes the development of the latest strategic attack weapons -- the MX intercontinental ballistic missile, Trident-2-armed nuclear submarines, the B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, long-range cruise missiles with mobile launching pads and updating communications and control of strategic offensive force systems. Although planned for 1990, the completion of this program has been accelerated.

Meanwhile, the United States refused to follow the example of the Soviet Union which assumed the historical obligation not to use nuclear weapons first. Representatives of the U.S. administration declare "unacceptable" the Soviet proposals on restricting and reducing strategic weapons. The proposals were made by Comrade Yurii Andropov, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, in his speech "Sixty Years of USSR" and were given a high rating not only by the progressive forces but also by soberly thinking personalities in the West.

The progress made by the American "hawks" is confirmed by the U.S. Presidential "Defense Directive for the 1984-1988 Fiscal Year." The main purpose stipulated in this official document is "The destruction of socialism as a sociopolitical system." The directive calls for the formulation of a plan "for first use of nuclear force in the theater of operations." Openly proclaiming their ambitions for world domination, the Pentagon militarists assure themselves and their allies that they would be the winners in a thermonuclear war.

The "triad" concept calls for the simultaneous or sequential improvement of intercontinental ballistic and sea- and air-based missiles. At the same time, the creation of cruise missile, the Pershing-2 ballistic missile and other operative-tactical nuclear weapons is considered a variety of a European "triad." It involves the NATO "triad" or the so-called "Eurostrategic forces. The latter are the arsenal for waging a "Eurostrategic war," through which the United States could attain its global objectives without taking the risk of a nuclear strike on its own territory. It is hoped that targets deep within the USSR could be destroyed without involving the use of overseas strategic weapons. One can easily understand that in such a case the might of a Soviet nuclear responsive strike would fall on Western Europe.

Conflicting views have been expressed on the subject of a "Eurostrategic war." On the one hand, global military policy objectives are being pursued, while on the other, the use of nuclear weapons is restricted to Europe alone. This is impossible, bearing in mind the merciless effect of the laws of war. We know that a country or coalition of countries which are attacking or defending themselves will not stop in their pursuit of victory until the entire arsenal
of means at their disposal has been used. Historical experience proves that a regional nuclear conflict in Europe would grow into a global nuclear war with all the catastrophic consequences for the aggressor who started it.

The "one-and-a-half war" concept defines the scale and directions in the deployment of ground forces, the tactical air force and the navy (excluding nuclear submarines) in waging limited wars. Essentially, this concept may be reduced to the creation of general purpose forces which, together with the NATO forces, could wage a large-scale war in Europe or Asia as well as another "half war" for putting out local conflicts elsewhere in the world. This concept has been recently refined and possibilities of waging a "half war" are being focused on the USSR in the Far East and the protection of sea lanes. That is why Japan is being assigned an increasing role in U.S. planning. Japan's "self-defense forces" exceed all constitutional limitations, and the country is heavily involved in the Pentagon's Far East and Pacific Ocean planning. In order to increase the combat power of general purpose forces, the number of combat units and formations will be increased, some unnecessary control and rear echelons will be eliminated and weapons and ordnance of the highest caliber are being procured. The structure of American forces in Europe is being retained, strong groups of forces are being created in Asia and aid to U.S. allies is being provided so that they may increase their military potential.

The "strategic mobility" concept calls for the fast transfer of large military contingents and materiel from one theater of operations to another with a view to strengthening already deployed or creating new groups of forces and improving the strategic position of the United States in a given part of the world. This concept is consistent with the global nature of U.S. military policy objectives and the impossibility of permanently stationing the necessary forces in threatened areas. It would be applied most likely in combination with the "advance basing" of forces, which requires huge costs and involves inevitable political complications. The "strategic mobility" concept ensures the implementation of the "one-and-a-half war" concept. It allows the United States efficiently to transfer forces to areas in the case of an adverse situation.

"Strategic mobility" is based on maintaining a significant mobile strategic reserve in a state of permanent readiness for action on U.S. territory. The idea of the creation of such a mobile strategic reserve is being implemented through the establishment of a 200,000-strong fast reaction corps. Its successful use requires an adequate number of sea and air transport facilities and a developed storage system for spare arms and materiel. The "strategic mobility" concept is acceptable to all three branches of the U.S. armed forces, for its helps the simultaneous reinforcement of land, air and naval forces. Politically, it is extremely reactionary, for the transfer of a mobile strategic reserve to various areas will involve gross encroachments on the sovereignty of individual countries, the replacement of inconvenient regimes and governments, the crushing of revolutionary movements, etc.

As the most important part of American military doctrine, the "oceanic strategy" concept features the accelerated development of the navy and increasing the share of nuclear missile-armed submarines in the strategic nuclear forces. The increased number of sea-based missiles improves the flexibility and
protection of these armaments. The Pentagon's military strategists believe that such flexible and invulnerable weapons are more promising in terms of reaching U.S. military policy objectives. For example, rearming 40 nuclear submarines with Trident-2 missiles would make it possible to hide and launch from the depths of the ocean some 13,440 nuclear warheads. It is considered that the world's oceans offer better opportunities for maneuvering strategic nuclear forces in terms of distant continents. The oceanic strategy also stipulates an overall superiority of U.S. naval forces over the Soviet navy and attaining and maintaining naval superiority in the various naval theaters of operation. The availability of strong fleets of nuclear submarines and groups of submarines, surface vessels, naval aviation and marines is stressed as an additional advantage of the "oceanic" strategy, for they would allow their more flexible use in different types of wars (nuclear and non-nuclear).

The other NATO members support the U.S. military strategic concepts and steps. However, they also have different views, some of which deeply affect the interests of the Western European countries.

The European NATO members try to exclude the concept of waging war without the use of nuclear weapons. They fear that the United States would deny them the necessary support unless it commits itself from the very beginning to the use of nuclear weapons. It is believed that a non-nuclear war would put the Western countries at a disadvantage given the "superiority" enjoyed by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in terms of ground forces and conventional armaments. Under this pretext they deliberately hinder talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, and circumvene or openly reject the latest Soviet proposals formulated by Yuriy Andropov. For the same reason the United States and its most loyal allies rejected the idea of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and Northern Europe as well as the latest proposal of Olof Palme, the Swedish prime minister, of establishing a zone free from tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. During his recent visit to the USSR, Claude Cheysson, the French foreign affairs minister, confirmed the need of deploying the 600 American Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles on the territory of some of the bloc's members.

The concept of "frontal defense" or "frontal lines" made its way in NATO under the pressure of FRG military circles. It calls for NATO's ground forces to be deployed not in great depth but in advanced areas, stretching from 15 to 75 km from the FRG's eastern border, and to mount an offensive in the initial period of the war or, should circumstances be adverse, to defense but without loss of territory. This concept calls for active offensive air and naval operations during the very first hours of the war. In other words, the "frontal defense" concept is oriented toward waging offensive operations on Warsaw Pact territory and immediately turning to the use of nuclear weapons. The only "defensive" part of the "frontal defense" concept is its name, the purpose of which is to conceal its rather aggressive and offensive nature. The strategy of "direct confrontation" with the USSR on a global and regional scale, formulated lately by Weinberger, the U.S. secretary of defense, in June 1981, ensures even more favorable conditions for the implementation of the U.S. and NATO military strategy concepts we described, for it calls for making U.S. military power "insurpassable" over the next few years, giving priority in the allocation of a large share of the U.S. military budget to war preparations,
while freezing social programs. The U.S. and NATO armed forces are asked to maintain a state of immediate readiness for combat in limited conflicts anywhere in the world of global war. Such military strategy offers the possibility of taking steps to maintain strategic offensive forces in a state of high combat readiness, extensive rearming of ground, air and naval forces with more advanced weapons, considerably upgrading strategic mobility, enhancing the mobilization readiness of the armed forces and the war industry and stockpiling large quantities of weapons, ordnance, and material and technical facilities.

The influence which the modern military strategy concepts shared by the United States and NATO has on the development of their armaments extends in several directions: The desire to retain existing armed forces and to increase their combat capabilities through quality improvements; maintaining general-purpose forces which would make possible the waging of nuclear or non-nuclear war in Europe and Asia and local wars elsewhere; upgrading the mobilization readiness of the United States and NATO and improving conditions for their strategic deployment; creating a "rapid reaction force" which could change the military strategic situation quickly in threatened remote areas; pursuing stressed and extensive scientific research and experimental design work in the United States and NATO in order to attain and maintain technical superiority in nuclear and conventional weapons and control and support systems, development of outer space weapons, etc.

The political declaration of the Warsaw Pact members stipulates that "The recently adopted American programs for the development and production...of weapons based on the latest scientific achievements and discoveries, already under implementation, include systems and weapons for conducting military operations in and out of outer space, the objective of which is to increase greatly the destructive power of the U.S. military arsenal."

A closer study of U.S. and NATO military strategy concepts reveals some of their characteristic sociopolitical features.

First, they are distinguished by their anti-Soviet and anticommunist line; in all cases they stipulate waging war against the USSR and the members of the socialist comity. Consequently, they are basically reactionary and serve the reactionary forces in the world.

Second, they proceed from the militaristic nature of imperialism and are aggressive. With the help of its developed material and economic base and leading positions in the administration of the country, the U.S. military-industrial complex is continuing to promote a militaristic ideology in military strategy concepts. The "limited strategic war" concept is the peak of aggressiveness. It relies on attaining U.S. military policy objectives through the devastation of the Western European countries.

Third, by displaying the actual pseudohumanism of their military strategy concepts the United States and NATO are trying to pressure the socialist countries into concessions in the face of the threat of the use of a superpowerful strategic nuclear weapon. The creation of "humane nuclear weapons," such as the neutron bomb, which could destroy the enemy but preserve his material values, is encouraged.
Fourth, these concepts conceal cynical immorality expressed in the fact that an ideological diversionary campaign is being waged among the nations on the existence of a "Soviet threat" great enough to justify even a "preemptive" nuclear strike which could cause the instantaneous loss of life of 250-300 million people. Such a concept is radically immoral and man-hating.

The approach adopted by the USSR and the other members of the socialist comity is the direct opposite. During the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the USSR, an impassioned appeal for peace and humanism was once again launched in Moscow. New constructive proposals were made, leading to a real prevention of the threat of war. They organically blend the proposals made by the Warsaw Pact, expressed in the Prague 1983 Political Declaration, calling for the conclusion of a treaty on the reciprocal non-use of military strength and maintaining peaceful relations between Warsaw Pact and NATO members, as well as the new constructive step recently taken by the GDR, Poland, the USSR and Czechoslovakia at the Vienna talks on reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. These proposals, which are consistent with the vital interests of all nations, are being warmly welcomed everywhere. The NATO strategists alone fail to "note and evaluate" them.

Let us emphasize, in conclusion, that the U.S. and NATO military strategy concepts are extremely reactionary and dangerous to mankind. Many of their aspects are unfounded and methodologically limited. However, they should in no case be underestimated. More than ever before, we need a sober assessment of the strong and weak sides of imperialist military strategy concepts. Accurate knowledge of the enemy and maintaining a state of highest combat readiness of our armed forces alone can protect us from any aggression or random factors in a strategic situation.

5003
CSO: 2200/94
KADARISM, ANALYSIS OF A MAN, POLITICAL SYSTEM

Paris INTERVENTION in French Mar/Apr 83 pp 74-84

[Article by Pierre Kende: "What is 'Kadarism'?"]

[Text] There are doctrinaire "isms" and pragmatic "isms." "Kadarism," which is a variant of communism in power under Moscow's control, undoubtedly belongs in the latter category. Semidependent management closely linked to the military-political system established by the USSR in East Central Europe, this local "ism" is analyzed, above all, as a style of government which arose from the confrontation of a situation and a protagonist. The situation had seemed almost beyond resolution and the protagonist without ability. Then little by little, the landscape changed and the protagonist proved that he was the right man in the right place.

For it must never be forgotten that Kadar's regime was spawned by the disaster of 1956 and that it originally represented not a recourse to an innovative "ism," but the Soviet response to the Hungarian revolt. Within a few days, the uprising had jolted the communist regime established by the Soviets after the war. In the turmoil, the Hungarian PC [Communist Party] had practically ceased to exist, with the exception of a reformist core which, under the triple patronage of Imre Nagy, chairman of the council, Janos Kadar, the newly elected successor of the sinister party chief, Cero, routed by the revolution, and finally the philosopher Georges Lukacs, had established itself as a Committee of Organization. The drama turned to tragedy when it became apparent that the Russians—who for a while had seemed to accept what had happened—decided to return in force. During a meeting held with the Soviet ambassador, one Yuri Andropov, Kadar had announced that if the Soviet troops returned to Budapest, he would take up arms himself to drive them back. A few hours later, he disappeared from the capital only to reemerge, this time as head of a countergovernment appointed by Moscow, after a mysterious 3-day absence. Once a patriotic communist, he had become the number one traitor of the nation. That was on 4 November 1956, D-day for first-stage "Kadarism."

Chosen by Khrushchev (apparently on Tito's recommendation) to lead the restoration, Kadar obviously had been given a triple mission: to crush the "counter-revolutionary" forces, to return the country to the Soviet fold and, finally and above all, to see to it that an explosion of the 1956 type could never occur again in Hungary. In a sense, second-stage "Kadarism" was a result
of this final mission: Indeed, in order to establish order securely, the Hungarians had to be reconciled with communism, which could not be done without concession and without innovation.

We could compare the case of Husak in Czechoslovakia with this view, i.e., the example of a firm establishment of order obtained without concession and without innovation. The objection is admissible. In fact, it should not be thought that there was only one means of pacification possible in a situation such as Hungary's after 1956 or Czechoslovakia's after 1968. But it is here, to be precise, that we hit on the originality of the approach chosen, and undoubtedly preferred, by Kadar. Of course, he did have the advantage over his Czechoslovak counterpart of having been launched by Khrushchev and not by Brezhnev, in a period of destalinization and not at the peak of post-Stalin immobility. However, the peacemaker's personal contribution should not be minimized, nor should his moral responsibility. Whereas Husak chose intransigence concerning all reformism, Kadar preferred compromise and sought approval. Even during the period of repression—harsher than in Czechoslovakia, but not as long—he did not lose sight of the need to safeguard the future, particularly within the party, by installing officials who were not very caught up in the excesses of Stalinism and who were favorable to controlled reformism. That is why, unlike Husak, he has not remained the hostage of repression; and starting in the early 1960's, he was able to initiate a policy of liberalization, timid at first, but once underway, bolder and bolder. To such an extent that in the 1960's, among the political police and Stalinists who had been pushed into the background, there began to be grumblings of betrayal, of capitulation, of victory surreptitiously granted (by Kadar) to the "counterrevolution."2

But the change in direction taken by Kadar in the early 1960's should not cause us to lose sight of the fact that, until then, Soviet orders were carried out with exemplary, systematic brutality. Once the rebellion was put down, some 30,000 people were imprisoned and a still undetermined number—but which could not be less than 1,000—were executed: that was also part of the landscape which second-stage "Kadarism" was destined to rearrange. Within a few months, every democratic invention of the 1956 revolution, starting with the Workers Councils, were ruthlessly crushed. With the arrival of Russian tanks and the establishment of the first Kadar government, the rule of deceit was reinstated in Budapest and all the promises of that period—"there will be no collectivization," "political pluralism will be maintained," "the workers will have genuine representation"—were quickly forgotten.

The Hungarian nation experienced that period as a cruel, final and irremediable defeat. Such distress is also part of "Kadarism"—or to be more exact, of its foundations—in the sense that if they had retained any hope at all, the Hungarians would have perhaps refused to go along with the process of normalization. They had to be pushed to the depths of despair so that, 5 or 6 years later, they would accept Kadar's outstretched hand. Such are the paradoxes of history.3
"Kadarism" as a Method of Government and as a State of Mind

Let us note first of all—for some impetuous visitors from Hungary have an annoying tendency to overlook this—that on the level of political institutions, Hungary is not notably different from the other countries of communist Europe. Institutionally, "Kadarism" falls into the category of normal Sovietism. The PC's monopoly is fully maintained; so-called representative bodies (parliament, for example) are nothing more than a facade; corporative agencies (trade unions and others) are firmly controlled by the "ruling party"; the written and spoken press, as well as publications (books, records) are also under the control of higher authorities, which also have very broad special powers for such purpose; legality is subordinate to PC directives; no political, trade union, cultural or social activity is tolerated outside of official contexts, i.e., organizations approved and controlled by the apparatus, and so on. This last point deserves some thought, because legally the workings of organizations are not banned or subject to explicit authorization by the PC (which, incidentally, is called the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party). But no one is fooled by this legal loophole, magistrates and local councils even less than others. Associations of angler fishermen are permitted without any problem, of course, but if the nature of the group poses the least problem, the matter is immediately referred to the so-called "respective" authorities. We should note, however, that recently some philanthropic initiatives, a bit suspect in the eyes of the authorities, have been tolerated as an experiment, it should be said.

The situation of churches should be analyzed separately. In glaring contrast to Poland, Hungary's religious communities have never regained their independence since the installation of communism, not even following the events of 1956. In Kadar's Hungary, the churches are perhaps more effectively watched, infiltrated and held in check by the communist state than in some less "liberal" neighboring countries. Monsignor Lekai, chairman of the Catholic Bishops Conference, is noted for the servility of his behavior and for his frequent statements of loyalty to communist authorities.

In other words, from the standpoint of its legal operation—excuse me for using this term—Hungary is properly a communist country. It is even more so if examined from the standpoint of its relations with Moscow. All ruling bodies, beginning with the party's Central Committee and the security organs, are totally infiltrated by Soviet agents. These agents are not necessarily secret: all Hungarian political officials communicate regularly with their supervisor-counterparts from Moscow; they do so in an official capacity, i.e., in the normal exercise of their duties. Thus there is no possible surprise in that respect. The national party, headed by comrade Kadar, is a reliable ally in the highest sense. If the case were otherwise, it would be known immediately in Moscow, since the least decision of any significance cannot be made in Budapest without the Soviet comrades being informed of it immediately.

If Hungary is not as "normal" as it tries to appear, however, it is because there is a nonnegligible distance between official regulations and the practices of institutions. Not only do controls not always work (in which regard Hungary is not at all unique), but between regulations and their application there is
a desire not to ruffle anyone’s feathers, to respect the interests of both sides insofar as it is possible. Moreover, in many cases, half-acknowledged schemes of complicity are established between the controllers and the controlled. Thus we are faced with an aspect of reality that is no less important than the official structure, but which is infinitely more difficult to define. For the sake of simplicity, we will call this something a "state of mind" (using as a basis, to some extent, the well-known definition of French radical socialism).

In fact, insofar as words have meaning, "Kadarism" is defined as a state of mind more than as a political policy (even though the latter may be its most obvious expression). This state of mind, which derives as much from the personal traits of a man as from the constraints of a situation, is a mixture of several things: awareness of the limitations imposed by the Soviet presence, a great understanding of the workaday ambitions of the ordinary man, the determination to avoid the excesses which provoked the great revolt of 1956, abhorrence of physical torture of political adversaries (and in this regard it must be said that the action of repressive organs is completely under control; blunders are not tolerated), nostalgia for a certain kind of civic peace, respect for the economy, even in its laws that are least consistent with the Marxist utopia, a certain indulgence for the shortcomings and schemes of others (which is even more remarkable since Kadar himself is a man of great integrity and, on the whole, is satisfied with a modest lifestyle). In general, "Kadarism" is characterized by the modesty of its ambitions and by a realism that is not only verbal: which is why it respects the aspirations of the people themselves and demands of itself a certain degree of flexibility with regard to doctrine. The rule of conduct is to proceed so that as much tension as possible is avoided, or when it does occur, to quickly deal with it in order to resolve it as fast as possible. Unless it is forced (by Big Brother in particular), the Kadar regime prefers not to take measures which provoke public criticism, which revive the allergies so painfully overcome. At the same time, the Kadar team is very careful not to question the Soviet model; on the contrary, it praises it; however, if its course of conduct is different, it is because it is better informed about reality and because it is more aware of the limits of possibility.5

Digression on the Economy

The economy is practically the only area in which the Kadar regime has allowed itself a certain degree of institutional innovation. For several years, there has been so much talk in the West about the Hungarian exception and, more particularly, about Hungarian-style "marketplace socialism" that this point must be examined carefully.

Let us first note that, even on the level of economic organization, Hungary is not so different from the Soviet model. Agriculture is 95-percent collectivized; industrial production, trade and services are under state control (except on the fringes), which means that all economic activities of any importance are, in principle, directed by ministerial departments or other similar agencies; enterprises are obliged to submit a "plan" to authorities; the banking system merges rather broadly with the state budget; labor is unionized only on paper
and is not entirely free to make its own occupational choices or transfers, etc. In all these cases, slight differences would need to be recognized (such as, for example, the situation of workers, whose movements, all things considered, are infinitely less restricted than those of their Russian counterparts). If we omit them, it is only to proceed more quickly.

For here again, what is different in Hungary is less the form than the practices of institutions. The reform of 1968 definitely caused waves, since it rejected bureaucratic planning in favor of requiring truth in pricing and costs, establishing the primacy of current demand over the implementation of plans, and justifying recourse to the marketplace. But (this is now recognized in Hungary by eminent economists taking part in the public debate) the principles of the reform have not been put into practice. After 1968, as before, enterprises have remained under the supervision of government officials and prices have been determined in bureaucratic negotiations and not under pressure from the marketplace. With the reform of 1968, however, a new interpretation of planning acquired acceptance: an interpretation in which the key word is no longer the implementation of plans at all costs, but rather respect for financial balances and constant adaptation of production to demand. Through its principles, even inadequately applied, the reform has created gaps into which the various classes of the population have been introduced so as to widen them. It is thanks to the combined action of all these factors that Hungary has become different economically.

Three specific points need to be emphasized in this connection. First, the reform was the result of a broad consensus including both experts and the public. Contrary to some claims, there was never any popular resistance to the reform, such as among the workers, since all social categories have, in one way or another, benefited from the relief provided by the reform. (More particularly in the case of industrial labor, the reform of 1968, by eliminating the hiring monopoly of the state-controlled sector, has created a bargaining force which did not exist until then.) Second, if the Kadar regime has succeeded, it is largely thanks to the contract of material well-being which it offered to the Hungarian population; but without reform, that contract would not have produced anything lasting. In this sense, the reform of 1968 must be considered an integral part of "Kadarism." Third, through its very principles (primacy of final demand, etc.), the reform considerably influenced economic policy by compelling it to consider the needs of the population and external constraints. This explains why, even with a reform applied only halfway, Hungary has become the first experimental area for socialist consumerism. Instead of bragging about nonexistent results, the Hungarian Government has learned to speak the language of reality (whence the amazing freedom with which Hungarian economists can express themselves, as well as the gap that has developed over the years between the quality of Hungarian statistics and those of other Soviet-bloc countries). As for Hungarian society, it has been urged to be concerned above all with its own problems of subsistence in order to become richer (i.e., through work). As a result, ideological and political tensions have lost much of their intensity.
What "Kadarism" Means in the Daily Lives of Hungarians

It is obvious that the "state of mind" which we mentioned above implies, at the time of its application, a number of concessions. It is these concessions which make the difference, in the eyes of the man on the street, between "Kadarism" and normal Sovietism. Not that these concessions are entirely absent from the practices of other East European communist regimes. As a trend, destalinization has taken that direction almost everywhere, even in the USSR, except that in Hungary it has gone even further. In this sense, "Kadarism" shows the potentiality of destalinization if it should ever encounter conditions as favorable as those in Hungary.

Let us therefore try to identify the typical concessions of "Kadarism" and the way in which they have affected the fate of the Hungarian population.

1--The most dramatic change in direction taken by the communist regime in Hungary concerns the return to individuals of that vast sphere of existence located beyond official contexts, i.e., that of private life. Recruitment of the population by so-called "mass organizations" has practically disappeared and the various forms of forced labor--"communist Saturdays," summer work camps for school-age adolescents, etc.--have been reduced to a minimum. Little by little, private life has regained its traditional rights, even in its most apolitical forms--individual leisure-time activities, family prosperity, "private happiness"--and from there on, many micro-interdependencies have been able to be reestablished on a purely societal basis.

2--Police despotism has declined considerably, as well as that associated with the party's initiatives and "campaigns." The Hungarian population now comes before rules which are both tolerable--not overly petty--and stable. Although the law remains weak, these rules confer a certain degree of civic security that is denied only to political opponents. The rules definitely have a granted character and they are revocable in principle (the passport system well illustrates the absence of a codified, inviolable law). Nevertheless, rules affecting daily life, civil law or certain social rights can be debated publicly (particularly in newspapers). From all indications, the regime is striving to bring these rules closer to the public's expectations, indeed closer to the practices observed in states governed by law.

3--The right to own small farms, after being violated by the forced collectivization of 1959-61, was subsequently recognized in principle and its applications expanded more and more. First in agriculture, in which the production of family plots was not only tolerated but positively encouraged, which is not to say that it became part of the operations of production cooperatives. The symbiosis between the collective and private sectors is probably one of the explanations for what is called the "miracle" of Hungarian agriculture and whose secret is quite simple: the communist state has stopped hindering the prosperity of farmers. This turnaround may also be observed in the pricing policy for farm produce (the variations which it has undergone since 1957 are very representative of the changes in the political balance at the level of the top leadership). For about 20 years, the small farm has also been spreading more and more in the form of plots, gardens and orchards, which
urban--and nonfarming rural--families buy either to cultivate or to turn into a second residence with a small cottage added. It is estimated that more than half of Hungarian households are now involved, in one way or another, in agricultural production, whereas officially only one-fifth of the working population is employed in agriculture.

The other major area of private property is that of housing. Having finally understood the advantage which it can derive in this area from private accumulation, the state has decided to encourage by every means (favorable loans, for example) the acquisition of private or cooperative property (the latter term denoting a kind of joint ownership). Finally, since the late 1970's, the reconversion of certain industrial, commercial and service activities to private ownership has become a current practice. Of course, there is no question of denationalizing, legally speaking. Decollectivization is taking the form of leasing, appointment of management, self-managed groups (whose members become subcontractors of their former enterprise instead of remaining its employees), and subcontractorship .... What looms on the horizon, however, is a kind of popular capitalism whose guiding principle is the systematic reinforcement of what the Chicago school calls the "right of ownership." A hybrid and still very uncertain in its application, the system is simultaneously meeting the needs of the economy (increasing productivity, improved distribution of responsibilities) and is satisfying the aspirations, basically middle-class, of the population. However, the thing for which these new economic freedoms can be blamed—and for which some opponents actually do blame them—is that they favor self-exploitation of the population. To seize the opportunities of the parallel economy, many people are putting in a second work day after the first, official one.

4—One of the major innovations of "Kadarism" had to do with the policy of cadres. Since the mid-1960's, professional know-how has overridden political loyalty: "experts" are preferred over "cadres" (of the party). From now on, to attain most (not all) positions of technical responsibility, it is enough that the candidate agree with the major policy defining his function; he is not required to take an oath of loyalty or to express verbal enthusiasm. Thus the experts are presently a majority among administrators (even at a high level, with the exception of the positions which may be guessed). It is true that, at all levels, administrative personnel are carefully monitored by the networks of the party and the police. Deviations or acts of opposition are punished by degrees (censure, delayed promotions, denial of passport) and even more by the diffuse pressure of the community, whose conformity definitely discourages the desire to stray and makes it unnecessary for authorities to have to take major steps. In this sense, the government is everywhere, even without a physical presence.

5—Another concession of the regime is the opening to the West. For the ordinary citizen, this has produced results in three areas:

a) Publishing, the cinema and television have been opened very broadly to Western products (including serialized items, which young people are wild about);
b) State-controlled trade, both to vary supply and quantitatively meet demand, has turned to massive imports of ordinary and luxury consumer articles;

c) Exit visas to the West, although still "rationed" on the pretext that foreign exchange is rare and expensive, are now being granted, for about the past decade, to all citizens except those whom the government considers politically suspect. Being able to travel in Western countries as tourists, individually or in family groups, has become a normal occurrence, or to be more exact, a possibility which the Hungarians, well aware of the prevailing conditions in neighboring countries, consider one of their privileges.\(^8\)

6--For creative intellectuals, finally, "Kadarism" has brought liberties, limited certainly, but nevertheless appreciable, and they are greater than those which communist regimes have customarily offered thus far. (The regime of Gomulka and Giersz represents the only example of even greater tolerance.) Literature and art have emerged from the stranglehold of socialist realism and compulsory propaganda. But it is in the area of research that liberties are most pronounced: in history and sociology, they have made it possible to deal with difficult issues as well as those with subversive implications—provided it is done with tact, discretion and sobriety, i.e., without calling into question the Soviets, the principles of Marxism-Leninism and socialism as the ultimate ideal. It is even possible, in retrospect, to criticize certain choices of the communist regime and to investigate the fate of individuals and groups that disappeared in the turmoil of attaining power. But it is not a good idea to tell the whole truth and all authorized research is not destined for publication. The limitations imposed on written and spoken publications are clearly more restrictive than those for research. In this regard, censorship jealously guards the integrity of "taboos" and forestalls any attack, even indirect, on the regime's legitimacy. The result is that excellent works, sometimes even the most interesting ones, are banned from circulation; when they are not confiscated or slapped with an absolute veto, they are confined to a restricted distribution destined for a select public. This situation, fraught with paradoxes and tensions, explains why the opposition in Hungary is particularly strong in intellectual circles.

7--The government's attitude toward the opposition probably deserves a separate chapter. I prefer not to talk about it in view of the uncertainty which has prevailed for several months concerning the fate of opponents. Therefore, it is better that I limit myself to the observation that from early 1975 to late 1982, no one was arrested in Hungary for more than a few hours—in any case, no one was turned over to the courts—for political activism. But it was during that same period that the intellectual opposition organized itself into a movement (very informally, it is true). This fact is already quite remarkable in itself. But what is even more remarkable—and which undoubtedly constitutes the major originality of the Hungarian situation from a political standpoint—is that a kind of two-way communication has become established between the opposition and the government. From all indications, the government has tried to respond to the criticism of "dissidents" not only through repression but also through measures intended to render such criticism irrelevant. More specifically, the liberalization of official publications has taken a real leap forward since 1977, the year in which the first "samizdat" appeared.
Results and Prospects of "Kadarism"

A list of the concessions granted is misleading in that it suggests the existence of something like a finished work. It should therefore be recalled, once again, that the policy of "Kadarism" was formulated in the heat of action, under the joint effect of a number of constraints, and that it has undergone variations in accordance with the pressures to which it has been subject and with the states of equilibrium through which it has passed. Since empiricism is its distinguishing characteristic, it is risky to attribute a doctrinal or logical coherence to it. This policy has evolved over the years—but not always in the same direction. Its continuity is linked to the characteristics of a man, himself torn between several temptations and loyalties, partly in contradiction with each other.

The proof that the policy followed since 1956 allows for several interpretations was provided by Kadar himself when he stated in 1981 to his Central Committee that his entire policy of the last 25 years had only been a "tribute" paid to 1956. If he were taken at his word, that would mean that without the revolution of 1956, he would have followed a completely different policy! This bizarre admission confirms, to some extent, the conclusion toward which any serious analysis would tend, i.e., that the regime's policy has not always necessarily conformed to the deep-seated aims of its masters.

Whatever its underlying motivation has been, the policy followed has nevertheless been attractive enough to enable the regime to neutralize most of its opponents, indeed to absorb a number of powerful opponents. Such was the case, first and foremost, of the casualties of the reformism of 1953-56 (whose main protagonists were overwhelmed by the storm of 1956). But the worker and anti-reformist opposition of 1972-75 met with the same fate, to such a degree that in the first years of the 1980's, on the eve of a second wave of economic reforms, absolutely no one came forth within the ranks—I mean at the higher levels—of the party in the name of that ideology. Even more important: The great populist movement, so representative of the middle class with rural affinities—including a good portion of Hungarian scholars—has not only made peace with Kadar, but has discovered in his brand of communism the realization of its lifelong ideals (the winning over of the philosopher-writer L. Nemeth in the early 1960's was particularly dramatic). Finally, we should note that many of the best-known "fifty-sixers" were not only to pursue their professional careers shortly after being released from prison, but some of them—I am thinking of the writer Tibor Dery in this instance—were later bedecked with honors, which dissuaded them from establishing themselves as a group of opponents. In the first years of the 1980's, except for restless young catholics of "grass-roots communities" and young radicals grouped around self-proclaimed publications, there was practically no social milieu in a state of declared disobedience or latent revolt.

In other words, the communist regime has succeeded better in Hungary than elsewhere in penetrating society and working from within, in spite of its initial handicap. The Kadar regime, unlike neighboring regimes, has managed not only to neutralize the social forces of its country, but also to formulate a modus vivendi on the basis of a consensus which seems fairly strong, as
evidenced by the calm with which the Hungarian people have accepted the economic austerity measures imposed on them for nearly a half-decade. Traumatized by the events of 1956 and profoundly resigned to Soviet colonization, the Hungarians accepted Kadar's proposals even more willingly since they saw a certain benevolence in them (which is not to say complicity). Whence a certain conformity of Hungarian society and the isolation of any opposition effort. The party and its satellite organizations securely control Hungarian society and can profit from the collaboration of the most diverse bodies and groups (writers, scholars, bishops). We should note the skill with which the government resolves social conflicts, generally by resolving them as soon as they develop: this is because it is well informed and because it does not hesitate to grant the required concessions—sometimes minimal—on the spot. Thus in Hungary, strikes last only a few hours and are settled, in most case, smoothly. The government does not allow trade union independence, but accepts, indeed desires, that official trade unions advise it of workers' grievances. It also listens to the warnings of experts.

The only problem that "Kadarism" has not managed to handle adequately concerns the situation of the Hungarian nation as such and, more particularly, the fate of Magyar minorities scattered in neighboring countries. It has taken some time for Kadar, who is perhaps the least nationalistic of all East European leaders, to understand that his fellow countrymen are seriously concerned about this problem, which in his eyes is purely a sentimental one. Moreover, it is the kind of problem that Janos Kadar wishes to ignore, since it comes under the heading of foreign, i.e. Soviet policy.

Does "Kadarism" have a future? Like any established regime, it may develop without any surprises over the intermediate term. For the longer term, scenarios depend on factors outside Hungary, beginning with the mood of the new Kremlin leaders. No one honestly knows whether they are in favor of experiments of the Hungarian type; but it is also true that nothing indicates that they want to put an end to it.

Secondly, the fate of "Kadarism" depends on its economic results with the current crisis. Here again, there is great uncertainty, since on one hand the assets available to Hungary for emerging from its indebtedness (which is just as great as Poland's) do not warrant optimism, although on the other hand it would seem that recent events have pushed back the brink of disaster. Let us say, in short, that in order to reestablish its foreign trade balance other than by reducing domestic consumption, Hungary should carry out an industrial reconversion whose prologue is not yet visible.

Finally, the regime's future also depends on its ability to move forward on the level of reforms and, more precisely, on its ability to institutionalize the resolution of conflicts, a resolution which it has achieved through pragmatic instincts. It must in fact be acknowledged that, in this regard, "Kadarism" has departed considerably from normal Sovietism. Whereas, according to the Leninist view, the party-state must function as a total guide and a concealer of ideas about everything, the Kadar regime has gradually gone over to the idea that the needs of society arise within the society itself, that they are in conflict and are complex (like society) and that in view of this
condition of reality, it is the state's role to arbitrate rather than to
decree. Whence the acceptance of the marketplace—allowing for expression
of needs—and whose principal merit, in the eyes of Hungarian planners,
is that it enables the state to act with full knowledge of the facts. This
perception of state-society relations, which is not at all liberal, is also
far removed from the Leninist notion of the guide-party. The future of
"Kadarism" depends to a large extent on its ability to go beyond this technoc-
ocratic approach to allow, over and above the marketplace, the institutionalized
(trade union, political, democratic) expression of particular interests.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. in this regard the view of Ferenc Feher (LIBRE, No 7), who views
"Kadarism" as "the model Khrushchevian state."

2. A state of mind very well described in some short stories by novelist
Gyorgy Moldova, and also in his novel "Az idegen bajnok" (1961).

3. The logical consequences of this view are analyzed in a comparative study
of East European "normalizations," which I wrote in collaboration with
W. Brus and Z. Mlynar.

4. The majority of the country is catholic, but almost one-third of the
population is divided between Calvinism and Lutheranism; there is also
a Jewish consistory.

5. I would like to stress that these assertions apply only to the management
of domestic affairs, the only area in which a member of the Soviet East
European bloc can have a certain amount of independence. In the case
of foreign policy, the only latitude of the Kadar regime is to adopt
as low a profile as possible. Unfortunatley for the regime, this is
not always a solution.

6. Cf. in particular the articles by E. Szalai (in VALOSAG, 1982, 5),
J. Kornai and L. Antal (in GAZDASAG, 1982, 3) and T. Bauer (in MOZGO
VILAG, 1983, 1).

7. In particular for several years. But already in the mid-1960's, the
government had "enjoined" experts and managers to express themselves
as candidly as possible on the state of the economy and its operational
problems.

8. From 1970 to 1980, the number of Hungarians visiting a noncommunist country
as tourists increased from 180,000 to 425,000 (according to the Statistical
Yearbook of Hungary, 1980). The total number of tourists leaving the
country for the East or West in 1980 was approximately 5 million. (Total
population of Hungary: 11 million.)

9. Since 1978, the living standard of Hungarians has stagnated, which is
the least that can be said.
10. When I say that Kadar is not nationalistic, I am not accusing him of indifference concerning the fate of Hungarians. Many accounts concur in suggesting, on his part, a kind of compassion for his people. It is this sentiment which helped him to interpret 1956 as a "tragedy"—that is the word he used in 1972: A tragedy born of a misunderstanding (poorly committed socialism), but especially a tragedy because there could only be losers. The complex hero of this tragedy, a rehabilitated rebel whom the empire made its number one operative, no one is in a better position than Kadar to know the gulf that separates his nation from the empire. Whence a low-profile patriotism: minimizing the damage, not pushing forward pointlessly, worrying about daily affairs .... There is nothing heroic about Kadar's ethnic affinities, thus he could not be expected to oppose the Soviets, if only verbally. As for the problem of oppressed minorities in neighboring countries, perhaps it interests him, but not to the point of making it an issue of dissension.
NATION SEARCHES TO FIND OWN WAY

Paris MAGYAR FUZETEK in Hungarian No 12, 1983, pp 76-102

[Article by Gyorgy Konrad: "The Hungarian Way"]

[Text] Excerpts from the author's work titled "Anti-Politics", as yet unpublished.

The Hungarian people are basically a conservative people, the Hungarian culture basically a conservative culture. We came from afar, looking for pasture, and came here to this beautiful but busy land. It was difficult to get the nomads to settle down, difficult to build cities, difficult to become Christian—in many respects we remain pagans even today.

A people of the flatlands, of the Alfold, who see far and regard with suspicion what appears on the horizon, no more ready to take than to bring. We are not a sea people, accustomed to trade by virtue of navigation; we only drove the fatted kine westward, like cowboys, and brought from there everything which was more complicated, more refined and more polished.

We are a sober people, our eyes see far; every well sweep, every stock appears clearly in the distance. We have no forest goblins, only galloping shamans. There is more fatalism in our mythology than scary divination.

In my childhood the peasant culture was still intact, and about it magic superstitions were tied to the animals. Ignorant, clumsy peasants were entangled in the two world wars, which we did not have much to do with. Few of them read newspapers; the high culture, the national culture, the state culture was of less stature than the local folk culture for the overwhelming majority in the villages. There were more people in the villages than in the city. The superiors were nobles and soldiers rather than bourgeoisie; the bourgeoisie were Jews and Germans rather than Hungarians.

The development of the bourgeoisie got its greatest impetus here under communism, under the leadership of the communists. This is something which neither the communists nor the enemies of the communists expected. The fundamental, long trends of history again tricked the short-lived actors, entangled in their words, standing on tiptoe. It was well known that the communists were anti-bourgeois, that is the way they started, and then for them to be the ones to carry out the development of the bourgeoisie! The phenomenon truly merits the smile of the historian.
A stubborn people wants to regain its self-awareness. One thousand years ago, a shamanist pastoral people accepted Christianity at the price of torment, so that they should have a king to whom the Pope had sent a crown, so that they should not be looked upon as marauders.

One looking at a map of the mountains and waters of Europe is struck by the geometric logic of the Carpathian Basin, its esthetic attraction and natural unity. The Hungarians, who turned up here, absorbed the peoples found here and those who came—the Slavs, the Cumanians, the Petchenegs, the Tatars, the Turks, the Germans, the Romanians, The Serbs, the Armenians, the Slavs, the Jews. Not all and not easily, for sometimes the absorbing Hungarian element declined alarmingly, to the edge of annihilation.

But finally, if not with perfect independence, if subordinate to or built into or even subjected as satellites to larger empires, still it survived to the end. The Hungarian state was able to function with relative independence for a thousand years, having been and remaining the protector and oppressor of its population. It appears that the Hungarians have shown relatively greater effectiveness in state creation than other Eastern European peoples.

The three Central European kingdoms of the middle ages—the Polish, Czech and Hungarian—were, it appears, the work of peoples capable of showing great tenacity in survival. In their different ways they expended much on their independence. If the many-centuries-long experiment in independence has not yet succeeded, this persistence lasting even today is proof that the struggle for self-determination will last until there is self-determination.

It would be an ahistorical stupidity to imagine that the Hungarian people, for example, after having shaken off the majesty of so many other powers has now finally sunk into a dream of submission, and will do nothing against its present and future occupiers. The Hungarian people, like other peoples, will not rest until it has won self-determination in the Carpathian Basin. It wants to look on every neighbor with friendly strength, not subjecting one of them, not being subject to one of them, but living with each of them in a natural exchange and cooperation.

I must note that that very simple system of concepts needed if we are to have a healthy national strategy has in this century been many times obscured by all sorts of confused and labyrinthine argumentation. The high culture has darkened at least as much as it has illuminated the brain of this sober people.

The chief aspiration of all of Hungarian history has been that there should be a Hungarian state. If not a kingdom then a principality. If not in a whole country, then at least in Transylvania. If not in the entire Carpathian Basin, then at least in the center of it. If not with unimpaired independence, then with mutilated independence. Making pacts with Turks, with Germans, with Russians, truly not only according to the heart, but never only out of coercion and in loathing. Even if the independence is ambiguous, still let there be a Hungarian state. Where the Hungarians live, let Hungarian be spoken, let the Hungarians manage the affairs of state. If not with ideal wisdom and fitness, at least with some understanding and good will. We may be angry with our state and consider it unjust, but let there be one.
And let it not fall into dust, as in 1944-45. That year was certainly the year of liberation, but it was also the year of the collapse of the historical Hungarian state. This was cause of at least as much bitterness as joy. It would have been better if the historical Hungarian state had proven wise, brave and clever enough not to have had to collapse.

The historical development is truly not only a fate, but also a responsibility. Especially the responsibility of the national elite. And within this the responsibility of the thinking people of the nation, considered most clever and most listened to. Wherever a great national defeat appears, we can certainly say that those who should have stood their ground were not wise enough, not clever and brave enough. History is the continual test of the fitness of the national elite.

The Hungarians found it difficult to accept the superiority of the Christian state, and in the late middle ages they did not make the necessary sacrifices for the survival of the national kingdom. The ever returning trouble was that the Hungarian ruling elite repeatedly made their own narrower stratum interests the strategic interests of Hungarian state existence, of Hungarian national existence.

1944-45 was a collapse, because the pre-war Hungarian elite was unable to clarify outspokenly enough its own interests, and even less the interests of the country. The thinkers who set the standards before the war are responsible for this too. And this responsibility also exists today.

I believe that the contemporary Hungarian elite is more realistic than it was before the war. One cannot say of it that it is not at all clever, wise and brave. I can say without national boasting that within the countries of the Soviet bloc the work of the Hungarian elite has proven most successful, and thus most intelligent too.

We cannot conclude, after rather careful study, that the contemporary Hungarian elite—the political, economic and cultural elite—has any considerable, circumscribable special interests which would lastingly contradict the strategic interests of Hungarian state survival. Indeed, it is as if their interests had not yet crystallized, and in twilight formation, ripening in internal debates. They are just now entering a state in which they can be formulated.

It is as if the contemporary Hungarian elite felt with an earthy intuition the exigencies of state and people. A popular middle class, having come from below, is rising; it does not want the impossible, but it wants much.

Today those are cadres who yesterday would have been large farmers, industrialists or merchants. The activists, the small entrepreneurs, who struggle to the top in every sort of system. The smarter, more cunning, more persistent of the upward striving workers and peasants, choosing among the various channels of mobility, choosing those which raise them into the state middle class, as political or professional cadres or as entrepreneurs (for the most part woven into state organs).
An agrarian-industrial society has woven into itself, with a familiar humor and flexibility, the more militant Soviet model of modernization. The members of the present Hungarian leading stratum are not determined ideologues, not Marxist-Leninist world revolutionaries, but rather the heirs of the Hungarian bourgeois development. The poor of yesterday have put on flesh, gaining weight is their morality, with all the changes they are following the same path as the bourgeoisie.

The first generation popular intelligentsia determines the character of the leading stratum of Central Europe. Its members are self-conscious about being resplendent, they look with the nervousness of little men at all that is strange. Their behavior is characterized more by peasant cunning than by lordly pride. This stratum does not sincerely believe the uncertainty of competition to be better than the certainty of the state. Their education does not include adventurous daring. If getting ahead requires adapting rather than being different then they can adapt too, uprightly and without shame. The streets are full of peasants dressed in cith clothes. The clumsiness and warmth of their origin still on them. Village cities, a family state village. Everyone knows everyone else. A community rather than a society. Interior, defensive, wedding humor, cunning. The clever make themselves out to be a little stupider, to have a nest therein. This popular intelligentsia, whether poet or politician, is similar by way of origin. So they can understand one another, and not everything has to be said openly. This leading stratum is no more selfish and no dumber than the pre-war stratum was. Less arrogant, more friendly, more inhibited, more prudish. They have no real difficulty fitting into state socialism. They were raised by it to the intellectual middle class. Now that they are comfortably placed, this stratum will gradually need more pluralism, but not so suddenly as to endanger their security. The more extravagantly talented of them have a hard road, but the more mediocre hardly have trouble with the censor. In general the system permits as much deviation as a mediocre element is capable of. The thinking of the first generation popular middle class is not entirely adult, it tends to respect authority, tends to be prejudiced. Its criticism is more moral than intellectual. Its behavior tends toward command and obedience rather than discussion and agreement. It tends to be judgmental rather than relativistic. Its esthetics are more conservative than radical. Uncertain sons, awkward fathers, cunning family tyrants, uncertain provincial craftsmen. Beating about the bush is honorable, outspokenness is depraved.

In the Second World War they were ideologically Germanophiles; today they are Russophiles out of a cautious recognition of reality. Today this is not an alliance of passion but rather an alliance like the old scheming one, when we made a pact with the Turks. If we were moved by our sympathies alone we would turn toward the West, not the East. But then, for 150 years, there was a Turkish army here; today there is a Russian army. It came not only in '45 but also in '56 just when it seemed that it might leave, and Mr Andropov, the ambassador, promised that the troops were being withdrawn. Mr. Andropov, who at the time certainly had a number of ideas about the matter, certainly knew that they were not to be withdrawn. Not with a defeat at their back. He was the consistent representative of the state interests of a great power, even when he was talking with the government of Imre Nagy about the solemn formalities
of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. And that is what he was after the 4 November invasion when he gave his advice to Jannos Kadar, the beginning first secretary of the party, the nominee of Tito and Khrushchev.

In all probability they understood one another, understood that a man may think many things about the same thing. It is alleged that in December '56, when the leaders of the workers' councils said that the people were behind them, Kadar said that the Soviet tanks were behind him. It will be a long time before we know the precise details of how he got in front of them, and how much heart he had for this state of affairs. There are rumors that he could choose: Go again before a court, perhaps beneath the gallows, or assume the premiership. But even if there was no threat they did tell him that the Russians were coming. They were coming one way or the other, and the only question was who would wear the crown. He may have accepted it voluntarily, he may have been forced, but in any case he could know that this crown did not come from the Hungarian people. He knew that the people did not make the king now, and it would be his job to break the stubborn Hungarian people to the yoke of the Yalta agreements. If there were order and obedience, then he might bit by bit win the forgiveness of his countrymen, even their trust.

I do not know if Jannos Kadar has read Macchiavelli's "The Prince" but after 1956 this little masterpiece was my dream-book. I could always tell from it what would happen, I understood these new leaders from it, understood this relatively young man—he was 44 years old then—who relatively speaking learned best, from among his Eastern European colleagues, the role of the good prince. He learned the lesson that only that power can be well-meaning which exists, which unambiguously and indisputably exists, that only a strong regime can be humane, and if it is strong then it must be humane. In all probability Kadar knew that he would do better than Rakosi, and that was not difficult. Indeed, he may have hoped that he would do better than others too. Could this have been done any better? From his viewpoint, perhaps not. I hear it in the bars: "God support Jani!", "It will be good for us as long as he is master." On the other hand abusing him was the recurring charge of incitement, like lese majeste in the old days. In a village inn, where I frequently go, a drunk went up to the policeman who drives out to the village once a week and, since he has nothing to do, drinks a glass of beer: "Do you know where your Kadar has gone, junior? Into your mother, that's where." And the drunk waited for the effect. And the policeman said, "Leave me in peace with your stupidities, Can't a man even drink beer in peace?" Those standing around laughed. The policeman drove away, the village remained without armed power for another week. It is a good thing to be without.

We still do not know how many were hanged together with Imre Nagy, his former colleague, in the time of his rule. The '56ers, who did time after '56, say nearly 2,000. Semi-officially they say 500. It is still forbidden for historians to inquire into such things. It is still a secret where the graves of Imre Nagy and his comrades are.

There were three communists in the government formed on 1 November 1956, representing the four-party coalition: prime minister Imre Nagy, minister of state Jannos Kadar and minister of state Geza Losonczy. In the 1951 trial started
against them, when the communists coming from Moscow were liquidating the domes-
tic communists, Kadar was the number one accused and Losonczy was number two,
both were tortured, they were tied together in history. After the Russian
intervention they made the offer to Losonczy too, to take part in the Kadar
government, and he rejected it. Either minister or prisoner, the alternative
was clear. He died while in investigative imprisonment—hunger strike, forced
feeding, the food went into his airpipe—this is one version. Historical
facts usually have several versions in this country.

In the fall of 1959 I was a guardianship official. One sunny afternoon my
business took me to Szazhaz Street, which has been partly torn down since. If
there was ever a slum this was one. Not only rubbish, poverty and crowding,
but for its warmth and publicness too. Everyone knew everyone else, people
lived out in the street. As I turned in there was sobbing everywhere. What
happened? That day the relatives had gone to the central prison for the clothes
of 18 boys and one girl. They had been hanged. They were insurgents in 1956,
most of them juveniles, hooligans, who blew up a few Soviet tanks. If they had
been Algerians (the FLN was fighting against the French at that very time)
they might have been called heroes. That is how they became counter-revolu-
tionary bandits. In the spring of 1959 the secret police surrounded the street
and, going from house to house, gathered up 70 young people, 19 of the 70 were
sentenced to death. The settling of accounts was not soft handed. They waited
until they were of age to put a better color on it. Who knows who passed
judgment on them and where? I would not think it was Moscow. Perhaps their
appeals for mercy did not reach Kadar. I suspect he would have had a way to
learn of them. This little episode cannot be read in any collection of docu-
ments. Oral traditions still supplement our written history. In a word, the
idyll began with classical retribution, and not only against those who bore
arms. My business was with a young widow, her children were vagrants. "How
did your husband die?" "They hanged him." He had been president of a workers'
council in a mine. He did not even have a pistol.

We have an odd tradition—the ugly beginning and the more attractive continua-
tion. In 1919 Admiral Horthy self-confidently called his coming to power a
counter-revolution—several hundred died, there were prisoners. It is true
that the Lenin boys, in armored trains and leather coats, the red terror, which
they did not hesitate to call themselves, had several hundred summary victims
too.

Then the Hungarians began to make peace with Horthy. This was the same sort of
reconciliation as under Franz Jozef, which also began with counter-revolution.
The loosening hand came after the iron fist. Liberalism came, and consolida-
tion, and that which prepared the Compromise—the idea of reform.

And then came the Second World War with an unknown end. Horthy would have lik-
ed to get Hungary out of the war, but he was clumsy and began too late. He
wanted to save his own power and that of his administration, wanted that more
than to save the Hungarian state.

Governments and administrations confuse themselves with the state here. Con-
fuse their own interests with the interests of the population as a whole. They
cannot bear to imagine a legal transfer of power. They bring down the country
with their own fall—which resulted from their inadequate vision.
The Second World War decimated the Hungarians, caused the death of nearly half a million Christian and half a million Jewish Hungarians. Of course it was impossible to stay out; if the Hungarians had not joined the war on the side of the Germans, Hitler's troops would probably have occupied the country. Then, perhaps, the Jews would have been deported earlier. Then there might have been a collaborating government which would have sent soldiers to the front. Then there might have been bombing and the front would have come to them. Then also the Russians might have been our liberators. Then also we might have gone from the German sphere of interest to the Russian sphere of interest.

The margin between wisdom and error is not too great. One way or the other it might have been possible to reduce the number of victims. In our part of the world national and social freedom cannot be the reward of clever policy. Here one can only reduce the volume of bloody and bloodless sacrifice with clever policy.

The state can be the defender of society, can articulate its interests; this is its job. The official order may have stupid representatives, but this is not a statistical law. Not only weak compromisers but many of great energy joined the party, to have room for their energies. Could this have been done better? Certainly. Even the Kadarist leading stratum might have understood better, and earlier, what it was doing. Those on the edge of society might have begun open thinking earlier too. The common desires of reform might have been clarified more clearly among the main body of intellectuals. The economic reform might have been carried out with greater determination and not been permitted to retreat in the long, costly years of the 1970's.

The Hungarian intelligentsia, the Hungarian middle class, has not yet created, not yet formulated or debated an interdependent worldview adapted to its situation which can be applied over both the long and short term. We have not thought through what it is we want. We have not debated what we might want given the chance. We have no developed self-awareness.

Naturally, we want external independence and internal democracy, as much as possible. But how much is possible? Only this much, or more? It is our fault that we have not been wiser than we were. Individuals, can be more independent than their states. We could be freer, more cultivated, more sharp sighted than we are.

It is the job of the intelligentsia to plan and check where we are going. Not only the job of the official intelligentsia, hindered in open speech, but also of the opposition minority, undertaking the adventure of open speech, thus excluding itself from the world of officialdom and the general tacit agreement.

It will be possible to proceed on the "Hungarian road" only if we make clear, with a refined conscience and knowledge of the terrain, where we are and what vicissitudes await us. Our entire society is proceeding on one road, those in the government party and those in opposition alike. The one more this way, the other more that. The one more quickly, the other more slowly. Everyone steers a little, if nothing else then himself.
I frequently feel that even the leaders are only feeling their way. They may see farther than their noses, but they long ago gave up thinking that the future would be as they planned. They are happy just to get through the difficulties of the day. It is to be hoped that they do not consider to be their mortal enemies those who worry more about the direction of the path because not burdened by government power.

This regime could strike roughly, but for a good time it has not. It turns a deaf ear to the possible external prompting to be more severe. It acts like the more lenient teacher who raises his voice in the rowdy classroom if he notices the principal. The children know that they do not have to get frightened. They also see the principal and know that he will be going on. He has enough to do, they will remain with the softer-handed teacher, who wants order, but takes no pleasure in swishing the stick.

It is possible to have the country pay less dearly for the fact that we remained on the eastern side of the iron curtain with the approval of the western great powers, contributing with our limited sovereignty to maintaining the international military balance. Our contribution to the peace of Europe is that should try with careful experimentation to give a living content to our self-determination, truly not limitless but greater than nothing and one which can be expanded moderately.

It is impossible to want something very different in place of this regime existing here today. Would it be desirable? Much could be said about this. In any case, I recognize that a Hungarian road has developed, a Hungarian governing style within the structure of Yalta which we can now talk about as Kadarism, but only after the fact, looking back on a 25 year stretch of the road.

A social condition has been given the name of a man who has been in power for 25 years. He has avoided being killed, avoided being overthrown, avoided the ambitious immoderation of obsession with power. He has made room beneath him for similarly moderate and sober, though not especially brilliant men. He has been able to act with fatherly dignity on the stage of a society which, according to its habits, is not particularly averse to paternalism.

In the folklore of rumor he has perhaps achieved an outstanding place like that of our king Franz Jozef, who in 1849, with the help of the Russians, mercilessly crushed the freedom fight of the Hungarian people, then ruled over them for 67 years, by the grace of God, in the meantime reaching a constitutional compromise with them and making possible the vigorous development of the bourgeoisie. Everyone got used to his sitting in his puritanic office, which would be a much more nostalgic memory if the old king had not led his people into world war--thinking of everything and considering everything.

The Hungarian regime wants to avoid two dangers--the anger of Moscow and the anger of the Hungarian society. Mediating between Moscow and the Hungarians, it wants to pacify both partners. What is desired is not to infuriate Moscow, while currying favor with Hungarian society.
What is not desired is for the imperial center to regard us as a source of tension to be suppressed. If we awaken its choleric vigilance, its pressure will be heavier than it was before. From time to time we are permitted to hear news of sulkings from the Porte of the Sultan, from the Court of the Tsar. How could one bargain without differences of interest and opinion?

What is to be avoided is that we become one of the chief stages for the news organs of the world. It is not in our interest to have a legion of reporters aggravating our internal contests. If too great press attention falls on us then a speech speaks not to the subject, not even to the opposing player, not even to our friends but rather to international public opinion, hungry for excitement.

There is no need to court international public opinion. The love and wrath of international public opinion are alike volatile and fashionable; we cannot count on it in times of trial. International public opinion has not been able to save our friends from prison or the gallows. So in our calculations we can give only limited attention to the organs of the foreign mass media—as a factor aiding our undertaking.

The inside game is the most important. Most events of contemporary world politics hide the possibility of providing a show lasting weeks, even months. If the actors have a theatrical inclination they can temporarily enter the mythology of the media, but this feeling of theatrical importance harms measured and sure progress, excessively links our cause to the contest between the two power blocs and deprives the treatment of the conflicts of the ironic complicity of the national players.

Since we can be neither openly contracting allies nor precisely differentiated enemies we, the reformist, critical democratic players—as opposed to the players defending the power monopoly of the party-state—must be at the same time their opponents in the interest of democracy and their accomplices in the interest of undisturbed national survival.

We are being clever if we make the foreign radios and newspapers—as workers for autonomy—into our tools, but do not ourselves become their tools. The system and worldview of Yalta regards the free expression of our nature and an open formulation of our national and human interests to be anti-regime, anti-state actions. The power and world publicity have a paradoxical community of interest—the autonomous word and deed should be a delict, challenge, deviation, heresy, an overemphasized and thus pathetic theatrical provocation.

In this situation I do not consider it offensive if the Hungarian intelligentsia regards itself as a great gang of rogues. We know this psychological condition from centuries of our history and we can distinguish the shadings between bargain and betrayal. We cannot condemn our Transylvanian princes, hardpressed between German and Turkish power, for their rascally games in either direction.

If the Russian leaders attribute emotional significance to symbols then let us, let our party and government leaders, be kind to their symbols. A Hungarian
patriot could find nothing more stupid to do than to soil a Soviet military memorial. I like the Hungarian village where they combined the memorials to Soviet and Hungarian fallen soldiers. "Traveller, stop," they wrote, "before the memory of soldiers fallen in our village." Let this village trick be a symbolic expression of the Hungarian way.

The wisdom of a nation appears most in how it faces risk. It should strive for moderation--ever greater advantage with ever less risk. Risk has no value in itself. But sometimes one must go to meet risk and take a reckless step. We can take this step at the most opportune moment and with the greatest safety only if our chess style in general is to avoid risk.

To play to win. To sacrifice for victory as little as possible in blood and suffering; to make more use of reason and work. This could with justice be the new strategy of a nation whose history is trimmed with so many defeats, because here we were too cowardly and there unwisely daring.

It is self-deception to think that we could deceive Moscow. The Soviet Russian ruling elite is not sentimental, does not lose sight of its own interests, is not afraid of international protest if it resolves on a hard defense of interests it considers essential, and it cannot be convinced that giving independence to the border regions is in its interest. Democracy and independence are impossible for us here and now, the basic structure of political and economic power cannot be reformed to such an extent as to permit the rise of decision centers truly independent of the power center which cannot be swallowed up again. The essential reform would be if law and constitutional court could guarantee the independence of new legal decision centers.

But we can always be constantly approaching our dreams by modest steps, without ever really approaching them. The hard structure remains, but the soft structure can be refined. As compared to the institutional structure of the exercise of power the spirit and style of the exercise of power are more flexible and changing. The good will, receptive intelligence and fair personality of officials cannot be overestimated sufficiently. If the stratum of officials is humane then even rule by authority is more tolerable. The personal responsibility of state people is large, and they can be made aware of this personal responsibility through supervision by the public. To blame the structure for everything is to be relieved of responsibility.

There are no good capitalists or bad capitalists for historical materialism; there are only exploiting capitalists. The spirit of textbook Marxism turned critically against real socialism is inclined toward this same insensitivity in judging state and party functionaries. The opposition, democratic public opinion, should free its philosophy of history conscience from this obligatory, ahistorical abstraction and reinstate the ethos of personal moral responsibility in our way of thinking. It is very important what sort of people exercise power over us, and even if we do not like that superstructure of power which weighs over us we must give recognition to cultured, wise and honest leaders and we must express our personal moral antipathy for those leaders who do the more stupid and more offensive things from among the decisions possible
in the given institutional system. We must receive with moral understanding
the fact that state people put in parentheses the goals they have no chance of
attaining and strive to attain what has a certain but not at all an assured
chance. The chief work of the democratic movement might be to spread a way of
thinking which takes into account that the practice of a national strategy
requires a division of labor; people respecting one another in different social
positions can permit themselves different degrees of openness and risk if they
want to carry out well the tasks falling upon them.

It is my impression that the Hungarian political leadership has no illusions
about Moscow; they know whom they are facing. They are able to combine a
freedom from illusions with reliable loyalty. This is how this leadership has
brought the desires of Hungarian society and of the Russian elite into a rela-
tive balance. The central eastern European leaders are national politicians
to the extent that they play a mediating role, to the extent that they can
deceive simultaneously from the viewpoint of local and imperial interests so as
to give a slight, but not too challenging, advantage to local interests.

It appears that despite every internal difficulty the Soviet empire is in good
health and is not progressing toward collapse under the influence of either in-
ternal or external conflicts. We cannot hope for radical structural changes.
The most that we can achieve is an enlightened paternalistic authoritarian
rule, a considered inclination toward gradual liberal reforms. The least evil
for us is the liberal conservative version of communism which we can see in
Hungary, around us and in us. If we can have no hope without deceiving our-
ourselves what can we hope? Is there for us an alternative to the resigned ca-
reerism of the state person?

We could also conclude that we were born in an incurably unlucky geographical
region, and that this misfortune can be corrected in only one way, if we our-
selves go from here to some more fortunate place. The other way is to attempt
what is virtually impossible; although our nation and our institutions have
no autonomy we should perfect what we have.

I do not regard only Budapest, Bratislava, Prague, Krakow, Warsaw and Berlin
as Europe but if I include Leningrad and even Moscow—why should I stop until
I got to Vladivostok? We are talking about Eurasia. There is no state bound-
ary in-between. One can think on the scale of Eurasia too. It is a scale more
fitting to the second millennium than that of little Western Europe, from which
that in which I live is an alien mythology. I would like to consider myself
the son of a utopian Europe which with its two arms, at San Francisco and
Vladivostok, reaches the Pacific Ocean and holds in peace what it embraces.

I can thank the Russians for my life; among the literatures of the peoples the
Russian had the greatest effect on me; I see the European role of the Russians
as the greatest question mark for world peace. It would be stupid for me to
think about us and not think about them. I know of no other way to free
Central Europe from Russian military occupation—we must occupy them with our
ideals. Let us see who colonizes whom in a thawed exchange of ideas.
"You are Zurich bankers in Eastern Europe!" a French journalist burst out in Warsaw in the fall of 1980, when I said that we were sympathetic observers of the Polish drama, because with our reflexes it was difficult for us to imagine for the time being a more practical communism than our own, than this conservative liberal authoritarian regime service for greater efficiency.

In fact we Hungarians did not create a KOR and Solidarity because we did not really believe that communist power was compatible with democratic institutions born of the self-determination of society. We watched what our Polish friends were doing, we would have liked them to succeed, and we doubted that it could succeed.

Be careful, I said to Adam, the third attempt must succeed! It did not succeed. Adam may be awaiting trial. "Incredible," he said, incredible that he could give a lecture on the Polish and Hungarian '56 at the Warsaw technical university. His lecture was very clever, now he did not stammer, it was sharp, dialectical and to the point. Then, they say, he fell in love with an actress. Then, they said, he was beaten half to death after his arrest. Then, they said, he is well. What is the lesson of what has happened, tell us, Adam? You are 35 million strong, you did not succeed, what now?

What would you say if I were to say that it is up to the Russians now? If we are so tied together we should win them to our game. They will permit us only a little more freedom than they have themselves. It is self-evident that if we want a good bit more freedom then we must wish them more freedom too. We have an elementary interest in talking them into reforming themselves, because this is in their interest too, not only ours.

A little more light in this country or that, and then it gets dark again. The national road of eastern European liberation does not lead very far, an exchange of ideas on reform and a reform experiment on a camp scale has not yet been tried. This would require partners. We look askance at them, to be sure, but if they are to be our partners in the reform we must look at them straight.

The peace strategy does not want to overcome others but rather to win them over. It does not want to fight but rather to come to an agreement. To make a bargain in the quiet of internal correspondence. STRuggle and bargain are both self-realization; when struggle does not work you make a bargain. Is struggle really better than a bargain? Or is it a necessary evil, in the absence of something better? In our culture the bargaining man feels less and less shame as compared to the struggling man.

What we need today is a real strategy which can be depicted after the fact, with a historical view, one which can be read from our behavior. I see it more in the behavior of individuals than in that of groups. Individual reactions, not really analytical and rational, not the most natural language of politics.

This people coexisted with Turk, German and Russian not only while fighting but also conquering the conqueror from below, almost on our backs, with two types of awareness—one that of the fighter who is ashamed of making a bargain, the
other that of the bargain maker, who has an aversion to the fighter and tries to outsmart him. The language of politics is apathetic and impoverished in regard to this sort of thing; our self-realization will be more colorful the farther it gets from politics.

Our mode of expression is sentimental-humorous wisdom of life, suggestive wit, a joke, winking at one another, I know what-I know and you know what you know. Looking from afar, I find rather many similarities in my government party and opposition acquaintances, they are outstandingly Budapesters. However morose a face they put on it their hidden humor is flavored with Budapester cynicism. What is it that those who remained at home cannot bear to give up and which those who left remember with longing? What is it that we really find good in life at home, really like in ourselves? Perhaps it is our vitality, roguery, brigandage, craftiness, cunning.

There are traces of conqueror and conquered in us. Finno-Ugric, Bulgar-Turk, Khazar, Slav, Petcheneg, Cumanian, Tatar, Romanian, Turk, German, Jew, Serb, Slovak, Russian, Greek, Gypsy.... What is a Hungarian? A Trans-Danubian mixture, the ability of peoples absorbed into one another to live together. He is vital who survives his defeats and turns misfortune to profit. The mixed awareness of nobles and serfs, the arrogant and the strong. A self-confident bourgeoisie is developing here, between haughty lords and head nodding servants, in the larva of the state man.

The self-confident center is still developing. We lack a formulated self-portrait of that balancing art with which we handle the shabby paradoxes of our being. If we cannot command destiny, we try to get around it by cunning. Today this people is politically active with something which is not political, something done in the garden over wine, something which makes the audience laugh in the meeting hall and almost says what they are thinking, what cannot be said can be a joke.

This central European strategy is a sensitive thing; in the state officials and in those who are nauseated by the state, a turn of mind of the same literature works in them.

We must do without democratic political institutions so we will do without them. It is not important that we give a name to friendly gatherings. If we have no common name we cannot be banned. We have no Solidarity, but we can have a solidarity which cannot be suspended. One cannot outlaw friendship. Our organizations are networks of sympathy, we have no headquarters or leaders, so it is more difficult to get at us. We are cunning, careful wild things, we will not make it easy for the hunger to shoot us down.

Our actual state of mind is neither victory nor defeat. Testing. If I look around, everyone is up to something, everyone is planning, making deals and can report some little success. An experimental school, interesting research, a new orchestra, a possibility of publishing, a film scenario which has been accepted, opening a little restaurant, a mathematics cooperative, a pretty private shop, a private gallery, travel in the West, cultural undertakings, independent publishing, semi-underground journals.
Alongside the second economy the second culture is becoming fashionable; perhaps it encourages and gives color to the first, the officially accepted culture the limits of which, if not open, are not so anxiously closed. This is possible, that is permitted. But not everything! A retarded expansion. There has been a frank documentary on television, a good play in some theater, an interesting study in one of the journals. The office is gradually taking cognizance of reality in the economy and in culture. Thus taking cognizance of the actual value system, that of the market and of unguidable public opinion.

Hungarian society is beginning to resemble us. The public awareness has as many ideas as we think of. We are not so much more clever, but we see through the curtain of censorship. State culture is not much more stupid than we are. There is no gulf between culture and reality, just a sort of displacement. We are not winners, but the image of a declining nation, this romantic mourning, no longer suits us. We are a society approaching the threshold of maturity, it is starting to use its head and beginning to talk to itself. Socialist reform thinking already has a past of two decades.

On whichever side we are all on the Hungarian team, players in the so-called Hungarian reality. All are acting in one play. Ten million roles and philosophies at various degrees of profundity, imagination and survival. The program has been arranged somehow. The performance is not first rank, but it is watchable.

The essence of the Hungarian road is that a certain limited pluralism has come into being within the frameworks of the Yalta settlement. The diversity of the state economy and the state culture is maturing. This limited pluralism does not indicate the weakness of the system but precisely its strength. It is able to incorporate and make into constituent parts undertakings which not long ago were still denied or silenced. It can permit itself to take into account publicly some of its structural conflict. It does not feel it a vital necessity for a pre-ordained portrayal to cover all of reality. The heretics, the black sorcerers and the sulfurous bearded experimenters are inciting the orthodox state priesthood to meditation and dialog.

This is not yet post-synod socialism, but the theses of the synod have been posted. A willingness to exchange views is growing in society as a whole. The leaders are not inoculated against an objectivity touching the essence. The turnover rate of intellectual innovations is accelerating. If publication outside of censorship produces works which are not only brave but original even the nonopposition people soon learn of them. We are in touch. The censor is obliged to put on the brakes, but he has recognized that the regime can tolerate a more lively exchange of information without being irresolute. The system has more self-confidence, and this is advantageous for us.

History has no national main road compared to which the roads of other nations are side streets. The less we think that there is the more interesting we make our street. Naturally the Soviet road is not the main road; I have just heard on television that they are re-organizing the guidance system for agriculture so that there will be potatoes. Communism: Many tanks and few potatoes. Much
fuss, few results. What is the main road in this? Naturally it is not the American road, nor the Japanese, nor the German, nor the French, nor the Swedish, no one road. There are no guiding models, no exemplary systems.

One can enjoy as many types of success as the goals toward which one strives! Every community puts before itself a different configuration of goals. Uneven development is possible and exists in culture if in anything. Culture does not become thicker or thinner as a function of economic growth.

If there is a sphere of activity in which unexpected progress and backwardness are possible it is the sphere of intellectual creativity. I am thinking that Budapest could be, in a Central Europe under Soviet influence, what Vienna was in Central Europe at the beginning of our century. We have been submerged and we have come to the surface. While digging the tunnel we hear voices from the other side. We have broken through the great simplification. We smile at one another anticipating the complexity of a mature Europe. It is as if we were no longer subject to some threatening, feverish stupidity. As if we were no longer lost in an aggressive labyrinth.

There is censorship in Hungary as in the other communist countries, but this censorship is less limiting, more expansive and permissive. We might say that of the countries of the Soviet bloc the censorship is mildest in Hungary so we have less to fear from the state here. This makes the social or written contact of people relatively more fresh, it is possible to participate in interesting conversations, one can read good books, one can get western newspapers and periodicals, the western radio broadcasts in the Hungarian language are not jammed, citizens—so says the law—have the right to request western passports, and the authorities can give them (they are not obliged to give them) if they approve and the great majority of those requesting them get permission to travel in the West once per year.

We almost—but only almost—live in a constitutional state. Limited openness, limited freedom, but not totalitarian, closed oppression. Here at home, for the most part, those who say that the state is totalitarian do so to relieve themselves of cautious accommodation to the censorship. If someone tries to exercise freedom of thought and finds that this has a price, but not a fatal one, he regards his existence outside of prison as proof that that in which we live is not the absolute opposite of democracy.

If a young person wants to be successful it does not hurt to be active in the Communist Youth Federation, join the party and enroll in the Evening School of Marxism-Leninism; he would deprive himself of many advantages and punish himself with many disadvantages if he respected the joy of free thinking more than the goods which can be obtained from the state, the higher position and higher pay, housing which can be obtained with preferential state support, frequent foreign travel at state expense, a public role.

It is natural that the majority want to be successful, and the western observer can hardly wonder at this. So getting ahead is more questionable, more suspicious than in the West. So there is a minority—necessarily—which would rather be on good terms with itself than with the state. They pay with their careers for this special friendship. Nothing can be perfect.
What is and what is not permitted in Hungary in 1982? One is free to think. Free thinking rarely has unpleasant consequences; if it does they can survive without greater injury. These unpleasant consequences can even have a stimulating effect, can encourage even freer thinking. Who knows how much more clever the country would be if it were permitted to be clever, if there were no sort of political oppression?

What people cannot express in one form they can express in another. To understand a country means to examine what its inhabitants must give up, and with what they compensate themselves for this. What is it that they cannot succeed at, and what is it they succeed at instead? What makes them as happy as the inhabitants of other countries more or less? If the values of key importance there are not powerful enough here then there must be another group of values which the inhabitants of this country consider primary, openly or tacitly.

I believe that Hungary is not really capable of performance which can be measured in competitive terms. We will hardly ever be at the top in world statistics on technical achievement. We may prosper more in this area than some eastern European countries, but we are in the middle range with works which can be sold on the market. The country is better off in something less conceivable, something we might call the art of living. Cultivating a homey environment, spending time pleasantly, a cordial mode of communication. A sort of life wisdom and perspective in judging those things which others consider of vital importance. A healthy, pagan cynicism as opposed to ambitious manias. Quietly drinking wine with friends in a well cared for garden at twilight, rather than rushing along a crowded, eight lane highway.

In Hungary one cannot criticize in the public media without circumlocution, cannot criticize analytically and objectively the political structure of the country or the higher organs and representatives of party and state. Lower level organs and leaders can be dealt with in pedagogical-moral criticism. One can criticize phenomena of the economic state, abstracted from their personal and institutional vehicles; but one cannot criticize the party center, the ministries or the police.

It is absolutely impossible to propose a referendum in those three basic questions which determine national and social self-determination. One: Should we or should we not remain members of the military alliance of the Warsaw Pact? Two: Can we select our parliamentary representatives from among representatives of one or more parties? Three: Should enterprise leaders be named by the supreme authorities or by bodies elected by the employees? It is perfectly impossible to publish objective information outside the samizdat journals, thus in the officially authorized press, about censorship. The first stage of this is the most immediate, self-censorship. The second stage is the cultural apparatus, including the editors and the entire hierarchy of ministerial and party functionaries. The third stage is the political police, which watches and warns the citizens, constantly consults about them with their superiors, passes an opinion on their promotions and which, naturally, is still working, and very well, even if it arrests no one for free thinking. At least not intellectuals. It does on occasion arrest unknown young workers.
It is impossible to conduct an objective study of the criminal justice organs of the state, of the prisons, of the extensive network of phone tapping and letter censorship, of the archaic custom of seizing from citizens at the border books offensive to the state or even of that oppressively widespread practice of using threats, money, promotion or state favors to make people, a great many of them worthy of better, inform on their associates and colleagues, in a word turning them into moral corpses.

One can get used to there being an apartment where one can get copies of uncensored studies and literature. The reflex is beginning to die out which regarded a different opinion as dishonorable, even hostile and thus punishable. For the time being it appears that the police are being used not to bury the second culture but rather only to keep it within limits. Here and there property is seized, there are unpleasant and intrusive demands, those working in independent publishing sometimes have a larger gorilla escort on the street than the prime minister. We turn to the public, we sign things, moderately and well aimed; the answers are flexible and in proportion.

To erase the second culture and maintain a credible, liberal prestige in the world, all this cannot be done at once any more than maintaining the standard of living and holding back the economic autonomy of larger or smaller undertakings. The regime is learning, and must learn, that its good reputation has a price. It cannot pretend to be civilized before the public of the world and frighten with heavyhanded secret police those few people who withdraw themselves from the vile ritual of censorship, and do not play with the censors in the game: "Oh, there is no censorship here, I only wanted to say as much as I can get published and not a word more."

This Hungarian experiment is a ticklish game, an easy one to spoil. Our old car is beginning to run pretty well. We sit in it, and wait for it to break down; because this is what it does, and usually at such times. It is time to sober up; we have done as much as we can. Our condition, our self-image. Fortune and misfortune. Is not this the talk of a blunderer? History is not made by a malevolent destiny but by us ourselves, according to our ability. If we mess it up again, we were not talented. If I hear someone mention general laws or national misfortune, I think of the hardheaded student who just happened not to know whatever he was asked about.

8984
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OPPOSITION'S ROLE IN REFORM JUDGED THREATENING

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 6 May 83 p 13

[Article by Heiko Flottau: "Limits for Every Hungarian Reform"]

[Text] The opposition puts up with the unalterable. If it would affect the fundamentals of the regime, Moscow would enter the scene.

When in mid-January in Budapest, at a general meeting on "Agitation, Propaganda and Cultural Policy," Gyorgy Aczel, member of the Hungarian Politburo, attempted to define the framework within which reform policy would be possible in the future in Hungary, he practically renewed the same "offer of alliance" which Janos Kadar, the now nearly 71-year-old party chief, had made as the basis for his actions after the 1956 revolution. Aczel interpreted this policy as a wish to continue to cooperate with everyone regardless of his ideology as long as he is not hostile to socialism. Nevertheless, Aczel also voiced a warning: No one should expect that "we treat those as allies who, counting on the deterioration of our position, would want to undermine our gains and disregard our laws."

Actually, it is only in Hungary that such relatively measured tones can be heard among the socialist states of the Eastern Bloc. But the "opposition" there is also restrained in its language. A short while ago, as propositions for far-reaching reform were made in the underground paper BESZÉLO, the authors refrained from any polemic. Rather, they made it clear that "Hungary's internal and foreign political situation is given," that is, it must be considered unalterable but that "there still are important political goals" which can be achieved "without shaking the basic institutions of the system."

Underground Publications

In spite of the measured language, the two sides cannot meet. The realities in Hungary prove that the party will use its power by which it alone will determine the limits of its "alliance politics." In January, the police evacuated the apartment of Laszlo Rajk in the inner city of Budapest (Laszlo Rajk is the son of Laszlo Rajk, the former minister of the interior and of foreign affairs who was executed as a Titoist in 1948 after a Stalinist showcase trial). At the time, underground literature was sold every Tuesday in the apartment of Rajk, Jr. He moved to his second apartment outside of the center of Budapest.
But the hope of the authorities to bring the sale of the samizdat literature to a halt by this action turned out to be a false one. Rajk reopened his "Boutique," as his bookstore is called. In addition, the private and, according to Hungarian laws, illegal AB Book Publishing House of Gabor Demszyky published No 5/6 of BESZÉLO, the underground periodical, an additional "illegal" samizdat periodical appeared with the title AB TAJEKOZTATO (Information). But toward the end of March, the police confiscated not only 200 copies of BESZÉLO but also a few hundred copies of AB TAJEKOZTATO.

The Party Feels Disturbed

According to reports from Budapest, every Tuesday there is a large police unit in front of the new home of Rajk to disquiet the buyers of the underground literature. In addition, there were raids at the apartments of Otilia Solt, the founder of the private Committee to Support the Poor, and of Rajk, Demszyky, Miklos Haraszti, Jenő Nagy and Ferenc Koszeg.

Recently, Miklos Haraszti described the strategy and goals of the opposition in the following manner: problems such as the leading role of the party or the position of Moscow in the political life of Hungary will not be touched. Rather, the aim is to achieve a democratic reform within a sharply delineated terrain. This would be good for all, including the bureaucrats because thereby the slide of Hungary into a greater economic crisis would be prevented and the critics of the system who still hope for a democratic future. However, the party rejected this offer. Peter Renyi, the representative chief editor of the party organ NEPSZABADSAG, who is also a member of the Central Committee, expresses this view clearly when, in front of the SZ [State Central Administration], he states that the opposition "disturbs" the party in its reform work.

Thus, a delicate situation currently exists in Hungary. The party knows that only the continuation of the course of economic reforms (which it wants accompanied by moderate political reforms) can keep the economy from slipping into a crisis, the population from becoming displeased and the intellectuals from becoming more restless. The opposition is pressing for continued reforms, but it is also aware (not least because of the fate of Lech Walesa and the Hungarian events of 1956) that all reforms which would shake the foundations of the current regime would immediately bring Moscow onto the scene.

Meanwhile, if one looked at the positions of the reform wing of the Hungarian Workers' Party and of the "opposition," although there are great differences in content, there also are some similarities. It is indeed seen more clearly by the opposition than by the party that the economic reform can be successful only if it goes hand in hand with a wide-ranging political reform. The party has now announced that it wants to continue to foster private small enterprises and to attempt to make the socialistic large enterprises profitable. For political reforms, it has at least decided to change the election law; in the future, there should be several candidates for the seat of each representative.
Propositions for the Future

In No 5/6 of the samizdat periodical BESZÉLO, which was in part confiscated by the police, wide-ranging propositions were made by the opposition for the further development of the political system. The often very detailed ideas have surely been elaborated by the philosopher, Janos Kis. In his conception, at least once every 6 months, the government should give a detailed report to the National Assembly about the economic situation including the extent of foreign debt; furthermore, the government should establish an independent council of experts which would have to give an opinion on the economic situation three to four times a year. Further, the opposition wants to have an open debate about how the social burdens, which to begin with would be brought about by a reorientation of the economy, would be divided among the segments of society; thereby afflicted groups should be given the right to form "interest lobbies."

In the opposition's view, above all, those should be allowed to form such interest lobbies "whose safety of existence would be much more endangered by the economic crisis" than the interests of the average group: renters, Gypsies, unemployed academicians and private groups who care for the needy on a voluntary basis (this is surely an allusion to SZETA); the new, private small enterprises should also be allowed to form interest lobbies.

Thoughts About Unemployment

In the view of the authors, enterprises operating at a loss, the subvention of which is canceled by the government, should be allowed to choose among three possibilities: they may remain in the factory but accept a possible lowering of wages; they may declare themselves ready for temporary unemployment with a corresponding social allowance; or they may become owners of their enterprise in form of a partnership.

Further, the opposition proposes a new trade union law. According to this, union officials should be accountable only to their electors and not to the party; in addition, the law should spell out procedures to settle "conflicts of interest" and determine "legal forms to exert pressure."

Finally, with respect to the development of the judicial system, the opposition urges that the system must "approach the requirements of constitutional statehood." The establishment of a constitutional and an administrative court system is suggested. The already proclaimed election law reform should be continued in such a manner that individual social groups (authors, trade unions, factories) could nominate their candidates for parliament themselves, that is, without the tutelage of the party.

To Approach Constitutional Statehood

In conclusion, a reform of the law is demanded which, until now, has placed the publishing of books and periodicals practically under the sole authority of the party, although the authors admit that the absence of "written censorship-like limitations" makes possible in practice a completely "flexible cooperation between those who publish and the oversight organization."
Therefore, at this time, the opposition does not demand a revised regulation of the entire publishing system. It would, for the moment, only make new forms of publication possible so that professional and cultural organizations as well as private groups could establish publishing houses by themselves; naturally, the opposition is considering first and foremost its own future possibilities for publication.

Dialogue Unlikely

The party reaction to these proposals has so far not gone beyond attempts to prevent their dissemination by means of the underground organ BESZELÖ. Nevertheless, some in the open-minded wing of the party will not roundly reject all presentations of the opposition. Yet a fruitful dialogue between the two sides will hardly come about. In the understanding of a Leninist-type Communist Party, a dialogue would be a first step toward giving up a part of its power to others, that is, to noncommunists. Even the alliance policy of Janos Kadar does not go this far.

In addition, real discussion between a governing party and an "opposition" contradicts the rationale of power dominating the Eastern Bloc. It would on the long run imperil not only the dominance of the governing parties over their countries but also the dominance of Moscow over these parties and countries.

Retrospect

Fifteen years ago, on 6 May 1968, Alexander Dubcek, the Czechoslovak party chief gave a report of the discussions he had in Moscow. The Soviet friends expressed their fear that the process of democratization in Czechoslovakia could turn against socialism. He and the other members of the Czechoslovak delegation assured them that communism would be an indispensable part of the current process of liberalization in the CSSR. "As it is done among good friends, we spoke openly as equals and had nothing to hide behind diplomatic courtesies." The Soviet friends listened with understanding and have expressed the conviction that the Czechoslovak Communist Party will successfully attain its goals. He made it clear that the CSSR "within the framework of the Warsaw Pact will continue to participate in the struggle against imperialism." They agreed on even closer economic cooperation.
LIFE AMONG YOUTH SEEN

Budapest KOZNEVELES in Hungarian 6 May 83 p 5

[Article by Aliz Hilda: "What Should We Do with Our Lives?"

[Text] The end of the school year approaches. In a few months tens of thousands of young graduates from the high schools, the colleges and universities will seek positions in adult society. Also the pedagogues of the future are already applying for jobs in the schools and colleges, prepared to educate and influence by their personality and ideological stance those who will follow them, the teen-agers in the process of formation.

Thus it is not immaterial what kind of view of life these young people are bringing to the schools and other social positions at the beginning of their careers.

Their world view is certainly variable and resistant to schematic patterns, and although it is preferable not to go into generalization, certain generational symptoms are discernible all the same and are causing some concern.

A few months ago a series of programs on "A Het" conducted interviews with groups of young people at the beginning of their professional lives. They were questioned about their conditions of life, goals and possibilities. I was particularly impressed by the first report, because of the points of view mentioned in the introduction. If I remember well, it was a conversation with graduates from a college at Nyiregyhaza, and they were probably many pedagogues among them.

Eight youths were sitting on the stairs of the college and speaking about their ideas of how they think they should begin their professional lives and if they have any plans of great importance. And they said unanimously that they had none. They would have to build an existence, they stated, look for an apartment and care for their future family, their children, and as one of them put it with a sophisticated term for "reproduction." Only one boy let a faint hope glimmer: the building of an existence--he said--requires at least 10 years, but perhaps after then...

After then? I thought sadly, hardly. If a 25 year old does not want to revolutionize or at least reform the world, when he does not risk anything, has no responsibility for anybody, if the failures of life have not yet worn him out,
his nerves are hopefully in good shape and his backbone is unbent, when he then does not plan anything else but to feather his nest, then later he is not likely to change. If somebody's actions are motivated for over 10 years by nothing else but the need of earning his life, to progress in employment and to conform himself to his environment, then when he approaches his 40th year, he will not be able to change his character. For by then he will have something to lose, his experiences will have sobered him, he will be responsible for a family and will have a good pretext at hand for not changing: the kid needs a winter coat.

I do not want to downgrade the concern of young intellectuals. Their situation, if they cannot count on parental help, is hopeless indeed. But since they were intelligent young people, would it not have been natural if at least one of them had said: it will be difficult since apartments are scarce and the existential problems are depressing, but I shall try nonetheless. Would it not have been the logical answer of an intellectual to the deplorable conditions of life: I will do my best to change this unbearable situation and not for me alone?

The young people who were interviewed were keenly aware of the fact that they belonged to the intelligentsia. They started each second sentence by: "the housing situation of the young intelligentsia..." "a member of the intelligentsia will overtake a skilled worker only at the age of 45" etc. But what kind of intelligentsia is this who has not a single thought beyond its own petty problems.

I know that society is responsible for all this. Yet it would be urgent to stop using society, this abstract notion which per se has no meaning, as a scapegoat in order to spare us from sharing responsibility for the views of the youth and the development of its ideals, as our role as parents, educators, journalists, politicians, neighbors, men in the street, in sum as living members of our society would demand from us.

For the child, the teen-ager and the youth at the beginning of his career, the world of adults represents the training ground. This is so obvious that I am ashamed to emphasize it. And if these young members of our intelligentsia brush aside all care for the problems of the community in such a matter-of-course manner, if they so shamelessly admit that, alas, they are not able to care about anyone else but themselves, this is our failure, there is no doubt about it. Perhaps when they were little children, instead of giving them inflatable rubber animals as a toy, we should have told them tales, tales in which the smallest boy slays the dragon, the virtuous breaks with the wicked and justice overcomes injustice. When they were teen-agers, instead of buying them fancy dresses, we should have told them more about the most touching moments of our lives that cannot be forgotten. We could have certainly made them understand that the only way to make a man happy is to make him care about things which are beyond himself. The young participants in the discussion obviously did not know this and in my experience the rest of our youth does not know it either. We forgot to tell them, or if we told them we did it as our era without pathos requires, casually and perhaps skeptically, ashamed to be grandiloquent. And here we stand now looking at these intelligent young men and women who, as it became apparent from the discussion, take their life

46
seriously. But the fact that they are individually and collectively creative members of society, whether they want it or not, both in their actions and their passive indolence has never crossed their minds. I am sorry for them both because of their really difficult situation but even more so because young as they are, they are so disarmed, so skeptical about themselves and about their possibilities. If their future will be as they plan it, they won't be happy. They will live through their lives amidst the everyday monotony of their little pleasures and little sorrows, under the oppressive realization of their own paltriness.

I wonder when they will realize, if they ever will, how grandiosely beautiful and grievously difficult is the agenda ahead of them, the tasks with which they could fill their lives, lives that cannot be repeated.

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LACK OF MORALITY, PURPOSE IN YOUTH DISCUSSED

Budapest KOZNEVELES in Hungarian 6 May 83 pp 3-5

[Interview Csaba Gombar, sociologist and political scientist at the Social Science Institute, by Byorgy Byori: "Morality, Politics, Youth"]

[Text] I like to watch the public debates on the "Scientist Club" television program because these exchanges of views are usually exceptionally open-minded and meaningful. I was particularly impressed by a program on February 23 at which economists and sociologists discussed the economic and social roots of morality under the title "Morality, Politics, Economy." A few weeks later I went to see one of the participants in the debate, the sociologist and political scientist Csaba Gombar, who is a member of the Social Science Institute and asked him to express some of his ideas about the phenomena of morality in Hungary, focusing this time on the problems of the youth rather than on those of the economy.

[Question] "Will my posterity make progress?" asks Adam in the Tragedy of Man, and the answer to this agonizing question of adults of all times is that they consider the young generation less strong, less able to progress and more corrupt in morals than their own generation. What is the opinion of a sociologist about morals in our society and particularly among the youth.

[Answer] I can hardly give you an accurate answer. I feel this way when I am asked about the political divisions and political aspirations in Hungary. We know little about these since the invisible political factions are prevented from emerging to public knowledge. Likewise we do not have a reliable general picture about morality, and therefore it seems to be irresponsible to make statements about it. Empirical research that could help us to sketch an accurate and clear picture about this problem, which is very murky at this stage, are utterly missing. There are no moral-sociological research efforts in the true sense of the word.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Perhaps because the pattern of government directives concerning science policy, in contrast with the directives on economic policy, is still too centralized. It adheres too rigidly to central planning and those who are in
charge of devising its main trends have disregarded this area thus far. Al-
though Elemer Hankiss's outstanding inquiries into value-sociological matters
have already touched upon subjects of the sociology of morality, and we may
expect a lot from these inquiries, the only monograph that I have ever read
was a work by the Polish author Ossowski which appeared in 1969 and was trans-
lated into Hungarian.

[Question] Yet, moral phenomena are much more perceptible and tangible than
the more hidden political processes. We can see them and experience them.
Thus no wonder there are many who are concerned about our youth.

[Answer] A certain amount of concern is understandable in all eras. We can
perceive certain facts without any scientific help and we may deduce certain
consequences from them and it is almost certain that they are trustworthy. If
we read about juvenile delinquency, the great number of divorces, the sexual
behavior of some of the young people, we may presume that morality is low and
this is perhaps true. But since we do not know the extent to which the cases
which become public knowledge are merely isolated incidents and since in-depth
scientific research into the subject is missing, no one can have an authentic
grasp of this area of sociology, which is still considered one of the blind
spots of our scientific endeavors. In my view it is a flagrant contradiction
that while moral questions are the focus of public interest, scientific re-
search into them is highly unsatisfactory.

[Question] Those who are concerned about the morals of youth often deplore the
fact that the so-called official policy has no definite and strong moral inspira-
tion, that it lacks of commanding norms. Above all, the pedagogues are com-
plaining about this.

[Answer] The core of the dilemma, I think, is the question of whether moral
imperatives are required and necessary or superfluous. This reminds me about
Gabor Body's film "A kutya eji dala" [The Night Song of the Dog] that was pre-
sented to a film festival in Budapest. In this picture we could see various
value aspirations. Among its characters there were a priest, a military offi-
cer, a Party secretary, a pop singer, etc. Many were shocked by the director's
omission of a definite stand on moral trends in this picture. Which one should
be followed? In my view the film provided a good mirror to reflect the present
situation; it showed that various value aspirations and value systems are co-
existing now. Yet it is quite unusual that there was no official "moral impera-
tive" in it. There was none only in the sense as had been customary in the
early 1950s, when Hungarian films always reflected a kind of officially inspir-
ed ethos of unselfishness which was also omnipresent in propaganda and educa-
tion.

But even then the various moral values coexisted although only in a hidden
form. Conversely we are now living in the midst of constant changes and in an
active reform process in which all kinds of attitudes and conceptions might
arise. And since there are now no points of reference provided from above,
the educators might hang in the balance, the more so since in principle they
would have to transmit clear-cut ideas to their pupils.
[Question] Should politics provide that point of reference?

[Answer] Things are not so simple. A so-called moral policy would cause even more problems. We call moral policy the one which applies certain moral values to political-strategic actions and starts moral crusades on behalf of them. Experience shows that every "moral policy" tends to denounce people and cause almost irreparable domestic and sometimes even international tensions. As a consequence of centrally drafted catechism-like tenets, conciliation becomes impossible. I would not consider it a fortunate idea to introduce the teaching and preaching of dogmatic ethics in the schools. I would rather consider it wise to hold many discussions and conversations with high school and college students about various moral ideals, conceptions and actions, thus familiarizing them with and even teaching to them a variety of moral views. We would thus make them realize that it is necessary to meditate about morality and to develop a good, even better, moral system which is after all their task. The educators will only be able to make progress in this area if they provide the possibility for mature thinking by youth.

[Question] Are there any ties or similarities between political and moral processes and developments?

[Answer] Of course there are. For example, here and now the most difficult problem and most crucial dilemma for both is the lack of publicity, more precisely the lack of necessary publicity. In our governmental system adequate publicity is not provided to either political or moral aspirations. This is understandable since we have recognized that a variety of social, group and individual interests also exist in our country. But those interests could only then be realized in a proper and controllable form if they would somehow become visible on the political stage and thus the conflicts of interest could be publicly settled. Since this is not the case now, it would be senseless, because of the suggested and desired conformity, to ask somebody whether he prefers the socialist or the so-called capitalist morality.

[Question] Why do you use the term "so-called"? In your opinion we cannot use the adjectives socialist or capitalist with respect to moral definitions?

[Answer] The reason why I am using these adjectives with some reservation is that in both social systems morality has many features and their real contents cannot be scrutinized through their moral characteristics. For example, Western postmaterialist research has revealed the growing strength of value aspirations among young people, in other words, the growth of aversion to money-grubbing and to the frantic quest for performance. This occurs in mass dimensions. On the other side of the political diagram, many authors described the moral character of the socialist labor movement using such terms as closed ranks, puritanism, self-restraint, etc. But to demand this now in the name of "socialist morals" is almost impossible, for the countries which we now call socialist differ from each other greatly in terms of culture, politics, traditions and habits. It is obvious that the ethics of a Moslem Uzbek differ from that of a Catholic, particularly if they have still remained loyal to their faith.
Yet there are not only differences but also similarities. In all socialist countries it is perceivable that class differences are vanishing, a development politicians consider positive. On the other hand the fact that in these countries "class consciousness" has declined and people's loyalty to a social class or a population sector has diminished and thereby the moral virtues of class and sector consciousness are disappearing might be regarded as the negative consequences of the aforementioned development.

Certain similarities can be demonstrated also on a universal level. Therefore I noted that the abovementioned two adjectives have rather ambiguous moral contents. For example, acceptance of the Ten Commandments is characteristic not only of a class or of a nation but it is valid for all of humanity, and this is so even if many do not comply with the basic moral commandments.

[Question] Thus the basic moral values are of eternal validity? Does this not contradict the laws of change?

[Answer] Humanity defined thousands of years ago the principal values and thoughts of good morality and if something has changed in each nation, each culture, each era and each social class, it was merely the degree of acceptance of these values, their presence in people's life and their implementation.

[Question] There are many who see a marked difference between the situation before 1956 and after in Hungary. Before, they say, although under the pressure of fear, people had a more resolute attitude than they have now in greater freedom. Is it possible that more liberty causes more laxity?

[Answer] I do not think that people's attitude was then more resolute. It is not certain either that this "greater freedom" is also sufficient freedom. We have a lot to do in this respect; it is most surprising that everybody relentlessly talks in all forums about the need to develop democracy. The institutions of democracy are not satisfactory, and thus the individual is unable to recognize his own place and possibilities in politics. Actions therefore are often channeled on wrong ways mainly because the relations of responsibility are not tangible enough.

I can tell you a simple example. When reading the reports on crime, we realize that if the criminal is an unskilled worker the paper publishes his name, occupation and sometimes even his place of employment. If the crime is committed by the manager of a major enterprise, then only the name of the culprit is divulged, his occupation only seldom. And if something happens in higher spheres—a breach of law, a crime or a family scandal—the event is most likely not reported at all. And since this has been the rule in our country over the decades, with the only exception being cases which are unveiled for a political purpose, people are now skeptical about the principle of equality before law for everybody. This is likely to affect their morality.

The other topical question is whether more complete publicity would really create more morality. It goes without saying that greater publicity per se does not postulate a society of perfect morality. However if everybody, regardless of the importance of his position, must face the possibility that his political, professional and perhaps even his family and private wrongdoings and scandals will be published in the newspapers, then this kind of greater publicity
would strengthen morality. On the other hand people then would feel safer
that no one can commit immoral acts to their detriment without being publicly
punished. Already this fact alone is likely to cause improvement in people's
behavior and conduct of life on both the upper and the lower echelons.

Virtue acquires real content in light of publicity; lasting morals can only be
nurtured if constantly reflected in the mirror of the media. Of course a per-
son can be virtuous without publicity: I mean the monk whose life is devoted
to God alone. Yet if moral good and moral wrong have no publicity in a soci-
ety, confusion, nihilism and irresponsible habits might develop in the wake of
the sensation that "it is worthless anyway to do anything."

[Question] May I interpret this so that all this affects also the moral be-
havior of the youth?

[Answer] Of course.

[Question] Don't you overestimate the importance of publicity?

[Answer] Maybe, but I still insist on it since this is a basic issue which is
connected with the syndromes of mimicry and conformism. Did you observe how
many are imitating, reflexively and often accidentally, the gestures and locu-
tions of those whom they most admire? Yet in politics mimicry and the reluc-
tance to stand out from the rank have a paralyzing effect. When I was working
in the central administration of the KISZ [Communist Youth Federation], I real-
ized how much trouble might arise, already at the start of a political career
for example in a youth organization, from someone's attempt to run his own
course. Hypocrisy and its bad effect on morality might eventually be the re-
sult of this.

[Question] Is there any way to get out of this?

[Answer] Individually, only with difficulty and by chance. About topical de-
velopments which occur behind the curtain of official secrecy, nobody knows
anything and this has a demoralizing impact, above all on the youth who yearns
for openness and the truth. For it is useless to tell young people that they
should be independent if they cannot be so with respect to the essentials of
their life, since they must do what they are told or suggested to do. Is
there any reason to be surprised under these circumstances if they want to
change this situation by behaving radically differently from what the authori-
ties try to prescribe to them?

This further reminds me that moralizing efforts are quite widespread in Hungary,
and as a reaction to them the opposition against moralizing. The latter tends
to be so exaggerated that, for example, moral and above all political-moral
questions are not publicly discussed at all. The image, career and life of a
politician, including his private life, cannot undergo moral criticism in our
country.

[Question] Would you suggest that we should revert to the practice of the yel-
low press, airing the private life of politicians, including perhaps the bed-
room scenes?
[Answer] Anyone who is a politician, a leading personality, must accept the possibility of this kind of criticism; we have said this in our recent TV discussion. The problems involved are certainly complex. That a public figure, a politician should not try to be always in the limelight of public attention is a right and correct idea. It is preferable that he be moderate and modest in this respect. However, that the private life of politicians should be hidden from the public is not right at all. For the issue in this case is not that the politician is modest but that he is inaccessible to the public. As a consequence, the masses of citizens are becoming distrustful and rumors start that the leaders do not do anything but hunt games that they do this, they do that, they are living so and so, and ultimately even the most puritanical politician falls victim to such gossips although he might have been the model of good morals. We should not forget that the career of a politician has many beautiful and attractive features and it is not true that merely "sacrifice," "self-denial" and "suffering" are the lot of leading statesmen. They therefore have to accept some inconveniences since both the acceptance and the refusal of such discomfort have their positive or negative impact on public morality.

[Question] We have reached now too high spheres and I propose that we return to the ground, to everyday life and more precisely to the school. What can a teacher do in order to raise free and clean people of good morality?

[Answer] Although I have taught various subjects at the university, in fact, I have never been a pedagogue and thus I might behave illogically if I tried now to give advice. As a layman, I would say that the best thing is if the teacher is sincere with a moral consciousness. He should answer sincerely all questions concerning his students' problems. He should be responsible for himself, for if the teacher has no moral background even the most high-sounding words have very little value. I know that this might entail some risk, but I cannot say anything else.

[Question] We discussed before the problem of the independence or lack of independence of the youth. What kind of contradictions do you see in this area?

[Answer] Very heavy ones indeed. Even in the colleges there are teachers appointed for the education of the students and the chances of self-government are very limited. The situation in the high schools is even worse. High school students are even more prevented from developing public activities. (This is valid, by the way, in case of the teachers too, who are mostly working under strict rules.) This is a result of the educational system the rules of which are diametrically opposed to the principle of freedom of teaching. Thus the students' choice of subjects is very limited.

[Question] We have just introduced the facultative teaching system in the high schools.

[Answer] This is an encouraging symptom. However, I am always amazed when reading or hearing about the literary and debating circles of the old school. That public forum of the past was much freer than many of the present forums. Opinions and moral ideals could be freely discussed in them.
[Question] You seem to say that you are deploiring the lack of existence of youth organizations with various tendencies within and outside of the schools that could develop their internal activities independently. Or am I wrong?

[Answer] You are not wrong. My opinion concerning the youth organizations has always been that they are too uniform, too one-dimensional. Yet the unity of the Hungarian youth insofar as the national and socialist values are concerned cannot be the product of a single organization. When saying this, my idea is that autonomous sectoral organizations should be established. It would be urgent to realize that the centralization of not only the educational system but also the public activities of the youth is simply repulsive to the young people. Thus if their sense of initiative, their participation in local public activities and their independent decisionmaking are important for us, we should build the organizational framework for them, i.e., a network of autonomous organizations. For example, the local youth association of the schools should be more independent both from the faculty and from the higher echelons of youth organizations than it is at present.

[Question] A recurring memory of my school years comes to my mind. In fact, not only one but various. I have often participated in the KISZ leaders' campings of my school. The question often arose at those camps of what should be the place of religious youths. Should they stay in the KISZ or should they be allowed to set up their own organization if they wanted to do so. The camp commander has always stated preemtorily that religious youths are KISZ members like the others and thus they cannot form a separate association. Do you agree with this?

[Answer] No. Although I do not know the pertinent legal regulations, I theoretically agree with the principle that wherever there are religious youths and they want to found a club of their own, they should be allowed to do so. For it is only in this conceivable way that in the same school knowledgeable materialists trained in open and in-depth discussions against transcendent arguments may be raised. Merely because the religious students cannot eventually expose their views, they will not stop being believers but only will start hiding their faith. Thence neither they nor the others will be able to walk around with their heads erect.

[Question] In sum you think that greater democracy, greater individual and political freedom and a greater scope for actions would contribute to an improvement in morality.

[Answer] Yes. For a sound formation of people's personality, for the building up and preservation of their character we would need a chance of alternatives and a full view of the various paths the individual can choose. I think this would favorably affect the situation and would contribute to the development of better moral standards. I am of course not so naive as to think that organic democracy will at once improve morality. But if we fail to meet the aspirations of society, above all those of the youth, toward an organizational growth of democracy and of its institutional framework, if we block the quite strong democratic endeavors of the present, we will have to reckon with general indifference, disappointment and the people's withdrawal from public life and social activities.
We need a progressive reform of the entire political structure. Aspirations toward this are constantly present in the schools and the institutions of higher education. I often come across with the dissatisfaction of those who want changes, and since this impetus cannot have effects, it may succumb to resignation.

On the other hand a better formation of people's character may be expected, also in the moral dimension, from a freer scope for actions. The right to show various faces would increase the number of men and youths with responsible character, for they could then openly air their thoughts. If they cannot do this, they will benumb their sense of responsibility toward the commonweal with the adage that "it is immaterial anyway," and this is a strongly demoralizing factor.