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USSR REPORT

USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology
No. 1, January 1985

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U.S. ACCUSED OF PURSUITING COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY, NOT DETERRENCE

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[Article by G. A. Trofimenko: "U.S. Military Strategy--An Instrument of Aggressive Policy"; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] All public strategic debates in the United States during the last quarter of a century have turned on several fundamental theoretical concepts. These include the concepts of "deterrence" [sderzhivaniye] of the potential enemy, "mutual deterrence" by means of threatening to inflict unacceptable damage on the other side in a retaliatory strike, and "sufficiency" of strategic forces for fulfilling the tasks of "deterrence." All of these concepts sound far from aggressive. But what do they in fact conceal: A strategy which primarily places the stress on defense, as the White House and the Pentagon are trying to prove to the American and world public, or a strategic course which is far from defensive, but offensive and aggressive in nature? This article is dedicated to examining this question.

The Concept of Nuclear Deterrence

In one of the first, if not the very first, open books published in the United States after World War II appraising the significance of nuclear weapons for future American strategy, the then still young associate of the RAND Corporation, B. Brodie, wrote: "Until now the main aim of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its main aim must be to prevent wars. It can have almost no other suitable aim."

However, neither the American political establishment nor the military establishment followed this perspicacious advice of perhaps the most prominent American thinker in the sphere of strategic theory in the nuclear age. On the contrary, both the White House and the Pentagon regarded the nuclear--"absolute"--weapon as a wonderful means of establishing U.S. world hegemony. Having demonstrated the colossal destructive power of nuclear weapons without any particular military necessity, by means of destroying two Japanese cities, American politicians and military personnel began waving the nuclear "stick" on all sides in order to intimidate both "potential enemies" and their own friends so as to ensure themselves a free hand to establish an American world order.
During the years of the American nuclear monopoly and the resulting retention of considerable superiority in the quantity of nuclear explosives and the means of their delivery, it never occurred to anyone in the White House to regard nuclear war as excluded for the future. On the contrary, the threat of war from the position of the American nuclear monopoly became the chief means of exerting American pressure in the international arena for the purpose of implementing strictly pro-American solutions to unresolved problems.

The only thing that American politicians did was to conceal their offensive, aggressive strategy with a pseudo-defensive label. Thus the term "deterrence" or "nuclear deterrence" made its appearance in American strategic terminology and has remained firmly rooted there ever since. This term was called upon to whitewash American global nuclear blackmail and U.S. pressure from a position of strength on the socialist countries by portraying the American position as a defensive one against those who were working to restrain the United States' globalist ambitions. Even today, the postulate that the American approach to safeguarding national security is implemented exclusively from the positions of deterrence is the main axiom of American public nuclear doctrine.

But is this really the case?

An analysis of U.S. strategy and U.S. actions in the world arena against the background of concrete American programs for military construction shows that over the last 40 years the label "deterrence" has concealed at least four variations on basic strategies, fundamentally different from one another.

During the period of the American nuclear monopoly, "nuclear deterrence" signified GAMBLING ON A PREVENTIVE NUCLEAR WAR and the maximum use of nuclear blackmail for exerting pressure on the Soviet Union (which then did not yet possess any nuclear weapons) and on the emerging community of socialist states. This pressure not only pursued the aim of pushing socialism back behind its prewar borders, but also of transforming the Soviet system and "softening" Soviet power, as prominent American politicians and theoreticians of strategy openly wrote.2

In other words, at that time "deterrence" meant the threat of a nuclear attack on the USSR in any case of "Soviet disobedience" or opposition to the interests of the United States. Just 51 days after the victory of the Allied (Soviet and American) forces over Japan, the American Joint Intelligence Committee presented the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff with a plan for war against the Soviet Union, entitled "The Strategic Vulnerability of Russia to a Limited Air Attack." The plan recommended destroying 20 Soviet cities by means of a preventive nuclear strike, not only if it should appear to Washington that the USSR was planning to attack in Europe or Asia, but also if the Americans should establish that technological progress in the USSR provided grounds for assuming that it would be capable of "an eventual attack on the United States or of defending itself against our attack."3

After the USSR had created its own atom bomb, "nuclear deterrence" [sderzhivaniye] in the period of the strategy of "containment" [sderzhivaniye]4 and "massive retaliation" meant that the United States threatened the Soviet
Union with a nuclear war in order to prevent social changes in the world and anticolonial revolution. This approach reached its climax after the Eisenhower Administration officially adopted the strategy of "massive retaliation." But while speaking of "retaliation," the American leaders envisaged carrying out a preventive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union "if necessary." Eisenhower wrote in his diary in January 1956 that the best method of "reducing losses" was to "take the initiative" and "carry out a surprise attack against the Soviets."5

For what actions, one asks, was the Soviet Union to be punished by "massive retaliation"—that is, by a preventive nuclear strike? According to the interpretation offered by then Secretary of State J. Dulles and his colleagues, not only the fears of Washington's leaders that "the USSR is intending to attack the United States" could serve as grounds for a strike against the USSR, but also a victory by partisans in the Malay jungles or any leftwing military coup in Latin America. According to Republican leaders at that time (and, incidentally, today), the initiator of all revolutionary changes in the world was Moscow. And since "the hand of Moscow," as Washington claimed, was the chief motivating force behind all such changes, then with any change in the status quo in the world unfavorable to the United States "the chief culprit—the Kremlin," according to American General A. Wempeymeyer, one of the first to formulate the strategy of "massive retaliation," was to be immediately attacked.6 In this way, by balancing on the brink of war, J. Dulles hoped to save the American empire which the United States was building on the debris of European colonialism, while filling the so-called power vacuum which, in his words, had appeared as a result of the European colonizers' departure from Asia and Africa.

In this second hypostasis, American "deterrence" did not appear as a defensive concept of preventing a Soviet attack on the United States by threatening a retaliatory nuclear strike, but as a strictly blackmailing concept of deterring social changes in the world by threatening preventive nuclear strikes "against the center of the world revolutionary movement"—Moscow. In other words, the strategy labeled "deterrence" was in actual fact a STRATEGY OF INTIMIDATION [ustrasheniye] of the Soviet Union.

It is precisely for this reason that in Washington's official interpretation at these two first stages, it was given the title "the cowboy strategy," to cite U.S. theoretician R. Kolokowicz. It "reflected strictly American preferences, style and values," and, more precisely: "The concentrated use of strategic, and not conventional or tactical forces; the substitution of technology for manpower because of the high cost of human life; the unbridled use of military strength in war; a punishing war against the despised enemy, coupled with an insistent demand for 'unconditional surrender,' and the priority of military considerations even after war has begun; the decisive and precise completion of all wars; the avoidance of land battles in 'distant regions' of the world."7

The fact that U.S. intimidation by means of threatening war did not become real nuclear aggression is explained not by the peaceful nature of American politicians and military strategists at that time, but by their more or less
realistic evaluations of the military balance. Each time evaluations of this kind were made, the Washington politicians came to the conclusion that the United States was just short of enough forces for what might be called an unpunished attack, and that with just a little more exertion in the sphere of military construction it would be possible to carry out an effective nuclear strike against the USSR. But U.S. leaders were never given a 100-percent guarantee of the possibility of carrying out an unpunished attack.

Finally, with the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear missile potential comparable to that of the Americans, and with the liquidation of the U.S. territory's former invulnerability, the concept of "deterrence" acquired a new meaning, its third in the postwar years: CONVINCING THE POTENTIAL ADVERSARY OF THE NECESSITY TO REFRAIN FROM ATTACK--this by means of threatening to inflict unacceptable damage on the adversary in a retaliatory strike. And although the Soviet Union had never intended to attack the United States, this interpretation of "deterrence" signified a fundamental step toward realism, which also ultimately led the U.S. leadership to understand the necessity of detente in relations with the USSR and to be prepared to conclude and sign agreements in the sphere of strategic weapons which fixed Soviet-American parity.

It soon became clear, however, that American politicians and strategists were prepared to sign agreements on parity only so long as they calculated that, despite their official recognition of the principle of parity in ensuring the security of both sides, the United States in fact possessed certain advantages over the USSR by virtue of geopolitical factors and in view of the fact that strategic bombers (which comprised a much greater proportion of the total throw weight of strategic forces in the United States than in the USSR) and also U.S. forward-based nuclear systems remained outside the SALT-I agreement. As long as Washington believed that the United States was "deterring" the USSR more strongly than the Soviet Union was deterring the United States, it was prepared to formally recognize parity. But as soon as the USSR caught up with the United States in terms of quantitative indices of means of delivering strategic nuclear warheads and also in terms of its real combat potential for a retaliatory strike, which meant that it would be possible to cause the United States unacceptable damage in any conceivable scenarios of the beginning and subsequent course of a conflict, the American interest in maintaining parity disappeared.

The thesis that emerged on the surface of strategic debates in the United States was that, by acknowledging parity with the USSR in the sphere of strategic weapons, the United States had lost the ability for so-called comprehensive [rasshirennoye] deterrence. But what is "comprehensive deterrence"? A close analysis of this term, which was put in circulation by theoreticians of the policy of force during the 1970's, shows that it screens the position of unilateral superiority. "Comprehensive deterrence" means "reliance upon U.S. superiority in the numerical strength and flexibility of nuclear forces," emphasizes the well-known American strategic theoretician W. Slocombe. It "relies on the sufficient potential of the United States and its NATO allies to use nuclear weapons first," notes another, no less well-known theoretician, C. Bertram, who was director of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies during 1975-1982.
The situation of "comprehensive deterrence," in the opinion of American theoreticians, not only made it possible for them to persuade the main potential adversary to refrain from attacking the United States, but also to make unrestrained use of force on the local level. In this respect they proceeded from the premise that the other side, feeling itself to be the weaker side, would not effectively repel the United States, because raising the conflict to a higher—and, what is more, nuclear—level would not be to its advantage. "Whoever has superior strategic nuclear might," wrote retired Admiral E. Zumwalt, who was chief of staff of the U.S. Navy from 1970 to 1974, "can coerce others and achieve goals without a single shot being fired—either nuclear or conventional."10

Thus, the final—fourth—American interpretation of the concept of "deterrence" is virtually a return to its original AGGRESSIVE-OFFENSIVE INTERPRETATION, to attempts to "intimidate" the other side.

Within the context of all that has already been said, official Washington's approach to the definition of "sufficiency" of U.S. strategic nuclear forces should also be evaluated.

The Problem of "Sufficiency"

In the period when the U.S. leadership was faced, in the altered strategic situation, with the necessity of interpreting "deterrence" not as coercion or intimidation, but as "dissuading" the potential adversary from attacking the United States, American strategic theoreticians were faced with the problem of determining what kind of force would be sufficient for this.

The first to provide a detailed answer to this question was the secretary of defense for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (1961-1968), R. McNamara—an economist by education who had become a major strategic theoretician.

Drawing from the studies of A. Wohlstetter, he stated that, in its "deterrence" of the potential adversary, the United States must aim at being able, having survived an attack, to inflict unacceptable damage on the enemy in a retaliatory second strike. According to the calculations of McNamara and his Pentagon team of systems analysts, in order to inflict unacceptable damage on any industrially developed country in the 20th century, one must be able to destroy one-fifth to one-fourth of its population and half of its industrial potential.11

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, he stated, it would be sufficient to ensure the guaranteed delivery of 400 one-megaton nuclear warheads to targets in the USSR in order to fulfill this task. In order to be able to do this in a second strike, McNamara stated, while evaluating the growth in Soviet offensive strategic forces in the worst possible variation for the United States ("a bigger threat than expected") and the possibility of Soviet development of anti-missile defense systems, the United States must have approximately 2,500 strategic nuclear missile carriers in starting positions and combat-ready. The American specialists arrived at these figures by calculating the so-called coefficient of weapons delivery,12 which, as applied to ICBM's, was 37 percent: That is, in order to be able to deliver 400
one-megaton warheads to enemy targets with the aid of ICBM's alone, under the
given conditions, 1,081 missiles need to be originally in position.

Naturally, the coefficients of reduction really adopted in calculations of this
kind are one of the Pentagon's top secrets. Nevertheless, by 1968 the quanti-
tative buildup of American means of delivering strategic warheads stopped at
the level of approximately 2,400 units and the number has basically remained
the same since. Does this mean that the Pentagon planners have really begun
to be guided by McNamara's criteria of "sufficiency" and rejected the former
tendency to permanently increase the number of targets on the territory of the
USSR and, consequently, both the number of warheads necessary for striking
these targets and the means of delivering them?

One can only give an unambiguously negative reply to this question. Indeed,
the Pentagon has stopped building up the overall quantity of its strategic
weapon carriers. But this has by no means been done because it has been
guided by the McNamara theory, but because, at the initiative of the same
McNamara, it has made the transition to developing multiple-warhead strategic
systems, having taken the criterion of value/effectiveness as its basis. The
Minuteman-2 missile with one warhead has been replaced by the Minuteman-3 mis-
sile with three independently targeted warheads (MIRV) with enhanced accuracy;
the submarine Polaris A-3 ballistic missiles with three warheads without
independent targeting have been replaced by Poseidon SLBM's capable of carrying
up to 14 independently targeted warheads; and finally, instead of being
equipped with two Hound Dog air-to-ground missiles, the B-52 bombers have
begun to be equipped with up to 20 SRAM air-to-ground missiles, also with
nuclear warheads of enhanced accuracy. All of this means that instead of the
approximately 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads with guaranteed means of delivery
to targets which the United States possessed at the beginning of the
1960's, U.S. offensive strategic weapons already carried a minimum of 15,000
nuclear warheads at the beginning of the 1980's.

Pentagon spokesmen now claim that the United States has supposedly removed
8,000 nuclear warheads from active service since the end of the 1960's. But
if this is so, it means that at some stage during these 20 years U.S. stra-
tegic forces contained more than 15,000 warheads (obviously owing to the
nuclear bombs designated for bombers). And as they became worn out and obso-
ette, they were taken out of active service. However, flaunting the removal
of a number of obsolete warheads from active service proves nothing, because
the colossal increase in the accuracy of warhead targeting (during this time
the magnitude of probable radius error, by which the accuracy of impact is
measured, was reduced in American ICBM's, for example, from approximately
1,500 meters to 150-200 meters) makes it possible to reduce both the number
of warheads and their mean power. A 10-fold increase in the accuracy of a
nuclear warhead is equivalent in its striking effect when targeted on so-called
point targets (such as an ICBM silo and other military objectives) to a 1,000-
fold increase in its explosive force. This makes it possible to reduce the
number of targeted warheads: For example, instead of three old warheads called
upon to ensure the striking of a target with 90-percent probability, just one
warhead need be targeted, while retaining the same high percentage of proba-
bility of a strike.\textsuperscript{13} But in actual fact the number of combat-ready strategic
nuclear warheads has not decreased over the aforementioned period, but has increased more than four times over.

Thus, in spite of R. McNamara's public reasoning about the corresponding quantity criteria of "sufficiency" for a crushing RETALIATORY strike against enemy targets, he himself and, even more, those who succeeded him in the post of U.S. secretary of defense have on no account been guided by any restrained criteria of sufficiency.

What is really involved in this connection is that, although the publicly announced American strategy envisaged making a retaliatory strike against the USSR in response to a possible attack and in this way "deterring" an attack, the United States in fact intended to use its strategic forces in a different way, that is, in an offensive way.

As the U.S. and USSR strategic potentials were reaching the same level and as the Soviet Union was achieving the potential of making a retaliatory strike in the event of an aggression being unleashed by the United States, a strike that would be no less crushing than the strike with which the United States threatened it, Washington politicians moved further and further away from the retaliatory strike concept and began to be inclined to the concept of a disarming first strike—that is, the so-called counterforce strike against Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and against command and control centers.

However, it must be said that American strategic thinking has never really adopted the position of a retaliatory strike. The second strike was discussed loudly only to put at rest the mind of a potential opponent. But in fact, as the Pentagon subsequently admitted and as McNamara himself now admits, the American strategic forces were not aimed only against cities and industrial sites but also against the armed forces of the USSR and its allies. In the 1960's, however, targeting exclusively against Soviet strategic forces was not really that important for Washington yet. It was believed in Washington that in view of the existing ratio of four to one in strategic warheads in favor of the United States, the United States could not only deter but also defeat the Soviet Union by making the first indiscriminate strike against all three categories of targets in the Soviet territory which have been selected by the Pentagon. But when they realized that the USSR's strategic potential was reaching equality with American potential not only in given quantity indices but also in real combat capability and that, under any conditions determined by the beginning or the course of war and even in the event of a U.S. first strike, the USSR would be capable of inflicting unacceptable losses on the United States with a retaliatory strike, they set their goal at preventing the USSR from nullifying the advantages of the unilateral American "deterrence."

One of the ways by which the United States hopes to extricate itself from the situation of the equal deterrence potentials of the two sides is increasing the counterforce potential of its strategic forces in order to be able to make a preventive or pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet strategic forces and command and communication centers and thereby essentially reduce the Soviet forces' ability to carry out a crushing retaliatory strike. Therefore, the task set in this connection is to liquidate the parity nailed down by the Soviet-American SALT-II agreement (not ratified by the United States primarily
because it records the real military-strategic parity between the two countries) and hold a position of counterforce superiority. It is precisely for this reason that the number of targets on USSR territory against which U.S. strategic forces are now targeted has been set at 40,000 units by the fifth single integrated operating plan. McNamara, however, is known to have set the number of targets needed for "deterrence" through the threat of retaliatory strike at 400 units—that is, the number of the targets for destruction has increased by 100 times! Thus the original approach of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) has triumphed: The greater the number of targets, the greater the number of warheads. And various public arguments about a "sufficient" minimum "deterrence" were nothing but demagoguery. In this connection, the intention to increase the counterforce potential of offensive forces has been supplemented by the plans for a simultaneous development of a large-scale antimissile system in outer space. That, according to the ideas of the present U.S. leaders, should "deal effectively" with those retaliatory strike forces that the USSR would still have after an American nuclear attack.

All of this provides more than enough evidence of the fact that the "deterrence" concept in its most recent hypostasis is not a defensive concept of "dissuading" the potential enemy from attacking the United States by threatening it with an unacceptable retaliatory strike, but is instead assuming its original form of intimidation by the threat of a preventive or preemptive strike and of ensuring a free hand for the United States to use all the arms of its armed forces at various levels.

McNamara in fact confirmed this in an interview with LOS ANGELES TIMES correspondent R. Shier in April 1982. He said: "Read once again my memorandum to President Kennedy (of 21 November 1962, which has been recently declassified--G. T.). Today I find it terrible even to read it: 'The Air Force is generally inclined to support a development of the armed forces that would ensure for the United States a first-strike potential, the use of which would not be doubted by the Soviet Union because of our capability to limit U.S. and allied losses to a level that would be acceptable in view of the circumstances and possible variations.' What is involved in this connection is that the Air Force advocated an increase of the American Armed Forces on such a scale that they would have the potential of first-strike destruction of such a large part of the Soviet nuclear forces that the Russians would then lack sufficient weapons to cause any alarm on our part over their retaliatory strike. My God, if the Russians thought that this was our goal, how should they react, in your opinion? In my opinion, this explains...many of their actions."16

It is true that McNamara is now trying to prove that the Air Force recommendations were not accepted and that the U.S. strategic development allegedly followed his plan—that is, the moderate option. But if this is so, why then was he himself concerned about the possibility of the United States being the first to use nuclear weapons? After all, the first use of nuclear weapons can be efficient only in a counterforce strike: A strike against empty missile silos and against airfields where there are no longer any bombers hardly makes sense, and if we consider his position in the 1960's, then that position represented an effort to prove U.S. adherence precisely to the concept
of second-strike—that is, retaliatory strike—or, in other words, to the concept of not being the first to use nuclear weapons.

Thus, why then is McNamara now, a quarter of a century later, calling on Washington to adopt the same position which, according to his statements when he became secretary of defense, the United States had adopted as long ago as in 1961? Is it perhaps because then, in 1961, the position of a retaliatory strike was merely talked about for effect to lull the other side with the imaginary nonaggressive nature of the American position, while at the same time the United States was ready—and is ready now—to unhesitatingly unleash a nuclear first strike against the USSR? But now it is not just that McNamara has become wiser, having left military affairs and, as president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, having come closer to the terrible tragedy of hunger and poverty in vast regions of the world, at a time when each American family pays for military purposes an amount that would be sufficient to sustain several hundred African families for a year. As he himself admits, the main thing is that the correlation of forces between the USSR and the United States has changed and that what was talked about in 1961 merely in order to present Washington's position to the general public as a peaceful one, has now become, in his opinion, a categorical imperative for the very survival of the United States itself as a society.

To confirm this thesis, we cite a recent article by McNamara: "As the Soviet Union moved closer to, and then attained, an approximate parity with the United States in strategic forces and intermediate-range forces, the CRITICAL ELEMENT OF THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE BECAME LESS AND LESS RELIABLE.... In short, THE KEY ELEMENT OF THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE WAS LIQUIDATED BY A CHANGE IN THE PHYSICAL REALITIES OF THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. In view of the enormous survivable arsenals of both sides, strategic nuclear weapons have lost any military usefulness that may have been attributed to them at that time. THE ONLY GOAL OF STRATEGIC FORCES TODAY IS TO DETER THE OTHER SIDE FROM THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" (emphasis mine—G. T.).

Therefore, in 1983 R. McNamara actually repeated the 1946 thesis of B. Brodie. It is therefore possible to state that it has taken some American politicians nearly 40 years to come to the conclusion which realistic thinkers drew as early as at the dawn of nuclear weapons. However, this is not what is involved now. This frank statement represents a most striking illustration and admission: What we heard from the mouths of the U.S. President and secretary of defense in the 1960's was, to put it mildly, a strategic deception. The U.S. strategic forces were not planned for a strike in retaliation for a nuclear attack, as they claimed at that time, but for taking the initiative, for a first strike against the USSR, in the belief that the Soviet retaliatory strike would turn out to be "acceptable" and endurable and would cause, so to speak, insignificant damage to the United States. Today these plans are still in force. Otherwise, why would McNamara and some of his realistically thinking colleagues wage the battle to make the United States renounce the first use of nuclear weapons? It turns out that even now U.S. strategic planning proceeds from the position of the expediency of a first strike although all American presidents from J. Kennedy to R. Reagan in their public statements have always presented American nuclear strategy as being based on the position of a second strike against the adversary!
"Mutual Assured Destruction"

In order to provide a theoretical basis for the PUBLIC U.S. strategy, portrayed by American civilian strategists as "purely defensive," they invented and launched the "mutual assured destruction" concept (MAD). This concept extended to the Soviet side the American public position of the threat of an unacceptable retaliatory strike for the purpose of deterrence or dissuasion. The American theoreticians expressed the view that if the Soviet Union adopted the same position of deterring an American nuclear attack with the threat of inflicting unacceptable losses on the United States by means of a RETALIATORY strike, a situation of mutual deterrence would be created, and this would be an important contribution to strengthening strategic stability. The Soviet Union itself has not advanced any such concept, but it is nevertheless obvious that an equilibrium in the sphere of strategic potential favors peace and not war. Life in a "balance of terror" situation is really not very comfortable, but for the stability of a situation, equilibrium is still better than its absence.

It is true that U.S. secretaries of defense—McNamara and those who followed him in that office—have never used the term "mutual assured destruction" themselves. They have preferred to talk about the "assured destruction" of the Soviet Union by the United States, indirectly admitting now and then that the Soviet strategic forces represent a deterrent counterthreat to the United States. However, they have never equated the Soviet and American potentials to inflict unacceptable losses on the other side with a retaliatory strike. But it has become an axiom in the writings of American theoreticians of military strategy that just as the United States can "assure the destruction" of the Soviet Union with a retaliatory strike, so the USSR can "assure the destruction" of the United States with a retaliatory strike, and that this "balance of terror" is the best means of preventing nuclear war.

However, the entire matter amounts to the fact that in the 1960's and during a considerable part of the 1970's, there was no parity of strategic arms between the USSR and the United States, even despite the SALT-I agreement (which left out the strategic bombers, representing a very substantial part—more than 80 percent—of the entire throw weight of the U.S. strategic forces). Therefore, under these conditions, the abstract theoretical reasonings of American authors about a situation of mutual assured destruction in fact served as a verbal screen to cover up U.S. superiority.

The situation changed toward the end of the 1970's when Soviet strategic forces reached the same level as American strategic forces in their combat potential and when the hypothetical situation of mutual assured destruction became an objective reality. This reality was recorded in the SALT-II agreement, which confirmed equality between the USSR and U.S. strategic forces in the number of launchers and made it possible for either of the two sides to achieve any essential advantage in the number of strategic nuclear warheads by setting the maximum permitted number of warheads for every type of missile held by them and for one permitted newly developed type of ICBM, as well as a definite number of cruise missiles that may be carried by strategic bombers. The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems also contributed to strengthening the situation of mutual assured destruction. As is
known, the 1974 protocol permitted each of the two sides to have only one antimissile complex with 100 antimissiles each. In other words, it made the antimissile defense systems of both countries purely symbolic and made the two sides open to retaliatory strikes. Finally, in June 1982 the USSR unilaterally assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This objectively created a situation to which, as they claimed, the American strategic planners had aspired—that is, a situation of mutually assured destruction—although it would naturally have been better for its complete confirmation if the American Government had also formally renounced the first use of nuclear weapons. It seemed that now the possibility was created to start a transition from the state of the "balance of terror" to its gradual reduction while strictly adhering to the principles of parity and equal security. However, instead of following the path of further limiting and reducing strategic weapons, the United States has made a step in the opposite direction. The Reagan Administration is trying to restore the situation of superiority, achieve the capability of destroying the Soviet society with a nuclear attack while ensuring the survival of the American society and, consequently, American victory in a nuclear war, which implies that, after an exchange of nuclear strikes, the United States will be in a much better position than the USSR.

The Soviet leaders authoritatively declare that they will not allow such a situation; the USSR is also fully capable of doing that, as scores and hundreds of specialists, including those in the United States, admit. For instance, H. Brown, who was secretary of defense in the Carter Administration, wrote: "In the 1980's and 1990's, the United States and the Soviet Union will have approximately equal strategic forces. The USSR will be able to counter any increase in U.S. potential and thereby liquidate the prospects for the restoration of U.S. superiority."18

However, the main thing in this case is that the plausible-sounding thesis of American theoreticians about the desirability of mutual assured destruction for the stabilization of the strategic balance has also turned out to be demagogy calculated to deceive public opinion with the imaginary non-aggressive nature of U.S. intentions. They discussed the concept of mutual assured destruction and praised the value of the balance of strategic retaliatory strike capability as long as the Soviet Union did not actually possess capabilities equal to the American ones. While publicly advertising mutual assured destruction as an "ideal stabilizing" means of strategic opposition, they secretly planned a crushing strike against the USSR, a strike that would deprive it of the possibility for an effective retaliatory strike against the United States. But as soon as the USSR achieved a real possibility to inflict a crushing retaliatory strike on the United States and, what is more, as soon as the situation was nailed down by the SALT-II agreement, the system of mutual assured destruction (and the agreement confirming it) immediately lost their appeal for many U.S. politicians and strategists. Advancing his "weightiest" argument against the SALT-II agreement at the hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Haig said on 26 July 1979: "I am very worried about the approach on which American strategic thinking is based today.... I see a strengthened flirting with the concept we call MAD.... I reject this strategy and believe that SALT II and the uncoupling
of the balance of power incorporated in it today represent a very big step in this direction. I would like to be...absolutely convinced that we are not de facto or consciously drifting toward this sterile, inhuman, amoral and, I think, self-undermining strategy."19

Therefore, when Washington thought that the U.S. strategic potential "intimiated" the other side more strongly than the latter's strategic potential intimidated the United States, and when it proceeded from the assumption that it could liquidate it with a first strike, neither A. Haig nor any of his colleagues had any moral problems. They also experienced no pangs of conscience when the United States used strategic types of arms (bombers, aircraft carriers and naval gunboats) in Vietnam, and recently again in Lebanon, for the random and therefore especially brutal bombing and shelling of the positions of resistance fighters who had no comparable military-technical potential. The question of "morals" arises only whenever the potential of the other side to restrain the United States from attacking it turns out to be equal (with the sole difference that the USSR has never intended to attack the United States, whereas the latter is constantly threatening the Soviet Union either with a massive nuclear strike or a counterforce strike against Soviet ICBM's, submarines and bombers). It was precisely the fact that the Soviet Union had actually achieved a capability for "mutual assured destruction"—speaking in the language of American strategists—that is equal to that of the United States, which H. Kissinger once in a fit of frankness called a "revolution in the strategic balance,"20 that put A. Haig and his military colleagues beside themselves and forced them to confirm out loud what was clear long ago: Until the conclusion of SALT II, the United States had never accepted or recognized the theory of mutual deterrence through mutual assured destruction. It was only "selling" this idea to the other side in order to cover up its strategy, the goal of which was not "deterrence," but the military defeat of the Soviet Union.

Mutual assured destruction "has never been an operational policy,"21 A. Wohlstetter authoritatively states. And he should know because the authorship of the concept of deterrence of the adversary with the threat of a crushing retaliatory strike is attributed precisely to him. Z. Brzezinski writes in his memoirs even more frankly about the situation of mutual assured destruction: "Our existing doctrine of deterrence based on the principle of the mutuality of assured destruction was basically formulated at a time of real U.S. superiority at the beginning of the 1960's, and therefore the 'mutual destruction' was actually unilateral: It was precisely the United States that could inflict far heavier losses on the Soviet Union than vice versa. This asymmetry provided the United States with the luxury of being able to ignore the doctrines of the other side as not really corresponding to its potential."22

And although, as shown above, American strategic doctrine has never actually been based on the principle of mutual assured destruction, but has only publicly flirted with that concept to deceive and "lull" the other side, Brzezinski is now concerned that the inertial adherence to this concept and its serious acceptance by the United States might indeed put the United States in the position of equal capability with the USSR and then it would
not be able to take the initiative in the flexible use of force. This is the reason for the Carter Administration's attempt to extricate itself from this situation by adopting presidential directives PD-59, PD-62 and PD-63, which formulated, as Brzezinski points out, a "new geopolitical doctrine" and which have been adopted as a point of reference by the Reagan Administration in its indefatigable striving for supremacy, something that the Republican Party platform adopted at the convention in Dallas demonstrated with new force. Yet another American moralist of the Haig type, P. Glynn, in his article with the indicative title "Why an American Arms Buildup Is Morally Necessary," emphasizes: "There is a certain irony in the history of mutual assured destruction because this doctrine of 'mutuality' of vulnerability was formulated at a time when vulnerability was anything but mutual."23

However, there are few such figures as Haig, Brzezinski and Glynn—that is, those who state with a soldier's directness the real reason for the unacceptability of the situation of mutual assured destruction for the United States and for the "moral nature" of the situation of absolute U.S. superiority. Most of the strategic analysts and political scientists try to cover up American sanctimoniousness in connection with mutual assured destruction with a new deception by stating that the situation of mutual assured destruction has been allegedly rejected by...the Soviet Union!24

But was it the Soviet Union and not the United States that scrapped the SALT-II agreement which confirmed the situation of mutual assured destruction at the level of complete parity? Is it the Soviet Union and not the United States that nurtures the idea of liquidating the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which, in the opinion of all honest American specialists and politicians, represents the best guarantee of preserving the mutual vulnerability of the two sides and thereby also of deterrence through its realistic function of persuading the two sides of the need to refrain from a first strike? The Soviet Union is declaring through its highest leaders that it is satisfied with the existing military-strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO and does not claim any superiority for itself. But what are the American leaders saying or, more correctly, doing? They are now dishing out 300 billion dollars annually for the program to restore American strategic superiority! Finally, it is precisely the Soviet Union that has solemnly and UNRESERVEDLY pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and has thereby made the most vital step toward confirming the situation of deterrence by preserving the potential of the two sides for an effective retaliatory strike. If Washington took a similar step and moved together with the USSR toward a freeze on strategic arms at the present level of parity (after all, the SALT-I agreement, which confirmed the parity, is still in force de facto), then a real situation of mutual assured destruction, in praise of which literally tons of literature have been published in the United States, would provide a starting point for an advance toward even greater stability through further arms limitation and reduction measures and the demilitarization of the rivalry between the two systems.
FOOTNOTES


2. For more about U.S. plans during this period, see "Sovremennaya vneshnyaya politika SShA" [Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy], vol I, Moscow, 1984, pp 283-293.


4. It should be borne in mind that in the U.S. political vocabulary there are two terms defining the concept "sderzhivaniye": Deterrence [in English] signifies "nuclear deterrence or intimidation [ustrasheniye]"; containment [in English] is a term from the vocabulary of the "cold war" which characterizes the policy of "containing communism." In this article we are dealing with "nuclear deterrence." 

5. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1983, p 40.


7. R. Kolkowicz, "The Soviet Union--Elusive Adversary," SOVIET UNION/UNION SOVIETIQUE, 1983, vol 10, pts 2-3, p 163 (Kolkowicz says in this context that "the irony lies in the fact that American preferences were basically unfulfilled and that American troops actually got bogged down on Asian territory (Korea and Vietnam), where strategic superiority meant little in the waging and outcome of each of these two wars").


12. One can cite the following scheme as a model calculation of the "coefficient of weapon delivery": It is assumed that the actual number of missiles comprises 90 percent of those theoretically in position, of which 90 percent are combat-ready; launching reliability reduces this latter figure by 10 percent, and the reliability of missiles in flight by a further 10 percent. As a result, 66 percent of the number deployed in
position remain. Further: After a first strike by the enemy, 75 percent of this number remains—that is, 49 percent of the missiles in position. Finally, calculations also proceed from the fact that approximately 75 percent of the missiles launched will be able to overcome the enemy's anti-missile defense. Thus, the "coefficient of weapon delivery" reduces their number to 37 percent of missiles deployed in position.

13. If reducing the number of warheads does prove anything, then it is only that the latest American proposals for so-called "reduction through buildup" (for every new warhead, two old warheads are removed from active service) are nothing other than an attempt to consolidate, by means of an agreement, the long existing practice of renewing nuclear warheads in U.S. strategic forces, and this forces one to seriously doubt the value of such a proposal from the point of view of making progress toward disarmament.

14. As early as 1950, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff divided targets in the USSR into three categories according to the level of their priority: The first priority was assigned to the targets whose destruction was supposed to "blunt" the Soviet retaliatory strike; they included the "Soviet capabilities for delivering nuclear weapons." The second place was assigned to the targets that should "slow down the Soviet war effort" if they were put out of commission: command and control centers, air defense systems, ammunition and fuel plants and installations, shipyards and so forth. The third category included industrial and urban complexes. These three groups of targets were given the corresponding codenames of BRAVO, ROMEO and DELTA (A. Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill. Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960," INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1983, pp 16-17).


15


24. "The concept of mutual assured destruction that determined the American policy in the 1960's has not been adopted by the Soviet Union," demagogically stated, for example, Admiral T. Moorer, who was once chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ("The SALT II Treaty. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, pt 4," Wash., 1979, p 40). "The Russians do not actually accept the doctrine of mutual assured destruction," R. Pipes, Reagan's senior adviser on the USSR in the U.S. National Security Council, has stated (THE WASHINGTON POST, 11 April 1982). One of the propaganda pamphlets of the Pentagon, to which the very idea of parity between the United States and the USSR in strategic possibilities represents impermissible sedition—that is, one of the pamphlets calculated to fool the average citizen—states: "The Soviets do not recognize either the Western concept of sufficiency or the Western concept of assured destruction" ("Soviet Military Power," Wash., 1981, p 95). This statement can be considered the apotheosis of hypocrisy.

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Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 16-26

[Article by A. S. Alekseyev: "Washington and the Stockholm Conference"]

[Text] From the very outset, the United States has treated the idea of the international Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, which has been in progress since 17 January 1984 in the Swedish capital, without any enthusiasm. For a long time, American diplomacy took a stand which complicated reaching an agreement on the convocation of the conference. Subsequently, the Stockholm conference has become one of those conferences to which official Washington representatives usually refer when they wish to create an impression of their desire for negotiations. However, understanding the course followed by the United States in Stockholm today is inseparable, of course, from considering its initial position.

The United States' basically negative approach to the idea of the conference has been determined by considerations of both a long-term, conceptual nature and a temporary, fluctuating one.

On 16 November 1980, State Department adviser and Ambassador Rosanna Ridgeway spoke before the Subcommittee for the Affairs of International Organizations [as published] of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee with an exposition of U.S. foreign policy aims at the then forthcoming Madrid meeting. The question of convening a conference on confidence-building measures and security and disarmament in Europe occupied a central place at the meeting. Noting that the proposal for such a conference possessed great attractive force among European countries for a number of reasons, R. Ridgeway admitted that for the United States there existed "potential difficulties in proposals for meetings on security issues after Madrid. The chief difficulty is the possibility that the subject of security will be taken beyond the bounds of an all-European conference and turned into a separate forum, and that the balance between problems connected with human rights and security measures and economic problems will be broken. We are also concerned lest this major initiative addressed to the public in the sphere of security divert attention from human rights and shift the focus of the all-European conference that we deem necessary to retain."\(^1\)
If one translates the camouflaging terminology into the language of political reality, then the essence of the matter lies in the following: Strengthening security and expanding cooperation on an all-European basis in the conditions of peaceful coexistence on the continent between states with socialist and capitalist systems do not answer the United States' global aspirations in the world arena. This would be at variance with the aim of gaining military superiority, an aim expressed by the formula "peace on the basis of strength," and would hamper the task of strengthening "Atlantic solidarity," which is called upon to ensure Washington's control over its West European allies. American diplomacy shows an immediate allergic reaction to anything that could even potentially help to reveal a community of interests between the European states in the sphere of security, to strengthen mutual trust and to reduce military opposition in Europe.

However, the United States cannot, of course, cancel the process begun by the all-European conference. This process has its roots in the soil of the European states' real need (including those belonging to the North Atlantic bloc) to exclude the possibility of a military conflict in Europe and to maintain a certain level of normal interstate relations between the socialist and capitalist parts of Europe. This process constantly receives life-giving impulses from the consistent policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community, a policy aimed at averting the danger of war, strengthening peace and security in Europe and developing extensive, mutually advantageous cooperation.

Under these conditions, the United States, which has been drawn into the all-European process by virtue of well-known circumstances, strives—as it cannot succeed in blocking and destroying this process—to adapt certain aspects of the Helsinki agreements to the needs of its policy aimed at stirring up confrontation in Europe. These agreements are treated as a kind of deal between East and West in which the West acts as the protector and guarantor of "human rights" and must demand certain "concessions" from the socialist countries in this sphere in exchange for progress in security issues. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs E. Abrams exhaustively explained the meaning of American policy in the sphere of human rights in an interview with THE NEW YORK TIMES in February 1984: "Anti-communism is one of the most important elements of this policy," and an inalienable part of this policy is "the Reagan Administration's tough stand in relation to the Soviet Union."

It is understandable that with an approach such as this, the Stockholm conference was included in U.S. foreign policy aims with real difficulty. What is more, the opening of the Madrid meeting in November 1980, which examined the issue of convening the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe, coincided with R. Reagan's election to the office of U.S. President. The influence of this fact on the course of the work in Madrid is obvious.

Among the direct reasons instilling apprehension in the United States in connection with the idea of the conference, prime place was naturally occupied by plans to deploy new American intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe,
which were stipulated by a decision made at a session of the NATO Council in December 1979. The wave of the antia war movement swelled in the countries where the United States planned to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles. Hesitation was also observed among government officials in a number of West European NATO countries. The participants in the Madrid meeting originally planned to bring it to a close in the spring of 1981, but the proposals introduced for its examination on the question of a conference on confidence-building measures proceeded from the possibility of beginning the work of this conference in the autumn of the same year.

However, American administration circles considered that convening such a conference would make it difficult to carry out NATO's missile plans. And it is no accident that the head of the U.S. delegation at the Madrid meeting, G. Bell, made no mention of this conference in his introductory policy statement, but simply said that the United States was "prepared to join efforts to exercise the entire potential of confidence-building measures." This "forgetfulness" was a deviation even from NATO's official position. As was indicated in a communiqué of the NATO Council session held on 13-14 December 1979 in Brussels, the members of the bloc "reached the conclusion that the proposal to convene a conference on disarmament in Europe, put forward by France, represented a useful idea, providing a basis on which they could continue to develop their approach in this sphere in order to achieve the holding of this conference."3

At the beginning of December 1980, several proposals for convening a conference were officially introduced for examination at the Madrid meeting. These proposals were put forward by the delegations from Poland, France, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Romania—that is, countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact, the North Atlantic bloc and the group of neutral and nonaligned states. And although in February 1981 the American delegate Mr. Kampelman first stated that the United States also agreed with the idea of holding a conference, after that the American representatives' efforts at the Madrid meeting were hardly directed at a constructive and businesslike discussion for the purpose of reaching a coordinated decision on the question of the conference. On the contrary, they actually slowed down and complicated in every way possible the working out of an agreement acceptable to all of the participants, while obviously not excluding the fact that this agreement could ultimately also be wrecked for one reason or another.

Various tactics were set in motion. It was stated with frank pressure that a "zero" outcome, so to speak, of the Madrid meeting, basically without any results apart from fixing the time and place of the next meeting of that kind, would also totally suit the United States. Under the pretext of "balancing" the results of the Madrid meeting, demands were made to "compensate" for a possible decision to convene a conference with positions on the issues of human rights, information and contacts known to be unacceptable to the socialist countries. It was emphasized, almost in the tone of an ultimatum, that if a decision were to be made on convening a conference on confidence-building measures and security, then this would only be done on the conditions inherent in the proposal made by France, thus ignoring the positions and interests of other states.
The words of Secretary of State C. Shultz at the closing sessions of the Madrid meeting, that the United States "welcomed" the decision to hold the Stockholm conference and that it would conduct "serious negotiations" at that conference "in order to reach agreement on measures important from a military viewpoint, politically binding and subject to verification, which would be applicable throughout the whole of Europe," consequently aroused well-founded skepticism.

Nothing in the U.S. position at the talks in Stockholm has as yet dispelled this skepticism.

The tone of official American statements on the conference changed, but the verbal fabric with which Washington tried to conceal the actions to undermine trust and security in Europe taken precisely during this period by the United States and its NATO allies was too transparent. They began to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles on the territory of a number of West European members of that bloc, thereby wrecking the Soviet-American Geneva talks on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe and limiting and reducing strategic weapons. The efforts of NATO diplomacy and propaganda were aimed at forcing the peoples of the continent to reconcile themselves to these dangerous actions and at presenting the matter in such a way as to make it seem as if it were not a question of a sharp increase in the nuclear threat in Europe, but of an ordinary, routine episode in connection with which the dialogue between East and West could continue as if nothing had happened. For the sake of these unseemly aims they were against speculating on whether the conference in Stockholm would begin work or not.

However, the stand taken by the United States on the essence of the problems that the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament in Europe was called upon to study very soon revealed its true aims.

On 24 January 1984, the delegations of the NATO countries presented the conference with a joint document containing their proposals for examination. This step, which was taken a week after the opening of the conference, was presented as evidence of their desire to get down to businesslike negotiations as soon as possible. It was directly emphasized in a statement by the State Department on 24 January 1984 that the rapidity with which NATO had submitted its proposals "demonstrates the seriousness of the intentions with which the West approaches the conference." If this were so, the legitimate question would surely arise as to why the NATO countries formulated and officially submitted their proposals before familiarizing themselves in detail with the positions and considerations of the other participants. At the Stockholm conference, as at other forums held within the framework of the all-European process, the rule of consensus generally operates and, consequently, one cannot count on being able to carry through any decisions that do not consider the interests of all the participating states. So the ostentatious haste was primarily dictated by propagandist motives. Another aim was also fulfilled at the same time: to bind the NATO countries together by a bloc platform from the very outset all the more since they submitted their proposals as a unified "package" of joint proposals.
The stamp "Made in the United States" is clearly apparent on the NATO "package." It virtually formulates the corresponding principles expounded by the U.S. secretary of state at the opening of the conference.

1. The exchange of information on the organization and deployment of the respective armed forces;

2. The presentation of annual preliminary plans for military exercises;

3. Advance information on important military activities;

4. Invitations to observe such forms of military activity;

5. Enhanced capacity for rapid communication between governments in times of crisis;

6. Measures to verify the observance by each party of the obligations agreed upon at the conference.

In the document submitted by the delegations of the NATO countries, the proposed measures are more concrete, which provides an even clearer idea of their true purpose, namely:

1. At the beginning of each calendar year, the participating states agree to exchange information on the structure of their ground troops and land-based air forces within the zone of application of coordinated measures for strengthening confidence and security, as envisaged in the conference mandate. This information can be clarified by appropriate means. It will be the basis for further measures concerning military activity.

2. The participating states will exchange annual preliminary plans on all forms of military activity within the stated zone, this activity being subject to prior notification in accordance with any other measures for strengthening confidence and security. This information can also be clarified by appropriate means.

3. The participating states will give 45 days advance notification on extra-garrison activity by ground troops, mobilizing activity, and activity by amphibious troops within the zone covered by the conference. Observance of the agreements coordinated within the framework of this measure will be subject to various methods of verification, including the invitation of observers and inspections.

4. The participating states agree to invite observers from all other participating states to all forms of activity of which prior notice has been given.

5. The participating states agree not to impede national technical means for the purposes of verification, and can also set the requirements regarding the conduct of inspections.
6. Agreements must be reached which will expand the means of communication between participating states.

"Our aim," G. Shultz summarized the meaning of the American proposals, "is to increase the transparency of military activity in Europe."7

The concept of the "transparency" of military activity, as is well known, is not new. It also has its history within the framework of the all-European process. Representatives of the NATO countries put forward this concept, in particular, during the second (Geneva) stage of the all-European conference, when the principles of the Final Act, later adopted in Helsinki, were being developed and coordinated. This concept was decisively rejected at that time.

What was the United States counting on when it made the concept of "transparency" the basis of its position at the Stockholm conference? Could it not realize that the negative attitude of the socialist states toward this concept not only did not weaken, but was instead even more strengthened?

Fighting for an "openness" of military activities, G. Shultz in his speech at the Stockholm conference set forth the conclusions that this would make it more difficult to launch any sudden attacks, would make miscalculations less probable, would prevent the use of military power for the purpose of intimidation and coercion, would result in greater predictability in military exercises, would shed light on any such deviations in them which could jeopardize peace and would enhance the ability to render harmless any growing crises.8 However, these arguments cannot stand the test if they are compared to existing reality.

As a matter of fact, what purpose would the availability of information on the structure and activities of the armed forces of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states serve at a time: when the United States is deploying new enhanced precision nuclear missiles near their borders;

When American General B. Rogers, supreme commander of the joint NATO armed forces, demands that it must be an immediate task to further increase and perfect conventional weapons in order to make it possible to deliver target strikes against the second wave of Warsaw Pact troops in depth behind the line of contiguity between the two military-political groupings in Europe;

And when the United States and other NATO nuclear powers refuse to follow the example of the Soviet Union and assume the obligation of not being the first to use nuclear weapons and evade the conclusion of a treaty on the mutual renunciation of the use of force in general?

The "transparency" concept can produce nothing but an intensification of mistrust and suspicion between states. The mandate of the conference coordinated at the Madrid meeting is based on premises that have nothing in common with the idea of "transparency." It defines the goal of the conference as the "execution in stages of new, effective and concrete actions aimed at developing progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament by making real and express the obligations of states to refrain from
the use of force or threats of force in relations with each other," and the task of its first stage now in progress is to "consider and adopt a set of mutually complementing confidence-building and security measures aimed at reducing the danger of opposing military stands in Europe."9

And since the demand for "transparency" was nevertheless raised as the basic position of the United States and its allies at the Stockholm conference, it can be concluded that this position is not calculated for businesslike negotiations, for achieving accords, that is, in short, for the success of Stockholm. In addition to this, the proposals of the NATO countries are aimed at achieving "transparency in relation to the armed forces of the USSR and its allies whereas a considerable part of the armed forces of the United States and other NATO countries would remain, so to speak, in the shadows.

It is impossible not to conclude that the real purpose of the measures demanding "transparency" is nothing more than supplementing the intelligence activities of the NATO special services and an attempt at attaching the appearance of "legitimacy" to these activities. The "demand"—overemphasized to the point of absurdity in the NATO proposals—for verification of future confidence measures, including a package of inspections, also attests to this.

The long history of various negotiations in the sphere of disarmament shows that the United States manipulates the problem of control every time it wants to block an opportunity for achieving positive results. Breaking up the organic link between the volume of control and the content of the accords that are subject to verification, it tries to impose a scheme of "control without disarmament" (in this connection it is enough to invoke the example of the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and arms in Central Europe, already going on for more than 10 years now, at which the United States and its NATO allies are moving away from accords on real mutual reductions and, at the same time, are making completely unjustified claims in the sphere of control under the guise of the so-called "accompanying measures"). On this question too, the NATO proposals are completely at variance with the mandate of the Stockholm conference, which clearly states that the planned confidence measures "will be safeguarded with the adequate forms of verification corresponding to their contents."10

The extremely onesided nature of the U.S. position, as expressed in the NATO proposals, is conspicuously obvious. The proposals concentrate all attention on ground forces in Europe and, as regards air force elements, exclusively on land-based air force elements. At the same time, nothing is said about, for instance, the activity of naval forces or sea-based air force elements that are directly connected with security in Europe; although it is written in black and white in the mandate that the confidence measures will be also applied to military activities in the sea (ocean) areas and airspace adjacent to Europe.

The U.S. position is a frank attempt to undermine the coordinated mandate, including one of its key premises on which a compromise solution was worked out with great effort. It is a completely open pretension to place the NATO bloc and, first and foremost, the United States, in an advantageous position
to the detriment of the security interests of the USSR and its allies. The method is well known, among other things, also on the basis of other negotiations in which the United States participated. If for some reason the United States does sit down at the negotiating table, it lays out proposals that are aimed at achieving one-sided gains and at infringing upon the legitimate interests of its counterpart in the negotiations.

The mandate of the conference envisages that the confidence measures must be built "on the basis of equal rights, balance approach and mutuality, and equal respect for the security interests of all participating states." This provision most obviously presupposes that each individual new confidence measure taken in the future, and the total group of these measures considered from the vantage point of a general balance of the sides' interests, must be in accord with the aforementioned conditions. The collection of measures included in the NATO "package" meets neither the first nor the second requirement.

It goes without saying that the basic fallaciousness of the approach incorporated in these measures cannot be concealed by verbal tricks. For example, J. Goodby, head of the U.S. delegation at the Stockholm conference, tries to parry the criticism of the NATO proposals by presenting the matter in such a way as to create the impression that these proposals are allegedly considered unfair because they do not include North America. Having substituted the concepts, he develops the following argument: The mandate worked out in Madrid does not extend geographically to North America; this also applies to the Asian part of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, a considerable part of the American land forces and tactical air force is deployed in Europe and is fully subject to the effect of the NATO proposals.

The American representative has tried to accuse the Soviet Union of striving to revise the agreement achieved in Madrid. But, in fact, as the substance of the NATO proposals cited above shows, it is precisely the NATO proposals that are aimed at revising the mandate coordinated in Madrid both in relation to the volume of the future confidence and security measures and in relation to the area of their implementation.

The U.S. position is characterized not only by the contents of the NATO "package," but also by its attitude toward other proposals made at the Stockholm conference. The following have submitted their proposals to the Stockholm conference to date: Romania (25 January 1984), the group of neutral and nonaligned states (9 March 1984) and Malta (9 November 1984). On 8 May 1984 the USSR submitted a document on measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe based on the joint initiatives of the Warsaw Pact states. The U.S. position in this connection is not distinguished by any diversity. The United States is saying "No" to everything that extends beyond the narrow framework of military-technical measures (according to the NATO understanding, of course) and to all proposals that concern the truly important problems of confidence and security in Europe, and which could in fact reduce the danger of military opposition.

The United States is especially obstinate in opposing the proposals concerning the obligation of nuclear powers to refrain from the first use of nuclear
weapons. To validate this negative position, it cites arguments which are clearly refuted by the actual state of affairs. For instance, it is claimed that the questions concerning nuclear weapons cannot be considered by the Stockholm conference because they are allegedly not envisaged by its mandate, although this onesided interpretation is not confirmed by a single word in the text adopted in Madrid. On the contrary, as it follows, for instance, from the Yugoslav and Swedish proposals on the question of the conference, many states proceed directly from the need to consider questions concerning nuclear arms at the conference. By its very nature, the conference that has the task of reducing the danger of military antagonism in Europe cannot ignore the most terrible issue, that is, the nuclear aspect of this antagonism, especially at a time when its level in Europe is rising sharply.

Representatives of the NATO countries are invoking the statement—included, in particular, in the Bonn declaration of the leaders of states of that bloc (10 June 1982)—that none of their weapons would ever be used except in response to an attack.12 If this formula also included the obligation of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, then there would be no grounds for refusing to clearly and unambiguously define this obligation in a proper form. But the point is that the aforementioned statement permits the possibility of a first nuclear strike by the United States and its allies. And the military doctrine adopted by NATO directly envisages the possibility of the first use of nuclear weapons and, in this connection, the use of these weapons during the early stages of a military conflict.

In order to justify this adventurist doctrine they never tire of repeating that the Warsaw Pact supposedly enjoys an "overwhelming superiority" in conventional arms—in terms of the numerical strength of its armed forces, in terms of divisions, artillery, tanks and fighter planes. But if one evaluates the correlation of the sides' forces objectively, on the basis of facts, then according to the main indices of conventional arms there exists an approximate balance of forces. The NATO bloc surpasses the Warsaw Pact in terms of the total number of its personnel, the number of its combat-ready divisions and its antitank weapons, and it has approximately the same amount of artillery and armored equipment as the Warsaw Pact. NATO enjoys superiority in terms of fighter-bombers, for which the Warsaw Pact compensates with a slightly higher number of air defense interceptor-fighters.13 But the facts are ignored.

The United States also disregards the opinion of the overwhelming majority of states in the world, which is expressed in the Declaration on the Condemnation of Nuclear War adopted at the initiative of the Soviet Union by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 1983. It condemns the development, promotion, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines "called upon to substantiate the 'lawfulness' of the first use of nuclear weapons and the 'permissibility' in general of unleashing a nuclear war."14 Only the United States and its allies have failed to support this declaration although, as is well known, voices in Western Europe and in the United States itself have been increasingly persistent in recent years in opposition to the first use of nuclear weapons. In an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS (spring 1982), an article which has aroused a broad response, M. Bundy, G. Kennan,
R. McNamara and J. Smith, who have played important roles at various times in the formation of U.S. policy in the sphere of security and arms control over the course of two decades, reach the conclusion that "the time has come for a careful study of ways and means of moving toward a new policy and doctrine for the alliance; Nuclear weapons will not be used if the aggressor does not use them first." One can also recall the pastoral message adopted in May 1983 by the majority of participants in the national conference of American Catholic bishops, which was held in spite of pressure by American officials, in which an appeal was made to NATO to adopt a no-first-use policy without delay.

Since the moment when the nuclear bomb appeared in the United States, nuclear weapons have been used and continue to be used by the United States as a means of blackmail and intimidation and as a means of gaining military superiority and creating a so-called position of strength. The obligation not to use nuclear weapons first, which would in fact be equivalent to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons in general, would tie the hands of the Americans who overestimate the importance of strength in international relations and would call into question the expediency of developing new extensive, expensive and dangerous nuclear weapons programs. In this lies the real state of affairs behind the present U.S. administration's negative attitude toward the proposal of no first use of nuclear weapons. Its refusal to take such an obligation on itself and to follow the example of the Soviet Union, which did this unilaterally as early as 1982, naturally cannot help but engender a profound mistrust of U.S. policy and of its aims and intentions, including, of course, with respect to the Stockholm conference.

The United States has also had a basically negative reaction to another large-scale initiative upheld by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Stockholm—the proposal to conclude a treaty on the mutual non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations.

At first the United States and its NATO allies gave the proposal for this kind of treaty a hostile reception, as they say. Trying to sow mistrust and doubts about the idea itself, they have resorted quite frequently to the argument that the principle of the non-use of force has already been recorded in international law, specifically in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, and that there is allegedly no sense or advantage in repeating it. It has also been alleged that the proposal for a treaty is supposedly of a declarative nature, whereas, quote, concrete and practical actions are what are needed.

If one believes that reference in the UN Charter to a certain principle of relations between states cancels the need for international treaties and agreements built precisely on the foundation of this principle, then one arrives at the general whole-sale negation of the value of any international agreements.

In fact, however, during the period immediately following the formation of the United Nations, the number of international legal acts amplifying the aims and principles of the UN Charter in the most diverse spheres of state
activity and interstate relations increased many times over. This, incidentally, is attested to by the fact that the principle of the non-use of force, formulated in the UN Charter in a general, universal form, was also recorded in the Helsinki Final Act, adopted 30 years after the creation of the United Nations. What is more, the Helsinki Final Act does not simply repeat the corresponding charter provision regarding this principle, but provides a detailed and specific definition appropriate to the new circumstances.

The proposed treaty would not repeat the provision on the non-use of force which has been recorded in current international legal acts—as U.S. representatives try to suggest, thus deliberately distorting the essence of the matter—but would concretely develop this principle proceeding from the actual state of affairs in Europe and from the need for decisive steps to correct the situation. It is proposed that the obligation not to use nuclear weapons or conventional weapons first—that is, not to use military force at all—be made the pivotal clause of the treaty. This obligation would extend to the territories of all signatories, to their military and civilian personnel, to their naval, air and space vehicles and to other installations contiguous to them, wherever they may be located. Also envisaged in the obligation of signatories to the treaty not to threaten the security of international sea, air and space lines of communication crossing an area to which no national jurisdiction applies. The proposal for a treaty also contains other important clauses aimed at building confidence and reducing military antagonism, averting the danger of a sudden attack and helping to halt the arms race, limit and reduce arms and achieve disarmament. Due attention is also devoted to such aspects of the matter as cooperation in the observance of treaty obligations. All of this totally refutes the statements about its allegedly declarative nature.

There is no doubt that the conclusion of this kind of treaty would create substantial guarantees against the outbreak of military conflicts in Europe and the rest of the world. It would have a favorable effect on the development of the whole international situation, vitally strengthen the political and legal foundation of the observance of the principle of non-aggression and the avoidance of threats of force and enhance the effectiveness of this principle.

Forced to reckon with the growing appeal of the proposed treaty, American diplomacy has recently resorted to maneuvering and to inventing formulas that would create the appearance of some kind of positive change in the U.S. position.

When the American President addressed the Irish Parliament on 4 June 1984, he referred to the Stockholm conference and touched on the issue of the non-use of force in particular. The simple confirmation of a principle that all states have recognized in the UN Charter and in other documents would, in his words, be an insufficient result of the conference. "We must embody this idea in actions that will help to create effective barriers against the use of force in Europe." If, as a result of negotiations, "the Soviet Union will agree to conclude agreements that will breathe new, concrete meaning into this principle," the United States will "gladly" enter into these negotiations.
This excerpt from the speech of the American President was widely broadcast in the West as a "step toward" the Soviet Union. Continuing in this vein, the head of the American delegation in Stockholm, J. Goodby, said in September 1984 in an interview with the newspaper ASAHI: "A framework is beginning to appear within which it will be possible to reach an agreement. This is the complete set of proposals on the non-use of military force, in which the Soviet Union is showing a great interest, and on concrete confidence-building measures, for which the countries of the West, as well as neutral and non-aligned states, are striving."

Thus, the United States is making a verbal 180-degree turn, as has happened on more than one occasion before: The proposal to conclude a properly binding treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations is being opposed by U.S. willingness for a declarative confirmation of the principle of non-aggression—that is, precisely that which they earlier opposed (as G. Shultz said at the beginning of the conference, "It would be a cruel deception of the people of Europe if this conference claimed that the reaffirmation of existing—and too often violated—obligations signified progress in building confidence in Europe"). In this respect, in exchange for "reaffirmation" of the principle of non-aggression, the condition is in fact being made of accepting the demands of the NATO bloc, which are aimed at disclosing the structure and activities of the USSR Armed Forces and those of its allies. Moreover, this is inexplicably presented as a "concession" to the Soviet Union, as if not all of the states participating in the Stockholm conference, including the United States and the other NATO countries, would benefit to the same extent as a result of obligations on the mutual non-use of military force being consolidated in a treaty.

Thus, the latest "step toward" the USSR is nothing more than a trick by American diplomacy, calculated to continue avoiding the serious consideration of this large-scale initiative of the Warsaw Pact states. This is also confirmed by the fact that the United States and its NATO allies ignored the direct appeal made to them by the Warsaw Pact states on 7 May 1984 to enter into multilateral consultations on the question of the treaty.

As regards the measures included in the Soviet Union's proposals at the conference, such as freeing Europe from chemical weapons or reducing military expenditures, the U.S. position amounts to overt obstruction. On the one hand, the United States groundlessly claims that these measures allegedly do not correspond to the mandate of the conference and that, if they were to be considered, then they should not be considered in Stockholm, but at some other forums, such as, for example, the Geneva Disarmament Conference (where the United States is blocking the drafting of a treaty on the prohibition and liquidation of chemical weapons on a worldwide scale) or in the United Nations (where the United States is replacing the proposal of the reduction of military spending with the demand that information on military budgets be submitted for "examination"). On the other hand, the United States and its allies have not responded to the proposals of the Warsaw Pact states (the 10 January 1984 proposal on chemical weapons and the 5 March 1984 proposal on military expenditures) on the establishment of contacts for the purpose of direct negotiations between both alliances on the aforementioned problems.
The United States makes it plain that it also does not sympathize with the proposals on the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe, although this idea has aroused the interest of many European states and although the matter has already been considered thoroughly. The explanation for this position is found in the Pentagon's plans, which assign the European continent the role of a theater of military operations involving the use of nuclear weapons and do not exclude the possibility that the territory of neutral and nonaligned states might also be used for this purpose.

Finally, the United States not only does not envisage in its proposals any kind of limitation of military activities in Europe, but also opposes the corresponding proposals of other states participating in the conference. Attempts have even been made to somehow substantiate the need to continue such large-scale NATO military maneuvers as, for instance, the "Autumn Forge-84" maneuvers, during which a few hundred thousand military personnel were brought into action.

The Stockholm conference is still going on. The time has not yet come to sum up or anticipate its results. At the conference itself, numerous and multifaceted factors and interests are clashing, interacting and intermingling in a complex tangle.

Of course, the course of the conference will be determined in many respects by the further development of the situation in Europe and in international relations in general. Under present conditions, all participants in the Stockholm forum have an even greater responsibility to succeed.

"Among the voices of our partners at the conference," A. A. Cromyko noted in his speech at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, "there are also sensible voices, although they are being drowned out for the time being by the chorus of opponents of mutual acceptable accords. The success of the work in Stockholm, to which we aspire, can be ensured only if all participants in the conference renounce attempts to obtain onesided advantages."17

On the continent the increased activity of broad social circles acting against the threat of war and advocating lasting peace also speaks for this.

FOOTNOTES

1. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, November 1980, p 50.


5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, March 1984, p 43.

7. Ibid., p 18.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
15. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1982, p 754.
17. PRAVDA, 28 September 1984.

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AMERICAN MISSILES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 49-54

[Article by S. A. Karaganov]

[Text] It has been a year since the United States started deploying new medium-range missiles on the European continent and thereby undermining the Geneva talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe. What has it achieved by taking this hostile step against the cause of peace? What has the appearance of the "Euromissiles" done to American-West European relations and to East-West relations?

The "Euromissiles" were designed to undermine the European military balance and strategic parity. Their deployment was a move against detente, a move to escalate tension and to attach Western Europe more closely to Washington strategy.

In some respects, the United States has been successful. The deployment of the missiles escalated tension in the world and struck a blow against trust between states.

In Western Europe, people on the extreme right who had always opposed detente felt more secure when the missiles arrived. They were already growing bolder at the beginning of the 1980's, when their spiritual brethren, Americans on the far right, took charge in Washington. The missiles gave some rightwing Europeans an additional injection of brazenness. Revanchist statements were voiced more loudly in West Germany. These tones could also be heard more distinctly in the speeches of some Bonn officials. School textbooks and maps depicting Polish, Czechoslovak and Soviet lands in the colors of the former reich are being published again, just as they were in the 1950's and 1960's.

The struggle over the deployment of the American missiles also led to some consolidation of ruling circles in the NATO camp. This was preceded by an unprecedented outburst of conflicts between them in 1981-1982, culminating in the battles over the White House's attempts to keep the West Europeans from participating in the "Gas for Pipes" project. The United States suffered an extremely humiliating defeat and had to retreat. The intensity and severity of the fight over the pipeline frightened its participants on both sides of
the ocean. Washington subsequently avoided direct confrontations, and its partners in Western Europe tried not to irritate the Americans.

The rise of the antimissile movement in Western Europe and the United States was largely responsible for the results of the Williamsburg summit meeting at the end of May 1983, especially the drafting of a declaration on security issues at a conference on international economic issues. By signing this joint declaration, Bonn, London and Rome formed a united front against their populations.

Washington is vigorously deploying cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. By October 1984 the deployment of the first missile division consisting of 36 Pershing II missiles had been completed in the FRG. In all, 109 Pershing II and cruise missiles had already been deployed by that time, and the figure was 175 by the end of the year.

By starting the deployment of the missiles, the United States disrupted the military balance. But the Soviet Union, which had issued several warnings that it would not allow this kind of disruption, took retaliatory measures to safeguard the security of the USSR and the other socialist countries. It canceled the unilateral moratorium announced in March 1982 on the deployment of SS-20 medium-range missiles in the European half of the USSR. As Soviet Defense Minister D. F. Ustinov announced, "Any further augmentation of the American nuclear missile potential in Europe will lead to a corresponding increase in the number of SS-20 missiles in the European part of the USSR. By an agreement with the governments of the GDR and CSSR, the deployment of Soviet long-range operational and tactical missiles on the territory of these allies was begun in December 1983 to secure the defense of the socialist community countries." These missiles are combat-ready and represent a counter-threat to primarily the regions where the American Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles are deployed.

In addition to deploying these missiles in Western Europe, the United States began to equip strategic bombers, surface ships and submarines of the U.S. Navy with long-range cruise missiles. By the end of 1984, for example, the Pentagon planned to have 1,000 air-based cruise missiles on heavy bombers for a purpose which was quite clearly stated in a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on the U.S. military posture for fiscal year 1984: "Extremely accurate air-based cruise missiles will be capable of destroying the most hardened targets in the USSR."

In response to this, the USSR Armed Forces, as the USSR Ministry of Defense reported in October 1984, began deploying long-range cruise missiles on strategic bombers and submarines. In terms of their scale, these measures are commensurate with the mounting threat posed by the United States to the security of the Soviet Union and other socialist community countries.

The Soviet countermeasures have an important political purpose in addition to counteracting the additional military threat from the United States. The USSR has reaffirmed its intolerance for attempts to deal with it from a position of strength and its willingness to defend its own security and the security of its allies.

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Washington and its NATO allies take every opportunity to state that the situation is a "peaceful" one and that the danger of war has not increased. In fact, the administration, which has displayed such an amazing ability to create "Soviet threats" out of whole cloth, is now striving to ignore or conceal the military implications of the Soviet Union's countermeasures. In this way, after arousing a reaction to its behavior, Washington is trying to keep the American people from finding out that its policy of undermining the security of others has put the United States in a more dangerous position.

The USSR's firmness has contributed to the increasing realization in American political circles of the futility and danger of U.S. pressure tactics. The Soviet Union "has displayed firmness, intelligence, non-compliance and the willingness to use its strength to put the United States in a difficult position and force it to accept responsibility for its actions," stated the well-known American correspondent W. Pfaff.

There is also increasing alarm in the United States in connection with the realization that the Pershing II and cruise missiles deployed in Europe could serve as a fuse to set off thermonuclear war. Nuclear planners in Pentagon offices are perfecting scenarios for the use of the new missiles to threaten "limited nuclear wars" and to fight them. But outside the Pentagon everything is seen in a different light, and the new missiles look like something that could involve the United States in a nuclear war.

The new American missiles aroused fear, anxiety and protest in Western Europe. Although these feelings were always strong, they have been mounting since the end of 1983, and as a result of not only the deployment of the missiles but also the increasing awareness of the dangers posed by the U.S. escalation of the strategic arms race, which is obviously geared to a first disarming strike. Suffice it to say that the MX missile is capable of destroying as many highly fortified targets as 15-20 of the existing Minuteman-3 missiles with highly accurate warheads. The Trident-2 missile, which the Pentagon plans to put in production in 1988, will have virtually the same combat capabilities as the MX. Against this strategic background, the Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles clearly represent, more than ever before, a means of undermining strategic stability and the spearhead of a pre-emptive strike.

West Europeans are realizing that the deployment of the new missiles in addition to existing forward-based U.S. weapons will increase the American potential to fight a "limited nuclear war" on the European continent. "For many West Europeans the new missiles are less a guarantee of peace than a means by which the United States will be able to fight a limited nuclear war," S. Talbott, expert on arms limitation, remarked in a special issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS dealing with "America and the World in 1983."

There is also an increasing awareness that the missiles will not reinforce the notorious U.S. "nuclear guarantees." And this was almost the main official aim of their deployment. "The American missiles," Chairman E. Barr of the West German Bundestag Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament wrote in VORWAERTS magazine, "could be the means by which European security is cut off from America's security."
The fears of the public have been compounded by the Reagan Administration's plans for an echelon ABM system for U.S. territory. This system could destabilize the strategic situation and would signify the further separation of the United States from the situation in Europe and thereby give Washington a stronger motive to start a nuclear war in Europe in the hope of its "localization." As Senator W. Proxmire said in July 1984, the ABM system could undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because this kind of system would weaken or completely nullify the American "nuclear umbrella" over Europe.

These fears evolved into overt clashes at the meeting of NATO defense ministers in Turkey in April 1984. Washington's obviously deceptive assurances that the ABM system would supposedly also protect Western Europe did not diminish the dissatisfaction. The conflict over this matter will apparently continue to rage.

West Europeans are also realizing that the deployment of the missiles has made them the hostages of Washington's global strategy, which is acquiring stronger elements of aggressiveness and adventurism. "The Pershing II and cruise missiles," West German expert and diplomat K. Bloemer remarked in FOREIGN POLICY, "are now seen by Washington as a means of imposing its global political ideas on its NATO partners. The United States is demanding that the allies share the related risk."

Obviously, there is the expectation that the allies will stop vacillating and trying to build friendly relations with the East and will return to the 1950's, when the United States issued orders and the West Europeans obediently, although sometimes with a frown, carried them out. But for this the United States will have to generate an atmosphere of war hysteria comparable to the one that existed in the late 1940's and early 1950's at the time of NATO's birth.

The well-known American liberal political analyst R. Barnet wrote in his book "The Alliance: America, Europe, Japan, Makers of the Postwar World," published in 1983, that the U.S. leadership was "frightened by the fact that Winston Churchill's famous statement 'If it were not for the American bomb, the Red Army would be at the Channel' seemed less persuasive in retrospect.... The absence of any kind of historical proof of these intentions and the acknowledgment of the destruction and losses the Soviet Union had suffered made the key myth justifying NATO's existence less and less convincing.... In Tokyo, just as in the European capitals, the Soviet Union was viewed as a country which should not be treated as a pariah under quarantine and not as a power to be destroyed, but as a country necessitating a strategy of coexistence."

Washington, according to one influential American conservative political analyst, the new editor-in-chief of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, W. Hyland, has an extremely negative opinion of the "tendency of the old great powers to regain a free hand and rid themselves of U.S. patronage.... The key issue is the struggle for the future of Europe: Will Western Europe continue to safeguard its security through dependence on the United States or gradually take a more independent and autonomous stand?"
The White House has been unable to force Western Europe to forget its own security interests. On the contrary, as Chairman P. Dankert of the European Parliament has pointed out, many members of its ruling circles have become even more aware that "the interests and goals of the United States and the West European countries are diverging more and more." "Western Europe has refused to accept the prevailing belief of the U.S. administration that the West is in a state of permanent conflict with the USSR," he said.

Washington has been unable to attain one of its main goals: It has been unable to surmount the frightening decline in support for NATO—the instrument of its domination of the "Atlantic system." The struggle over the missiles further eroded West European support for NATO and created more problems for the "Atlanticists" than it was supposed to solve. "Instead of helping to strengthen trust and security," K. Bertram, once the director of London's International Institute of Strategic Studies and now the editor-in-chief of the influential West German newspaper DIE ZEIT and one of the most active supporters of the deployment of missiles in Western Europe, had to admit when he assessed the consequences of the deployment, "the program and the political climate in which it was carried out turned out to be counterproductive from the standpoint of the original aim. As a result, acute and painful disagreements broke out within West Germany."

This frustrated the attempts of some circles, particularly in the FRG, to assume a position of strength in dialogue with the East with the aid of the missiles. It is already obvious that the deployment of the missiles has made Bonn's foreign policy position noticeably worse.

The Social Democratic Party in the FRG, which originally supported the deployment plan, is not the only party to have changed its position; the Labor Party in Great Britain and some centrist parties in Western Europe are now opposing the missiles. By the beginning of 1984 this was almost the prevailing mood in Western Europe. H. Kissinger admitted with regret in an article in TIME magazine on 5 March 1984 that "the prevailing European attitude toward the missiles is similar to a host's treatment of an invited but unwelcome guest."

The struggle over the deployment of the American missiles led to a situation in which the antinuclear movement in Europe was joined by the broadest range of political forces, gave all Europeans a deeper awareness of the danger of war and a sense of responsibility for their own security and changed the psychological climate in Europe. The masses began to influence politics more actively and grew more aware of their own interests and of the need to fight against those who are pushing the world into war. The peace movement put down deep roots and expanded its base.

The negative view of American policy even prevailed in England, which has traditionally been regarded as the most "pro-American" country in Western Europe. Former Director of the London Royal Institute of International Relations D. Watt wrote with undisguised alarm about the mounting anti-Americanism of West Europeans at the beginning of 1984: "Even the most experienced Americans are incapable of understanding how deep and widespread the critical view (of Washington's policy—S. K.) has become."
Anxious notes of realization can be heard behind the bravura of official statements about "NATO's victory." In July 1984 a prominent American expert on military policy, Executive Director W. Taylor of the conservative Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote: "Anyone who thinks that the issue of the deployment of medium-range forces has been settled had better think again. Almost every indication is to the contrary. The Dutch Cabinet of Ministers has already decided to postpone the deployment of cruise missiles until November 1985. How many of the extraordinarily high number of conservative governments now in power in Western Europe will survive the next set of elections?"

In its race for military superiority to the socialist world, however, the current administration apparently does not even want to consider the injuries this will inflict on the United States' own political position and is adhering to its policies.

Washington's adventurous attempts to escalate international tension and undermine the arms limitation process are counterbalanced by the responsibility and realism of Soviet policy and Soviet attempts to strengthen international security. The NATO propagandists are making every effort to promote the myths of the USSR's "aggressive intentions" and the "Soviet military threat" to Western Europe.

"In a number of spheres: in art, business, trade, diplomacy and even nuclear strategy," D. Endelman, a renowned American expert on "Atlantic relations," wrote with un concealed alarm about this tendency, "the image of the Soviet Union, its government and the bases of its policy is undergoing obvious changes that might be described as de-demonization."

The Soviet Union is firmly opposed to any kind of infringement of its security and the security of its friends and allies. At the same time, it consistently proposes new ways of improving the international climate and stopping mankind's slide toward catastrophe. "The Soviet Union," A. A. Gromyko said at the 39th Session of the UN General Assembly, "is in favor of serious negotiations. We are willing to take part in these negotiations and we insist on them. Our proposals on strategic arms limitation and reduction and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe are still in force. They will not give unfair advantages or disadvantages to any side."

Security in Europe and in the rest of the world can be achieved by curbing the arms race and by reducing and completely liquidating nuclear weapons first.

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ACID RAIN IN CANADA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 54-56

[Article by V. I. Sokolov]

[Text] The problem of so-called acid rain is now prominent among the many vital issues in Canadian-American relations that the new Conservative government in Canada will have to resolve. After choosing the improvement of relations with the southern neighbor as the basis of Canadian foreign policy, Prime Minister B. Mulroney put this topic at the top of the list of items to be negotiated with the United States.

Why, out of all the issues uniting—or, more precisely, disuniting—Ottawa and Washington, should acid rain be given the highest priority in bilateral relations? What is the essence of this problem the Liberal government of P. Trudeau was incapable of solving, and what is its history?

It appears that this ecological problem became a political issue and Canada's main foreign policy concern primarily because of the colossal and constantly growing scales of the injuries the acid rain is inflicting on the Canadian economy and population, injuries sometimes comparable to the effects of military operations. In the last 25 years the acid content of rainfall in eastern Canada increased, even according to the conservative estimates of American experts, more than 50-fold. This rain is destroying forests and the flora and fauna of rivers and lakes. More than 4,500 lakes in the country have already been killed by acid rain and another 12,000 are on the verge of death. The health of hundreds of thousands of Canadians has been injured severely. Toronto's GLOBE AND MAIL reported that the Canadian economy's annual losses due to acid rain are already estimated at 5 billion dollars and could reach 15 billion by the end of the century.

The main culprits in this critical situation are the U.S. industrial monopolies that have not installed gas-purifying equipment in their enterprises. The pollution of the atmosphere by huge quantities of sulfur and nitrogen oxides results, due to the prevailing winds and other natural and climatic conditions, in dangerous precipitation primarily in eastern Canada. Back in 1977 the American Congress adopted a resolution on the compulsory installation of gas-purifying equipment and the removal of up to 90 percent of all harmful emissions from fuel at power engineering and industrial enterprises
(these demands were recorded in amendments to the Clean Air Act). Changes for the better did not take place, however, because of the obstructionist behavior of American monopolies with the tacit support of the U.S. administration.

In 1980, under pressure from Canada, the U.S. Government had to sign a so-called Canadian-American memorandum on intentions, declaring the desire of both governments to take steps to solve the acid rain problem. At subsequent negotiations, however, U.S. spokesmen took the offensive by asserting that the acid rain in Canada was caused by local pollution and that the struggle against it was consequently the Canadians' own affair. The talks were cut off after 2 years of negotiation produced no results. This aroused the indignation of the Canadian public and strengthened anti-American feelings in Canada. The U.S. position was absolutely groundless: Researchers estimated that annual emissions of sulfur and nitrogen oxides leading to the creation of acid rain totaled 27 million tons in the United States and only 4.8 million tons in Canada. Most of the harmful precipitation, on the other hand, was, as mentioned above, in eastern Canada.

When the United States had to return to the negotiating table under public pressure, it underwent only an external change of position. Its spokesmen now said that the resolution of the conflict would require "thorough scientific preparations," as if there were still not enough scientific data to corroborate the seriousness of the situation. The Canadians were of a completely different opinion. Back in 1983 the head of the Canadian Ministry of the Environment remarked: "Scientific data lead to the inescapable conclusion that the time to take steps has already arrived." In an attempt to somehow influence the intractable U.S. position, he even promised to enlist the aid of scientists from countries uninvolved in this conflict.

What was Canada's position at the talks on acid rain?

The Canadian Government proposed that the first step in solving this problem consist in joint efforts with the United States to cut harmful emissions in half by installing gas-purifying equipment at the largest power engineering and industrial enterprises. According to Canadian estimates, this initial step would reduce "acid precipitation" to 20 kilograms a year per hectare of soil, but would also require the mobilization of substantial material resources. Canadian economists calculated that Canada would have to allocate from 600 million to a billion dollars a year for the next 20 years and the United States would have to allocate from 2.5 to 4.7 billion a year for the struggle against acid rain. But it was precisely this that aroused the objections of the U.S. monopolies and the U.S. administration, which is preoccupied with the search for resources to expand military programs.

For this reason, Canadian legislation did not help either. After only a day of debates in 1983, for example, the Canadian Parliament adopted an amendment to the Clean Air Act to make the Canadian Government responsible for the damages inflicted on neighboring countries by sources of pollution located within Canada. But the Canadian parliamentarians' hopes that the American Congress would assume similar obligations were unjustified. Furthermore, all
bills envisaging measures to combat acid rain are still being blocked in the highest U.S. legislative body, and the Congress has avoided approving the renewal of the Clean Air Act for 4 years now. Consequently, the provisions of this law obligating the federal government to concern itself with matters of so-called extraterritorial pollution are also being ignored (§ 115).

In connection with this, it must be said that acid rain is far from the only unsolved ecological problem of mutual interest. Back in 1909 the two countries signed a special agreement on the protection of border waters, including the Great Lakes. The development of economic activity made the problem of preserving the lakes more acute. American biologists discovered, for example, that the Great Lakes "aged" as much during the quarter of a century after the war as they would have "aged" over 5,000 years under normal conditions. And again, U.S. industrial monopolies have played far from the least prominent role in this process. For example, the Reserve Mining company dumped more than 67,000 tons of industrial waste a day in Lake Superior for more than two decades. Extraterritorial environmental pollution has given rise to a number of other disputes and conflicts between Canada and the United States. There were, for example, the conflicts over the irrigation work on the Harrison Reservoir (North Dakota), which posed a severe threat to lakes Winnipeg and Manitoba in Canada; over the construction of dams on the St. John River (Maine), which disrupted hydrological conditions on nearby Canadian territory; over the Pittson Company's construction of an oil refinery in Maine, and others.

In terms of scale and pertinence, however, all of these ecological conflicts and disputes are certainly surpassed by the problem of acid rain, which the Mulroney government has made an item of intergovernmental discussion. Whereas at the beginning of the 1980's the American NEWSWEEK magazine called the problem of protecting the environment against the effects of acid rain the most emotional issue for Canadians, now, according to the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, it has become one of the main issues in conflicts and disputes between Canada and the United States. Last February, for example, the Canadian Government vehemently protested the United States' effective refusal to take specific measures to reduce the dangerous pollution of the atmosphere by acid-forming gases. This was preceded by other diplomatic moves and talks between Canada's foreign minister and the American secretary of state. The Liberal government pledged to cut Canadian emissions of sulfur dioxide in half by 1994, although Canadian officials doubted that Washington would follow this example. B. Mulroney, however, has promised to insist on a solution. Some American experts believe that the United States might agree to install filters on some old smokestacks, and this is probably all it will do.

The history of the acid rain issue proves that relations between the two North American states in the sphere of environmental protection, in the words of Canadian research D. Manton, are distinguished by the mounting danger of Canada's severe dependence on the United States in economic and other matters. The Canadian public is understandably objecting to this prospect.

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SOME FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES IN THE 98TH CONGRESS

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 65-71

[Article by T. N. Yudina]

[Text] The 2 years of the 98th Congress are coming to an end. The names of the new members of the House of Representatives for 1985-1986 and of the 33 new senators elected in 1984 for the next 6 years are already known.

The results of the activities of both houses testify that the U.S. legislative body as a whole supported the Reagan Administration's policy of militarizing the country: According to the data of the Congressional Research Service, the President's requests for military programs were satisfied by 97.5 percent. On the other hand, the course of debates and the results of balloting testify to the gradually mounting disagreement of legislators with the most aggressive aspects of Reagan Administration military and political strategy. The congressmen expressed worries about the high growth rate of the U.S. military budget and the administration's very approach to the resolution of problems connected with military affairs, believing that there are better ways of securing national strength. The discussion of specific weapon programs in both houses was accompanied by increasing opposition.

Ways of curbing the arms race were proposed. In February 1983 Democratic Senators E. Kennedy (Massachusetts) and C. Dodd (Connecticut) and Republican Senator M. Hatfield (Oregon) submitted a draft resolution on a nuclear freeze and the reduction of nuclear weapons. This proposal was vehemently opposed in the Senate by the "hawks," led by influential Republican J. Tower (Texas), the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. The struggle went on for the entire session, and rightwing forces finally prevailed during the last days of the 98th Congress: The resolution was rejected by a vote of 55 to 42.

On 4 May 1983 a group of senators, including Democrats E. Kennedy and A. Cranston (California) and Republican D. Durenberger (Minnesota) introduced a bill to institute a moratorium on the buildup of weapons. A similar bill signed by 82 congressmen was introduced in the House of Representatives. It envisaged the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union on a mutual and verifiable freeze on the development, testing and deployment of new ballistic nuclear missiles as well as antisatellite weapons and other space
weapon systems. Congress would stop allocating funds for the development of these weapon systems unless the President agreed to support the proposed freeze. The 98th Congress did not pass any such laws, although the idea won fairly broad support in both houses.

For example, several proposals with regard to antisatellite weapons were made. Hearings were conducted to discuss a broad range of issues connected with the development of this new type of weapon. Several legislators in both houses announced that they would head the movement for the immediate negotiation of this matter. Republican Senator L. Pressler (South Dakota), for example, believes that unless an arms race in space is prevented, it will be much more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to avoid its escalation and a consequent increase in expenditures on space weapons, and he said that it would be best to prevent it from the very beginning.4

The position of the U.S. legislative branch on antisatellite weapons consisted in attempts to define the terms on which funds would be allocated for this purpose. One of these conditions would be the demand that the administration take all possible steps to begin negotiating a ban on these weapons with the Soviet Union as soon as possible. The majority of legislators do not agree with the Reagan Administration's position on this matter, but they are not actively opposing it either, confining their comments to stipulations of a symbolic nature.

Ronald Reagan's style and methods of leadership began to be criticized more during the last months of the 98th Congress. As the Democratic leader in the Senate, R. Byrd (West Virginia) said, "cutting remarks, personal insults and the use of bombastic phrases, slogans and exaggerations without considering the consequences and without considering all possible options are not only a negligent approach to leadership but also a recipe for miscalculations and disasters."5

In August 1984 Democratic Congressmen E. Markey (Massachusetts) and D. Edwards (California) asked members of Congress to sign a letter to President Reagan regarding his "joke" about bombing the USSR. The letter said, in particular: "Too many people in the United States and other countries are afraid that the American Government is more than ready to think about the unthinkable prospect of nuclear war with the Soviet Union.... As the President, you bear the most serious and colossal responsibility any individual could have.... We are asking you to publicly renounce this statement and reaffirm the U.S. desire for the peaceful settlement of differences with the Soviet Union." The letter was signed by many legislators and was sent to the President.

One of the most important items on the agenda was the discussion of the 1979 Export Control Act, which expired on 30 September 1983. In the administration's opinion, changing political, economic and other circumstances required serious changes in export legislation.6 The Reagan Administration's attempts to use export control as a means of foreign policy pressure aroused serious disagreements in political circles in the United States and the allied countries. Congress was the scene of clashes between various approaches to the issue of export control.
Members of the administration, with the President in the lead, earnestly advocated more rigid controls and broader presidential authority to exercise control. An interagency advisory group on export policy was created, consisting of representatives from the State Department, National Security Council and Departments of Defense, Commerce and Energy. Their main argument was that the sale of some of the latest goods and technology to the Soviet Union by the United States and other Western countries would supposedly increase its military potential.

The provisions of export legislation have been studied and discussed in detail in both houses in the last 2 years. Several House committees prepared reports and conducted hearings. The Congressional Research Service prepared a report on "The Premises of East-West Commercial Relations" for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It said, in particular, that "the administration is obviously overestimating the foreign policy impact of export control." The authors of the report analyzed the administration's views on this matter in detail (the Soviet Union supposedly depends on Western technology and credit, the severance of economic bonds would supposedly have a substantial effect on Soviet policy, etc.) and then stated that the Soviet Union has been developing without assistance from the West, that the U.S. refusal to take part in economic cooperation has had no effect on Soviet policy and that the United States will be unable to control the economic relations of the Western world with the USSR because each country has its own motives and Western Europe is striving to establish long-term economic ties with the Soviet Union.

The report contained a number of important conclusions and proposals, essentially suggesting that export control should be part of a long-range foreign policy strategy, and not an incidental tactic, and should be instituted only after consultations with allies. It proposed the limitation of the President's power to impose controls on existing contracts on agricultural shipments and envisaged the creation of a special subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (it was created and is headed by Democratic Congressman E. Hutto from Florida) to review the issue of East-West economic and commercial relations from the standpoint of U.S. national security. The report noted that the development of foreign trade would be exceptionally important to the United States itself in view of its huge public debt (1,591,600,000,000 dollars in fiscal year 1984—Editor) and the constant deficit in its balance of trade.

The adverse effects of export control on the U.S. economy were also pointed out in the report "Technology and East-West Trade," prepared by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment.

These reports, based on substantial documented information, contradicted the White House's point of view and aroused the displeasure of the administration, which is stubbornly trying to turn export control into another instrument of political pressure.

Bills designed to amend export legislation were introduced in both houses of the Congress during the discussion of this matter. The main specific
differences between the documents drafted by the two houses concerned two matters—the inviolability of contracts and extraterritoriality.

The House draft allowed for exceptions to the inviolability of contracts if the President should consider the imposition of an embargo necessary to "punish" a country for "aggression, terrorism, the testing of nuclear devices or the violation of human rights." The Senate draft completely excluded the possibility of export restrictions on existing contracts.

In the matter of extraterritoriality, the House of Representatives limited the President's power to interfere with the export practices of companies located outside the United States; the Senate bill allowed the President to limit the operations of these companies, stipulating that extraterritorial measures by the American administration should not have an adverse effect on relations with allies. With the aid of the reference to extraterritoriality, Washington would like to assume the right to control the exports of foreign firms and to prohibit U.S. imports of the products of companies ignoring American restrictions. This means that any foreign company owned or managed by an American citizen or using American technology would take the risk of a ban on shipments of its products to the United States. The White House was striving to exert a stronger influence primarily on countries actively engaged in trade with socialist states.

The discussion in the House of Representatives was quite heated. The strongest pressure was exerted by representatives of the administration, who tried to weaken the opposition of the business lobby, which is extremely interested in developing U.S. export potential. Organizations working toward the reduction of unemployment argued that "each billion dollars in exports is equivalent to 25,000-30,000 jobs." But their influence was negligible in comparison to administration pressure. Nevertheless, the prevailing view in the House of Representatives was that control should be sharply limited in volume and applied consistently.

Business groups pressured the legislators in the belief that the expansion of the extraterritoriality principle would have a pernicious effect on American exports, because the companies of other countries would stop using American technology in the fear that Washington would institute restrictive measures for political reasons. In its final form, the House bill was aimed at securing the export capabilities of American business.

The administration expressed support for the Senate draft. Both bills were handed over to conference committees, but the differences between the two were so great that no compromise could be reached, and on 30 March 1984 President Reagan announced the renewal of the 1979 act without changes for an indefinite period.

The outcome of this struggle could be viewed as a victory for the Reagan Administration, although even the Senate bill, not to mention the House one, envisaged the limitation of the President's power to institute export controls. The course of the discussion in the two houses indicated a stronger tendency toward domestic policy pragmatism in the approach to foreign policy matters.
in the Senate, and to an even greater extent in the House of Representatives. As the elections approached, this tendency grew increasingly noticeable.

As for White House policy in Latin America, although the majority of legislators agree with the anticomunist premises of the President's foreign policy line, such programs and actions as the expansion of covert aid to anti-government groups in Nicaragua through CIA channels were criticized in the Congress.

Commenting on the President's policy statement on Latin America, Senator C. Dodd announced that the Democrats agree that the administration is misinterpreting the causes of the conflict in Central America. "If Latin America were not so poor or so hungry...there would be no revolutions there. Instead of eradicating the causes of revolution, the American administration is investing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid and is even sending American paramilitary units there. This will not be successful." 12

Democratic Congressman H. Gonzalez from Texas spoke of the need for economic aid to Latin America, and not military aid, which is, as experience has shown several times, the least effective political instrument. 13

In an attempt to neutralize congressional criticism, Ronald Reagan promised to consult with the legislators and involve them in future decisions.

In spring 1983, when the covert CIA actions against Nicaragua became public, congressional criticism was voiced more distinctly. Democratic Senator C. Pell from Rhode Island said: "What the President is doing in Nicaragua is contrary to the interests of the United States. He alleges that the American Government does not want to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, but specific actions testify to the contrary. This policy is counterproductive and can only escalate the conflict." In July 1983 the situation in Nicaragua was discussed in detail at a joint session of the House committees on intelligence and foreign affairs. An amendment was introduced by Democrats E. Boland (Massachusetts) and S. Solarz (New York) and was then passed in the House by a vote of 221 to 205. The amendment envisaged the curtailment of "covert aid" to Nicaragua. It stipulated that its resumption would require special congressional authorization. When the administration requested this kind of authorization a short time later, the House denied the request by a vote of 223 to 203. 14

Administration policy in Nicaragua also aroused several critical comments in the Senate, but no resolutions were passed here.

The legislators' approach to Washington policy in Latin America reflected a desire to avoid U.S. involvement in adventures like the war in Vietnam. The administration's rigid anticomunist aims, however, received their support.

One example of this is the aggression against Grenada. It is no secret that the U.S. administration took an extremely hostile view of the democratic reforms instituted in Grenada by the Bishop government after the 1979 revolution. On 25 October 1983 American troops invaded Grenada on the specious
pretext of protecting American students attending medical school there. The United States occupied the country and established a "new order" there. Although 11 American servicemen were killed and 35 were wounded, Congress did not protest the aggression at first. Furthermore, it was later learned that the leaders of both parties in the Senate and the House knew of the planned operation in advance. Nevertheless, resolutions were passed in the Congress reflecting the desire of the legislative branch to oversee the administration's actions in Grenada. A resolution stating that the requirements of the War Powers Act, in accordance with which the President is supposed to withdraw American troops within 90 days unless the Congress passes a special resolution on their longer commitment to action, extended to Grenada was passed by a vote of 433 to 23 in the House on 27 October 1983 and a vote of 60 to 24 in the Senate on 28 October.15

It must be said that the barbarous U.S. aggression against sovereign Grenada aroused anger and indignation throughout the world. The reaction of the world public had a sobering effect on several legislators. The Reagan Administration's behavior was pointedly criticized in the Congress. Democrat R. Edgar from Pennsylvania demanded the cessation of the aggression. Another member of the House of Representatives, Democrat M. Dymally (California) submitted a draft resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Grenada.16 Seven members of the Democratic Party in the House—T. Weiss (New York), J. Conyers (Michigan), J. Dixon and M. Dymally (both from California), H. Gonzalez and M. Leland (both from Texas) and P. Mitchell (Maryland) advised in their draft resolution that Ronald Reagan be subject to impeachment for the Grenada invasion, as "this action violated constitutional principles." Another 11 congressmen, including W. Clay (Missouri), R. Dellums and D. Edwards (both from California), G. Crockett (Michigan), G. Savage (Illinois), L. Stokes (Ohio) and others, instituted proceedings in a Washington court against President R. Reagan, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J. Vessey, accusing them of violating American laws, as "the President has no right to declare war on another sovereign state with the clear aim of overthrowing its government and replacing it with a pro-American regime."17 The suit was dismissed, but the very fact that it was instituted directed the attention of the American public to the illegality of the Reagan Administration's actions.

In April 1984 administration policy in Latin America was again the subject of heated discussions in Congress in connection with the latest flagrant action—the covert CIA operation involving the mining of Nicaraguan ports. On 11 April 1984 E. Kennedy's resolution demanding that CIA funds not be used for these purposes was passed in the Senate by a vote of 84 to 12.

In an attempt to lessen the opposition of legislators, the Reagan Administration put some limits on actions arousing the greatest indignation, such as the mining of ports and the participation of American advisers in military operations. It also tried to convince the Congress that the allocation of requested sums could considerably reduce the need for direct U.S. participation in military conflicts in the future. The administration pressure resulted in the authorization of additional military assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica in fiscal year 1984 and of almost double the previous amount in fiscal year 1985—256 million dollars.
In spite of this, by a vote of 88 to 1, the Senate passed a resolution in June 1984 to exclude the administration's request for 21 million dollars for the support of Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries in the current fiscal year from a bill on domestic federal programs. A similar decision was adopted by the House of Representatives earlier. Commenting on this, Speaker T. O'Neill (Democrat, Massachusetts) said that "the Senate also rejected the President's strange philosophy in accordance with which it is much more important to pay anti-Nicaraguan counterrevolutionaries than to provide Americans with jobs. The Senate's action should put an end to the U.S. support of the war against Nicaragua."18

As the elections approached, critical feelings grew stronger in the Congress. In general, however, it must be said that the Congress actually did not prevent the Reagan Administration from pursuing a tough and aggressive policy in this region.

The position of the 98th Congress on U.S. policy in the Middle East was distinguished primarily by wholehearted support for Israel, Washington's strategic ally in the Middle East, although during the last stage of the U.S. actions against Lebanon, after many American servicemen had died, congressional opposition became one of the main factors impeding the Reagan Administration's attempts to maintain a direct military presence in the region.19

It must be said that the participation of the 98th Congress in foreign policy activity was influenced by several factors. The position of legislators was influenced substantially by President Reagan's approach to international relations and by his militarist rhetoric about the revival of a "strong America" which will "command attention" throughout the world. The White House position on the need to build up military strength to counteract the "Soviet threat" was also supported on Capitol Hill.

In general, the extremely broad support of administration anti-Soviet actions by U.S. legislators was striking. For example, the anti-Sovietism of the 98th Congress was clearly revealed in the adoption of an unprecedented hostile resolution at a joint session of both houses in September 1983 in connection with the South Korean airliner incident. This Congress also took a pointedly anti-Soviet position on the issue of "human rights." In particular, 102 legislators joined an organization called "Friends of the Defenders of Human Rights," created in December 1983 by the self-styled Committee To Oversee the Fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords; 89 members of the House (77 Democrats and 12 Republicans) and 13 senators (7 of them Democrats) responded to the invitation addressed to all members of Congress to join the organization. Democratic Congressman A. Hall from Ohio became a member of the organization's executive committee.

Several of the Reagan Administration's actions, particularly the mounting financial burden of military budget increases, aroused some opposition in the Congress. Whereas the majority of legislators gave in to the demands for higher Pentagon allocations in the atmosphere of militarist anticommunist hysteria created by the administration, the Congress cut these allocations when requests for specific military programs were considered.
During the discussion of the military budget for 1985, for example, the House agreed to a real increase of 3.5 percent (after inflation), and not the 13 percent proposed by the Reagan Administration, in military spending in 1985. After lengthy debates, both houses approved an increase of 7 percent in military appropriations. In April 1984 when the military budget was being discussed in the House Armed Services Committee, the committee suggested the reduction of the number of MX missiles requested by the administration from 40 to 30 and the number of Pershing II missiles from 93 to 70, it made cuts in requests for R&D in the sphere of space-based weapons and it denied requests for funds for the development of nerve gas for combat use.

The struggle over the military budget for FY 1985 went on until the last days of the session. A conference committee reduced the President's request for MX missiles from 40 to 21. Furthermore, part of the funds allocated for this purpose will be frozen until each house votes twice in March 1985 to spend the funds. The President's request for antisatellite weapon research funds was reduced by 150 million dollars.

The 98th Congress also put forth some of its own initiatives in the sphere of foreign policy. In June 1984, for example, 40 senators, headed by Democrat E. Kennedy and Republican C. Mathias from Maryland, and 125 members of the House from both parties, headed by Democrat B. Bedell from Iowa, announced their intention to ask the President to immediately resume the talks, unilaterally broken off by the United States, with the USSR and Great Britain on the drafting of a universal and complete nuclear test ban treaty. Amendments to this effect were introduced in both houses to the bill on appropriations for 1985.

Moves of this kind generally follow congressional approval of the administration's latest plans for the buildup of military strength, which prompted the WASHINGTON POST's ironic comment: "After paying old congressional traditions the proper request, legislators from both parties took out election insurance. Their determination in the sphere of arms control was equal to their determination in the sphere of rearmament."

In the last few months there have been clearer disagreements between rightwing forces in the Congress, supported Reagan Administration policy, and legislators with a more realistic frame of mind. In the Senate, for example, E. Kennedy, A. Cranston and G. Hart have issued increasingly insistent appeals for a more sensible policy. Legislators are being influenced more and more by the members of mass democratic movements, labor unions and the general voting public who are disturbed by the mounting danger of war. This should affect the attitudes of the legislators of the new 99th Congress and the position of the Congress as a whole.

FOOTNOTES

1. The 98th Congress displayed a move toward the center. It had a higher number of moderate legislators than the previous Congress. The conservative wing, which prevailed in 1981-1982 by virtue of its aggressiveness,
was diminished slightly in numbers and in political influence, which is also attested to by the lower level of support for presidential initiatives in both houses: Whereas the 97th Congress supported 82.4 percent of Ronald Reagan's initiatives in 1981 and 72.4 percent in 1982, the 98th Congress supported 67.1 percent in 1983 and 66 percent in 1984 (CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WEEKLY REPORT--hereafter called CQWR--31 December 1983, p 2783).


3. For more detail, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1984, No 8, pp 5-16; No 11, pp 85-88--Editor's note.

4. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, 7 April 1983, p S4316.

5. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 26 August 1984.

6. The 1979 Export Control Act gives the President extensive powers in three spheres: the export and re-export of American goods and technology; the export and re-export of foreign goods made of American parts; the export and re-export of foreign goods manufactured with American technology. The observance of the law is overseen by a special office of the Department of Commerce ("Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the Committee on Foreign Relations, July 30, August 12, U.S. Senate," Wash., 1983, p 5).

7. CQWR, 26 March 1983, p 609.


9. Ibid., pp 5, 6, 7.

10. The consequences of export control are discussed in detail in the report. Several adverse factors are listed because the export of goods is an important condition for national economic development, the improvement of the balance of payments and the resolution of the unemployment problem: Between 1977 and 1980 exports increased employment in the private sector by 30 percent. Export controls undermine faith in American firms and reduce their competitive potential dramatically (ibid., p 29).


12. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, October 1983, p 239.


14. CONGRESSIONAL DIGEST, October 1983, p 231.
15. CQWR, 29 October 1983, pp 2221-2224 (by the end of this time period the main contingent of American troops had been withdrawn from Grenada).


17. CQWR, 12 November 1983, p 2360.


21. Since the texts of the amendments differed, the drafts were turned over to a conference committee. No compromise had been reached by the end of 98th Congress.


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IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN THE 1980'S

Moscow SSA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 90-97

[Article by S. I. Appatov and Ya. Chervena: "Criticism of Theories of American Bourgeois Political Scientists"]

[Text] The most flagrant and primitive forms of anticommunism and the American "imperious" ideology have been revived to a considerable extent in the United States in recent years. The rightwing ideological offensive is designed primarily to create favorable conditions for the attainment of the military and political goals of the United States and its allies. The American ruling elite is striving to portray the thesis about the need to achieve military superiority to the USSR as a "guarantee of peace" and "international stability."

The recommendations of the professional ideologists in the service of the Reagan Administration are filled with appeals for broader military preparations and for the combination of these preparations with plans for intensive "psychological warfare" against the socialist countries. Following this advice, U.S. foreign policy behavior reflects two mutually supplementary approaches: the achievement of military-strategic superiority as a means of political pressure and the updating of recipes for the erosion and destabilization of the political situation in the socialist countries.

American bourgeois historians and political scientists specializing in the study of foreign policy and international relations have always played an important role in the creation and implementation of the ideological component of U.S. foreign policy. It is the purpose of this article to analyze the ideological aspects of U.S. foreign policy strategy in the 1980's through the views of American bourgeois historians of the late 1970's and early 1980's.¹

The participation of bourgeois scholars in the determination and validation of the class interests of U.S. ruling circles in the world arena is now distinguished primarily by the predominance of researchers with extreme rightwing convictions. They now have a decisive impact on the preparation of theoretical bases for administration political and ideological activity. The White House has charged the leading ideologists of neoconservatism and theorists of
anticommunism—N. Podhoretz, W. Griffith, R. Pipes, C. Gray, S. Huntington, E. Lutwak, K. Adelman, A. Wohlstetter and others—with the task of reinforcing the policy of confrontation and the arms race with "scientific arguments."

In their works they try to convince the reader that the American public supports the interventionism of U.S. ruling circles and rejects the elements of policy they call neo-isolationism, using the term to signify any non-forcible methods of conducting foreign policy. The substantiation of the inevitability of military and political confrontations with socialist countries is also connected with the task of laying the theoretical foundations for mass-scale anticommunist and anti-Soviet campaigns in the United States and in the international arena.

These aspects of the work of rightwing conservative authors are also connected with attempts to distort or directly falsify the recent past, especially the essence and evolution of the policy of international detente. Their allegations that this process caused the United States to lose its earlier military superiority and that it was a "fatal error" diminishing U.S. influence in the world system of international relations have been particularly harmful. In this way, they are distorting the very idea of the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social orders.

The authors of rightwing conservative theories have put considerable effort in the vindication of the theory and practice of "cold war" and the depiction of international tension as the normal state of affairs. It is no coincidence that they distort the role of the ideological factor in relations between states belonging to the two opposing systems and the degree to which this factor influences international events. The laws of the struggle between ideologies—bourgeois and communist—and the uncompromising nature of this struggle are arbitrarily equated with the practice of international relations by states of the two systems, resulting in the deliberate distortion of the distinctive features of international and intergovernmental relations and their separation from the ideological struggle in the world arena. All of this is done for the obvious political purpose of preventing the normalization of U.S.–USSR relations.

Throughout the postwar period the bastions of rightwing conservative thinking have been such research centers as the Hoover Institute of War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and the recently founded National Institute of Social Policy in Washington, the Institute for Contemporary Studies in San Francisco, the National Legislative Research Center and others. At the beginning of the 1980's these institutes published a number of anthologies and monographs—something like encyclopaedias of U.S. foreign and domestic policy in the 1980's. The military-political and political-ideological theories in these works represent the overt defense of expansionism and the use of military force as a means of strengthening U.S. positions in today's world. The authors of articles included in these works—P. Nitze, R. Allen, E. Lutwak, F. Ikle, E. Teller, K. Adelman, K. Rowan, A. Wohlstetter, E. Zumwalt, N. Podhoretz, R. Pipes, R. Klein and others—criticize the American "strategy of weakness" in the 1970's. They demand increased military preparations and
a long-range strategy involving an arms race for the certain achievement of military superiority to the USSR and its allies.

Elements of the theory of a U.S. "victory" in a nuclear war against the socialist countries are present in these works in a slightly camouflaged form. The theory is described most fully in the works of Director C. Gray of the National Institute of Social Policy and his colleague K. Payne.\(^3\) These authors support the theory of the so-called "protracted conflict," which interprets postwar international relations as a struggle for world domination between "Western democracy" and the "communist world" and views the outcome of the struggle as the necessary destruction of one side by force. They are demanding that the United States arm itself with a "strategy of nuclear war fighting" instead of the "strategy of deterrence." This "strategy," in their opinion, is an essential condition for U.S. victory in a nuclear war, a guarantee of the "complete destruction of Soviet political power and the creation of a postwar international order compatible with American values." The creation of the material and technical prerequisites for an offensive nuclear war against the socialist countries, they assert, will make successful "atomic diplomacy"--that is, nuclear blackmail--possible.

The idea of winning a nuclear war became part of the official U.S. military-strategic doctrine under the Reagan Administration.

An analysis of the works of C. Gray and K. Payne and of many other authors of the belligerent wing of U.S. bourgeois political science indicates that the present period is distinguished less by the "division of labor" among "ideologists" (A. Ulam, Z. Brzezinski, R. Pipes, W. Griffith, N. Podhoretz, W. Buckley, S. Huntington and others) and the so-called "globalists" or "civilian strategists" (R. Tucker, R. Allen, P. Nitze, R. Osgood, C. Gray and others) than by the continued convergence of these two currents. Military-strategic theories are being supplemented with the premises of the "inevitability of confrontation" with the Soviet Union, taken from the anticommunist arsenal of "pure ideologists"; anticommunist and anti-Soviet lies are inseparable from speculations involving the "Soviet military construction" and "Soviet military threat" invented by specialists in the area of military policy.

The works of N. Podhoretz, the acknowledged leader of American neoconservatives and chief editor of COMMENTARY magazine, are the most popular in the "ideologists'" camp among militarist members of the ruling elite. Podhoretz calls the policy of detente a "strategic retreat" by the United States and the direct result of the ruling elite's "diminished willingness" to pursue the policy of "communist containment." In several of his works he strives to convince the reader that the restoration of American "prestige and influence" in the world can be accomplished only through the achievement of military-strategic superiority to the USSR and through "decisive action." In an article called "The Future Danger," in which the history of the American intervention in Vietnam is "rewritten" from a neoconservative point of view, he not only attempts to vindicate U.S. imperialism's dirty venture but also tries to provide theoretical reinforcement and validation for U.S. armed intervention against national liberation movements in any part of the world. The use of armed force, the author writes, is always morally justified if it
is directed against communism. Podhoretz' "morality" is the class morality of the most reactionary segment of the monopolistic bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, connected with the military-industrial complex. Its aggressiveness and adventurism are typical features of the policy of a class which has lost its earlier initiative and is agitated by the distintegration of the sociopolitical foundations of its existence, particularly on the global scale. It is no coincidence that he literally orders the White House to start "containing" communism on the global scale without delay.

The assertion that detente was something of an aberration in American foreign policy (while the natural U.S. policy would presuppose an offensive position and the eradication of the Soviet Union's influence) is also the prevailing theme in the recently published memoirs of Z. Brzezinski. This patent anti-communist had already perfected his plan for "conquering" the Soviet Union in the "cold war" era. Brzezinski advises the entire capitalist world--"industrial democracies"--to unite under U.S. auspices and then exert pressure on the developing countries, from the position of combined Western strength, to "put North-South relations in order," with primary consideration for the interests of transnational corporations. The third phase of this plan consists in forcing the USSR to accept Western conditions or "remain outside the mainstream of world history." Brzezinski's memoirs are demagogically entitled "Power and Principle." But as he himself admits, "when a choice had to be made between a show of U.S. strength or the consolidation of human rights (as, for example, in the shah's Iran), I felt that power had to come first." The extremely unprincipled and amoral nature of U.S. policy is clearly confirmed by examples cited in the memoirs. The author frankly explains how he and J. Carter "brainwashed" Sadat in Camp David, urging him to betray the Arab cause. Brzezinski also brags that Carter's presidential directives "paved the way" for President Reagan's "new geopolitical strategy."

The same lack of principles is displayed by the author of another recently published book of memoirs--former Secretary of State in President Reagan's administration A. Haig. It is probably no coincidence that whenever U.S. policy veers in the direction of "cold war," the American establishment makes a general the secretary of state. At the end of the 1940's it was General George Marshall, and in the 1980's it was Haig. But even Haig, despite his obsession with militarism, turned out to be, judging by his own remarks, "too soft" for the Reagan Administration, because he, prompted by his subordinates in the State Department, sometimes had to remind the White House of the need for diplomacy--at least in relations with allies. As for "adversaries," with the Soviet Union at the top of the list, here Haig and Reagan agreed that relations with the USSR should be based only on a "convincing show of determination and strength." The relationship between "ideals" and "realities" in U.S. domestic and foreign policy is the subject of a work by Harvard University Professor S. Huntington, a well-known representative of the neoconservative school of history. The author calls the American political system and its socioeconomic foundation "the best liberal-democratic society in the world" and strives to validate the position of the idea of "American exceptionalness" in the ideological arsenal of U.S. foreign policy. He feels that the American "liberal
democratic" system of government should have a positive effect on other countries and peoples and defend "human rights" and "democracy." In view of the constant interaction of all countries and states, the United States can consolidate its security only by creating a "world system" consisting of politically identical states. The actual message conveyed by S. Huntington's line of reasoning is that "interdependence might turn out to be incompatible with coexistence" by states of different social systems.

The collected works of R. Pipes, former director of the Center for Russian Area Studies at Harvard University and an adviser to the U.S. National Security Council in 1981-1982, clearly reflects the views of the extreme right wing of the so-called "Sovietological" field of American conservative history. All of the author's works of the 1970's and early 1980's testify to the immutability of Pipes' approach to problems in U.S. relations with socialist countries. Misrepresenting the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, this frankly anticommunist ideologist strives to convince members of the American ruling elite that all of the United States' "defeats" in the international arena, particularly during the period of detente, stemmed from the American leadership's insufficient knowledge of the history of "Russian expansionism" and communist ideology, which allegedly presupposes efforts by the USSR to rule the world.

When he was interviewed by TIME magazine, R. Pipes again underscored the need to closely "link" the extension of loans and credit to the Soviet Union and socialist countries of Eastern Europe with the organization of "liberal reforms" in these countries. In the same interview, Pipes expressed his certainty that the United States would "win" a thermonuclear world war.10

Pipes' views are shared by L. Beilenson, whom Reagan calls his "good friend."11 This militant apologist for imperialism is obsessed, as his latest book proves, with the idea of the inevitability of nuclear war, allegedly stemming from the "flaws in human nature." He predicts that the United States will win this war and makes every effort to "calm down" the reader by understating its catastrophic implications. Beilenson opposes negotiations based on mutually acceptable compromises. "Treaties are traps," he writes, "and they should be avoided." He does not see any hope of peaceful relations between states in international trade either. What kind of panacea does he suggest for the troubled world? Just one: the "containment of communism" by means of military superiority and a race for nuclear and conventional weapons.12

The author of the thesis, popular among rightwing conservative researchers, that international detente is a "one-way street" allegedly benefiting only the Soviet Union, is Director A. Ulam of the Harvard University Center for Russian Area Studies. He has repeatedly demanded political and ideological concessions from the USSR "in payment" for detente. As the head of a Soviet foreign policy study group created by the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in the 1980's, A. Ulam has based its work on the thesis of the "serious underestimation of the Soviet threat." This "threat" allegedly stems from the "nature of communist ideology." The "global responsibility" of the United States presupposes, in Ulam's opinion, "the exclusion of the USSR from the contemporary system of international relations."13
The opinions of rightwing representatives of the American academic community are clearly reflected in the Reagan Administration's present foreign policy line. At the same time, its extremely aggressive nature alarms even conservative experts on foreign policy, and this is resulting in the distinct divergence of views and the intensification of the struggle of ideas. Criticism of some aspects of current U.S. foreign policy can be found, in particular, in the works of leader of the American school of geopolitics G. Liska and former U.S. Under Secretary of State G. Ball.14 These authors do not conceal their conservative and anticommunist convictions, but they do acknowledge the need to seek more constructive approaches to relations with the Soviet Union.

Representatives of the liberal wing of American bourgeois historians have a slightly different view of the current balance of power in the world and its implications. These are the professional historians and political scientists A. Schlesinger, Jr., S. Hoffmann, M. Shulman and G. Kennan. The group also includes politicians, such as W. Fulbright. In their assessments of the present state of relations between the United States and the USSR, they acknowledge the obvious fact that the historical dispute between the two systems cannot be solved by military means in the present or the future. In their opinion, the "war or peace" alternative, as it is now interpreted by the military strategists and foreign policy ideologists of the Reagan Administration, transcends the bounds of reasonable policy. The current level of military confrontation between states of the two systems and the new features of the arms race, these authors believe, should motivate politicians, diplomats and military experts on both sides to seek a mutually acceptable form of peaceful coexistence. The first step in this direction, in their opinion, should be the U.S. abandonment of attempts to achieve military-strategic superiority.

The so-called "statement of the big four"—M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. McNamara and G. Smith—on the pages of the influential foreign policy magazine FOREIGN AFFAIRS had substantial repercussions in the scientific community and among military and political experts opposing the Reagan Administration's military-strategic doctrine. Appealing for the abandonment of illusions connected with plans to achieve military superiority, the authors warned that "any use of nuclear weapons poses the danger of escalation to the level of nuclear world war, which would mean death for all and victory for none."15 The authors of the article, experienced diplomats and military experts, reject the lies about the imaginary "Soviet military superiority." The same view is expressed by G. Kennan in a series of articles published in a separate book in 1983.16

"Detente without illusions" is advocated by Harvard University Professor S. Hoffmann in his articles and books. He recommends that the U.S. administration "give up anticommunist rhetoric, pressure tactics and plans for 'nuclear superiority'" and "limit the means and intensity of rivalry" and advises the U.S. leadership to "discuss a joint political strategy with Moscow in various parts of the world." Hoffmann writes about the need to curb the arms race as the central issue in American-Soviet relations. He realizes that successful arms limitation talks will require "a change in the political climate and the expansion of Soviet-American contacts."17 He
warns the U.S. Government against pressuring the USSR in matters of so-called "human rights," as they are interpreted by American propaganda. This can only complicate relations, the author says. "Peace is the basic human right," he writes, "and only the development of cooperation among states will provide a chance for effective actions for the benefit of human rights in general." In one of his articles, S. Hoffmann criticizes the tendency to equate the ideological struggle with intergovernmental relations, a tendency characteristic of the Reagan Administration. He says that this leads to "discrepancies between Reagan's dogmas and reality" and recalls that D. Acheson and J. Dulles were engaged in a similar process at the height of the "cold war."

Although liberal researchers do not deny their belief in the values of bourgeois ideology and morality, they view the Carter and Reagan administration "crusades" and ideological campaigns "in defense of the values of the free world" as a deliberate attempt to stifle American-Soviet relations.

M. Shulman, the head of the Averell Harriman Institute and a consistent advocate of constructive talks with the USSR, criticized President Reagan's speech in Great Britain's Parliament in June 1982. Reagan, Shulman writes, says that "communism must be destroyed," but also promises to "work in conjunction with the USSR to reduce the danger of nuclear confrontations." Professor Shulman says that these two approaches to relations with states of the opposite sociopolitical system are mutually exclusive. He opposes the attempts to "link" strategic arms limitation with totally unrelated matters.

Professor R. Legvold, the head of the Soviet Policy Studies Program of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, advocates a return to detente, but with some changes. He constructs his own theory of "containment without confrontation," which, in his opinion, envisages "firmness...but without a desire for military superiority." Examining two possible alternatives for U.S. foreign policy in the 1980's—"tougher" and "softer"—the author excludes the road of military confrontation in both cases. The former executive secretary of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, J. Chace, also insists on "moderation" in American-Soviet relations and opposes the revival of "global containment" and ideological obsession in foreign policy. He does not believe that American foreign policy should be based on belligerent "ideologized" anti-Sovietism. This kind of policy, in his opinion, could result in the isolation of the United States and its alienation from the West European NATO allies. It is impeding the resolution of the problems of disarmament, the energy crisis and so forth.

M. Harrison, an expert on European affairs from Johns Hopkins University, expresses even more categorical views. He definitely opposes the ideologized "black-and-white" foreign policy of the Reagan Administration and advocates the resumption of businesslike and constructive talks with the USSR on disarmament issues.

An anthology entitled "Detente or Debacle. Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations" became something like a manifesto of liberal authors promoting talks between the USSR and the United States in the spirit of peaceful coexistence, without the imposition of "ways of thinking." Its authors (F. Neal, W. Fulbright, G. Kennan, G. Kistiakowsky, D. Riesman, J. Galbraith,
S. Cohen, S. Dreil, J. Kendall and S. Pisar) have rallied round the American Committee for East-West Accord since the end of the 1970's. Their ideological creed consists in the belief that there is no alternative to detente and that detente must correspond fully to existing political realities and be developed with a view to the differences in the sociopolitical systems of the United States and USSR. This presupposes, according to the authors, competition in the most diverse fields, including the sphere of ideology. But this competition must stay "within reasonable bounds"—that is, it must take exclusively peaceful forms, without any intervention in one another's internal affairs. The idea of the urgent need to move from confrontation to peaceful and businesslike cooperation between the United States and the USSR is also expressed in an anthology published by the American Committee for East-West Accord.23

The results of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy behavior have convinced sensible bourgeois researchers that the race for arms under the slogan of "creating guarantees of lasting peace" and the subordination of the consolidation of peace to the forcible spread of "American democracy" to other countries are eliminating the elementary basis for political dialogue in international relations and for mutually acceptable arms limitation agreements.

Members of the leftist radical current of American bourgeois studies of international relations were largely "diluted" in the wave of belligerent conservatism and extreme anticommunism in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Nevertheless, they are still criticizing not only the tactics and methods, but also the essence, forms and consequences of the United States' imperialist foreign policy. N. Chomsky, R. Barnet, M. Klare, G. Kolko, H. Zinn, F. Holliday and other authors are directing attention to the fact that the foreign policy of American ruling circles has certainly not secured peace in recent years but, rather, has undermined the stability of international relations.24

The strong point of the scientific and journalistic works of radical historians and political scientists is their pointed criticism of the Republican administration's militarist policy line. They reject the idea of "American exceptionalness" and depict the United States today as a counterrevolutionary, purely conservative force hoping to perpetuate the social status quo in the capitalist world. These researchers now see their main objective as the disclosure of the aggressive essence of the plans of Washington "hawks" and the mobilization of the public to fight against the "power" aspects of Reagan Administration foreign policy.

The views of the left wing of bourgeois history and political science are having a significant ideological and political impact on the peace movement in the United States. The members of this wing are contributing to the intensification of the battles over Reagan's militarist policy line by establishing a political platform for various segments of the movement for a nuclear freeze, against the arms race and against covert and overt intervention by U.S. ruling circles in Latin America and other parts of the world. In addition to the positive elements of the ideological and political influence of radical researchers on the antimilitarist movement, however, the
negative features of this influence are also obvious. The problem here is
the tendency of petty bourgeois radicals to express opinions reflecting
their "moderate" anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. These opinions objectively
obscure the essence of the issue of responsibility for the continuous arms
race and international tension. For example, radicals often speak of the
"two superpowers" and of the "equal responsibility" of the United States and
the USSR for international confrontation. They do not reveal the fundamental
difference between socialist and bourgeois foreign policy and they misinter-
pret or underestimate the prime movers of the historical process -- class
interests and class struggle, including struggle on the international scale.

In spite of their shaky ideological position, however, the authors of the
radical current are contributing more than anyone else to the creation of a
discerning American view of Washington's current foreign policy line and
they offer the most acceptable democratic alternative to Reagan's policy.
And this is to their credit.

In conclusion, it must be said that the political influence of some currents
of foreign policy studies is connected with the overall evolution of the
approaches of American ruling circles to the realities of today's world, and
particularly to U.S.-USSR relations. Since the end of the 1970's members of
the extreme right wing of the academic elite have been responsible for the
ideological validation of the foreign policy line of the most reactionary
rightwing segments of the U.S. ruling class now governing the country.
Studies by ideologists of militant anticommunism, as shown above, combine
appeals for the escalation of international tension and an unbridled arms
race with the tendency to view the ideological struggle between the two social
systems as the "primary cause" of all international conflicts. Psychological
warfare against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is based on
this analytical foundation.

FOOTNOTES

1. For an analysis of the theories of American bourgeois political scientists
and historians of international relations and U.S. foreign policy from
1945 to 1979 and the criteria employed in its classification and categori-
zation, see S. I. Appatov, "The Ideological Aspects of U.S. Foreign Policy
Doctrines," in the book "Ideologicheskaya bor'ba v sovremennom mire" [The
Ideological Struggle in Today's World], Kiev, 1978; idem., "American
Bourgeois Historical Studies of International Relations: Their Evolution

2. "The United States in the 1980's," edited by P. Duignan and A. Rabushka,
Stanford, 1980; "National Security in the 1980's: From Weakness to
American Foreign Policy and National Defense," edited by P. Dietrich,
Washington, 1982, etc.

Lexington (Kentucky), 1982; K. Payne, "Nuclear Deterrence in U.S.-Soviet


6. Ibid., p 49.


9. Ibid., p 244.


18. Ibid., p 27.


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SOME RESULTS OF LINGUISTIC REFORM IN CANADA

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 108-113

[Article by Ye. A. Shchukina]

[Text] The issue of the French-Canadian nationality, a problem stemming from the inferior status of French-Canadians in all of the country's provinces, including Quebec, where they constitute the majority of the population, has been one of Canada's main sociopolitical problems in recent decades. The rise of the French-Canadian movement in the 1960's forced the Liberal government to make an earnest effort to solve this problem. The Liberals shifted the emphasis in this ethnic problem to its cultural-linguistic aspects, and it was within this narrow framework that they officially supported the equality of all French-Canadians within a united Canada.

Viewing the eradication of the most odious forms of discrimination against the French language in public life as one of the main methods of "quelling" the wave of separatist feelings in Quebec, which threatened Canada's national unity, the Liberal government of P. Trudeau drew up a program of linguistic reforms, designed to strengthen the federation by making partial concessions to French-Canadians and by raising their linguistic status slightly while making no changes in their socioeconomic and political status. The program began to be carried out more than 15 years ago when a law was passed on the official languages of the country, legally securing the equality of the French and English languages in federal establishments.¹

Although a period spanning a decade and a half is not long enough to determine the final results of this kind of massive undertaking, affecting virtually all facets of public life in the country, now that the "Trudeau era" is over it is possible and necessary to assess his policy of bilingualism and the problems the Conservatives inherited in this sphere.

Positive Changes

The reform was supposed to be carried out in three basic areas: First of all, the legal and actual equality of the French and English languages was to be established on the federal level—in the federal Parliament, the courts, the civil service and royal (or state) corporations. In this area, the government's chief aim was to grant French-Canadians the right to use their native
language in contacts with government establishments and in federal jobs. Secondly, the equality of these languages was to be secured on the provincial level (the French language in English Canada and the English language in Quebec). The main objective here was the right to receive education in the native language in public schools. Thirdly, the equality of the two languages on the federal and provincial levels was to be recorded in the Constitution of Canada.

It is already obvious that P. Trudeau's linguistic reform produced several positive results. For example, there has been definite progress on the federal level in securing the Canadian citizens' right to communicate with government institutions in either of the official languages in Quebec and the so-called "bilingual belt," including northern New Brunswick and northeastern Ontario, where most of the French-speaking Canadians in English Canada are concentrated. The number of French-Canadians employed by federal establishments has risen. In 1983 they already accounted for 27.4 percent of the total, as compared to 21.5 percent in 1965. The 1978 program for the recruitment of graduates of French universities for federal service played a definite role in this process. The percentage of French-Canadians among top-level employees has increased considerably—from 17.5 percent in 1974 to 25 percent in 1983. Although the percentage of French-Canadians in royal corporations is not as high as in the civil service, it has also risen—from 15 percent in 1965 to 18.5 percent in 1980. The relative number of French-Canadians in the armed forces has also risen: from 20 percent of all servicemen in 1971 to 26.9 percent in 1983.

Some progress has also been made in expanding the linguistic rights of the French-Canadian minority on the provincial level during the period since the language reform was instituted. The French language has an official status equal to that of the English language in two provinces in English Canada—New Brunswick and Manitoba. In New Brunswick a 1969 law on official languages secured the equality of the two languages in all provincial institutions, including royal corporations. The official status of the French and English languages is guaranteed by the constitution of this province—to date the only Canadian province with this kind of guarantee.

In 1979 the Canadian Supreme Court restored the legal and constitutional equality of the French and English languages in the legislature and courts of Manitoba, which had been abolished by English-Canadian chauvinists 95 years before. The New Democratic Party government elected in this province in 1981 is trying to extend the official status of the French language to the provincial civil service and to secure it in the constitution. Provincial laws are being translated into French. Simultaneous translation has been practiced in the legislature since December 1982, making debates in two languages possible.

In the sphere of education, members of the French-Canadian minority have much more opportunity than before to give their children an education in their native language in public schools. In the last 15 years the existence of public schools with French-language instruction has been legally secured in the majority of English-speaking provinces, although to differing degrees: French instruction has been guaranteed in all grades of elementary and secondary schools in Ontario, New Brunswick and Manitoba, and for part of the day.
in Saskatchewan. The greatest success in this area has been achieved in New Brunswick and Ontario: More than 90 percent of the French-Canadian children of school age in these provinces were already receiving an elementary and secondary education in their native language by 1979.7

Another important result of the linguistic reform was the registration of the official status and equality of the two languages in the 1982 Canada Act,8 securing constitutional guarantees for the right of minorities to receive an education in their native language regardless of changes in provincial governments and changes in the national political and demographic situation. Furthermore, the law's constitutional guarantees were also extended to Newfoundland, the only province without any laws on French-language instruction in the schools.

There have also been positive changes in the English-Canadian population's views on the issue of linguistic equality. Polls conducted at the end of 1980 in four western provinces indicated that an average of 53 percent (from 47 percent in Manitoba to 57 percent in British Columbia) want the linguistic rights of minorities to be guaranteed by the constitution, and 75 percent want the right of French-Canadians to receive an education in their native language to be fully acknowledged.9 Changes in the English-Canadians' attitude toward the French language were also reflected in the increased interest in studying French: The percentage of elementary school students studying French as their second language rose from 28.6 percent in the 1970/71 academic year to 48 percent in 1983/84.10

Unsolved Problems

These positive results of the linguistic reform represent only the first steps toward the establishment of the complete equality of the French and English languages on the federal and provincial levels. Many major problems connected with the regulation of linguistic relations are still unresolved. Outside the "bilingual belt" in English Canada, for example, federal establishments have little opportunity to conduct their affairs in French. To a considerable extent this is due to the fact that most of the bilingual jobs are concentrated in Quebec and the "bilingual belt," and only 4 percent are outside this zone.11 Furthermore, far from all of the people with bilingual jobs are fluent enough in the second language to use it at work. In 1980 the Public Service Commission found that 16.2 percent of them were incapable of performing their work in two languages.12

The problem of serving the French-Canadian minority in their native language is being complicated by the absence of precise organizational criteria. To date the principles of effective bilingual service have not been determined for various federal institutions. The criterion now in force is the extremely vague one of "significant need." Furthermore, agencies and establishments can decide for themselves how "significant" the need is for service in either language. In the majority of cases, these decisions are made arbitrarily and do not correspond to the needs of the French-speaking minority.

The inferior status of French-Canadians in the federal civil service is far from eradicated. Although their total number has risen, the personnel staff
of several agencies still consists primarily of English-speaking Canadians. For example, French-Canadians represented only 14.6 percent of the federal police force in 1983.13 They are concentrated almost exclusively in Quebec, and their numbers are insignificant in English Canada, even in the federal capital of Ottawa.

### French-Speaking Population of Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thousands</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thousands</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5793.65</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>6249.10</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>5.0</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
<td>36.03</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY**, Autumn 1982, No 8, pp 5, 10, 12.

French-Canadians still have unequal opportunities in the important sphere of being able to use their native language at work. With few exceptions, French-Canadians can use the French language at work only in Quebec, the region of the federal capital, northeastern parts of Ontario and northern New Brunswick. Even here, however, they use French only for around 60 percent of the average work day. French-Canadians in bilingual jobs use English for half of their work day, whereas English-speaking Canadians with the same jobs only use French 18 percent of the time.14

As for private enterprise, it has remained unaffected by the language reform. As the commissioner of official languages had to admit, "the status and use of the French language in the business community represent the most complicated aspect" of the entire issue of bilingualism.15 In the sphere of private business English is still the dominant language everywhere in Canada, with the exception of a few firms operating in Quebec. The main reason is the predominance of English-Canadian and American monopolies in the Canadian economy. English-speaking businessmen have no interest in incorporating the French language in the system of commercial relations because they see no practical need for this and they do not want to spend large sums of money on this.

The reform has not affected the linguistic situation in the country. The results of the 1981 census testify to a decrease in the relative number of French-speaking Canadians in almost all of the provinces of English Canada.
Furthermore, the decrease has been relative and absolute in Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan.

This testifies that economic factors have the deciding effect on the linguistic situation, and that it cannot be changed only by means of language policy. The reduction of the French-speaking population in English Canada due to assimilation is largely a result of the fact that the French language is virtually unacknowledged here on the provincial level and the rights of the French-speaking minority are extremely limited.

In the majority of English-speaking provinces the two languages are neither legally nor actually equal. The records of provincial institutions are kept only in English. The Manitoba government's attempt to pass a law extending the sphere of French-language use to the main offices of provincial ministries and departments has been unsuccessful to date, for example, due to the resistance of the Conservative opposition, which is backed up by the English-Canadian business community.

In several provinces French-Canadians have no opportunity to secure a French secondary education for their children because provincial "school acts" provide for the establishment of only bilingual schools, where only a few hours a day are set aside for instruction in French and where this kind of instruction is often nonexistent in the higher grades. In the provinces where French schools exist, their number is insufficient and there have been difficulties in building new schools.

Many French-Canadian communities outside Quebec do not have press organs in their native language. A survey of the French-Canadians in English Canada at the end of 1978 indicated that 35.3 percent had no French-language press (70 percent in the western provinces). The main press organs outside Quebec are still weeklies with a small circulation. Until the early 1980's there were two French daily newspapers -- DROIT in Ontario and EVANGELINE in New Brunswick. In September 1982 financial difficulties brought about the demise of EVANGELINE, a newspaper founded in 1887. The province has no new daily French newspaper yet.

The Situation in Quebec

In Quebec the language reform has been completely unsuccessful in regulating relations between the French-Canadian majority and the English-speaking minority. The very concept of bilingualism in the federal government's interpretation is unacceptable to the province. Its nationalist circles accepted only those elements of Trudeau's language policy which were connected with an increase in the number of French-Canadians in the civil service and the establishment of the equality of the French language in federal institutions. They completely rejected the chief aim of the language reform -- the establishment of the equality of linguistic minorities, both French-Canadian in English Canada and English-Canadian in Quebec.

The differences between the Quebec and federal governments in the sphere of language evolved into an overt conflict after the separatist Parti Quebecois,
headed by R. Levesque, took charge of the province in 1976. This government concentrated on political undertakings in the linguistic sphere just as the Trudeau government did, but its policy had a clear anti-federal thrust and was absolutely contrary to the principles of the language reform. The Levesque government's chief policy aim in the sphere of linguistic relations was the reinforcement of the French language's position and the restriction of the use of the English language for the purpose of strengthening the influence of the French-Canadian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia in the main spheres of provincial affairs, especially economic matters, and the removal of English-speaking Canadians from public life.

In August 1977, for example, a French-language charter was adopted in Quebec, declaring the French language to be the only official language of the province. Some of its provisions were designed to broaden the use of the French language in the private business sphere (for example, the programs to turn English-speaking firms into French ones and the prohibition of advertisements, posters and announcements in the English language). In the sphere of education the charter sharply restricted children's access to English schools.

The implementation of the charter's provisions had a significant effect on the linguistic situation in the province. According to the 1981 census, the number of French-speaking Quebecers was 3.5 percent higher than it had been in 1976, and the number with English as their native language was 14 percent lower. Many English-Canadians left the province because they were dissatisfied with the official language policy, and the number of English-Canadians moving to Quebec decreased for the same reason. Therefore, the reinforcement of the French language's position in Quebec was largely a result of the restriction of the rights of English-speaking Canadians in the sphere of education. It must be said that the Levesque government boycotted virtually all of the federal government's undertakings in connection with the language reform, and it is largely to blame for the repeated failures to conclude a long-term federal-provincial agreement on cooperation in the development of bilingualism in the educational sphere.

The conflicts between the Quebec and federal governments over the language issue were particularly apparent in 1976-1981, during the period of preparations for the constitutional reform in Canada. The Levesque government refused to support federal proposals regarding the inclusion of guarantees of minority language rights in the constitution. It cited its objection to this point as one of the main arguments against the entire reform as a whole. As a result, Article 23 ($ 1a) of the Canada Act, securing members of linguistic minorities the right to choose any language of instruction, is limited to English Canada and does not extend to Quebec.

After 15 years, the results of the linguistic reform in Canada appear rather ambiguous. To a considerable extent, it has had a positive effect in linguistic matters. It has also suffered a number of failures, and its implementation by federal and provincial governments has frequently been distinguished by half-hearted effort and a lack of genuine democratism. The principal shortcoming of the policy of bilingualism is its inability to affect linguistic relations in the economic sphere, especially in private business, where the English language is still predominant.
As far as the general problem of the status of French-Canadians is concerned, it is quite clear that the policy of bilingualism has failed in this area. Attempts to improve the position of French-Canadians only by means of linguistic policy, with no regard for the socioeconomic aspects of ethnic inequality, have not produced any results. In the past decade the position of French-speaking Canadians in the economy has not improved in English Canada or in Quebec. Their standard of living is still lower than that of the majority of other ethnic groups.19

Although the French-Canadian problem seemed to grow less acute in the beginning of the 1980's, this was more the result of economic factors than of the language reform, whose basic premises Quebec is still rejecting. This dissatisfaction with federal government policy was reflected in the results of the general elections on 4 September 1984, at which time most of the voters in Quebec abandoned the Liberal Party and supported Conservatives. In view of the current severity of the language problem in Canada and its role in relations between Ottawa and Quebec, the Conservative government of B. Mulroney will have to deal with the problems that were left unsolved by the Liberals' language reform. The new Canadian prime minister has already repeatedly expressed support for the "principle of bilingualism," but there is still no indication of the specific measures the Conservatives will take to solve the language problem. One thing is clear: It cannot be solved completely without the actual acknowledgement of the equality of the French-Canadian population of Canada in all spheres of public life.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more about this law, see V. A. Tishkov, "Language and Politics (The Issue of Bilingualism in Canada)," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1977, No 2--Editor's note.

2. This is what the nine provinces with a predominantly English-speaking population are called to distinguished them from French Canada--French-speaking Quebec.

3. The 1867 British North America Act, the main document of the Canadian Constitution, granted the French language official status along with the English language only in the federal Parliament and courts and in the courts and legislature of Quebec.


8. In April 1982 the Parliament of Great Britain passed the Canada Act, sanctioning the patriation of the Canadian Constitution and adding a
number of amendments to the British North America Act, including the basic provisions of the language reform.


17. LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY, Autumn 1982, No 8, p 12.

18. For more about the constitutional reform in Canada, see V. Ye. Shilo, "Constitutional Crisis in Canada," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1981, No 11--Editor's note.


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8588
CSO: 1803/6
OBSESSION WITH FORCE IN WASHINGTON FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 85 (signed to press 18 Dec 84) pp 114-121

[Article by V. V. Potashov]

[Text] The list of cases in which the United States used military force for political purposes, numbering 245 by the beginning of 1981, has been augmented by around 50 more such incidents since the start of the Reagan Administration. Furthermore, the number and scales of joint maneuvers by the armed forces of the United States, its allies and its puppets have been augmented; in addition to the Middle East and Persian Gulf, Central America, the Pacific basin and Southeast Asia have become zones of dramatically increased U.S. military activity. It includes the concentration of U.S. naval forces led by nuclear aircraft carriers near foreign shores, ostentatious transcontinental flights by American B-52 strategic bombers, etc.

Directive 138 (on the "fight against international terrorism"), signed by President Reagan on 3 April 1984, envisages the preventive use of specially trained armed subunits against national patriotic and revolutionary movements and the countries supporting them. In this way, the United States itself has raised terrorism to the level of state policy. This policy has been specifically reflected in the criminal invasion of Grenada by the American Armed Forces and the U.S. occupation of this tiny island, in the mass-scale bombing of Lebanese civilians, in the overt blockade established by the mining of Nicaraguan ports, in the assistance of antidemocratic regimes in Central America, in the support of racists in South Africa, etc. Threats of "preemptive strikes" have been issued to Iran, Syria, Libya, the DPRK and other countries.2

"Criminal terrorist actions are being committed before the eyes of the entire world. They are being committed on small, medium and grand scales, by individuals and groups and sometimes even with the extensive participation of the armed forces of some states. This happened in Grenada, it happened in Lebanon and it is happening now in Nicaragua," said General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium K. U. Chernenko in response to PRAVDA's questions in June 1984. He stressed that the Soviet Union has always condemned all forms of terrorism and resolutely rejects the policy of the United States, which has chosen terrorism as a method of dealing with other states and peoples.3
What are the aims of Washington's obsession with force in intergovernmental relations? As President Reagan explained, the purpose of his policy, based on the use of military strength, is "the revival of the spirit of capitalism" in the world. For the sake of this, the Reagan Administration is striving to employ the laws of force literally throughout the world. In 1983 alone the United States conducted around 10 sets of military maneuvers of unprecedented dimensions for the purpose of political blackmail and intimidation in Central America, the Far East, the Middle East, Turkey, Europe and other regions. Washington seems to be measuring and testing its ability to gain political concessions by means of intimidation or to be prepared to gain them by force. All of this is designed to frighten nations pursuing an independent policy and not wanting to give in to American demands. Any anti-imperialist reforms in sovereign states, including those of a domestic nature—for example, progressive democratic reforms—serve as a pretext for U.S. intervention.

The most flagrant American methods of countering progressive reforms on the planet include interference in such forms as military presence, the commitment of troops to action for the purpose of a show of strength and overt intervention. The United States has more than 1,500 military bases and installations in 32 states, with over half a million American servicemen stationed there at all times. The purpose of the U.S. military presence abroad has been frankly announced as "the protection of American interests." As U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger declared: "It is best to defend the United States outside the United States." 4

Newly liberated countries are becoming a frequent target of the most shameless form of American intervention. Secretary of State C. Shultz admitted in one of his speeches that the United States had sent armed forces to developing countries at least 185 times since World War II to take care of situations "threatening American political and economic interests." 5

According to the data of the Brookings Institution, the United States resorted to the use of armed force for intervention, blackmail and pressure 215 times between 1945 and 1975, 6 and by 1981—that is, by the time Reagan took office—the number had already reached 245. Furthermore, this kind of activity reached its peak at the height of the "cold war," when up to 20 such actions took place each year. Only the period of detente was distinguished by a reduction of the number to 4-5 incidents a year. The use of American military force to intimidate and blackmail other states and peoples became more frequent at the beginning of the past decade and increased each year: 7 actions in 1980, 8 in 1981, 10 in 1982, 13 in 1983 and 17 by November 1984. The total number exceeded 290. Relying on its "strategic superiority," the United States used force much more frequently during the period of "cold war" than it did after the establishment of the military balance that became the objective basis of detente. Now, on the other hand, the Reagan Administration is again displaying dangerous adventurism in politics with only threats about the achievement of a "position of strength" in the future.

Extremely important qualitative changes have also taken place in the nature of such actions. The United States has begun to use shows of strength not only as a method of blackmail and diktat, but also as a means of concealing preparations for overt military actions, when pressure tactics fail to work.

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If a state does not give in to American blackmail and diktat, the United States will resort to armed intervention, as the Grenada experience proved. In October 1983, just before the aggressive attack, it organized a mass-scale show of strength near the coastline of Grenada by sending a naval task force there, consisting of 21 ships led by the aircraft carrier "Independence" and two helicopter carriers, the "Saipan" and the "Guam," with 2,000 Marines on board. This show of strength soon turned into intervention. President Reagan was quick to announce a "victory" in Grenada, and the Pentagon chief stressed: "We need armed forces capable of reacting just as quickly, flexibly and effectively as they did in Grenada when U.S. national interests are challenged."

In Honduras, where the Pentagon is preparing a bridgehead for intervention in Nicaragua, the "Big Pine" series of joint maneuvers was conducted last year on a scale unprecedented in Central America. As an official Pentagon spokesman said, the American maneuvers were a "warning to Nicaragua and Cuba." The "Grenadero-1" maneuvers involving troops from Guatemala, El Salvador and some other Latin American countries, the largest in the entire history of joint combat maneuvers, began in April 1984 and went on for 3 months. The almost year-round U.S. combat maneuvers and the "lesson for Grenada" were supposed to keep the people of Nicaragua and other countries in Central America in a state of fear with regard to the constant threat of invasion.

The same thing is happening in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. The combat-ready U.S. ships and aircraft carriers cruising these regions, the "Bright Star" maneuvers by the rapid deployment force (RDF) and the creation of their command, CENTCOM, with 19 sovereign states within its zone of action, all represent a threat and demonstrate the U.S. willingness to resort to the direct use of military force at any time.

Troops of the RDF have been transferred from the United States to Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman; ships are patrolling the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, and shows of strength have been organized in the Caribbean and the Indian Ocean. In this way, the RDF, officially created for preventive use, became an active instrument of U.S. state terrorism.

The United States is employing the same methods in the Far East and Southeast Asia. The regular and growing "Team Spirit" rehearsals for aggression in South Korea, concocted by the tripartite alliance of the United States, Japan and South Korea, and shows of nuclear strength have become one cause of the constantly mounting threat of war in this region. American nuclear submarines carrying missiles have entered Yokosuka port much more often in recent years: 4-8 times a year between 1974 and 1981, and 23 times in 1983.

Therefore, the current American administration is trying to turn shows of strength from an instrument for selective political use into a permanent cause of international tension and a means of blackmailing freedom-loving peoples.

Shows of U.S. military strength have grown considerably in terms of scales. For example, the zone of the NATO "Autumn Forge-84" maneuvers, involving 350,000 people, took in all of Western Europe from Norway to Turkey and
included the Atlantic. Combat exercises and maneuvers are now more likely to resemble rehearsals for real wars, including nuclear ones.

Particularly dangerous signs of this have been apparent in the series of broad-scale exercises by U.S. nuclear forces, conducted for the first time since the 1950's: "Ivy League-82," "Global Shield-83" and "Global Shield-84," in which methods of fighting a nuclear war were perfected, intercontinental missiles were actually launched and hundreds of strategic bombers were taken up under conditions maximally approximating real combat.

In these military actions and shows of strength, Pentagon strategists are obviously testing their new theories about "simultaneous combat operations" in different parts of the world, the "horizontal escalation" of conflicts and the ways of fighting a global protracted and limited conventional and nuclear wars (see appendix).

As Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR minister of defense, stressed in his statement at the end of the Warsaw Pact "Shield-84" exercises, the USSR and its allies cannot remain indifferent to the unprecedented scales and content of NATO maneuvers. In terms of the number of troops involved, the missions they include, their duration and their intensity, they clearly represent rehearsals for starting and fighting an aggressive war.

FOOTNOTES


2. SPOTLIGHT, 30 April 1984 (Comments by Secretary of State G. Shultz at a meeting of the Trilateral Commission).


7. THE NEW YORK TIMES, 3 November 1983.

APPENDIX


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<tr>
<td>1 February 1981</td>
<td>The United States conducted the provocative &quot;Black Hawk&quot; maneuvers involving three different kinds of forces in</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>October 1982</td>
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airplanes carrying nuclear weapons on Japanese territory, arousing protests from the Japanese public. American and Japanese military circles, however, demonstrated their determination to build up their military strength by conducting large-scale joint naval maneuvers, involving the aircraft carrier "Coral Sea" and strategic B-52 bombers; the first joint exercises by ground troops, "Yamato-82," were conducted at the same time.

17 November 1982  The United States built up its military presence in South-East Asia: A naval task force, consisting of the aircraft carrier "Midway" and 8 ships with 7,000 servicemen on board, was sent to Thailand—the largest force since the withdrawal of American troops from the region in 1976.

18 December 1982  In connection with the creation of the RDF Central Command (CENTCOM), the United States conducted large-scale "Jade Tiger" exercises in Somalia, Oman and Sudan with 2,500 Marines, B-52 bombers, AWACS planes and F-15 fighters.

19 February 1983  In Honduras, on the Nicaraguan border, the United States conducted the "Big Pine-1" troop maneuvers, the largest in Central America, involving 4,500 American and Honduran soldiers. The anti-Cuban and anti-Nicaraguan campaign of blackmail and threats flared up again in the United States at the same time.

20 February 1983  In support of U.S., Japanese and South Korean plans to create a tripartite military alliance against the people of Asia, armed forces from the three countries conducted the joint "Team Spirit-83" maneuvers with 73,000 American and almost 200,000 South Korean servicemen and around 50 ships from the U.S. Seventh Fleet, including 2 aircraft carriers. The maneuvers were so aggressive that the DPRK had to put its armed forces in a state of combat readiness.

21 February 1983  In connection with the escalation of friction between Libya, Sudan and Egypt, the United States sent the aircraft carrier "Nimitz" with 6,000 Marines on board to the Libyan coastline. American AWACS planes were deployed in Egypt and made flights over Libya, violating its air space.

22 April 1983  The United States conducted naval and air force maneuvers near the eastern borders of the USSR, south of the Aleutian Islands, for the first time in many years. They involved 3 aircraft carriers, more than 250 planes and 23,000
APPENDIX (Continued)

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<td>Began</td>
<td>servicemen. The officially announced purpose was to demonstrate the growing U.S. presence and the determination to &quot;protect U.S. interests&quot; in this region.</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>June 1983</td>
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<td>The United States, England, the FRG, Italy, Belgium and Turkey conducted the joint troop maneuvers of NATO mobile forces, &quot;Adventure Express-83,&quot; of unprecedented scales in direct proximity to the Soviet-Turkish border. According to American General B. Rogers, the supreme commander of NATO forces in Europe who was present at the exercises, they were supposed to demonstrate the bloc's ability to transfer &quot;mobile forces to southeastern Turkey&quot; and serve as a &quot;serious warning to the USSR.&quot;</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>August 1983</td>
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<td>To support the French and Zairian troops invading Chad, the United States sent weapons, including missiles, to this country on its military cargo planes, sent 550 servicemen to neighboring Sudan and put the aviation of the Sixth Fleet in a state of combat readiness; PC-135 and AWACS planes made reconnaissance flights from Egyptian territory.</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>August 1983</td>
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<td>A large American naval task force led by the aircraft carrier &quot;Dwight D. Eisenhower&quot; was concentrated near the Libyan coast; the &quot;Bright Star-83&quot; American RDF combat exercises were conducted in Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman with 7,000 servicemen, 100 planes, including B-52 bombers, F-111's and F-16's, with the aircraft carrier &quot;Carl Vinson&quot; and AWACS planes. This multi-purpose show of strength, which was actually a rehearsal for intervention, was used by the United States to pressure Libya and the Arab countries to accept the American-Israeli plan for the settlement of the Mideast crisis.</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>August 1983</td>
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<td>Turning Honduras into a bridgehead for aggression against Nicaragua, the United States conducted the large-scale &quot;Big Pine-2&quot; combat maneuvers there, involving 5,500 American and 6,000 Honduran soldiers. At the same time, 19 American naval ships practiced a naval blockade of Nicaragua and Cuba. This was followed by the &quot;Ridex-83&quot; naval maneuvers in the Caribbean, with 32 ships, including 2 aircraft carriers and the battleship &quot;New Jersey.&quot;</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>September 1983</td>
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<td>The United States organized a provocative reconnaissance operation in the region of Kamchatka and Sakhalin, an area of strategic importance to the Soviet Union, involving a civilian South Korean airliner, a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane and a spy satellite.</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>September 1983</td>
<td>To demonstrate NATO's determination to deploy American medium-range missiles in Western Europe, mass-scale combined exercises by the armed forces of 13 NATO countries, &quot;Autumn Forge-83,&quot; were conducted, involving over 300,000 servicemen. The United States sent an additional 17,000 soldiers and officers to Europe to participate in the maneuvers.</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>September 1983</td>
<td>The United States began the direct use of military force in Lebanon. The U.S. President ordered the American contingent to open fire and carrier-borne planes to attack Lebanese targets at will. In addition to American Marine subunits, fighter-bombers and the artillery of the Sixth Fleet, including more than 20 warships, 2 aircraft carriers and the battleship &quot;New Jersey,&quot; were used in the military operation against the Lebanese.</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>October 1983</td>
<td>The United States sent 10 warships led by the aircraft carrier &quot;Independence&quot; and the helicopter carrier &quot;Saipan&quot; to the shores of Grenada. Soon afterward, this show of strength turned into an invasion of Grenada by 3,000 servicemen from the RDF and the occupation of the island.</td>
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<td>31</td>
<td>October 1983</td>
<td>Using the explosion in Rangoon as a pretext, the United States threatened the DPRK by putting 40,000 of its troops in South Korea and South Korea's entire army of 600,000 in a state of heightened combat readiness.</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>The American-South Korean &quot;Team Spirit-84&quot; maneuvers were used by the United States to demonstrate its willingness to commit aggressive actions and deliver a preventive nuclear strike. They involved 207,000 servicemen, B-52 bombers and F-15 and AWACS planes, which violated the DPRK's air space many times; the landing of 50,000 amphibious troops was perfected during the maneuvers.</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>Around 1,800 U.S. Marines who had been in Beirut for almost a year and a half were moved to naval ships; at the same time, the battleship &quot;New Jersey&quot; began firing more heavily on Lebanon, firing up to 550 one-ton shells a day, and bombing raids by planes from carriers were stepped up. The world press described this barbarous action as an attempt to frighten the Lebanese with terrorism on the governmental level.</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>February 1984</td>
<td>After the American-Honduran maneuvers on the Nicaraguan border had come to an end, the United States announced that around 2,000 soldiers and officers would remain in Honduras in a show of military presence and willingness to intervene.</td>
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Continuing the undeclared war against Nicaragua, the United States organized the mining of its ports; the Soviet ship "Lugansk" and around 10 other ships sailing under Dutch, Japanese, Panamanian, Liberian, Nicaraguan and other flags were struck by mines.

The "Grenadero-1" joint maneuvers of U.S., Honduran, Guatemalan and Salvadoran troops began 20 kilometers from the Nicaraguan border on Honduran territory; the U.S. naval "Ocean Venture-84" maneuvers involving 2 carrier task forces, 250 combat planes, including B-52's, and 30,000 servicemen were conducted in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.

In another show of combat readiness "under conditions approximating real combat," the United States conducted the nuclear "Global Shield-84" maneuvers of unprecedented scales with armed forces from Canada, other NATO countries and Japan, during the course of which they launched ICBM's, SIBM's and cruise missiles from B-52's, organized the mass takeoff of 200 B-52's carrying nuclear weapons and put 150,000 servicemen in action.

On the pretext of securing "free navigation" during the escalation of the military conflict between Iran and Iraq, the United States concentrated a large naval task force led by the aircraft carriers "Kitty Hawk" and "America" in the Persian Gulf; 7 ships entered the gulf. The State Department announced that the United States would any action deemed necessary in this oil-rich zone of "vital interests."

Just before the invasion of the Lao People's Democratic Republic by Thai military subunits, the United States conducted joint troop exercises in Thailand.

American-Israeli combat maneuvers for the practice of marine landings were conducted in the East Mediterranean. This was followed by large-scale multi-purpose maneuvers by the Israeli Army on occupied Arab lands. Washington and Tel Aviv, the strategic allies, tried to intimidate the Arab states with a "combined military fist."

Threatening Nicaragua with armed intervention, the United States doubled its military contingent in neighboring Honduras by transferring subunits of special forces and dozens of reconnaissance helicopters and planes there. A large detachment of combat ships led by the aircraft
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<td>42</td>
<td>August 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>Carrier &quot;Kennedy&quot; and the battleship &quot;Iowa,&quot; recently modernized and equipped with cruise missiles, began patrolling the Nicaraguan coast.</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>On the pretext of conducting operations for the demining of the Red Sea, the United States and other NATO countries built up their military presence in the region by sending dozens of combat ships, helicopters and planes there.</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>To threaten Libya, the United States conducted such extensive naval maneuvers, involving 2 carrier task forces led by the carriers &quot;America&quot; and &quot;Saratoga,&quot; on the approaches to Libya's territorial waters that this country had to put its own armed forces in a state of combat readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>To exert pressure on the Danish public, protesting the deployment of American nuclear missiles in Denmark, 16 NATO warships with 17,000 servicemen from the United States, England, the FRG, Holland and Denmark entered the port of Copenhagen. During the &quot;Bold Gannet-84&quot; maneuvers, a large marine landing operation was conducted in Denmark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>Demonstrating its willingness to start and fight a war in Europe, NATO conducted the largest exercises in the entire history of combined maneuvers, &quot;Autumn Forge-84&quot; with 350,000 servicemen. All of the first-strike Pershing-2 missiles were put in combat positions for the first time, the largest postwar landing operation, involving 130,000 Marines, was organized, as well as the airborne transfer of around 20,000 servicemen from the United States, and a B-52 bomber attack was perfected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>September 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>On the pretext of a reaction to the bombing of the American embassy in Beirut, the United States again built up its military strength near the Lebanese coast by sending a naval task force led by the aircraft carrier &quot;America&quot; and the helicopter carrier &quot;Shreveport&quot; with 1,800 Marines on board to the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>November 1984</td>
<td>Began</td>
<td>During the democratic elections in Nicaragua, U.S. naval ships invaded its territorial waters and attacked a patrol boat. The United States concentrated 40 warships led by the aircraft carrier &quot;Nimitz&quot; and the battleship &quot;Iowa&quot; near the Nicaraguan coast. This was followed by a new series of &quot;Big Pine-3,&quot; &quot;Grenadero-2&quot; and &quot;King Guard&quot; maneuvers with Salvadoran troops.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
September

2 -- K. U. Chernenko's replies to PRAVDA's questions about the present and future of Soviet-American relations were published.

6 -- Prominent political and public spokesmen pointedly criticized the Reagan Administration's adventuristic foreign policy line in THE NEW YORK TIMES: former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Harriman, former Secretary of Defense C. Clifford and former special adviser to the secretary of state M. Shulman.

10 -- Addressing a group of Polish-Americans in Doylestown (Pennsylvania), President Reagan again questioned the decisions of the 1945 Crimean conference of the leaders of the USSR, United States and Great Britain on postwar construction. In this connection, the President viciously attacked the USSR and Poland.

10-22 -- Famous American religious leader B. Graham visited the USSR as the guest of religious organizations.

27 -- Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko had a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz in New York. They discussed aspects of Soviet-American relations and a number of international issues.

28 -- A. A. Gromyko had a meeting with Democratic presidential nominee W. Mondale in New York.

29 -- Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko was invited to the White House by U.S. President R. Reagan. He was the guest of honor at a 2-hour conversation and breakfast organized by the President for the discussion of cardinal issues in USSR-U.S. relations and the state of world affairs.

30 -- A. A. Gromyko had a meeting in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz. They discussed aspects of USSR-U.S. bilateral relations and the
state of affairs in several parts of the world, including Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. They agreed that representatives of the two sides should meet whenever necessary in the future to discuss these matters and others.

October

2 -- The latest session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to promote the implementation of the goals and provisions of the ABM treaty and the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, concluded by the USSR and United States on 26 May 1972, and the agreement on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war, concluded by the two countries on 30 September 1971, began work in Geneva.

10 -- An influential American public organization, the American Committee for East-West Accord, asked the Washington administration to take immediate steps to improve Soviet-American relations and curb the arms race.

14 -- PRAVDA printed a USSR Ministry of Defense report on the deployment of long-range cruise missiles on strategic bombers and submarines in response to corresponding U.S. actions. The report stressed that these measures are commensurate in scale with the mounting U.S. threat to the security of the USSR and other socialist community countries.

18 -- K. U. Chernenko's replies to the WASHINGTON POST's questions were published.

The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace sent President Reagan and the U.S. Supreme Court telegrams to protest the continued persecution of antivar demonstrators.

The USSR Academy of Medical Sciences protested the arrest of world-renowned pediatrician B. Spock, prominent peace movement activist.

21 -- A TASS statement was published to refute the false statements in the report of the so-called consultative committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency about imaginary Soviet violations of arms limitation and reduction agreements.

21-31 -- A meeting of Soviet and American public representatives was held in the United States under the slogan "For Peace and Common Security." The meeting was organized by the USSR-USA Society and an American public organization promoting dialogue between citizens of the United States and USSR.

31 -- A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request. They discussed some aspects of Soviet-American relations and some international issues.

The Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace and the Committee of Soviet Women protested the U.S. chemical weapon tests in Brazil; a similar statement was issued by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries on 3 November.
November

4 -- PRAVDA printed a TASS release entitled "Incendiary Speculations," containing pointed criticism of the anti-Soviet campaign launched by American officials and some news organs in connection with the escalation of friction in India and the events following the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

4 -- Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. A. Tikhonov had a meeting with Secretary of State G. Shultz and Senators H. Baker and D. Moynihan in New Delhi. Current problems in Soviet-American relations were discussed during this meeting.

6 -- Speaking at the festivities commemorating the 67th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, A. A. Gromyko said: "The Soviet Union is still committed to the arms limitation and reduction process and is willing to take part in serious and honest negotiations to conclude agreements having no adverse effects on anyone's interests. We have clearly and repeatedly informed the U.S. Government of this."


18 -- K. U. Chernenko's replies to the questions of M. Kalb, correspondent of the American NBC Television Company, were published.

19 -- A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request. They discussed some aspects of Soviet-American relations of mutual interest.

20 -- According to the findings of a Gallup Institute public opinion poll printed in the SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, around 80 percent of the Americans are in favor of Soviet-American nuclear test ban and nuclear freeze agreements.

22 -- The USSR and the United States agreed to begin new negotiations for the purpose of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on all matters pertaining to nuclear and space weapons. The sides agreed that Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz would meet in Geneva on 7-8 January 1985 to draft a common understanding of the subject and goals of the talks.

28 -- Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev received Co-Chairman D. Andreas of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (ASTEC). They discussed aspects of Soviet-American commercial and economic relations and of ASTEC activities.

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