STRATEGIC CREEP: FROM POWER PROJECTION BACK TO FORWARD PRESENCE

BY

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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The U.S. Army has transformed from a Cold War era forward based force to a power projection Army, capable of rapid deployment. While permanent overseas presence has decreased dramatically, operational deployments have increased exponentially. The frequency and duration of deployments raise the question of whether the Army’s forward based strategy has truly changed. This study contends that the Army remains a force still very centered on overseas presence. The “Strategic Creep” posed by long-term global commitments demanding continuous presence has forced the Army to adopt an execution strategy of forward presence. With signs of strained readiness, what are the Army and our nation willing to pay to maintain the U.S. role as a global leader? Will over-commitment jeopardize our capability to respond to real national security threats? A greater commitment by the global community to solve global problems is needed.
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PREFACE

In February 1998, as commander of the 11th Engineer Battalion, 3rd Infantry Division, I deployed to Kuwait on Operation Desert Thunder. The division's mission was to reassure allies of U.S. resolve, deter Iraqi aggression, and if necessary, defend the Emirate of Kuwait from attack by Iraqi forces. A last minute brokered United Nations (UN) agreement preserved peace for the moment and facilitated the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq. As the tension and immediacy of the crisis passed, U.S. forces remained in the Kuwaiti desert for an indefinite mission to support the decisions of our National Command Authority (NCA).

While waiting for a change of mission from the NCA, I observed first hand the Army's strategy to sustain its role in our National Security and Military Strategy. This strategy, one of forward presence, is a strategy that the Army continues to execute globally on a daily basis. It is the only strategy that unequivocally demonstrates U.S. resolve and sets the conditions for stability.

This strategy is not without costs. From my foxhole, I saw the effects on readiness, morale, and quality of life in the desert as well as the impact on the families and soldiers back home. I also saw a division in our Army's contingency corps locked in operational paralysis, struggling with managing a
force spread geographically with the division flag and a brigade combat team (+) in Kuwait, a division (−) and installation to manage at Fort Stewart, and a brigade combat team at Fort Benning. With no end in sight and no relief from on-going missions, the division was in a state of turmoil.

I also began to see the impact of this strategy beyond my foxhole as the Army struggled to name a successor unit to assume the Bosnia mission. With rumors that the 3rd Infantry may get the mission, a million “what-if” drills were initiated. Finally, with the announcement that the 1st Cavalry Division would be headed to Bosnia and that the 3rd Infantry would retain exclusive focus on Southwest Asia, it struck me that perhaps our Army was over-committed. With both heavy divisions from the contingency corps committed, a heavy division embedded in Korea, and two heavy divisions in Europe reconstituting following repetitive Bosnia rotations, the Army’s heavy force capability to respond to a Major Theater War was seriously in question.

These events triggered the thesis I chose for this study. Additionally, I want to thank Colonel Jay Yingling, who at the time was the 3rd Infantry Division’s Division Artillery Commander. On many a day in the desert heat, Colonel Yingling recounted his “nightmare” in developing a topic and working on his SRP while a USAWC student. His inspiration, dialogue, and suggestion of this topic is greatly appreciated.
STRATEGIC CREEP: FROM POWER PROJECTION
BACK TO FORWARD PRESENCE

America’s Army is a team of teams. It is a Total Army—with people at its core. An essential contributor to our National Security Strategy, the Army plays a unique and key role in defending the Nation and promoting peace and stability by shaping the international security environment, responding to the full range of crises when called, and preparing now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future. The Army is the Nation’s first full spectrum force, capable of conducting prompt and sustained land operations across the entire spectrum of military operations. It is also multi-mission capable, providing a range of options for America’s participation in the post-Cold War World. The Army is doing the Nation’s heavy lifting, providing over 60 percent of the committed forces to 28 joint military operations since 1989, while receiving about 25 percent of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budget. America can make no greater statement of its resolve to friends and adversaries alike than the commitment of the Army. As demonstrated in Bosnia, Macedonia, and elsewhere, only the sustained presence of land forces can fully set the conditions for stability. The Total Army is our Nation’s force of decision.

—The Honorable Robert M. Walker, Acting Secretary of the Army and General Dennis J. Reimer, U.S. Army Chief of Staff

The Army’s two chief executives informed the Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and House of Representatives regarding the posture of the U.S. Army for Fiscal Year (FY) 1999 that only the sustained presence of land forces can fully set the conditions for stability. In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. Army has repeatedly demonstrated that American soldiers on the ground serve as a symbol of undeniable
commitment to a cause. In December 1989, 21,000 soldiers deployed to Panama during Operation Just Cause in support of democracy and the security of American citizens. In 1990, 335,000 soldiers deployed to Saudi Arabia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm to liberate Kuwait. Since then, thousands of soldiers have deployed to Kuwait on four separate occasions to deter Iraqi aggression. In September 1994, over 18,000 soldiers deployed to Haiti on Operation Uphold Democracy to restore the legitimate Haitian government and to stabilize the country. Additionally, humanitarian assistance missions in Rwanda, peacekeeping in Somalia, and multinational observer force (MFO) duty in South America and the Middle East have further demonstrated American resolve to maintain global stability through forward presence.

Today, the Army sustains a large overseas presence of land forces in Europe, Korea, Southwest Asia, the Pacific, Bosnia, Macedonia, Haiti, and the Sinai. Most recently, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are balking at supporting air strikes against Yugoslavia unless the U.S. agrees to be part of a multinational ground force peace enforcement mission in Kosovo. Like Bosnia, Kosovo is likely to require a long-term commitment of American forces on the ground. If we accept Secretary Walker's and General Reimer's premise of the necessity of using ground forces to restore and maintain stability, then
we must confront the issue of whether our strategy requires forward presence. Is the Army truly following a post-Cold War strategy of power projection? Or is our Army still a force very centered on and perhaps providing its greatest utility in sustaining overseas presence?

To answer this question, we should first describe the post-Cold War Army and understand the transformation it has undergone. Additionally, we need to determine what is meant by a "new-world order." Finally, we must ask why the Army is being employed as it now is. The National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and Joint Vision (JV) 2010 are all relevant cornerstone documents that dictate the current operational tempo (OPTEMPO), force structure, and future focus for the Army. These preeminent strategic documents have created the Army and the Armed Forces we have today.

The cost of global leadership in today’s international environment must not be overlooked. Overcommitment may jeopardize our capability to respond to real national security threats to our genuine vital interests. The time has come to “...assess the impact of our engagement effort on the overall health of the force...and...carefully weigh the costs and benefits of using military forces, before committing them in support of U.S. policy.” Further, we must acknowledge our resources are
finite and be selective in the use of our capabilities—especially the commitment of our Army and Armed Forces.

While we will always reserve the right to act unilaterally, we should take unilateral action only to counter threats to indisputably vital interests. On the other hand, the U.S. should place a greater reliance on multinational coalitions, alliances, and commitment by the world community to engage in missions of global and regional significance. In promoting this major paradigm shift, the U.S. should consider playing a supporting role in operations that involve other than vital interests. Multinational forces, non-governmental and private volunteer organizations (NGO/PVO), and UN officials should make up the largest part of any response force. Even so, the U.S. may still exert leadership by standing up command and control organizations, providing logistical support, and coordinating responsibilities among participants. We can retain true global leadership through the exercise of aggressive economic and diplomatic measures backed by the maintenance of a credible warfighting force—a force reserved for true threats to U.S. national security.

**TODAY’S ARMY**

The Army is currently globally engaged: Over 100,000 soldiers and 28,000 civilians are stationed abroad. On any given
day, an additional 30,000 to 35,000 soldiers are deployed overseas to conduct operations and participate in exercises in approximately 100 countries. Since 1990, the Army has made over 25 significant deployments, routinely providing the bulk of deployed forces. Current operational tempo has soldiers away from home on operational or training missions approximately 135 days a year.\textsuperscript{6} This phenomenon is not unique to the Army. Daily, over 240,000 service members are deployed or stationed overseas. The deployment tempo for the Navy is up to 170 days away from home a year, while the Air Force has reached 176 days.\textsuperscript{7} A security strategy based on engagement and enlargement is enacted by an Armed Forces routinely engaged overseas.

America’s Army is more than 667,000 soldiers and civilians smaller than it was in 1989.\textsuperscript{8} Leaving over 700 installations worldwide, the Army’s forward-deployed force transitioned to a continental U.S. (CONUS) based force reliant on power projection.\textsuperscript{9} Significant changes in both Active and Reserve Component missions and force structure accompanied this transition. The United States Army shrunk from five to four active duty corps, 18 to ten active divisions, and ten to eight reserve divisions.\textsuperscript{10} The Army budget declined in real terms by 39 percent while the number of deployments over that period increased by 300 percent.\textsuperscript{11} The Army has over 62 percent married soldiers and 15 percent women.\textsuperscript{12} The cumulative effects of all
of this change on the total force have strained near and long-
term readiness: equipment readiness, appropriateness of force
structure, multiple apportionment for missions, operations other
than war, frequent deployments, quality and quantity of
training, quality of life for service and family members. It is
little wonder that skeptics are already decrying a hollow force.

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

So why is our post-Cold War Army in this perplexing
situation? Where is the peace dividend that everyone expected
and assumed would follow the Cold War? The Army now finds itself
as the service of choice for contingency operations and global
engagement; yet its primary mission is to prepare to fight and
win future wars. The post-Cold War years have brought
underfunding and increased use of a smaller force. To understand
the precarious condition in which the Army now finds itself, we
must know more about the engine that drives the train. Our NCA
employs the Army and its sister services in support of our NSS
and its corresponding NMS. These cornerstone documents and the
strategic direction they map out define the roles and missions
of the Armed Forces and our Army.

The President’s 1998 NSS (A National Security Strategy For A
New Century) outlines the continuation of a strategy of
engagement abroad and enlargement of partnerships and alliances
to strengthen our global leadership, promote democracy and
stability, and to protect our vital interests while maintaining
our security. The NSS is a forward-looking strategy, based on
three core objectives: to enhance our security, to bolster
America’s economic prosperity, and to promote democracy abroad.
The primary purpose of this strategy is to secure and strengthen
the gains of democracy and free markets, while discouraging
their enemies.\textsuperscript{13}

To remain secure at home, the U.S. must lead abroad, for
the spread of democracy supports American values and enhances
our security and prosperity. The U.S. must be willing to use all
instruments of national power in dealing with other states and
actors. In addition to the application of economic and
diplomatic measures in the execution of the NSS, “we must
maintain superior military forces at the level of readiness
necessary to deter aggression, conduct a wide range of peacetime
activities and smaller-scale contingencies, and, preferably in
concert with regional friends and allies, win two overlapping
major theater wars.”\textsuperscript{14} Threats to vital national interests and to
humanitarian/other interests are diverse and difficult to deal
with. These uncertain and dynamic threats fall into four
categories: regional dangers, the proliferation of advanced
weapons and technologies, transnational dangers, and threats to
the U.S. homeland.\textsuperscript{15}
To deter or answer these threats to our vital, national, and other interests, the U.S. must have a credible military force and the demonstrated will to use it. Peacetime engagement and overseas presence help deter aggression, promote regional stability, prevent conflicts, and strengthen alliances and coalitions. Further, the U.S. Armed Forces serve as role models for the militaries of emerging democracies. The readiness of our forces and their ability to rapidly deploy, to gain access to critical regions and infrastructure, to form and lead multinational coalitions, and to use equipment strategically positioned or deployed forward contribute to credible capability.¹⁶

The strategy of engagement and enlargement requires a versatile military, capable of executing missions across a wide spectrum of operations. First, the force seeks to effectively shape the international environment to deter instability and prevent major theater war (MTW). The force must be prepared to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of enemy objectives in two theaters, in close succession; be prepared to fight and win in the face of asymmetric means; and be able to transition from a posture of global engagement to fighting MTWs. The security risk increases when we become overly involved in contingency and engagement activities and lose our capability to respond rapidly to the outbreak of MTWs.¹⁷ We must remain
prepared for MTWs while concurrently preparing now for the threats of the future.

The NSS thus poses a genuine dilemma for our military services. How can a declining post-Cold War force, particularly the Army with its contribution of over 60 percent of committed forces to joint military operations since 1989, effectively carry out all assigned missions while retaining its readiness and fighting edge?\textsuperscript{18} The NMS, developed to support the NSS, provides the strategy to accomplish national military objectives and recommends the force required to execute the strategy. This strategy, in concert with the demands of the NSS and reduced funding, is the root cause of the over-stretched force we have today.

**NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY**

In recent testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) described our military’s post-Cold War obligations:

As members of this Committee are well aware, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of threats to U.S. global security interests. Indeed we are in many ways more challenged now than in the past given the diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable nature of today’s threats. From the continuing conventional military challenges posed by North Korea and Iraq, to the criminal acts of international terrorist networks and the growing threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of outlaw states, the international security
environment is placing unprecedented demands on America’s military.\textsuperscript{19}

General Shelton’s opening statement accurately described the environment America’s Armed Forces operate in daily. The military strategy they execute is based on the NSS and the Secretary of Defense’s (SECDEF) 1997 report to Congress, the QDR. The NMS provides advice from the CJCS in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Specified and Unified Combatant Commanders to the NCA on the strategic direction of the Armed Forces.

As specified in the NMS, the purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the nation’s wars and to protect U.S. national interests. Our national military objectives are to promote peace and stability and, when necessary, to defeat adversaries. Potential threats to American national security come from regional dangers, transnational threats, asymmetric challenges, and possible “wild card” threats.\textsuperscript{20}

The strategy to protect U.S. interests in this uncertain, dynamic, post-Cold War world is to shape the international environment to advance U.S. interests, maintain the capability to respond to the full spectrum of threats to national interests, and to prepare now for the threats and dangers of tomorrow and beyond. To shape the international environment, the Armed Forces promote stability through peacetime engagement
activities, thereby preventing or reducing conflicts and threats, and through a demonstrated ability and willingness to use a credible warfighting force to maintain peacetime deterrence. To respond to a full spectrum of crises, U.S. forces must be able to respond while in a posture of global engagement. Deterring aggression or coercion through a series of measured military responses, maintaining the capability to fight and win two MTWs, and being able to conduct multiple/concurrent smaller-scale contingencies is inherent in this strategy. Finally, our forces must prepare now for the uncertain future through an increased investment in modernization to exploit the technology revolution. This future focus will transform our military of today into the joint warfighting force of the future envisioned in JV 2010, a conceptual template for future operations.\textsuperscript{21}

Key concepts that govern use of U.S. forces in the execution of the NMS are strategic agility, overseas presence, power projection, and decisive force.\textsuperscript{22} The Army has demonstrated superb strategic agility, unquestionable power projection capability, and the ability to concentrate decisive force. However, the nature of the deployments the Army has executed and continues to execute demonstrates increased reliance on forward presence. Unquestionably, the U.S. Army remains globally engaged as a means of shaping the international environment. The Army also has proven its worth in responding to challenges and
crises. The difficulty remains in determining when a response evolves into a sustained operation requiring long-term presence and sustained engagement. Regarding American responses to crises in Southwest Asia and Bosnia, a DoD official commented on the future of U.S. troop involvement: "It is not at all clear if the end is in sight." 23 Those responses that involve commitment of land forces, resulting in a steady and substantial overseas presence of forces, add credence to the notion that the U.S. Army is continuing its strategy of forward presence, whether it wants to or not. We might call this phenomenon "strategic creep", by analogy with an earlier demon known as "mission creep."

FORCE PROJECTION

The U.S. Army's keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5 OPERATIONS, "...links Army roles and missions to the NMS, of which, power projection is a fundamental principle. Thus force projection—the military's ability to respond quickly and decisively to global requirements—is fundamental to Army operations doctrine." 24 Additionally, FM 100-5 asserts that: "Force projection replaces forward defense as a more likely employment of Army elements." 25 Further, "Doctrine must provide an understanding of and prepare Army forces for the difficulty
of getting to the region of conflict with the appropriate force to accomplish the mission."²⁶

Force projection, a key element of power projection, is the ability to alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate anywhere in the world.²⁷ To meet its force projection requirement, the Army initiated the Army Strategic Mobility Program (AMSP), which expanded investment in fast sealift shipping, overseas prepositioning of essential equipment, and improving the transportation infrastructure to rapidly deploy forces from their duty location through CONUS ports and airfields. The AMSP action plan, published in March 1993, set forth the Army's plan to meet its force projection mission.²⁸

The Total Army is structured to accomplish its mission with forces sustained at various readiness levels and stationed in diverse geographical locations structured as follows: a CONUS-based contingency corps with five divisions; a forward presence force with a corps and four divisions in Europe, Korea, and the Pacific; a reinforcing corps with an active division and 15 Reserve Component brigades; a strategic reserve of eight Reserve Component divisions. The deployment of the contingency corps drives force projection requirements. The Army must be able to project the entire corps and its support command into an active theater of operations within 75 days of notification to deploy. A leading light brigade must close within four days, a leading
division within 12 days, and two heavy divisions within 30 days.\textsuperscript{29}

The key enablers for meeting this timeline are the Army's prepositioned stocks, strategic air and sealift assets, and power projection installations. The Army maintains seven prepositioned heavy brigade equipment sets afloat and on land, along with operational projects and supplies. By FY 2001, the Army plans to have a division set in Southwest Asia. For strategic airlift, the Army depends on today's inventory and tomorrow's production of the Air Force's C-17A Globemaster and future upgrades to the C-5 aircraft. The Navy's strategic sealift relies on fast sealift ships for surging heavy forces and carrying prepositioned equipment, stocks, and supplies. To improve installation power projection capability, the Army is investing $3.5 billion between FY 1998-2003 on military construction, railcars, shipping containers, Army watercraft, automation, and training.\textsuperscript{30}

Clearly the Army is preparing to rapidly project forces in support of the NMS's principle of power projection. It continues to enhance this capability for future operations. But once forces are deployed in response to a crisis, when do they come home? The Army's evolving role in global engagement and enlargement not only requires an Army capable of force projection but also an Army oriented on sustained overseas
presence. Only a sustained overseas land presence ensures stability and demonstrates the resolve and commitment called for in our NSS. So power projection enables us to implement the NSS, but forward presence enables us to sustain the NSS.

POST-COLD WAR DEPLOYMENTS

The new power projection Army has deployed on over 28 joint military operations since 1989. Many deployments have been training exercises furthering military readiness and improving joint and combined operations. Many more though have been in response to threats posed by the new security environment. The common thread to all, however, is forward presence and its immediate and lasting effect on stability. An examination of several key operations, crisis responses, and peacekeeping missions demonstrates the U.S. Army’s prosecution of a strategy of forward presence.

Southwest Asia

In response to Iraq’s surprise and unprovoked occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, the U.S. launched a massive deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia to deter further aggression and to force Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Under UN mandate, the U.S. with coalition partners conducted a sustained air campaign followed by a ground offensive. In February 1991, over 335,000 U.S. Army soldiers participated in the attack.
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were very successful. The vast majority of U.S. forces began redeployment in March 1991. But some U.S. Army forces have remained in the Persian Gulf and have in fact never left. In April 1991, a U.S. Joint Task Force with troops from U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) conducted Operation Provide Comfort, a humanitarian assistance mission to aid Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Iraq. In October 1994, in response to Iraq’s build-up of forces along the Kuwaiti border, elements of the 24th Infantry Division deployed to Kuwait on Operation Vigilant Warrior and remained on the ground for several months. In September 1996, the NCA deployed a 1st Cavalry Division brigade combat team to Kuwait on Operation Desert Strike in response to Iraqi aggression against Kurdish minorities in northern Iraq. In February 1998, the largest deployment of ground forces since Desert Storm occurred. Over 6,300 soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division and thousands from other Army commands deployed and sustained a six-month presence in Kuwait during Operation Desert Thunder. A residual force of over 2,000 soldiers remained after the main body redeployed in July; they were later joined by several thousand soldiers in December 1998 for Operation Desert Fox.

Since 1994, U.S. Army combat forces have sustained their presence in Kuwait. A battalion task force of over 1,500 soldiers remains stationed in the Kuwaiti desert as part of an
exercise known as Intrinsic Action. Additionally, as part of U.S. Central Command’s forward presence strategy, the U.S. Army maintains numerous soldiers in theater providing air defense, communications, and combat service support to deployed units. The Army maintains a heavy brigade set of equipment pre-positioned at Camp Doha, Kuwait and is establishing a second set in Qatar. U.S. Army Central Command (ARCENT) maintains a forward deployed headquarters in Kuwait year round.

The costs of these contingency deployments are substantial, as well as the overhead for supporting troops in theater. Deployment costs are not included in Army budget submissions. Long before Congress provides any supplemental funding, the Army diverts dollars from other accounts, thereby negatively impacting training, quality of life, and modernization. Despite an apparently complete victory over Iraq during Desert Storm, U.S. Army troops are increasingly frustrated over recurring crisis responses. Long-term open-ended deployments with no apparent effect on Iraq’s actions arguably undermine the morale and the readiness of Army soldiers. Veterans of Foreign Wars Commander-in-chief Allen Kent echoes this concern: “Prolonging such missions as Kuwait and Haiti can only sap the offensive spirit of combat troops. Men trained to fight must not be misused: They are warriors, not social welfare workers.”
Somalia

Widespread starvation in Somalia resulting from a severe drought prompted the U.S. to provide support to three separate UN humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement operations beginning in August 1992. Military support to Operation Provide Relief was primarily limited to the emergency airlift of food and supplies to relief organizations. The relief mission was jeopardized as Somalia’s warlords and clans presented unique security challenges and disrupted the flow of supplies to and from distribution sites. The U.S. land force presence and scope of mission increased dramatically in December 1992 with the deployment of over 28,000 U.S. troops in support of Operation Restore Hope. The mission to establish a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations went on for 17 months before transitioning to a UN peacekeeping force in May 1993. U.S. land force participation decreased to over 3,000 logistical support personnel and 1,150 troops from the 10th Mountain Division serving as a Quick Reaction Force. Additionally, a U.S. commander remained in charge of the UN forces.

The U.S. Army’s role in Somalia thus took on many faces, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping and combat operations. In October 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed and 75 wounded in the bloodiest battle of any UN peacekeeping operation. America’s only post-Vietnam Medal of Honor winners
were two U.S. Army special operations non-commissioned officers. After more than 28 months of sustained forward presence, U.S. forces withdrew from Somalia in March 1994.\textsuperscript{41}

Costs of the Somalia operation also drained the Army’s budget, since contingency operations were not funded in advance. The Army has never been fully reimbursed for funds diverted to contingencies. DoD’s incremental costs through fiscal year 1993 were over $885 million; only $123.6 million qualified for UN reimbursement.\textsuperscript{42} As with other long-term deployments, costs go far beyond monetary measures. The absence of clear entry and exit strategies, an inability to measure success, and mission creep that led U.S. forces into combat operations deepened and extended the involvement of U.S. Army soldiers.\textsuperscript{43}

Haiti

Military operations, while reduced in scope and intensity continue in Haiti well over four years after the U.S. first began Operation Uphold Democracy. In September 1994, a U.S. Joint Task Force composed of a headquarters from the XVIII Airborne Corps and over 18,000 troops prepared for an airborne, amphibious, and special operations invasion of Haiti. A last minute agreement between Haiti’s ruling military leader and U.S. envoys preempted the invasion, so U.S. forces occupied the island permissively. Their mission was to set the conditions for the return of Haiti’s exiled President, restore stability, and
transition the follow-on peacekeeping and humanitarian mission to UN forces.\textsuperscript{44}

Over the ensuing months, over 10,000 soldiers remained in Haiti, with U.S. troop presence expected to end in March 1995.\textsuperscript{45} The UN did assume responsibility for the mission. Nonetheless, more than 3,000 soldiers and a U.S. general officer in command of UN forces remained through February 1996.\textsuperscript{46} Today, U.S. Support Group-Haiti exercises command and control over all U.S. forces deployed in the republic to conduct civil military operations. While deployments are generally of short duration, the U.S. has a sustained presence and commitment of land forces.\textsuperscript{47} U.S. presence in Haiti has been extended indefinitely by President Clinton as Haiti's government remains unstable, its infrastructure languishes in ruins, and its population shows signs of continued discontent.\textsuperscript{48}

Diverting scarce resources and tying down operational forces for lengthy periods, Operation Uphold Democracy is another example of the Army's reliance on overseas presence to meet global engagement challenges. Additionally, the stress on frequently-deployed personnel presents a readiness concern. Forty percent of the enlisted soldiers and 18 percent of the officers were veterans of a lengthy Somalia deployment and many others had seen service during Operations Desert Storm and Just Cause.\textsuperscript{49} The stress on soldiers and family members is hard to
quantify, yet deployments with ill-defined missions and open-ended durations do have an impact. The second and third order effects of these missions may best be seen in future retention and recruiting accomplishments and other quality of life issues.

**Bosnia**

Perhaps the greatest post-Cold War example of an open-ended deployment is the sustained presence of the U.S. Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina. U.S. involvement followed a three year war (1992-1995) among Bosnia's three major ethnic/religous groups: Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs (Eastern Orthodox Christians), and Croats (Roman Catholics). The fight over whether Bosnia should become a unified multiethnic state or three distinct ethnically pure states resulted in over 200,000 deaths and over 2 million refugees. UN efforts to stop the fighting generally failed until the U.S. sponsored a cease-fire and negotiations for peace. The resulting peace settlement, the December 1995 Dayton Agreement, declared Bosnia to be a single multiethnic state with two entities: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Bosnian-Croatian Federation.

The Dayton Agreement authorized NATO to deploy military forces to the region to implement its terms. Under a 12 month UN mandate, the initial military force package, the Implementation Force (IFOR), had the mission to use force if necessary to separate and control the three militaries in Bosnia to maintain
a cease-fire. The IFOR, some 60,000 allied soldiers strong, was a NATO led force commanded by a British corps commander. President Clinton agreed to a yearlong presence with a U.S. land force commitment to IFOR in December 1995 consisting of over 18,000 soldiers. Those soldiers predominantly deployed from the European forward-based U.S. Army V Corps and 1st Armored Division. While IFOR created the basis for a secure environment, much remained to be accomplished to stabilize the foundation for a lasting peace.

As the December 1996 deadline approached, another UN mandate called for the IFOR to transfer responsibility to execute tasks as specified under the Dayton Agreement for 18 additional months (through June 1997) to a follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR). The President agreed to extend U.S. presence and the 1st Infantry Division, also forward-based in Germany, replaced 1st Armored Division. The SFOR, while reduced to 36,000 allied soldiers, still had a considerable U.S. Army representation of 8,500 troops, the largest of any participating nation. Not only did SFOR participation continue to tie down the focus of the V Corps to Bosnia, but the commander of USAREUR, dual hatted as the commander of NATO's Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), assumed command of SFOR. Over the course of the year and a half extension, the 1st Armored Division returned to
Bosnia and was followed by the 10th Mountain Division and the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment.

In June 1998, the UN authorized an SFOR follow-on force for an additional 12 months and left open the possibility that the authorization could be extended beyond that. President Clinton agreed to the extension and announced that this new force, also called SFOR, will not be tied to any specified exit date, but rather to agreed upon benchmarks between U.S. and NATO to measure the implementation of the Dayton accords. These benchmarks, the criteria for reaching them, and estimated target completion dates will be subject to six-month reviews by NATO, our NCA, and Congress. Realizing that the establishment of previous deadlines caused great consternation in Congress and with the public, President Clinton hedged his timeline bets: "Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines can prove impossible to meet and tend to encourage those who would wait U.S. out and undermine our credibility."58

Today, the U.S. Army remains in Bosnia, committing between 7,000 and 8,000 1st Cavalry Division soldiers.59 Additionally, another 3,750 troops remain in Croatia, Hungary, and Italy in support of operations in Bosnia.60 The U.S. 10th Mountain Division has already been designated to replace them in late 1999. Also, it appears the Army is looking to the Texas National Guard's 49th Armored Division to provide a 480 man replacement division
headquarters with a mix of Active and Reserve Component forces under their command and control. Part of the Army's strategic reserve, the 49th is the National Guard's only remaining heavy division. Its employment represents a decision to reduce the strain on the Army's Active Component heavy divisions.61

These soldiers undoubtedly promote regional stability and assure NATO allies that the U.S. honors its commitments. But what price is the U.S. paying to sustain this indefinite deployment? In monetary terms, DoD costs are projected to be $10.6 billion from FY 1996-FY 1999. U.S. Army costs in FY 1997 were approximately $1.77 billion; these costs are not expected to decrease in future years.62 Supplemental budget authorizations have always come after the fact, forcing the Army to divert other budgeted funds to contingency operations. Additionally, supplemental funds have never fully covered the costs incurred. In September 1998, the Senate passed the 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, which included $1.9 billion for continued operations in Bosnia. At the same time, the Senate rejected amendments to reduce American troop strength in Bosnia and to curb presidential power to employ U.S. forces.63

Macedonia

With a significantly smaller footprint, the Army continues to maintain its presence in the independent Republic of Macedonia. A former Yugoslavian state, Macedonia declared
independence in September 1991. To demonstrate U.S. resolve in keeping Yugoslavia’s civil war from spreading outside Bosnia and in an attempt to diminish criticism for an unwillingness to deploy land forces to Bosnia, President Clinton committed U.S. soldiers to a sustained forward presence in Macedonia. Since June 1993, the U.S. has participated in the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) providing forces to assist in monitoring Macedonia’s borders with Serbia and Albania. Today, a battalion task force of between 500-1,000 soldiers under UN sanction remains with no end in sight. The DoD cost of sustained support to this UN peacekeeping operation is well over $10 million a year.

Kosovo

Today, a new hotbed of unrest and instability is developing in the Balkans that may well require U.S. involvement and sustained presence by our land forces in the region. The Yugoslavian province of Kosovo, much like Macedonia, now seeks independence from Yugoslavia. There is a growing possibility that the province of Montenegro may attempt secession as well. Unlike in Macedonia eight years ago, the Yugoslavian government refuses to back down. It has not been reluctant to use military and security forces to defeat Kosovar rebels. Amidst long-term fighting, atrocities, and a recently broken cease-fire, NATO is struggling to make an effective response. Despite the repeated
threat of air strikes, Yugoslavian president Milosevic shows little interest in negotiating for a lasting peace or for compromising Kosovo's political autonomy.

NATO allies seem reluctant to initiate air strikes without commitment from the U.S. to participate in a multinational ground force that could be deployed on a peace enforcement mission. This force, based on the Bosnia model, would implement a cease-fire, provide security for foreign monitors, and apply pressure on the Yugoslavian government to come to agreement with Kosovo regarding their quest for independence. The JCS and SECDEF Cohen are opposed to committing U.S. forces because they believe the mission would require a long-term commitment and presence. However the Clinton administration is contemplating just that option. A senior U.S. national security official opined that, "Any serious discussion on how to resolve the Kosovo crisis over the long-term must explore all options, including American participation on the ground."67

The real question is whether Kosovo's independence and Balkan security really constitute a U.S. vital interest worth the risk of war. There is a strong possibility that Yugoslavia and Serbia will defend their interests. History shows that the Germans were tied down in a prolonged bloody struggle with Serb partisans during World War II; eventually, the Nazis abandoned their Balkan campaign. The U.S. should have learned a big lesson
in Vietnam. It remains to be seen if our NCA will engage U.S. land forces in a lengthy, sustained presence in Kosovo.

CONTINUED FORWARD PRESENCE

Despite the drawdown of forces overseas, today’s Army still stations over 100,000 soldiers permanently in Europe, Korea, and the Pacific. Additionally, in support of a 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement the Army sustains a long-term overseas presence in the Middle East. Since April 1982 an infantry battalion task force ranging from 600-800 soldiers has served as part of the MFO mission in the Sinai Peninsula. Originally, only Active Component airborne and light infantry battalions comprised the MFO. But due to the length of the mission (over sixteen years), Reserve Component battalions have joined in the rotation for Sinai duty.

Today, America’s post-Cold War force projection Army sustains over 120,000 soldiers forward-deployed overseas. This represents 25 percent of the 480,000 soldiers on Active duty and almost 40 percent of the Army’s 310,000 soldiers in the operational force. Four of the Army’s ten divisions and one of four corps sustain overseas presence. Despite its billing as a force projection Army, between permanently stationed forces abroad and soldiers deployed on open-ended missions it appears we still make a heavy investment in forward presence. It is
evident that in response to both the NSS and NMS, the U.S. Army remains a force capable of force projection. But we are as well executing a strategy of forward presence to accomplish missions.

READINESS IMPACT

So what is the cost of carrying out this unannounced strategy—in dollars and in readiness. Our busier-than-ever Army lives with a declining budget. Contingency operations have not been budgeted in the past, and supplemental authorizations for additional funding fail to fully reimburse the current costs of doing business. For the Army, the impact of this deficit funding has led to a diversion of funds from other accounts to pay for ongoing operations. The Army now needs an additional $700 million per year for the next six years to fix training and operations and maintenance deficiencies alone.\textsuperscript{71} The Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM) reported a $179 million shortfall in funds for readiness.\textsuperscript{72} Across the Army, funding for base operations has been at only 84 percent of requirements—and at only 59 percent for real property maintenance. Depot maintenance funding is at only 80 percent for combat systems and 50 percent for other equipment.\textsuperscript{73} For years the Army has been balancing near term readiness with future readiness. With only a 15 percent share of DoD’s research and development funds, the Army increased its FY 99 modernization account at the expense of
today's readiness. Senator James Inhofe, Chairman of the Senate Readiness Subcommittee, minced no words in describing the costs: "We are draining precious resources which we should be investing in our military's primary role, which is to fight and win wars."  

Training readiness also suffers. The U.S. Army has turned to its CONUS-based and Reserve Component force to take the strain off of both USAREUR and the Total Force. With funds diverted to support contingency operations, units conduct fewer collective training exercises and rely more heavily on simulations and command post exercises. OPTEMPO training miles for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles has been cut from 800 to 652, while helicopter flying hours have declined from 14.5 to 14. Results of recent rotations at our combat training centers (CTC) support the contention that units do not arrive as well trained. Training scenarios at our CTCs have been adjusted to cover a wider spectrum of conflict and to incorporate peacekeeping missions. These scenarios and the required train-ups detract from operational units' primary mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Most USAREUR units have not trained collectively on mission essential tasks for years. Other negative training impacts on forces deployed to Bosnia include a lack of maneuver area for conducting exercises, inadequate
ranges, and carrying out missions for which units are not primarily trained or equipped.\textsuperscript{78}

Personnel readiness also pays a price. The high OPTEMPO, a perceived erosion of pay and benefits, concern over the retirement system, and a force with almost two-thirds of its personnel married contribute to a loss of personnel. Particularly worrisome is the loss of mid-grade non-commissioned and commissioned officers.\textsuperscript{79} Clearly, quality of life has been a bill payer for heavy demands on the operational Army.

The most worrisome of the readiness impacts of the shape, respond, and prepare now strategy and the unspoken requirement for sustained forward presence is the assessment by the JCS regarding the military's capability to conduct its primary mission: to fight and win the nation's wars. Both the CJCS and Army Chief of Staff (CSA) recently testified that one MTW is executable with acceptable risk, but that a second MTW poses high risks and could entail massive casualties.\textsuperscript{80} Of particular concern to the CSA is the requirement to mobilize the Total Force and disengage troops from Bosnia in time to make a difference.\textsuperscript{81}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The post-Cold War Army—smaller, reliant on a Total Force, predominantly CONUS-based and oriented on power projection—
remains an Army fully engaged overseas. Since 1989, the evidence clearly indicates that the Army continues to maintain a substantial forward presence despite the emergence of a new-world order. The frequency and duration of Army deployments clearly demonstrate the Army’s greatest utility to a NSS of engagement and an NMS requiring shaping and response is in sustained forward presence and basing.

Not without costs, this strategy of forward presence also poses serious readiness problems. Indications are that defense spending may get a much-needed boost in the years ahead, but will it be enough? Can DoD and the Army sustain their current pace and guarantee on-going readiness? Finally, what price is the nation willing to pay to sustain global leadership? At some time in an era of declining resources, the U.S. must clearly specify and prioritize its interests. The global community must make a greater commitment to peace and stability. Multinational coalitions, with U.S. support, may be in order. The U.S. should take unilateral action only in response to threats to vital U.S. interests.

In the interim, as long as the world turns to America for leadership and as a role model for democracy, America’s Army must continue to remain prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars while conducting a full spectrum of military operations around the globe. This multifaceted role requires a force not
only capable of power projection but also capable of sustaining forward presence. Forward overseas presence can take many forms with forward basing representing the most visible symbol of U.S. commitment. Landpower offers the most daunting overseas presence; the presence of Army troops on the ground constitutes a statement neither an opponent nor the American people can ignore. In This Kind of War, T.R. Fehrenbach eloquently stated the purpose of landpower and the utility of forward presence on the ground:

You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by putting your young men into the mud.

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ENDNOTES


3 Force of Decision, 8-9.


7 The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant's Lecture Series.

8 Army Budget FY 99, 44-45.


10 Army Budget FY 99, 39-41.


14 NSS, 1:7.


16 NSS, 8:12.

17 NSS, 22.


19 SASC Hearing.

NMS, 12-19.

NMS, 19-20.

The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by a speaker participating in the Commandant’s Lecture Series.


Operations, 1-2.

Operations, 1-2.

Operations, 3-1.


Army Budget FY 99, 39-41.


Force of Decision, 8.


43 Somalia Operations, 28-32.
45 VFW-Haiti, 6.
49 VFW-Haiti, 6.
51 Michael Clarke and Andrew Duncan, Replacing SFOR in Bosnia: Options for a DFOR in 1998 (London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1997), 6; hereafter cited as Replacing SFOR.
52 BOSNIA-Dayton, 2-3.
53 BOSNIA-Dayton, 3.
54 Replacing SFOR, 4-5.
55 SASC Hearing.
56 BOSNIA-Dayton, 3-4.
57 Replacing SFOR, 5:32.
60 BOSNIA-Dayton, 4.

BOSNIA-Dayton, 21.


Army Budget FY 99, 43.


Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Status of U.S. Military Forces: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 105th Cong., 29 September 1998, 4; hereafter cited as Status of Forces.


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