THE FUTURE OF THE COMBAT TRAINING CENTERS TO MEET THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RONALD L. BERTHA
United States Army

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The Future of the Combat Training Centers to Meet the National Military Strategy

by

Ronald L. Bertha
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Colonel Michael A. Pearson

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
ABSTRACT

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The U.S. Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs) have been a great success story since their inception nearly 20 years ago. The National Training Center, Joint Readiness Training Center, Battle Command Training Program, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center all have been essential in maintaining the combat readiness of both leaders and units throughout our Army. These programs not only help to train our forces, but just as important, they are instrumental in the overall force development process. In view of this importance, many critics (to include senior Army officials) argue that our CTCs must change to not only accommodate the reality of increased unit OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO and decreased training budgets, but also to be more relevant to our current National Military Strategy (NMS). This paper argues that an evolutionary change of our CTCs with the times is most appropriate. However, the various revolutionary changes suggested by such critics are contrary to the basic purpose and fundamentals of our CTCs, detrimental to the readiness of the U.S. Army, and in actuality do not support our NMS.
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Most important, I want to thank the unending support of my family while writing this essay, during my year of studies at the War College, and throughout my service in the Army. My wife Pam, and children Michael and Kimberly make my efforts worthwhile and my life worth living.

Lastly, let me thank the many soldiers who have contributed to making me the Army officer that I am today. Soldiers like Ferguson, Burnell, Wigglesworth, Austin, Maynard, Rath, Camp, Carraway, Pickerelli, Jackson, Martin, and many others have been immeasurable in helping me develop into a soldier and leader. I regret that my real-Army troop days are over, but I will always cherish the influences that these great Americans have had on me professionally and personally, as well as the unselfish contributions that they have made to our country.
The Future of the Combat Training Centers
To Meet the National Military Strategy

Introduction

In war while everything is simple, even the simplest thing is difficult. -Clausewitz

The U.S. Army's official account of the Gulf War credits our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) with "resounding success" in helping our units prepare for war. In actuality, the CTCs have not only been vital for improving combat readiness, but more importantly, short of real combat, for nearly 20 years CTC rotations have given commanders at the Corps level and below the most opportunistic experience to develop the art of battle command.

However, the National Training Center (NTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) are much more than just training centers or programs. Just as important, these centers/programs are instrumental in the overall force development process as they help to: establish doctrine, determine standards for training and leader development, provide organizational and materials requirements, and give insights to soldier needs.
As successful as the CTCs have been, there are those in the U.S. Army, to include senior officials, who would like to revolutionize the CTCs by changing their basic purpose and fundamentals. Such critics argue that our CTCs must change to not only accommodate the reality of increased unit operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), as well as decreased training budgets, but also to be more relevant to our current National Military Strategy (NMS). Proposed changes include using the CTCs for: platoon and company lane training; training that emphasizes Operations Other than War (OOTW); and more Reserve Component (RC) training.

Even though these ideas do not attract much publicity in our journals today, senior Army officials talk about them often when visiting our CTCs. In fact, I heard these proposed changes first hand from Corps Commanders, the Forces Command (FORSCOM) Commander, and even the Chief of Staff himself while I served as an observer/controller (Senior Mechanized Task Force Trainer) at NTC (July 1997 - July 1998). More importantly, as simple as these proposals may sound, they would revolutionize the fundamentals of our CTC program, and have an adverse impact on the combat preparedness of our forces.

The purpose of this paper is to argue against these revolutionary ideas and to suggest another future evolution for our CTCs. This is a very relevant issue, because as training costs increase and available time and training dollars decrease,
the U.S. Army will undoubtedly look to the efficiency of the CTCs for expected changes.

**Combat Training Centers**

**The more an Army sweats in peace, the less it will bleed in War.**

- General Patton

The reality of a CTC was born in October of 1981 when the first Army maneuver units rotated through the NTC at Fort Irwin.² The army developed CTCs based on the studies of combat experience in previous wars which indicated a method was necessary to steepen the learning curve prior to combat in order to reduce battle casualties significantly.³ NTC's purpose then and now, as well as that of JRTC and CMTC which were developed later, is to provide the most realistic battlefield training short of actual combat.⁴

While NTC, JRTC, and CMTC provide battlefield training for brigade units and below (to include commanders and staffs), BCTP focuses on command and control training for brigades through corps. As such, it provides training only for commanders and their staffs.⁵

Without a doubt, the CTCs have been instrumental in improving the combat readiness of our Army. Our Army's Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, has referred to them as "the crown jewels of our training program."⁶ Former Army Chief of
Staff, General Carl E. Vuono said, "The value of the CTCs cannot be overstated, and the payoff is measured in the performance of our units in battle." It is no wonder that many countries throughout the world have or are trying to develop similar training centers.

The overwhelming success of the CTCs has made them the cornerstone of our Army's training readiness. Because of personnel turbulence which often occurs just after a CTC rotation, many argue that the greatest value of the CTCs is the tough, realistic, hands-on, training experience that they provide leaders and soldiers, rather than preparing units for combat. Additionally, these centers not only help train individuals and units, but just as important, they are instrumental in the overall force development process as they "serve as a laboratory for testing the effectiveness of current and emerging doctrine, force structure, organization, materiel systems, and training management approaches."8

The effectiveness of the CTCs cannot be duplicated by any other training method. So what makes the CTCs so successful, particularly as the most superb training that units and leaders can ever experience, short of actual combat? Certainly the training realism provided by the intense scenarios, real terrain and weather, and a freethinking, professional Opposing Forces (OPFOR) are key ingredients of the CTC experience. The former Commander of Operations Group at NTC, Brigadier General J.D.
Thurman, includes the following as essential elements for providing realistic training at the CTCs: true replication of time and space; need for commanders to integrate and synchronize all combat functions (nothing is notional); and above all, commanders are put under pressure and they have to perform.⁹

Simply put, the CTCs are effective because they follow the nine principles of training outlined in Field Manuals 25-100 and 25-101, particularly those of: train as a combined arms team, train as you fight, and train to challenge. Additionally, the CTCs train using multi-echelon techniques, another U.S Army training principle. This is very important in order to “use available time and resources most effectively,”¹⁰ and it adds to the realism of the conditions. Furthermore, the CTCs use the Army’s eight-step training model, which includes conducting after action reviews (AARs). Brigadier General Thurman considers this AAR process, which ensures immediate feedback, along with the observer controllers (trainers), as the most important reasons for the success of our CTCs.¹¹

A key ingredient of all the CTCs is the level at which training takes place. NTC, originally used to train Battalion Task Forces, eventually evolved into training Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). This evolution occurred because the large training area at Fort Irwin certainly supported this level of training, and “Senior Army Officials believed that training for a full three-battalion brigade would provide a more realistic
battlefield environment and enhance training in command and control.\textsuperscript{12} Besides, why not give Brigade Commanders, their staffs, and the complete BCT the most realistic and best training opportunity available.

JRTC followed the lead of NTC to train Brigade-level units, but unfortunately, the Holenfelds training area at CMTC was too restricted to train beyond Battalion Task Force Operations. Without any land constraints, BCTP always remained focused on training Commanders and battle Staffs from Brigade through Corps level.

We must understand that Brigade, and in many cases even Battalion Task Force, force-on-force combined arms training cannot be supported by training resources at home station--at least not to the extent as offered at the CTCs. The CTC battlefield realism, supported by a professional OPFOR, trained observer/controllers, and an electronic tracking system that greatly enhances AARs, is the most effective training that units and leaders can ever experience.

As effective as the training may be, we must recognize that training at the CTCs is expensive. For instance, it costs up to $12 million for a heavy BCT to deploy to, train at, and redeploy from NTC. Obviously, the cost is less for light units that train at JRTC and NTC because of their limited number of vehicles, as well as for Battalion Task Forces that train at CMTC. BCTP costs are even less because the training normally tasks place at home
station using only command and control vehicles and facilities. Additionally, training at the CTCs is limited to 10 rotations per year for NTC, JRTC, and CMTC, while the number of BCTP exercises per year varies based on need rather than limitations. Because of such cost and limitations it is imperative that we gain the maximum benefit from our important CTC resources.

Lane Training

"Man for man, one division is as good as another. They vary only in the skill and leadership of their Commanders."

-General Omar N. Bradley

"Lane training is a technique for training primarily company team-level and smaller units on a series of selected soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific terrain." Furthermore, it normally involves force-on-force scenarios, uses multi-echelon techniques, and in most cases is supported with observer/controllers. Lane training provides a narrow focus in order to select the most critical mission essential tasks for training. This technique is not normally associated with staff training, and therefore is not applicable for BCTP.

Those critics, to include our FORSCOM Commander, General Thomas Shwartz, whom I had a chance to talk with at NTC in March 1998, argue that changing CTC rotations into lane training for squads, platoons, and company teams is necessary. From their perspective, there is simply not enough time or money to
adequately train at home station for the way CTCs are currently oriented—focused at battalion and brigade levels. They use the recent poor results of rotational units as justification for their argument. Indeed, recent results clearly indicate a problem with home station training. As identified by General Reimer, "This degradation of both soldier and unit training levels has been evident when units arrive for their rotations at our Combat Training Centers."14

Before continuing, it is important to note that company lane training is conducted during the first week of a unit's rotation at CMTC. However, because of limited maneuver training land available in Germany, this first week of a rotation is actually part of unit's home station training. Also, units in Germany rotate to CMTC as often as every 12 months, rather than every 18-24 months for units going to NTC or JRTC.

Considering the high cost and limited number of rotations per year, using CTCs for lane training is not a very efficient use of valuable training resources. More importantly, it eliminates the need or requirement to conduct effective home station unit training above platoon level. This "lowers the bar" for establishing a training standard for our active forces. Despite our current home station training problems, General Reimer argues that "we must continue to strive to get the maximum benefit from CTC rotations. The Army must move more toward a 'continuum of training.' Training realism must be achieved at
home and at the CTCs." A former senior maneuver observer/controller at CMTC adds: "Units must arrive at the CTCs ready for a 'graduate-level' training experience. This demands comprehensive home station training . . . Otherwise, the full potential of the CTC experience will not be realized."  

Our CTCs over the years have "infused in field commanders an institutional obsession to train realistically for combat." As such, we must not use the CTCs to replace home station training, but rather, use the example of CTC training experiences to enhance the training conducted at home station. Home station opportunities are essential in order to continuously maintain our combat readiness for war. In the words of our Chief of Staff, "Our Army never has an 'off-season.' Commanders must train within the band of excellence throughout the year. Home station training plays a large role in sustaining readiness within that band of excellence."  

Additionally, while training company teams at our CTCs certainly does not degrade combat readiness of companies, platoons, and individual soldiers, it denies our brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs essential experiences of battle command. "To my mind the art of battle command is only gained through experience. The less experience you have, the more problems you are going to have teaching and understanding the art of battle command." Brigade commanders already are void from this critical experience at CMTC because of the small size
of the training area. Using CTCs for lane training would only exasperate this deficiency for all brigade and battalion commanders Army-wide.

Simulations are often suggested to fill the training shortfall of our brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs. In effect, while companies are conducting lane training, brigade and battalion staffs could be conducting JANUS exercises for their own training during a CTC rotation. It is justifiable that in this period of reduced training dollars, the Army is working hard to leverage technology through simulations as a means to train more efficiently. While some simulations show distinct promise for developing technical and even tactical skills, even Lieutenant General Thomas N. Burnette, warns of the inherent shortcomings of simulations. In his article entitled "The Second Training Revolution," the U.S. Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans reminds us that "live training remains the foundation of current training strategies," especially since virtual simulators and constructive training tools "cannot fully replicate all aspects of the live training environment."\(^20\)

In fact, commanders can and often do gain negative lessons from simulations. For instance, gaining smoke effects in JANUS is a constant because wind does not change, inversion effects are not applied, and indirect fire is unrealistically responsive. It is much more challenging to achieve the necessary effects of
smoke at an actual breach site on the ground under actual environmental conditions, while trying to synchronize it with security forces, direct and indirect fire suppression, and obstacle reduction assets. Of course one would never know how difficult this really is if they only tried it using JANUS. According to Brigadier General Thurman, "everything always works in simulation."\(^{21}\) It is no wonder why the following is a common phrase of rotational commanders, heard by observer/controllers at NTC: "This is not the way it happened in JANUS."

In effect, the lack of realism in simulations does not help to promote leader confidence or competence, essential for bold and decisive leadership. The intuition necessary for a battalion or brigade commander to make good and timely battlefield decisions must be developed through realistic experience, like the type of training available today at the CTCs. Only through the most realistic experiences—both seen and felt—can a leader learn effective battle command. "Nothing in the 'synthetic' world will ever equal the effectiveness of high-quality field training exercises and combined arms live fires.\(^{22}\)

If indeed, training is still our Army's top priority,\(^{23}\) as General Reimer and former Chiefs of Staff Generals Sullivan and Vuono have proclaimed, we cannot allow our CTCs to be used for merely lane training. Furthermore, if it is true that "live exercises must and will remain the foundation of future Army training,"\(^{24}\) we cannot afford to use resource limitations as
excuses for not conducting necessary and effective home station field training at company level and above. Rather, we need to use the proven training doctrine and practices that caused us to win the Gulf War; remembering General McCaffrey's words, "This war didn't take 100 hours to win, it took 15 years."\textsuperscript{25}

**Operations Other Than War**

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No American soldier must ever die in combat
Because we failed to provide the tough, realistic training demanded by the battlefields of today.
- General Carl E. Vuono
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"Military operations other than war [(MOOTW)] encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war."\textsuperscript{26} As such, "MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises."\textsuperscript{27} Understand, while the joint community uses the term MOOTW, the U.S. Army uses OOTW, but the terms are interchangeable. Among the many types of OOTW, the types that conventional U.S. Army forces are normally involved in include humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, peacekeeping or peace enforcement, and show of force.

Rather than war itself, OOTW are the type of operations that U.S. units are most often committed to today, and have been committed to in recent history. Bosnia, the former Yugoslavian
Republic of Macedonia, the Sinai, and Kuwait are a few of the places today where U.S. Army forces are deployed conducting OOTW. Of course, that is the exact argument of critics who say the CTCs need to be used more to train for OOTW rather than for war. Since the likelihood of OOTW is much greater than war itself, critics argue that we should make our CTCs more relevant by using them to train primarily for OOTW. Additionally, they argue that this will enable our CTCs to better support our country’s National Military Strategy (NMS), which advances national security by applying military power as directed to shape the international environment, respond to the full spectrum of crises, and prepare now for an uncertain future.28

The CTCs do have the capability to infuse OOTW scenarios into a rotational unit’s training, and this has been done in the past. During the period when units from U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) were rotating to Bosnia for peacekeeping, much of a unit’s CMTC rotation involved training for OOTW. However, even during this period, though the amount of training on conventional type of warfighting missions (i.e. movement to contact, defend, and attack) was reduced, it was still continued. Additionally, the 1st Calvary Division is using JRTC to conduct peacekeeping training prior to each unit’s deployment to Bosnia and their assumption of this OOTW mission. Despite the use of our CTCs to help train for upcoming OOTW missions, the focus of our CTCs remains on warfighting. Should this be the case?
The direct counter argument to those who want to use the CTCs primarily for training OOTW is that such training degrades the warfighting requirement of U.S. forces, and will cause us to lose our edge on combat readiness. I have personally observed that even minor OOTW exercises at NTC, like the escorting of U.N. humanitarian relief convoys, have caused training units to lose training efficiency for conventional operations. As a result, in many cases, these types of missions have been cancelled or reduced for the sake of overall training effectiveness.

Training for or executing OOTW simply does not exercise the same skills as those required for war. As a result, warfighting skills do deteriorate while a unit is involved in OOTW missions or training. Richard J. Newman, in an article published last January for U.S News and World Report, attributed our involvement in OOTW, particularly peace operations, as a major reason for the U.S. military's current lack of combat preparedness.²⁹

Certainly OOTW are implied in our NMS since these types of missions are imperative to help shape the international environment. However, according to our National Security Strategy (NSS), our strategy to shape merely attempts to "enhance U.S. security by promoting regional security and preventing or reducing the wide range of reduced threats."³⁰ Idealistically, shaping will help reduce the potential for war, but realistically, it will never eliminate it. It is the warfighting capability of our military that gives it the credibility to
effectively shape the environment while performing OOTW. As articulated in our NMS:

U.S. Armed Forces help to shape the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances. Critical to deterrence are our conventional warfighting capabilities and our nuclear forces.31

Responding to the full spectrum of crises means the U.S. Army must be prepared to engage in a wide range of various military operations from humanitarian assistance to major theater wars. As such, does this mean units must train on all types of OOTW, as well as on conventional missions? The Army’s philosophy behind mission essential task list assesses that units cannot effectively train at everything, not even all their go-to-war tasks. Given the limited training time that is available, some type of training balance must be achieved between OOTW versus war missions, or the risk of one versus the other must be accepted.

Even though skills involving OOTW and fighting conventional wars are both perishable, it is generally believed and documented that it requires more training resources—including time, money, and land—to train a unit for war. Training for OOTW is by no means automatic, but it is less challenging and less resource intensive than retraining a unit back to high-intensity conflict standards of readiness. All units learn this, as did the 1st Infantry Division during their recent return from the Bosnian mission. They were even given additional Army funds to assist in this transition.32
Even though OOTW is a reality for our Army today, training "down" for such operations should only be done as required, to avoid shifting our focus away from the primary purpose of our military—"to deter threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail." It is therefore much more feasible to accept the risk of not being prepared for OOTW than for not being trained for war. We must never forget, that our military’s focus is not building bridges in hurricane-torn Honduras, providing hurricane relief in Homestead, Florida, stopping the dying in Rwanda, or even keeping the peace in Bosnia. At least according to our current NMS, "Our Armed Forces’ foremost task is to fight and win our Nation’s wars." 

Preparing our military now for the future is a "strategy that calls for transformation of our doctrine and organizations and a stabilized investment program in robust modernization." The CTCs greatly support this pillar of strategy since (as previously stated) they not only train leaders and units, but are also a vital link in the establishment of doctrine, organizations, and materiel requirements. If the future of war only consisted of operations that we currently know to be OOTW, then the CTCs would definitely have to change. However, no one can anticipate such a revolutionary change in warfare. Furthermore, according to U.S. Army War College professor and futurist, Doctor Steven Metz, the American people and their
political leaders, not the Army or military, are responsible to redefine war or change its basic focus. Change will be based on environmental considerations and the political realities of the times. "Put simply, until told otherwise, the Army has to remain focused on conventional, state-on-state warfighting."  

Despite arguments to the contrary, the current focus of our CTCs on warfighting directly supports our NMS. In fact, because of the numerous OOTW that the Army is and has been involved in during recent history, it makes the current focus of the CTCs that much more important and relevant. Without their emphasis on training and preparing for war, we may likely be overcome by current deployments and events, and thus forget the true purpose of our Armed Forces.

**Reserve Component Training**

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In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.

- General MacArthur
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The issue of weather Reserve Component (RC) units should train at our CTCs has been around ever since 1983 when the first National Guard (NG) unit, 1st Battalion, 108th Armor from Georgia, a subordinate element of the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mechanized), trained at NTC. Ever since then, RC personnel and units have been training at our CTCs, to include during the period of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, when the 48th
Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the Georgia NG and the 155th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the Mississippi NG trained at NTC. In fact, a light enhanced NG Brigade and a heavy enhanced NG Brigade rotate through the JRTC and NTC respectively every Summer. AT CMTC, while individual RC personnel occasionally train with active units on rotation, no RC-unit rotations are ever scheduled. RC training is not an issue for BCTP, especially since there is a RC BCTP team organized specifically to help train RC divisions, and even a Brigade Command Battle Staff Training Program team dedicated to training RC brigade and battalion commanders and their staffs.

The argument for RC use of our CTCs from senior RC officials as well as our Chief of Staff of the Army, General Reimer, is a very logical one. Since our active forces are seldom deployed during war or peace without the support or augmentation of the reserves, it only makes sense that the RC trains with active units. More importantly, RC rotations at our training centers force these units to meet the same high standard as their active component (AC) counterpart, while theoretically achieving the same benefit as well. This certainly helps to promote the “Total Army” concept and improve the overall readiness level of our Army.

Despite such honorable gestures, controversy has surrounded this issue since 1983. The idea of RC personnel or platoon size units or smaller participating in AC rotations is not in question
here. This practice is valid since these individuals or units will indeed most likely augment or supplement their respective active counterpart unit during crisis response. In fact, this idea will be even more relevant with Division XXI where several hundred positions in the active division will be filled with RC personnel. However, RC brigades or battalions training at our CTCs is where the problem lies.

For RC units to use the limited CTC training resources is not efficient for the total Army. Because of only 10 rotations each year, CONUS active brigades only rotate to NTC or JRTC about every 12-18 months. Considering the fact that only two of the three organic battalions rotate with the brigade each time, some active battalions only experience a CTC once in every two or three years. This means that some battalion commanders never even get the chance to realize the CTC battle command experience while they are in command. My intention is not to slight the RC, but training readiness must start with the AC.

More importantly, RC only have 39 drill days per year to train, only sufficient time to train at best up to the standard of platoon-level and Battle Staff collective tasks. This level of training is not consistent with the purpose or focus of the CTCs. Experience since 1983 shows that training efficiency of the CTCs for RC units is poor because of the low entry training level. As a senior observer/controller at the time, I can attest that the results of last year’s NTC rotation of the 116th
Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the Idaho NG clearly espouse this point. While skills at the platoon level and below were good, those at company team level and above proved to be below standard even at the end of the rotation.

Remember that it took approximately ninety days of training, to include fifty-five days at NTC, for the Army to "validate" the 48th Brigade's training during Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. As a result, the 48th Brigade never did get the opportunity to deploy and participate in the Persian Gulf War. However, NG units were "never meant to deploy without significant post mobilization training." In fact, the normal expectation for a premiere RC unit, i.e. an enhanced brigade, to go to war is as long as ninety days after mobilization.

Even General Reimer has doubts about the utility of RC units training at CTCs. Last June he contracted for RAND to conduct a yearlong study to answer the question of whether (and how often) RC units should rotate through NTC/JRTC. The Army has been down this road before, but has still not learned the necessary lessons. Psychologically, it is great for the "Total Army" concept that RC units rotate periodically through our CTCs. However, based on the limited training time of our RC and the limited number of rotations per year at NTC and JRTC, the RC should limit their involvement at the training centers to augmentation personnel. Consequently, we should not only
prohibit an increase of RC training at the CTCs, but also
discontinue the current annual rotations offered to RC units.

The Army's teaming concept, integrated division, and multi-
component force show potential in fulfilling General Reimers goal
of "One Team, One Fight, One Future." However, a "Total Army"
should not necessarily equate to the same expectations from all
its parts. The RC is a vital part of our Force and NMS, but we
must accept it for what it is, a reserve force.

Conclusion: The Future of Our Combat Training Centers

Training: Our Army's top priority and don't you
forget it!

- General Dennis J. Reimer

If the CTCs should not be changed to incorporate lane
training into rotations or to change their focus of training to
OOTW, then what is their future except the possible elimination
of RC rotations? What changes are foreseen to ensure NTC, JRTC,
CMTC, and BCTP are relevant into the 21st century?

In order for the CTCs to remain the cornerstone of the U.S.
Army's training readiness, they must change to support our
evolving NMS. As General Reimer reminds us, "Readiness is
measured against our ability to execute the NMS." The NMS will
in turn change as our NSS evolves to meet the future demands of a
changing geopolitical environment.
Based on his recent experience as the Commander of operations Group at NTC, Brigadier General Thurman may have the best perspective on the future of our CTCs. He believes our training centers will stay focused on the "fundamentals of warfighting at the mid to high spectrum of conflict." Additionally, at least until war is redefined, the CTCs will emphasize the basic conventional missions of attack, defend and movement to contact. Certainly, some asymmetrical threats will be introduced, as these threats become more prevalent in the world. However, such threats will only attempt to distract a unit from the primary threat of a highly trained and equipped, freethinking enemy. Brigadier General Thurman also believes as intelligence acquisition, analysis, and dissemination becomes more important, information warfare will be a significant contributing factor in deciding the outcome of CTC battles or campaigns.

None of these future developments will change the essential character of our CTCs, and it is doubtful that other innovations at our CTCs will either. The basic purpose and fundamentals of our CTCs have not changed in nearly 20 years, and are unlikely to change in the next 20 years without a drastic change to our NSS or NMS. The future of our CTCs will be an evolutionary change with the times, not a revolutionary one.

Word Count = 5,021
ENDNOTES


3Scales, 20.


8Chapman, 2.

9Brigadier General James D. Thurman <ThurmanJ@irwin.army.mil>, “NTC Info,” electronic mail message to LTC Ron Bertha <BerthaR@pa.net>, 9 January 1999.


11Thurman.


14 General Dennis J. Reimer, statement before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, speaking on the subject of "Readiness," during the second session of the 105th Congress, 29 September 1998.

15 Reimer, "Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It," 61.


17 Scales, 22.

18 Reimer, "Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It," 61.


21 Thurman.

22 Burnette, 118.

23 General Dennis J. Reimer, "Training: Our Army's Top Priority and Don't You Forget It," 55.

24 Burnette, 118.

25 Scales, 35.


\textsuperscript{31}Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{National Military Strategy}, 2.

\textsuperscript{32}Naylor, Sean D. "Are Heavy divisions Going the Extra Mile for the Training?," \textit{Army Times}, 8 February 1999, 18.

\textsuperscript{33}Joint Chiefs of Staff, \textit{National Military Strategy}, 5.

\textsuperscript{34}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{36}Doctor Steven Metz <MetzS@AWC.Carlisle.army.mil>, "RE: Presentation," electronic mail message to LTC Ron Bertha <BerthaR@AWC.Carlisle.army.mil>, 4 September 1998.

\textsuperscript{37}Chapman, 227 and 230.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., 238 and 246.

\textsuperscript{39}General Dennis J. Reimer, "Total Army Update," address to the National Guard Association of the United States, 7 September 1998.

\textsuperscript{40}General Dennis J. Reimer, "CSA 98-17 Random Thoughts While Running," electronic mail message from LTC Kurt Weidenthal <Weidentk@AWC.Carlisle.Army.mil> to LTC Ron Bertha <BerthaR@AWC.Carlisle.Army.mil> via COL Thomas P. Watts, via LTC Joseph P. Robinson, via LTC Patrick W. Shull, 21 October 1998.

\textsuperscript{41}Thurman.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid.
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