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TONG-A ILBO Discusses Co-Hosting Possibility

[By reporter Yi Chong-se "Participation of North Korea in the 1988 Seoul Olympics—Difference Between Excuses and Reality"]

Is it really possible for South and North Korea to co-host the Seoul Olympics scheduled in just 4 months? Or would it be possible to let North Korea host some of the events? Or is it possible at least for South and North Korea to participate in the Olympics as a unified team? Such questions are being asked even more urgently than ever since the opposition group and the students recently urged both government authorities to resume negotiations so that North Korea can participate in the Olympics, and the students are insisting on the co-hosting. The organizations that have been involved in the preparation for the Olympics for the past 6 years expressed their view, that while such insistence can be lessen the mistrust between South and North Korea, and lay the basis for reconciliation, it is realistically unfeasible. This is because co-hosting is against Article 34 of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Charter, and it is too late for North Korea to participate together.

Although it is still possible for North Korea to participate in the Seoul Olympics in the manner similar to East Germany's in the Munich Olympics in 1972, that possibility also seems to be remote. On the other hand, there is criticism that the inconveniences caused by these questions at this late stage to the preparation is a result of the unilateral execution of the process by involved organizations without seeking a consensus among the people through efforts such as public relations and discussions.

The Insistence of Unofficial Opposition Group and Students

In their statement on 11 May entitled, "A Letter to President No Tae-u of the Republic of Korea and President Kim Il-song of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," 35 people including the dissident Ham Sok-hon urged South and North Korean authorities that "resume the negotiation for both parties to participate in the 24th Olympics." This statement also pointed out that "Since the Seoul Olympics is a good opportunity for both South and North Korean people to meet each other without having any political burden, it will be very regretful if our brothers and sisters in the North cannot participate together."

On 14 May, the University Student Representatives Committee insisted at the "Pan-Citizen and Student Congress for Co-Hosting the Olympics" sponsored by Korea University that "The South and North Korean authorities should sublimate the Seoul Olympics as an occasion for laying down the basis of the reunification by concession and compromise."

Co-Hosting the Olympics

At the first sports meeting between the South and the North in October, North Korea suggested that they both co-host the Seoul Olympics, use the official name as the "Choson Olympics or Pyongyang-Seoul Olympics," and equally share the events and the income from the sale of TV broadcasting privileges.

However, the IOC and the Korean Olympic Committee (KOC) of Seoul have taken the official position from the beginning that co-hosting is impossible on the grounds that there is no such precedence in the 100-year history of modern Olympics and that it is against the IOC Charter.

According to Article 34 of the IOC Charter, "All of the events should be held at the main stadium or its vicinity in the host city. For events at other cities in the host country, they should get an IOC approval."

The IOC Charter also specifies that the official name should have the host city name, and furthermore, that organizations involved in the preparation of the Olympics as the Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee, which carry out services on behalf of the IOC, cannot unilaterally distribute events or income from the Olympics.

Although North Korea cited the example that at the Melbourne Olympics in 1956, horse racing was held in Stockholm, Sweden, the IOC and the KOC explained that this was necessary because the Australian animal quarantine law at the time prohibited foreign horses from entering the country.

Distributive Sponsorship

At the fourth sports meeting between South and North Korea in July 1987, the IOC allowed North Korea to sponsor archery, table tennis, complete women's volleyball games, preliminary soccer games for one set of teams, and men's road cycling. North Korea, however, requested that they host all of the soccer games, that the IOC replace the road cycling event with a different one, and that the IOC add an additional event to these.

The IOC, however, took the position that they cannot accept North Korea's request and that even if their request would be accepted, it is too late to be implemented.

Such a position was based on the judgment that North Korea cannot be completely prepared for the games in just 4 months, whereas the preparation period for the Olympics is normally considered to be about 6 years.
The experts' opinion is that even if a stadium is available, it is impossible to resolve other related issues such as accommodation, transportation, registration, communications, medical facilities, and cooperation with the International Federations within the remaining period.

Forming a Unified Team

The IOC is not involved in this problem because they consider it a problem between the South and North Korean Governments. The makeup of a unified team for a divided country, however, involves a lot of technical problems such as naming the country, national anthem, national flag, constitution of members and players, and training. In case of East and West Germany, it took 256 official meetings and unofficial contacts for 5 long years to succeed in forming a unified team to participate in the 1956 Melbourne Olympics. Thus, 4 months will be far too short to resolve numerous problems associated with the construction of a unified team.

North Korea's Participation in the Seoul Olympics

The IOC disclosed on 17 January that the committee will accept late applications by 17 May, which is the deadline for a preliminary entry, by the six out of 167 member nations including North Korea and Cuba who did not notify their intention to participate by the initial deadline. The door for North Korea to participate has been opened by the IOC. If North Korea shows any intention to participate even after 17 May, the KOC's official position is to try their best to make it possible by cooperating with the IOC. In this case, the official name for North Korea will be the "Democratic People's Republic of Korea" and the KOC will acknowledge their national anthem and flag. It is the prediction of those concerned, however, that the possibility for North Korea to participate in the Seoul Olympics is dim because there has not yet been any such indication from North Korea.

Counterplan by Organizations Concerned

It is an urgent task for the organizations concerned to reinforce the public relations efforts so that people can better understand the exact situation. Although briefings to higher authorities such as the Blue House are important, it is equally important for the people to be timely informed of any change or development related to the Olympics, and a consensus should be sought from the people.

It is true that many people still have an impression that the organizations involved in the preparation for the Olympics seem to prevent North Korea from participating or from requesting shared sponsorship. Therefore, in order to prevent such a misunderstanding, they have to intensify the public relations efforts towards the people.

Some people believe that South Korea should maintain an attitude and effort of resuming talks with North Korea like a big brother, rather than condemn their inconsistent behavior of obstructing the Korean government's effort to host the 24th Olympic games in Seoul, their persistent demands for changing the host site after it was decided that the Olympics would be held in Seoul, and their present insistence on co-hosting or shared hosting.

Main Agenda for the Sports Meetings Between South and North Korea

1st Meeting (8-9 October 1985)

South: Assigned preliminary handball, volleyball, and soccer events to the North; Suggested connecting South and North Korea for a road cycling event. North: Co-hosting the Olympics; Equal distribution of events between the North and the South; Joint establishment of the Olympic organizing committee; Equal distribution of the income from the sale of broadcasting rights. IOC: Co-hosting is impossible.

2nd Meeting (8-9 January 1986)

South: Joint entrance by the South and the North Korean teams at the opening ceremony; Assigned handball, volleyball, and preliminary soccer events to the North; Suggested connecting South and North Korea for the road cycling event; Suggested the North Korean participation in cultural events. North: Reiterated co-hosting; Set priority on the establishment of a unified team.

3rd Meeting (10-11 June 1986)

South: Assigned table tennis, complete fencing events to the North; Assigned the preliminary match of soccer for one set of teams to the North; Suggested connecting South and North Korea for the road cycling event. North: Assigned six or more complete events to the North; Removed the city name from the official name; Requested separate opening ceremonies in Seoul and Pyongyang; Cultural events in both Seoul and Pyongyang.

IOC: Assigned table tennis and complete archery events to the North; Assigned preliminary match of soccer for one set of teams to the North; Suggested connecting South and North Korea for the road cycling event; Cultural events in South and North; Suggested that North Korea guarantee free visitation of the South and the North by the players' families numbering about 25,000.

4th Meeting (14-15 July 1987)

South: Urged to agree on the IOC’s proposal from the 3rd meeting. North: Reiterated co-hosting; Concurrent Lausanne meetings and direct meetings between the South and the North.

IOC: Modified proposal of assigning archery, table tennis, women's volleyball (new), preliminary soccer for one
set of teams, and men's single road cycling to the North; If the North rejects this proposal, no more meetings.

After the 4th Meeting: The sports meetings practically ceased since the Chairman of the North Korean Olympic Committee, Kim Yu-sun announced on 23 October 1987 that discussions would be resumed on co-hosting if the democratic power should win the election in South Korea.

13302
PPD Requests Parliamentary Probe of Chon, Relatives
SK1306082088 Seoul YONHAP in English
0753 GMT 13 Jun 88

[Text] Seoul, June 13 (YONHAP)—South Korea’s leading opposition party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) has requested a parliamentary probe into alleged wrongdoing by former President Chon Tu-hwan, his wife and some of their relatives as well as alleged abuse of power and human rights’ suppression during Chon’s seven year rule.

The request came in a statement issued Monday by the party’s special committee which is probing irregularities allegedly committed by Chon’s family and his government.

In a statement, the party said that more than 100 of Chon’s family members and relatives occupied important posts in government agencies and state-run companies and embezzled national property during Chon’s seven-year presidency.

It also said that Chon’s family and relatives funneled the embezzled money to foreign countries including the United States and Australia over the past seven years.

The statement urged that Chon and his relatives, who are suspected of irregularities, be prohibited from leaving the country so a probe can be conducted into their alleged wrongdoing and all their overseas property can be returned to the national treasury.

The statement demanded a full explanation into rumors that 6.5 million U.S. dollars was received as a commission for Korea’s purchase of U.S. weapons during the Chon government, as well as rumors of a six million-dollar commission for U.S. rice imports, and a commission worth 0.1 million dollars for a nuclear plant.

The statement also called for an explanation into rumors that the Standford hotel on New York City’s 32nd Avenue was purchased during the Chon administration at a cost of 5.5 million dollars.

It said more than 20 cases in which Chon’s family allegedly funneled illicit financial gains to foreign countries should be thoroughly investigated.

The main opposition party also called for an investigation into whether an alleged bribe worth 6.25 million dollars from a U.S. aircraft company, for the sale of F-20 fighters to the Korean air force, was handed over to former President Chon by a Korean lobbyist.

The statement claimed that Chon’s wife, Yi Sun-cha, was involved in corruption totaling about 700 billion won (about 950 million dollars) during the seven years of her husband’s presidency. Chon stepped down as president on Feb. 25.

The party said several cases involving alleged suppression of human rights during the Chon administration should also be examined.

The cases include the so-called Samchong Training Course, a controversial camp for lawbreakers in 1980 before Chon came to power, as well as the alleged torture of anti-government activists.

In response to the opposition party’s charges, the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) issued a statement reiterating its objection to a direct investigation of former President Chon saying that such a probe would be undesirable because a substantial portion of the allegations are based only on groundless rumors and the nation’s prestige is at stake.

The government party’s statement also said it should be taken into account that Chon was the first South Korean president to establish the tradition of a peaceful transfer of power.

Corruption allegedly involving Chon’s family and relatives has emerged as a top political issue in South Korea since the opposition camp vowed recently to set up a special assembly panel to investigate the allegations.

In the April 26 parliamentary elections, three opposition parties—Kim Tae-chung’s PPD, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP)—won a combined majority of assembly seats.

The PPD emerged from the elections as the no. 1 opposition party, relegating Kim Yong-sam’s RDP to the status of the no. 2 opposition party, while Kim Chong-pil’s NDRP emerged as the no. 3 opposition party.

The elections marked the first time that the ruling party failed to win a majority of assembly seats in Korea’s 40-year modern history.

Meanwhile, Kim Yong-sam said Friday that he would ask the government to ban all members of Chon’s family and some of his relatives from leaving the country as a preparatory step for a possible probe into their alleged past wrongdoing.
New Era Sparks Consideration of Revising, Repealing National Assembly Laws

Both Parties Studying Alternatives

41070056 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
6 May 88 p 1

[Text] Under the understanding that the first session of the 13th National Assembly will consider revising the National Assembly Laws, both the ruling and opposition parties are studying the alternatives of revision.

Focal points under consideration by both parties are: Restriction on the length of assembly sessions; Restriction on the time allowed for amendments; Increasing the number of permanent committees; Establishing a permanent committee for budget; Permission for TV and radio broadcasting assembly sessions; Managing permanent committees by question-and-answer procedure; Allowing more time for making statements during sessions.

In connection with this topic, both parties are considering revisions along the following lines: The article (Article 8) restricting the number of days for both plenary and special sessions to 150 days be revised so that at least 100 days from the current 90 days be allowed for regular session so as to accommodate the anticipated revival of national auditing, and the 60 day limit for special sessions be extended to hold special sessions any time at the request of members; The opening hour of the regular session be changed from 2:00 pm to 10:00 am (Article 67); Permanent committees of the National Assembly be increased in number from the current 13 to 16 (Articles 36 and 38) by dividing the social and social affairs committee into a health and social affairs committee and a labor committee, and also by dividing the education and public information committee into an education committee, a public information committee and an athletics committee; Changing the special committee for budget into a permanent committee; Repealing the current restriction which prohibits, except by permission of the president of the assembly, either video or audio taping of sessions so as to permit live broadcasting of assembly sessions; and Revising the current regulation which restricts questioning of executive branch officials to 30 minutes with one 10 minute extension so as to allow 60 minutes.

In addition, sources indicate that there will be a discussion regarding the rounding down of quorum for agenda setting as well as vote counting.

In connection with this topic, the floor leader of the Democratic Justice Party Kim Yun-hwan clarified on 6 May, “The current National Assembly Laws were made under the yushin regime for the two members per district system and then somewhat revised during the Fifth Republic, and as such they are restrictive of the assembly functions and contain many anti-democratic elements. Revision is inevitable. The Democratic Justice Party will take an active initiative to revise those obstacles standing in the way of a new assembly even before the opposition party comes up with suggestions.”

With regard to the time of revision, Kim said, “Since the opening session of the Assembly will be devoted to issues of assembly structure, the topic is most likely to be handled in a special session to be held after the opening session.”

Over 70 Laws Selected for Possible Revision, Repeal

41070056 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean
12 May 88 p 1

[Text] In anticipation of the opposition parties’ request for revision of anti-democratic laws during the 13th National Assembly, the ruling Democratic Justice Party has selected 70 some laws for consideration of either revision or repeal. They include repealing the law for the national senior advisory council and revising the laws for national security and social order, and they have begun to reexamine them in detail.

On the 11th, the party’s special committee for statute revision selected the following laws for possible revision: the National Security Act; the Social Order Act, the Political Funding Act, the Assembly Act, the law pertaining to the publication of periodicals.

On the other hand, the laws selected for possible repeal include the following: the National Senior Advisory Council Act; the Social Reform Movement Act; the Labor-Management Dispute Act.

The committee will also consider legislating new laws such as: the national audit act; the deferrment of farmers and fishermen debt act; the wire tapping and mail inspection act.

One member of the committee noted that the National Defense Act would also be considered for revision so as to promote democratization of the armed forces.

In connection with the selection of these laws, this source indicated that “the laws selected for consideration are the ones the opposition parties have had problems with in the past” and “in the future other laws will also be selected in consultation with opposition parties.”

Regarding the direction of appraisal, this source clarified that “we have not decided on specifics of change” but “the policy of our party is to rewrite them to be persuasive and credible to the public.” It is said that the Police Performance Act is being considered for repeal and a consensus is being built on eliminating the article on national disgrace from the criminal law.

Under consideration for revision: National Assembly Law; Criminal Law; Commercial Law; Law concerning the compensation for assembly members; Election Law; Law concerning political funding; Social Order Law; Law regarding execution of sentence; Criminal Proce-
The ruling and the opposition parties are taking pains in searching for countermeasures and a future direction for the current state of affairs such as the opening of the National Assembly and release of detainees. The ruling and the opposition parties each held meetings and discussed these issues on 16 May. We closely followed these meetings and report here in detail.

The DJP

As the opening of the 13th National Assembly approaches, the DJP is busy preparing for anticipated attacks by the opposition circles and thus is holding frequent meetings with the government in its effort to deal with a changed political situation.

The party showed busy activities such as holding a conference between the senior party and government members where measures to cope with the political situation were discussed, followed by an expanded party staff meeting presided by Chairman Yun Kil-chong on the morning of 16 May. On the afternoon of the same day, it held the first policy adjustment conference between the party and the government since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic. The staff members unanimously under-emphasized the meaning of these meetings by calling them a "formal bow."

However, the staff members do not feel light-hearted because the atmosphere outside of political circles, which has a seasonal element, is not necessarily light and, in addition, there was the unexpected student suicide by jumping from Myongdong Cathedral which could inevitably influence political circles at a time when a long-awaited politics of dialogue is in its initial stages.

“Regular members” participated in the conference between senior party and government members held that morning in a form of breakfast meeting: there were Secretary General Pak Chun-pyong and Floor Leader Kim Yun-hwan from the party, and there were Director of the Agency for National Security Planning Pae Myong-in, Minister of Home Affairs Yi Chun-ky, Minister of Justice Chong Hae-chang, First Minister of State Yi Chong-chan from the government, and there were Secretary General Hong Song-chol and Senior Presidential Secretary for Political Affairs Choe Pyong-yol from the office of the president. Although people concerned kept silent after the meeting by saying “Nothing particular has been decided,” rumor had it that issues concerning a meeting between President No Tae-u and the three Kims and the release of detainees were mainly discussed.

In particular, it is said that someone suggested that the government reconsider its decision not to release additional detainees on the basis of a judgment that the suicide of student Cho Song-man at Myongdong Cathedral on 15 May could cause a stir in the political world.

Although a four-party meeting between President No and the three Kims to be held “before the opening of National Assembly” was also confirmed, the method or the time of the meeting has not been decided because of the opposition parties’ change of plan. The party regards...
individual meetings as more desirable for a practical discussion of the impending agenda. However, it postponed its decision on whether it will hold individual meetings until it sees the progress of negotiations for constitutional reform at the floor leaders meeting, because the clear agenda of the National Assembly is not known due to the postponement of the floor leaders' meeting on 16 May and also because Peace and Democratic Party (PDP) President Kim Tae-chung, who originally hoped for individual meetings, is now moving toward a “joint meeting” with the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP).

This clearly shows the DJP's situation where it is forced to consider the atmosphere of the opposition parties on every occasion unlike in the past when it was able to present “one-sided” but quick and firm decisions with its majority in the National Assembly.

In the ensuing expanded party staff meeting held at the party headquarters, the awkward party position was revealed even more when the party could not voice its own opinion on the release of detainees because of the opposition of the government in spite of increasing demand on that issue within and without the party.

In the meeting, the party clarified its position by saying that "Because those 'detainees' whose release the opposition parties demand include not only people serving their prison terms but also those under investigation or suspects who are detained pending trial, it is not desirable to lump them together in a overall political negotiation," thus giving people an impression that it had retreated from its original policy of "vigorous cooperation with the government."

In the party-government conference meeting for policy adjustment held on the afternoon of that day, the party, by selecting the issues of economic trends, reunification, security measures, administrative reform, and improvement of the legal situation as its agenda rather than political issues, reflected its wish to give utmost priority to such issues as reunification, security, and the people's livelihood.

The party argued that the release of detainees did not even appear on the “official agenda” and the incident of the suicide of the student, Mr Cho, was not discussed during the afternoon party-government meeting. However, it is also said that there was a quiet discussion at the request of Chairman Yun, who said that “Although there was a large-scale release in commemoration of the presidential inauguration, I hope that the government will closely reexamine the issue of an additional release in recognition of the 29 June anniversary.”

The PDP

As the incident of Seoul National University student Cho Song-man's suicide broke out 3 days prior to the eighth anniversary of the 18 May Incident, the PDP reacted very sensitively with increased criticism against the government and the ruling party while using this incident as a stepping-stone in order to cross to an “era of unified struggle by the opposition camps against 18 May.”

It appears that the PDP decided to take advantage of this period and exert efforts to consolidate the opposition forces when it noticed that 14 opposition organizations which are connected with the Kwangju Incident such as the “Association of Participants in the 18 May Kwangju People's Uprising” organized a Committee for Unified Struggle of Pan-Democratic Forces for the Succession of the May People's Uprising and Inquiry into the Truth (abbreviated as May Unified Struggle Committee) and will hold simultaneous memorial services across Kwangju for 10 days from 18 May to 27 May.

As the Seoul National University student Cho incident broke out, PDP President Kim Tae-chung took various measures such as promptly visiting Paek Hospital on the evening of 15 May where Mr Cho's coffin was placed, expressing his consolation to the bereaved family, and giving an order to convene an emergency party affairs meeting instead of the regular presidential staff meeting slated for 16 May.

He also directed Floor Leader Kim Won-ki to contact floor leaders of the three opposition parties such as the RDP and the NDRP and discuss cooperative measures on pending issues such as the freeing of detainees, which resurfaced with the Cho suicide incident.

Prior to the party conference on the morning of 16 May, President Kim indicated that “the government, which had declared its intention to release prisoners of conscience and lift the ban on wanted men on a selective basis on this occasion also, thus showing its passive attitude concerning the eighth anniversary of the Kwangju Uprising, was entirely responsible for such a tragic incident” and stressed that “only when the detainees are freed by political means, can the other issues also be solved by political means.”

The PDP also decided that President Kim would not attend the memorial service to be held in Mangwol-tong, Kwangju, but would send his recorded memorial speech via Executive Vice President Mun Tong-hwan.

The PDP, which had been prepared to take advantage of the detainee release issue coming to the forefront through the incident of the suicide of Mr Cho in order to put this issue on an agenda which would utilize “the era of 18 May unified struggle by the opposition groups,” again urged the government to release the entire group of detainees and begged students to refrain from “extreme methods” such as committing suicide by throwing oneself from a building. It was clear that the PDP tried to accommodate considerably the requests of students by using a five point political platform in its resolution adopted at the party conference on 16 May, which
included in part recent points of dispute among certain student groups, which were publicized through things like the suicide note of Mr Cho. The students' demands were U.S. withdrawal, public discussion of reunification, and a single Olympic team for North and South Korea. The resolution also included adherence to an independent attitude in conducting diplomacy and public discussion of reunification. However, while the PDP acted very promptly concerning short-term issues like the incident of the suicide of Mr Cho and the anniversary ceremony of 18 May, it remained passive concerning issues such as organizing the National Assembly or a four-party meeting.

Concerning the one No-three Kim meeting whose formalities have been controversial, President Kim Tae-chung seemed to have completely retreated from his previous position favoring individual meetings during the press conference on the morning of 16 May by saying that "I will follow the agreement by the three parties because the cooperation among the three opposition parties is important."

In regard to this, one party authority interpreted it to mean that President Kim had apparently reached a compromise to hold a joint meeting first followed by an individual meeting after taking "various" factors into consideration. However, it seemed that President Kim was worried about the possible impact in thinking that there might be some restriction on his ability to maneuver in the future if he conducted an individual meeting with President No.

The RDP

After completing a party system reorganization with the party convention and reshuffle of party personnel, the RDP seemed very busy in order to prepare fully for the development of a four-party political situation on 16 May. During this 1 day, not only were a political affairs meeting and general parliamentary assembly held consecutively, but also an investigation team on the case of the kidnapping of the head of the labor union at the Hyundai Engineering and Construction Company and the sit-in by coal miners in Sabuk was launched. Also, the floor leader team was also formally inaugurated with the appointment of five deputy floor leaders on the same day.

As the party comes to life after a long interval of depression since the 26 April National Assembly elections, it begins to take specific official positions on various pending issues.

In the first political affairs meeting and general parliamentary assembly since its inauguration, President Kim Yong-sam proposed the party's basic positions concerning issues ranging from the central issues of the 13th National Assembly to the U.S. demand for increased defense expenditure by South Korea, the absurd remark of Mr Okuno, and economic issues such as prices. He then asked the members to deal with these problems in a positive and scientific manner, thus showing a new face of the party to the people. In his speech, President Kim stressed that "the result of this past National Assembly election is a solemn order for the opposition parties to be a strong balancing force against the dictatorial ruling party and to eradicate various forms of power-related corruption, thus accomplishing a new political development through true democratization." He then clarified that the RDP should exert strong efforts in liquidating the authoritarian legacy of the past.

The resolution adopted at the general parliamentary assembly showed their determination to exert all-out efforts in "parliamentary struggle" in which they will fight for the rooting out of the corruption of the Fifth Republic, the release of detainees, and the abolition of bad undemocratic laws adopted since the Yusin era. It also expressed a "firm commitment to prepare for a decisive battle in order to become the next party to come to power by leading the national salvation movement's struggle for democracy." The RDP's effort to impress others with "strong will" in the face of the opening of the 13th National Assembly is viewed as not unrelated to its need to establish a clear identity under a four-party system.

Observers say that such a calculation of the RDP was based on the fear that it might lose the leadership of the opposition parties if the PDP displays a preemptive attack against the ruling party concerning democratization. The RDP's strong demand for immediate freeing of all the prisoners of conscience in connection with the SNU student, Cho sung-il, suicide incident through the resolution adopted at the political affairs meeting and the statement by the spokesman can be interpreted as the reflection of such a desire of the RDP.

The RDP's judgment that the issue of release of detainees could quickly turn into a focal political point because of the Cho incident, prompted its party human rights committee to make a precise analysis of the exact current situation of the detainees and wanted men and the reasons for their detention. With regard to the Cho incident, one party authority put forward the interpretation that "This incident was a testimony to the fact that there is a great difference in attitudes between a certain group of people including college students and the general public, to whom our society appears to be heading for democratization. How to narrow this tremendous gap in attitudes is a big political task."

The RDP reaffirmed its vigorous intention of supporting a dialogue between the ruling and the opposition parties through various meetings this day. With regard to the formalities of leaders' meetings, however, the RDP disclosed its position of preferring a four-party meeting among one No and three Kims to "individual meetings." One aide to President Kim explained that "Meetings
between the leaders of the ruling and the opposition parties will be a desirable thing from the viewpoint of realization of open politics.”

The NDRP

The NDRP held an unusual senior party staff meeting at President Kim Chong-pil’s Chonggu-tong residence rather than the party headquarters on 16 May and clarified the party positions on the three Kim meeting slated for 18 May and the leaders’ meeting between the ruling and the opposition parties.

It is explained that the meeting site was moved because President Kim was supposed to attend the 16 May award ceremony at 10:30 am. The list of participants in that meeting is as follows; Vice Presidents Yi Pyong-hui and Ku Cha-chun, Chairman of Political Affairs Committee Kim Yong-hwan, Secretary General Choe Kak-kyu, Floor Leader Kim Yong-chae, Director of General Planning Department Yi Hui-il, Spokesmen Kim Mun-won, and Cho Yong-sik, Chief Presidential Secretary Kim Tong-kun.

The meeting is said to have concentrated on the discussion of the formalities and the agenda for the three Kim meeting, which President Kim had initially proposed, and to have dealt with the anticipated positions of the PDP and the RDP and the NDRP’s countermeasures.

In connection with this, Spokesman Cho Yong-sik explained the atmosphere of the meeting by saying that “The general opinion of the meeting was as follows: With the result of the National Assembly election, a four-party system where the ruling party is the minority and the opposition parties are the majority has been established. In consequence, the role and responsibility of the opposition parties have become greater than at any time. Therefore, it is good to engage in a high level dialogue concerning the attitudes of the opposition parties regarding the operation of state affairs in a three opposition party meeting.

In a related matter, some participants even mentioned the adoption of a joint communique at the three Kim meeting. However, the party postponed the discussion on this issue until 17 May when it heard about the positions of other parties through channels such as the three party floor leaders’ meeting.

However, the NDRP strongly indicated its intention as a minority party toward favoring the “open meeting” because its consensus is that whether it is the three Kim meeting or the four-party meeting between President No and the three Kims, “there is a concern that a meeting behind the scenes can give the people bad impression. Therefore, staff members such as spokesmen should also participate in the meeting. The party’s positions on general issues such as the National Assembly opening were also discussed during the meeting. However, only issues such as the procedure of convocation for the regular session and the special session of the National Assembly and a positive examination of expansion of the standing committees of the National Assembly were discussed.

Special Public Administrative Reform Committee Inaugurated

Members, Chairman Selected

41070057 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 12 May 88 p 1

[Text] In keeping pace with the trend of internationalization and the introduction of local autonomy, the government will launch the Public Administrative Reform Committee on 13 May, headed by former Prime Minister Sin Hyon-ho, in order to propose an overall reorganization of the government organization and administrative system.

Minister of Government Administration Kim Yong-kap said that this committee will act as a presidential advisory organization for 1 year until the end of May 1989 and will report to the president with its future-oriented “administrative reforms.” They are: reestablishment of administrative and civilian functions of the government such as reducing the government’s authority and transferring it to the private sector, redefinition of the central and local functions of the administration, and a rational reorganization of all administrative departments and their subordinate organizations.

The government plans to take necessary legislative measures such as gradual amendment of the government organization law from June 1989 on the basis of the reform measures proposed by this committee.

The committee will convene for the first time on 13 May, while canvassing public opinion through public hearings, seminars, and television discussions.

Minister Kim disclosed that “The Public Administrative Reform Committee will even examine public pledges and political policy made by the political parties, both the ruling and opposition parties, along with the issue of police independence and adjustment of its administrative districts.” He further said that “If necessary, this committee will also deal with the organization and functions of the Agency for National Security Planning.”

Minister Kim said that “However, the military organization, being a special organization, will be excluded from the objects of discussion of this committee.”
The Public Administrative Reform Committee will also reexamine the functions of such organizations as government-funded organizations. It will have four subcommittees on comprehensive, general administrative, economic and scientific, and social and cultural aspects. Its members are as follows.

Cho Sok-chun (dean of Graduate School of Government Administration, Seoul National University), Choe U-sok (senior editorial writer, CHUNGANG ILBO), Kim Kwang-ung (professor at Seoul National University), Kim Song-chin (president, Korea Computer Institute), Kim Chae-kyom (president, Saengyong Cement), Kim Hak-ro (dean of Graduate School of Government Administration, Pusan National University), No Chong-hyon (professor, Yonsei University), Mun Hui-hwa (president, Korea Productivity Center), Min Yo-ki (floor leader, Federation of Korean Trade Unions), Pak Yun-hun (professor, Kyung gi University), Pak Chin-hwan (dean of Agricultural Co-operative Junior College), So Ki-won (president, Korean Culutral and Arts Foundation), O Sok-rak (floor leader, Korean Bar Association), Im Hui-soo (professor, Korea University), Chang Myongsu (director of editorial department of HANGUK ILBO), Chong Mun-hwa (director of Appeals Reviewing Committee of Ministry of Government Administration), Chong Chong-kil (professor, Seoul National University), Choe Chong-rim (director of editorial department of CHOSON ILBO), and Hwang In-chong (deputy director, Korea Development Institute).

Kang In-won, member of Appeals Reviewing Committee of Ministry of Government Administration was nominated as spokesman for the committee.

Editorial Expresses Concern
41070057 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 14 May 88 p 2

[Editorial: "Administrative Reform Job With Many Tasks - What Can Be Done in Limited Period of 1 Year?"]

[Text] The Public Administrative Reform Committee, which will examine improvement measures for government organization and administrative systems, has been inaugurated as a presidential advisory committee.

This Public Administrative Reform Committee is said to consist of 19 members and will operate for a limited period of 1 year until May 1989.

The Public Administrative Reform Committee will determine the basic direction and contents of the tasks that it will deal with, which were cited by the Ministry of Government Administration as including a basic examination of matters such as independence of the police, adjustment of the organization and functions of the Agency for National Security Planning, complete realization of local autonomy, and adjustment of administrative districts.

Although the selection of other tasks to be studied by the Public Administrative Reform Committee remains to be seen, we expect that it will broaden its vision without being limited to the government’s requests because the necessity of administrative reform is a demand of the present time.

In fact, the inauguration of the Sixth Republic itself according to the new constitution makes a large-scale reexamination of government organizations and administrative functions unavoidable. Even if there were not the establishment of a new constitutional organization, the transformation of administrative functions and organizations along with changes in statutory law are necessary in order to cope with partial changes in important government functions.

In addition, both the ruling party and the three opposition parties have made many public pledges concerning reorganization of government bureaucracy and administrative functions in the course of the past two elections. Therefore, some tasks of reorganization or improvement are proposed as unavoidable simply for the sake of smooth administration of state affairs.

However, the need for administrative reforms is suggested not only in the political and legal aspects but also in the dimension of national development. The current government organization or administrative function is fundamentally based upon what was adopted in the 1960's, therefore, it has become like a badly fitting set of clothes. Furthermore, it will be grossly inappropriate for the 1990's or the 2000's.

Therefore, the reform task must be a comprehensive one which can include both aspects, and only then can one be faithful to the long-awaited task.

However, the recently inaugurated Public Administrative Reform Committee is very ambiguous in its character.

First of all, the time limit of 1 year is very arbitrary.

One must conclude that there are serious doubts that this organization has been inaugurated in the first place with the idea that much could be done in less than 1 year.

If one looks at the list of tasks noted by the Ministry of Government Administration, none of them can be easily solved. The issues of independence of the police and adjustment of the organization and function of the Agency for National Security Planning, which are connected to the power structure and, therefore, very sensitive political issues, involve an overwhelming number of aspects that need to be considered. Since the problems of the total realization of local autonomy and the adjustment of administrative districts' tasks have been suggested, in addition, it is very doubtful whether these tasks can be examined in such a short time as 1 year.
Of course, one can make the interpretation that these issues can be solved in a rather easy way through political channels because they are political issues. However, the impact that these issues will make on the political channels because they are political issues. How

Of course, one can make the interpretation that these issues have been mentioned as the primary task of administrative reform, one can easily see how dangerous it would be to draw an easy conclusion.

Furthermore, a more fundamental reason for the need for administrative reform in an inauguration of the Sixth Republic lies in democratization and internationalization. It is proper that one should make a comprehensive reexamination if one attempts an administrative reform along the lines of transforming the past authoritarian system into a democratic one. However, it is very doubtful that such an objective can be achieved by a 19-member committee in 1 year. Furthermore, even in light of the necessity to improve the efficiency of the society as a whole in dealing with openness and internationalization, administrative reform will naturally engage in a wide-ranging review, therefore leaving behind a fear that it had applied a rough-and-ready method.

In addition, administrative reform at such levels can create many interested parties. For example, one can be confronted with various small and large tasks in the case of transforming a government-controlled system to a private one.

Therefore, we cannot help doubting once again whether the Public Administrative Reform Committee with its limited time of 1 year can perform its original duty at all.

There is no reason to limit the life expectancy of the Public Administrative Reform Committee to 1 year simply to keep the public pledge made by the ruling party. It is because the realization of such a public pledge is a task to be achieved during the 5-year tenure of the presidency. Of course, although some tasks need to be achieved in a hurry, and administrative reform may be one of them, an early start and a rough-and-ready method are two entirely different things.

As was indicated above, the reasons why a 1-year time limit cannot help leading to a rough-and-ready method are as follows: first, there is a great accumulation of tasks; second, an overall basic reorganization is unavoidable; and third, these tasks cannot be taken on an annual basis because of their characteristics.

In the case of Japan, it took them 3 years to produce a tentative plan with wide participation from various sectors of society. I do not mean that we need the same amount time they did. However, I expect that one can turn these reforms into a masterpiece once one determines to make them following the demands of the age. It is a well-known fact that whenever a certain task has been raised, the government sets up a committee which has always produced nominal results. Although I hope that this committee does not follow in the footsteps of the several previous committees that have emerged since the inauguration of the Sixth Republic, I cannot but feel that they are nearly identical.

Of course, I do not mean that this must necessarily be so, and it should not be that way. However, I feel this way because there is a preposterous relationship between the government's announcement that the administrative reforms should be made because its current basic organization and function are based on that of the 1960's, and its launching of a committee with a limited 1-year existence.

There are approximately 70 laws, which were selected by the DJP, that need to be changed as a part of democratization.

The fact that there needs to be that many legal changes makes possible the inference that the reorganization of administrative organization and functions must be comprehensive and varied.

With all these factors, it is very doubtful what the Public Administrative Reform Committee restricted by a time limit can accomplish its mandate.

Separation of KNP From MHA Praised

[Article by Choe Hong-un: “Emerging New Style Police Forces”]

[Text] The government's decision to separate the Korean National Police (KNP) from the Ministry of Home Affairs, (MHA) and to upgrade it as an independent organization under the direct control of the Prime Minister's Office is praised as an epoch-making event opening up a new era in the 43-year long history of the KNP.

Because elections, a symbol of democracy, are managed by the MHA, and because “appointments and dismissals” of ministers to the MHA are made for political reasons, the KNP's independence from the MHA signifies “political neutrality of the KNP.”

The neutralization of the police can be interpreted as a clear demonstration of the Sixth Republic's effort to realize true democracy. The KNP's autonomy has been a long-cherished aspiration of all Koreans as well as the 140,000 men police force. They knew the day would come but did not know when or how.
This decision of the new government is also valued as a positive response to today's demand for democracy. Although detailed plans are yet to be formulated, necessary strategies and measures for a positive outcome will be made in the course of thorough research and public opinion polls by the soon-to-be-organized "Special Committee for Public Administration Reform," before a plan is sent to the National Assembly for approval.

One can see this as a "mature aspect" of the government as it proceeds with its decision to grant autonomy to the police, but on the other hand, it also means that the government can no longer hold off the demand for democracy.

The issue of police neutralization is no news to us. The KNP was an independent organization from 1945, when the Police Affairs Bureau (kyongmuguk) was under the U.S. military government until the Police Affairs Bureau was transferred to the control of the Security office of the MHA in 1948, when the new republic was organized. Naturally, the issue of police autonomy has been raised constantly ever since.

Especially, the then, ruling Democratic Party, after witnessing the rigged and corrupt 15 March election, realized an urgent need for a "provision to guarantee police neutrality." And the constitution of the Second Republic included such a provision, and a plan to set up a special "public safety committee." Much, to our regret, they never saw the light because of the "16 May revolution."

In 1980, the KNP itself raised its demand for "autonomy in criminal investigation rights" creating an intense conflict with the prosecution and it turned out that the task was not attainable. The issue emerged again recently when the KNP's credibility was in question because of the disclosure of "sexual torture done by a policeman of the Puchon police station" and "the torture death of the Seoul National University's (SNU) student Pak Chong-chol during police interrogation." The general consensus is that the core of the problem can only be solved by providing the KNP the right to perform its duties without outside pressure.

It is no exaggeration to say that the KNP's main duty is to protect the lives and property of the population. However, under the current structure it is difficult to perform these duties.

The KNP has been criticized for not carrying out its duty of maintaining order and a law-abiding spirit among people. Especially, during the 13th Parliamentary Election period, the KNP failed to meet the public's demands. However, the KNP is not as bad as the police force of the Liberal Party era, when the police led the rigging of the election in favor of the ruling Liberal Party and became a tool of the government. Unfortunately, even today, some police officers are afraid to stand up to the ruling party and the government.

The real cause of the increasing psychological conflicts in police officers is attributed to the abnormal system where the KNP is under the MHA and the MHA manages all elections. Even during ordinary times—non-election years—the KNP mainly served the ruling party and the government. Too often, neglecting their main duty, the protector of the population. Naturally, the KNP often became the object of hate and distrust rather than trust by the people. The hate and distrust of the police reached its peak when SNU student Pak Chong-chol died of police brutality.

Consequently, the then director general of the KNP was arrested, and police officers who lost their police integrity and honor could not face the people. This triggered an internal cry for reform from those inside the KNP, despite its rigid nature. The statement calling for police neutrality was signed by a group of low-level police officers who are police academy graduates and academy students. They are staking their lives on careers in the police force.

Their statement titled "Our View of Police Neutrality" strongly insisted that "the political neutrality of the police must be guaranteed if one wants to realize democracy and the issue can not be a matter of political compromise, but must be obtained for the sake of the nation's future, where police can return to perform the real duty of maintaining public peace and order."

They explained by saying, "as the youth of the ROK, and the proud members of the KNP, we have faced exploding social unrest, crises and public distrust, yet we want to dedicate ourselves to police work. Thus, we have studied and put together our thoughts to write this statement, hoping to recapture our reputation and the public trust."

This statement together with police Lieutenant Yi Pyong-mu's paper titled "Confession for the Realization of Democracy and Development of the Police" caused enormous shock and sensation. Lieutenant Yi was a member of the first graduating class of the police academy.

The essential part of these two statements is a demand for political neutrality of the police, which was applauded by many police officers who had been the silent majority.

The long time police officers, who had been yearning for reform of the KNP and improvement in its system, agreed with the young idealistic police officers that this problem can only be solved through full cooperation of the nation and the police force itself. This influenced even the small number of police insiders who had shown blind obedience to the government to meditate seriously about the true role of the police. The government also began active research on the issue of police neutrality in its own way, producing substantial results, and a decision about when and how it is going to be implemented.
In 1980, when the issue of the “police autonomy in criminal investigation rights,” only frustrated the police because of the strong resistance of the prosecution office which insisted that “if the autonomy of criminal investigation rights is granted to the police in the name of the political neutrality of the police, it could likely be an abuse of the right.”

Many police officers with vivid memories of 1980, expressed their hope that in addition to currently acquiring the KNP’s structural and management autonomy, other rights such as the autonomy of criminal investigation rights will be obtained by the year 2000. By then the graduates of the police academy, the bright and well educated police officer will be the new police leadership.

Anyhow, no one will raise an objection to the point that police neutrality and its development is the essential factor in the development of democracy, and our country has taken a first step toward it.

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MILITARY

WOLGAN CHOSON Reviews Korean Army
SK3006070588 Seoul WOLGAN CHOSON in Korean
1 Jun 88 pp 188-221

[Article by Cho Kap-che: “Korea’s Military”]

[Text]

“What good is an army if all the people are gone?”

Grandma Impun survived, and this is her testimony.

“The soldiers ordered everyone related to a policeman or a soldier to leave the group. I guess about a dozen people rushed away. When they were gone, the soldiers completely surrounded the rest of us in the ravine. Mr Mun Pan-tae, who was about 40 at the time, stood beside me, his hands raised high over his head.

“Honorable commander,’ Mr Mun shouted. ‘If I am to die, at least allow me to say something first. What good is a country if all the people are gone?” The soldiers fired at Mr Mun but missed and hit his daughter. She fell right down. She was 15. Then the shots rang out in volleys, like so many firecrackers, and the bullets buzzed among us like bees.”

In those years, the army uniform served as a kind of license to behave like a spoiled child in public. Adults closed their eyes when a soldier stole a ride on a train or an intercity bus without paying the fare. And when you were on leave, sometimes a stranger who didn’t even know your name would give you red-carpet treatment just because you were a “suffering soldier.” This reporter remembers going on a 3-day leave to the East Coast in the company of three barracks buddies, and among us we spent hardly a dime. I think my total travel expenses amounted to less than 1,000 won because of the lavish treatment we received at the hands of total strangers. An old grandfather who had sent his grandson off to the army put us up for the night, and a young girl whose older brother was serving in the army gave us potatoes for dinner.

The Korean Army once again appeared on the streets as martial law forces when the October Restoration (Yusin) was announced on 17 October 1972, but even then the antagonism of the Korean people was directed not at the army but at President Pak Chong-hui. Even in the Yusin era the army managed to preserve an image quite distinct from that of the National Police, who were vilified as the “slaves of the dictatorship.”

The Kochang Massacre goes down in history as the supreme tragedy in the relationship between the Korean people and their army. The Korean Army was conducting operations against communist guerrillas in an area they were known to frequent and took revenge on the innocent residents of the area. The screams that burst from the killing zone 3 decades ago, “What good is a country if all the people are gone,” has now become the plea, “What good is an army if all the people are gone?”

During the 19 April Student Revolution in 1960, however, army units acting in the capacity of Martial Law troops chose to do nothing but observe as demonstrators opposed to the Syngman Rhee regime proved that they were indeed the “people’s army.” Then in 1961 in the wake of the 16 May Military Coup D’etat, the army emerged to take control of the civilian government. Although the army was now in a position to directly influence the daily lives of the people, popular antimilitary sentiment did not reach worrisome dimensions. In the late sixties when this reporter wore an enlisted uniform, Seoul bus girls would not accept fares from enlisted men. The girls slyly returned coins given to them by enlisted men because the girls identified with the soldiers.

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The Pusan-Masan Incident Changes Good-Will to Antagonism.

In February 1951 during the Korean war, the ROK Army slaughtered 719 innocent people in Kyongsang Province’s Kochang. Precisely half, 359, were under 14 years of age. Of these, 100 were mere babies, 191 were from 3 to 10, and 68 were from 11 to 14.
In the Pusan-Masan Incident, the Korean people witnessed the first example of bloodthirsty army soldiers since the Kochang Massacre of 1951. The SWC paratroopers were trained to confront the enemy under the most stringent battlefield conditions. They were unleashed in an urban area among unarmed civilians, triggering a situation in which the national armed forces conducted military operations against the citizens of the nation. The Pusan-Masan Incident foreshadowed the tragedy that was to occur 7 months later in Kwangju.

On 12 December 1979 a bloody revolt occurred within the Korean Army. The army chief of staff was arrested without a warrant and later forced to submit to water torture. A colonel who helped arrest the chief of staff was shot at the scene and later promoted to major general in spite of the fact that his wound paralyzed him permanently from the waist down, and when he retired he received a golf course as a gift.

This incident planted basic doubts in the minds of the Korean people about who was really in control of the army. The Kwangju Incident occurred only months later, leaving a deep chasm between the Korean Army and the Korean people. Whatever the motivation, the army's self restraint during the June Incident went a long way toward restoring the Korean people was so amicable that few such examples exist in world history. But that relationship deteriorated swiftly, leading straight down through an "army that can fire on its top officer" to an "army that can use rifles and bayonets against its own people."

### The Military's New Policy of Openness

June 1985 was a tumultuous time as the National Assembly looked into the Kwangju Incident. This reporter observed an absorbing incident that summer. An enlisted man was fighting with a young civilian at Seoul's large Chamsil intersection. The young man broke away and ran off a few steps, but couldn't control his anger. Turning back, he threw a rock at the soldier but missed. The soldier charged after the young man, who bolted into the street in front of an oncoming taxi.

"I'm just a common soldier," he sobbed. "I didn't do anything wrong." This reporter was able to verify that this "miniature Kwangju Incident" was triggered by the soldier's uniform. A decade earlier, the same uniform caused people to treat soldiers with the kindness they reserved for their own children. Now the uniform had become a symbol that triggered an explosion of popular hate.

The 1987 June Incident [demonstrations that erupted as a result of the revelations into the torture-death of a Seoul National University student] was a national expression of the people's rejection of the military. If the same official terror used in the Pusan-Masan demonstrations and the Kwangju Incident had been employed during the June Incident, even several hundred SWC brigades could not have brought the situation under control. Our army displayed admirable patience and self-control. Their hands were probably tied by the realization that, "If the army spills blood again, there will be hell to pay."

Whatever the motivation, the army's self restraint during the June Incident went a long way toward restoring the people's good-will toward the military. When labor disputes swept the country in late 1987, the army stayed in the barracks even when workers with heavy equipment occupied downtown Ulsan and became the city's unchallenged rulers. "They'll come out tomorrow," we said. "They'll come out the next day," we said. But in the end the army stayed in the barracks, while we conducted a presidential campaign and weathered a crisis over the legitimacy of power.
The army has reacted very positively during this period of accelerated change. On 20 April 1988, the commanding general of the Capital Defense Command (CDC) invited reporters covering the Ministry of Defense to his unit and held an extremely frank discussion with us for 1 and a half hours. The general had the ill luck to see himself mentioned unfavorably in numerous foreign press accounts, some of which named him as the leader of the hard-line faction of the army and as the probable ring-leader of a possible coup d'etat. In his discussion with the reporters, the general made a simple request: “I would be pleased if you folks would not view the Capital Defense Command as a player in the political game.” Later, he joked, “I’ve been mentioned 86 times in the foreign media. And though I’ve even been maligned as the guy who would lead a coup d’etat and as the guy who would be president, I seem to persist in doing my job and nothing else. But that seems to worry the press even more.” He also described himself as a believer in “rational justice” and “not a hard-liner too stupid to avoid swimming against the current of historical trends.” He stressed that, “Our army does not want to exercise political influence.”

The next day, the commanding general of the SWC also invited the reporters covering the Defense Ministry to visit his unit, and chatted with us after a counter-terrorism training event held in our honor. The general said, “It aggravates me very much that people think we have horns growing out of our heads.” He added, “I would appreciate it if you reporters could help us get rid of some of this misunderstanding.” At another point, the general said, “We have our own story to tell about the Kwangju Incident.” Still later he added, “When a political decision is made, the army is an organization that can kill people.” [The July issue of WOLGAN CHOSON says this is wrong, that the general actually said, “When politicians decide to settle problems between nations by means of warfare, then the army is used for that purpose.”]

At about the same time, the commander of the Defense Security Command (DSC) visited the Defense Ministry press room and talked with reporters there. The lieutenant generals who head the “three commands,” the DSC, CDC, and the SWC—the three units most crucial to the security of the regime—revealed a positive view of both the press and the Korean people that symbolized the army’s new, open attitudes.

A Move To Revise the Military Secrets Act

The military’s positive attitude toward the press originated last summer when Chong Ho-yong was appointed minister of defense. In February 1988, when Chong briefed president-elect No Tae-u on the activities of his ministry, Chong said that the military would adopt a policy of openness. Immediately thereafter in an informal meeting with the Defense Ministry press corps, reporters asked Chong whether he was also “considering amending the Military Secrets Act.” The minister said he was “thinking about that too.”

This triggered a spate of press reports under headlines like, “Revision of Military Secrets Act Under Review.” These articles served to help make such a review an accomplished fact. In his first briefing to President No on Defense Ministry operations, incoming Defense Minister O Cha-pok told the president that he was pushing for the revision of the Act. Although the revision movement tries to create the impression that the military will benefit most from any changes in the law, in fact, revision of the Military Secrets Act is absolutely necessary if there is to be any active reporting on the military.

The people must be told on what is really going on in the military if a significant improvement in the relationship between the army and the people is to occur. If the people are to be informed, the inescapable conclusion is that the stringent limitations imposed by the Military Secrets Act can be relaxed only by amending the Act itself. The “military secrets” the law is designed to protect are defined in such a way as to cover virtually everything related to the military. The Defense Ministry press regulation of 28 January 1984 goes even further than the Act, stipulating that, “Reporters covering the military may not enter the premises of the Defense Ministry without permission from the Public Affairs Office, and when not accompanied by a representative of that office may enter no Defense Ministry facilities except the press room, the Public Affairs Office itself, and convenience facilities.” This regulation has the effect of reducing reporters to the role of newspaper delivery boys. But at Army Headquarters and other major commands, attitudes about amending the Military Secrets Act are extremely negative. One high-ranking general officer at Army Headquarters said, “If we carefully administer the Act, that will do. There is no need to amend it. We don’t even know the name of enemy division commanders. How can we unilaterally reveal everything that happens on our side?” The negative attitudes of active-duty general officers toward revising the Military Secrets Act stems quite simply from the fact that the Act has been abused over the years to conceal incidents that occur in Army units and to cover up commander’s personal mistakes.

During the presidential campaign last December, the ruling DPJ sought to add to its vote total by limiting military involvement in civilian society. Their most popular move was to announce that they were seeking to abolish the so-called Yusin Recruitment System and to limit the DSC’s role in the civilian community. Under provisions of the Yusin Recruitment System, military officers were given preferential, noncompetitive appointments to civil service positions up to subsection chief level. In the 11 years from 1977 to 1987, 586 officers left the military and secured such appointments in the executive branch. This number represents fully 1/5 of all those appointed in that period. But the civilians
had to win their positions by passing the Administrative Civil Service Examination. Thus there now exists in the civilian bureaucracy an entrenched, well-defined network of former military officers. Defense Minister Chong Ho-yong made the final decision to accept the DJP’s proposal to abolish the Yusin Recruitment System, but he did so in the face of bitter military opposition.

One DJP official told me, “I’m embarrassed that in all these years the assembly has established no effective control over military spending, ”even though we devote fully a third of the national budget to national defense. A glance at the process of deliberating the massive military budget at the assembly reveals that budgetary documents are provided to members for only about 30 minutes before they are taken back into the possession of the Defense Ministry. How can a budget of almost 500 billion won be comprehended in that brief time? The most effective way to control the military is the press. But the DSC mechanisms for influencing politics must be eliminated if overall army involvement in politics is to be rooted out.”

Officers of the Korea Military Academy [KMA] Class 34, now mostly majors, met on the afternoon of 7 May 1988 at the KMA auditorium on the occasion of the 10 year reunion of the class. They invited Chong Sung-hwa to address them. Chong had been KMA Commandant when Class 34 cadets were in their sophomore, junior, and senior years. On 17 May 1988 the Korean Veterans Association (KVA) invited Chong to attend a briefing for retired general officers about recent developments in North Korea. At a cabinet meeting on 23 December 1987, the government approved a change to the Military Personnel Law and had it passed at the assembly. The changes restored the original military rank of former officers like Chong Sung-hwa and Kim Kye-won, who had been reduced to the rank of private in the reserves because of court convictions. Thus, the names of these men were restored to the KVA’s membership roster, and they once again qualified for treatment as retired flag officers. Not only was this reversal of former policy a laudable step in improving the army’s relationship with the civilian world, it also served to defuse significant discord on the issue within the army itself.

Nor is such change limited to government officials and general officers. PPD President Kim Tae-chung acknowledged the fairness of absentee voting within the Armed Forces in April’s general elections and publicly congratulated the military. RDP President Kim Yong-sam praised the military as “a mature national force.” Moreover, the military’s privileged position of sanctuary ended with the military’s new assembly. Thus there now exists in the civilian bureaucracy an entrenched, well-defined network of former military officers. Defense Minister Chong Ho-yong made the final decision to accept the DJP’s proposal to abolish the Yusin Recruitment System, but he did so in the face of bitter military opposition.

The Army Is Always on the President’s Side

At the end of April 1988 this reporter telephoned the office of an army commander whose unit is located in the Seoul area. The commander’s aide answered the phone. The reporter identified himself, and the aide immediately connected the caller to the commander. The reporter conveyed his request, and the general did not hesitate. “Fine. I’ll meet you tomorrow.” The next afternoon the reporter interviewed the general in his office for 2 hours. In his early 50s, the commander’s frame was every inch that of a general and a perpetual smile played on his lips.

But his use of the humble speech forms contrasted sharply with his icy eyes. “I...,” he said and then paused for a few seconds. Then he went on to explain why he responded so quickly to my request for an interview.

“A few months ago a number of news articles appeared with my name in them, including quotations from rumors about me current in Japan. The rumors and many other statements in the articles simply were not correct. I sent someone to talk to the reporter. I told him ‘You and I are not foreigners, you know. We both live under the skies of Seoul. I would think at a minimum you would have come and checked with me before submitting the article.’”

“The reporter said, ’I didn’t try to meet with you because contacting an army general is all but impossible.’ So misinformation was published about me because we’re perceived as unapproachable. And then, you called to say you wanted to talk about changes in the military, and I had things I wanted to say on that. So I agreed to the interview. You were astonished I agreed so readily, right?”

The general then candidly proceeded to vent to his personal views, first establishing that he should remain anonymous. He touched on the political neutrality of the army.

“There is way too much misunderstanding about the term political neutrality. The army is always on the president’s side. The Constitution makes the president the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. That’s a difficult term; simply, it means the president is the top commander, a five-star general. The army must be loyal to the president elected by the Korean people, and this is what we mean by political neutrality.”

[Cho] The military received high marks for the fairness of its absentee balloting during the general election.

[General] “In a democratic society it is natural to be loyal to the group to which one belongs. Farmers support candidates who say they will emphasize agricultural management, and soldiers support candidates who say they will boost national defense. If the military absentee balloting system was subject to problems in the past, then the problems were caused only by an excess of loyalty. Information aimed at soldiers must be geared to the overall educational level of the army. If you baldly direct soldiers to vote for a certain candidate, that is
virtually certain to boomerang on you. In my case, all I did was have my men read a newspaper editorial by a professor who discussed the personality of a certain politician."

Kwangju Is History

[Cho] We turned to remarks made very recently by the commanding generals of the CDC and SWC who invited the press corps covering the Defense Ministry to visit their units.

[General] "President No has repeatedly urged army commanders to tear down the walls separating us from the press, to open wide the windows of dialogue. The army maintained contact with the press in the past, but this was pretty much restricted to social occasions involving ranking press figures, like playing golf with the presidents of media companies, chief editors, and leading editorial writers. This was not really effective because the army mistakenly thought that rank was as important in the media world as it was in the army. We didn't understand the crucial need to communicate with distinguished working reporters who actually pounded beats.

[General] "In relations between the press and military and between the people and the military, it is crucial that each side recognizes the other side’s existence and understand his arguments. Dialogue will never develop if each side measures the other only by his own lights. When I was a captain, a reporter covering the military was rude and offensive to the general I was working for, and when I could not take it anymore, I said something. The reporter explained his reasons to me. He said he adopted exactly the same posture toward the army chief of staff that he took toward me, a mere captain. He said it was anathema for a reporter to be intimidated or co-opted by the army hierarchy. It wasn’t until he told me those things that I began to understand the psychology of press people.

"At this point in history, army officers are different from what they were in earlier days when they avoided conversations with reporters because they felt intellectually out-classed or suffered from feelings of inferiority, or because they wanted to conceal improprieties. President No tells us that there is nothing the military needs to conceal; he urges us to be forthcoming and accommodating with the press."

[Cho] Kwangju is shaping up to be a serious issue in the upcoming National Assembly session.

[General] "It was not just civilians who died in Kwangju. Many soldiers in the crowd-control forces died too. Kwangju must be handled with primary emphasis on reconciliation. The press must work to tone down the people’s excessive demands. That is necessary for the history of tomorrow. Trying to fix responsibility for Kwangju is like demanding that Gato Kiyomasa assume responsibility for Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea in 1592. We must perceive Kwangju as a past history and endeavor to learn its lessons."

[Cho] Does that mean that if we dig too deeply into the Kwangju Incident that we will irritate the army?

[General] "Our army is not so small-minded as to be irritated by that. During April’s general election the army was roundly vilified, but did anyone respond nervously?"

[Cho] There is criticism that real power in the army is wielded by the so-called Hana-hwe network.

[General] "The Hana-hwe did exist previously, but virtually everything said about it is exaggeration. Some KMA Class 11 cadets born in North Korea formed a private fraternity, and in response cadets hailing from Taegu organized the Hana-hwe. Every Korean organization has its share of private networks. What is important is what that network does."

Happy or Sad, It’s Our Country

[Cho] I think the Hana-hwe was responsible for the 12 December military coup d’etat.

[General] "As I pledge before God, the army did not undertake the 12 December Incident for the purpose of assuming political power. The situation developed in a manner that only later swept the army in that direction. Even this minute I can clearly remember General Chon Tu-hwan persistently rejecting the idea of becoming president. I can bear witness that it was politicians, press people, and religious figures more than soldiers who earnestly begged General Chon Tu-hwan to take over as president."

[Cho] Is there opposition among army officers to abolishing the Yusin Recruitment System?

[General] "Two years ago, when No Tae-u was DJP chairman, I recommended to him that we abolish that system. I thought that the number of officers utilizing the system was steadily decreasing; I wanted to shut off what I saw as a brain drain benefiting the civil service to the detriment of the army; and I wanted to be rid of a system that was heaping scorn on the army, harming our respectability. The army is a pyramid. Officers who fail to be promoted as they move up the pyramid leave the army for civilian society in an endless stream, and society must make room for them.

"Right now, however, the Korean people are making it crystal clear that they do not want to cooperate in this process, so we have no choice but address the issue on our own. We are extending age limits on officers in order to slow the flow of officers into the civilian sector. This approach is not without its problems. The army must

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constant turn over if it is to avoid stagnation. Extending age limits raises the average age of army officers, reducing vigor, and slowing promotion cycles. But under existing conditions, we have no choice but to accept these negative features. I recall the saying that a patriot 'loves his country whether happy or sad.' The army is sad right now, but this is the time for us to love our country.'

[Cho] What do you think about the outcome of April’s National Assembly elections?

[General] “I don’t think it turned out well. But soldiers are trained not to be frustrated even when they plunge into a worst-case situation. We are trained to seek the best solution logic can provide.”

Investigation of Chon Tu-hwan May Bring Catastrophe.

[Cho] What would you like to say about a desirable relationship between the army and the people?

[General] “If the people continue to hold the army in contempt as they do now, then it will be impossible for the government to rule. When one is held in contempt, then one reacts. That is the law of the nature. The Korean people must understand the army, and the army must understand the people. I think we have arrived at the point where our country must install a cooperative system between the civil service and the military. World history teaches us that national fortunes improve only when this relationship is harmoniously balanced.”

“Traditionally, our country selected the system of putting civil officials in charge of the highest levels of national administration. Our country was unable to project its power overseas, stagnating instead within the confines of our small peninsula. The reason for this was that the government’s primary object was to maintain a system of civilian rule. Thus, it is a mistake to regard a military government as being completely worthless. Don’t you agree that the military government can provide an opportunity to establish a balance between the civilians and the military?” After the 16 May 1961 Coup, Koreans began pushing overseas, and we experienced an explosion of national energy. The military mind contributed to those outcomes. "When I visited Europe I noticed that most of the statues honored generals. Soldiers place the highest emphasis on honor.

I thought at the time that Europe’s highly-intelligent civil officials had very successfully satisfied the soldier’s need for honor, maintaining military morale at a very high level. Our country’s civil officials detest soldiers, hold us in contempt. But they must learn another way.”

[Cho] What does the military think about recent demands for the investigation of former president Chon Tu-hwan or for him to be subject to criminal investigation for corruptions of the Fifth Republic?

[General] “President Chon himself speculated that precisely this issue would surface after he left office, but he chose to concentrate on the task of peaceful power transfer. This was a wonderful exhibition of bravery. If the opposition adamantly presses for direct investigation of former president Chon, then that amounts to disregarding the public pledges they made to forego political retribution. Any direct attack on former president Chon must also be an attack on President No Tae-u. If that
happens, then history will cease to exist. Have there not already been two presidents who were either assassinated or forced into foreign exile? Two is enough. Under no circumstances is it acceptable for former president Chon to be sent overseas."

"Were that to happen, the world would mock our country's level of political development. If we are to allow direct investigations, then would direct investigations find Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam blameless? We must exercise self control at some point on the continuum. The opposition parties, in particular, must reign in their attitudes. President No will go directly to the Korean people on this matter, of course. But if the brakes are not applied, the desirable situation we have so laboriously sought for can degenerate to catastrophe."

[Cho] And what if some kind of terrorism is directed against former president Chon?

[General] "Public power is responsible for his protection. And of course, the army is a component of public power. That kind of incident must be prevented."

As I was about to leave, this general, acknowledged by others to be a representative figure of the Korean Army, said something that had a profound meaning. Behind the 12 December 1979 Coup was a strong sense of loyalty for the late president Pak Chong-hui by a group of KMA officers who developed a strong mistrust for Army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa, who was present close to the site where President Pak was assassinated. Chong was regarded with increasing suspicion, the general said, but he refused to resign. I am stricken with the notion that we must pay strong attention to the question of how the unique propensity of the military mind for loyalty to seniors and for maintaining the strong sense of honor will manifest itself in the case of Chon Tu-hwan.

Dancing Officers

Last 7 May this reporter visited an Army Corps Headquarters on the outskirts of Seoul. I wanted to know the attitudes of today's officers. The reporter's guide was LTC Chang, 43, the Corps troop information and education officer, who had graduated from Hanyang University and been commissioned in 1968 from the Officers Candidate School. Chang had been in service for some 20 years. He said his family home was an 18-pyong [1 pyong equals 3.3 square meters] apartment in Seoul's Kaepo-tong that he leased for about 13 million won in key money. His wife and two children lived there, while Chang himself lived in a military apartment at Corps Headquarters. Chang drew about 500,000 won in monthly salary, of which he used about 150,000 won for personal expenses and another 30,000 won per month on apartment management fees and utilities. LTC Chang received official leave once a month. Chang was in his 7th year of living apart from his family. "Lately," he said, "they've done away with orderlies even for full colonels, so the most nettlesome thing for me is having to cook breakfast and dinner by myself." In his 20 years as an army officer, LTC Chang has moved 16 times, and each time his wife has done the packing.

The Corps Headquarters was as well-manicured as a national park. The commander, a lieutenant general, received this reporter in his office on the second floor of the command building. The general had a bone-crushing handshake and an imposing physique, but this Seoul native was always smiling and seemed relaxed. During the interview, the general was accompanied by the DSC Unit commander, a colonel, and by LTC Chang. The general avoided answering political questions, insisting that, "I don't look to the rear; I look only to the front."

During the 3-hour interview, we spent much of the time discussing the press and the position of the army. The general was inclined neither to adjust his own reasoning nor be persuaded by mine. "The army today," he said, "is just not yet a 1988 army." And then he explained a number of ways in which "the army is being democratized from the inside." As examples of the process, he mentioned a ban on striking soldiers, educating enlisted men in self expression, and educating officers with the idea that leading enlisted men can best be accomplished by treating them as if they were members of one's own family.

The general's leadership principles were three, he said. First, blaze the trail and the men will follow. Second, if they should fail to follow, use persuasion. Third, only when persuasion fails should the leader resort to forceful means like issuing orders. The army uses disciplinary training units in lieu of the beatings and other corporal measures of yesterday. Problem enlisted men are sent to disciplinary training units for 1 or 2 days where they are made to do such things as double time in full combat gear.

The general also emphasized the positive features of military culture. "Civilian society is based on materialistic values, but the army aims at practical application of the spiritual values of justice and patriotism." The general also mentioned the army's superior morality. "We must build the Korean people's ethics. I am very frustrated that Korea is not recognized as having a characteristic national morality such as Japan's sense of loyalty, China's sense of honor, Britain's instinct for fair play, or America's Puritanism."

According to the general, the army should be the Korean people's spiritual training center. "If we who now face Dracula," he said, "commit an error of execution, then the army and the people must sit down and agonize together to find ways to minimize the error." As he stood to close the interview, the general added, "This has been the plea of a frontline soldier."
Female Officers Conduct Ideological Training

I had lunch with the corps commander and his staff at the officers mess. The officers eat only lunch at the mess, which is operated by monthly fees taken from their pay. Enlisted men have unlimited dining rights, and can eat as much as they want. The Corps publishes the monthly enlisted menu, which contains not only meal listings but calorie counts, contract food prices, and even the name of the contractor who supplies the food. According to the menu, the daily individual food allowance costs 1475 won for 4055 calories. The menu is based on rice and three side dishes per meal. Each man is given 1 egg per day and 3 servings of beef, 12 servings of pork, 8 servings of chicken, and 31 portions of seafood each month.

As we were dining, a pretty female lieutenant began a 10-minute lecture, going about it as if it were a daily occurrence. A graduate of Kangwon University and a troop Information and education officer, the lieutenant discussed the problem of procommunists and leftists in Korean society. "When I was in college," she said, "I thoughtlessly participated in demonstrations." Later on, her voice rose as she said, "A fantasy prevails in Korea that communism as a theory is all right; problems arise only when it comes to putting communism into practice. We must never merely tolerate those enthralled by this fantasy." I was told that the army started using female troop information and education officers a few years ago, and that officers and men alike enjoy lectures given by these pretty female officers. The army guarantees that these female officers can remain on active duty even after they marry.

When lunch was over, we were walking past the headquarters command building when I noticed dozens of officers dancing outdoors. The dance looked like one a troupe would perform at a tavern, and now army officers were performing it in broad daylight a mere stone's throw from their headquarters. Are those officers dancing? The general explained, "Military culture gives short shrift to the emotions, so we're encouraging our officers to give their emotions more freedom. We think singing and dancing help in this regard."

From the Guard Posts

I stopped by the military apartments located on the corps headquarters compound. The apartments were constructed for company- and field-grade officers. Each 12-pyong apartment was heated by a coal briquette boiler. Each had two small rooms and entrances were so tiny that shoes could not be left on the floor but had to be hung on pegs along the inside wall. I visited the apartment of Capt Chong Kwang-chae, 34, a graduate of the Third Military Academy. His wife O Chong-ae, 30, had a youthful face and a very trim figure. They had been married for 6 years and had moved five times. In the 2 years they had lived in their apartment, they had never visited Seoul, a 1 hour bus ride away.

Of the 300,000 won Capt Chong brings home each month, the family saves 100,000 won and puts 50,000 won into a mutual aid society. They say they spend 150,000 won for living expenses for their two children and themselves. "Seoulites believe army people live well," LTC Chang volunteered, "but they fail to understand that military apartments are tiny compared to the 30-40 pyong apartments they enjoy. But the reality is as you see it here. Virtually none of the company grade officers and only thirty or forty percent of the field grade officers can afford to buy their own apartments. Chang then produced a chart comparing military and civilian salaries. It looked like he had had the chart all ready for me.

Military and Civilian Wages (each unit equals 10,000 won)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Military officers; Civilian jobs (1987)</th>
<th>Military Salaries; Civilian Industries, 1987</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade</td>
<td>Years in service</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LT; Jr officer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT; Sub-sec chief</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
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<td>MAJ; Section chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC; Asst dept director</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL; Dept director</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG; Board director</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes basic pay plus bonuses, benefits, and special fees

The jeep chugged over dirt roads for about 2 hours. It was mid-May and everywhere else Korea was verdant with new grass and dazzling with the hues of spring flowers. But not the desolate areas along the road to the DMZ. I could not even spot a dandelion along the road. Farmers working the fields were mostly older men; no young men were to be seen. With no flowers blooming and no young girls promenading, I found it difficult to tell whether it was spring, fall, or winter. There are no seasons at the DMZ.

The battalion commander, LTC Sin, a KMA graduate, briefed me personally. We sat in an ROK Army observation post [OP] located on a high point in the DMZ, but a North Korean puppet army OP located to our front on even higher ground, about 1000 meters above sea level, kept us under constant surveillance. Inside the DMZ, enemy and friendly OPs confront each other across a scant few hundred meters of hilly terrain. LTC Sin said the enemy has 75 percent of its total personnel strength positioned within 50 miles of the DMZ, and that it is possible for them to attack the ROK with no further redeployments. The northern puppets fired at this OP last year, LTC Sin said with obvious tension in his voice, wounding one soldier and causing the division to raise its combat readiness posture.

LTC Sin seemed to be the typical field officer, stubborn but sharp. After he finished his rigid briefing, I had an opportunity to converse privately with him. We quickly developed a difference of opinion regarding a section of my article in the May issue of WOLGAN CHOSON; "Chon Tu-hwan: His Network of Men, His Network of Money."
"You seem intent on dividing officers into two groups," noted Sin, "political officers and pure field officers. But I'm not sure that's possible. When I read your article, that was the first I had heard about the 'Hana-we.' I think you've (?injected) interpretation into your description of the army. I oppose exploitation of the army for purposes of commercial journalism."

"It seems to me that you are trying to shove responsibility for all society's problems onto the military government," he continued. "Even problems that antedated the military government. In any event, last December's presidential election settled the question of military government, so I would appreciate it if you would stop disappointing others by suggesting otherwise as it is." Although the content of Sin's remarks was biting, his tone was humble itself. The colonel's views on the Kwangju Incident and the 12 December Military Coup were diametrically opposed to those widely held in press circles, but I drew the impression that LTC Sin was expressing those views from personal conviction and not merely because he was speaking to a reporter. He sincerely seemed to believe them.

Please Leave Us Alone

Three Chungpuk University students were at the OP undergoing their sophomore-year, frontline military training. They all said the same thing: "When we came up here for this training, we were all set to have some fun. But as we talked with the enlisted men we were working with on the barbed-wire fence along the DMZ's southern limit line, we changed our minds pretty fast." One student who said he had grasped what the term "walk in your sleep" really meant, said, "I have begun to understand that in spite of it all students and soldiers have got to understand each other."

LTC Sin said nervously, "You know. When I am in uniform and pass by a place where a demonstration is underway, I get extremely self-conscious. Its tragic when you cannot feel comfortable with your fellow countrymen."

On the way back from the DMZ, I stopped by the quarters of a regimental commander who hails from Chonju in North Cholla Province. It was late at night. When the colonel said he had served for 15 years in the army, I asked him what he thought about the Kwangju Incident. His response follows.

"Once a mission is levied on a military organization, soldiers have no choice but to execute that mission. One can quibble with the methodology used, but when an order is given to suppress a demonstration, that is what one must do without fail. If one tries to pass judgment on this military doctrine from a civilian point of view, there will never be mutual understanding." According to this regimental commander, after the Kwangju Incident the army adopted tough new training designed to teach SWC troopers to treat civilians courteously.

The colonel turned the conversation to Song Chung-hak, one of his sergeants who lived next to an old civilian who was partially paralyzed. The sergeant treated the old gentleman as if he were a father, and the colonel asked me to say something about Song in my article. The colonel believed Song's story could help improve the army's relationship with the Korean people. "This is an example of the fact," the colonel said, "that this is the people's army."

The regimental commander, an OCS graduate, said that he had purchased a 40-million won apartment in Seoul's Kaepo-tong in 1984. This was possible, he said, only because he served with the ROK forces in Vietnam and was able to save the extra money he made there. The colonel explained that with more than 20 years of army service, if he retired today he could elect to receive his retirement as an annuity or as a lump sum of about 27 million won. During most of his years in the army, the colonel had lived in rented quarters and been the object of scorn by a series of landlords. The colonel spent a considerable amount of time reminiscing about especially egregious disputes with landlords.

LTC Chang was also present and added his own story. "My father came to visit me one time. We lived in a rented room and our situation really was kind of pitiful. In fact, my father took my oldest son home to live with him just to ease our burden somewhat. He raised the boy for about 2 years, but I was too busy in a frontline assignment to visit them. After 2 years I finally got some time off and went to see my son. He did not recognize me and said to me 'Hi, older brother!' That almost broke my heart. So I brought him back to be with me on the frontline."

A Warning From Chong Pyong-chu

I have talked with many men who stand opposite the present generals who run the army. Chong Sung-hwa, former chief of staff of the army; Chong Pyong-chu, retired major general who commanded the SWC at the time of 12 December 1979; Kim Chin-ki, retired brigadier general who was provost marshal general at army headquarters at the time of 12 December 1979; Kang Chang-song, retired major general and former commander of the DSC's predecessor unit, the army Defense Command; and a number of DSC officers who investigated the Hana-hwe. Before I started meeting them, I naturally assumed that they would hold views that would sharply contrast from those of active duty general officers. But I found instead that their views on the Kwangju Incident and the relationship that must prevail between the army and the Korean people were virtually identical.

Former SWC commanding general Chong Pyong-chu is highly regarded for comporting himself cleanly, and in a manly and soldierly manner during the recent tumults. Chong supported the ROK Army Headquarters side on the night of 12 December 1979, but in fact he was much
closer personally to the network figures who supported the Joint Investigation Headquarters cause that night, Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u, Pak Hui-to, Choe Se-chang, and Chang Ki-o.

Chong commanded the SWC for 5 years, and during that time he raised the SWC to world standards for special paratroop units. Chong was known as the "godfather of the SWC network" and personally brought into the SWC paratroop units. Chong was known as the "godfather of the SWC network" and personally brought into the SWC paratroop units. Chong was known as the "godfather of the SWC network" and personally brought into the SWC paratroop units. Chong was known as the "godfather of the SWC network" and personally brought into the SWC paratroop units. Chong was known as the "godfather of the SWC network" and personally brought into the SWC paratroop units.

Chong was forced out of the army in the spring of 1980, and although he received certain proposals from the Chon Tu-hwan administration, he chose to reject these and remained in seclusion.

"I eat three times a day, and stare at the sky," Chong told me. "The ground is there, so I walk on it, and then I sleep. I really enjoy walking. When resentment got the better of me, I would take a bottle of liquor and stagger around by myself all day in the Five West Tombs area at Kupabal, and then fall down anywhere and sleep. And then when I passed a checkpoint north of Seoul I wondered how Mr No Tae-u passed that place.... The instant I took off my uniform, I retired not just from the army but from life itself. I am saying I just don't want any other job in life. The way I was retired caught me unprepared, and I have not been able to adjust to it."

General Chong broke his silence and expressed his convictions only once. When the 12 December 1979 Military Coup became an issue in the presidential campaign in late 1987, Chong called a news conference in conjunction with former army provost marshal Kim Chin-ki. Chong adopted a conciliatory attitude, telling reporters, "For the sake of history, the truth about the 12 December Incident must be precisely told, but a number of the main actors remain on active duty in the army. I don't want to name these men because to do so might undercut the process of democratization. And if the press were to carry their names, I think it would vastly complicate their task of command. I don't want to see that."

Chong's ideas about the army and politics are distinctive indeed. "The army has only one reason to exist, to obey lawful orders issued by the constituted chain of command, and obey them absolutely. If you are ordered to go to die, you must go. Why did I refuse to go along on the night of 12 December 1979? On the friendship level, I was closer to General Chon's group, but was it not irrefutably true that the constituted chain of command through army headquarters was active and functioning? The foundation for Korean democracy and the key to rekindling trust between the army and the Korean people are one and the same: the simple issue of whether the army as a group will obey commands or whether it will not.

"Military people have very simple mentalities. They are continuously trained to blindly obey commands. As a result, they are constitutionally unable to comprehend the complex society Korea has become today. My wife still complains that I govern our family in a military style. No professional soldier can doff his uniform one day, enter the political world the next, and possibly expect to be free of these ingrained habits. In a military society, the senior officers can do whatever they want to. Take that mentality and see what kind of trouble it leads to in economics or politics."

When Army Officers React to Alienation

"The principal reason the military cannot preside over a civilian government is that we officers have a strong tendency of confusing military orders from established law," Chong Sung-hwa said. "No matter how honorable our intentions, we cannot do things that subvert the process of law." Chong's point was that many military officers fail to comprehend that in a constitutional state actions must be founded in law. Chong was noting that generals tend to overlook the fact that commands must always remain within the realm of legality, and because of this tendency when generals take political power, they inevitably degrade law to the level of a mere tool of power. The military mentality was the basic cause of the perversion of law that occurred during the Fifth Republic.

"When there is an illogical regulation in the U.S. Army," one retired general officer told me, "American officers unswervingly obey that regulation even as they set out to change it. But Korean officers simply ignore the regulation while they look into it."

The so-called Yusin Recruitment System was originated by Chong Sung-hwa when he served as KMA commandant from 1975 to 1977. As commandant, Chong noted that the quality of high school graduates applying to the KMA was falling, and the army was concerned. Part of the problem was decreased academic performance, but the number of applicants from farming families and from the urban poor was also up sharply. Chong said he was concerned at the time that this trend could result in the forming of a group of KMA officers with roots in
socially alienated classes that could be potentially rebellious. Chong reacted by inviting the principals of the nation's leading high schools to visit the KMA on several occasions. He personally gave them guided tours of the academy and urged them to send only their “top students” to the KMA. Chong claimed that to boost the quality of KMA cadets he needed to be able to tell the applicants and their high school principals that the army offered an alternate road into the civil service in the event a young officer dropped behind in his military career. Thus, Chong recommended to President Pak that the government adopt the Yusin Recruitment System.

“Even now I think the Yusin Recruitment System is a valid idea,” Chong says today, “but the Korean people have rejected military government and the Yusin Recruitment System with it. They have thrown the baby out with the bath water, so to speak. Then too, abuses in the administration of the program triggered a strong backlash from the civil service itself.” Chong went on, “Korea is still divided into a south and a north. If our society continues to vilify the army, then rebelliousness and negative reaction on the part of military officers can only grow. In the kind of free society we have enjoyed lately, no other profession is suffering the deprivation of freedom that the army is experiencing.”

A Progressive Military?

Chong Sung-hwa said he told RDP presidential candidate Kim Yong-sam many times during last year’s presidential campaign that, “When you censure the army, limit your attacks to the few political officers and not the simple soldiers who comprise the vast bulk of the army.”

Chong Sung-hwa said that if the Korean people are to regain their trust in the army, large numbers of former military officers must join opposition political parties. This would help change the military’s view of the opposition and, at the same time the opposition would come to understand the military. “If the opposition parties continue to heap blame on the army for being the hand maiden of power,” Chong emphasizes, “and the ruling elite perceives the army as nothing more than a tool of power, then the army itself has no independent ground on which to stand. Opposition forces have an obligation to prevent the situation in which the army is viewed as the DJP’s private security guard. For their part, the opposition parties are rife with thinly-disguised prejudice against retired officers, but I think we have reached a point in our development where the man should be evaluated regardless of what his professional background was.”

In 1984, this reporter undertook a study of the military backgrounds of the 11th National Assembly. Of the 185 deputies who were qualified for the draft, 50 members (27 percent) had not actually served in the military. In a number of cases, a deputy failed to serve because of physical limitations, but a large majority of them seemed to have intentionally avoided mandatory military service. In developed countries, failure to pay taxes or heed the draft are absolute disqualifiers for public office. Under the concept of “noblesse oblige,” social figures who enjoy the respect that flows from holding high office (noblesse) accept a corresponding measure of social obligation (oblige). But in Korea the “noblesse oblige” mentality has yet to take hold, and indeed there may be a trend in the opposite direction because of the people’s animus toward the military government.

A DJP official well versed in national defense issues said the following: “Military officers in Europe had their roots in the nobility, and in Japan, in the Samurai class. Even in the United States only young men from the upper classes who receive the personal recommendation of a senator can attend West Point. This provides the governing class with underpinnings rooted in the officer corps and guarantees a built-in predisposition to defend the system. In contrast, the Korean officer corps originates largely from the lower middle class, and far from being predisposed to safeguarding the system, it tends to seek power itself, and from time to time even displays characteristics of socialism.”

Healing the Relationship Between the People and Their Army Is the Best Way To Strengthen National Defense

A retired KMA colonel who worked as a senior Chong-wadae staffer in the Fifth Republic said very nearly the same thing: “Academically speaking, an army is conservative and right-wing by definition, but in a developing country the military can be closer to the left of the political spectrum than to the right. Thus, it is wrong to perceive Korea’s army officers to be uniformly conservative. They are certainly conservative when it comes to security matters, but they have very progressive ideas when it comes to social and economic issues. The social reforms instituted by the army’s elite after the 16 May 1961 Military Revolution and again in 1980 reflected this liberal inclination.”

There is some criticism, however, that the liberalism of the ROK Army officer corps lacks either a theoretical or philosophical base and amounts to little more than an ordinary brand of reformism tinged with a heavy dose of romanticism. The danger is, of course, that this brand of reformism can easily evolve into the extreme rightism of national socialism, or it could fade away, a victim of capitalism's insistence on the preeminence of law. Some say that the key army officers who assumed political power in 1980 advocated the progressive idea of implementing a just society but in the end failed to achieve significant social reform because they lacked a cohesive ideological framework and because they were overwhelmed by the sheer inertia of industry, the civil service, and other capitalistic structures of the Korean society.
Sin Tae-chin was one of the fast-burners of KMA Class 15. As a cadet, he was selected as KMA 15’s “representative knight” [tae pyo hwarang] and was among the first of his class to attain flag rank. But Sin retired last March at the major general rank from the relatively undesirable assignment of deputy commanding general of the First Field Army, while his fast-burner mates from KMA 15 went on to be promoted to lieutenant general. Sin attended middle school in North Kyongsang Province’s Andong and graduated from Taejon High School. Many believe that Sin’s career skewed into dead-end assignments and early retirement merely because he happened to be former army chief of staff Chong Sung-hwa’s brother-in-law.

In spite of the wide divergence between Major General Sin’s career and the careers of the political soldiers who led the army during the Fifth Republic, virtually no difference exists between what Sin has to say about the army’s relationship with the Korean people and what the active-duty general officers I talked to said on that subject. “[The army is a fish in a pond called the people,” Sin says. “The army eats and sleeps on morale. If the people censure the army, morale will suffer, and it will be difficult in the future.” The problem is also in people trying to differentiate between the military and the people. But recently the mass media has broken its bonds, and as a result each side will come to understand that their mutual perceptions of reality vary very little indeed.”

Sin went on to explain a theory that the power of the army is directly related to the degree of popular acceptance and support it enjoys. According to Sin, war fighting capability can be represented by the formula F:M:a, where “F” is the ability to conduct warfare, “M” is economic capacity, and “a” is the speed of mobilization. The speed of mobilization, according to Sin, depends on the quality of voluntary cooperation among the government, the military, and the people. If the people do not trust the army, then mobilization is undermined and national defense itself is threatened. “Thus, nothing we can undertake will strengthen national defense like healing the relationship between the people and their army.”

Sin Tae-chin suggested that improving friendly relations among officers and between officers and enlisted men would also strengthen combat power. He said that two other things would contribute to improved combat capability. The first was abolishing private organizations within the officer corps, and the second was democratizing army management by such means as banning the beating of soldiers.

“The army must preserve its organization under any foreseeable circumstance if it is to successfully apply the force required by its basic combat mission,” Sin went on. “Organizational cohesion should be based on human relationships. In the periods of crisis when the army will be required to use its power, nothing official, no stack of commands, will suffice to hold the army together. Unit integrity hinges on the quality of human relationships within the unit. Strong armies are built by nurturing unit cohesion, not by punishment and discipline.”

Military Government Hurts Soldiers Most

Sin Tae-chin was very pleased with the fair absentee ballot that took place in the military during this election. It was a turning point. The fair voting revealed that the vast majority of the army wants nothing to do with politics.”

Having left the service after 33 years, Sin had a lot to say about the sacrifices officers make. “I was so busy being assigned hither and thither across the frontlines that I neglected my children’s education and was not able to provide them with even the simple piano lessons. I once took my children to a relative’s house in Seoul, and my heart ached when I saw my own kids just standing and staring in envy as my relative’s children were happily banging out tunes on the piano.”

“No you know,” Sin said, “during the 9 years I wore general’s stars, I spent less than 9 months living with my family. Obviously I spent most of the time at my unit, but even there my general officer status prevented me from sneaking into a tearoom and I had to live the life of a Buddhist priest in a temple.

Sin added that “even when friends offered to buy me drinks, I could not go simply because I could not afford the 30,000 won tips required in places with hostesses. He even joked that calling out his wife and having some barbecue was cheaper than the 30,000 won tip.”

Many active duty officers I have met said that the “army is being scorned at by society.” One retired colonel went further, asserting that “the military is being oppressed by society.”

On the other hand, a great many Korean civilians believe that the military is receiving preferential treatment and that they have been the objects of military oppression but the officers believe that they are being oppressed by public opinion. These contrasting views originated from a mutual misunderstanding which developed during the rule of military government of doubtful legitimacy. As a retired general said, “Those hurt most by the military government were the soldiers.”

“A few political officers doffed their uniforms and shouldered their way into politics, finance, and the management of government-funded companies,” the former general continued, “conveying the false impression that all officers enjoyed such privileges. These men, however, to secure their perquisites, sacrificed the interests of the whole army. They started to oppress their former senior officers by banning the alumni gathering of various commissioning classes and by forcing the retired general officers’ association known as the Star..."
Friends Society [Songuhoe] to disband. And they sacrificed the Yusin Recruitment System merely for the sake of votes in the presidential election, even though this program was vital for officers trying to return to civilian society. And above all, a mere handful of political officers caused an army beloved by the Korean people to become instead the object of the people's loathing."

Even after President No Tae-u's Sixth Republic got underway, former generals continued to be appointed as presidents of government-invested firms. The No administration appointed retired lieutenant general Kim Tae-kyun, KMA Class 13, to be president of the Korean National Highway Corporation, replacing Chong Tong-ho who left the job to run for the National Assembly on the DJP ticket. A retired lieutenant general and former army vice chief of staff, Chong is also a graduate of KMA Class 13.

The No administration selected former DSC commander An Pil-chun, KMA Class 12, retired army general, and former president of the Youth and Students League, to be president of the Korean National Coal Company. An was also a member of the Hana-hwe.

The No government recently appointed Nam Ung-chong, from the Interpreters Officer Course Class 6, to be president of the Korean National Broadcast Advertising Corporation. Nam was DSC chief of staff on 12 December 1979. His appointment has sparked criticism even within retired military circles. Many say Nam landed the job because he is a graduate of No Tae-u's alma mater, Kyongpuk High School in Taegu.

One-third of Cabinet Ministers Are Former Military Officers

In his "The Ideology and Politics of Korean Military and Civil Officials," Professor Kim Kwang-ung of Seoul National University's Graduate School of Administration notes that, "Two characteristics of Korea's leadership elite have remained remarkably constant over the past 20 years. The first is the growing influence of the military elite, and the other is the number of Kyongsang Province figures in positions of authority."

During the period, 245 figures served as directors of independent government agencies. Of these, 99 (39 percent) were former military officers.

Let's review the place of origin of these ministers, vice ministers, and independent agency directors. Of the ministers 31.3 percent, vice ministers 35.6 percent, and directors 39.4 percent hailed from Kyongsang Province, as opposed to only 13.1 percent, 9.2 percent, and 13.3 percent, respectively, from Cholla Province. Compared to the overall population proportions of about 35 percent for Kyongsang Province and 25 percent for Cholla Province, the ratio of high officials hailing from Kyongsang Province is slightly higher than the Kyongsang proportion of the population, but the percent of high officials hailing from Cholla Province is much lower than the Cholla population slice. Former officers overwhelmingly dominate the executive management levels at government-invested firms.

In 1987, Professor An Yong-sik of Yonsei University did a study of the backgrounds of 162 executives of quasi-government companies. Among the surveyed group former civil service officials predominated, with 28.1 percent of the total, followed by former professors at 22.2 percent, and retired military officers at 21 percent. However, former officers dominated the three highest positions in the studied companies. Nine of 25 chairmen, 10 of 26 presidents, and 12 of 26 auditors were retired military officers.

One university professor said: "Former military officers managing corporations at a time when society is being specialized is like a professor becoming a commander of a division."

About 43 Percent of Field Grade Retirees Are Unemployed

The figures shown earlier make the army look like a privileged class indeed, but other surveys must be considered as well.

According to "A Study of Army Officers' Career Management," a master's thesis done in 1982 at Seoul National University's Graduate School of Administration by the present Defense Minister O Cha-pok, 11 percent of army officers surveyed when questioned about their career attitudes responded that, "There is no chance to succeed." Another 44 percent said, "There is almost no chance to succeed." On the question of career satisfaction, only 33 percent clearly responded that they were "satisfied" with their jobs. O's thesis also reveals unemployment rates for the three field grades (as of 1980) as follows: about 35.2 percent of colonel retirees were unemployed; 43.4 percent of retired lieutenant colonels; and 40.4 percent of retired majors, for an overall field grade retiree unemployment rate of 43.4 percent. O also points out that most of those who retire in the field ranks were born in the forties and early fifties, so when they retire they are at a point in their
lives when education expenses for their children are highest. In many cases, therefore, retiring officers experience grave economic difficulties.

About 20 percent of retired general officers from KMA Class 15 are unemployed, and another 10 percent are working but are experiencing economic difficulties.

In his thesis, O lists the occupations of retired general officers as of 1975. Of the 598 total, 8.7 percent engaged in politics; 4.2 percent in government; 7.4 percent at government-invested firms; 33.3 percent in civilian industry; 4 percent in education; 7 percent in financial and social organizations; and 8.7 percent in private businesses. Another 1.5 percent lived overseas, 2.3 percent were diplomats, and 22.3 percent were unemployed.

For years the government has devoted considerable resources to finding jobs for retired generals or in providing other means for them to support their families, neglecting to provide support for officers who retire at other ranks. Many suggest that this is a major cause of the misimpression among the Korean people that all soldiers receive preferential treatment. Others specifically condemn the Fifth Republic's Soldiers Mutual Aid Society for providing hundreds of thousands of won monthly in "livelihood support fees" to unemployed retired generals, while all but ignoring retired officers of other ranks.

The "contempt" active duty soldiers say they endure springs less from specific ways they are treated than from the "unfortunate impressions" society and the Korean people have about the army. The press and opposition parties condemn a "few political officers" while seeking to spare the vast majority of military officers and men who seek only to do their jobs, but this effort seems to have had little salutary impact on public perceptions. The chief reason for this is simply that political officers cannot readily be distinguished from dedicated officers. In the case of Pak Hui-to, army chief of staff, the press and opposition parties regard him as a political officer because on 12 December 1979 he commanded the SWC's First Brigade, led his unit across Haengju Bridge into Seoul, and occupied both the army headquarters and the Ministry of Defense, and because he made a negative statement about Kim Tae-chung during the presidential campaign. But many active duty officers consider Pak to be, "The simplest soldier of all. No informed person would take him to be a 'political officer,'" not only because of his heroic performance in the Vietnamese war or because he led the team that cut down the offending tree during the Panmunjom axe murder incident in 1976, but also because of his no-nonsense, conventional military personality.

Many active duty officers simplistically apply criticism of the few political officers to the army in general. During December's presidential campaign and again in April's general election campaign, many officers responded with anger to provocative criticisms of the army. One full general attending a private social function heard about an opposition politician who had delivered a campaign speech while holding up a pair of military boots and ridiculing the army. In the presence of politicians and reporters and without a moment's hesitation, the general said, "If I had been there with a gun and a silencer, I would have blown him away."

Soldiers On Active Duty Cannot Testify

A retired colonel employed as an executive of a quasi-government corporation heard about an opposition deputy of the 12th assembly who severely criticized former military officers who work in government-funded firms. The colonel met with the deputy privately and denounced him in no uncertain terms, "Honorable Mr National Assemblyman. Are you aware of the psychology of us soldiers now? They are hoping that you continue to insult the army as you have done, and incite social instability so that when martial law results from that social disruption, you, Mr Deputy, will be the first person the army will take into custody. Do you think the army's principles are so different? If you keep it up, the opposition will never seat a president in this country." Army officers are reluctant to assume responsibility for the Kwangju Incident; many respond to accusations with a simple question. "What did we do wrong?" Most officers acknowledge the SWC's excessive use of force in containing the situation in Kwangju, but all seem to defend the tactics used. "The army is different from the police. When the army is given a crowd-control mission, then the army must accomplish that mission without excuse. Only the manner in which the mission is to be executed is open to discussion, and that is a secondary issue. As far as the SWC goes, that unit's wartime mission is to infiltrate behind enemy lines and conduct violent operations there. The highly specialized SWC trains ceaselessly for this distinctive mission. I believe it was probably a mistake to employ a unit of that type against demonstrating civilians. On the other hand, how can soldiers simply disregard civilians who possess firearms?" Another officer said, "The only possible outcome to constantly surfacing the Kwangju issue will be to trigger a strong negative reaction on the part of the entire officer corps. And that will end up being undesirable for the process of democratization."

"If the assembly should summon active duty officers to testify about military actions during an investigation of the Kwangju Incident," one high-ranking general officer said, "I will not allow them to respond, even if it will cost me my job. If we allow soldiers to be summoned, no soldier would ever again follow orders to participate in civil suppression operations." One retired officer said, "The Kwangju Incident remains an unresolved issue because of the naive public information policies of the Fifth Republic. The government should have acknowledged errors, and should have defended what needed to be defended. They should have apologized about the excessive use of force at the beginning of the incident,"
and should have convincingly explained that after the city's citizens acquired firearms, the suppressive operations became unavoidable if national integrity was to be preserved.

Army Chief of Staff General Pak Hui-to was the commander of a front-line division at the time of the Kwangju Incident. At a social function Pak noted that, "We division commanders believed that if the Kwangju Incident spread as far north as Taejon, then Kim Il-song would misjudge and mount an attack on the ROK. The situation was urgent enough that some division commanders believed that we should mount a preemptive attack on North Korea before we found ourselves beset from both the north and south."

**Many Officers Incorrectly Perceive the Kwangju Incident**

In meetings with reporters, former Defense Minister Chong Ho-yong on many occasions expressed frustration.

"Why don't your newspapers publish what I say about the Kwangju Incident? Are you afraid you will be criticized? Neither former president Chon Tu-hwan, Nor Tae-u, nor myself were in the chain of command responsible for the Kwangju Incident, so why do you keep worrying the issue to death?"

Minister Chong said he received many letters from officers who asked him, "Why don't you start defending the military position on Kwangju?"

Many people believe that if the opposition parties demand an investigation into the facts of the Kwangju incident that tension will build within the army. Opposition parties are not yet calling for punishment of the responsible commander, but the army already has displayed sensitivity to the possibility that the chain of command might be challenged in some way during an assembly investigation, by investigating individual commanders, for example.

Sources say that the army took statements from the officers and men directly involved in the Kwangju Incident. According to one high-ranking general officer who had reviewed this material, "When I read those statements, I realized the troops had no other choice."

The same general also said that a written statement submitted by retired General Yi Hui-song, martial law commander at the time of the Kwangju Incident, to the National Democracy and Reconciliation Council in early 1988 in which Yi essentially acknowledged that excessive force was used by the military in Kwangju was simply not justifiable. Two of the three SWC brigade commanders involved in the Kwangju Incident have retired: Sin U-sik (KMA Class 14, retired as a major general) and Choe Ung (KMA Class 12, retired as a lieutenant general). The third, Choe Se-chang (KMA Class 13) serves as chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, the highest uniformed position in the military establishment. Pak Chun-pyong, who commanded the 20th Division which was sent to Kwangju and participated in the final operation there on 27 May 1980, was appointed recently to be DJP secretary general. Also very recently, So Chun-yol, who was commander of the South Cholla Province Area Martial Law Command during the Kwangju Incident, was made chairman of the Korea Veterans' Association.

Many SWC officers have played key roles in the Fifth and Sixth Republics, including Chon Tu-hwan, No Tae-u, Chong Ho-yong (who was SWC commander at the time of the Kwangju Incident), Choe Se-chang, Pak Hui-to, and Chang Ki-o, who served formerly as the minister of government administration. An investigation of the Kwangju Incident will unavoidably jolt the SWC, be seen as a symbolic attack on both the Chon and No governments, influence the future direction of Korean politics, and negatively impact the already delicate relationship between the Korean Army and the Korean people.

The perceptions of the Kwangju Incident shared with this reporter by many active duty officers often diverge significantly from the facts of the case. Kwangju citizens armed themselves as a means of self protection only after the military had used excessive force against individual demonstrators. Contrary to fact, however, a number of military officers believe that excessive force became unavoidable when citizens armed themselves without provocation.

Most officers believe that it was a mistake to use a specialized military unit to suppress civilian demonstrations. Many see the situation from the viewpoint of the SWC's airborne units. These officers point out that SWC units in Kwangju possessed insufficient crowd-control equipment and were confronted with massive numbers of demonstrators. They say that contrary to the common perception, it was the soldiers who were terrified, and who thus resorted to brutal use of power from sheer desperation.

**The Character of the Army's Top Leaders**

Military opinion regarding the 12 December 1979 incident does not seem to be as uniform as it does about the Kwangju Incident. Everyone agrees, however, that, "There must never again be another incident like this." Many officers attempt to rationalize the incident with the logic that, "In the days leading up to 12 December, no less important a military figure than army Chief of Staff General Chong Sung-hwa was under a cloud of suspicion in regard to the assassination of President Pak Chong-hui. And the problem was simply that Chong failed to choose the manly solution and resign." This logic, of course, speaks volumes about the values of these officers.
There seems to be little support in the army for the concept of military subordination to civilian leadership or for the legal tidiness of constitutional government. As one ranking civilian government official put it, "Even if Chong Sung-hwa were under suspicion in the assassination case, any move to arrest him should have been based on proper legal procedure, including an arrest warrant signed by the president." The prevailing mindset, however, seems to have been the one-dimensional, simplistic view that "Well, Chong's a bad man, so we will be forgiven even if we go too far." As if that were not bad enough, the investigations and trials that followed the 12 December Incident revealed no basis for suspicions that Chong colluded with presidential assassin Kim Chae-kyu. Thus the information on which most officers relied at the time was simply distorted. This suggests that military intelligence can monopolize critical intelligence information and use it to successfully manipulate the unique traits of military organization to mislead the officer corps into erratic behavior, at least for the short term. Thus, Chong Sung-hwa was not subject to the dictates of a sense of justice based on universal values but was instead the victim of parochial values. This was true also for other figures who played feature roles in the incident. For example, Chong Pyong-chu, who commanded the SWC on the night of 12 December 1979, was subjected to various adversities, as were the family members of Chong's secretary of the general staff, who was killed during the incident. Chong was rewarded for following the lawful orders of ROK Army Headquarters that night when his own men shot and wounded him and took him into custody. But the same key players in the incident who treated Chong and others in this unfortunate manner showered U Kyong-yun with preferential treatment after U was wounded by gunfire while aiding in Chong Sung-hwa's arrest. This disparate treatment lets us gauge the real nature of the "justice" the political officer group publicly espoused.

The issue more sensitive to the military than Kwangju and more likely to trigger a military reaction is the demand for an investigation into the corruption of former president Chon Tu-hwan.

A key Seoul-area commander told this reporter that he believed this is the one move the army leadership considers it must block. And the army no doubt is pressuring President No Tae-u to accept its position on the matter. The lieutenant generals and full generals atop the army pyramid today are personally closer to Chon Tu-hwan than they are to No Tae-u. Some of them put their lives on the line with Chon on the night of 12 December 1979, some served continuously as Chon's subordinates when he was on active duty, some were members of the Hana-hwe, some hail from Chon's province, and some fall into two or three of these categories at the same time, making them extremely close to the former president. Moreover, these "network" men put more value on personal relationships than on official or private ties. Thus they are adamant that an investigation of Chon Tu-hwan "simply cannot be allowed. It is unacceptable even on humanitarian grounds." Military reaction will be even more acute so long as the army sees PPD President Kim Tae-chung as leading the demands for investigations into the facts of the Kwangju Incident and corruption by Chon Tu-hwan. Since April's general elections, Kim Tae-chung's attitude has seemed more moderate, but the military leadership's views of Kim have not been ameliorated in the slightest by this moderate stance. Given the taut command structure of the military, the attitudes of the top military leadership exert virtually total influence on the attitudes and actions of officers at all levels. Only a few dozen lieutenant generals and full generals comprise the top rung of the army.

Let's look at what makes 20 of them tick.

Only one is an OCS product; all the rest are graduates of the KMA. Of the 20, 5 mobilized troops to support Combined Investigations Headquarters Commander Chon Tu-hwan at the time of the 12 December Incident in 1979. Only 2 of the 20 were not members of the former Hana-hwe. Six graduated either from Kyongpuk High School or Kyongpuk Middle School. No other secondary schools are represented by a more alumni among these flag officers. Two graduated from Pusan High School, and three from Seoul High School. Ten hail from Kyongsang Province, six from Chungchon Province, three from Seoul, and one from Cholla Province. A colonel serving at army headquarters said the following about networks in the army.

"There are three broad categories of networks among army general officers. The first is based on shared secondary school experience. Virtually all flag officers graduated from only a small number of high schools: Kyongpuk, Pusan, Kyongnam, Taejon, Seoul, Chinju, Kimchon, Masan, Kwangu, Wonju, Kangnung, Chunchon, and Songnam. The second network is military school classmates, and the third is comprised of those who have served together in military assignments.

Many general officers hail from Kyongsang Province, but this is not an example of regional discrimination so much as a reflection of the fact that the Kyongsang area has the largest fraction of the overall population and also because a disproportionate number of Kyongsang cadets applied to enter the KMA. The importance of the Hana-hwe network is greatly exaggerated."

The army officers corps is composed of men commissioned from the KMA, ROTC, the Third Military Academy, and men with baccalaureate degrees. Although ROTC officers predominate numerically, the overwhelming majority of general officers are KMA graduates, and in fact KMA officers lead the army. The first ROTC graduate ever to command a division was appointed only recently, from ROTC Class 1 which was commissioned the same year as KMA Class 19. Sin Tae-chin believes that a future ROK Army chief of staff must be selected from among officers who are not KMA
The U.S. Army chief of staff has been selected from among men who did not graduate from West Point. According to Sin, "Officers commissioned in different ways follow very different career paths, but those who are to remain in the army at senior ranks must all attend the Army College as junior field grade officers. It is imperative that the Army College course act as a leveler to erase disparities caused by divergent commissioning sources, putting Army College graduates on an even competitive footing."

The Political Army Will Persist for Another Decade

Because so many of today's top army leaders were involved in the politicization of the army, they naturally are sharply opposed to calls for democratization and for an end to the military government. The likely next Chief of Staff General Yi Chong-ku was a key member of the Hana-hwe. The chief of staff after him is likely to be a graduate of KMA Class 16, 17, or 18, and the fast-burners of each of these classes were either Hana-hwe members or played roles in the 12 December Incident which brought the military to political power once again. Thus for at least the next decade the Korean Army will be dominated by this strongly politicized leadership elite. The probability is high that the army's habit of political intervention will not die suddenly, but will instead trundle slowly down the path to oblivion.

Nevertheless, the top army leadership fully recognizes that, "The time when the army could control politics is past. The way to restore the army's honor is for the army to stay as far as possible away from politics." Sources suggest that the army top brass has told President No that, "The Fifth Republic dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the army. Please restore that prestige in the Sixth."

I heard the following from two unrelated sources at different times and in different places, from a DJP military specialist and a knowledgeable Chongwadae official.

"Had one of the two Kims been elected president in December's presidential election, the president-elect almost surely would not have been inaugurated. In the political whirlpool triggered by such a victory, the army would not have accepted civilian rule but probably would have chosen to play an independent role of its own once more.

"I think that having as president a man like No Tae-u who is a former Hana-hwe member and knows the army well is a very lucky thing for this country. He will help ensure that the army stays out of politics and will do much to improve the popular perception of the military. In any event, the Sixth Republic can be seen as a transitional government, but with the advantage that President No is fully capable of controlling the military, buying time for the army gradually to democratize during his tenure. Luckily, men like No Tae-u, Chong Ho-yong, Kim Pok-tong, and O Cha-pok who exercise influence on the military share identical views of the role of the army, and although the future will not be entirely painless, the military will gradually be edged further and further from the political arena."

Minister O Cha-pok's Thesis

Present Defense Minister O Cha-pok earned a master's degree in 1982 from Seoul National University's Graduate School of Administration. The title of his thesis was "A Study of Army Officers' Career Management." O Cha-pok passed the graduate school entrance examination even though he was burdened by his military duties at the time. The test is so difficult that those who pass the National Civil Service Examination in Administration often fail it.

In his thesis, O discusses the "nature of the military when viewed from the vantage point of ethics." First, he says, the military works under a continual awareness of struggle. The army sees a universe, both natural and human, in which conflict and struggle can occur at anytime. Second, the army acknowledges violence. The military goes beyond the position that man is naturally evil, holding instead that violence is deeply rooted in the nature of man. Thus, the army is inclined more toward force than toward persuasion. Third, the army holds the group in highest esteem and takes the state as its focal point. Fourth, the military's world view is rooted in realism. The army bases all its planning and actions on history and experience, making it conservative and realistic. But the military comes up short on flexibility, intuition, and sensitivity. Fifth, the military is future-directed. Officers never forget that life or death turns on victory or defeat in battle, and they cope with this uncertainty by directing their energies toward the future.

O Cha-pok points to two peacetime expressions of the military ethic. First, the valor required of soldiers in wartime may express itself in peacetime as an interest in materialistic concerns, like rank and living conditions, and predisposes them to conservatism. Second, the respect afforded the army in wartime by the civilian community diminishes in peace time, causing a "drop in army prestige."

O Cha-pok perceives a significant role for the military in various "social undertakings." He sees positive military contributions to society in introducing the nation's young men to citizenship and social relationships, in training a significant segment of the nation's manpower, and in employing men from society's lowest social strata. O notes, however, that due to a rigid dogmatism common to the military mentality, "In underdeveloped countries military contributions to society tend to cause the military to develop a sense of authority vis a vis civilian society which then is expressed in forceful means rather than in cooperation with the civil sector, providing the basis for military control of the civil government."
O Cha-pok also pointed out that, “The more democratic the political structure and the more industrialized the country, the more the military lowers its standards, attracting men who fall behind in social competition, thus weakening the army's ruling class roots.” As an example of this tendency, O published materials showing that the high school academic performance of young men applying to the KMA was worsening.

Majors and lieutenant colonels today were in the top 40, 50, or even 60 percent of their high school graduating classes when they entered the KMA in the early 1970s, but prior to 1970 the average KMA applicant was in the top 30 percent of his high school graduating class.

O Cha-pok recommended seven measures to boost military professionalism: Increase the value put on military careers by society at large; ensure that only outstanding young men are commissioned; guarantee a fair promotion system; provide for more in-service education and training; provide reasonable compensation; adopt effective means to find civilian employment for officers who fail to be promoted; and accommodate the law of supply and demand in long-range officer personnel planning. In his thesis, O Cha-pok complained that education at army expense in both civilian and military institutions of higher learning was often provided exclusively to KMA officers. As of 1979, 763 of the 1071 officers awarded such training were KMA graduates. Noting that officers will always regard promotion as the supreme value and devote a large portion of their energies to achieving it, O then advanced some recommendations for improving the promotion system. According to O's data, 38.8 percent of all army officers are satisfied with the present promotion system, 18.7 percent are dissatisfied, and 42.5 percent are neutral about it.

O Cha-pok specifically recommended that non-KMA officers be considered more promotion-worthy, as should officers in specialist careers, who also suffer from career neglect in other ways. He added that consideration should be given to opening the existing closed promotion board system. “No matter how the face of warfare changes,” O asserted, “the essence of military power will continue to be soldiers. In the final analysis, the critical element determining whether an army wins or loses in battle is that army's officers and men.” O stressed that, “The personnel structure in the army is completely closed. Unlike the civil service or private industry, therefore, the military cannot bring in top-level administrators from outside when the situation warrants such a solution. Since officers can be promoted only from within the system, the proper nurturing of military personnel assets is an urgent matter.”

Alleviating Discontent About Promotion Delays

As Minister O pointed out, officers put a very high value on honor. The concrete expression of honor is military rank. Army organization begins and ends precisely in rank. Promotion management, therefore, is the key to effective military personnel management and even to effective military operations. Many officers maintain that serious anomalies in the officer personnel management system could trigger a military rebellion.

Retired KMA Colonel Han Yong-won, a professor at Kyowon College has said, "The 16 May 1961 Military Coup was related to Pre-KMA Class 8's dissatisfaction with a promotion lag, and the 12 December 1979 Incident was related to delays in promotions for KMA officers. Most of the Pre-KMA Class 8 officers were lieutenant colonels on 16 May 1961, and had been trapped at that rank for 6 or 7 years. Yet men of essentially the same age and who were commissioned only a year or two earlier either in the Pre-KMA classes or through the Interpreter Officers' Course were already major generals and lieutenant generals. One reason so many Pre-KMA Class 8 officers joined the 16 May Coup was their dissatisfaction with their stagnated promotions."

At the time of the 12 December 1979 incident, then Colonel U Kyong-yun was a leader of the team sent to arrest Army Chief of Staff Chong Sung-hwa. Yun later retired as a major general. In 1979 he served as the joint investigations headquarters' chief of investigations and simultaneously army headquarters' criminal investigations team chief. Just days before the 12 December Incident, Chon Tu-hwan tipped off Colonel U that he had been passed over for brigadier general. At the same meeting in which he relayed this intelligence, General Chon also asked for Colonel U's cooperation in Chong's arrest. One of the first things that U said to General Chong as he took him into custody was, “Mr Chief of Staff, I hear that I was passed over. I feel bad about that.”

That same night a certain colonel who was an officer in President Choe Kyu-ha's Presidential Security Force but whose sympathies were with General Chon severed President Choe Kyu-ha's communications with the outside world. This colonel had also been passed over for brigadier general, in his case as the result of the direct intervention of Chong Sung-hwa with the promotion board. After the 12 December Incident, this colonel rose to the rank of full general.

Virtually all of those who supported General Chong Sung-hwa on the night of 12 December 1979 were generals commissioned in Pre-KMA Class 10 and earlier, while virtually all those who supported General Chon were KMA graduates. After 12 December, general officers commissioned in Pre-KMA Class 10 and earlier classes were hustled out of the army in bunches, clearing the promotion bottleneck and allowing bulk promotions for KMA officers. This removed from the army the residue of promotion discontent that was the root cause of the 12 December Incident.
"In the Korean military," writes Professor Han Yong-wong, "a promotion logjam seems to occur about every 10 years. One occurred in the early sixties, and another about a decade later, although the Korean Army's participation in the Vietnam war solved that one. The 12 December 1979 Incident served to blast loose the next logjam, 10 years later. Some real thought must be devoted to preventing another of these recurring promotion logjams."

The abolishment of the Yusin Recruitment System will cause a serious lag to develop in the time it takes to find a retiring officer to find a civilian job. The Ministry of Defense is moving to solve the problem, increasing by 3 to 5 years for each grade the mandatory age at which an officer must retire, although this will require amending the Military Personnel Law. Three time-related restraints face officers serving in the military today. An officer may not serve beyond a set time-in-grade, a fixed time in service, or a certain age. When an officer reaches the first of these three limitations, he is required to retire from the service. In the case of colonels, the time-in-grade limitation is 9 years, time-in-service is 27 years, and age is 50. Under the new Defense Ministry plan to ease the age limitation, a colonel's age limit will be extended to 55 from 50, and for lieutenant colonels to 50 from 47. Some people worry, however, that the extension will cause stagnation at the field grades, delaying promotions, perhaps severely enough to cause another logjam.

After the 16 May Coup and the 12 December Military Coup, a number of officers who played key roles in support of insurgent forces were rewarded with promotions. This is a major source of irritation for some retired officers. In 1980, for example, Kwon Chong-tal, Ho Sam-su, Ho Hwa-pyong, and Yi Hak-pong, the so-called inner core of reformist leaders, were promoted to brigadier general several years ahead of their classmates, and days later were retired from the army. Such men are called "three-day generals." Awarding "tombstone promotions" for unofficial purposes makes a mockery of the sacrosanct military ranks. This alone is enough to upset the established hierarchy, according to one very angry retired officer, who adds, "Medals should be given as rewards for meritorious service, not promotions."

The Military's Relative Decrease in Importance

Bangladesh political scientist (Tarukto Maenirujaman) classified 61 military coups according to the length of time that the coup forces retained power. During the period from 1946 to 1984, Korea came in 23rd. Of those 36 years, Korea was under military government a total of 27 years, or 63.9 percent of the time.

First place went to Taiwan with 100 percent military government during those years; second place to Thailand with 89.5 percent; and then, in order, Nicaragua and El Salvador at 86.8 percent; Algeria with 86.4 percent; Egypt with 84.2 percent; Zaire with 83.3 percent; Burundi with 81.8 percent; Paraguay with 78.9 percent; Sudan with 75 percent; and Argentina with 71.1 percent.

None of these countries boasts the long history of civilian rule that Korea has enjoyed. In its 2,000 years of history, Korea was ruled by civilians for all but a few centuries. There is simply no doubt that December's presidential election was a turning point in the 27 years of continuous military rule. For us, military rule began to ebb in December 1987.

"Let's leave the evaluation of the rightness or wrongness of military government to history," a retired colonel who is now a political scientist said. "What we must do is determine why Korea experienced 27 years of military rule, and we must coolly determine the source of the army's power. What I mean is that we must understand these things if we are to avoid yet another round of military rule."

The national budget for fiscal year 1988 is 17,464.4 billion won. Of this, national defense costs amount to 5,733 billion won or about 32.8 percent of the total budget. Military expenditures increased by 15.6 percent this year over last year, although the budget itself increased by only 8.7 percent. The defense budget for 1988 is 5.43 percent of the estimated GNP for the year and is a decrease of 0.12 percent from the 5.55 percent set at last year's budget draft proposal. These facts tell an important story. Although military expenses are increasing in absolute terms, they are decreasing as a proportion of the national economy. The source of the military's strength is physical power, and in a capitalist society physical power is expressed in terms of money.

This is the logic of the retired colonel turned political scientist. The military's influence can only decrease as the civilian sector expands, and this is the trend that will ensure civilian rule. The Korean war made military rule possible in the first place, as the army's manpower and capital exploded far ahead of any other social organization. The military enjoyed a lead quantitatively and qualitatively in the war years and emerged as a hugely powerful organization on the post-war national scene. As economic development built momentum in the seventies, however, the efficiency of industrial organizations improved dramatically, and they grew until even their size overwhelmed the military. The army reached the limits of its ability to preside over Korea's government.

In the 1988 national budget, educational expenses amount to 3,601 billion won, or 20.7 percent of the total, second only to national defense expenses at 32.8 percent. The increasing educational budget has helped boost the influence of college students. The two opposing poles of Korean politics, the army and the students, did not evolve by accident, but the mother's milk of rising budget expenditures nurtured them both.
Education Refines the Officer Corps

I am told that about one-third of all KMA colonels possess masters degrees. And five to seven percent of the graduates of each KMA class have earned doctoral degrees. This means that with the single exception of professors, KMA officers are more highly educated than any other profession. And the army is very proud of this accomplishment.

Professor Yi Tong-hui of Kyonggi Industrial Open College sketched an interesting thesis in his “Korea’s Political Development and the Relationship Between the Army and the People.” He writes, “In the fifties, at a time when social confusion prevailed in the country and the civilian university system remained undeveloped, the KMA was already intensively instructing its cadets using American-style methods and inculcating American democratic ideals. Because officers who graduated from the academy imbibed an education which strongly highlighted professional consciousness, the officer corps as a group may become the future champions of political neutrality for the army.” Professor Yi also asserts that, “We all lose if the relationship between the army and the people degenerates into a question of whether obedience triumphs or defiance triumphs.”

If we look at the career pattern of a KMA officer, we see that the officer completes a period of education followed by a military assignment and a promotion, and then the cycle begins anew. A cadet completes 4 years at the KMA and is commissioned a second lieutenant. The new officer then receives 4 months of basic officer training before serving as a platoon leader. As a captain he completes 4 months of advanced officer training before serving as a company commander and then is promoted to major. The officer then attends the Army College for 1 year. After promotion to lieutenant colonel, he serves as a battalion commander and enters the National Defense College for 1 year before being promoted to colonel. The Defense Ministry is planning to extend both the Army College and National Defense College courses to 2 years. Even under the present system, KMA officers undergo about 3 years of concentrated education after they leave the academy and before they are promoted to colonel. The elite among them also receive training at government expense in universities at home or abroad.

This degree of training and education and the military officer’s unique sense of responsibility combine to make him a hard-driving achiever, even after he retires and enters civilian society. A recent example of this military drive can be seen in the twin engines propelling No Tae-u’s presidential campaign in late 1987. The victory was engineered by An Mu-hyok (KMA Class 14), then National Security Planning Agency director, and Yi Chun-ku, then No Tae-u’s campaign director. Those who worked for the two men claim that, “No orthodox politician today can match either An or Yi in devotion to duty or in the stamina needed to execute that duty.”

One retired officer saw some troubles, however. He believed that retired army officers who enter the business world excel as long as they exploit their military spirit to pioneer new areas or solve problems. He regards the retired officer, however, to be unsuitable for day-to-day business management. “These men have been trained to place the highest premium on honor,” he says. “When their honor is tarnished by the need to lobby or when they are given responsibility for day-to-day business operations, they provoke internal dissension.”

A Country in Which Coups and Rebellions Are Impossible

A high-ranking government official who served under president Chon Tu-hwan at Chongwadae made the following comparison.

“December’s presidential elections turned on the question of whether the old generation of opposition politicians were better managers or whether modern military culture was superior. The two Kims publicly promised that only one of them would run for the presidency, but they parted ways when faced with the tantalizing prospect that one of them might actually win the presidency. This must be contrasted with the relationship between Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u. Although tongues wagged everywhere that their relationship would not survive, in fact it endured to the end. Indeed, in spite of differences, they managed to pursue complementary roles to an unprecedented extent. During the campaign, President Chon called in candidate No and told No that he should not refrain from bluntly attacking Chon if that would help him win votes. Even in the transitional period following the election, President Chon called in his closest aides and told them they must shrug off criticism and work hard to get the new government off to a running start.”

According to the official, “The chief reason the army did not intervene in the chaotic situation prevailing in June 1987 was that President Chon stuck to his promise to serve only one term. In any case, history will look favorably on Chon’s contributions. The first objective evaluation of Chon’s presidency will come only when history records that during his watch economic stability was established, the North-South balance swung decisively in our favor with the landing of the Olympics, and political power was transferred peacefully for the first time in modern Korean history.”

In the process of researching this article, I met many retired generals, active duty generals, and military specialists. The one thing they all agreed on was that, “Korea is now a country in which it is impossible for either a coup d’etat or a revolution of the masses to occur.” There was an eerie balance to April’s general elections. Heroes of the dissident camp who ran for the assembly without the nomination of major opposition parties lost their races, and the DJP’s retired military
Thus, the view that neither a military coup nor a civil rebellion will occur is supported by the symbolism of the familiar saying that the general election "buried the heroes and the stars in the same grave."

At this juncture, an army move to grab political power would probably fail. Almost everyone agrees that the army might successfully seize power but could not hope to hold onto it successfully. The Korean society has outgrown the time when the army could exercise national leadership. The military is now only one of several national power groups. Others are the press, the civil service, college students, the churches, and industrialists. And the relative clout of the military in this lineup sinks lower by the day.

Still, we cannot completely rule out another army intervention. Active duty general officers share this view: "When the ability of the national police to protect society reaches its limits, and procommunists and leftists violently shake the national discipline, then the army will not be able to sit idly by and observe." It is possible, of course, for the army to leave the barracks solely to restore stability without staying on to seize political power, but the maturing Korean people and the increasingly sophisticated political parties are unlikely to invite the kind of situation that would test the army's ultimate intent.

The army did not intervene in June 1987 as it did in May 1980, and the reason it did not was that in 1980 the middle class did not support the students whereas in 1987 they did. To put it another way, the possibility of a military coup d'etat increases as middle-class anxiety increases. Most observers believe, however, that even in the case where the middle class clearly perceives a crisis, a coup would fail unless it enjoyed virtually total national support.

A high-ranking government official observed, "If it comes to physical confrontation, no group can vanquish the army. If democratization is to succeed, we absolutely must not allow the situation to degenerate to physical confrontation." The LOS ANGELES TIMES carried an article saying that military support for President No Tae-u would likely weaken because the DNP failed to win a majority of assembly seats in April's general elections. Certainly a degree of tension has gripped the top military leaders as a result of the clout Kim Tae-chung won in the general election, but many expect that the seasoned Kim Tae-chung's turn toward moderation may serve to reduce that tension.

A Chongwadae official looked ahead to the post-Olympic period. He said, "If Mr Kim Tae-chung decides to make a life or death issue out of President No's vote of confidence, politics will heat up and tension will grip the army as well."

Rewards and Sorrows in the Army of a Divided Country

Most active duty officers I talked to agreed with the sentiment that "there is probably no other group in Korea today that has less regionalism than the army." They mean that regionalism is simply not an issue in the army, where everyone is bound together by a common mission and where all tumble and strain together to train for that mission. The army which has been insensible to regionalism is now changing to the view that "regionalism should not be like this..." said one colonel.

The Korean people's antipathy toward military rule has caused them to forget the admirable qualities of military culture. Until recently, the antimilitary sentiment in Korea has been such that people were unable to say that "What is good is good" about the army, but that is beginning to change. A professor at Seoul National University said, "Frankly, these army officers are just superior to most of us. Most of them are healthy and honest, have a finely developed sense of justice, are action oriented, and know how to manage a project, and when you talk to them you find them to be very pleasant people. Military society has contributed greatly to the economic development of this nation."

Although we have heard it many times, it remains true that the army's management and planning systems were transplanted into civil government and industry, where they flowered into the efficient management methodologies common today. Some people say that the military is responsible for the explosion of Korean national energy that has now spilled over into the international arena.

Korean males have gained experience with society's basic indignities and impediments through their experience in war and their service in the military. We have risen from the very bottom, where one can fall no lower. In the process, we have become a uniquely Korean people, filled with bravery and hope. We have released our latent energy, leaping a monstrous leap that has carried us to every country in the world. When confronted by difficulties, Koreans remember the sufferings they experienced in the army, and regain their bravery by saying "Let us just pretend that we are back in the army" and try one more time to go over the top. "If you cannot do it, keep trying till you can." We owe much of our mental toughness to our military experience, and our mental toughness has served Korea well on its path of progress. In spite of the many problems nagging the army as an organization, the 2 or 3 years we spent in the army as young men have made the Korean people stronger. We have learned how to leave the loving arms of parents and family, how to overcome loneliness, and how to deal with early reveille, hunger, drubbings, double-time, squat punishment, and even love letters. And Korea's young men share a common military experience that serves as a kind of social bond.
If you talk with someone for an hour, you can tell whether he has served in the army or not. Military culture is ingrained in the character of Korean males. The problem we face is how to return the relationship between the military and the people to the strong state of amity that characterized it before the 1979 Pusan-Masan demonstrations, so that the Korean people and Korean society can once again enjoy the military culture so much a part of us all.

Democratization will never be achieved if we depend on the indulgence and good intentions of the military government. We have learned that we can achieve democracy only through confrontation, confrontation between society's power centers as a result of dynamic shifts in the balance of power among these groups. The people's strong demand for power has wrought a miracle, but the price was high. Today, the military government has jumped aboard the democratization express; No Tae-u performed an about face when he would have continued as another political military leader; army officers have gained a healthy respect for public opinion, and may even have awakened to the damage caused by years of military government. The army's retreat from politics did not occur because the army yielded its desire to remain in control. It occurred because they had no choice in the matter. The army held the people to its bosom for decades, but now at last the army can be under the bosom of the people. This means that the people have become greater and the army has become smaller but with good behavior.

Kim Min-ki wrote the lyrics and melody of the “Song of the Old Soldier” for one of the retiring sergeants and the second and third verses are like this:

My sons and daughters, do not be sad
For you are the children of a proud soldier
Did you want to wear better clothes and eat better food?
Don't fret, children of a proud soldier......
What is my desire from life?
It is holding my grandson's hand and visiting Mt Kumgang
Till the day when flowers brightly bloom and the day is clear
My youth has disappeared longing and longing for that day.

The rewards and sorrows of being a soldier in the army of a divided nation—our people know them all too well, but we have had no choice but pretend to forget them. But now is the time to work to recall those dim memories. The process is a rebirth of the people's relationship with their army.

**ECONOMIC**

Samsung Group Moves Toward Merger, Expansion
14070068 Seoul CHOSON ILBO in Korean
29 May 88 p 7

[Article by reporter Kim Mun-sun]

[Text] “Yi Kon-hui's Samsung” Is in Full Swing in Transformation; Electronics and Semiconductor Merged; Launches into Petrochemical Industry; Takes Over Credit Card Company; Increases Competitive Power by Diversifying Main Strength Businesses; [Will] Invest 860 billion [Won] in Petroleum Complex; Business Circles Stare with Surprise and Apprehension

System Consolidation Already Finished

The Samsung Group, which has just passed the 50th anniversary of its founding, is currently pushing a transformation of the group. It has decided to establish a large-scale petrochemical complex on the west coast; and it has announced a lightening-fast merger of its central business enterprises, the Samsung Electronics and the Samsung Semiconductor Communications. These came as a surprise to business circles.

At the same time, the Samsung Group has established the Samsung Credit Card Co. and launched into credit card business, which is called “the 4th money market” because it holds the promise of diversifying holdings and expanding markets. Thus it has established a new foothold in the monetary circles. The current transformation of the Samsung Group is focused on the unification of its strongest areas ranging from electronics to the petrochemical and monetary fields and the strengthening and strategy-oriented operation of competitive power in the field of electronics and semiconductors, which represent its current main strength businesses.

The changes in the Samsung Group, which have been going on during a half year period from the time when Chairman Yi Kon-hui, who is a second generation official, assumed office, is drawing more attention because of its “ambitiousness” in scale and “intention” unlike the Samsung of the past. At first, business circles presumed that it would take considerable labor pains and time for the system of the new chairman, Yi Kon-hui, even to take root because the shadow of the late chairman, Yi Pyong-chol, founder of Samsung, looms so large. However, new Chairman Yi Kon-hui finished up early consolidation of his own management system through wide ranging personnel shake-ups staged in December of last year, and February of this year. Thus he is planning to stage a large expansion of management's reach beyond the confines of domestic needs. There is a thread of connection between the recent series of operations and Chairman Yi’s remarks that he would make Samsung grow into “a first-class international business enterprise” by the 1990's.
Second Challenge Since the Hanguk Piryo [Incident]

What the Samsung Group is most enthusiastically pushing is the construction of a large-scale petrochemical complex. It is planned that 650,000 pyong of sea in and around Taesan-myon, Sosan-gun, South Chungchong Province be reclaimed at an estimated cost of 860 billion won, and that a large-scale petrochemical complex capable of producing 350,000 tons of ethylene be built by 1992. It is significant that the scale of the plan is big; but even more significant is the fact that it has been declared that the group's main strength will be diversified from the current electronics to petrochemicals. The Samsung Group will establish a Samsung Synthetic Chemical Company for that purpose. Thus, for the first time in a private business enterprise, a plan for production of petrochemical products from beginning to end, starting with raw materials to semi-finished and finished products, including polypropylene and styrene monomer, has been mapped.

This launching by Samsung into the petrochemical business is another challenge to the group's long cherished ambition, held since that Hanguk Piryo Incident of 1967. The Samsung Group, which has persistently sought to move into the petrochemical field since the Hanguk Piryo incident, established Samsung Petrochemical in 1974 and has been producing 500,000 tons of TPA yearly. In June of this year, Cheil Textile is planning to establish a plant that would produce synthetic resins, ABS [Acrylonitril-Butadiene-Styrene Resin] and PS [Polystyrene].

The Samsung Group's recent decision to move at full speed into the petrochemical business may represent a strategy for growth devised by looking at its competitive power, and the situation on the international economic stage of the 1990's. Judging that the existing electronics-semiconductor field is not enough to allow growth into a first-class international business enterprise, the Samsung Group has decided to enter the petrochemical field as a strong central venture in view of the fact that the petrochemical industry is a growing industry whose products are in short supply worldwide, and whose uses are increasing in the electronic and automobile industries.

Samsung's "First Step" Toward the 21st Century

Launching into the petrochemical business is a measure designed to unify main strengths of the group, so the merger of the Samsung Electronic with the Samsung Semiconductor Communications may be designed to strengthen the competitive power of the basic industry. The Samsung Electronic and the Samsung Semiconductor Communications, which are scheduled to be merged soon, are the strong enterprises of the Samsung Group: they are Samsung's flagship companies.

An interested party said that the recent decision of the Samsung Group to merge its Electronic and the Semiconductor Communications is a long-term strategic measure designed to face the international competition and to become fifth in the world in the field of up-to-date electronics by the mid-1990's.

In fact, through this forthcoming merger, Samsung Electronic equips itself with the IC [integrated circuit] designing technology that is required for the development of multifunction and high value added goods among existing household electric products. And Samsung Semiconductor Communications, too, becomes capable of expanding the development of semiconductors necessary for household electric goods. Thus the two companies have developed the capability of utilizing together the technological power required for developing semiconductors and computers.

The electronic industry in Japan is already in the system in which a single business is in charge of producing the electronic machines and apparatuses which are used for household electronic appliances and in the semiconductor industry. The two companies of Samsung, too, are able to avoid duplicate investment among the [group] affiliated companies through the recent merger; and thus they have laid a foundation for growing into a most up-to-date comprehensive electronics industry from a household electronic appliance centered business.

In particular, the two companies have become, after the merger, a giant business enterprise whose total assets are 2.2 trillion won, whose total receipts from sales are at 3.7 trillion won, and whose total number of employees is 38,000. Thus they have become capable of strongly resisting the hardship of import controls.

The recent changes in Samsung have reportedly been carefully advanced on the basis of a long-range plan called the Samsung of the 2000's. This has been apparent since the end of last year, immediately after Chairman Yi's assumption of office. In other words, it represents the first step toward a long-range development plan. Thus, business circles are casting, in unison, respectful but apprehensive eyes on Chairman Yi Kon-hui's intentions, looking for the second leap.

7989

Production of Export Goods Diversified
41070066 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 19 May 88 p 5

[Text] Industries, with the textile and foot wear industries leading the way, are gradually changing their production systems from large volume production of a small variety of goods to small volume production of a large variety of goods.
This is because with the same large volume production method which has been used in the past it is difficult to effectively deal with the worsening of the business environment which is brought on by such things as the re-evaluation up of the won, the strengthening of advanced nations export regulations and competition from the Least Developed Developing Countries (LDDC).

Especially the emergence of LDDC's such as Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia as strong competitors with their low wage base and mass production of electronic goods (TV's, cassettes, etc.), textiles and foot wear which are Korea's principle export items, has become a factor causing the change to a system of small volume production of a variety of goods.

On the 19th, according to business circles, this method of small volume production of a variety of goods is appearing not only in the labor intensive cotton textile industry and sewing industry but also in the electronics industry, the leather industry, the machine industry, the toy industry and the musical instrument industry and is even spreading to assembly production industries such as the automobile industry and even to the food industry which has traditionally been only a domestic industry.

Of the three Dong-il textile factories, one in Inchon, one in Anyang and one in Chongju, plans are to convert the one in Chongju, which has 1,952 OE [original equipment] spinning machines into a strategic small volume diversified goods factory.

Also in the field of textiles the Pangnim Spinning Company is developing post processing techniques such as low smell, dirt resistant, flame resistant, water resistant, and moisture resistant techniques and constructing a small volume diversified goods system which selectively utilizes these techniques according to the demands of the purchaser.

Son-gyong Industries decided to construct a pilot plant inside the Suwon Factory Research Center and carry out research development on high quality adhesive using engineering plastic among other special projects and to run a strategic production facility that could respond to the demands of the purchaser.

The electronics industry and leather industry have improved their product development labs in view of the increasing number of companies engaged in basic production in preparation for a genuine small volume diversified goods production system. Last year the Taegon Leather Company especially expanded it's testing and research section changing it into a research and development lab and at the same time reduced the total amount of output from 10,000 square feet to 3,000 square feet. The Kajong Samsa company has also improved its product design office and has mapped out a strategy to change to a system that will produce state of the art products and fashion goods.

The footwear industry in consideration of how difficult it is to change to a small volume diversified goods production system using an original equipment manufacturing (OEM) method is engaged in developing an independent brand name. Accordingly, in the case of the footwear industries which have maintained their own brand name such as Hwasung, and Kukje Enterprises the minimum production unit has decreased to less than half of what it has been.

By introducing new kinds of equipment when replacing worn out facilities; promoting post processing techniques; constructing small-scale experimental production plants (pilot plants); diversifying raw materials; strengthening product design efforts; establishing temporary processing systems; and studying methods for developing brand name goods, businesses are making efforts to overcome the obstacles of mass production systems.

The business world has carefully considered the fact that Taiwan, which has a similar business environment to Korea, has had a small volume diversified goods production system for some time and it has helped cut down their competition. The business world believes that the process of changing to a small volume diversified goods production system is vital to exporting high value added products.

13446

Rapid Information Industry Development Predicted
41070074 Seoul MAEIL KYONGJE SINMUN in Korean 19 May 88 p 7

[Text] Although our country's information industry is in the budding stage and lags 20 years behind Japan and 30 years behind the U.S., the prediction is that by around 1993, our country will have become an information-oriented society and in the 2000's, the use of information systems will be greatly increased in various sectors.

Also, it is estimated that by the year 2001, computer hardware production will reach $34 billion and will export $25 billion. Overall semiconductor technology will reach parity with advanced countries by 1994; it is forecasted that 256M DRAMs will be independently developed by the year 2001.

The above points are delineated in the Korean Information Industry Association's report entitled, "Prospects of Korea's Information Industry and its Development Task."

The report points out that only 20.9 percent of our labor force is employed in the information industry, which is similar to Japan's 1960 level (17.9%) and the U.S.' 1950 level (30.5%). It analyzes that our country lags behind Japan and the U.S. by 20 and 30 years, respectively, and is also far behind Japan and the U.S. in various fields of electronic industry.
Although computer hardware technology is now at a mid-level, by 2001, annual production and exports will soar to $34 billion and $25 billion, respectively, and the portable work station and large network computer systems will be developed, according to the report.

Social Welfare

Sixth 5-Year Plan Expands Regional Development, Social Services
41070062 Seoul SEOUL SINMUN in Korean
13 May 88 p 3

[By Chang Chong-haeng]

A characteristic of the revised bill governing the finances section of the Sixth Plan which was set forth by the government on 12 May is that emphasis of the bill will be on the improvement of the people’s living standards, including improvement of distribution and the development of local areas. This will be in an effort to meet the rising expectations of the people as a result of the process of democratization. It is expected that economic growth will improve during the Sixth Plan period, and that revenue will also increase by as much as 13.4 percent every year. However, the increase in demands for funds will grow as welfare expands; thus the people’s tax burdens will increase from 17.3 percent in 1988 to 20 percent of 1992.

A summary by field of the revised bill governing the finances section of the Sixth 5-Year Plan is as follows:

Revised Sixth Plan

Readjustment of arable land: in 1988 78%; in 1992 91%

Assistance in fishing and agrarian village funds: in 1988 29%; in 1992 53% Funds to enhance the living standards of the poor: in 1988 20 billion won; in 1992 40 billion won

Number of students in primary and middle schools: in 1988 56 per class; in 1992 50 per class

Highway pavement: in 1988 60%; in 1992 77%

For those (the poor) who receive state aid, assistance a minimum level for living expenses will be given; and in addition vocational training will be given to more than 10,000 of them every year so that they may become self-supporting. By 1992, a total of 1.1 trillion won in loans will be advanced to them to aid in their road to self-support. On the other hand, the idea of simply giving assistance will be gradually reduced from the current level of 30 billion won a year, and be completely wiped out by 1992.

As for educational assistance for the poor, the assistance funds will pay 100 percent of school expenses of business high school students at the poverty level in the fishery and agrarian villages and 50 percent of school expenses of business high school students of the poor in the cities during the next year. In 1990, this measure will be expanded to the extent that assistance payments will be made for students of humanities high schools.

As for the stipend for bereaved families of those who have contributed distinguished service to the state, the current pension 50,000 won a month per person will be increased, step by step. As for those eligible for additional pensions due to age, current eligibility at the age of 80 and above will be lowered to the age of 78 and above in 1989 and to the age of 75 and above in 1990.

To provide for the increased number of older people, the current 14 banks for senior citizens’ accounts will be increased up to 120 by 1992; workshops for the aged, too, will be increased from the current 68 to 100. For the physically handicapped, 36 sanitariums will be established by 1992 for those severely handicapped. A vocational training institute for the handicapped will be opened in 1990.

In order to cope with the increase in demand for technical manpower caused by the adjustment of industrial structure, vocational training will be given to 57,000 people in 1989, to 68,000 people in 1990, and to 76,000
people in 1992. To those unemployed young people who could not go on to schools of higher education, too, vocational training will be given at the cost of 400 million won.

In order to increase employment opportunities for farmers in the agricultural industrial regions, a vocational training institute will be established in each province; and more than 6,000 farmers will be given vocational training for 20 kinds of occupations by 1992. For those who lost jobs due to the adjustment of industrial structure, too, more than 20,000 of them will be given training for occupational changes.

Revenue Prospect During the Sixth Plan Period (billion won; %)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National tax</td>
<td>16,562</td>
<td>18,429</td>
<td>21,370</td>
<td>24,519</td>
<td>28,139</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal tax</td>
<td>10,753</td>
<td>12,355</td>
<td>14,695</td>
<td>17,215</td>
<td>20,160</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custom duty</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>1,823</td>
<td>1,764</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense tax</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>2,867</td>
<td>3,467</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>4,773</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational tax</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monopoly payment</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-tax revenue</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bringing forward</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total revenue</td>
<td>17,464</td>
<td>19,569</td>
<td>22,053</td>
<td>25,246</td>
<td>28,915</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Increase rate) 12.2 12.1 12.7 14.3 14.5 18.3

Tax burden rate 17.3 17.6 18.5 19.2 20.0

National tax 15.1 15.2 15.9 16.4 16.9

Local tax 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.1

Education

Emphasis will be put on qualitative improvement rather than on the expansion of educational opportunities. Assistance, emphasis of which has so far been placed on universities, will be turned to primary and middle schools.

The current number of students per class in primary and middle schools is 58; but this will be reduced down to 50 by 1991 and the two-shift class system will be completely abolished. In order to enhance the competence of teachers, the number of those teachers of primary and middle schools who go abroad for training will be increased up to 3,000 in 1992 from the 500 in 1988.

In the case of universities, in compliance with the benefit principle, the tuition differences between national universities and private universities will be reduced, step by step. The system of financing of national universities will be transferred to a special account and donations from private sources will be encouraged.

National Land Development

The west coast development plan will be pushed, step by step, and investments in highways and harbor facilities will be increased. Emphasis will be placed on completing on-going projects rather than on beginning a new project. Careful advance examination will be made before setting priorities for investments and the time frame for beginning projects.

The present national highway pavement rate, 57 percent, will be raised to 77 percent by 1992. For state highways, the current 80 percent will be increased to 96 percent; for local highways, the current 42 percent will be increased to 70 percent; and for the county highways, the current 22 percent will be increased to 46 percent.

As for the express highway construction projects, more than 10 of them, which are presently being talked about, including those between Taegu and Chinju, between Kumi and Ichon, between Taegu and Ichon, between Panwol and Inchon, and between Chonan and Nonsan, only one or two of them will be started next year in accordance with project priority.

The three step expansion project for the Pusan Harbor will be completed by 1990; and the rear highway network connecting piers, too, will begin its construction by 1990.

The Kunsan Outer Port improvement project and the Inchon pier improvement project will completed as planned. The west coast development projects, including the three step Inchon harbor project and new ports of Asan and Kunsan, will be pushed, step by step, in accordance with project priority. Construction of the new airport of Chongju will begin in 1990; and airport facilities throughout the country, including those of Kimhae Airport, will be continuously expanded.

As for the large-scale new railroad projects, including the four-track electric railway between Suwon and Chonan, the Seoul-Pusan express electric railway, and the East-West electric railway, it will be decided on whether or not to start them based on the result of a survey that will be made beforehand.
The comprehensive river improvement project of the Kum River water system will begin implementation in 1989; and the construction of medium-scale dams in those two regions, including Puan and Hoengsong, whose water situation is tight, will be started. However, as for large-scale dam construction, no new projects will be started due to the increased cost for the dam site land and the cost of compensation for those people who are forced off the site.

As for the west coast development projects, which have been actively discussed in almost all fields, including the development of highways, harbors, public corporations, and regions, an implementation committee will be organized within this year, and it will map a comprehensive development plan and a plan for raising funds.

**Housing**

From 1988 to 1992, a total of 2 million will be built. Five hundred thousand rental houses will also be built for the lower income group; and 175,000 of them will be permanently leased.

A 400 billion won assistance will be set aside for the national housing fund for housing construction by 1992. An 890 billion-won assistance loan will be advanced to the national housing fund. A total of 575.4 billion won will be set aside as assistance for housing construction.

**Assistance to Fishing and Agrarian Villages**

The industrialization of agrarian villages will be actively pushed and the populace of agrarian villages will be absorbed into that. Non-agricultural income will be increased. Secondary social facilities, including roads, and welfare facilities for fishing and agrarian villages will be expanded.

In order to lessen the debt for fishing and agrarian villages, a total of 360.3 billion won will be maintained by the national treasury from this year until 1992. A total of 344.6 billion won will be set aside as the reduction of and exemption from the agricultural association membership fee. Three hundred agricultural industrial regions will be established by 1992 and 830,000 people will be employed there. By 1990, the agricultural management fund will be increased to 2.4 trillion won and the fishery management fund will be increased to 600 billion won. A total of 1.4 trillion won will be appropriated as the development fund for fishery and agrarian village regions by 1992.

**Subway Workers Accept Last-Minute Mediation**

SK1760602788 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English 17 Jun 88 p 5

[Text] The planned strike by the labor union of the Seoul Subway Corporation today was averted as the laborers accepted mediation forwarded by Seoul City Mayor Kim Yong-nae in the last-minute negotiation yesterday.

Mayor Kim promised to raise the salaries of the blue-collar workers to the level which they might receive if their present occupational grade is raised by one notch from next month.

The meeting took place at a hall of the Sejong Cultural Center.

Kim and labor representatives also agreed to solve the matters of elevating the organizational status of the workers organizational status of the workers to be on par with white-collar workers through negotiations after the Seoul Olympics.

The labor union earlier demanded that the salaries of blue-collar workers be hiked by “three grades” to be on a par with that of white-collar workers.

The Central Labor Committee also accepted the request of the Labor Ministry to intervene in the dispute in the face of threats by the labor union to go on strike from 4 a.m. today.

The unionized workers have been in dispute with the management, demanding that the current pay structure distinctively unfavorable to blue-collar workers be revamped.

The union members of the corporation decided to go on strike indefinitely unless the management accepts their demand in a vote session on Thursday.

In a vote participated in by about 6,000 out of the total 6,800 union members, 97 percent or 5,820 workers voted in favor of a strike. Only three percent or 180 workers opposed.

The management and labor of the Seoul Metropolitan Subway Corp. have held three rounds of negotiations, but all ended in failure due to the wide discrepancy.

The corporation claimed that the demand of the labor union, if accepted, is feared to break the basic order of the organization.

The demand for increasing salaries of blue-collar worker will require about 20 billion won of additional budget a year, it said.

Facing the threat of going on strike, the Labor Ministry asked the Central Labor Committee to intervene in the dispute to avert the planned strike on Thursday.
When the request is accepted by the committee, the labor union is required to defer their planned strike for 15 days under the pertinent law.

And the labor and management have to follow the arbitration forwarded by the committee during the cooling-off period, according to the pertinent law.

The Seoul City administration held an emergency meeting yesterday and decided to mobilize 1,986 various type of vehicles held by government organizations and 17,465 private vehicles.

It also decided to allow all the private taxis to operate without restriction beginning today, enabling some 80,000 more taxis to be operated during the strike.

The time zone of commutation will be staggered among students, government officials and bank workers to relieve the expected congestion.

The start of school for students, and office hours for civil servants and banking officials will be adjusted to 8 a.m., 9 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. respectively, to relieve the expected congestion during the subway strike.

The subway corporation has a total of some 6,800 employees, of whom 6,060 are blue-collar workers.

The metropolitan subway system extends a total of 116.5 kilometers.

Daily Lauds Peaceful Settlement in Subway Dispute
SK1806004888 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD in English 18 Jun 88 p 8

[Editorial: “Subway Workers' Disputes”]

[Text] A strike by subway workers was averted by an eleventh-hour agreement between the union and management early yesterday morning. The end to the nearly three-week-long dispute came after hectic overnight bickering and dickering when the union accepted mediation by Seoul City Mayor Kim Yong-nae. It was only just in time for millions of commuters in and around the metropolitan Seoul who endured a few early morning hours of inconvenience due to a brief subway stoppage.

Mayor Kim promised to hike the salaries of the blue-collar workers to that of an occupational grade one level higher next month. The mayor and union representatives also agreed to discuss elevating the organizational status of the workers to par with white-collar workers after the Seoul Olympics. The labor union had earlier demanded that the salaries of blue-collar workers be raised by three grades to give them an equal standing with their white-collar counterparts.

It is most fortunate that what had loomed as a major disaster for metropolitan commuters was parried by a timely and amicable settlement. Many citizens besides those directly embroiled in the dispute have good reasons to breathe a sign of relief at the settlement.

It is especially noteworthy that delegates from labor and management did their level best until the very final moment to thrash out a compromise with a maximum of patience and sincerity. The solution is an example for any labor-capital feud taking place in a similar situation. Peaceful settlement of such disputes will prove in the best interest of both parties and their clientele.

Simultaneously, we cannot help but raise our concern about possible strikes or sabotage in various public utility industries such as electricity, water supply, garbage disposal and mass transit. Citizens should be protected from disruption of their services. Self-restraint and a spirit of concession are always required of both sides, especially those serving public utilities, so that the citizenry is not victimized.

Investigative Report of Labor-Management Disputes
41070059 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean 19 May 88 p 5

[Article by Mun Myong-ho]

[Text] Labor-management disputes regarding wage increases, formation of labor unions, and improvement of working conditions, which started last summer, have continued steadily into this year. The number of disputes for this year hardly matches the record of 3,300 some cases that took place in the 3 months after the 29 June incident last year. The total for this year is 776 cases nationwide as of today.

It has been pointed out that the disputes of this year are unlike last year's incidents in that they rarely cause physical friction such as violence, destruction of property, and demonstrations. Instead both sides attempt to resolve differences within the confines of the law to the extent possible. Thus there has been a considerable improvement in labor management over last year.

In some cases, however, the resolution of differences is forced to become a contest of power instead of being resolved through talks. This phenomenon is in part due to the fact that as a result of the post-29 June democratization climate in our society, laws related to labor management and disputes have been revised to permit labor union activities and to make it easier for grievances and disputes to surface.

At the same time, though, it is equally true that a part of the reason is attributable to the lack of sincere, patient efforts on both sides to resolve differences through well-meaning dialogue.
It is not infrequent that both management and labor allow disputes to escalate into confrontations without making a sincere effort to resolve it through dialogue. Sometimes employers use hired hands to disrupt and oppress union activities, while during cooling-off periods unions at times resort to abnormal forms of waging dispute campaigns under the slogan of “legitimate battle.” Due to inefficient negotiations on both sides, disputes during the confrontation stage are allowed to drag on from 40 to 60 days.

In the following we provide a diagnostic analysis of the labor disputes that have evolved since the 29 June incident.

Improved Form of Disputes

The Hyundai Mipo Shipbuilding Company and Hyundai Heavy Industries in Ulsan—whose labor disputes last year escalated to the occupation of the city hall, mobilization of heavy equipment, and street demonstrations—have continued into this year. However, the management was able to resolve the dispute a few days before the deadline.

At the Daewoo Shipbuilding Company in Koje, the disputes lasted for more than a month, and the management was forced to issue an ultimatum that the plant might be closed. Fortunately, however, both sides continued to exercise restraint and were able to resolve their differences without resorting to any physical confrontation.

The Tongil Company in Changwon, whose labor-management dispute last year erupted into arson and violence, has been beset by a strike for over a month. Nevertheless, both sides believe that there will not be a repetition of last year’s physical confrontation.

This posture of restraint on both sides is common to all large businesses. Even when disputes take the extreme form of severe criticism and sit-in demonstrations, management negotiators have shown their goodwill to continue dialogue and negotiations.

In spite of this prevailing atmosphere of constructive compromise, labor disputes continue to erupt in which management and labor have differing opinions regarding their causes. Namely, the employers insist that diametrically opposed opinions between management and labor occur because of the internal friction within labor unions, and the ensuing adoption of extreme strategies as a solution to their internal problems. Further, the management side maintains that differences in perspectives and opinions become aggravated due to the lack of negotiating techniques, unreasonable demands that ignore business reality, influence by outside agitators, and problems related to legal restrictions and administration regulations.

On the other hand, the labor side insists that escalation into open disputes results from the authoritarian attitude of the management which does not accept the union representatives as equal partners, the absence of good efforts to improve adverse working conditions including low wages, and an insincere negotiating posture. The labor side holds management responsible for the aggravation and escalation of disputes.

Assertions of the Employer Side

The Daewoo Group, which among the conglomerates, encountered the most labor disputes this year reiterated its position through an official statement entitled, “Daewoo’s position regarding labor disputes,” which places most of the blame on the union side.

The statement maintained that:

Upon being challenged for its legitimacy, the newly created labor union proposed an excessive wage increase as a solution to its internal problems;

The situation became entangled with the problem of struggle for domination among labor unions, and each union was pressed by the need for “creating one’s own unique image”;

Labor unions irresponsibly rushed into open confrontation without making efforts to negotiate;

A serious question was raised regarding how representative the union representatives were from the standpoint of democratic union administration.

Plagued by these internal problems, it was extremely difficult to enter into negotiation, which resulted in prolonged labor disputes.

The company statement explained that in reference to the dispute of last April, the executive leadership of the union could not sanction the agreement worked out between management and union, and instead had to defer to a general meeting of delegates and a plenary session of the union, which resulted in the rejection of the worked out resolution. It maintained that this incident highlights the lack of legitimacy of the union representatives and causes an enormous waste of time and effort on both sides.

In response to this account, the Daewoo Labor Union noted, “Referring to the general meeting of delegates or the plenary session, it is a reflection of our desire to effectuate our demands against a management who has all the advantage of proprietary information and technical knowledge. It is more than a simple question of legitimacy.”
In reference to these differing viewpoints, some labor experts point out that although some of the newly created labor unions do present problems, the management side in general appears to ignore the fact that management may have to accept a portion of the blame. They further note that since management has in the past suppressed the formation of labor unions or their activities, it can not expect a sudden appearance of mature behavior on the part of labor unions. To do so is to reveal its opportunistic attempt to find an excuse.

Contentions of the Labor Union Side

In many instances, however, labor unions criticize the posture of the management side.

Cha Kyong-chon (40), president of the Korea Heavy Industry Labor Union in Chang Won, insisted that “in spite of its lip service to management-labor dialogue, management still considers workers mere objects of labor supply and paid servitude and has not changed its outdated authoritarian outlook.”

He continued, “At the time of wage negotiations last April, the union side requested a counterproposal from the company management while submitting the union proposal. Management kept repeating that the company is in a difficult position, kept delaying making its counterproposal, and refused to explain what the difficult position was. Under these circumstances, how could one carry on productive negotiations through dialogue?”

In addition to the problem of the negotiating attitude, many observers of labor union affairs in manufacturing fields agree, the mid-level managers and low-level supervisors at the frontline of manufacturing locations all treat workers, not as human beings, but as mere means of production. This demeaning posture has made the management-labor relationship more difficult than necessary.

With regard to the case of Korea Heavy Industries, the management concedes that, as it is with other government-financed enterprises, its management and staff attitude have lacked necessary flexibility in dealing with workers.

Allegations of Outside Influence and Oppressive Union Activities

At most of the work places, the management side maintains that union officers and some members are linked with outside power and exploiting union activities for ulterior, impure objectives. This, they say, is a major reason for either the occurrence of labor disputes or aggravation of the disputes.

At the Tongil Company in Chang Won, a subsidiary business of the Unification Church, the union side started wage negotiations on 31 March but has been giving priority to the rehiring of the discharged workers over wage issues.

On the other hand, the union side insists that a total of 29 employees were unjustly fired during last year’s labor dispute and union activities and the company should rehire 25 of them, including the unemployed, those dismissed for indictment, the arrested, and those whose challenge against illegal discharge is pending.

The acting president of the labor union of this company, who is acting for the president under arrest, explains the union position as follows, “There have been too many unjust, wrongful discharges of workers at this company since 1985. In one case, the reason for discharge was an unexcused absence of 3 days which took place 3 years ago. In order to prevent the recurrence of such wrongful acts and to win job security, the members should insist on the rehiring of those wrongfully discharged, which is more important than wage increases.”

The company takes a firm position that since the issue of rehiring is in the hands of the court, it will follow the court decision. The company further stipulates that if the union insists, the company could hire the discharged as subcontractors at the company pay level and even compensate for their lost wages, but could not restore their status to the pre-discharge level.

President Moon Sung-kyun and other senior officials of this company maintain that “rehiring the discharged is not possible since the current union members who are instigating the present dispute are manipulated by the discharged workers, who in turn are influenced by pro-communist Moon Song-byon, who in 1985 was the union president and arrested for violating the national security act.”

At the Tongyang High-Pressure Rubber Company in Kyonggi Province, the union side, which included two college graduates, occupied the plant last April demanding sincere negotiations on wage increases. In retaliation, the company deployed hired hands and disbanded the occupying workers under the ostensible reason of “retrieving urgent documents.”
Because of this incident, some workers forced themselves into the headquarters office of the Party for Peace and Democracy and staged a sit-in demonstration, demanding an investigation into the deployment of hired hands as well as an apology from the company president. The Party for Peace and Democracy sent an investigation team, and the dispute escalated to a dramatic height.

At the Daewoo Precision Company in Yang San, Kyongnam Province, which has been struggling with labor disputes since 31 March, the company management insists that “the labor union has made a detailed plan, established a close network with companies in related fields, and coordinated with the forces behind the scene, thus deviating from a simple, legitimate demand of wage increases.”

The management further asserts that “taking advantage of the fact that the company is defense-related and hence reluctant to make the company position public, the labor union has resorted to staging demonstrations at the Seoul Railroad Station and the Myongdong Cathedral, thus creating social disturbances.”

In response, the union insists that “on the contrary, the company is taking advantage of the defense-related nature of its business by not disclosing business details. Although it is profitable, it refuses to heed the demand that a minimum standard of living be guaranteed.”

The union president of this company asserts that “the union members' efforts to form a union was crushed in 1983 by the manipulation of security agencies, and the union is under considerable oppressive force. These adverse conditions cause the members to fear that their union is vulnerable and may get crushed again, which in turn forces them into extreme forms of response.”

Path of Management-Labor Stabilization

President Kim Kyon-su of the Korean Association of Labor Education provided the following analysis, “The current problems of management-labor disputes are caused largely by two factors: many employers still maintain a posture of superiority over workers and do not recognize labor negotiations as a legitimate means of conflict resolution, but consider it a reflection of chaos and disorder. On the other hand, the union has not acquired the necessary negotiation skills and capacity as an equal partner.”

President Kim continued, “Employers should recognize that guaranteeing the right to dispute and negotiate is an inexpensive means of preventing violence and revolution by sustaining healthy capitalism. They should, therefore, accept labor unions and labor disputes from a pragmatic standpoint. Meanwhile, unions should establish their credibility and representative legitimacy. Communication channels and rules of negotiating conduct should be established regarding the handling of management-labor disputes. These ingredients would constitute a most expedient path to the stabilization of management-labor relations.”

Deregulation Results in Debut of Over 20 New Dailies

The tide of press deregulation is expected to spawn a large number of new news media. As of 12 April, 22 new dailies have filed with the Ministry of Culture and Information the applications for registration as periodical publications, and four new radio stations have filed license applications. In addition, there are signs that several other dailies may be either newly founded or revived. All in all, the outlook is that at least 20 new dailies will debut before the end of the current year.

Considering that in our country the door has been kept closed for the publication of new dailies since September 1965, when the last entry, the CHUNGANG ILBO, made its appearance, the expected emergence of such a large number of new news media should rightly be viewed as evidence of the revolutionary change the South Korean press is now undergoing.

This change was set in motion by the “29 June declaration” [the 29 June 1987 declaration by the then presidential hopeful No Tae-u, conceding to the opposition demand for sweeping democratization measures.] As is well known, the essence of the part of the 29 June declaration dealing with the press was that “the government neither can nor should control the press.” The implementation of the declaration's promises led to the abrogation late last year of the infamous Basic Law Governing the Press, which was then replaced by the newly-legislated “Law Concerning the Registration of Periodical Publications.” Under the new law, it became possible for anyone to launch a newspaper publishing company if he can only meet certain requirements. Specifically, the law now allows anyone wishing to publish a daily to found a publishing company provided that the company has a rotary press capable of printing more than 20,000 copies per hour of the standard 4-page paper twice the tabloid size and has a total printing capacity adequate to handle the circulation volume to be set in a presidential ordinance.

At any rate, riding on the tide of this change, as of now 22 new dailies have already filed registration applications with the Ministry of Culture and Information, which intends to complete the work of verification
before the end of April so that certificates of registration may be issued to those applicants meeting the required conditions. This means that beginning in May there will be new newspaper publishing companies coming into being one after another.

These emerging dailies can be classified in several different ways: some are general papers while others are devoted to special subjects such as economic affairs; some are metropolitan papers while others are local; also, some are first-time publications while others are papers which once existed and are being revived.

Of the general dailies that have completed the registration-application formalities as of 12 April, metropolitan papers are HANGYORE SINMUN [One Race Newspaper] (Song Kon-ho, publisher), SEGYE ILBO [The World Daily] (Kkw Chong-hwan, publisher), and SIN-A ILBO [The New Asia Daily] (Chang Ki-pong, publisher), while the following are local papers: KYONGBUK ILBO [North Kyongsang Provincial Daily] (An Yu-ho, publisher) and YONGNAM ILBO [The Yongnam Regional Daily; "Yongnam" refers to the region covering both North and South Kyongsang provinces] (Yi Chae-pil, publisher), both to be published in Taegu; INCHON SINMUN (Mun Pyong-ha, publisher) and KYONGJE SINMUN [The Kiho Regional Newspaper; "Kiho" refers to the region covering both Kyonggi and Chungchong provinces] (So Kang-hun, publisher), both to be published in Inchon; KYONGBUK ILBO [North Kyongsang Provincial Daily] (An Yu-ho, publisher) and YONGNAM ILBO [The Yongnam Regional Daily; "Yongnam" refers to the region covering both North and South Kyongsang provinces] (Yi Chae-pil, publisher), both to be published in Taegu; INCHON SINMUN (Mun Pyong-ha, publisher) and KYONGJE SINMUN [The Kiho Regional Newspaper; "Kiho" refers to the region covering both Kyonggi and Chungchong provinces] (So Kang-hun, publisher), both to be published in Inchon; KYONGBUK ILBO [North Kyongsang Provincial Daily] (An Yu-ho, publisher) and CHONNAM ILBO [South Cholla Provincial Daily] (Yi Hun-tong, publisher) and MUDUNG ILBO (Pak Song-sop, publisher), both in Kwaju.

There are following entries in the category of specialized dailies: CHUNGANG KYONGJE SINMUN [Central Economic Newspaper] (Yi Chong-ki, publisher), and affiliated PUSAN KYONGJE SINMUN [Pusan Economic Newspaper] (Yun Im-sul, publisher), an affiliate of The HANKOOK ILBO; ILGAN NAEOE KYONGJE [Domestic and Foreign Economic Daily] (Han Chong-u, publisher), an affiliate of The KOREA HERALD; KUMYUNG JUNGKWIN ILBO [Financial and Securities Daily] (Chong Yuk-su, publisher), an affiliate of the Wolgan Chaejong Sa [The Monthly "CHAEJONG" Company]; PUSAN KYONGJE SINMUN [Pusan Economic Newspaper] (Yun Im-sul, publisher), an affiliate of The PUSAN ILBO; MAEIL SANOP KYONGJE [Industrial and Economic Daily] (Kim Tal-ch’ul, publisher), an affiliate of The MAEIL SINMUN; TAEHN KYONGJE ILBO [Taehan Economic Daily] (Un Chae-p’yo, publisher); CHONGI TONGSIN ILBO [Telecommunications Daily] (Ko Ha-yun, publisher); KONGOP SINMUN [Industrial Newspaper] (Han Myong-sang, publisher); ILGAN KONGOP SINMUN [Daily Industrial Newspaper] (Om Cha-kyong, publisher); and CHUNGHAK-SAENG CHOSON ILBO [Choson Ilbo for the Middle-School Students] (Pang U-yong, publisher).

Of all these new entries, the ones that are currently drawing the most interest from the press sector and the general public are HANGYORE SINMUN, SEGYE ILBO, and PAEDAL SINMUN (tentative name) which is widely expected to file the registration application soon. HANGYORE SINMUN is the focus of unusual interest among the people because of its founding ethos and editorial policy; SEGYE ILBO is generating many rumors and much gossip because its publisher is the Unification Church with enormous financial resources; and PAEDAL SINMUN, which is to be published by the orthodox Evangelical Church, is showing signs of its uncommonly enthusiastic drive.

HANGYORE SINMUN To Serve the People

What follows is a close examination of the state of preparation for publication by and the respective idiosyncrasy of these newly emerging newspapers:

HANGYORE SINMUN: This is the paper that has made more progress than any other toward publication. It was immediately after the 29 June declaration of last year that a group of former reporters of the TONG-A ILBO and CHOSON ILBO, who had lost their jobs in the 1975 and 1980 purges, formed the core of a movement toward the launching of a new paper totally different from the existing press which they had been denouncing as being the establishment press; preparations have been underway since. On 23 September 1987, this group held a formal meeting of the promoters and enunciated the new paper’s ethos and editorial policy as follows:

First, the primary goals of the paper shall be to realize democratic values, to lead the work of improving the lives of the masses, to overcome the sense of division, and to strive toward reunification of the nation; second, in the interest of ensuring the paper’s independence from the big capital, the company’s stocks shall be offered to all the people for public subscription with the caveat limiting the holdings of any one person to less than 1 percent of the total capital subscription, and the autonomy of the editorial rights shall be made secure structurally by ensuring participation of the editorial and production staff in the management of the company; third, the privilege-consciousness and dogmatism of the editors and reporters shall be thoroughly denounced, and the readers’ right of counterargument shall be guaranteed to the maximum; fourth, the paper shall practice the lateral writing system of Hangul [Korean alphabet] and shall be prepared to use the simplest forms of expression so that all the people can read and comprehend it; and fifth, in the interest of contributing to the enhancement of the quality of the people’s lives, the paper shall frame and be guided by a self-imposing code of ethics.

On 30 October 1987, the group of promoters held a general meeting to formally declare the founding of the new paper and simultaneously launched a fund-raising campaign. By 25 February this year the campaign successfully raised the targeted sum of 5 billion won as the paper’s inaugural fund.
Having already completed the staffing of its editorial bureau, the HANGYORE SINMUN is now simply waiting for the issuance of registration certificate. If all goes well, indications are that the paper will begin publication before the end of May.

Incidentally, one close look at the structure of the HANGYORE SINMUN's editorial bureau is enough for anyone to sense the directional orientation of this paper. For example, the position traditionally known as chief of editorial bureau within the existing press is called as chairman of editorial committee at this paper; likewise, traditional department chiefs are called as editorial committee members. In addition, the bureau's functional division and component names, too, are considerably at variance with the traditional press.

Specifically, although the traditional political and economic department is retained under the same name at this new paper, the foreign news department is renamed as national and international department, the social department as social and educational department, and the cultural department as cultural and science department. Moreover, this paper has two new departments—the public welfare and human rights department and the public opinion and media department—which the existing traditional papers do not have.

This is indicative of the extraordinary interest this paper has in the matters of public welfare and human rights. The public opinion and media department is said to have the role of keeping an eye on the existing papers—the establishment press.

The HANGYORE SINMUN's desk-staff lineup is as follows:

Song Yu-po (chairman of the editorial committee): A former reporter of The TONG-A ILBO purged in 1975; after being purged, became active at the forefront of the popular opposition, which resulted in his imprisonment on three different occasions; served as secretary general of the Council for Democratic Press Movement.

Pak U-chong (a probationary member of the editorial committee assigned to the National and International Department): A former reporter of The KYONGH-YANG SINMUN purged in 1980.

Hong Su-won (member of the editorial committee assigned to the Public Welfare and Human Rights Department): A former reporter of The KYONGH-YANG SINMUN purged in 1980.

Song Han-p'yo (member of the editorial committee assigned to the Political and Economic Department): A former reporter of The CHOSUN ILBO purged in 1975; also holds the position of assistant chairman (in charge of news gathering) of the editorial committee which is equivalent to deputy chief of the editorial bureau in the existing press.

Yi Ki-chung (member of the editorial committee assigned to the Public Opinion and Media Department): A former reporter of The TONG-A ILBO purged in 1975.

Kim Tu-sik (member of the editorial committee assigned to the Social and Education Department): A former reporter of The TONG-A ILBO purged in 1975.

Although purged reporters from the years past form the mainstream of the editorial staff at the HANGYORE SINMUN, the staff also includes a fair number of veteran reporters scouted from the existing papers. These veteran reporters have joined this new paper, willingly, accepting salaries one-half of what they were getting from their former employers.

The paper's inauguration date, originally set for 1 May, is now up in the air because of the uncertainty of whether the verification survey by the Ministry of Culture and Information can be completed before the end of April. The inaugural issue is planned to be an eight-page morning edition. The paper will be prepared entirely in Hangul written laterally. In early April, the paper's editorial bureau, which had been located at Anguk-dong, moved to Yangp'yong-dong where the printing plant is located.

Rumors Surrounding SEGYE ILBO

SEGYE ILBO: This is a general newspaper being readied for publication by the Unification Church. With its inauguration secretariat established on the third floor of the Towon Building near the Garden Hotel in the Map'o District of Seoul, the preparation work for the paper's publication is progressing in earnest. Its publisher is Pastor Kwak Chong-hwan, chief of the global missionary work headquarters of the Unification Church. Its chief editor's position—a focal point of interest within the press circles—has been filled by Mr Yi Yi Ok-sun, formerly an editorial writer with The CHUNGANG ILBO. The selection of its editorial bureau chief is said to have been entirely left up to the discretion of the chief editor.

The paper plans to complete the staffing of its editorial bureau in April through the process of competitive hiring. Already undergoing training are 50 followers of the Unification Church selected from among this year's university graduates. The planned launching date is 1 September.

The SEGYE ILBO's bureau-staffing projections reveal the paper's intention to use more personnel and a larger percentage of women as compared with the existing newspapers. For instance, while the average size of the editorial bureau staff among the existing papers is 120, the SEGYE ILBO intends to exceed this level by 15 in its first year, by 60 in the second year, and by 80 in the third year.
The paper is also considering a staffing level for its editorial-writing team and editorial committee at 150-200 percent of the average level at other papers; it intends to hire many women to serve on these editorial positions. The rationale for such moves reportedly is to inject and vivify unique flavors in the paper's contents.

All these plans and projections may seem unrealistically ambitious for a paper vowing to begin publication on 1 September, but those involved in the work of getting the SEGYE ILBO ready are full of confidence, saying that there will not be any slippage in their planning.

Such a boastful claim by the paper's planners is well founded. The Unification Church has already invested a vast sum in the press business. In the United States alone, this church group is publishing the following periodicals: The WASHINGTON TIMES, a general daily; NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE, one of New York's local papers; The SEGYE ILBO, a Korean-language daily intended for the Korean community; INSIGHT, a newsweekly; and WORLD AND I, a monthly publication with as many as 1,000 papers. The group is also in the process of setting up a broadcasting station in Washington. In Japan, the group is publishing the general daily SEGYE ILBO.

In addition, this church group owns two Spanish-language papers—the (NOTICIAS DEL MUNDO) and the (ULTIMAS NOTICIAS) being published in New York and in Montevideo, Uruguay, respectively—as well as the MIDDLE EAST TIMES being published in Cyprus. In short, the Unification Church can be said to have accumulated ample know-how in the matter of setting up newspaper publishing companies.

To cite one case-example, it was on 1 January 1982 when the Unification Church's leadership center reportedly made the decision to publish The WASHINGTON TIMES and issued instructions that the publication of this paper commence on 1 March. On 1 March, 2 months after receiving the instructions, the paper began printing 5,000 copies of its 4-page introductory edition, and on 17 May its official inaugural issue consisting of 56 pages was published.

In any event, the SEGYE ILBO's plan to begin publication in September has spawned a torrent of rumors within the press circles.

These incessant rumors have it that the Unification Church intends to invest 200 billion won into the SEGYE ILBO, that the reporters of this new paper will be paid twice as much as the highest-paid reporters of the existing papers, and that each editorial writer of this paper will be provided with a private office, an automobile, and a private secretary. There is even a story going around that a certain individual was offered a blank check in a proselytizing move by the paper.

But the SEGYE ILBO people are denying the rumor as unfounded, saying that they are not about to violate the common-sense rules governing the proselytizing practice. Although the paper has already secured adequate equipment and facilities to meet the pre-registration requirements subject to verification by the government, reportedly it has ordered a state-of-the-art rotary press from Japan and has begun searching for a suitable office building.

The avowed editorial direction of the SEGYE ILBO is oriented toward anticommunism and conservatism; it also intends to deal with the reunification issue in earnest. Moreover, the paper plans to give a wide-ranging coverage of news and other stories concerning the countries of the world through maximum utilization of the Unification Church's mission bases set up in more than 130 different countries. In addition, the paper intends to maintain close ties with other Unification Church-affiliated newspapers in various parts of the world, such as The WASHINGTON TIMES in the United States and The SEGYE ILBO in Japan, in order to establish a system of coordination and exchange of coverage. At the same time, the paper plans to hire many foreign reporters well versed in the Korean language.

It is said that the SEGYE ILBO will be entirely in the CTS [computerized type setting] mode and will adopt the lateral-writing format.

PAEDAL SINMUN “To Embody Christian Ethos”

PAEDAL SINMUN (tentative name): This is a paper to be published by the orthodox Evangelical Church; although it has not yet filed registration application, it plans to do so by meeting the requirements before the end of April. Despite the orthodox Evangelical Church's being the publisher, the intent is to create a paper wholly independent of the church foundation—a la CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR in the United States and the KYONGHYANG SINMUN which used to be published by the Catholic Church. The sole aim is to launch the paper as a cultural activity that may help facilitate societal embodiment of the Christian ethos. The Christian ethos utterly rejects falsehood and this, in the view of the paper's planners, coincides with the intrinsic function of the press. Accordingly, the PAEDAL SINMUN intends to strive toward a society in which man can live a life worthy of human beings.

Under an editorial policy it has already adopted for itself, the paper intends to wage an earnest campaign designed to give concrete expression to the Christian ethos by boldly exploring truths and by standing on the side of and extending a hand of love to those who are being oppressed or otherwise wronged.

But the paper intends to pursue this editorial policy entirely through the exercise of the intrinsic functions of the press without injecting religious flavors into its contents.
It is a widely held assumption in town that, given the orthodox Evangelical Church's total congregation numbering half a million or so, the PAEDAL SINMUN should be able to maintain a circulation volume at that level. But those at the paper are saying that the church's congregation is not a factor at all in their readership projection, that what they are studying is a circulation volume which would be appropriate strictly from the economic standpoint, and that they are in the process of drawing up a plan for a readership drive independently of the church.

The position of chief editor at the PAEDAL SINMUN has been filled by Mr Pak Won-kun, former chief of social department at the TONG-A ILBO who was purged in 1980. Serving on the paper's board of directors is Mr No Chae-song, who became an Evangelical pastor after having worked as a reporter for the Tong-A Broadcasting Service and the Tongyang Broadcasting Service; Mr No is deeply involved in the work of getting this paper ready for publication.

The construction of a new office building to house the Paedal Sinmun Company began on last 15 March at a site in Youido. The building will occupy a 2,400-pyong lot and will have a total floor space of 24,000 pyongs; it is scheduled to be completed in 4 years. But the paper's actual publication is scheduled to begin in the spring of next year because to wait for the completion of new facilities will mean too much of a delay in launching the paper.

The staffing of the paper's editorial team is to be completed 6 months prior to the planned publication, but those wanting to become reporters for this paper are being demanded of rather difficult qualifications. To wit, they must have the ability not only to converse but also to take shorthand notes in English; in addition, they must be as skilled in photography as any press photographer. An an insurance measure, the company is planning to organize a special training program covering these areas of skill; also being planned is a concurrent training program covering driving, typing, and the pointers on how to prepare a complete copy.

Moreover, it is the company's policy to give preferential treatment to those cub-reporters with a second foreign language in addition to English. Such an emphasis on foreign-language capability is said to be a reflection of the company's desire to perform the press function becoming of the times—an era of internationalization; in this connection, the company is making it known that it intends to significantly beef up overseas training of its reporters. At the same time, in keeping with the decentralization trends of the times, the company is trying to come up with a special program designed to foster local-news coverage. Recognizing that the existing press has flawed itself by indulging in the production of newspapers that are focused primarily on Seoul and official quarters, this company is avowing to expand the horizon of its news-gathering outwardly to international society and inwardly to local areas.

At any rate, its aspired orientation toward a new genre of newspapers and its self-set goal of attaining the highest standard in employee compensation and in printing facilities are making the PAEDAL SINMUN yet another focal point of attention within the press sector.

SIN-A ILBO: Mr Chang Ki-pong, who lost his previous paper at the time of the 1980 press consolidation measure, has filed the registration application for this new paper as its publisher.

Mr Chang has retained his old company building as existed in 1980; he also has a new office building. It is in the old building where the facilities for the publication of the new paper have been readied. There have been rumors that Mr Chang had sought out financial backers for the new paper, but given his reportedly sizable real-estate holdings, it is generally believed that his own financial resources are more than adequate to get the new paper launched. “Someday another opportunity is bound to come for me to get back into the newspaper publishing business”—never wavering from this conviction, Mr Chang is said to have not only preserved his old data base but continued to build on it by personally collecting newspaper clippings, all the while biding his time. Although once he had lost most of his employees to the KYONGHYANG SINMUN and MBC ("Munhwa" or "Cultural" Broadcasting Company) under the circumstances beyond his control, since he filed the registration application for his new paper his former employees reportedly have been calling on him in increasing numbers. Be that as it may, the paper's editorial bureau is yet to be staffed; the plan is to wait for the issuance of the registration certificate before stepping up the preparations for the paper's inauguration.

Newspaper Boom More Evident in Local Areas

The HANGYORE SINMUN, the SEGYE ILBO, the PAEDAL SINMUN, and the SIN-A ILBO are general dailies to be published in the nation's capital. These aside, it has been rumored off and on that the TAEHAN ILBO, which was discontinued during the 1970's, might stage a comeback.

It is generally agreed within the press sector that the TAEHAN ILBO is in the best position right now to start up a new paper in less time than anyone else. This view is based on such known facts as that Mr Kim Yon-chun, the owner of the defunct TAEHAN ILBO, driven by his tenacious attachment to the newspaper publishing business, has preserved his printing facilities intact even though the paper was discontinued and that he has already built a new office building across the street from the CHUNGANG ILBO building with another newspaper venture in mind. Subsequent to the 29 June declaration of last year, at one point there was a flurry of...
Community rumors that Mr. Kim Yong-chun showed a keen interest in having the TAEHAN ILBO revived, only to abandon the idea at the restraint by those close to him.

Then at the beginning of this year another rumor had it that the “D” Group [probably the Daewoo Group] was negotiating a deal with Mr. Kim Chun-yon in order to establish a newspaper publishing company. At the present time, however, nothing more is being said about it.

Recently the Unification Church was rebuffed in its attempt to buy the TAEHAN ILBO building to use it as the office building for the SEGYE ILBO. This seems to indicate that perhaps Mr. Kim Yong-chun is still clinging to his deep-rooted attachment to the newspaper publishing business. In any event, given that the TAEHAN ILBO has all the prerequisites most conducive to the formation of a new newspaper publishing company, the possibility of its staging a surprise comeback cannot be ruled out.

The move to establish new newspaper publishing companies is progressing rather more vigorously in local areas than in Seoul. There is a reason for this: At the time of the 1980 press consolidation drive, the enforcement of the one-province-one-newspaper rule inflicted a severe blow on local newspapers; to those victims of that blow, who have been biding their time in a state of agonizing frustration, it is merely a matter of course that they take advantage of the opportunity now being created by the tide of press deregulation. As of now, eight entities from local areas have filed the registration applications for new newspaper publishing companies, and indications are that this number will soon rise. Furthermore, given the prospect of an era of the local press which is expected to be ushered in with the implementation of the local self-government system, the outlook is for even greater growth in the number of local newspapers.

What follows is a status report on local newspapers being readied for publication:

INCHON SINMUN: Of the 21 stockholders (15 are from the Inchon area; 6 are from the Suwon area) of the KYONGIN ILBO, the 15 from the Inchon area have formally seceded themselves from the rest and are now in the process of establishing this new paper. This group already has authorized capital of 2.2 billion won but plans to increase it to the level of 5 billion won. Mr. Mun Pyong-ha, the publisher-designate of the new paper, is president of Hanyang Haeun, a merchant shipping company in Inchon with 60-years-long history and tradition. Mr. Pak Sang-pok, former chairman of the KYONGIN ILBO, is the principal stockholder with a 40-percent holding. But the group intends to revise the by-laws, prohibiting any one person from owning more than 20 percent of the total shares, in order to prevent anyone from exercising undue influence over the paper’s editorial policy.

Speaking of editorial policy, the INCHON SINMUN’s planned approach is quite different from other local papers. Whereas most of the local papers rely on wire services and carry national news on their front pages, the INCH’ON SINMUN intends to report local news on its front page on through. Mindful of the heavy concentration of industrial entities in the Inch’on area, the paper plans to give priority coverage to news items related to local industries. Also, when the local autonomy system goes into effect, the paper intends to treat the decisions emerging from local legislatures as significant news items.

The paper’s editorial staff will be built around the reporters (18) and others who have been working out of the Inch’on branch office of the KYONGIN ILBO; the staff will be augmented by additional experienced hands and novices to be hired during the month of May through open competition.

The planned inauguration date is set for 1 July, which is Inchon’s Citizens’ Day. The paper will consist of 16 pages beginning with its inaugural issue.

KIHO SINMUN: This is a reincarnation of the KYONGGI KYOYUK SINBO, currently being published in Inchon; under this new name, the paper has filed a registration application as an every-other-day publication. The publisher is Mr. So Kang-hun, currently representing director of the KYONGGI KYOYUK SINBO, who previously served as assistant editor of the KYONGGI ILBO. As soon as the registration certificate is issued, the paper will strengthen its existing structure and step up preparations for its new start.

KYONGGI ILBO: This paper is to be published in Suwon. Its publisher is Mr. Yun Sok-han, former managing director of the KYONGIN ILBO. The publication date, originally set for sometime in June, is likely to be delayed because of the problems having to do with the on-spot inspection by the Ministry of Culture and Information and with the readiness status of the office building and rotary press. The rotary press has been ordered from the United States; the new office building under construction is scheduled to be completed by 15 June. The paper has adopted the CTS method for its production; the personnel to man the system’s computer room are already undergoing training. The staffing of the editorial bureau will be completed as soon as the paper receives the registration certificate.

Being a local paper, its editorial orientation will understandably be toward local news. On the other hand, Suwon is part of the capital zone and is still much a captive of the centralization tendency; mindful of this fact, the paper intends to grasp the sensitive reactions of the capital zone as a whole to news events and have them reflected in its reporting.
Second Chances for Purged Journalists

CHONNAM ILBO: This paper is to be published in Kwangju. Its publisher, Mr Yi Hun-tong, is chairman of Chosun Naehwa [Korea Fireproofing Co]; for a local businessman, he is reputed to be a man of considerable financial means. He started a fireproofing factory in Mokpo 40 years ago; since then, the basic importance of the refractory material to the heavy and chemical industries has grown and so has his business which is now a major enterprise. It is in the spirit of putting some of his personal wealth back to the local community that he reportedly has decided to establish the CHONNAM ILBO. This spirit is also reflected in the paper’s avowed goal to help revitalize the local culture—the culture unique to the southwest region of the country.

Although a temporary building with printing facilities is ready, the construction of a new building to house the paper’s publishing company is now being planned.

The paper’s general editor is Mr Choe Chong-su, a former editorialist with the HANKOOK ILBO; its chief editor is Mr Mun Sun-tae, a novelist who lost his job with the CHONNAM MAEIL in 1980. The availability of qualified personnel is limited in the Kwangju area; it is no wonder, therefore, that many of the former employees of the CHONNAM MAEIL, which fell victim to the 1980 press consolidation move, are now involved with this new paper. The publication of this paper is scheduled to commence at the end of this year.

MUDUNG ILBO: This is another newspaper to be published in Kwangju. Its publisher is Mr Pak Song-sop, the second son of Mr Pak Chol-ung who once was president of Chosun University. The younger Pak, a graduate of Kyonggi High School and Seoul University Law School, completed the doctoral course in business administration at the University of Pennsylvania. He is currently vice chairman of Koryo Cement Company.

Mr Pak In-song, an elder in the local press circles who previously served as the editor-in-chief of the CHONNAM ILBO, has been respectfully installed as the general editor of this paper. A search is now on for a candidate to fill the chief editor’s position. As in the case of the CHONNAM ILBO, this paper, too, is expected to face the problem of finding enough qualified personnel. In any event, the emergence of two new newspapers in Kwangju surely means other job opportunities for those local journalists who lost their previous jobs in the 1980 purge. Mr Pak In-song, the general-editor-designate, is one of them.

KYONGBUK ILBO: The publisher of this paper is Mr An Yu-ho (representing director of Pukwang Development Co.) who previously served as an editorialist with the YONGNAM ILBO. The move to promote the launching of this paper began 8 years ago with the formation of an organizing committee comprised of some 1,200 personages of the Pusan and North Kyongsang areas, including businessmen, professors, attorneys, doctors, etc. The registration application was filed in December 1983.

The office building and printing facilities for this paper are ready now, and editorial staffing is 70 percent completed. The paper’s projected start-up date, initially set for 1 April at the time of filing the registration application, is being delayed on account of the verification inspection by the Ministry of Culture and Information which is only just getting underway now. At any rate, the plan is to begin publication as soon as the registration certificate is issued.

YONGNAM ILBO: This is the same paper that was closed down in the 1980 press consolidation act; it filed a new registration application on 12 April. The man who was the owner of the paper in its previous incarnation will again be the publisher: he is Mr Yi Chae-pil. It is no secret that Mr Yi has suffered quite a blow, in both tangible and intangible ways, as a result of the forced closure of his previous paper; however, he is expected to make a comeback by those of press circles. At any rate, with Mr Yi’s expected return to the newspaper business, the question of what will happen to those who were previously involved with the old YONGNAM ILBO is drawing considerable attention.

CHUNGDO ILBO: This is another move to revive a paper that went out of business as a result of the 1973 press consolidation act. Mr Yi Ung-yol, who was the publisher of the old paper with the same name, will again be the publisher. The paper’s old building, located at Taehung-dong, Taejon, will be used; a rotary press has been ordered from the United States. Meanwhile, a web-fed printing press—an item prerequisite to the filing of the registration application—has already been acquired from abroad and is in place. This paper, too, has adopted the CTS system; it will be published entirely in Hangul, the Korean alphabet. As soon as the importation of a rotary press is firm ed up, the personnel required for the editorial bureau will be selected to undergo training. The paper has announced that it will commence publication on either 1 July or 15 August.

KUKCHE SINMUN: This paper was discontinued at the time of the 1980 press consolidation. It is said that former employees of this paper set up an office in Pusan last year in an attempt to revive this paper but failed to make much progress. More recently the Lucky-Goldstar Group, the former owner of the paper, has begun showing a serious interest in having the paper revived. This group, which had up until very recently maintained a position refusing to get involved in the newspaper publishing business, has apparently had a change of heart. The group plans to set up a secretariat before the end of this month in preparation for the paper’s revival.
CHONBUK TOMIN SINMUN (tentative name): A committee to promote the publication of this paper was formed on 11 April; it is chaired by Mr Pak Yong-ki, former member of the 10th National Assembly. As in the case of the HANGYERYE SINMUN, this paper, too, plans to raise its start-off capital from the residents of the province ["Chonbuk" or North Cholla Province] through public subscription; also, the stated objectives of its management policy are: (1) to run a local newspaper that belongs to the people of the province who own the company stocks; (2) to ensure complete independence of the editorial right from the management; (3) to reflect the public opinion by making all the people of the province into stockholders as well; and (4) to ensure managerial reforms through the system of making the employees into stockholders as well.

In addition to the papers cited above, the possible revival of the KYONGNAM SINMUN in Chinju, which was the very first local newspaper published in our country, is being considered by a group led by business personages of Chinju. There is also a budding rumor that the CHUNGNAM ILBO (in Taegon) might be revived. In any event, with the dawning of an era of decentralization, many local areas are seeing brisk efforts to get either old papers revived or new ones started. It seems quite likely that the implementation of the local self-government system will usher in a golden age for the local press.

Religious Groups Moving to Establish Broadcasting Stations

Also moving briskly are the efforts to get either new papers specializing in economic affairs started or old such papers revived. Some of these emerging papers will be published in local areas, specializing in local economic affairs. What follows is a status report on such efforts:

SEOUl KYONGJE SINMUN: This used to be a sister paper of the HANKOOK ILBO until it was closed down at the time of the 1980 press consolidation drive. Unwilling to let it stay dead, the HANKOOK ILBO is now preparing for its revival. In this connection, the Hankook Ilbo Company temporarily suspended the publication of its sports-leisure magazine after the April issue so that it can devote more resources to the work of preparing for the revival of its economic daily; to handle this task, the company established the Seoul Kyongje Sinmun Revival Preparation Committee. The revived economic daily is scheduled to begin publication on 1 August. Required personnel will be hired during the month of April through public advertisement. The paper will consist of 12 pages; the CTS method will be used for its production. Mr Pak Pyong-yun, chief editor of the HANKOOK ILBO, will concurrently assume the position of chief editor for the economic daily.

KUMYUNG JUNGKWON ILBO: Chaejong Kongnon Sa [Financial Affairs Public Opinion Co] (a joint-stock company) has filed the registration application for this paper which is to specialize in financial and securities matters. Its publisher will be Mr Chong Yuk-su, who at one time was an editorialist with the SIN-A ILBO. A search is under way for a suitable building to house this new venture. A web-fed rotary press of domestic manufacture has already been purchased. The paper's daily issue will have eight pages. The plan is to complete the editorial staffing after the registration certificate is granted.

TAEHAN KYONGJE ILBO: Registration application for this paper has been filed by Mr Un Chae-p'yoo, who was the publisher of the HANGUK KYONGJE ILBO which was closed down in 1973—the name of the new paper is a slight variation of that of the old one's. Mr Un, saying that the loss of his old paper in 1973 was due to the pressure by a certain agency, insists that the TAEHAN KYONGJE ILBO is not a new publication but the old one revived. He has already purchased a domestic-made rotary press and is now looking for a suitable office building. He plans to begin publication after 6 months of preparation pending the issuance of the registration certificate.

CHONGI T'ONGSIN ILBO: Mr Ko Ha-yun, president of Chonkwang Sanop Sa—a printing company—will be the publisher of this paper. This paper will concern itself mainly with the telecommunications and economic sectors. Each issue will have 8 to 12 pages. Editorial staffing will get under way pending issuance of the registration certificate.

ILGAN KONGOP SINMUN: Mr Om Cha-kyong, who formerly was president of Sanop T'ongsin Sa [Industrial News Co], will be the publisher of this paper. A rotary press is already on order from Japan. The publisher’s professed intent is to make this an economic newspaper specializing in the industrial affairs.

CHUNGANG KYONGJE SINMUN: This is an economic newspaper to be published as a sister paper of the CHUNGANG ILBO. Knowing that the Samsung Group is the parent concern of these papers, the existing economic newspapers are watching the emergence of this new economic paper with a sense of wariness. But the details of the publication plan for this paper are still being kept secret; they are not available to outsiders.

ILGAN NAEOE KYONGJE: This was a sister paper of the KOREA HERALD; it was discontinued as part of the 1980 press consolidation drive. The plan is to revive its publication in the second half of this year pending issuance of the registration certificate.

PUSAN KYONGJE SINMUN: This will be a sister paper of the PUSAN ILBO. It will deal mainly with economic matters of the Pusan area.
MAEIL SANOP KYONGJE: This will be a sister paper of the MAEIL SINMUN in Taegu. It plans to cover mainly the economic activities of the Taegu area.

In addition to these dailies cited above, the CHOSON ILBO plans to convert its SONYON CHOSON ILBO [CHOSON ILBO for young people] into an edition for elementary-school students; it also intends to convert its edition for the middle-school students into a separate publication under the name of CHUNGHAKSAENG CHOSON ILBO. The PYONGHWA SINMUN, a new newsweekly to be published by the Catholic Church, is already a topic of conversation in town.

Although the PYONGHWA SINMUN was to have begun publication on 3 April, the Easter Sunday, it is still producing a trial edition only.

It is said that the PYONGHWA SINMUN will eventually complement the function of the P'Yonghwa Pang-song Guk [Peace Broadcasting Station], which the Catholic Church plans to establish and for which the church has filed a license application. It is generally understood that the paper will concentrate on in-depth reporting of current affairs.

In addition to the broadcasting station planned by the Catholic Church, the “Chogye” Sect of the Korean Buddhist movement has filed license application to establish a Buddhist broadcasting station to operate on the AM band. These religious broadcasting stations plan to perform the general news-reporting function as well. On the FM broadcast side, a weather broadcasting station (under the National Meteorological Observatory) and a traffic broadcasting station (under the municipal government of Seoul) are being planned.

As for other new broadcasting stations for which license applications are expected to be filed, the Catholic Church’s Taegu Archdiocese and Kwangju Archdiocese are going forward with independent plans to establish local bureaus of the Peace Broadcasting System. Also, it is reported that the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) is going forward with a plan to establish a TV broadcasting station.

Talent-Scouting Madness Likely To Engulf the Press Sector

In addition to daily newspapers and broadcasting stations, vigorous efforts are under way to launch new weeklies and monthlies as well. As of this writing, the Ministry of Culture and Information has received registration applications for more than 50 new weeklies and more than 100 new monthlies. Most of the new weeklies are to specialize in economic and/or religious matters. Likewise, more of the planned monthlies are to deal with special, technical subjects rather than general, cultural matters.

The press sector is now facing a turbulent period of internecine struggles. The developing trends toward significant growth in the number of news media—especially the new ones—are raising many problems.

Of particular concern is the prospect that, given the highly specialized nature of the journalist profession, the news media are likely to face an increasingly severe shortage of qualified personnel, that the quality of the journalists will deteriorate, and that the problem of mock reporters will develop into a social issue.

According to sources in the Ministry of Culture and Information, if the current trend should continue in the rate of newly emerging news media, the number of working-level reporters alone is expected to increase by 1,800 before the end of this year. Such a sharp increase in the number of untrained reports will, the same sources predict, inevitably lead to a mass production of mock reporters. Such a prospect, reminiscent of the chaotic state of the press in the period immediately after the “19 April” event, is even making some wonder and worry about the wisdom of the current wave of the press deregulation itself.

In any event, as soon as the Ministry of Culture and Information begins issuing registration certificates to these new news media, a hot wind of talent-scouting is expected to sweep the entire press sector, which is certain to face a shortage of qualified personnel. A diagnosis is that this problem of personnel shortage is, and will be, especially acute among local newspapers.

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Article in First Issue Tells HANGYORE SINMUN’S Background, Principles

41070065 Seoul HANGYORE SINMUN in Korean 15 May 88 p 3

[Article by Editorial Writer Kwon Kun-su: “Nine Months from the Statement of Intent to the First Issue—A People’s Drama”]

[Text] In late November 1979, An Chong-pil, chairman of the TONG-A Tuwi, told his fellow inmates in Room 17 on the second floor, Wing 7, of the Songdong Detention House, in Seoul that:

“When a new era comes, a newspaper company should be established in which all the people invest and of which they become the owners.”

“To make it a newspaper really for the masses of people, Hangul [the Korean alphabet] should be used so that everyone can easily read it. Editing should be done in an all-around manner both in name and reality, instead of dividing it into the political, economic, and cultural sections, etc., as is the practice now. The current practice of visiting government ministries and agencies to collect news material should be abolished. As it stands now,
news coverage by the press is centered on the government so much that the will of the masses is not fully reflected.” (from the 17 March 1980 issue of “TONG-A TUWIT”)

Shortly afterwards, on 29 February 1980, less than 3 months after his release from the detention house, Chairman An died of the illness he had suffered from during his imprisonment. As pointed out in the memorial tribute to him, Chairman An left a prophetic testament “as befitting the Moses of the press.”

The CHOSUN Tuwi, which led the free press movement together with TONG-A Tuwi in the 1970’s, issued a statement at the Pundo Hall in Changchungdan, Seoul, on 6 March 1985 marking its 10th founding anniversary. Proposing the establishment of a new press in place of the “establishment-oriented press,” the statement called for “an indefinite national movement to establish a mass-oriented press as part of legal and institutional preparations.” In an article entitled “We Propose the Establishment of a New Press Medium” in its 15 June 1985 inaugural number, the newspaper “WORD” issued by Onhyop pointed out that “outside the establishment-dominated press, self-reliant press activities are briskly going on to reflect the voices of people in various fields, including workers and farmers.” The article, which appeared in the “Suggestion Column” of the paper, proposed that “in response to this demand of the era of mass-oriented media, a nationwide mass movement be launched to create a new press medium.” The ardent desire for a new press has persisted so long and is deep-rooted. This desire became a realistic issue suddenly when the people’s resistance in June of last year compelled No Tae-u, chairman of the DJP, to issue his 29 June manifesto. In early July last year, dismissed journalists met with printing, sales, and advertisement experts to collect basic data and worked out a basic plan on the basis of the data collected. In mid-July the dismissed journalists vied to pay 500,000 won each into the promotion fund and signed the “written agreement of promotion” was organized. Many of the dismissed journalists vied to pay 500,000 won each into the promotion fund and signed the “written agreement of promotion” of the new newspaper company. While considering the question of “how to raise tens and hundreds of millions of won necessary to issue a newspaper,” Yi Pyong-chu, 50, former chairman of the TONG-A Tuwi, proposed a plan to launch a campaign to have each citizen own one share of stock so that all the people become the stockholders. At about that time, Chong Tae-ki, 47, former chairman of CHOSUN Tuwi, met with printing, sales, and advertisement experts to collect basic data and worked out a basic plan on the basis of the data collected. In mid-July he called on Song Kon-ho, 61, former chief editor of TONG-A ILBO and Onhyop chairman, to ask him to stand in the van of the drive to establish a new newspaper.

At the request of Song Kon-ho, the question was referred to the Onhyop executive committee, which after a 3-hour deliberation, instructed Yi Pyong-chu, Chong Tae-ki, and Kim Tae-hong, 46, then Onhyop secretary general, to form a “research committee for the creation of a new press.”

The first paper submitted to this new action committee was entitled “A Tentative Plan for the Founding of What Is Tentatively Named as MINJUNG SINMUN.” The name MINJUNG SINMUN was changed to KUNG-MIN SINMUN in the subsequent print, and to SAE SINMUN shortly thereafter.

Reflected in this tentative plan submitted in late July was the image of an ideal newspaper, including ways to guarantee people’s participation, the independent right of editing, the vertical rendering of Hangul, and the reader’s right to dissent—the image that will become reality in the first issue of the proposed new newspaper. The tentative plan also included this schedule: “the issuance of a statement of intent on 15 August 1987, the incorporation of the newspaper company on 1 November, and the publication of the first issue on 1 February 1988.” We cannot look back on our hard work in those days without a sigh of relief.

In mid-August a lively discussion proceeded at full steam among the dismissed journalists on the basis of the basic survey. A rented room in the Yuhwa Building in Taechong, Kangnam District, Seoul, under lease by Hwadam Technologies operated by Chong Tae-ki, was used as a meeting place where 7 to 8 people at least, and over 20 people at times, gathered daily after their work was over to carry on serious discussions far into the night.

At last, on 1 September, an inaugural bureau was set up in a 50-pyong space in Anguk Building at 175-87 Anguk-tong, Chongno District, Seoul, ushering in the Anguk-tong period of “HANGYORE Sinmun in the making.” Immediately afterward, a “Preparatory Committee for the Declaration of Intent” was organized. Many of the dismissed journalists vied to pay 500,000 won each into the promotion fund and signed the “written agreement on the promotion of the new newspaper.” The desire of the dismissed journalists to found a new journal was so deep-rooted and so fervent that it took less than 15 days to raise a huge sum of nearly 100 million won.

A general meeting of organizers was held on 23 September. At this meeting, which took place in an unoccupied office next to the office of the inaugural secretariat, the organizers adopted a decision to offer stocks for public subscriptions to raise the capital from the whole people, with a view to insuring the independence of the new newspaper from political power and specific capital, and also decided to limit the face value of each stock to 5,000 won and the maximum amount of stocks available to a stockholder to 1 percent of the total capital of 5 billion won.

This was an event that had no parallel in the world press as far as the intent and spirit were concerned. The statement of promotion ended on this emotional note: “We feel as if we were hearing the sound of the rotary press printing out news copies.” But the conventional press sneered at the report of the organizers meeting by printing it in such a small space column in such small type on page 10 that it could hardly be noticed.
On the following day the “Preparatory Committee for the Declaration of intent” was reorganized into the “Committee for Accelerated Promotion,” which went into action to organize a large group of promoters.

The original plan to enlist approximately 1,000 promoters went smoothly beyond expectation. Particularly the 12 October statement by 24 prominent elders in all fields, including Ham Sok-hon and Yi Hui-sung, urging the people to support the new newspapers drew an amazing response from all intellectual circles, such as academic, religious, and judicial. The number of promoters who pledged to invest 100,000 won in capital exceeded 3,000 in 20 days.

On 22 October, a week before the scheduled meeting of promoters, a final decision was made to name the newspaper HANGYORE SINMUN. Before making this decision, there had been on-going discussions over the title of the newspaper because of a lack of consensus. The discussion was concentrated on four options, namely TONGNIP SINMUN [INDEPENDENT JOURNAL], MINJU SINMUN [DEMOCRATIC JOURNAL], CHAJU MINBO [SELF-RELIANT PEOPLE’S DAILY], and HANGYORE SINMUN [ONE-NATION DAILY], which was proposed last. To break the impasse, it was decided that a survey in the form of a questionnaire be conducted. The survey was carried out by asking questions to two hundred adults chosen from among the promoters and 200 youths, mainly college students, in writing or by telephone. The results of the poll were: 164 in favor of CHAJU MINBON, 118 in favor of MINJU SINMUN and TONGNIP SINMUN in that order.

Much time was also spent on choosing the logo. A preparatory group headed by Art Critic Yu Hong-chun came up with dozens of studies prepared by superimposing the brush handwriting of the master calligrapher, Chang Hs-sun, and woodblock writing adapted from the “Oryunhaengsilto” [“Illustrated Biographies of the Paragons of the Rules Governing the Five Human Relations”], on paintings and woodcuts by many other artists. At the end, a final decision was made to adopt one bearing characters written in “Oryunhaengsilto” style on the background of the “Paektusan Chonji” [the crater lake of Mt Paektu].

This was the result of a laborious work that had lasted more than 4 months. At last, on 30 October, the promoters meeting was held at the large auditorium of the Young Women’s Christian Association [YWCA] building in Myongdong, Seoul, with over 1,000 promoters and citizens, who gathered together to witness the start of the new newspaper whose master would be the people. The excitement of the crowd surged as the “Song of HANGYORE SINMUN” rang through the hall.

“Is it true? The story that a good newspaper is organized with sweat-soiled money collected from all fellow countrymen.... A paper of the brethren that will tell falsehood from truth. Let us join the warm hearts of our brethren, as one and stand up and shout, genuine freedom, genuine peace....” (Written by Kang Chong-mun, composed by Kim To-hyang)

On behalf of the 3,314 promoters, an unprecedentedly large number, Attorney Hong Song-u read the statement of promotion in a voice which seemed to quiver with emotion, unlike his usual style of presentation in court.

“We are starting HANGYORE SINMUN not because there are no press media in this land, but because there is no righteous and courageous press that represents the voice of the people of our country and the conscience of our nation.”

The proceedings on that day, however, which would go down in the annals of the intellectual history of this country as the greatest event ever, could not break a hole in the monolithic wall of the established newspaperdom.

The meeting organized an “Inaugural Committee” consisting of 56 representatives chosen from all walks of life, to substantiate the legitimacy of HANGYORE SINMUN as a journal that belongs to the people, and hence which has no particular owner. The following is the list of the inaugural committee members selected on that day:

Kye Hun-che, Ko Un, Kim Yun-su, Kim Sung-hun, Kim Chong-han, Kim Chi-kil, Kim Chon-chu, Mun Chae-in, Pyon Hyong-yun, So Kyoung-won, Song Mun, Sim Song-po, An Yong-su, Yi Ki-ung, Yi Ton-myong, Yi So-son, Yi U-chong, Yi Hyo-chae, Cho A-Ra, Cho Chun-hui, Cha Pom-sok, Chung Yong-sye, Choe Won-sik, Paeng Won-sun, Han Sung-hon, Han Yong-hui, Hong Song-u, and Hwang In-chol. (The above represent all circles.)


Subsequently, the committee selected Song Kon-ho and Yi Ton-myong as its joint representatives. The inaugural committee is an important organization which will select the candidates for the board of governors and report the selection to the general meeting of stockholders and deliberate important matters involving the basic direction of the company.

On 8 November, after a brief respite following the organizers and promoters meetings, CHOSUN ILBO carried a full-page ad under the title “A New Paper That Will Be Created by All the People—Let Us Become theOwners of HANGYORE SINMUN,” with the roster of...
the 3,000 or more promoters. From that day to 25 February in the following year, when TONG-A ILBO carried the exciting ad “All the 5 billion won in an inaugural fund has been raised,” the secretariat for the inauguration of the new newspaper had to spend a tense 100 days or more, during which moments of joy alternated with worrisome moments.

During the presidential election period, the whole secretariat sank in disappointment due to the poor results of the fund-raising campaign. Immediately following the election, an advertisement was run reading “Democratization is not a one-shot game. Let us overcome prostration and frustration and join forces to help create HANGYORE SINMUN.” To the relief of all those in the secretariat, this ad caused a rush of emotional phone calls from those who believed that “HANGYORE SINMUN is the only one we can trust,” inquiring about how to buy its stocks.

The bulletin “NEWS ON HANGYORE SINMUN” was of great help in the fund-raising drive. The circulation of the bulletin, which was issued nine times altogether, at least 100,000 copies each time and 2 million copies at the peak time, not only earned for itself a chapter in this period of fomentation in the history of this nation but also played a unique part as a printed material. The personnel of the secretariat, wearing shoulder bags, went out to Seoul Railway Station and downtown subway stations many times to distribute copies of the “NEWS” to pedestrians. The fund-raising teams always carried an armful of copies of the NEWS when they visited churches, universities, labor unions, and so forth.

Meanwhile, in more than 50 cities throughout the country, including Pusan and Kwangju, supporters associations were organized with local leaders of the democratization movement at the center, and these associations disseminated the NEWS by mail or through street distribution. In this way, the bulletin played a key role in spreading the fund-raising fervor throughout the country. In the course of preparation for the first edition, everyone was skeptical about the feasibility of raising the 5-billion won inaugural fund, but the whole amount was eventually raised from 27,052 stockholders in what amounts to a nationwide contribution. The great undertaking, which may be called a miracle of our time, thus passed a critical point.

On 15 December, the day before the presidential election, HANGYORE SINMUN was officially started as a joint stock company with the completion of the registration following the inaugural meeting which was held earlier in the day, with the inaugural committee representing some 7,000 registered stockholders as of that day, including the organizers—the de facto charter members—acting as legal promoters. The new company, with an authorized capital of 5 billion, started with 1.25 billion won paid by these stockholders to inaugurate the new company. Additional stocks were subsequently issued twice to raise its capital to 5 billion won, the authorized amount.

The inaugural meeting elected Song Kon-ho as representative director, Im Chae-Kyong as managing editor, and Kim Chong-han, Hong Song-u, YI Pyong-chu, Chong Tae-ki as directors, and Hwang In-chol as auditor, and decided to include in the board of directors a labor union representative when it was organized in the future. The meeting also named Yi Hye-choe, Kim In-han, Sin Hung-pom, Kwon Kun-sul, Song Yu-po, and Kim Tae-hong as unregistered directors. Thus the meeting named a 10-man executive board comprising four full-time registered and six unregistered directors as the supreme decision-making body. Later Cho Yong-ho was added to the board as an unregistered member.

While the fund-raising campaign and the work to inaugurate the new company were underway, the editorial planning group made its utmost to map out the organization of the editorial bureau, establish the direction of editing, and make arrangements for manning the editorial staff. The group, after a lengthy discussion, first defined the basic feature of the paper as “a newspaper for the just voice of the masses” and adopted the editorial board system to insure the democratic operation of the editorial bureau. The group also clearly mirrored the aspiration and will of HANGYORE SINMUN by creating the national and international division, the opinion conveyance division, and the livelihood and civil rights division, among others, in addition to the usual divisions that the editorial bureau of a conventional newspaper would have.

Entering the new year, Song Yu-po, 45, who had devoted himself to the civil democratization struggle as member of the TONG-A Tuwi, was named chairman of the editorial board. The whole editorial board was chosen from among the journalists who had been dismissed while fighting for a free press. This completed the framework of the editorial staff. The open tests for probationary and experienced reporters conducted in February were taken by 8,052 applicants, a fact graphically illustrating the public expectations on HANGYORE SINMUN, particularly the fervent enthusiasm of the youth.

When additional tests for experienced reporters were given, incumbent writers and other members of existing local as well as national newspapers came in droves to take the tests. The wage scale offered by HANGYORE SINMUN was less than half of what they were getting, but these applicants decided to abandon their daily comforts and rushed to this newspaper, with the sole purpose of working for a newspaper worthy of its name. The dismissed journalists who had left the press world a long time before joined these incumbents in a training session. These two groups differed in age and in journalistic experience, though they shared the same desires and
enthusiasm. This training session in which they reviewed the “current stage of Korean society,” was a scene like which could hardly be found in the established newspaperdom.

Moreover, in mid-April the reporters organized a reporters council, an organization of rank-and-file journalists, and pledged to “stand in the van of the efforts to preserve the independence of editing and secure democracy in the organization.” The council chairman is Yi Tae-ho.

On reflection, the work of introducing printing equipment was unbearable. Particularly, each time we introduced necessary equipment, such as Nos 1 and 2 rotary printers and other input and output machines associated with the computerized printing system, and the nation’s first editing machine, we were nervous and jittery at the thought of the huge sum of money we had to defray.

It was on 23 January that preparations for the first issue were virtually completed and the written application for registration was filed in accordance with the “Law on Registration of Periodicals.” From that date until 25 April, the day before the general election, the issuance of the certificate of registration was delayed for no less than 3 months on various pretexts, such as the incomplete observance of the enforcement regulations and the need for an on-site inspection of the equipment. As a result, the efforts to issue the first edition were faced with enormous obstacles, repeatedly forcing the rescheduling of the date for issuing the first edition.

Without receiving the certificate of registration, the date for issuance of the first edition was announced, and reporters and other members of HANGYORE SINMUN held a protest rally in downtown Seoul on two occasions. Finally, the certificate of registration was issued on 25 April. On the afternoon of 5 May, 10 days before the first edition came out, the editorial bureau in the company building in Yangpyong-tong was crowded with the members of HANGYORE SINMUN.

“We will print the newspaper according to our own judgment and will reject interference from the outside. We will receive no improper gift or make no unwarranted profit in connection with newspaper business.”

That is an excerpt from the code of ethics of HANGYORE SINMUN read by Im Chae-kyong, a member of the editorial board, at the 5 May meeting. When the reading of this code was completed, the 300 or more executives and employees gathered rose from their seats as one to applaud thunderously in a show of their determination to implement the code. Each and every one of them was brimming over with self-confidence and enthusiasm. They are now ready to rush to their workplace at the newspaper, for which they will join forces with the public, the owner of their newspaper, to usher in a new era of journalism.

HANGYORE SINMUN has worked out and adopted the “ethic code of HANGYORE SINMUN” and the “guidelines for the implementation of the code of ethics,” on the grounds that for the press to discharge its social duties and to measure up to the public expectations on the “new press,” this effort should invariably be backed up by the moral determination of journalists themselves to practice democracy in the press.

All the executives and employees of HANGYORE SINMUN gathered at a meeting at its building in Yangpyong-tong, Seoul, on 5 May 1988, for a meeting to pledge their allegiance to the code of ethics and the guidelines of its implementation. The code of ethics reads as follows:

HANGYORE SINMUN has been established as a result of the age-long concerted wishes for and devotion to realizing democracy and a free press in this land. All executives and employees of HANGYORE SINMUN, always bearing in mind that this newspaper is a newspaper of the people and by the people, will never forget that their press activities are designed to express and implement the will of the public.

HANGYORE SINMUN is charged with the historic task of contributing to the democratization of our society, the acceleration of the independent and peaceful reunification of the country by ending the division, and the securing and enhancing the right of survival of the masses.

To discharge this mission, we believe that the press should play an intrinsic role in reporting truthfully and criticizing in a constructive way, accompanied by the moral determination of the journalists themselves regarding their social obligations and the practice of this determination.

All executives and employees of HANGYORE SINMUN pledge themselves to practice democracy in journalism and maintain the right attitude as men of the press through the adoption and observance of the following code of ethics:

I. Protection of Freedom of the Press

(1) We believe that freedom of the press and freedom of expression are a basic right of mankind and the basis of all other freedoms. Accordingly, the protection of freedom of the press is an obligation for all of us working in HANGYORE SINMUN.

(2) We will publish our newspaper according to our own judgment, rejecting whatever interference from the outside, including interference by political power.
(3) To make HANGYORE SINMUN independent from a specific capital, we will prevent a small number of stockholders from monopolizing the right to manage the company. Independence from political power and capital is an unalterable principle of HANGYORE SINMUN.

II. Responsibility for Factual and Truthful Reportage

(1) We reject commercialism and propaganda in the press.

(2) We will reveal nothing but truths so that the public may know about important world events. Failure to accurately report facts and truths is a betrayal to the established rights and duties of the press and amounts to an encroachment on the people’s right to know.

(3) We will serve as a criticizer of injustices and corruption and expose human right violations by political and other powers.

(4) We will spurn any request for favor or any pressure by any particular interest group.

III. Guaranteeing the Reader’s Right of Rebuttal

We will guarantee the reader’s right of rebuttal.

IV. Correction of Erroneous Reports

When we find an error in reportage, we will admit the error and make the correction.

V. Protection of News Material Collectors

We will never fail to honor the pledge not to reveal the source of news and protect the provider of information.

VI. Protection of Personal Privacy

We will respect the honor and privacy of the object of a report where no public interest is involved.

VII. Attitude Toward Political Parties and Religious Organizations

We will not affiliate with any political party or represent the stand of any specific political party, religion, or sect.

VIII. Quality of Journalists

(1) We will receive no improper gifts, monetary or in kind, or make no unwarranted profit in connection with newspaper business.

(2) We will not write or handle articles for personal interests.

IX. Sales and Advertisement

We will make no deals in contravention of the norms of ethics.

X. Establishment of In-House Democracy

We will freely exchange our views on matters concerning our company and reflect our consensus on the production of each edition and on the management of the company.


For the implementation of this code of ethics, guidelines for the enforcement of the code of ethics will be worked out separately.

XII. Ethics Committee

An ethics committee will be established for the enforcement of this code of ethics and the guidelines on its implementation.

XIII. Date of Enforcement

This code of ethics will take effect as of 5 May 1988.

Footnotes

1. TONG-A Tuwi is an abbreviation of the “TONG-A Struggle Committee for the Protection of Freedom of the Press,” an organization of the 130 or more reporters, producers, and announcers of TONG-A ILBO and Radio TONG-A who were dismissed by TONG-A ILBO Company in March 1975 while struggling for freedom of the press under the Yusin system. The dismissal took place as a result of TONG-A ILBO Company’s submission to the pressure of the government, exercised through a squeeze on the company’s advertisement business.

2. CHOSUN Tuwi is the abbreviation of the CHOSUN Struggle Committee for the Protection of Freedom of the Press. CHOSUN Tuwi is composed of reporters fired by CHOSUN ILBO on 6 March 1975 while engaging in a movement for freedom of the press against the government’s suppression of the press and colluded with it.

3. The Council for Democratic Press Movement (Onhyop) was organized on 19 December 1984 by the dismissed journalists belonging to the TONG-A Tuwi, the CHOSUN Tuwi, and the Council for Journalists Dismissed in 1980 for the purpose of launching a democratic press movement as a united action.
FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

TONG-A ILBO Views Changing ‘Role’ of U.S. Embassy
41070069 Seoul TONG-A ILBO in Korean
31 May 88 p 13

[Article by Nam Chan-sun]

[Text] The Korean-U.S. relationship has gradually changed, depending on the circumstances of the times, such as “the friendly, blood-forged ally,” “guardian,” and “partner.” Starting in the 1980’s the relationship showed yet another aspect of change amid the hot air of the anti-American movement in some quarters of society. A series of anti-American incidents attest to the degree to which this sentiment has spread particularly among youths; namely, the seizure of the Pusan American Cultural Center [ACC] in 1982, the explosion incident at the Taegu ACC in 1983, the seizure of the Seoul ACC in 1985, and the recent bomb-throwing incident at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

Specialists give the following reasons to the growing anti-American movement in the 1980’s: The negative views regarding the U.S. roles in the inauguration of the Fifth Republic and at the time of the Kwangju incident; the U.S. pressure for opening the Korean markets in conjunction with Korea’s economic growth; and more fundamentally, the critical evaluation of the U.S. influence in regard to solving the division of the Korean Peninsula.

Up until the 1970’s, the Korean-U.S. relationship was adjusted and developed in a simple manner, relative to our advance into the international community and our national strength. At present, it may be said that the nation is in the throes of establishing the relationship on a different plane, along with complex and diverse expressions of national interests. In the case of the U.S. Embassy in Korea, which is the nerve center and heart of the U.S. policy toward Korea, its role shows an appreciable rise and fall depending on such changes.

It was on 7 May 1883 when Gen Lucius Foote, the first American charge d'affaires, arrived at Inchon after the Korea-U.S. Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty was ratified by the United States. In the following year, 1884, Foote secured the land for the first U.S. ambassador’s official residence. He bought the land at $2,000 from a man by the name of Min Kye-ho. It is the present U.S. ambassador’s residence in Chong-dong, Chongno-gu, Seoul.

The U.S. Embassy building in front of the First Government Building is one designed and constructed by the United States at the request of the former International Cooperation Agency (ICA) in August 1960. Under the agreement, the building is to be used by the United States, free of charge, as long as the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Pact remains in force.

Following the Japanese surrender, in 1948 the United States took on the important role of helping establish the government of the Republic of Korea. The U.S. Legation in Korea was promoted to the status of an embassy on 20 February 1949. Soon, the first U.S. Ambassador, John Mucio, assumed his office. The Embassy began to take charge of the local implementation of U.S. policy toward Korea.

For 3 years until the time when the Korean Government was established, the U.S. Military Government needed no partner. It could perform its policy independently. Even after the establishment of the Korean Government, the U.S. Ambassador met chiefly with the Korean president in dealing with problems. Until the government of President Syngman Rhee was toppled, American ambassadors personally discussed matters with President Rhee, and had free access to the presidential mansion, Kyongmudae, as occasion called. Up until the time when the power was transferred to a civilian government, after the 19 April Student Revolution and the 16 May Military Revolution, the American Ambassadors dealt directly with the head of the state or the government. That the ambassador dealt directly with the head of state meant that he had an influence on the decisions about the host country’s “destiny.”

Commenting on the early days of Korea-U.S. relations, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had this to say: “The Korean war, which broke out on 25 June 1950, provided the momentum enabling the Korean leaders to realize what the U.S. role in Korea was. The Korean-American relationship in the 1950’s following the Korean war may also be thought of as one between the protector and the protected. Because of the threat of reinvasion by North Korea and the need to cultivate our own national strength to counter it, there was no other way but for the Korea-U.S. relationship to form a complete vertical relationship.”

In fact, following the first U.S. Ambassador Mucio, former Ambassador Ellis Briggs, William Lacy, and Walter Dowling were those who had strong influence on the Korean political circles, against the backdrop of the U.S. political, military, and economic support to Korea, in the early days of the Korean Government, during the Korean war, and after the Armistice agreement.

The Korean war was one which proved for the first time that there are decisive limits to an American influence on Korea. Mr Marshall Green, then charge d'affaires, on 16 May 1961—the day on which the Military Revolution occurred—sent a message broadcast by the United Nations Command and the 8th U.S. Army broadcast network, to the effect that he “fully agreed to the UN Command’s position that the Korean military commanders must immediately restore the sovereign authority to the legitimate government authorities.” Then, he met with Messrs Yun Po-son and Pak Chong-hui at Chong Wa Dae, but his proposal was to no avail.
Earlier in the preceding year, 5th Ambassador Walter McConagi played his important role in making President Rhee step down as soon as the 19 April Student Uprising occurred. At the report of the student uprising, Ambassador McConagi went to Kyongmudae, even without instructions from his home government, and politely advised Rhee to step down. And Rhee was greatly moved by his advice, it was said later.

Following the 16 May Military Revolution, the role of the U.S. Embassy in Korea gradually was reduced in its power. The ambassadors' partners were also "downgraded" from the head of the state to cabinet members. Ambassador Winthrop Brown, upon taking his post here in August 1964, conveyed the U.S. position concerning normalization of relations between Korea and Japan, through Foreign Minister Yi Tong-won. He also made contact with Mr Yun Po-son, who was opposed to the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam.

Soon he met a strong protest from Foreign Minister Yi, demanding that negotiations on the troop dispatch should be conducted only through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Observe the diplomatic channels." In the 1970's the partners for Ambassador Philip Habib and Richard Snyder were invariably the foreign minister at the time.

From the early 1970's, various kinds of U.S. economic aid to Korea were gradually ended; and the annual amount of grant-type military assistance was reduced drastically. Ambassador Habib, the ninth U.S. ambassador to Korea, assumed his office during the period when the position and relationship between Korea and the United States was being readjusted.

Shortly after he took his post in October 1971, he witnessed the announcement of a state of emergency. He had to deal with big political changes in Korea, such as the North-South Korean joint statement announced on 4 July 1972 and the October Yusin (Revitalizing Reform) in the same year. Making use of his experience in having served in the post of political counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Korea for 3 years from 1962, he demonstrated his diplomatic knack by meeting with Korean friends over Makkoli (crude rice wine), Kimchi, and Komisang (beef broth), rather than trying to exercise his influence directly on the Korean Government. There were strong criticisms from the U.S. public concerning the Korean political situation. Well aware of the political realities of Korea, Habib conveyed only the administration's view, but never emphasized his own position.

Ambassador Richard Snyder assumed his post in September 1974. He came to realize the limits to the embassy's role in relations with the questions regarding U.S. troop withdrawal, the Chong Wa Dae tapping incidents, and particularly the Pak Tong-son scandal. And he had to establish an unprecedented "equal relationship between Korea and the United States" In order to make Mr Pak Tong-son come back to the United States and testify at the Congressional hearings and be sublimated to the judicial process, he had to see Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin no less than 13 times during the 2-month period. Mr Pak Tong-son did not go to the United States, but the U.S. Attorney General visited Korea to see Pak.

In his speech delivered at the year-end party of 1971, sponsored by the Korean-American Association, Ambassador Snyder said, "The U.S. relationship as Korea's big brother is coming to an end." At that time, Foreign Minister Pak defined the Korean-American relationship as "a partnership." Experts say that this was the time when a new line was drawn in the relationship between the two countries.

In the Fifth Republic, the U.S. Embassy had to face the two big issues resulting from "the partnership." One is the trade issue between the two countries and the other is the diffusion of anti-American sentiments accumulated in Korea. Trade friction between Korea and the United States appears to be a natural consequence resulting from the rapid economic growth of Korea and the weakening economic power of the United States.

The U.S. assertions are that in reducing the American trade deficits, Korea, as a country enjoying a trade surplus, should help the United States by making efforts to open its markets to American goods and services. Added to the problem of "misunderstandings" of the U.S. role in the early days of the Fifth Republic, such trade friction has provided the momentum to arouse anti-American sentiments in Korea.

An American Embassy official says, "The main axis of the Korea-U.S. relationship may well be said to lie in security. This is a common area of understanding since the United States is equally interested with the Korean side. In trade issues, however, selfish motives are bound to clash with each other, and a tug-of-war is inevitable." He emphasized that "with the anti-American sentiments, the U.S. position has become even more difficult. Now there is no other way but to approach solving the question in the spirit of mutual concession and cooperation."

Obviously the change in the U.S. Embassy's role in Korea is one of the most realistic yardsticks explaining where Korea stands in the international community today. In the international community, however, there still exist some prejudice which views Korea as "American Korea" or at times "through the glasses called America." In a "partnership relationship," it is deemed necessary to have a "balanced perception" of one another.

The new position should be established to suit the era of internationalization of give-and-take. This must be a critical task now in relation to the current climate, in which things are apt to be seen from the dichotomous
viewpoints of “pressure vs. submission” and “pro-American vs. anti-American,” and the evolution of a new Korea-U.S. relationship.

**Government To Drop Tariffs on Over 700 Items**

SK1406012188 Seoul YONHAP in English 0112 GMT 14 Jun 88

[Text] Seoul, June 14 (YONHAP)—Tariffs on more than 700 items, including about 300 consumer goods, will drop by up to 30 percent when quota tariffs are applied next month, the finance ministry said Tuesday.

The ministry measure is intended to stabilize commodity prices by increasing the imports of goods whose international prices are lower than domestic prices, as well as to manage the increasing current account surplus.

Customs duties on such consumer goods as refrigerators, recorders and washing machines will drop from the current 30 percent to the 20 percent quota tariff starting next month.

The government sometimes uses a quota tariff system, which in general is a preferential tariff, to simplify the inflow of certain items when an expanded supply of the goods on the domestic market is necessary. The government can unilaterally determine the application of the quota tariff system while a change in the base tariff requires parliament’s approval.

The ministry also plans to lower base tariffs on some home appliances, including color televisions and videotape recorders, from the current 30 percent to 20 percent next year, 16 percent in 1990, 13 percent in 1991, 10 percent in 1992 and eight percent in 1993.

Tariffs on electric equipment for industrial use, including generators, transformers and cable, as well as appliance parts will drop from the current 20 percent to 15 percent next year, 16 percent in 1990, 13 percent in 1991, 10 percent in 1992 and eight percent in 1993.

Customs duties on telephones, black and white televisions and cathode ray tubes will drop from the current 20 percent to 15 percent next year, 13 percent in 1990, 11 percent in 1991, nine percent in 1992 and eight percent in 1993.

**Import Diversification Increases**

SK1706021188 Seoul YONHAP in English 0039 GMT 17 Jun 88

[Text] Seoul, June 17 (YONHAP)—Korea’s dependence on Japanese imports among its total imports declined to 31.3 percent during the first four months of this year due to its efforts to diversify import sources, the trade and industry ministry said Friday.

The comparable figures are 33.3 percent in 1987 and 34.4 percent in 1986.

Of Korea’s imports, the share of imports from the United States rose to 22.4 percent during the cited months from 21.4 percent in 1987 and 20.7 percent in 1986, while imports from the European Community (EC) have increased since 1983 to 12.0 percent this year.

Korea’s trade deficit with Japan also fell by 269 million U.S. dollars in the first quarter of this year, compared with a drop of 224 million dollars last year, the ministry said.

The top 100 Korean companies which imported the most from Japan shifted import sources for 200 million dollars worth of goods from Japan to other countries including the United States (95 million dollars) and Europe (83 million dollars).

Machinery topped the list of items whose import sources were converted from Japan to other nations with 99 million dollars worth.

Goldstar Co. led the shift of import sources, followed by tongyang Nylon Co., tongyang Polyester Co., Daewoo Shipbuilding and Heavy Machinery Ltd. and Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., according to the ministry’s tally.

The ministry plans to further encourage domestic firms to shift their import sources from Japan to other countries by promoting imports from the United States or the EC, by supplying more information on import sources, and by supporting foreign currency-denominated loans to the firms.
MILITARY

Renewal of Military Solidarity With China

[Unattributed Article]

[Text] (Seoul—Naewoe) North Korea's military delegation headed by O Chin-u, member of the Standing Committee of Political Bureau of the KWP, paid a visit to the PRC from 16 to 20 May [1988].

It is reported that O Chin-u discussed matters of mutual concern in a series of meetings, held during his recent visit to the PRC, with Deng Xiaoping, PRC's man of real power, Yang Shangkun, president, and Qin Jiwei, minister of national defense. To all appearances, the itinerary of O Chin-u and his party seemed a simple courtesy visit designed to confirm continuation in the traditional friendship relationship between the two countries.

O Chin-u, who headed the North Korean military delegation, met immediately after his arrival in Beijing, on 16 May, with Qin Jiwei, minister of national defense of the PRC. The only announcement made on the talk was to the effect that it was held in a friendly and cordial atmosphere; no details were reported about the content of the talk.

However, in view of the fact that among the personages on the PRC side were Xu Xin, deputy chief of staff of the PRC People's Liberation Army, Li Yaowen, political commissar of the Navy, and Wang Hai, commanding officer of the air force, it is conjectured that overall practical military affairs, including the cooperative system between the army, navy, and air forces of the two countries, were discussed in the talk.

And it is also guessed that both sides exchanged views over the military close relationship between North Korea and the Soviet Union, which is to be associated with the recent consecutive visits to North Korea by Petr Lushev, first deputy minister of defense of the USSR, in April, and by “the Red Flag Pacific Fleet” (commanding officer: Admiral G. Khratov in May.

North Korea was in a position in which it had assuage the worries on the PRC side over the recently stepped up military cooperation with the Soviet Union, including the issue of visits to Wonsan Port by fleets of the Soviet Union and of introduction of Soviet-made military weapons. While the PRC side, too, was in a position in which it could not just stand by and watch North Korea's close military relationship with the Soviet Union. Thus it is surmised that opinions were exchanged between the two sides in order to understand each other.

At the welcome banquet which was held, following the talk, under the sponsorship of Qin Jiwei, minister of national defense of the PRC, in the People's Convention Hall in Beijing in the evening of that day, there were indications, although they were indirect, of some adjustment or coming close of the positions of the two countries. In his speech at the welcome banquet, Qin Jiwei, minister of national defense of the PRC, saying by way of introduction that “two countries, China and Korea, have overcome historical trials and maintained traditional friendly relationships,” emphatically stated that “The Chinese people and the People's Liberation Army will continue, from now on as in the past, their efforts to strengthen and develop the militant friendship formed through the ties of blood between the peoples and armies of the two countries, China and Korea.”

Furthermore, he showed his stand supporting North Korea by emphatically saying that "the Korean people's desire for accomplishing independent unification of their fatherland will be realized without fail.”

In response to that, O Chin-u, too, said by way of introduction that "strengthening and developing the Sino-Korean friendship continuously, generation after generation, represent a firm policy of the Korean Workers Party.” Then he emphasized that “we will make all out efforts to safeguard and develop the Sino-Korean friendship.”

In these speeches, one may find some statements indicative of the fact that there was mutual understanding regarding military issues [pending] between the two countries. For example, such indications are to be found in the following remarks: Qin said: “From now on, too, as in the past, the militant friendship and unity formed between the peoples and armies of the two countries, China and Korea, will be strengthened and developed...”; and O said: “developing [it] continuously, generation after generation, is an unwavering policy of the Korean Workers Party.”

Moreover, on 17 May, the second day of their visit, O Chin-u and his party visited a communications unit of the People's Liberation Army of the PRC in Beijing and, right after that, visited a base of the North Sea Fleet of the PRC Navy, in Qingdao in Shandong Province, which is located on the opposite side of Nampo Port in North Korea. These visits may be regarded as something more significant than just courtesy visits. It is very probable that there were some discussions, during O Chin-u and his party's visit to a Qingdao naval base, which recognized anew the strategic relationship between the navies of North Korea and the PRC, and which were related to the cooperative system between the armed forces of the two countries.

Manifestation of the PRC side's support of North Korea was again confirmed by Yang Shangkun, president of the state. In a talk held between Yang Shangkun and O Chin-u on 18 May, it is reported, there were discussions about issues of common concern, including further stepping up the friendship and cooperation between the
In discussions, Yang Shangkun vowed to continue supporting North Korea: he said that he “highly appreciates the traditional friendship between the armed forces of the two countries”; and that “continuously strengthening the traditional friendship between the armed forces of North Korea...”

However, Yang Shangkun sent greetings only to Kim Il-song and not to Kim Chong-il; and on the other hand, earlier, when Kim Yong-nam, foreign minister of North Korea, visited Moscow, Kim was asked by leaders of the Soviet Union to convey their greetings to Kim Chong-il. These two events are in contrast to each other and are worthy of attention.

Nevertheless, it is rather difficult to regard such an attitude of the PRC leaders as an event signifying any estrangement in the relationship between the PRC and North Korea or as an indication of a gap effected between leaders of the two countries. One may have to attribute such events to the fact that, although, at present, Kim Chong-il, together with Kim Il-song, is exercising substantial sovereignty, he has no official position for receiving diplomatic messages as a matter of protocol.

For another example, when O Chin-u had a talk with Deng Xiaoping on 19 May, too, Deng only received greetings from Kim Il-song. This event, too, may be regarded as a natural diplomatic protocol procedure in view of the fact that Kim Il-song, Deng Xiaoping, and Yang Shangkun are all of “the first generation of revolution” unlike Kim Chong-il who belongs to the second generation of revolution.

In the meantime, what was greatly worthy of attention about the itinerary of O Chin-u’s recent visit to China is the content of the talk with Deng Xiaoping. In that talk, Deng emphasized an explanation of the PRC’s reform and open door policy, while repeatedly declaring the continued support of North Korea.

In particular, referring to the price policy and the relationship between reformists and conservatives in the PRC, Deng said as follows regarding the price adjustment policy: “Of late, when prices have been adjusted, a phenomenon of randomly buying goods has developed and much complaint is being heard. But broad masses of the people have understood this and the party leaders believed the decision was correct.” Thus he expressed his strong will regarding the reform policy, saying: “We hope that this reform will succeed; and it can be successful.”

Furthermore, Deng said that the alternation between the old and new, the reformists and conservatives, “was made smoothly” through the 13th plenary session of the CCP and the 13th plenary session of the representatives of the whole country. Then he said: “Participants in the meetings not only upheld in unison the reform and open door policies, but also asserted that the reform be pushed farther and farther.” Thus he explained in detail the PRC’s positive move toward reform and an open door.

Such remarks on the reform and open door policies by Deng Xiaoping are nothing new in view of the fact that, whenever North Korean leaders, such as Yi Kun-mo (premier) and Kim Pok-sin (vice premier), visited the PRC, such explanations were given and North Korea expressed its stand of supporting the PRC’s open door policy.

However, when one takes into consideration the current circumstances in which North Korea recently sunk into an isolated international position due to its non-participation in the Seoul Olympic games and its act of savagery in blasting a Korean Air Line aircraft, and in which [North Korea’s] economic stagnation is being prolonged, Deng Xiaoping’s recent explanation of the PRC’s turning to an open door policy which was made on the occasion of O Chin-u’s visit is of great significance as a positive invitation to North Korea to adopt a similar policy, one may say.

Furthermore, a kind of disguised reproach to North Korea, who clings to the system of hereditary succession of Kim Il-song and his son, and is holding fast to a premodern political and economic system, might have been intended by Deng Xiaoping when he personally gave a positive advice on economic reform, etc., despite the fact that O Chin-u was on a visit with a military delegation.

After all, one may say that, through O Chin-u’s recent visit to the PRC, North Korea could vow to continue its traditional friendship with the PRC and somewhat dissolve its uncomfortable stand caused by its close adhesion to the Soviet Union. However, it seems that North Korea has now realized that the cleavage and differences in views, which have widened between North Korea and the PRC regarding the political and economic systems, are presently deepening to such an extent that it has now become difficult to reduce them.

The Itinerary of O Chin-u’s Visit to the PRC

On 16 May the North Korean military delegation headed by O Chin-u (minister of People’s Armed Forces) arrived at Beijing (Received by Qin Jiwei, Minister of National Defense of the PRC); O Chin-u and Qin Jiwei had a talk; Attended the welcome banquet sponsored by Qin Jiwei; Qin Jiwei speech: Let us do our best to defend the Sino-Korean friendship; O Chin-u speech: Expressed gratitude toward the support of the Korean people’s struggle.
On 17 May O Chin-u visited Qingdao and visited the North Sea Fleet of the Navy.

On 18 May Friendship talks were held with Yang Shang-kun, president, in Beijing; Attended a banquet sponsored by Yang Shangkun; Visited a unit of the People's Armed Forces of the PRC in Beijing.

On 19 May a meeting was held with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing.

On 20 May the North Korean military delegation returned to Pyongyang. O Chin-u extended his stay in the PRC for recreation.

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**Weapons Export Used To Increase Foreign Exchange**

41070064 Seoul PUKHAN in Korean

No 5, May 88 pp 62-68

[Article by No Chae-sung: “Essays on North Korea—Actual Condition of North Korea’s Weapons Export”]

[Excerpts] Scope and Condition of Weapons Export

It has been revealed that North Korea is currently indebted by approximately $3 billion to foreign countries. Needless to say, when the amount, $3 billion, is assessed only in terms of a quantitative concept, it may be estimated to be nothing special. When compared to a country like Brazil with as much as $85 billion in foreign debt, as a matter of fact the quantitative concept of $3 billion is miniscule. However, foreign debts should not be assessed only in terms of a quantitative concept. Rather it is generally theorized that foreign debts should be understood in terms of a relative concept: “amount of foreign debts against the strength of the national economy.”

Looking at this way North Korea’s external trade amounted to $1.4 billion in 1982, so the significance of foreign debt amounting to $3 billion must be taken with serious implications. Because of lack of experience in transactions with advanced nations of the West, and the lowly developed export industries, North Korea’s foreign currency reserve has long been exhausted. To make the matter worse, its trade deficit has reached serious proportions. With the expansion of the trade deficit, its foreign debt has increased. North Korea has not been able to pay even the interest, to say nothing of the principal, so North Korea has finally become a nation incapable of repaying debts.

It is generally believed that there is no prospect for North Korea to be able to free itself from the pressure of its foreign debts. Only through emergency means called “smuggle diplomacy,” including weapons exports has North Korea been able to obtain foreign currency in an irregular manner. By their nature weapons exports between nations and organizations are a violation of international laws so they are carried out as hidden transactions in backrooms, it is a fact that their exact scope and condition is difficult to grasp. Nevertheless, to estimate North Korea’s weapons export, in 1982 of $1.4 billion of annual exports, weapons export accounted for as much as $450 million. Judging from this, the scope and actual condition of North Korea’s clandestine weapons sale can be sufficiently estimated.

Also, if we only judge from a report by an Indonesian daily newspaper, JAKARTA POST, that during 10 years from 1974 to 1984, North Korea exported guns and military equipment worth $2.4 billion to as many as 42 countries, it proves that North Korea is one of the world’s largest weapons smugglers. Moreover, this fact is supported by a report by the WASHINGTON TIMES, dated 16 April 1985, revealing that for 1 year, 1984, North Korea sold more than $800 million worth of weapons to Iran alone.

In terms of recipient countries of North Korea’s weapons export, since the late 1960’s North Korea has supplied small firearms, field artillery pieces, and other small arms in the name of a joint “anti-imperialist anti-colonialist struggle” to some nonaligned nations, including Vietnam, Egypt, and North Yemen. Then, since the 1970’s, expanding its recipient nations to the Middle East, Central-South America, North Korea offered weapons for money or free of charge, depending on the level of political support from recipient nations, and massively expanded the kinds and quantities of weapons for aid.

Although in the early stage of North Korea’s weapons export, the kinds of weapons were limited to small firearms and infantry equipment, with the continuing growth policy for the munitions industry North Korea has reached a level whereby it can even manufacture on its own MiG fighters, tanks, and patrol boats, and it has concentrated on these heavy weapons with high foreign currency earning power. Recently, an AFP dispatch on 25 March 1983 reported that the surface-to-surface missiles used in the Iran-Iraq war are none other than North Korean-made missiles.

In many cases North Korea’s clandestine weapons exports are handled directly by locally stationed North Korean missions or by North Korean military advisers (mainly guerrilla warfare specialists) widely dispatched to areas of conflict throughout the world. These North Korean military specialists employed at relatively low cost, are reportedly actively involved in weapons sale operations as well as in terrorist training.

Since North Korea has been frantically engaged in building the Kim Il-song-Kim Chong-il father-son dynasty and preparations for war against South Korea, even amidst accusations and denunciations by many countries of the world today, North Korea is facing a difficult situation in all areas, including politics, the economy,
and the society. In spite of this situation, while keeping itself enclosed behind high walls under the slogan of so-called "self-reliance," and captivated by a fantasy of communizing the Korean Peninsula for unification, North Korea is frenziedly engaged in preparations for war. On the other hand, North Korea is carrying out smuggling through its diplomats for the purpose of earning foreign currencies, and declaring the advent of the so-called world revolution North Korea is exporting violent revolution everywhere.

Such North Korean acts of exporting violent revolution and smuggling will not be suspended as long as its closed policy and its extremely poor socialist economic system are maintained. And as long as such international misconduct last, it is evident that world peace and world order will be challenged.

**Main Weapons Exported by North Korea**

The main weapons exported by North Korea are as follows:

1966—At the time of the third Middle East war, North Korea offered a 1,500-strong military force (including 25 pilots) and large quantities of weapons. This North Korean military force withdrew in 1976.

1969—In October North Korea offered large quantities of small firearms and war materiel to the rebels who rose against the Republic of Chad. (This was revealed by Albasidik, a rebel leader.)

1971—North Korea offered weapons to Eritrean guerrillas who attempted secession and independence from Ethiopia at that time. In April North Korea supported Sri Lankan Government guerrillas with submachine guns and other weapons. North Korea also offered weapons to Ethiopia by transporting them aboard a Polish vessel. In December North Korea supplied Pakistan with thirteen 130-millimeter artillery pieces.

1973—North Korea offered one-hundred 75-millimeter guns and military uniforms to the Khmer Rouge. In October at the time of the October war in the Middle East, North Korea lent support with 30 pilots, 20 ground maintenance crew, and missile technicians.

1974—In September North Korea offered Nigeria North Korean-made AK rifles and large quantities of live ammunition. North Korea transported and supplied to Sierra Leone weapons disguised as agricultural machines aboard a North Korean vessel. In December North Korea supported Tanzania with antiaircraft artillery pieces and shells.

1975—North Korea supplied large quantities of weapons, including rifles, to Chilean left-wing guerrillas. (General Gustav, a Chilean Government leader, disclosed this.) In May North Korea offered large quantities of AK rifles and live ammunitions to Cambodia. In September North Korea aided Zaire with three torpedo boats. During the time of a civil war in the Congo, North Korea sent 280 AK rifles, ammunition, and howitzers. Also, in October North Korea offered to Zaire 30 new tank models, including T-72's. The total weapons that North Korea clandestinely sold to Zaire in September and October was as much as $6 million worth. In December North Korea offered light machine guns to the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO).

1976—In May, North Korea aided North Yemen with 50 antitank guns and 2,000 automatic rifles. (According to classified documents of the U.S. Department of Defense disclosed in 1976, North Korea either secretly sold or offered free of charge a total of $44 million worth of weapons to Egypt, Sierra Leone, Pakistan, Togo, and Zaire.)

1977—In February North Korea supported Rhodesia with AF rifles. In July North Korea offered to Gabon 60 AK rifles, 52 light machineguns, 2,536 antiair machine-guns, and 8 mortars.

1979—In October North Korea offered to the antigovernment guerrillas of India RPG-2's, including hand grenades, and burp guns.

1980—In December North Korea exported large quantities of weapons to Iran.

1983—In February North Korea clandestinely sold to Guyana approximately 6,000 tons of weapons and ammunition. Approximately 300 North Korean military advisers were stationed in Iran. (An ordinance depot commanded by an Iranian Forces Colonel was revealed to have been actually managed by a North Korean colonel.)

1984—It was revealed that scores of North Korean military advisers had been dispatched to Grenada, a Central-South (as published) American nation, and also that North Korea supplied large quantities of fire extinguishers and large quantities of weapons, including machineguns to the left wing forces in Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Paraguay. (In April 1985 an influential Danish daily news, VESTKYSTEN, reported that during 1 year in 1984 North Korea sold $800 million worth of weapons to Iran.)

1985—In January North Korea dispatched to the antigovernment forces of El Salvador a military advisers group and supported them with large quantities of military equipment. (This was disclosed by a British military journal, DEFENCE.) In February North Korea sold to Zimbabwe 20 armored military transport carriers worth $3 million. An AFP dispatch from Harare dated 22 February reported that the deal was completed with Prime Minister Robert Mugabe participating.) Then, in March an NHK broadcast from Japan dated 27 March reported that surface-to-surface Scud missiles that Iran
used in attacking Baghdad, the Iraqi capital, were probably purchased from North Korea. In June it was disclosed that North Korea offered a military advisers group and equipment for the special forces newly created in Uganda, and an AP dispatch dated 15 June from Kampala reported that in a joint statement the three opposition parties of Uganda opposed such a move on the part of North Korea. Then, in July it was disclosed by U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT that North Korea supplied security equipment to the presidential security force of the Seychelles Islands.

1986—In February it was revealed by the Peruvian vice minister of the interior, Augstin Mantilla, that North Korea supplied 10,000 sub-machineguns to Peru. Vice Minister Mantilla disclosed that Peru purchased North Korean-made sub-machineguns because they were cheaper than West European models, and also that Peru planned to invite North Korean military advisers to teach ammunition manufacturing methods at Peruvian munitions factories. In March, in accordance with the 20-year mutual friendship and aid treaty signed by North Korea with Cuba, North Korea offered approximately 100,000 newly developed automatic rifles and hundreds of thousands of rounds of live ammunition. This fact was revealed in Castro’s speech at a welcoming rally when he visited Pyongyang on 12 March and he referred to it: “North Korea has recently offered such military aid in a loan with favorable terms.” Also, in June THE NEW YORK TIMES dated 11 June reported that North Korea, together with the Soviet Union, had recently sold on a regular basis weapons and military supplies to the Sandanista regime of Nicaragua. Moreover, THE GUARDIAN of the United Kingdom dated 5 December reported that North Korea offered Iran 60 MiG 19’s and MiG 21’s which appeared to have been built in Communist China and the Soviet Union, together with necessary light weapons worth approximately $400 million. Richard Armitage, U.S. assistant secretary of defense, revealed at the East Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives that there were signs that North Korea was supplying weapons to the communist insurgents in the Philippines.

1987—In June the WASHINGTON TIMES dated 8 June reported that silkworm missiles that Communist China recently supplied to Iran to be used in actual combat appear to have been sold through the intermediary of North Korea. This newspaper added that the sales of these Communist China-made silkworm missiles to Iran amounted to $600 million. In July a British defense journal, JANE’S DEFENCE, reported that a fleet of North Korean fishing boats operating in the Persian Gulf recently supplied early warnings and long distance reconnaissance and firing target data to the Iranian revolutionary guards based in Bandar Abbas port in the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, JANE’S DEFENCE, dated 4 November reported that North Korea exported to Iran, Syria, and Nicaragua tanks that North Korea developed into its own models from the Soviet-made T-76 model tank and the Communist Chinese 60 light tank, and multiple-head rocket launchers (MRL) developed in four models from the Communist Chinese multiple-head rocket launcher. Then, in November, (Soriani), a national security assistant to the Philippine President Corazon Aquino, on 12 November, disclosed that a vessel that North Korea mobilized to transport weapons to the communist rebel forces of the Philippines, the New People’s Army (NPA), was discovered by the Philippine Government forces, and it escaped.

1988—In March it was confirmed by the interior minister of Peru that North Korea exported AKM-65 automatic rifles and ammunition that had been requested by the Peruvian Government for stepping up its sweeping operations against the left wing guerrillas by forging documents for batteries and accessories.

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ECONOMIC

Kwangbok Street Polyclinic Under Construction

SK0807104788 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1019 GMT 8 Jul 88

[Text] Pyongyang July 8 (KCNA)—A polyclinic with a total floor space of 15,000 square meters is under construction in Kwangbok street.

The hospital will consist of six buildings including outpatient, treatment, and sick wards.

A hall of peculiar style soaring up the ceiling of the second floor will occupy the center of the three-storied outpatient ward with flat roof.

The reception counter will be available in the hall from which will fan out the corridors to the surgical, internal treatment and all other sections.

The sick ward will be an eight-storied building, the per-bed floor space will be 45.4 square meters. This ward will be furnished with all necessary facilities such as air-conditioning devices and call and signal systems.

A neat lotus pond park will be laid out in the polyclinic compound and a sports treatment ward will make its peculiar appearance.

Chemical Fiber Production Capacity Rises

SK1107101388 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1006 GMT 11 Jul 88

[Text] Pyongyang July 11 (KCNA)—The Chongjin Chemical Fibre Complex has completed the expansion of its capacity in the main and started production on some lines.

Workers and technicians there have increased the chemical fibre production capacity 20 percent by carrying out the technical remodeling of over 150 machines.
they boosted the daily capacity of pulp procession 38 percent by introducing more than 20 technical innovation proposals. A proposal helped raise the capacity of the sulfuration and solution machines over 50 percent each.

The staple fibre shop has increased the capacity of the spinning and drying machines 70 percent through the application of many technical innovation proposals, while the filtration shop has lifted the filtering capacity 25 percent.

**New Nonferrous Mine To Be Commissioned**

SK0707044188 Pyongyang KCNA in English 0424 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Pyongyang July 7 (KCNA)—The Chongpyong mine, a new nonferrous mineral production base, is being developed in Korea.

Very promising is this mine which will be commissioned shortly.

The builders cut the period of installing ore grinding equipment of the dressing plant to one-third and completed the groundwork of the conical crusher far ahead of the set time.

Innovatory successes are reported from the transport pits, slanting pits, ore-dropping chutes, underground crushing site and all other places.

The construction of the substation and the dust ore settling basin has entered the finishing stage.

The builders there have set themselves the goal to put the mine into operation before the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Republic.

**Sungri Motor Works Expands Capacity**

SK0707100488 Pyongyang KCNA in English 1001 GMT 7 Jul 88

[Text] Pyongyang July 7 (KCNA)—The expansion of the capacity of the Sungri General Motor Works is progressing in full scale.

The construction of buildings for nearly 30 objects including the general engine shop, the general sheet metal assembling shop and the foundry shop with a floor space of tens of thousands of square metres has been completed in the main thanks to the energetic efforts of the builders. Now it is confidently foreseen that the expansion project will be completed before the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

The builders there increased the construction speed by making a highly efficient self-propelled crane, a 500-ton mould press and other equipment and introducing several valuable technological innovation proposals.

They have dynamically pressed ahead with the project from the time of erecting pillars of the buildings.
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