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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ARMED FORCES

CAREER OF TEST PILOT DISCUSSED

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 1, Jan 83 (signed to press 13 Dec 82)
pp 14-15

[Article by Nonna Oreshina: "We Tell About Test Pilots: Three Flights Out of Thousands"]

[Text] ...A dual blow lashed the air, and the aircraft's trace blossomed like a white notch and melted away in the blue. Viktor Ignat'yevich tore his gaze from the sky and quickened his step, but the roar which originated in the heights continued. For an instant it seemed that he was again sitting in the cockpit, only not that of the modern, heavy missile-armed aircraft aboard which he had flown in recent years, but the fragile cockpit of a cargo glider. The blackness of night which stuck to the cockpit glass splashed in his eyes as a strange contrast to the gleaming whiteness of the day. The characteristic whistling of the glider surfaces, first lisping then hoarse, and the muffled, cautious rumble of the tow plane sounded in his ears.

Perhaps he should tell the lads about one of those flights. They have imagination. They will conjecture and understand... Then he was not much bigger than these recent tenth-graders. Only how could he pass on the feeling of the nearness of earth when you are ground-level flying, how deceptive the silence of night is and how vulnerable the tow plane-glider unit is from the sky and the ground?

The foot grows numb on the pedal, keeping the glider at the necessary interval from the neighboring aircraft. The uneven distribution of cargo in the fuselage can be felt in the controls--the glider is trying to raise or lower its nose and one has to parry this movement all the time. And everything in you--thoughts, nerves and muscles--are like a compressed spring. It is that way all four hours of the flight to the front line where there are bonfires in a clearing and where the tow plane-glider unit is being awaited impatiently.

A little light flashes sharply as if stabbing the darkness--the signal has been given from the tow plane: "Get ready." And in a brief time interval comes another flash, a double one: "Disengaged!"

The monotony is broken. With your entire body you push off in a sharp bank to one side, sensitively testing the overload and trying to gain meters of altitude granted by the speed. You look around quickly and tenaciously, noticing

the bend in the gleaming river, dark on dark--the large wooded area and three splashes of fire in it. The fires float to meet you like the windows of your home. Now you see only them. They are the only thing linking you with the earth, the people and with the life of the frontline strip.

...Viktor Ignat'yevich halted and thought with a grin: "No, I probably shouldn't talk about this for today's youth gliders are too simple. To have them listen carefully you have to surprise them. But how do you surprise a young boy if they even talk about space as about a neighboring rayon center to which they have no access for now, but in time..."

Two small boys ran across the road right in front of the engine of a Volga, which fortunately was proceeding unhurriedly. The vehicle screeched its brakes, but the bare ice took it along and a woman with a child dashed aside from the edge of the sidewalk. There was satisfaction and challenge in the small boys' eyes. They wanted to prove their boldness and to believe in it themselves, only they didn't know how. This comes to an adult in an understanding of true courage and perceived risk which might be demanded by duty and sometimes by everyday routine work. But for small boys risk is an assertion of their male ego in defiance of the coddling of grandmothers, teachers' admonitions and the shouts of tender-hearted passers-by. If their enthusiasm is not directed they will think up for themselves the most stupid tests and take senseless risks. But it is even more terrible when a young lad has no thirst for an exploit, when spiritual flabbiness nests in a frail body...

He had a heavy beating in his temple and his chest was tight. "I'm going too fast. I have to go slower," thought Viktor Ignat'yevich as he halted and caught his breath. "Everything is real in aviation--danger, the overcoming of difficulties, and respect for yourself... I have to tell the boys something they will be able to picture and try on for themselves, about the work of a test pilot. There was so much in a quarter century."

There were flights where he went right after flying accidents that were bitter and irreparable. He would look for the reason by repeating the conditions which led to them, intentionally taking the aircraft into an emergency situation. And he would find them. In other test flights he had to step beyond the bounds of what had been mastered, cautiously probing the unknown, unstudied, and not yet experienced by anyone to expand the combat, tactical and technical capabilities of the aircraft.

"Yes, specifically about this, about aerial refueling," thought Viktor Ignat'yevich, again beginning to hurry, unnoticed by himself. "I'll tell how once, in determining the zones of safe maneuvering at high altitude, I got into the wake of the tanker flying ahead and the bomber was hurled several hundred meters toward the ground. Or how I practiced refueling at low altitude."

But in the kaleidoscope of the past one flight stood out more and more clearly: The clouds below seemed to be hummocked with locks of snowy manes, although the aircraft was not flying above the Arctic, where they had been a few hours ago, but above the Urals. Somewhere in this area the tanker was supposed to come together with the other aircraft with the help of the command post.

The silhouette of the tanker loomed ahead, ploughing the fields of the sky with a snow-white furrow. He increased speed and the tanker gradually and smoothly began to increase in size. Now it took up a portion of the cockpit windshield, now almost half of it, and it finally grew before his eyes, with rivets on the fuselage and wings gleaming in the sun.

There was the customary sequence of commands and actions and the customary composure and precision of movements. Now the filling hose with the little chute on the end would appear from the tanker's right surface. After gulping the stream of air, its cupola seemed to harden in its porcelain whiteness...

"Commander, the stabilizing chute is damaged. The hose is 'wandering.' What will we do?" There was more surprise than alarm in the voice of the assistant aircraft commander, although it was not difficult to understand what this half-open cupola with torn shrouds, incapable of keeping the hose from swinging and whipping, might mean for them.

"Commander, the weather has worsened at the alternate airfield. There isn't enough fuel to our own," reported the navigator, anticipating the question.

"Well then, let's try to tame the 'wandering' hose. Crew, attention!"

A precise maneuver without haste. The aircraft's left wing closed with the hose slowly as if apprehensively, and hovered over it. Now, by cautiously descending, cover it and lightly press it with the surface as if pressing it with a palm. Then drop back a bit to the right, trying to insert the hose in the holding device, all the while "just a bit, easy, barely," as if on tiptoe, holding the breath... If the maneuver succeeded they had to freeze for tens of long seconds like hours and wait until the hose was stretched and the fire unit commander would give the long-awaited command: "Contact."

"The hose is jumping beneath the surface and isn't entering the holding device," reported the fire unit commander--all this was visible from his place in the tail section of the aircraft. But this could be understood even without a report: The hands on the controls felt the blows against the aileron. In an instant the hose slipped from under the wing and began going up and down. The small white cupola shuddered on the surviving shrouds like a crushed flower, and then it was torn away entirely.

"Let's try again." Even now, many years later, Viktor Ignat'yevich remembers how he uttered this phrase, cutting short unnecessary conversation and doubts. He even remembers the tone of voice--quiet and authoritative. He always kept this intonation when something unforeseen occurred in the air and the crew had to be mobilized. At such moments everything in him was watchful and frozen. But his brain would begin to figure, remember and analyze with astounding speed and clarity. His vision, hearing, feeling of his hands on the controls, every cell of his body and all his feelings strangely grew more acute as if something had been renewed in him and he grew younger in a simultaneous unfettering and tension. It was like the inspiration of combat. Later it would be forgotten, what would remain was the fatigue bowing the shoulders, the helmet liner and coveralls wet from sweat, and the sharpened features of a face grown thinner.

They tried to dock another five times. His eyes were filled with sweat. He didn't notice what they were using to wipe his face, with a handkerchief or helmet liner. He remembered only the sensation of something soft sliding over his forehead and brows and the rather bitter taste of rubber in the mouth although pure oxygen was entering the mask.

Now it was as if from aside that he was seeing the very cold blue of the sky, the two aircraft in it, finally joined by the umbilical cord of hose, the wing of the tanker next to his wing glassy in the fierce gleam, and the nervous needle of the fuel gauge...

But telling about this was the very same as trying to pass on music in words or paint a picture with colorless paints. And he would have to choose familiar, everyday words. They would become so helpless and faded when you tried to express the feeling of the flight. It was in the thirties that young boys flaunted flying terminology and every word for them was like a call to arms. Now these words were lost in hundreds of new words and concepts, while those remaining in use had lost that surprising resonance which made the chest ache with proud joy and excited the imagination, giving birth endlessly to a marvelous feeling of the romance of flying. Youth... Self-confident and trusting, unskilled and daring. How carefully and wisely one must nourish its soul and what important words had to be said...

It was as if the houses with frosted-over windows were following him. There was something surprisingly familiar in the solid and delicate incrustation of frost and in these blind window panes. He even sensed the cold of the snow on the tips of his fingers and the burning stream of icy air. But at first there was the fall--seconds of doom and struggle; the nose of the heavy, reared-back missile-armed aircraft pointed unnaturally to the sky, the impotent controls and calculatingly synchronized but helpless movements.

"On approaching the given regime the aircraft arbitrarily went beyond the limiting angles of attack, lost speed and..." Later, analyzing what had happened in official papers and in conversations with friends, and thinking everything over with that scrupulous accuracy of which only the experienced, composed pilot is capable, he tried to understand whether or not it had been possible to avoid this stall into a spin. Setting aside the feelings, emotions and everything personal that might interfere with his being objective, he sought the mistake in his actions with the memory of sensations and movements, and visually, and didn't find it: When the tests of a new aircraft are being conducted at the limit of theoretical tolerances, experience can introduce its own corrections. It was not by chance that it had been decided to reduce the crew on this flight to the minimum...

The altimeter needle seemed to gobble up hundreds of meters of altitude. In the second turn of the spin the long nose climbed upward even more vigorously and now the aircraft again was stalling onto the wing... The overload grew. He seemed to feel in his shoulders, his back and his entire body how the fuselage and surfaces were straining with terrible effort.

"Yura, get ready," he warned the radio operator. "Go!" There was the seemingly quiet shot of the catapult and a strange relief: Now he was in the aircraft alone.

Below as if covered with fog the glass of the cockpit was misting over and the forest, river and ribbon of road were turning around. Remotely, as if not about himself, he thought: "It's early for me to jump." The aircraft was being hit by shuddering and everything in it moaned and resisted. He was trying to break its path carefully. With a sense matured from experience he understood and foresaw that it had to give up, only patience was necessary. He couldn't "rip" the controls toward himself otherwise the aircraft would break up, not withstanding the overload; it was only made of metal...

The fog outside the cockpit window became impenetrably dense. The ground disappeared and only the altimeter needle impassionately registered 800 m, 600... The aircraft went into horizontal flight at 500 m. The instrument needles calmly froze and the engines droned customarily in a toil-worn bass, taking the aircraft to the airfield.

He tore the oxygen mask from his face and extended his hand to the cockpit glass--his fingers poked into a grayish, cold frost: There was too sharp a change in temperature high up and at the ground in the depressurized cockpit. For an instant he felt himself to be bricked up solidly, forever. This feeling of blindness was unexpected and terrible...

"Viktor Ignat'yevich, the predraft-age youths are in the large hall," said the military instructor standing on the threshold of the officers' club. They took off their coats and went into the room, which was humming with voices. The military instructor raised his hand:

"Quiet, comrades. Before you is HSU, Honored Test Pilot Kuznetsov. He will tell you..."

"What should I tell you, boys," thought Viktor Ignat'yevich. "How I landed the aircraft using the small side direct-vision window intended for communicating with a ground crew? But all this is something specific. It is only an episode... Everyone in life has his take-offs and landings, his test flights, his spins. A person matures only in difficult things. But have you seen much that is difficult, boys? How can we teach you to live in the highest phase of your abilities, at the limit of what you can do and a bit more? Herein lies the meaning and the happiness. Otherwise life becomes empty and meaningless."

Faces, faces--ruddy and swarthy, with the fluff of a moustache beginning to show or long ago accustomed to shaving, serious or derisive... And he was standing before them in the armor of his knowledge and experience, and happiness for them, who had everything ahead, made his heart ache in pain.

"I would like to have your ages, boys. I would like to repeat everything again, go through all difficulties and through mortal risk..." He almost said this aloud, but merely caught his breath and licked his dried-out lips.

Sensing that the pause was dragging on, he looked into the eyes of youth, still shining in purity, still not dulled with everyday concerns, still capable of burning with passion for life. But there was not yet in them curiosity or admiration. One perceived only expectation in them for now...

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ARMED FORCES

HISTORY OF PEOPLE'S FRIENDSHIP IN USSR MILITARY DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 24, Dec 82 (signed to press 29 Nov 82) pp 2-4

[Article by Army Gen A. A. Yepishev, chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The People and the Army Are One"; passages rendered all in capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] Our entire multinational people and all progressive mankind are solemnly noting a significant date--the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is with a feeling of pride that we examine the difficult and glorious path which has been covered during these six decades. We look to the future with confidence.

During all these years, the people's glorious Armed Forces have been going through tests, struggling, winning, and becoming stronger together with them.

From the very first days of the creation of the Republic of Soviets, the severe necessity arose to protect it from the numerous enemies who did not want to accept the fact that the Red Banner of victory flutters over one-sixth of the world.

The great goals of building socialism and communism and defending the new social system from imperialist encroachments are common for the people and their Armed Forces. Hence the inexhaustible love which the people nourish for their army, and hence the readiness of the workers to render comprehensive support to them. The close tie with the popular masses and the profound understanding of the significance of the defense of the socialist motherland made for the unprecedented strength and steadfastness of the Soviet Army and the mass heroism of its men.

One of the most important features of our army is that it is an army of the brotherhood and friendship of peoples and represents a single combat union of all the nationalities of our socialist state.

V. I. Lenin saw the very foundation of military organizational development in the daily and undivided leadership of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party and its Central Committee. The party mobilizes the workers' energy and directs it toward the accomplishment of the grandiose tasks of peaceful socialist construction as well as toward the armed defense of the country against imperialist aggression. Thanks to the concerns of the Communist Party, the complete unity of front and rear and the army and the people and the transformation of the country into a single military camp were accomplished in the period of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. The entire life of the state, the people, and the army was subordinate to the interests of ensuring victory.

That difficult time is especially memorable to us, people of the older generation. The severe and important mission to be personally involved in the defense of the country and in the accomplishment of the party's instructions on the organization of a crushing rebuff for the Hitlerite aggressors befell our lot.

When the Great Patriotic War began, I had the occasion to be the first secretary of the Khar'kov party obkom. I well remember the great national patriotic enthusiasm.

The doors of the party obkom were not closed during those grim days and nights. Not only did communists go--also to go were gray-haired veterans of the revolution who had been dropped from military accountability and teenagers who were barely 14 or 15 years of age. "Give us weapons! Let's go to the front!" they requested. The war which suddenly broke out required so much initiative, sagacity, energy, and endurance of the communist-leaders! Even today, I remember all of them by name....

The tremendous arc of the fronts blazed days and nights from the Barents to the Black Sea. And all the peoples of our country fought the enemy everywhere, on each of its sectors, shoulder to shoulder sparing neither blood nor life itself. In the constellation of more than 11,000 Heroes of the Soviet Union who received this highest distinction for valor and steadfastness of spirit we see representatives of almost all the nations and nationalities of our motherland.

Each person experiences deep emotion each time when, in solemn silence, he approaches the grave of the Unknown Soldier, the eternal flame of our popular memory....

The Soviet people paid a dear price--20 million lives--for the right to live freely and happily. To liberate the peoples of Europe from the brown plague of fascism.

I had the occasion to greet 9 May in Prague. The 38th Army together with other armies had carried the illustrious banners to victory.

I remember even now the rejoicing of the people and their shining faces. Even then one thought: "These are our friends. They are travelling the same straight road with us. A difficult but most correct road."

And today, the peoples of the countries of socialism are moving with our country in a single, fraternal alliance. No one can shake this great unity of like-minded people and friends for we are joined together by the blood which has been spilled, fraternal friendship, and common ideas and goals.

I recently had the occasion to visit the hero city of Volgograd. A tank with the tank number 18 and the sign: "Chelyabinsk kolkhoz farmer" has been placed on the Mamayev burial mound forever. This tank was part of the column which the kolkhoz farmers of the Southern Urals built with their labor savings. This tank is only a particle of the great national contribution to our victory. During the war years, the kolkhoz farmers of the Tambov region contributed 40 million rubles for the building of the tank column "Tambov kolkhoz farmer." There were also the tank columns: "Moscow kolkhoz farmer," "Khabarovsk Komsomolets" [Komsomol member], "Soviet Uzbekistan," "Georgian kolkhoz farmer," "Sverdlovsk kolkhoz farmer," "Donets Cossack," "Taganrogite," "For Soviet Estonia...."

Soviet pilots fought valiantly in the fiery sky in airplanes of the squadrons named "Latvian Marksman," "Saratov kolkhoz farmer," and others. In the Barents Sea, seamen of the submarines "Yaroslavl' Komsomolets," "Chelyabinsk Komsomolets," "Novosibirsk Komsomolets," and "Lenin Komsomolets" sank enemy ships.

Today, in the 1980's, ships traditionally named the same as their predecessors of the times of the Great Patriotic War are serving in our Navy's combat formation. Of course, in their technical equipping and combat capabilities they are basically new ships which meet the requirements of contemporary times. The sons and grandsons of veterans of the Great Patriotic War are serving on them. And it should be said, they are serving excellently.

Altogether, during the years of the Great Patriotic War more than 2,500 combat aircraft, thousands of tanks and guns, and dozens of boats and submarines were constructed and turned over to the Soviet servicemen from the voluntary contributions of the workers.

We are living in a difficult, tense time. Military conflicts are breaking out constantly in almost all parts of the world through the fault of the imperialists.

As the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov, said at the November plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: Imperialism's aggressive intrigues force us, together with the fraternal socialist states, to be concerned, and to be seriously concerned, about maintaining the defensive capability at the proper level. The Soviet people have outfitted their Armed Forces with the most improved military equipment and weapons which correspond to the nuclear missile age. The men and peoples of the socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Pact are standing with us shoulder to shoulder. The support and solidarity of millions of the world's progressive people are with us.

The Soviet servicemen--the sons of a great people--are strong with their ideological conviction and devotion, deep consciousness of the unity of their personal interests with the interests of the collective and of the entire people as a whole, excellent knowledge of contemporary weapons and equipment, and the readiness to step forth for the defense of the Soviet Union and the interests of the socialist countries at any moment.

The Soviet servicemen are patriots and internationalists who are ready to overcome any difficulties.

There are many examples of this. Soviet internationalists fought in the ranks of the Republicans in Spain. In 1939, at the Khalkin-Gol River units of the Red Army came to the aid of the fraternal people of Mongolia and helped to defend the independence of the republic against the encroachments of the Japanese aggressors.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War, the men of the Soviet Armed Forces freed the countries of Europe and Asia, in which hundreds of millions of people resided, from the yoke of fascism....

Our army is a large, harmonious international family. Representatives of 15-20 nationalities and peoples often serve in one regiment or on one ship, serve with the

complete output of strength, and are growing spiritually and politically. They are ready to accomplish their military duty to the motherland in any situation.

I recall the article in the press by Private First Class A. Sadykov which, in my opinion, expressed very precisely the feelings and attitudes of many thousands of soldiers of the non-Russian nationalities who are serving alongside other such lads--representatives of many nations and nationalities of our country. Said Sadykov: "I NOW HAVE TWO HOMES AND TWO FAMILIES. ONE IS IN DISTANT UZBEKISTAN, IN THE VILLAGE OF SAYRAM, WHERE MY PARENTS, BROTHERS, AND SISTERS LIVE. THE OTHER FAMILY IS THE SOLDIER FAMILY, FAR EASTERN. IN THIS FAMILY ARE KIRKHIZITES AND TATARITES, ESTONIANS AND RUSSIANS, KAZAKHS AND TURKMENIANS. THERE IS MUCH IN COMMON IN THESE FAMILIES. LOYALTY, FRIENDSHIP, AND LOVE FOR THE MOTHERLAND ARE GENUINELY TREASURED IN BOTH.

Remarkable words! And if you consider, in addition, that Private First Class A. Sadykov grew up in the family of Hero of the Soviet Union Batabay Sadykov, that today he is the heir to the soldierly glory of his hero-father, then it becomes clear what remarkable people are now serving in the ranks of our Armed Forces and what remarkable sons the people are sending to the army.

Service in the ranks of the Armed Forces has rightly begun to be considered as a genuine school of real life, a school of military and civilian tempering. Here is a letter from now Sergeant (Reserve) G. Babayan which he sent from sunny Armenia to his commanders and young soldiers.

"DEAR COMRADES! OF COURSE, YOU REMEMBER ME. NOT SO LONG AGO, I SERVED IN YOUR UNIT, IN THE 1ST BATTALION. HERE I BECAME AN EXCELLENT SOLDIER AND FIRST-CLASS SPECIALIST. HERE I GOT TO KNOW THE VALUE OF FRIENDSHIP AND MILITARY BROTHERHOOD. IN THE ARMY I BECAME A CANDIDATE MEMBER OF THE CPSU. WHEN I WAS RELEASED TO THE RESERVE THE BATTALION COMMUNISTS, MAJOR TUCHKOV AND MAJOR KOVALEV, AND THE KOMSOMOL ORGANIZATION GAVE ME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JOINING THE CPSU. AND SO I BECAME A MEMBER OF THE LENINIST PARTY. I FULFILLED MY DREAM. I ALWAYS REMEMBER YOU AND EVERYTHING GOOD AND NECESSARY WHICH YOU DID FOR ME. YOUR LESSONS ARE HELPING ME NOW IN WORK. AND I WILL GO ON WORKING AS YOU TAUGHT ME IN THE ARMY, AS THE TITLE OF COMMUNIST REQUIRES OF ME."

Yes, our people rightly call their army a school for life, a school for the moral and political indoctrination of the youth. As nothing else, the Soviet Army is linked by vital bonds and inseverable ties with the people and with the life of the country.

As competent citizens of their great country, the Soviet servicemen are participating actively in the life of the people and in their political, social, and economic affairs. More than 13,000 servicemen are deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Supreme Soviets of union and autonomous republics, and local Soviets of People's Deputies. Thousands of Army and Navy communists and Komsomols have been elected to local party and Komsomol organs.

The political organs of the Armed Forces regularly maintain close ties with local party committees, public organizations, enterprises, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes and take an active part in the conduct of mass defense work among the population and

and in instilling in the youth and all Soviet people a love for the Armed Forces and a readiness for the defense of the socialist motherland.

Not one decree of the party and the government, not one important national-economic matter gets by without the active participation and assistance of the servicemen.

The virgin land.... Thousands of former servicemen developed it together with the entire people. "I WAS CONVINCED MANY TIMES IN MY LIFE," wrote L. I. Brezhnev in the book "Tselina" [Virgin Land], "THAT REAL HEROES IN A REGULAR SITUATION, AS A RULE, ARE MODEST AND NOT VERY NOTICEABLE. THEY DO THEIR WORK SIMPLY AND RELIABLY. SUCH A PERSON WAS DANIIL NESTERENKO, A TRACTOR DRIVER OF THE "DAL'NIY" SOVKHOZ IN TSELINOGRAD OBLAST....

"THE SIMPLE ZHANYSPAYKA STREAM, IN THE WORDS OF THE OLD-TIMERS, THREATENED TO OVERFLOW SWIFTLY AND WIDELY. WHILE THERE WAS STILL ICE ON IT, IT WAS NECESSARY TO CROSS THE TRACTORS AT ONCE. NESTERENKO HELPED HIS COMRADES TO CONDUCT THIS RISKY OPERATION AND WAS THE LAST TO MOVE HIS TRACTOR. BUT THE MELTING ICE, ALREADY COVERED WITH WATER, DID NOT WITHSTAND IT....

"WHEN HIS FRIENDS TOOK THE VICTIM FROM THE WATER, THE CERTIFICATE OF HERO OF THE SOVIET UNION WAS DISCOVERED IN HIS POCKET."

For selfless labor in the virgin lands, former tankman Vasiliy Burygin was awarded the Order of Lenin and two orders of the "Badge of Honor." Former servicemen S. Dement'yev, P. Karasev, V. Ustyuzhanin, and I. Petukhov also work with him today.

Since 1945, the "Kantemirovets" sovkhov created by former tankmen has been providing the country with grain in Chkalovskiy rayon, Kokchetav oblast. Today, too, it is being replenished with yesterday's soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers. In the Kazakh steppes are the "Tamanets," "Tikhookeanskiy" [Pacific], "Krasnogvardeyskiy" [Red Guard], "Krasnoflotskiy" [Red Fleet], "Tolbukhinskiy" [Tolbukhin], "Pogranichnik" [Border Guard] and many other sovkhoves.

In connection with the decision of the May plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "On the USSR food program for the period out to 1990 and measures for its realization," many servicemen who have been released to the reserve expressed the desire to work in agriculture. The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy ardently supports the initiative of these patriots and expresses the firm confidence that those servicemen of yesterday who have come to work in agriculture as well as those who are still in the combat formation today will express their weighty utterance in strengthening the economic might of our motherland and in the further rise of its agriculture.

The men of the Armed Forces are also participating actively in the national battle for the harvest. Sent directly from the fields of soldierly training to the gathering of the harvest, they understand this honorable task as the motherland's order to be where needed, where it is difficult, and where discipline and army grasp are needed.

We cannot fail to say a good word about our military railroad men whose contribution to the building of the Baykal-Amur Mainline Railway is so ponderable and visible.

On the Eastern section of the main line they have already laid hundreds of kilometers of track and built more than 250 large and small bridges. The steel road runs across Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast.

The party and the Soviet people value highly the labor of their sons who are participants in the construction project of the century. Many military railroad men have been awarded the medal "For Construction of the Baykal-Amur Mainline Railway" and orders, and Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel S. Pal'chuk has been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

The main and permanent mission of the Soviet Armed Forces was and remains the defense of the socialist motherland. The slogan of the men of the Armed Forces is the former one which does not grow old: "Everything created by the people should be reliably protected!"

I should like to note that the Komsomol youth, and namely it, comprises the basis of the military collectives in the units and on the ships, is the leader of many initiatives and undertakings, and provides an example in the development and skillful mastery of combat equipment and weapons. Thanks to the purposeful work of commanders and political officers and Armed Forces party and Komsomol organizations, there are many excellent units and ships in our Armed Forces today.

It is not for nothing that communists are called people of a particular stamp. When they pronounce these words, they have in mind their ideological conviction and devotion to the cause of communism and Marxist-Leninist ideals.

The communists cement the ranks of the men of the Armed Forces. They subordinate each of their practical steps to the tasks of strengthening combat readiness. The army communists step forth as the initiators of patriotic undertakings and of all good deeds in the units and on the ships.

It is not easy to attain high results in the accomplishment of the tasks of contemporary combat training; it is not easy to be first. Now the troops are saturated with contemporary combat equipment and weapons, the nature and methods for the conduct of battle have changed, combat training has become more intense, and the requirements for the quality of performing combat alert duty have increased. The significance of organization, performance, and military discipline as a whole has increased many-fold. And if we consider the compressed times for the mastery of a military specialty, the high requirements imposed today on the spiritual and physical qualities of the men are completely obvious. Also clear in this connection is our interest in the store of knowledge and abilities with which the youths come to the army and how well prepared they are for the difficulties of military service.

And here we give their due to the our Komsomol, the Komsomol Central Committee, the labor of the DOSAAF organizations, and the All-Union Pioneer Organization for their ponderable contribution to the indoctrination of the motherland's future defenders. Our men, of course, are ardently interested in their active work.

Our main concern is constant combat readiness. All our strength and all our intelligence are give to it. The people outfitted their Armed Forces with the latest, most improved weapons and equipment which, in the strong and capable hands of

masters of military affairs, are a reliable means for restraining the militaristic daring of any aggressor,

But there is one more category of combat readiness which we never separated from the combat readiness of our weapons. It is moral and political readiness. For it is namely it which is the fundamental principle in the accomplishment of all the difficult missions facing our Armed Forces.

Here, too, in the maintenance of the high heat of the moral-political and combat training of each man in particular and of the Armed Forces as a whole, a tremendous role is played by commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol activists. They should constantly accumulate in people a high charge of combat vitality, boldness, and a readiness for decisive and skillful actions.

Combat readiness, political maturity, and a constant high state of discipline--these are the three tasks on which the communists of the Armed Forces are working and will work indefatigably.

Competition has received an unprecedentedly broad scope in the districts and fleets in honor of a glorious jubilee--the 60th anniversary of the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In accordance with a good tradition, the men are greeting their national holiday with new successes in combat and political training.

Let our people work calmly and confidently. Their Armed Forces are guarding the interests of the country and of the entire socialist commonwealth vigilantly and reliably.

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ARMED FORCES

ARMY GEN PETROV EXAMINES COMPONENTS OF COMBAT READINESS

Moscow SOVETSKIY VOIN in Russian No 5, Mar 83 (signed to press 15 Feb 83)
pp 1-3

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen V. Petrov, commander-in chief of the Ground Forces and USSR deputy minister of defense: "Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Combat readiness.... What does this concept include? What are its political and moral-ethical aspects? How should each soldier understand his specific role in carrying out the task of great state importance, the task of constantly raising the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces? Our correspondent asked Army Gen Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov to talk about this.

The defense of the state interests of the USSR and the securing of communist construction and the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people are considered as the most important function of the socialist state and its Armed Forces. The USSR Constitution states: "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to securely protect the socialist fatherland and to be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

These words legislatively define the essence of military duty and the great responsibility of the Army and Navy personnel both to the people and to their own conscience. Both the new recruit and the veteran know these words well and take them to heart. Constant combat readiness has been and remains the crucial factor restraining the enemies of peace from military provocations, adventures and the unleashing of a new war.

In taking the military oath, a young soldier, in coming under the glory-wreathed colors, as it were concretizes the concept of duty in his personal conduct and deeds, that is, to conscientiously study military affairs and be an honest, brave, disciplined, physically strong and vigilant soldier. All of this is essential for him ultimately in order to be ready upon the first command to come with weapons in hand to the defense of his motherland, the USSR, and to protect it courageously and skillfully, with dignity and honor, sparing neither his blood nor life itself until complete victory over the enemies.

The greatest possible rise in troop combat readiness has been caused by the increased aggressiveness of the most reactionary imperialist forces which are

implementing practical measures to raise nuclear and military potential, to build military bases and launching positions for new missiles, to equip staging areas for the deployment of invasion forces and to strengthen the material and moral preparations for unleashing a war. For this purpose, the United States is developing space attack systems, neutron and laser weapons and is stockpiling chemical and biological means of mass destruction. The U.S. military-political leadership is elaborating plans for a so-called first pre-emptive nuclear strike against the USSR and the other socialist nations. It systematically holds major exercises involving strategic offensive forces, the scrambling of a large number of combat aircraft carrying nuclear weapons, the readying of missiles for launching against real installations on Soviet territory and the sending of missile-carrying nuclear subs and ships of the carrier fleet into the ocean and sea waters close to USSR frontiers.

For precisely these reasons, high vigilance and constant combat readiness are an objective necessity. "...It would be a major error to ignore the fact that the imperialist nations presently possess enormous economic and military potential as well as powerful, well-trained and equipped armed forces," emphasized the member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov. "The threat of war, the threat of aggression from their side is a harsh reality of our times. This demands from us doubled, trebled vigilance and constant daily work in strengthening national defense and raising the combat might and readiness of our Armed Forces."

Due to the continuous growth of the socialist economy, the enormous achievements of Soviet science and technology and to the unstinting labor of the Soviet people, the Army and Navy personnel are equipped with the most modern weapons and military equipment. We have something to defend, someone to defend and something to defend with. The Soviet Armed Forces are securely guarding peace and socialism. In a combat alliance with the armies of the fraternal Warsaw Pact nations, they are capable of carrying out any tasks and checking any aggressor. However, our doctrine is of a strictly defensive nature and is aimed at defending the creative labor of the Soviet people. This is its inescapable moral superiority over the military doctrines of the imperialist states which reflect the policy of seizing foreign territories and suppressing the peoples.

Combat readiness is an all-encompassing category which includes the high moral-combat qualities of all the personnel, their training, discipline and physical tempering; the equipping of the troops with modern weapons and military equipment, the maintaining of these in proper working order and the ability to effectively utilize them on the battlefield; a high level of training among officer personnel; teamwork among the control and command bodies; the proper manning of the formations and units and a sufficient reserve of specialists; the necessary availability of stockpiled material supplies; the capacity of the troops to rapidly commence successful combat operations.

It is essential to point out that each element which is a component of combat readiness is important in its own way, but all these elements are closely interrelated and represent a single complex where there should be no weak link and no unaccounted for detail. At the same time, it is essential to emphasize

that the chief element in the aggregate of factors comprising combat readiness is the personnel who have mastered the military equipment and weapons and who conscientiously carry out their military duty. They ultimately determine the level of combat capability and readiness in the troops, for all the plans and ideas of the command are realized through the troops' knowledge of military affairs, their skill, initiative, intrepidity, endurance, steadfastness and will to victory. Combat experience shows that troops which are well trained and have high morale have won victories over numerically superior enemy forces.

In the Ground Forces, high combat readiness is achieved by steady, daily work, by the intense training of all the personnel, by the constant improving of the activities of the staffs, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations, and by effective party political work in the area of ideological indoctrination of the troops and raising their combat, moral-political and psychological qualities. It is precisely by the proper coordinating of training and indoctrination that one observes the principle of a close unity between training and indoctrination and one realizes in practice the firm rule of: in training, indoctrinate and in indoctrinating, train. In the aim of maintaining constant high combat readiness in the units and formations of all branches of troops, within the maximum shortest time the following are carried out: basic training and indoctrination of the young soldiers, their shaping up, the development of combat teamwork among the crews, squads and subunits, the mastery of the equipment and weapons and the study of related specialties. The method of such combat training leads to a situation where in the course of it the individual military specialists are formed and at the same time battleworthy subunits are developed. The flawless training of each soldier ensures accuracy, speed and preciseness in their performance of individual duties and coordinated actions as part of a squad, crew, team or subunit. It is particularly important to achieve complete interchangeability and the greatest possible mutual aid and assistance as this has a direct impact on raising troop combat readiness.

During the Great Patriotic War we, the commanders, instilled in ourselves and our subordinates high combat activeness which ensured continuity of troop operations during the day and at night. We feel that under the conditions of modern warfare, if the aggressors initiate this, victory on the battlefield to a significant degree will be determined by a powerful, uncheckable offensive drive as the embodiment of the will for victory, the constant search for the enemy, the desire to quickly close in on him, and to anticipate the enemy in deploying the battle formations and making the fire strikes.

How can we indoctrinate it, this activeness, in peacetime? The primary condition for success is a modern training method aimed at the high quality execution of exercises and drills, at the quickest mastery of the military equipment and weapons, at ensuring precise cooperation between all the subunits as well as at the moral-psychological conditioning of the personnel.

In one of the tactical exercises, the tank battalion under the command of Capt S. Bakhmet distinguished itself. He was able in an organized manner to bring the companies to the forward edge and under the cover of artillery fire and together with the motorized rifle subunits to rapidly attack the "enemy" strongpoints. The successful maneuver by the left-flank company provided an

opportunity to quickly reach the area of the artillery firing positions and create a threat from the rear. The "enemy" subunit did not withstand the pressure and began to pull back. In the course of this combat one constantly felt the firm guiding hand of the commander, his boldness and tactical maturity.

A further study of the experience of the battalion commander showed that success was brought about by the broad utilization of progressive methods. In all the previous exercises and drills, upon the demand of the battalion commander and with his aid, all the subunit commanders carefully worked through the questions of maintaining continuous observation and reconnaissance, quick decision-taking and the organization of combat, dependable fire neutralization of the enemy, the maintaining of close cooperation, bold maneuvering for enveloping operations and so forth.

A most important indicator of troop combat readiness is the quality state of the weapons and military equipment. In order to maintain the equipment and weapons in constant proper order and in readiness for combat, the troops and subunits organize technically efficient operations, they promptly eliminate malfunctions and perform precise seasonal maintenance, tuning and testing as well as high-quality repairs and adjustments. Experienced commanders establish the firm rule that not only during fleet maintenance days, but also under daily conditions of permanent billeting, in exercises, at training centers and on the march all the equipment should be promptly maintained.

At present, weapons and military equipment are constantly being developed and improved while the amount of knowledge needed by the personnel is growing proportionately to their greater complexity. Due to this the technical knowledge of all categories of the personnel has been turned into one of the main indicators for troop combat capability and readiness. Certainly the equipment can be controlled only by personnel who have a good knowledge of the equipment and capabilities and who have mastered the practical skills of its use. A truly combat ready person is the one who can instantaneously put the weapons into use, who has brought his actions of controlling the instruments, missile units, weapons, tanks and radios up to the point of being automatic and who is capable of fully utilizing their technical capabilities. For this reason, all forms of indoctrination and training should instill in the men a love for the weapons and equipment as well as create conditions for raising the level of knowledge and practical skills.

For example, let us take the subunits which are under the command of Lt Col A. Ivanov and Majors N. Sverdila and A. Khoroshev. What is characteristic of them? Primarily, a sound knowledge of the equipment and weapons on the part of the personnel and their able employment. As a result, in the course of the conducted exercises the subunits made effective fire at maximum ranges and the targets were hit with the first round and the first launch. A majority of the drivers were able to skillfully cross difficult obstacles both during the day and under the conditions of limited visibility. This was the result of the correct organizing of the technical training of the men and the painstaking labor by the commanders.

This year, in the leading subunits a good initiative has arisen: "For the New Military Equipment, a Higher Level of Its Mastery." In order to reduce the

time spent on the technical training of the young soldiers and specialists, to more thoroughly master the material, to more quickly acquire skills and to ensure a great savings of resources, in the training practices it is essential to widely introduce trainers, monitoring equipment and other technical devices and programmed training methods. This leads to the rational expenditure of training time and to the intensification of exercises in the area of technical training. It is also important that in the course of field training, no exercise on any level be conducted without a detailed elaboration of the tasks related to the complete technical support for the troops and the servicing of equipment.

In increasing troop combat readiness, a decisive role is played by the officer personnel, that is, the commanders, the political, engineer and technical cadres. The resolving of all questions related to the maintaining of the subunits, units, formations and staffs in constant combat readiness depends upon their organizational abilities, initiative, exactingness, preparedness, industriousness and military skill.

In the aim of maintaining constant troop combat readiness, the commanders, in relying on the staffs and the political bodies and on the party and Komsomol organizations in the subunits and units, in their daily work focus their efforts on ensuring a rapid transition of the units and formations from peacetime training to combat status. Here they endeavor to bring out all the reserves of time and seek out the best methods and procedures in order not to allow even the slightest delay and to act with maximum precision and calmness and with a minimum expenditure of time on taking decisions, on passing on signals and commands, on issuing orders and instructions and on preparing the equipment for the march or bringing it into combat readiness and for the organized reaching of the designated areas. They see to it that each of these troop actions embody precise and real calculations, establish norms and the maximum limited times in hours and minutes, both under peacetime conditions and in wartime.

The responsible status of the commanders and the complexity of the tasks carried out to increase troop combat readiness oblige them to constantly and systematically improve their military, political and technical knowledge, to master the new combat training procedures and to constantly upgrade their skills and ability in firm control of the troops and means of combat under the most difficult conditions. Whatever position is held by a commander, success in his work in the area of strengthening combat readiness is achieved primarily by a profound knowledge of the nature and character of modern combined-arms combat, the combat capabilities of his own and the enemy troops, and by the ability to employ and utilize the diverse methods and procedures which can be applied in the event of combat operations.

The combat readiness of a unit is formed from the combat readiness of the subunits, crews, teams and individual men. For this reason, each soldier, warrant officer ["praporshchik"] and officer should assess all his deeds and actions through the prism of their impact on the combat readiness of the entire troop collective. This is an objective necessity which requires iron military discipline in everything: from exemplary appearance and smartness of the serviceman to his highest efficiency in standing alert duty and actions in combat; from a healthy moral climate in each troop collective to the flawless teamwork in

carrying out the common combat task. With good reason, discipline is termed the mother of victory.

As experience confirms, those subunits and units where strong military discipline and high organization have been established and where efficiency has been brought up to the highest limit are a powerful and well-coordinated combat organism united by a common will and capable, in disdaining any difficulties, of achieving victory even over superior enemy forces. For this reason, troop wisdom states: "The strength of a soldier is doubled by discipline."

At present, with the high level of equipping the troops with diverse collectively utilized equipment, the role of discipline and primarily responsibility for the assigned job has increased by many-fold. Collective weapons and the rapid movement of the units on the battlefield demand from each soldier, team, crew or subunit an exceptional preciseness, synchronized actions, a constant readiness to immediately carry out commands, signals and orders and the strictest observance of the equipment maintenance rules. Certainly a mistake by just one soldier caused by negligence, inattentiveness or irresponsibility or even out of inability can cost the entire subunit or unit a great deal.

In order to indoctrinate the men in a spirit of discipline and efficiency, the commanders, the political bodies and staffs in the course of combat training and service should organize a precise pace of training, proper order, unswerving fulfillment of the requirements of the military oath and the orders of commanders and the constant maintaining of correct relationships between the men.

At the basis of combat readiness lie profound communist conviction, a high awareness by the men of their patriotic duty, their wholehearted loyalty to the motherland and fidelity to the Leninist party and Soviet people. The ideological tempering and political awareness of the personnel are the foundation of the combat and moral-psychological qualities and the main incentive force which gives the men valor, courage, steadfastness and leads them to a feat, to mass heroism for the sake of defending the Soviet fatherland. The high morale of the personnel greatly increases the moral-combat capabilities of the men, it multiplies the combat might of the troops and provides a definite qualitative superiority over the enemy. For this reason in the troops, all forms and methods of political indoctrination and training are directed by the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations at turning the knowledge of the men into their personal convictions, a conscientious attitude toward military duty, into a profound belief in the justness of our cause, and into high vigilance without which combat readiness is inconceivable. Here they endeavor to combine this knowledge with successes in combat training. With good reason, the men have chosen as the motto of the 1983 socialist competition the words: "To Raise Vigilance and To Firmly Ensure the Security of the Motherland!"

As a result of the daily efforts and creative labor by the commanders and political bodies, the units and formations of the Ground Forces have achieved high ideological loyalty and awareness, strong comradely unity, combat friendship and solidarity. Each subunit and unit is a strong monolith where all the

men act precisely, energetically, they help one another, and in difficult minutes do not lose their self-possession and tenacity. An atmosphere of professionalism, collectivism and creative zeal has been created by a strict life and by an active and energetic party influence on the men in the subunits. All of this is expressed in successful combat training and mastery of the equipment, in the increased number of outstanding men in military and political training and class specialists and in coordinated actions in field exercises, field firing and in vigilant service.

Guided and directed by the Leninist party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in all their thoughts desire peace and by everything available to them are defending peace in the world and are struggling to prevent a war. In conducting a titanic struggle to strengthen universal peace, the Communist Party and the Soviet government here show the greatest steadfastness, courage and unbending will.

The Soviet Armed forces are the most important guarantor of peace. Their primary and main patriotic and international task is to always be in constant readiness to check the aggressor and to defend the victories of the peoples in the socialist countries. The Soviet people can rest assured that the present generation of the defenders of the socialist motherland is the worthy heir and perpetuator of the combat traditions of the heroic generation which on the fields of previous engagements defended the honor and independence of the Soviet state and head-on defeated the aggressor. At present, under the unquiet conditions, the Soviet military are worthily carrying out their historic mission, in vigilantly standing the combat watch. They are making every effort to further raise the level of their combat readiness and to be a dependable guard for the creative labor of the Soviet people.

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ARMED FORCES

ROLE OF THE INTELLECT IN MILITARY AFFAIRS REVIEWED

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pp 26-27

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Prof, Lt Gen D. Volkogonov:
"Intellect"]

[Text] Ancient history has left us with the image of Minerva, the Goddess of Wisdom. The ancients depicted her in the form of a statuesque woman who arose from the head of Jupiter fully armed: on her head was a shield, in one hand a spear and in the other a sword. At the feet of the goddess is an owl, a sacred bird embodying the noiseless flight of thought. It, thought, according to the beliefs of those who lived in remote antiquity, always sailed over man and over history. It is very symbolic that in the mind of the ancients Minerva who was the embodiment of wisdom was armed. A true, great idea or thought should be able to affirm itself and defend itself. This was understood even at the very dawn of human civilization.

Over all times, wisdom and a clear mind have been valued exceptionally highly by people. Even Helvetius said that "there is nothing more worthy of respect in the world than a clear mind." As society developed, the role and importance of human mental abilities constantly grew. Persons strong in spirit and creative might were the pioneers of intellectual progress. At present, we cannot imagine human history without Democritus and Plato, Lomonosov and Newton, Shakespeare and Beethoven, Boethe and Pushkin.... Great minds and the giants of the spirit not merely made great "breakthroughs" into the area of the unknown and new, but also to an enormous degree made human culture richer, brighter and more unique. The founders of scientific socialism, K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin became true Prometheuses of reason. The flashes of their thought disclosed and illuminated the laws according to which society develops as well as the paths for freeing the workers from social injustice. In this titanic undertaking, the main implement for understanding the infinitely complex secrets of social life was their mind capable of the most profound scientific discoveries. Mental or intellectual activity (this actually expresses the same thing) of the great thinkers armed the proletariat with an ordered theory expressing its fundamental class interests. Once again, this confirms the indisputable truth that the mind or intellect is one of the greatest spiritual values of man. This value must not only be respected and protected, but also developed.

Intellect is a property of each normal man. It expresses his mental abilities. Without a developed intellect it is impossible for a harmonious personality to exist. "Human life," wrote K. Marx, "devoid of its intellectual aspect is reduced to the level of simple material strength." With all the uniqueness or inimitability of each intellect and the differences in the cognitive abilities in it, it is possible to see two basic aspects, the social and the cognitive.

The social aspect of an individual's intellect expresses its ideological or class nature. An optimistic, humanistic vision of the world and a revolutionizing attitude toward reality are most fully expressed among advanced, progressive classes with the aid of intellect. With good reason, V. I. Lenin emphasized that the proletariat is the "intellectual and moral engine" of progress. The true value of intellect is determined by its aims and by the ability to proceed from social interests and noble drives. In this light the minds of bourgeois scientists who serve social evil are like malevolent demons worthy only of hate and disdain. The misanthropic act of the Hiroshima tragedy, the invention of mobile gas chambers by Nazi scientists, the appearance of Taylor and Cohen, the American "fathers" of the hydrogen and neutron bombs, the testing of psychogenic agents on humans by CIA agents and statements by the American president on the "admissibility of nuclear war" are the "calling cards" of perverted intellects. In other words, the social value of an intellect is completely determined by the political nature of its activity.

The cognitive aspect of intellect expresses the power of human reason, the maturity of its reasoned thought and the capacity for creativity and foresight. This is equally important for the scientist and the worker, the marshal and the soldier. In the sphere of military affairs, this aspect of intellect presently is of particular significance. The new, increased demands on the mental qualities and abilities of people are processes related to scientific and technical progress. Completely proven out are the prophetic words of F. Engels who pointed out that "when the waves of the technical revolution are crashing around us...we need fresher, bolder heads." Modern war, if the aggressive forces succeed in starting it, like military activities in peacetime, to a significant degree is a competition of minds and a clash of the intellectual might of the staffs and all command personnel of the armies.

The maturity of intellect for an officer, sergeant, petty officer, soldier or sailor to an enormous degree depends upon their abilities. These are numerous: the ability to understand the new, the ability to creatively solve arising problems, the ability to use general scientific methods, for intuitive thinking and so forth.

V. I. Lenin, in noting the creative nature of the intellect, emphasized that "human cognition not only reflects the objective world, but also creates it...." Often the process of creativity is accompanied by an emotional state, by inspiration which is capable of causing a person's "enlightenment" leading, for example, a commander to an original decision, to a new approach, to an unusual step for the enemy or to a maneuver which is difficult to predict for the opponent. A creative intellect is capable of utilizing favorable chances and neutralizing the consequences of unfavorable ones.

In addition to these common abilities, inherent to the intellect of the Soviet soldier are also certain others the intensive development of which is brought about by the specific features of military activity. In a combat situation and sometimes in peacetime a soldier encounters acutely difficult situations which require broad and, I would say, courageous thinking and great decisiveness. Flexible thinking based on firm moral and political convictions, scientific knowledge and training of the mind strengthens the moral forces of a soldier and constantly directs him toward creative search. Conversely, a conservative or dogmatic bent can rapidly be paralyzed by the severe moral-psychological stresses of modern warfare. Such an intellect, having encountered a serious obstacle, places all its hopes on ready-made, pat decisions.

This notion is confirmed by the long history of wars. With other conditions being relatively equal, campaigns and engagements have been lost by military leaders who think dogmatically. Conversely, the creative intellectual power of the famous Soviet military leaders such as Zhukov, Konev, Rokossovskiy, Vasilevskiy and many others has gained the upper hand in the struggle of minds and will and demonstrated a disdain for routine and rote, inertness and facility of thought.

Among the most specific traits in the intellect of a serviceman (and particularly a professional one) one could put the following.

As in no other sphere, intellect manifests itself fully in relying on will. Knowledge makes it possible for a person to be competent while feelings make him noble. But will provides an opportunity for convictions, intentions and intellectual ideas to be turned into a deed, action or conduct. Will is like the "muscles" of the mind, it is the motive force of the intellect. Each soldier is strong to the degree that he can overcome his own weaknesses. For one's own impotence is as dangerous as an alien force.

A soldier who possesses a "volitional" intellect is able to achieve, it can refrain, it can stop, and is capable of "overstepping" the impossible. The presence of a strong will makes the intellect active, effective and purposeful. Such a bent of the intellect provides an opportunity for the soldier to maintain self-possession, tenacity and calmness under the complex situations of modern combat. The true "fitness" of an intellect for a combat situation is recognized only in a situation which is close to real, taut combat and an engagement. The ability of a soldier to suppress the feeling of fear and confusion not only plays an enormous role on the moral level, but also helps to maintain favorable conditions for precise logical thinking, objective estimates, accuracy of conclusions and effectiveness of decisions.

Inherent to a soldier's intellect is such a trait as a clearly expressed active nature of mental work which is fully apparent in practice. The well-known Soviet psychologist B. M. Teplov at one time commented that the mind of a serviceman or military leader is one of the specific forms of a "practical mind." Such an intellect expresses the main thing: not only the mental focus of the soldier on solving a specific problem, but also the ability to apply the available knowledge, experience and skills. The mental operations of such an intellect, in relying on the general (a knowledge of the laws, categories, principles and methods of science, including military science) in a way move to the particular, the concrete and the direct.

For example, a correct assessment of the situation is not an end in itself, but rather a condition for the more complete and accurate carrying out of a combat task. Here it is important to bear in mind that a soldier's activities are exceptionally limited by time and space parameters. There is scarcely a sphere of human activity where the price of time or the role of spatial characteristics is so high. An action may be formally correct, but if it is late it is the equivalent of a major, frequently irrectifiable mistake. A hundred steps in the right direction may not atone for one wrong step. It is particularly important that this be remembered by those going on alert duty, standing a watch or carrying out a specific task in maintaining high combat readiness.

A particular feature of a soldier's intellect is also manifested in his ability to predict the possible development of events. In no other situation is prediction so difficult and so vitally essential as under the conditions of combat operations. The intellectual capacity of a serviceman has a noticeably expressed probability nature. The problem is that under the conditions of a combat situation, an enormous number of new relationships, factors, circumstances and data are put into operation and these must be considered. A lack of information about the enemy impedes prediction. For this reason, it is important not only to know as much as possible about the enemy in operational, organizational and moral-political terms, but also be able to think like the enemy and to scientifically predict its probable actions.

Intellect is not innate. It is formed and developed by the entire way of our life, by the existing system of training and indoctrination, by self-indoctrination and self-education. The major military-technical shifts in the area of military affairs also have had their formative effect on the human ideology and through it on the human intellect. The epoch-making scientific discoveries and technical inventions have a great influence on the individual's perception of the world. A man of today is no longer amazed simply by the new, the essence of which he unfailingly links with social changes.

Thus, the ongoing revolutionary changes in the area of military affairs and the arms race imposed by the imperialists with far-reaching consequences cannot help but be reflected on the social focus of the intellect: it cannot remain indifferent to what the destiny of mankind's future is, what is the role of the socialist Armed Forces in the military confrontation of the two worlds and what is the specific place of man in this struggle.

In our times, there is a noticeably stronger tendency for the growth of rational elements in awareness. The need for scientific knowledge and a polytechnical education, the greater involvement of technology in life and the increased flow of information have led to a situation where the amount of knowledge to be assimilated by the personnel has doubled over the last decade. The role of scientific abstractions in understanding has grown, and mathematics is being evermore widely employed in the most diverse spheres of activity. All of this has brought about the accelerated development of human intellectual abilities. Now, no one would be surprised by a soldier giving a lecture on cybernetics in a subunit; or a company in which everyone down to the last man has at least a 10th-grade education; a young officer who has proposed an original solution to a complex military technical problem. The growth of the rationality of understanding and its power are an objective imperative of the times which is fully manifested under the conditions of a socialist society.

An investigation of the life and activities of many prominent revolutionaries, scientists and military leaders shows that all of them were engaged in the conscious development of certain intellectual, moral and volitional qualities. The most important way to do this is to master Marxist-Leninist ideology, the principles of the natural and technical sciences and military theory. Only by mastering the treasurehouse of scientific knowledge is it possible to develop the intellectual capacities for analysis and synthesis, generalizations, deductive and inductive conclusions, the ability to proceed from the abstract to the concrete, to combine the logical and historical methods in understanding phenomena and so forth. Even clearly expressed abilities require development and unique, constant training.

It goes without saying that self-education and self-indoctrination, with all their importance, do not resolve all the problems of the intellect's development. These can acquire great mental strength and creativity only in problem situations and in resolving complex contradictions. Here precisely lies the value of the troop tactical and operational-strategic exercises, command-staff games and participation in various special experiments and testing. A problem situation is characterized by the fact that its solution requires not merely the use of the existing knowledge or experience, but also the true manifestation of logical, creative and volitional principles. In solving a problem which arises in an exercise or in a difficult situation, it is essential to involve the entire spectrum of a person's capacities in the mental process. Certainly, it is important not merely to possess an intellect, but also be able to use it. The mind rusts merely from laziness of thought and idleness.

An individual's personality is a priceless pearl. Without the constant development of mental abilities, it is difficult to count on the growth of a person's competence and a rise in his skills. As L. Tolstoy said, "the first evil is bad reason."

The opportunities existing in our society for the spiritual growth of each individual make it possible to hone the cognitive abilities of a person and to improve the sharpness and flexibility of the mind capable of solving the most complex problems. The Soviet man and the Soviet soldier are the carrier of a rich intellect which is not obscured by superstitions, mysticism or a belief in the supernatural. A modern man in a military greatcoat, in using the words of Block, is capable of the "fire of cold figures and the gift of divine visions"; inherent to him are intellectual penetration into the essence of life and fine emotional flights.

The owl of Minerva, in embodying the flight of thought, not merely dispassionately sails over man, rather it helps him create, to transform and defend the new world, to look closely and see the future.

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ARMED FORCES

MAR SU KULIKOV WRITES ON STALINGRAD

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[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union V.G. Kulikov: "The Art of Victory"]

[Text] There have been few events in the history of wars, which were followed by the peoples of the planet with such intense attention as that which was focused on the Battle of Stalingrad.

The Soviet people knew that the homeland's fate was being decided there on the Don and the Volga.

Soldiers of the field army, on whatever sector of the front they happened to be, in a defense or an offensive, knew very well how difficult it was, how arduous, to defend positions in the Don steppe, to protect a devastated city, to hold on to the edges of the land along the Volga. And they strove to ease the lot of their comrades in arms fighting at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, with accurate shots and swift attacks.

Military history has never known a battle whose importance was so rapidly and so fittingly appreciated by a grateful mankind. The order from the Supreme High Command congratulating forces of the Don Front on the successful completion of their elimination of enemy troops encircled near Stalingrad had barely been read over Radio Moscow, when ordinary people, political figures and newspapers of the entire world commented that the turning point in World War II had arrived, that Stalingrad's defenders had demonstrated unprecedented bravery, spiritual strength and selflessness, that their example would inspire their contemporaries and their descendants.

In 1967 at the opening of a memorial complex in Volgograd, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev made the following statement about the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad: "The entire world followed the battle on the Volga with bated breath. In Washington and London, in Paris and Belgrad, in Berlin and Rome--people everywhere sensed and understood that the outcome of the war was being determined there. This was clear to both our enemies and our allies.... Not only were the select Hitlerite troops crushed in that battle, but fascism's aggressive spirit dies there, its morale was broken."

The courage, endurance and mass heroism of the fightingmen played an enormous, an inestimable role in the course of the great battle on the Volga and in its victorious outcome. The military leaders and chiefs, who based their decisions on the principles of Soviet military art, the art of Victory, had no less a role. As a military man, I would like to describe how that art was embodied and developed in the Stalingrad epic.

In the battles launched on the Don and Kuban expanses in the summer of 1942 the Soviet Army was faced with an extremely difficult military problem, that of restoring the integrity of the front of our strategic defense, weakening the enemy and then, switching to a counteroffensive, achieving the enemy's total defeat.

The problem of restoring the strategic front of our defense arose at the beginning of World War II, when the Wehrmacht's powerful armored wedges broke through the Polish army's defense front and then, in the summer of 1940, that of the Anglo-French forces. Neither the Polish nor the Anglo-French armies were able to restore it, and they lost the war.

During the first 5 months of the war the Soviet Army had to restore its defensive front three times. In the summer of 1942 the front was penetrated four times. And it was no less difficult to restore the front than it had been a year previously: The entire southern wing of the Soviet defense front was shattered, and a strategic gap around 700 kilometers wide was formed. As a result, the length of the Soviet-German front was increased by 1,600 kilometers, reaching the enormous length of 6,400 kilometers. An enormous effort was required over a period of 2-3 months in order to close that gap. Headquarters, Supreme High Command, decided to bring in new formations to the southwestern axis, force the enemy to alter its strategic plans in the midst of intense fighting and scatter its forces, and ultimately, make it impossible for the enemy to achieve the objectives set for the campaign.

The first attempt to restore the integrity of the strategic front was undertaken within the large bend of the Don. Headquarters deployed five reserve armies along the middle stretch of the river, which became a part of the newly created Voronezh and Stalingrad Fronts: the 6th and 60th Armies in the former, and the 62nd, 63rd and 64th Armies in the latter. In addition, the 38th, 40th, 21st and 57th Armies, which had withdrawn to the southwest, were restored, and the 1st and 4th Tank Armies were hastily created on the Stalingrad front. Thanks to reserves created in advance, Headquarters was thus able to form an unbroken sector of front along the entire middle stretch of the Don by mid-June, linking it with the defense of the North Caucasus and Southern Fronts southeast of Stalingrad. This greatly limited the enemy's maneuvering possibilities, and it was forced to break through our defense once again.

Upon determining that the enemy planned to break through to the Caucasus, the Soviet political and military leadership decided to make the Stalingrad axis the main axis in the summer campaign, to weaken the enemy forces with a determined and vigorous defense there, to frustrate its plans for 1942 and create the preconditions for altering the course of the war in our favor. The erection of three Stalingrad perimeters was renewed and the preparation of a fourth, city perimeter was begun at the instruction of Headquarters. Rifle, tank and air formations and units, a draft of reinforcements and combat equipment for restoring the divisions and corps which had fallen back, were also brought in at the directions of Headquarters. In a telephone conversation with A.S. Chuyanov, first secretary of the Stalingrad Oblast party committee, on 20 June I.V. Stalin declared: "Stalingrad will not be surrendered to the enemy...."

The involvement of local party and state organs, industrial enterprises and the population in the performance of defense tasks was an important strategic factor. Stalingrad and Stalingrad Oblast provided the city's defenders with a great deal of assistance. A people's militia corps was formed in the city. Plants and factories worked to the limits of their capabilities to produce war materiel, to restore tanks to action and repair guns and mortars, and tens of thousands of city residents erected defense installations.

Preparing to break through our defense on the Lower Don and develop the offensive on the Caucasus axis, the main axis, where the 1st and 4th Tank Armies were already operating, with Italian 8th Army and the Romanian 3rd Army being moved there, the German fascist command sent only the 6th Army to Stalingrad. It was to penetrate to the little bend in the Don from the march, capture crossings there and then take the city. After that it was planned to develop the offensive along the Volga toward Astrakhan.

The main thrust of this army was directed against the 62nd Army's right flank, where the enemy had managed to create a 5-fold superiority in personnel, a 10-fold artillery superiority and an absolute tank superiority on the sectors of the breakthrough.

Fighting began on the distant approaches to Stalingrad on 23 July. Upon breaking through our first positions, the enemy penetrated deeply into the 62nd Army's defense, threatening its main forces with encirclement.

Marshal of the Soviet Union A.M. Vasilevskiy wrote about those days in his book "Delo vsey zhizni" [A Lifetime Matter]: "A study of the situation which had developed on the front showed us that the only possibility of eliminating the threat of encirclement for the 62nd Army and the enemy's capture of crossings over the Don near Kalach and to the north of there was to immediately execute counterthrusts against the enemy with available forces of the 1st and 4th Tank Armies."

It was fairly difficult to make the decision to counterattack, especially since the defense had still not acquired adequate strength. It was necessary to reduce to a common denominator the numerous, constantly changing elements in the complex situation and to anticipate the minimum which could occur in a 24-hour period: Could the stability of the Soviet forces be established and maintained? To what depth might the enemy penetrate? To what extent would the enemy divisions be weakened? What would their morale be like? Based on all of this we had to select the time and the axis for the main thrust and to define the depth to which the forces would advance, the kind of fire and engineer support needed and the specific nature of the party-political work to be performed. The latter became especially important during the difficult July days of 1942.

The difficulty lay in the fact that counterthrusts are a mutually acute form of combat operations. Success helps to stabilize the defense, while failure results in major weakening.

Although the front created on the approaches to Stalingrad was not yet very stable, Headquarters, based on its operational and strategic experience, adopted the firm decision to carry out a counterattack.

The 1st and 4th Tank Armies, which had around 600 tanks, were to attack the enemy's main grouping: the 1st Tank Army from the south and the 4th from the northeast. Then, after joining up in the area of Verkhnyaya Buzinovka, they were to rout the grouping's main forces.

If we consider only the quantitative aspect, the counterattacking groupings were perfectly capable of inflicting appreciable damage upon the enemy. Quantitative superiority is completely manifested, however, only when the proper conditions have been created for this. The tank armies designated for carrying out the counterattack, however, had been formed hastily, with tank formations which had just become a part of the front. Many tank brigades were still en route, and time was needed for them to

assemble in the areas of concentration and move up to the lines of deployment. The situation made it necessary to hurry, however. The enemy had encircled around three divisions of the 62nd Army. Personnel of those divisions which had not yet been shelled might be unable to withstand extensive combat pressure in open terrain, under continuous enemy air attacks, especially since their ammunition was running out and they were in need of immediate assistance. Since the enemy had deeply penetrated our defense on the 62nd Army's right flank, there was an increased danger of encirclement of its main forces, which would have opened the way to Stalingrad. Because of this the 1st Tank Army was forced to carry a counterattack on 25 July, 2 days before the 4th Tank Army was able to begin active operations.

The very fact of executing a powerful counterattack against an enemy which had intended to take the city with ease, from the march, had a great psychological effect. The enemy halted after moving up large forces against the 1st Tank Army, and this weakened the ring of encirclement. A group led by Colonel K.A. Zhuravlev broke the ring and withdrew beyond the Don.

The time gained in the course of executing the counterattack made it possible to strengthen the defense on the Don and prevent the advance of enemy forces into the rear of the 62nd Army. And so, despite the fact that the 1st Tank Army had advanced very little, the results of the counterattack were significant.

A counterattack carried out in the zone of the 64th Army defending to the south also produced significant results. The enemy's 24th Tank Corps and 51st Army Corps had switched to an offensive there. They had penetrated to the Chir River and captured a bridgehead on the river around 8 kilometers in depth. General M.S. Shumilov, the army commander, used four divisions and a tank corps for the counterattack. The enemy was thrown back from the bridgehead, and this not only stabilized the defense for the entire 64th Army, but also secured the 62nd Army's left flank.

The counterattacks by the Stalingrad Front, undertaken at the directions of Headquarters, were of great operational-tactical and strategic importance. The great activity of Soviet forces under the extremely adverse conditions of the situation had almost the same effect on many elements of the enemy's command personnel as did the determined and active resistance by Soviet forces on the Mozhaysk defense line near Moscow. At that time no one in the enemy camp had doubted that the capture of Russia's capital was a matter of only a few days. And now an entire series of unexpected counterattacks were being made. The stunned enemy broke off the offensive in order to make preparations for its renewal.

At the end of July 1942 the enemy command understood that it could not take Stalingrad with the 6th Army alone, and it returned the 4th Tank Army to Army Group "B," in order to attack the city from the southwest as well.

This decision was based on the idea of the operational leadership of fascist Germany's armed forces that "the fate of the Caucasus would be determined at Stalingrad." The Hitlerite command assumed that after the arteries linking the Caucasus with the center of Russia were severed, its defense would be rapidly exhausted.

Subsequent military operations showed that this was the beginning of a gross miscalculation. Neither the political leadership nor the German general staff took into

account the enormous amount of organizational work which the Communist Party Central Committee, the State Defense Committee of the USSR and Headquarters, Supreme High Command, had been able to accomplish after creating the defense on the Middle Don and the immediate approaches to Stalingrad. Nor did they consider the ever-increasing resistance of the Soviet forces.

The plan to take Stalingrad from the march was frustrated, and this played an important role in the stabilization of defenses on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front. The operational-strategic situation of Soviet forces continued to deteriorate during the last days of July, however, especially on the Caucasus axis. After capturing several bridgeheads on the Lower Don, the enemy began an offensive toward the Caucasus on 26 July. Three days later enemy forces had reached the Manych Canal and the Kagal'nik River. This brought the threat of capture of the Kuban and Stavropol grain-growing regions and the oil-producing areas of the North Caucasus and of lengthening the strategic front.

The enemy's rapid advance was due not just to the fact that it had great superiority. Failures which our fronts had suffered on the southwestern axis in July also had an effect. The effective combat strength of the formations and field forces was sharply reduced by the large losses. A total of 54,000 men were left in the 37th, 12th and 18th Armies by the end of July 1942, for example, and the 9th Army, which had broken out of encirclement, had only 1,113 men, nine guns and 32 mortars. This had to reduce their fighting capabilities, of course.

USSR People's Commissar of **Defense** I.V. Stalin issued Order No. 227 on 28 July, which thoroughly summarized the existing military-political situation and defined the main tasks. Extensive party-political work was launched on the basis of that order. Commanders and political workers, all the communists, attempted to make every fightingman aware of the fact that the fate of the homeland depended upon his persistence, upon his military ability. The order charged the commanders with personal responsibility for the combat operations of the units and subunits under their command and for the defense of that sector of Soviet land entrusted to them. Party and Komsomol meetings were held in all the units, which mobilized the efforts of the fightingmen for the absolute implementation of that order. The party's slogan "Not a step backward!" went to the hearts of all the fightingmen and commanders.

The directness with which Order No. 227 described the situation which had developed in July of 1942 and the party-political work launched as a result of that order drastically altered the mood of the fightingmen, commanders and political workers and their attitude toward events on the front. The troops became even more steadfast. This was confirmed by an objective criterion, the enemy's rate of advance. At the beginning of July it was around 15-16 kilometers per day, but was reduced 5-fold in August, although the 4th Tank Army was brought to the Stalingrad axis and the number of divisions advancing on the city increased from 14 to 39.

The Communist Party was the organizer of efforts by the fightingmen and all the Soviet people to perform and resolutely to alter the course of the war in the Soviet Union's favor. The party appeals met with rapid and effective response. Plants and factories increased shipments of weapons to the front literally from one day to the next. The forces near Stalingrad and on the Caucasus axis were receiving more tanks, aircraft, guns and mortars, ammunition, uniforms and supplies. Agricultural workers of the

eastern regions made every effort to provide the army and navy with as much food as possible, to compensate for supplies cut off from oblasts occupied by the fascists.

The troops of all the fronts defending to the north of the middle stretch of the Don were called upon to give Stalingrad's defenders maximum assistance. This assistance was diversified. Divisions and special units were freed to be sent to Stalingrad, and forces remaining on the previous defense lines took over their tasks. Individual offensive operations, conducted to make it impossible for the enemy to transfer forces from quiet sectors of the strategic front of defense to Stalingrad and the Caucasus, provided the most effective assistance. And more than 60% of all the forces of the enemy's Eastern Front were operating on these sectors: 130 divisions, almost 1,500 tanks, 31,500 guns and mortars, 1,680 combat aircraft. If we had been unable to tie them down in battle and create the threat of a breakthrough of the defense, the enemy would have been able to transfer at least 15-20 divisions and a considerable quantity of combat equipment to the southern wing of the front.

Headquarters planned for offensive operations over the entire front where the enemy was on the defensive: near Leningrad, in the Valdai Hills, at Rzhev, Zhizdra and Volkhov, as well as on the newly created sector of the strategic front along the middle stretch of the Don and immediately to the north of Stalingrad.

I took part in the Rzhev-Sychevo operation conducted by forces of the Western Front and our Kalinin Front.

We penetrated the most powerfully reinforced enemy positions on the very first day. Troops of the Western Front swept toward the Vazuza and Osuga rivers and captured bridgeheads there. Our Kalinin Front was unable to develop the success it had initially achieved: There was a heavy rain, and the already soaked ground became a swamp. Tanks bogged down, and the movement of artillery was held up. The troops continued to attack, however, and moved closer and closer to Rzhev, which the enemy had turned into a strong defense area.

General-Field Marshal Kruge, commander of Army Group "Zentrum," undertook determined counterattacks in an attempt to regain the lost positions. Fierce fighting developed, in which up to 1,500 tanks participated on the two sides. The enemy was unable to force the Soviet troops from the positions they held and switched to a defense after losing a large number of tanks.

During the Rzhev-Sychevo operation and operations in the areas of Sukhinichi, Zhizdra and Volkhov, forces of the Western and Kalinin Fronts were able to pin down 80 enemy divisions, one third of all the Eastern Front's forces, including 12 divisions brought up from the south. Three tank divisions and several infantry divisions from Army Group "Zentrum," which were being readied for transfer, were drawn into battle and suffered heavy losses.

The thoughts and feelings experienced by us during the period of the battles which we conducted in an attempt to help the defenders of Stalingrad and the Caucasus were beautifully expressed by Aleksandr Tvardovskiy in the poem "I Was Killed At Rzhev":

Stalingrad, suddenly named on the front.
Just how much time has passed?
How long ago was that?
You, the living, are asked.

The front aflame, undiminishing,
Like a welt on the human skin.
I was killed there and do not know:
Is Rzhev at last ours again, then?

There on the Middle Don,
Did ours stand fast or break?
What a terrible month that was,
And everything was at stake.

No, no, it cannot be!
The enemy did not win that one.
No, no, no! For otherwise,
What meaning, even for those now gone?

Even to the dead, the silenced,
This gives the joy we craved:
Although we died to make it so,
This homeland of ours was saved.

It became especially important strategically to activate the defense front on the sector between Voronezh and Stalingrad. Several attacks were carried out there, especially powerful attacks, involving three or four armies. The breakthrough of the enemy's defense to the north of Stalingrad was bringing Soviet forces to the rear areas of its Stalingrad grouping, and the advance toward Rostov-na-Donu, to the rear of its Caucasus grouping as well. The development of events in this direction became more realistic as Headquarters built up the fronts and strengthened the defense on the Middle Don. And the reinforcement process went forward continuously, despite the increasingly fierce battles on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city itself. A total of 55 rifle divisions, 9 rifle brigades, 7 tank corps and 30 tank brigades were moved to the Stalingrad axis between 23 July and 1 October alone.

One of the important elements of military art is the ability to form more and more new divisions, as many as needed, month after month, while a difficult war is underway. Relying on the powerful industrial and economic base created by our people, the Soviet Supreme High Command demonstrated this art back in 1941, when 336 effective divisions were formed during a 5-month period. This is six times the number the Hitlerite command expected to encounter when it began its war against the Soviet Union.

By the summer of 1942 Headquarters, Supreme High Command, had deployed 120 new divisions, in addition to which numerous divisions had been restored to action while intense battles were underway.

The beefing-up of the fronts on the Don, their powerful counterattacks and the capture of bridgeheads forced the enemy also to reinforce its forces supporting the defense on the Upper and Middle Don with each passing week and month. The Italian 8th Army and then the Romanian 3rd Army, which, according to the Hitlerite command's initial plans were to operate on the Caucasus axis, were sent there.

As a result, there were two German armies on each strategic axis at the beginning of August. What appeared to be absolutely incredible then occurred: The enemy had fewer forces left on the main, Caucasus axis than on the Stalingrad axis, where the grouping of forces had grown from 38 to 69 divisions, while Army Group "A" was reduced from 60 to 29 divisions. Counting the Italian 8th Army and the Romanian armies, a total of 38 divisions were transferred to the Stalingrad axis. This weakening of the Caucasus grouping demonstrated the failure of the enemy's plan for the 1942 summer campaign. An enormous amount of credit for this goes also to the defenders of the Caucasus. They prevented the Hitlerites from breaking through along the coasts of the Black and Caspian Seas to Poti and Baku and through passes in the Rioni and Kura river valleys. The intensity of the fighting did not lessen, but actually grew, especially on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city itself.

The German command began to prepare for a new offensive operation, which called for two powerful thrusts, each involving 10 divisions, against Stalingrad from the northwest and the south. This would mean a 4-fold superiority in tanks and more than a 2-fold superiority in artillery and aircraft. The armies and corps were headed by experienced military chiefs of the Third Reich. The operation plan was based on the belief that the Soviet Army no longer had significant reserves and that divisions could not be removed from the Moscow axis (the offensive by the Western and Kalinin Fronts was continuing there). After creating the Stalingrad Front with 30 divisions, however, Headquarters, Supreme High Command, reinforced it with 15 rifle divisions during the first half of August alone.

The Hitlerite command was eager to cut up the Stalingrad center also because its situation in the Caucasus was becoming worse and worse: The offensive was reaching a deadlock.

The danger of the enemy's new offensive lay not only in the fact that the force of the strikes was now doubled, but also in the special determination with which the Hitlerite command planned to conduct it, since it linked the successful conclusion of the military campaign with the capture of Stalingrad.

For the Soviet forces it was difficult to repel this attack, since the flanks of the 62nd Army had been dangerously deflected during previous battles, and now the defense ran along an unprepared line. In addition to this, the reserves designated for the Stalingrad Front were still en route.

The enemy attack hit the 62nd Army hard. Part of its forces were encircled, and enemy troops reached its defense perimeter. Divisions of the 64th Army, to the southeast of which the 57th Army had gone over to a defense, withdrew to the left of that perimeter.

Fighting on the immediate approaches to Stalingrad began in mid-August. The heaviest fighting developed first on the little bend of the Don and on the southwestern approaches to the city. The enemy did not manage to reach the Don until 20 August, however.

While these battles were underway Headquarters was continuing to reinforce the Stalingrad axis. It detailed significant forces to those fronts, defined the nature of subsequent operations, enlisted troops from other fronts to help Stalingrad, sent the 1st Guards Army, which was already approaching the area, to attack the enemy groupings

right at Stalingrad, and began moving up the 24th and 66th Armies. The commands of the Stalingrad and Southeastern Fronts had to make skilful use of the forces which they possessed, in order to gain time for the reserves to reach them.

The time factor is one of the most important in a war. Sometimes being slightly late or a holdup, or just the opposite, haste, **greatly** reduces the results of the troops' efforts. In order to gain time for large reserves to approach in August of 1942, it was necessary to hold the immediate approaches to Stalingrad.

The troops of the all the armies charged with defending the approaches to the city understood this mission very well. Formations and units of the 62nd, 64th and 57th Armies, defending to the west and southwest of Stalingrad, operated especially effectively. By skilfully maneuvering their forces, Generals M.S. Shumilov and F.I. Tolbukhin, army commanders, repelled four determined attempts by the enemy's 4th Tank Army to break through to the city from the southwest and the south in the middle half of August. Only by exhausting the reserves was the enemy able to approach to a distance from which it was possible to shell the city with artillery fire.

The situation to the west of Stalingrad was becoming far more difficult. After conducting an operation in the little bend of the Don against a very weakened 4th Tank Army, the enemy's 6th Army on 17 August switched its efforts to the boundary between the 4th Tank Army and the 62nd Army, in order to capture bridgeheads on the Don, to penetrate to Stalingrad and capture it.

At instructions from Headquarters the Stalingrad Front's command prepared in good time to repel the enemy attack. It moved its reserves up to the middle defense perimeter, created a number of strong anti-tank areas, deployed the 28th Tank Corps for combatting the tanks and formed a counterattack group. Provisions were also made for providing the troops with air cover and inflicting air strikes upon the enemy. The experience with defensive battles fought in 1941, especially those near Moscow, now came in useful. One difference lay in the fact that the forces on the most important axes were deployed at positions reaching the ultimate objective, Stalingrad itself, near which two tank corps and a rifle division were concentrated.

Several days were required to solidify the defense on the western side of the front. This was to enable reserve divisions and tank brigades to arrive and replace those which had already suffered large losses. The 4th Tank Army and the 62nd Army had four such divisions each. It was necessary to provide more than half the brigades with replacements in the tank corps. The fact that the defending troops were in this condition on the threshold of a powerful enemy thrust made it necessary for the military chiefs to carefully weigh their instructions.

General A.I. Lopatin, commander of the 62nd Army, requested the front commander to add reserves to the sector on which the enemy breakthrough was being readied. This was urgently needed, because the weakened divisions in the first echelon were defending in wide zones. The reply did not arrive until a day later: The front commander permitted only the 87th Division to join the forces in the first echelon and ordered the 35th Guards Division to take over its defense zone.

The enemy began its offensive on 23 August, however, while the 87th Division was only approaching the front. It was subjected to an air attack and suffered large losses.

Forcing it back to the south, the enemy rushed toward that very area which it had abandoned and which the 35th Guards Division had not yet occupied. The enemy's 14th Tank Corps rapidly penetrated the middle defensive perimeter and reached the Volga in a narrow wedge. The front's defense zone was split. Air attacks raged over Stalingrad. The enemy thought that the city's fate had been predetermined.

During the last days of August and in September it became an extremely important matter to hold Stalingrad. The importance was due, first of all, to the fact that the Hitlerite command linked to the seizure of Stalingrad its hopes of capturing the Caucasus and its oil-bearing regions, involving Japan and Turkey in the war against the Soviet Union and keeping its allies obedient. It also hoped to prevent a new winter catastrophe by going over to a defense on the Don in good time and preventing Soviet forces from breaking through to the south, into the rear area of army groups "A" and "B."

The Soviet Supreme High Command sent extensive forces, the necessary quantity of ammunition, fuel, food and combat equipment to the Stalingrad on an emergency basis. Army General G.K. Zhukov, deputy supreme commander, was detached to provide practical assistance to the forces fighting in the Stalingrad area. A number of attacks were undertaken against the enemy on the Don. The 63rd and 21st Armies conducted an offensive against the Italian 8th Army and captured vast bridgeheads west of the city of Serafimovich and near the village of Verkhniy Mamon. This forced Hitler on 27 August to announce: "The crucial danger **lies with the Italian 8th Army.**"

Difficult as the situation was in the Stalingrad area, its defenders stepped up their resistance. The residents built and restored fortifications and workers at the tractor plant defended their plant together with the soldiers, all under continuous bombings. Newly arrived tankmen and infantrymen began attacking the corridor which the enemy had broken through. All of this made it impossible for the enemy to develop the success it had achieved and capture the city. The enemy was halted to the northwest of Stalingrad on 28 August and to the southwest on 2 September. The defense line now lay along the inner perimeter, 3 kilometers from the city.

The enemy continued to attack the more important targets, however, in an attempt to prevent the reinforcement of the city's defense. Advancing from 500 to 900 meters a day, it had approached to the edge of the city by 12 September.

During that time the 24th and 66th Armies, from the Headquarters' reserve, arrived to help the Stalingraders, and divisions of the 1st Guards Army, weakened in counterthrusts at the end of August, received replacements. These forces went over to an offensive on 3-5 September, without completing their concentration and regrouping, and diverted to themselves several enemy divisions.

The creation of army front artillery groups and sub-groups was a new thing in the organization of a defense. This made it possible to carry out concentrated fire attacks, to frustrate attacks by entire divisions and prevent enemy from advancing. Powerful centers of defense were set up in the intact and preserved stone buildings of Stalingrad itself.

Party and Komsomol organizations did an enormous amount of work, appealing to the troops to halt the enemy at the walls of Stalingrad. And it should be noted that the main factor in the impregnability of stronghold on the Volga was not so much the fortifications as it was the great fighting spirit and heroism of the Soviet soldiers.

Preparing to storm the city, the German fascist command reinforced the 4th and 6th Tank Armies. A total of nine divisions and one brigade were transferred to them between 1 and 13 September alone. The formations designated for storming Stalingrad numbered 170,000 soldiers. They were supported by as many as 1,000 aircraft. On the axis of the main attack, which the enemy planned to execute against the 62nd Army, it succeeded in creating almost a 2-fold superiority in men and artillery and close to a 5-fold superiority in tanks.

At a conference in Vinnitsa on 12 September Hitler ordered the command of Army Group "B" to take Stalingrad and the bank of the Volga adjacent to it no matter what, in order to keep it "from becoming an all-devouring focal point for a long period of time."

The "planned offensive against Stalingrad" began on 13 September. The sector leading to the center of the city received especially heavy fire from artillery and aircraft: A total of 250 tanks supported by artillery and aircraft attacked there. They encountered stiff resistance. They could only break through to the city after they had killed all its defenders along the way. Individual enemy units began to approach the Volga embankment. In this situation it seemed that the city could no longer be held.

The front command decided to make a counterthrust. The innovative aspect of this decision lay in the fact that the forces were to execute it immediately after crossing Europe's largest river, the Volga.

I think it is probably difficult for the readers who did not take part in the war to imagine how the attack was carried out, to image the feelings of the men as they crossed the river, roiled by bursting shells, clambered up the steep bank and entered into the attack, and how they lived, actually lived, in constant danger, losing their comrades but not their spirit. The heroic deeds of Stalingrad's defenders have been imprinted in works of literature and art. And in my opinion, one of the best of these works is the story "Dni i nochi"[Days and Nights] by Konstantin Simonov, produced before the smoldering ruins of Stalingrad had cooled.

The 13th Guards Division, which had gained a toehold on the Stalingrad embankment and the blocks of the city still held, carried out attacks not as a solid front as in the conventional counterthrust, but as separate subunits and groups, storming houses and not streets. This battle experience soon became the possession of all the forces there and was rapidly adopted by General V.I. Chuykov, commander of the 62nd Army, and by the headquarters, commanded by General N.I. Krylov. Soon thereafter, V.I. Chuykov wrote in the magazine VOYENNY VESTNIK: "It would be incorrect to think that city combat is street fighting in every case and in the literal sense of the term. City fighting in a situation in which the enemy has ensconced and fortified itself in the city is a battle for a home, a building, a block. The operation developed along connecting trenches, inside houses, in ruins and underground. The streets were empty, the squares as well."

The battles in Stalingrad were characterized by a determined effort to hold each building, by decisive counterattacks against an enemy which had wedged itself in. The need to combine the static and aggressive modes of defense was dictated by the urgent need to hold Stalingrad. Executing one attack after another, the enemy was capturing structures and city blocks. Our counterattacks conducted on a broad front were pinning the enemy down, making it impossible for the enemy to create powerful groupings on the

crucial sectors by maneuvering its forces along the front. The counterattacks greatly helped those defenders of Stalingrad who were repelling the particularly fierce onslaught. Lastly, the aggressive defense was wearing down the morale of the enemy troops.

General Paulus reported to the higher military leadership in September: "Although the greater part of the city is in German hands, nonetheless the offensive will lose strength without additional forces." Reports submitted day after day about "fierce repeat attacks" by the Russians, about "their reinforcement in the city," about how "a powerful enemy tank group has penetrated to the railroad east of Kotlubani and is moving toward Borodkin, creating a danger to the flank" robbed the strategists in the Reich of their composure and patience, and they began intervening in the tactical operations of the troops thousands of kilometers away, ordering them to do things which were no longer consistent with the situation or which were in general not required by the situation. And the German fascist forces suffered ever-increasing losses, became discouraged and entered into the attacks with less and less confidence.

The second offensive against Stalingrad, the edge of which was mainly directed against the settlement at the "Krasnyy Oktyabr'" plant and Mamayev Mound, lasted from 27 September to 8 October. It was beaten off. Only on certain sectors was the enemy able to reach the Volga. Still the maniacal expectation of capturing Stalingrad did not leave Hitler. Employing all types of transport, including aircraft, the German fascist command began transferring new forces to the Stalingrad area. A total of 200,000 trained replacements, as many as 90 artillery battalions with up to 80,000 guns, and 40 combat-engineer battalions specially trained for storming a city were delivered there at the beginning of October.

The third offensive was begun on 10 October. The efforts of the enemy divisions were directed primarily against the tractor plant and the "Barrikady" and "Krasnyy Oktyabr'" plants. Attacks came one after another, five or six a day. Preparation in the form of powerful artillery fire and air strikes was made for each attack. It had become increasingly difficult for troops of the 62nd Army to beat them off. Neighboring forces came to their aid. The 64th Army made a counterthrust on 25 October, and forces of the Don and Voronezh Fronts, somewhat earlier. The weakened divisions were replaced by divisions restored for action, specifically the 87th Rifle Division, which fought on the outer and middle perimeters.

The defenders of Stalingrad demonstrated great tactical skill in their determination and endurance, in their ability to hold isolated sectors of defense, blocks and even individual homes such as the "Pavlov house." "The Russians," General Dorr admitted, "surpassed the Germans in the use of the terrain and camouflage and were more experienced in fighting from barricades and in fighting for individual houses."

The defensive battles for Stalingrad lasted 4 months. During that time the enemy suffered enormous losses: 700,000 killed or wounded, more than 2,000 guns and mortars, more than 1,000 tanks and assault guns and over 1,400 combat and transport aircraft.

In the unprecedented heroic struggle the Soviet forces not only frustrated the plans which the Hitlerite leadership had set for the second offensive campaign, but also created the important preconditions for switching to a counteroffensive and routing the enemy.

After doing a great deal to restore the strategic front of defense, the Soviet Supreme High Command was able by the beginning of the winter campaign to allocate for the southern axis or to replenish several dozen rifle divisions, 16 tank and mechanized corps, a considerable number of tank and engineer brigades and 12 artillery divisions. Our artillery had not previously had such formations as the latter.

The Western, Kalinin, Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts, which were to perform important operational and strategic missions, were reinforced.

The reinforcement of forces in the field army permitted Headquarters, Supreme High Command, to assign them the mission of fundamentally altering the course of the war to the benefit of the USSR.

The plan for the winter campaign was already being developed during the fierce struggle against the enemy which had penetrated to Stalingrad and to the North Caucasus. The offensive at Stalingrad was to be the beginning and the main element of that plan.

The plan for the counteroffensive took specific shape on the day Hitler ordered the planned offensive against Stalingrad to be started. It was on 13 September that G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevskiy reported the preliminary plan to Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin. It consisted of two main phases: "1. The breakthrough of the defense and encirclement of the Stalingrad grouping of German forces and the creation of a solid outer perimeter to isolate that grouping from outside forces; 2. The destruction of the encircled enemy and the cutting off of enemy attempts to relieve it."

The plan for the counteroffensive demonstrated the fact that despite the continuing fierce battles for Stalingrad, Headquarters was confident that the Hitlerite command's plans for the summer had been thwarted, that it was time to prepare for a breakthrough in the war in our favor.

The encirclement operation opened up possibilities for accomplishing several operational-strategic missions, first of all, that of destroying the powerful enemy grouping consisting of four armies at Stalingrad. This was to result in large enemy losses and have a powerful moral-psychological effect on the enemy troops, at least the entire southern wing of the enemy front and, in turn, create a strategic gap in that front. At the same time the development of an offensive through Millerovo to Rostov could make it possible to cut off the entire Army Group "A" in the Caucasus. The expansion of the strategic gap with a thrust from the Upper Don created prospects for an offensive on the Kurst, Khar'kov and Donbass axes, with the liberation of the nation's important industrial and agricultural regions.

Favorable as the conditions were for a counteroffensive in the winter of 1942, in order to avoid splitting up the prepared reserves, Headquarters called for only two large operations in addition to the Stalingrad operation, one on the western axis and one at Leningrad.

Headquarters and its representatives on the fronts A.M. Vasilevskiy, G.K. Zhukov and N.N. Voronov gave a great deal of attention to the planning of the operation for encircling and routing the Stalingrad enemy grouping. The operation was given the name "Uran." An entire group of measures were specified and developed, which guaranteed absolute success.

In order to accomplish the encirclement it was planned to break through the enemy's defense on two axes converging toward Kalach. Adequately powerful assault groupings consisting of two or three combined-arms armies, two or three tank (mechanized) corps and one or two cavalry corps were created on those axes for this purpose. Not all of the rifle divisions making up those armies could take part in the breakthrough and its development, however, but only 14 or 15 in the northern grouping and 7 or 8 in the southern.

The most difficult task was that of forming artillery groupings capable of reliably breaking up the defense to a depth of at least 3-5 kilometers. There were only 15,500 guns and mortars in the three fronts on the Stalingrad axis. Most of them belonged to the army artillery, that is, to armies, corps, divisions and regiments. Since strategic equality was only just beginning to be established on the front and the enemy was still capable of undertaking attacks, it was extremely risky to deprive the divisions defending in the first echelon of this artillery. After all, an enemy breakthrough even to a small depth, especially near the assault groupings being created, could hold up the counteroffensive or complicate preparations for it.

Artillery of the Supreme High Command's reserve, army and corps artillery and that of the divisions included in the assault groupings could be drawn upon for the artillery attack. Only 3,500 guns and mortars of the 6,000 guns and mortars in the Southwest Front could take part in the artillery support of the offensive, and large-caliber artillery accounted for only 20% of this, with up to 50% made up of mortars with their limited firing range. With a density of 60-100 guns and mortars per kilometer it would be possible with this quantity of artillery to suppress the enemy on a front stretching 18-20 kilometers.

Although the enemy's reserves were limited, by moving up even two or three divisions plus the forces which had withdrawn to a breakthrough sector of that width, the enemy could localize and then close the gap created, prevent our assault groupings from achieving room to operate and prevent the ring of encirclement from being closed.

The Soviet command selected the enemy's weakest defense sectors for the breakthrough. It was decided to carry out two or three attacks at a distance of 20-30 kilometers, one after the other, on each operational axis, in order to create adequately wide gaps. The breakthrough of the enemy's defense, with the encirclement and routing of its forces in those breaks would result in gaps 80-100 kilometers wide, which it would be far more difficult to close, especially with the attacking forces advancing rapidly into the operational depth.

The success of the encirclement operations depended greatly on the rate of advance, because the advancement of the forces was to forestall the enemy's movement of reserves up to the breakthrough sectors. This required reliably breaking up the enemy's defense with artillery fire and air strikes and then immediately, before the enemy had recovered, successfully emerging from the shelters, occupying firing points and attacking the enemy with infantry and tanks. For developing the attack the rifle divisions had to penetrate the first and strongest defensive positions with adequate speed to permit the tank and mechanized corps to make a swift rush into the depth of the enemy's defense. It was precisely for this purpose that such corps had been made a part of the armies. They were to enter into battle at a depth of 4-5 kilometers and rush immediately toward the area at which the ring of encirclement was to be closed. The

rifle divisions were to advance at an average rate of 10-25 kilometers per day, the tank corps, 20-45 kilometers.

Finally, an outer front of encirclement had to be created. Some of the rifle divisions and cavalry corps were being moved up to a line on the Chir River and on toward Obganerovo Station for this purpose. This line was 40-80 kilometers distant from the designated area of encirclement of the enemy's 6th and 4th Tank Armies. This distance ruled out the possibility that enemy relief troops would break through to the encircled forces within 2 or 3 days and create the preconditions for rapidly organizing a solid defense on the axes of the enemy thrusts.

The advance detailing of personnel and equipment for creating an outer front of encirclement was something new in Soviet military art.

In addition to the attacks for effecting the encirclement, the plan called for a thrust from the area of Kachalinskaya toward Verityachi by forces of the Don Front's 24th Army for purposes of encircling the enemy in the bend of the Don and assisting troops of the Southwestern Front.

This is a brief description of the basic elements of the plan for the winter campaign of 1942-1943 and its crucial operation, the counteroffensive near Stalingrad.

I want to discuss one other substantial problem in military art, that of the element of surprise. Surprise makes it possible to create a powerful effect upon the enemy forces with the very first strike and to preserve the planned ratio of personnel and equipment by depriving the enemy of the possibility of bringing in reserves to the axes of our attacks before the offensive begins.

Adhering to the Politburo's decree that the forthcoming operation in the area of Stalingrad was the main operation until the end of 1942 on the entire Soviet-German front and was to have a crucial impact on the entire course of the winter campaign, Headquarters, Supreme High Command, assumed responsibility for performing the basic measures aimed at the achievement of surprise. The most important of these was the preparation of a large offensive operation code-named "Mars" on the western axis. A large concentration of personnel and equipment was demonstrated for the enemy as early as September. Throughout October enemy intelligence noted intense preparations for encirclement of the 3rd and 9th Tank Armies defending the Rzhev salient. Large strategic reserves were formed on the Moscow axis. All of this made it possible to divert the attention of the Hitlerite leadership to those areas and to convince them that our decisive offensive would be undertaken on the Moscow-Smolensk axis.

The element of surprise in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad was in great part, perhaps, basically achieved due to the secrecy of its preparation by the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad Fronts. Headquarters gave them instructions to halt individual offensive operations and go over to a fierce and prolonged defense. Orders were issued to prepare the positions with continuous trenches, strong firing structures and a system of artificial obstacles, and to distribute the reserves in accordance with defense requirements. Centers of population to a depth of up to 25 kilometers were adapted for defense, and the residents were evacuated from a zone along the front.

The achievement of surprise was also complicated by the fact that the terrain on the Don is open and the bridgeheads being set up by the assault groupings were completely visible to enemy intelligence. Movements from the rear to the front, especially across the Don, were therefore permitted only at night and with strict observance of blackout rules. Life came to a halt in the forming-up areas in the daytime, and the troops were carefully concealed in ravines, population centers and the developed positions. Violations of the requirements for surprise and deception were regarded as failure to carry out a combat order and immediately halted. All questions pertaining to preparations for the counteroffensive were resolved verbally on the spot by representatives of the Supreme High Command, who met with a restricted number of individuals.

The enemy was deceived as a result of all this. At the beginning of October German intelligence still did not reject the possibility of a Soviet Army offensive in the area of Stalingrad, whereas later it concluded that the main strike was being set up and would be conducted on the sector of Army Group "Zentrum," that is, on the western axis. A total of 80 divisions remained in that group, including eight tank and five motorized divisions. In addition, two tank divisions of the strategic reserve were located there.

At that time Army Group "B" had only six tank divisions and four motorized divisions. And it had few tanks, 675 in all, that is, half the number located on the western axis.

Recalling preparations for the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, G.K. Zhukov wrote in his book "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Memories and Reflections]: "The distinguished service of Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and the General Staff lies in the fact that they proved themselves capable of analyzing all the factors of that grand operation with scientific precision and were able to foresee its development and its conclusion."

No matter how well the situation was assessed and no matter how well founded the decisions were, it was extremely difficult to completely implement them and, as military history has demonstrated, it was far from always possible. After all, it is not possible to foresee absolutely everything which can occur over a prolonged period-- an entire campaign, for example, which lasts 4-6 months, or even a single operation, since the other side is resisting the attacker vigorously, determinedly and sometimes, desperately. Chance therefore manifests itself in military activities more frequently than in any other area of human affairs. I speak of chance as a manifestation of necessity in a military struggle. It was originally planned to begin the counteroffensive at Stalingrad on 9 November, for example. It proved impossible, however, to deliver the required quantity of materiel on time on the single-track railways, against which the enemy had stepped up its air raids. The prolonged fall season of bad roads and the shortage of motor transport means made it difficult to haul the supplies from distant stations to the troops, especially those in the forming-up positions beyond the Don and the Volga. The newly formed or restored formations sometimes lacked experience in regrouping at night with limited time available. All of this made it necessary to postpone the beginning of the offensive to 19-20 November.

Headquarters, Supreme High Command, High Command, and the front and army commanders demonstrated great skill in the massing of personnel and equipment on the crucial axes. The counteroffensive by Soviet forces at Stalingrad was begun with a relatively disadvantageous balance of personnel and equipment. They had a 1.1-fold superiority

over the enemy in personnel, a 1.5-fold superiority in guns and mortars, a 2.2-fold superiority in tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces and a 1.1-fold superiority in combat aircraft. With this ratio of forces our troops had to fight not with numbers but with skill, as the great Russian military leader A.V. Suvorov expressed it.

From the standpoint of military art this was minimal superiority, and the situation could only be resolved with the skilful and determined massing of personnel and means on narrow sectors of the breakthrough and the axes of the main thrusts by the fronts and armies. And our command successfully achieved this. Thanks to the decisive and skilful concentration of main efforts on the crucial axes, our forces in the Southwestern Front had a 2-fold superiority over the enemy in personnel, guns, mortars and tanks, and in the Stalingrad Front our superiority over the enemy was 2.5-fold for personnel and 3-fold for guns, mortars, tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces.

The skilful creation of assault groupings and the decisive massing of personnel and means on the main axes not only assured the achievement of crucial preponderance over the enemy, but also made it possible to make powerful initial attacks and to increase their force in the depth as the counteroffensive progressed.

Even more of the unforeseen occurs in the course of operations.

The counteroffensive began on 19 November from staging areas on the Middle Don. There was a dense fog and heavy snowfall, which even today the forecasters can only predict from 1 to 3 days in advance, and then not with overly great accuracy. This prevented the employment of aircraft. Their combat missions were reassigned to the artillery. Because of a shortage of ammunition and the short range of the mortars, however, the artillery was unable to completely make up for bombing and strafing by aircraft, especially against the reserves and targets in the enemy's defensive depth. After penetrating the forward edge the attackers suddenly encountered fairly strong resistance. We were unable to conduct a nonstop offensive to the depth of the first position also because the regiments and divisions were arranged in a single echelon. We assumed that this arrangement would make it possible to compensate to some degree for the lack of artillery fire with fire from small arms. This assumption was partly justified, but it was impossible for the regiments and divisions to build up the thrust into the depth, taking advantage of weak sectors in the enemy defense.

It should be noted that the commanders, who had considerable combat experience, rapidly understood this fact and found ways to overcome the enemy's resistance the very first day. With concentrated artillery fire they suppressed the enemy's best strong-points, making it possible to capture them with infantry and tanks. This broke up the defense the enemy had formed on the new line. The reserves began to be built up during the second half of the day, in order to develop the success there where it was taking shape or was already established. Second echelons had already been formed during the night in many divisions and regiments.

Seeing that the development of the attacks had slowed, the army commanders requested permission from the front commanders to commit tank corps to the battle ahead of the time specified. Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, commander of the Southwestern Front, satisfied that request and simultaneously took steps to provide air and artillery support for the introduction of tank corps into the breach, although the weather was extremely unfavorable for air operations.

Due to the unexpectedness of the counteroffensive and the breakthrough by Soviet forces on several axes at once, the command of Army Group "B" was unable to determine which axis was the most dangerous. It therefore first sent the 48th Tank Corps to a secondary axis, against our 21st and 65th Armies. Some time passed before it was directed to our 5th Tank Army's zone, where the main strike was being made. Time had been lost, however. Furthermore, the divisions of that corps lost contact with each other during the regrouping and were operating without coordination.

Tank corps of the 5th Tank Army (actually a composite army, since it included six rifle divisions) thwarted an enemy counterattack on 20 November with active operations, broke out into operational space and rushed toward Kalach.

The offensive by assault groupings of the Stalingrad Front were even more unexpected for the enemy. After breaking through the enemy defense the rifle divisions created conditions conducive to the commitment to battle of the 4th Mechanized Corps and the 13th Tank Corps, which immediately rushed toward Sovetskiy.

Tank and mechanized corps of the Southwestern and Stalingrad Fronts met in the area of Kalach-na-Donu and Sovetskiy on 23 November 1942, securely closing the ring of encirclement, which contained 22 divisions and more than 160 separate units. These were a part of the 6th Army, but some belonged to the 4th Tank Army. In addition, 27,000 soldiers and officers were taken prisoners.

As the solid ring of encirclement was created, its outer front was simultaneously formed. An attempt was also made to split the encircled grouping, in order to accelerate its total defeat by destroying it piecemeal. Because of the limited ammunition, however, the Don Front's 24th Army was unable to break through the enemy defense and develop a thrust along the little bend of the Don. The struggle with the encircled grouping then became more difficult. By 30 November we had only been able to reduce by half the area defended by the grouping. This was mainly due to the fact that considerably more forces were encircled than we had anticipated, and the enemy was able to create a fairly solid defense around the ring of encirclement.

The first operational-strategic objective, a very important one, had still been achieved, however: The enemy's most powerful and active grouping was encircled and was bottled up in that area which it had spent more than 3 months capturing.

Even in this phase the Soviet command had demonstrated great military art. It was reflected in the selection of axes for the attacks and the time for going over to a counteroffensive, in the conduct of the artillery attack, the systematic commitment of operational echelons to the battle and in the coordination of the efforts of troops advancing toward the ultimate point of encirclement. Effective party-political work assured the coordinated launching of the attacks, the skilful advance of the forces into the depth of the enemy's defense and their mass heroism.

As soon as the Stalingrad enemy grouping had been encircled forces of the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts, at Headquarters' instructions, began to prepare for operation "Saturn," during which it was planned to penetrate to Rostov.

Later, the Hitlerite command noted that an attack from the Middle Don could result in a "Super-Stalingrad." In an attempt to prevent a catastrophe, following several days

of confusion after the encirclement of Paulus' forces, it began frantically seeking ways to rescue them. The commander of Army Group "B" proposed withdrawing the 6th Army to the west. Hitler, supported by those close to him, stated stubbornly and categorically: "I will not abandon the Volga. I will not withdraw from the Volga." Loss of the Stalingrad area would mean an important military-political defeat, after all, and force the enemy to abandon the entire area captured during the summer campaign. The idea of involving Japan and Turkey in the war against the USSR also had to be abandoned. Furthermore, the Romanian military chiefs were expressing dissatisfaction over the destruction of their two best armies.

In the final days of November Hitler confidently assumed that decisive steps would make it possible to break through to the 6th Army.

Army Group "Don" headed by Field Marshal Manstein, an experienced commander, was created as an emergency measure to restore the front on Don and the Volga and to prevent the destruction of the 6th Army, and another army group commanded by General Hoth, also an experienced commander, was created to break through to Stalingrad. Divisions from the North Caucasus, from France, from the areas of Voronezh and Orel, as well as a battalion of heavy "Tiger" tanks, were transferred to it. The operations to relieve the encircled forces were called "Wintersturm," during the course of which it was planned to knock out a corridor to the 6th Army: and "Donnerslag," which was to result in the complete freeing of the encircled forces.

As a result of this the Soviet Supreme High Command had to make substantial changes in the plan for the campaign. First of all, our forces needed to destroy the enemy forces planning to break through to the encircled grouping and to hold the Stalingrad area. While continuing preparations for operation "Saturn," Headquarters limited the missions to the Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts. Instead of a thrust from the south toward Rostov, they were ordered to conduct an offensive on the southeastern axis, into the flank of Army Group "Don." The operation was now code-named "Malyy Saturn." The 5th Assault Army and the 5th Tank Army, which had been turned over to the Stalingrad Front, were to carry out an attack against that group from the east. The target dates for eliminating the encircled grouping were also postponed. The routing of Got's army group became the main mission of the Stalingrad Front's main forces.

The decision on the development of the counteroffensive was an extremely interesting one. Headquarters was able to rapidly assess the new situation and to discover the main center in it, the breaking up of which could result in the achievement of the main objectives and missions of the entire winter campaign. That center was created by the enemy's Army Group "Don." Its formations were driven back from the 6th Army 100 or more kilometers in the first phase of development of the counteroffensive by attacks from the Middle Don and from the outer front of encirclement, and it found itself in a hopeless situation.

The routing of Army Group "Don" completed the breakthrough of the enemy's strategic front. The subsequent offensive by forces of the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts from the Upper Don to the west, and by those of the Stalingrad Front toward Rostov resulted in the destruction of the entire southern wing of the enemy's Eastern Front and created conditions conducive to the development of an offensive in a zone running from Kursk to Taganrog.

The refined plan for the campaign could produce enormous military-political results. The enemy would be routed where it had achieved the greatest success, and this in itself would undermine the enemy's prestige and confidence in its ability to win the war. Enormous areas of fertile land would be freed. The attacking forces would create the operational-strategic preconditions for liberating even more important areas of the Ukraine and Central Russia.

In order to prevent penetration by Hoth's group to the area of Stalingrad, the 51st Army was ordered to go over to a defense in a zone around 200 kilometers wide. Its divisions therefore had to hold a front stretching up to 50 kilometers, 4-5 times more than the accepted norm.

The enemy began its breakthrough to the encircled grouping on 12 December. On a narrow sector of front it created approximately a triple superiority in personnel and artillery and a 6-fold superiority in tanks. Two tank divisions and a "Tiger" battalion, as well as three infantry divisions and one cavalry division fell upon our two divisions, a rifle and a cavalry division. The enemy's operations were made easier also by the fact that forces of the 51st Army had not been able to set an adequately strong defense on the frozen ground.

Despite all this, the enemy was only able to penetrate from 4 to 12 kilometers into the positions of our forces on the first day of the offensive. The rate of advance dropped to 3-5 kilometers during the next 4 days. The enemy advanced only 60 kilometers in 7 days.

The strength of the 51st Army's divisions was reduced even more in the battles fought against the enemy pushing toward Stalingrad. The 13th Tank Corps and the 4th Mechanized Corps arrived from the inner ring of encirclement to help them. They conducted a counterthrust, halted the enemy's advance and forced it to split up its forces. The enemy still had a significant superiority, however, and began regrouping for the final spring toward the 6th Army.

In an attempt to prevent the breakthrough, Headquarters moved General R. Ya. Malinovskiy's 2nd Guards Army up to meet Hoth's army group. It had two rifle corps, two mechanized corps and a tank corps, as well as powerful artillery. Reaching the Myshkova River, its forces, together with the 51st Army, completely halted the advance of the enemy divisions and soon carried out an attack themselves. By 30 December the Stalingrad Front's left wing had captured the Kotel'nikovskiy area and rushed along the lower stretch of the Don.

The enemy was preparing to conduct its second attack from a staging area near Ryshkovskiy Farm, but forces of the 5th Assault Army thwarted the plan with an anticipatory attack.

Four days after the enemy began operation "Wintersturm" Soviet forces began an offensive from the Middle Don. They were resisted by the Italian 8th Army's defense, prepared over a 5-month period, which consisted of two zones with a combined depth of 20-25 kilometers and with numerous trenches, foxholes, earth-and-timber emplacements, covered trenches and obstacles.

The enemy offered determined resistance during the breakthrough and carried repeated counterattacks in an attempt to push the attackers back to the starting point. During

the very first day Soviet troops advanced 4-5 kilometers, however. The next day they accomplished a breakthrough of the enemy's strongest defense zone and advanced 20-25 kilometers in the depth. The third day they progressed 40 kilometers, and on the fifth day the tank corps reached points 150-240 kilometers from their starting points and created a threat to routes leading from the rear of Army Group "Don" into Southeastern Ukraine. Manstein was forced to halt the offensive toward Stalingrad and transfer some of his forces to oppose troops of the Southwestern Front.

A comparison of the rate of advance of Hoth's army group with that of the Soviet forces executing operation "Malyy Saturn" convincingly shows that the latter was readied far more skilfully and that the Soviet formations, especially the tank corps, performed more successfully than the enemy forces.

The Soviet command employed various kinds of combat operations against Army Group "Don." In the defense these consisted of holding the lines occupied and making powerful counter-thrusts. In the offensive they included breaking through the enemy's defense and developing the breakthrough, pursuit, flank attacks, the repelling of tank attacks and the fortification of positions occupied. All of this made it possible not only to prevent the enemy from penetrating to the 6th Army, but also to envelop Army Group "Don" from the flanks. It began to withdraw. Forces of the Stalingrad Front, renamed the Southern Front, rushed toward Rostov. The Bryansk, Voronezh and Southwestern Fronts completed preparations for the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh and Voronezh-Kastornoye operations, in which it was planned to free the Central Chernozem area and regions of the Eastern Ukraine.

An encircled enemy grouping remained in the rear, however. The Soviet command had to decide what to do now. Should it direct the main forces to develop the success achieved during the counteroffensive, in order to free as much territory as possible in the southeast, which included such grain-producing areas as the Left-Bank Ukraine and Central Russia and two large industrial areas, Khar'kov and the Donbass? Or should it conduct an offensive to the west simultaneously with the destruction of the Stalingrad grouping? And after that? After that.... It was impossible to say, because the enemy might strengthen its shattered front. This would also mean that the Don Front (44 effective divisions, 6,860 guns and mortars, 257 tanks and 300 aircraft) would be unable to take part in the offensive toward the Dnepr and the Desna.

A question arose as to the best way to relieve the Stalingrad grouping with the limited forces and whether to assign the freed forces, approximately three armies, to develop the offensive to the west. The fact that the front would be hundreds of kilometers from Stalingrad would inevitably result in capitulation by the enemy's exhausted grouping. There were some grounds for believing this. Other circumstances had to be considered in the resolution of this question, however.

The Soviet people were having a bitter time of it. The people desperately wanted a breakthrough in the war. It was necessary to strengthen their faith in our ultimate victory. Naturally, the liberation of the entire Don, the North Caucasus, areas of the Chernozem and regions in the Ukraine would be regarded by the Soviet people and their army as an enormous victory over a powerful enemy. The other side also had to be considered, however. We needed not simply a victory, but a victory which would shake up the German army and all of Germany even more than did the victory at Moscow. We needed a situation in which the Hitlerite leadership could neither justify nor explain the

Wehrmacht's defeat. We needed to prevent fascist propaganda from creating yet another "miracle" (a year previously it had passed off the retreat from Moscow by Wehrmacht forces, which barely escaped total destruction, as a "miracle").

The routing of the grouping encircled at Stalingrad could be such a victory. A victory was also needed for operational-tactical reasons. In the winter campaign of 1941-1942 the Soviet Army had encircled or deeply enveloped several large enemy groupings, but by taking desperate steps, the fascist leadership still managed to prevent a total rout. Hitlerite propaganda began to say that the Soviet command was incapable of completing an encirclement operation. "Hold on stubbornly," the Hitlerite Reich's propagandists assured their troops, "the Fuhrer will rescue you." On 23 November, when the ring of encirclement was closed, Hitler radioed Paulus to say: "I know the 6th Army and its supreme commander and I know that in the present situation they will steadfastly hold on. The 6th Army should know that I am doing everything possible to aid and rescue it."

All of these circumstances forced us to make the decision that the 6th Army was to be totally routed or forced to make an unconditional surrender. The German soldiers and officers had to be made aware by the fate of Paulus' army that from now on resistance by encircled forces would be senseless, that their destruction would be inevitable. This was of enormous importance for our subsequent offensive operations: The very threat of encirclement should undermine the determination of the defending forces.

Finally, it was necessary to eliminate the encircled Hitlerite grouping also in order to improve the movement of troops and freight for the national economy. Rostov was in enemy hands, and rail shipments between the Center and the Caucasus could only be made through Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk, especially in the winter. The Astrakhan-Kizlyar Railway had still not begun operating. Forces of the Southern Front advancing toward Rostov-na-Donu were being based on the Stalingrad-Tikhoretsk Railway, and troops of the Southwestern on the Stalingrad-Likhaya Railway. It was impossible to use these railways without freeing the Stalingrad railway junction.

I shall not enumerate all the consequences of the decision adopted by Headquarters to totally rout the encircled grouping. I shall discuss only one. Hitlerite propaganda was making every effort to present the 6th Army's operations as heroic, to show that the soldiers' Nordic spirit had not been broken. Even after Soviet forces had enveloped it in an iron ring, attempts were being made in Germany to elevate the doomed grouping to the ranks of the immortal, to cite the troops as an example not just for those who were to carry on the criminal war, but also for postwar Germans, whom it was planned to use for yet another act of revenge. The 3-day period of national mourning was declared in Germany for precisely this purpose, and a splendid requiem was performed for Paulus (assuming that he had already shot himself or that he would do so). All of the main generals attended, and Hitler himself placed Germany's highest decoration on an empty grave.

All of this failed to produce the desired result for the Hitlerite leadership, however. The routing of the 6th Army shook the nation. The Germans understood that the Soviet Union would win.

The soldiers taken prisoner learned from German communist emigrants the truth about the political and military motives for which the Hitlerite leaders had forced the encircled troops to hold out to the last bullet, learned how they had been betrayed and

calmly doomed to destruction. These soldiers have still not forgotten Stalingrad. They are frustrating attempts by revengers to create a halo of heroism over those who fought in the encirclement.

The defeat at Stalingrad robbed the German General Staff of its former self-confidence, and it began to make frequent, gross errors. The operation plan for the summer campaign of 1943, for example, was worked out without a clear ultimate goal. G.K. Zhukov wrote the following about events occurring a year later in his book "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya": "As we observed and analyzed the actions of the German forces and their main command in that operation (the Belorussian operation--V.K.), frankly speaking, we were somewhat surprised at their grossly erroneous maneuvers, which doomed the forces to a catastrophic outcome. Instead of rapidly withdrawing to rear lines and transferring powerful groupings to their flanks, which were threatened by Soviet assault groupings, the German forces were drawn into lengthy frontal engagements to the east and north-east of Minsk."

The routing of the Hitlerite forces at Stalingrad elated all progressive mankind, strengthened their faith that victory over fascism would be achieved and encouraged the Resistance and underground fighters and the allied forces.

From the standpoint of military art operation "Kol'tso," during which the encircled grouping was routed, was remarkable in that it was conducted with only a 1.5-fold superiority on the part of Soviet forces in artillery and a 3-fold superiority in aircraft, while Soviet forces had fewer tanks and men than the enemy. This predetermined the operation plan and the nature of the operations conducted by various branches of troops. The main thrust was carried out from west to east, since the enemy's defense was weaker there. The 62nd and 64th Armies were able to advance toward the main forces, and this made it possible to rapidly split the encircled grouping. The limited number of tanks made it necessary to give special attention to the artillery. Artillery densities were increased to 120 guns per kilometer of breakthrough sector, and the moving barrage was employed to support an attack for the first time in the Patriotic War. The extensive fire damage inflicted upon the enemy made it possible for the attacking forces to advance 6-8 kilometers into the depth in one day.

The enemy still had some reserves and was able to halt the attack. Altering the axis of the thrust, the Soviet command began achieving success once more: By 17 January the front line had been shortened from 170 to 110 kilometers. This made it possible to increase the artillery density on the axes of the strikes to 220 or more guns per kilometer. The enemy suffered enormous losses from our artillery fire. The remaining forces were bottled up in an area of 100 square kilometers. "The hellish fire strike," as the German soldiers subsequently called the artillery preparation, broke up the defense, and the encircled grouping was split into two parts. This predetermined its rapid capitulation.

The final phases of the historic battle on the Volga faded out on 2 February 1943.

The news of the victory at Stalingrad swept over the entire front, the entire nation, within a few hours. We who had fought far from Stalingrad rejoiced at the victory and were proud of those whom we had helped in some way to achieve it. This victory gave us new strength, and as we prepared to storm the Rzhev bridgehead, we intended to operate in the Stalingrad way.

When one recalls those long-ago days, one thinks primarily of the incredible difficulties which the Soviet Army and all of our people had to endure during the summer and fall of 1942. We withstood and overcame all of the difficulties because we were led by the Communist Party, which was able to mobilize all the nation's material, military and spiritual reserves. Although the enemy captured enormous territories and extremely important industrial and agricultural areas in the nation, the party built up the Soviet people's confidence that victory would ultimately be ours, conducted an enormous operation to relocate and restructure industry and, during the period of considerable military losses, was able to replace them and provide the Soviet Army with a quantity of weapons, combat equipment and new military formations which permitted them to inflict the most terrible defeat in Germany history upon the Wehrmacht.

Many types of strategic, operational and tactical operations were employed during the year and a half of fighting on the approaches to Stalingrad and in the city itself, as well as far from the city--on those fronts which were helping it. The continuation of the war required that they be carefully analyzed, in order to recommend to the field army that which would assure to the greatest degree possible the accomplishment of the forthcoming military-political tasks.

It was fairly difficult to determine the most effective methods for conducting the combat operations, for the interval between the winter and summer campaigns lasted only 2½-3 months. However, the commanders and staffs had already acquired enough combat experience to be able not only to select what was best from it, but also to introduce it in the forces within brief periods of time. This was confirmed by the operations conducted on the Upper Don during the second half of January 1943, when 22 enemy divisions were encircled. Their defeat was accomplished within 5-6 days, and the front of encirclement was created by continuing the offensive by the forward units and formations.

The accumulated combat experience had to be summarized, however, so that the new recommendations would conform to the significant changes occurring in the armed conflict during the turning point of 1942-1943. The time had passed for the localized, shallow defense employed by the enemy in its first defensive campaign. It was now creating a deep, static defense with continuous trenches and numerous solid weapon emplacements covered by minefields and barbed wire entanglements along the entire front line.

Headquarters, Supreme High Command, revealed the enemy's plan for the summer of 1943: to achieve total victory in the war or at least a "standoff," that is, force the Soviet Union to make peace under terms advantageous to Germany, with yet another general offensive code-named "Zitadelle." Taking into account the experience in the defensive campaign of 1942, Headquarters adopted a decision to go over to a premeditated defense in a situation in which our field army had considerable superiority over the enemy forces.

The enemy assault groupings encountered extremely stiff resistance during the very first days of operation "Zitadelle." The improved heavy tanks, the fascist command's main operational trump, proved incapable of creating the conditions for performing the strategic missions. At Hitler's headquarters people were already talking about the encirclement and destruction of the Soviet armies near the Kursk salient, of "weakening" them and the commitment to the battle of the greatest possible number of our reserves.

After making the decision to go over to a premeditated defense, the Soviet Supreme High Command continued to prepare for the summer counteroffensive. Its plan took into account the experience of the counteroffensive at Stalingrad and other offensive operations. Special attention was given to the organization of the breakthrough of a deep, static defense.

Foreseeing that the enemy would switch to a static defense everywhere, as early as the winter of 1942-43 the Soviet command began carrying out a system of measures which would make it possible to break through that defense rapidly and absolutely and assure that it would be smashed on a considerable front.

The penetration of the enemy's defense at the beginning of the Stalingrad counteroffensive and especially that conducted during operation "Kol'tso" demonstrated the fact that the system of fire and obstacles is destroyed more reliably and the moral-psychological stamina of the hostile forces is considerably reduced as the artillery density is increased. All of this ultimately results in penetration of the defense with fewer losses and at greater speed.

The scientific summarization of the experience of the last battles at Stalingrad and during the breaking up of the Leningrad blockade made it possible to determine the density of forces, especially the artillery, which would assure the reliable break-in and penetration of the enemy's defense by the attacking echelons. It was 160-200 or more guns per kilometer of breakthrough sector, with artillery and air preparation of considerable duration. The tank density was increased to 41 per kilometer. The zones of advance for the divisions were narrowed by half, and this, in turn, increased the density of the companies and battalions.

The creation of this density of forces on breakthrough sectors 20-30 kilometers wide would require 3,000-6,000 guns and mortars, 1,000-2,500 tanks, 1,200-2,500 aircraft and 20-50 divisions. There could be as many as 10,000 or more vehicles in such groupings, which would have to be secretly concentrated on selected axes.

In order to plan the combat employment of this quantity of forces and concentrate them rapidly in small areas without detection by the enemy, their structure would have to be enlarged. First of all, the separate artillery regiments of Reserve, Supreme High Command, would be combined into brigades and divisions, and new artillery formations--breakthrough divisions and corps--would be formed. The combining of the air forces into air armies had been completed on the fronts. Instead of composite tank armies, such as the 5th Tank Army at Stalingrad, as an example, five tank armies were created with only tank and mechanized corps.

Such large organizational measures were a significant achievement of Soviet military art and created the material preconditions for conducting operations aimed at overwhelming the enemy's powerful defense. Encirclement operations were not extensively employed in the summer-fall campaign of 1943, however. The reason, in our opinion, was the fact that Soviet forces were faced with penetrating a very powerful enemy defense system. The experience of the last campaign had shown that it would be very difficult to achieve a rapid advance by the forces in an offensive against such a defense, since not all of the elements had been smoothly coordinated yet in the operations of the troops securing the breakthrough.

In his book "General'nyy shtab v gody voyny" The General Staff in the War Years S.M. Shtemenko expressed a different opinion: "...encirclement and subsequent elimination of the Belgorod-Khar'kov German grouping would have pinned down a large number of our troops for a long period of time and diverted them from the offensive against the Dnepr, thereby making it easier for the enemy to create a powerful new defense on the right bank of the Dnepr."

Whatever the reason, preference was given to deep, cleaving attacks. Special attention was given to the planning, preparation and execution. The commanders and staffs took what was to a significant degree a new approach to the resolution of questions pertaining to the echeloning of the troops, the breaking up of a powerful defense with artillery fire and air strikes and the employment of large bodies of tanks. The rifle forces for the breakthrough were now being arranged primarily in two or three echelons. Echelons for developing the success were created in the fronts and in certain armies, which included one or two tank armies or separate tank and mechanized corps. Interaction among the forces during their commitment to battle was organized especially thoroughly. This helped to increase the rate of the offensive and led to the rapid splitting up of the opposing enemy grouping and to the formation of large breaches in its defense. This made it possible to switch to mobile operations.

We were not able immediately to completely coordinate the commitment of tactical and operational echelons in the summer of 1943. During the first day of the operations the forces rarely penetrated the enemy's defense to the entire tactical depth of 15-20 kilometers. There were a number of reasons for this. On the Western and Bryansk Fronts the 3rd and 4th Tank Armies were not completely organized by the beginning of the counteroffensive and were belatedly committed to the battle. The enemy's powerful defense on the Central Front was not suppressed sufficiently for the attacking forces to advance with adequate speed. And the 2nd Tank Army was unable to complete the breakthrough: It had suffered considerable losses in the defensive engagement just ended. During the very first day of the Belgorod-Khar'kov operation, the 1st and 5th Guards Tank Armies advanced 30 kilometers and created the conditions for a swift thrust into the depth. The rate of penetration by our forces there was three times that of the enemy's penetration in operation "Zitadelle," which had just ended in failure.

The experience in executing cleaving thrusts acquired in 1943 was subsequently perfected and successfully employed in the concluding operations of the Great Patriotic War.

Encirclement operations were brilliantly incorporated in the military campaigns of 1944 and 1945. The Soviet fronts conducted four such operations in the Right-Bank Ukraine during the winter and spring of 1944. These were made difficult by the fact that the new campaign was essentially a development of the previous one, and therefore there were no operational intervals between them, during which it would have been possible to replace losses and stockpile materiel. Concentrating 18 tank divisions, which was 80% of all those fighting in the east, in the Ukraine, the enemy even achieved a certain superiority in tanks. Despite this, the Soviet Supreme High Command and the front and army commands skilfully held the strategic initiative and successfully conducted a number of successive and simultaneous operations. The Korsun'-Shevchenko operation, during which our forces managed to rout an enemy grouping numbering around 10 divisions, was the most significant. The defense of Army Group "Sud" was shaken and the morale of its troops broken. This made it easier, during the season of bad roads, to penetrate the enemy's defense and swiftly pursue its armies far to the west.

The strength of the attacking groupings made it possible to conduct encirclement operations with diverse objectives and at various depths. In the Belorussian army group operation, for example, encirclement operations were employed in the very beginning of the offensive to capture such important strategic points as Vitebsk and the Bobruysk area. This cut the supports of the "Belorussian balcony," as the enemy called the defense it had created in Belorussia. Combined with the frontal cleaving thrusts and the encirclement of enemy forces at Orsha and Mogilev, this resulted in the formation of an enormous breach in its strategic defense, stretching from the Western Dvina to Pripyat'.

The speed and destructiveness with which the encircled groupings were routed created panic and reduced the will to resist in the enemy's country. This is what an officer of the 36th Infantry Division revealed about this: "The Russians had managed to encircle the 9th Army in the area of Bobruysk. The order came to break through, and we were successful in the beginning.... But the Russians created several blockades around each area, and we escaped one only to fall into another. General confusion resulted. It was not uncommon for German colonels and lieutenant colonels to rip off their shoulder boards, discard their service caps and begin awaiting the Russians. Universal panic reigned.... This was a catastrophe such as I had never before experienced."

After penetrating the strategic front swift pursuit of the enemy was begun. Soviet forces closed the iron ring of encirclement to the east of Minsk, developed the success, reached Lithuania and Latvia and cut off the entire Army Group "Nord"--33 divisions--in the Baltic area.

Yet another of the more brilliant encirclement operations, the Iasi-Kishinev operation, was conducted at the end of the summer of 1944. Eighteen of 25 divisions in the "Southern Ukraine" Army Group were encircled on the fifth day of the offensive, and in another 5 days the group ceased to exist.

In 1944 our forces conducted 15 encirclement operations, routing many dozens of enemy divisions.

The strength of the Soviet Army and its superiority over the Hitlerite army in all aspects of military art increased even more in the final year of the Great Patriotic War. Correspondingly, its capabilities for conducting encirclement operations also grew. Planning the final military campaign in the west, however, the Soviet Supreme High Command called primarily for deep cleaving thrusts supplemented with the encirclement of those forces located between the axes of the thrusts in the strategic offensive operations. This type of operation made it possible with one powerful thrust to rapidly overrun the first strategic echelon and, forestalling the withdrawal of the defeated enemy forces, to penetrate numerous defense lines in the depth from the march. The Vistula-Oder operation was based on precisely this concept. Encirclement operations were employed where they could produce important operational-strategic results. Specifically, the encirclement of two large enemy groupings--in Berlin and to the southeast of there--were executed along with deep cleaving thrusts during the Berlin operation. A total of 25 enemy groupings encircled or pressed against the sea were routed in 1945.

The victory at Stalingrad had an extremely favorable effect upon Soviet military art. After studying the enemy's strong and weak points and acquiring experience in organizing the combat operations of our troops, and confidence, the Soviet command made bold and far-sighted decisions and perfected its skill in directing the forces from one operation to the next.

At Kursk and near Lake Balaton Soviet military leaders and chiefs and the forces structured their defense in such a way that the enemy's most powerful armored wedges were broken up against it. Encirclement operations underwent extensive development in the offensive operation. The strategic breakthrough accomplished by the Soviet Army in the winter of 1942-43 was repeated many times in subsequent military campaigns.

The Battle of Stalingrad had an enormous influence on the development of our military art after the war. And each new generation of generals and officers scrupulously study and will continue to study that experience, in order to find the bases for resolving those military problems which our turbulent times are bringing up.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

USSR CIVIL DEFENSE CHIEF ON ARMY-NAVY DAY

Moscow STROITEL'NAYA GAZETA in Russian 23 Feb 83 p 1

[Article by Army Gen A. T. Altunin, Hero of the Soviet Union and chief of USSR Civil Defense and USSR deputy minister of defense: "A Secure Bulwark of Peace and Labor"]

[Text] The Soviet people, the workers in the fraternal socialist nations and our friends abroad are celebrating the 65th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces, the secure bulwark of peace and labor. The birth, rise and development of the Soviet Army and Navy are inseparably linked to the name of V. I. Lenin. In following his ideas and instructions, the Council of People's Commissars on 28 January 1918 ratified the Decree on the Organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army and on 11 February, the Decree on the Creation of the Worker-Peasant Red Navy.

The young Soviet republic at that time was living through difficult days. The internal counterrevolution and international imperialism were doing everything, as W. Churchill then stated, "to strangle the Bolshevik babe in its cradle." The German imperialists, having violated the truce conditions, on 18 February advanced their hordes in an offensive along the entire front. The enemy directly threatened Red Petrograd, the capital of the proletarian revolution. The greatest danger hung over the nation. The Soviet government turned to the people with the appeal-decree "The Socialist Fatherland in Danger" which was drawn up by V. I. Lenin. The party appeal evoked an unprecedented upsurge of revolutionary energy among the working masses. During those days, tens of thousands of the finest sons of the working class and peasantry volunteered for the Red Army.

The days of mobilizing the revolutionary forces of the people and the heroic defense of the victories of Great October against the invasion by the hordes of German imperialism have become part of the eternal history of the Soviet Armed Forces. In commemoration of this great feat, on 23 February each year our nation celebrates Soviet Army and Navy Day.

Created by the Communist Party and the great Lenin, the Soviet Armed Forces have carried their glory-wreathed standards through many engagements, in winning brilliant victories. Over their heroic history, they have taught more than one instructive lesson to those fond of violating our sacred frontiers or attacking the socialist victories.

The war of 1941-1945 prepared for and started by German Naziism was the severest testing for the Soviet people and their armed defenders. Some 190 divisions numbering 5.5 million soldiers and officers, many thousands of tanks, combat aircraft, guns and mortars and other equipment were moved by Nazi Germany against the USSR. Never before had the history of wars known such a mighty invasion army.

The war lasted 1,418 days and nights and became for the Soviet people the Great Patriotic War for the freedom and independence of their motherland. In terms of its political content, for the USSR, this was a just, liberation war. It determined not only the fate of the world's first socialist state, a question of life itself for the Soviet people, but also the future of world civilization. This was the main source of the self-sacrifice, courage and valor of the Soviet people in the rear and on the front. The acute clash between the two opposing worlds determined the unprecedented acuteness and uncompromisingness of the struggle.

The Communist Party was the inspirer and organizer of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War. The party and its Central Committee focused their chief efforts on the leadership of the wartime economy and the Armed Forces and on indoctrinating our people in a spirit of ardent patriotism and total dedication to the cause of the socialist fatherland.

The victory of our people and their army in the Great Patriotic War altered the face of the world. Under its influence the world socialist system arose and colonial empires collapsed.

But the weakening of the positions of capitalism, as events were to show, did not reduce, but rather strengthened the aggressiveness and adventurism of its policy. "Recently," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in a ceremony devoted to the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, "significantly increased activities have been shown by the most militant groupings whose class hate for socialism has gained the upper hand over a feeling for reality and at times even over common sense."

The U.S. ruling circles, in fanning the myth about the "Soviet military threat," are conducting a political, ideological and economic offensive against socialism and have brought the intensity of military preparations to an unprecedented level. The total number of American Armed Forces exceeds 4 million men. The U.S. leadership has been increasing its strategic nuclear weapons in every possible way and has been organizing new troop contingents, primarily the "Rapid Deployment Forces." Over the next 5 years, the Pentagon has been allocated more than 1.5 trillion dollars and this is 6-fold more than the military expenditures by the United States over all World War II.

The FRG, England, France, Italy, Japan and other capitalist nations have actively joined the arms race and are involved in it.

The new American strategy envisages the broad use of weapons of mass destruction against human beings. The Reagan Administration considers nuclear warfare as acceptable and even advisable and is actually preparing for it,

proceeding from the plan to get the upper hand in it. Thus, the world today has been brought to a dangerous brink by the efforts of the imperialists.

Under these conditions, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are doing everything to thwart the aggressive adventuristic plans of imperialism and prevent a nuclear catastrophe.

However, as events have shown, the United States and its NATO partners have essentially rejected the Soviet peace initiatives. They are stubbornly continuing the senseless aggressive course. The Soviet Union cannot help but consider this. In fighting for peace, it is forced to constantly strengthen its defense capability.

Our people are well aware that peace cannot be begged from the imperialists. It must be defended, relying solely on the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

At present, due to the constant concern of our party and government, the Soviet Army and Navy have changed in appearance beyond recognition. In their planned development, particular attention has been given to those forces and weapons which most ensure combat might. The Strategic Rocket Troops are the chief component of this might under present-day conditions and they serve as the basic factor checking the aggressor and possess the capacity in the event that the imperialists start a thermonuclear war, to immediately carry out a crushing retaliatory strike.

The technical equipping of all the other Armed Services and branches of troops has been significantly increased.

The 26th CPSU Congress provided high praise for the present level of combat might in the Armed Forces. "A strong alloy of high technical equipping, military skill and invincible morale," stated the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee, "this is the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces."

It is essential to emphasize that now the nation's defense capability has come to depend largely not only upon the development level and the state of combat readiness in the Soviet Armed Forces to defeat the enemy, but also upon other factors. As is known, in nuclear war the distinctions are eliminated between the front and the rear and the economy of the states, as the material basis of the war, become an object of armed action virtually to the entire depth of the nation's territory. Under these conditions, the CPSU sees the growing importance of all activities to ensure the viability of the state in the event of war, including the necessity of the corresponding preparation of the national economic sectors and the organizing of civil defense on a proper level.

The protection of the population is the main task of civil defense. Humans, as is known, are the highest value of our socialist state and the ensuring of the security of the Soviet people comprises the most important aim of all our defense measures. The success of carrying out all the remaining tasks of both civil defense as well as the state's defense generally depends totally upon the successful carrying out of the tasks to protect the population.

The population is protected primarily by building protective shelters. The collectives of Soviet construction workers have made a substantial contribution to creating a system of shelters and fallout shelters. Our soldiers are celebrating their holiday under conditions of intense military and political training and by new successes in improving their combat skills.

The last training year has become an important stage in carrying out the tasks posed by the 26th Party Congress for the Soviet Armed Forces. The combat readiness of the formations, units and ships has been increased. Many troop collectives have achieved outstanding indicators in military and political training and have completely fulfilled their socialist obligations.

For 65 years, the Soviet Army and Navy have securely defended the victories of Great October. Their high military might has been and remains a firm guarantee for the security of our fatherland and all world socialism. Rallied closely around the Communist Party and in a combat alliance with the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations, they are vigilantly protecting the peaceful creative labor of their people and are in constant readiness to deal a crushing rebuff to any aggressor. The Soviet people can build communism peacefully and confidently. Their labor is securely protected.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

CHAIRMAN YEGOROV DEFINES TASKS CONFRONTING DOSAAF

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 11, Nov 82 (signed to press 14 Oct 82)
pp i-1

[Article by USSR DOSAAF CC Chairman, HSU Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov: "Illuminated by the Light of October"]

[Text] The Soviet people and their friends abroad celebrated the 65th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Preparations for and celebration of this grand jubilee were marked by a high degree of political activeness and vital labor by Soviet citizens implementing plans for building communism, and by strenuous and purposeful struggle for fulfilling the historic outlines of the 26th CPSU Congress, quotas of the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the USSR Food Program and the Peace Program proclaimed by our party.

The Great October opened an era of general revolutionary renewal of the world--an era of transition from capitalism to socialism. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin ingeniously predicted the grandiose consequences of socialist revolution in Russia: "The history of mankind is making one of the most magnificent and most difficult turns in our days, having an immense and, without the slightest exaggeration one could say world-liberating, significance." (PSS [Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy (Complete Collected Works)], XXXVI, 78).

Life convincingly confirmed the prophecy of the great Lenin.

Beneath the banner of October the Soviet people showed a model of creative application in practice of the Leninist theory of socialist revolution, an example of the successful creation of a new social system and constructive resolution of such problems as the country's industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture and the cultural revolution. In a short period of time our Motherland became a leading, highly developed power. A developed socialist society was built in the USSR.

This year's celebration of the anniversary of the Great October is going on on the eve of the Soviet Union's 60th anniversary. The USSR's formation is the result of the Great October Socialist Revolution's victory. As noted in the CPSU CC Decree "On the 60th Anniversary of the USSR's Formation," establishment of the power of the working class and of socialist ownership of the means of production laid down a firm foundation for the free development of all nations and nationalities and for their close unity and friendship.

Creation of the USSR is a living embodiment of Leninist principles of nationality policy. A great brotherhood of nations appeared in our country under the CPSU's leadership and a new historic community of people--the Soviet people--was formed. Our Motherland now stands before the entire world as a friendly family of republics with equal rights building communism together. The solidarity of the Soviet people about the native Communist Party and its Central Committee headed by a true continuer of the great Leninist cause, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, is indestructible.

Immediately after the victory of the October Revolution our party was faced with the task of armed defense of Soviet power and creation of a new workers' and peasants' army. "Any revolution is worthwhile only if it is able to defend itself..." said V. I. Lenin.

Under his immediate direction the party created a regular, class-oriented army linked with the people by indestructible bonds, possessing high political awareness and mastering all forms of armed struggle. This army utterly defeated the White Guard hordes and foreign interventionists during the Civil War.

The enormous capabilities of socialism and the indestructible might of our army were displayed vividly during the Great Patriotic War. By defeating fascist Germany and imperialist Japan the Soviet Union defended its revolutionary achievements and saved world nations from enslavement.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev emphasized at a conference of military leaders in the Kremlin, today under conditions of an aggravation of the international situation which occurred through the fault of imperialist circles, we have to "steadfastly strengthen national defense and preserve supreme vigilance." Guidelines of the 26th party congress and its demands on the strengthening of defensive capability have been and remain a constant guide for armed defenders of the Soviet state. Our people love their Armed Forces and have confidence in their constant readiness to defend their socialist Motherland.

The USSR DOSAAF has an important role to play in involving Soviet citizens in the mastery of military affairs and further reinforcement of national defense. Under guidance of the Leninist party the Defense Society, in close coordination with trade unions, the Komsomol, and unit and ship commanders and political entities, conducts extensive work of military-patriotic indoctrination of workers and the youth, training specialists for the Armed Forces, propagandizing military-technical knowledge, preparing cadres of mass technical trades for the national economy, and developing technical and applied military sports.

The military-patriotic and mass defense work being conducted by DOSAAF is perceived by Soviet citizens as their own vital cause. Today 101 million USSR citizens are in the Defense Society, thus reflecting a desire to contribute in every way to a strengthening of the Motherland's might and a readiness, should it be necessary, to defend the achievements of socialism with gun in hand.

In the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation many DOSAAF committees and organizations considerably activated military-patriotic work and raised the level of indoctrination of DOSAAF members, especially the youth,

in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and of respect for heroic revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the party and people. DOSAAF organizations of Kuybyshev, Omsk, Rostov and Bryansk oblasts of the RSFSR, the city of Moscow, the Ukraine, Georgia and many others have been achieving noticeable successes over a number of years.

Beneficial experience has been gained in particular in Khabarovsk Kray. I personally had occasion to visit a number of primary organizations in the kray, and DOSAAF schools, and to see and become familiar with interesting forms of military-patriotic work. The primary organization of the Khabarovsk Dal'dizel' Diesel Construction Plant and the Khabarovsk Radiotechnical School are skillfully using a form such as theme nights entitled "Indestructible Union of Free Republics" where Army and Navy personnel and representatives of union and autonomous republics speak. There were showings of movies here telling the history of creation of the multinational Soviet state, and there were sports competitions dedicated to the USSR's jubilee.

The role played by DOSAAF committees, the large DOSAAF aktiv, and veterans of war, labor and the USSR Armed Forces is great in reinforcing the ideological conviction of Defense Society members. Lenin and sociopolitical readings, theme nights, political classes, political briefings, lectures, reports, talks, film nights, film festivals on military-patriotic topics, readers' conferences and many other forms of ideological influence are used actively in the work of many defense organizations. Monthlong and weeklong campaigns of mass defense work have become widespread. Each year over 60 million persons take part in activities of monthlong campaigns dedicated to the anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces. At the initiative of the USSR DOSAAF CC and with the immediate participation of its sports organizations, a vivid and interesting air holiday was held in Moscow on the 1982 Air Fleet Day. Such holidays will continue to be held regularly and will become a good tradition. Sports demonstrations are being arranged in many cities around the country and are serving as an effective means of propagandizing aviation sports.

At the same time, based on party directions, the military-patriotic indoctrination of Society members requires further improvement. Some DOSAAF committees still are doing a poor job of taking in rural layers of the population with their influence. This shortcoming is especially characteristic of certain organizations of Siberia and the Far East in which many indoctrination activities are conducted at an insufficiently high level, which naturally degrades their effectiveness.

Unfortunately aviation knowledge also is poorly propagandized here and aviation specialists are not always trained with good quality. Meanwhile a large contingent of the youth, among whom it is especially important to conduct mass defense activities, is working on the BAM [Baikal-Amur Railroad], in Tyumen and in Urengoy.

The level of military-patriotic work has to be raised and new forms and methods of indoctrination must be sought and adopted persistently and traditional forms and methods improved. It is advisable to make wider use of experience gained in the jubilee year.

The Society's assistance in strengthening national defense is manifested especially vividly in its work to prepare the youth for service in the Soviet Armed Forces. "Over a third of the draftees receive good training in DOSAAF training organizations," remarked CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal D. F. Ustinov. "They study specialties needed in the Armed Forces and for the national economy. DOSAAF rightly is called a preparatory classroom for that great school of life which service in the ranks of the Armed Forces is."

All DOSAAF training organizations are trying to justify this high evaluation during their daily activities. For example, cadets and instructors of the Rostov and Kinel'-Cherkasy air clubs are working with great enthusiasm these days. They successfully fulfilled their socialist pledges made in honor of the USSR's 60th anniversary. The air clubs are showing concern for improving training quality and the effectiveness of every class. Individual indoctrinational work is well arranged here. The strict supervision of the progress of training and regular methods classes held with instructors are producing good results in cadet training. Pledges for preparing ranking athletes were fulfilled successfully thanks to constant concern for the development of sports.

The Defense Society has numerous air clubs, and the collective in each of them is attempting to do its bit for training aviators, developing aviation sports and preparing athletes of a high class rating. Many of them are skillfully using the abundant experience gained by Osoaviakhim [Society for Assistance to Defense and Aviation-Chemical Industry] organizations in indoctrinating and training pilots, parachutists and other specialists. Many famed heroes of the past war matured and came to manhood in our air clubs. The example of Triple HSU's A. I. Pokryshkin and I. N. Kozhedub, of Soviet aces A. P. Mares'yev, B. F. Safonov, M. G. Gareyev and many others even now inspires the Soviet youth.

Many conquerors of space have gotten a start from the Defense Society's airfields. Student Svetlana Savitskaya came to the 3d Moscow Air Club as a 17-year-old girl. After going through a good school of aviation sports in 1½ years, she set three world records in high-altitude group jumps and made over 500 parachute jumps. In 1970 she became world champion in aerobatic flying. She has 18 world aviation records to her credit. In August 1982 DOSAAF air club alumna S. Savitskaya was part of the crew of the Soyuz T-7 spacecraft which made a weeklong flight in space and became the second woman in the world to conquer space altitudes. She was awarded the title of HSU for courage and valor.

Many air clubs successfully prepare parachutists and other specialists for the Armed Forces, including for the VDV [Airborne Troops]. The air clubs of the Ukraine, Belorussia and of Volgograd, Tula, Omsk and Sverdlovsk oblasts of the RSFSR produce good replacements for the Army, but we cannot rest on our laurels. We have to improve the quality of cadet training and indoctrination; wage a persistent struggle for flight safety, for accidentfree driving of automotive equipment, and for high effectiveness and quality of every aircraft and helicopter sortie; and achieve full use of every training minute.

But it has to be borne in mind that some DOSAAF training organizations, including air clubs, still are resolving these matters without proper

persistence or challenge. Concern must be shown to see that not just trained people emerge from the walls of our schools and air clubs, but specialists ready to act skillfully in a combat situation.

DOSAAF collectives must continue to make their contribution toward fulfilling the USSR Food Program. They must give more effective help to agriculture in preparing machine operators and other specialists, continue to develop military-patriotic and mass sports work among Society members in the village, and actively facilitate implementation of party plans.

The jubilee year was a period of our organizations' active work to fulfill the CPSU CC and USSR Council of Ministers Decree "On a Further Upswing in the Mass Nature of Physical Culture and Sport." Attention here was devoted to the key factor--involving the youth in sports activities. Much has been done.

Now some 31 million persons engage in technical and applied military sports. Young people are being accustomed actively to sports, they are receiving comprehensive physical conditioning and are being prepared to better master working trades and, in the Army and Navy, to master combat specialties faster and with higher quality in DOSAAF organizations of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Rostov, Moscow, Saratov, Penza and a number of other oblasts.

This year our athletes took part in several championships. Pilot V. Smolin and parachutist L. Korycheva became all-around world champions. Smolin also became holder of the Kh. Aresti Cup. Pilot Kh. Makagonova and aircraft model builder V. Kramarenko were awarded gold medals at world championships. High sports results were achieved by V. Yaikova, L. Leonova, Ye. Burkova, by a young pilot from Lithuania Yu. Kayris, and by Odessa Air Club alumnus N. Nikityuk and others. Soviet athletes made dozens of corrections to world record tables in the jubilee year. This is proof of their heightened proficiency and great industriousness and persistence. Our air clubs have developed many remarkable sports pilots, parachutists and glider pilots. For example, the name of V. Zakoretskaya, all-around world champion with 8,200 jumps, is widely known. Not one woman in the world has such a record.

Meanwhile our teams surrendered their positions in a number of sports. Sports parachutists and motocross athletes reduced their indicators somewhat. This is the result of poor attention of some committees to the development of these sports. We must regenerate the grand Osoaviakhim tradition and reintroduce jumps from parachute towers into practice. We must improve the work of aviation and missile model building sections and circles and ensure a further improvement in the mass nature of technical and applied military sports.

Accomplishment of these tasks largely depends on further development of a physical facility. It should be noted that some of our committees and organizations are not improving it enough. The interests of the matter demand that the aviation industry and design bureaus give more attention to improving the quality of sports aviation equipment. Our athletes need more sophisticated light aircraft and helicopters, gliders and hang gliders, parachutes and equipment for model builders. The USSR DOSAAF CC is taking steps to raise the effectiveness of the work of plants and other enterprises of the Defense

Society. There has to be more active cooperation of DOSAAF committees with the aviation industry in local areas in accomplishing tasks set for them of improving mass defense work. Close contacts of masters of sport, champions and record holders are advisable with enterprise and design bureau collectives and with party, trade union and Komsomol organizations of plants where sports equipment is made.

The cause of the Great October is in reliable hands. It is being worthily continued by the heroic Soviet people, headed by their fighting vanguard--the Leninist party of communists. Soviet citizens look with optimism at tomorrow. They are persistently implementing the historic resolutions of the 26th CPSU Congress and are heading confidently on a Leninist course toward new goals.

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DOSAAF AND MILITARY COMMISSARIATS

NAVIGATIONAL PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED DURING ANTARCTIC FLIGHT

Moscow KRYL'YA RODINY in Russian No 11, Nov 82 (signed to press 14 Oct 82)
pp 26-27

[Article by polar pilot A. Lebedev: "A Polar Pilot's Notes: Antarctic Riddles"]

[Text] "...We have climbed to 6,000 m above Mirnyy and are flying a box pattern above the clouds. We're doing our job and the meteorologists are doing theirs. In short, we're sounding the atmosphere," says Yasha Dmitriyev unhurriedly.

We're sitting and listening to him attentively. "We" are the pilots living at No 7 ulitsa Lenina in the settlement of Mirnyy--Vladimir Mal'kov, Boris Min'kov, Mikhail Stekol'shchikov, Mikhail Dolmatov, the author of these lines, and others. After another working day we had gathered in the cozy boiler room (kitchen) and were conversing.

"At the given altitude we made a 15 minute pattern without hardly paying attention to the radio compass readings. Weather on the ground was calm, with the lower edge of clouds at Mirnyy at some 500 m and there was no cause for alarm," continued Dmitriyev. "Oskar Krichak, head of the meteorologists, broke away from his instruments and gave a command from the passenger cabin: They've done everything for the landing and we can head home. Pavel Starkov tuned the radio compass more precisely and said we could make a beacon approach. I kept the radio angle of approach, the KUR, at 0 degrees. The magnetic heading indicated that we were following the seacoast to Mirnyy. We flew for five minutes and no Mirnyy. We flew for ten minutes and the radio compass needle was holding confidently, showing that Mirnyy was ahead. We flew another five minutes with no flyover. What in the world?.. Starkov checked the compass readings, moving the needle off manually--everything was normal and the needle confidently returned to KUR 0 degrees."

"Yasha, let's turn to 180 degrees. Perhaps something's wrong with the antenna," suggested the navigator.

"We turned and headed in the reverse direction. As it should have, the radio compass needle indicated KUR 180 degrees. We again turned toward Mirnyy. Should we descend below the clouds? But what if the wind carried us off? No, there was fuel and we would descend following all laws--only above the beacon!

"The weather at Mirnyy is the same as during our take-off," announced radio operator Pivovarov. "They're asking when we'll be there."

"Occasional breaks in the cloud cover had appeared. This was good. Flight engineer Anatoliy Mezhevykh, sitting in the right pilot's seat (there were not enough copilots), said with exaggerated calm:

"Commander, there's something black under the clouds to the right, like a shark's fin above the smooth sea surface."

"That's Mt. Gauss. It can't be any other," said the navigator quickly, pressing to the direct-vision window, through which Mezhevykh was looking. "It did take us off course. That's a wind!.. 180 km to Mirnyy!"

"The lower edge of the clouds was at some 300 m (Mt. Gauss was 370 m high). In an hour's time we had made our way home visually along the coast. Along the way Krichak told us that such strong winds high up are called jet streams, but they are observed rarely at such low altitudes in middle latitudes," concluded Dmitriyev.

"I'd like to get into such a stream in service," joked someone.

"Listen, Lebedev," said Misha Stekol'shchikov to me, "they say that at Oasis you began to take off in one direction, but took off in the other."

"Just so. After completing mapping we were descending above Oasis. Nothing forebode ill--visibility was 'a million by a million,' the Amundsen Mountains could be seen far to the south, from which a hummocked river of ice 'flowed' in a widening ribbon. It was calm from 3,000 to 1,000 m. Below that it began to be a bit bumpy and on the landing approach it began to jolt so heavily that I would have liked not to land and proceed to Mirnyy, but fuel was coming to an end and the aircraft had wheels--where would you land except for Oasis and Mirnyy? We landed. To my surprise it was calm on the runway. While they rolled up fuel drums I fed sausage to the airfield 'commandant'--the seagull which always awaited us and took the sausage straight from my hands..."

"Miracles," uttered Boris Min'kov pensively.

"Listen further. Hardly had the seagull grabbed the last bit of sausage when it was blown away by the wind, and I almost was carried away with it. The gusts of wind repeated themselves from various directions over brief time intervals. I was thinking about what direction in which to take off, but then again it became calm. During take-off in the middle of the run the next gust turned the aircraft to the left such that I had to throttle down the right engine almost completely. This is where, as Misha said, I took off in a direction other than the one I intended, 45 degrees more to the left. It was a blessing that the 'airfield' was large and permitted it... After lift-off we began to be thrown around so much that even the instrument speed readings varied from 140 to 250 km/hr and the vertical 'leaps' were up to 8 m/sec. I had only one thing in mind--how to get out of this 'shaking' zone as quickly as possible. We covered 10-15 km toward Mirnyy and it became calm."

"You didn't notice any outward signs?" asked Stekol'shchikov.

"No, it was clear round about if you don't count the egg-shaped cloud above Oasis, right at 1,000 m altitude, below which it began to jolt."

Quiet set in in the boiler room for awhile. It was interrupted by the voice of a very old ace of polar aviation--Vladimir Vasil'yevich Mal'kov:

"I was given a riddle that it took me three days to solve. Everyone knows that the newly opened station of Komsomol'skaya needs diesel fuel, and so four crews took off for there: Moskalenko, Min'kov, Dmitriyev and myself. . . . I took off, made the traditional circle, climbed to the necessary 600 m and headed upward along the slope of the dome on a heading toward Pionerskaya. After flying about 35-40 km I caught sight of a large fissure on the surface. I remembered well that it had not been there the day before. I consulted with Misha Dolmatov, our navigator, and he also had not seen it. It made our flesh creep when we recalled that the prime mover of Misha Kuleshov, the best expedition driver, should be on the approach to Mirnyy judging from a time calculation. But there was break in his path!

"After a minute of flying we caught sight of a reddish point ahead with a plume of black smoke from an operating diesel spreading behind it. It was he! There could be no doubt. I circled above the prime mover and it halted. Two persons emerged from the cab, one a head taller than the other. It was Kuleshov--there was no person taller than him in the Antarctic. They were greeting us with waves of the hands. They didn't understand and didn't sense the danger. How could we help them? The navigator was not at a loss. He quickly prepared a message bag and inserted a note with a recommendation of the route to follow.

"We were reassured when we saw that the prime mover backed up a bit, then turned to the west and followed the route we recommended.

"We approached Komsomol'skaya precisely. I saw the prime movers standing there with the little huts on runners attached. Smoke from one of the prime movers was heading directly upward--it was a total calm without wind. I landed or, more precisely, touched the snowcover, and then something I didn't understand began--a heavy braking, especially in the second half of the landing run, and I immediately realized that the skis had begun to tear. But I immediately recalled that they were entirely metallic and there could be no tear. Without stopping after the landing, I taxied with difficulty almost with the engines at take-off power. The impression was such that we were taxiing over the sand of a good beach. I halted at the near prime mover and decided to turn and immediately get onto my track to make the future take-off easier, but the aircraft remained in place no matter how hard I revved up the motors to take-off power and no matter how much I pushed the controls back and forth, pressing first on my left then the right foot.

"Moskalenko, Min'kov and Dmitriyev came in. After unloading, only Dmitriyev was able to take off.

"We tried all known measures to get moving: from tapping the skis with a 'micrometer'--a wooden sledgehammer--to digging out from underneath them, and all without results. Then someone suggested making an ice runway. We soaked oakum generously with fuel oil, set fire to it and thawed an icy quadrant of 10 x 10 m and began to drag the aircraft onto it with prime movers. Moskalenko and Min'kov took off from this 'take-off' strip. It came our turn to take off from this high-mountain 'resort.' I don't have to tell you that any physical labor at this altitude of 3,500 m is an exploit. Even in a quiet state the body feels a lack of oxygen and the 'caliber' of our nostrils isn't sufficient for rapid filling of the lungs and if you breathe through the mouth you can burn the lungs with the 60-degree cold air. It is like your head is in a pincers and your pulse is 150-160 beats per minute...

"'Everything ready?!' I asked flight engineer Kolyadenkov.

"'Commander, the right engine oil cooler is leaking.'

"It was only on the fourth day, after Yasha brought us a new cooler, that we tore away from the high-mountain 'prison'."

"Yasha! How were you able to take off from Komsomol'skaya? Or do you have a special aircraft? Or were the skis of a special design?"

"It's no secret," began Dmitriyev. "From what the glaciologists have said you now know that the snow at Komsomol'skaya consists of crystals resembling dry sand. The sliding is very poor. I also felt this and at take-off used high engine power, using manual control of the turbocompressors."

"And how much pressure charging did you give?" asked Mal'kov impatiently.

"1,050 mm/Hg."

"But the instructions say only 900 mm."

"Dear Vladimir Vasil'yevich! We are here for the first time and we will write the instructions on how to fly under Antarctic conditions in Moscow, using the experience we built up."

"The radio altimeter in my aircraft gives a strange reading," said Misha Stekol'shchikov, taking advantage of the pause and deciding to express his doubts.

"In what sense?" asked Mal'kov.

"In the sense that at Pionerskaya it shows one altitude at the parking area and in Mirnyy another. Initially I didn't pay attention to this," continued Misha, "but yesterday at Pionerskaya when I taxied to the parking area I saw that the radio altimeter showed some 60 m instead of zero altitude. I thought that while the weather was good and flying was heavy I would work with it that way, but I told the flight engineer to have specialists check it in Mirnyy... But in Mirnyy the instrument shows zero altitude at the parking area. What

kind of marvel is this? They check it in both ranges and everything is proper, the needle is on zero. Did I imagine it? I loaded up with drums of solar oil and again headed for Pionerskaya. After landing I kept an eye on the radio altimeter reading while I was taxiing. It showed positively without any vacillation that we were at an altitude of 60 m! I checked in Mirnyy and the altitude on the instrument was zero both while taxiing and at the parking area. That means it isn't in the instrument--it is serviceable. How is it with you?" Stekol'shchikov asked those present.

"I have the very same picture--at Pionerskaya and at Komsomol'skaya the radio altimeter shows the same 50, 70 m," confirmed Mal'kov.

"It's the same with us, and for me," came the voices of the other pilots. "What's the matter?"

Dolmatov tried to explain: "I think it is because in Mirnyy the aircraft are on pure, solid ice while at Pionerskaya and Komsomol'skaya the snow cover density apparently is not great and the radio altimeter signals begin to reflect only from dense layers of the Antarctic cupola. But these are only my thoughts. The specialists of course will explain it more precisely."

"Vasiliy Petrovich!" said Min'kov to Koloshenko. "Why are you silent, or is everything the same as in the Arctic for you in the helicopter?"

"No," objected Vasiliy, somewhat embarrassed. "I've been sitting and thinking how best to say it for you to understand me. It happened in the vicinity of Oasis," began Koloshenko. "I took off from the next 'site' and was working as always with the geologist. We were flying and everything was normal. Flight engineer Leshchenko in the right seat was watching the equipment readings. It was about 50 km to Oasis. We were flying above a level plateau. Suddenly I sensed something strange: some kind of sharp quivers and a resilient 'itch' in the controls. I became somewhat uneasy. I looked at Leshchenko: He was sitting calmly but his face was pale. I couldn't see my own face. We began to be tossed about in a somewhat strange manner. I cast a glance at the speed indicator and was stupefied: 230 km/hr, but the Mi-4's speed limitation is only 180 km/hr! I looked forward and couldn't understand where our helicopter was flying. I opened my door and couldn't believe my eyes--we were flying backward! But the instrument showed 230! And this was forward! I looked at Leshchenko--he was quite pale but wasn't showing uneasiness. Well, I thought, I was having hallucinations. I decided nevertheless to check the instrument. I had to get out of the speed danger zone. I cautiously pulled the controls toward me. The needle showed a drop in speed, passed 180 km/hr, and the 'itch' ceased. That meant for now everything was going by law, but we still were flying backward. I continued to pull on the controls and speed dropped to 40 km/hr--the backward movement ceased. The helicopter was hovering. I glanced at Leshchenko: Let's land?! The flight engineer merely nodded his head. We landed, turned off the engine and were silent. The rotor blades stopped. We got out of the helicopter--around about it was quiet, total calm. I didn't understand a thing... We went to one side so that our scientists didn't overhear us.

"'What did you notice?' I asked.

"'I had the sensation that either we would crash right now or the helicopter would fly to bits.'

"We inspected our 'dragonfly' and noticed nothing of a negative manner. We gathered our courage and flew to Oasis. At dinner the scientists forced us to admit what had caused our unexpected stop. After listening to our story carefully the meteorologists explained the situation into which we had gotten: The temperature in the vicinity of Oasis was positive, but in the mountains to the south it was negative. There was a horizontal cyclone because of the abrupt difference in temperatures, and we had gotten into it..."

Gradually our meetings in the "boiler room" turned into a session for exchanging experience. Many of the "riddles" told here later became paragraphs of manuals for performing flights under the unusual Antarctic conditions.

Before taking the manuscript to the editors I met with Dolmatov to discuss together the accuracy of what had been said and suddenly heard a rebuke from him:

"Everything is correct, but you were silent about my discovery. You recall, in 1961 I took part in the first flight to the Antarctic from Moscow? I was the navigator of the lead Il-18, with Aleksandr Polyakov flying it. The weather was excellent and the sun such that it was impossible to look at the boundless white desert of the Antarctic cupola without sunglasses. I performed the necessary navigational calculations and decided to check the operation of the radar. I turned it on and looked at the screen--I saw several spots. I cast a glance through the windshield--there was not one noticeable elevation ahead, nor a single dark spot. I again looked at the radar scope--the spots were in the previous place. Could it really be unserviceable? I checked the readings of control instruments--everything was normal, the radar was serviceable. I decided to determine the altitude of the spots by changing the antenna tilt and it turned out that they were much lower than the altitude of the cupola! These were the tops of a mountain range hidden under the thick snow-ice cover of the largest glacier in the world. The radar was 'looking through' the thickness of the glacier. An Antarctic joke..."

The work of scientific research expeditions in the Antarctic continues even in our day. And of course people will have to solve many riddles prepared by the sixth continent.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

ROLE OF U.S., NATO ARMED SALES DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNNYYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 2, Feb 83 (signed to press 6 Jan 83)
p 31

[Article by Yu. Basistov: "Imperialism Without a Mask: Exporters of Death"]

[Text] A special place is set aside for the export of arms in the military-political concepts of U.S. ruling circles. A directive signed by President R. Reagan calls military deliveries "an integral component" of Washington's foreign policy, intended to strengthen "U.S. capability to demonstrate force together with its friends and allies." The results of these "demonstrations" are well known: Two-thirds of persons who have died in armed conflict since World War II were killed with American weapons. The "Made in USA" stamp is on missiles and shells and on the phosphorus, ball-bearing antipersonnel, and vacuum bombs placed in the hands of Israeli aggressors, who sowed death on Lebanese soil.

The arms trade has become one of the important components of the aggressive politics of U.S. imperialist circles and a factor of their political, economic and military penetration into other countries. The "philosophy of force" preached in the United States finds its practical expression not only in the unchecked build-up of its own arms, but also in the ever-growing flow of arms deliveries to reactionary forces of all stripe and shade. As noted by the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, the United States uses arms delivery abroad to expand its influence in various parts of the world and to support pro-American regimes in Israel, Pakistan, South Korea and Taiwan. Among the clients of American arms manufacturers are the fascist juntas in Chile and Guatemala, racists of the YuAR [Republic of South Africa], and terrorist bands attempting to overthrow legal governments in Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua.

The United States today is the largest supplier of arms and military supplies in the world. During the 1970's the volume of American military exports rose by more than 30 percent. The present U.S. administration is displaying particular zeal in expanding military business. According to official American data, the level of 1980, when \$17.5 billion-worth of arms were sold abroad, was almost doubled in 1982.

Large consignments of American military deliveries are heading for NATO countries. In the 1970's Great Britain and the FRG purchased five billion dollars worth of weapons each in the United States. European partners are obtaining

from abroad or producing under American licenses a considerable amount of aviation equipment, tank weapons and various classes of missiles.

Delivery of American F-16 aircraft to a number of West European countries was called the "deal of the century" in the West. The United States managed to "persuade" its allies to accept a new tank of American manufacture in the inventory. It will cost Great Britain at least 6-7 billion pounds sterling for the planned refitting of its submarine fleet with the American Trident system missiles. A deal was made in late September 1982 for delivery to Spain of 84 F-18A fighter-bombers produced by the American MacDonalld-Douglas aviation company. The cost of the order is three billion dollars.

Since the late 1960's a considerable portion of the American arms exports began to go to developing countries. This above all was a reflection of the increased U.S. neocolonial aspirations and its attempts to reinforce imperialist positions in Third World countries. The deadly flow of American arms gushed into the Near and Middle East with special force. In just the period from 1976 through 1979 the total value of deals for delivery of American arms to Near Eastern countries was almost \$37 billion. The cost of purchases by Saudi Arabia alone reached \$35 billion in the last ten years. American military equipment is heading for Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia and Pakistan in growing quantities.

But as before, Israel remains the chief client of the U.S. military-industrial complex in the Near East. Tel Aviv has long been using its preferential right to obtain the latest American military equipment. As noted by the western press, U.S. military aid to Tel Aviv has increased even more of late. It supplied the Israeli Army with the latest models of its weapons for making the piratic raid against Lebanon last summer and it is hastening to make up for Israel's losses in military equipment. The White House requested Congress to increase military aid to Israel in 1983 to \$1.7 billion.

U.S. NATO allies are actively engaged in the arms business. During the 1970's, for example, France increased arms exports tenfold and holds second place in this area after the United States. Each year an average of 30-40 percent of the equipment produced at French military plants goes abroad. A considerable number of the clients of French military concerns are in the Near and Middle East.

Italy is one of the largest arms merchants. The country has some 300 enterprises specializing in arms production and their products go to countries of Latin America and Africa and to other regions.

In Great Britain, which has experienced a deep slump in the economy, only one sector of industry--that producing arms--is in an unprecedented upswing. Great Britain supplies its aircraft, tanks, machineguns and submachineguns to 61 countries of the world. According to data of the DAILY TELEGRAPH, in 1981 British military concerns produced military equipment and gear valued at six billion pounds sterling.

The FRG's military-industrial complex keeps building up the export of its products abroad and is confidently catching up with its chief partners and rivals in NATO. From 1970 through 1977 arms exports from the FRG rose a hundredfold in terms of value! West German concerns supply weapons, military equipment as well as military technology to more than 70 countries.

The number of states which export arms grows from year to year. Sweden, Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Spain, Brazil and others have joined in on the export of military materials. In recent years there has been a continuous growth in the Israeli export of death. The main routes of Israeli arms deliveries lead to South Africa and Latin America, including some 45 percent to the racist YuAR. Transports with Israeli arms regularly tie up in ports of Chile, Uruguay and Guatemala. After the United States, Israel holds second place as arms supplier to the Chilean fascist clique.

For monopolies of the military-industrial complex of imperialist countries the sale of arms is a real gold mine. The economic slump in the capitalist world has no effect at all on the business of the "gun kings." Under conditions of the unchecked arms race they continue to increase their profits confidently. According to estimates of American specialists, profits in the sphere of the arms trade are 50-60 percent higher than in nonmilitary fields. With regard to the largest U.S. weapon concerns, their profits reached 200 percent and in some cases even 500 percent.

The arms trade plays no small part in the complicated tangle of conflict situations and thorny problems of the modern world. The business of the arms manufacturers is poisoning the international climate more and more and threatening the security of nations. The unchecked growth of western military deliveries is expanding the scope of the arms race, creating new centers of tension and increasing the threat of war.

The Soviet Union is for defining proper limits to this dangerous development, since there is no area of disarmament and no category of arms on which it would be impossible to agree. This also relates fully to the question of limiting the international arms trade. Our country more than once has declared its readiness for talks on this problem on the basis of complete respect of the principles of equality and equal security of the sides, consideration of their lawful interests and respect for the rights of other nations.

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